author: DUPONT, J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CLARENCE AUSTIN
    (AC 21815)
    Schaller, Bishop and Dupont, Js.

      Argued October 29, 2002
    officially released February 4, 2003

      Glenn M. Conway, with whom, on the brief, were Tara L. Knight, E. Gregory Cerritelli and David Garner, legal intern, for the appellant (defendant).

      Michele C. Lukban, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Melanie L. Cradle, deputy assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

DUPONT, J.

The defendant, Clarence Austin, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 2 la-278 (b) and possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a (b). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to suppress evidence and (2) ruled that his sequestration motion, which was granted at the suppression hearing, did not extend to the trial proceedings.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On January 4, 2000, while Officer Louis Cavalier and Officer Douglas Harkins of the New Haven police department were conducting surveillance of the area of Chapel, Dwight and Kensington Streets in New Haven, they observed a male approach the defendant. After a short conversation, the male handed the defendant money, which the defendant placed in his pocket, in exchange for cocaine, which the defendant retrieved by reaching down his front waistband. Subsequently, a second male approached the defendant. The two conversed. Then, after receiving an amount of money and placing it in his pocket, the defendant gave the male an amount of cocaine. The defendant then proceeded along Kensington Street and entered the Dusk Market convenience store (Dusk Market).

Cavalier and Harkins then radioed Officers Anthony Maio and Vincent Anastasio with a description and location of the defendant. On the basis of information from Harkins that the defendant had engaged in a drug transaction, Maio and Anastasio proceeded to Dusk Market, conducted a search of the defendant and then arrested him. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Prior to trial, the court conducted a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from him following the search by Maio inside Dusk Market on January 4, 2000. In addition to those facts stated previously, the court found the following facts in its memorandum of decision. Maio and Anastasio entered Dusk Market and approached the defendant. Maio conducted an interview, which led him to believe the defendant was concealing contraband. He conducted a patdown search that revealed, in the defendant’s pant leg, a concealed item, which was soft and bulgy to the touch. Maio asked the defendant if he was concealing any contraband, to which the defendant responded that if he was, the officer would have to find it. Maio raised the defendant’s right pant leg. A bag containing a white substance fell to the floor.

Subsequently, Maio unrolled the defendant’s pant leg within which was a ziplock bag containing smaller ziplock bags. A field test later revealed that the smaller bags contained crack cocaine. Maio then proceeded to conduct a full search of the defendant. In the course of the search, he found a ziplock packet containing smaller empty, yellow tinted ziplock packets, $112 in United States currency and a razor blade. The defendant then was arrested.

On the basis of those facts, the court concluded that the officers had conducted a valid search and seizure under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and further, that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The court concluded that the probable cause validated the contemporaneous search and seizure as incident to a lawful arrest. The court, therefore, denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The defendant claims that the denial was improper and that all of the seized items should have been suppressed because the warrantless search was unreasonable under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut. 6He argues that the search was not valid under Terry or any other recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The state argues that the search was a valid search incident to lawful arrest, and, in the alternative, that it was valid under Terry. We agree that the search was valid as incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to consider whether the search was valid under Terry.

Subject to only a few well recognized exceptions, a search without a warrant issued on probable cause is per se unreasonable. State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 291, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001); State v. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 235, 673 A.2d 1098 (1996). A search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, however, is an exception to the warrant requirement. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-58, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981); State v. Clark, supra, 291; State v. Trine, supra, 235. “When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for a police officer to search for, and seize . . . evidence within the immediate control of the arrested person in order to . . . prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence.” State v. Clark, supra, 292.

In reviewing whether the court properly concluded that the search and seizure was valid under the exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident to a lawful arrest, it is first necessary to evaluate the validity of the arrest. General Statutes § 54-lf (b) authorizes a police officer to make a warrantless arrest based on probable cause. Under the federal and Connecticut constitutions, the court uses a totality of the circumstances test in determining whether probable cause existed. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); State v. Velasco, 248 Conn. 183, 190-91, 728 A.2d 493 (1999).

“Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe a felony has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, supra, 255 Conn. 292; State v. Trine, supra, 236 Conn. 236-37. In evaluating probable cause for a warrantless search, the court may “consider all of the legally obtained facts available to a police officer, and all of the reasonable inferences that might be drawn therefrom in light of the officer’s training and experience.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Trine, supra, 230-31.

“In reviewing a trial court’s determination that probable cause to arrest existed, we consider whether [it is] legally and logically correct and whether [it] findfs] support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision .... Because a trial court’s determination of the existence of probable cause implicates a constitutional claim, we must review the record carefully to ensure that its determination [is] supported by substantial evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, supra, 255 Conn. 293-94.

We conclude that prior to their entry into the market, Maio and Anastasio had probable cause to arrest the defendant on the basis of information provided to them by Harkins and Cavalier. As the court found, Harkins and Cavalier, while conducting surveillance of a known high crime area, observed the defendant engage in two drug transactions. In each transaction, the defendant had been waiting on the street when an unknown individual approached and engaged him in a brief conversation. The defendant then received money from the individual and put it in his pocket. Next, the defendant reached into his pants and retrieved a bag containing smaller bags of a white substance, which he handed to the individual. Those facts would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant had committed a felony. Therefore, Harkins and Cavalier radioed Maio and Anastasio to arrest the defendant in connection with suspected drug transactions. We conclude that the warrantless arrest based on probable cause was authorized under § 54-lf (b).

Having concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant within the market, we next consider whether the search and seizure prior to the defendant’s actual arrest was valid as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Both the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court have held that “[e]ven if a search and seizure chronologically precede a formal arrest, the search and seizure may be constitutionally valid as long as the arrest and the search and seizure are substantially contemporaneous and ar e integral parts of the same incident.” State v. Trine, supra, 236 Conn. 236; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980); State v. Clark, supra, 255 Conn. 294 n.41. Here, the facts allow the conclusion that the search and seizure were substantially contemporaneous with the arrest.

We conclude, therefore, that the search of the defendant’s pant leg and pockets, and the seizure of all the items discovered were valid as incident to his lawful arrest. The court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.

II

SEQUESTRATION ORDER

Prior to trial, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress. Immediately preceding the introduction of the state’s evidence, defense counsel orally requested a sequestration order. The court granted the motion. There was only a brief exchange regarding that motion:

“[Defense Counsel]: I request a sequestration order. I formally make that request.

“The Court: So ordered.”

The only other reference to the sequestration order during the hearing occurred prior to the lunch break on the first day of the hearing. At that time, the court asked the state to “remind [Cavalier] of the sequestration order [and] not to discuss [his] testimony with anyone.”

In a memorandum of decision, the court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. At trial, during the state’s case-in-chief, while cross-examining Cavalier, defense counsel elicited testimony that Cavalier had discussed the case with Harkins, Maio and Anastasio to get their stories straight. During a recess, defense counsel raised the issue of whether that discussion of their testimony demonstrated a violation of the sequestration order.

Following arguments by counsel, the court concluded that on the basis of disjunctive language of General Statutes § 54-85a and Practice Book § 42-36, the sequestration order granted at the suppression hearing was not in effect for the trial proceedings. Further, the court concluded that even if the sequestration order was in effect, the violation did not prejudice the defendant.

The defendant claims that due to the virtually identical issues at the suppression hearing and at trial, the sequestration order granted at the hearing remained in effect for the trial. He argues that the court’s ruling values form over substance. He argues that because the court did not place any limitation on the order, there is a presumption that in requesting the order at the beginning of the hearing, counsel sought to cover the entire trial process. He further contends that in delineating the scope of the order, courts, adhering to the purposes of a sequestration order, should err on the side of protecting the defendant’s rights.

A

A review of the defendant’s claim requires us to examine the scope of a sequestration order granted pursuant to Practice Book § 42-36 and General Statutes § 54-85a on the facts of this case. In evaluating the propriety of the court’s actions, we note that a “court must take full account of the significant objectives advanced by sequestration in discerning the proper scope of a sequestration order.” State v. Nguyen, 253 Conn. 639, 650, 756 A.2d 833 (2000). “The right to have witnesses sequestered is an important right that facilitates the truth-seeking and fact-finding functions of a trial. . . . Sequestration serves a broad purpose. It is a procedural device that serves to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony to that of earlier witnesses; it aids in detecting testimony that is less than candid and assures that witnesses testify on the basis of their own knowledge.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 649.

In Nguyen, our Supreme Court broadly interpreted the scope of the statute and the rule of practice. In that case, after the trial court had granted a sequestration order, the state overheard defense counsel discussing a prior witness’ testimony in the presence of a prospective witness. Id., 643. The defendant argued that the discussion did not violate the sequestration order because that order barred witnesses only from being in the courtroom prior to testifying. The court held, however, that “ [although the language of [Practice Book § 42-36] may seem merely to bar a sequestered witness from being in the courtroom when he is not testifying . . . we do not follow so rigid an interpretation. Indeed, such an interpretation would vitiate any sequestration order by exalting form over substance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nguyen, supra, 253 Conn. 651.

In the present case, the state argues, as the defendant did in Nguyen, for a strict and literal interpretation of the statute and the rule of practice. The state bases its argument on the use of the word “or” in Practice Book § 42-36 and in General Statutes § 54-85a. In accordance with that argument, the trial court in the present case held that the sequestration order requested at the suppression hearing, because it was not otherwise modified, was in effect only for the duration of that hearing. In light of the holding of Nguyen and the purposes of a sequestration order, we do not agree.

We acknowledge, as the state argues, that Practice Book § 42-36 and General Statutes § 54-85a are written in the disjunctive. Contrary to the state’s argument, however, a reading of the statute in light of the purposes of a sequestration order, leads us to the conclusion that the disjunctive language merely separates the types of proceedings at which a party may make a motion to sequester witnesses. The disjunctive language does not delineate or affect the scope of the order. If we were to read the statute as the state requests and therefore require the party seeking a sequestration order to renew its request at each juncture of a case, we would be “ ‘exalting form above substance.’ ” State v. Nguyen, supra, 253 Conn. 651. Thus, in adhering to the purposes of the sequestration of witnesses and the holding in Nguyen, we conclude that the defendant’s request for a sequestration order prior to the hearing on his motion to suppress remained in effect through the end of the trial. The officers’ discussion of their testimony was, therefore, a violation of the order.

B

Having concluded that the sequestration order was violated, it is next necessary to consider whether the defendant was prejudiced. The defendant argues that due to the similarities of the issues at the suppression hearing and at trial, he was prejudiced and that a new trial should be granted to protect his right to a fair trial. The state argues that the defendant has not shown any prejudice.

“A violation of a sequestration order does not automatically require a new trial. . . . The controlling consideration is whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the violation. . . . The burden rests on the party requesting the sequestration to show that the violation was prejudicial. ... If the prejudice resulting from the violation is likely to have affected the jury’s verdict, a new trial must be ordered.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Robinson, 230 Conn. 591, 599, 646 A.2d 118 (1994); State v. Morgan, 70 Conn. App. 255, 277-78, 797 A.2d 616, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 919, 806 A.2d 1056 (2002).

In this case, the violation occurred when the four officers involved had a discussion after testifying at the suppression hearing, but prior to testifying at trial. “Not all testimony that is tainted by a violation of a sequestration order [however] is necessarily prejudicial. Rather, [a]n inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case is necessary to ascertain whether the purpose of a sequestration order has been thwarted. ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robinson, supra, 230 Conn. 600. First, we must determine whether the testimony of the officers at trial was tailored to what was discussed in violation of the sequestration order. Second, if the testimony was tailored, we must determine whether that testimony is likely to have affected the jury’s verdict. Id., 601.

Whether the officers tailored their testimony can be evaluated by comparing the testimony given by each officer at the suppression hearing, prior to the violation of the order, to the testimony given by each officer at trial, subsequent to the violation of the order. A thorough examination of the record reveals that the officers’ testimony at each proceeding was the same. Although the officers testified similarly, that was not due to the tailoring of each one’s testimony to that of the other officers. The similarity in the officers’ testimonies existed at the suppression hearing before the violation occurred. That similarity is fully explainable by the fact that the officers observed and were witnesses to the same events. See State v. Scott, 16 Conn. App. 172, 183, 547 A.2d 77 (similarities in testimony wholly explainable by reference to other factors), cert, denied, 209 Conn. 821, 551 A.2d 758 (1988); State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn. App. 80, 85, 525 A.2d 1353 (1987) (same).

Further, the defendant has not pointed out, either in his brief or at oral argument, any tailoring of the officers’ testimony. Indeed, during oral argument, the defendant conceded that the officers testified in the same way at the hearing on the motion to suppress and at trial. Additionally, the defendant had ample opportunity to, and did in fact, cross-examine the witnesses and argue to the jury regarding the officers having spoken with each other before testifying at trial.

Under the facts of this case, the defendant has not met his burden of showing prejudice as a result of the officers’ discussion of their testimony and, hence, the purposes of the sequestration order were not thwarted.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Initially, the defendant was charged in two separate informations in connection with incidents occurring on January 4 and February 7, 2000. Prior to trial, the two case files were consolidated on the state’s motion. The state proceeded at trial on the two informations. The defendant, however, was convicted of the charges related only to the January 4, 2000 incident, and, therefore, only those charges are relevant to this appeal.

       The facts of the search are discussed in part I.

       The hearing also addressed evidence seized in connection with the charges that were filed against the defendant in connection with a separate incident that occurred on February 7, 2000. Because the defendant was found not guilty on those charges, we omit facts relevant to that incident. See footnote 1.

       The fourth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”

       Article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”

       General Statutes § 54-lf (b) provides in relevant part: “Members . . . of any local police department. . . shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony.” “Reasonable grounds to believe” is synonymous with the term probable cause. State v. Velasco, 248 Conn. 183, 189, 728 A.2d 493 (1999).

       Even though Maio and Anastasio did not personally observe the transactions, the probable cause that Harldns and Cavalier had was attributable to Maio and Anastasio as well. See State v. Hedge, 59 Conn. App. 272, 279, 756 A.2d 319 (2000) (evidence in possession of officers sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest).

       The hearing was conducted over three days. The proceeding on the last day was a supplemental hearing on the motion to suppress involving the production of Cavalier’s field notes and examination regarding the same. On that day, while counsel and the court were discussing an issue regarding the accuracy of the transcript of Maio’s testimony from the preceding day, the state brought to the attention of defense counsel and the court that Cavalier was present in the courtroom. The state asked whether the presence was a violation of the sequestration order. Neither the court, nor defense counsel believed it was a violation. Thus, the defendant has waived any argument that it might have been a violation of the order. Further, neither in his brief nor at oral argument has the defendant argued that Cavalier’s presence was a violation of the order. Therefore, we do not consider that occurrence for the purposes of our discussion.

       During the subsequent testimony of Harkins, he admitted having spoken with Cavalier about the case, but not about his testimony. He denied having spoken with Maio and Anastasio. Maio testified that he had not spoken with any officers about the case or his testimony. Anastasio testified that he had not spoken with the other officers about his testimony.

       General Statutes § 54-85a and Practice Book § 42-36 are virtually the same. General Statutes § 54-85a provides: “In any criminal prosecution, the court, upon motion of the state or the defendant, shall cause any witness to be sequestered during the hearing on any issue or motion or any part of the trial of such prosecution in which he is not testifying.” (Emphasis added.)
      Practice Book § 42-36 provides: “The judicial authority upon motion of the prosecuting authority or of the defendant shall cause any witness to be sequestered during the hearing on any issue or motion or during any part of the trial in which such witness is not testifying.” (Emphasis added.)

       In Nguyen, as in the present case, the court granted the sequestration order without any elaboration as to its scope. State v. Nguyen, supra, 253 Conn. 650.

       The court found that the violation was that of “the officers conversing about the case outside the presence of the court.” When the court ruled, however, the only testimony that the court had heard was that of Cavalier stating that he had discussed the case with the other officers to get their stories straight. The ruling of the court, impliedly, therefore, did not extend to a general discussion of the case, but to the discussion of the officers’ testimony.

       At oral argument, the defendant pointed out that there was some inconsistency in the testimony of Cavalier and Harkins regarding the location of Harkins in a separate February 7, 2000 incident in which the defendant also was charged. That is irrelevant, however, because the defendant was acquitted of those charges. See footnotes 1 and 3.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: SCHALLER, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. FRANCIS D.

    (AC 21599)
    Foti, Schaller and Peters, Js.

      Argued September 19, 2002 —
    officially released February 11, 2003

      Mary Anne Royle, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Robin S. Schwartz, special deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state’s attorney, and Cornelius P. Kelly, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

       In keeping with our policy to protect the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom her identity may be revealed. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

   Opinion

SCHALLER, J.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53-21 (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) permitted a constancy of accusation witness to provide expert testimony, (2) admitted into evidence the victim’s written statement that she had given to the police and (3) refused to allow the defendant to make requested offers of proof during cross-examination of two witnesses. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On Saturday, July 17, 1999, the victim, who was then twelve years old, was visiting with her grandparents at their home. During the evening hours, the victim and her cousin, who also was visiting, began watching television in the bedroom of the defendant, who is the victim’s uncle. At that time, the defendant was thirty-nine years of age and lived in the victim’s grandparents’ home. Sometime thereafter, the victim’s cousin left the bedroom and went downstairs. Between the hours of 10 and 11 p.m., the defendant entered his bedroom and discovered the victim lying in his bed and watching television. The defendant lay down beside the victim and fell asleep The victim continued watching television, falling asleep sometime thereafter.

Between the hours of 11 p.m. and 1 a.m., the victim awoke to find the defendant touching her breasts. As the defendant was doing that, he moved closer to the victim and began digitally penetrating her vagina. The victim unsuccessfully attempted to push the defendant away. When the defendant eventually stopped, the victim moved away from him, remained in bed and fell back to sleep.

When the victim awoke the next morning, she felt the defendant fondling and digitally penetrating her vagina. The victim pushed the defendant away and ran from the bedroom. The victim did not immediately report either incident to her mother or to the grandparents on Sunday, July 18,1999. The victim reported the incidents to her mother on Monday, July 19, 1999.

Following the victim’s disclosure, the mother took the victim to a hospital for an examination. At the hospital, the victim was met by Detective Thaddeus Walewski, Officer Donald Schuler and a social worker at the hospital’s emergency department. A physical examination of the victim revealed that she had suffered a superficial bruise on one breast. There was, however, no sign of vaginal trauma. Tests performed as part of a sex crimes kit protocol were inconclusive for sexual assault.

Two days after first reporting the incident, the victim signed a written statement for the police in which she recounted the attacks of Saturday night, July 17, and Sunday morning, July 18,1999. On September 16, 1999, the state filed a five count substitute information charging the defendant with two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2), one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (2).

The defendant was tried before a jury. On November 13, 2000, the jury found the defendant guilty on both counts of risk of injury to a child and acquitted him of the sexual assault counts. On December 15, 2000, the court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years incarceration, execution suspended after six years, and ten years of probation. The defendant now appeals. Additional facts will be set forth where necessary to the resolution of the appeal.

I

We first consider the defendant’s claim that the court improperly permitted a constancy of accusation witness to provide expert testimony. Specifically, the defendant argues that (1) because the social worker was offered solely as a constancy of accusation witness, and was not recognized or qualified as an expert witness, her testimony regarding the theoiy of delayed disclosure was inadmissible under the constancy of accusation doctrine, and (2) even if the social worker was qualified properly as an expert witness, her testimony was improper because it invaded the fact-finding province of the jury.

We first set forth our standard of review. “[Wjhether evidence is admissible under the constancy of accusation doctrine is an evidentiary question that will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. ... An appellate court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pereira, 72 Conn. App. 107, 121, 806 A.2d 51 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 931, 815 A.2d 135 (2003).

The following additional facts are necessary to the proper resolution of the defendant’s claim. In the defendant’s November 10, 1999 motion for disclosure and examination, he requested the “[identification of any and all experts whom the State intended] to call as witnesses at trial, including name, business, address, and subject area of the expert’s proposed testimony.” (Emphasis added.) On November 2, 2000, the state filed its disclosure response, enclosing a copy of the victim’s medical records and informing the defendant that results of the rape test kit were forthcoming. The state also provided its witness list. Within that list, the state disclosed the social worker as a witness, but did not specifically identify her, or any other person, as an expert witness. The list provided the social worker’s name, professional title and designation, and place of employment.

During its case-in-chief, the state called the social worker to testify regarding her involvement in this case. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked a series of questions concerning the social worker’s education, experience, her role as a social worker at the hospital and her encounter with the victim. We may summarize the social worker’s testimony in that regard as follows. The social worker testified that she had a bachelor’s degree in psychology and a master’s degree in social work. She discussed her employment as a social worker in a nursing home and at two hospitals, and discussed her experience working with sexually abused children, which consisted of ten to fifteen cases. After the social worker had answered those questions, the prosecutor inquired about the theory of delayed disclosure. Despite defense counsel’s objections, the court permitted the social worker to testify about delayed disclosure.

A

The defendant argues that because the social worker was offered solely to prove constancy of accusation, her testimony regarding the theory of delayed disclosure was inadmissible. Because the defendant did not preserve his claim for appellate review, we decline to afford it review.

The standard for the preservation of a claim alleging an improper evidentiary ruling at trial is well settled. “This court is not bound to consider claims of law not made at the trial. ... In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for review, trial counsel must object properly. . . . Our rules of practice make it clear that when an objection to evidence is made, a succinct statement of the grounds forming the basis for the objection must be made in such form as counsel desires it to be preserved and included in the record. ... In objecting to evidence, counsel must properly articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise nature of the objection and its real purpose, in order to form an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling. . . . Once counsel states the authority and ground of his objection, any appeal will be limited to the ground asserted. . . .

“These requirements are not simply formalities. They serve to alert the trial court to potential error while there is still time for the court to act. . . . Assigning error to a court’s evidentiary rulings on the basis of objections never raised at trial unfairly subjects the court and the opposing party to trial by ambush.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bush, 249 Conn. 423, 427-28, 735 A.2d 778 (1999).

Where, however, there is a question as to whether the claim was preserved, as long as it is clear from the record that “the trial court effectively was alerted to a claim of potential error while there was still time for the court to act”; Pestey v. Cushman, 259 Conn. 345, 367, 788 A.2d 496 (2002); the claim will be considered preserved. Id., 366-67 (where defense counsel attempted to object to introduction of evidence, but failed to use word “objection,” Supreme Court held claim preserved because transcript revealed trial court understood grounds on which counsel objected).

At trial, the defense counsel objected to the testimony of the social worker concerning her understanding of the theory of delayed disclosure. Objecting, defense counsel stated that “[tjhere has been an inadequate foundation as an attempt to take the fact-finding matter out of the hands of the jury. . . . With the use of a witness to draw a conclusion based upon the facts or hypothetical, whereas the jury is in the best position to decide.” When the state queried the social worker as to the whether a delayed response is a recognized type of behavior in sexually abused children, defense counsel again objected, claiming that there was an “inadequate foundation . . . taking the issue from the jury on the facts.”

In further support of his argument, the defendant on appeal asseits that the social worker’s testimony as to delayed disclosure was improper for a constancy of accusation witness pursuant to State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (en banc), and that he preserved that issue for our review. Our review of the record, however, reflects that such an objection was not raised at trial.

In Troupe, our Supreme Court held that “constancy of accusation witnesses in sexual assault cases would be confined to testily only regarding the fact that the victim complained to them, the time when that complaint was made, and the limited details of the assault, including the identity of the alleged perpetrator as reported to the witness by the victim.” State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 36, 770 A.2d 908 (2001). None of the defendant’s objections concerned whether the testimony of the social worker exceeded the limits of Troupe. Instead, the explicit ground asserted for the defendant’s objections was that the social worker was not qualified as an expert witness and, therefore, her testimony regarding delayed disclosure violated his constitutional right to a jury trial because it allegedly usurped the jury’s function of assessing the credibility of witnesses.

The defendant’s objections failed to provide enough background to “ ‘properly articulate the basis of the objection ....’” State v. Bush, supra, 249 Conn. 427. At no time during the colloquy did the defendant raise Troupe or state that the witness was a constancy of accusation witness who could testify only within the parameters of Troupe. Compare State v. Romero, 59 Conn. App. 469, 476-77, 757 A.2d 643 (defense counsel explicitly raised Troupe as objection, clearly indicated that witness was constancy witness), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 919, 763 A.2d 1043 (2000). Therefore, the claim, on the basis of that particular argument, was not preserved properly. In the alternative, the defendant requests that the claim be reviewed under the doctrine of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or, in the alternative, the plain error doctrine of Practice Book § 60-5.

We turn first to Golding analysis. The defendant does not satisfy the conditions established in State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40. “[A] defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “The first two conditions are determinations of whether a defendant’s claim will be reviewed, and the third condition involves a review of the claim itself.” State v. Graham, 33 Conn. App. 432, 442, 636 A.2d 852, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 906, 640 A.2d 117 (1994). When any one of these conditions is not satisfied, the claim will fail. See State v. Golding, supra, 240.

The defendant fails to satisfy the second prong of Golding. “In Connecticut, it is well established that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate a defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Thompson, 71 Conn. App. 8, 13, 799 A.2d 1126 (2002). Although we recognize that the defendant argues that the testimony of the social worker exceeded the scope of Troupe, we are unpersuaded that this rises to the level of a constitutional claim because, in essence, the defendant attempts to “ ‘put a constitutional tag on a nonconstitutional evidentiary ruling.’ ” Id. “Regardless of how the defendant has framed the issue, he cannot clothe an ordinary evidentiary issue in constitutional garb to obtain appellate review. . . . Although this court will review an unpreserved constitutional claim if it satisfies the criteria of State v. Golding, [supra, 213 Conn. 239-40] . . . unpreserved evidentiary claims are not afforded the same protection.” (Citation omitted.) State v. McHolland, 71 Conn. App. 99, 108, 800 A.2d 667 (2002); see also State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 480, 625 A.2d 791 (1993); State v. Romero, supra, 59 Conn. App. 479-81 (unpreserved claim regarding admission of constancy of accusation testimony does not satisfy second prong of Golding).

The defendant also seeks plain error review, alleging that the court’s admission of the social worker’s testimony concerning delayed disclosure affected the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings. The doctrine of plain error is codified in Practice Book § 60-5, which provides in relevant part that this court “shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court. . . .” “[T]o prevail under the plain error doctrine, the defendant must demonstrate that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice. . . . This doctrine is not implicated and review of the claimed error is not undertaken unless the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hair, 68 Conn. App. 695, 705, 792 A.2d 179, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 925, 797 A.2d 522 (2002).

As a preliminary matter, we note that the defendant does not claim that an expert witness cannot testify as to the theory of delayed disclosure. Instead, the defendant claims that the social worker, testifying exclusively as a constancy witness, could not testify as to the delayed disclosure theory. Because she was uniquely qualified to testify in the capacity of both a constancy of accusation witness and an expert witness, and in light of the defendant’s specific claim, we must determine whether the social worker was qualified properly as an expert witness.

“The trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the qualification of expert witnesses and the admissibility of their opinions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 376, 556 A.2d 112, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933, 110 S. Ct. 322, 107 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1989). “The test for admissibility of expert testimony is whether (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cardany, 35 Conn. App. 728, 732-33, 646 A.2d 291, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 942, 653 A.2d 823 (1994).

Immediately after beginning the direct examination of the social worker, the state began to lay a foundation as to her qualifications. The state inquired about her education, work history and experiences with abused children. On the basis of those answers, the court permitted the state to treat, and to question, the social worker as an expert.

In light of that evidence, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the social worker was qualified to testify as an expert in the field of social work and about the behavioral characteristics of child sex abuse victims. See State v. Spigarolo, supra, 210 Conn. 380. At no time did the defendant object as to the sufficiency of the social worker’s qualifications. Moreover, defense counsel treated her as an expert and cross-examined her as to her understanding of and testimony concerning the theory of delayed disclosure. Because we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in recognizing the social worker as an expert witness and that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court’s ruling affected the fairness of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings, we conclude that the court did not commit plain error.

B

The defendant argues that even if the social worker was qualified properly as an expert witness, her testimony was improper because it invaded the fact-finding province of the jury.

Because, as we stated previously, the defendant objected to the social worker’s testimony on the ground that it removed the fact-finding function from the jury, that claim was preserved properly at trial.

We disagree with the defendant’s contention that the social worker’s expert testimony usurped the jury’s function of assessing the credibility of witnesses. Our Supreme Court has stated that “[w]here the defendant has sought to impeach the testimony of the minor victim based on inconsistencies, partial disclosures, or recantations relating to the alleged incidents, the state may present expert opinion evidence that such behavior by minor sexual abuse victims is common.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 377. That is, our Supreme Court has “recognized the critical distinction between admissible expert testimony on general or typical behaviorfal] patterns of minor victims and inadmissible testimony directly concerning the particular victim’s credibility.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grenier, 257 Conn. 797, 806, 778 A.2d 159 (2001).

After the social worker was qualified as an expert, the state questioned her on her understanding of the theory of delayed disclosure. The rationale for allowing testimony in the state’s case-in-chief to explain alleged reporting delays is analogous to the rationale for permitting constancy of accusation testimony. Constancy of accusation testimony “is allowed, in part, to satisfy the jury that the victim behaved reasonably in light of the alleged assault. If the victim’s report had been immediate as would be expected . . . the jury might logically infer that the victim’s trial testimony more probably was truthful. ... On the other hand, [a] delayed statement [might undermine] the victim’s credibility because it was considered obvious that for one who claims to have been [sexually abused] to have long kept silence about it, would, if unexplained, weaken the force of any testimony that [he or] she might give in court, in support of a prosecution for such an offense.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cardany, supra, 35 Conn. App. 732. Because it is only natural “for a jury to discount the credibility of a victim who did not immediately report alleged incidents . . . testimony that explains to the jury why a minor victim of sexual abuse might delay in reporting the incidents of abuse should be allowed as part of the state’s case-in-chief.” Id. Expert testimony, concerning the behavioral patterns of children who have been sexually abused, is permissible. We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.

II

Next, we turn to the defendant’s claim that the court improperly admitted the victim’s July 21, 1999 written statement to the police. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court could not properly admit the statement under any of the state’s three asserted theories, which included (1) a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986), and State v. Wearing, 46 Conn. App. 741, 701 A.2d 41, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 937, 702 A.2d 645 (1997), (2) past recollection recorded or (3) pursuant to footnote 19 of Troupe. Consequently, the defendant argues that the admission of the statement violated his right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution. We conclude that the statement was admitted properly pursuant to Whelan and Wearing and, therefore, affirm the court’s ruling.

The defendant argues that the written statement was not offered by the state as a prior inconsistent statement, relative to the victim’s in-court testimony, pursuant to Whelan and Wearing. Moreover, the defendant argues that instead of offering the victim’s prior recorded statement as substantive evidence against her, the state offered it to bolster her credibility as a result of her memory lapses on cross-examination. We disagree.

“The admissibility of ... a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to Whelan, is a matter within the wide discretion of the trial court. ... On appeal, the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed except on a showing that it has been abused.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Newsome, 238 Conn. 588, 596, 682 A.2d 972 (1996).

In Whelan, our Supreme Court adopted a rule “allowing the substantive use of prior written inconsistent statements, signed by the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated, when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination.” State v. Whelan, supra, 200 Conn. 753. In State v. Wearing, supra, 46 Conn. App. 741, we further clarified the parameters of what constitutes an “inconsistency.” There, we held that “[a] statement’s inconsistency may be determined from the circumstances and is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. Thus, inconsistencies may be found in changes in position and they may also be found in denial of recollection. . . .

“Whether there are inconsistencies between the two statements is properly a matter for the trial court. . . . Inconsistencies may be shown not only by contradictory statements but also by omissions. In determining whether an inconsistency exists, the testimony of a witness as a whole, or the whole impression or effect of what has been said, must be examined.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 752-53. Whether a prior statement is in fact inconsistent is a matter to be determined within the court’s discretion. State v. Bruno, 236 Conn. 514, 554, 673 A.2d 1117 (1996).

Applying the Whelan test to the prior written statement in question, we must analyze whether the written statement was inconsistent with the statements provided on direct examination. In its brief, the state indicates approximately twenty instances of the victim’s inability to recall material facts during direct examination and cross-examination. Pursuant to Wearing, inconsistencies for Whelan purposes can be “ ‘found in [the] denial of recollection.’ ” State v. Wearing, supra, 46 Conn. App. 753. The victim’s inability to recall material facts, then, clearly satisfies the inconsistency element. Additionally, the victim’s July 21, 1999 statement was written and signed by the victim, who had personal knowledge of the facts stated within the writing and was subject to cross-examination. Therefore, all of the Whelan requirements were satisfied.

Despite the statement’s compliance with Whelan, the defendant argues that the timing of the introduction of the statement was improper because it would have been admissible only had the victim been unable to recall material facts at the time she testified on direct examination as opposed to redirect examination. We disagree with the defendant’s argument. The defendant cites no case law in support of his proposition. Recently, in fact, we held that a Whelan statement was admitted properly where it was offered by the state during redirect examination of the victim. See State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 18-20, 793 A.2d 1172, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002).

Because inconsistencies may be found in the denial of recollection, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the victim’s testimony was inconsistent with her July, 21, 1999 statement to the police. It was therefore admissible under Whelan.

Ill

The defendant’s final claim is that the court improperly restricted defense counsel’s cross-examination of the state’s key witnesses in violation of his constitutional right to confrontation. That claim was preserved properly at trial. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court improperly denied him the opportunity to make a requested offer of proof while cross-examining the victim’s mother and again during the cross-examination of the social worker. The defendant argues, as to each, that the offers of proof were relevant to show motive and inconsistency pertaining to the victim’s testimony.

“Offers of proof are allegations by the attorney in which he represents to the court that he could prove them if granted an evidentiary hearing.” State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487, 511, 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207, 112 S. Ct. 3000, 120 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1992) (Berdon, J., dissenting). The purpose of an offer of proof has been well established by our courts. “First, it informs the court of the legal theory under which the evidence is admissible. Second, it should inform the trial judge of the specific nature of the evidence so that the court can judge its admissibility. Third, it creates a record for appellate review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walsh, 67 Conn. App. 776, 786-87, 789 A.2d 1031, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 906, 795 A.2d 546 (2002), quoting State v. Jenkins, 56 Conn. App. 450, 456, 743 A.2d 660, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 947, 747 A.2d 523 (2000).

A trial court cannot preclude a defendant from making an offer of proof. See State v. Zoravali, 34 Conn. App. 428, 433, 641 A.2d 796, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 906, 644 A.2d 921 (1994). Therefore, the court’s denials of permission for him to make offers of proof were improper. That is not the end of our analysis, however. We must determine whether the court’s denials of the defendant’s requests to make offers of proof violated his constitutional rights. In making that determination, we examine the underlying rulings of the court with regard to the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim’s mother and the social worker.

“Our standard of review of a claim that the court improperly limited the cross-examination of a witness is one of abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walsh, supra, 67 Conn. App. 793-94. “The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and the scope of cross-examination. Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the. correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” State v. Aponte, 249 Conn. 735, 750, 738 A.2d 117 (1999).

“The sixth amendment to the [United States] constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to confront the witnesses against him. . . . The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination . . . and an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying. ... In order to comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the trial court must allow a defendant to expose to the jury facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. ... In determining whether a defendant’s right of cross-examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hunter, 62 Conn. App. 767, 772, 772 A.2d 709, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 925, 776 A.2d 1144 (2001). “This right may include impeaching or discrediting [state witnesses] by attempting to reveal to the jury the witnesses’ biases, prejudices or ulterior motives, or facts bearing on the witnesses’ reliability, credibility, or sense of perception.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Barrett, 43 Conn. App. 667, 675, 685 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 240 Conn. 923, 692 A.2d 819 (1997).

“The confrontation clause does not, however, suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination. . . . Only relevant evidence may be elicited through cross-examination . . . [and] [t]he trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and the scope of cross-examination.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peczynski, 50 Conn. App. 51, 55, 716 A.2d 149, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 936, 722 A.2d 1217 (1998).

Once it is established that the court’s ruling on the scope of cross-examination is not constitutionally defective, this court will apply “[e]very reasonable presumption ... in favor of the correctness of the [trial] court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether the court’s rulings, which excluded the offers of proof, resulted in the exclusion of extrinsic evidence that so significantly bore on the motive, bias or interest of the victim that the exclusions infringed on the defendant’s right to confrontation and, consequently, exceeded the court’s broad discretion.

A

With those principles in mind, we review first the court’s denial of defendant’s request to make an offer of proof during the cross-examination of the victim’s mother.

In his brief, the defendant cites to that portion of the trial transcript concerning an inquiry into the planned living arrangements of the victim, her family and the defendant without discussing how the offer of proof would have illustrated a motivation for the witness to he. The state objected, claiming that any answer by the witness would have been speculative. The court sustained the objection on the ground that the information was not relevant.

Importantly, the defendant does not discuss in his brief what the offer of proof was intended to show and fails to elaborate on how or why the offer of proof would have illustrated the motive, bias or interest of the victim. In its brief, the state surmises that the defendant’s offer of proof would have shown that the victim may have had the motivation to fabricate the attack to prevent her parents from moving into the same home with the defendant and, consequently, the victim would have continued to live in close proximity to her grandparents. The court, presented with defense counsel’s inquiry into “[w]hat would have happened if [the victim’s family] had moved [into the same home as the defendant and] the effect it would have had on the . . . family and the relationships,” as a means to prove motivation of the victim, presumably to fabricate the attack, determined that the line of questioning was speculative and irrelevant.

We disagree with the court’s determination that the line of questioning was irrelevant and speculative. One of the important functions of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’ motivation to testify. Certainly, any testimony elicited by the victim’s mother concerning the potential for the victim to fabricate a story of sexual abuse, in an effort to prevent an upcoming move into the same home with the defendant, would expose an important motivation that the jury should have been permitted to consider. Therefore, “[w]e must determine whether the court’s limitation of the defendant’s cross-examination of the [witness] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There are several factors that the court considers in the determination of such an inquiry. The most important factor is an examination of the impact such evidence would have on the trier of fact and the result of the trial.” State v. Horrocks, 57 Conn. App. 32, 39, 747 A.2d 25, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 908, 753 A.2d 941 (2000).

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the court’s improper ruling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the court’s ruling, the jury was given the opportunity to hear the defendant during closing argument discuss the victim’s motivation to fabricate the story. At that time, defense counsel stated: “What could be gained by — by making up or imagining this happened? Well, we know that the two families, that is [the victim’s] family and her — her mother’s parents lived in the same duplex. Right in the same building. And we know that she was close to her grandparents. And we know that they continue to live in that duplex. ... If [the victim] had moved . . . she would have left her grandparents behind . . . [s]he wouldn’t have seen the grandparents on a daily basis.” Although the court’s ruling was improper, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B

Next, we turn to the offer of proof concerning the social worker. In support of his argument, the defendant refers to his colloquy with the court during cross-examination of the social worker. In summary, the court precluded the defendant from questioning the social worker as to the number of times that the victim reported to her that the defendant had touched the victim because the witness was deemed, at that time, a constancy of accusation witness. The trial transcript reflects that the defendant argued that that line of questioning concerned the consistencies or inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony.

Our review of the record convinces us that the preclusion of any cross-examination of the witness concerning the number of times that the victim reported that the defendant had touched her improperly prohibited inquiry into a legitimate area of relevant concern to show inconsistency in the victim’s testimony. Consequently, we again must determine whether the court’s limitation of the defendant’s cross-examination of the witness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the nature of the excluded inquiry was not central to whether the victim had provided consistent testimony. Although the credibility of the victim’s testimony is important, that was not the only opportunity for the defendant to impeach the witness or to show inconsistencies. See State v. Peczynski, supra, 50 Conn. App. 56-57 (exclusion of videotape purporting to show hostility, bias of state’s only witness toward defendant did not preclude defendant from adequate cross-examination of that witness because defendant still had ample opportunity to do so). The jury had before it other evidence from which it could have drawn reasonable inferences or inconsistencies. That proof included the written report of the social worker’s interview with the victim at the hospital. In the report, the victim reported to the social worker that the defendant had “repeatedly” touched her throughout the night.

The defendant was allowed the minimum cross-examination so as to expose to the jury the facts from which the jurors, as sole triers of facts and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the state’s witnesses. Therefore, the field of inquiry was covered adequately by the admission of the written report of the social worker’s interview with the victim, and any improper limitation of cross-examination was harmless. Compare State v. Horrocks, supra, 57 Conn. App. 40-41 (limiting cross-examination to subject matter of defendant’s consent defense harmful error).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53-21 provides in relevant part: “Any person who ... (2) has contact with the intimate parts, as defined in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child . . . shall be guilty of a class C felony.”

       Nowhere in the witness list does the state label any witness an expert witness. The only apparent distinction is that there is a heading entitled “others.” The victim’s mother was a constancy witness listed under the “others” heading, but other constancy witnesses, such as Officer Schuler, are not listed under the “others” category. Therefore, it would appear that such a distinction is without merit and that the witness disclosure list was not misleading.

       The transcript of the social worker’s November 8, 2000 testimony in relevant part is as follows:
      “[Prosecutor]: Okay. Now, based upon your experience [at two hospitals] and your training in the area of social work, have you ever had the opportunity to come across the term delayed disclosure?
      “[The Witness]: Yes.
      “[Prosecutor]: Okay. And what is that term?
      “[The Witness]: It’s — ”
      At that point, defense counsel objected, stating that there had been “an inadequate foundation as an attempt to take the fact-finding matter out of the hands of the jury” and that the question also called for speculation. The court overruled the objection on the ground that it would not be an intrusion on the fact-finding function of the jury to permit the social worker to define the term “delayed disclosure.” She indicated, on the basis of her training and experience as a social worker, that she was familiar with the reasons that a person would delay disclosing incidents such as those at issue in this case.
      Thereafter, the colloquy continued in relevant part as follows:
      “[Prosecutor]: . . . [H]ave you come across that term in your work as a social worker?
      “[The Witness]: Yes.
      “[Prosecutor]: Is that a recognized type of behavior of children who are sexually abused?

        “[The Witness]: In my experience, yes, it’s — it often happens that there is a delay in response for a variety of — of reasons.”
      On the basis of the social worker’s response, defense counsel objected, arguing that the question called for speculation and was based on an inadequate foundation because, counsel argued, the question being asked was best suited “for the person whose actions are — being questioned . . . .”
      Thereafter, the colloquy continued in relevant part as follows:
      “[Prosecutor]: In your experience, in whether it be your educational experience or your training in this field of social work, is that a term that is commonly used or, at least, is that a term that’s recognized in the field of sexual abuse, that term, being a delayed disclosure or late disclosure?
      “[The Witness]: It’s a term I’ve heard in my experience working in hospitals—
      “[Prosecutor]: Okay.
      “[The Witness]: — in emergency departments.
      “[Prosecutor]: All right. And with respect to any — have you received training with respect to children who were sexually abused?
      “[The Witness]: Yes.
      “[Prosecutor]: And is that an ongoing process, the training that you receive in that area?
      “[The Witness]: Yes.
      “ [Prosecutor]: And during that training, has that concept of delayed disclosure come up during any of the training that you’ve received in this particular field?
      “[The Witness]: Yes.
      “[Prosecutor]: Okay. And is it a recognized characteristic with respect to children who claim they’ve been sexually abused in the area of social work?
      “[The Witness]: Yes.
      ♦ * *
      “[Prosecutor]: Does the relationship of the offender in any way effect the — well, let me put it this way. Does the relationship of — could the relationship of the defendant — of the offender to the victim in any way have any bearing on the time of disclosure the child would make?
      “[The Witness]: Yes. . . .
      “[Prosecutor]: And in what way?
      “The Court: In what way?
      “[Prosecutor]: In what way?
      “[The Witness]: Because they’re afraid of what would happen if they tell. I find that — based upon my experience, I find that children—
      “[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. Again—
      “The Court: I’ll allow it. She’s qualified to say that.
      “[The Witness]: I find that in these types of cases, that children are afraid no matter who the perpetrator is. Whether it be a family member or anybody else, they’re afraid.”

       During oral argument, concern by the court was raised as to whether the state was obligated to identify the social worker explicitly as an expert witness prior to trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the state complied with all requirements of our rules of practice and the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Beyond disclosing the social worker as a witness, the state was under no additional affirmative duty to identify her as an expert witness.
      With respect to the rules of practice, disclosure of witnesses in criminal matters is governed by Practice Book §§ 40-11 through 40-20. In particular, Practice Book § 40-11 discusses the disclosure of information and materials discoverable by the defendant as of right from the prosecuting authority. Nothing within Practice Book § 40-11, however, requires the state to disclose the names of the expert witnesses. Practice Book § 40-11 (a) (4) provides that the prosecuting authority shall additionally disclose “[a]ny reports or statements of experts made in connection with the offense charged including results of physical and mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons which are material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for use by the prosecuting authority as evidence in chief at the trial . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
      “The rules of statutory construction apply with equal force to Practice Book rules. ... A basic tenet of statutory construction is that when a statute [or rule of practice] is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. . . . When we have occasion to construe rules of criminal procedure, they are to be strictly construed to protect the fundamental constitutional right to liberty.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Genotti, 220 Conn. 796, 807, 601 A.2d 1013 (1992). Had the legislature intended the prosecuting authority to have specifically identified an expert witness on the witness disclosure list, the legislature would have used the same, or similar, language as that used in Practice Book § 13-4 to require parties in civil matters to identify the expert witness and to disclose the subject matter to which the expert will testify. See id.
      We also do not find support for the defendant’s argument in the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Section 7-2, the relevant code provision, contains a two-pronged requirement. First, the witness must be qualified as an expert. Next, it must be determined that the expected testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue. Neither of those prongs require identification or disclosure of an expert witness.

       The constancy of accusation doctrine states that “a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim’s complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim’s complaint with the pending charge, including, for example, the time and place of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator. . . . Thus, such evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim’s testimony and not for substantive purposes.” State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 304.

        State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).

        State v. Wearing, 46 Conn. App. 741, 701 A.2d 41, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 937, 702 A.2d 645 (1997).

        State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 304 n.19, provides: “Of course, the rule that we adopt today does not affect those cases in which the details of a sexual assault complaint are otherwise admissible, as, for example, in the case of a spontaneous utterance or in the case of a prior consistent statement admitted to rebut a claim of recent fabrication. Moreover, we recognize that the defendant, on cross-examination of a constancy witness, may elicit details of the victim’s complaint for the purpose of demonstrating inconsistencies between the victim’s trial testimony about the sexual assault and the victim’s report of the incident. In such cases, the effect of our modification of the constancy of accusation doctrine is merely to shift the timing of the introduction into evidence of the details.”

       The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”

       Specifically, the defendant argues that his sixth amendment right was violated because he allegedly had no opportunity to cross-examine the victim when she provided the police with a written statement and because there was allegedly no indication that the statement was given under oath.

       Because we have determined that the admission of the July 21, 1999 statement was proper pursuant to Whelan, we do not need to reach the merits of the defendant’s other arguments concerning his claim. Additionally, a review of the trial transcript reflects that the court’s instruction to the jury indicated that the statement was admitted solely as a Whelan statement.

       The following colloquy occurred in relevant part during the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim’s mother:
      “[Defense Counsel]: If you had moved into the house [with the defendant], your daughter wouldn’t have seen your parents as often as she did in the past; is that right?
      “[Prosecutor]: Objection, Your Honor.
      “The Court: What do you claim the relevance of this is?
      “[Defense Counsel]: The relevance is, Your Honor, the state on direct examination was able to talk about the living arrangements — or planned living arrangements of the — of the parties. The defense is showing the— the same thing to complete the picture. What would have happened if they had moved in [with the defendant], the effect it would have had on the— on the family and the relationships.
      “The Court: I haven’t—
      “[Prosecutor]: It’s speculative, Your Honor.
      “The Court: — seen it — anything. I haven’t seen anything in any of the questions so far. I believe it’s gone in deep enough. Other than that, it’s collateral and not relevant to what we’re here for. Okay. Get back on track here.
      “[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, can I make an offer of proof?
      “The Court: No, I — the—the issue is sexual assault in the first degree—
      “[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, the—
      “The Court: — risk of injury.
      “[Defense Counsel]: The motivation.
      “The Court: I just want to keep it on track.
      “[Defense Counsel]: But the motivations of the parties—
      “The Court: The motivation — the reason this woman was on the [witness] stand—
      “[Defense Counsel]: — are important.”

       The following colloquy occurred in relevant part during the defendant’s cross-examination of the social worker:
      “[Defense Counsel]: How many times did [the victim] indicate to you that she was touched by — by her uncle?
      “[Prosecutor]: Object, Your Honor.
      “The Court: No, I don’t think I can allow that without opening the door to the state. Do you disagree or do you agree? I’d like an answer to that.
      “[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
      “The Court: You what?
      “[Defense Counsel]: Yes, that — that would allow the state to cross-examine.
      “The Court: Exactly. And I will explain that to you later. That a witness here for purposes of constancy of accusation is [to testify] only as to the date, the time, the place and the person. [The witness] cannot continue to testify as to what was told to them. Now, if there’s an inquiry as to how many times, whatever, that opens the door, and that person may respond to the state. Do you have anything else?
      “[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
      “The Court: What would it be?
      “[Defense Counsel]: How many times did .... The same question, Your Honor.
      “The Court: I just thought I went through that.
      “[Defense Counsel]: Can I make an offer of proof on this?
      “The Court: I don’t think so. I think the law is clear. Your next offer on that would be at the Appellate Court.
      “[Defense Counsel]: This would relate to the constancy or inconstancy that the defense would claim is in the case. That the inconsistencies — ”


author: BISHOP, J.

text:
    KLM INDUSTRIES, INC. v. MICHAEL TYLUTKI ET AL.
    (AC 22308)
    Foti, Mihalakos and Bishop, Js.
    Argued October 25, 2002 —
    officially released February 11, 2003

      Nathalie Feola-Guerrieri, with whom, on the brief, was Daniel Shepro, for the appellant-cross appellee (defendant John Voloshin).

      Edward B. Bradley, with whom was Robert A. Ziegler, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).
   Opinion

BISHOP, J.

The defendant John Voloshin appeals from the judgment of the trial court holding him personally hable on a debt incurred by the defendant Home Investment Corporation, LLC (Home Investment), to the plaintiff, KLM Industries, Inc., and ruling that the plaintiff was a proper party to seek payment of the debt. The plaintiff cross appeals, claiming that the court improperly ruled in favor of Voloshin on the third and sixth counts of the complaint, which alleged that Voloshin had forged or knowingly benefited from a forged lien waiver. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff initiated the underlying action to recover for materials furnished to Home Investment in connection with the construction of a single-family dwelling in Milford. Two wholly owned subsidiaries of the plaintiff, Stevenson Lumber Company, Inc. (Stevenson Lumber), and Stevenson Millwork, Inc. (Stevenson Millwork), furnished the materials, which were valued at approximately $32,340, on or about June 30, 1997.

The plaintiff brought a six count complaint against Home Investment and later cited in its president, Voloshin, as a defendant. Counts one, two and three allege, respectively, (1) an amount owed by Home Investment on account to the plaintiff, (2) unjust enrichment on the part of Home Investment and (3) that Home Investment forged a lien waiver or benefited from its knowledge that it had been forged. Counts four through six mirror the first three counts, but are directed against Voloshin personally.

After trial, the court permitted the plaintiff to amend its complaint to conform to the evidence that the amounts owed to Stevenson Lumber and Stevenson Millwork had been validly assigned to the plaintiff, and in its memorandum of decision, the court credited the claimed assignment. The court found that the sum of $32,340 was due from Home Investment to the plaintiff with respect to counts one and two. Additionally, the court found for the plaintiff with respect to counts four and five, i.e., that Voloshin is personally liable on the debt. The court found for Voloshin and Home Investment on counts three and six, concluding that neither Voloshin nor Home Investment is liable on the alleged forged lien waiver claim. This appeal followed.

I

VOLOSHIN’S APPEAL

Voloshin first claims that the court improperly concluded that he was personally liable for Home Investment’s debt. We agree and reverse the court’s judgment as to counts four and five.

Our standard of review when a court draws legal implications from factual findings “involves a two part function: where the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision; where the factual basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous.” Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). We employ both standards of review because the appeal implicates the court’s factual findings as well as the legal conclusions drawn from them.

The court found the following facts. Stevenson Lumber and Stevenson Millwork furnished building materials worth $32,340 to Home Investment to be used in the construction of a dwelling. The finished home was sold by warranty deed for $288,000 by Home Investment. At all times, Home Investment acted through Voloshin, its president and sole shareholder. Voloshin personally arranged for the purchase of goods and materials, and signed documents on behalf of Home Investment. He exercised complete control over the management and finances of the corporation, and was responsible for the hiring and supervising of all employees and independent contractors. During the year in which the debt at issue became due, substantial sums of money were withdrawn from Home Investment for the benefit of Voloshin and members of his family. In December, 1997, Voloshin issued a check to Stevenson Lumber in the amount of $35,911, which was returned due to insufficient funds.

On the basis of those factual findings, the court concluded that Voloshin was personally liable to the plaintiff. The court ascribed personal liability to Voloshin by piercing the corporate veil of Home Investment.

General Statutes § 33-673 (b) acts to exempt shareholders of a coiporation from personal liability and provides in relevant part that “a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the coiporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.” That statutory cloak protects those who own a corporation in all but the exceptional circumstance in which an individual may be held personally liable for the ostensible debts of the corporation.

“A court may pierce the corporate veil only under exceptional circumstances . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Progress Builders, Inc., 26 Conn. App. 749, 755, 603 A.2d 1190 (1992). In such unusual circumstances, “[c]ourts will disregard the fiction of separate legal entity when a corporation is a mere instrumentality or agent of another corporation or individual owning all or most of its stock. . . . Under such circumstances the general rule, which recognizes the individuality of corporate entities and the independent character of each in respect to their coiporate transactions, and the obhgations incurred by each in the course of such transactions, will be disregarded, where . . . the interests of justice and righteous dealing so demand.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hersey v. Lonrho, Inc., 73 Conn. App. 78, 86, 807 A.2d 1009 (2002). The “issue of whether the corporate veil [should be] pierced presents a question of fact. . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, 70 Conn. App. 133, 148, 799 A.2d 298, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 91, 806 A.2d 49 (2002).

“When determining whether piercing the corporate veil is proper, our Supreme Court has endorsed two tests: the instrumentality test and the identity test. The instrumentality rule requires, in any case but an express agency, proof of three elements: (1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) that such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.” Hersey v. Lonrho, Inc., supra, 73 Conn. App. 87.

“The identity rule has been stated as follows: If a plaintiff can show that there was such a unity of interest and ownership that the independence of the corporations had in effect ceased or had never begun, an adherence to the fiction of separate identity would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the economic entity to escape liability arising out of an operation conducted by one corporation for the benefit of the whole enterprise. . . . The concept of piercing the corporate veil is equitable in nature and courts should pierce the corporate veil only under exceptional circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The court pierced Home Investment’s corporate veil and found that Voloshin was personally liable to the plaintiff on the ground that Home Investment merely was his instrumentality. In making that determination, the court concluded that Voloshin exercised complete control over Home Investment sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the test. The court found that Voloshin exercised that control in such a way as to commit a fraud or wrong, namely, that he caused the finances of Home Investment to be depleted while the debt to the plaintiff remained unpaid. The court also found Voloshin liable under the identity rule and stated that “to adhere to the fiction of a separate legal existence between Home Investment and John Voloshin, would serve to defeat justice and equity, and would allow John Voloshin to avoid payment of a lawful debt due to the plaintiff, KLM Industries, Inc.” Although one might reasonably conclude that Voloshin misapplied company assets to his personal use and inappropriately handled company finances, we are not persuaded that his actions warrant application of the common-law exception to the statutory protection against personal liability.

Cases in which the corporate veil has been pierced are factually dissimilar to the present case. In Davenport v. Quinn, 53 Conn. App. 282, 730 A.2d 1184 (1999), the trial court pierced the corporate veil of the defendant’s corporation because the defendant was the sole shareholder, director and officer of several corporations, did not maintain separate bank accounts for each corporation, used one corporation to pay off the debts of the others and depleted corporate resources to avoid a default judgment. The court found that such “alter ego” status warranted application of the doctrine. Id., 301-303. In Toshiba America Medical Systems, Inc. v. Mobile Medical Systems, Inc., 53 Conn. App. 484, 730 A.2d 1219, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 930, 733 A.2d 851 (1999), this court held that piercing the corporate veil was proper because the defendant, the sole shareholder of two corporations, transferred more than $1.1 million from one of his corporations to another to avoid paying the plaintiff, held no corporate meetings to approve such transactions, did not file any tax returns or other documentary proof with the secretary of the state as to corporate existence, had no employees and had no equipment or property other than an automobile for the defendant’s use. Id., 488-92. The defendant used corporate funds to pay his personal income tax and permitted his son to write checks on the corporate account. Id., 491.

Unlike the defendants in Davenport and Toshiba America Medical Systems, Inc., the defendant in this case, Voloshin, was not the sole shareholder and, in fact, held no corporate shares. In that regard, the court’s factual finding to the contrary clearly is improper. It appears from the record that it was undisputed at trial that Voloshin’s spouse, Linda, was the sole shareholder and director of Home Investment. Additionally, our review of the record suggests that Voloshin exercised no more control over Home Investment than that of any president of a closely held corporation. Contrary to the court’s findings, the record demonstrates that the Voloshins treated the company as a distinct entity. For example, there was evidence that the Voloshins had informal discussions concerning company activities from time to time, and that Linda Voloshin consented to corporate actions for each year from 1995 to 1997. Also, Home Investment maintained its returned checks and statements, filed and maintained corporate tax returns, and filed its biannual reports. Evidence that the company adhered to those practices is inconsistent with a finding that the company was the mere instrumentality of Voloshin. See Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, supra, 70 Conn. App. 152 (adherence to corporate formalities militates against finding of control). The fact that Voloshin acted on behalf of the company is no more than a reflection of the reality that all corporations act through individuals. It is axiomatic that while such an entity has a distinct legal life, it can act only through individuals. Finally, to the extent that the court suggested that piercing the corporate veil also was justified under the identity theory, we hold that the evidence in this case does not support a finding that the unity of interest and ownership between Voloshin and the company was such that the company ceased to exist or had never begun, or that adherence to the notion of a separate identity would serve only to defeat justice and equity. See Hersey v. Lonrho, Inc., supra, 73 Conn. App. 87. Here, the court’s conclusions that Voloshin’s actions evinced such pervasive control as to negate the separate existence of the company is unsupported by the record. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to counts four and five.

II

Voloshin next claims that the court improperly found that the plaintiff satisfied its burden of proof that it was the proper party to seek payment for the materials sold by Stevenson Lumber. Specifically, he claims that because the building materials had been sold to Home Investment, not by the plaintiff, but by Stevenson Lumber, as alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff failed to prove that Home Investment owed it moneys. As previously stated, after trial, the court permitted the plaintiff to amend its complaint to allege that the right to seek payment for the materials provided by Stevenson Lumber had been assigned to the plaintiff. Because we have determined that the judgment against Voloshin, the only defendant on this appeal, must be reversed for other reasons, we need not reach Voloshin’s claim.

Ill

PLAINTIFF’S CROSS APPEAL

In its cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly found that Voloshin was not liable to the plaintiff on the forged lien waiver. We are not persuaded.

Count six of the plaintiffs amended complaint sought recovery on the ground that Voloshin had signed, or caused to be signed, a mechanic’s lien waiver on behalf of Stevenson Lumber, which enabled Home Investment to close on the property at issue. At trial, there was testimony that the waiver was signed with the name “Steve Baldino,” a name purportedly unknown to any of the parties. Voloshin testified that although he could not recall the precise circumstances of the lien waiver, he believed the signature had been obtained by the project superintendent and that the waiver had been delivered to him with the name “Steve Baldino” already affixed. The court was entitled to credit or discredit any or all of the testimony regarding the circumstances in which the lien waiver had been signed and utilized.

The court’s factual findings are binding on this court unless they are clearly improper in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. “We cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Putnam Park Associates v. Fahnestock & Co., 73 Conn. App. 1, 11-12, 807 A.2d 991 (2002).

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the court’s finding was not clearly improper. We do not disagree with the court’s conclusion that there is insufficient evidence that Voloshin forged or knowingly benefited from a forgery of the lien waiver in question.

On the defendant John Voloshin’s appeal, the judgment is reversed as to counts four and five and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of John Voloshin on those counts. On the plaintiffs cross appeal, the judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The plaintiff, KLM Industries, Inc., instituted this action against four defendants, Michael Tylutki, Rebecca Tylutki, People’s Bank and Home Investment Corporation. Thereafter, the action was withdrawn as to the Tylutkis and People’s Bank. The plaintiff then cited in John Voloshin as a party defendant. Voloshin is the only defendant to appeal.

       The appellation “Home Investment Corporation, LLC,” suggesting that the defendant is both a corporation and a limited liability company is incorrect. Home Investment Corporation (Home Investment) was sued and appeared as a corporation. At some point pretrial, counsel for the plaintiff filed a pleading in which “LLC” was added to Home Investment’s name. This is apparently incorrect. From the trial record, it is clear that there is no dispute that Home Investment is a closely held stock corporation and not a limited liability company. The confusion as to its legal status appears in the court’s memorandum of decision in which the court refers to Home Investment as a limited liability company, but then makes findings as to its stock ownership. This misapprehension does not, however, prevent our determination of the issues on appeal. Although we disagree with the court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil, we agree with the court that the determination of whether to pierce the corporate veil of a stock corporation or to disregard the protections afforded a limited liability company requires the same analysis. Additionally, it is clear from a review of counsels’ briefs that they treated Home Investment as a stock corporation. We do as well.

       Although the identity rule primarily applies to prevent injustice where two corporations are controlled as one enterprise; Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Construction & Paving, Inc., 187 Conn. 544, 560, 447 A.2d 406 (1982); it has been applied to hold an individual liable for a corporate obligation. See Saphir v. Neustadt, 177 Conn. 191, 209-10, 413 A.2d 843 (1979); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 575-78, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).