text:
    CITY OF BRIDGEPORT v. WHITE EAGLE’S SOCIETY OF BROTHERLY HELP, INC., ET AL.
    (AC 33977)
    Lavine, Robinson and Pellegrino, Js.

      Argued November 27, 2012
    officially released February 12, 2013

      John T. Bochanis, for the appellant (named defendant).

      Walter M. Spader, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

ROBINSON, J.

The defendant White Eagle’s Society of Brotherly Help, Inc., appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court on its counterclaim brought against the plaintiff, the city of Bridgeport, to enforce a stipulated judgment rendered in a prior action. The defendant claims that the court improperly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact and granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the counterclaim was barred because the defendant had failed to avail itself of statutory remedies available pursuant to General Statutes § § 12-111 or 12-119. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The defendant is the record owner of several parcels of real property located in Bridgeport, including two parcels described as 695 East Washington Avenue and 617-621 East Washington Avenue (subject properties). In 2002, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment, in which they agreed to settle an action arising from the defendant’s failure to pay property taxes for various real estate holdings, including the subject properties, for the years 1996 through 2000. The stipulated judgment provided that the defendant was entitled to a 40 percent tax exemption for the years at issue in the action, thereby reducing the amount of back taxes it owed to the plaintiff. The judgment further provided that the defendant would pay its back taxes in quarterly installments over a period of five years. Finally, the judgment provided that the 40 percent exemption would “remain in place so long as the same use of the property is maintained . . . .”

In February, 2007, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose on new tax hens resulting from the defendant’s alleged nonpayment of property taxes for the subject properties as assessed on the October 1, 2004 grand list. The defendant filed an answer and special defenses, in which it alleged that it had paid all applicable taxes in accordance with the terms of the 2002 stipulated judgment and that the plaintiff was not taxing the defendant’s properties in accordance with that judgment.

On March 31,2009, the defendant filed a counterclaim in the foreclosure action, which restated its allegations that the plaintiff “has failed to comply with the [2002] stipulated judgment and ha[s] proceeded to file tax hens on the . . . [defendant’s] properties and ha[s] failed to properly apply the agreed upon tax exemption.” By way of relief, the counterclaim sought an order requiring the plaintiff to comply with the terms of the stipulated judgment. See Bank of Boston Connecticut v. DeGroff 31 Conn. App. 253, 256, 624 A.2d 904 (1993) (court has power to issue orders necessary to protect integrity of stipulated judgment). The plaintiff filed an answer denying the allegations that it had faded to act in accordance with the stipulated judgment; the plaintiff raised no special defenses to the counterclaim.

According to the plaintiff, in December, 2009, the defendant paid its outstanding 2004 tax obligation. As a result, on January 26, 2010, the plaintiff withdrew its foreclosure complaint. The counterclaim, nevertheless, remained on the docket. See Practice Book § 10-66 (counterclaim survives withdrawal of underlying complaint); 98 Lords Highway, LLC v. One Hundred Lords Highway, LLC, 138 Conn. App. 776, 790, 54 A.3d 232 (2012) (same).

On June 1, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to the counterclaim, arguing that the counterclaim was barred as a matter of law because the defendant should have sought relief in a tax appeal pursuant to §§ 12-111 or 12-119. On October 6, 2011, the defendant filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, arguing that because it was seeking the enforcement of a stipulated judgment rather than directly challenging a tax assessment or the imposition of an illegal tax, its counterclaim was properly before the court. The court issued orders on October 12, 2011, granting the motion for summary judgment and overruling the objection. This appeal followed.

“Our standard of review is well established. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ... On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [a] . . . motion for summary judgment is plenary. . . .

“An appellate court’s review of a trial court decision is circumscribed by the appropriate standard of review. . . . When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.P. Alexandre, LLC v. Egbuna, 137 Conn. App. 340, 346-47, 49 A.3d 222, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 913, 53 A.3d 1000 (2012).

The defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the court erred in rendering summary judgment on the ground that adjudication of the counterclaim was barred as a matter of law because the defendant should have raised its issues in a statutory action brought pursuant to § § 12-111 or 12-119. The defendant argues that the plaintiff failed to raise that ground as a special defense and, therefore, the court should not have considered the argument. The defendant also argues that because the counterclaim did not directly challenge a tax assessment or the imposition of an illegal tax, but rather sought to enforce the parties’ 2002 stipulated judgment, the case law relied on by the plaintiff in its motion for summary judgment and by the trial court was inapplicable. We decline to address the first argument because it was never raised to the trial court and are not persuaded by the second argument.

The defendant first argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because the plaintiff failed to raise by way of a special defense its theory that the counterclaim should be barred on the basis of the availability of other statutory remedies. The defendant, however, never raised its special defense argument in its opposition to the motion for summary judgment or at oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. We will not consider on appeal an argument that was never raised to or considered by the trial court. See Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 264 Conn. 509, 534, 825 A.2d 72 (2003) (declining to consider argument in opposition to summary judgment raised for first time on appeal).

We next turn to the defendant’s argument that its failure to pursue a statutory remedy pursuant to §§ 12-111 or 12-119 should not have precluded adjudication of the claims raised in its counterclaim because the counterclaim did not directly challenge a tax; assessment or the imposition of an illegal tax, but only sought enforcement of the parties’ 2002 stipulated judgment. “Our Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that a taxpayer wishing to contest the legality of its tax assessments must follow prescribed statutory procedures. . . . Where the General Assembly has established complete, adequate and speedy statutory remedies for alleged tax irregularities, a taxpayer must exhaust them. ... A taxpayer who has not sought redress in an appropriate manner is foreclosed from continuing litigation outside these statutes. ... By failing to contest the assessments of the parcel properly, the defendant has effectively waived his right to challenge them. . . . Indeed, direct judicial adjudication is not warranted when the relief sought by a litigant may have been obtained through an alternative statutory procedure which the litigant has chosen to ignore.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Farmington v. Dowling, 26 Conn. App. 545, 549-50, 602 A.2d 1047 (1992), appeal dismissed, 224 Conn. 592, 619 A.2d 852 (1993).

In the present case, the central allegation of the counterclaim was that the defendant had not received the 40 percent tax exemption that it believed it remained entitled to pursuant to the terms of the 2002 stipulated judgment and that the plaintiff was failing to abide by the terms of that judgment. A tax appeal pursuant to § 12-111 is the proper vehicle for an aggrieved taxpayer to challenge “the doings of the assessors . . . .” General Statutes § 12-111 (a). One of the duties of a city’s board of assessors is to monitor the tax assessor’s handling of applicable tax exemptions. See Covenant Home, Inc. v. Cromwell, 47 Conn. Sup. 60, 63-64, 777 A.2d 216 (2000), aff'd and adopted, 63 Conn. App. 337, 775 A.2d 1003 (2001). Accordingly, if the defendant believed that the assessor erred in determining that the same use of the property was no longer maintained as stated in the stipulation and the assessment therefore did not properly reflect an applicable tax exemption, the defendant was aggrieved by the doings of an assessor and could have sought to correct the alleged error by filing a § 12-111 tax appeal. Additionally, whenever a city levies a tax on property that is subject to a tax exemption, that is an illegal exaction that is amenable to redress in an action brought pursuant to § 12-119. See Faith Center, Inc. v. Hartford, 192 Conn. 434, 437, 472 A.2d 16, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018, 105 S. Ct. 432, 83 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1984). Thus, the defendant also could have sought to enforce its right to an exemption under the stipulated judgment in a § 12-119 action. In sum, we agree with the court’s order overruling the defendant’s objection to the motion for summary judgment, in which the court found that the issues the defendant sought to adjudicate by counterclaim could have been addressed earlier by following appropriate statutory procedures, “either by (1) timely appealing from the assessments to the city’s board of assessment appeals pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-111 and 12-112, and from there by timely appealing to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a, or (2) timely bringing a direct action pursuant to General Statutes § 12-119.” Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 12-14, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999).

Although the defendant argues that there remains a factual dispute as to whether it has maintained “the same use of the property” so as to warrant a continuation of the 40 percent tax exemption as provided for in the 2002 stipulated agreement, that disputed fact was not material to the court’s summary judgment determination. That factual issue and whether the plaintiff had a continuing obligation to abide by the terms of the stipulated judgment are exactly what should have been submitted to the administrative tax appeal process, and the defendant’s failure to seek such redress foreclosed it from seeking untimely adjudication by way of its counterclaim. The trial court’s conclusion that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law was legally and logically correct and finds support in the facts that appear in the record.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The complaint in this matter, which sought to foreclose on municipal tax liens, was withdrawn prior to judgment on the counterclaim. The complaint named Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut, the water pollution control authority for the city of Bridgeport, Yousseff Makhraz and the Polish National Alliance of the United States of North America as additional party defendants by virtue of interests that each held in the subject properties that were subsequent in right to the tax liens being foreclosed. Those defendants were not parties to the counterclaim that is the subject matter of this appeal. Hereafter, all references in this opinion to the defendant are to White Eagle’s Society of Brotherly Help, Inc.

       General Statutes § 12-111 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any person . . . claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of the assessors of such town may appeal therefrom to the board of assessment appeals. . . . Such board may equalize and adjust the grand list of such town and may increase or decrease the assessment of any taxable property or interest therein . . . .”
      General Statutes § 12-119 provides in relevant part- “When it is claimed that a tax has been laid on property not taxable in the town or city in whose tax list such property was set, or that a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof . . . may, in addition to the other remedies provided by law, make application for relief to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated. ... In all such actions, the Superior Court shall have power to grant such relief upon such terms and in such manner and form as to justice and equity appertains, and costs may be taxed at the discretion of the court. If such assessment is reduced by said court, the applicant shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any overpayment of taxes in accordance with the judgment of said court.”

       In its brief, the defendant describes itself as “a Polish organization which promotes Polish culture, education and fellowship of individuals of Polish descent.”

       The statutory basis of the exemption provided for in the stipulated agreement is not apparent from the record; see General Statutes § 12-81 (setting forth exemptions from property taxation); see also Plastic Tooling Aids Laboratory, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 213 Conn. 365, 369, 567 A.2d 1218 (1990) (tax exemptions are “matter of legislative grace”); however, our resolution of this appeal does not require identification of the exact exemption at issue.

       The trial court issued postcard decisions in this matter rather than a detailed memorandum of decision setting forth the factual and legal basis for its decision. Although the court’s order stated that summary judgment was granted “as to liability only”; see Broadnax v. New Haven, 294 Conn. 280, 297, 984 A.2d 658 (2009) (judgment rendered only upon issue of liability ordinarily not final judgment for purposes of appeal); the ruling nevertheless effectively disposed of the defendant’s counterclaim without the need for any additional proceedings, such as a hearing in damages; accordingly, the court’s decision was an appealable final judgment. See Evans v. General Motors Corp., 277 Conn. 496, 507-508, 893 A.2d 371 (2006) (proper to look beyond wording to effect of decision in deciding existence of appealable final judgment).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVID J. HENDERSON ET AL.
    (AC 34140)
    Gruendel, Beach and Peters, Js.
    Argued December 10, 2012
    officially released February 12, 2013

      Daniel Henderson, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

      Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Christopher Malany, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and Rana Cathc-

      art, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This case arises out of governmental actions to shut down, as a public nuisance, an establishment that described itself as an “adult business.” Without the consent of the city in which the property is located, the state and the owners of the property entered into a stipulated judgment to permit the use of the property under stated conditions. On appeal, one of the owners of the adult business challenges the court’s denial of his motion for enforcement of the stipulated judgment. We affirm the judgment of the court.

On April 30,2009, pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-343, the plaintiff, the state of Connecticut, filed an action to abate a public nuisance against the defendants, David J. Henderson, Daniel Henderson, Laura Kuhl, Cityscape Real Estate Holding, Inc., and the real property known as 2041 North Broad Street, Meriden, Connecticut, a.k.a. “2041 Club.” On September 10, 2009, prior to the presentation of evidence at trial, the court vacated the temporary restraining orders that it had issued on April 30, 2009, and rendered a stipulation for judgment in accordance with the parties’ written agreement of that date.

The stipulation for judgment provided, inter alia, that the business known as “2041 Club,” located at 2041 North Broad Street in Meriden, “shall remain closed and not reopen for business,” and that the named defendants would not operate any business there in the future. It further provided that any future purchaser of the property would have to be preapproved by the Division of Criminal Justice and would be required to comply with specific restrictions on the use of the property. The city of Meriden (city) was not a signatory to the stipulated judgment.

On October 16, 2009, David J. Henderson and Daniel Henderson entered into a contract to sell the 2041 Club to Jess Daenekindt for $400,000. Although the Division of Criminal Justice approved the sale, it was not consummated because city officials informed Daenekindt that no adult business would be permitted to operate at that property.

The defendant then filed a motion to enforce the stipulated judgment. Noting only that, in the court’s view, he had no standing to pursue such a motion, the court denied it without issuing a written decision, and also denied his subsequent motions for reconsideration, for articulation and for contempt. Although he has appealed from that judgment, the defendant has not filed a motion with this court, pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5, directing the trial court to articulate the grounds for its decision.

On the record before us, there is no evidence to support the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to enforce the stipulated judgment. The record does not substantiate the defendant’s present allegation that the city was in any way bound by the terms of the stipulated judgment between the state and the Hendersons. The transcript of the proceedings on September 10, 2009, when the court, B. Fischer, J., approved the stipulation for judgment, contains nothing to suggest that the city formally appeared at that hearing. Furthermore, the transcript documents that “there [had been] some discussion between the parties — the Hendersons and the State,” without any reference to the city. Finally, on the record, Judge Fischer meticulously canvassed the parties that had agreed to be bound by the stipulated judgment. The city, however, was not so canvassed.

To prevail on this appeal, in light of the record, would require a demonstration that the city was bound by the terms of a contract to which it was not a party and to which it did not, in any other way, manifest its assent. See, e.g., FCM Group, Inc. v. Miller, 300 Conn. 774, 797-98, 17 A.3d 40 (2011). We know of no authority supporting such a proposition, and the defendant has cited none.

The judgment is affirmed.

       General Statutes § 19a-343, titled “Action to abate public nuisance after three or more arrests or arrest warrants. Offenses,” provides, in relevant part: “(a) For the purposes of sections 19a-343 to 19a-343h, inclusive, a person creates or maintains a public nuisance if such person erects, establishes, maintains, uses, owns or leases any real property or portion thereof for any of the purposes enumerated in subdivisions (1) to (11), inclusive, of subsection (c) of this section. . . .
      “(c) Three or more arrests, or the issuance of three or more arrest warrants indicating a pattern of criminal activity and not isolated incidents, for the following offenses shall constitute the basis for bringing an action to abate a public nuisance:
      “(1) Prostitution under section 53a-82, 53a-83, 53a-86, 53a-87, 53a-88 or 53a-89.
      “(2) Promoting an obscene performance or obscene material under section 53a-196 or 53a-196b, employing a minor in an obscene performance under section 53a-196a, importing child pornography under section 53a-196c, possessing child pornography in the first degree -under section 53a-196d, possessing child pornography in the second degree under section 53a-196e or possessing child pornography in the third degree under section 53a-196f.
      “(3) Transmission of gambling information under section 53-278b or 53-278d or maintaining of a gambling premises under section 53-278e.
      “(4) Offenses for the sale of controlled substances, possession of controlled substances with intent to sell, or maintaining a drug factory under section 21a-277, 21a-278 or 21a-278a or use of the property by persons possessing controlled substances under section 21a-279. Nothing in this section shall prevent the state from also proceeding against property under section 21a-259 or 54-36h.

        “(5) Unauthorized sale of alcoholic liquor under section 30-74 or disposing of liquor without a permit under section 30-77.
      “(6) Violations of the inciting injury to persons or property law under section 53a-179a.
      “(7) Maintaining a motor vehicle chop shop under section 14-149a.
      “(8) Murder or manslaughter under section 53a-54a, 53a-54b, 53a-55, 53a-56 or 53a-56a.
      “(9) Assault under section 53a-59, 53a-59a, subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53a-60 or section 53a-60a.
      “(10) Sexual assault under section 53a-70 or 53a-70a.
      “(11) Fire safety violations under section 29-292, subsection (b) of section 29-310, or section 29-315, 29-317, 29-320, 29-325, 29-329, 29-337, 29-349 or 29-357.”
      We note that Public Acts 2009, No. 09-177, § 20, and Public Acts 2009, No. 10-54, § 6, made changes to § 19a-343 (c) (11) that are not relevant to this appeal. We refer to the revision of § 19a-343 that was in effect at the time of the incidents that occurred in this case.

       Daniel Henderson is the only defendant involved in this appeal. Hereafter, references to the defendant are to Daniel Henderson.

       According to the state, Daenekindt unsuccessfully appealed to the city zoning board of appeals for a special exception use.

       Practice Book § 66-5 provides in relevant part: “A motion seeking . . . an articulation or further articulation of the decision of the trial court shall be called a motion for rectification or a motion for articulation, whichever is applicable.”

       We note that the fact that the defendant has filed his appeal without the assistance of counsel does not relieve him of the burden “[to provide] an adequate record for appellate review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wahab, 122 Conn. App. 537, 542, 2 A.3d 7, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 918, 4 A.3d 1230 (2010).


author: BEAR, J.

text:
    MARY V. CUNNINGHAM v. GERARD J. CUNNINGHAM
    (AC 33403)
    Graendel, Bear and Flynn, Js.

      Argued November 13, 2012
    officially released February 12, 2013

      Kenneth J. Bartschi, with whom were Wesley W. Horton and Joseph T. O’Connor, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Thomas M. Shanley, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

BEAR, J.

The plaintiff, Mary V. Cunningham, appeals from the judgment of the trial court setting forth its financial orders incident to the dissolution of the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant, Gerard J. Cunningham. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) abused its discretion in the manner in which it divided the defendant’s nonqualified, nonfunded retirement plan (nonqualified plan) and that the division is unworkable and (2) abused its discretion in crafting its alimony award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are necessary to our determination of the issues presented. On March 9,2011, the court rendered a judgment of dissolution, terminating the nearly twenty-two year marriage of the parties. The court, inter alia, also entered extensive financial orders, certain of which, the court later clarified in an articulation. The court, in part, ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff $20,000 per month in alimony until January 31, 2018, or until either party dies or the plaintiff remarries or enters into a civil union. The court ordered that alimony was nonmodifiable as to term and that the amount of alimony also was nonmodifiable by the defendant if the sole basis for a modification is that the annual gross earnings of the plaintiff are $36,000 or less. The court also ordered in relevant part that the defendant’s nonqualified plan, which is provided to him through his employer, Deloitte Consulting, LLC (Deloitte), “be divided by means of a [d]omestic [Relations [o]rder ... 60 [percent] to the [defendant] and 60 [percent] to the [plaintiff].” The court further ordered: “Unless the parties shall otherwise agree, the [defendant] shall elect a 60 [percent] joint and survivor annuity, so-called, and in the event that the [defendant] shall predecease the [plaintiff] prior to drawing his pension, the [plaintiff] shall be entitled to 100 [percent] of that portion of the preretirement benefit vested and accrued as of [March 9, 2011]. Any benefit vesting and accruing thereafter shall belong to the [defendant]. The foregoing notwithstanding, it is the intention of the court that for purposes of calculating the coverture period for either the retirement or preretirement benefit, that the numerator of the fraction shall be equal to the length of time in whole months, beginning with the first day of the month in which the parties were married and ending with the last day of the month in which the marriage was dissolved, and that the denominator shall be equal to the length of time in whole months, beginning with the first day of the month in which the [defendant] commenced employment with Deloitte and ending with the last day of the month in which the marriage was dissolved. The [plaintiff] and her attorney shall be entitled to any and all information regarding the [nonqualified plan] necessary for a review of the [domestic relations order]. The court shall retain jurisdiction to deal with any issues which may arise with regard to the preparation and filing of the [domestic relations order] and the division of the [nonqualified plan].” The court also noted that “ [n] either party offered any evidence as to the present value of this retirement benefit, however, each has offered a proposed distribution of this marital asset, if, as and when it is paid.” This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion in the manner in which it divided the defendant’s nonqualified plan and that the division is unworkable under the facts of this case. She argues: “The court’s attempt to divide the [nonqualified plan] as of the date of dissolution suffers from a fundamental flaw in that it is unworkable under the facts of this case to calculate what the [defendant would have received from that asset had he retired on the date of dissolution. To the extent that the court reserved jurisdiction to address the issue later, that method — the reserved jurisdiction method of distribution — was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 761, [785 A.2d 197] (2001). More important, such calculation would result in a hypothetical figure that bears no relation to the benefits the [defendant ultimately receives. This error requires a new trial on all financial orders.” The defendant argues that the court properly exercised its discretion when it divided the nonqualified plan. Specifically, he argues that the plaintiff has voiced no concern over the proportion of the nonqualified plan that she was awarded, but, rather, she complains about the manner of distribution of this asset. He further argues that the court’s order is not unworkable or in contravention of Bender, and that the plaintiff “is obviously confusing the court’s reservation of jurisdiction to enforce and effectuate its order, which it did, with a reservation of jurisdiction to divide the pension, which it did not. . . . Thus, contrary to the [plaintiffs] position that the division is ‘unworkable,’ the division is quite workable, because it provides that if, as, and when the [defendant] retires or otherwise begins to receive the benefits from the [nonqualified plan], a coverture fraction shall be applied to the entire benefit that was vested as of the date of dissolution to determine the ‘marital portion.’ ” We agree with the defendant.

“The standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. ... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . [T]o conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the court either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ranfone v. Ranfone, 103 Conn. App. 243, 246, 928 A.2d 576, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 940, 937 A.2d 698 (2007).

“As a general framework, [t]here are three stages of analysis regarding the equitable distribution of each resource: first, whether the resource is property within [General Statutes] § 46b-81 to be equitably distributed (classification); second, what is the appropriate method for determining the value of the property (valuation); and third, what is the most equitable distribution of the property between the parties (distribution).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, supra, 258 Conn. 740. Here, the parties agree that the nonqualified plan properly was classified as property. The plaintiff also does not challenge the portion of the nonqualified plan that the court awarded to her. Rather, her dispute is with the court’s valuation of the nonqualified plan, which she claims is unworkable because the court reserved jurisdiction to order the distribution and the calculation of the distribution would result in an improper hypothetical figure. We disagree.

In Bender, our Supreme Court explained some of the methods for valuing pension benefits for purposes of equitable distribution: “There are three general approaches to address the problems of valuation and distribution of pension benefits: (1) the present value method, also called the immediate offset method; (2) the present division method of deferred distribution; and (3) the reserved jurisdiction method of deferred distribution.” Id., 754. “[T]he present value or immediate offset approach requires the court to determine the present value of the pension benefits, decide the portion to which the nonemployee spouse is entitled, and award other property to the nonemployee spouse as an offset to the pension benefits to which he or she is otherwise entitled.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 754-55. “Under the present division method [of deferred distribution], the trial court determines at the time of trial, the percentage share of the pension benefits to which the nonemployee spouse is entitled. ... In other words, the court will declare that, upon maturity, a fixed percentage of the pension be distributed to each spouse.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 758. “Alternatively, under the reserved jurisdiction method, [which is a variant of the present division method of deferred distribution] the trial court reserves jurisdiction to distribute the pension until benefits have matured. Once matured, the trial court will determine the proper share to which each party is entitled and divide the benefits accordingly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

After having explained each of these methods, which are not exclusive, our Supreme Court then expressly rejected the reserved jurisdiction method, explaining: “On its face, the statutory scheme regarding financial orders appurtenant to dissolution proceedings prohibits the retention of jurisdiction over orders regarding lump sum alimony or the division of the marital estate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 761. In the present case, it is this specific rejection of the reserved jurisdiction method of valuation by our Supreme Court in Bender that the plaintiff claims the trial court improperly ignored. We conclude, however, that the court in this case properly employed the present division method of deferred distribution, rather than the reserved jurisdiction method rejected in Bender.

In Bender, the plaintiff wife was awarded 50 percent of the defendant husband’s unvested pension benefits earned through the date of the dissolution decree. Id., 738. The defendant claimed on appeal that the court improperly awarded unvested pension benefits to the plaintiff, for which a present value could not be determined. Id., 739. In considering the defendant’s appeal, our Supreme Court explained that “[a]t the time of trial, the defendant had been employed as a firefighter by the city of Meriden for approximately nineteen years. The defendant is entitled to a pension as a firefighter in the event that he reaches twenty-five years of service. His pension, therefore, is unvested, except for purposes of disability. If the defendant were to leave the fire department before twenty-five years of service, other than for a disability, he would receive only his contributions made to the pension, which, at the time of trial, were valued at approximately $27,741.” Id., 736-37. The court went on to explain that “it is, of course, theoretically possible that the defendant’s pension will not vest, whether because of the defendant’s resignation, misconduct on his part that results in his dismissal, the defendant’s death, or a decision on the part of the municipality to discontinue the pension plan. We conclude, however, that the defendant’s expectation in his pension plan, as a practical matter, is sufficiently concrete, reasonable and justifiable as to constitute a presently existing property interest for equitable distribution purposes.” Id., 749.

Our Supreme Court next determined that the fact that a present value for the pension distribution could not be ascertained did not impede the trial court’s ability to award the plaintiff a percentage of the pension. Id., 762. The court explained that because the trial court had applied the present division method of deferred distribution, it was “unnecessary for the trial court to determine the benefits’ present value . . . .” Id. The court held that “the trial court properly applied the present division method of deferred distribution, delaying distribution, in accordance with the domestic relations order, until the pension came into pay status. Specifically, the trial court determined, at the time of dissolution, the percentage of the benefits to which the plaintiff would be entitled in the event that the pension vested, namely, 50 percent of the pension benefits earned through the date of the dissolution decree. . . . Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its treatment of the defendant’s unvested pension benefits.” Id., 763-64.

In the present case, the court ordered in relevant part that the defendant’s nonqualified plan, “be divided by means of a [d]omestic [Relations [o]rder ... 50 [percent] to the [defendant] and 50 [percent] to the [plaintiff].” The court also fully explained the method for calculating the coverture fraction: “[I]t is the intention of the court that for purposes of calculating the coverture period for either the retirement or preretirement benefit, that the numerator of the fraction shall be equal to the length of time in whole months, beginning with the first day of the month in which the parties were married and ending with the last day of the month in which the marriage was dissolved, and that the denominator shall be equal to the length of time in whole months, beginning with the first day of the month in which the [defendant] commenced employment with Deloitte and ending with the last day of the month in which the marriage was dissolved.”

The parties do not dispute that pursuant to the coverture fraction formula, the plaintiff will receive 41 percent of the defendant’s nonqualified plan valued as of the date of dissolution of the marriage. The fraction is calculated as follows: The plaintiff was awarded 50 percent of the nonqualified plan subject to the coverture fraction. On the date of dissolution, the defendant had been employed by Deloitte for 322 months, and he was married to the plaintiff for 263 months of those 322 months. Therefore, 263 divided by 322 equals approximately 82 percent. That 82 percent is then multiplied by the plaintiffs 50 percent award to get the actual award after the application of the coverture fraction. Eighty-two percent of 50 percent equals 41 percent.

Although the plaintiff argues that it would be unworkable to calculate the value of the defendant’s nonquali-fied plan on the date of dissolution to award 41 percent of that value to the plaintiff after the defendant retires, the defendant argues that the court used the date of dissolution to determine the coverture fraction and that the plaintiffs portion of his nonqualified plan is 50 percent of whatever the defendant would have received from the plan if he had retired on the date of the dissolution judgment, “adjusted by (1) the coverture formula that we all agree is 263 [divided by] 322 months (which represents the calculation of the court’s coverture order) hence 41 [percent], (2) any reductions to the benefit applied by Deloitte as required in the [nonquali-fied] plan (because [the plaintiff] shares in what [the defendant] receives) and (3) federal and state taxes in the event that the [defendant] incurs any such tax on the portion distributed to the [plaintiff].”

Because the plan was nonqualified and nonfunded, the date of the defendant’s retirement was uncertain, and the amount of and basis for calculation of any distribution was unknown as of the date of the dissolution of marriage, the court and the parties as of the date of the dissolution could not use the formula propounded by the court to determine the exact amount of the plaintiffs share of the nonqualified plan. That lack of information and consequent inability to determine the exact amount of the plaintiffs share as of the date of dissolution, however, did not render that portion of the court’s order unworkable. The court, having determined the formula for the division of the assets received by the defendant pursuant to the nonqualified plan, had discretion to retain jurisdiction to effectuate its judgment by “deal[ing] with any issues which may arise with regard to the preparation and filing of the [domestic relations order] and the division of the [non-qualified plan].” Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion either in the manner in which it divided the defendant’s nonqualified plan, or in the manner in which it retained jurisdiction.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court abused its discretion in crafting its alimony award. She argues: “Because the trial court indicated that alimony was interrelated with the pension benefits, and because the record does not support time limited alimony for rehabilitative purposes, the termination of alimony prior to the defendant reaching the mandatory retirement age is not logically related to the facts on this record.” We disagree.

“ ‘[I]n dissolution proceedings, the court must fashion its financial orders in accordance with the criteria set forth in General Statutes §§ 46b-81 (division of marital property), 46b-82 (alimony) and 46b-84 (child support). All three statutory provisions require consideration of the parties’ amount and sources of income in determining the appropriate division of property and size of any child support or alimony award.’ . . . Rozsa v. Rozsa, 117 Conn. App. 1, 5, 977 A.2d 722 (2009). [Section] 46b-82 provides in relevant part: ‘In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall hear the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81. . . .’ ‘[Section] 46b-82 describes circumstances under which a court may award alimony. The court is to consider these factors in making an award of alimony, but it need not give each factor equal weight. ... As long as the trial court considers all of these statutory criteria, it may exercise broad discretion in awarding alimony.’ . . . McMellon v. McMellon, 116 Conn. App. 393, 397, 976 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 926, 980 A.2d 911 (2009). We note also that ‘[t]he trial court may place varying degrees of importance on each criterion according to the factual circumstances of each case.’ Ippolito v. Ippolito, 28 Conn. App. 745, 751, 612 A.2d 131, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 905, 615 A.2d 1047 (1992). ‘There is no additional requirement that the court specifically state how it weighed the statutory criteria or explain in detail the importance assigned to each statutory factor.’ Rivnak v. Rivnak, 99 Conn. App. 326, 331, 913 A.2d 1096 (2007).” Kaczynski v. Kaczynski, 124 Conn. App. 204, 210-11, 3 A.3d 1034 (2010).

The plaintiff argues that “it appears from the limited explanation the court gave that it intended the payments from the defendant’s Deloitte pensions to provide a means of support for the plaintiff when alimony ends. The problem is that the termination of alimony is not logically aligned with the facts in the record. Alimony terminates in January, 2018. The defendant turns [sixty-two] in October, 2017. Although the defendant is required to retire by the end of the fiscal year in which he turns [sixty-two], he testified that Deloitte’s fiscal year typically ends around the end of May or beginning of June. Thus, if the defendant chooses to work until he is required to retire, there will be a gap of [four or five] months from the end of alimony [to] the beginning of the pension payments. The gap amounts to $80,000 to $100,000 of support the plaintiff will not receive.” The plaintiff claims that this gap creates a logical inconsistency that amounts to an abuse of discretion that requires reversal of the court’s judgment on the financial orders. We understand the plaintiffs argument that the puipose of the court’s alimony award was to provide support to the plaintiff until the defendant reached retirement age and that the alimony award and the award of the multiple pension benefits should provide the plaintiff with a continuous stream of income. We disagree, however, that the possible gap identified by the plaintiff between the time that the alimony ceases and the pension benefits begin creates a logical inconsistency in the judgment.

The court specifically stated that it had considered all of the statutory factors set forth in § 46b-82, “including the age, health, education, earnings, and work experience of the [plaintiff], as well as the division of assets, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case . . . .” The court proceeded to order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $20,000 per month as periodic alimony until January 31, 2018. The court also awarded the plaintiff certain real estate, including income producing property, and personal property, including investment accounts, savings accounts and checking accounts. The court also divided all of the parties’ retirement accounts and the defendant’s profit sharing plan, with the plaintiff receiving a considerable share of these accounts, including the sole possession of her own retirement accounts. When asked by the plaintiff to reconsider, inter alia, the possible gap in the alimony award, the court stated that it had “considered all of the statutory factors ... in particular the assignment of income producing property” and it denied the plaintiffs request to reconsider this award.

After reviewing the record, we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion in this regard. Although it is possible that the plaintiffs alimony will cease four or five months before she is eligible to receive her portion of the defendant’s retirement accounts, it also is possible that the defendant will retire prior to his mandatory retirement date and that the plaintiff, in this event, will receive both alimony and her portion of the defendant’s retirement accounts. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the plaintiff would be destitute or unable to care for herself during this gap, especially in light of the court’s award of income producing property, which the court specifically stated it placed much emphasis on in determining the periodic alimony award. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       “By vested we refer to pension interests in which an employee has an irrevocable . . . right, in the future, to receive his or her account balance (under a defined contribution plan), or his or her accrued benefit (under a defined benefit plan), regardless of whether the employment relationship continues. 3 Family Law and Practice (A. Rutkin ed., 1995) § 36.13 [2], p. 36-71; see id., § 37.11 [1] [b], pp. 37-157 through 37-159; see also 2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property (J. McCahey ed., 1991) § 23.02 [2] [a], p. 23-8; see Thompson v. Thompson, 183 Conn. 96, 100 n.3, 438 A.2d 839 (1981) ([v]ested benefits . . . refer to those accrued benefits to which the employee has a nonforfeitable right to receive at retirement age whether or not he is in the service of the employer at that time). Prior to vesting, an employee’s accrued benefits may be forfeited by termination of employment. Once the employee with a vested pension interest reaches the age of retirement and elects to retire, his rights are said to be vested and matured. See 3 Family Law and Practice, supra, § 36.13 [2], p. 36-71, and § 37.11 [1] [b], p. 37-159; see also Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 491, 463 N.E.2d 15, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1984). Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 788-89 n.12, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, supra, 258 Conn. 737 n.2.

       The plaintiff disputes that under the court’s order her portion of the nonqualified plan will be adjusted by any reductions to the benefit applied by Deloitte. Because at this time whether Deloitte will reduce the benefit in accordance with the terms of the nonqualified plan is unknown, we offer no opinion on this potential issue.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSEPH VANALLEN
    (AC 33369)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Robinson and Espinosa, Js.

      Argued November 26, 2012
    officially released February 12, 2013

      Elizabeth M. Inkster, assigned counsel, and Freesia Singngam, certified legal intern, for the appellant (defendant).

      Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and Robert F. Mullins, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Joseph VanAllen, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a), criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217 (a) (1), unlawful discharge of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53-203, risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (1) and two counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § SSa-OS. The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal with regard to the risk of injury to a child and reckless endangerment counts and (2) admitted certain evidence, namely, bullet shell casings found at the scene of the crime. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found that on December 25, 2009, the defendant was at his apartment in Hartford with his two year old daughter. Ruth Whaley, the child’s mother, joined by Camilla Williams and Nicole Williams, drove to the apartment shortly after 7 p.m. to pick up the child. The defendant and Whaley were not on good terms that day. Whaley parked her automobile in a parking area adjacent to the apartment complex. Upon their arrival, Camilla Williams exited the automobile, retrieved the child from the defendant and seemed the child in a car seat in the rear of the automobile, behind the passenger’s seat. Camilla Williams sat in the rear of the automobile, next to the child.

An argument between the defendant and Whaley ensued. During the altercation, while standing next to the driver’s side of the automobile, the defendant pointed a handgun at Whaley’s head, while she was seated in the automobile, before pointing the handgun in the air and firing the gun several times. Whaley quickly drove from the parking area, the defendant fled the scene and Camilla Williams called the police to report the incident. The defendant’s arrest and conviction followed.

I

First, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal with regard to the risk of injury to a child and reckless endangerment counts of the state’s amended information. We disagree.

With regard to the risk of injury to a child count, the state charged that on December 25, 2009, the defendant caused his daughter “to be placed in ... a situation where the life and limb of such child was endangered . . . .” With regard to the reckless endangerment counts, the state charged that on December 25, 2009, the defendant “did recklessly engage in conduct that created a risk of serious physical injury to another person . . . .” The reckless endangerment charges concerned the defendant’s conduct toward Whaley and Camilla Williams. The state’s theory of the case was that the defendant engaged in the criminal conduct alleged by pointing a loaded handgun at Whaley while she was sitting in an automobile with her daughter, Camilla Williams and Nicole Williams, and by firing the handgun into the air several times.

At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal as to all counts of the state’s amended information. On appeal, the defendant argues, as he did at trial, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction with regard to the risk of injury to a child count because his conduct did not create a situation that endangered the life and limb of his child. Also, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction with regard to the reckless endangerment counts because his conduct did not create a risk of serious physical injury to Whaley or Camilla Williams.

“In reviewing the denial of a motion for [a] judgment of acquittal, we employ a two part analysis. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether, from all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the juiy reasonably could have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Green, 81 Conn. App. 152, 155, 838 A.2d 1030, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 909, 845 A.2d 413 (2004).

The defendant acknowledges that there was testimonial evidence that he used a handgun in the manner alleged by the state. His sufficiency claim is limited to the risk associated with that conduct. He argues that the evidence did not support a finding that the discharged bullets or the shell casings from those bullets could have caused physical harm to any occupant of Whaley’s automobile.

The evidence amply supported a finding that the defendant, from just outside of Whaley’s automobile, pointed an operable, loaded handgun at Whaley’s head while she was in an automobile and in very close proximity to his daughter, Camilla Williams and Nicole Williams. The defendant did so in the course of a heated argument with Whaley. From this evidence, the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant created a risk of serious physical injury to Whaley and Camilla Williams. See General Statutes § 53a-63 (requiring evidence that defendant “creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person”); State v. Wayne, 60 Conn. App. 761, 767, 760 A.2d 1265 (2000) (holding that one creates risk of serious physical injury by pointing loaded gun at another). Just as the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant created such a risk to the other occupants of the automobile, the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant created a situation that endangered the life and limb of his daughter. See General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1) (requiring evidence that defendant “causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered”). Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal with regard to the crimes at issue.

II

Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly admitted into evidence bullet shell casings found at the scene of the crime. We disagree.

Whaley testified that the defendant pointed a “small gun” at her face and then fired the handgun in the air four or five times. Camilla Williams testified that, on the basis of her observation of the handgun, as well as the sound it made when it was fired, she believed that the defendant fired either a .22 caliber handgun or a .26 caliber handgun at the crime scene. Nathan Buynicki, a news photographer who was working near the crime scene at the time of the shooting, testified that he saw a man discharge a gun into the air approximately five times.

The state presented the testimony of Tom Phelom, a Hartford police officer who arrived at the crime scene on December 25, 2009. Phelom testified that, at the scene, Whaley and Camilla Williams told him that the defendant had discharged a firearm. Phelom searched for and seized five shell casings in a parking area near the defendant’s apartment.

The prosecutor indicated that he intended to introduce the shell casings into evidence. Outside of the presence of the jury, the defendant’s attorney objected to the admission of the shell casings on the grounds that the evidence was not relevant and was more prejudicial than probative. The defendant’s attorney argued that the state did not recover a handgun and that there was no evidence linking the shell casings to the defendant. The prosecutor represented that the state would present evidence that all five shell casings came from the same handgun and that the testimony elicited at trial sufficiently demonstrated the probative value of the evidence. The court admitted the evidence over the defendant’s objection.

Asserting the relevancy and unfair prejudice arguments he raised at trial, the defendant claims that the court improperly admitted the bullet shell casings. “Unless an evidentiary ruling involves a clear misconception of the law, [t]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility ... of evidence. . . . The trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion. . . . We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling .... Moreover, evidentiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 219, 881 A.2d 160 (2005).

Here, there is no showing that the court’s rulings reflected a clear misconception of relevant legal principles. We readily conclude that the court properly determined that the evidence was relevant. See Conn. Code Evid. § 4-1. Whether the defendant brandished and discharged a gun was a disputed, material issue of fact. There was ample testimonial evidence that the defendant used a small caliber handgun. Because shell casings logically tend to prove that a firearm was discharged in the vicinity in which they are found, the discovery of the five small caliber shell casings, in the area in which the incident occurred, shortly after it occurred, made it more likely that the defendant engaged in the conduct with which he was charged. The defense availed itself of the opportunity to argue vigorously before the jury that it was unreasonable to draw such an inference from the evidence.

In summary fashion, the defendant labels the shell casings as “highly prejudicial.” He then states: “[T]he prosecution relied on the bullet shell casings to put a gun in the defendant’s hand at trial. Furthermore, the shell casings were the only evidence that the shooter used an automatic or semiautomatic gun. The state never presented any other evidence that the gun used was one that would emit shell casings and not a revolver.” Also, the defendant asserts that, without the shell casings, the state’s case was not as strong.

The defendant invites us to analyze the shell casings in artificial isolation but, in assessing their prejudicial nature, we properly view them against the matrix of the other evidence presented at trial. Here, the challenged evidence was consistent with, and thus not far more prejudicial than, other evidence presented by the state. The fact that, apart from other evidence, the shell casings by their nature tended to prove that the handgun used by the defendant was a type that discharged shell casings does not lead us to conclude that they were unfairly prejudicial to the defense. Further, the argument that the evidence strengthened the state’s case is not persuasive, for all adverse evidence is prejudicial to the defense. See Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3 (“[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” [emphasis added]).

The judgment is affirmed.

       The court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years incarceration, execution suspended after five years, followed by five years of probation.

       Later, the state presented testimony from Megan E. Murasso, a firearms and tool mark examiner. Murasso testified that her examination of the shell casings led her to verify that they were from .25 caliber ammunition designed to be fired in a semiautomatic pistol, and they had been fired from the same firearm.


author: ESPINOSA, J.

text:
    SUSAN BONITO v. DOMINICK BONITO
    (AC 33307)
    Lavine, Beach and Espinosa, Js.

      Argued October 10, 2012
    officially released February 12, 2013

      Nicholas J. Adamucci, for the appellant (defendant).

      Susan E. Nugent, with whom was Thomas A. Espos-ito, for the guardian ad litem for the minor children.
   Opinion

ESPINOSA, J.

In this marital dissolution action, the defendant, Dominick Bonito, appeals from the judgment of the trial court. The court dissolved the marriage between the defendant and the plaintiff, Susan Bonito, and entered various financial orders, as well as orders related to the custody of the parties’ three minor children. The defendant claims that the court (1) was without jurisdiction to render judgment because it failed to render its decision within 120 days following the completion of the trial and (2) abused its discretion by way of its various financial orders that, the defendant asserts, unfairly favored the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed for divorce in September, 2008. In its memorandum of decision of January 18, 2011, the court determined that the parties’ marriage, which began in August, 1993, had broken down irretrievably. The court found that “fault restfed] wholly and squarely on [the defendant’s] shoulders” and that “he was essentially a despot in his home and if his wife or children dared to cross him they would pay dearly.” The court dissolved the marriage, awarded sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ children to the plaintiff, ordered the defendant to pay child support and alimony and entered other financial orders including those related to the family home, retirement assets, debts and insurance. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

First, the defendant claims that the court was without jurisdiction to render judgment because it failed to render its decision within 120 days following the completion of the trial. We disagree.

The record discloses the following additional relevant facts. The trial occurred over several days between July 12 and August 23, 2010. On August 23, 2010, following the presentation of evidence, the parties made closing arguments in lieu of filing written memoranda.

On September 1, 2010, the plaintiff filed an “Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Hearing to Open Evidence.” In the motion, the plaintiff represented that, during the trial, Thomas A. Esposito, the guardian ad litem for the parties’ children, recommended that the defendant be afforded the right to unsupervised nontherapeutic visits with the parties’ youngest child, R. The plaintiff represented that “since the date of the close of evidence, a serious and significant event occurred during the defendant’s visitation with said minor child” and, consequently, Esposito had altered his recommendation regarding the defendant’s visitation rights with R. By way of relief, the plaintiff asked the court to “order an immediate hearing regarding said incident [and] the guardian ad litem’s revised recommendations . . . .”

In conjunction with the motion to open the evidence, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from Esposito, who set forth certain facts that he had learned concerning an unsupervised visit between the defendant and R on August 29, 2010. Specifically, Esposito learned that, during the unsupervised visit, the defendant did not share information with the plaintiff with regard to the time at which he would return to the family home with R. Later in the day, while the plaintiff was out shopping, the defendant compelled R to tell the plaintiff over the telephone that he was locked outside of the family home alone. Believing that R had been left unsupervised and concerned for R’s welfare, the plaintiff contacted the police. The plaintiff returned home and found R, the defendant and the police in the driveway. R later told a police officer that the defendant told him to lie to the plaintiff about being left alone so that she would drive home quickly. The record reflects that R was eleven years old in August, 2010, and had special needs.

The court held an evidentiary hearing on September 29, 2010, related to the plaintiffs motion to open the evidence. The parties, represented by counsel, appeared at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the defendant told R to lie to the plaintiff on August 29, 2010, and that R lied to the plaintiff in the defendant’s presence. The court found that the defendant’s actions were part of a larger pattern of destructive conduct that was motivated by his desire to retaliate against the plaintiff. The court found that the defendant’s conduct was a detriment to R. Immediately, the court terminated the defendant’s visitation rights with R.

The court issued its final decision in the dissolution action on January 18, 2011, 111 days following the evi-dentiary hearing of September 29, 2010. Its decision encompassed many issues relating to the parties, including the defendant’s visitation rights with the parties’ children. In its decision, the court made findings with regard to the incident that occurred on August 29, 2010, concerning R. Moreover, the court granted the plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ children and did not afford the defendant any visitation rights with regard to the children.

On February 3, 2011, the defendant filed a “Notice of Objection to the Past Due Judgment,” in which he argued that the trial ended on August 23,2010, the court did not render a decision within 120 days of that date and, consequently, a new trial was warranted under General Statutes § 51-183b. The defendant argued that the court was without jurisdiction to render judgment on January 18, 2011. The court denied the motion on March 18, 2011. With regard to the court’s jurisdiction to render judgment on January 18, 2011, the defendant advances the arguments he raised before the trial court.

General Statutes § 51-183b provides: “Any judge of the Superior Court and any judge trial referee who has the power to render judgment, who has commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have power to continue such trial and shall render judgment not later than one hundred and twenty days from the completion date of the trial of such civil cause. The parties may waive the provisions of this section.” “[T]he defect in a late judgment is that it implicates the trial court’s power to continue to exercise jurisdiction over the parties before it. . . . Absent waiver of the provisions of the statute, a judgment rendered by a court beyond the time period permitted by § 51-183b, lacks personal jurisdiction over the [parties]. . . . Even after the expiration of the time period within which a judge has the power to render a valid, binding judgment, a court continues to have jurisdiction over the parties until and unless they object.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gumpert v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 39 Conn. App. 635, 640-41, 666 A.2d 437 (1995). “[The parties’ consent to a late judgment] may be implied from the conduct of the parties or their attorneys, in proceeding without objection with the trial or argument of the case, in remaining silent until the judgment has been rendered or in failing to object seasonably after the filing of the decision.” Rowe v. Goulet, 89 Conn. App. 836, 845, 875 A.2d 564 (2005).

Here, the defendant seasonably objected to the court’s judgment. The facts surrounding the issue are undisputed and are evident from our review of the record. “A challenge to the court’s personal jurisdiction that presents a question of law applied to undisputed facts is an issue over which our review is plenary.” Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex ret. Arnold v. Forvil, 302 Conn. 263, 270, 25 A.3d 632 (2011).

The issue before us requires that we ascertain “the completion date of the trial” for purposes of § 51-183b. That portion of the statute has been the subject of interpretation and has been applied in several appellate decisions. In accordance with Frank v. Streeter, 192 Conn. 601, 604-605, 472 A.2d 1281 (1984), this court consistently has interpreted the statute such that “[t]he one hundred twenty day period begins to run from the date that the parties file posttrial briefs or other material that the court finds necessary for a well reasoned decision.” Cowles v. Cowles, 71 Conn. App. 24, 26, 799 A.2d 1119 (2002); see also Jordan v. Jordan, 125 Conn. App. 207, 209 n.4, 6 A.3d 1206 (2010) (same), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 919, 14 A.3d 333 (2011); O.J. Mann Electric Services, Inc. v. Village at Kensington Place Ltd. Partnership, 99 Conn. App. 367, 374 n.5, 913 A.2d 1107 (2007) (same); Bramwell v. Dept. of Correction, 82 Conn. App. 483, 488, 844 A.2d 957 (2004) (same); Northeast Savings, F.A. v. Scherban, 47 Conn. App. 225, 231, 702 A.2d 659 (1997) (same), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 907, 714 A.2d 2 (1998).

It is undisputed that, in reaching a final judgment in the dissolution action, the court had to resolve issues related to the parties’ children, such as custody and visitation rights. The court heard evidence related to these issues during the hearings that concluded on August 23, 2010, including testimony from Esposito. The plaintiff, by her September 1, 2010 motion, asked the court to “open the evidence.” In response to the motion, the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing at which the plaintiff presented additional evidence that was relevant to the custody and visitation issues yet to be resolved by the court. In its January 18,2011 decision, from which the defendant appeals, the court explicitly referred to this evidence and made findings related to the evidence. On this record, it is clear that on September 29,2010, the court heard additional evidence, based on an incident that occurred prior to the time that it rendered its decision, that it deemed necessary for a well reasoned decision in the dissolution action. As the court subsequently rendered its judgment on January 18, 2011, within 120 days of hearing this additional evidence, the defendant’s jurisdictional argument is without merit.

II

Next, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by way of its various financial orders that, the defendant asserts, unfairly favored the plaintiff. We disagree.

A

The defendant’s primary argument in connection with this claim is that the court “implicitly” found that he fraudulently transferred assets in an effort to deplete the marital estate prior to the time that the plaintiff initiated the present dissolution action, the court improperly “did not articulate the standard of proof it used in finding [that he completed such] fraudulent transfers” and, consequently, “the court should not have considered the transfers in fashioning its financial and property awards.” This argument is not supported by the record.

The court made the following relevant findings: “After filing for divorce in 2008, [the plaintiff] was shocked to discover her husband had taken out a line of credit in November, 2006, (after she threatened to file for divorce and moved out of the bedroom) removing $370,000 to $379,000 [in] equity from the [family] home. As of the trial, the home was in foreclosure. [The defendant] stopped paying the mortgage, second mortgage and taxes in late 2008, despite a court order of May 6, 2009, specifically requiring him to do so. . . .

“[The defendant] testified that he used the proceeds of the line of credit to make a real estate investment with his brother, a lawyer in Nevada. He was clueless about the details of the alleged investment and presented no documentation to prove the investment. [The defendant] did not know if the investment was made as an individual, LLC, partnership or corporation. He testified [that] the investment might be in residential/ commercial real estate located in Nevada and/or California. He testified [that] he wired his brother $250,000, but $125,000 was returned to him. [The defendant] testified [that] his brother declared bankruptcy in the past year due to the declining real estate market. He did not know if or when the money would be repaid or if the investment had been lost.

“[The defendant] himself filed [for] bankruptcy in July, 2009 .... [The defendant’s] bankruptcy schedule D shows [a] $150,000 loan to his brother. At trial, the defendant claimed [that] he gave his brother the money [at issue] to support himself and pay medical bills when he had heart attacks, but could not recall when this money was transferred to his brother. [The defendant] claimed an additional $25,000 was transferred to his brother over a period of time from 2005 to 2009. [The defendant] presented no documentation for any of the money he claimed to have transferred to his brother and was unable to classify the funds as a loan, gift [or] investment. Finally, [the defendant] was unable to tell the court if he ever expected his brother to repay him.

“[The defendant’s] August, 2008 bank statement shows [that] he withdrew $100,000 on August 21, 2008, after [the plaintiff] told him she was seeing a divorce lawyer and shortly before the writ, summons and complaint was served. In addition, [the defendant] testified [that] he took loans from his mother in the amount of $150,000 [to] $152,000 during the pendency of the divorce. [The defendant’s] testimony was inconsistent with sworn financial affidavits filed with the court and his bankruptcy petition and filings. The court finds the defendant’s testimony [to be] evasive, inconsistent and not credible. The court did not believe the defendant was truthful regarding his alleged investment with his brother, and it was evident [that] he removed the equity from the home as a direct result of [the plaintiffs] threats to file for divorce.”

Later in its memorandum of decision, the court found that “[the defendant] did not put [the plaintiffs] name on the deed to the family home and immediately withdrew the equity in the marital home to put it beyond the reach of [the plaintiff] and the court [in the present] dissolution action.”

We carefully have reviewed the court’s decision. The court found that the defendant transferred substantial marital assets for the purpose of shielding them from the plaintiff in the present divorce action and that the details of the defendant’s purported investment were unclear. The court, however, did not state that the defendant committed an act of fraud. Essentially, the defendant’s claim rests on two presumptions. First, he invites this court to presume that the court made a finding concerning fraud that is not apparent from the record. Second, he invites this court to presume that because the court did not articulate the correct legal principles and standard of proof concerning fraud, the court’s decision was flawed. Nonetheless, the defendant asserts that there was evidence of fraud before the court and that “the court’s findings are supported by the evidence.”

This aspect of the claim is without merit. It is well settled that this court does not presume findings that were not made nor, absent support in the record, does it presume that a court applied an incorrect standard of proof in finding facts. See, e.g., Kaczynski v. Kaczynski, 124 Conn. App. 204, 206 n.2, 3 A.3d 1034 (2010) (“the reviewing court will not presume error from silence as to the standard used”); State v. Baker, 50 Conn. App. 268, 275 n.5, 718 A.2d 450 (“[w]e do not presume error; the trial court’s ruling is entitled to the reasonable presumption that it is correct unless the party challenging the ruling has satisfied its burden of demonstrating the contrary” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 937, 722 A.2d 1216 (1998).

B

To the extent that the defendant argues, in broad terms, that the court’s financial orders were “excessive and inequitable” in the plaintiffs favor, we reject the claim. In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that it considered the relevant statutory criteria and regulations in crafting its financial orders. The court made detailed findings concerning the parties, including but not limited to those related to their age, their health, their employment, the amount and sources of their income, their skills and employability, their financial assets and liabilities as well as their financial needs. As set forth previously in this opinion, the court considered the cause of the dissolution, finding that fault rested solely with the defendant. The court’s analysis reflects due consideration of relevant statutory criteria.

“[T]here is no set formula the court is obligated to apply when dividing the parties’ assets and . . . the court is vested with broad discretion in fashioning financial orders.” Casey v. Casey, 82 Conn. App. 378, 386-87, 844 A.2d 250 (2004). In reviewing financial orders in dissolution cases, “this court will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in the facts. ... In making this determination, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of the trial court’s action.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 123-24, 955 A.2d 1 (2010).

Apart from the argument advanced in part II A of this opinion, the defendant does little more than express general dissatisfaction with the court’s financial orders. Viewing the court’s detailed findings of fact and its financial orders in accordance with the deferential standard of review set forth previously herein, we do not disturb the court’s judgment. The defendant has not demonstrated that the court’s orders were the result of a misconception or a misapplication of the law, or that they reflect an abuse of the court’s broad discretion.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The plaintiff did not file a brief with this court. In addition to the brief and arguments advanced by the defendant, we consider the appeal on the basis of the brief and arguments advanced by the guardian ad litem of the parties’ minor children, who urges us to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

       We note that, in its memorandum of decision, the court referred to the dates on which it heard evidence. In so doing, it referred to the September 29 hearing.