author: Lavery, J.

text:
    Anne F. Young et al. v. Michael Falk et al.
    (12430)
    Lavery, Spear and Cretella, Js.
    Argued March 25
    decision released June 28, 1994

      David J. O’Dea, with whom were Donald R. Beebe and, on the brief, Thomas Norton, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Brendan T. Flynn, with whom, on the brief, was Robert L. Hirtle, Jr., for the appellees (defendants).
   Lavery, J.

The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court accepting the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendants in the plaintiffs’ chiropractic malpractice suit. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly charged the jury and refused to set aside the jury’s verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In June, 1987, Anne Young, the named plaintiff, sought chiropractic treatment from the defendant to alleviate intermittent dizziness, vertigo and soreness in her neck and shoulders. Over a period of twelve days, the defendant treated her several times with cervical manipulation, cervical traction, massage and ultrasound. After her condition did not improve, the named plaintiff consulted a neurologist who recommended against further chiropractic treatment. She returned, however, to the defendant two days later for further treatment. On that occasion, the defendant used only cervical traction, not manipulation. Approximately thirty-six hours later, the named plaintiff suffered a brain stem stroke that left her unable to work or to drive a car.

The complaint alleged that the defendant had been negligent in testing, diagnosing and treating the named plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant had (1) failed to conduct and record properly a test used to determine whether a patient has a high risk of a stroke, (2) misdiagnosed her condition and used contraindicated treatments, and (3) failed to warn her about the risks and obtain informed consent to the procedures.

The plaintiffs also sued Susan Falk, the defendant’s wife, alleging that the defendant fraudulently transferred his interest in his office building to his wife after learning of the plaintiffs’ suit. They also claimed that the transfer evidenced the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. The claims against Susan Falk were severed. The remaining claims were tried to a jury, which found in favor of the defendant.

I

The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly failed to give the requested charge of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. The term falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) refers to the prerogative of the jury to discredit all of a witness’ testimony if the jury finds that the witness has testified falsely in some respect. State v. Smith, 201 Conn. 659, 666, 519 A.2d 26 (1986). The plaintiff had requested that the trial court give this charge to the jury. The court did not charge as requested. The trial court did, however, explain to the jurors that they could believe all, some or none of a witness’ testimony. The court stated clearly that the jury alone determined the credibility of witnesses and what testimony to believe.

“The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus in its permissive form has been approved in this state as an instruction to the jury in relation to their determination of the credibility of witnesses. . . . The approved instruction deals with the weight and credibility of testimony and not with the competency of witnesses. It serves as an aid to the jury in weighing and sifting the evidence. It is not a mandate to disregard all testimony of a witness who has been found to have wilfully or knowingly testified falsely as to any material fact although that was its literal meaning and original purpose. ... It has long been an established legal principle in this state that the trier of fact has the right to accept part and disregard part of the testimony of a witness. . . . Under the proper instruction the jury may or may not, as they see fit, reject all the testimony of the witness, and act on their own judgment as to the value and credibility of the testimony. . . . Under the general instructions by the court relating to the credibility of witnesses, the jury are similarly advised even if in fact the maxim is not called to their attention. . . . Instruction on the maxim is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial judge.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Raia v. Topehius, 165 Conn. 231, 234-36, 332 A.2d 93 (1973).

“A jury charge is to be considered from the standpoint of its effect on the jury in guiding it to a correct verdict. . . . The charge is to be read as a whole, with the instructions claimed to be improper read in that context. ... A reviewing court does not critically dissect the charge to discover possible inaccuracies. . . . The test to determine if a jury charge is proper is whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . Jury instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically accurate, so long as they are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lynch v. Granby Holdings, Inc., 32 Conn. App. 574, 580, 630 A.2d 609, cert. granted, 228 Conn. 913, 635 A.2d 1230 (1993).

Our review of the charge as given persuades us that it fairly presented the case to the jury in a way that injustice was not done to either party under the established rules of law.

II

The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in its charge to the jury. The plaintiffs requested a charge on the defendant’s consciousness of liability. Although not in the language requested, the trial court did instruct the jury that if a defendant disposes of property for no consideration after an event that might render the defendant liable, that disposition of property can be considered proof of the defendant’s consciousness of liability. The court also noted the defendant’s explanation for his transfer of property to his wife. The plaintiffs claim that this part of the charge improperly interfered with the province of the jury by impermissibly bolstering the defendant’s credibility.

The defendant asserts that this claim was not properly preserved for appeal. In order to preserve full appellate review of a jury charge assigned as error, the plaintiffs must (1) have either (a) requested the court to charge on the topic or (b) objected to the charge as given; Practice Book § 315; State v. Kwaak, 21 Conn. App. 138, 160 n.9, 572 A.2d 1015, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 811, 576 A.2d 540 (1990); and (2) moved to set aside the verdict. Budlong v. Nadeau, 30 Conn. App. 61, 65, 619 A.2d 4, cert. denied, 225 Conn. 909, 621 A.2d 290, cert. denied, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 62, 126 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1993); Cuartas v. Greenwich, 14 Conn. App. 370, 374, 540 A.2d 1071, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 803, 548 A.2d 436 (1988). “This rule is essential in order to prevent a judicial game of pin-the-tail-on-the-claim-of-error.” Cuartas v. Greenwich, supra, 375.

In this instance, the plaintiffs did not object to the trial court’s reference to the defendant’s explanation for disposing of his property. Although the plaintiffs did raise the issue in their motion to set aside the judgment, that alone is insufficient. See Practice Book § 315. The purpose of the rule is to provide the trial court with an opportunity to cure any defects or ambiguities in the charge while that can still occur without retrial. See Thomas v. Katz, 171 Conn. 412, 414, 370 A.2d 978, 980 (1976). Because the plaintiffs did not object after the charge, their claim is not properly preserved.

Where a claim of improper jury charge has not been preserved in the trial court, we are limited in our review to whether the trial court committed plain error. Budlong v. Nadeau, supra, 30 Conn. App. 65. Plain error exists only in “truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” Id., 66.

Our review of the charge leads us to conclude that the trial court’s reference to the defendant’s explanation was not plain error. In fact, it was not error. Although “a trial court has not only the right but often the duty to comment upon the evidence . . . [instructions should not . . . direct the attention of the jury too prominently to the facts in the testimony on one side of the case, while sinking out of view, or passing lightly over the portions of the testimony on the other side . . . .” Bruneau v. Quick, 187 Conn. 617, 628, 447 A.2d 742 (1982). By reminding the jury of the defendant’s explanation, the trial court properly presented both sides of the issue of consciousness of guilt and did not overstep its bounds.

Ill

The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court improperly failed to charge on some of their allegations of negligence. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had been negligent in his treatment of the named plaintiff in eleven different ways, including negligent diagnosis, treatment, testing, monitoring, warning, failure to obtain consent, and failure to follow proper procedures. The plaintiffs requested a charge on negligence that highlighted each separate negligence accusation. Although not in the plaintiffs’ language, the trial court charged the jury that the defendant stood accused of negligent diagnosis, treatment, failure to warn, failure to obtain consent, and failure to follow proper procedures.

The defendant asserts that this claim was also not properly preserved for appeal. As noted previously, full appellate review of a jury charge assigned as error is available only if the appellant (1) either (a) requested the court to charge on the topic or (b) objected to the charge as given; Practice Book § 315; State v. Kwaak, supra, 21 Conn. App. 160 n.9; and (2) moved to set aside the verdict. Budlong v. Nadeau, supra, 30 Conn. App. 65; Cuartas v. Greenwich, supra, 14 Conn. App. 374. In this instance, however, the plaintiffs submitted a proper request to charge and raised the issue in their motion to set aside the verdict. Thus, the claim is preserved for our review.

“It is not error for a trial court to charge the jury in language other than that submitted by the parties. Although the court did not charge in the exact language, [ejrror cannot be predicated on a failure to adopt the particular language of a request to charge where the matter is adequately and fairly covered in the charge. ... A charge must be read as a whole; the test is not whether it is exhaustive, letter perfect or technically accurate . . . but whether the charge as a whole fairly presented the case so that no injustice was done.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogers v. Delfino, 13 Conn. App. 725, 728, 539 A.2d 156 (1988); see also Mazzucco v. Krall Coal & Oil Co., 172 Conn. 355, 357, 374 A.2d 1047 (1977).

Although the trial court did not use the plaintiffs’ exact language, the charge did cover the plaintiffs’ allegations adequately and fairly. Our comparison of the request and the charge persuades us that the charge fairly presented the case and that no injustice was done.

IV

The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court improperly refused to set aside the verdict as contrary to the evidence. They assert that they presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude only that the defendant was negligent, that his negligence was the proximate cause of the named plaintiff’s injuries, and that he testified falsely and was conscious of his liability. Conversely, the defendant argues that sufficient evidence was adduced to support the jury’s verdict.

“The function of the trial court in setting a verdict aside, and the role of this court in reviewing that action, are well settled. The trial court possesses inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court’s opinion, is against the law or the evidence. . . . The trial court should not set a verdict aside where there was some evidence upon which the jury could reasonably have based its verdict . . . . Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion .... Limiting that discretion, however, is the litigants’ constitutional right to have issues of fact determined by a jury where there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded jurors. . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) American National Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 221 Conn. 768, 774, 607 A.2d 418 (1992).

“This court’s inquiry focuses on the action of the trial court .... We determine whether the trial court abused its broad discretion, according great weight to the action of the trial court and indulging every reasonable presumption in favor of its correctness . . . because the trial court, unlike this court, has had the opportunity to view the witnesses, to gauge their credibility and the weight of their evidence, and to detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury. ... In doing so, we must examine the evidential basis of the verdict itself to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id., 774-75.

Central to this claim is the plaintiffs’ assertion that the evidence presented at trial could only support the conclusion that the plaintiff’s stroke resulted from the defendant’s treatment. The plaintiffs’ own experts testified, however, that the stroke could have resulted from other causes. Further, the defendant’s expert testified that the length of time between the last treatment and the stroke indicated that there was no causal connection.

Our review of the testimony and evidence adduced at trial persuades us that a sufficient evidentiary basis existed to support the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the verdict.

y

Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury that contributory negligence was not applicable to the action. The named plaintiff consulted a neurologist prior to her final treatment from the defendant. The neurologist advised her not to permit the defendant to manipulate her neck again. She returned for further treatments, however, and permitted the defendant to manipulate her neck. The plaintiffs sought to have the trial court instruct the jury that the named plaintiff’s conduct could not be viewed as evidence of negligence.

The defendant did not plead contributory negligence as a special defense. “A plaintiff . . . may not claim as error the trial court’s refusal to grant a request to charge on any issue not reasonably given rise to by the pleadings.” Krattenstein v. Thomas, 7 Conn. App. 604, 610, 509 A.2d 1077, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 807, 515 A.2d 378 (1986). “A jury can only be confused and misled by interjecting into their deliberations a doctrine inapplicable to the evidence as a matter of law.” Faulkner v. Reid, 176 Conn. 280, 281, 407 A.2d 958 (1978). Therefore, the trial court properly refused to charge as requested.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The plaintiffs in this action are Anne F. Young, the patient, and her husband, Paul A. Young.

       The defendants in this action are Michael Falk and Falk Chiropractic Services. For the purposes of this opinion, the term defendant refers to Michael Falk.

       This request had its basis in disputed evidence that the defendant had altered some entries on his patient notes after suit had been commenced. The defendant testified about the changes and denied making any material changes. The plaintiff requested that the trial court charge the jury as follows: “Likewise you can consider whether or not the defendant changed his office records. If you find that the defendant made a false statement by changing his office records, then you can disregard his entire testimony. The legal maximum [sic] in Latin states: Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus which translates as: False in one thing, false in everything. The doctrine means that if the testimony of a witness on a material issue is willfully false and given with intention to deceive, the jury may disregard all the witness’ testimony.”

       In this regard the trial court charged the jury as follows: “Now, in connection with finding the true facts is the question of the credibility of witnesses. You and you alone decide that. You can believe anything a witness said, nothing a witness said, believe some things and not other things. You consider their connection with the case, whether they are a party, whether they are truly independent, whether they have been retained by somebody to testify, whether they are friends or relatives. Whatever their interest might be in the outcome of the case is to be considered by you in determining their credibility and whether or not you accept as truthful and accurate their testimony.”

       The plaintiffs requested that the trial court charge on this issue as follows: “The rule is well established that when a defendant after the happening of an accident or the occurrence of some other event which might render him liable, disposes of his property for no consideration (or payment) the jury may consider that transfer as proof that the defendant was conscious of his liability.”

       The trial court charged the jury on this subject as follows: “The claim has been made, and I have to tell you what the law is, that when a defendant, after the happening of an accident or the occurrence of some other event which might render him liable, disposes of his property for no consideration or payment, the jury may consider that transfer as proof that the defendant was conscious of his liability.
      “Now, the word there is the jury ‘may’ consider it. You don’t have to consider it. As I recall, there was an explanation made by Dr. Falk that he did it for tax purposes. So, if you feel that’s what the reason was, then you don’t consider that as proof of consciousness of liability. Its up to you how you interpret that act that was done.’’

       The plaintiffs requested that the trial court charge on this issue as follows: “The claims are that Dr. Falk from June 12,1987 through June 24, 1987 in endeavoring to treat Anne Young did not exercise the degree of care or skill ordinarily exercised by chiropractors in one or more of the following particulars: (a) He failed to properly and/or timely diagnose the condition that the plaintiff, Anne F. Young, had; and/or (b) He attempted to treat the plaintiff, Anne F. Young, with procedures that were detrimental to her health; and/or (c) He failed to perform proper preliminary tests before performing the procedures on her; and/or (d) he was not aware, although he should have been aware, of the probable complications that his procedures could and/or would have on the Plaintiff, Anne F. Young, including but not limited to, the physical and related problems that the plaintiff now has; and/or (e) He failed to warn the Plaintiff, Anne F. Young, of the risks of the procedures that he was to perform and/or did perform on the Plaintiff, Anne F. Young; and/or (f) He failed to follow standard chiropractic procedures and testing in the treatment and care of the Plaintiff, Anne F. Young; and/or (g) He failed to follow standard medical procedures and testings in the treatment and care of Anne F. Young; and/or (h) He failed to obtain the informed consent of the Plaintiff, Anne F. Young, before performing chiropractic manipulations on her; and/or (i) He failed to conduct proper diagnostic testing; and/or (¡) He failed to properly monitor the patient while treating her; and/or (k) He failed to correct any one or more of the above errors.”

       The trial court charged the jury on this issue as follows: “Now, if you find that the plaintiff proved a standard of care . . . the next thing the plaintiff must also prove by expert testimony is that there was a violation of this standard of care in one or more of the ways alleged in the complaint .... And I’ll read those allegations at this time. The plaintiff claims that the defendant attempted to treat the plaintiff Anne Young from June 12,1987 through on or about June 24,1987 and, endeavoring to treat her, did not exercise the degree of care or skill ordinarily exercised by chiropractic physicians in their professions in one or more of the following ways or particulars: He failed to properly and/or timely diagnose the condition that the plaintiff Anne Young had; and/or he attempted to treat the plaintiff Anne F. Young with procedures that were detrimental to her health; and/or he failed to warn the plaintiff Anne F. Young of the risks of the procedures that he was about to perform on the plaintiff Anne F. Young; and/or he failed to follow standard chiropractic procedures and testings in the treatment and care of the plaintiff; and finally, he failed to obtain the informed consent of the plaintiff Anne F. Young before performing chiropractic manipulations upon her.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Schaller, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jacqueline Duggins v. H.N.S. Management Company, Inc.
    (12360)
    O’Connell, Landau and Schaller, Js.
    Argued March 21
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Kenneth J. Levine, for the appellant (named plaintiff).

      William J. Melley III, with whom, on the brief, was Anita M. Varunes, for the appellee (defendant).
   Schaller, J.

This case comes before us, pursuant to Practice Book § 4147, by reservation of a question of law from the trial court. The reserved question is: “Whether a common carrier owned by the state of Connecticut is obligated to provide uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 38a-336 et seq. (formerly § 38-175c), for the benefit of its passengers.” We decline to answer the reserved question.

A stipulation filed pursuant to Practice Book § 4148 reveals that the defendant, H.N.S. Management Company, Inc., operates under the name Connecticut Transit and is a duly authorized public service transportation company. Connecticut Transit buses are owned by the state of Connecticut, which is not a party to this action. On April 24,1987, the plaintiff, Jacqueline Dug-gins, was a fare paying passenger on a Connecticut Transit bus in Hartford. A pickup truck, operated by Stefan Pagano, collided with the bus in the course of making a left-hand turn. Pagano, who was uninsured, was the party at fault. The plaintiff was not an insured under any automobile liability policy.

Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4a-19 and 4a-20, the Connecticut State Insurance Purchasing Board has never purchased uninsured motorist coverage for Connecticut Transit buses nor has Connecticut Transit, which is self-insured, filed a certificate of self-insurance. The plaintiff brought this action seeking relief including money damages, interest, and an order directing Connecticut Transit to proceed with uninsuredunderinsured motorist arbitration.

This court “will not entertain a reservation for its advice upon questions of law arising in any action unless the question or questions presented are such as are, in the opinion of the court, reasonably certain to enter into the decision of the case, and it appears that their present determination would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action.” (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 4147; see Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Greenwich Catholic Elementary School System, Inc., 202 Conn. 609, 615, 522 A.2d 785 (1987); Hoblitzelle v. Frechette, 156 Conn. 253, 255, 240 A.2d 864 (1968); Barr v. First Taxing District, 147 Conn. 221, 223, 158 A.2d 740 (1960).

The question reserved involves the responsibility of a common carrier owned by the state of Connecticut to provide uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits. The stipulation of facts does not provide an adequate basis for us to conclude that an answer to the question reserved would enter into the decision of the case. A fair reading of the stipulation indicates that, in this case, the state does not own the common carrier but has merely contracted with the common carrier, H.N.S. Management Company, Inc., a private corporation doing business as Connecticut Transit, to provide bus transportation service to the public. While the state of Connecticut owns the buses, it does not own the common carrier.

The stipulation does not provide a factual predicate for the question reserved and, as a result, we are not reasonably certain that an answer to the question presented would enter into the decision in this case.

We decline to answer the reserved question.

No costs will be taxed to any party.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Practice Book § 4147 provides in pertinent part: “A reservation shall be taken to the . . . appellate court from those cases in which an appeal could have been taken directly ... to the appellate court . . . had judgment been rendered. . . .
      “All questions presented for advice shall be specific and shall be phrased so as to require a Yes or No answer.
      “The court will not entertain a reservation for its advice upon questions of law arising in any action unless the question or questions presented are such as are, in the opinion of the court, reasonably certain to enter into the decision of the case, and it appears that their present determination would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action. . . .”

       Practice Book § 4148 provides in pertinent part: “Before any question shall be reserved by any court, counsel shall file in that court a stipulation which shall clearly and fully state the question or questions upon which advice is desired; that their present determination by . . . the appellate court would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy injudicial action, the grounds for such allegation being particularly stated; that the answers to the questions will determine, or are reasonably certain to enter into the final determination of the case; and that the parties request that the questions be reserved for the advice of . . . the appellate court.”

       General Statutes §§ 4a-19 and 4a-20 provide for a state insurance purchasing board that has the duty to determine the methods by which the state shall insure itself against losses.


text:
    Robert V. Squeglia, Jr. v. Robert V. Squeglia, Sr.
    (12706)
    Foti, Lavery and Heiman, Js.
    Argued March 31
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Kathleen S. Mass, with whom, on the brief, was Vincent R. Falcone, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      David J. Crotta, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Carolyn P. Gould, for the appellee (defendant).
   Lavery, J.

The sole issue on appeal in this case is whether the doctrine of parental immunity bars an action by an unemancipated minor against his father pursuant to General Statutes § 22-357. The defendant, Robert V. Squeglia, Sr., owned a dog that attacked and injured his four year old son, Robert V. Squeglia, Jr., in 1991. Later that year, the child brought suit against the defendant pursuant to General Statutes § 22-357 seeking damages for his personal injuries.

The defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that the parental immunity doctrine barred the plaintiff’s recovery. The trial court found that no genuine issue of material fact existed because the parties were father and son and the father owned the offending dog. The trial court also found that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the doctrine of parental immunity barred the plaintiff’s suit. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendant.

The standard governing our review of a trial court’s summary judgment ruling is clear. Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Practice Book § 384. Once the movant shows an absence of any disputed material fact, the opponent must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists through supporting evidence. Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 27 Conn. App. 162, 165-66, 604 A.2d 1339, aff’d, 224 Conn. 240, 618 A.2d 506 (1992). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The plaintiff brought suit pursuant to § 22-357. That statute imposes strict liability on the owner or keeper of a dog to third parties for injuries the animal causes. Maccarone v. Hawley, 7 Conn. App. 19, 24, 507 A.2d 506 (1986). It “ ‘abrogate[s] the common-law doctrine of scienter as applied to damage by dogs to persons and property, so that liability of the owner or keeper became no longer dependent upon his knowledge of the dog’s ferocity or mischievous propensity ....’” Id., quoting Granniss v. Weber, 107 Conn. 622, 625, 141 A. 877 (1928).

The parties did not dispute that the defendant is the plaintiff’s father or that the defendant owned the responsible dog. Thus, the trial court correctly found that there existed no genuine issue of material fact. The trial court went on to rule that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the parental immunity doctrine barred the plaintiff’s suit. The plaintiff challenges this ruling.

“The parental immunity doctrine bars an unemancipated minor from suing his or her parent for injuries caused by the negligence of that parent.” Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 523, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 86-87, 145 A. 753 (1929). Under this doctrine, parents are not liable civilly to their children for personal injuries inflicted during their minority. Dubay v. Irish, supra, 523; Mesite v. Kirchenstein, supra, 82-83. The purpose of the doctrine is to preserve the integrity and unity of the family and to avoid unnecessarily injecting the machinery of the state into the day-to-day exercise of parental discretion. See Dubay v. Irish, supra, 527; Mesite v. Kirchenstein, supra, 82-83. Our Supreme Court has recently confirmed the vitality of the doctrine. See Dubay v. Irish, supra, 523, 527-28, 530.

Connecticut law recognizes only four exceptions to the parental immunity doctrine. First, an unemancipated minor can sue the employer of a parent whose negligence in the course of employment injured the child, thereby putting the parent at risk of an indemnity suit. Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Cory., 111 Conn. 377, 380, 150 A. 107 (1930). Second, a minor can sue a parent if the child was emancipated prior to the tortious conduct. See Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 283, 63 A.2d 586 (1948). Third, an unemancipated minor can sue a parent for injuries received through the negligent conduct of a business enterprise conducted away from the home. Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290, 300, 512 A.2d 130 (1986). Fourth, an unemancipated minor can sue a parent for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, aircraft or waterborne vessel. General Statutes § 52-572c.

This last exception is notable in the context of this case. By adopting § 52-572c in 1967, the legislature chose to abrogate the doctrine only as it related to various motorized vehicles. Although § 22-357 was in effect at that time, and the legislature is presumed to have “acted with knowledge of existing statutes and with an intent to create one consistent body of laws”; Zachs v. Groppo, 207 Conn. 683, 696, 542 A.2d 1145 (1988); the legislature chose not to abrogate the doctrine as it related to dog induced injuries. Thus, although the legislature knew of the existence of § 22-357, the legislature chose not to remove it from the scope of the parental immunity doctrine. See Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co., 157 Conn. 445, 450 n.1, 245 A.2d 907 (1969); but see Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 301 (refusing to attribute any import to the narrow scope of § 52-572c).

The plaintiff argues that the parental immunity doctrine applies solely to cases sounding in negligence. Because his suit is based on a statute, he posits that the doctrine is not a bar. The plaintiffs assertion is incorrect: the parental immunity doctrine bars all parental civil liability to an unemancipated minor for personal injuries inflicted during minority. Roberts v. Caton, 224 Conn. 483, 491, 619 A.2d 844 (1993); Mesite v. Kirchenstein, supra, 109 Conn. 82-83; see also Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co., supra, 157 Conn. 450 (rejecting claim that parental immunity doctrine does not bar suit for wilful and wanton misconduct).

Further, the reasoning behind the rule applies equally in both negligence and nonnegligence tort cases. “The State and society are vitally interested in the integrity and unity of the family and in the preservation of the family relation. The obligation of the [parents] to care for, guide, control and educate their child, and the reciprocal obligation of the child to serve and obey the parent, are essentials of the family relationship. Authority in the parent to require obedience in the child is indispensable to the maintenance of unity in the family. Anything [that] undermines this authority, brings discord into the family, weakens its government and disturbs its peace, is an injury to society and to the State. New things could bring about this unhappy condition more quickly or widen the breach between parent and child further than the bringing of an action at law for personal injuries by a minor child against the parent.” Mesite v. Kirchenstein, supra, 109 Conn. 84; Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 293. To permit such actions is against sound public policy. Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co., supra, 157 Conn. 450.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly ruled that the parental immunity doctrine barred the plaintiffs action and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The suit was commenced by Claudia Squeglia, the plaintiffs mother and next friend.

       General Statutes § 22-357 provides in pertinent part: “If any dog does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper, or, if the owner or keeper is a minor, the parent or guardian of such minor, shall be liable for such damage . . . .”

       General Statutes § 52-572c provides in pertinent part: “In all actions for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and . . . for negligence in the operation of an aircraft or vessel, as defined in section 15-127, resulting in personal injury, wrongful death or injury to property, the immunity between parent and child in such negligence action brought by a parent against his child or by or on behalf of a child against his parent is abrogated.”


author: He IMAN, J.

text:
    Sheila Rodriguez et al. v. Anthony M. Petrilli
    (12719)
    Heiman, Freedman and Cretella, Js.

      Argued March 30
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Sanford J. Plepler, with whom, on the brief, was Christine M. Murphy, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Craig A. Fontaine, with whom, on the brief, was Paul J. Narducci, for the appellee (defendant).
   He IMAN, J.

The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after the court directed a verdict against them. The plaintiffs assert that the trial court improperly denied their motion to set aside the verdict, which they based on a claim that the court had abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of the plaintiffs’ sole expert witness on the issue of the standard of care. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are necessary to our resolution of this appeal. Sheila Rodriguez and her husband, Ronald Rodriguez, commenced this action seeking damages from the defendant for claimed acts of dental malpractice. The plaintiffs alleged that Sheila Rodriguez had consulted the defendant in 1985, and, on October 15,1985, the defendant performed a surgical procedure known as an intraarticular surgery and meniscectomy bilateral with the insertion of a VITEK teflon prosthesis implant. On October 14, 1987, the defendant performed additional surgery on Sheila to remove the prosthesis because of an adverse reaction to the device. Subsequent to the second surgery, Sheila experienced a variety of complications including pain in the neck, head and jaw, an inability to chew, intermittent right temporomandibular joint (TMJ) swelling and other problems. All of these symptoms were reported to the defendant.

In July, 1989, Sheila’s difficulties were diagnosed by another dental practitioner as being related to ongoing degenerative changes in both temporomandibular joints and the condylar fossa. In March, 1990, and June, 1992, she underwent reconstructive surgery, including a joint reconstruction.

The plaintiffs’ claim is that Sheila’s subsequent surgeries and disabilities resulted from the dental malpractice of the defendant in that he failed to diagnose and treat properly conditions that followed her surgery of October 14,1987. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that the defendant breached the duty of care owed to Sheila in both his surgical technique and the postoperative care rendered.

On August 6,1991, the plaintiffs filed a notice of disclosure of an expert witness, pursuant to Practice Book § 220 (D), notifying the defendant of their intention to call Joseph H. Kronman as an expert witness. In the notice, the plaintiffs indicated that Kronman would testify to the care and treatment afforded to Sheila by the defendant and to the standard of care of a practicing oral surgeon as it related to the care and treatment afforded to Sheila with particular reference to the defendant’s postoperative care in October, 1987. The notice also set forth the fact that Kronman’s opinion was that the defendant deviated from that standard of care in one or more particular ways.

The notice claimed that Kronman’s opinion was based on his review of the medical and dental records provided to him by counsel, and “his experience and expertise in the field of oral and maxillofacial surgery and in particular in the field of TMJ surgery and the implantation and removal of dental prosthesis such as that undertaken in this case. Dr. Kronman also based his opinion on his education and experience in the field of oral and maxillofacial surgery, as set forth in his curriculum vitae attached hereto.”

On June 10, 1993, the defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking an order precluding the plaintiffs from “eliciting any expert opinion testimony from Joseph H. Kronman, D.D.S., concerning or relating to the standard of care of oral surgeons or to [the defendant’s] alleged deviation therefrom for the reason that Dr. Kronman is not qualified to render any such opinion.” After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion in limine finding that Kronman lacked the necessary qualifications to testify as to the standard of care of oral surgeons because of his lack of experience in the field, either practically or academically.

The plaintiffs sought a mistrial, but that motion was denied by the trial court. The plaintiffs disclosed to the trial court that Kronman was their only witness on the issue of standard of care and thereupon rested. The defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was granted and judgment was rendered in his favor. A subsequent motion to set aside the verdict was denied by the trial court and this appeal followed.

The plaintiffs assert that the trial court improperly denied their motion to set aside the verdict because the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of their sole expert witness on the issue of the standard of care. Thus, the dispositive issue is whether the trial court correctly found that Kronman failed to meet the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 52-184c.

The standard of care required to be established and the qualifications of expert witnesses who may testify to establish that standard, in claims for damages alleged to have been caused by the negligence of a health care provider, are controlled by General Statutes § 52-184c. “Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is a matter that rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” DiBella v. Widlitz, 207 Conn. 194, 202, 541 A.2d 91 (1988); Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18 Conn. App. 622, 631, 561 A.2d 443 (1989). We have consistently held that the trial court’s exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless it has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law. Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 35, 372 A.2d 516 (1976); Churchill v. Skjerding, 31 Conn. App. 247, 249, 624 A.2d 900, cert. denied, 226 Conn. 914, 628 A.2d 986 (1993). In the context of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Kronman failed to qualify as an expert witness pursuant to General Statutes § 52-184c (d).

At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Kronman about his activities in the field of oral and maxillofacial surgery. He testified that he does not function as an oral surgeon, does not consult in oral surgical techniques, nor has he been involved in postsurgical or follow-up care of patients who have undergone dental surgery. He had not been involved in the field of oral surgery, either as a practitioner or as a teacher, for more than thirty years. His area of expertise was in teaching anatomy and in fields other than oral and maxillofacial surgery. On the basis of the record, the trial court found that he lacked the statutorily mandated qualifications to testify as an expert.

We conclude, on the basis of the record, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Kronman. Here, the trial court found that the witness lacked sufficient training, experience and knowledge from the practice or teaching in a related field of medicine so as to be able to provide such expert testimony as to the prevailing professional standard of care the field of oral surgery. The trial court found that Kronman was not engaged in a related field of medicine to that of the defendant and that he thus did not meet the minimal standards imposed by General Statutes § 52-184c (d). The finding by the trial court is adequately supported by the record and the exclusion of the testimony on that basis was not an abuse of discretion.

The plaintiffs also assert that the trial court’s action in directing a verdict and then failing to set it aside was improper. Again, this claim is premised on their assertion that the trial court acted incorrectly in excluding the testimony of the proffered expert witness. We have already concluded that the trial court acted properly in excluding the testimony of the expert and that it did not abuse its discretion. Thus, in the face of the lack of expert testimony, the trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. “A directed verdict, while disfavored, should be ordered whenever a jury could reach no other conclusion without speculation.” Williams v. Chameides, 26 Conn. App. 818, 822, 603 A.2d 1211, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 923, 608 A.2d 689 (1992). In reviewing the action of the trial court in directing and then in refusing to set aside the verdict, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Williams v. Chameides, supra, 822; Samose v. Hammer-Passero Norwalk Chiropractic Group, P.C., 24 Conn. App. 99, 102, 586 A.2d 614, cert. denied, 218 Conn. 903, 588 A.2d 1079 (1991).

In order for a plaintiff to prevail in an action seeking damages arising out of a claim of medical malpractice, the plaintiff must produce evidence supporting (1) the requisite standard of care, (2) evidence supporting a deviation from that standard, and (3) evidence of a causal relationship between the deviation and the claimed injury. Williams v. Chameides, supra, 26 Conn. App. 822; Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 25 Conn. App. 702, 717, 596 A.2d 1318, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 933, 599 A.2d 384 (1991); Samose v. Hammer-Passero Norwalk Chiropractic Group, P.C., 24 Conn. App. 102-103. It is necessary for the plaintiff to produce expert testimony to establish both the standard of care to which the defendant is to be held and a breach of that standard. Mather v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 130-31, 540 A.2d 666 (1988); Williams v. Chameides, supra, 823. The plaintiffs failed to produce admissible expert testimony to support their burden of proof and the trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and properly refused to set it aside.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The plaintiffs are Sheila Rodriguez, who sought damages on the basis of claimed direct acts of malpractice committed against her, and her husband, Ronald Rodriguez, who sought damages based on his incurring medical expenses and other expenses on behalf of his wife and for loss of consortium.

       Practice Book § 220 (D) provides in pertinent part: “[A]ny plaintiff expecting to call an expert witness at trial shall disclose the name of that expert, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion, to all other parties within 60 days from the date the case is claimed to a trial list. Each defendant shall disclose the names of his or her experts in like manner within 120 days from the date the case is claimed to a trial list. If disclosure of the name of any expert expected to testify at trial is not made in accordance with this subsection, or if an expert witness who is expected to testify is retained or specially employed after that date, such expert shall not testify except in the discretion of the court for good cause shown.”

       General Statutes § 52-184e provides in pertinent part: “(a) In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1,1987, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, as defined in section 52-184b, the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider. The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.
      * ** *
      “(d) Any health care provider may testify as an expert in any action if he: (1) Is a ‘similar health care provider’ pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of this section; or (2) is not a similar health care provider pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of this section but, to the satisfaction of the court, possesses sufficient training, experience and knowledge as a result of practice or teaching in a related field of medicine, so as to be able to provide such expert testimony as to the prevailing professional standard of care in a given field of medicine. Such training, experience or knowledge shall be the result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.”


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    New Connecticut Bank and Trust Company, N.A. v. 20 Sisson Street Associates et al.
    (12798)
    Foti, La very and Landau, Js.
    Argued March 22
    decision released April 12, 1994

      Daniel Del Grosso, Richard Del Russo and Salvatore Malespini, pro se, the appellants (defendants).

      Susan Birke Fiedler, with whom, on the brief, was Donald E. Frechette, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Dime Savings Bank of New York, F.S.B. v. Peter Z. Wu et al.
    (12130)
    Landau, Schaller and Cretella, Js.
    Submitted on briefs February 28
    decision released April 12, 1994

      Paul L. Bollo, filed a brief for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

      Robert G. Golger, filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

In this foreclosure action, the reliance by the defendants Peter Z. Wu and Judy M. Wu (defendants) on the case of Cummings & Lockwood v. Gray, 26 Conn. App. 293, 600 A.2d 1040 (1991), for the proposition that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on both the complaint and the counterclaim is misplaced.

In Cummings & Lockwood, the motion for summary judgment was specifically directed to the complaint while here, the plaintiff made a general motion for summary judgment which allowed the court also to resolve the issue of the counterclaim which it properly did.

We have also fully reviewed the record and briefs as to the other claims of the defendants and find them to be without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Ann Schuld v. William J. Schuld
    (12196)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued March 22
    decision released April 12, 1994

      George R. Temple, for the appellant (defendant).

      Edward R. Giacci, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Torrance Battle
    (11857)
    Dupont, C. J., Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued March 30
    decision released April 19, 1994

      Richard Cramer, with whom, on the brief, was Brian M. O’Connell, for the appellant (defendant).

      Margaret Gaffney Rodionovas, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state’s attorney, and Corinne L. Klatt, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Ibsen Brothers, Inc. v. David C. Goldman et al.
    (12431)
    Dupont, C. J., Foti and Heiman, Js.
    Argued March 29
    decision released April 19, 1994

      Gordon R. Raynor, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      David R. Schaefer, with whom, on the brief, was Marie A. Casper, for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Samuel R. Russo v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
    (12733)
    Heiman, Freedman and Cretella, Js.
    Argued March 30
    decision released April 19, 1994

      Allen A. Currier, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Peter J. Dauk, with whom was Lawrence F. Reilly, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Gary Lintz v. Susan Lintz
    (12424)
    Dupont, C. J., O’Connell and Foti, Js.
    Argued March 28
    decision released April 19, 1994

      Gary Lintz, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

      Shirley M. Pripstein, for the appellee (defendant).

      Rochelle Homelson, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Seymour P. Dunn, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Scarsdale National Bank and Trust Company v. Robert A. Schmitz et al.
    (11990)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Freedman, Js.
    Argued April 4
    decision released April 26, 1994

      Robert A. Schmitz, pro se, with whom was Marion B. Schmitz, pro se, the appellants (named defendant et al.).

      Ellery E. Plotkin, for the appellee (plaintiff).

      John F. Lambert, with whom was Thomas F. Hartch, for the appellees (defendant Deutsche Bank Compagnie Financiere Luxembourg, S. A., et al.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Cynthia Giovacchino v. Mark S. Licsak
    (11840)
    Dupont, C. J., Landau and Heiman, Js.
    Argued February 24
    decision released April 26, 1994

      Enrico Vaccaro, with whom was Timothy F. Wood-bridge, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Benson A. Snaider, with whom, on the brief, was Alysia D. Maffucci, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Deutsche Bank Compagnie Financiere Luxembourg, S. A., et al. v. Karl L. Hermann et al.
    (11991)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Freedman, Js.
    Argued April 4
    decision released April 26, 1994

      Robert A. Schmitz, pro se, with whom was Marion B. Schmitz, pro se, the appellants (named defendant et al.).

      John F. Lambert, with whom was Thomas F. Hartch, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Stephen Holland v. Robert M. Elliott
    (12307)
    Heiman, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued April 5
    decision released April 26, 1994

      Harold R. Burke, with whom, on the brief, was Philip H. Bartels, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Robert M. Elliott, pro se, the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Napoleon St. Cyr v. Jack Lockshier et al.
    (12659)
    Dupont, C. J., Landau and Freedman, Js.
    Argued April 6
    decision released May 3, 1994

      Napoleon St. Cyr, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

      John T. Boehanis, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas J. Weihing, for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


author: Per Curiam:.

text:
    Thoracic and Cardiovascular Associates of New Haven, P.C. v. Charles Sartell
    (12804)
    Landau, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued April 4
    decision released May 17, 1994

      Sung-Ho Hwang, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Charles Sartell, pro se, the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam:.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment of the trial court, following a court trial, rendered in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiff has failed to present either a written memorandum of decision or a transcribed copy of an oral decision signed by the court, stating its decision on the issues in the case and, if there were factual findings, the factual basis for its decision. The plaintiff, as appellant, has the responsibility to provide this court with an adequate record for review. Practice Book § 4061; DeMilo v. West Haven, 189 Conn. 671, 681, 458 A.2d 362 (1983); Holmes v. Holmes, 32 Conn. App. 317, 319, 629 A.2d 1137, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 902, 634 A.2d 295 (1993); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Linsky, 32 Conn. App. 13, 15, 627 A.2d 954 (1993); Augeri v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 24 Conn. App. 172, 178, 586 A.2d 635, cert. denied, 218 Conn. 904, 588 A.2d 1383 (1991). “This court recently noted that we cannot render a decision without first having ‘specific findings of fact to determine the basis of the court’s ruling.’ State v. Rios, 30 Conn. App. 712, 715, 622 A.2d 618 (1993).” Gelormino v. Blaustein, 31 Conn. App. 750, 751, 626 A.2d 1325 (1993). We have consistently stated that it is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review and we see no reason to depart from that rule.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Marvin Syms
    (13234)
    Lavery, Freedman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued April 26
    decision released May 17, 1994

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, was G. Douglas Nash, public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Edward R. Narus, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.

       Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, the Supreme Court transferred this appeal to this court.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. William T. Evans
    (12547)
    Foti, Landau and Cretella, Js.
    Argued April 28
    decision released May 17, 1994

      Beth A. Hogan, with whom, on the brief, was Peter Scillieri, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Kevin T. Kane, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was C. Robert Satti, Sr., state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Frederick Heimann et al. v. Peter Moseley et al.
    (12529)
    Lavery, Freedman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued April 26
    decision released May 17, 1994

      Peter M. Ryan, for the appellants (defendants).

      Donald F. Reid, with whom, on the brief, was Anastasios T. Savvaides, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Bradford J. May v. Jill Sherber et al.
    (12694)
    O’Connell, Foti and Landau, Js.
    Argued April 26
    decision released May 17, 1994

      James E. Swaine, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Matthew G. Conway, for the appellee (defendant Phoenix Landing Condominium Association, Inc.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Ronald Zienka v. City of New Britain
    (12750)
    O’Connell, Foti and Landau, Js.
    Argued April 26
    decision released May 17, 1994

      Harold J. Geragosian, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Daniel L. Healey, assistant city attorney, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    Godfrey Anderson et al. v. Jack Janus
    (12403)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Freedman, Js.
    Argued April 29
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Francis Ficarra, with whom, on the brief, was Frank J. Riccio, for the appellant (named plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Bristol Savings Bank v. John J. Cellino et al.
    (12578)
    Lavery, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued April 29
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Richard P. Weinstein, for the appellants (defendants).

      Richard Leibert, with whom, on the brief, was David Mara, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    William Safford v. Commissioner of Correction
    (12768)
    Dupont, C. J., Lavery and Schaller, Js.
    Argued May 2
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Kweku J. Hanson, for the appellant (petitioner).

      James A. Killen, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and John Dropick, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Michael M. Morin
    (12631)
    Lavery, Heiman and Freedman, Js.
    Argued April 29
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Frederick W. Odell, for the appellant (defendant).

      David J. Sheldon, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patricia A. Swords, state’s attorney, and Richard Colangelo, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Town of Monroe v. John C. Mandanici, Jr., et al.
    (12922)
    Dupont, C. J., Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued April 27
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Joseph R. Mirrione, for the appellant (named defendant).

      William T. Browne, with whom, on the brief, was William J. Varese, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgments are affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Keith Burke
    (11952)
    Dupont, C. J., Lavery and Spear, Js.
    Argued May 3
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Todd A. Edgington, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Pamela S. Meotti, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, Cornelius J. Shea, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and Edward Wilson, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Stannard Beach Association, Inc. v. Zoning Commission of the Town of Westbrook et al.
    (12658)
    O’Connell, Foti and Lavery, Js.
    Argued April 28
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Michael E. Cronin, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Howard J. Wicker, for the appellee (defendant DGG, Inc.).

      Duncan J. Forsyth, for the appellee (named defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Sandra A. Leon v. Steven J. Leon
    (12132)
    O’Connell, Lavery and Spear, Js.
    Argued May 3
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Lloyd Frauenglass, with whom, on the brief, was Candace V. Bath, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Seymour A. Rothenberg, with whom was Martha Anne Cosgrove, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    William H. Wilson v. Department of Public Utility Control et al.
    (11959)
    Lavery, Freedman and Spear, Js.
    Argued May 4
    decision released May 24, 1994

      JohnL. Laudati, with whom, on the brief, was Philip N. Walker, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Tatiana D. Sypko, assistant attorney general, with whom were Robert S. Golden, Jr., assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    West Cove Marina Corporation v. Waterslip Management Company, Inc., et al.
    (12784)
    O’Connell, Foti and Freedman, Js.
    Argued May 3
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Steven G. Mednick, for the appellant (named defendant).

      Jeffrey J. Vita, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting a new sale date.


text:
    Stanley Kulenski v. Atlas Moving and Storage Company, Inc., et al.
    (12966)
    Landau, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued May 4
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Ronald F. Bozelko, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Hanon W. Russell, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Stanley Troski et al. v. Stop and Shop Holdings, Inc.
    (12967)
    O’Connell, Lavery and Spear, Js.
    Argued May 3
    decision released May 24, 1994

      Charles K. Thompson, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Gerard McEnery, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam:.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Thelonious Paige v. Saint Andrew’s Roman Catholic Church Corporation et al.
    (11830)
    Dupont, C. J., Foti and Freedman, Js.
    Submitted on briefs May 9
    decision released May 31, 1994

      Richard S. Bartlett filed a brief for the appellant (Turnpike Furnace Company).

      Vincent M. Musto filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).

      Mark R. Cramer filed a brief for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Michael Martino v. Oliver Botteiller et al.
    (12352)
    Foti, Heiman and Freedman, Js.
    Submitted on briefs May 9
    decision released May 31, 1994

      Sue L. Wise filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Thomas E. Stevens filed a brief for the appellee (named defendant).

      Patricia M. O'Neil filed a brief for the appellee (defendant Mary Botteiller).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    The Hannon Group, Inc. v. Robert A. Herd
    (12404)
    Foti, Landau and Heiman, Js.
    Argued May 5
    decision released May 31, 1994

      James C. Mulholland, for the appellant (defendant).

      Susan J. Lawshe, with whom, on the brief, was James A. Wade, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    High Street Associates v. William J. Zisk
    (12482)
    Foti, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued May 6
    decision released May 31, 1994

      Paul Gozzi, for the appellant (defendant).

      Jennifer L. Berkenstock, with whom was Joseph E. Milardo, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    G. Patricia Elliott v. Arthur L. Elliott
    (12497)
    Foti, Landau and Heiman, Js.
    Argued May 5
    decision released May 31, 1994

      Kurt Siuzdak, with whom, on the brief, was Judith A. Busch, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Edward G. Fitzpatrick, with whom was Jayne Elser Welch, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Donna Gorneault v. Larry Gorneault
    (12505)
    Freedman, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued May 5
    decision released May 31, 1994

      Thomas W. Conlin, with whom was Alfred F. Morrocco, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Allen J. Segal, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court modifying an order of child support.

The plaintiff has failed to present either a written memorandum of decision or a transcribed copy of an oral decision signed by the court, stating its decision on the issues in the case and, if there were factual findings, the factual basis for its decision. The plaintiff, as appellant, has the responsibility to provide this court with an adequate record for review. Practice Book § 4061; DeMilo v. West Haven, 189 Conn. 671, 681, 458 A.2d 362 (1983); Holmes v. Holmes, 32 Conn. App. 317, 319, 629 A.2d 1137, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 902, 634 A.2d 295 (1993); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Linsky, 32 Conn. App. 13, 15, 627 A.2d 954 (1993); Augeri v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 24 Conn. App. 172, 178, 586 A.2d 635, cert. denied, 218 Conn. 904, 588 A.2d 1383 (1991). “This court recently noted that we cannot render a decision without first having ‘specific findings of fact to determine the basis of the court’s ruling.’ State v. Rios, 30 Conn. App. 712, 715, 622 A.2d 618 (1993).” Gelormino v. Blaustein, 31 Conn. App. 750, 751, 626 A.2d 1325 (1993). We have consistently stated that it is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review and we see no reason to depart from that rule. We, therefore, decline to review this matter.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Bank of Hartford, Inc. v. One Seventy Russ Corporation et al.
    (12587)
    O’Connell, Foti and Freedman, Js.
    Submitted on briefs May 9
    decision released May 31, 1994

      Richard B. Polivy filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Richard P. Weinstein filed a brief for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Saybrook Bank and Trust Company v. Edith G. Baum
    (12945)
    Heiman, Freedman and Schaller, Js.
    Submitted on briefs May 9
    decision released May 31, 1994

      Richard P. Weinstein and Peter B. Rustin filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Steven A. Torneo filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    Bernice Thomas v. Lloyd Thomas
    (12634)
    Foti, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued May 6
    decision released June 14, 1994

      Robert J. Cartoceti, with whom, on the brief, was D. Susanne Snearly, law student intern, for the appellant (defendant).

      Thomas W. Calkins, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court in this action for dissolution of marriage. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly entered orders regarding property distribution, alimony and child support. The plaintiff concedes, and we agree, that the trial court acted improperly “in predicating an award of child support by the application of the statutory guidelines to the parties’ financial circumstances at the time that pendente lite orders were entered.” The plaintiff further stated that “there was uncertainty as to the [defendant’s] actual income.”

“Because the financial orders in an action for dissolution of marriage are of necessity interwoven and because the rendering of a judgment in an action for the dissolution of marriage is ‘a carefully crafted mosaic’; Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2 Conn. App. 416, 424, 479 A.2d 826 (1984); we must remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on all financial matters. Mulholland v. Mulholland, 26 Conn. App. 585, 590, 602 A.2d 1054 (1992).” Michel v. Michel, 31 Conn. App. 338, 341, 624 A.2d 914 (1993).

The judgment is reversed as to the financial orders only and the case is remanded for a new hearing on all financial issues.


text:
    New England Savings Bank v. Bijan Bahramian et al.
    (11889)
    Dupont, C. J., Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Argued May 9
    decision released June 14, 1994

      Bijan Bahramian, pro se, and Bahin Bahramian, pro se, the appellants (defendants), filed a brief.

      Edward B. O’Connell, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Maria Gutierrez et al. v. Elise Nugent et al.
    (12451)
    Foti, Lavery and Freedman, Js.
    Argued May 6
    decision released June 14, 1994

      Melvin J. Silverman, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Thomas G. Cotter, with whom, on the brief, was Edward V. Walsh, for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    New England Health Affiliates, Inc. v. Talar, Inc., et al.
    (12211)
    Landau, Spear and Cretella, Js.
    Argued June 1
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Richard P. Weinstein, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Eric C. Hard, for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Pearl-Main Investment Company v. Homecrest Builders and Remodelers, Inc., et al.
    (12590)
    Laveky, Freedman and Spear, Js.
    Argued May 31
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Max F. Brunswick, for the appellant (defendant Anthony A. Fappiano).

      Edwin L. Doemberger, with whom, on the brief, was William C. Eustace, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    John C. Fuessenich et al. v. E. Seward Stevens et al.
    (12832)
    Lavery, Freedman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued May 31
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Joseph A. Mengacci, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Julie Harris, for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Patricia Krafick v. John H. Krafick
    (12717)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued June 9
    decision released June 28, 1994

      David S. Maclay, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Daniel P. Weiner, with whom, on the brief, was Dan M. Schacht, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Maurice S. Kanbar v. Peter J. Betsos et al.
    (12980)
    Lavery, Freedman and Spear, Js.
    Argued May 31
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Peter J. Betsos, pro se, with whom, on the brief, was Dolores E. Betsos, pro se, the appellants (defendants).

      Joel Z. Green, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting a new sale date.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Ronald Willis
    (12597)
    Foti, Lavery and Freedman, Js.
    Submitted on briefs June 3
    decision released June 28, 1994

      William Holden, public defender, and Kristen Jones, certified legal intern, filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, filed a brief for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The defendant appeals from the trial court’s judgment revoking his probation. The state concedes, and we agree, that our Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 641 A.2d 370 (1994), as to the correct standard of proof in a revocation of probation proceeding controls the disposition of this matter.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new probation revocation hearing.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Mitchell Baron
    (12121)
    O’Connell, Foti and Lavery, Js.
    Argued June 6
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Stephen G. Murphy, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Benjamin A. Solnit, for the appellant (defendant).

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and James Clark, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Deborah Sheiman v. Stuart M. Sheiman
    (12418)
    Foti, Lavery and Freedman, Js.
    Argued June 3
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Joy K. Fausey, law clerk, and, on the brief, Susan M. Cormier, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Stuart M. Sheiman, pro se, the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Philip Mann
    (12672)
    O’Connell, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued June 6
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Philip Mann, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

      David J. Sheldon, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patricia A. Swords, state’s attorney, and Richard Preston, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    John J. Wynne v. Sharon A. Wynne
    (12126)
    Laveky, Heiman and Freedman, Js.
    Argued June 7
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Sharon A. Wynne, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

      Louis Kiefer, for the appellee (plaintiff).

      Stacy A. Welch, for the minor children.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Wanda Torres
    (12290)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Freedman, Js.
    Argued June 10
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Richard S. Cramer, with whom, on the brief, was Brian M. O’Connell, for the appellant (defendant).

      John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul E. Murray, senior assistant state’s attorney, and James E. Thomas, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Ralph Vuolo, Jr.
    (12523)
    Lavery, Landau and Heiman, Js.
    Argued June 10
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Robert S. Reger, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Thomas O’Brien, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Linda Marshall v. Wayne Marshall
    (12562)
    Foti, Lavery and Freedman, Js.
    Submitted on briefs June 13
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Sean Orion Lebas filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      John J. Bennett filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Jeanette Delphia v. Michael Delphia
    (12981)
    Foti, Lavery and Freedman, Js.
    Argued June 13
    decision released June 28, 1994

      John W. Callahan, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Joseph R. Crispino, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


author: O’Connell, J.

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Henry Jemison
    (12333)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Foti, Js.
    Argued March 28
    decision released June 2, 1994

      James A. Winslow, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   O’Connell, J.

The defendant appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, of escape in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-169 (a) (2). The dispositive issue is whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of escape in the first degree if he failed to report to his supervising parole officer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant was a convicted felon serving a sentence in the custody of the commissioner of correction. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 18-100 (e) he was transferred to a supervised home release program in August, 1991, with his assigned community residence being his mother’s home at 174 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford. The defendant’s mother, Patricia Jemison, was his home release sponsor. Prior to entering the program, the defendant signed an agreement listing twenty-one conditions of his release into the community. One of the conditions required the defendant to report to his parole officer once a week. The defendant abided by this condition from the time he entered the program until May, 1992.

Due to his drug use in violation of the drug use condition, the defendant was placed in a drug treatment program from May 6 to June 4, 1992. On June 4, the defendant reported to his newly assigned parole officer, Thomas Conway, who told him that he was to report again on June 11, and that he would have a standard Thursday reporting day. The defendant failed to report on June 11 or any time thereafter, resulting in ten missed reporting days.

Conway followed department procedures in an attempt to locate the defendant and to secure his compliance with the reporting requirements. In accordance with these procedures, Conway checked the computer on the evening of June 11 to determine if the defendant was in custody due to a subsequent arrest. Finding no report of an arrest, Conway mailed a letter to the defendant instructing him to report on June 18. The defendant did not do so. On June 19, in a further attempt to locate the defendant, Conway telephoned and visited 174 Blue Hills Avenue, but did not find him. Upon leaving the residence, Conway left his business card with his telephone number in the door. Thereafter, on June 22, Conway received a telephone call from the defendant’s mother. Although he inquired several times whether she knew how to get in touch with the defendant and where he was residing, he was unable to elicit an answer.

When the defendant failed to report on June 25, Conway ran another computer check and sent another letter to the defendant’s assigned community residence. On June 30, one of the defendant’s sisters, who would not give her name, responded to the letter by telephoning Conway. She did not indicate that she knew the defendant’s location. Nevertheless, Conway gave her a message that the defendant must report to him on July 2. Once again, the defendant failed to report. On July 8, Conway and the defendant’s drug counselor visited the defendant’s assigned residence and spoke to the defendant’s mother who said she had no idea where the defendant could be found.

When the defendant failed to report on July 9, Conway ran another computer check and sent a third letter to the defendant’s community residence. The defendant failed to report on July 16 and 23. On July 24, Conway made another home visit and once more did not find the defendant. During these July visits, Conway was permitted to enter the house, although he never saw the defendant. Some time later, Conway again spoke to the defendant’s mother, who furnished no information concerning her son’s location. Conway visited the house again on August 14 and emphatically informed the defendant’s mother that her son was required to report. During his August visit to the house, Conway was taken into the kitchen where he could see into the defendant’s bedroom. Although the home visits were made at varying times of the day, Conway never saw the defendant in or around the house. Following his August 14 home visit, Conway applied for a warrant for the defendant’s arrest for escape.

The defendant presented evidence in support of his defense that he had continued to reside at 174 Blue Hills Avenue but had hidden from Conway because he did not want to be reincarcerated due to his drug use. The defendant’s mother similarly testified that the defendant had been living at her house during the summer of 1992, but she had lied to Conway about her son’s whereabouts because she feared that Conway would send him back to jail. She also testified that while living with her, the defendant had received his mail and his telephone messages, had known of Conway’s visits and had been given Conway’s business card.

In rebuttal, Conway testified that on each of the three home visits during which he spoke with the defendant’s mother, she told him that he did not live at her house and that she had guessed various places where he might be found each time Conway asked where he was.

During its deliberations, the jury sent the following note to the court: “Is it necessary for the state to prove that the defendant was not a resident of 174 Blue Hills Avenue during the period in question? Must the state supply evidence of another residence, i.e., physically put him at another location?” In response to this question, the court gave a comprehensive supplemental charge, the essence of which was that the defendant could be found guilty if he either (1) failed to reside at the required address or (2) failed to report to his parole officer.

As now instructed, the jury had two alternatives under which it could find the defendant guilty. When one of two alternative grounds for conviction would not constitutionally support a guilty verdict, the conviction must be invalidated because a general guilty verdict makes it impossible to know whether the jury relied on the impermissible ground. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 31-32, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1969); State v. Reid, 193 Conn. 646, 667 n.22, 480 A.2d 463 (1984); State v. Marino, 190 Conn. 639, 651, 462 A.2d 1021 (1983); State v. Linares, 32 Conn. App. 656, 673, 630 A.2d 1340 (1993).

The defendant concedes that escape under the first alternative (i.e., failure to live at the assigned community residence) is well established in law. The defendant, however, challenges the constitutional validity of the second alternative (i.e., failure to report to his parole officer). Accordingly, unless the trial court’s instruction on the second alternative is correct in law, we must reverse the conviction. State v. Reid, supra, 193 Conn. 667 n.22.

In support of his claim that the supplemental instruction was not correct in law, the defendant relies heavily on State v. Lubus, 216 Conn. 402, 581 A.2d 1045 (1990). The Lubus court held that proof of a defendant’s single failure to report to a supervisor was insufficient to convict a defendant of escape because a single failure to report could not be construed as an unauthorized departure or failure to return. Id., 410.

Lubus is distinguishable from the present case. Lubus involved only one failure to report and the record in that case was silent as to any contacts or attempted contacts between the defendant and his supervisor and between the scheduled reporting date and the issuance of the Lubus arrest warrant. By contrast, the record in this case contains evidence of ten failures to report as well as extensive investigative action by the supervising officer.

In Lubus, the Supreme Court analyzed “escape” in its classic sense as a scenario in which a lawfully incarcerated person “breaks out” of his confinement behind steel bars and concrete walls. Id., 407-408. One envisions fleeing prisoners wading through the swamps of Devil’s Island, pursued by baying dogs while sirens wail in the distance. The Lubus court recognized, however, that in an attempt to accommodate the needs of changing rehabilitation practices and prison overcrowding, the legislature had redefined escape to include various types of misconduct that are not the stereotype breaching of prison walls. See General Statutes § 53a-169 (a) (4) (failure of person to return from an authorized furlough constitutes escape); General Statutes § 53a-169 (a) (5) (failure of person to return from work or education release constitutes escape).

The critical factor in Lubus was the nexus between custody and the conduct alleged to constitute the escape. The Lubus court enunciated that “[r]ead in context, § 53a-169 (a) (2) simply identifies another environment — -a community residence — from which an unauthorized departure, or to which a failure to return, is possible and made culpable. The subsection does not, in this one instance, impose criminal sanctions for an ‘escape’ that has no demonstrated custodial nexus.” Id., 409.

The present case presents the issue the Lubus court did not reach: whether repeated failures to report might allow an inference of custodial irregularity sufficient to constitute escape. Here, the defendant repeatedly failed to report and intentionally concealed himself from his parole officer’s persistent attempts to establish contact. The defendant intentionally evaded the constraints imposed on him. He did not deny this at trial, but rather offered the excuse that he feared reincarceration because of his drug abuse and therefore hid from his parole officer, although claiming never to have ceased residing in his mother’s home. Thus, under Lubus, the defendant’s “repeated failures to report as scheduled . . . reasonably support an inference of present or imminent custodial irregularity and thus evidence a violation of § 53a-169 (a) (2).” Id.

It is conceivable that a single failure to report could result from mere oversight or neglect. When, however, as in this case, a defendant completely removes himself from the constraints of his custody, a jury may infer that he has escaped. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury was properly instructed.

The defendant’s second claim relies on the Lubus court’s holding that the commissioner of correction exceeded his authority by defining escape to include a simple failure to report where the legislature itself had not criminalized such conduct. Id., 410. Because our conclusion that repeated failures to report as scheduled to an assigned community residence constitutes “escape” under General Statutes § 53a-169 (a) (2), the defendant’s claim must fail.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-169 (a) (2) provides: “A person is guilty of escape in the first degree . . . (2) if he escapes from any . . . community residence to which he was transferred pursuant to subsection (e) of section 18-100

       The defendant also argues that the commissioner of correction acted beyond his authority when he attempted to create a new escape crime by including failure to report as an escape in the conditions of release signed by the defendant. This claim is subsumed under the single issue stated above.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 18-100 (e) provides in pertinent part: “If the commissioner of correction deems that the purposes of this section may . . . be more effectively carried out, he may transfer any person . . . to an approved community residence with the concurrence of the warden, superintendent or person in charge of the facility to which said person is being transferred. Any inmate so transferred shall remain under the jurisdiction of said commissioner. Any inmate transferred to an approved community residence shall also be subject to specifically prescribed supervision by personnel of the department of correction until his definite or indeterminate sentence is completed.”

       The conditions included the following:
      “(6) I realize that I am still an inmate and am responsible to conforming to the rules of the department [of correction].
      “(7) I will abide by all conditions of my release. Failure can result in reincarceration and disciplinary sanctions.
      “(8) I will report as directed and follow the instructions of my supervising officer. Report before 11:00 a.m. on Thursday mornings.
      “(9) I agree that I am guilty of escape in the first degree if I escape from a community residence to which I was transferred pursuant to subsection (e) of section 18-100 ....
      “(18) I will not at any time use, or have in my possession or control, any illegal drug or narcotic ....
      “(21) I also agree to abide by the following INDIVIDUAL CONDITIONS: (A) Report to Hartford Parole Officer Sequist on Thursdays, 8:30 a.m.-ll:00 a.m. or 4 p.m.-6:30 p.m. (B) Report to community services counselor Jack Towne for drug/alcohol tx once a wk for six mon. at 300 Sheldon St. Htfd. CT 566-3177.”

       The pertinent part of the trial court’s supplemental charge was as follows: “The information in the case alleges that the defendant committed the crime of escape in the first degree in two ways . . . first by failing to reside at 174 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford, Connecticut, the community residence to which he had been transferred, or by failing to report to the Hartford Division Of Parole on June eleven, nineteen ninety-two [6/11/92], June eighteen, nineteen ninety-two [6/18/92], June twenty-five, nineteen ninety-two [6/25/92], July second, nineteen ninety-two [7/2/92], July nine, nineteen ninety-two [7/9/92], July sixteen, nineteen ninety-two [7/16/92], July twenty-three, nineteen ninety-two [7/23/92], July thirty, nineteen ninety-two [7/30/92]; August six, nineteen ninety-two [8/6/92], and August thirteen, nineteen ninety-two [8/13/92],
      “If the evidence satisfies all of you beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant escaped by committing any one of the two means alleged by the state, then you may find the defendant guilty of count one. If not, then your verdict would be not guilty. Your verdict, however, must be unanimous one way or the other as to the manner the crime was committed. That is all six of you must agree that the evidence does or does not establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by either way of committing the offense.
      * ** *
      “So, to answer your question more specifically, to prove that the defendant violated the statute by failing to reside at 174 Blue Hills Avenue, Hartford, Connecticut, the state must prove that the defendant [failed to] reside at 174 Blue Hills Avenue, the community residence to which he had been transferred. However, to prove that the defendant escaped by failing to report on the dates specified on the information, the state does not have to prove that the defendant [ceased to] reside at 174 Blue Hills Avenue, Hartford, Connecticut.”
      The language contained within the brackets in the last two sentences of this supplemental instruction were not in the transcript and were apparently left out by either the trial court or the court reporter. The defendant does not, however, challenge the charge as being unclear. Thus, we will assume that the jury heard the charge as it appears above.

       The Lubus court stated: “We need not decide today whether, at some juncture, repeated failures to report as scheduled would reasonably support an inference of present or imminent custodial irregularity and thus evidence a violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-169 (a) (2).” State v. Lubus, supra, 216 Conn. 409.