author: O’Connell, J.

text:
    Kathleen Cardillo v. Richard A. Cardillo, Executor (Estate of Emil J. Cardillo)
    (8503)
    O’Connell, Norcott and Landau, Js.

      Argued October 29, 1991
    decision released March 31, 1992

      Paul E. Potanka, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).

      John R. Caruso, for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).
   O’Connell, J.

This appeal and cross appeal arise from a dispute concerning the title to property owned by the plaintiff and Emil Cardillo (the decedent). The defendant, the executor of the decedent’s estate, claims that the trial court improperly directed a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the first count of the counterclaim. The plaintiffs cross appeal claims that the trial court improperly directed verdicts for the defendant on the first and second counts of her complaint. Because we hold that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over these claims, we need not consider the parties’ claims.

The plaintiff and decedent intermarried on June 17, 1967, and on August 8, 1968, purchased a parcel of real estate in Torrington, taking title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. On December 21, 1979, the couple’s marriage was dissolved by decree of the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield. The decree ordered the plaintiff to convey her one-half interest in the real estate to the decedent in return for which the decedent was to pay the plaintiff $11,250. Pursuant to the decree, the plaintiff signed a deed quitclaiming her interest in the real estate to the defendant. Her attorney was to hold the deed until the decedent paid the full $11,250 awarded by the court.

On February 14, 1980, the decedent executed a will that left the residue of his estate to be divided evenly between his children and grandchildren from a prior marriage. A few months later, in May, 1980, the parties reconciled and resumed living together in the former marital home. Although the decedent had paid the plaintiff approximately $7500 under the decree, upon their subsequent reconciliation, the plaintiff deposited the bulk of that money into a joint account for the couple’s use and the quitclaim deed remained in her attorney’s possession. Neither party took any further action to enforce the judgment.

The decedent died on July 29, 1985, and his will was admitted to probate without objection. The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action seeking certain relief concerning title to the property and recompense for funeral expenses and other payments made on the decedent’s behalf. The defendant executor filed a counterclaim seeking conveyance to himself as executor of the estate of the plaintiff’s share of the real estate and for other money allegedly owed by the plaintiff to the estate. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant on the counts of the complaint concerning the title to the property and directed verdicts for the plaintiff on the counts of the counterclaim concerning the property’s title. The effect of the trial court’s action left the title to the real estate unchanged.

We begin our analysis by noting that the plaintiff brought this action against the executor of the estate of Emil J. Cardillo asking, inter alia, that the court enter a decree that she “owns the [property] in fee simple and that the decedent’s estate has no estate, right, title, lien, or interest in said property.” The executor, in his fiduciary capacity, was the sole named defendant. None of the devisees was a party to the action. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim must fail.

It is fundamental jurisprudence that title to real estate vests immediately at death in a deceased’s heirs, or in devisees upon the admission of the will to probate. Satti v. Rago, 186 Conn. 360, 365, 441 A.2d 615 (1982); O’Connor v. Chiascione, 130 Conn. 304, 306-308, 33 A.2d 336 (1943). The recording of a probate certificate of devise or descent is necessary only to perfect marketable title. That certificate furnishes evidence that the heir’s or devisee’s title is no longer in danger of being cut off by a probate sale to pay debts of the estate and also because it furnishes a record of who received the title. Such a probate certificate is not a muniment of title, however, but merely a guide or pointer for clarification of the record. Hewitt v. Sanborn, 103 Conn. 352, 374, 130 A. 472 (1925); G. Wilhelm, Connecticut Estate Practice, Settlement of Estates (1974) § 22; Connecticut Bar Association, Standards of Title § 13.1 (1980). The fiduciary of the decedent’s estate does not take title to the real estate; Ryder v. Lyon, 85 Conn. 245, 252, 82 A. 573 (1912); and a fiduciary has no right to interfere with the devolution of title unless the property is needed to satisfy claims against the estate. Brill v. Ulrey, 159 Conn. 371, 269 A.2d 262 (1970). There is no allegation here that the estate needed the property to pay claims. Accordingly, although the plaintiff is correct that the defendant executor has no title to the property, it is because of the principle of immediate devolution of title and not because of her arguments pertaining to alleged agreement with the deceased concerning the title after their reconciliation.

The plaintiff’s claim for relief, which asked that the court enter a decree that the plaintiff own the property in fee simple, must fail for the same reason. It is axiomatic that an action to determine title to real estate must include all parties in interest. See General Statutes § 47-31 (b); Swenson v. Dittner, 183 Conn. 289, 292, 439 A.2d 334 (1981). Because title had already vested in the devisees, it was not possible to determine the property’s ownership in an action in which the devisees were not parties. The effect of declaring the plaintiff to be the sole owner in fee simple would be to deprive the devisees of their shares of title in an action in which they were not parties. That the devisees were aware of the proceeding and that some of them testified as witnesses is irrelevant. The devisees’ rights to the property cannot be authoritatively determined where they were not joined. Mihalczo v. Woodmont, 175 Conn. 535, 400 A.2d 270 (1978). Accordingly, we conclude that those counts of the plaintiff’s complaint that sought conveyance of the real estate to her should have been dismissed by the trial court.

We turn now to the counterclaim. The record discloses that the defendant, as executor of the estate, filed a counterclaim seeking to have the court compel the plaintiff to abide by the dissolution judgment and the unrecorded quitclaim deed, and to transfer title to him. The estate is precluded, however, from bringing a counterclaim against the plaintiff’s one-half interest in the real estate unless it alleged that the property was necessary to satisfy claims against the estate. Brill v. Ulrey, supra. Because such an allegation is lacking here, the defendant failed to state a cause of action properly. Having no interest in the real estate, the issues of his counterclaim seeking conveyance of the real estate must fail.

Because we find that both the complaint and counterclaim were improperly brought before the trial court, we do not reach the issues raised by the parties in the challenges to the court’s directed verdicts.

The judgment is reversed in part and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss counts one and two of the complaint and count one of the counterclaim.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       In the first count of the counterclaim, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff failed to convey title to the parties’ real estate to him as executor of the decedent’s estate by virtue of an executed quitclaim deed retained by the plaintiffs counsel and by virtue of the judgment of dissolution.

       In the first count of the plaintiff’s complaint, she alleges that she and the decedent agreed to resume cohabitation after their dissolution upon condition that the decedent would transfer any right, title, and interest he held in the property to the plaintiff. She alleges that she relied on that agreement to her detriment and that the defendant has refused to honor her claim to the real estate.
      In the second count of the plaintiffs complaint, she alleges that the decedent’s failure to convey the real estate to her resulted in an unjust enrichment of the decedent and his heirs.

       The plaintiff argues that this action was not an action to quiet title pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31 et seq. We agree, but reach no conclusion regarding whether such an action could be brought to clear up all doubts and disputes about this title.

       The trial court also directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on an allegation of undue influence. The jury reached a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the remaining issue of whether the estate should reimburse the plaintiff for the debts of the decedent that she paid. These counts were not appealed.

       The standards of title “establish the custom in the legal community . . . [but] are not controlling, contractually or otherwise.” Carter v. Girasuolo, 34 Conn. Sup. 507, 510, 373 A.2d 560 (1976).

       We note that the balance of the $11,250 awarded to the plaintiff under the dissolution judgment was never paid. We therefore question whether the plaintiff had an obligation under the dissolution judgment to convey her interest to the decedent and now to his devisees.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Daly, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    William Milardo v. Inland Wetlands Commission of the Town of Haddam et al.
    (9961)
    Daly, Foti and Freedman, Js.
    Argued January 7
    decision released March 31, 1992

      Thomas P. Byrne, for the appellant-appellee (named defendant).

      Vincent T. McManus, Jr., for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).
   Daly, J.

The named defendant Haddam inland wetlands commission appeals from the trial court’s decision reversing the commission’s denial of the plaintiff’s permit application. The commission claims that the trial court improperly found that its denial of the plaintiff’s permit was not supported by substantial evidence. In his cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that, after concluding that the denial of the application was arbitrary, the trial court should have determined whether the evidence supported an order to grant the application. In essence, the plaintiff claims that the court should have granted his application if it found that there was substantial evidence supporting the application, instead of remanding the case to the commission for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The trial court found the following facts. The plaintiff’s agent sought a permit to conduct regulated activities in certain wetlands located in the town of Haddam. The permit proposed the construction of a driveway crossing the wetlands. The permit also requested permission to build a single-family house with an on-site well and septic system on the plaintiffs property. There were a series of hearings held by the commission concerning the plaintiffs permit. The commission rejected the plaintiffs permit application at a meeting on February 8, 1990.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-43, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the commission’s denial of his application for a permit. The court, after reviewing the evidence, concluded that, on the basis of the minutes of the February 8, 1990 meeting, the commission properly considered the statutory factors listed in General Statutes § 22a-41 (a) and gave its reasons for denying the permit on the record as required by General Statutes § 22a-42a (d).* ** The court reviewed the transcript of the public hearings of December 11, 1989, and January 8, 1990, concerning the plaintiffs application. It found that the transcript contained many omissions, mistakes and gaps which rendered them “incomprehensible.” These transcripts failed to provide any evidential support for the commission’s action. There was no transcript of the February 8, 1990 meeting. The court then reviewed the minutes from all of the public hearings involving the plaintiff’s permit. The minutes of these meetings provided a sufficient record of what occurred to enable the court to determine if there was substantial evidence to support any of the commission’s findings. After reviewing the remaining evidence, the court concluded that the denial of the permit was not supported by substantial evidence. The court sustained the plaintiff’s appeal and remanded the action to the commission for further proceedings.

The commission claims that there was substantial evidence on the record to support its denial of the permit. According to the commission’s argument, the trial court substituted its own judgment for that of the agency’s judgment in sustaining the plaintiff’s appeal. We disagree.

The trial court must search the record of the agency hearings to determine whether there was an adequate basis for the inland wetlands commission’s decision. Gagnon v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 213 Conn. 604, 611, 569 A.2d 1094 (1990); Kaeser v. Conservation Commission, 20 Conn. App. 309, 312, 567 A.2d 383 (1989). The agency is responsible for assessing witnesses’ credibility and reviewing factual findings. Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171 Conn. 705, 708, 372 A.2d 110 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S. Ct. 2930, 53 L. Ed. 2d. 1066 (1977). This court will not disturb an agency decision as long as there is substantial evidence in support of any one reason given for the agency’s action. Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 539-40, 525 A.2d 940 (1987); Tanner v. Conservation Commission, 15 Conn. App. 336, 339, 544 A.2d 258 (1988).

We agree with the trial court that the transcripts of the December 11, 1989 and January 8, 1990 public hearings are inadequate and fail to provide any support for the commission’s denial of the application. Both transcripts fail to identify the speakers and are replete with omissions. The transcripts reveal that there was some questioning of the plaintiff’s proposal to build a culvert across the wetlands. The commission members, for example, inquired about whether a bridge would better preserve the wetlands area. There was, however, no final resolution of this concern placed on the record by the members during these meetings.

The minutes of the meetings held by the commission concerning this application also failed to provide substantial evidence supporting the commission’s denial of the permit. According to the minutes of the November 13, 1989 meeting, three members of the commission visited this site. One member expressed his concern about the proposal to another member. There was, however, no mention of what this concern specifically related to regarding the plaintiff’s proposal nor were there any findings in the record concerning the visit conducted by the members. The minutes of the December 11, 1989 meeting indicate that the plaintiff was questioned about his intention to use the twenty-four inch concrete culvert for the driveway crossing over the stream. The commission members asked whether a bridge should be used instead of a culvert, but there was no reason stated for suggesting why the bridge would be better than the culvert. The minutes of the January 8,1990 meeting indicated that the plaintiff was questioned further about the sheet flow that would result from the building of the culvert across the stream. The plaintiff responded that he had not done any calculations with regard to the sheet flow. One member expressed concern that the plaintiffs proposal would result in an island being created during heavy flow which could lead to erosion. The member felt that the use of a bridge instead of a culvert would probably cure this problem and prevent the occurrence of erosion.

A letter from the town engineer concerning the plaintiffs proposal was also entered into the record at this meeting. On the basis of his initial review, the town engineer stated that the plaintiffs proposal appeared to be satisfactory. The town engineer was unable to give formal approval because of a backlog of cases. The letter indicated that the detailed analysis of the proposal probably would be completed by the end of January, 1990. The final conclusion reached by the town engineer regarding the plaintiffs proposal was not made a part of this record. The minutes of the February 8, 1990 meeting provide some evidence of the commission’s reasons for denying the permit. One member voiced his concerns for the wetlands crossings and possible damage from the plaintiff’s proposal. There was no listing in the minutes of what these concerns were or the possible damage that might occur. There was also no basis given for the member’s concerns. Another member of the commission stated, “This is an extremely valuable wetlands because of the constancy of water. This would disrupt one of the best areas for small animals.” Again there was no basis given for this opinion, which contradicts the expert testimony offered by the plaintiff.

Section 10.5 of the Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Regulations of the town of Haddam prohibits the commission from using material or evidence not part of the public hearing record in reaching its decision. The record reveals that members of the commission conducted two visits to the plaintiffs land. “Knowledge obtained through personal observations of the locus may properly be considered by the agency in arriving at reasons given for its denial.” Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, supra, 547. The record does not contain any findings concerning the on-site inspections of the plaintiffs land. It is unclear what the commission discovered because there is no discussion on the record about these visitations. In order to use the knowledge gained from the visits, the commission was required by its regulations to make its findings part of the record.

The commission argues that this case is controlled by our decision in Kaeser v. Conservation Commission, supra. In Kaeser, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s finding that there was substantial evidence supporting the commission’s denial of the plaintiffs’ application. In its denial, the commission stated that “ ‘the proposed activity will create conditions which may significantly and adversely effect the health, welfare and safety of the community and the Mill River environment.’ ” Id., 311. The plaintiffs in Kaeser argued that this reason was “merely a conclusory statement and not a reason for denying a permit.” Id. Our search of the record in Kaeser revealed that there was substantial evidence supporting the commission’s denial of the plaintiffs’ application.

The facts of Kaeser v. Conservation Commission, supra, are distinguishable from the facts of this case. The record in Kaeser revealed that there was a report by a conservation enforcement officer recommending the denial of the plaintiffs’ application. Id., 312. An engineer retained by the commission also suggested alterations to the plaintiffs’ proposal but the record failed to indicate whether the plaintiffs incorporated these alterations into their proposal. Id. In the present case, there is nothing in the record from any public officials recommending a denial of the plaintiff’s application because of its detrimental effect on the wetlands. In fact, the town engineer’s initial review approved of the plaintiff’s proposal.

At the four public hearings held in Kaeser, several neighboring landowners testified about their fear of flooding and concerns that the plaintiffs’ proposal would increase the flooding. Id., 315. In this case, none of the neighboring landowners, all of whom were notified, appeared at any of the hearings to oppose the plaintiffs application. The plaintiffs in Kaeser were also given a chance to offer additional evidence after the commission denied their application but the plaintiffs failed to take advantage of this opportunity. Id. In Kaeser, there was no contrary expert testimony rebutting the plaintiffs’ expert testimony in support of their application. Expert testimony was unnecessary in Kaeser because there was substantial evidence on the record offered by nonexperts to justify the commission’s denial of the plaintiffs’ application. The record evidence in the present case, both from experts and nonexperts, fails to establish substantial evidence in support of the commission’s denial of the plaintiff’s application.

Our Supreme Court has stated that “a lay commission acts without substantial evidence, and arbitrarily, when it relies on its own knowledge and experience concerning technically complex issues ... in disregard of contrary expert testimony . . . .” Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 429, 429 A.2d 910 (1980). The determination of what constitutes an adverse impact on a wetlands is considered to be a technically complex issue. See Tanner v. Conservation Commission, supra, 341. In Tanner, this court upheld the trial court’s finding that a denial of the application was not supported by substantial evidence since all of the expert testimony was to the effect that the proposed activity would not adversely affect the wetlands.

In this case, the plaintiff submitted a report conducted by a certified soil scientist and environmental consultant that concluded that “the proposed house and septic system will have minimal impact on the present functioning of the wetland . . . .” The report by the plaintiff’s expert states that the location of the house and septic system would not threaten any rare or endangered species, nor would it inhibit access for wildlife travel. A soil test conducted by this expert indicated that the installation of a septic system would be feasible. It also found that “[t]he proposed twenty-five foot wetland setback buffer would further protect the functioning of the wetlands system on this site.” There was no expert evidence in the record that contradicted the expert evidence submitted by the plaintiff. “While we recognize that an administrative agency is not required to believe any of the witnesses, including expert witnesses . . . it must not disregard the only expert evidence available on the issue when the commission members lack their own expertise or knowledge.” (Citation omitted.) Tanner v. Conservation Commission, supra.

On the basis of this record, we conclude that, although the commission did give its reasons for denying the plaintiffs permit, these reasons were not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the trial court’s decision that the commission’s denial of the plaintiff’s permit was arbitrary is correct.

The plaintiff in his cross appeal claims that the trial court was required to search the record to determine whether his application should have been granted. The plaintiff argues that the trial court should not have remanded the case to the agency if it determined on the basis of the evidence presented that the application should be granted. We reject the plaintiff’s argument and affirm the trial court’s order remanding this case to the agency for further proceedings.

Under Connecticut law “[w]hen agency action is overturned . . . because of invalid or insufficient findings . . . a court must ordinarily remand the matter under consideration to the agency for further consideration.” Feinson v. Conservation Commission, supra, 429-30. “When it appears, however, that the [agency] could reasonably reach only one conclusion, the court may direct the [agency] to do that which the conclusion requires.” Chevron Oil Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 170 Conn. 146, 153, 365 A.2d 387 (1976). In Chevron, the trial court’s order directing the zoning board of appeals to grant'the variance sought by the plaintiff was proper because if the variance were not granted the application of the zoning regulation would have been “tantamount to confiscation.” Id. Thus, the granting of the variance was the only reasonable action in that case.

The plaintiff argues that the commission’s denial was tantamount to a confiscation. According to the plaintiff’s argument, the only way to gain access to the land is by crossing the wetlands. Once the commission refused to grant a permit with or without conditions, the plaintiff was denied access to the land and was prevented from developing it. The plaintiff points out that the minutes of the February 8,1990 meeting indicate that one member of the commission requested a motion to approve the plaintiffs application with conditions. No one moved to approve the application with conditions. The plaintiff claims that the failure to impose conditions on his application such as requiring the use of a bridge instead of a culvert signified that the commission would not grant an application to cross the wetlands under any conditions.

The trial court reasoned that because the commission initially denied the plaintiffs application, the commission was not obligated by § 22a-41 (b) to determine whether a feasible and prudent alternative to the plaintiffs proposal existed. The plaintiff argues that there is no alternative because he must cross the wetlands to gain access to the properly. The plaintiff fails to point to any evidence in the record showing that his proposal for the use of a culvert and its location was the only feasible method for crossing the wetlands.

We conclude that a remand to the agency is necessary on the basis of A.D.A.M. Land Development Corporation v. Conservation Commission, 21 Conn. App. 122, 572 A.2d 364 (1990). There, the trial court found that the commission failed to consider part of a plaintiff’s application seeking permission for two separate wetlands crossings. A report by the commission’s engineer approved the western wetlands crossing as the only feasible alternative. Id., 126. Although, the evidence indicated that there was no feasible alternative to the plaintiffs proposal, we still remanded the case so that the commission could determine if § 22a-41 (b) was satisfied. Id., 126-27. Here, the record contains no evidence to indicate whether there are any feasible alternatives to the plaintiffs proposal. On the basis of this record, we are unable to find that the granting of the plaintiffs permit is the only reasonable conclusion that the commission can reach. Thus, the trial court’s properly remanded this case to the commission.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The other defendants included the Connecticut department of environmental protection, the town of Haddam and the conservation enforcement officer for the town of Haddam. These other defendants are not involved in this appeal.

       The commission denied the application on the basis of its application of General Statutes § 22a-41. The defendant found that:
      “1. Significance of the Environmental impact of the activity.
      a. a large wetland crossing is required
      b. inability to develop the site without encroaching on the buffer zone set backs
      “2. The unsuitability of the area to the use proposed.
      a. the site is largely wetland and the only buildable area is severely limited by wetland setbacks.
      “3. Balance between benefit and loss is very poor.
      a. the project proposes no environmental benefits and at the same time there is a loss of wetland and possible addition of impacts on the wetlands after construction by situation and septic tank failures.
      “4. It is an irreversible use of resources and it is short term use of the environment with no enhancement of long term productivity.
      a. the project provides a long term irreversible loss of wetland and associated habitat.”

       General Statutes § 22a-41 (a) provides: “In carrying out the purposes and policies of sections 22a-36 to 22a-45, inclusive, including matters relating to regulating, licensing and enforcing of the provisions thereof, the commissioner shall take into consideration all relevant facts and circumstances, including but not limited to:
      (1) The environmental impact of the proposed action;
      (2) The alternatives to the proposed action;
      (3) The relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity;
      (4) Irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed activity;
      (5) The character and degree of injury to, or interference with, safety, health or the reasonable use of property which is caused or threatened; and
      (6) The suitability or unsuitability of such activity to the area for which it is proposed.”

       General Statutes § 22a-42a (d) provides in pertinent part: “In granting, denying or limiting any permit for a regulated activity the inland wetlands agency shall consider the factors set forth in section 22a-41, and such agency shall state upon the record the reason for its decision. In granting a permit the inland wetlands agency may grant the application as filed or grant it upon such terms, conditions, limitations or modifications of the regulated activity, designed to carry out the policy of sections 22a-36 to 22a-45, inclusive. . . .”

       General Statutes § 22a-41 (b) provides: “In the case of an application which received a public hearing, a permit shall not be issued unless the commissioner finds that a feasible and prudent alternative does not exist. In making his finding the commissioner shall consider the facts and circumstances set forth in subsection (a). The finding and the reasons therefor shall be stated on the record.”


author: Norcott, J.

text:
    State of Connecticut v. William Guckian
    (9539) (9540)
    Dupont, C. J., Daly, O’Connell, Norcott, Foti, Lavery, Landau, Heiman and Freedman, Js.

      Argued January 15
    decision released March 31, 1992

      Jack W. Fischer, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Eugene J. Callahan, state’s attorney, Michael E. O’Hare, former deputy assistant state’s attorney, and Robert Katz, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

      Lawrence D. Church, with whom, on the brief, was Cheryl Brienza Cook, for the appellee (defendant).
   Norcott, J.

The state appeals, with the trial court’s permission, from the judgment granting the defendant credit toward his prison sentence. The credit was based on the court’s determination that the defendant was eligible for state sponsored alcoholism treatment, after he pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) and violating his probation contrary to General Statutes § 53a-32.

The state claims the trial court (1) improperly found that a violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) is a crime within the meaning of Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390 (the Act), (2) made factual determinations that are improper under the Act, (3) failed to sentence the defendant as mandated by General Statutes § 14-215 (c), and (4) unlawfully sentenced the defendant for violating his probation.

A panel of three judges of this court initially heard arguments in this case in November, 1991. Thereafter, we requested, sua sponte, further argument en banc on the issue of whether a violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) constitutes a crime for purposes of the Act. We now affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, and reverse it in part.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On November 28,1989, the defendant appeared before the trial court, McGrath, J., and pleaded guilty to charges of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a), and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months imprisonment on each count, execution suspended, and placed on probation for one year. The defendant’s right to operate a motor vehicle also was suspended for one year pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227a (h).

In March, 1990, the defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c). As a result, he was charged in April, 1990, with violation of his probation under the provisions of General Statutes § 53a-32. He was released from custody on a promise to appear in court, subject to the condition that he cooperate with a substance abuse counseling program known as Neon in obtaining a drug and alcohol evaluation.

Counselors at Neon referred the defendant to another program, the Meridian Center, where it was determined that he needed residential treatment. As a result, the defendant was referred to the Berkshire Woods Chemical Dependence Treatment Center in Newtown, which he voluntarily entered in May, 1990, as a patient in its alcohol abuse program. After successfully completing the program, he was discharged on August 3, 1990.

On August 16, 1990, the defendant returned to court, where the trial court, Bingham, J., granted his motion for an examination pursuant to § 3 of the Act to determine if he was drug or alcohol dependent with respect to both the probation violation and operating under suspension charges. The state objected, and its exception was duly noted.

On August 23, 1990, the court heard testimony about the defendant’s evaluations from Kenneth Hodge, a substance abuse counselor at Neon. Hodge testified that the defendant is an alcoholic, and that he needed and would benefit from further treatment. When the defendant requested credit toward his sentence for the violations of General Statutes §§ 14-215 (c) and 53a-32 under § 9 of the Act* * for the time spent in residential treatment at Berkshire Woods, the state renewed its objections, which the trial court overruled.

The state then raised further objections when the court indicated it construed § 9 as authorizing the granting of credit. The state argued that § 9 (e) does not permit the court to grant credit toward completion of the defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence. The state also argued that § 9 (c) permits the court to order treatment as a condition of probation, but does not permit the court to order treatment in lieu of incarceration.

Before ruling on the state’s objections, the court put the defendant to plea. He thereupon pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension and admitted having violated the terms of his probation. After further argument from the parties, the court ruled that the Act was applicable to the defendant’s case. The court found that the defendant had been treated in a licensed, state-run program between May, 1990, when he was admitted, and August, 1990, when he was discharged. The court then entered findings, pursuant to § 9 (b), that the defendant was alcohol dependent at the time of the crime, that there was a relationship between the dependency and the crime, and that the defendant needed and was likely to benefit from treatment. The court also found that the defendant was eligible for treatment under § 9 and that he met the criteria for probation.

After canvassing the defendant, the court accepted his guilty plea to the operating under suspension charge and imposed sentence. The defendant was fined $500 and given a six month prison term, execution suspended after thirty days, with probation for eighteen months. The court then granted the defendant credit for thirty days based on the time spent at Berkshire Woods. After another canvass to determine if the defendant had voluntarily admitted violating his probation, the court opened and vacated the judgment by which the probation was imposed. It then sentenced the defendant to six months imprisonment, execution suspended, and eighteen months probation. No mittimus was issued.

On November 30, 1990, the state moved for articulation of the trial court’s rulings, and on May 15,1991, the trial court issued an articulation. This appeal followed.

I

Whether Operating Under Suspension Is a Crime Under General Statutes §§ 17a-648 Through 17a-658

The state first claims the trial court improperly found the defendant eligible for state sponsored alcoholism treatment because only people charged with or convicted of a “crime” are within the scope of the Act’s coverage. The state argues that under State v. Brown, 22 Conn. App. 108, 575 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811, 580 A.2d 61 (1990), and State v. Kluttz, 9 Conn. App. 686, 521 A.2d 178 (1987), a violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) is not a “crime” but a “motor vehicle violation” within the meaning of our penal code’s definitional scheme, General Statutes §§ 53a-24 through 53a-27.

We begin with a brief discussion of the pertinent case law as a basis of our analysis. In State v. Anonymous (1980-5), 36 Conn. Sup. 527, 528, 416 A.2d 168 (1980), the Appellate Session of the Superior Court held that a violation of General Statutes § 14-227a is a “crime.” The court noted that although our statutes do not define “motor vehicle violation,” a “violation” is defined as “[a]n offense, for which the only sentence authorized is a fine . . . unless expressly designated an infraction. General Statutes § 53a-27 (a).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 530. The court reasoned that a violation of § 14-227a is a “crime” because it could not qualify as a “motor vehicle violation,” since it is punishable by imprisonment as well as a fine.

Seven years later in State v. Kluttz, supra, this court determined that “motor vehicle violations” are not “crimes” under our penal code’s definitional statutes because “offense,” as defined in General Statutes § 53a-24 (a), excludes “motor vehicle violations.” Id., 692-93. We held that negligent homicide with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-222a is not an “offense” or a “crime” within the meaning of General Statutes § 53a-24 (a), but that it is an offense for purposes of our lesser included offense doctrine. State v. Brown, supra, 111. “We reasoned that ‘[w]hat may- or may not be a criminal offense for purposes of a particular statutory categorization is not necessarily determinative of whether it is a criminal offense for purposes of the lesser included offense doctrine. . . . Whether the lesser included offense doctrine should apply to include a transgression of the law which the legislature has categorized for certain purposes as noncriminal depends, not on that categorization, but on the functions and purposes of the doctrine itself.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id., 111-12.

More recently in State v. Brown, supra, we held that a violation of General Statutes § 14-227a is a violation of the criminal law for purposes of a defendant’s conditions of probation. Id., 112. As in State v. Kluttz, supra, our analysis focused not on the legislature’s categorization of the law, but on the functions and purposes of the matter at issue, which was probation. We found that the central concerns of probation are rehabilitation of the probationer and the safety of the community, both of which were addressed as part of the defendant’s probation. Because the law that was violated, General Statutes § 14-227a, proscribed the type of conduct contemplated by the probation order, we held that General Statutes § 14-227a constituted a “criminal law” for purposes of the defendant’s probation. State v. Brown, supra, 113.

In the matter before us today, the state argues with great force that we must adhere to our determination in State v. Kluttz, supra, that “motor vehicle violations” are not “crimes” and find that the trial court incorrectly determined that a violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) is a “crime” within the meaning of Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390. The state contends that when the legislature drafted the Act it was aware of the holding in State v. Anonymous (1980-5), supra, and thus intended to exempt from its coverage a specific “crime,” rather than a “motor vehicle violation.” The state further argues that because the Act was adopted two years after Kluttz, which it asserts did not overrule State v. Anonymous (1980-5), supra, the legislature drafted the measure in light of the Kluttz interpretation of the term “crime.”

Although the state’s argument at first blush is enticing, a closer look reveals that it fails to account for the holding and rationale of State v. Kluttz, supra. The state’s argument overlooks that in Kluttz, and later in Brown, we eschewed rigid application of our penal code’s definitional statutes and instead considered them in the context of the matter at hand, along with the functions and purposes of the laws at issue. If the legislature was aware of the Kluttz interpretation of the word “crime” when it adopted Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390, it also was aware of the rationale behind our holding that a “motor vehicle violation” under the penal code’s definitional statutes can nevertheless be an offense for purposes of the lesser included offense doctrine. The legislature is presumed to be mindful of judicial construction that is relevant to any legislation it enacts. Wilson v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Conn. 532, 539, 569 A.2d 40, cert. denied, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 52, 112 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1990); Murach v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 196 Conn. 192, 200 n.14, 491 A.2d 1058 (1985). It is presumed to know “all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or nonaction will have upon any one of them,” and it is “presumed to have intended that effect.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 197, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989). We must conclude, then, that in drafting Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390, the legislature was aware of the rationale underlying Kluttz, as well as its holding, and chose to leave them intact. Because the state offers no compelling reason to abandon the mode of analysis employed in Kluttz and Brown, we decline to do so now. Whether the word “crime” as used in the penal code includes motor vehicle violations, our case law indicates that a motor vehicle offense is a crime for purposes of accelerated rehabilitation, as in Anonymous (1980-5), for purposes of lesser included offense analysis, as in Kluttz, and for purposes of probation conditions, as in Brown. The question of this case is whether a motor vehicle offense is a “crime” for purposes of Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390.

In ascertaining the functions and purposes of Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390, our careful review of its legislative history discloses that it was adopted in response to the pervasive problems in our society brought on by burgeoning drug and alcohol abuse. The Act affords certain substance abusers an opportunity for state sponsored treatment as an alternative to the traditional odyssey through our already crowded criminal justice system. To implement its intentions, the legislature earmarked approximately $27 million for more beds in treatment facilities, and for improvements in our judicial system and police forces statewide. It also provided for procedures for substance abuse evaluations of defendants, and their subsequent placement and monitoring in state approved treatment facilities.

While we agree with the parties that much of the legislative history is not helpful, our review discloses that several of the Act’s sponsors on the floor of the Senate addressed its underlying purposes and rationale. Senator John C. Daniels stated that the bill “represents a major, a major assault on drugs in the state of Connecticut.” 32 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1989 Sess., p. 3630. The remarks of Senator Anthony V. Avallone yield insight into the legislature’s objective of promoting the use of treatment programs for those who qualify. Discussing the enormous demand for treatment of drug and alcohol related problems, Senator Avallone stated that many substance abusers often resort to violating the law deliberately so that they can be arrested because they believe that is the only way they can gain admittance to treatment programs. “For every bed that’s filled,” Senator Avallone remarked, “there are hundreds of people out there looking for help. And when they get into the Criminal Justice System, instead of it being [a] funnel . . . unfortunately it’s a hole into which they drop.” 32 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1989 Sess., p. 3639. Additionally, Representative Richard D. Tulisano stated on the floor of the House of Representatives that the Act establishes “a drug rehabilitation system for people who come into the criminal justice system.” 32 H.R. Proc., Pt. 40, 1989 Sess., p. 14288.

Although the legislative history contains no discussion as to whether the Act covers those accused of violating General Statutes § 14-215 (c), it does shed light on the broad reach the legislature intended that the Act have. Senator Avallone repeatedly and unequivocally stated that the Act “give[s] the court discretion, in less serious cases, misdemeanors and class D felonies, to suspend prosecution ... to give people an opportunity . . . for treatment programs”; 32 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1989 Sess., p. 3635; and that it comes into play “when the individual is arrested, and presented to the court for the first time, and we know that the crime is a misdemeanor or a class D felony.” 32 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1989 Sess., p. 3667; see also 32 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1989 Sess., pp. 3637-38 (“[tjhis is for misdemeanors, and class D felons”). (Remarks of Senator Avallone.)

Our Supreme Court has declared that statements made on the floor of the House of Representatives, “although not controlling, may be judicially noticed and are a strong indication of legislative intent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elections Review Committee of the Eighth Utilities District v. Freedom of Information Commission, 219 Conn. 685, 695, 595 A.2d 313 (1991), quoting Manchester Sand & Gravel Co. v. South Windsor, 203 Conn. 267, 276, 524 A.2d 621 (1987). The same principle applies with equal force to statements made on the floor of the Senate. See Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 310-11, 592 A.2d 953 (1991). Such statements are entitled to particular weight and careful consideration in discerning legislative intent when they are made by the bill’s sponsor or by legislators who report it out of committee. United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 760 n.14, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992); see generally 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1992) §§ 48.14, 48.15. Therefore, the statements of Senators Daniels and Avallone on the floor of the Senate are a strong indication that the legislature intended the Act to apply to less serious transgressions so as to divert substance abusers out of the judicial system and into state approved treatment programs. We see no reason to disregard the statements of Senators Daniels and Avallone, or those of Representative Tulisano. Their remarks are consistent, and no other explanation of the Act’s underlying purposes or policies was offered in either chamber of the legislature. See George P. Gustin Associates, Inc. v. Dubno, 203 Conn. 198, 211, 524 A.2d 603 (1987).

Here, the context in which the legislature used the word “crime” dictates that we not give the Act the crabbed interpretation the state suggests. To do so would frustrate the legislative intent to cast its net broadly in an effort to combat substance abuse and lessen the dangers posed to society as well as the tremendous demands placed on its resources. The defendant’s right to operate a motor vehicle was suspended after he pleaded guilty in November, 1989, to violating General Statutes §§ 14-227a and 14-222. The law he subsequently violated, General Statutes § 14-215 (c), proscribes conduct paradigmatic of that which the Act seeks to remedy, driving under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, given the functions and purposes of the Act, the policies it is designed to implement, the mischief it seeks to remedy and the goals it aims to achieve, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that a violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) is a “crime” for the purposes of General Statutes §§ 17a-648 through 17a-658.

II

Factual Determinations

The state next claims that even if the Act does apply to the defendant, the trial court made improper factual determinations under § 9 (b). Specifically, the state claims the court improperly found (1) that the defendant was alcohol dependent at the time he was charged with violating General Statutes § 14-215 (c), (2) that the defendant needed and was likely to benefit from further treatment, and (3) that a relationship existed between the alcohol dependency and the crime. We disagree.

A

At trial, the court heard testimony from Kenneth Hodge, the Neon counselor, who discussed the defendant’s treatment program and substance abuse evaluations. In determining that the defendant was alcohol dependent in March, 1990, when he was charged with operating under suspension, the court relied on Hodge’s testimony and the defendant’s November, 1989 sentencing for driving while under the influence. The record further discloses that in determining that the defendant needed and was likely to benefit from further treatment, the court found Hodge to be a competent substance abuse counselor and relied on his testimony that staff at the Meridian Center believed further treatment was appropriate.

As a threshold matter, we must identify the appropriate standard under which we review these claims. In addressing a challenge to a trial court’s factual findings, an appellate court’s function is limited to determining whether those findings are clearly erroneous. In re Keijam T., 221 Conn. 109, 116, 602 A.2d 967 (1992). We cannot retry the facts; Commissioner v. Youth Challenge of Greater Hartford, Inc., 219 Conn. 657, 667, 594 A.2d 958 (1991); nor can we z pass on the credibility of witnesses. Plikus v. Plikus, 26 Conn. App. 174, 177, 599 A.2d 392 (1991). It is the function of the court as trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses. Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 308; Francoline v. Klatt, 26 Conn. App. 203, 210, 600 A.2d 8 (1991), cert. granted, 221 Conn. 913, 603 A.2d 404 (1992).

Although the state argues that no evidence existed regarding the defendant’s drug dependency at the time he was arrested in March, 1990, such is not the case. The evidence before the court included the record of the defendant’s sentencing in November, 1989, and Hodge’s testimony, which the court was entitled to credit. The state further contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s finding that the defendant needed and was likely to benefit from further treatment because nothing in the record indicates Hodge or the Meridian counselors were qualified to make such a judgment. This argument, however, is utterly lacking in merit because the state failed to object at trial to Hodge’s testimony. Hearsay statements that come into a case without objection may be relied on by the trier “in proof of the matters stated therein, for whatever they were worth on their face.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 518, 529 A.2d 177 (1987). Accordingly, we cannot say that it was clearly erroneous for the court to conclude that the defendant was alcohol dependent at the time he was arrested, and that he needed and was likely to benefit from further treatment.

B

The state also asserts that the trial court’s finding that a relationship existed between the defendant’s alcohol dependency and his violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) constitutes plain error. The state contends that the defendant was not charged with any violation pertaining to the use of alcohol, and that no evidence exists that he was under its influence at the time of his arrest. Moreover, the state asserts that § 9 (b) requires that “the defendant clearly must show that his dependency contributed to his commission of the offense.” In essence, then, the state argues that absent a showing of some form of causation, a court may not find a relationship between a defendant’s alcohol dependency and the crime committed. We disagree.

In its articulation, the court stated the basis on which it determined that a relationship existed between the defendant’s alcohol dependency and his violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c). The court found that at the time the defendant was arrested he was on probation for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, an alcohol related offense. Thereafter, he was admitted to Berkshire Woods and treated until August, 1990, during which time he was alcohol dependent. The court also stated that it relied on Hodge’s testimony and considered the defendant’s history of alcohol abuse.

Since the gravamen of the state’s claim centers on an interpretation of the term “relationship,” we commence our analysis with settled principles of statutory construction designed to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 225, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 755. It is axiomatic that when a statute’s words are plain and unambiguous, we look no further for interpretive guidance because we assume the words themselves express the legislature’s intent. Norwich v. Housing Authority, 216 Conn. 112, 117-18, 579 A.2d 50 (1990). “That axiom only applies in full force, however, [w]here . . . the language of a statute is . . . absolutely clear on its face and where no ambiguity is raised in applying the statute in a particular case.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, quoting Elections Review Committee of the Eighth Utilities District v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 692.

By contrast, when we are confronted with ambiguity in a statute, “ ‘we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.’ ” United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 756, quoting Texaco Refining & Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 Conn. 583, 589, 522 A.2d 771 (1987); Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra. We also look to “the mischief it was designed to remedy ... to determine what purposes the legislature sought to achieve.” Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 713, 595 A.2d 297 (1991).

We conclude that the legislature’s use of the term “relationship” is not absolutely clear but susceptible to different interpretations. The wording of § 9 (b) contains no definition or modifying language that clarifies the use of the term “relationship.” It merely states that there must be “a relationship between the dependency and the crime” committed. Because ambiguity exists, we turn to the Act’s legislative history. United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 755.

Our review of this history discloses that Senator Avallone, one of the bill’s sponsors, stated on the floor of the Senate: “That’s the first thing you have to determine, not that they’re a use[r], or that they were under the influence of alcohol at the time. You must establish, and the bill sets forth how one establishes drug dependency, before one can become eligible.” 32 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1989 Sess., p. 3661. Although statements made on the floor of the legislature are not controlling, as we have noted; Elections Review Committee of the Eighth Utilities District v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 695; statements by a bill’s sponsor are entitled to particular weight and careful consideration in discerning legislative intent. United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 760 n.14; see generally 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1992) §§ 48.14, 48.15. We therefore conclude that the legislature did not require a showing of a contributory or causal link between the defendant’s drug or alcohol dependency and the crime committed.

This conclusion finds support in the language of § 9 (b). Its specific statement that there need be only a “relationship” between the dependency and the crime committed “connotes the legislative intent to exclude that which is not specifically stated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Department of Correction, 221 Conn. 41, 44, 601 A.2d 539 (1992), quoting State v. Kish, 186 Conn. 757, 765, 443 A.2d 1274 (1982); State v. Waterman, 7 Conn. App. 326, 337, 509 A.2d 518, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 807, 512 A.2d 231 (1986); see generally 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1984) § 47.23. “It is not for this court to impose obligations not intended by the legislature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., 216 Conn. 533, 540, 582 A.2d 1174 (1990), quoting Doe v. Institute of Living, Inc., 175 Conn. 49, 65, 392 A.2d 491 (1978). If the legislature had intended to require that a defendant’s condition in some way contribute to or cause the crime committed, “it certainly was aware of the explicit language with which it could do so”; Roto-Rooter Services Co. v. Department of Labor, 219 Conn. 520, 527, 593 A.2d 1386 (1991); and “it could have explicitly so provided.” Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 219 Conn. 644, 652, 594 A.2d 952 (1991). Courts ordinarily decline to read into statutes provisions that are not clearly stated. Id.; Local 218 Steam Fitters Welfare Fund v. Cobra Pipe Supply & Coil Co., 207 Conn. 639, 645, 541 A.2d 869 (1988). Accordingly, we decline to read additional obligations into the terms of § 9 (b) merely because the state in its wisdom deems that a defendant’s alcoholism must somehow contribute to or cause the crime committed before a court can order treatment. See Wins-low v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., supra.

Finally, our conclusion is further buttressed by our Supreme Court’s mandate that statutes be interpreted in accordance with the policy they seek to serve. Chrysler Corporation v. Maiocco, 209 Conn. 579, 592, 552 A.2d 1207 (1989); Nichols v. Warren, 209 Conn. 191, 203-204, 550 A.2d 309 (1988); see 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1992) §§ 56.01, 56.02. When statutes are remedial in nature, as the state concedes General Statutes §§ 17a-648 through 17a-658 are, they “are to be liberally construed in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, 220 Conn. 400, 404, 599 A.2d 738 (1991); see also Barrett Builders v. Miller, 215 Conn. 316, 323, 576 A.2d 455 (1990). By refusing to qualify the statute’s use of the word “relationship,” the trial court gave effect to both the remedial nature of the statutes and the legislature’s policy of combating substance abuse by offering treatment to those accused of a broad range of less serious crimes. We conclude that the court correctly determined under § 9 (b) that the defendant’s alcohol dependency was related to his violation of § 14-215 (c).

Ill

Award of Credit for Time Spent in Treatment

The state’s third claim is that the trial court improperly granted the defendant thirty days credit toward his prison sentence. The state argues that the credit renders the sentence unlawful because it contravenes the mandate of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) that requires a minimum of thirty consecutive days incarceration. We agree.

The court sentenced the defendant to a six month prison term, execution suspended after thirty days for the violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c). Over the state’s objections, the court then granted thirty days credit for the time spent in Berkshire Woods. The court did not issue a mittimus committing the defendant to the custody of the correction commissioner for the mandatory thirty day period.

Before reaching the state’s claim, we must first address the defendant’s assertion that this issue is not properly before us. The defendant argues that review is improper because the state failed to move in the trial court for correction of the defendant’s sentence. We disagree with the defendant’s contention. “Both the trial court and this court, on appeal, have the power, at any time, to correct a sentence that is illegal.” State v. Daniels, 207 Conn. 374, 387, 542 A.2d 306 (1988); Practice Book § 935. Therefore, this claim is properly before us.

General Statutes § 14-215 (c) carries a mandatory minimum penalty of thirty consecutive days imprisonment, “which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner.” Section 9 (g) of the Act states that “[t]he provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit the application of any provision of the general statutes requiring mandatory minimum sentences and prohibiting probation for certain offenses.” Because the credit effectively rendered the defendant’s sentence a nullity, he did not serve the mandatory thirty consecutive days required by § 14-215 (c). See Plourde v. Liburdi, 207 Conn. 412, 418, 540 A.2d 1054 (1988) (the phrase “may not be suspended or reduced in any manner” in § 14-227a precludes the granting of sentence credits to those convicted of a third violation of the statute); State v. Darden, 171 Conn. 677, 680, 372 A.2d 99 (1976) (legislature may impose mandatory minimum sentences and preclude probation or suspension of sentence). We therefore conclude that the court improperly granted the defendant thirty days credit against his sentence in violation of § 9 (g) of the Act.

IV

Sentencing for Violation of Probation

The state’s final claim is that the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant for violating his probation. The state argues that the court imposed an unlawful sentence when it vacated the original judgment on the probation violation and imposed a new term that is six months longer than that imposed by the original sentencing court. We agree.

We note at the outset that although the state has withdrawn this claim, we nevertheless review it under the plain error doctrine because “failure to rectify such an evident oversight may undermine public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ralto Developers, Inc. v. Environmental Impact Commission, 220 Conn. 54, 60, 594 A.2d 981 (1991), quoting State v. Hinckley, 198 Conn. 77, 87-88, 502 A.2d 388 (1985). Reversal for plain error is generally reserved for truly extraordinary situations such as this, “where the existence of the error is . . . obvious”; (internal quotation marks omitted); Goral v. Kenney, 26 Conn. App. 231, 236, 600 A.2d 1031 (1991), quoting State v. Hinckley, supra; and results in an unreliable verdict or miscarriage of justice. State v. Polanco, 26 Conn. App. 33, 39, 597 A.2d 830, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 926, 598 A.2d 367 (1991). A trial court commits plain error when it fails “to apply a clearly relevant statute to the case before it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ralto Developers, Inc. v. Environmental Impact Commission, supra, 59, quoting State v. Hinckley, supra, 88.

In this case, General Statutes § 53a-32 (b) provides that once a probation violation is established, “the court may continue or revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge or modify or enlarge the conditions, and, if such sentence is revoked, require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence.” Because the statute does not authorize an increase in a defendant’s probation, the court failed to abide by the statute and thus imposed an illegal sentence. We conclude that the court’s sentence constitutes plain error and therefore vacate it.

In summary, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that the defendant is eligible for alcoholism treatment is proper, as are its factual findings pursuant to Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390. We also conclude that both the judgment granting the defendant thirty days credit toward completion of his sentence, and the judgment imposing sentence for the probation violation are improper and should be vacated, and that the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his pleas. At that time, the defendant may plead not guilty and proceed to trial. Should he plead guilty, the court is to impose at least the mandatory minimum sentence required by General Statutes § 14-215 (c). The court may then exercise its discretion as to whether to afford the defendant the opportunity for further treatment.

The judgments are reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 14-215 (e) provides in pertinent part: “Any person who operates any motor vehicle during the period his operator’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this state is under suspension or revocation on account of a violation of subsection (a) of section 14-227a . . . shall be . . . imprisoned not more than one year, thirty consecutive days of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner.”

       Section 3 of Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390, is codified in General Statutes § 17a-650, which provides: “order for examination for alcohol or drug dependency. The court, on its own motion or on motion of the state’s attorney or a person charged with a crime or convicted of a crime but not yet sentenced, may order, if the interests of justice will be served, that such person be examined, pursuant to the provisions of section 17a-651, to determine if the person is alcohol-dependent or drug-dependent and eligible for treatment under section 17a-653 or 17a-656. A probation officer may order that such an examination be conducted as part of a presentence investigation conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 54-91a.”

       Section 9 of Public Acts 1989, No. 89-390, is codified in General Statutes § 17a-656, which provides: “order of treatment for alcoholic or drug dependency of convicted person, (a) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any person convicted of murder, attempt to commit murder, kidnaping, robbery in the first degree or any felony involving serious physical injury or to any person who has been previously ordered to be treated under this section or section 19a-387 or 21a-285 of the general statutes, revised to 1989.
      “(b) Before sentencing a convicted person, the court may consider any information before it concerning the alcohol or drug dependency of the person, including an examination report made pursuant to section 17a-651. The court may impose a sentence and order treatment as provided in subsection (c) of this section if the court finds that (1) the convicted person was an alcohol-dependent or drug-dependent person at the time of the crime for which he was convicted, (2) there was a relationship between the dependency and the crime, (3) the person presently needs and is likely to benefit from treatment for the dependency, (4) the person is not ineligible under subsection (a) of this section and (5) the person meets the criteria for probation under subsection (c) of section 53a-29.
      “(c) The court may, after imposing sentence, (1) suspend execution of a sentence of imprisonment, either entirely or after a period set by the court, (2) impose a period of probation as provided in this section and subsections (b) and (c) of section 53a-28 and (3) as a condition of probation, order the office of adult probation to place the person in an appropriate treatment program for alcohol or drug dependency. The court may require that a probation officer have at least one contact per week with the treatment program in which the person is participating and at least one contact per week with the person when such person is not participating in an inpatient program. Placement in a treatment program shall be no earlier than the date that space is available in a treatment program as reported by the examining committee under section 17a-651.
      “(d) The court may order that the person be transferred immediately to a treatment program provided space is available as provided in subsection (c) of this section. If the court orders an immediate transfer, it shall issue a mittimus directing the sheriff to convey the person to the treatment program.
      “(e) Time spent in a treatment program by a person pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not be credited against any sentence, the execution of which was suspended because of such treatment.
      “(f) Any violation of conditions set under this section shall be a violation of probation under section 53a-32.
      “(g) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit the application of any provision of the general statutes requiring mandatory minimum sentences and prohibiting probation for certain offenses.”

       Although the court previously ordered the defendant to undergo substance abuse evaluation with regard to both charges, it applied the Act only as to the violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c).

       General Statutes § 53a-24 provides: “offense defined, application OF SENTENCING PROVISIONS TO MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRUG SELLING VIOLATORS. (a) The term ‘offense’ means any crime or violation which constitutes a breach of any law of this state or of any other state or of federal law or local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine, or both, may be imposed, except one that defines a motor vehicle violation or is deemed to be an infraction. The term ‘crime’ comprises felonies and misdemeanors. Every offense which is not a ‘crime’ is a ‘violation.’ Conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.
      “(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), the provisions of sections 53a-28 to 53a-44, inclusive, shall apply to motor vehicle violations. Said provisions shall apply to convictions under section 21a-278 except that the execution of any mandatory minimum sentence imposed under the provisions of said section may not be suspended.”

       General Statutes § 17a-656; see footnote 3, supra.

       Although the state admits it did not object at trial to the hearsay portion of Hodge’s testimony, it nevertheless urges that we review this claim. Ordinarily, we do not review claims of error not properly preserved below. Ralto Developers, Inc. v. Environmental Impact Commission, 220 Conn. 54, 59, 594 A.2d 981 (1991). In this case, however, because the record clearly shows that the state repeatedly alerted the trial court to the issue it now presses on appeal, the failure to object to Hodge’s testimony is not a waiver of the state’s claim as long as that claim remains the same on appeal, as it does here. See Sokolowski v. Medi Mart, Inc., 24 Conn. App. 276, 279-80, 587 A.2d 1056 (1991).

      . See footnote 3, supra.

       Practice Book § 4185 provides in pertinent part: “The [appellate] court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. The [appellate] court may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court.”