author: PELLEGRINO, J.

text:
    THE NATIONAL GROUPS, LLC v. CHARLES NARDI ET AL.
    (AC 34998)
    Lavine, Sheldon and Pellegrino, Js.

      Argued May 16
    officially released August 27, 2013

      Richard P. Weinstein, with whom, on the brief, was Nathan A. Schatz, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Michael D. Goldfarb, with whom was Robert E. Kae-lin, for the appellees (defendants).
   Opinion

PELLEGRINO, J.

The plaintiff, The National Groups, LLC, appeals from the judgment in favor of the defendants, Charles Nardi and Marie Nardi, on a claim of negligent misrepresentation. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly determined that the plaintiff did not actually or reasonably rely on the terms of the parties’ contract. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reflects the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The defendants, lessees pursuant to a ground lease, own an office building on property located in Glastonbury. From 2008 to 2011, the defendants were engaged in litigation with the ground lessor, Grunberg 628 Hebron, LLC (ground lessor), regarding the amount of parking available under the terms of the ground lease (pending litigation). The plaintiff, owned in part by Lori Arate, was interested in acquiring the defendants’ office building for the purpose of relocating its business.

On March 4, 2009, Kenneth Grader, the plaintiffs attorney, telephoned Daniel Mara, the defendants’ attorney, and expressed the plaintiffs interest in acquiring the property. During this conversation, Grader also stated that the plaintiff was concerned about the pending litigation. Grader and Mara facilitated the parties’ negotiations and collaboratively drafted the operative lease agreement and option to buy the office building (agreement). The plaintiff and the defendants executed the agreement on March 16, 2009, despite the fact that the pending litigation had not yet been resolved.

Mara prepared the initial draft of the agreement based on a form contract that included a provision stating that the defendants had “no . . . knowledge, information or notice ... of any pending, threatened or contemplated judicial or administrative action, relating to the Premises, any part thereof, or the present or [the plaintiffs] intended uses thereof.” This misstatement escaped the attention of both Mara and Grader, and the provision inadvertently was included as paragraph 10 (d) in the agreement signed by both parties. When the pending litigation concluded, the defendants were entitled to use only forty-eight of the eighty-eight available parking spaces. Consequently, this left the plaintiff with insufficient parking for its employees, and, thus, when the agreement ended, the plaintiff did not exercise its option to buy the property.

The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation arising out of the assertion in paragraph 10 (d) that there was no pending litigation related to the property. Following a court trial, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not prove that it actually or justifiably had relied on the defendants’ admitted misstatement. The court based its decision primarily on the fact that the plaintiff, through Grader, had actual knowledge of the pending action. Charged with this knowledge, the plaintiff could not claim actual or justifiable reliance on paragraph 10 (d). Although the court found Arate’s testimony that she was unaware of the pending litigation credible, it did not credit Arate’s testimony that she had relied on the relevant provision when entering into the agreement. The court cited the inconspicuous nature of paragraph 10 (d) in relation to the seventy-five page agreement. The court reasoned that “[t]he testimony did not satisfy the court that [Arate, as principal for the plaintiff] read this rather generic paragraph and, from that reading, assured herself that there was no pending litigation over parking at the property,” and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that it did not rely on paragraph 10 (d), and, in the alternative, (2) the court’s finding that the plaintiff did not actually or justifiably rely on paragraph 10 (d) was clearly erroneous. We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles applicable to this appeal. “Our Supreme Court has long recognized liability for negligent misrepresentation. . . . The governing principles [of negligent misrepresentation] are set forth in similar terms in § 552 of the Restatement Second of Torts (1977): One who, in the course of business, profession, or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Savings Bank of Manchester v. Ration Financial Services, Inc., 91 Conn. App. 386, 389-90, 881 A.2d 1035 (2005). Even an innocent misrepresentation can give rise to liability if the speaker reasonably should have known the truth. Glaser v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 72-73, 873 A.2d 929 (2005). In order to prevail, however, the plaintiff is required to prove reasonable reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation. Visconti v. Pepper Partners Ltd. Partnership, 77 Conn. App. 675, 682, 825 A.2d 210 (2003).

Reliance on a statement may become reasonable based on context, the statement’s formal nature, the relationship between the parties; see Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 580, 657 A.2d 212 (1995); or when the statement is made by an individual with specialized knowledge; Richard v. A. Waldman & Sons, Inc., 155 Conn. 343, 346-47, 232 A.2d 307 (1967). “We have consistently held that reasonableness is . . . determine [d] based on all of the circumstances.” Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 580. Reliance on a contractual term or a writing is not automatically reasonable—a court still must give due consideration to the surrounding circumstances. Savings Bank of Manchester v. Ration Financial Services, Inc., supra, 91 Conn. App. 391-92 (plaintiffs knowledge regarding facts underlying contractual term relevant); see Petitte v. DSL.net, Inc., 102 Conn. App. 363, 373, 925 A.2d 457 (2007) (unreasonable to rely on employment offer letter because letter did not guarantee employment and employment was at-will).

The plaintiffs knowledge is particularly relevant to determining whether, under all the circumstances, reliance was reasonable. See Gibson v. Capano, 241 Conn. 725, 733-34, 699 A.2d 68 (1997) (innocent misrepresentation); see also Visconti v. Pepper Partners Ltd. Partnership, supra, 77 Conn. App. 683-84. Knowledge of the fact misrepresented can preclude a claim that reliance on a contrary representation was reasonable. Gibson v. Capano, supra, 734 (plaintiffs’ knowledge of underlying facts precludes claim they were “induced to agree to the clause as a result of the defendants’ misrepresentation”); Savings Bank of Manchester v. Ralion Financial Services, Inc., supra, 91 Conn. App. 391-92 (trial court could not have found plaintiff relied on language in agreement because of plaintiff’s knowledge to contrary). Even if the misrepresentation forms part of a binding agreement, a plaintiff cannot reasonably rely on a contractual term he knows to be false. Savings Bank of Manchester v. Ration Financial Services, Inc., supra, 391-92; see Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 55-56, 76-78 (binding agreement can support cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, but no cause of action due to lack of damages). The trier of fact considers all relevant circumstances in determining whether reliance is reasonable. Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 232 Conn. 580. The plaintiffs knowledge of the misrepresentation carries significant weight. See Gibson v. Capano, supra, 733-34; Savings Bank of Manchester v. Ration Financial Services, Inc., supra, 391-92; Visconti v. Pepper Partners Ltd. Partnership, supra, 683-84.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the parol evidence rule bars the court from using the March 4,2009 communication between Mara and Grader to determine whether the plaintiffs reliance was reasonable. We find the parol evidence rule inapplicable here.

“[T]he parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but a substantive rule of contract law”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of State of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 779, 653 A.2d 122 (1995); that prevents parties from using extrinsic evidence to vary the terms of an otherwise clear and unambiguous contract. This rule does not bar extrinsic evidence from being used for other purposes, such as proving mistake or fraud. Id., 780. Parties may introduce evidence extrinsic to the contract to disprove the elements of negligent misrepresentation, despite the parol evidence rule. See Warman v. Delaney, 148 Conn. 469, 474, 172 A.2d 188 (1961) (“[T]he plaintiffs are not seeking to add to, subtract from or alter the terms of the written contract itself. . . . Th[e] action is concerned solely with material misrepresentation in the inducement of the contract.”); see also Martinez v. Zovich, 87 Conn. App. 766, 778, 867 A.2d 149, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 908, 876 A.2d 1202 (2005); cf. Gibson v. Capano, supra, 241 Conn. 733 (Warman inapplicable to innocent misrepresentation claims). The court, therefore, properly disregarded the parol evidence rule when examining whether the plaintiff reasonably relied on the terms of the agreement for purposes of its negligent misrepresentation claim.

II

The plaintiffs next claim is that the court improperly concluded, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff did not actually or reasonably rely on paragraph 10 (d) as a “representation . . . made ... by and through [a] contractual covenant” in the agreement. The plaintiff argues that the court “misapplied various established legal rules in reaching its conclusions . . . .” The first principle the plaintiff recites is that knowledge of the terms of a contract is imputed to the contracting parties. See Connelly v. Kellogg, 136 Conn. 33, 38, 68 A.2d 170 (1949). On the basis of this principle, the plaintiff asserts that a court must find as a matter of law that a contracting party actually or reasonably relied on each particular term in a contract, for otherwise the court has “read [a contractual term] out of’ the agreement. From Smith v. Frank, 165 Conn. 200, 202, 332 A.2d 76 (1973), and Jaybe Construction Co. v. Beco, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 406, 409, 216 A.2d 208 (1965), the plaintiff gleans a second principle of contract law, that “contractual representations are made by one party to the other party ... to induce contractual acceptance and reliance . . . .” The plaintiff contends that the court “undermined” this rule of law when it concluded that the plaintiffs reliance was not reasonable. We are not persuaded.

The plaintiff challenges the court’s legal conclusions as drawn from the facts of this case. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that when a misrepresentation is contained in a contract, as here, a court must conclude that reliance on the misrepresentation is reasonable under general principles of contract law. When considering a challenge to the court’s legal conclusions, “our review is plenary and we must decide whether its legal conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp., 254 Conn. 145, 156, 757 A.2d 14 (2000).

This court previously has held that the principles of contract law are not dispositive in a claim of negligent misrepresentation, which sounds in tort. See Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 116 Conn. App. 483, 501-502, 977 A.2d 228 (2009), appeal dismissed, 303 Conn. 721, 36 A.3d 662 (2012). We find the discussion in Sovereign Bank instructive. In Sovereign Bank, the statute of frauds was raised on appeal as a defense to a claim of negligent misrepresentation. Id., 495. The issue was whether “the statute of frauds bars recovery based on a claim of misrepresentation when the alleged misrepresentations relate, in some way, to an unenforceable oral agreement.” Id., 497. The court reasoned: “A negligent misrepresentation action does not seek to enforce the underlying contract; rather, it seeks damages for reb-anee on misrepresentations that may have been made in relation to that contract. This critical distinction sets the tort action apart from a contract action and makes the claim worthy of independent review.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 501-502.

As in. Sovereign Bank, the distinction between enforcing paragraph 10 (d) and reasonable rebanee on paragraph 10 (d) greatly diminishes the force of the plaintiffs argument that contract law doctrine necessitates finding reasonable rebanee. Imputed knowledge of the contract terms may justify enforcing the contract, but in tort a party’s knowledge does not automaticaby result in reasonable rebanee. Reasonable rebanee is distinct from mere knowledge. Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., supra, 274 Conn. 73 (negbgent misrepresentation requires, inter aba, that plaintiff both knew or should have known of falsity of misrepresentation and that plaintiff reasonably relied on misrepresentation). Furthermore, even if a term is intended to induce contractual reliance, that alone is not proof that the rebanee was reasonable. While the proffered principle may reflect the intent of one party under some circumstances, it has no bearing on whether the other party relied on a contractual term. Had the plaintiff sought to enforce paragraph 10 (d) in contract, these established principles would be pertinent. The plaintiff instead chose to sue in tort by arguing that it reasonably relied on paragraph 10 (d). In tort, these contract principles do not require a finding of reasonable reliance as a matter of law.

III

The plaintiffs second claim is, in the alternative, that the court erred in its factual finding that the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on paragraph 10 (d). We do not agree.

“[Reasonableness is a question of fact for the trier to determine based on all of the circumstances.” Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 232 Conn. 580. “[W]e will review the findings of the court as to negligent misrepresentation and reverse [a] judgment . . . only if the findings are clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Centimark Corp. v. Village Motor Associates Ltd. Partnership, 113 Conn. App. 509, 518, 967 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 907, 973 A.2d 103 (2009). “A court’s determination is clearly erroneous only in cases in which the record contains no evidence to support it, or in cases in which there is evidence, but the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Considine v. Waterbury, 279 Conn. 830, 858, 905 A.2d 70 (2006). “In applying the clearly erroneous standard of review, [a]ppellate courts do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a different conclusion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sovereign Bank v. Licata, supra, 116 Conn. App. 503. We do not “retry the facts or pass on issues of credibility.” CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Guadiano, 142 Conn. App. 440, 449, 68 A.3d 101 (2013).

The court determined, primarily on the basis of Mara’s testimony, that the plaintiff did not actually or justifiably rely on paragraph 10 (d) because Gruder exhibited knowledge of the pending litigation. Mara testified that Gruder had called twelve days before the parties entered into the agreement to express the plaintiffs interest in the property. During this conversation, Gruder also noted the plaintiffs concern about the pending litigation. The court credited Mara’s testimony and found Gruder was “fully informed” of the pending litigation. The court imputed Grader's knowledge of the misrepresented fact to the plaintiff and then concluded that this knowledge defeated the plaintiffs claim of reasonable reliance.

Upon our review of the record, we conclude it was not clearly erroneous for the court to find that Grader had knowledge of the pending litigation and that this knowledge prevented the plaintiff from reasonably relying on paragraph 10 (d). Mara’s testimony established that Grader was the plaintiffs attorney and was acting within the scope of his authority to negotiate a contract for sale when he contacted Mara to discuss purchasing the property in question. Grader indicated during this conversation that he had knowledge of the pending litigation, and this knowledge was sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs claim of reasonable rebanee.

“[N]otice to, or knowledge of, an agent, while acting within the scope of his authority and in reference to a matter over which his authority extends, is notice to, or knowledge of, the principal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) West Haven v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 174 Conn. 392, 395, 389 A.2d 741 (1978). “The fact that the knowledge or notice of the agent was not actually communicated will not prevent the operation of the general rule, since the knowledge or notice of the agent is imputed to the principal . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) National Publishing Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 94 Conn. App. 234, 276, 892 A.2d 261 (2006), rev’d on other grounds, 287 Conn. 664, 949 A.2d 1203 (2008). An attorney is the client’s agent and his knowledge is imputed to the client. See Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 509-511, 4 A.3d 288 (2010). It follows that an attorney’s knowledge regarding the falsity of a statement prevents his client from claiming he reasonably relied on that statement in an action for negligent misrepresentation.

The conclusion that the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on paragraph 10 (d) was also based on the court’s assessment of the plaintiffs credibility. “It is basic to our jurisprudence that credibility determinations are within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” Grolier, Inc. v. Danbury, 82 Conn. App. 77, 79, 842 A.2d 621 (2004) (per curiam). “Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 433, 487, 970 A.2d 592 (2009). Arute testified that she read and relied on paragraph 10 (d) when entering into the contract. In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that paragraph 10 (d) was just one paragraph in a “thirteen page purchase and sale agreement accompanied by a twenty-eight page ground lease and a thirty-four page lease for the office building.” In light of this evidence and the testimony at trial, the court was “not satisf [ied] . . . that [Arute] read this rather generic paragraph and, from that reading, assured herself that there was no pending litigation over parking at the property.” We will not disturb the court’s credibility determination on appeal. Accordingly, the court did not err in finding the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on paragraph 10 (d).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Under the terms of the ground lease, the defendants have the right to possess the land until 2085, and can build or make improvements at their own expense. The ground lessor collects a set annual rent and, upon the expiration or termination of the ground lease, the ground lessor takes title to any buildings or improvements.

       See Nardi v. Grunberg 628 Hebron, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-08-4038808-S (April 7, 2011, Hon. Robert Satter, judge trial referee).

       Mara memorialized the substance of the March 4, 2009 conversation in a memo to file on March 6,2009. The court credited Mara’s testimony, which was consistent with the memo.

       The court stated that “the plaintiff did not actually or justifiably rely on [the defendants’] misstatement. . . .” Our case law uses the term “reasonably” interchangeably with “justifiably” when considering whether a plaintiff’s reliance is sufficient for purposes of negligent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Glazer v. Dress Bam, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 73, 873 A.2d 929 (2005). We continue that practice herein.

       The plaintiff does not make this claim explicit in its statement of issues. In its brief, however, the plaintiff claims that under the parol evidence rule “the trial court could not properly rely on prior statements by [Mara] as a matter of law.” The defendants briefed this claim, and we consider it independently as a threshold issue.

       The plaintiffs statement of the issues appears to claim that a court can conclude actual reliance only as a matter of law. Even if we found this argument persuasive, it would not be grounds for reversal because negligent misrepresentation requires reasonable reliance. Visconti v. Pepper Partners Ltd. Partnership, supra, 77 Conn. App. 682. The plaintiffs brief also asserts that the court “undermined [a] rule of law” when it failed to find “actual or reasonable” reliance. We interpret this language as claiming that the court erred in not finding either actual or reasonable reliance as a matter of law, and we address that argument accordingly.

       Although the plaintiff states that parties have “only one purpose” in drafting contractual provisions, “to induce contractual acceptance and reliance, ” the language in the cases cited is not so absolute. See Jaybe Construction Co. v. Beco, Inc., supra, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 408 (it is “common” to induce other party to enter into contract by making offer); Smith v. Frank, supra, 165 Conn. 202 (facts of case indicated defendant purposefully induced reliance). A party may draft a contract provision to limit its own liability, for example, which is a term not reasonably calculated to induce the other party’s acceptance. We cannot agree that reliance is the “only” purpose for drafting contractual provisions.

       Another example of this critical distinction between tort and contract law is the parol evidence rule. As discussed in part I of this opinion, the parol evidence rule governs contract law and does not affect the evidence that may be used in tort to disprove negligent misrepresentation. See Martinez v. Zovich, supra, 87 Conn. App. 778.

       The plaintiff states that the court “was not satisfied that the plaintiff had read and understood [p]aragraph 10 (d).” This mischaracterizes the court’s decision. The court was not convinced that the plaintiff read this paragraph “and, from that reading, assured herself that there was no pending litigation . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The court’s decision correctly depended on reliance, not mere knowledge as the plaintiff asserts.

       In its brief and at oral argument, the plaintiff argued that a court cannot “read [a contractual term] out of’ the agreement, “[render] them a nullity,” or “rewr[i]te the contract.” The court did not engage in any of these alleged modifications. The court examined whether the parties relied on this provision without passing judgment on whether paragraph 10 (d) was in fact valid or part of the contract.

       The plaintiff argues that, even if it had imputed knowledge of the pending litigation, the timing of the contract is of critical importance because “litigation is a matter that is subject to change at any moment . . . .” The time at which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the underlying facts is a relevant factor in considering whether reliance was reasonable, especially when the subject matter is prone to sudden change. As an appellate court, it is not within our province to make factual findings. State v. Nowell, 262 Conn. 686, 695-96, 817 A.2d 76 (2003). Therefore, we will not decide whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to assume that the pending litigation was resolved in twelve days. Regardless, the court sufficiently articulated other grounds for concluding that the plaintiffs reliance on paragraph 10 (d) was unreasonable.

       While this evidence alone was sufficient to defeat the claim, the court reasoned that, subsequent to executing the agreement, Grader’s lack of surprise in e-mails mentioning the pending litigation suggested that Grader already had knowledge of the pending litigation. This further supports our conclusion that the court’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous.

       In light of our holding, we do not reach the defendants’ alternative grounds for affirming the judgment, namely, that the plaintiff did not suffer damages because another corporate entity paid the rent on the property.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DUPONT, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    JOHN RUTKA v. CITY OF MERIDEN
    (AC 34909)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Gruendel and Dupont, Js.

      Argued May 20
    officially released August 27, 2013

      John Rutka, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

      Deborah L. Moore, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

DUPONT, J.

The plaintiff, John Rutka, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the city of Meriden, on his application to discharge four “mechanic’s lien[s]” placed on his real property by the city. One of the hens was described by the court as an anti-blight lien and the other three liens were described as property maintenance hens. The court rendered judgment for the defendant as to two of the property maintenance hens, for the plaintiff as to the third property maintenance hen, and dismissed the plaintiffs apphcation to discharge the anti-blight hen for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his apphcation to discharge two of the property maintenance hens, (2) dismissed his apphcation to discharge the anti-blight hen for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (3) prevented him from presenting evidence during his hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the property maintenance liens but set aside its judgment dismissing the anti-blight lien for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, remand the disposition of the anti-blight lien to the court for further proceedings.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff owns property located at 11 Colony Place in Meriden. His property had been the subject of various problems with blighted conditions over a seven year period, during which time the defendant eventually acted to clean and restore the property pursuant to the relevant statute and city ordinance. After the initial discovery of the poor conditions on the plaintiffs property in 2004, the defendant notified the plaintiff in writing that if he did not clean the property so that the violations no longer existed, he would be subject to citation pursuant to Chapter 159 of the City Code of Meriden (code). The plaintiff was also notified in writing that he had violated that code when he did not take measures to correct the blighted conditions on his property and that he would be issued a citation but that he could demand a hearing. The plaintiff took no action to either pay the fines or to contest the citation at that time, and, as such, the defendant levied an assessment against him and placed the November, 2005 anti-blight lien on the plaintiffs property pursuant to both the city ordinance, Chapter 159, and General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 7-148aa. The discharge of that lien was the focus of the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and represents the unpaid citation for the plaintiff’s violation of the city code, amounting to $3800, which continues to accrue daily.

The defendant took action, beginning in 2009, to correct the blight after the plaintiff did not clean his property. The additional three liens, placed on the plaintiff’s property on November 19, 2009, January 20, 2010, and September 1, 2011, were property maintenance liens levied pursuant to General Statutes § 49-73b. Those liens represent the value of the maintenance work performed by contractors hired by the defendant in order to bring the plaintiffs property in line with the city code and building regulations and amount to $1224.02, $2693.46, and $8920, respectively.

The plaintiff, acting as a self-represented party, initiated the present action on March 6, 2012, by filing an application for “discharge or reduction of mechanic’s lien[s].” The application to discharge referred to the four separate hens that the defendant had previously placed on the plaintiffs property, pursuant to its authority under the city code, Chapter 159, and §§ 7-148aa and 49-73b. A four day hearing was held by the trial court on May 14, July 25 to 26, and August 1, 2012. Over the course of this hearing, the defendant submitted documentary evidence consisting of the photographs taken of the plaintiffs property, memoranda concerning the work performed to clean the property and administrative search warrants that allowed Thomas Kilroy, the Chief Housing Inspector for the defendant, to enter and search the plaintiffs property to determine if it complied with the city code.

The court also heard extensive testimony regarding the three property maintenance liens from both the plaintiff and Kilroy. These witnesses testified about the alleged conditions of the plaintiffs property, the work completed by the defendant’s employees and contractors in order to clean the property, and photographs that were taken of the conditions on the property. Kilroy further testified with regard to an investigation of the plaintiffs property that revealed that it was in poor condition. Kilroy also testified about an application for an administrative search warrant, admitted at trial, that was granted and revealed that the condition of the plaintiffs property continued to cause a serious fire hazard both to the plaintiff and to the neighboring homes and emergency responders, due to a dangerous accumulation of rubbish along the outside of the building.

In its August 1, 2012 decision, rendered from the bench, the court granted the plaintiffs application to discharge the second lien, dated January 20, 2010, on the ground that the hen was not filed within a thirty day period as required by § 49-73b. The court denied the plaintiffs application as to the November 19, 2009 and September 1, 2011 hens (the remaining two property maintenance hens), finding that the defendant had estabhshed probable cause to sustain the validity of those hens.

The defendant also had submitted a June 25, 2012 motion to dismiss the plaintiffs apphcation to discharge the November, 2005 anti-blight hen, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to discharge that type of lien. In issuing its oral decision, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, determining that anti-blight hens are not subject to review pursuant to § 49-73b. The court further determined that it could not review an apphcation to discharge “mechanic’s lienfs]” pursuant to § 7-148aa, and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs claim as to the November, 2005 lien. The plaintiff now appeals from the judgment denying his apphcation to discharge the two property maintenance hens and the granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss his apphcation to discharge the anti-blight hen.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly denied his apphcation to discharge the two property maintenance hens that remain on his property pursuant to § 49-73b. We are not persuaded.

Section 49-73b (f) provides that: “Any municipal hen filed pursuant to this section may be discharged or dissolved in the manner provided in sections 49-35a to 49-37, inclusive.” Accordingly, we turn to those sections of the General Statutes that govern the discharge of municipal hens to determine the defendant’s burden to sustain the property maintenance hens on the plaintiffs property. “General Statutes § 49-35b (a) provides that before a lien can be upheld the lienor must establish probable cause to sustain the validity of the hen. Proof of probable cause is not as demanding as proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. . . . The legal idea of probable cause is a bona fide belief in the existence of facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a man of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in entertaining it.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Newtown Associates v. Northeast Structures, Inc., 15 Conn. App. 633, 636-37, 546 A.2d 310 (1988).

“The standard of proof applicable in proceedings to discharge [municipal] hens is a modest one. ... It is important to remember that the [lienor] does not have to establish that he will prevail, only that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim. . . . Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard. It does not demand that a behef be correct or more likely true than false. . . . Thus, we must determine whether the trial court’s determination that probable cause exists to sustain the defendant’s claim was clearly erroneous.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 690, 694-95, 915 A.2d 916, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 905, 920 A.2d 311 (2007). Once probable cause has been established, the party applying for a discharge of the hen must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the hen is invalid. See New Image Contractors, LLC v. Village at Mariner’s Point Ltd. Partnership, 86 Conn. App. 692, 699, 862 A.2d 832 (2004). We must examine, therefore, whether the defendant demonstrated that probable cause existed to place the two property maintenance hens on the plaintiffs property and, if probable cause existed, whether the plaintiff satisfied his burden to prove that the hens were nevertheless invalid.

In this case, the court heard four days of testimony concerning the conditions of the plaintiffs property in addition to reviewing documentary evidence of those conditions. Kilroy testified with respect to the dangerous conditions on the plaintiffs property that led to the determination that the defendant had to intervene to clean the plaintiffs property after he had been fined for failing to do so himself. The court specifically found, on the basis of Kilroy’s credible testimony, that the history and conditions of the property going back to 2005 established probable cause for the defendant’s actions to clear the blight on the property and to place the liens on the property for the value of that maintenance. The court also found that “the property at issue and as depicted by the photographs evidence that the condition of the property was certainly ripe for the [defendant’s] intervention. And the [c]ourt finds that there was probable cause that the property posed a public safety issue.”

“[I]t is well established that [i]t is within the province of the trial court, when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh the evidence presented and determine the credibility and effect to be given the evidence. . . . Credibility must be assessed . . . not by reading the cold printed record, but by observing firsthand the witness’ conduct, demeanor and attitude. ... An appellate court must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment of credibility because [i]t is the [fact finder] . . . [who has] an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and the parties; thus [the fact finder] is best able to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to draw necessary inferences therefrom.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Beaulieu Co., LLC, 140 Conn. App. 571, 578, 59 A.3d 393 (2013). Accordingly, we defer to the court’s finding that Kilroy’s credible testimony, in combination with the other evidence presented at the hearing, established probable cause to place the property maintenance hens on the plaintiffs property.

The plaintiff further contends that the photographs submitted into evidence were taken only after the defendant’s employees and contractors had entered his property to remove the blight and that they are responsible for the poor conditions on the property. Because, however, there was ample other evidence demonstrating the prior blighted conditions, we are not persuaded that the plaintiff has met his burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the challenged property maintenance hens are invalid. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the November 19, 2009 and September 1, 2011 liens.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the trial court improperly dismissed his application to discharge the November, 2005 anti-blight lien on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider his claim. While the court properly concluded that it did not have the statutory authority to discharge the anti-blight lien pursuant to § 49-73b, we do not agree that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs claim pursuant to § 7-148aa.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review. “In an appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss on the ground of subject matter jurisdiction, this court’s review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lost Trail, LLC v. Weston, 140 Conn. App. 136, 146, 57 A.3d 905, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 915, 61 A.3d 1102 (2013). “When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and fmd support in the facts that appear in the record. . . . Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 98 Lords Highway, LLC v. One Hundred Lords Highway, LLC, 138 Conn. App. 776, 783, 54 A.3d 232 (2012).

As our Supreme Court explained in Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 727-28, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999), the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is distinct from the authority to act under a particular statute. “Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. ... A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Although related, the court’s authority to act pursuant to a statute is different from its subject matter jurisdiction. The power of the court to hear and determine, which is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be confused with the way in which that power must be exercised in order to comply with the terms of the statute. . . . Therefore, in an effort to ensure that we have adjudicated adequately the plaintiffs claims, we have reframed the issues into distinct claims addressing the [court’s] subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims before it as well as its authority to act pursuant to the relevant statutes.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 261 Conn. 1, 5 n.2, 803 A.2d 879 (2002).

In its memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss the anti-blight lien for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant argued that because § 49-73b does not govern anti-blight liens, the court lacked jurisdiction to discharge the lien pursuant to that statute and that “[t]here are no statutory provisions permitting the court to reduce or discharge anti-blight liens as there are for property maintenance hens.” The trial court agreed and also stated that “the application to discharge or reduce a mechanic’s hen is not available to the plaintiff under the anti-blight statutes, specifically [§ 7-148aa]. And as such the court, therefore, lacks subject matter jurisdiction over [the] application to discharge that hen . . . .”

“No writ, pleading, judgment or any kind of proceeding in court or course of justice shall be abated, suspended, set aside or reversed for any kind of circumstantial errors, mistakes or defects, if the person and the cause may be rightly understood and intended by the court. . . . [General Statutes §] 52-123 is a remedial statute and therefore must be liberally construed in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit. .. . Our Supreme Court has explained that § 52-123 replaces the common law rule that deprived courts of subject matter jurisdiction whenever there was a misnomer ... in an original writ, summons or complaint. . . . When a misnomer does not result in prejudice to a party, the defect in the writ is circumstantial error.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Western Boot & Clothing Co. v. L’Enfance Magique, Inc., 81 Conn. App. 486, 491-92, 840 A.2d 574, cert. denied, 269 Conn. 903, 852 A.2d 737 (2004). Although the plaintiff applied to discharge “mechanic’s lien[s]” on his property, as we have previously noted, the parties and the court properly construed those liens as three property maintenance hens and one anti-blight hen, and, thus, the plaintiffs misnomer has not prejudiced the defendant. Accordingly, the plaintiffs use of a form entitled “application for discharge or reduction of mechanic’s hen[s]” to apply to discharge an anti-blight hen did not prevent the court’s consideration of the plaintiffs claim.

Furthermore, we agree with the trial court and the defendant that § 49-73b does not govern the discharge of anti-blight hens, but we do not agree that there is no statutory authority to consider an application to discharge such a hen because we, instead, conclude that anti-blight hens are governed by a different statute, namely, § 7-148aa. If subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of action pursuant to a particular relevant statute exist, the court is not lacking in jurisdiction merely because another irrelevant statute would deprive the plaintiff of a cause of action. See Amodio v. Amodio, supra, 247 Conn. 727-28.

Section 7-148aa provides in relevant part: “Any unpaid penalty imposed by a municipality pursuant to the provisions of an ordinance regulating blight . . . shall constitute a hen upon the real estate against which the penalty was imposed from the date of such penalty. Each such hen may be continued, recorded and released in the manner provided by the general statutes for continuing, recording and releasing property tax liens. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court has the authority to release anti-blight hens in the same manner that property tax hens are released. Section 7-148aa, therefore, gives the court subject matter jurisdiction, the power to act, to determine whether it can treat the anti-blight hen as a property tax lien, and if so, whether the anti-blight hen may be discharged as such. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that “every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Stepney Pond Estates, Ltd. v. Monroe, 260 Conn. 406, 417, 797 A.2d 494 (2002); and is consistent with “the [judicial] policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 16, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001).

In light of the relevant case law and because trial courts have jurisdiction to interpret statutes and to determine if a cause of action exists pursuant to those statutes, we conclude that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs application to discharge the anti-blight hen pursuant to the applicable statutory provision, § 7-148aa. Whether a cause of action exists pursuant to that provision has yet to be determined by the trial court. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff can sustain a cause of action pursuant to the statutory authority granted by § 7-148aa to treat the anti-blight hen as a property tax hen.

Ill

The plaintiff finally claims that the court improperly prevented him from presenting evidence during the hearing on his apphcation to discharge the hens on his property. The plaintiff specifically contends that the court denied him access to a witness and, for the first time in his reply brief, argues that the court refused to admit signed letters or reports on the basis that they were hearsay. Because the plaintiff has failed to cite relevant case law and apply those principles to the issues raised in this appeal, we decline to review these claims.

“It is weh settled that [w]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in then-briefs. We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited. . . . [Assignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nowacki v. Nowacki, 129 Conn. App. 157, 163-64, 20 A.3d 702 (2011).

“Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. . . . Self-represented parties are not afforded a lesser standard of compliance, and [although we are solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants . . . [s]uch a litigant is bound by the same rules . . . and procedure as those qualified to practice law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Emile L., 126 Conn. App. 283, 285 n.3, 11 A.3d 1117 (2011). The plaintiff has not demonstrated, aside from unsupported assertions, how the trial court’s actions were improper. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff has abandoned these issues as the result of an inadequate brief.

The judgment is reversed only as to the dismissal of the application to discharge the anti-blight hen and the case is remanded with direction to reconsider the plaintiffs application to discharge that hen; the judgment is affirmed in ah other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The court granted the plaintiffs application to discharge the third property maintenance lien on the ground that the defendant’s filing of the lien was untimely. Neither party appeals from that decision.

       It is difficult to identify the nature of all of the plaintiffs claims as set forth in his briefs. We have addressed the claims to the extent that they are analyzed. See Paoletta v. Anchor Reef Club at Branford, LLC, 123 Conn. App. 402, 406, 1 A.3d 1238 (“for this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 931, 5 A.3d 491 (2010).

       Although the anti-blight lien certificate cites § 17.7 of the City Code of Meriden, it is undisputed that the code was recently renumbered and that Chapter 159 of the code contains the applicable ordinances. Chapter 159-1, as adopted by the city council of the defendant, states that “ [t]his Chapter is to be known as the ‘Anti-Blight Ordinance,’ and is enacted pursuant to the authority granted to the City of Meriden under Connecticut General Statutes § 7-148 (c) (7) (H) (xv).” (Emphasis added.)
      Chapter 159-7, as adopted by the city council of the defendant, states that “[a]ny unpaid fine imposed pursuant to the foregoing anti-blight citation hearing procedure shall constitute a lien upon the real property against which the fine was imposed from the date of such fine in accordance with § 7-148aa of the Connecticut General Statutes. Said lien shall be continued, recorded, released and enforced as provided for in § 7-148aa of said statutes.” (Emphasis added.)

       General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 7-148aa provides: “Any unpaid fine imposed by a municipality pursuant to the provisions of an ordinance regulating blight, adopted pursuant to subparagraph (H) (xv) of subdivision (7) of subsection (c) of section 7-148, shall constitute a lien upon the real estate against which the fine was imposed from the date of such fine. Each such lien may be continued, recorded and released in the manner provided by the general statutes for continuing, recording and releasing property tax liens. Each such lien shall take precedence over all other liens filed after July 1, 1997, and encumbrances except taxes and may be enforced in the same manner as property tax hens.”
      Section 7-148aa was amended by Public Acts 2012, No, 12-146, § 4 (P.A. 12-146), effective October 1, 2012. Pursuant to P.A. 12-146, “penalty” was substituted for “fine.” For convenience, subsequent references to § 7-148aa in this opinion will be to the current statutory revision, unless otherwise noted.

       General Statutes § 49-73b provides in relevant part: “(a) Any municipality that has incurred expenses for the inspection, repair, demolition, maintenance, removal or other disposition of any real estate in order to secure such real estate, to remedy a blighted condition on such real estate or to make it safe and sanitary under any provision of the general statutes or any municipal building, health, housing or safety codes or regulations shall have the right to recover such expenses from the owner of the real estate for which such expenses were incurred.
      “(b) The interest of each person in such real estate shall be subject to a lien for the payment of such expenses, which lien shall take precedence over any other encumbrance except municipal tax assessments on such real estate. No such lien shall be valid, unless the municipality, not later than the date thirty days after the date on which such work has ceased, files a certificate of such lien and gives notice to the owner of the real estate in the same manner as provided in section 49-34. Simultaneous with the filing, the municipality shall make reasonable efforts to mail a copy of the certificate by first class mail to the lienholder’s current or last-known address. . . .
      “(d) Any municipal lien filed pursuant to the provisions of this section may be foreclosed in the same manner as a mortgage. . . .
      “(f) Any municipal lien filed pursuant to this section may be discharged or dissolved in the manner provided in sections 49-35a to 49-37, inclusive. . . .”

       The plaintiffs application to discharge did not reference a specific statute and was filed on a preprinted form that labeled all four of the liens as “mechanic’s lien[s].” The court and the parties properly construed the November, 2005 lien as an anti-blight lien and the remaining three liens as property maintenance liens. The court, however, evaluated its statutory authority to discharge all four liens solely pursuant to § 49-73b, which governs property maintenance liens, concluding that an application to discharge “mechanic’s lien[s]” was not available to the plaintiff pursuant to § 7-148aa, which governs anti-blight liens.

       See footnote 1 of this opinion.

       General Statutes § 49-35b provides: “(a) Upon the hearing held on the application or motion set forth in section 49-35a, the lienor shall first be required to establish that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of his lien. Any person entitled to notice under section 49-35a may appear, be heard and prove by clear and convincing evidence that the validity of the lien should not be sustained or the amount of the hen claimed is excessive and should be reduced.
      “(b) Upon consideration of the facts before it, the court or judge may: (1) Deny the apphcation or motion if probable cause to sustain the validity of the hen is established; or (2) order the hen discharged if (A) probable cause to sustain its validity is not established, or (B) by clear and convincing evidence its invalidity is established; or (3) reduce the amount of the hen if the amount is found to be excessive by clear and convincing evidence; or (4) order the lien discharged or reduce the amount of the lien conditioned upon the posting of a bond, with surety, in a sum deemed sufficient by the judge to indemnify the lienor for any damage which may occur by the discharge or the reduction of amount.”

       The plaintiff also contends that his right to due process was violated because the maintenance work performed on his home by the defendant was completed on the basis of an improper ex parte civil search warrant, and, therefore, the property maintenance liens are invalid. The plaintiffs argument is, seemingly, that the warrant to enter his property was improperly granted because there was no statutory authority under which the court could issue it. Section 49-73b, however, which is cited in the defendant’s application for an administrative search warrant, clearly gave the defendant authority to remedy the blight on the plaintiffs property in addition to placing a lien on the property for the value of the work performed. Additionally, General Statutes § 29-305 allows for the inspection of buildings and facilities by local fire marshals through the issue of such warrants. See State v. Burke, 23 Conn. App. 528, 530 n.2, 531-32, 582 A.2d 915 (1990) (fire marshal inspection statute authorizing issuance of administrative search warrant to conduct periodic annual inspection for fire code violations not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 218 Conn. 906, 588 A.2d 1383 (1991). Thus, we decline to further address this claim.

       The plaintiff argues that the court erred when it considered his application to discharge the property maintenance liens and the anti-blight lien under the same city ordinance, Chapter 159. Although that ordinance is entitled “Property Maintenance,” that language is a misnomer, as its terms indicate that it is actually an ordinance that was enacted pursuant to the city’s authority granted by § 7-148aa, the anti-blight statute. See footnote 3 of this opinion. While the anti-blight lien was placed on the plaintiffs property in accordance with § 7-148aa and Chapter 159, the ordinance passed pursuant to that statute, the property maintenance liens were placed on the plaintiffs property solely on the basis of the statutory authority granted to the defendant pursuant to § 49-73b. The property maintenance liens were not placed on the property on the basis of any city ordinance, and, therefore, the plaintiffs argument lacks merit.

       The defendant had enacted an ordinance pursuant to its authority under § 7-148aa, Chapter 159 of the city code, which regulates blight. Chapter 159-7 states in relevant part: “The provisions of this chapter may be enforced by citation, in addition to other remedies, in accordance with § 7-152c of the Connecticut General Statutes. . . .”
      Section 7-152c (c) and (d) provide that if a property owner does not contest a citation for violation of the anti-blight ordinance within ten days by demanding a hearing before a citation officer, he will be deemed to have admitted liability, and an assessment and judgment will be entered against him. The statute also allows the property owner an opportunity to appeal such a judgment by a citation officer to the trial court within thirty days of receiving the assessment. General Statutes § 7-152c (g). The defendant followed the procedures set out in § 7-152c for the enforcement of assessments and judgments. We note, however, that the plaintiff neither requested a hearing nor appealed the judgment entered against him to the trial court, instead applying to the court for a discharge of the “mechanic’s lien[s]” on his property.


author: BORDEN, J.

text:
    ALLEN S. ALTERISI v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 33935)
    Beach, Robinson and Borden, Js.

      Argued May 23
    officially released August 27, 2013

      Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

      Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and David Clifton, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
   Opinion

BORDEN, J.

In this habeas corpus appeal, the petitioner, Allen S. Alterisi, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas coipus that was based on claims of ineffective assistance of appellate and prior habeas counsel. He claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that he had not established either claim. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

In 1997, this court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction on five counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70, and six counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. State v. Alterisi, 47 Conn. App. 199, 702 A.2d 651 (1997). In 2000, the habeas court, Hon. Anthony V. DeMayo, judge trial referee, denied his first habeas corpus petition, in which he had claimed ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, John Donovan, and, in 2002, this court affirmed that judgment. Alterisi v. Commissioner of Correction, 67 Conn. App. 625, 789 A.2d 489 (2002). In 2010, the petitioner brought this second petition, in three counts, alleging, respectively, ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, ineffective assistance of his prior habeas counsel, and ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel on direct appeal. The court, T. Santos, J., dismissed the first count as successive and the case went to trial on the remaining two counts. The court, Bright, J., rendered judgment denying the petition. This appeal followed.

In the underlying criminal case, this court stated the facts as follows. “In 1990, the [petitioner] was living in Meriden with his girlfriend, A, and her two sons, B, age five, and D, age three. During the two years that the [petitioner] lived with A, he often took care of the children while she worked as a waitress in the evenings. In January, 1992, A lost custody of the boys due to her substance abuse and psychiatric problems. The children were sent to live with A’s sister and brother-in-law, who became the boys’ custodial guardians. B and D remained at the home of their aunt and uncle in Meriden for four years.

“When the boys arrived at the home of their aunt and uncle, they exhibited unusual behavior. The aunt and uncle and school officials noticed that the boys were very aggressive, punching and hitting each other and other adult males in the groin. This behavior and other incidents prompted the aunt and uncle to take the boys to a child therapist at the Child Guidance Clinic in Meriden (clinic).

“In February, 1992, the boys began attending weekly counseling sessions with Steven Thermes, a social worker at the clinic. In individual counseling sessions, both children expressed a strong fear of the [petitioner]. They stated that he hit them, locked them out of the house in the cold weather, and forced them to urinate and defecate outdoors. In February, 1993, the boys first disclosed to Thermes that they had been sexually assaulted by the [petitioner]. Both boys revealed that, among other actions, the [petitioner] had touched their genitals with his hand. The children appeared relieved to have disclosed this information to Thermes. The following week, Thermes reported the allegations to the Meriden police.

“On February 26, 1993, the children were separately interviewed by Detective Gary Brandi of the sex crimes unit of the Meriden police department. B and D both asserted that the [petitioner] had undressed them and touched their genitals on numerous occasions when their mother was at work. Each provided graphic detail about the incidents. The boys stated that some of the activity took place in the presence of both brothers. During their interviews, Brandi showed each boy a series of anatomically correct drawings depicting figures of an adult male and a young boy. With the aid of these drawings, each child described the [petitioner’s] conduct. They also stated that the [petitioner] had threatened to hurt them and their mother if they told anyone about these regular occurrences.” State v. Alterisi, supra, 47 Conn. App. 200-202.

I

APPELLATE COUNSEL

We first consider the petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel in the underlying criminal conviction, Robert M. Casaie, was ineffective, and that the habeas court in the present case improperly concluded that the petitioner had not established that ineffectiveness. More specifically, he argues that Casaie was ineffective in not having raised a claim on appeal that the state committed prosecutorial impropriety in its final argument in the trial. We disagree.

It is axiomatic that, in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a habeas petitioner must establish both deficient performance and the resulting prejudice. See Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn. App. 560, 562, 867 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 934, 875 A.2d 543 (2005). The performance prong requires proof that appellate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id., 563. There is a strong presumption that counsel has rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. Just as the decision of trial counsel not to object to certain evidence is a matter of trial tactics, not evidence of incompetency; Levine v. Manson, 195 Conn. 636, 648, 490 A.2d 82 (1985); the tactical decision of appellate counsel not to raise a particular claim is ordinarily a matter of appellate tactics, and not evidence of incompetency, in light of the presumption of reasonable professional judgment. Orellana v. Commissioner of Correction, 135 Conn. App. 90, 99, 41 A.3d 1088, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 913, 45 A.3d 97 (2012). This is particularly apt because our courts have frequently chided appellate counsel for not exercising more discriminating judgment in selecting which claims to present on appeal, so as not to dilute the strength of strong arguments by forcing the court to consider weak ones. See, e.g., id., 98; Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 131 Conn. App. 805, 809, 29 A.3d 166 (2011); DaEria v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 539, 542, 946 A.2d 249, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 911, 957 A.2d 877 (2008).

The prejudice prong requires proof that, had the prior performance been reasonable rather than inadequate, there is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have prevailed on the appeal. Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 131 Conn. App. 808. A failure to establish either prong will be fatal to a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. Crawley v. Commissioner of Correction, 141 Conn. App. 660, 665, 62 A.3d 1138, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 946, 68 A.3d 656 (2013). Our scope of review regarding the underlying facts found by the habeas court is the clearly erroneous standard, and the plenary standard of review applies regarding the legal conclusion of whether those facts amount to ineffectiveness of counsel. Orellana v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 135 Conn. App. 99.

The following are the facts underlying this claim. Because the petitioner believed he was not guilty and wanted to prove his innocence, during plea negotiations he agreed to take a polygraph at the state police headquarters in Meriden on December 14, 1994. There, he filled out a questionnaire and, prior to taking the polygraph, participated in an interview that was based on his answers to the questionnaire. One of the questions was: “How do you feel the police have treated you during this investigation?” His written answer was: “I don’t feel a proper investigation was performed.” When asked to elaborate on this answer, he questioned why the police had not talked to nineteen other women with children with whom he had lived who could tell the police “whether it had ever happened with them.” During the criminal trial, the petitioner testified, and he was asked on cross-examination whether he had lived with nineteen other women with children; he answered in the affirmative.

During closing argument, Donovan, his trial counsel, argued that the state’s case lacked the evidence to support its allegations. He argued: “If you can’t prove that he molested those kids, then try to show that he is a bad person,” and bolstered this argument by arguing that the petitioner’s then girlfriend “knows she is not living with a child molester.”

In rebuttal, the state argued: “[The petitioner] admitted he is thirty-six years old and he has said he has lived with . . . nineteen different women. And every single one of those nineteen different women all had children; that should tell you something. The odds of that are phenomenal. You don’t just live with nineteen separate women, and you are only thirty-six years old and they’ve all had children. It seems like he is seeking women with children. And you wonder why he is seeking women with children—because he is a pedophile. And how do we know that? Because the state has proved that he is a pedophile here in court. You heard [the victims] testify.” Donovan did not object, move for a mistrial, or request a curative instruction.

We first note that, in contrast to his argument in this court, in the habeas court in the present case, the petitioner specifically disclaimed any challenge to the use of the word “pedophile,” and the habeas court in its memorandum of decision noted that concession and, accordingly, did not address it. Instead, his argument in the habeas court focused on the reference to his having lived with nineteen other women with children, implying, in his view, that there were other victims of his sexual molestation and, therefore, referring to facts not in evidence.

In this habeas matter, Casale testified that after thoroughly reviewing the transcripts and conversing with Donovan, he determined, as a tactical matter, to raise only the issue of whether the trial court had improperly permitted the children to testify by videotape pursuant to General Statutes § 54-86g and State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061, 108 S. Ct. 1017, 98 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1988), because he determined that it was the strongest issue in the case. He testified further that he did not raise any issue of prosecutorial impropriety because it had not been preserved, it would not have merited appellate reversal under the then prevailing standard of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), regarding such a claim; see State v. Smith, 209 Conn. 423, 428, 551 A.2d 742 (1988) (review granted only where record disclosed “a pattern of repeated, strident and serious misconduct”); State v. Lepri, 56 Conn. App. 403, 416, 743 A.2d 626 (“where the record does not disclose a pattern of misconduct pervasive throughout the trial or conduct that was so blatantly egregious that it infringed on the defendant’s right to a fair trial, we have consistently held that the second prong of Golding has not been met” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 253 Conn. 902, 753 A.2d 938 (2000); in that it was brief, isolated, not necessarily improper and, even if improper, not blatantly egregious. The habeas court credited Casale’s testimony, and determined that his tactical choice was reasonable. We agree with the determination of the habeas court that this was a reasonable tactical decision on the part of appellate counsel and, therefore, the petitioner cannot prevail on his claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel.

We conclude, along with the habeas court, that it was a reasonable tactic not to raise this unpreserved claim because it was brief, isolated and not egregious. It is highly unlikely that it would have prevailed on appeal, and would have, if raised, only served to dilute the strength of the appellate claim that was raised.

II

FIRST HABEAS COUNSEL

The petitioner also claims that the habeas court in the present case improperly rejected his claim that his first habeas counsel, William Palmieri, rendered ineffective assistance in presenting that petition. We disagree.

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel, a petitioner must establish that (1) counsel was ineffective; and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced, by showing that there is a reasonable probability that the habeas court would have found that he was entitled to reversal of the conviction and a new trial. Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, 138 Conn. App. 454, 474-75, 53 A.3d 257, cert. granted on other grounds, 307 Conn. 940, 56 A.3d 948 (2012). This necessarily means that the petitioner must establish that both prior habeas counsel and trial counsel were ineffective. Lozada v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. 834, 842-43, 613 A.2d 818 (1992). We have characterized this burden as presenting a “ ‘herculean task’ . . . .” Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 475. With particular reference to strategic decisions of trial counsel, we are required to eliminate the distortion of hindsight; to reconstruct the circumstances regarding trial counsel’s conduct and evaluate that conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time; and to afford it the presumption that, under the circumstances, it might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Additionally, the right to counsel is not the right to perfect counsel. Ancona v. Commissioner of Correction, 100 Conn. App. 283, 289, 918 A.2d 283, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 918, 925 A.2d 1099 (2007). With this legal background in mind, the petitioner presents several instances in which he claims that Paimieri was ineffective because he failed to claim that Donovan had been ineffective. We consider each instance in turn.

The first instance involves Donovan’s failure to file a motion in limine regarding the petitioner’s mental health treatments and to object to certain questions regarding that treatment. The facts are as follows. Prior to the polygraph, during an interview conducted by a state police detective, in which the petitioner had been given Miranda warnings and which was recorded on a DVD, the petitioner told the detective that he was collecting social security disability benefits and veterans’ benefits. He explained that his disability arose from a fall he sustained while he was in the Navy. He injured his knee. Responding to a question about medications, he stated that he had taken Lithium and Thorazine daily for a personality disorder, and that he had been treated for mental health issues from 1986 until two years before the interview. In response to a question about whether he had ever had a major illness, he responded, “if you want to consider personality disorder,” and stated that such a disorder must be a major illness because he was receiving disability payments for it. In response to a question about whether he had ever been treated for emotional or psychiatric illnesses, he answered in writing: “personality disorder: manic-depressive, 1986 to two years ago.” During the criminal trial, the petitioner testified on direct examination that he was receiving veterans’ disability benefits for injuries to his back and knee resulting from a fall he sustained while he was in the Navy. Donovan then asked him: “Are you currently receiving a disability payment in connection with your injuries?” He responded: “Yes, I receive social security disability and VA comp.,” thus linking both sets of disability payments to his knee and back injuries.

On cross-examination, the state began to ask him if he had told a state police detective that his disability was a personality disorder. Donovan objected, and the jury was excused. A colloquy ensued in which the state claimed that it was offering the petitioner’s prior statement to the detective as a prior inconsistent statement because it contradicted his statement that his disability payments were based on his injuries he sustained while in the Navy, and Donovan claimed that the prior statement was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Ultimately, the court requested that the state ask the petitioner the question, in the jury’s absence, that it sought to ask in the jury’s presence.

The state did so and asked: “Mr. Alterisi, you said you are collecting a social security and VA compensation disability, correct?” The petitioner answered affirmatively and the state followed up, asking: “What are you collecting the social security disability for?” The petitioner responded that “[t]he social security disability is for a personality disorder, bipolar manic depressive.”

There then ensued a confusing set of rulings by the court:

“The Court: Objection sustained. Bring the jury back. That statement is consistent with his testimony.
“[The Prosecutor]: I would be able to ask that question, though?
“The Court: Oh, certainly.
“[The Prosecutor]: Objection as to the inconsistent part.
“The Court: Yes.”

When the jury returned to the courtroom, the state asked the question referred to previously, the petitioner responded, and the state asked a couple of follow-up questions regarding his treatment for his personality disorder. Donovan did not object to those questions.

During the trial on the present habeas petition, Donovan testified that, although he had asked the petitioner on direct examination only about his veterans’ compensation for his knee and back injuries, the petitioner had spontaneously added that he was also receiving social security disability payments. That, in Donovan’s view, opened the door to the state’s cross-examination regarding the source of the social security disability payments, and resulted in Donovan’s objection to that subject as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. He further testified that he thought he had secured a favorable ruling on the question, but that he did not renew his objection in front of the jury because, despite the ruling sustaining his objection, the state had specifically asked the court if it could ask the question and the court had specifically permitted the state to do so.

Palmieri, counsel for the petitioner in the first habeas trial, testified during the second habeas trial that, in reviewing the file he learned that Donovan had accompanied the petitioner to the state police complex in Meriden for the polygraph, and that while waiting for the interview to begin, Donovan told the petitioner that he had to go to the Meriden courthouse to attend to some matter, and the petitioner agreed that he could leave while the petitioner took the polygraph. Palmieri further testified that he took the view that the interview had turned out to be more like an interrogation and, therefore, his strategy in the first habeas trial was to claim that Donovan had been ineffective by leaving the petitioner unattended during the interview.

Palmieri also testified that for several reasons he did not claim that Donovan was ineffective by failing to object, once the jury had returned to the courtroom, to the state’s question regarding the source of the petitioner’s social security disability benefits. Donovan had done all he could to preclude the inquiry about the petitioner’s personality disorder and, in fact, secured what appeared to be a favorable ruling. When the state nonetheless asked the question in the jury’s presence, Donovan had made a reasonable tactical decision not to object again because the court already had specifically granted the state permission to ask the question, and to object again would have highlighted something that was fleeting, isolated and not harmful, and might have resulted in a rebuke by the court for objecting to a question that it had already specifically permitted.

Similarly, Palmieri said he did not view Donovan’s failure to file a motion in limine as ineffective assistance because Donovan already knew the contents of the DVD, and that to do so might have caused the state to delve further into a worrisome issue than it might otherwise have done. Instead, he testified, it was smart strategy on Donovan’s part to wait and see whether the state would inquire about the petitioner’s mental health and, if it did, make an appropriate objection.

In sum, Palmieri testified that he, himself, made a tactical decision not to pursue claims that Donovan should have objected again to the state’s question and should have filed a motion in limine as to the DVD. Paimieri’s tactical decision was based on his view that raising weak claims risks obscuring a party’s strong claims.

At the second habeas trial, the petitioner presented the expert testimony of Attorney Auden Grogins. The habeas court summarized her testimony as follows. Reasonably competent counsel would have argued further outside the presence of the jury, Donovan let the favorable ruling slip away by not objecting to it again, and reasonably competent counsel would have done so because evidence of a mental health issue is highly prejudicial in a sexual assault case. In addition, Grogins testified that, because any time a criminal defendant testifies, he opens himself up to having statements he made to the police used against him on cross-examination, reasonably competent counsel would have filed a motion in limine to preclude any inquiry into the petitioner’s mental health. She further testified that Donovan should have sought a clarification of the court’s confusing ruling. The habeas court, however, did not credit Grogins’ expert opinions that Donovan had been ineffective and that, by implication, Palmieri had been ineffective by not raising this issue in the first habeas trial.

The habeas court in the present case rejected the petitioner’s claim that Palmieri had been ineffective in failing to claim that Donovan had been ineffective in failing to keep the jury from learning of the petitioner’s personality disorder. The court specifically credited Palmieri’s testimony that he made a tactical decision not to do so. The court further concluded, on the basis of the reasons given by Palmieri, that the “petitioner cannot overcome [the strong presumption of reasonableness] by second-guessing an approach that proved to be unsuccessful.”

We agree with the habeas court. It was a presumptively reasonable tactical decision by Palmieri not to raise what may well have been an unsuccessful claim that Donovan had been ineffective in failing to object to, and in failing to file a motion in limine regarding, the evidence of the petitioner’s personality disorder, and to focus the first habeas court’s eye on what he regarded as a strong claim, namely, Donovan’s having left the petitioner unattended at the interview prior to the polygraph. Just as trial and appellate lawyers must make tactical decisions on which claims to raise—so as to focus the fact finders’ minds on their strong claims and not dilute that focus by raising weak claims— habeas counsel must do the same. Like the habeas court, we cannot conclude that the petitioner has overcome the strong presumption of reasonableness that attaches to counsel's tactical decisions.

Next, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly rejected his claim that Palmieri had been ineffective by not claiming that Donovan had been ineffective for failing to keep from the jury the fact that the petitioner had been in a drug treatment program. We are not persuaded.

The facts regarding this claim are as follows. During the interview prior to the polygraph, the detective asked the petitioner if he had ever participated in an alcohol or drug abuse program. The petitioner said that, about four years prior, he had admitted himself to a thirty day drug clinic at a Veterans Administration hospital.

In the course of the petitioner’s direct examination during the criminal trial, he testified that A, the mother of the victims, had a drinking problem, and had been violent toward him and the victims. On cross-examination, the state asked: “Didn’t you also have your own substance abuse problem during the time you were with her?” When the petitioner denied this, the state asked: “In 1990, about December of 1990, didn’t you check into the West Haven [Veterans Administration hospital] for thirty days for a drug treatment program?” The petitioner responded: “Yes.”

At the habeas trial in the present case, Donovan testified that, although he did not recall why he had not objected, it may well have been a tactical decision to let the answer pass without drawing attention to it. Palmieri testified that he regarded Donovan’s failure to object as a sound tactical decision, not evidence of ineffectiveness and, similarly, Donovan’s not having filed a motion in limine as a discretionary and tactical decision not to alert the state to what the defense regarded as worrisome information. Palmieri also testified that, because the petitioner had waived his Miranda rights before the interview with the detective, that was a significant factor in deciding which claims to pursue against Donovan regarding those parts of the interview that came out at the criminal trial.

Grogins opined that reasonably competent counsel would have objected, on the ground of irrelevance to any questions about the petitioner’s drug treatment. She also acknowledged, however, that she does not object every time opposing counsel asks an objectionable question, and that in presenting habeas cases, she does not pursue every potential claim regarding tactical decisions of trial counsel because of the difficulty of overcoming the presumption of reasonableness in matters of strategy.

The habeas court in the present case found Palmieri’s testimony to be credible. It also stated: “Based upon the information available to . . . Palmieri at the time, the court cannot say that he was ineffective for not raising this issue. This is particularly true given that our appellate courts have repeatedly held that the decision of a trial lawyer not to make an objection is a matter of trial tactics, not evidence of incompetency.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Again, we agree with the habeas court. As for the motion in limine, it is very unlikely that the criminal trial court would have granted it, given that the petitioner had waived his Miranda rights and, because he took the witness stand at trial, the court would have undoubtedly wanted to consider any questions asked on cross-examination in light of his direct examination. As for the failure to object to the question about the petitioner’s drug treatment on cross-examination at the criminal trial, we simply agree with the reasoning of the habeas court that Palmieri cannot be faulted for failing to raise the issue because such a decision by criminal trial counsel ordinarily falls within the realm of trial tactics and is not ordinarily evidence of ineffectiveness. Further, it was a reasonable tactic by Palmieri, as habeas counsel, to decline to raise that issue so as not to dilute the strength of what he regarded as his strong claim.

Next, the petitioner claims that Palmieri was ineffective for not claiming that Donovan had been ineffective for failing to object to certain questions asked of the petitioner regarding his having lived with nineteen women, all of whom had children. Specifically, the petitioner argues that the questions constituted prosecu-torial impropriety as having been based on facts not in evidence, containing excessive sarcasm, suggesting that the petitioner was immoral, and as having been inflammatory and unduly prejudicial. We disagree.

At the criminal trial, after the petitioner’s direct examination, the state asked the following questions on cross-examination:

“Q. Now, weren’t you attracted to [A] because she had children?
“A. No.
“Q. Haven’t you lived with, nineteen women, all of who[m] have had children?
“A. Somewhere around there. I don’t know the exact number.
“Q. So, somewhere around nineteen women you have lived with and they all had children?
“A. It’s hard to find a single girl without kids today.
“Q. And I suppose that none of those children were yours?
“A. No, they weren’t.”

Donovan did not object to any of these questions. At the habeas trial in the present case, Donovan testified that the petitioner had volunteered the information about having lived with nineteen other women with children in order to demonstrate his dissatisfaction with the police investigation, namely, that, if the police had interviewed them, the police investigation would have shown that he had not molested any of those children. Donovan further testified that part of his theory of defense at the criminal trial was the inadequacy of the police investigation. Thus, the petitioner’s testimony in this regard was consistent with that theory of defense, and Donovan testified that it could have been construed as a comment upon the investigation.

Palmieri testified that, during the first habeas trial, he had raised and extensively argued the issue of the petitioner’s statements about having lived with nineteen other women with children in the context of his claim that Donovan had been ineffective in leaving the petitioner unattended during the interview with the detective, which had led to the petitioner’s having made the statements about the other women with whom he had lived. The first habeas court, however, was unpersuaded by this claim, and that judgment is not before us.

The habeas court in the present case stated: “Attorney Grogins testified that, in her opinion, any reasonably competent habeas counsel would have raised the issue because any reasonably competent trial counsel would have objected to this evidence being admitted, and would have filed a motion in limine to prevent inquiry into the area. She also testified that the evidence was highly prejudicial because it left the jury with the impression that the petitioner sought out women with young children whom he could molest. . . . The undisputed fact remains that Attorney Palmieri did make arguments regarding the state’s cross-examination regarding the nineteen women. Thus, there is evidence that Attorney Palmieri made a tactical decision as to how to approach this issue. Based on that evidence, the court cannot say that Attorney Palmieri’s tactical decision was unreasonable. The petitioner himself made the comment about the nineteen women in the interview because he thought if the police talked to those women, the police would conclude that he was not a child molester. . . . [T]he court cannot conclude that it was unreasonable for Attorney Palmieri not to argue that the failure to object to a question constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. As noted above, decisions not to object made in the heat of trial axe presumed to be tactical, and are almost unassailable. The same is true as to the decision not to file a motion in limine. As Attorney Palmieri noted, filing such a motion can sometimes serve to bring to your opponent’s attention an issue he might not have otherwise pursued. Based on the evidence presented to this court, the petitioner has not met his burden to prove that Attorney Donovan’s failure to object or file a motion in limine constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, Attorney Palmieri’s failure to raise that as an issue in the first habeas proceeding cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.)

We agree that the petitioner did not establish that Palmieri rendered ineffective assistance of habeas counsel. Palmieri’s tactical decision not to attack Donovan’s decision not to object to the evidence and not to file a motion in limine falls well within the presumption of reasonableness, given how the evidence of the petitioner’s relationships with the nineteen women came out, and given the unlikelihood of the success of such a motion.

The petitioner’s final claim mirrors his first claim. He claims that Palmieri was ineffective in not attacking Donovan’s failure to object to that portion of the state’s rebuttal closing argument that the petitioner had lived with nineteen women, all of whom had children. This claim requires very little discussion.

The habeas court in the present case specifically credited Palmieri’s testimony that his was a tactical decision based on his assessment that Donovan’s tactical choice was reasonable, for a number of reasons. Donovan’s choice was reasonable because to have objected would have drawn more attention to the matter than it warranted; it was isolated; it was consistent with Donovan’s argument that the state was merely attempting to besmirch the petitioner in the absence of hard proof of the crimes charged; and it would have been unlikely that Donovan would prevail on that claim. The court specifically discredited Grogins’ opinions to the contrary. For much the same reasons that we gave in rejecting the petitioner’s claim that Casale performed ineffectively as appellate counsel, we also reject the petitioner’s claim that Palmieri performed ineffectively as first habeas counsel in this regard.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Judge Bright granted certification to appeal.

       The petitioner did not take the polygraph because of psychiatric problems disclosed during the interview.

       Although in his brief in this court the petitioner raises a number of other passages from the state’s final argument in support of his claim of prosecutorial impropriety, the passage quoted was the only one specifically presented to the habeas court in the present case, and, accordingly, the only one considered by the habeas court in its memorandum of decision. We therefore decline to address those other passages on appeal. See State v. Busque, 31 Conn. App. 120, 127, 623 A.2d 532 (1993) (this court will not review claims presented for first time on appeal), appeal dismissed, 229 Conn. 839, 643 A.2d 1281 (1994).

       We do not suggest by this analysis that the argument of the prosecutor was proper or improper. We need not engage in that analysis because, even if the argument was improper, taken in isolation, it was a reasonable tactical appellate decision not to raise such a claim, given the then existing standard of review in order to prevail on such a claim. Since then, however, our Supreme Court has changed the standard for appellate review for claims of prosecutorial impropriety at the trial level. See State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 663, 572-73, 849 A.2d 626 (2004) (requiring use of factors discussed in State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 623, 540, 529 A.2d 653 [1987]). Even if we were to apply the Williams factors, moreover, Casale’s tactical decision not to raise the claim was reasonable.

       See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).