author: ROBINSON, J.

text:
    DAVID ROSS v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF WESTPORT
    (AC 30209)
    Harper, Robinson and Mihalakos, Js.
    Argued April 20
    officially released November 24, 2009

      Ira W. Bloom, for the appellant (defendant).

      Robert A. Fuller, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

ROBINSON, J.

The planning and zoning commission of the town of Westport (commission) appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal by the plaintiff, David Ross. On appeal, the commission argues that the court improperly (1) remanded the case to the commission for further evidence in the record concerning jurisdiction under the Coastal Management Act, General Statutes § 22a-90 et seq. (act), and (2) concluded that General Statutes § 8-26a (b) (1) is to be interpreted broadly so as to preclude the ability of the town to enforce state and federal regulations on property located within a preapproved subdivision plan. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff is the owner of certain real property located at 8 Sandpiper Road in Westport. In 2001, the plaintiff sought to construct a two-story, single-family dwelling on the then vacant property. He filed an application with the commission for approval of a coastal area management site plan, which was approved on July 26, 2001. After receiving all the necessary approvals, the plaintiff was issued a zoning permit on August 31, 2001, and a building permit on October 12, 2001. Final inspection of the property was conducted on December 30, 2003, and, on March 11, 2004, the plaintiff was issued a zoning certificate of compliance.

On March 15,2004, the plaintiff filed a new coastal site plan application with the commission, seeking approval for an addition to the existing dwelling. At a meeting conducted on July 26, 2004, the commission denied the application. The plaintiff appealed from this decision to the trial court.

On July 18, 2005, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the trial court that arose from a related matter. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The appeals were consolidated for the puiposes of the hearing; however, the court issued separate memoranda of decisions sustaining both appeals. Although separate, the memorandum of decision sustaining the present appeal incorporated by reference the court’s memorandum of decision sustaining the appeal from the decision of the zoning board of appeals. This appeal followed.

I

The commission first claims that the court improperly remanded the case to the commission to gather further evidence in the record concerning the coastal area management boundary, a fact that implicates the jurisdiction to review the coastal area site plan. Specifically, the commission argues that the court failed to recognize that the plaintiff had submitted to the jurisdiction of the commission when he filed the site plan and, accordingly, waived the jurisdictional issue. We disagree.

“Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power . . . to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. ... A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy. . . . This concept, however, is not limited to courts. Administrative agencies . . . are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and their jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the validity of the statutes vesting them with power .... As our Supreme Court has explained, certain jurisdictional facts are essential to establish the statutory jurisdiction of tribunals of limited authority. The existence of these facts is fundamental to the power to entertain and adjudicate a proceeding on the merits. In short, such facts condition the power to act.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 103 Conn. App. 571, 576-77, 930 A.2d 739, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930, 934 A.2d 245 (2007). Furthermore, once the board’s subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal is questioned, the jurisdictional question must be resolved before the substantive issues of the appeal are addressed. See Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 114 Conn. App. 81, 86, 968 A.2d 960 (2009). “[A] determination regarding [an agency’s] subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 576.

The 2004 coastal site plan that is the subject of this appeal was the third such plan filed by the plaintiff. In the application that is the subject of this appeal, the plaintiff sought approval for the construction of an addition to the existing structure on the property. The West-port zoning regulations require a coastal site plan to be submitted “for any use, activity or project as defined in [General Statutes] § 22a-105 (b) of the [act] . . . .” Westport Zoning Regs., § 31-10.6. Section 31-10.6 of the zoning regulations, however, enumerates exceptions to this requirement. Of relevance to the present appeal is the exemption for “ [c] onstruction of an individual single family residential structure, except when such structure . . . (b) is in or within two hundred (200) feet of the Mean High Water Line . . . .” Id., § 31-10.6.1. The location of the plaintiffs property within the designated area became a contested matter in the underlying appeal despite the fact that the plaintiff had filed three coastal site plans. Recognizing the effect that this fact would have on the resolution of the appeal, the court remanded the matter to the commission with instructions to open its hearing and accept further evidence into the record on the issue of the mean high water mark. Following the remand, a survey was admitted into the record that purportedly indicated that the property was outside of the 200 foot mark. At the hearing conducted on March 27, 2008, counsel for the commission also stated that the property was outside of the 200 foot mark.

In its memorandum of decision, the court incorporated its decision in the companion case, in which it concluded that “[s]ince the property is located more than 200 feet from the mean high water mark, the property was exempt from coastal site plan review pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-109 (b) and § 31.10.6 of the Westport zoning regulations. The zoning officials had no subject matter jurisdiction over any of the coastal site plan applications, even though they were filed by the plaintiff at the direction of the commission’s agent.” The court then correctly noted that the subject matter jurisdiction of an administrative agency cannot be created through consent or waiver and can be raised at any time. See Windsor Locks Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 90 Conn. App. 242, 247-48, 876 A.2d 614 (2005).

On appeal to this court, the commission argues that the matter improperly was remanded to the commission for the receipt of the additional evidence regarding the property’s proximity to the mean high water mark. Specifically, the commission maintains that the location of the property was not relevant to determine its jurisdiction because the plaintiff had submitted to the jurisdiction of the commission by submitting the application for its approval. In support of this argument, the commission cites three cases that purportedly demonstrate that “the jurisdictional issue can be waived under proper circumstances . . . .’’On review of the cited authority, however, we are not persuaded. The commission has not referenced a case that supports the position that aparty can waive the lack of subject matter jurisdiction; in fact, well established case law points to a result that is in direct opposition to this position. See Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., supra, 114 Conn. App. 86. (“[a] subject matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived ... [or jurisdiction] conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

In Koepke v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 230 Conn. 452, 645 A.2d 983 (1994), the first case cited by the commission in support of its position, our Supreme Court addressed a zoning board of appeal’s purported lack of subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal that challenged the issuance of a permit to construct a radio tower. The plaintiff was issued a zoning permit on July 11, 1986; however, after issuing the permit, the zoning enforcement officer requested that the plaintiff make certain alterations and submit a new plot plan. The plaintiff acquiesced and was issued a new zoning permit on August 7, 1986. The original permit was thereafter revoked. On August 12, 1986, more than thirty days past the issuance of the original permit, the defendant challenged the validity of the new permit before the zoning board of appeals. The determinative issue was whether the defendant’s appeal was untimely and, therefore, whether it deprived the zoning board of appeals of jurisdiction. Our Supreme Court eventually concluded that the appeal was timely filed because the second permit was the legally operable permit; however, it did note that “the plaintiff acquiesced in the decision of the zoning enforcement officer to revoke the July 11 permit in favor of the August 7 permit. In so doing, the plaintiff waived whatever claim he may have had with respect to the authority of the zoning enforcement officer to revoke the first permit.” Id., 458.

In the present case, the commission references the previously quoted language from Koepke in support of its contention that an analogous situation exists regarding the plaintiffs appeal. This argument is without merit, however, because the waiver by the plaintiff in Koepke did not implicate the board’s subject matter jurisdiction over his appeal, which is what is at issue in the present case.

Likewise, the commission’s reliance on Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 219 Conn. 352, 593 A.2d 118 (1991), is also in error. In Casería, our Supreme Court evaluated the impact that a planning and zoning board’s improper conduct could have on the subject matter jurisdiction of the zoning board of appeals. The court found that the zoning enforcement officer’s “purported improper motive was insufficient to defeat what was otherwise manifestly valid jurisdiction in the board to hear the plaintiffs appeal.” Id., 361. Central to this conclusion was the fact that the board had jurisdiction to hear the particular controversy, a fact that distinguishes Casería from the present case. Although the commission attempts to utilize Casería’s reference to “manifestly valid jurisdiction” to support its position, it is this very concept that undermines the commission’s argument. Here, the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review a coastal site plan because the location was specifically exempted by the zoning regulations that provided the basis for its authority. This is a markedly distinct issue from that discussed in Casería, in which there was no dispute over the zoning board of appeals’ jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.

Finally, the commission also refers to M & L Homes, Inc. v. Zoning & Planning Commission, 187 Conn. 232, 445 A.2d 591 (1982). In M & L Homes, Inc., the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus ordering the zoning and planning commission to approve a subdivision plan. The plaintiff argued that the plan had been approved by operation of law pursuant to General Statutes § 8-26 because of the commission’s failure to “approve, modify and approve, or disapprove” the plan within the statutorily prescribed time frame. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 233. Our Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to mandamus relief because it had withdrawn its original application for the subdivision and subsequently filed a new application. Only after the new application was filed did the plaintiff realize that the original application was entitled to approval as a matter of law. The court noted that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to command the performance of a duty and that the burden rests on the party seeking performance of the duty to establish his legal right to its performance. Id., 245. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s refusal to issue a writ of mandamus. Regarding the application of that court’s analysis to the facts of the present case, we once again note that the commission’s reliance on this authority to support its proposition is misplaced because the cited authority does not involve a waiver of subject matter jurisdiction.

The commission argues that the previously cited authority collectively supports its contention that once a plaintiff “puts the ball in play,” he must continue with the process. This argument ignores the distinct premise underlying this case. Here, all parties agree that the property is located outside of the area designated in the commission’s regulations as subject to the commission’s approval of a coastal site plan, a fact that directly impacts the commission’s subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Although the commission references specific language contained in each of the three cases that appear superficially to support its position, the commission has not provided any authority that demonstrates that a defect in subject matter jurisdiction can be waived by the plaintiffs decision to “put the ball in play.” Rather, the commission’s argument is premised on references to specific language in each case that misconstrues the respective holdings and are analyzed out of context.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not improperly remand the case for further submission of evidence regarding the commission’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II

The commission next argues that the court improperly concluded that § 8-26a (b) (1) should be interpreted as sufficiently broad so as to exempt zoning regulations based on state and federal statutes. Specifically, the commission maintains that the provisions of the act, § 22a-105, and the requirements promulgated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency should not be included in the scope of § 8-26a (b) (1). In light of our conclusion that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the coastal site plan, we need not reach the merits of this claim.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The court also sustained the plaintiffs appeal in arelated matter involving an appeal from the zoning board of appeal’s decision to uphold the revocation of the plaintiffs zoning permit. See Ross v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 118 Conn. App. 90, 983 A.2d 11 (2009).

       We note that the following facts are derived from the records in both this appeal and the related appeal. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The facts derived from the record presented in Ross v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 118 Conn. App. 90, 983 A.2d 11 (2009), are not disputed issues that govern our resolution of the present appeal and are included for the purposes of providing the full context of the circumstances underlying this matter.

       While this appeal was pending, the zoning enforcement officer sent notice to the plaintiff that the zoning permit and certificate of zoning compliance were revoked on February 10,2005. On March 11,2005, the plaintiff appealed to the zoning board of appeals from the action of the zoning enforcement officer. A public hearing was conducted by the board on June 14, 2005; thereafter, on June 28, 2005, the board denied the appeal.

       The referenced survey is not apart of the record for this appeal; however, it is included in the record for the related appeal in Ross v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 118 Conn. App. 90, 983 A.2d 11 (2009).

       Specifically regarding the admission of the new survey following remand, counsel for the commission stated: “And now the record has been supplemented, let’s say, to show that in fact the property is outside 200 feet of the mean high water. We know that now. We didn’t know it at the time.” Counsel then noted that this was the third site plan review submitted by the plaintiff, despite the fact that the property was outside of the 200 feet mark. “Because neither the homeowner realized he was outside 200 feet, the commission didn’t realize it. This is the third application he applied for under [the act]. Twice before he came in thinking he was within 200 feet, and this time he did also."

       The commission also argues that the court failed to address the fact that the plaintiffs application was denied for incompleteness. The commission did not seek an articulation on this issue, and the failure to do so provides ample ground for this court to decline to review the claim. See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 59 n.38, 970 A.2d 656 (2009) (noting it was “responsibility [of the appellant] to move for an articulation to clarify the basis of the trial court’s ruling or to ask for a ruling on any overlooked matter”). We do note, however, that even if we assume arguendo that the application was incomplete and therefore in violation of § 31-10.7.1 of the Westport zoning regulations, this fact does not provide the commission with grounds to deny an application that was not properly within its purview to review.

       We do note that although the commission has offered lengthy argument in support of this claim, our review of the argument is impeded by the lack of a factual analysis of the argument as it relates to the specific circumstances of this appeal. The commission offers sweeping statements that are unsupported by citations to the record. Despite numerous references to these alleged violations, the commission fails to elucidate these claims specifically by providing a link between the alleged violation and the state or federal regulation that was purportedly violated. Therefore, even if we were to reach the merits of this claim, the commission has failed to present a cohesive argument on the basis of the particular facts of this appeal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BEACH, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    JOY WARE v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT
    (AC 28600)
    Lavine, Beach and Dupont, Js.

      Argued April 27
    officially released November 24, 2009

      Beth Z. Margulies, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).

      Denise Bevza, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

BEACH, J.

The defendant, the state of Connecticut, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Joy Ware. The defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motion to dismiss because (1) sovereign immunity bars the plaintiffs claims of wrongful termination and breach of implied contract, (2) the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to several of her claims brought pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-60 and (3) sovereign immunity bars claims for punitive damages against the state. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. On July 23, 2004, the plaintiff was transferred from a position with the department of children and families to a position with the office of victim services. The department of children and families is an agency within the executive branch of the state, and the office of victim services is within the judicial branch. In December, 2004, the plaintiff informed her supervisors that she was pregnant. On April 8, 2005, the plaintiff was discharged from her position at the office of victim services.

The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant by way of a three count complaint. In count one, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant improperly terminated her employment and failed to rehire her in violation of General Statutes §§ 5-196, 5-236 and 5-239 and “Connecticut Regulations § 5-239 (b) . . . ,” The plaintiff alleged that the defendant improperly subjected her to a nine month probationary period rather than the six month period provided in the State Personnel Act (personnel act), General Statutes § 5-193 et seq. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant violated § 5-236 by failing to place her on the reemployment list and that the defendant’s discriminatory conduct created a “hostile and offensive work environment . ...” In count two, the plaintiff alleged employment discrimination in violation of § 46a-60 (a) (1), (4), (5) and (7), as well as the creation of a “hostile and offensive work environment . . . .’’In count three, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant “breached its express and implied contractual commitments to [her] by terminating [her] employment, without cause,” and “breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to take [the] rights afforded her . . . seriously, and failing to place safeguards in the workplace that would prevent the [defendant from retaliating against [her].” Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

We begin by noting the standard that this court applies in reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss. “A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court. . . . [0]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [denial] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Welwood, 258 Conn. 425, 433, 780 A.2d 924 (2001). Factual findings underlying the court’s decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Practice Book § 60-5; State v. Wiggs, 60 Conn. App. 551, 553, 760 A.2d 148 (2000). The determination as to which statutory and regulatory scheme governed the plaintiffs employment and whether sovereign immunity bars the plaintiffs claims are questions of law. “The question of whether a particular statute . . . applies to a given state of facts is a question of statutory interpretation .... Statutory interpretation presents a question of law for the court. . . . Our review is, therefore, plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Atlantic Mortgage & Investment Corp. v. Stephenson, 86 Conn. App. 126, 131-32, 860 A.2d 751 (2004).

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied its motion to dismiss as to the counts of the complaint alleging wrongful termination and breach of implied contract because the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars those claims. We agree.

“It is a well-established rule of the common law that a state cannot be sued without its consent. ... A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. . . . The practical and logical basis of the doctrine is today recognized to rest on this principle and on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 78-79, 818 A.2d 758 (2003).

Our Supreme Court has held that “a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immxmity must show that: (1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 397, 968 A.2d 416 (2009). We will address each of these exceptions in turn.

A

With regard to the first exception to sovereign immunity, we must first determine which statutory scheme governed the plaintiffs employment with the defendant before we can determine whether sovereign immunity has been waived. The plaintiff argues that her employment with the defendant was governed by the personnel act. In particular, the plaintiff refers to § 5-196 (20), which defines “permanent employee” as “an employee holding a position in the classified service under a permanent appointment or an employee holding a position in unclassified service who has served in such a position for a period of more than six months . . . .” Section 5-196 (21) defines “ ‘[pjermanent position,’ ” with limited exceptions that are not applicable here, as “any position in the classified service which requires or which is expected to require the services of an incumbent without interruption for a period of more than six months . . . .” Section 5-196 (25) defines “ ‘[sjtate service’ ” as “occupancy of any office or position or employment in the service of the state, but not of local governmental subdivisions thereof, for which compensation is paid.”

The defendant argues that the plaintiffs employment is governed by General Statutes § 51-12 rather than the personnel act. Section 51-12 provides in relevant part: “(a) With the exception of those employees whose compensation is fixed by statute, the judges of the Supreme Court shall, from time to time, prescribe the compensation plan for all employees of the Supreme Court and the Superior Court and other employees of the Judicial Department, (b) The compensation plan may include regulations concerning employee hiring and separation practices, sick leave, vacation leave, absences with and without pay, longevity payments, increments and all other matters regarding personnel policies and procedures. The judges of the Supreme Court shall establish such job classifications as they deem necessary as part of the plan. ...”

The defendant argues that within the powers prescribed by § 51-12, the judicial branch has promulgated its own personnel policies and procedures, including a nine month probationary period. In particular, the defendant refers to the judicial branch’s administrative policies and procedures manual (manual), § 207, entitled “Probationary Periods,” which provides in pertinent part: “Persons hired into permanent positions serve a probationary period, which is deemed an extension of the hiring process. Probationary periods are designed to provide the employee with an opportunity to demonstrate ability, interest, and skill. . . . The length of the probationary periods for bargaining unit employees are set forth in the Probationary Period articles of the collective bargaining agreements in a separate volume of this manual.” Section 1 (a) of article XI, entitled “Probationary Period,” of the collective bargaining agreement between the judicial branch and the union of professional judicial employees AFT/AFT-CT, AFL-CIO provides in pertinent part: “ [P] ermanent status in a duly authorized full-time or part-time position will be attained by the employee after the conclusion of a satisfactory probationary period of nine (9) months of continuous employment . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

The plaintiffs argument that her employment was governed by the personnel act rests on the broad language of that act, which speaks of employees in the “state service” and does not distinguish between the different branches of the state government. General Statutes § 5-194 provides in relevant part: “This chapter shall be so construed and administered as to provide a uniform and equitable system of personnel administration of employees in the state service. ...” As stated previously, § 5-196 (25) defines “ ‘[s]tate service’ ” as “occupancy of any office or position or employment in the service of the state, but not of local governmental subdivisions thereof, for which compensation is paid.” On the basis of this language, the plaintiff asserts that “[the defendant’s] opinion that it does not have to abide by [provisions of the personnel act] is preposterous.” We disagree.

It is a “well-settled principle of [statutory] construction that specific terms covering [a] given subject matter will prevail over general language of . . . another statute which might otherwise prove controlling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. State Board of Education, 278 Conn. 326, 338, 898 A.2d 170 (2006). “When statutes relate to the same subject matter, they must be read together and specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over other general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zanoni v. Lynch, 79 Conn. App. 309, 320 n.4, 830 A.2d 304, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 929, 837 A.2d 804 (2003).

Here, the specific terms of § 51-12 prevail over the more general terms of the personnel act. Section 51-12 specifically instructs the “judges” of the Supreme Court to “prescribe the compensation plan for all employees of the Supreme Court and the Superior Court and other employees of the Judicial Department”; General Statutes § 51-12 (a); including regulations concerning employee hiring and separation practices and “all other matters regarding personnel policies and procedures. . . .” General Statutes § 51-12 (b). It not only enables the “judges” of the Supreme Court to do so, but directs them to do so, as is evidenced by the use of the word “shall.” See General Statutes § 51-12 (a) (“[w]ith the exception of those employees whose compensation is fixed by statute, the judges of the Supreme Court shall, from time to time, prescribe the compensation plan for all employees of the Supreme Court and the Superior Court and other employees of the Judicial Department” [emphasis added]); see also Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 20, 848 A.2d 418 (2004) (“[i]t is especially relevant that the legislature chose to use the word ‘shall’ ... in contrast to the more permissive, ‘may’ ”).

In contrast to § 51-12, the personnel act does not refer to a specific branch of the state government and speaks more broadly of “state service.” Section 51-12 clearly instructs the judges of the Supreme Court to prescribe employment regulations and policies for employees of the judicial branch apart from those set forth in the personnel act. We conclude that the plaintiff’s employment with the defendant was governed by § 51-12 and the applicable policies as expressed in regulations and the manual, which expressly incorporates the nine month probationary period in the union contract.

Having determined that the plaintiffs employment was governed by § 51-12, and the nine month probationary period enacted pursuant to that section, we must next determine whether that section either expressly or by force of a necessary implication statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity. See Lyon v. Jones, supra, 291 Conn. 397. This is a question of statutory construction over which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 287 Conn. 1, 7, 946 A.2d 1219 (2008). “The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § l-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 181-82, 914 A.2d 533 (2007).

In making the determination whether a statute waives sovereign immunity, our Supreme Court has recognized “the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed.

. . . Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 712, 937 A.2d 675 (2007). With this standard in mind, we conclude that § 51-12 does not expressly waive the state’s sovereign immunity. The statute directs the creation of “the compensation plan for all employees of the Supreme Court and the Superior Court and other employees of the Judicial Department”; General Statutes § 51-12 (a); and then sets out what that may include. There is no express waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 51-12 also does not waive sovereign immunity by force of necessary implication. Our Supreme Court has interpreted “necessary implication” to mean “[t]he probability . . . must be apparent, and not a mere matter of conjecture; but . . . necessarily such that from the words employed an intention to the contrary cannot be supposed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 558 n.14, 569 A.2d 518 (1990); Weed v. Scofield, 73 Conn. 670, 678, 49 A. 22 (1901). Nothing in the text of the statute itself or its relationship to other statutes leads us to conclude that § 51-12 waives sovereign immunity by force of necessary implication. There is no evidence that the statute even creates a cause of action against the state, let alone impliedly waives sovereign immunity such that an intention to the contrary cannot be supposed.

B

We next address the second exception to the state’s sovereign immunity, that being whether, in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. See Lyon v. Jones, supra, 291 Conn. 397.

“In those cases in which it is alleged that the defendant officer is proceeding ... in excess of his statutory authority, the interest in the protection of the plaintiffs right to be free from the consequences of such action outweighs the interest served by the sovereign immunity doctrine. ... In such instances, the need to protect the government simply does not arise and the government cannot justifiably claim interference with its functions .... Where [however] no substantial claim is made that the defendant officer is acting pursuant to an unconstitutional enactment or in excess of his statutory authority, the propose of the sovereign immunity doctrine requires dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 169, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). Those cases holding that sovereign immunity does not bar an action brought against a state employee in his official capacity if the complaint alleges that the employee acted in excess of his statutory authority are based on the rationale that “[s]uch conduct on the part of state officials would exceed their powers and, as such, would not be the conduct of the state of Connecticut.” Simmons v. Parizek, 158 Conn. 304, 307, 259 A.2d 642 (1969).

In the present case, not only is there no substantial allegation that a state officer was acting pursuant to an unconstitutional enactment or in excess of his statutory authority, there is no allegation against a state officer at all. The sole defendant in this action is the state of Connecticut. The plaintiff has not made any claims against any state employees in their official capacity. As such, the rationale behind this exception to sovereign immunity cannot apply to the plaintiffs claims against the state, and “the ‘in excess of statutory authority’ analysis is irrelevant. ” Hanna v. Capitol Region Mental Health Center, 74 Conn. App. 264, 271 n.7, 812 A.2d 95 (2002). Thus the second exception does not apply.

Our conclusion that neither exception to sovereign immunity applies to the claims in this case, which are governed by § 51-12, leads us to conclude further that the court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to counts one and three of the plaintiffs complaint. Count one was based on the allegation that the defendant improperly separated the plaintiff from her employment because she was no longer within the probationary period for new employees set forth under the personnel act. We concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiffs employment was instead governed by § 51-12 and that in this case, sovereign immunity barred claims against the state under this statute. Thus, the court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to count one.

We also conclude that the court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to count three, which was based on the theory of implied contract. “[S]tate employees do not have contractual employment rights absent a clear and unambiguous expression of legislative intent to the contrary. . . . Thus, state employees serve by appointment, and their entitlement to pay and other benefits must be determined by reference to the statutes and regulations governing [compensation], rather than to ordinary contract principles.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 267, 690 A.2d 368 (1997). Accordingly, the plaintiff can prevail on her contract claim only if she can establish that the legislature intended to bind the state contractually under the statutory scheme pursuant to which she was appointed. See id. The plaintiff refers to nothing in § 51-12 or elsewhere in our laws and regulations to support her claim of implied contractual entitlement. Thus, her employment was governed only by § 51-12 and the policies and regulations adopted pursuant to it, but not by any implied contract. Because we concluded previously that sovereign immunity bars claims brought pursuant to § 51-12, the court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to count three.

II

The defendant’s next claim pertains to the plaintiffs allegations of employment discrimination in violation of § 46a-60 (a) (1), (4), (5) and (7) contained in count two of her complaint and the allegation of a “hostile and offensive work environment” contained in counts one and two. The defendant claims that the court should have granted its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to § 46a-60 (a) (4) and (5) and her “hostile and offensive work environment” claim on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to those claims by obtaining a release of jurisdiction from the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission). We agree.

A

We first address the threshold jurisdictional issue of whether the defendant has appealed from a final judgment. Following oral argument before this court, we ordered supplemental briefs addressing this jurisdictional issue. The defendant argues that its “failure to exhaust” argument presents a colorable claim of sovereign immunity because General Statutes § 46a-100 provides a waiver of sovereign immunity only to those persons who have received a release of jurisdiction. We agree.

As we previously have noted, “[t]he general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory ruling and, therefore, is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. . . . The denial of a motion to dismiss based on a colorable claim of sovereign immunity, by contrast, is an immediately appealable final judgment because the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 645 n.5, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

The defendant’s motion to dismiss count two, which alleged violations of § 46a-60, was based on the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under § 46a-100. The motion presents a colorable claim of sovereign immunity. “[Section] 46a-100 represents an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity, authorizing actions against the state for alleged discriminatory employment practices in violation of § 46a-60.” Lyon v. Jones, supra, 291 Conn. 397. The plain language of § 46a-100 dictates that the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by that statute is predicated on the plaintiffs first obtaining a release of jurisdiction from the commission and is limited to such situations. Section 46a-100 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person who has timely filed a complaint with the [commission] . . . and who has obtained a release from the commission . . . may also bring an action in the superior court for the judicial district in which the discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred or in which the respondent transacts business, except any action involving a state agency or official may be brought in the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford.” The requirement that a plaintiff must first obtain a release of jurisdiction before bringing an action in Superior Court is codified at General Statutes § 46a-101 (a), which provides that “[n]o action may be brought in accordance with section 46a-100 unless the complainant has received a release from the commission in accordance with the provisions of this section.”

Accordingly, “§ 46a-100 expressly waives sovereign inununity and creates a cause of action in the Superior Court for claims alleging a violation of § 46a-60 over which the commission has released jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. Jones, supra, 291 Conn. 400. Thus, only a plaintiff who has first obtained a release is entitled to take advantage of the state’s statutoiy waiver of sovereign immunity. Because the principles of sovereign immunity and exhaustion of administrative remedies are intertwined, the defendant’s motion to dismiss portions of count two and the “hostile and offensive” work environment claim was based on a colorable claim of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to these portions of the plaintiffs complaint constitutes an immediately appealable final judgment.

B

We now turn to the merits of the defendant’s claim. “Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [plaintiffs] claim. . . . The Superior Court has no jurisdiction to act where there is an adequate administrative remedy that has not been exhausted.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Flanagan v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 54 Conn. App. 89, 91-92, 733 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 250 Conn. 925, 738 A.2d 656 (1999). Thus, our resolution of the defendant’s claim turns on whether the complaint filed with the commission, in which the plaintiff made claims under § 46a-60 (1) and (7), satisfied the exhaustion requirement as to the other claims contained in her complaint before the Superior Court.

To resolve the defendant’s claim, we turn to federal precedent. Our Supreme Court has determined that when an overlap between state and federal law is deliberate, federal precedent is particularly persuasive. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Assn., Inc., 273 Conn. 373, 386, 870 A.2d 457 (2005). Additionally, we have been reluctant to interpret state statutory schemes in a manner at odds with federal schemes on which they are modeled. See, e.g., Blasko v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 98 Conn. App. 439, 456, 910 A.2d 219 (2006) (finding “highly significant” that federal tax code permitted plaintiffs to claim credit, while interpretation of state credit scheme, which sought “to mirror the federal credit scheme,” disallowed application of any credit).

In drafting and modifying the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (fair employment act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., our legislature modeled that act on its federal counterpart, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and it has sought to keep our state law consistent with federal law in this area. See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 273 Conn. 385 (“[w]ith the intent of creating a state antidiscrimination housing statute consistent with its federal counterpart, the legislature adopted [General Statutes] § 46a-64c and related provisions”). Accordingly, in matters involving the interpretation of the scope of our antidiscrimination statutes, our courts consistently have looked to federal precedent for guidance. Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 164, 717 A.2d 1254 (1998) (“[i]n defining the contours of an employer’s duties under our state antidiscrimination statutes, we have looked for guidance to federal case law interpreting Title VII .. . the federal statutory counterpart to § 46a-60”); Malasky v. Metal Products Corp., 44 Conn. App. 446, 454, 689 A.2d 1145 (“[although the [federal precedent] was concerned primarily with [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)] filing requirements, the same rationale applies to the requirements of the [commission]”), cert. denied, 241 Conn. 906, 695 A.2d 539 (1997).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit “has recognized that [a] claim is considered reasonably related if the conduct complained of would fall within the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge that was made. ... In this inquiry, the focus should be on the factual allegations made in the [EEOC] charge itself, describing the discriminatory conduct about which a plaintiff is grieving. . . . The central question is whether the complaint filed with the EEOC gave that agency adequate notice to investigate discrimination on both bases. . . . The reasonably related exception to the exhaustion requirement is essentially an allowance of loose pleading and is based on the recognition that EEOC charges frequently are filled out by employees without the benefit of counsel and that their primary purpose is to alert the EEOC to the discrimination that a plaintiff claims [he] is suffering.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Housing Authority, 458 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006). This determination will in large part rest on our interpretation of the plaintiffs pleadings, which “is always a question of law for the court . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Votre v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, 113 Conn. App. 569, 576, 966 A.2d 813, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 911, 973 A.2d 661 (2009).

In the present case, the plaintiffs complaint to the commission alleged, inter alia, violations of § 46a-60 (a) (1) and (7). In her complaint to the Superior Court, the plaintiff alleged violations of § 46a-60 (a) (1), (4), (5) and (7). Section 46a-60 (a) (1), as is pertinent to the facts of this case, makes it discriminatory to refuse to hire or to discharge an employee because of the employee’s sex. Section 46a-60 (a) (7) makes it discriminatory to discharge or refuse to reinstate an employee because of her pregnancy. Section 46a-60 (a) (4) provides that it shall be a discriminatory practice “[f]or any person, employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has opposed any discriminatory employment practice or because such person has filed a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding” before the commission. Section 46a-60 (a) (5) provides that it shall be a discriminatory practice “[f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any act declared to be a discriminatory employment practice or to attempt to do so . . . .” The plaintiffs complaint in the Superior Court also appeared to allege the creation of a “hostile and offensive work environment . . . .”

The central question is whether the complaint filed with the commission gave that agency adequate notice to investigate discrimination claimed in the present action. See Williams v. Housing Authority, supra, 458 F.3d 70. In her complaint to the commission, the plaintiff alleged that during her employment she “received no verbal or written warnings for poor performance or attendance” and that the defendant’s “reason for terminating [her] employment, and not returning [her] to [her] previous position, was a pretext for discrimination based on [her] sex . . . and pregnancy.” In her complaint before the Superior Court, the plaintiff alleged that she informed representatives of the defendant that she was pregnant and was discharged “without just cause” approximately four months later. She also alleged that the defendant “retaliated” against her but does not allege any specific retaliatory acts in her complaint and does not distinguish between discrimination committed by the defendant and retaliation. The plaintiffs “hostile and offensive work environment” claim, to the extent that it may be intended to constitute a cause of action; see footnote 4 of this opinion; consists of the allegation that the defendant’s “discrimination and retaliation, created an intimidating, oppressive, hostile and offensive work environment, which interfered with [the plaintiffs] emotional well-being.”

We conclude that the plaintiffs claims under § 46a-60 (a) (4) and (5) and her “hostile and offensive work environment” claim are not so closely related to the allegations in her complaint to the commission that they reasonably would have been investigated by the commission. With regard to the claim under § 46a-60 (a) (4), nothing in the complaint to the commission gave that agency adequate notice to investigate a claim for retaliation. It alleges that the plaintiff was discharged because of her sex and because she was pregnant. Only after her discharge did she bring the claim before the commission. There are no allegations that she opposed any discriminatory practice or filed a complaint alleging any discriminatory practice prior to her discharge or was subject to any otherwise discriminatory treatment for doing so. Next, with regard to the claim brought under § 46a-60 (a) (5), nothing in the complaint to the commission alleged or could reasonably be interpreted to have alleged that an individual aided, abetted, incited, compelled or coerced the doing of any discriminatory act. The plaintiffs failure to allege any facts underlying this claim in her complaint to the Superior Court also contributes to our conclusion that this claim is not reasonably related to those before the commission. Finally, nothing in the complaint to the commission gave that agency adequate notice specifically to investigate a vague claim of a hostile work environment. The plaintiff made no specific allegations relating to a sexual harassment hostile work environment claim in her complaint to the commission. We also cannot interpret any of the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint to the commission to allege such a claim.

We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs complaint filed with the commission did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement as to those claims brought under § 46a-60 (a) (4) and (5) contained in count two of her complaint and her “hostile and offensive work environment” claim contained in counts one and two. As a result, the plaintiff could not obtain, as to those claims, a release of jurisdiction pursuant to § 46a-100 and, therefore, is not entitled to take advantage of the state’s statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.

The court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to those claims brought under § 46a-60 (a) (4) and (5) contained in count two of the plaintiffs complaint and her “hostile and offensive work environment” claim contained in counts one and two.

Ill

The defendant’s final claim is that the court improperly determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-104. We agree.

We again note that the question of whether § 46a-104 either expressly or by force of a necessary implication statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity is a question of statutoiy construction over which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., supra, 287 Conn. 7. In its memorandum of decision, the court succinctly concluded: “[The] language [of § 46a-104] is sufficiently broad to include punitive damages.” Section 46a-104 provides: “The court may grant a complainant in an action brought in accordance with section 46a-100 such legal and equitable relief which it deems appropriate including, but not limited to, temporary or permanent injunctive relief, attorney’s fees and court costs.” The defendant argues that sovereign immunity bars the recovery of punitive damages in actions against the state.

Our Supreme Court recently held that “§ 46a-100 represents an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity, authorizing actions against the state for alleged discriminatory employment practices in violation of § 46a-60.” Lyon v. Jones, supra, 291 Conn. 397. Although the Supreme Court concluded in Lyon that § 46a-100 waives sovereign immunity for claims brought under § 46a-60, “a waiver of immunity from suit does not necessarily imply a waiver of immunity from all aspects of liability.” Shay v. Rossi, supra, 253 Conn. 166-67.

We repeat the well established principle that “statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. . . . Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, supra, 284 Conn. 712; see also Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 350, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). We conclude that the legislature did not, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waive the state’s sovereign immunity from liability for punitive damages under the fair employment act. See Lyon v. Jones, supra, 291 Conn. 397 (“a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity must show that . . . the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity” [internal quotation marks omitted]). There is no express waiver of liability in §§ 46a-100 or 46a-104. Moreover, there is no necessary implication that the defendant waived its immunity to liability for punitive damages. This conclusion is supported by the policy against finding the state liable for punitive damages.

This court previously has recognized the public policy against permitting punitive damages against the state. See Hartford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 760, 49 Conn. App. 805, 817-18, 717 A.2d 258 (“[wjhile the public is benefited by the exaction of such damages against a malicious, willful or reckless wrongdoer, the benefit does not follow when the public itself is penalized for the acts of its agents over which it is able to exercise but little direct control” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 920, 722 A.2d 809 (1998). In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that punitive damages are unavailable against municipalities in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981) (“Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct. . . . Under ordinary principles of retribution, it is the wrongdoer himself who is made to suffer for his unlawful conduct. If a government official acts knowingly and maliciously to deprive others of their civil rights, he may become the appropriate object of the community’s vindictive sentiments. ... A municipality, however, can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials. Damages awarded for punitive purposes, therefore, are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself.” [Citations omitted; emphasis in original.]).

The court incorrectly concluded that sovereign immunity did not bar the plaintiffs request of punitive damages under § 46a-104.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       There is no § 5-239 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. Sections 5-239-1 and 5-239-2 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies regulate employee transfers, but the plaintiff does not specify to which of these she may be referring.

       “The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory ruling and, therefore, is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. . . . The denial of a motion to dismiss based on a colorable claim of sovereign immunity, by contrast, is an immediately appealable final judgment because the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 645 n.5, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). “[Ujnless the state is permitted to appeal a trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss, filed on the basis of a colorable claim of sovereign immunity, the state’s right not to be required to litigate the claim filed against it would be irretrievably lost.” Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 165, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).

       The plaintiff does not allege that she was a member of a union, and the record is silent in that regard.

       The defendant raises a claim on appeal with respect to the plaintiff’s “claim” in counts one and two of a “hostile and offensive work environment . . . .” The plaintiffs complaint does not specifically allege a hostile and offensive work environment as a separate cause of action. See Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005) (“[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court .... Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).
      We do not express an opinion as to whether, as pleaded, it constitutes a complete cause of action. Counts one and two of the plaintiffs complaint, however, do appear to contain allegations of the creation of a “hostile and offensive work environment” in the context of recognized causes of action. These allegations arise within the context of a released claim.
      That is to say, to the extent that the allegations arise within the context of count one or within the portion of count two that alleges a violation of § 46a-60 (a) (4) or (5), they may not be considered in this action because those claims are barred by sovereign immunity. To the extent that the allegations arise within the portion of count two alleging a violation of § 46a-60 (a) (1) or (7), the defendant made no claim on appeal challenging the court’s denial of its motion to dismiss as to those portions of count two.

       As we have previously stated, “[statutory construction is a question of law and, therefore, our review is plenary. . . . The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rios v. CCMC Corp., 106 Conn. App. 810, 815, 943 A.2d 544 (2008). As stated previously, “statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. . . . Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chatterjee v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 277 Conn. 681, 691, 894 A.2d 919 (2006).

       See Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349-53, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).

       On her commission complaint form, the plaintiff marked boxes regarding discrimination on the basis of gender and pregnancy. There is no reference to any other basis.

       General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:
      “(1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness

         General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . .
      “(7) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent: (A) To terminate a woman’s employment because of her pregnancy; (B) to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from her pregnancy; (C) to deny to that employee, who is disabled as a result of pregnancy, any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of the accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained by the employer; (D) to fail or refuse to reinstate the employee to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits upon her signifying her intent to return unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; (E) to fail or refuse to make a reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable temporary position which may be available in any case in which an employee gives written notice of her pregnancy to her employer and the employer or pregnant employee reasonably believes that continued employment in the position held by the pregnant employee may cause injury to the employee or fetus; (17) to fail or refuse to inform the pregnant employee that a transfer pursuant to subparagraph (E) of this subdivision may be appealed under the provisions of this chapter; or (G) to fail or refuse to inform employees of the employer, by any reasonable means, that they must give written notice of their pregnancy in order to be eligible for transfer to a temporary position . . . .”

       In fact, the entirety of the plaintiffs retaliation claim is composed of the allegation that the defendant “retaliated” against her, without any supporting facts, and the citation to § 46a-60 (a) (4).

       Again, it is not clear whether the hostile work environment “claim” is intended to constitute an allegation of prohibited conduct or an item of damages, i.e., a result of previously alleged prohibited conduct.

       It may be argued that an agency investigating a complaint of gender discrimination might reasonably consider the work environment. To the extent that a “hostile and offensive work environment” may have been caused by gender discrimination and thus relates perhaps to damages, the issue has been preserved by its presentation to the commission and the release of jurisdiction issued by the commission.

       See footnote 2 of this opinion.

       The defendant also questions whether § 46a-104 even permits the awarding of punitive damages at all, whether against the state or a private party. We need not address this argument because we conclude that sovereign immunity bars the recovery of punitive damages against the state under § 46a-104.

       General Statutes § 46a-100 provides: “Any person who has timely filed a complaint with the [commission] in accordance with section 46a-82 and who has obtained a release from the commission in accordance with section 46a-83a or 46a-101, may also bring an action in the superior court for the judicial district in which the discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred or in which the respondent transacts business, except any action involving a state agency or official may be brought in the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford.”


text:
    DAVID ROSS v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE TOWN OF WESTPORT
    (AC 30210)
    Harper, Robinson and Mihalakos, Js.

      Argued April 20
    officially released November 24, 2009

      Ira W. Bloom, for the appellant (defendant).

      Robert A. Fuller, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

ROBINSON, J.

The zoning board of appeals of the town of Westport (board) appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal by the plaintiff, David Ross. On appeal, the board claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that the town zoning enforcement officer (officer) and board had no authority to enforce state or federal statutes that were implemented after the date that the relevant subdivision plan was approved, (2) failed to remand this case to the board for further review to consider existing zoning violations, illegalities and discrepancies and (3) concluded that the zoning enforcement officer was estopped from enforcing established errors in the plaintiffs submissions and approvals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our discussion of the present appeal. The plaintiff is the owner of certain real property located at 8 Sandpiper Road in Westport. The subject property is part of a subdivision approved by the Westport planning and zoning commission (commission) on October 20, 1965. In 2001, the plaintiff sought to construct a two-story, single-family dwelling on the then vacant parcel. He filed an application with the commission for approval of a coastal area management site plan, which was approved on July 26,2001. After receiving all necessary approvals, the plaintiff was issued a zoning permit on August 31, 2001, arid a building permit on October 12,2001. Final inspection of the property was conducted on December 30, 2003, and the plaintiff was issued a certificate of zoning compliance on March 11, 2004.

On March 15,2004, the plaintiff filed a new coastal site plan application with the commission, seeking approval for an addition to the existing dwelling. At a meeting conducted on July 26, 2004, the commission denied the application. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which sustained the appeal. Thereafter, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Ross v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn. App. 55, 982 A.2d 1084 (2009).

While the appeal was pending in the related matter; see footnote 1 of this opinion; the officer sent notice to the plaintiff that his zoning permit and certificate of zoning compliance were revoked on February 10, 2005. On March 11, 2005, the plaintiff appealed to the board from the action of the officer. A public hearing was conducted by the board on June 14, 2005; thereafter, on June 28, 2005, the board denied the appeal. Although the board did not reference in its notice of decision any specific zoning regulation that it believed the plaintiff had violated, the record demonstrates that the board’s decision was predicated on alleged violations of its coastal area regulations, flood plain regulations and lot coverage regulations.

On July 18, 2005, the plaintiff commenced the present appeal to the court. This appeal and the appeal in the related matter were consolidated for the purposes of the hearing; however, the court issued separate memo-randa of decision sustaining both appeals. Although separate, the memorandum of decision sustaining the appeal from the commission’s decision incorporated by reference its discussion in the memorandum of decision sustaining the appeal from the decision of the board. Accordingly, the memorandum sustaining the appeal underlying the present matter before this court provides an analysis of both appeals. This appeal followed.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the intertwined nature of the two companion appeals is evident from the joint nature of the court’s memorandum of decision as well as the parties’ arguments on appeal. Therefore, for clarification purposes, we find it necessary to distinguish the specific issues raised in the present matter to focus our review properly in this case. The present appeal specifically addresses the board’s decision to uphold the officer’s revocation of the plaintiffs zoning permit and certificate of zoning compliance. In the memorandum of decision sustaining the plaintiffs appeal from the board’s decision, the court determined that the property was exempt from any zoning regulations enacted after October 21,1965, the date when the subdivision map that included the plaintiffs property was approved by the commission. The court also noted that the board’s decision did not identify any specific zoning violation. Ultimately, the court concluded that the construction complied with the applicable zoning regulations. On those grounds, the court sustained the plaintiffs appeal from the decision of the board.

I

The board’s first claim is that the court incorrectly held that the officer and the board were without authority to enforce state and federal statutes that were enacted subsequent to the approval of the plaintiffs subdivision in 1965. In support of this contention, the board advances four arguments: (1) neither General Statutes § 8-26a nor Poirier v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 75 Conn. App. 289, 815 A.2d 716, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 912, 821 A.2d 766 (2003), operate to deprive the board of jurisdiction to enforce state and federal statutes, including its enforcement of regulations promulgated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (agency); (2) even if § 8-26a does strip it of jurisdiction to enforce state and federal laws that were enacted after the subdivision was approved, it retains jurisdiction under the related theories of waiver and manifest jurisdiction; (3) both Westport’s zoning regulations and Connecticut’s jurisprudence explicitly provide for the revocation of a zoning permit; and (4) public policy supports a decision to allow it to enforce agency regulations relating to flood zones. We agree with the court that the board and the officer were without jurisdiction to enforce federal and state laws that were not in existence at the time that the subdivision was approved.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles and standard of review that guide our resolution of the board’s appeal. “Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction. . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention. . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 802, 970 A.2d 640 (2009). Moreover, “[a] determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In connection with the board’s first argument, that neither § 8-26a nor Poirier v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 75 Conn. App. 289 (lot shown on subdivision plan for residential property approved prior to effective date of change in zoning regulations not required to conform to subsequent change), operate to deprive it of jurisdiction to enforce state and federal statutes, we are not persuaded. We begin by consulting the text of § 8-26a to ascertain whether this case comes within the ambit of that statute. Section 8-26a (b) (1) provides in relevant part that “when a change is adopted in the zoning regulations ... of any town . . . no lot . . . shown on a subdivision or resubdivision plan for residential property which has been approved, prior to the effective date of such change, by the planning commission of such town . . . and filed or recorded with the town clerk, shall be required to conform to such change.” Thus, our initial analysis inquires (1) whether the plaintiffs lot is on a subdivision plan that was properly approved and recorded and (2) whether the approval and recording of that subdivision occurred prior to the subject change in the board’s zoning regulations.

It is not disputed that the subdivision lot on which the plaintiff built his home was approved by a properly authorized planning commission on October 20, 1965, and that it is recorded as lot 14 on map number 6054 in the Westport land records. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Westport’s zoning regulations include provisions that regulate coastal areas; see Westport Zoning Regs., § 31-10; flood plains; see id., § 31-11; and lot coverage limits for homes in residence A district. See id., § 13-6. Thus, the regulations that the board suspects the plaintiff to have violated are presumptively “zoning regulations.” See Poirier v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 75 Conn. App. 295 (regulations found in town’s zoning regulations “presumptively a ‘zoning regulation’ ”); see also id., 302 (“we find no indication that the legislature intended distinctions to be drawn between certain zoning regulations, for example, that protection might extend to changes in setback requirements, but not to changes in coverage requirements”). Finally, it is undisputed that the subject zoning regulations were not in effect in 1965, at the time the plaintiffs subdivision was approved and recorded.

Our analysis does not end there, however, because § 8-26a was amended in 2004 to clarify which subdivision lots are eligible for its exemption. See Public Acts 2004, No. 04-210, § 1 (P.A. 04-210). As amended, § 8-26a draws a distinction between subdivision lots that are vacant at the time of construction and those that have been improved: vacant lots are exempt from zoning regulations enacted after the subdivision was approved and recorded, while improved lots do not enjoy that exemption. See General Statutes § 8-26a (b) (2) (A). According to the statute, “a lot shall be deemed vacant until the date a building permit is issued with respect thereto and a foundation has been completed in accordance with such building permit but shall not be deemed vacant if any structures on such lot are subsequently demolished . . . .” General Statutes § 8-26a (b) (2) (B). By contrast, “a lot shall be deemed improved after the date a building permit is issued with respect thereto and a foundation has been completed in accordance with such building permit.” General Statutes § 8-26a (b) (2) (B). In this case, the record supports the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs lot was vacant when he sought a building permit to construct his new home in 2001. Accordingly, because the plaintiff has satisfied each of the statute’s prerequisites, we agree with the court that the plaintiffs lot fits squarely within the contours of § 8-26a, and that, as a consequence, he is not required to comply with zoning regulations enacted after 1965.

Our conclusion in this regard also enjoys support from the holding in Poirier v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 75 Conn. App. 289. In that case, this court held that a homeowner was entitled to a building permit to erect a garage and breezeway that did not conform to the zoning regulations in effect at the time of the proposed construction because § 8-26a operated to allow the homeowner to instead comply with the zoning regulations that were in effect at the time the subdivision was approved and recorded in 1954. Id., 298. In Poirier, as in the present case, it was not disputed that the subject subdivision plan was properly authorized and recorded. Id., 295. Moreover, in both Poirier and in the present case, the disputed regulations were found in the zoning regulations on file in the planning and zoning department of the town. See id. Although the legislature has narrowed the zoning compliance exception since this court reviewed § 8-26a in Poirier by limiting its availability to vacant lots; see P.A. 04-210, § 1; that amendment did not disturb our previous holding that § 8-26a is not retroactive, though it nevertheless applies to subdivisions that were properly approved and recorded prior to its enactment. Poirier v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 295-98. Accordingly, as in Poirier, we conclude that the plain terms of § 8-26a conferred on the plaintiff a vested right, and that right entitles him to a build a house in conformity with the zoning regulations that were in effect at the time his subdivision was approved and recorded.

The board next appears to argue both that § 8-26a does not apply to municipal zoning regulations that separately sound in state and federal law and that the exemptions contained within § 8-26a, as elucidated by this court’s decision in Poirier, should not include municipal zoning regulations enacted under a statutory grant of power outside chapter 124 of the General Statutes, which governs zoning. Whatever merit those arguments may have, the board does not provide a cohesive analysis of these claims and, instead, refers to the discussion set forth in its brief filed in support of the related appeal. See Ross v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 118 Conn. App. 55. The analysis contained within the board’s brief for this matter does not provide citations to relevant legal authority, let alone apply such precedent to the evidence contained in the record currently before us. We, therefore, decline to review these claims due to inadequate briefing. See State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291, 312-13, 772 A.2d 1107 (failure to discuss application of relevant law to facts amounts to inadequate brief for purposes of appellate review), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1068, 122 S. Ct. 670, 151 L. Ed. 2d 584 (2001).

Similarly, the board’s alternative argument that even if § 8-26a strips it of jurisdiction to enforce zoning laws that were enacted after the subdivision was approved, it retains jurisdiction under the related theories of waiver and manifestly valid jurisdiction, is also inadequately briefed. “We are not obligated to consider issues that are not adequately briefed. . . . Whe[n] an issue is merely mentioned, but not briefed beyond a bare assertion of the claim, it is deemed to have been waived. ... In addition, mere conclusory assertions regarding a claim, with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record, will not suffice.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 87, 942 A.2d 345 (2008). Accordingly, we do not reach this issue.

The board’s third argument in support of its broad contention that it has jurisdiction to enforce its current zoning regulations against the plaintiff is that the court failed to acknowledge the right of the officer to revoke a zoning permit and certificate of zoning compliance if a subsequent review of the property results in the discovery of zoning violations. To buttress its argument in this regard, the board references § 45-3 of the West-port zoning regulations, which provides that a zoning enforcement officer has express authority to revoke a zoning permit if a subsequent review reveals that the conditions of the permit have not been met or have been violated. Additionally, the board cites several cases standing for the unobjectionable proposition that a zoning committee or appeals board may revoke a permit after subsequently determining that the property is noncomplying. See, e.g., Manchester v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 18 Conn. App. 69, 73, 556 A.2d 1026 (upholding revocation of zoning permit after zoning board of appeals subsequently determined lot was not valid nonconforming use), cert. denied, 212 Conn. 804, 561 A.2d 946 (1989). Although the board is correct that its officer may revoke a permit in the proper circumstance, that authority is necessarily premised on a finding that the conditions of the permit or certificate have not been satisfied. See id. That did not happen here. Instead, the officer revoked the plaintiffs building permit and compliance certificate for alleged violations of inapplicable zoning regulations, which neither Westport’s zoning regulations nor our jurisprudence countenance.

The fourth argument advanced by the board in support of its overriding argument that it has jurisdiction to enforce current zoning regulations against the plaintiff is that public policy militates in favor of requiring him to comply with regulations that protect his health and safety or that of the environment. In this respect, the board offers news articles chronicling the importance of flood plain regulations in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, as well as commentary speculating as to the lifesaving impact that a wetlands buffer could have achieved in New Orleans. Although we are sympathetic to these considerations, those issues are for our legislature to consider in its deliberative wisdom. See Luce v. United Technologies Corp., 247 Conn. 126, 146, 717 A.2d 747 (1998) (McDonald, J., concurring) (courts “shouldleave policy decisions to the legislature”). Moreover, as this court noted in Poirier, “[t]he legislature has clearly made a policy decision that once the division of the land and proposed lot layout has been reviewed by the municipality through its planning commission the subdivision does not have to be reviewed again, and that the subdivision lots are not affected by subsequently enacted zoning regulations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Poirier v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 75 Conn. App. 298. Although the General Assembly has amended § 8-26a to narrow the reach of its exception to vacant lots, the public policy behind that exception remains intact. Accordingly, we decline to substitute our policy prerogatives for those of the legislature.

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the court that the 1965 subdivision plan that includes the plaintiffs lot, and which was approved, filed and recorded in the town of Westport prior to enactment of the subject zoning regulations, places his lot within the intended scope of § 8-26a (b) and its attendant exceptions. Moreover, because § 8-26a foreclosed the board and its officer from enforcing zoning regulations promulgated after 1965, the building permit issued on October 12, 2001, and the certificate of zoning compliance granted on March 11, 2004, which were both predicated on compliance with zoning regulations enacted after 1965, were nullities ab initio. Consequently, there was nothing for the officer or the board to revoke, and both the officer and the board remain without jurisdiction to enforce the disputed regulations against the plaintiff.

II

The board’s final argument is that the court improperly failed to remand the case to the board for further review of the plaintiffs compliance with its zoning regulations. We agree, albeit on different grounds.

It is well settled that “a court, in reviewing the actions of an administrative agency, is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the agency or to make factual determinations on its own. . . . Upon appeal the function of the court is [limited] to examining] the record of the hearing before the board to determine whether the conclusions reached are supported by the evidence that was before [the board].” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 258 Conn. 691, 708-709, 784 A.2d 354 (2001). In this case, the board did not make a determination as to whether the plaintiffs new house was in compliance with its 1965 zoning regulations. Indeed, as the court noted, the board’s decision upholding the officer’s revocation of the plaintiffs building permit and compliance certificate did not mention the town’s 1965 zoning regulations at all. In the absence of any such action by the board, the record before the trial court was inadequate for its review. Because the board, not the trial court, was required to issue a decision with respect to the plaintiffs compliance with the applicable zoning regulations, the trial court improperly decided that issue on the merits instead of remanding the case to the board for its consideration of that question. See id., 709. Accordingly, we conclude that the court improperly declined to remand the case to the board for its consideration of that issue.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded with direction to remand the case to the zoning board of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The court also sustained the plaintiffs appeal in a related matter involving an appeal from the Westport planning and zoning commission’s denial of the plaintiffs coastal site plan application. See Ross v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn. App. 55, 982 A.2d 1084 (2009).

       We note that we have derived several facts from the record presented in Ross v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn. App. 55, 982 A.2d 1084 (2009). These are not disputed issues in the present appeal and are included only for the purpose of providing the full context of the circumstances underlying this matter.

       The legal arguments contained in the briefs of both parties do not discern between the issues underlying each distinct appeal. For example, in the present case, the board argues that the court improperly concluded that “the planning and zoning commission had no jurisdiction in 2001 and no statutory authority to regulate it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) A review of the memorandum of decision reveals that this statement by the court is not applicable to the present case. As previously noted, the court had issued separate memoranda of decision; however, the analysis incorporated into each decision discusses issues arising in both appeals.
      Of particular relevance is the fact that the court’s discussion immediately preceding this statement referenced by the board involved the commission’s jurisdiction to review a coastal site plan. The court then stated: “The same situation applies to the first site plan appeal. Since the commission had no jurisdiction over it and no statutory authority to regulate it, the plaintiffs property did not have to conform to and was exempt from regulation.” Thus, this statement applied to the court’s discussion of the appeal from the decision by the commission, which involved the 2004 denial of a coastal site plan, the third of three such applications filed by the plaintiff.

       The memorandum of decision sustaining the plaintiffs appeal from the board also provides a discussion of the court’s analysis pertaining to the companion appeal from the commission’s denial of the plaintiffs third coastal site plan application. Regarding this appeal, the court found that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the coastal site plan applications filed by the plaintiff because the property was located more than 200 feet from the mean high water mark. The propriety of this conclusion is addressed in the companion matter. See Ross v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 118 Conn. App. 55.

       General Statutes § 8-26a provides in relevant part: “(b) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or special act or local ordinance, when a change is adopted in the zoning regulations or boundaries of zoning districts of any town, city or borough, no lot or lots shown on a subdivision or resubdivision plan for residential property which has been approved, prior to the effective date of such change, by the planning commission of such town, city or borough, or other body exercising the powers of such commission, and filed or recorded with the town clerk, shall be required to conform to such change.
      “(2) (A) Any construction on a vacant lot shown on a subdivision or resubdivision plan approved before, on or after June 1, 2004, shall not be required to conform to a change in the zoning regulations or boundaries of zoning districts in a town, city or borough adopted after the approval of the subdivision or resubdivision. Notwithstanding subdivision (1) of this subsection, any construction on an improved lot shown on a subdivision or resubdivision plan approved before, on or after June 1, 2004, shall be required to conform to a zoning change adopted subsequent to said lot becoming an improved lot.
      “(B) For purposes of this subsection, (i) a lot shall be deemed vacant until the date a building permit is issued with respect thereto and a foundation has been completed in accordance with such building permit but shall not be deemed vacant if any structures on such lot are subsequently demolished, and (ii) a lot shall be deemed improved after the date a building permit is issued with respect thereto and a foundation has been completed in accordance with such building permit.”

       These conclusions are coterminous with those reached by Westport’s director of planning and zoning, Katherine Barnard, who authored a letter to the plaintiff on July 16, 2003, advising him that “development [of a new house] on the property may conform to the zoning regulations in effect on March 5, 1964” because his property was situated on a properly approved subdivision.

       We note without deciding that “as a creation of the state, a municipality [whether acting itself or through its planning and zoning commission] has no inherent powers of its own . . . and that [it] possesses only such rights and powers that have been granted eocpressly to it by the state . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buttermilk Farms, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 292 Conn. 317, 326, 973 A.2d 64 (2009). Thus, all zoning regulations, whether those related to flood plains or those detailing setback provisions, find their geneses in a state law that enables a municipality to enforce such regulations. Consequently, efforts to excise from the exemption contained in § 8-26a (b) municipal zoning regulations that likewise sound in state or federal law strike us as fruitless.
      Similarly, in light of the fact that § 8-26a resides in chapter 126 of the General Statutes, the contention that its reach is confined to zoning regulations promulgated under chapter 124 of the General Statutes, and is, therefore, not even applicable to subdivision regulations enacted under the same chapter in which § 8-26a is located, appears equally unavailing.

       Section 45-3 of the Westport zoning regulations provides in relevant part: “If the conditions of the Planning & Zoning Commission resolution, conditions of the Zoning Board of Appeals variance or Zoning Permit have not been met, have been violated or if work extends in time or scope beyond the approvals then the Zoning Permit shall be revoked. ...”

       Having concluded that the board and the officer are without jurisdiction to enforce against the plaintiff zoning regulations enacted after 1965, we do not consider the board’s argument that the court, improperly concluded that the officer was estopped from enforcing established errors in the plaintiffs submissions and approvals.

       Moreover, we note that the record is not at all clear that the plaintiffs house is in compliance with the 1965 zoning regulations. By way of example, one of the conditions of approval for the plaintiffs subdivision is that the houses on lots 5 through 14 are restricted to three bedrooms. In light of the alleged construction that the plaintiff has undertaken on the lower level, which could be an additional bedroom, the record was inadequate for the court to conclude that the plaintiff was in compliance with the 1965 zoning regulations.