author: ALVORD, J.

text:
    LORI J. HIBBARD v. TONY E. HIBBARD
    (AC 33652)
    Alvord, Espinosa and Sullivan, Js.
    Argued September 11
    officially released October 30, 2012

      Erin C. O'Leary, with whom, on the brief, was Michael A. Blanchard, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Christopher D. Grotz, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

ALVORD, J.

The plaintiff, Lori J. Hibbard, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the postdis-solution motions of the defendant, Tony E. Hibbard, to modify the court’s custody order and to find the plaintiff in contempt. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly admitted the report of a family relations counselor, (2) abused its discretion by finding her in contempt of the court’s visitation orders and (3) abused its discretion in granting sole custody of the minor child to the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the plaintiffs appeal. The parties were married on October 11, 2003, and have one minor child who was bom August 4, 2005. On September 12, 2007, the court dissolved the parties’ marriage and incorporated into its judgment the provisions of a marital settlement agreement. The agreement provided, inter alia, that the parties would share joint legal custody of their daughter, whose primary residence would be with the plaintiff. The parties further stipulated that the defendant would be entitled to two scheduled visits per week “or such other times as the parties may agree.”

Commencing in July, 2008, both parties began filing postjudgment motions. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to comply with the court’s financial orders, and the defendant alleged that the plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s visitation orders. Since the date of the dissolution, the parties have filed approximately thirty postjudgment motions. Initially, most of the disputes were resolved by agreement. As time passed, however, the parties became increasingly contentious over the issue of the defendant’s parenting time with their daughter. The visitation schedule has been modified several times. The defendant’s access to their daughter was restricted to supervised visits, later expanded to permit overnight visits on alternating weekends, and then again modified to eliminate the overnight visits. Additionally, the court entered an order regarding the visitation schedule on holidays and birthdays when the parties were unable to reach a consensus.

There are four motions at issue in this appeal. On May 26, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to find the plaintiff in contempt for her failure to deliver their daughter for scheduled parenting time on May 18, 19, 21 and 22, 2011. On May 31, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to modify the custody order to award him sole custody of the. minor child and to accord supervised visitation to the plaintiff. In his motion for modification, he alleged that the circumstances of the case had changed substantially in that “[t]he plaintiff continues parental alienation of the minor child with the defendant.” The plaintiff filed two motions on June 1, 2011, requesting that the court modify the judgment to suspend the child’s unsupervised visitation with the defendant. The orders in effect at the time the parties’ four motions were filed provided for joint custody of the minor child, primary residence with the plaintiff, and visitation with the defendant on Wednesday afternoons, alternating Saturdays and Sundays from 12 to 7 p.m., and designated holidays and birthdays.

The court held a hearing on the parties’ motions on June 9, 15 and 24, 2011. On June 27, 2011, the court issued its memorandum of decision. The court first stated that it had reviewed all of the pleadings and orders in the file and that it had considered applicable case law and statutes, particularly General Statutes §§ 46b-56 (c) and 46b-87. The court further noted that it had observed the demeanor and attitude of the witnesses and had assessed their credibility. The court then proceeded to make its findings and conclusions. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish any justification for her unilateral suspension of visits between their child and the defendant scheduled for May 18, 19, 21 and 22, 2011, and, accordingly, it found her in contempt of the court’s visitation orders.

Further, the court determined that “the enduring and passionate battle between the parents renders the original joint custody arrangement no longer workable and hence not in the child’s best interest . . . .” The court referred to the plaintiffs “strategy of pursuing the elimination of [the] defendant from their daughter’s life” and concluded that leaving the child with the plaintiff would result in “the eventual loss to the child of her father.” The court concluded by granting the defendant’s motion to modify the custody order and awarded sole custody of the minor child to the defendant. Additionally, the court entered orders allowing the plaintiff to have unsupervised visitation with their daughter.

I

The plaintiffs first claim is that the court improperly admitted into evidence the comprehensive evaluation report prepared by Matthew Walker, a family relations counselor. She argues that the report contained numerous prejudicial hearsay statements that should have been redacted prior to its consideration by the court. The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary for the resolution of this claim.

On November 29,2010, the court, Shluger, J., referred this matter to the family relations division for a comprehensive evaluation report. Walker completed the report on June 8, 2011. The next day, which was the first day of the scheduled hearing on the parties’ outstanding motions, the plaintiffs attorney stated on the record that he had just received the report and that he had contemplated requesting a continuance of the hearing. He represented, however, that he had conferred with his client and that the plaintiff was comfortable in proceeding with the hearing at that time.

When Walker subsequently was called by the defendant as a witness, the defendant’s attorney offered the report as a full exhibit. The court inquired if the plaintiff objected to its admission. The plaintiffs attorney responded: “I would object. There’s numerous hearsay statements contained in the document.” The court overruled the objection: “That’s fairly customary in a family relations [counselor’s] report. So I’m going to overrule the objection. . . . You will, of course, have occasion to cross-examine Mr. Walker.” On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the admission of the report with the unre-dacted hearsay statements of various individuals was prejudicial because “the court expressly relied on several of the hearsay statements in its June 27,2011 memorandum of decision.”

In support of her position, the plaintiff cites Stewart v. Stewart, 177 Conn. 401, 418 A.2d 62 (1979). In Stewart, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly admitted a family relations report that contained inadmissible hearsay statements. Id., 404-405. Our Supreme Court affirmed the challenged ruling because the plaintiff had persisted in obj ecting to the entire report instead of specifying the inadmissible portions and giving reasons why those portions were inadmissible. Id., 405. The plaintiff in the present case argues that the court “summarily overruled” the plaintiffs objection to the admission of the report without having “invited” counsel to make objections to any specific portions containing inadmissible evidence.

Stewart is inapposite to the present case. In a footnote, the court in Stewart stated that a recent amendment to the rules of practice; Practice Book (1978) § 479; permitted the admission of case study reports if the author was available for cross-examination, but that the amendment had not been in effect at the time the case was heard. Stewart v. Stewart, supra, 177 Conn. 405 n.l. Section 479 is now Practice Book § 25-60, titled “Evaluations and Studies.” Subsection (c) of Practice Book § 25-60 provides: “Any report prepared pursuant to Section 26-61 shall be admissible in evidence provided the author of the report is available for cross-examination.” Practice Book § 26-61 provides: “The family services unit shall, at the request of the judicial authority, provide assistance with regard to issues concerning custody, visitation, finances, mediation, case management and such other matters as the judicial authority may direct.”

The trial court in the present case requested a comprehensive evaluation report from the family services division. As such, the report was admissible pursuant to Practice Book § 25-60 provided that the family relations counselor who authored it was available for cross-examination. Walker was called as a witness and was available for cross-examination, as the court indicated when it overruled the plaintiffs objection to the admission of the report on hearsay grounds. Accordingly, the court properly admitted the report and the plaintiffs first claim has no merit.

II

The plaintiffs next claim is that the court abused its discretion by finding her in contempt because it should have concluded that her noncompliance with the court’s visitation orders was justified under the circumstances. The court found that the plaintiff failed to deliver their daughter for parenting time with the defendant on May 18,19, 21 and 22,2011, which were court-ordered visitation dates. The plaintiff testified at the hearing that her refusal to comply was justified by a reasonable fear for the safety of their daughter. The court concluded that she failed to establish any justification for her unilateral suspension of those visits and found her in contempt of the prior court orders.

“A finding of contempt is a question of fact, and our standard of review is to determine whether the court abused its discretion in failing to find that the actions or inactions of the [plaintiff] were in contempt of a court order. ... To constitute contempt, a party’s conduct must be wilful. . . . Noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of contempt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gina M. G. v. William C., 77 Conn. App. 582, 590, 823 A.2d 1274 (2003). “[A] court may not find a person in contempt without considering the circumstances surrounding the violation to determine whether such violation was wilful.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 592. “[A] contempt finding is not automatic and depends on the facts and circumstances underlying it. . . . It is within the sound discretion of the court to deny a claim for contempt when there is an adequate factual basis to explain the failure to honor the court’s order.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Meehan v. Meehan, 40 Conn. App. 107, 110, 669 A.2d 616, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 915, 673 A.2d 1142 (1996).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the trial court’s decision in the present case. Following the hearing on the parties’ motions, the court issued a comprehensive twenty page memorandum of decision in which it set forth the history of the case, the prior modifications of visitation orders, the evidence submitted by the parties with respect to the pending motions and the court’s factual findings and conclusions. At the outset, the court noted that it was familiar with the parties and their prior disputes because it had entered the last two orders in the file that addressed visitation with the minor child. The court also expressly stated, as we previously have discussed, that it had observed the demeanor and attitude of all of the witnesses and had assessed their credibility.

At the hearing, the plaintiff did not deny that she failed to deliver their minor child for visitation with the defendant on May 18, 19, 21 and 22, 2011, and that the orders in effect at that time entitled the defendant to parenting time with their daughter on those days. Instead, the plaintiff claimed that she refused to permit the visitation because their daughter, on or about May 6, 2011, had informed her that a man at the defendant’s home inappropriately touched her during the previous Wednesday visit with the defendant. The plaintiff testified that she was afraid that their daughter’s “safety was being compromised” and that she had telephoned her therapist to discuss the matter. The plaintiffs therapist, being a mandated reporter pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-101a et seq., reported the alleged abuse to the department of children and families (department). After an investigation, the department concluded that the allegation was unsubstantiated.

The court found that the plaintiffs stated concern did not justify her unilateral suspension of their daughter’s visits with the defendant. The court gave the following reasons for that determination: (1) the plaintiff had made prior allegations, which were unsubstantiated, claiming that the defendant slapped their daughter in the face and placed her in physical danger; (2) the plaintiff previously sought and was granted restrictions on visitation when she claimed another friend of the defendant upset the child by taking pictures of her during one of the scheduled visits; (3) the plaintiffs repeated allegations that the child was afraid of the defendant and refused to visit with him were contradicted by the child’s therapist, the investigative social worker from the department, a worker at the child’s day care facility, Walker, and the credible testimony of the defendant; (4) the plaintiff had not been candid and truthful in her reporting on the defendant and his relationship with their daughter as evidenced by, inter alia, the plaintiffs erroneous statement to the department’s social worker that the defendant had been arrested for child abuse in New Hampshire and her unsubstantiated allegations about other male friends of the defendant that resulted in referrals to and investigations by the department; and (5) the social worker’s testimony that the child told her that the plaintiff had prompted their daughter to say that she had been touched by the defendant’s friend. All of the court’s findings are supported by the evidence in the record.

“The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . We cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gina M. G. v. William C., supra, 77 Conn. App. 592. On the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing, and the court’s assessment of the credibility of the parties, the court found that the plaintiffs expressed fear did not justify her wilful noncompliance with the court’s visitation orders. “It is axiomatic that a person may not pick and choose which court orders he will obey. ... A party’s opinion concerning the necessity for a particular order does not excuse his disobedience. . . . There is no privilege to disobey a court’s order because the alleged contemnor believes that it is invalid . . . [or] should not be obeyed.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. For these reasons, we conclude that the corut did not abuse its discretion by holding the plaintiff in contempt of the visitation orders.

III

The plaintiffs final claim is that the court abused its discretion by modifying the custody order and awarding sole custody of the minor child to the defendant. Specifically, she argues that the court improperly modified the order without finding a substantial change in circumstances and that it erroneously determined that the modification was in the best interests of the child. We disagree.

Section 46b-56 (a) provides the court with authority to make or modify any proper order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of minor children in dissolution actions. Section 46b-56 (b) provides in relevant part that in making or modifying any such order, “the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests. . . .” In considering the best interests of- the child, the court may consider one or more of the factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c). Those factors include, inter alia, “the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders”; General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (6); and “any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute . . . .” General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (7). That statute also provides that “[t]he court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.” General Statutes § 46b-56 (c).

“Before a court may modify a custody order, it must find that there has been a material change in circumstance since the prior order of the court, but the ultimate test is the best interests of the child. . . . The sole question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that the best interests of the child would be served by [the modification].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gillespie v. Jenkins, 127 Conn. App. 228, 232, 14 A.3d 1019 (2011). In other words, “[although a court also must find that there has been a material change in circumstance since the prior order of the court . . . the ultimate test is the best interests of the child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eisenlohr v. Eisenlohr, 135 Conn. App. 337, 344-45, 43 A.3d 694 (2012).

“The well settled standard of review in domestic relations cases is that this court will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in the facts. ... As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case .... [W]hether the best interests of the [child] dictate [s] a change ... is left to the broad discretion of the trial court. ... A mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify the intervention of this court. Nothing short of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference. . . . When the factual basis of the trial court’s decision is challenged on appeal, the role of this court is to determine whether the facts set out in . . . the decision . . . are clearly erroneous. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gillespie v. Jenkins, supra, 127 Conn. App. 232-33.

We apply these principles to the present case in our review of the trial court’s findings and conclusions with respect to its modification of the custody order that resulted in an award of sole custody of the minor child to the defendant. We begin with the plaintiffs claim that the court modified custody without making a finding of a substantial change in circumstances. She argues that the court considered only the best interests of the child in reaching its determination and failed to make the requisite finding that there had been a material change in circumstances since the prior custody order. See Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Conn. App. 50, 56, 732 A.2d 808 (1999).

In the court’s June 27,2011 memorandum of decision, it found that “the enduring and passionate battle between the parents renders the original joint custody arrangement no longer workable . . . .” This determination was made following the court’s summary of the history of the case, its statement that it had reviewed all of the pleadings and orders in the file, and its factual findings regarding the plaintiffs efforts to thwart the defendant’s visitation with their daughter in connection with the motion for contempt. The joint custody order as agreed to at the time of dissolution was premised on the assumption that the defendant would enjoy certain visitation rights with their daughter. Unfortunately, as time passed, disputes over visitation became more frequent and more contentious, as evidenced by the numerous postjudgment motions for contempt and modification filed by the parties in this case.

Although the court did not expressly state that changed circumstances warranted the modification of the custody order, it did expressly state that the original joint custody order was unworkable. The court also expressly stated that it made its determinations pursuant to the standard enunciated in § 46b-56 (c). The decision referenced evidence that demonstrated the parties’ inability to communicate or to reach agreement with respect to issues involving their daughter. For example, the court noted that the plaintiff terminated their daughter’s therapy without consulting the defendant when the child’s therapist proposed including the defendant in that therapy. Further, the court commented that the plaintiff unilaterally terminated their daughter’s four year relationship with her day care provider because a day care worker had communicated information about the child to the child’s stepmother, the defendant’s current wife.

We conclude that the plaintiffs claim fails for the reasons set forth in Lambert v. Donahue, 78 Conn. App. 493, 827 A.2d 729 (2003). In Lambert, the plaintiff claimed that the court improperly modified custody without making a finding of changed circumstances. This court held: “Upon our review of the court’s memorandum of decision, however, we find that the corat specifically stated that its orders were made in consideration of the evidence . . . [and] § 46b-56 concerning custody .... Furthermore, the memorandum of decision is replete with references to evidence that demonstrates a change in circumstances by the parties’ complete inability to communicate concerning their child. . . . Finding that a coparenting situation was not working for these parties, the court properly awarded sole custody to the parent that it found, on the basis of the evidence, best suited to assume that very important responsibility.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 506; see also Payton v. Payton, 103 Conn. App. 825, 835, 930 A.2d 802, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 934, 935 A.2d 151 (2007).

The plaintiff next argues that the court improperly found that awarding sole custody to the defendant was in the best interests of the child. In her brief, the plaintiff stresses that the child had lived with her since birth and that the court acknowledged that she had met their daughter’s “material and intellectual needs.” The plaintiff also references testimony of the child’s guardian ad litem that a transfer of custody would result in a period of “serious readjustment” for the child.

The court was not unmindful of these considerations. In its memorandum of decision, the court stated: “Because the child has lived with [the] plaintiff since birth, the court does not take lightly the prospect of changing her primary residence at this point.” Nevertheless, the corut determined that such a modification to the custody order was in the best interests of the child because “[c]learly, in light of the above discussion regarding contempt, [the] plaintiff demonstrates a real deficiency in her ‘willingness and ability ... to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any corut orders,’ to quote § 46b-56 (c).” The court referenced the plaintiffs “strategy of pursuing the elimination of [the] defendant from their daughter’s life” and concluded that the result of leaving the child with the plaintiff would be “the eventual loss to the child of her father.”

As a consequence of this situation, the court noted that the minor child was beginning to evidence a pattern of expressing complaints of pain, which led to an unusual number of visits to her physician’s office or a hospital emergency room. The child also manifested signs of distress and guilt when preparing for visitations: “[S]he indicated that she will sometimes say that she does not wish to visit her father, as that makes her mother happy.” The court expressed the concern, as was voiced by the child’s therapist, that the plaintiff had a propensity to remove their daughter from a setting in which a neutral observer might conclude that the defendant was not as bad a parent as she portrayed him to be. As examples, the court referred to the plaintiff abruptly terminating both their daughter’s therapy sessions and the four year arrangement with the child’s day care provider.

There is support in our case law for transferring custody of a minor child when the custodial parent has engaged in conduct designed to alienate the child from the noncustodial parent. In Eisenlohr v. Eisenlohr, supra, 135 Conn. App. 340, 345, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the custody award to transfer sole physical custody of the minor child from the defendant mother to the plaintiff father. The trial court made its ruling after finding that the defendant was not truthful and had caused the initiation of baseless department investigations. Id., 341. Further, “the plaintiff presented an abundance of evidence pertaining to specific acts of coercion and manipulation on the part of the defendant that the court, as the finder of fact, credited.” Id., 348. We concluded that such considerations were expressly authorized by § 46b-56 (c) (7). Id.

As this court repeatedly has emphasized, we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to afford their testimony. See Malave v. Ortiz, 114 Conn. App. 414, 425, 970 A.2d 743 (2009). The record supports the court’s findings that the plaintiffs activities were designed to alienate their daughter from her father and that they were having an adverse impact on the child. The court’s concern was clearly apparent: it feared that the child eventually would be left with a relationship with one, but not both, of her parents. As poignantly stated by the court, “[the plaintiff] is unapologetic for the lengthy interruptions in the [defendant’s] visits with the child, or for the cost and humiliation which her several claims have caused him. She gives this court little confidence that a continuation of the status quo would not simply produce more of the same: continued conflict over visitation, and over every detail of [the defendant’s] relationship with his child; continued litigation; and continued pain for the child, until something changes or [the] defendant gives up.” Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the court erroneously found that a modification of the custody order would be in the best interests of the minor child or that it abused its discretion by transferring sole custody of the minor child to the defendant.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The plaintiff is now known as Lori J. Bielecki.

       The court appointed a guardian ad litem for the minor child on August 6, 2009.

       The defendant filed a motion for contempt on May 23, 2011, which was essentially identical to the motion filed on May 26, 2011. The May 23, 2011 motion subsequently was withdrawn.
      The May 26, 2011 motion alleged that, in addition to the four days in May, 2011, the plaintiff further failed to deliver the minor child for scheduled visitation on thirty previous occasions. During the hearing on the motion, however, the parties indicated that only the four days in May were at issue before the court. Accordingly, the court addressed only those four days in its memorandum of decision.

       The court considered the second motion to be an exact copy of the first motion and, therefore, “redundant.”

       A fortiori, the court denied the plaintiffs motions to modify the judgment to suspend unsupervised visitation with the defendant.

       The plaintiffs attorney did cross-examine Walker at the hearing.

       The court concluded that “[the plaintiffs] premise that the child is afraid of [the defendant] and does not desire contact with him is baseless.”

       The plaintiff takes issue with the court’s statement that it found her account of the alleged touching to be doubtful because she failed to notify the defendant directly about the incident. According to the court, it would have been logical and appropriate for the plaintiff to telephone the defendant about the alleged touching so that he could take immediate measures to protect their daughter. The plaintiff claims that this finding is clearly erroneous because it was undisputed that she did contact the defendant by way of a text message. This one inaccuracy does not undermine our confidence in the court’s fact-finding process and we are not persuaded that it was harmful. See Lambert v. Donahue, 78 Conn. App. 493, 508-509, 827 A.2d 729 (2003).

       The defendant testified that if he was awarded physical custody of their daughter, he faithfully would deliver their child for visitation or allow the plaintiff to pick up the child for visitation in accordance with any visitation schedule ordered by the court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: FLYNN, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ARMEN MANUKYAN v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT
    (AC 33880)
    Gruendel, Lavine and Flynn, Js.

      Argued September 10
    officially released October 30, 2012

      Richard T. Sponzo, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).

      Armen Manukyan, pro se, the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

FLYNN, J.

Our Supreme Court has held that when the Superior Court reviews an appeal from the employment security board of review (board), and no timely motion to correct has been filed with the board, the board’s factual findings are not subject to further review by the Superior Court or an appellate court. JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 265 Conn. 413, 422, 828 A.2d 609 (2003). The court only looks to whether the referee’s and board’s conclusions are reasonably and logically drawn. See Howell v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 174 Conn. 529, 533, 391 A.2d 165 (1978); see also JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 417. The defendant, the administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court reversing the decision of the board, which upheld the decision of an appeals referee (referee) concluding that the pro se plaintiff, Armen Manukyan, was not available for full-time work, as is required by General Statutes § 31-235 (a) (2), and was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. The court found the board’s conclusions that the plaintiff “ ‘is primarily devoting his time to his self-employment activities and that he is not genuinely attached to the labor market or available for full-time work’ ” were not supported by the board’s findings of fact, nor did the board reference any evidence supporting its conclusions in its findings of fact. The court reversed the board’s decision and remanded the matter to the board for recalculation of the benefits due to the plaintiff. We reverse the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. The plaintiff is a jeweler. He and his sister were employed at Lux Bond & Green, Inc., until they lost their positions in January, 2009. The plaintiff filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits effective January 11, 2009, and was found eligible.

Armeny, LLC (the LLC), was formed as of June 29, 2009, and the plaintiffs sister was listed as the managing member. The plaintiffs home address was the address initially listed by the LLC when it registered with the department of revenue services for sales tax purposes. The LLC’s business, Armeny Custom Jewelry Design, is located in West Hartford and opened on September 1, 2009.

In February, 2010, after receiving an anonymous tip, the administrator investigated whether the plaintiff was the owner-operator of Armeny Custom Jewelry Design. On April 9, 2010, after a hearing, an adjudicator denied the plaintiff unemployment benefits. In his decision, he made a “[recommendation for fraud overpayment and penalty weeks.” The adjudicator found that the plaintiff was unavailable for work because he was fully employed as an owner of a business or, at least, devoted all his time to working for the LLC.

On April 15, 2010, the plaintiff appealed the adjudicator’s determination to the referee contending that he was available for work. After a de novo hearing on July 13, 2010, the referee issued his decision in which he affirmed the adjudicator’s determination and dismissed the plaintiffs appeal. In his decision, the referee made several findings of fact, including:

“7. The [plaintiff] routinely spent 25-30 hours per week working at the business.
“8. Business cards were printed listing the [plaintiff] as owner/designer of the business.
“9. Publicity in local periodicals list the [plaintiff] as owner and operator of the business. They also reference the [plaintiff] as experienced in [jJewelry [d]esign and fabrication, with the skill and experience to create custom products.
“10. The [plaintiffs] on-line business is also cited.
“11. The [plaintiffs] work search consists primarily of jewelers, who are in competition with this business.”

The referee further determined: “[Although the [plaintiff] does not own the business, he is a principal in it. . . . [H]e is held out as the jeweler running the business, with the skills and experience to provide services to the general public. . . . [T]he [plaintiff] has the requisite skills necessary to make the business successful. The [plaintiffs] efforts to find work are primarily with jewelry companies that would be in competition with the business he runs for his sister. ... It is not realistic that a company would hire an individual advertised as the owner and competitor. . . . [T]he referee agrees with the administrator that the [plaintiff] is fully employed and therefore ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.” (Citation omitted.) The plaintiff filed a timely appeal to the board on August 25,2010.

On appeal to the board, the plaintiff argued that although he did help his sister in her business, “he had been unequivocally exposed to the labor market because he extended his search to retail sales positions.” The plaintiff further argued that his experience in the industry would make him an attractive applicant to competitors and “the referee improperly conducted an investigation by searching the Internet regarding the [plaintiffs] activities.” After reviewing the record, the board affirmed the referee’s decision. The board adopted all of the referee’s findings of fact, but added the additional finding: “The business, Armeny Custom Jewelry Design, and the [plaintiffs] Internet site advertise custom jewelry designs. The [plaintiffs] sister is experienced in retail sales, but she is not a jewelry designer and repairer, which is the [plaintiffs] expertise. The [plaintiff] and his sister are the only people in the business, which is open seven days a week.”

The board concluded that the plaintiff has been engaged in self-employment, “primarily devoting his time to his self-employment activities and ... is not genuinely attached to the labor market or available for full-time work.” The board supported its conclusion based on a business card for Armeny Custom Jewelry Design, which referred to the plaintiff as the owner of the business, the business being originally registered with the department of revenue services vrith the plaintiffs home address as the address for the LLC, the plaintiff answering the telephone when the investigator called Armeny Custom Jewelry Design, the plaintiffs indication to that investigator that he was working there that day, as well as the next day, and the plaintiffs presence at Armeny Custom Jewelry Design when personnel from the department of revenue services visited the business.

The plaintiff timely filed what he termed a “motion to reopen” the board’s decision on December 2, 2010, alleging that the board ignored evidence submitted to the referee, specifically evidence that the plaintiff was looking for and applying for work. The board denied the motion on the basis that there was “ample evidence that the claimant is self-employed” and “the [plaintiffs] efforts have been directed only at competitors.”

The plaintiff then appealed the board’s decision to the Superior Court on March 21, 2011. The matter was taken on the papers because neither party requested oral argument. The plaintiff did not file a memorandum of law or position statement with the court, but the defendant filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the plaintiffs appeal. In his memorandum of law, the defendant argued, again, that the plaintiff was unavailable for work based on the findings of fact by the referee and board. Furthermore, the defendant correctly contended that because the plaintiff failed to file a motion to correct under Practice Book § 22-4 the board’s factual findings were binding on the court.

In a memorandum of decision filed August 10, 2010, the court acknowledged the plaintiffs failure to file a motion to correct the board’s findings and the subsequent effect of precluding further review of the facts found by the board. The court proceeded to review “the board’s decision that the plaintiff was not available for full-time employment only to determine if the board’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or illegal.” In its review, the court found “that the board’s decision was arbitrary in that its conclusions are not founded on its findings, are speculative and not in compliance with its own regulations.” The court specifically noted the absence of factual findings that, in its opinion, were needed to support the board’s conclusions, including findings that “the plaintiff was employed full-time or that he [had] received any compensation from his sister’s business” or “the plaintiff did not make himself available for full-time employment elsewhere or that he was unable or unwilling to do so.” Additionally, the court further stated the conclusions it found to be unsupported or based on speculation, including: “the plaintiff actually was a legal owner of his sister’s business,” “the plaintiff might have been compensated by his sister” and “the plaintiff is primarily devoting his time to his self-employment activities and that he is not genuinely attached to the labor market or available for full-time work.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Due to these purported deficiencies in the board’s decision, the court sustained the plaintiffs appeal and reversed the board’s decision. The defendant then filed a motion to reargue on August 30, 2011, which was denied by the court the next day.

On September 20, 2011, the defendant filed this appeal claiming that, based on the board’s binding factual findings, the plaintiff was not available for work and was ineligible for benefits because the plaintiff primarily was devoting his time to self-employment and was not exposed unequivocally to the labor market and available for full-time work.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review and the principles that guide our analysis. “To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board of review. The court must not retry the facts nor hear evidence. ... If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts. Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted.) United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 209 Conn. 381, 385-86, 551 A.2d 724 (1988). “[The court] is bound by the findings of subordinate facts and reasonable factual conclusions made by the appeals referee where, as here, the board of review adopted the findings and affirmed the decision of the referee.” DaSilva v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 175 Conn. 562, 564, 402 A.2d 755 (1978). “If the referee’s conclusions are reasonably and logically drawn, the court cannot alter them.” Howell v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 174 Conn. 533.

A party’s “failure to file a timely motion for correction of the board’s findings in accordance with [Practice Book] § 22-4 prevents further review of those facts found by the board.” JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 265 Conn. 422. Practice Book § 22-9 (a) provides in relevant part: “[The court] considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether . . . there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions reached. It cannot review the conclusions of the board when these depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. . . .”

Section 31-235 (a) (2) provides in relevant part that an individual is eligible for unemployment benefits if an “individual is physically and mentally able to work and is available for work and has been and is making reasonable efforts to obtain work . . . .” “[T]he determination of a claimant’s eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits shall be based solely on the provisions of this chapter and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto. . . .” General Statutes § 31-236e (a). Section 31-235-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “(a) Except as provided in section 31-235-6a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, in order to find an individual eligible for benefits for any week, the Administrator must find the individual available for full-time work during that week. An individual is available for work if the individual is genuinely exposed to the labor market. An individual is genuinely exposed to the labor market if such individual is willing, able and ready to accept suitable work, (b) The Administrator shall find that a labor market exists for an individual, if within a reasonable geographic area, there are jobs for which such individual possesses skills and abilities. The fact that there are more persons in an area qualified for a certain type of job than there are job vacancies does not negate the existence of a labor market for the individual. . . .” More simply put, “[t]o be available for work within the meaning of the statute, one must be ready, able and willing to accept suitable employment. He must be exposed unequivocally to the labor market.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stapleton v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 142 Conn. 160, 164-65, 112 A.2d 211 (1955). “[A] person seeking self-employment is not exposing himself to the labor market but has in fact withdrawn from it to become involved in his own enterprise.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 3 Conn. App. 264, 268, 487 A.2d 566 (1985).

Although not binding on this court, it is helpful to refer to previous board decisions in order to examine the application of the availability requirement to claimants engaged in self-employment. In one such board decision, the claimant was found to be self-employed despite the fact that he did not own shares in the family corporation. Deans v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, Employment Security Appeals Division Board of Review, Case No. 1136-BR-90 (November 15, 1990). The board’s decision was based on the presumption of an identity of interest in family corporations, as well as the claimant’s actions in furtherance of the corporation’s success, including performing all repairs for the business and soliciting work for the corporation. Id. “[A] claimant who is seeking work as an employee . . . has the difficult burden of proving that he is not primarily devoting his time to his own business but is genuinely attached to the labor market and available for full-time work.” Id.

After á thorough review of the certified record, we conclude that the referee’s and board’s factual findings support the conclusion that the plaintiff was ineligible for benefits under § 31-235 (a) (2) because the plaintiff primarily was devoting his time to his self-employment activities and not genuinely attached to the labor market or available for full-time work. Specifically, the board found that the business was only comprised of the plaintiff and his sister, was open seven days a week, advertised custom jewelry designs, and the plaintiffs expertise was in jewelry design and repair, while the plaintiffs sister lacked such expertise. The board adopted the referee’s findings that the plaintiff “routinely spent 25-30 hours per week working at the business,” “[b]usiness cards were printed listing the [plaintiff] as owner/designer of the business” and publicity for the business “list[ed] the [plaintiff] as [the] owner and operator of the business,” who possessed skill and experience in custom jewelry design and fabrication. In making these findings, the board did not find credible that “both the company’s advertisement and the [plaintiff’s] business card would erroneously refer to the [plaintiff] as the owner of the business.”

We conclude there is a logical and rational basis for the board to conclude the plaintiff was self-employed. Specifically, the referee, whose decision was adopted wholly by the board, found the plaintiff to be a principal in the business. Furthermore, both local business publicity and business cards described the plaintiff as the owner of the business. Finally, there was a presumed identity of interest in family businesses based on the plaintiff’s unity of interest in the business, as well as his actions in furtherance of the business’ success, including devoting a substantial amount of time working in the store and performing repairs. See Deans v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, Employment Security Appeals Division Board of Review, Case No. 1136-BR-90, supra. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the plaintiff was self-employed.

Although self-employment does not automatically disqualify a claimant from receiving benefits, if the self-employment renders the claimant unavailable within the meaning of § 31-235 (a) (2), then the person is not eligible for compensation. See generally Johnson v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 3 Conn. App. 264; Micca v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 26 Corm. Sup. 16, 209 A.2d 682 (1966). The board did not treat the plaintiffs business involvement as an automatic disqualification, but looked at all of its factual findings. Here the business was open seven days a week, but only two people, the plaintiff and his sister, were involved in the business. Of these two people involved in the business, explicitly described as a custom jewelry store, only the plaintiff had the expertise to repair jewelry and to create custom pieces. It would be reasonable to conclude that someone has withdrawn from the labor market who is half of the labor force in a business that is open seven days a week. Therefore, the board’s findings form a logical and rational basis for the board’s conclusion that the plaintiffs self-employment rendered him unavailable for full-time work and, thus, unattached to the labor market.

The court does point to what it concludes are factual omissions and conclusions of the referee and board, which would have made their decisions more clear and definite. We cannot say their conclusions are so unreasonable or illogical as to warrant judicial interference. See Howell v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 174 Conn. 533. It was the plaintiffs obligation, under Practice Book § 22-4, to make a timely motion to correct if he claimed any lack of clarity or error in the board’s findings, but he did not do so.

Accordingly we conclude that the court improperly determined that the factual findings did not support the board’s conclusion that the plaintiff is primarily devoting time to self-employment and is not genuinely attached to the labor market nor available for full-time work.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the defendant.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       We set forth abrief road map of the unemployment compensation appeals process. The administrator can investigate claimants receiving benefits. General Statutes § 31-241 (a). After such an investigation, an appeal from the administrator’s decision and a request for a hearing before an adjudicator may be made. General Statutes § 31-241 (a). If the adjudicator denies the claimant unemployment benefits, the claimant can then appeal the adjudicator’s determination to an appeals referee for a de novo review of the claim. General Statutes § 31-242. The referee’s determination may then be appealed to the employment security board of review; General Statutes § 31-249; whose subsequent determination may then be appealed to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 31-249b.

       The board disposed of this claim by noting that while the referee updated the information from the administrator’s report through an Internet search, “[t]he [plaintiff did not object to the referee’s admitting this evidence. Instead, he testified that the website was no longer active.” The board found that the plaintiffs due process rights were not violated by the referee’s inquiry.

       The plaintiff also sought a waiver of the assessed overpayment amount. The board found, however, that the issue was not properly before it because the plaintiff failed to file a timely appeal of the overpayment determination.

       Practice Book § 22-4 provides: “Ifthe appellant desires to have the finding of the board corrected, he or she must, within two weeks after the record has been filed in the superior court, unless the time is extended for cause by the board, file with the board a motion for the correction of the finding and with it such portions of the evidence as he or she deems relevant and material to the corrections asked for, certified by the stenographer who took it; but if the appellant claims that substantially all the evidence is relevant and material to the corrections sought, he or she may file all of it, so certified, indicating in the motion so far as possible the portion applicable to each correction sought. The board shall forthwith upon the filing of the motion and of the transcript of the evidence, give notice to the adverse party or parties.”

       General Statutes § 31-249b provides in relevant part: “At any time before the board’s decision has become final, any party, including the administrator, may appeal such decision, including any claim that the decision violates statutory or constitutional provisions, to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford or for the judicial district wherein the appellant resides. . . .”

       “[The court] cannot review the conclusions of the board when these depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility ofwitnesses. . . .” Practice Book § 22-9 (a).

       For example, the Superior Court noted the absence of findings of fact “that the plaintiff was employed full-time,” “that the plaintiff did not make himself available for full-time employment elsewhere or that he was unable or unwilling to do so.”