text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PATRICK COLLINS
    (AC 21589)
    Lavery, C. J., and Landau and Dranginis, Js.
    Argued November 29, 2001
    officially released April 2, 2002

      John R. Williams, for the appellant (defendant).

      Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John

      A. Connelly, state’s attorney, and Maureen M. Keegan, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

DRANGINIS, J.

The defendant, Patrick Collins, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a juiy trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) failed to admit eyewitness testimony of specific acts of abuse perpetrated on the defendant by the victim, and (2) admitted evidence of prior bad acts and bad character of the defendant. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are not in dispute. On January 17, 1998, the defendant, who was sixteen years old at the time, stabbed the victim, his stepfather, to death. The victim had lived with the defendant and the defendant’s mother since the defendant was eight. The defendant and the victim did not get along. On the night of the incident, sometime after 11 p.m., the defendant and the victim engaged in an argument about a stereo that the defendant had purchased with his mother’s credit card. The two began a fistfight. The defendant stabbed the victim with a pocketknife and a kitchen knife, and ran out the door. He immediately called his uncle from a pay telephone, who told him to call 911. The defendant called the police and informed them that there had been a fight. He stated that he did not know if he had stabbed his victim or what his condition was. When the police arrived, he stated, “I took a swipe at him with my pocketknife.”

The victim’s body was found on the living room couch. An autopsy performed on the victim revealed that he suffered four sharp force injuries, including three to the left chest and one to the right abdomen. A wound to the victim’s chest measuring eight and one-half inches deep caused death. A bloodied, eight inch long kitchen knife was found on the kitchen floor. A pocketknife later was found in the pocket of a coat in the defendant’s bedroom by his mother.

The jury found the defendant guilty. He was sentenced to a forty year term of imprisonment. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary to resolve the issues on appeal.

I

BAD ACTS OF THE VICTIM

The defendant first claims that the court improperly precluded him from offering evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim perpetrated on the defendant, thereby depriving him of his constitutional right to present a defense. He claims that the acts of violence were highly relevant to his claim of self-defense because they tended to show his state of mind at the time of the killing. Specifically, he argues that the court improperly limited the cross-examination of James D’Virgilio, Jr., the son of the victim; the direct examination of Jeremy Smith, a friend of the defendant; Darilee Beliveau, the defendant’s girlfriend; and Bobby Collins, the defendant’s uncle, regarding whether they ever had witnessed specific acts of abuse perpetrated on the defendant by the victim.

“The constitutional right to present a defense does not include the right to introduce any and all evidence claimed to support it. . . . The trial court retains the power to rule on the admissibility of evidence pursuant to traditional evidentiary standards. . . . The defendant has no right to present evidence that is not admissible according to the rules of evidence . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bridges, 65 Conn. App. 517, 524, 782 A.2d 1256, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 934, 785 A.2d 230 (2001).

“Upon review of a trial court’s decision, we will set aside an evidentiary ruling only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. . . . The trial court has wide discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence and the scope of cross-examination and [e]very reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rolon, 257 Conn. 156, 173, 777 A.2d 604 (2001).

“Furthermore, evidentiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only upon a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. . . . [T]he burden to prove the harmfulness of an improper evidentiary ruling is borne by the defendant . . . [who] must show that it is more probable than not that the erroneous action of the court affected the result.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pappas, 256 Conn. 854, 892, 776 A.2d 1091 (2001).

In this case, the defendant argues that evidence of specific prior acts of violence by the victim perpetrated on the defendant was probative of his state of mind and, therefore, relevant to his claim of self-defense. The state, in response, argues that the evidence properly was excluded as specific acts of violence offered to show the victim’s character for violence. We agree with the defendant.

“As a matter of hornbook law, evidence of other crimes or bad acts is normally treated as inadmissible character evidence. See, e.g., 1C. McCormick, Evidence (4th Ed. 1992) § 190.” State v. Mozell, 36 Conn. App. 672, 675, 652 A.2d 1060 (1995). “[E]vidence of character in any form—reputation, opinion from observation, or specific acts—generally will not be received to prove that a person engaged in certain conduct or did so with a particular intent on a specific occasion, so-called circumstantial use of character. The reason is the familiar one of prejudice outweighing probative value. Character evidence used for this purpose, while typically being of relatively slight value, usually is laden with the dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction, time consumption and surprise.” 1 C. McCormick, supra, § 188, p. 793.

The general exception to the rule with respect to the admissibility of character evidence in the context of self-defense claims is well settled. “When a defendant charged with murder asserts that he killed in self-defense, his state of mind—the existence and reasonableness of apprehension of such violence by the deceased as to justify the defensive measures adopted—becomes material. ... In such a case, the defendant may introduce evidence of the victim’s violent character to attempt to show that the victim was the aggressor. . . . Similarly, a defendant may, if he first shows that he was aware of the victim’s violent nature, introduce such [character] evidence to show his own state of mind at the time he confronted the victim, and thereby show the reasonableness of his belief that the use of force was necessary. ... A victim’s violent character may be proven by reputation or opinion evidence or by evidence showing convictions for crimes of violence. ... It may not, however, be proven by evidence of other specific acts. . . . Except where character is directly in issue, a person’s violent character may not be established by evidence of specific acts. ... A decedent’s violent character may not be established by evidence of specific violent acts, other than convictions, not because it is unconvincing but because it has the potential to surprise, to arouse prejudice, to multiply the issues and confuse the jury, and to prolong the trial.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, 48 Conn. App. 755, 763, 713 A.2d 255, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 901, 719 A.2d 905 (1998).

Equally important is the rule that “[e]vidence is admissible when it tends to establish a fact in issue or to corroborate other direct evidence in the case. One fact is relevant to another fact whenever, according to the common course of events, the existence of the one, taken alone or in connection with other facts, renders the existence of the other either certain or more probable. Unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, any fact may be proved which logically tends to aid the trier in the determination of the issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cansler, 54 Conn. App. 819, 832, 738 A.2d 1095 (1999).

“Evidence is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that evidence tend to support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, so long as it is not prejudicial or merely cumulative. C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) § 8.1.1, p. 226.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 243 Conn. 168, 196, 700 A.2d 38 (1997).

We have articulated the requirements of self-defense as follows. “A person may justifiably use deadly physical force in self-defense pursuant to [General Statutes] § 53a-19 (a) only if he reasonably believes both that (1) his attacker is using or about to use deadly physical force against him, or is inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm, and (2) that deadly physical force is necessary to repel such attack. . . . We repeatedly have indicated that the test a jury must apply in analyzing the second requirement, i.e., that the defendant reasonably believed that deadly force, as opposed to some lesser degree of force, was necessary to repel the victim’s alleged attack, is a subjective-objective one. . . .

“The subjective-objective inquiry into the defendant’s belief regarding the necessary degree of force requires that the jury make two separate affirmative determinations in order for the defendant’s claim of self-defense to succeed. First, the jury must determine whether, on the basis of all of the evidence presented, the defendant in fact had believed that he had needed to use deadly physical force, as opposed to some lesser degree of force, in order to repel the victim’s alleged attack. . . . The jury’s initial determination, therefore, requires the jury to assess the veracity of witnesses, often including the defendant, and to determine whether the defendant’s account of his belief in the necessity to use deadly force at the time of the confrontation is in fact credible. This probe into the defendant’s actual state of mind clearly demonstrates the function of the jury in [its] evaluation of the self-defense claim. . . .

“If the jury determines that the defendant had not believed that he had needed to employ deadly physical force to repel the victim’s attack, the jury’s inquiry ends, and the defendant’s self-defense claim must fail. If, however, the jury determines that the defendant in fact had believed that the use of deadly force was necessary, the jury must make a further determination as to whether that belief was reasonable, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances. . . . Thus, if a jury determines that the defendant’s honest belief that he had needed to use deadly force, instead of some lesser degree of force, was not a reasonable belief, the defendant is not entitled to the protection of § 53a-19a.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scarpiello, 40 Conn. App. 189, 206-207, 670 A.2d 856, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 921, 674 A.2d 1327 (1996).

We conclude that the evidence of prior acts was not proffered for the purpose of establishing the decedent’s violent character. Rather, the evidence was proffered to show the state of mind of the defendant directly because the victim’s abuse of the defendant tends to show that the defendant in fact feared the victim and was reasonable in doing so.

At trial, the defendant claimed that he had stabbed the victim in self-defense. He testified that on the night of the incident, he had returned home with a new stereo and entered the home through the front door instead of the back door. The victim became angry and demanded to see the receipt for the stereo. The defendant went into his bedroom and began searching for the receipt. Meanwhile, he spoke with his girlfriend on the telephone. The victim came into the defendant’s room and ordered him off the telephone. The defendant further testified that the victim hit him in the back of his head with his fist. The defendant then hung up the phone, but the punching continued. At one point, the victim had the defendant in a headlock and repeatedly punched him in the head. The defendant testified that he managed to pull out a pocketknife, open it partially and strike the victim with it. The defendant’s girlfriend telephoned again. The victim answered and hung up. In the kitchen, the two continued fighting and yelling at each other. The defendant testified that the victim was relentless in coming at him and that he was fearful that the victim would not stop beating him. The defendant finally picked up a kitchen knife and stabbed the victim.

In this case, the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing is a fact in issue. Evidence of prior bad acts by the victim perpetrated on the defendant may be admissible to show the defendant’s state of mind. See State v. Guess, 44 Conn. App. 790, 810, 692 A.2d 849 (1997) (victim’s threat to defendant relevant to show animosity between victim, defendant and reasonable to infer defendant might have wanted to take revenge), aff'd, 244 Conn. 761, 715 A.2d 643 (1998); State v. Delgado, 8 Conn. App. 273, 280-82, 513 A.2d 701 (1986) (improperly excluded testimony of defendant’s wife relevant to defendant’s state of mind, self-defense claim in that it showed he had reasonable apprehension of danger from victim); cf. State v. Vega, 48 Conn. App. 178, 191, 709 A.2d 28 (1998) (testimony that defendant previously abused victim relevant to show defendant’s state of mind relative to defense of extreme emotional disturbance). Because the defendant claimed that he acted in self-defense, the jury had to determine (1) whether he in fact believed that deadly force was necessary and (2) whether his belief “was reasonable, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scarpiello, supra, 40 Conn. App. 207.

The state’s reliance on State v. Carter, supra, 48 Conn. App. 763, is misplaced. In Carter, the trial court refused to allow the defendant, who had claimed self-defense, to testify that he witnessed or heard of specific prior acts of the victim that rendered him in fear of his victim. Id., 762. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction. As in this case, the trial court permitted the defendant in Carter to testify about specific acts of violence committed against him by the victim. Id., 764. Carter is distinguishable, however, because in that case, the defendant and other witnesses were precluded from testifying about violent acts that the victim had perpetrated on third parties that put the defendant in fear of his victim. Here, the defendant was precluded from introducing testimony of specific acts of violence that had been perpetrated on him by the victim. Id. We find the facts of Delgado and Guess to be more in line with the facts of this case.

As in the present case, the defendant in Delgado admittedly killed his victim, but claimed self-defense. In both cases, the evidence showed “bad blood” between the defendant and the victim. In Delgado, the victim had assaulted his former girlfriend, the defendant’s daughter. Approximately one year later, the defendant and the victim got into an argument in which, ultimately, the defendant stabbed and killed the victim. At trial, the defendant sought to admit evidence of his state of mind through his wife’s testimony. Specifically, she would have testified that three weeks prior to the killing, the defendant had sent her to the state’s attorney’s office seeking protection from the victim. She stated that the family was in fear and that she did not know what the defendant would do if the police could not protect them. The court, however, excluded the proffered evidence as collateral and confusing to the jury. On appeal, this court determined that the proffered evidence improperly had been excluded and that it was “crucial to the defendant’s claim of self-defense.” State v. Delgado, supra, 8 Conn. App. 281.

In Guess, under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rale, the state offered evidence of a specific prior act of the victim, namely, that the victim had threatened the defendant. The state argued, and this court agreed, that it was reasonable to infer from the threat that there was animosity between the victim and the defendant, and that the defendant had wanted to take revenge on the victim. The court distinguished the facts of Guess from the situation in which the state seeks to submit evidence of a victim’s fear to show animosity between a victim and a defendant. The court noted that “[h]atred begets more anger and perhaps revenge, while fear is far less likely to produce a heated response.” State v. Guess, supra, 44 Conn. App. 810. In cases of self-defense in which the defendant claims that he or she had a reason to fear his or her victim, we conclude that specific acts of violence brought upon an individual are likely to invoke fear of the victim in the mind of that individual.

We hold that in the case of self-defense, eyewitness testimony of prior specific acts of violence perpetrated on a defendant by his or her victim is admissible to show the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the killing.

The improper exclusion of certain evidence may amount to a deprivation of a defendant’s right to present a defense. State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. 711, 720, 670 A.2d 261 (1996). “It is a fundamental facet of due process that a defendant charged with a crime be afforded the right to establish and present a defense.” State v. Delgado, supra, 8 Conn. App. 282. “The state bears the burden of demonstrating that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . That determination must be made in light of the entire record. . . . Stated another way, the question is whether it is reasonably possible that the court’s refusal affected the verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 65 Conn. App. 649, 654, 783 A.2d 511 (2001).

Here, the defendant was precluded from offering evidence that went to a crucial element of his defense— his state of mind. The defendant testified about abuse by the victim, and others testified about the victim’s violent character. The defendant was precluded, however, from offering evidence that substantiated his claim that he in fact feared the victim and that his fear was reasonable under the circumstances. Testimony of independent observers would have bolstered the defendant’s credibility. Without their testimony, it was more likely that the jury would think that the defendant was fabricating the severity of the abuse and the extent of his fearfulness because of his interest in the outcome of the case. The jury needs all relevant and material information to assess the subjective fear of the defendant. “The jury’s assessments of the defendant’s credibility, and that of the witnesses in his defense, were crucial to its ultimate determinations of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 736, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987). Had the evidence been admitted, the jury might reasonably have been persuaded that the defendant, who was smaller and younger than the victim, reasonably had concluded that under the circumstances he was justified in using deadly force. In fact, we cannot conceive of more probative evidence of the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that he was in imminent peril at the time of the killing than evidence that the victim, over a course of eight years, physically had abused the defendant. The evidence was crucial to the defendant’s claim of self-defense, and the court should not have excluded it in its entirety. We conclude, therefore, that it is reasonably possible that the exclusion of the evidence affected the jury’s verdict.

II

THE VICTIM’S STATE OF MIND

The defendant next claims that he improperly was restricted from questioning Joanne D’Virgilio, the victim’s wife and the defendant’s mother, regarding whether the victim had made any statements shortly before his death that might have indicated that the victim had a violent state of mind at the time of the incident.

The following additional facts are relevant to the defendant’s claim. On direct examination, the defendant asked D’Virgilio about her interaction with the victim on the night of the incident. She testified that upon returning from work at about 11:40 p.m. that night, she “told him not—don’t start anything. Don’t start because I was not in the mood to get into an argument at that point. ” The defendant wanted to elicit further testimony that the victim had answered, “Oh, I will start something, all right.” The defendant argued that the statement went to the state of the mind of the victim, which was relevant, therefore, to a determination of whether he was the aggressor. The state argued, and the court agreed, that the statement was hearsay.

“[A]n out-of-court statement that is offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted is inadmissible hearsay unless the statement falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. . . . An out-of-court statement is not hearsay, however, if it is offered to illustrate circumstantially the declarant’s then present state of mind, rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ... Of course, for any such out-of-court statement to be admissible, it must be relevant to an issue in the case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wargo, 255 Conn. 113, 137-38, 763 A.2d 1 (2000). “Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. . . . One fact is relevant to another if in the common course of events the existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain or more probable. ... It is well settled that questions of relevance are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . Pickel v. Automated Waste Disposal, Inc., 65 Conn. App. 176, 184, 782 A.2d 231 (2001); see also 1 B. Holden & J. Daly, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) § 67b.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boretti v. Panacea Co., 67 Conn. App. 223, 227-28, 786 A.2d 1164 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 918, 791 A.2d 565 (2002). Our review of the record reveals that the victim’s statement was made to his wife about getting into an argument with her. We therefore cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in excluding the statement, which was not relevant to whether he was the initial aggressor against the defendant.

Ill

BAD ACTS AND CHARACTER OF THE DEFENDANT

The defendant next claims that the court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts and bad character. Specifically, he argues that the state improperly was allowed to elicit testimony that the defendant (1) habitually abused marijuana, (2) was disruptive and performed poorly in school, (3) was abusive to his younger brothers, (4) put his materialistic desires before the needs of the family and (5) had disciplinary problems while he was in jail.

“As a general rule, evidence of prior misconduct is inadmissible to prove that a criminal defendant is guilty of the crime of which the defendant is accused. . . . Such evidence cannot be used to suggest that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity for criminal behavior. . . . Exceptions to the general rule exist, however, if the purpose for which the evidence is offered is to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity or the elements of a crime. . . . We have developed a two part test to determine the admissibility of such evidence. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. . . . Second, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. . . . The primary responsibility for making these determinations rests with the trial court. We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Abrahante, 56 Conn. App. 65, 75-76, 741 A.2d 976 (1999).

With respect to the defendant’s claim that the court improperly admitted evidence of his marijuana use, we conclude that the defendant opened the door to the challenged testimony. “[I]f a party delves into a particular subject during examination, he is said to have ‘opened the door’ for further examination regarding that subject.” State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 766, 772 A.2d 703, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921, 774 A.2d 141 (2001). On direct examination, the defendant testified that he had smoked marijuana with Smith and others at around 6 p.m. on the day of the incident. On cross-examination, the state asked the defendant whether he smoked marijuana every day. The defendant objected on the ground that what happened before the day of the killing was not relevant. After hearing counsels’ arguments outside the presence of the jury, the court permitted the state to ask the defendant whether he had used marijuana before that day and whether he smoked every day. After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion.

The court also allowed the state to question Smith as to whether he smoked marijuana on a regular basis. On direct examination, Smith had testified that on January 17, 1998, he and the defendant had smoked marijuana at around 6 p.m. He further testified that while accompanied by his parents, he had told police that he was with the defendant on that evening. On cross-examination, the state properly impeached the witness by asking whether he told the police that he had smoked marijuana that night and had smoked marijuana with the defendant almost every day in high school. The door had been opened by the defendant, and the questions fairly went to the credibility of the witness.

The defendant next claims that the court improperly admitted evidence that he performed poorly in school and got into fights. We do not agree. Apparently as part of the defendant’s trial tactics, he was asked, again on direct-examination, how he performed in school and what fights, other than with the victim, he had gotten into. The defendant responded that he got into fights in school and in jail, did not do well in school and had been suspended from school. The state, thereafter, questioned the defendant regarding those incidents. The court properly allowed that line of questioning, as the defendant had opened the door.

The defendant did not object to the state’s line of questioning regarding his alleged treatment of his siblings, including whether the defendant hit them, was jealous of them, urinated in the sink while they were bathing, put only his own belongings in the bedroom he shared with his siblings, had expensive clothes despite his stepfather working two jobs and whether he had used his mother’s signature to purchase the stereo. “Our rales of practice make it clear that counsel must object to a ruling of evidence [and] state the grounds upon which objection is made ... to preserve the grounds for appeal. . . . These requirements are not simply formalities. . . . We consistently have stated that we will not consider evidentiary rulings where counsel did not properly preserve a claim of error by objection .... Because of the defendant’s failure to comply with the rales of practice, the claim concerning the admissibility of this particular evidence was not properly preserved for appeal.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ulen, 31 Conn. App. 20, 30, 623 A.2d 70, cert. denied, 226 Conn. 905, 625 A.2d 1378 (1993). We therefore decline to review those claims.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Police officers performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation until the victim was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead.

       The defendant also notes that he improperly was prohibited from using a photograph of his facial injuries to cross-examine a police officer. The defendant failed, however, to provide any analysis to support his claim. “We are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . We will not review claims absent law and analysis.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 67 Conn. App. 25, 27 n.2, 787 A.2d 43 (2001).

       Although our conclusion on the first issue is dispositive of this appeal, we address the defendant’s other claims because the issues are likely to arise on retrial. See State v. Lattore, 51 Conn. App. 541, 549, 723 A.2d 541 (1999).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    NANCY BURTON v. JOSEPH DIMYAN ET AL.
    (AC 21252)
    Schaller, Dranginis and Dupont, Js.
    Argued November 1, 2001
    officially released April 2, 2002

      Nancy Burton, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

      Stuart M. Ketaineck, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

      Karen T. Gerber, with whom, on the brief, were Jane E. Stoddard and Anthony Nuzzo, Jr., for the appellee (defendant Elie Coury).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The pro se plaintiff, Nancy Burton, appeals from the trial court’s judgment of nonsuit rendered against her. In this appeal, she claims that the trial court improperly (1) rendered the judgment of nonsuit, (2) granted the defendants’ motions to strike the counts of her complaint that alleged a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and (3) denied her motions for stay, transfer and disqualification without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history is necessary for our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant law firm, Pinney, Payne, Van Lenten, Burrell, Wolfe & Dillman (law firm), and attorneys Joseph Dimyan and Elie Coury, claiming, inter alia, vexatious prosecution, abuse of process and unfair trade practices. During the pendency of the action, the case appeared on the dormancy calendar several times. On June 7, 1999, the court, ruling on one of the plaintiffs many motions to exempt the case from dormancy dismissal, granted the plaintiffs motion notwithstanding its untimeliness and ordered the pleadings closed and the case to be on the trial list by August 2, 1999. The court stated, “If pleadings are not closed [by such time], motion for nonsuit may be filed.”

On August 10,1999, the case was still not on the trial list, and the law firm and Dimyan together filed a motion for nonsuit. On August 18, 1999, Coury also filed a motion for nonsuit. On January 31, 2000, the court granted both motions, stating: “Nonsuit may enter if order dated June 7, 1999, is not complied with on or before April 15, 2000.” On April 13, 2000, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint accompanied by a motion for an extension of time to close the pleadings. Thereafter, a judgment of nonsuit was rendered against the plaintiff. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly rendered the judgment of nonsuit. We disagree.

Practice Book § 17-19 provides in relevant part that “[i]f a party fails to comply with an order of a judicial authority . . . the party may be nonsuited or defaulted by the judicial authority.” Because the nonsuit here was a penalty for the plaintiffs failure to close the pleadings, we apply the modified standard of review set forth by our Supreme Court in Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 17-18, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001), for claims challenging a trial court’s order for sanctions.

“First, the order to be complied with must be reasonably clear. In this connection, however, we also state that even an order that does not meet this standard may form the basis of a sanction if the record establishes that, notwithstanding the lack of such clarity, the party sanctioned in fact understood the trial court’s intended meaning. This requirement poses a legal question that we will review de novo.

“Second, the record must establish that the order was in fact violated. This requirement poses a question of fact that we will review using a clearly erroneous standard of review.

“Third, the sanction imposed must be proportional to the violation. This requirement poses a question of the discretion of the trial court that we will review for abuse of that discretion.” Id.

We conclude that the court properly rendered the judgment of nonsuit because the court’s January 31, 2000 order was abundantly clear, and it is undisputed that the plaintiff, who is an attorney, failed to close the pleadings. The judgment of nonsuit was rendered in light of the case having been placed repeatedly on the dormancy calendar and the plaintiffs failure to close the pleadings a full year after the court’s initial order to do so.

The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly granted the motions to strike the CUTPA counts of her complaints. We disagree.

The plaintiffs brief is vague and provides little guidance for this court to evaluate this claim. After reviewing the record, it appears that she is challenging the granting of the request to revise of Dimyan and the law firm. In this case, the defendants’ request to revise was proper. See P&L Properties, Inc. v. Schnip Development Corp., 35 Conn. App. 46, 50, 643 A.2d 1302, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 913, 648 A.2d 155 (1994). The plaintiff failed to file a timely objection to the defendants’ request to revise. Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-37, the request is automatically granted unless the opposing party files a timely objection. Furthermore, on April 13, 2000, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint in which she did not allege any CUTPA claims against any of the defendants. Because the plaintiff filed an amended pleading, she waived her right to claim that the trial court’s action was improper. Id., 49. There being no timely objection in this case and because the plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint that excludes the CUTPA counts, we conclude that this claim is without merit.

The plaintiff finally claims that the court improperly denied her motions for stay, for transfer and to disqualify without a hearing, thereby depriving her of the opportunity to create an appellate record and of her fundamental right to due process.

The plaintiff offers no legal support or analysis for these claims. “We are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Elm Street Builders, Inc. v. Enterprise Park Condominium Assn., Inc., 63 Conn. App. 657, 659 n.2, 778 A.2d 237 (2001). We deem these claims abandoned and therefore decline to review them.

The judgment is affirmed.

       The plaintiffs preliminary statement of issues on appeal also includes a claim that the trial court improperly denied her motion to reargue. Because the plaintiff failed to address this claim in her appellate brief, we consider it abandoned. See State v. Mims, 61 Conn. App. 406, 410, 764 A.2d 222, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 944, 769 A.2d 60 (2001).

       The other defendants are Bruce A. Chamberlain, Milton Burton, June Burton and John Burton. They are not involved in this appeal. The plaintiff claims that Coury also is not a party to this appeal because the action remains pending against him in the trial court. The court’s order of January 31, 2000, granting the motion for a nonsuit if the plaintiff did not comply with the court’s previous order by April 15, 2000, however, terminated the lawsuit as to Coury.

       It is unclear from the record when the court acted on this motion. It appears, however, that the motion was denied.

       Coury, Dimyan and the law firm filed additional motions for nonsuit on June 29 and 30, 2000, respectively. It appears that the plaintiff objected to the motions in one objection. The record reveals that the court granted the motion for nonsuit filed by Dimyan and the law firm, but did not act on Coury’s motion.
      We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs assertion that Coury, therefore, is not a party to this appeal. The court’s order of January 31, 2000, granting the motion for nonsuit if the plaintiff did not comply with the court’s previous order by April 15, 2000, terminated the action as to Coury.

       The defendants’ motion to strike the CUTPA counts was previously granted by the trial court in June, 1996. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a substitute complaint again alleging the CUTPA counts. The record reveals that the trial court overruled the defendants’ objection to the substitute complaint, thus, reinstating the CUTPA counts. Thereafter, the defendants filed a request to revise.

       We also note that these motions have not been made part of the appellate record. It is the appellant’s burden to provide the court with a proper record for review. Practice Book § 61-10.


author: BISHOP, J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARIO MARRO STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD A. ROBINSON
    (AC 21873)
    (AC 21876)
    (AC 22251)
    (AC 22252)
    Lavery, C. J., and Foti and Bishop, Js.
    Argued January 22
    officially released April 2, 2002

      Angela R. Macchiarulo, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Eugene Callahan, state’s attorney, and David M. KutznerandRichard Colangelo, assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      William B. Westcott, for the appellee (Barbara Mott).

      Angela R. Macchiarulo, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Eugene Callahan, state’s attorney, and David M. KutznerandRichard Colangelo, assistant state’s attorneys, for the plaintiff in error.

      Martin R. Libbin, for the defendant in error, Richard A. Robinson.
   Opinion

BISHOP, J.

In this matter involving two consolidated writs of error and two consolidated appeals, the plaintiff state of Connecticut appeals, in AC 21873 and in AC 21876, from the judgments of the trial court granting two motions for rebate filed by the depositor of cash bail following the recapture of the fugitive defendant, Mario Marro. In AC 22251 and in AC 22252, the state filed separate writs of error, challenging the propriety of the court’s orders. The state claims that the court improperly determined that the depositor was entitled to a rebate on forfeited bail bonds where the principal was recaptured within one year of the date of forfeiture. We dismiss the writs of error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The record discloses the following relevant facts. The defendant was arraigned on a charge of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71. The court set a cash bond in the amount of $25,000. Thereafter, Barbara Mott deposited $25,000 on behalf of the defendant to secure his release from the Bridgeport Correctional Center. In conjunction with the posting of the bond, the defendant executed an appearance bond, promising to appear in court for all scheduled hearings. Mott also executed a portion of the appearance bond that stated in part: “I, the Depositor, understand that if the above named Defendant fails to appear in accordance with the foregoing promises, I will be liable for the full amount of bond, including forfeiture of any amount deposited. I also understand that upon discharge of the bond, as specified above, the amount deposited will be returned to the above named depositor less any fee that may be required by statute.”

The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Bond was set in the amount of $25,000 cash. The defendant signed a second appearance bond, and Mott deposited an additional $25,000 to secure his release from confinement. The portion of the appearance bond signed by Mott contained the same language as the first bond regarding Mott’s liability for the full amount of the bond should the defendant fail to appear in court for scheduled hearings.

When the defendant failed to attend a scheduled court appearance in each of the previously mentioned cases, the court ordered the cash bonds called and forfeited, and issued a rearrest warrant. The defendant later was apprehended in the state of Washington and returned to Connecticut, where he was arraigned.

Mott thereafter filed motions, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-65a (b) and Practice Book § 38-22, for partial rebate of the forfeited bonds. In her motion, Mott characterized herself as a surety and claimed to be entitled to a rebate of 38 percent of the amount forfeited. In its written memoranda of decision, the court found that 253 days had elapsed between the date of the defendant’s failure to appear and his return to Connecticut, and that Mott, as a surety, was entitled to a rebate of 30 percent of the amount forfeited. Accordingly, the court ordered a rebate of $7500 on each bond.

Uncertain as to proper procedure, the state challenged the court’s rulings by filing an appeal in this court and a writ of error in our Supreme Court in each of the two cases. The appeals and writs of error all raised the issue of whether the court incorrectly concluded that General Statutes § 54-65a (b) and Practice Book § 38-22, which provide for a rebate to the surety on a forfeited bail bond if the principal is returned to the jurisdiction within one year of the date of forfeiture, apply to the depositor of a cash bond as well.

Mott filed a motion to dismiss the appeals on the ground that this court did not have jurisdiction because the appeals concerned the interest of a bondsperson who was not a party to the underlying action. We denied the motion without prejudice and directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the jurisdictional question for reconsideration by the panel hearing the merits of the appeals.

At the same time, Judge Robinson, who had granted the depositor’s motions for rebate and who is the defendant in error in AC 22251 and in AC 22252, argued to the Supreme Court that a writ of error is not the proper procedural vehicle to appeal from the ruling on a motion for a bond rebate because the state is entitled to appeal directly. Thereafter, the Supreme Court, sua sponte, ordered the writs of error transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 52-273 and Practice Book § 65-1.

I

We first address the jurisdictional issue. General Statutes § 52-263 sets forth the basic jurisdictional requirements for appellate review, these being that the appellant must be an aggrieved party to the underlying action and that the appeal must be taken from a final judgment. In this instance, the state was a party to the underlying action, the state is aggrieved by the court’s orders remitting a portion of the forfeited bonds, and the orders constitute final judgments for purposes of appeal.

Contrary to Mott’s claim, the holding in State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 735 A.2d 333 (1999) (en banc), is not applicable where, as in this instance, the state brings the appeal. In Salmon, unlike the present case, the party who brought the appeal, a bondsperson, was not a party to the underlying criminal action. Id. Because the statutory requirements are satisfied, this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeals.

Having resolved the jurisdictional question, we dismiss the writs of error as procedurally improper because appeals he from the court’s decisions to grant Mott partial rebates on the forfeited bonds. Because the right to appeal has been granted and the state has appealed, the writs of error do not he. General Statutes § 52-273; see footnote 6.

II

We now consider the merits of the appeals. The state claims that the court improperly concluded that a depositor of cash bail is entitled to a rebate following the return of the fugitive defendant to court within one year of the date of forfeiture. We do not agree.

We first set forth our standard of review. The essence of the parties’ dispute involves the proper interpretation of General Statutes §§ 54-65a, 54-66 and the corresponding rules of practice. Statutory construction presents a question of law. Trimar Equities, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Board, 66 Conn. App. 631, 634, 785 A.2d 619 (2001). Our review is, therefore, plenary. Id.

General Statutes §§ 54-63c, 54-63d and 54-64a provide that an arrested person may be released from custody upon a written promise to appear or upon the execution of a bond with or without surety. Until recently, sureties and depositors of cash bail were treated differently when a bond was ordered forfeited for failure of the principal to appear in court.

General Statutes § 54-65a contains provisions relating to the forfeiture of a bond executed “with surety.” The statute specifically provides that when a bond is ordered forfeited, the court shall give to the surety written notice that the principal has failed to appear and order a six month stay of execution on the forfeiture. General Statutes § 54-65a. The bond is automatically terminated and the surety released if the principal is returned to custody within six months. General Statutes § 54-65a. If the principal is returned to custody within one year, the surety on the bond is entitled to a partial rebate on the forfeited amount. General Statutes § 54-65a.

General Statutes § 54-66 (a) contains provisions relating to the forfeiture of a bond executed upon the receipt of cash bail “in lieu of a surely or sureties upon such bond.” Prior to the 2001 legislative session, the statute provided that the amount received was to be paid to the payee immediately upon forfeiture, there being no provision for a written notice to the depositor, a stay of execution or a rebate. Significantly, however, the legislature amended § 54-66 in 2001 for the purpose of giving depositors of cash bail the same incentives as sureties to return defendants to court. Although the amendment did not provide for rebates, it did require that written notice be sent to a depositor of cash bail if the accused failed to appear. The amendment also provided for the court to order a six month stay of execution upon the forfeiture.

Practice Book §§ 38-21 and 38-22 are intended to implement the statutory scheme on forfeiture of bail. Section 38-21 provides in relevant part: “(a) If the defendant fails to appear at the time and place promised in any bond or written promise to appear . . . the bond may be forfeited in accordance with its terms .... (b) If the bond which has been forfeited was in an amount of $500 or more, the court shall order a stay of execution upon the forfeiture for six months. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Section 38-22 provides in relevant part: “Whenever an arrested person, whose bond has been forfeited, is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within one year of the date such bond was ordered forfeited, the surety on such bond shall be entitled to a rebate . . . .”

“When we engage in statutory interpretation, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Texas-Ohio Power, Inc., 243 Conn. 635, 645, 708 A.2d 202 (1998). “The rules of statutory construction apply with equal force to Practice Book rules.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tinsley, 59 Conn. App. 4, 17, 755 A.2d 368, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 938, 761 A.2d 765 (2000).

We conclude that the relevant statutes and rules of practice do not expressly provide for a rebate to a depositor of cash bail when a defendant is returned to court more than six months after the bond has been called. General Statutes § 54-65a provides for a rebate to sureties, but there is no similar provision with respect to depositors of cash bail in § 54-66. Practice Book § 38-21 contains rules regarding the forfeiture of bail that apply to “any bond,” but Practice Book § 38-22, which specifically deals with rebates, states only that “the surety on such bond shall be entitled to a rebate.” Neither the statutes nor the rules of practice, however, preclude the granting of a rebate to a depositor of cash bail when a defendant has been returned to the jurisdiction more than six months after the bond has been called.

We affirm the judgments of the trial court, but on a different basis. See Biro v. Hirsch, 62 Conn. App. 11, 16 n.7, 771 A.2d 129 (affirming proper result for different reason), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 908, 772 A.2d 601 (2001). For more than a century, Connecticut courts repeatedly have recognized that the power to admit to bail is inherent in the court so long as the defendant is in its custody. State v. Vaughan, 71 Conn. 457, 461, 42 A. 640 (1899); see also Carino v. Watson, 171 Conn. 366, 368, 370 A.2d 950 (1976). For example, our Supreme Court has stated that a court has authority “to ensure compliance with the conditions of release. While released on bail prior to trial, a defendant is still within the constructive custody of the law. State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 330-31, 99 A.2d 133 (1953). The trial court retains jurisdiction over the conditions of release . . . and possesses the inherent authority to exercise powers; to implement and enforce laws; to exact [obedience . . . .] In re Dodson, 214 Conn. 344, 350, 572 A.2d 328, cert. denied [sub nom. Dodson v. Superior Court], 498 U.S. 896, 111 S. Ct. 247, 112 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1990); see also State v. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 671,69 A. 1057 (1908). One court has noted that ... a court with jurisdiction over a criminal case has the power to enforce its orders as to bail just as it has control over other orders. Mello v. Superior Court, 117 R.I. 578, 583-84, 370 A.2d 1262 (1977).” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ayala, 222 Conn. 331, 347, 610 A.2d 1162 (1992).

Applying those principles here, we conclude that Connecticut courts have the power to ensure a defendant’s appearance in court by granting a rebate to a depositor of cash bail on a forfeited bail bond. A court’s authority to grant such a rebate is consistent not only with its recognized custodial function in matters involving bail, but also with expressed legislative policies regarding forfeiture of bail.

The underlying goal of the rebate provision in § 54-65a is to bring offenders to justice by providing an incentive to find and apprehend fugitive defendants. That goal was expressed clearly at the time the statute was enacted. Robert Kahn, a director of the Connecticut State Surety Association, an organization of bail bond agents, testified at a judiciary committee hearing on the proposed legislation that “the purpose of bail is to assure the appearance of [the] defendant in court. This bill combines two elements which will expedite the apprehension of bail jumpers by providing the bondsman with the tools and incentives to return criminal defendants who fail to appear in court. The bail and automatic rearrest warrants are the tools and the rebate is the incentive. . . . Passage of this bill will reduce considerably the number of defendants who flaunt the law by their failure to appear in court and who otherwise would never be brought to justice.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 1977 Sess., pp. 470-71. Senator Salvatore C. DePiano similarly explained on the floor of the Senate that the bill would “assist in perhaps apprehending people who have skipped and not appeared in court . . . .” 20 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1977 Sess., p. 3017.

During legislative debate on the recent amendment to § 54-66, policymakers acknowledged that sureties and depositors of cash bail had been treated differently in the past. They also indicated, however, that the purpose of the amendment was to change the status quo so that depositors of cash bail would have the same opportunity as sureties to bring fugitive defendants to justice. Senator Eric D. Coleman, cochairperson of the judiciary committee, explained to his colleagues that the amendment would “permit private citizens who post bond or pledge property for a criminal defendant to have the same benefit that a professional surety would have in the event that the defendant fails to appear in court, and that is that upon forfeiture of the bond, the forfeiture would be stayed for a period of six months to give the private citizen the opportunity to bring the defendant into court .... This is the same privilege or entitlement that professional bonds people have, and in some cases where parents have put their property in jeopardy and large sums of money have been put in jeopardy it was felt to be unjust in those kinds of situations, particularly when the defendant did reappear in court but there was nothing that could be done about it, even though the reappearance was within a six month period.” 44 S. Proc., Pt. 10, 2001 Sess., pp. 3093-94.

Representative Michael P. Lawlor, cochairperson of the judiciary committee, spoke in a similar vein on the floor of the House. He stated that the amendment would preserve the incentive “to find the offender[s] and return them to court.” 44 H.R. Proc., Pt. 20, 2001 Sess., p. 6641, remarks of Representative Lawlor. “This amendment simply says that whether it’s a professionally posted bail bond or a privately posted bail bond, either way, if there’s a failure to appear, there’s an automatic stay for six months. If the person is returned during that period of time, the person who posted the bond can be released from it. ... I think this would help accomplish the goal of returning people to justice after they fail to appear. And I think it’s also a fairness issue.” Id., pp. 6641—42.

Permitting Connecticut courts to grant rebates to depositors of cash bail is “a fairness issue” as well because a depositor of cash bail and a professional bondsperson both act to satisfy the required financial conditions for a defendant’s release on bail. Although the major difference between the two is the bondsperson’s obligation to produce the defendant in court, the depositor and surety share a common financial interest in assuring the defendant’s timely presence.

We therefore conclude that the court’s rebate order, though not specifically authorized by statute, was consistent with the legislature’s stated intent to treat professional bondspersons and cash depositors equally. Moreover, because the legislature has been silent on the issue of rebates to cash depositors where a defendant is returned to court subsequent to the six month automatic stay set forth in § 54-65a (a), such rebates are not in conflict with existing statutory provisions. Accordingly, the court had inherent authority under its common-law powers to grant Mott partial rebates when the defendant was returned to court within one year of the date of forfeiture.

The writs of error in AC 22251 and AC 22252 are dismissed and the judgments in AC 21873 and AC 21876 are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       In the motions for rebate and the court’s written memoranda of decision dated April 9 and 23, 2001, the defendant in AC 21873 and in AC 21876 is referred to as Mario Marra. In this opinion, we refer to the defendant as Mario Marro, the name that appears on all of the other documents contained in the record.

       General Statutes § 54a-65a (b) provides: “Whenever an arrested person, whose bond has been forfeited, is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within one year of the date such bond was ordered forfeited, the surety on such bond shall be entitled to a rebate of that portion of the forfeited amount as may be fixed by the court or as may be established by a schedule adopted by rule of the judges of the court.”

       Practice Book § 38-22 provides: “Whenever an arrested person, whose bond has been forfeited, is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within one year of the date such bond was ordered forfeited, the surety on such bond shall be entitled to a rebate in the following amount:
      “(1) 46 percent of the amount of the bond ordered forfeited if the arrested person is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within 210 days of the date such bond was ordered forfeited;
      “(2) 38 percent of the amount of the bond ordered forfeited if the arrested person is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within 240 days of the date such bond was ordered forfeited;
      “(3) 30 percent of the amount of the bond ordered forfeited if the arrested person is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within 270 days of the date such bond was ordered forfeited;
      “(4) 23 percent of the amount of the bond ordered forfeited if the arrested person is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within 300 days of the date such bond was ordered forfeited;
      “(5) 15 percent of the amount of the bond ordered forfeited if the arrested person is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within 330 days of the date such bond was ordered forfeited;
      “(6) 7 percent of the amount of the bond ordered forfeited if the arrested person is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within one year of the date such bond was ordered forfeited.”

       Although Mott is not a party to the underlying criminal matter, she is a real party in interest, and we have granted her the right to file a brief and to argue the issue before us, thus according her, as a practical matter, party status.

       In support of her motion, Mott relied on State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 735 A.2d 333 (1999) (en banc), which held that because the bondsman was not a party to the underlying criminal matter, he was not entitled to appeal from the trial court’s denial of its motion for rebate and release of bond pursuant to General Statutes § 52-263.

       General Statutes § 52-273 provides in relevant part: “No writ of error may be brought in any civil or criminal proceeding for the correction of any error which might have been reviewed by process of appeal.”

       Practice Book § 65-1 provides that the Supreme Court may transfer a cause from itself to the appellate court.

       General Statutes § 52-263 provides in relevant part: “Upon the trial of all matters of fact in any cause of action in the Superior Court, whether to the court or jury, or before any judge thereof when the jurisdiction of any action or proceeding is vested in him, if either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or judge upon any question or questions of law arising in the trial ... he may appeal to the court having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court or of such judge . . . .”

       Although neither party briefed the issue of aggrievement, we conclude that in this instance, where the court ordered the cash bonds forfeited, the state’s loss of aportion of the forfeited deposits constitutes its aggrievement.

       General Statutes § 54-65a provides: “(a) Whenever an arrested person is released upon the execution of a bond with surety in an amount of five hundred dollars or more and such bond is ordered forfeited because the principal failed to appear in court as conditioned in such bond, the court shall, at the time of ordering the bond forfeited: (1) Issue a rearrest warrant or a capias directing a proper officer to take the defendant into custody, (2) provide written notice to the surety on the bond that the principal has failed to appear in court as conditioned in such bond, and (3) order a stay of execution upon the forfeiture for six months. When the principal whose bond has been forfeited is returned to custody pursuant to the rearrest warrant or a capias within six months of the date such bond was ordered forfeited, the bond shall be automatically terminated and the surety released and the court shall order new conditions of release for the defendant in accordance with section 54-64a. When the principal whose bond has been forfeited returns to court voluntarily within five business days of the date such bond was ordered forfeited, the court may, in its discretion, and after finding that the defendant’s failure to appear was not wilful, vacate the forfeiture order and reinstate the bond. Such stay of execution shall not prevent the issuance of a rearrest warrant or a capias.
      “(b) Whenever an arrested person, whose bond has been forfeited, is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within one year of the date such bond was ordered forfeited, the surety on such bond shall be entitled to a rebate of that portion of the forfeited amount as may be fixed by the court or as may be established by a schedule adopted by rule of the judges of the court.”

       General Statutes § 54-66 (a) provides in relevant part: “hi any criminal case in which a bond is allowable or required and the amount thereof has been determined, the accused person, or any person in his behalf, (1) may deposit, with the cleric of the court having jurisdiction of the offense with which the accused stands charged or any assistant clerk of such court who is bonded in the same manner as the clerk or any person or officer authorized to accept bail, a sum of money equal to the amount called for by such bond, or (2) may pledge real property .... When cash bail is offered, such bond shall be executed and the money shall be received in lieu of a surety or sureties upon such bond. Such cash bail shall be retained by the clerk of such court until a final order of the court disposing of the same is passed; provided, if such bond is forfeited, the clerk of such court shall pay the money to the payee named therein, according to the terms and conditions of the bond. ...”

       Public Acts 2001, No. 01-186, § 18, amended General Statutes § 54-66 by adding in relevant part the following language, which now is codified as subsection (c): “Whenever an accused person is released upon the deposit by a person on behalf of the accused person of a sum of money equal to the amount called for by such bond or upon the pledge by a person on behalf of the accused person of real property . . . and such bond is ordered forfeited because the accused person failed to appear in court as conditioned in such bond, the court shall, at the time of ordering the bond forfeited: (1) Issue a rearrest warrant or a capias directing a proper officer to take the accused person into custody, (2) provide written notice to the person who offered cash bail or pledged real property on behalf of the accused person that the accused person has failed to appear in court as conditioned in such bond, and (3) order a stay of execution upon the forfeiture for six months. When the accused person whose bond has been forfeited is returned to custody pursuant to the rearrest warrant or a capias within six months of the date such bond was ordered forfeited, the bond shall be automatically terminated and the person who offered cash bail or pledged real property on behalf of the accused person shall be released from such obligation and the court shall order new conditions of release for the accused person in accordance with section 54-64a. When the accused person whose bond has been forfeited returns to court voluntarily within five business days of the date such bond was ordered forfeited, the court may, in its discretion, and after finding that the accused person’s failure to appear was not wilful, vacate the forfeiture order and reinstate the bond. Such stay of execution shall not prevent the issuance of a rearrest warrant or a capias.”

       The legislature did not express an intent, however, to impose an obligation on depositors of cash bail to return defendants to court.