author: DRANGINIS, J.

text:
    IN RE AMNERIS P.

    (AC 20719)
    Mihalakos, Dranginis and Daly, Js.

      Argued May 4
    officially released October 23, 2001

      Carolyn C. Mihalek, for the appellant (respondent mother).

      Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).

      Thomas F. Mitola, for the minor child.

       In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79-3, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Appellate Court.

   Opinion

DRANGINIS, J.

The respondent mother, Blanca, L., appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor daughter, A. She claims that the court improperly (1) denied her motion to exclude testimony from an expert witness, (2) concluded that she had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, (3) concluded that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship and (4) concluded that the department of children and families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunite her with A. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts found by the court are as follows. On August 8, 1992, A was bom. A is the respondent’s third child. The department first became involved with this family on December 21, 1992, when it received an oral report from Bridgeport Hospital regarding A’s sibling, J. A, herself, was taken to the hospital by the respondent in Febmary, 1993. The respondent reported that A had a lump on her head and that she had been vomiting for two weeks. An examination revealed that A had a skull fracture. The respondent’s explanation for how the accident happened was vague. A was returned to her mother’s care after her hospitalization.

The situation in the family deteriorated during the course of 1993. By October, 1993, the respondent was unable to care for her children. On October 19,1993, the respondent voluntarily placed A with the department, which placed her in a foster home, where she continues to reside to the present day. On Febmary 10, 1993, the department received a report from Ann Yost, a social worker at Bridgeport Hospital, expressing concern about the family’s poor social situation, namely, that the mother was young, overwhelmed, appeared to be of limited intelligence, had an abusive former boyfriend and exhibited poor judgment. Between 1993 and 1995, the respondent was homeless on several occasions, visited A only sporadically and did not take steps to deal with her drug addiction. Although the respondent was offered visitation and some services in the intervening time, it was not until January, 1997, that she became committed to rehabilitating herself and reuniting with her daughter.

On November 12, 1998, the petitioner filed a petition for the termination of the respondent’s parental rights as to A. The respondent filed a motion for revocation of the commitment of her child, which was consolidated with the termination petition for trial. On February 8, 2000, the court denied the motion for revocation and granted the petition for termination of the respondent’s parental rights. The court stated in its memorandum of decision: “[T]he court grants the petition ... [as to the respondent] because of her failure to rehabilitate herself as a parent to this child and because there is no longer an ongoing parent-child relationship with her child.” This appeal followed.

I

The respondent first claims that the court improperly denied her motion to exclude her expert from the petitioner’s witness list. Specifically, the respondent claims that the petitioner’s calling as a witness at trial the respondent’s expert, Carol Swenson, a psychologist who had conducted an independent psychological evaluation of the respondent at the respondent’s request, and the admission of Swenson’s report into evidence, violated the attorney-client privilege and the work product rule.

The following additional facts are necessary for our resolution of the respondent’s claim. On February 18, 1999, the respondent filed a motion requesting court fees to cover the costs of an independent psychological evaluation. On March 10, 1999, the court granted the motion and appointed Swenson to conduct the examination. By letter dated April, 13, 1999, Swenson was directed to send her reports directly to the respondent’s counsel. On June 15, 1999, Swenson, in error, sent the psychological evaluation directly to the department and to the Juvenile Court in Bridgeport rather than to the respondent’s counsel. On August 25, 1999, when the petitioner filed the required preliminary witness list, it included Swenson’s name. On November 2, 1999, the respondent filed a motion to preclude Swenson from testifying and to bar the department from using any information contained in her psychological evaluation. On December 3,1999, the court denied the respondent’s motion, concluding that “because of the lapse of time in raising this issue, there is a waiver of whatever privilege may have existed.” The court also stated: “I think that the harm that’s being complained about could have been prevented by action, and I think, as such, as [counsel is] a representative of the mother, that waiver took place by inaction.”

As a threshold matter, we note the proper standard of appellate review applicable to a trial court’s determination on evidentiary matters. “Our standard of review for evidentiary matters allows the trial court great leeway in deciding the admissibility of evidence. The trial court has wide discretion in its rulings on evidence and its rulings will be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion or an injustice appears to have been done. . . . The exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed unless it has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bunting v. Bunting, 60 Conn. App. 665, 670, 760 A.2d 989 (2000).

The respondent has the burden of demonstrating that harmful error occurred. See George v. Ericson, 250 Conn. 312, 327, 736 A.2d 889 (1999). Whether error is harmless in a particular case depends on a number of factors, such as “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.’ ” State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 333, 618 A.2d 32 (1992).

In this case, even if we were to conclude that the court improperly denied the motion to preclude the respondent’s expert from testifying, the respondent also would have to demonstrate that the ruling was harmful and likely to affect the result of the trial. See Hayes v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 38 Conn. App. 471, 475, 661 A.2d 123, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 922, 666 A.2d 1185 (1995). The court terminated the respondent’s parental rights because of her failure to achieve sufficient rehabilitation as a parent and because there was no longer an ongoing parent-child relationship. In making that determination, the court relied on both the evaluation of the respondent that was conducted by Jill Ramsey-Edgar, a court-appointed clinical psychologist, and Swenson’s evaluation.

The court stated in its memorandum of decision: “[Ramsey-Edgar] noted that [A] did not seem connected to [the respondent] and was critical and rude to her as the interview progressed. [The respondent] was not able to engage the child and set limits for her. Dr. Ramsey-Edgar testified that she had grave concerns about reunification based on what she saw [as the interview progressed. A’s] reaction to her mother was not positive, [Ramsey-Edgar] noted, and the child went out of her way to let her know that her foster mother was her ‘mommy.’ ” We conclude that the court had sufficient evidence to terminate the respondent’s parental rights without considering Swenson’s testimony. Therefore, even if it was improper to admit Swenson’s testimony and report, it was harmless.

II

The respondent’s second claim is that the court improperly found that she had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. We disagree.

The court concluded it its memorandum of decision: “[The respondent’s] lack of rehabilitation must be seen from [A’s] optic, for [the respondent] was not able to maintain a reasonable relationship with her or reestablish one. Her own testimony highlights her lack of understanding of this child’s needs and her inability to resume a constructive or useful role in the child’s life. Given the length of time [that the respondent] has been receiving services and her failure to begin to understand her child, the court finds that the evidence is clear and convincing that there is no prospect that [the respondent] will be rehabilitated with respect to this child within the foreseeable future.”

Failure of a parent to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation is one of the statutory grounds on which a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 17a-112 (c) (3) (B), now (j) (3) (B). That ground exists when a parent of a child whom the court has found to be neglected fails to achieve such a degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of that child.

“Personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . . [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her] child’s life. . . . In re Eden F., [250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999)]. This court recently explained that in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. ... In re Shyliesh H., [56 Conn. App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn. App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). A court’s determination “that the evidence is clear and convincing that the parent has not rehabilitated herself will be disturbed only if that finding is not supported by the evidence and [is], in light of the evidence in the whole record, clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn. App. 595, 602-603, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999).

The court considered the fact that the respondent had made progress in recovering from drug abuse and in rehabilitating her life. Ultimately, however, the court concluded that her rehabilitation fell short by analyzing her progress with respect to her relationship with the child. The respondent claims that it was improper for the court to measure her rehabilitation “from [A’s] optic.” The statute requires the court to analyze the respondent’s rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child. In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 706. “[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shyliesh H., supra, 56 Conn. App. 180.

Although the respondent may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, the court had more than sufficient evidence to support a finding that her personal gains were not made in a timely way so as to assist her child. The court’s finding that the child should not be further burdened by having to wait for her mother to achieve the level of competency necessary to parent her was fully supported by the evidence.

Ill

The respondent’s third claim is that the court improperly found that no ongoing parent-child relationship existed. For the reasons set forth, we decline to review her claim.

In part II, we concluded that the court properly found that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (c) (3) (B), now (j) (3) (B). We need uphold only one statutory ground found by the court to affirm its decision to terminate parental rights. In re John G., 56 Conn. App. 12, 20 n.4, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). “To prevail on her claim that the court improperly terminated her parental rights, the respondent must successfully challenge all of the bases of the judgment terminating her parental rights. If [any] of the grounds on which the trial court relied are upheld on appeal, the termination of parental rights must stand.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Because one statutory ground for termination properly exists, namely, failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, the respondent cannot successfully challenge all of the bases ofthe termination of her parental rights. We therefore do not reach the respondent’s claim that the court improperly found that no ongoing parent-child relationship existed. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn. App. 234, 243, 753 A.2d 409 (2000).

IV

Finally, the respondent claims that the court improperly concluded that the department had made reasonable efforts at reunification. We disagree.

Before a court may grant a petition to terminate parental rights on the basis of a parent’s failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the department has made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with the parent. General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 17a-112 (c) (1), now 0) (1).

“The term reasonable efforts was recently addressed by this court: Turning to the statutory scheme encompassing the termination of the parental rights of a child committed to the department, the statute imposes on the department the duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. ... In re Tabitha T., [supra, 51 Conn. App. 600].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. 463, 474-75, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).

The record discloses that the department made efforts to provide the respondent with services to help reunify her with A. Some of those services included referrals to deal with issues of domestic violence, parenting and substance abuse, visitation and services to benefit A. The court found that those efforts were hampered by the respondent’s passivity, her cognitive limitations and the extended period of time that had elapsed from the time of the child’s placement until the respondent’s decision to begin work toward rehabilitation. We cannot conclude that the court committed clear error in finding that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with the respondent.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Although the trial court also terminated the parental rights oí A’s father, only the respondent mother has appealed from the judgment of the court. We therefore refer in this opinion to the respondent mother as the respondent.

       The respondent’s fourth child was bom during the pendency of the termination petition and remains in her care.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MIHALAKOS, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    HELEN WITTY, TRUSTEE, ET AL. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF HARTLAND ET AL.
    (AC 20923)
    Landau, Mihalakos and Flynn, Js.

      Argued June 8
    officially released October 23, 2001

      Timothy Brignole, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Mary E. R. Bartholic, with whom were Brian J. Comerford, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Thomas W. Witherington and Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
   Opinion

MIHALAKOS, J.

The plaintiffs appeal from the declaratory judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the court improperly failed to conclude that the unpaved segment of Pell Road that abuts their property in the town of Hartland is a public road. In support of that argument, the plaintiffs claim that the court (1) after properly concluding that an 1870 ordinance discontinuing portions of Pell Road as a public road was ambiguous, improperly (a) considered the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the ordinance and (b) resolved the ambiguity, (2) improperly refused to admit into evidence certain expert testimony, (3) improperly refused to admit into evidence (a) testimony concerning a 1996 meeting of the Hartland board of selectmen and (b) hearsay testimony that the plaintiffs had maintained was traditionary evidence and (4) abused its discretion in denying nonparties permission to file briefs as amici curiae. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. In 1870, segments of Pell Road were discontinued as a public road following a majority vote by the townspeople and a majority vote by the board of selectmen. The townspeople voted to discontinue two segments of Pell Road: (1) “the Highway commencing at Henry A. Browns to the Road near Jeremiah Emmons” and (2) “the Road from Richmond Bannings north to the Road coming from Leverett Emmons to Roberts.” (Emphasis added.) The board of selectmen, in its vote, described the latter segment, which is the subject of this declaratory judgment action, as “the Highway from Richmond Bannings north to the road running past Leverett Emmons to the William Roberts place.” (Emphasis added.) In both instances, the location of the southern terminus of the segment at issue is identified by the phrase “Richmond Bannings.”

In 1997, the plaintiffs, owners of a tract of land that abuts Pell Road, brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration as to whether Pell Road is a public highway, which would allow the plaintiffs to subdivide their property. In their action, the plaintiffs maintained that the reference to “Richmond Bannings” from the minutes to the board of selectmen meeting in 1870 referred to the northern boundary of an improved property once owned by Richmond Banning, a person. The court concluded, however, that “Richmond Bannings” referred to a house that Richmond Banning had owned. Thus, the court concluded that “ ‘from Richmond Bannings north’ meant, to all concerned, ‘from his house.’ ” It also concluded that that house, which no longer exists, had abutted Pell Road and had been located near the midpoint between the northern boundary and the southern boundary of the property that Richmond Banning had owned. As the court noted, both the “1869 Atlas of Hartland” and an “1870 Map of the Hartland Business Directory” show clearly the location of Richmond Banning’s house. The court concluded that the unpaved portion of Pell Road that abuts the plaintiffs’ property lies north of the place where Richmond Banning’s house had been located and that in 1870 it was discontinued as a public road. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, and this appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be presented as necessary.

I

The plaintiffs claim that the court, after properly concluding that the 1870 ordinance was ambiguous, improperly (1) considered the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the ordinance and (2) resolved the ambiguity. We disagree.

“A local ordinance is a municipal legislative enactment and the same canons of construction which we use in interpreting statutes are applicable to ordinances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall Manor Owner’s Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 154, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989). “The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case .... In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 105, 120, 774 A.2d 969 (2001). Because the questions presented by this claim concern issues of statutory interpretation, our review is plenary. See id., 121.

Hall Manor Owner’s Assn., when read in conjunction with the text of Modem Cigarette, Inc., referred to in this opinion reveals that a court, when interpreting an ordinance, is free to consider the circumstances surrounding the enactment of that ordinance. Accordingly, the first part of the plaintiffs’ claim fails. We now examine the record to determine whether the court correctly resolved the ambiguity in the 1870 ordinance.

The record discloses that the town’s expert, Kathleen Hoemer, testified as follows. The town of Hartland endured a significant population loss during the nineteenth century. That loss, which totaled approximately one third of Hartland’s population, occurred between 1800 and 1860 and resulted from migration to Ohio. Because of the reduced labor pool and diminished tax base, the town of Hartland “needed to discontinue some of the roads so that their — the maintenance of those roads could be kept to a minimum.”

The record also discloses that an abridged version of a historical treatise about the residents of Hartland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Gaines Notes) was admitted into evidence. A map of Hartland that was based on the Gaines Notes, which shows the location, in 1911, of homes, mills, highways and discontinued roads, also was admitted. That map indicates that in 1911 a segment of Pell Road, specifically, from Richmond Banning’s house north to the Massachusetts border, was a discontinued road. Hoemer’s testimony and the 1911 map, together with the fact that the 1870 ordinance provides “from Richmond Bannings north” and not “from Richmond Bannings property north,” leads us to conclude that the court correctly concluded that the town of Hartland discontinued the unpaved segment of Pell Road that abuts the plaintiffs’ property and, thus, properly resolved the ambiguity.

II

Second, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly refused to permit Terry Tondro, a legal expert, to present testimony concerning an ultimate issue, namely, “[w]hat location is specified by the term ‘Richmond Bannings’ as used in the 1870 ordinance?” We disagree.

The following legal principles guide our consideration of this claim. “[T]he trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony and, unless that discretion has been abused or the ruling involves a clear misconception of the law, the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed. . . . Expert testimony should be admitted when: (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Billie, 250 Conn. 172, 180, 738 A.2d 586 (1999). “An expert witness ordinarily may not express an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact, which must be decided by the trier of fact.” State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35, 41, 540 A.2d 42 (1988). An expert may, however, “give an opinion on an ultimate issue where the trier, in order to make intelligent findings, needs expert assistance on the precise question on which it must pass.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodgers, 207 Conn. 646, 652, 542 A.2d 1136 (1988).

In the present case, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the court needed expert assistance to determine properly the location specified by the term “Richmond Bannings” as used in the 1870 ordinance. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its wide discretion in refusing to permit Tondro to present expert testimony on that issue. Accordingly, this claim fails.

Ill

The plaintiffs also claim that the court improperly refused to admit into evidence (1) testimony concerning a 1996 meeting of the Hartland board of selectmen and (2) hearsay testimony that the plaintiffs had maintained was traditionary evidence. We reject both claims.

The following standard governs our review of these claims. “It is well established that [t]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility [and relevancy] of evidence. . . . The trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199, 259, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997). We now address separately the plaintiffs’ claims.

A

The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly refused to admit hearsay testimony concerning a 1996 meeting of the Hartland board of selectmen (1996 meeting) despite their contention that such testimony was both relevant and admissible under the admission exception to the hearsay rule. We disagree.

“The proffering party bears the burden of establishing the relevance of the offered testimony. Unless such a proper foundation is established, the evidence ... is irrelevant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Barnes, 232 Conn. 740, 747, 657 A.2d 611 (1995). “Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. . . . One fact is relevant to another if in the common course of events the existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain or more probable. . . . Evidence is irrelevant or too remote if there is such want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principal facts that, all things considered, the former is not worthy or safe to be admitted in the proof of the latter. . . . Evidence is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that the evidence tend to support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, so long as it is not prejudicial or merely cumulative.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Billie, supra, 250 Conn. 181.

The record discloses that the 1996 meeting was held at the behest of one of the abutting landowners because “he was having a problem demonstrating ownership of the road and that was causing him a problem as far as selling the property and [he] asked if the town could clarify ownership for his benefit.” It discloses also that, at the 1996 meeting, no official action was taken with respect to Pell Road. The proffered testimony, through which the plaintiffs sought to establish that the town of Ilartiand’s position regarding the 1870 ordinance was inconsistent, did not have a logical tendency to aid the court in the determination of the issues. It also was too remote in time, for it concerned a meeting that took place 126 years after the 1870 ordinance was enacted. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony, and, accordingly, this claim fails.

B

The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly refused to admit into evidence the hearsay testimony of Adrian French despite their contention that that testimony was admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception for traditionary evidence.

During the trial, the plaintiffs sought to elicit from a witness testimony indicating that John Barber, the preceding owner of the plaintiffs’ property, had made statements to him indicating that he believed that Pell Road was a public road. The plaintiffs did not seek to establish that Barber was dead or unavailable. The court precluded the plaintiffs from doing so on the ground that the questions called for hearsay testimony.

“The exception to the general rule excluding hearsay evidence, which permits in certain cases the reception of what is called traditionary evidence concerning facts of public or general interest affecting public or private rights, is limited to proof of declarations of deceased persons, or persons supposed to be dead or who are not available as witnesses, as to ancient rights of which they are presumed or are shown to have had competent knowledge, and which rights are incapable of proof in the ordinary way by living witnesses; and this exception is not to be favored or extended.” (Emphasis added.) Hartford v. Maslen, 76 Conn. 599, 615, 57 A. 740 (1904).

In the present case, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony concerning Barber because the traditionary evidence exception to the hearsay rule is limited to instances in which the offering party establishes that the declarant is dead or otherwise unavailable. Accordingly, this claim fails.

IV

The plaintiffs’ final claim is that the court improperly refused to permit two of their experts to file briefs as amici curiae. Our rules of procedure provide a vehicle for a nonparty to obtain permission to file an. appellate brief as an amicus curiae. See Practice Book § 67-7. Although the rules of practice do not specifically provide a vehicle for a nonparty to obtain permission to submit briefs or to appear as an amicus curiae, the rules do not prohibit such a request. See Thalheim v. Greenwich, 256 Conn. 628, 639-40, 775 A.2d 947 (2001). Permission to appear as amici curiae, however, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Id., 644. The trial court in this case determined that it would not be proper for the proposed amici, who are both attorneys, to testify as expert witnesses at trial and to appear as amici curiae. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making that determination.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The plaintiffs are Helen Witty and Patricia Rasner, trustees of the Helen M. Witty trust.

       This action was originally filed against the town of Hartland, the planning and zoning commission of the town of Hartland, and the state department of environmental protection. The plaintiffs subsequently cited in abutting landowners as additional defendants.

       “In civil as well as in criminal cases, [t]he words and acts of a party-opponent are generally admissible against him under the admission exception [to the hearsay rule].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 796, 632 A.2d 1114 (1993).

      ‘[C]onduct of a party to the proceeding, in respect to the matter in dispute, whether by acts, speech, or writing, which is clearly inconsistent with the truth of his contention, is a fact relevant to the issue.’ ” Connecticut Union of Telephone Workers v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 148 Conn. 192, 202, 169 A.2d 646 (1961).


author: SPEAR, J. LAVERY, C. J.,

text:
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. MUTUAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL.
    (AC 20525)
    Lavery, C. J., and Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued May 10
    officially released October 23, 2001

      Michael S. Lynch, for the appellants (defendant Guardian Systems, Inc., et al.).

      Michael J. Mannion, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff Fairway Asset Management, Inc.).
   Opinion

SPEAR, J.

The defendants Jerome G. Terracino and Guardian Systems, Inc. (Guardian), appeal from the deficiency judgment rendered against them and their codefendants, Mutual Communications Associates, Inc. (Mutual), Richard T. DeMarsico and Robert Rossman (Rossman), subsequent to a judgment of foreclosure. The defendants claim that the court improperly (1) concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find that Rossman’s attorney was acting as Rossman’s agent when he purchased a promissory note and assigned it to a company controlled by Rossman’s wife, (2) failed to apply the equitable rule that the conduct of a wife may be presumed to be for the benefit of her husband, (3) failed to conclude that the note could not be enforced after Rossman acquired it, (4) rendered judgment in favor of Fairway for the full amount due and (5) rendered judgment against the defendants on their cross claim and counterclaim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On July 19, 1991, Mutual entered into a loan agreement with Brookfield Bank (Brookfield) to borrow $270,000. Mutual, through two of its corporate officers, DeMarsico and Terracino, signed a promissory note for the loan amount. Mutual secured the debt by a mortgage on one of its properties. DeMarsico, Terracino and Ross-man, another coiporate officer, signed personal guarantees as well. Terracino and Rossman signed an additional guarantee as principals and officers of Guardian, an alarm company in which they were the only shareholders.

On May 8,1992, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) took possession of Brookfield’s assets, including the promissory note, mortgage and guarantees. At about the same time, Mutual defaulted on the loan. On or about November 30, 1994, the FDIC commenced a foreclosure action against Mutual and the other defendants. A judgment of foreclosure by sale was rendered on December 16, 1996.

Thereafter, the judgment was opened and a judgment of strict foreclosure was rendered with law days commencing March 25,1997. Prior to the judgment of strict foreclosure, JLM Services Corporation (JLM) succeeded the FDIC as plaintiff, and title vested in JLM when Mutual failed to redeem its equity within the set law days.

JLM filed a motion for a deficiency judgment on April 1, 1997. While the motion was pending, JLM assigned the note, guarantees and deficiency claim to Rossman’s attorney and friend, Andrew Buzzi, Jr., as trustee. Buzzi then assigned them to a limited liability company, Consolidated Asset Management, LLC (Consolidated), which he owned with Rossman’s wife. Thereafter, Consolidated assigned the note, guarantees and deficiency claim to Fairway Asset Management, Inc. (Fairway), the substituted plaintiff and judgment creditor.

The defendants filed three special defenses, a cross complaint and a counterclaim in response to the motion for a deficiency judgment. The special defenses, as amended, alleged facts that occurred subsequent to the judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendants claimed that Rossman breached the fiduciary duty that he owed them because of his role in assigning the note to Consolidated and Fairway’s failure to pursue a mortgage it held on Rossman’s property to reduce the deficiency claim. In the third special defense, the defendants claimed that the note was not enforceable because it was assigned after the judgment had been rendered and the law days had passed. The counterclaim and cross complaint were based on the same facts as the special defenses and requested a judgment that Fairway and its predecessors could enforce the note only to claim a proportionate contribution toward funds actually paid on behalf of Rossman for the note, or a judgment declaring the note null and void.

The court granted the motion for a deficiency judgment. It rejected the third special defense and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find that either Buzzi or Catherine Rossman acted as Rossman’s agent, and, therefore, there was no need to address the defendants’ other claims premised on a theory of agency. The court also concluded that the defendants had not met their burden of proof on the counterclaim and cross claim. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

I

The defendants claim that the court improperly concluded that there was insufficient evidence on which to base a finding that Buzzi acted as Rossman’s agent when Buzzi purchased the promissory note as trustee for the Catherine Rossman Trust and assigned the note to Consolidated. The defendants claim that certain findings of fact made by the court are clearly erroneous and entirely inconsistent with the evidence produced at the hearing, specifically, the findings that (1) Rossman’s efforts to purchase the note from JLM were unsuccessful, (2) Buzzi, as trustee, purchased the note from JLM and (3) Rossman never owned the note. We disagree.

The court found the following facts by a fair preponderance of the evidence. In June, 1997, Buzzi unsuccessfully attempted, on behalf of Rossman, to negotiate a purchase of the note, mortgages and deficiency from JLM. On July 7, 1997, Buzzi, as trustee, purchased the note, guarantees and deficiency claim from JLM. On July 23,1997, Buzzi, as trustee, sold the same to Consolidated, of which he and Catherine Rossman were officers. Because Rossman was Buzzi’s client in July, 1997, Buzzi disclosed the transaction to him in a letter dated July 23, 1997. Rossman signed the letter, which acknowledged the disclosure and sought to continue the attorney-client relationship with Buzzi. Catherine Rossman formed Consolidated to protect the joint assets that she held with her husband, intending to pursue a judgment against Guardian and Terracino. Consolidated sold the note, guarantees and deficiency to Fairway in October, 1998. Rossman never owned the note, and there was no evidence of an agreement with Fairway not to pursue the judgment against him.

“An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s decision is circumscribed by the appropriate standard of review. ... To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous. . . . The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence .... We cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bugryn v. Bristol, 63 Conn. App. 98, 103, 774 A.2d 1042, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 927, 776 A.2d 1143 (2001).

Agency normally is a question of fact. Hallas v. Boehmke & Dobosz, Inc., 239 Conn. 658, 674, 686 A.2d 491 (1997). “[T]he three elements required to show the existence of an agency relationship include: (1) a manifestation by the principal that the agent will act for him; (2) acceptance by the agent of the undertaking; and (3) an understanding between the parties that the principal will be in control of the undertaking. ... A principal is generally liable for the authorized acts of his agent . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 673.

Our careful review of the record reveals more than ample evidence to support the factual findings that Rossman’s efforts to purchase the note were unsuccessful, that Buzzi, as trustee, purchased the note from JLM and that Rossman never owned the note. Although the court did not make a finding as to the individual or entity that Buzzi represented as trustee when he purchased the note, Rossman testified that he did not request or authorize Buzzi to acquire the note as his trustee, that he never had any direct or indirect ownership interest in the note, that he did not participate in the formation of Consolidated, that he did not have a legal ownership interest in Consolidated, that he did not authorize, encourage or in any way delegate to his wife or Buzzi the authority to act on his behalf in their ownership interest in Consolidated and that he never had an agreement with his wife or Buzzi that gave him any say in the purchase, holding or sale of the note by Consolidated. That testimony is consistent with the testimony of Buzzi and Catherine Rossman. Furthermore, the disclosure letter, which was admitted into evidence at the hearing, expressly stated that Buzzi purchased the note from JLM as trustee for the Catherine Rossman trust, and the defendants provided no documentary evidence indicating otherwise.

“The trial court, as the finder of fact, is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses testifying before it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rund v. Melillo, 63 Conn. App. 216, 222, 772 A.2d 774 (2001). Moreover, “[w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Granger v. A. Aiudi & Sons, 60 Conn. App. 36, 41, 758 A.2d 417, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 902, 762 A.2d 908 (2000). On the entire evidence, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.

II

The defendants next claim that the court, in finding that Rossman did not purchase the note, improperly applied the law of agency and concluded that the actions of Catherine Rossman, individually or by virtue of her ownership of and involvement in Consolidated, were not tantamount to a purchase by Rossman. They argue, pursuant to Skolnick v. Skolnick, 131 Conn. 561, 41 A.2d 452 (1945), that, as a matter of public policy, the conduct of a wife may be presumed to be for the benefit of her husband. We disagree.

Because “the trial court rendered judgment for the [defendant] as a matter of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether [the trial court’s] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davies v. General Tours, Inc., 63 Conn. App. 17, 21, 774 A.2d 1063, cert. granted on other grounds, 256 Conn. 926, 776 A.2d 1143 (2001) (appeal withdrawn October 18, 2001).

Marital status does not, in and of itself, prove the agency relationship. Bolmer v. Kocet, 6 Conn. App. 595, 611, 507 A.2d 129 (1986); see also Lovesky v. Zeligzon, 20 Conn. App. 139, 144, 565 A.2d 1 (1989). A person’s status as a wife, without more, cannot permit a reasonable inference that a husband’s knowledge was imparted to her. Bolmer v. Kocet, supra, 611. “It [is] but one circumstance to be considered bearing upon [the] issue.” Cyclone Fence Co. v. McAviney, 121 Conn. 656, 659, 186 A. 635 (1936).

The court, citing these well established principles of law, properly concluded that the marital relationship and the benefit to Rossman, standing alone, were insufficient to create the presumption that Catherine Ross-man acted as her husband’s agent. This conclusion is supported by the testimony described in part I of this opinion indicating that Rossman did not authorize either Buzzi or Catherine Rossman to act as his agent. Accordingly, we reject the defendants’ claim and find the trial court’s conclusions to be legally and logically correct and properly supported by the facts.

The defendants assert that the court improperly failed to apply the equitable rule enunciated in Skolnick v. Skolnick, supra, 131 Conn. 564. In Skolnick, a mortgage foreclosure action, the defendant and his father were tenants in common of a jointly mortgaged property. Seven years after executing the mortgage, the holder of the mortgage threatened to foreclose. The defendant drew and delivered a check to his wife, the plaintiff, who endorsed the check to the holder. The holder assigned the mortgage to the plaintiff at the request of the plaintiffs husband. The plaintiff then commenced a mortgage foreclosure action against her husband and his father. One of the questions before the court was whether a tenant in common who purchases an encumbrance against his property holds the encumbrance as a trustee for both himself and his cotenant. In its analysis, the court cited the “well recognized” rule, grounded in public policy, that the purchase of such an encumbrance by a tenant in common’s wife is tantamount to a purchase by the cotenant himself. See id., 564.

Skolnick, however, is distinguishable from the present case. In Skolnick, the funds used to purchase the encumbrance were those of the cotenant husband, whose wife merely endorsed his check and was assigned the property by the holder at his request. Here, by contrast, it was Buzzi as trustee, not Rossman, who purchased the note from JLM and assigned it to Consolidated, a company in which Rossman had no ownership interest. Moreover, the defendants in Skolnick were the comakers of the note and mortgage, whereas here, Rossman was not a maker of the note; he only guaranteed it, and his wife did not acquire it directly.

Furthermore, Skolnick relied for legal authority on four very early cases from other jurisdictions. Although our Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Skolnick, we cannot conclude that the principle recognized in Skolnick that “when a spouse of a tenant in common is the purchaser the same trust arises”; id.; necessarily applies in the present context. We have found no reported Connecticut case citing Skolnick since that opinion was issued in 1945. Even more significantly, our courts have issued several opinions since Skolnick that rely on a theory of agency and reflect a more contemporary approach to the legal ramifications of the marital relationship. See Botticello v. Stefanovicz, 177 Conn. 22, 26, 411 A.2d 16 (1979); Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Veneri, 157 Conn. 20, 24, 244 A.2d 401 (1968); Iodice v. Rusnak, 143 Conn. 244, 247, 121 A.2d 275 (1956); Bolmer v. Kocet, supra, 6 Conn. App. 611; Lovesky v. Zeligzon, supra, 20 Conn. App. 144. We, therefore, conclude that the court properly applied the law of agency in the circumstances here.

Ill

The defendants’ remaining claims that the court improperly (1) failed to conclude that the note could not be enforced after its acquisition by Rossman, (2) rendered judgment in favor of Fairway for the full amount due and (3) rendered judgment against the defendants on their cross claim and counterclaim all rest on the premise that Buzzi or Catherine Rossman acted as Rossman’s agent when the note was acquired by Buzzi, as trustee, and later by Consolidated. Given our conclusions in parts I and II of this opinion as to the absence of an agency relationship between Ross-man and either Buzzi or Catherine Rossman, we decline to review those claims.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion SCHALLER, J., concurred.

LAVERY, C. J.,

dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would conclude, on the basis of the facts found by the trial court, that it is inequitable and contrary to public policy to allow Robert Rossman’s attorney, Andrew Buzzi, Jr., and Rossman’s spouse, Catherine Rossman, to purchase the promissory note, guarantees and deficiency judgment at 10 percent of its face value for the purpose of protecting Robert Ross-man from the deficiency judgment, and then to seek payment based on its face value from two of the other guarantors.

I do not quarrel with either the majority or the trial court’s legal analysis of agency and how it applies to the facts in this case; rather, I am relying on equity. If Robert Rossman had himself purchased the note, guarantees and deficiency judgment, he would be subject to a contribution obligation to his fellow guarantors. Under the law of suretyship, when they guaranteed the bank’s loan to Mutual Communications Associates, Inc., Guardian Systems, Inc. (Guardian), Richard T. DeMarsico, Jerome G. Terracino and Robert Rossman became cosureties.

“Equity does not permit one tenant in common to buy in an outstanding title or incumbrance, and hold it for his exclusive benefit to the prejudice of his cotenants. Such a confidential relation with respect to the common property is said to exist between such tenants that it would be inequitable to allow one of them to do with respect to the property that which would be prejudicial to the others. Van Horne v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 388, 407 [1821]; Venable v. Beauchamp, 3 Dana [33 Ky.] 321 [1835]; Coburn v. Page, 105 Me. 458, 461, 74 Atl. 1026 [1909]; Rothwell v. Dewees, 2 Black (67 U.S.) 613, 618 [1862],

“A tenant in common who thus purchases an outstanding incumbrance or title is generally said to hold it in trust for all the cotenants in proportion to their respective shares of the common property. His cotenants, within a reasonable time, may elect whether they will contribute their equitable share and secure the benefit of the purchase. If they do not elect to contribute, the purchaser cannot compel them to do so, except to the extent of their interest in the common property.” Scanlon v. Parish, 85 Conn. 379, 381, 82 A. 969 (1912).

I conclude that, as a result of their status as cosureties on the original note, Robert Rossman, DeMarsico, Guardian and Terracino had fiduciary duties to each other with respect to the opportunity to reacquire the note. Section 55, comment a, p. 236, of the Restatement (Third), Suretyship and Guaranty, provides in relevant part: “When secondary obligors are cosureties . . . the relationship between them is such that they should share the cost of performance of their secondary obligations.” An illustration contained in the same section explains the situation more precisely: “P borrows $1,000 from C. SI and S2 are cosureties for P. SI and S2 agree that the contributive share of SI is $600 and [that] of S2 is $400. ... As between SI and S2, SI is a principal obligor to the extent of $600 and a secondary obligor to the extent of $400 .... Thus, SI has a right of contribution against S2 to the extent that SI has liability to C in excess of $600.” Restatement (Third), Suretyship and Guaranty § 55, comment a, p. 237 (1996).

The illustration contained in the Restatement clearly shows the principle that Robert Rossman can collect contribution only from the other guarantors, Guardian, Terracino and DeMarsico, and only to the extent that he paid more for the note, guaranties and deficiency judgment than his share (one third) of the original note. There being no evidence in this case that he paid in excess of that amount, I conclude that the defendants had no obligation to contribute and that the plaintiffs had no greater right to enforce the original note as against the defendants.

The trial court found that Consolidated Asset Management, LLC, was formed to protect the assets of Catherine Rossman and Robert Rossman. The shareholders of Consolidated consisted of only Catherine Rossman and the Rossman family attorney, Buzzi.

“A tenant in common who purchases an outstanding incumbrance holds it in trust subject to the election of his cotenants to contribute their equitable share and have the benefit of the purchase under certain conditions. Scanlon v. Parish, [supra, 85 Conn. 381], and authorities therein cited. [The defendant] . . . claims that when a spouse of a tenant in common is the purchaser the same trust arises. . . . [This rule] is well recognized, Robinson v. Lewis, 68 Miss. 69, 71, 8 So. 258 [1890]; Biggins v. Dufficy, 262 Ill. 26, 104 N.E. 180 [1914]; Abbott v. Williams, 74 W. Va. 652, 82 S.E. 1097 [1914]; note, 54 A.L.R. 879; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (3d Ed.), p. 292. The rule is based upon public policy in view of ‘the danger which lurks in allowing a wife to do what a husband could not, on account of his fiduciary relationship to the party affected.’ Seymour v. Seymour, 120 Misc. 525, 527, 199 N.Y.S. 23 [1923]; Robinson v. Lewis, supra.” Skolnick v. Skolnick, 131 Conn. 561, 564, 41 A.2d 452 (1945).

I would apply this doctrine of equity not only to the wife, Catherine Rossman, but also to attorney Buzzi, who represented both Rossmans. Buzzi represented Robert Rossman in June, 1997, in his unsuccessful attempt to purchase the note, guarantees and deficiency judgment. In July, Buzzi, as trustee, purchased the note, guarantees and deficiency judgment from JLM Services Corporation. In the same month, Buzzi sold them to Consolidated, whose officers were Buzzi and Catherine Rossman, with the full knowledge and acquiescence of Robert Rossman. Consolidated was formed solely to protect the assets of the Rossmans and stands to profit at the expense of the other sureties.

A foreclosure proceeding is an equitable proceeding. It would be inequitable for two guarantors to be held liable on the note and deficiency judgment while another escapes the obligation due to the actions of his spouse and family lawyer. The doctrine of Skolnick is not one of agency but of equity.

I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case with an order to allow the other guarantors the right of contribution on the purchase price that Consolidated paid for the note, guarantees and deficiency judgment.

       The defendants on appeal are Terracino and Guardian. We refer in this opinion to those defendants as the defendants.

       In a letter of disclosure from Buzzi to Rossman dated July 23, 1997, Buzzi stated that he acted as trustee for the Catherine Rossman Trust.

       The defendants’ arguments, although appealing, rest on factual claims that the trial court rejected. We cannot substitute our view of the evidence for the trial court’s finding that Rossman’s wife and attorney did not act on behalf of him, a finding that is not clearly erroneous.

       Restatement (Third), Suretyship and Guaranty § 53 (3), pp. 227-28 (1996), provides in relevant part: “In the absence of agreement between or among them, secondary obligors for the same underlying obligation are cosureties .. . .”

       Although DeMarsico was one of the guarantors of the note, he is not a party to this appeal.

       I acknowledge that since its publication over half a century ago, Skolnick has not been cited in any reported case. It is, however, a decision of our Supreme Court and, as such, retains the force of precedent unless and until it is overruled by that court, or by the legislature. “[T]his court will not reexamine or reevaluate Supreme Court precedent. Whether a Supreme Court holding should be reevaluated and possibly discarded is not for this court to decide.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maia, 48 Conn. App. 677, 683 n.8, 712 A.2d 956, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 918, 717 A.2d 236 (1998).


author: FLYNN, J.

text:
    LINDA ELF v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
    (AC 20874)
    Schaller, Flynn and O’Connell, Js.

      Argued June 12
    officially released October 23, 2001

      Vincent P. McCarthy, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Rosemary M. McGovern, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and William M. Brown, Jr., and Richard J. Lynch, assistant attorneys general, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

FLYNN, J.

The plaintiff, Linda Elf, appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision by the defendant department of public health (department) revoking her license to operate a family day care home. The plaintiff claims on appeal that the court improperly upheld the revocation of her license because (1) the department’s decision was not based on substantial evidence, (2) the court in reviewing the department’s decision applied the wrong standard of review, and (3) the plaintiff was denied due process and natural justice at the revocation proceedings and was subjected to an unconstitutional search of her facility. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The department’s hearing officer found the following facts. The plaintiff had been a licensed family day care operator for approximately fifteen years, and during the period immediately preceding the revocation of her license, operated a family day care home with a capacity for six children in the basement of her home in the Sandy Hook section of Newtown. On August 12, 1998, department investigators Sandra Lok and Patricia Galante, in response to an August 6, 1998 anonymous complaint alleging overcapacity, made a surprise inspection visit to the plaintiffs facility. The plaintiff signed a consent to inspect form and admitted the inspectors.

Upon entering the facility, the inspectors noted that ten children and three adult women were present. The plaintiff explained that two of the children were not ■under her care, but were only visiting the center with their mother. Shortly thereafter, those two children left the facility with one of the women. The plaintiff further told the investigators that another of the children was not a day care client, but was being cared for and given piano lessons by the other woman, who was the plaintiffs daughter, Courtney.

As Lok and Galante began conducting their inspection, the plaintiff made two telephone calls to women named Renee and Linda. She told them both that the inspectors were at her facility pursuing an overcapacity complaint and advised them to implement a telephone chain to alert other providers. Shortly thereafter, a woman identifying herself as Linda Simpson arrived at the facility to pick up one of the remaining eight children. She explained that she was that child’s regular day care provider and that she had just returned from vacation.

The inspectors requested that the plaintiff provide them with enrollment records for the children in her care. The plaintiff complied, and the inspectors viewed the records, which they found to be incomplete. The plaintiff and Lok left the basement to inspect the upper floor of the residence while Galante and Courtney stayed in the basement with the remaining seven children. Galante continued to review the records and to inspect the basement area.

No violations were identified in the other parts of the residence, and the plaintiff and Lok returned to the basement. The inspectors asked her to produce the records they found lacking, and informed her that she was being cited for overcapacity and incomplete records. The plaintiff began to search for the records. As she searched, Galante noticed a calendar on the wall, on which were inscribed names of children and instructors on the various days. Galante copied some of the information from the calendar to her notepad. That action concerned the plaintiff, who believed that Galante was acting outside of her authority and violating the plaintiffs and the children’s civil rights because she considered the information confidential. The plaintiff tried to see what Galante had written down, but Galante would not allow it.

The inspectors thereafter informed the plaintiff that the visit was over and requested that she sign a complaint investigation form. They apprised her that she would be provided with copies of some of the paperwork generated by the visit and could request anything she required further pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiff, believing that she was receiving unfair and illegal treatment, called the police. She told the inspectors that they were to stay until the police arrived, then latched the door through which the inspectors had entered and stood in front of it. The inspectors remained at the plaintiffs facility until a police officer arrived some ten to fifteen minutes later.

Newtown police officer Steve Ketchum arrived to find a “great deal of commotion” in the basement. As he tried to ascertain what had occurred, the plaintiff moved between him and the inspectors, speaking in a loud voice and gesturing at Galante and Lok. Ketchum moved the plaintiff aside and spoke with her for some time. He then interviewed Galante and Lok outside, speaking with each of them individually. Ketchum then consulted with his supervisor and requested additional assistance. When another officer arrived, the two entered the facility and informed the plaintiff that she was being arrested for disorderly conduct. After arrangements were made for someone else to supervise the children, the plaintiff was escorted outside, handcuffed and brought to the police station.

On August 14,1998, the department issued a summary suspension of the plaintiffs family day care license. The department cited the plaintiffs violations of the following sections of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies as the basis of the suspension: §§ 19a-87b-6 (b) (health); 19a-87b-6 (e) (personal qualities); 19a-87b-7 (e) (household environment); 19a-87b-10 (a) (capacity); 19a-87b-10 (b) (1) (child enrollment form); 19a-87b-10 (b) (2) (child health record); 19a-87b-10 (b) (3) (written permission from the parent); 19a-87b-10 (h) (3) (immediate attention); and 19a-87b-13 (c) (access to day care records). Those violations all stemmed from the August 12, 1998 inspection. As a result of the summary suspension, the plaintiff was required immediately to cease operation of her family day care facility. On August 15,1998, the plaintiff requested a formal hearing to contest the suspension. On August 28,1998, her attorney also requested a hearing on the plaintiffs behalf, asking that it be scheduled as soon as possible.

On September 2, 1998, before that hearing was held, the department informed the plaintiff that her license was being permanently revoked. In addition to outlining more fully the regulatory violations found on August 12,1998, the department cited prior violations as further bases for the revocation. Specifically, it noted that on March 9, 1998, the plaintiff had refused inspectors access to her entire residence and failed to provide complete records, and that on March 13,1998, the plaintiff had exceeded enrollment of children under age two while lacking a department approved assistant and failed to provide complete records. The department informed the plaintiff that it considered her to be in substantial noncompliance with Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § § 19a-87b-5 (e) (infant and toddler restriction); 19a-87b-6 (b) (health); 19a-87b-6 (e) (personal qualities); 19a-87b-7 (e) (household environment); 19a-87b-10 (a) (registered capacity and maintaining compliance with the regulations); 19a-87b-10 (b) (1) (enrollment form); 19a-87b-10 (b) (2) (general health record); 19a-87b-10 (b) (3) (written permission from the parent); 19a-87b-10 (h) (3) (immediate attention); 19a-87b-13 (b) (inspection of facility); and 19a-87b-13 (c) (inspection of records), and that such noncompliance was a sufficient basis for the revocation of her license.

The plaintiff requested a hearing on the proposed revocation and requested further that it be held simultaneously with the hearing on the summary suspension. On September 29,1998, the department held a combined hearing on the summary suspension and the license revocation. The plaintiff attended the hearing and was represented by counsel. Ketchum, inspectors Lok and Galante, the plaintiff, the plaintiffs three daughters, another inspector and several parents testified, and the parties submitted much documentary evidence.

The department hearing officer found that on August 12, 1998, during the inspection by Galante and Lok, the plaintiff ignored the children in her care, became increasingly angry and agitated, and created a dangerous situation. She found that several of the children in the plaintiffs care were upset or crying during the inspection, and that the plaintiff ignored them and generally failed to attend properly to their needs. The hearing officer found that the plaintiff had displayed poor judgment in a stressful situation and turned a routine investigation into an emergency event. She found not credible the plaintiffs testimony that she was frustrated but not angry, that the children were well attended, that the inspectors had overlooked records that were there and that not all of the children present on August 12, 1998, were day care children. The hearing officer noted the prior violations of March 9, 1998, and March 13,1998, and concluded that the department had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff had violated several regulations, which was sufficient to revoke her license.

Thereafter, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, the plaintiff appealed from the department’s decision to the Superior Court. The court found that the hearing officer’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the decision. The court considered that the department’s revocation action appeared to be based largely on technical and bookkeeping practices, but that regardless of the plaintiffs exemplary fifteen year record as a “competent, conscientious and caring day care provider” who never “created a danger to children in her care or fostered an unsafe or dangerous environment,” the substantial evidence standard was satisfied. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

We begin by emphasizing that our review of the court’s judgment upholding the department’s decision is narrow. “We review the issues raised by the plaintiff in accordance with the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the [Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.] Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 164, 635 A.2d 783 (1993); Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 3, 509 A.2d 489 (1986). ‘Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.’ . . . Dufraine v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 250, 259, 673 A.2d 101 (1996); Schallenkamp v. DelPonte, 229 Conn. 31, 40, 639 A.2d 1018 (1994). [Constrained by a narrow scope of review] [n] either this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact. Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S. Ct. 781, 93 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1986); Connecticut Natural Gas Corp. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 183 Conn. 128, 134, 439 A.2d 282 (1981). Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 164; New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 773, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988).” Dolgner v. Alander, 237 Conn. 272, 280-81, 676 A.2d 865 (1996).

“The substantial evidence rule governs judicial review of administrative fact-finding under the UAPA. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) (5) and (6). An administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence if the record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. v. Carothers, 218 Conn. 580, 593, 590 A.2d 447 (1991); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 51, 57, 591 A.2d 1231 (1991). The substantial evidence rule ‘imposes an important limitation on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency . . . and . . . provide [s] a more restrictive standard of review than standards embodying review of weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous action. . . . The United States Supreme Court, in defining substantial evidence in the directed verdict formulation, has said that it is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dolgner v. Alander, supra, 237 Conn. 281. With that standard in mind, we proceed to review the plaintiffs claims.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly affirmed the decision of the department revoking her family day care license because the department’s factual findings were neither supported by substantial evidence nor were its conclusions legally correct. We are not persuaded.

Our Supreme Court has found the substantial evidence standard unsatisfied where a hearing officer revoked a family day care license on the basis of evidence that consisted only of “conclusory and general statements,” and where “[t]he evidence presented at the hearings failed to disclose the factual particulars regarding inappropriate conduct that had occurred at the plaintiffs family day care home, the dates on which inappropriate conduct occurred, the frequency of inappropriate conduct or any other details concerning the plaintiffs alleged violations . . . .’’Id., 282. Further, because various reports containing more detailed information were not introduced into evidence at the hearing, the hearing officer in Dolgner “was not provided with an opportunity to assess and to weigh independently and adequately the accuracy and the reliability of the evidence presented.” Id.

That was not the case at the plaintiffs hearing. Our review of the record discloses that each of the hearing officer’s factual findings had a basis therein. The hearing officer heard consistent testimony from Galante, Lok and Ketchum regarding the events of August 12, 1998. Copies of the inspectors’ statements and Ketchum’s police report also were admitted into evidence, as was a six page descriptive narrative prepared by the inspectors for the department subsequent to the August 12, 1998 visit. Another inspector, Geneva Shields, testified as to past visits with the plaintiff when other violations were found. Detailed and dated department records pertaining to the plaintiff were admitted into evidence at the hearing. Those included a copy of the intake report for the anonymous complaint that prompted the August 12,1998 visit, the completed complaint investigation form for that visit, a home visit compliance form noting that on March 9,1998, the plaintiff had denied Shields access to her entire facility and failed to provide enrollment information, and Shields’ narrative describing the events of that day. Because of the extensive documentation and testimony supporting the hearing officer’s factual findings, we cannot say that the substantial evidence standard was unsatisfied.

The plaintiff and her daughters also testified as to the inspection of August 12,1998, and relayed a version of events markedly different from that of the investigators. Several of the parents of children that the plaintiff had cared for testified and spoke favorably of the plaintiffs skills as a day care provider and of her positive personal qualities, though each stated that they had not witnessed firsthand the events in question. The plaintiff also provided an eight page document entitled “Answer to Summary Suspension Allegations,” in which she addressed the department’s charges against her. She later submitted a twenty-three page document entitled “Rebuttal to Proposed Memorandum of Decision,” in which she addressed each of the hearing officer’s findings of fact.

It is clear from the hearing officer’s decision that she found the testimony and evidence presented by the department credible and that presented by the plaintiff not credible. We reiterate here that under the limited and deferential review afforded by the substantial evidence standard, which is embodied in our legislation and case law, neither the trial court nor this court may retry the case, substitute its judgment for that of the hearing officer or engage in independent evaluation of the weight of the evidence or questions of fact. “The credibility of witnesses and the determination of factual issues are matters within the province of the administrative agency, and, if there is evidence . . . which reasonably supports the decision of the [hearing officer], we cannot disturb the conclusion reached . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 58 Conn. App. 642, 661, 754 A.2d 828, cert. granted on other grounds, 254 Conn. 926, 761 A.2d 754 (2000).

The plaintiff also argues that the hearing officer’s decision was legally improper. After a review of the case law concerning the revocation of day care licenses, we cannot agree. Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 19a-87b-13 (b) requires that a “[family day care] provider . . . shall allow Department staff to inspect, upon request, any part of the family day care facility during the performance of a home visit,” and that “failure of the provider to allow a complete inspection may be grounds for the initiation of registration suspension or revocation proceedings.”

In Kagan v. Alander, 42 Conn. App. 92, 677 A.2d 1391, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 913, 682 A.2d 1001 (1996), we adopted the trial court’s decision in Kagan v. Alander, 44 Conn. Sup. 223, 680 A.2d 1015 (1994), affirming the revocation of the plaintiffs family day care license after she had refused to allow an investigator entry to inspect her facility during an unannounced visit. That refusal was the sole basis for the revocation of the plaintiffs license. The trial court in Kagan noted that the “regulations [governing family day care facilities] . . . require . . . acquiescence in the state inspection program, including . . . consent to unannounced spot inspections.” Id., 227-28; see also Brandon v. Dept. of Human Resources, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 920519272 (March 26, 1993) (8 C.S.C.R. 422), aff'd, 37 Conn. App. 903, 654 A.2d 389 (1995); Harris v. Alander, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 92-0067537 (October 22, 1993).

The record in this case supports the hearing officer’s finding that on March 9, 1998, the plaintiff denied an inspector access to part of her facility. Because the regulations and the case law establish that this alone is a ground for revocation of a provider’s license, we hold that the hearing officer’s decision to revoke the plaintiffs license was not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or in abuse of her discretion.

The plaintiff points out that the department, in revoking her license, made much of the fact that an infant was crying and that some of the other children became upset during the August 12, 1998 inspection, but that there was no evidence presented at the hearing that any child ever suffered any harm under her care. We note in that regard that the inspectors’ visit necessarily took the plaintiffs attention away from her child care responsibilities and easily could explain why the children became unsettled. Our review of the several parents’ testimony at the hearing disclosed nothing but laudatory comments regarding the care their children received at the plaintiffs facility. Nonetheless, we reiterate that “[o]ur ultimate duty [on review of an administrative agency decision] is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.” Dolgner v. Alander, supra, 237 Conn. 280. Because the department’s revocation of the plaintiffs license was premised on her earlier refusal to admit an inspector to her entire facility, which is an established ground for revocation, as well as on the events of August 12, 1998, we must conclude that the department acted within its discretion.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court misunderstood the standard of review of the department’s decision to revoke her license. She claims that it is clear that if the court had understood its power properly, it would have overturned the department’s decision. We disagree.

The court in articulating its standard of review of the department’s action noted the substantial evidence rule, citing to several cases in which that rule is outlined. It correctly deferred to the department’s factual findings pursuant to that rule. It is true that the court did not quote the portion of the standard requiring it to determine whether the department’s revocation of the plaintiffs license was “unreasonabl[e], arbitrar[y], [illegal] or in abuse of its discretion.” Id. Nonetheless, the court’s understanding of that standard is implicit in its upholding of the department’s action after concluding that the plaintiff had violated the regulations.

Our review of the court’s memorandum of decision convinces us that the court used the proper standard of review and correctly applied it to the hearing officer’s decision.

Ill

The plaintiff claims finally that her rights to due process of law and natural justice were violated by the procedures used by the department in the revocation of her family day care license and that the warrantless search of her facility violated the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. We disagree.

The plaintiff argues, in essence, that the department hearing officer was biased in favor of the department. She claims impropriety in the fact that the hearing officer is a department employee and urges that the hearing officer’s lack of neutrality is demonstrated by her findings of fact, which were predominantly unfavorable to the plaintiff.

It is well established that “[i]t is not violative of due process for the same authority which initiated the subject of the hearing to listen to and determine its outcome as long as that authority gives the person appearing before it a fair, open and impartial hearing. ... An administrative agency can be the investigator and adjudicator of the same matter without violating due process.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 151-52, 627 A.2d 1257 (1993). The fact that the investigators and the hearing officer both are employees of the department, standing alone, does not render the proceedings offensive to due process.

“The applicable due process standards for disqualification of administrative adjudicators [due to bias] do not rise to the heights of those prescribed for judicial disqualification. . . . The mere appearance of bias that might disqualify a judge will not disqualify an arbitrator. . . . Moreover, there is a presumption that administrative [officers] acting in an adjudicative capacity are not biased. ... To overcome the presumption, the plaintiff . . . must demonstrate actual bias, rather than mere potential bias, of the [hearing officer] challenged, unless the circumstances indicate a probability of such bias too high to be constitutionally tolerable. . . . The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a disqualifying interest.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 362, 613 A.2d 254 (1992).

To prove bias, the plaintiff “must make a showing that the [hearing officer] ha[d] prejudged adjudicative facts that [were] in dispute. ... A tribunal is not impartial if it is biased with respect to the factual issues to be decided at the hearing. . . . The test for disqualification has been succinctly stated as being whether a disinterested observer may conclude that [the hearing officer] has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Here, the plaintiff does not point to any indication of actual bias on the part of the hearing officer other than that she found facts that supported a revocation of the plaintiffs license. Instead, the plaintiff attacks the propriety of the structure of the department generally, arguing that the inherent potential for bias is constitutionally unacceptable. Because, as previously noted, the combination of investigatory and adjudicative functions within the same agency does not itself offend due process, the plaintiff has not satisfied her burden of showing that she suffered unconstitutional bias.

The plaintiff also argues that the manner in which her license was revoked was contrary to concepts of natural justice. In explaining the informal nature of hearings before an administrative body, our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he only requirement is that the conduct of the hearing shall not violate the fundamentals of natural justice. That is, there must be due notice of the hearing, and at the hearing no one may be deprived of the right to produce relevant evidence or to cross-examine witnesses produced by his adversary or to be fairly apprised of the facts upon which the board is asked to act.” Parsons v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 290, 292-93, 99 A.2d 149 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Ward v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 153 Conn. 141, 146-47, 215 A.2d 104 (1965); see also Grimes v. Conservation Commission, 243 Conn. 266, 274, 703 A.2d 101 (1997).

Here, the plaintiff received due notice of her hearing via a letter from the department that outlined extensively the charges against her, including the details of her alleged violations and citations to the regulatory sections it considered that she had violated. At that healing, she presented the testimony of several witnesses and submitted much documentary evidence. The plaintiff at all times was represented by counsel, who cross-examined the witnesses who testified for the department. Further, she was given full opportunity to respond in writing to the findings of fact embodied in the hearing officer’s proposed memorandum of decision. Consequently, the plaintiff’s assertion that she was denied due process and natural justice in the proceedings is ill founded.

The plaintiff last claims that the August 12, 1998 inspection was in violation of her fourth amendment rights. We disagree.

“It is well established that a [plaintiff bringing a] challenge to a duly enacted statute on the basis that it is unconstitutional carries a heavy burden. Indeed, constitutional flaws must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 79, 584 A.2d 1157 (1991). Regulations carry the force of statute and are similarly armored against constitutional challenge. Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, [supra, 200 Conn. 497].” Kagan v. Alander, supra, 44 Conn. Sup. 228.

The trial court in Kagan approved of the very type of inspection at issue here, rejecting a claim that the requirement of consenting to home inspections as a condition to maintaining a day care license was so coercive that it amounted to a warrantless search. The court noted that “[t]he regulations in question are designed to provide state officials immediate access to inspect private homes that have been licensed as places where other people’s children are cared for in the absence of their parents. . . . [T]he tender years of the children, their dependence on the provider, the potential for abuse, and the easy concealment of common dangers found in a private residence provide a rational basis for the requirement of spot inspections. . . . [T]he absence of parental supervision . . . provides strong support for state supervision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 229. The court concluded that the regulations served a rational purpose in protecting the public welfare, particularly the welfare of children, and had not been proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

The regulations governing family day care centers mandate that providers consent to regular inspections or face action against their licenses. The plaintiff argues that consent to an inspection “under threat of revocation” of her license cannot be constitutionally legitimate consent. We disagree. The plaintiffs right to pursue her chosen employment is not without limits, but is subject to the state’s exercise of its police power to protect the health and welfare of the public. See State v. Vachon, 140 Conn. 478, 101 A.2d 509 (1953). “[A]mong all the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws, none is more important [than the protection of public health]; and an imperative obligation rests on the state, through its proper instrumentalities or agencies, to take all necessary steps to promote this object.” 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Health § 1 (1999).

Precedent indicates that in the interest of protecting the public health, requiring consent to certain searches is an appropriate condition under similar circumstances. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973) (consent to airport search valid condition for engaging in air travel); State v. Taylor, 12 Conn. App. 427, 433, 531 A.2d 157 (1987) (consent to Breathalyzer test valid condition for maintaining driver’s license). We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff has not sustained her heavy burden of proving that the regulations allowing for inspections of family day care centers are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 19a-77 (a) (3) provides in relevant part: “A ‘family day care home’ . . . consists of a private family home caring for not more than six children, including the provider’s own children not in school full time .... During the regular school year, a maximum of three additional children who are in school full time, including the provider’s own children, shall be permitted, except that if the provider has more than three children who are in school full time, all of the provider’s children shall be permitted . . . .”

       The department later determined that this name was false.

       See General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § l-18a et seq., now § 1-200 et seq.

       The hearing officer found that the plaintiff had violated Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 19a-87b-5 (d) (1) (A) (terms of registration); 19a-87b-5 (e) (infant and toddler restriction); 19a-87b-6 (b) (health); 19a-87b-6 (e) (personal qualities); 19a-87b-7 (e) (household environment); 19a-87b-10 (a) (capacity); 19a-87b-10 (b) (1) (enrollment form); 19a-87b-10 (b) (2) (general health record); 19a-87b-10 (b) (3) (written permission from the parent); 19a-87b-10 (h) (3) (immediate attention); 19a-87b-13 (b) (inspection of facility); and 19a-87b-13 (c) (inspection of records).

       General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: “Appeal to Superior Court, (a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section. . .

       General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides in relevant part: “The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are ... (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment under subsection (k) of this section or remand the case for further proceedings. For purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment.”

       At the combined hearing on the summary suspension and proposed revocation of her license, and on appeal, the plaintiff argued that the department’s discretion to summarily suspend her license is narrower than its discretion to revoke the license and, therefore, the hearing officer was bound to consider the evidence pursuant to the more narrow standard. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the hearing officer was limited to considering only whether the events of August 12, 1998, endangered the children’s health, safety or welfare. We disagree.
      It is true that pursuant to subsection (c) of General Statutes § 4-182, which governs matters involving licenses, summary suspension, of a license is authorized “[i]f the agency finds that public health, safety or welfare imperatively requires emergency action . . . .” Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 19a-87e (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, however, “[t]he Commissioner of Public Health shall have the discretion to refuse to license ... a person to own, conduct, operate or maintain a family day care home ... or to suspend or revoke the license ... if the person who owns, conducts, maintains or operates the home . . . either fails to substantially comply with the regulations ... or conducts, operates or maintains the home in a manner which endangers the health, safety and welfare of the children receiving child day care services. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
      Nothing in the statutory scheme governing family day care requires that a license first be suspended before it is revoked. The plaintiff requested that both her summary suspension and the proposed revocation be the subject of the same hearing. Pursuant to § 19a-87e, revocation is an authorized response to aprovider’s substantial noncompliance with the regulations governing family day care facilities. Thus, the plaintiffs prior refusal to fully admit inspectors and her recordkeeping violations properly were subjects of the hearing.
      In addressing the plaintiffs claims, we will employ the standard of § 19a-87e and will limit the discussion to whether the department properly revoked her license because the issue of whether it properly summarily suspended her license is moot. “An issue is moot when the court can no longer grant any practical relief.” Twichell v. Guite, 53 Conn. App. 42, 52, 728 A.2d 1121 (1999). Because the plaintiffs license already has been revoked, a finding that the summary suspension was improper would afford her no practical relief.

       The fourth amendment to the United States constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.”

       Contrary to the plaintiffs assertions, authorization for inspections pursuant to the regulations is not limited to emergency situations, nor is the state’s interest limited to addressing imminent threats to day care children. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 19a-87b-13, 19a-87b-14. As such, the plaintiffs attempt to cast her challenge to the regulations authorizing inspections as an “as applied” challenge rather than as a facial attack is misplaced.