author: Foti, J.

text:
    State of Connecticut v. John Anziano
    (10041)
    Daly, Foti and Freedman, Js.
    Argued January 7
    decision released February 18, 1992

      Jack W. Fischer, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Juliett L. Crawford, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

      Patricia A. King, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas P. Cadden, for the appellee (defendant).
   Foti, J.

The state appeals, with permission of the trial court, from the judgment rendered dismissing with prejudice the charges against the defendant of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), sale of illegal drugs in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b), conspiracy to sell illegal drugs in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 21a-278 (b), possession of less than four ounces of marihuana in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (c), and destruction of evidence in violation of General Statutes § 54-33e. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant executed on January 22,1990. After the court granted the motion on October 5, 1990, the state entered a nolle on each charge. The state then filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice pursuant to General Statutes § 54-96 and Practice Book § 815, which was granted on February 22, 1991.

The state alleges that under the “totality of circumstances” test; State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 594 A.2d 917 (1991); the affidavit in support of the application for the search and seizure warrant provided a substantial factual basis for the issuing authority to conclude that probable cause was demonstrated. We agree.

The facts are not disputed. On January 22, 1990, detectives of the Meriden police department obtained a search warrant for the residence and vehicles of the defendant, which called for the seizure of illegal drugs, among other things. On that same day, the warrant was executed, resulting in the seizure of various drugs and drug paraphernalia, and the arrest of the defendant.

On July 16, 1991, our Supreme Court overruled State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985). State v. Barton, supra. In so doing, it held that a determination of probable cause under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution is to be made pursuant to the “totality of the circumstances” test applicable under the federal constitution as set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); accord State v. Johnson, 219 Conn. 557, 594 A.2d 933 (1991). Our Supreme Court has explained the “totality of the circumstances” analysis as follows: “When a search warrant affidavit is based on information provided to the police by confidential informants, the magistrate should examine the affidavit to determine whether it adequately describes both the factual basis of the informant’s knowledge and the basis on which the police have determined that the information is reliable. If the warrant affidavit fails to state in specific terms how the informant gained his knowledge or why the police believe the information to be trustworthy, however, the magistrate can also consider all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit to determine whether, despite these deficiencies, other objective indicia of reliability reasonably establish that probable cause to search exists. In making the determination, the magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented.” State v. Barton, supra, 544.

We have recently given retroactive effect to State v. Barton, supra, in State v. Payne, 25 Conn. App. 428, 431, 594 A.2d 1035 (1991). Because the defendant acknowledges that he cannot claim that he acted in reliance on the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test retained until Barton, we review the warrant under the totality of the circumstances test. See State v. Ryerson, 201 Conn. 333, 340, 514 A.2d 337 (1986).

This court’s scope of review, in evaluating the existence of probable cause, is limited to the facts that appear on the four comers of the affidavit or facts that may be properly inferred from those facts. State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 536, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985). In so doing, we must use common sense; State v. Castano, 25 Conn. App. 99, 101, 592 A.2d 977 (1991); and “defer to the reasonable inferences drawn by the [issuing] magistrate.” State v. Barton, supra, 544-45. Our role “is to determine whether the affidavit at issue presented a substantial factual basis for the magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause existed.” State v. Johnson, supra, 565.

In this case, the information supplied to the police came from a “concerned citizen.” In suppressing the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant, the trial court found that the affidavit “utterly fail[ed] to establish this concerned citizen’s reliability or veracity, or basis of knowledge.” Our review of the affidavit leads us to conclude, however, that the type of detail provided by the concerned citizen indicates a reliable basis of knowledge, and permits a reasonable inference that the information was derived from personal knowledge and observation.

The information provided by the concerned citizen supplied the police with some specificity of the who, what, where, when and why. The defendant was named and his car was described accurately, as well as the location of his home. The informant told the police that the defendant had traveled to New York on a particular part of a particular day, that he had obtained a specific amount of cocaine, that he had returned to the Meriden area, split up the narcotics and stored it at two specific locations. One of those locations was the house of a named individual, who was known to the police as a drug dealer. The information also accurately detailed this residence and the automobiles driven by this second named individual. Much of this information was corroborated by information already held by the police, and additional tips received by the police point to the defendant and his drug selling activities, demonstrating a basis on which the affiants determined that the information was reliable. Furthermore, the informant’s credibility is bolstered by the fact that citizen informers are considered more credible than confidential informants who are often criminals themselves with ulterior motives for providing information to the police. State v. Barton, supra, 542 n.10; State v. Banta, 15 Conn. App. 161, 177-78, 544 A.2d 1226, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 815, 550 A.2d 1086 (1988).

The amount of detail contained in the affidavit, together with all the other information and circumstances contained in it, could reasonably allow an inference by the magistrate that the information supplied by the concerned citizen was derived from personal knowledge or observation and that it was current information. The affidavit presented sufficient objective indicia of reliability to justify the issuance of the warrant. Thus, after considering the totality of the circumstances described in the affidavit, we conclude that the affidavit presented a substantial factual basis on which the magistrate could conclude that probable cause existed.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 54-96 provides: “Appeals from the rulings and decisions of the superior court, upon all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by the state, with the permission of the presiding judge, to the supreme court or to the appellate court, in the same manner and to the same effect as if made by the accused.”
      Practice Book § 815 provides: “The following defenses or objections, if capable of determination without a trial of the general issue, shall, if made prior to trial, be raised by a motion to dismiss the indictment or information:

        “(1) Defects in the institution of the prosecution including any grand jury proceedings;
      “(2) Defects in the indictment or information including failure to charge an offense;
      “(3) Statute of limitations;
      “(4) Absence of jurisdiction of the court over the defendant or the subject matter;
      “(5) Insufficiency of evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or indictment or the placing of the defendant on trial;
      “(6) Previous prosecution barring the present prosecution;
      “(7) Claim that the defendant has been denied a speedy trial;
      “(8) Claim that the law defining the offense charged is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid; or
      “(9) Any other grounds.”

       The affidavit in support of the application for the search and seizure warrant is as follows;
      “1. That Detective William Staton and Detective Trevor Thorpe are regular members of the Meriden Police Departments Narcotics Division with a combined total of about 23 years of police experience between them. The affiants Thorpe and Staton have investigated numerous narcotic cases arrests and convictions as well as numerous seizures of illegal narcotic substances and paraphernalia. The affiants have attended various schools and seminars teaching investigative techniques in narcotic investigation and as the result of their training and experiences are familiar with the methods and practices of illegal drug violators as well as the deceptions used by them to avoid police detection.
      “2. That in the early 1987 The Meriden Police Department Narcotic division began to review information from its 634-DRUG hotline indicating that a white male named John Anziano living at 124 Arch Parkway in Meriden Connecticut was a local cocaine dealer. This information was received from various informants and other police officers during the following months until on 10-12-87 Affiant Thorpe along with other detectives observed Mr. Anziano run from a car into the woods in the Baldwins Pond area of Meriden and subsequently recovered 18 grams of cocaine as well as several baggies

        “3. That during the following two years several more confidential informants advised the Narcotic detectives that John Anziano continued to sell cocaine in the city of Meriden on a regular basis from his cars which were described as a red Honda Civic and what appeared to be an older Ford that appeared to be an old state trooper car. One informant advised of having personally purchased and observed sales within these two vehicles on a regular basis and that Anziano had a beeper and would meet customers at various pay phones in the Meriden area when they called him in their efforts to purchase cocaine from him. Members of the narcotic division including affiant Thorpe frequently checked the address of 124 Arch Parkway and frequently observed the fact that a red Honda Civic bearing Connecticut registration plate number 693FWL and a four door red Ford bearing Connecticut reg. number 918FVA were parked there late at night on a regular basis.
      “4. That on November 11, 1988 a caller to the Meriden Police Department 634-Drug hotline advised that a man named Pierre Chenard of number 264 Wall Street in Meriden Connecticut was selling cocaine and storing it in a thermos within one of his vehicles. A second caller to Narcotic Detective Anderson advised of observing Chenard within his residence at 264 Wall Street in the act of snorting cocaine and of having observed cocaine within his residence as well as observing many persons coming and going from the house on a regular basis.
      “5. That on 1/22/90 Detective Kearns of the Wallingford Police Department narcotic division called the Meriden Police Department Narcotic Division and advised that the Wallingford Narcotic Division ha[d] received information from various informants during the past several months indicating that Mr. John Anziano of 124 Arch Parkway is selling cocaine on a regular basis in Meriden and that he operates a red Honda Civic, a blue Ford Mustang and an older Ford that looks like an old State Police car. The informants also gave accurate registration plate numbers for these vehicles and accurately described the location of the Anziano residence on Arch Parkway in Meriden. Kearns went on to be advised that he had just received information from a concerned citizen whose son had received cocaine from Mr. John Anziano and who had personal knowledge that Mr. John Anziano had gone to New York on Saturday evening (01/20/90) and had picked up a pound of cocaine for distribution in the Meriden area. This concerned citizen indicated to Kearns that the cocaine had been split up by Anziano and that some of it was being stored at the residence of a Mr. Pierre Chenard at number 264 Wall Street in Meriden, Connecticut and that John Anziano kept the rest of the cocaine for sale within his residence at number 124 Arch Parkway in Meriden, Connecticut. This concerned citizen accurately described the vehicle operated by Anziano as well as his home and its location in Meriden as well as the residence and vehicles owned by Mr. Chenard.
      “6. That it is the training and experience of the affiants that illegal drug dealers often keep and carry weapons including firearms in order to protect their illegal drugs from their competitors as well as to intimidate their customers. It is therefore requested that weapons including firearms be included in this affidavit if granted.
      “7. Wherefore the affiants feel that they have established probable cause to believe that John Anziano possesses cocaine for sale within the second floor apartment of number 124 Arch Parkway in Meriden, Connecticut in violation of Connecticut General Statute number 21a-278b and hereby request that a search and seizure warrant for that address as well as his vehicles bearing Connecticut registration plates 693FWL a 77 red Honda, 925BVS a blue Ford and 918FVA a red Ford be granted.”

       The two-pronged test required that a search warrant affidavit based on an informant’s tip contain some of the underlying circumstances demonstrating his reliability or his veracity, along with his basis for knowledge. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Landau, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    State of Connecticut v. James Menzies
    (9239)
    Dupont, C. J., Daly and Landau, Js.

      Argued October 30, 1991
    decision released February 18, 1992

      Ramona S. Carlow, special public defender, with whom was Glenn D. Woods, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Susann E. Gill, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were JohnM. Bailey, state’s attorney, John Massameno, assistant state’s attorney, and James J. Rubin, law student intern, for the appellee (state).
   Landau, J.

The defendant, James Menzies, appeals from a judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70, sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. These offenses all involved the defendant’s stepdaughter, L. On appeal, the defendant raises the following claims: (1) The refusal of the assistant state’s attorney to drop the risk of injury count regarding J, a second alleged victim, constituted prosecutorial misconduct and denied the defendant his constitutional right to due process; (2) the trial court improperly restricted the defendant’s right to cross-examine L concerning acts of misconduct indicative of a lack of veracity, in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights of confrontation; (3) the trial court improperly adopted special procedures during L’s testimony that heightened sympathy for her and enhanced her credibility; and (4) remarks made by the assistant state’s attorney during closing argument violated the defendant’s federal and state privileges against compulsory self-incrimination, resulting in an unfair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. During the months of September, 1985, through June, 1986, the defendant lived in East Hartford with L and her mother, to whom he was married, and was visited occasionally by his daughter from a previous marriage, J, on weekends. At this time, L was six years old and J was ten years old. The defendant was responsible for taking care of L in the evenings while her mother worked.

One evening during this time period, the defendant sexually assaulted L. It was not until two years later, however, that L told anyone about this encounter. In October, 1987, the department of children and youth services (DCYS) learned of this incident. Jennifer Spec-tor, a social worker employed by DCYS, first interviewed the student whom L had told about the incident with the defendant, and then interviewed L. Also present during the interview with L were another DCYS social worker, L’s teacher and Sergeant Dennis McQueeney of the East Hartford police department.

During this interview, L recounted more than one sexual encounter with the defendant and gave contradictory reasons for having had such sexual contact. L was direct and straightforward during this interview, with the one exception being when she was asked when the sexual assault with the defendant had taken place. She ultimately responded that it had occurred two years earlier, when she was in the first grade.

Following the interview, Spector, McQueeney and the second DCYS social worker went to the defendant’s house to speak with L’s mother and the defendant. When confronted with the allegations of abuse, the defendant initially denied having had any such contact with L. Later during the interview, he stated that he could not remember if he had sexually assaulted L two years earlier and asked McQueeney how much time he would get if he pleaded guilty. L was sent to live with her grandparents in Vermont for the remainder of the school year.

Spector again interviewed L upon her return to Connecticut in the fall of 1988. Unlike the first interview, this interview was videotaped. During this interview, L recounted only one sexual assault by the defendant and appeared more uncomfortable than she had during the prior interview.

Spector also interviewed J. J confirmed that she had been sexually abused by her father, although she was unable to state exactly when the assault had occurred. At trial, however, J denied having been sexually assaulted by her father.

On the basis of this evidence, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the count of risk of injury to a child involving J. The defendant was convicted by the jury of the remaining counts involving L. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years imprisonment, execution suspended after eight years with five years probation. The defendant has appealed from this judgment.

I

The defendant’s first claim is that the refusal of the assistant state's attorney to drop the risk of injury count regarding J constituted prosecutorial misconduct that was so serious as to deny him his constitutional right to due process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and by article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. We disagree.

The defendant was initially charged with eight counts of violations of the General Statutes. Four counts were predicated on conduct involving L, and the four remaining counts involved his daughter, J. The defendant was initially charged with two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70, two counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), two counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (2) and two counts of risk of injury to a minor in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. Prior to trial, the court dismissed the two counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree due to the running of the statute of limitations and the state entered nolle prosequis as to the two remaining counts of sexual assault involving J, claiming that J was psychologically unable to testify with respect to those charges. The defendant proceeded to trial on the remaining four counts, one of which involved J. After the presentation of the state’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the count of risk of injury to a child regarding J.

At trial, J testified that her father had never sexually assaulted her. Defense counsel claimed that the assistant state’s attorney knew, prior to calling J to the stand, that she would deny any allegations of sexual contact with her father. The defense also claimed that the state had no other evidence that it reasonably believed to be admissible implicating the defendant in this offense and thus abused its discretion as the prosecuting authority by pursuing the risk of injury count involving J. The assistant state’s attorney explained that he entered a nolle prosequi as to the first degree and second degree sexual assault counts involving J because, at that time,* she was unable to provide further information that would place the events within the statute of limitations, but that the remaining count clearly fell within the statute of limitations. The trial court, noting the difference in the type of sexual conduct alleged in the first and second degree sexual assault counts and the conduct alleged in the risk of injury count, concluded that there would be no prejudice in retaining the risk of injury count pertaining to J.

It has long been recognized by both the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court that it is the prosecutor’s duty to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to proceed with a criminal charge and that the prosecutor has broad discretion in determining what crime or crimes to charge in any particular situation. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-608, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1985); State v. O’Neill, 200 Conn. 268, 279-80, 511 A.2d 321 (1986); State v. McKenna, 188 Conn. 671, 680, 453 A.2d 435 (1982); State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 473-74, 450 A.2d 828 (1982); State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 168, 377 A.2d 263 (1977); State v. Villafane, 171 Conn. 644, 664, 372 A.2d 82 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1106, 97 S. Ct 1137, 51 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1977); State v. Dills, 19 Conn. App. 495, 500, 563 A.2d 733 (1989). The criminal justice system vests the prosecutor with broad discretion to determine whether to pursue a prosecution. State v. Corchado, 200 Conn. 453, 460, 512 A.2d 183 (1986). The discretionary power of the state to select an appropriate charge is, of course, “limited in the usual and lawful manner by the facts the prosecutor may be reasonably expected to prove at trial.” State v. Darden, 171 Conn. 677, 682, 372 A.2d 99 (1976); see also State v. Riggs, 7 Conn. App. 180, 185, 508 A.2d 67, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 804, 510 A.2d 191, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 107 S. Ct. 183, 93 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1986). “So long as he acts within the jurisdiction of his office it is not appropriate for a court to set policy for the performance of his prosecutorial function.” State v. Haskins, supra, 474.

With respect to the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct regarding the retention of the risk of injury count, “ ‘the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’ Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S. Ct. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982); State v. Cosgrove, 186 Conn. 476, 489, 442 A.2d 1320 (1982).” State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 562, 482 A.2d 300, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985); State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 163, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985). We must, therefore, determine whether the actions of the prosecutor, in refusing to drop the risk of injury charge involving J, in light of all of the circumstances, was so egregious and so damaging to the defendant that it deprived him of a fair trial. State v. Couture, supra, 562-63.

The defendant has not demonstrated that he was harmed by the retention of this count. The trial court adequately instructed the jurors that the count pertaining to J was dismissed and that they were to disregard any testimony relating to that charge. In regard to this count, the jury heard the denial of J, the alleged victim, and an unanswered question posed to J’s mother regarding whether J had made an allegation of sexual abuse against her father. Any other reference to J was made outside the presence of the jury. The defendant presents us with no basis on which we can find that he was prejudiced by the inclusion of this count. Moreover, the defendant’s failure to file a motion to sever the count relating to J from the counts relating to L demonstrates his belief that no prejudice would result from the combined trial of all the counts. We therefore conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the retention of this count constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly restricted his right to cross-examine L concerning acts of misconduct indicative of a lack of veracity, in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights of confrontation. See United States Const., amends. VI and XIV; Conn. Const., art I, § 8; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974); State v. Maldonado, 193 Conn. 350, 356, 478 A.2d 581 (1984). We disagree.

Prior to L’s testimony, the state made an oral motion in limine to prohibit the defendant from asking “questions concerning any allegations of physical abuse of L . . . until there was a preliminary ruling from the court as to its admissibility.” The trial court deferred ruling on this motion until the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim. On cross-examination, defense counsel renewed his objection to the state’s oral motion and, in support of his claim of prior allegations of physical abuse made by L, attempted to question L regarding two reports, a DCYS case transfer report and an East Hartford police department incident report. Both reports indicated that in 1989 L had made a complaint against another person, her mother’s then boyfriend in which L related that he intentionally injured her by burning her with a hot light bulb, but that L later admitted that she had not been telling the truth, because the incident was an accident rather than intentional. Defense counsel also informed the court that he intended to test L’s credibility by questioning her about other false claims she may have made. Specifically, defense counsel claimed he intended to ask L: “Do you always tell the truth and was there an incident ... in May of 1989, this past year, in which you told a teacher and school social worker and a police officer something about [your mother’s boyfriend] that in fact wasn’t true?” In response to the state’s objections, the trial court precluded defense counsel from questioning the witness about the complaint indicated in the reports. The court concluded that the reports contained nothing relevant and nothing that would bring her credibility into play, and that they would be merely speculative and would mislead the jury.

Defense counsel then sought to question the witness about her complaint, outside of the presence of the jury. The state argued that this line of inquiry was inadmissible because the words used in the reports were not those of the witness, but rather those of the author of the report. The state further asserted that even if the child had reported the incident in such a way as to indicate that the act was intentional and not accidental, it did not demonstrate that she was lying. The court denied defense counsel’s request, stating that “there is nothing in the report that would indicate anything about the truth or veracity of the child. DCYS made a report that she was burned with a light bulb and the police investigated it and said it didn’t appear to be intentional .... The issue is credibility of this young lady who as I read that report could have been telling the absolute truth that she was. There is nothing in there that indicates that she was—she said anything false. ... I don’t think this is relevant to the trial. The only way it could come in would be on the issue of credibility. There is nothing, from what I’ve seen, that really reflects directly on credibility. It’s a side issue. So I don’t think it’s appropriate to question the witness on that particular issue.”

Initially, it must be noted that a criminal defendant’s right to impeach the witnesses against him implicates his constitutional right to confrontation. State v. Rodriguez, 180 Conn. 382, 393, 429 A.2d 919 (1980). The confrontation clause gives the defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. Cross-examination to elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias, prejudice and lack of veracity is a matter of right and may not be unduly restricted. State v. Oehman, 212 Conn. 325, 330, 562 A.2d 493 (1989); State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 402, 497 A.2d 956 (1985). The right of confrontation, however, is not absolute and is subject to reasonable limitation. State v. Vitale, supra, 401. “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559, 108 S. Ct. 838, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1988), quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985). Not every evidentiary ruling that denies a defendant a line of inquiry to which he thinks he is entitled is constitutional error. State v. Vitale, supra, 403.

Prior acts reflecting adversely on a person’s honesty bear sharply on the issue of veracity at trial, and subject to the court’s discretion, may be admitted for purposes of impeachment. State v. Martin, 201 Conn. 74, 87, 513 A.2d 116 (1986); State v. Coriano, 12 Conn. App. 196, 204, 530 A.2d 197, cert. denied, 205 Conn. 810, 532 A.2d 77 (1987). Admittedly, whether the witness had made false accusations of abuse in the past is relevant to her credibility and veracity and any evidence tending to establish such accusations would be admissible. Here, however, the trial court correctly concluded that the two reports had no bearing on the witness’ credibility.

We conclude, after a detailed examination of the reports, that the trial court properly concluded that testimony by the witness about them would be irrelevant to the witness’ credibility. The reports contain the judgment and impressions of the authors, based on their discussions with the victim, and are not a verbatim account of the conversation with the victim. The trial court properly concluded that the proffered reports contained nothing to indicate that L had lied and, therefore, were not relevant to her veracity. A trial court is vested with “broad discretion to determine . . . the relevancy ... of evidence. . . . Only upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion will this court set aside on appeal rulings on evidentiary matters.” (Citations omitted.) Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303, 324, 528 A.2d 1123 (1987); see also State v. Moye, 214 Conn. 89, 570 A.2d 209 (1990). The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

With respect to the trial court’s ruling precluding the defendant from asking the witness on voir dire whether she had lied about the light bulb incident, we conclude that the trial court acted properly. Defense counsel proposed to ask the witness one question, whether she had lied about the incident involving the light bulb and her mother’s boyfriend. We conclude that this limitation was proper because the witness’ response would not have affected the trial court’s ruling precluding defense counsel from questioning her about the comments indicated in the two reports.

Ill

The defendant’s third claim involves the special procedures the trial court adopted pertaining to L’s testimony. Prior to trial, in a motion for special procedures pursuant to General Statutes § 54-86g (b), the state requested that the trial court adopt the following procedures during L’s testimony: (1) closing the courtroom to the public and press, except those persons who would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child; (2) permitting the guardian ad litem to sit with the child; (3) permitting the use of anatomically correct dolls or diagrams; (4) permitting the use of leading questions when necessary on direct examination of the child; (5) requiring counsel to question the child in a lowered voice while seated at a table positioned in front of the witness box. The defendant takes issue with the second request which requires the guardian ad litem to sit with the child during her testimony. He argues that the results of this special procedure prejudiced the defendant, that the procedure was not warranted, that it heightened sympathy for L and that it enhanced her credibility. The defendant also argues that he was prejudiced by a delay between the direct examination and the cross-examination of the child. We do not agree.

A

The defendant contends that the requirement that the guardian ad litem sit with the child during her testimony was not warranted. He relies on State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 705, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061, 108 S. Ct. 1017, 98 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1988), for this assertion. In Jarzbek, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether, in a criminal prosecution involving alleged sexual abuse of children, a minor victim may testify through the use of a videotape made outside the physical presence of the defendant. See General Statutes § 54-86g (a).

Although, here, we are not concerned with taking testimony outside of the courtroom, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Jarzbek is illustrative because the underlying concerns for requesting the procedures outlined in General Statutes § 54-86g (a) and (b) are the same. The Jarzbek court recognized that “it is by no means clear that sexually abused children are harmed, psychologically or otherwise, by the experience of testifying in the presence of their alleged abusers”; State v. Jarzbek, supra, 702; see also G. Melton, “Psychological Issues in Child Victim’s Interaction with the Legal System,” 5 Victimology 274 (1980); G. Goodman, “The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions for Research and Legal Practice,” 40 J. Soc. Issues, 157, 167-68 (1984); D. Whitcomb, E. Shapiro & L. Stellwagen, “When the Victim is a Child: Issues for Judges and Prosecutors,” National Institute of Justice (1985) pp. 17-18; and “that some minor victims actually benefit from their participation in proceedings that give them a sense of power over those who have violated them and afford them a long awaited opportunity to achieve vindication.” State v. Jarzbek, supra; G. Melton, “Sexually Abused Children and the Legal System: Some Policy Recommendations,” 13 Am. J. Family Therapy 61, 64-65 (1985); C. Rogers, “Child Sexual Abuse and the Courts: Preliminary Findings,” Social Work and Child Sexual Abuse (Conte & Shore Eds. 1982) pp. 145, 150. The court also noted, however, “the possibility that such a witness might be intimidated, or for any number of reasons inhibited, by the presence of the accused”; State v. Jarzbek, supra, 703; and that “[i]n such instances, affording the defendant the right of physical confrontation would undermine the purpose of confrontation, instead of advancing its truth-seeking goals.” Id., 703-704.

In order to accommodate the competing concerns of the state and the defendant, the Jarzbek court mandated a case by case analysis “whereby a trial court must balance the individual defendant’s right of confrontation against the interest of the state in obtaining reliable testimony from the particular minor victim in question.” Id., 704. The trial court must conduct “an evidentiary hearing, [to determine] whether the state has demonstrated a compelling need for excluding the defendant from the witness room during the videotaping of a minor victim’s testimony.” Id. In order to satisfy its burden of proving a compelling need, the state must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor victim would be so intimidated, or otherwise inhibited, by the physical presence of the defendant that the trustworthiness of the victim’s testimony would be seriously called into question. Id., 705. The trial court must focus on the reliability of the minor victim’s testimony, not on the injury that the victim may suffer by testifying in the presence of the accused. Id.

Here, a hearing on the state’s motion for special procedures was conducted prior to the commencement of trial. The state presented evidence through the testimony of three witnesses, Jennifer Spector, David Mantell, and the guardian ad litem, Attorney Barbara Ruhe, to the effect that adopting the proposed procedures would facilitate L’s in-court testimony. Spector testified that she believed the presence of a guardian ad litem would “provide support for L throughout the testimony.” Mantell testified that “it is helpful for child witnesses to have present at the time of their testimony a trusted person, being an adult person, who can comfort them and is physically present to offer them a sense of companionship through their courtroom presentation.” The guardian ad litem testified that “L has indicated to me that it is her hope that the judge will permit me to stand or be near her because she said ‘if I get really frightened will you hold my hand’ and I have indicated to her that I would certainly hope the judge would permit that,” demonstrating that she too believed that her presence at L’s side while she was on the witness stand would facilitate her testimony.

The trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that L would be intimidated or otherwise inhibited in her testimony if the normal courtroom procedures were used and found a compelling need to grant specific portions of the state’s motion. Most significantly, the trial court ordered that “the guardian ad litem, an adult with whom the child may feel comfortable, and who is an officer of the court, will or may be seated close to the child during her testimony. She will be allowed to touch the child, L, but will not suggest or in any way communicate with her concerning what the answers to any question might be. The guardian ad litem will not participate directly in the trial.” Defense counsel objected to the court’s ruling and noted his exception for the record.

The state’s burden was to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a compelling need to have the guardian ad litem sit by the alleged victim’s side during her testimony. Whether the state has satisfied this burden is a question of fact. It is not the role of this court to make factual determinations and conclusions. “It is the sole province of the trier of fact to evaluate [such] testimony, to assess its credibility, and to assign it a proper weight.” Id., 706; Johnson v. Fuller, 190 Conn. 552, 556, 461 A.2d 988 (1983). We can only review such conclusions “to determine whether they could legally, logically and reasonably be found, thereby establishing that the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did.” Zolan, Bernstein, Dworken & Klein v. Milone, 1 Conn. App. 43, 47, 467 A.2d 938 (1983). On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence adduced at the hearing on the state’s motion for special procedures adequately supports the trial court’s conclusions.

The defendant also claims that the presence of the guardian ad litem during L’s testimony enhanced L’s credibility and heightened sympathy for her. At the conclusion of L’s direct examination, the trial court instructed the jury that “we did allow what we call the guardian ad litem to sit with the child. Please don’t draw any inference from that. The purpose is simply to facilitate the child’s testimony and don’t draw any inferences from it. It just puts the child at ease in this setting .... Don’t draw any conclusions . . . other than we are dealing with a child.” Again, this instruction adequately explained to the jurors the purpose and function of the guardian ad litem and admonished them not to draw any inferences from her presence.

Moreover, the defendant has failed to establish that he was in any way prejudiced by the presence of the guardian ad litem. The guardian in no way interfered with the jury’s ability to observe the witness’ demeanor or to evaluate her credibility, nor did her presence suggest that the witness was a victim who required protection from the defendant. The court clearly explained that the guardian’s presence was merely to facilitate the testimony of a child witness and not to protect the witness from the defendant. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly adopted the state’s request that the victim be accompanied by the guardian ad litem during her testimony and that this procedure did not enhance L’s credibility or heighten sympathy for her.

B

L’s direct examination was conducted on a Thursday. The cross-examination was delayed until the following Monday because of the unavailability of the guardian ad litem. Defense counsel objected to the delay between the direct examination and the cross-examination, arguing that it prejudiced the defendant by emphasizing the witness’ uncontroverted testimony and by unduly strengthening the intervening testimony. We find no merit in this argument.

The trial court has wide discretion in determining the order of proof. State v. McCall, 187 Conn. 73, 84, 444 A.2d 896 (1982). It is not unusual for the testimony of witnesses to be interrupted for one reason or another. See Finch v. Weiner, 109 Conn. 616, 618, 145 A. 31 (1929). The purpose of allowing discretionary variations from the logical order of proof relates largely to convenience or accommodation in forwarding the trial, usually to avoid the necessity of detaining or recalling a witness, or some similar consideration. Id. Departure from the regular order should not be permitted, however, where it would work injustice to either party. Id. Here, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that any injustice resulted from the delay in cross-examination. The testimony of the intervening witness, Spector, and presentation of the taped interview with the victim were in no way enhanced by the fact that they came after the direct, and, as yet, uncontroverted testimony of the alleged victim.

Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury about the disruption in the victim’s testimony as follows: “[I]t would not really be possible to complete the examination this afternoon because of a conflict that the witness will not be available to us tomorrow, so what we are going to do, this happens quite frequently in trials, the cross-examination of the last witness will be put off until Monday morning .... That, as I say, is something that happens quite frequently and it’s really the best thing we can do here, so we are going to adjourn now until ten o’clock tomorrow morning.” This instruction adequately explained to the jurors that they should not draw any inferences from the delay in the witness’ cross-examination because such an interruption was a common occurrence and that they should not blame either party for the suspension. Because the defendant has failed to demonstrate any injustice arising out of the trial court’s variation from the traditional order of proof and the trial court appropriately explained the reason for the suspension of the cross-examination in a limiting instruction to the jury, the defendant’s argument must fail.

IV

The defendant’s final claim is that certain remarks by the assistant state’s attorney during closing argument violated his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, resulting in an unfair trial. Because he did not object to these remarks at trial, the defendant seeks review under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 327 A.2d 576 (1965), and State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

In State v. Golding, supra, 239-40, the Supreme Court held that a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial if the following four conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental constitutional right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant cannot prevail on an unpreserved constitutional claim unless all of the four conditions are met, any one of which may be considered first. State v. Shaw, 24 Conn. App. 493, 497, 589 A.2d. 880 (1991). An examination of the defendant’s claim fails, however, to reveal a constitutional violation that clearly deprived him of a fair trial, and, therefore, he cannot prevail on this claim.

In its final closing argument; see Practice Book § 874 (4); after the defendant had argued to the jury, the state in its rebuttal argument stated that the defendant failed to introduce or explain certain evidence. Specifically, the assistant state’s attorney commented: “I would like to talk to you a little bit about the evidence that you don’t have . . . there is certainly no evidence that the defendant was confused when he responded [to McQueeney’s question whether he had sexually assaulted L two years earlier] by saying ‘I don’t know.’ ” The defendant takes issue with the comment concerning the defendant’s possible state of confusion during his interview with McQueeney, and claims that this comment constituted an indirect comment on his failure to testify.

The defendant contends that implicit in the defendant’s response “I don’t know, I can’t remember” was that, but for a state of confusion, an innocent person would not have answered as the defendant did and no evidence of confusion was presented. The defendant asserts that evidence of such confusion could have been supplied only by the defendant because the defendant’s understanding of McQueeney’s question was information possessed solely by him. He further asserts that the comment regarding the lack of evidence that the defendant was confused at that time was such that the jury would naturally interpret this to be a comment on his failure to testify.

The right of the accused not to take the stand is his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964). Comment by the prosecuting attorney or the court on the defendant’s failure to testify is prohibited by the fifth amendment to the federal constitution. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S. Ct. 1228, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965). Moreover, the Connecticut legislature has recognized and affirmed this right in adopting General Statutes § 54-84 (a) which provides in part: “(a) Any person on trial for [a] crime shall be a competent witness, and at his or her option may testify or refuse to testify upon such trial. The neglect or refusal of an accused party to testify shall not be commented upon by the court or prosecuting official . . . .”

“The parameters of our inquiry are well established. Tn its closing argument the state may properly call to the attention of the jury any portion of the evidence that stands uncontradicted. Such a comment becomes objectionable only when it focuses the attention of the jury on the failure of the defendant to testify and thus violates the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. California, [supra] that “the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” . . . ’ ” State v. Walker, 206 Conn. 300, 307, 537 A.2d 1021 (1988). Further, even an indirect remark by the prosecuting attorney that draws the jury’s attention to the failure of the accused to testify may also violate the accused’s right. United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, 418 F.2d 1266, 1269 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Leak v. Follette, 397 U.S. 1050, 90 S. Ct. 1388, 25 L. Ed. 2d 665 (1970).

The test for evaluating a prosecutor’s argument asks whether" ‘ “the language used [by the prosecutor was] manifestly intended to be, or was ... of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” ’ ” State v. Walker, supra; see also United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, supra; State v. Allen, 9 Conn. App. 169, 179, 517 A.2d 1043 (1986), rev’d in part, 205 Conn. 370, 533 A.2d 559 (1987). Consequently, the prosecutor is prohibited from asking for explanations that only the defendant can provide because such questions are an indirect comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. State v. DeMartino, 7 Conn. App. 292, 295, 508 A.2d 809 (1986).

An analysis of the remarks of the assistant state’s attorney clearly shows that the prosecutor did not point to the defendant as the only person who could supply the missing explanations and answers. The assistant state’s attorney properly commented on the defendant’s responses to the questions posed by McQueeney during their initial confrontation. He properly remarked that the defendant responded that he did not know and could not remember whether he had abused L two years earlier. This dialogue was introduced at trial through the testimony of three witnesses, Spec-tor, L’s mother and McQueeney, all of whom were present during the conversation and who testified that they were able to observe the defendant during the conversation. Additionally, each of the three witnesses was specifically asked whether the defendant appeared to be confused at any time during his interview with McQueeney. All responded in the negative. Because evidence of a mental state need not be proven by direct evidence but may be proven by circumstantial evidence; State v. Steiger, 218 Conn. 349, 376-82, 590 A.2d 408 (1991) (court reached conclusion that defendant was aware of the wrongful nature of his actions based on testimony of third parties concerning the defendant’s conduct); evidence of the defendant’s confusion was not something that could be provided solely by the defendant and no other. Rather, this remark in the prosecutor’s closing argument was a comment on the testimony of three independent witnesses. Thus, the comment that there was no evidence that the defendant was confused during his conversation with McQueeney did not seek an explanation that only the defendant could provide, and, therefore, was not an indirect comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. State v. DeMartino, supra.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The information failed to indicate a particular subsection of General Statutes § 53a-70 under which the defendant was to be prosecuted.

       The student informed a school social worker about L’s allegations. The school social worker, in turn, contacted DCYS.

       L claimed that the defendant had threatened her when she was unable to do her homework that she could either “have her butt beaten” or perform oral sex on him. L also claimed that the defendant came into bed with her and pressed his body against hers.

       The student had also told the school social worker about similar allegations J had made against the defendant.

       The state argued, in opposing the defendant’s motion for a dismissal of these two counts, that children who have been victims of sexual abuse go through varying periods where they can and cannot discuss the abuse.

       General Statutes § 54-193 (b) provides: “No person maybe prosecuted for any offense, except a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-54d, for which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in excess of one year, except within five years next after the offense has been committed. No person may be prosecuted for any other offense, except a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-54d, except within one year next after the offense has been committed.”
      General Statutes § 54-193a provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 54-193, no person may be prosecuted for any offense involving sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or sexual assault of a minor except within two years from the date the victim attains the age of majority or seven years, whichever is less, provided in no event shall such period of time be less than five years after the commission of the offense.”

       The fifth count read as follows: “Said State’s Attorney further accuses James Menzies of the crime of Sexual Assault in the First Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70; more specifically, James Menzies, by the use of force or threat of force, compelled J. to engage in sexual intercourse (fellatio) at . . . East Hartford, in the morning on an unknown weekend date between June, 1985, and June, 1986.”
      The sixth count read as follows: “Said State’s Attorney further accuses James Menzies of the crime of Sexual Assault in the Second Degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1); more specifically, James Menzies engaged in sexual intercourse (fellatio) with J., a person under sixteen years of age, at . . . East Hartford, in the morning of an unknown weekend date between June, 1985, and June, 1986.
      The eighth count read as follows: “Said State’s Attorney further accuses James Menzies of the crime of Risk of Injury to a Minor, in violation of General Statutes § 53-21; more specifically, James Menzies did an act likely to impair the health or morals of J., a child under the age of sixteen years, by subjecting her to sexual contact at . . . East Hartford, on unknown weekend dates between June, 1985, and October, 1987.”

       We note that an oral motion in limine does not meet the requirement of Practice Book § 196 that such motions be made in writing.

       The events L described were substantially the same as those related to Officer G. A. Willett of the East Hartford police department by both her mother and her mother’s boyfriend. Their statements indicate that the mother’s boyfriend unscrewed a light bulb, which had recently been lit, to light the mother’s cigarette. While reaching toward Mrs. Menzies, her boyfriend intentionally touched L under the chin with the bulb to show her that it was not too hot, since he was able to hold it comfortably by the base.

       General Statutes § 54-86g (b) provides: “In any criminal prosecution of an offense involving assault, sexual assault or abuse of a child twelve years of age or younger, the court may, upon motion of the attorney for any party, order that the following procedures be used when the testimony of the child is taken: (1) Persons shall be prohibited from entering and leaving the courtroom during the child’s testimony; (2) an adult who is known to the child and with whom the child feels comfortable shall be permitted to sit in close proximity to the child during the child’s testimony, provided such person shall not obscure, the child from the view of the defendant or the trier of fact; (3) the use of anatomically correct dolls by the child shall be permitted; and (4) the attorneys for the defendant and for the state shall question the child while seated at a table positioned in front of the child, shall remain seated while posing objections and shall ask questions and pose objections in a manner which is not intimidating to the child.”

       The assistant state’s attorney argued to the court that he was seeking to have these procedures adopted as a less drastic alternative to the procedures outlined in General Statutes § 54-86g (a) and in an effort to protect the defendant’s right to confrontation. General Statutes § 54-86g (a) involves taking the testimony of the child outside of the courtroom.

       Although Jarzbek stands primarily for the proposition that the main focus of the court is on the reliability of the testimony, the attitude and bearing of the witness have a direct bearing on the witness’ reliability.

       Although the Jarzbek court concluded that General Statutes § 54-86g (a) requires that there be an evidentiary hearing prior to the court’s adoption of the procedures outlined therein, no such similar requirement has yet been adopted with respect to the procedures outlined in subsection (b). Because the parties have not raised the issue of whether subsection (b) requires an evidentiary hearing, and because a full evidentiary hearing was conducted here, we need not address that question.

       Defense counsel objected to Mantell’s testimony on the ground that he was not qualified to state an opinion about L because he had examined only documents and reports pertaining to her but had never examined her personally. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted him to testify, stating that the objection would go to the weight of the testimony.

       The trial court noted that L is hearing impaired and might need assistance with her hearing aids during the course of her testimony.

       Additionally, the trial court ordered that during L’s testimony (1) access to the courtroom would be restricted in the same manner as during the jury charge, (2) use of anatomically correct dolls or diagrams would be permitted, (3) leading questions would be permitted on direct examination where necessary, (4) counsel would be permitted to question the witness from a table positioned in front of the witness box, and (5) objections were to be made in a low voice so as not to startle the witness.

       Because of the trial court's earlier ruling regarding the presence of the guardian ad litem during L’s testimony, her testimony could not be heard when the guardian was unavailable to accompany her.

       The trial court properly instructed the jury that it should draw no adverse inference from the defendant’s failure to testify. Specifically, the trial court instructed: “Now, in this case the defendant did not take the witness stand and testify. The law does not compel the defendant to take the witness stand and to testify and no inference of guilt may be raised and no unfavorable inference at all may be drawn from the fact that the defendant decides not to testify. You must not permit such a fact to weigh in the slightest degree against the defendant, nor should it interfere into your discussions or deliberations at all.”

       Prior to the enactment of Public Acts 1977, No. 77-350, General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 54-84 (now § 54-84 [a]) provided in part: “The neglect or refusal of an accused party to testify shall not be commented upon to the court or jury.”


author: Dupont, C. J.

text:
    State of Connecticut v. James E. Milton
    (9600)
    Dupont, C. J., Daly and Foti, Js.
    Argued November 5, 1991
    decision released February 18, 1992

      J. Brendan Sharkey, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, and John Smriga, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Dupont, C. J.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), possession of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of General Statutes § 53a-211 (a), and possession of a machine gun in violation of General Statutes § 53-202 (c). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss filed on the basis of the failure to notify him of his statutory speedy trial rights pursuant to General Statutes §§ 54-82c and 54-82d. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The defendant was arrested on the charges underlying his conviction on July 15,1989. Having failed to make bond, the defendant was held in custody at the North Avenue correctional facility in Bridgeport. On December 20,1989, while those charges were still pending, the defendant was sentenced to a four year prison term for an unrelated charge and immediately began serving his sentence at the Somers correctional institution. Thereafter, the defendant was transferred to correctional facilities in Enfield and Cheshire before being transferred back to the Bridgeport facility on April 6,1990. On July 25,1990, the defendant filed the motion to dismiss that is the subject of this appeal. At the start of the defendant’s trial on July 26, 1990, he was still serving the four year prison term, which had commenced 218 days earlier.

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, additional facts were adduced. The department of correction had maintained a personal inmate file on the defendant since his incarceration on the unrelated charge on December 20,1989. Such a file follows an inmate from one institution to another as he is transferred through the facilities of the correctional system. The defendant’s inmate file contained a “rap sheet.” The rap sheet indicated the charges then pending against the defendant arising out of his July 15,1989 arrest. The file contained no indication that any correction official had given the defendant notice of his speedy trial rights under General Statutes § 54-82c. The defendant testified that he was never notified by any warden or other prison official of his speedy trial rights under § 54-82c while incarcerated at the Somers, Enfield, Cheshire or Bridgeport correctional facilities. The warden of the North Avenue correctional facility in Bridgeport testified that, pursuant to advice received from the office of the attorney general, inmates are not notified of their § 54-82c speedy trial rights concerning charges that are already pending and for which the inmate has already been arraigned at the time the inmate commences his term of imprisonment. The defendant never requested a final disposition of the charges against him pursuant to § 54-82c. Neither the state nor the defendant introduced any evidence regarding the effect, if any, the pending charges may have had on the conditions of the defendant’s incarceration, or on his ability to participate in rehabilitative or other programs while in prison.

In its memorandum of decision, the trial court articulated the following reasons in support of its decision to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss: (1) there was nothing in the defendant’s inmate file that would have put any correction official on notice of any untried indictment or information against the defendant; (2) correction officials did not have to provide notice to the defendant pursuant to § 54-82c because he had already been arraigned on the subject charges; (3) the defendant never requested final disposition of the pending charges pursuant to § 54-82c; and (4) constitutional speedy trial analysis did not require dismissal of the charges against the defendant.

This appeal revolves about the statutory interpretation of General Statutes § 54-82c. The brief legislative history of the bill that became § 54-82c indicates that its purpose was to “allow a prisoner who was committed to jail to ask that he be tried within 120 days on any information or indictment pending against him.” 7 S. Proc., Pt. 6,1957 Sess., p. 3712, remarks of Senator John H. Filer; Craig v. Bronson, 202 Conn. 93, 96, 520 A.2d 155 (1987). The rationale of affording speedier trials to those serving criminal sentences than to those not yet incarcerated has been previously explored by this court. See State v. Harris, 14 Conn. App. 244, 249, 540 A.2d 395 (1988); State v. Foshay, 12 Conn. App. 1, 530 A.2d 611 (1987). The rationale has also been considered by other courts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has thoroughly analyzed the concerns that arose because of the prior system that allowed detainers to remain on file against a prisoner without disposition, concerns that eventually led to the drafting and adoption of interstate and intrastate detainer statutes across the country. “The disadvantages and potential abuses of this system were many. Prison authorities often accorded detainers considerable weight in making decision with respect to the terms and conditions of the prisoner’s incarceration and release on parole. Sometimes the prisoner would automatically be held under maximum security. Sometimes he would be ineligible for special work programs, athletic programs, release for visits to relatives’ death beds or funerals, or special minimum security facilities. Often detainers precluded the granting of parole. . . .

“In addition, the pending charges forming the basis of a detainer might themselves significantly impede the development of a coherent program for the prisoner’s punishment and rehabilitation. . . . [P]arole boards and prison authorities found it difficult to formulate the prisoner’s rehabilitative program, since they were forced to act without knowing whether the prisoner would be convicted on the other pending charges.

“This same uncertainty also often adversely affected the prisoner’s attitude towards his own rehabilitation. . . .

“Moreover, the prisoner subject to a detainer was handicapped by delay in preparing for trial of the charge upon which it was based. As in all cases of trial delay, witnesses might die, evidence disappear, and memories fade.” United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737-40 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S. Ct. 1834, 56 L. Ed. 2d 329 (1978).

Similar concerns are reflected in the legislative history underlying General Statutes § 54-82c, our intrastate detainer statute. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 1, 1957 Sess., pp. 229-30, remarks of Representative Marjorie D. Farmer; id., pp. 230-31, remarks of Howard Jacobs.

General Statutes § 54-82c is patterned after General Statutes § 54-186, which is known as the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) and which applies to prisoners who are incarcerated in one state and face charges in another. “A primary purpose behind both statutes is to alleviate problems posed by outstanding detainers on efforts at prisoner rehabilitation. At committee hearings on the bill that became General Statutes § 54-82c, Representative Marjorie D. Farmer noted that ‘[a]ny program of rehabilitation which is undertaken in a penal institution is ineffective if a man has time hanging over his head.’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 1, 1957 Sess., p. 229. Similarly, proponents of the Interstate Agreement noted that the uncertainty and anxiety accompanying outstanding charges often inhibits prisoner response to training programs and thwarts efforts at rehabilitation. See United States v. Mauro, supra, 359; see also Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Federal and Intergovernmental Relations, 1957 Sess., pp. 37-42. General Statutes § 54-82c, like § 54-186, then, provides a mechanism by which an inmate can remove the uncertainty of pending charges and can compel a speedy resolution of those charges.” State v. Foshay, supra, 11—12; see also State v. Harris, supra, 248-49.

In order to further the purposes of § 54-82c, the statute places clear and unambiguous obligations on state correction officials. Whenever a person has begun a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution in this state, § 54-82c (c) provides in pertinent part that a “warden, community correctional center administrator or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him in writing of the source and contents of any untried indictment or information against him concerning which the warden, administrator or other official has knowledge and of his right to make a request for final disposition thereof.” This provision, by its very terms, places two related but independent obligations on correction officials: (1) to inform a prisoner of charges pending against him; and (2) to inform the prisoner of his right to request speedy disposition of those charges.

In order to dispose of this appeal, we must decide whether the correction officials failed to fulfill both obligations of the statute, and whether these obligations must be fulfilled even if the defendant is aware of the charges pending against him. If the former questions are both answered in the affirmative, we must also decide whether the charges against the defendant must be dismissed.

I

The Obligation to Inform

The trial court found that “[t]here is nothing in [the defendant’s personal inmate] file that would have put any warden, community correctional center administrator or any other official having custody of the prisoner on notice of any untried indictment or information against him.” If this finding is correct, then the defendant’s claims necessarily fail because the notification requirements of subsection (c) of the statute are made operable only when a correctional official “has knowledge” of “any untried indictment or information” against a prisoner. We conclude that this finding is not supported by the evidence of record, and, therefore, it cannot stand.

“On appeal, it is the function of this court to determine whether the decision of the trial court is clearly erroneous. See Practice Book § [4061]. . . . [W]here the factual basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous.” Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980); Forox Corporation v. Groppo, 24 Conn. App. 72, 77, 585 A.2d 707 (1991).

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Warden Edward Davies testified that the defendant’s inmate file, which was maintained since the date of his initial imprisonment, at each correctional institution to which the defendant was transferred, contained a rap sheet. The rap sheet indicated the precise charges on which the defendant was arrested on July 15,1989, and indicated that those charges were pending. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the undisputed evidence shows that correction officials had notice of the charges pending against the defendant.

The state next argues that while the rap sheet may have provided correction officials with notice of the charges pending against the defendant, it did not provide knowledge of “the source and contents of any untried . . . information” within the meaning of § 54-82c. The state claims that something more than awareness on the part of the warden that a case is pending is required to activate the remedial provisions of the statute. That something, according to the state, is a detainer.

The word detainer does not appear in the text of § 54-82c. Our courts, however, have incorporated the term detainer in the intrastate act. See, e.g., Craig v. Bronson, supra, 104 (referring to § 54-82c as a “detainer statute”); State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 585-86, 504 A.2d 1036 (1986) (§ 54-82c provides “a statutory method by which an inmate of a Connecticut penal institution who has a detainer placed against him can request and receive an expedited disposition of pending charges”); State v. Foshay, supra, 11 (noting that a primary purpose behind § 54-82c “is to alleviate problems posed by outstanding detainers”). The use of the word detainer in these cases is warranted by the title of the 1957 legislative enactment, Public Acts 1957, No. 551, now codified at § 54-82c, and its legislative history. Public Acts 1957, No. 551, is entitled “An Act Concerning Disposition of Detainers within this State.” House Bill 683, which became Public Acts 1957, No. 551, contained the following statement of purpose: “To make it possible for a prisoner to institute disposition of detainers.” Both the title of a bill and its statement of purpose are valuable aids to construction. Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, 204 Conn. 399, 405, 528 A.2d 805 (1987). Moreover, Public Acts 1957, No. 551, was modeled after a proposal of the Committee of State Officials on Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments in its 1957 program, which also advocated adoption of an Agreement on Detainers for prompt disposition of charges against out-of-state prisoners. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 1, 1957 Sess., pp. 229-30, remarks of Representative Marjorie D. Farmer. A review of the Council of State Governments report leaves little doubt that the intrastate act is intended to apply to detainers, as does its interstate counterpart, which is replete with use of the term detainer. See Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation Program for 1957, pp. 74-86.

Having concluded that a detainer is required to invoke the notification provisions of § 54-82c (c), we now turn to the question of whether the rap sheet in the defendant’s inmate file constituted a detainer for purposes of the intrastate act. We have found no case that presents this issue for resolution and, therefore, we know of no case that holds that a rap sheet is or is not the equivalent of a detainer. Interpretations of the interstate agreement on detainers (IAD), however, are helpful in our resolution of this issue. There is abundant authority for the proposition that the intrastate and the interstate legislation should be similarly interpreted because they impliedly have the same legislative intent; Craig v. Bronson, supra, 104-105; State v. Foshay, supra, 12-13; although we recognize that there may sometimes be reason to interpret the intrastate legislation on detainers differently from the interstate legislation. State v. Anonymous (1980-6), 36 Conn. Sup. 327, 331-32, 419 A.2d 904 (1980).

The IAD contains no definition of the word detainer. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359, 98 S. Ct. 1834, 56 L. Ed. 2d 329 (1978). The United States Supreme Court has accepted the congressionally approved definition of a detainer as “ ‘a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.’ ” Id., quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-1018, p.2 (1970), and S. Rep. No. 91-1356, p.2 (1970). A detainer, however, need not take any particular form; its purpose is to provide “written notice to prison authorities . . . that charges are pending against the prisoner.” Gilbreath v. State, 651 P.2d 699, 701 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); see also United States v. Mauro, supra, 358 (“a detainer merely puts the officials of the institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated on notice that the prisoner is wanted in another jurisdiction for trial upon his release from prison”); Smith v. Liburdi, 26 Conn. App. 254, 256, 600 A.2d 17 (1991). Thus, a letter from a police department to prison officials; People v. Browning, 108 Mich. App. 281, 291-92, 310 N.W.2d 365 (1981); a letter from the clerk of court to prison officials; People v. Beamon, 83 Mich. App. 121, 132, 268 N.W.2d 310 (1978); and a letter from a prosecuting attorney to prison officials; Riley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 409, 412, 349 S.E.2d 274 (1986); have all been held to fall within the IAD definition of a detainer. This view of what constitutes a detainer accords well with the requirement that the IAD “shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.” General Statutes § 54-186, Article IX.

These authorities serve as a guide for the answer to the question of whether the rap sheet in the defendant’s prison inmate file constituted a detainer for purposes of § 54-82c. See Remick v. Lopes, 203 Conn. 494, 498, 525 A.2d 502 (1987). The rap sheet in this case provided prison officials with information concerning the precise charges pending against the defendant as a result of his July 15, 1989 arrest. Although the informal nature of this notice to prison officials may have left some questions unanswered concerning the source or contents of the untried information in question, we conclude that, in the context of the intrastate act, the rap sheet in this case sufficed as a detainer. Should the correction officials have desired more information, a minimal effort would have allowed them to gather any additional data about the intrastate charges. To require more formal notice in order to invoke the remedial provisions of the intrastate act, as is urged by the state, would exalt form over substance. The notice, here the rap sheet, informed prison officials of the continuing prosecution against the defendant. The spectre of that prosecution for the pending charges was sufficient to produce “ ‘the uncertainty and anxiety accompanying outstanding charges [that] often inhibits prisoner response to training programs and thwarts efforts at rehabilitation,” which the act was intended to address. State v. Foshay, supra, 11.

The rap sheet in the defendant’s inmate file, which came to the attention of correctional officials having custody of him, was sufficient to serve as a detainer.

II

Relevance of the Prisoner’s Knowledge of the Pending Charges

The defendant claims that because he was not notified of the charges pending against him, he could not request a final disposition of the pending charges, and that his knowledge of the pending charges or his arraignment as to those charges did not exonerate the correction officials of their obligation to inform him of his right to request a speedy trial. The trial court concluded that the failure of correction officials to notify the defendant pursuant to § 54-82c (c) was not due to any malfeasance on the part of correction officials, “but rather compliance with advice from the attorney general’s office indicating that the notice required by statute applied only to untried indictments or informations the existence of which a prisoner might be unaware.” Because we conclude that notice to a prisoner by correction officials of the right to request speedy disposition of pending charges is required notwithstanding the prisoner’s awareness of the charges, we cannot sustain the decision of the trial court on this ground.

By its terms, § 54-82c (c) has placed the obligation on correction officials to notify prisoners of their particular speedy trial rights. To allow prison officials to escape this duty on the basis of a prisoner’s awareness of the charges against him would be contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. The duty would have little meaning if it did not exist when a prisoner is aware that charges against him remain outstanding, since such an awareness is almost always present. Nor has the legislature made a distinction between prisoners who know little of the criminal system and those who have been prisoners on many occasions. In fact, the purpose of the act is most likely to be best served when the prisoner is not a stranger to incarceration.

“On the few occasions that we have had the opportunity to apply General Statutes [§ 54-82c] ... we have required strict compliance with the statutory notice procedures.” State v. Toste, supra, 588. In addition, there is nothing in the record on which to conclude, nor does it necessarily follow, that the defendant’s knowledge of the charges against him provided him with any information concerning his speedy trial rights pursuant to § 54-82c or the statutory method of invoking those rights. To conclude otherwise would nullify the separate and independent obligation placed by the statute on prison officials “promptly [to] inform [a prisoner] in writing ... of his right to make a request for final disposition” of any untried indictment or information against him. General Statutes § 54-82c (c). “Because of the importance of this requirement, a [warden’s] failure to fulfill the duties imposed by [§ 54-82c] is itself a violation of the [detainer statute], independent of any violation of the requirement that the prisoner be brought to trial within [120] days of receipt of the prisoner’s request by the court and the prosecuting official. . . .” People v. Trancoso, 776 P.2d 874, 377-78 (Colo. 1989); People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 996 (Colo. 1986); see also State v. Fitch, 37 Ohio App. 3d 159, 162, 524 N.E.2d 912 (1987).

The failure of correction officials to notify the defendant of the charges pending against him and of his right to demand speedy disposition of the pending charges, violated the provisions of the act, regardless of his knowledge of the pending charges.

Ill

The Remedy

The defendant argues that dismissal of the charges against him is the penalty to be exacted from the state for its violation of General Statutes § 54-82c.

General Statutes § 54-82d provides a remedy of dismissal if the state does not try the defendant within 120 days after the defendant invokes his statutory speedy trial rights and the warden causes the same to be delivered to the court and prosecuting authority. No remedy, however, was expressly created by the legislature for a violation of the notice requirement of § 54-82c (c). In a case involving a delay by New Jersey prison officials in providing a prisoner with IAD forms and forwarding them to Connecticut officials as required by the IAD, our Supreme Court concluded that, in the absence of a statutorily prescribed remedy, “this defendant’s right to prompt IAD notification can appropriately be protected by invoking the balancing principles of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), which determine when a deprivation of [constitutional] speedy trial rights requires dismissal of criminal charges against a defendant.” State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78, 89, 554 A.2d 686, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912, 109 S. Ct. 3230, 106 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1989). Because a failure by prison authorities to notify a prisoner of his rights under § 54-82c (c) does not fall within the express terms of § 54-82d, we follow the Herring court’s reliance on a constitutional speedy trial analysis.

The four factors that form the matrix of an analysis under Barker v. Wingo, supra, are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant. Id., 530; State v. Herring, supra, 89-90; State v. Foshay, supra, 13. “A balancing test is to be applied on a case by case basis. None of the factors standing alone demands a set disposition; rather it is the total mix which determines whether the defendant’s right was violated.” State v. Foshay, supra, 13-14.

In conducting this analysis, however, we recognize that a complete failure to notify the defendant of his statutory rights and how to invoke them, as opposed to a delay in the processing of his request, will skew the four factors found in Barker v. Wingo, supra. Any analysis must not permit the state to benefit from its statutory violation. “We would be remiss in our obligation to effectuate the . . . purposes and principles [of the intrastate detainer statute] if we were simply to ignore such a violation.” State v. Herring, supra, 89.

First, we examine the length of the delay in the present case. Had the defendant been promptly notified of his statutory speedy trial rights by prison officials as required by § 54-82c, he could have requested speedy disposition of the charges against him as early as the commencement of his term of imprisonment. In the absence of such notification by prison officials, the calculation of time for statutory speedy trial purposes must be viewed as having commenced upon the triggering of the state’s duty to give notice of the right to demand speedy disposition. State v. Fitch, supra. The length of the delay here, therefore, runs from the date of the defendant’s incarceration (December 20, 1989) until the commencement of the defendant’s trial (July 26, 1990), a period of seven months. A delay of seven months, while certainly “not an overwhelming period of time” for constitutional speedy trial purposes; State v. Brown, 172 Conn. 531, 536, 375 A.2d 1024, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S. Ct. 153, 54 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1977); is longer than the 120 day period established by § 54-82c.

Application of the Barker balancing test next requires a consideration of the reasons for the delay. As previously noted, the delay was occasioned by the state’s noncompliance with the notification requirements of § 54-82c (c). The defendant was not notified of his statutory speedy trial rights because he was a postarraignment, pretrial detainee with respect to the outstanding charges at the time he entered upon a term of imprisonment at a state correctional facility. Warden Edward Davies testified that the failure to comply with § 54-82c (c) reflected a policy involved in such cases.' This testimony indicates a deliberate and systematic policy that necessarily undermines a prisoner’s speedy trial rights under the statute. As such, this reason for the delay must be weighed heavily against the state. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, supra, 531.

As to the third Barker factor, it goes without saying that the defendant did not vigorously assert his right to a speedy trial under § 54-82c. He first indicated his reliance on § 54-82c when he filed his motion to dismiss on the eve of trial. While our consideration of his failure to seek speedy disposition of the charges against him pursuant to § 54-82c cannot logically be separated from the failure of prison officials to advise him of his right to do so; see State v. Fitch, supra; we find it significant that at no time during the pendency of the charges against him did the defendant request a speedy trial to effectuate his separate constitutional speedy trial rights. The failure of the defendant to assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial and the state’s failure to notify him of his statutory rights under § 54-82c precludes reliable use of this factor in our analysis. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, supra, 530 n.30. On the basis of the record before us, therefore, this factor weighs in favor of neither the defendant nor the state. See Phillips v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 400-401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

The final Barker factor that we must consider is prejudice caused by the delay. “Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect.” Barker v. Wingo, supra, 532. Our detainer statute, however, was intended to supplement and expand the speedy trial rights of prisoners for reasons distinct from those underlying constitutional speedy trial concerns. Thus, “[w]hen faced with a situation such as is presented here, a court should analyze the implications of the violation for the defendant’s prison rehabilitation program as well as the subsidiary concern of the impact of the violation on the defendant’s speedy trial rights.” People v. Higinbotham, supra, 998.

The seven month delay here caused the defendant to wait only three additional months beyond the 120 day period set forth in the statute for the disposition of the charges against him. Given that the defendant had only recently commenced a four year prison term, it is very unlikely that any of the concerns involved in the passage of § 54-82c; see United States v. Ford, supra; would have come into play during the three additional months of incarceration suffered by the defendant before the disposition of the pending charges. Moreover, the defendant’s failure to request a speedy trial pursuant to his constitutional speedy trial rights, coupled with the startling lack of any evidence of record suggesting that he would have invoked his rights under General Statutes § 54-82c had he been properly informed of them, lead us to the conclusion that the effect of the violation of the defendant’s rights here was minimal or nonexistent. In light of the lack of any evidence that the conditions of the defendant’s incarceration including his ability to participate in particular prison programs was adversely affected by the delay caused by the statutory violation, we must resolve the final Barker factor against the defendant.

We recognize that “the linchpin of the speedy trial cláim is a showing of prejudice.” State v. Lloyd, 185 Conn. 199, 209, 440 A.2d 867 (1981); see also State v. Herring, supra, 90; State v. Foshay, supra, 15. Applying the principles of Barker v. Wingo, supra, to the facts of this case, we conclude that the appropriate remedy for the violation of the defendant’s statutory speedy trial rights is not dismissal of the charges. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the criminal charges against him.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       “[General Statutes] Sec. 54-82c. prisoner’s right to speedy trial ON PENDING CHARGES, (a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution of this state and, during the continuance of the term of imprisonment, there is pending in this state any untried indictment or information against such prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred twenty days after he has caused to be delivered, to the state’s attorney or assistant state’s attorney of the judicial district or geographical area, in which the indictment or information is pending, and to the appropriate court, written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition to be made of the indictment or information. For good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the warden, community correctional center administrator or other official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner.

        “(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in subsection (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, community correctional center administrator or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
      “(c) The warden, community correctional center administrator or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him in writing of the source and contents of any untried indictment or information against him concerning which the warden, administrator or other official has knowledge and of his right to make a request for final disposition thereof.
      “(d) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final disposition referred to in subsection (a) hereof shall void the request.”
      “[General Statutes] Sec. 54-82d. dismissal of charges on failure to grant prisoner speedy trial. If an action is not assigned for trial within the period of time as provided in section 54-82c, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried indictment or information be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same.”

       At oral argument in this court, the state indicated that no such written advice was ever given by the attorney general.

       The rap sheet referred to by Warden Edward Davies in his testimony was never introduced into evidence or marked for identification. The state contends that our review of this document is crucial and that the defendant has not satisfied his obligation to provide this court with an adequate record for review. Practice Book § 4061. According to the state, a determination of whether the rap sheet contained “the source and contents of any untried . . . information” requires our review of the document. We do not agree.
      First, the testimony of Davies was specific as to the content of the defendant’s rap sheet. Reading from the rap sheet contained in the defendant’s personal inmate file, he was able to state the exact charges still pending against the defendant arising out of his July 15, 1989 arrest. Our review of the document itself is unnecessary where there was testimony concerning the contents of the document and where the veracity of those contents is undisputed.
      Second, Davies testified that this information concerning the pending charges, which was contained in the defendant’s inmate file, was available to any correctional official having custody of the defendant. The file was created on December 20, 1989, and it followed the defendant as he was transferred as a state prisoner within the correctional system. The inmate file, therefore, adequately notified correctional officials of the July 15,1989 charges against the defendant and their pending status beginning on December 20, 1989.

       See footnote 2, supra.

       See footnote 1, supra.

       Subsections 1 (a) and 1 (b) of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act are strikingly similar to General Statutes § 54-82c, but subsection 1 (c) of the Uniform Act provides a remedy for the type of statutory violation at issue in this case: “Failure of the [warden, commissioner of correction or other official] to inform a prisoner, as required by this section, within one year after a detainer has been filed at the institution shall entitle him to a final dismissal of the [indictment, information or complaint] with prejudice.” 11 Uniform Laws Annotated 328. The Uniform Act was proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1958, one year after the enactment of our intrastate act concerning the disposition of detainers. Section 54-82c, however, has been amended in 1961, 1963, 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1980, without providing for a provision similar to that of section 1 (c) of the Uniform Act.