author: Heiman, J.

text:
    Beverly Puris v. Martin Puris
    (10604)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued January 15 —
    decision released February 23, 1993

      Gordon H. Marsh, pro hac vice, with whom, were Miles F. McDonald, Jr., and, on the brief, Pamela S. Valentine, for the appellant (defendant).

      William T. Fitzmaurice, with whom were Laura Welch Ray and, on the brief, Samuel V. Schoonmaker III, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Heiman, J.

The defendant appeals challenging the financial orders rendered by the trial court incident to the judgment dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly (1) allocated more than $4,000,000 of debts to the defendant under the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-81, (2) awarded to the plaintiff alimony of $276,000 per year, under the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82, (3) valued one of the parties’ residences, (4) awarded the plaintiff a Nantucket residence, and (5) awarded counsel fees of $50,000 to the plaintiff under the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-62. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are necessary for a resolution of this appeal. In May, 1963, the plaintiff and defendant married at Fort Wayne, Indiana. Since 1986, they both have resided continuously in this state. Both parties are fifty-three years old and are in good health. Their marriage lasted for twenty-seven years before it irretrievably broke down through no fault of either party. The plaintiff instituted the dissolution action in 1990, nearly two years after the defendant had left the marital home.

Throughout the marriage, the plaintiff assumed the role of homemaker, raising two children who are both over the age of eighteen, and supporting the defendant in his business endeavors. The defendant is the president of an advertising agency, Ammirati & Puris, Inc., in New York.

The trial court examined the parties’ various assets. It found that they owned a family home in Greenwich (Greenwich property) that they purchased in 1986 for approximately $1,850,000, with a mortgage debt of $356,105, and extensively remodeled at a cost of over $2,000,000. The court determined that the fair market value of this property was $2,500,000. It ordered the defendant to convey his right, title and interest in the property subject to the mortgage debt to the plaintiff, who would be solely responsible for paying that debt.

The court also found that the plaintiff held legal title to property in Nantucket (Nantucket property) and the defendant held legal title to property, an apartment, in New York (New York property). The Nantucket property was unencumbered and the parties agreed that it had a fair market value between $625,000 to $675,000. The court permitted the plaintiff to retain the entire interest in this property. The New York property was subject to a mortgage debt of approximately $965,000. The defendant purchased the property in 1990 at a cost of $2,650,000 and testified that his total investment in that property including furnishings and remodeling was $3,850,000. The court stated in its memorandum of decision that the defendant’s appraiser would testify that this property has a fair market value of $2,750,000. The court permitted the defendant to retain the entire interest including the furnishings in the New York property.

The court found that the parties’ other assets included a joint account (Neuberger & Berman account), with an estimated value of approximately $3,519,000, a profit sharing plan solely in the defendant’s name which had a value of $505,000, the furniture and furnishings of the Nantucket property, automobiles, bank accounts, and other personal property listed in their respective affidavits. The court ordered that the Neuberger & Berman account be equally divided in kind between the plaintiff and the defendant to avoid taxes and equally distributed the cost basis proportionately between the plaintiff and defendant and that the furniture and furnishings in the Nantucket property be equally divided.

The court also distributed to the parties the following assets. The court awarded the plaintiff the furniture and furnishings contained in the Greenwich property, a 1989 automobile, and a Connecticut Bank and Trust money market and checking account. In addition, the trial court awarded the plaintiff alimony commencing on September 1, 1991. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of $23,000 per month or $276,000 per year until the plaintiff dies, remarries, or cohabitates. The defendant was also ordered to provide the plaintiff with COBRA coverage through his company for three years with the plaintiff responsible for the cost of the medical coverage provided to her. The defendant was further ordered to maintain a $3,000,000 life insurance policy for the benefit of the plaintiff as long as the defendant has alimony obligations, and to pay $50,000 to the plaintiff as attorney’s fees.

While not specifically valuing the defendant’s interest, the court permitted the defendant to retain his entire interest in Ammirati & Puris, Inc. The court noted that “irrespective of which expert the court chooses to believe, [Ammirati & Puris, Inc.,] provides the defendant with a source and flow of income with which to pay an award of alimony . . . .” The court also allowed the defendant to retain his profit sharing plan at Ammirati & Puris, Inc., which the court found to be worth $505,000, three automobiles, and the personal property listed on his affidavit. Under the court’s order, each of the parties would be responsible for the various debts and liabilities listed on their respective affidavits.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly allocated more than $4,000,000 of debts to him under the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-81. The defendant speculated that the trial court attempted to distribute the assets equally between the parties, but failed in its application by saddling the defendant with this debt. He also asserts that the trial court failed to find the value of his interest in Ammirati & Puris, Inc. We are unpersuaded that the trial court abused its discretion.

We review financial awards in dissolution actions under an abuse of discretion standard. Rostain v. Rostain, 214 Conn. 713, 715-16, 573 A.2d 710 (1990). Our role as an appellate court is not to retry the facts of the case, substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, or articulate or clarify the trial court’s decision. Id., 716. In reviewing the trial court’s decision under this standard, we are cognizant that “[t]he issues involving financial orders are entirely interwoven. The rendering of a judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other. ...” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sunbury v. Sunbury, 210 Conn. 170, 175, 553 A.2d 612 (1989); Mulholland v. Mulholland, 26 Conn. App. 585, 590, 602 A.2d 1054 (1992). When reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discretion in making these awards, “every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [T]he ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v. Investors Capital Corporation, 29 Conn. App. 48, 55, 613 A.2d 1370, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 902, 615 A.2d 1044 (1992); Rostain v. Rostain, supra.

The defendant fails to direct us to any case that requires, as a matter of law, that the trial court separately value each asset. This court has stated that “[a] trial court must consider a number of factors in distributing the assets of the parties, and it may exercise broad discretion in considering the statutory criteria enumerated in § 46b-81 (c). . . . The court need not recite each factor in its decision ... or give equal weight to each of the criteria ... or set forth the weighing process employed by the court when considering all relevant statutory criteria. . . . It is sufficient that the memorandum of decision at least reflect a proper consideration and weighing of the factors set forth in the statute.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Miller, 22 Conn. App. 310, 314, 577 A.2d 297 (1990); cf. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 24 Conn. App. 343, 346, 588 A.2d 242 (1991) (trial court not obligated to make express findings on each of the enumerated criteria in General Statutes § 46b-82, but the court’s memorandum of decision must at least reflect that those criteria were considered and weighed in view of the particular circumstances). Here, the trial court found that Ammirati & Puris, Inc., provided the defendant with a source and flow of income. It factored that function into its decision. The court was not required to assign a value to the stock in Ammirati & Puris, Inc., but was required to consider it only when applying the statutory criteria and distributing the assets to the parties. See Miller v. Miller, supra, 314-15. In Miller v. Miller, supra, we stated that “[o]ur case law is clear that a trial court is free to weigh the relevant statutory criteria without having to detail . . . what importance it has assigned to the various statutory factors. ...” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) If the defendant was uncertain as to the method by which the trial court valued and distributed the property, he should have filed a motion for articulation and provided us with an adequate record for review. See Practice Book §§ 4051 and 4061. Construing every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of the court’s weighing of the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-81, we conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion and his claim is therefore without merit.

II

The defendant also asserts that the trial court improperly awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in attorney’s fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-62. He speculates that the only plausible explanation for this award is that the trial court attempted to equalize the property distribution under its formula. We disagree.

General Statutes § 46b-62 provides in pertinent part: “In any proceeding seeking relief under the provisions of this chapter . . . the court may order either spouse . . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b-82. . . .’’The criteria set forth in § 46b-82 include “the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties

The trial court exercises broad discretion in determining whether to allow counsel fees and what amount to award. Graham v. Graham, 25 Conn. App. 41, 50, 592 A.2d 424, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 903, 593 A.2d 969 (1991). The court must consider the statutory criteria set out in General Statutes §§ 46b-62 and 46b-82 and the parties’ respective financial abilities. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 190 Conn. 26, 34, 459 A.2d 498 (1983). “If . . . the trial court concludes, based on the total financial resources of the parties, that denying an award of counsel fees would undermine its prior financial orders, then it may award counsel fees to the requesting party.” Id. The trial court is uniquely qualified to determine whether its financial orders would be undermined by denying the plaintiff counsel fees. See Eslami v. Eslami, 218 Conn. 801, 820, 591 A.2d 411 (1991). “The policy underlying this allowance is that a spouse should not be deprived of his or her rights owing to lack of funds.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra. “An abuse of discretion in denying an award of counsel fees will be found only if this court determines that the trial court could not have reasonably concluded as it did.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, supra.

The availability of “ample liquid funds” is not an absolute litmus test for an award of counsel fees. Maguire v. Maguire, 222 Conn. 32, 44, 608 A.2d 79 (1992); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, supra. A party’s ability to pay her counsel fees does not prevent a court from awarding counsel fees. Eslami v. Eslami, supra. The court properly may award counsel fees to a spouse who has sufficient liquid assets if the failure to do so would substantially undermine the other financial awards. Maguire v. Maguire, supra; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, supra.

The evidence in this case, which includes the parties’ twenty-seven year marriage, the fact that the plaintiff acted as a homemaker while her husband was the primary wage earner, the plaintiff’s age, and the defendant’s access to an income source provides adequate support for the court’s finding that an appropriate allowance for counsel fees and litigation costs should be made so that its other financial orders would not be undermined. See Eslami v. Eslami, supra, 820-21. In its articulation in response to the plaintiff’s motion; see footnote 7, supra; the court stated that it “specifically considered [General Statutes] § 46b-62 ... in awarding counsel fees of $50,000 to the plaintiff. The court considered the respective financial abilities of the parties and their respective opportunity for future acquisitions of assets and income.” The court also stated that it “awarded the plaintiff the sum of $50,000 as contribution towards her attorney’s fees so as to avoid under mining the court’s other financial awards in this case. Notwithstanding this award, the plaintiff will have additional attorney’s fees and expert fees to pay.” (Emphasis added.) The court thus considered the appropriate statutory criteria in granting the plaintiff attorney’s fees. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra.

The defendant also failed to file a motion for articulation requesting the trial court to articulate on the record the basis on which it ordered the payment of counsel fees. See footnote 7, supra. For us to adopt the plaintiff’s assertion that the court made this award for attorney’s fees in order to “equalize” the property distribution and that the court applied the incorrect legal standard would require us to engage in sheer speculation. See Carothers v. Capozziello, 215 Conn. 82, 105, 574 A.2d 1268 (1990).

On the basis of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion or acted unreasonably in allowing the plaintiff’s counsel fees. See Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, supra. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $50,000 for counsel fees to the plaintiff.

Ill

Our review of the defendant’s remaining claims convinces us that the trial court’s orders do not reflect an abuse of its discretion. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. Walton v. New Hartford, 223 Conn. 155, 169, 612 A.2d 1153 (1992). The trial court’s exercise of its discretion will be reversed only where the abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done. State v. Young, 29 Conn. App. 754, 765, 618 A.2d 65 (1992).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff alimony of $276,000 per year to be reviewed upon the defendant’s retirement. It examined the statutory criteria and determined the plaintiff's entitlement to this alimony. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that such an award was an abuse of discretion. The trial court also reasonably could choose to credit the plaintiffs appraisal of the Greenwich property and find that the fair market value of that property is $2,500,000. This finding is not clearly erroneous. Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980); Solomon v. Hall-Brooke Foundation, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 129, 132, 619 A.2d 863 (1993). The defendant has also failed to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff the Nantucket property.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rendering the financial orders incident to its judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 46b-81 provides: “assignment of property and transfer of title, (a) At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b-45, the superior court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect.
      “(b) A conveyance made pursuant to the decree shall vest title in the purchaser, and shall bind all persons entitled to life estates and remainder interests in the same manner as a sale ordered by the court pursuant to the provisions of section 52-500. When the decree is recorded on the land records in the toym where the real property is situated, it shall effect the transfer of the title of such real property as if it were a deed of the party or parties.
      “(c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”

       General Statutes § 46b-82 provides in pertinent part: “alimony. At the time of entering the decree, the superior court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b-81. The order may direct that security be given therefor on such terms as the court may deem desirable, including an order to either party to contract with a third party for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party. In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall hear witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81 . . . .”

       General Statutes § 46b-62 provides in pertinent part: “ORDERS FOR PAYMENT of attorney’s fees in certain actions. In any proceeding seeking relief under the provisions of this chapter and sections 17-323a, 17-323b, 45a-257, 46b-l, 46b-6, 46b-204, 47-14g, 51-348a and 52-362, the court may order either spouse . . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b-82. . . .”

       The parties stipulated that the defendant’s appraiser would testify that the current value of the family home is $3,500,000 and that the plaintiff’s appraiser would testify that the current value of the home is $2,500,000.

       The trial court noted that this alimony award will be examined on a “second look” when the defendant retires.

       The trial court stated that this provision shall be modified in the future.

       Employing an unusual but creative tactic, the plaintiff-appellee filed a motion for articulation to which the court responded as follows:

        “1. The court carefully considered the statutory criteria set forth in §§ 46b-81, 46b-82, and 46b-62 C.G.S. in fashioning its financial awards in this matter.
      “2. The court specifically considered § 46b-62 C.G.S. in awarding counsel fees of $50,000 to the plaintiff. The court considered the respective financial abilities of the parties and their respective opportunity for future acquisition of assets and income.
      “3. The plaintiff, age 53 years was a homemaker throughout the marriage of 27 years. The plaintiff was not employed at the time of the trial and had not worked outside the marital home during this 27 [year] marriage.
      “4. The defendant, also 53 years of age, is at the peak of his career in advertising.
      “5. The plaintiff had liabilities of approximately $7,000 excluding a claim for attorney’s fees in the amount of $145,000. The plaintiff had liquid assets of approximately $7,800 solely in her name, at the time of trial.
      “6. The court awarded the plaintiff the sum of $50,000 as a contribution towards her attorney’s fees so as to avoid undermining the court’s other financial awards in this case. Notwithstanding this award, the plaintiff will have additional attorney’s fees and expert fees to pay.
      “7. The acquisition of the assets in this case occurred and accrued during the course of the marriage. The defendant had access to marital funds and used the same for payment towards his counsel’s fees prior to the date of trial.
      “8. The substantial liquid account, the Neuberger & Berman account, remained frozen at the time of trial. This account was not available to the wife at the time of trial and had been frozen for some period of time prior to trial. The defendant had been able to withdraw approximately $400,000 from this account prior to the date of trial. The wife had no such resource available to her as did the husband through his business.”
      The defendant never filed a motion for articulation. In his reply brief he stated that he “did not move for an articulation because it was apparent that in awarding $50,000 counsel fees to the [plaintiff], the trial court was equalizing the value of assets (as valued by the court) awarded to each party. This, however, is not a legitimate basis upon which to award attorney’s fees . . . .”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Freedman, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Pamela J. Delfino et al. v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Torrington et al.
    (11218)
    (11220)
    Daly, Landau and Freedman, Js.

      Argued November 30, 1992 —
    decision released February 23, 1993

      Albert G. Vasko, corporation counsel, for the appellant (named defendant).

      Peter C. Herbst, with whom, on the brief, was Lynn D. Wittenbrink, for the appellant (defendant Joseph J. Ficca).

      Michael D. Rybak, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
   Freedman, J.

The defendants, the planning and zoning commission of the city of Torrington (commission) and Joseph J. Ficca, appeal from a decision of the trial court sustaining the plaintiffs’ appeal from a change of zone granted to Ficca. The defendants claim that the trial court improperly sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal upon finding that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it failed to comply properly with the notice requirements of General Statutes § 8-3b. The plaintiffs argue, however, that even if this court were to reverse the decision of the trial court on this notice issue, there are four alternate grounds upon which the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The four alternate grounds are (1) the failure of the commission to file a copy of the proposed zone change map with the city clerk’s office no later than ten days before the public hearing, as required by General Statutes § 8-3 (a),* * (2) the failure of the commission to notify the neighboring municipality of New Hartford as required by General Statutes § 8-3h, (3) the failure of the commission to file a copy of the final map with the city clerk’s office prior to the effective date of the zone change, as required by General Statutes § 8-3 (d), and (4) the receipt by the commission of an ex parte communication from the applicant’s attorney after the close of the public hearing. Although we conclude that the trial court was incorrect in sustaining the plaintiffs’ appeal on the grounds that it did, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on one of the alternate grounds put forth by the plaintiffs.

The following facts, either found by the trial court or not disputed by the parties, are relevant to this appeal. On April 12, 1990, Ficca applied to the commission for a change of zone of land owned by him from R-15 residential to RCC restricted residential community. Notice of a public hearing on Ficca’s application, which hearing was scheduled for May 23, 1990, was published in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. Notice of this hearing was sent to the Litchfield Hills Council of Elected Officials, the regional planning agency for Torrington and New Hartford, on May 3,1990, twenty days prior to the hearing. On the same date, notice of the public hearing was also given to the neighboring municipality of New Hartford. The public hearing commenced on May 23,1990. After evidence was taken on that date, the hearing was continued to and concluded on June 13,1990. The regional planning agency submitted a written report to the commission prior to the commencement of the public hearing. On September 13,1990, the commission voted to grant the Ficca application with certain changes. Notice of this decision was published in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. A copy of the final map as approved was never filed with the city clerk.

In light of the trial court’s disposition of the matter on the grounds of improper notification to the regional planning agency, it made no findings as to whether a copy of the proposed zone change map was filed with the city clerk prior to the public hearing. At the hearing before the trial court, Addo Bonetti, the Torrington city clerk, testified that no map of the proposed zone change was ever filed in his office. Candi Deleppo, an employee of the Torrington planning and zoning office, testified that she brought the map to the office of the city clerk for filing on May 30, 1990.

I

In Edelson v. Zoning Commission, 2 Conn. App. 595, 481 A.2d 421 (1984), this court held that the failure to give notice to the regional planning agency as required by General Statutes § 8-3b; see footnote 2, supra; constitutes a jurisdictional defect that renders the actions of the commission null and void. Subsequently in Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 459-65, 600 A.2d 310 (1991), our Supreme Court held that failure to give notice to an adjoining municipality as required by General Statutes § 8-3h; see footnote 4, supra; does not implicate a commission’s subject matter jurisdiction, involves only personal jurisdiction, may be waived, and may be raised only by the one to whom notice must be sent. Lauer drew the distinction between statutorily required published notice to the general public and statutorily required personal notice to specific entities or individuals. “The purpose of a personal notice statute is to give actual notice to [the person entitled to notice]. . . . Therefore, if a person has actual notice of a hearing, the failure to give mailed notice does not frustrate the purpose of the notice provision. . . .The purpose of publishing notice to the general public, however, is to notify, by means of legal advertisements, as much of the population as possible of contemplated zoning actions. ... In the absence of newspaper publication, unknown individuals with an interest in zoning matters would have no way of learning what zoning decisions were being contemplated. Failure to provide such notice deprives the administrative tribunal of subject matter jurisdiction even when the complaining party appeared at the public hearing since the legislative intent to notify the public constructively would otherwise be frustrated. . . . Thus, what is required is not actual notice, but, rather, constructive notice.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 462.

We are persuaded that the reasoning in Lauer, decided in 1991, effectively overrules Edelson, decided in 1984. Although Lauer dealt with General Statutes § 8-3h, its reasoning applies with equal vigor to the requirements of General Statutes § 8-3b. Both General Statutes § 8-3h and § 8-3b require notice to a specific entity. In the case of § 8-3h, it is an adjoining municipality; in the case of § 8-3b, it is a regional planning agency. In neither case is the notice designed to inform the general public. Indeed, as the dissent in Lauer points out, § 8-3h provides that “[n]o hearing may be conducted on any application, petition, request or plan unless the adjoining municipality has received the notice required under this section,” language that the Lauer majority refused to give subject matter jurisdiction status. No such language, or anything similar thereto, appears in § 8-3b. In fact, § 8-3b specifically provides that “[t]he report of said planning agency shall be purely advisory.” This is further indication that the failure to notify the regional planning agency properly, like the failure to notify an adjoining municipality properly, should not be elevated to the status of depriving a commission of subject matter jurisdiction. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court was incorrect when it found that the notice to regional planning agency, having been given twenty days before the public hearing rather than thirty-five days, as provided in § 8-3b, deprived the commission of subject matter jurisdiction.

II

This court may, however, rely on alternative grounds supported by the record to sustain a judgment. Where a trial court reaches the correct result, but has based that result on mistaken grounds, we will sustain the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist to support it. Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 592, 606 A.2d 693 (1992); In re Jennifer G., 29 Conn. App. 689, 692-94, 617 A.2d 921 (1992). We now turn to the first alternative ground to uphold the trial court’s judgment urged by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs claim that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ficca’s application because a map of the proposed zone change was not filed in the city clerk’s office at least ten days before the public hearing. General Statutes § 8-3 (a); see footnote 3, supra; which delineates the requirements for published notice preceding a public hearing on a proposed change of zone, provides in pertinent part that “a copy of such proposed regulation or boundary shall be filed in the office of the town, city or borough clerk, as the case may be, in such municipality ... for public inspection at least ten days before such hearing . . . .” The published notice in this matter appeared in the local newspaper as follows:

“Applicant: Joseph J. Ficca
Location: Torrington Street
Proposal: Zone change from R-15 Residential to R.R.C. Restricted Residential Community on 163.5 acres.
“As shown on map entitled Land Use Plan, Torringford Hills Estate, Torrington St., Torrington, CT. dated 4/12/90, prepared by Richard E. Couch, P.E. St. of Ct. Lie. 15480
“Time of hearing: Immediately following the close of the first hearing.
“Copies of the application and map are on file in the Planning & Zoning Office and the City Clerk’s Office, 140 Main St., Torr., CT. for inspection prior to the hearings.”

The underlying reason for the publication requirements of General Statutes § 8-3 (a) is to not “permit changes, exceptions or relaxations [in zoning matters] except after such full notice as shall enable all those interested to know what is projected and to have opportunity to protest, and as shall insure fair presentation and consideration of all aspects of the proposed modification. . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Timber Trails Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 374, 379, 610 A.2d 617 (1992).

It is quite obvious that if the map referred to in the published notice of the public hearing in this matter was not in fact on file in the office of the city clerk, as required by § 8-3 (a), it would be impossible for all those interested to know with any degree of intelligence exactly what was proposed in this application for a change of zone. Bombero v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 17 Conn. App. 150, 153-55, 550 A.2d 1098 (1988). “ ‘Compliance with the statutory procedure [for public notice set forth in General Statutes § 8-3 (a) is] ... a prerequisite to any valid and effective change in zonal boundaries.’ ” Timber Trails Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 378; State ex rel. Capurso v. Flis, 144 Conn. 473, 481, 133 A.2d 901 (1957). The failure to file such maps in this matter deprives the commission of subject matter jurisdiction and any zone change granted is invalid. Scovil v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 12, 14-15, 230 A.2d 31 (1967); Bombero v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra.

The trial court made no finding as to whether a copy of the proposed zone change map was filed with the city clerk prior to the public hearing. “Ordinarily it is not the function of . . . the Appellate Court to make factual findings, but rather to decide whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.” State v. Reagan, 209 Conn. 1, 8, 546 A.2d 839 (1988). There are times, however, when the undisputed facts or uncontroverted evidence and testimony in the record make a factual conclusion inevitable so that a remand to the trial court for a determination would be unnecessary. See State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 208-209 n.3, 530 A.2d 603 (1987). This is just such a case.

A thorough review of the briefs of the parties, the record below, and the transcript of the testimony before the trial court makes it clear either that the map referred to in the published notice of the public hearing was never filed in the office of the city clerk or that, if it was in fact filed, it was filed on May 30,1990, some seven days after the public hearing commenced. There was no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the map was filed “at least ten days before such hearing.” General Statutes § 8-3 (a).

We conclude that the failure to file such map properly in this case resulted in a failure to give the public adequate notice of what was proposed by this application for a change of zone and deprived the commission of subject matter jurisdiction. The zone change granted to Ficca was, therefore, invalid. Scovil v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra; Bombero v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra.

While we do not agree with the trial court’s analysis, we do agree with its ultimate conclusion that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to act on the zone change application. Therefore, the trial court’s decision is correct, but not for the reason stated. This court is not required to reverse a ruling of the trial court that reached a correct result, albeit for a wrong reason. New London v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 29 Conn. App. 402, 409, 615 A.2d 1054 (1992).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The plaintiffs own land on Torrington Street in Torrington, which abuts the land of the defendant Ficca.

       “[General Statutes] Sec. 8-3b. notice to regional planning agency of proposed zone or zone use change. When the zoning commission of any municipality proposes to establish or change a zone or any regulation affecting the use of a zone any portion of which is within five hundred feet of the boundary of another municipality located within the area of operation of a regional planning agency, the zoning commission shall give written notice of its proposal to the regional planning agency or agencies of the region in which it and the other municipality are located not later than thirty-five days before the public hearing to be held in relation thereto. The regional planning agency shall study such proposal and shall report its findings and recommendations thereon to the zoning commission at or before the hearing, and such report shall be read aloud at the hearing. ... If such report of the regional planning agency is not submitted at or before the hearing, it shall be presumed that such agency does not disapprove of the proposal. A regional planning agency receiving such a notice may transmit such notice to the secretary of the office of policy and management or his designee for comment. The planning agency may designate its executive committee to act for it under this section or may establish a subcommittee for the purpose. The report of said planning agency shall be purely advisory.”

       General Statutes § 8-3 (a) provides in pertinent part: “No . . . [zoning district] boundary shall become effective or be established or changed until after a public hearing in relation thereto ... at which parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard. Notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be published in the form of a legal advertisement appearing in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in such municipality at least twice at intervals of not less than two days, the first not more than fifteen days nor less than ten days, and the last not less than two days, before such hearing, and a copy of such proposed . . . boundary shall be filed in the office of the town, city or borough clerk, as the case may be, in such municipality, but, in the case of a district, in the offices of both the district clerk and the town clerk of the town in which such district is located, for public inspection at least ten days before such hearing, and may be published in full in such paper. . . .”

       “[General Statutes] Sec. 8-3h. notice to adjoining municipalities. The zoning commission of any municipality shall notify the clerk of any adjoining municipality of the pendency of any application, petition, request or plan concerning any project on any site in which: (1) Any portion of the property affected by a decision of such zoning commission is within five hundred feet of the boundary of the adjoining municipality; (2) a significant portion of the traffic to the completed project on the site will use streets within the adjoining municipality to enter or exit the site; (3) a significant portion of the sewer or water drainage from the project on the site will flow through and significantly impact the drainage or sewerage system within the adjoining municipality; or (4) water runoff from the improved site will impact streets or other municipal or private property within the adjoining municipality. Such notice shall be made by certified mail, return receipt requested, and shall be mailed within seven days of the date of receipt of the application, petition, request or plan. No hearing may be conducted on any application, petition, request or plan unless the adjoining municipality has received the notice required under this section. Such adjoining municipality may, through a representative, appear and be heard at any hearing on any such application, petition, request or plan.”

       Because we affirm the judgment of the trial court on the basis of the plaintiffs’ first alternative ground in support of the judgment, we do not need to reach the other grounds urged in support of the judgment. We note, however, that the plaintiffs’ claim that the commission was without jurisdiction to act on the zone change application because it failed to notify the neighboring municipality of New Hartford properly, is without merit. Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 459-65, 600 A.2d 310 (1991).


author: Schaller, J.

text:
    Paul Foti v. Toni Richardson, Commissioner of Mental Retardation
    (10870)
    Dupont, C. J., Heiman and Schallek, Js.

      Argued December 8, 1992 —
    decision released February 23, 1993

      Lawrence W. Berliner, with whom, on the brief, was Debra S. Gershman, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      James P. Welsh, assistant attorney general, with whom were Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
   Schaller, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether a person who is autistic but not mentally retarded is eligible for the services of the department of mental retardation (department). The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the trial court, in an administrative appeal, finding him ineligible for the services of the department. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that General Statutes § 17a-215 (formerly § 19a-462) does not operate to make persons who are not mentally retarded eligible for services, and (2) concluded that the commissioner’s denial of eligibility does not violate Connecticut constitutional and statutory rights to equal protection, due process, and nondiscrimination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are undisputed. In 1989, the plaintiff, then a nineteen year old man who had been diagnosed with a condition known as autism, applied to the department for services consisting of case management, day services, vocational training, and supported living. The commissioner denied the application because the plaintiff was not diagnosed as mentally retarded. The parties agree that, while the plaintiff is autistic, he is not mentally retarded. The plaintiff essentially predicated his claim to eligibility on § 17a-215.

On February 7, 1990, the plaintiff and the department’s regional director attended an administrative review meeting to discuss the basis of the denial. On February 23,1990, the regional director upheld the initial decision. After the plaintiff requested review of that decision, the commissioner upheld the regional director’s decision because of the plaintiff’s diagnosis of autism, stating that the plaintiff “does not meet eligibility criteria for this department and responsibilities as ‘lead agency for autism services’ are limited to coordination among agencies.”

The plaintiff then filed his administrative complaint which was dismissed by the commissioner in a final decision dated November 5, 1990. The plaintiff appealed from that final decision to the Superior Court under General Statutes § 4-183 of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Superior Court upholding the commissioner’s decision.

I

The first issue raised by the plaintiff is whether persons who are not mentally retarded but are diagnosed as having autism are eligible for department services on the basis of the function of the department as the coordinating agency for services to autistic persons.

We note at the outset that the standard of review of administrative agency rulings is well settled. “[Jjudicial review of administrative conclusions of law is limited to a determination of whether, in light of the evidence, those conclusions are unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.” Fleischman v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 22 Conn. App. 181, 184, 576 A.2d 1302 (1990). On the other hand, when we are concerned with a statute that has not been subject to judicial scrutiny, thus presenting us with a pure question of law, our standard of review is broader. State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709, 717-19, 546 A.2d 830 (1988). In such cases, “it is the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law.” Id., 717; N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S. Ct. 980, 13 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1965). The facts of this case are not in dispute. Rather, the parties have presented us with an issue of first impression involving the applicability of § 17a-215. We, therefore, do not accord special deference to the administrative determination.

Our review must comport with the well settled principles of statutory construction. The objective in analyzing legislative action is to discern and effectuate the apparent intent of the legislature. State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987); Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 295, 300, 620 A.2d 176 (1993). “We look first to the plain, unambiguous language of the statute.” Arway v. Bloom, 29 Conn. App. 469, 473, 615 A.2d 1075 (1992), cert. granted, 224 Conn. 924, 618 A.2d 530 (1993). Where particular words or sections are themselves imprecise, we consider the provision at issue in the context of its underlying statutory scheme. Danbury v. International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 801, 221 Conn. 244, 250, 603 A.2d 393 (1992).

The critical provision of the department’s enabling statute provides: “The department of mental retardation, with the advice of a council on mental retardation, shall be responsible for the planning, development and administration of complete, comprehensive and integrated state-wide services for persons with mental retardation. ” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 17a-210 (formerly § 19a-460). On the face of this provision, there is no mention of a concomitant responsibility to develop services for persons that are autistic but not mentally retarded. In this case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff is not mentally retarded. His disability is, therefore, not within the aegis of § 17a-210. It would be wholly improper for this court to annex an additional provision to an unambiguous enabling statute. Battersby v. Battersby, 218 Conn. 467, 470, 590 A.2d 427 (1991) (“[ajbsent ambiguity, the courts cannot read into statutes, by construction, provisions that are not clearly stated”). We conclude that the trial court properly upheld the decision of the commissioner that denied residential, vocational and case management services to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff argues that the language of § 17a-215 supports his claim that he is entitled to the full services of the department. This position is flawed because the plaintiff is not claiming that he needs the department to serve as lead agency to coordinate the functions of other agencies. Section 17a-215 provides that the department “shall serve as the lead agency to coordinate, where possible, the functions of the several state agencies which have responsibility for providing services to autistic persons.” In this case, the complaint is devoid of any claim that the plaintiff is in need of coordination between agencies. Rather, the plaintiff claims entitlement to residential, vocational and case management services. Therefore, § 17a-215 is inapposite.

We conclude that the full services of the department do not obtain in this case because the plaintiff has not been diagnosed as mentally retarded.

II

The second issue raised on appeal is whether the commissioner’s denial of eligibility for department services to a person who is autistic but not mentally retarded violates Connecticut’s constitutional and statutory provisions relating to equal protection, due process, and nondiscrimination.

Our state constitutional and statutory law firmly establishes rights to equal protection and nondiscrimination for all persons. Article first, § 20, as amended by article twenty-one of the amendments to the Connecticut constitution, provides in pertinent part that “[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of . . . physical or mental disability.” Similarly, General Statutes § 46a-71 provides: “All services of every state agency shall be performed without discrimination based upon . . . mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability”; and “[n]o state facility may be used in the furtherance of any discrimination, nor may any state agency become a party to any agreement, arrangement or plan which has the effect of sanctioning discrimination. . . .”

It was well within the legislature’s prerogative to target a disability, i.e., mental retardation, and devise a scheme to address the specific needs of that disability. Specialized programs of this nature may very well be the most effective way to provide meaningful services. We conclude that the commissioner has not applied § 17a-215 in a manner that violates the rights to equal protection and nondiscrimination accorded to all persons.

This court recently held that classifications based on disabilities are subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the Connecticut constitution. Daly v. DelPonte, 27 Conn. App. 495, 608 A.2d 93, cert. granted, 223 Conn. 903, 610 A.2d 177 (1992); see also R. Berdon, “Connecticut Equal Protection Clause: Requirement of Strict Scrutiny When Classifications are Based Upon Sex, Physical Disability or Mental Disability,” 64 Conn. B.J. 386, 401-402 (1990). In this case, however, the commissioner has not predicated disparate treatment on the plaintiff’s autism. Rather, it is the absence of mental retardation that underlies his ineligibility for department services. We agree with the trial court that the denial of department services to persons who are autistic but not mentally retarded violates neither article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution nor General Statutes § 46a-71.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 17a-215 (formerly § 19a-462) provides: “The department of mental retardation shall serve as the lead agency to coordinate, where possible, the functions of the several state agencies which have responsibility for providing services to autistic persons.”

       Throughout the proceedings, the plaintiff has failed to explain exactly why this case implicates General Statutes § 17a-215. We, therefore, emphasize that our holding in this case should not be read as interpreting the scope of § 17a-215 when a party properly seeks coordination of the functions of agencies.

       While we hold that the department, via General Statutes § 17a-215, is not the appropriate state agency to respond to the plaintiff’s claim for residential, vocational and case management services, the plaintiff is not precluded from pursuing other statutory alternatives for services to persons who suffer autism.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Anna Lee
    (10905)
    Daly, Lavery and Schaller, Js.

      Argued December 3, 1992 —
    decision released March 2, 1993

      Jeremiah Donovan, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Terry Sablone Donovan, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were C. Robert Satti, Sr., state’s attorney, and JohnP. Pannone, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Schaller, J.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of criminal attempt to possess more than one kilogram of marihuana with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes §§ 21a-278 (b) and 53a-49 (a) (2). The defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly denied her motion to dismiss, (2) improperly (a) declined to order the state to disclose information concerning its informants, (b) precluded cross-examination concerning their activity and (c) declined to order the state to produce an informant for trial, (3) improperly declined to recognize the defense of “objective entrapment,” (4) improperly foreclosed the defendant from inquiring into the potential bias of a witness, (5) improperly permitted testimony concerning firearms seized at the defendant’s residence, (6) improperly refused to admit evidence pertaining to charges against the defendant that the state had dismissed, and (7) improperly restricted the defendant’s inquiries into the attitudes of prospective jurors toward the defense of entrapment. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

The following facts are pertinent to the resolution of this appeal. At the time of trial, Anna Lee, the defendant, was fifty-five years old and had no criminal record. Her son, Mario, had been arrested in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for conspiracy to possess cocaine. Although the Florida Appellate Court recently reversed his conviction; Krajewski v. State, 587 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); he was imprisoned in Florida prior to and during the incidents giving rise to the defendant’s conviction. During Mario’s imprisonment, the defendant received crudely written letters from other inmates, some threatening Mario’s life. In addition, she sent money orders and other items to inmates for her son’s protection. Her correspondence with her son and other inmates revealed her deep concern for Mario’s well-being.

When calls and letters from Mario ceased, the defendant decided to travel to Florida. En route, the defendant learned that her son was in solitary confinement because of threats on his life by other inmates. 'Eventually, she met with her son who appeared to her to have “heat rashes on him.”

Because of her concerns about the conditions of Mario’s imprisonment, the defendant was determined to obtain the assistance of a private attorney to pursue Mario’s appeal. She had already spent thousands of dollars on Mario’s trial and was hesitant to draw further on her line of credit with Household Finance Company, especially since she and her husband had no promising job prospects. The defendant, at this point, had begun to deteriorate mentally and physically and would “break down constantly.”

Against this background, the defendant became involved with persons purportedly interested in selling her large quantities of marihuana for resale. She first spoke with Augustus Buckley. Buckley, an informant and Florida prison inmate, telephoned the defendant to discuss the possibility of the purchase and sale of fifty pounds of marihuana for $40,000 to be delivered to the defendant without an advance payment. Buckley further explained that he was a friend of Mario and that the defendant should try to get a private attorney to handle Mario’s pending appeal. Buckley’s wife also spoke with the defendant.

Buckley then informed Detective Daniel Losey of the Fort Lauderdale police department that the defendant was interested in purchasing marihuana for resale. Losey subsequently decided to contact the defendant. In his first telephone call to the defendant, on July 23, 1990, Losey explained that he was aware of her interest in purchasing marihuana. Before discussing the possibility of a sale, Losey suggested that they refer to the marihuana as “carpet” and its quantity, in pounds, as “feet.” Contrary to the discussion between Buckley and the defendant, Losey explained that he typically would not sell less than 150 feet of carpet in a given deal and quoted a price of $1000 per foot. Further, Losey said that he would require the defendant to send him an advance payment of $3000. The defendant expressed reluctance to entertain the deal as proposed. She stated, “for the first time it’s too big an amount.” Losey then reduced the quantity proposed from 150 to 50 feet, but insisted on the advance payment and the originally quoted price. The defendant still declined to go ahead with the deal because of the advance payment requirement.

Losey telephoned the defendant the next day. The defendant again expressed her reluctance, citing the $3000 advance and the price of $1000 per foot. She did, however, state: “I wish, make this deal come true, make some money.” The conversation concluded without any fixed arrangement.

Eight days later, on August 2,1990, Losey again telephoned the defendant. In this conversation, Losey told the defendant that he would be willing to reduce the price from $1000 to $800 per pound. The defendant also testified that around this time Buckley had contacted her and urged her to accept the requirement that there be an advance payment, because the advance was going to be paid to his wife. According to the defendant, Buckley said, “I think your son’s sentence will end very soon. We end his sentence very soon if you go through with it.”

On August 8,1990, Losey telephoned the defendant. In this conversation, the defendant insisted that the deal would have to be “cash on delivery.” Losey responded that he would be able to meet her demands in this respect since he was making a delivery in the area anyway. He further stated that he would call the defendant later.

A week later, Losey made yet another call to the defendant. The defendant explained to Losey that too much time had elapsed and that she did not want to buy marihuana from him. Through her correspondence with her son and Buckley, the defendant became skeptical about the relationship between Buckley and Losey, concerned that they might be attempting to “set her up.” As she understood it, the “set up” would then result in a reduced sentence for Buckley. Losey dispelled her anxieties explaining that Buckley was probably “going crazy” in prison and that Buckley believed everyone was taking advantage of him. When Losey swore that he was not a police officer, the defendant then told him to deliver the marihuana to her.

Losey called the defendant the next day and asked if they could meet in Connecticut the following morning. Losey restated the deal as involving the sale of fifty pounds of marihuana for $40,000. The next day, August 17, Losey contacted the defendant and told her that he was staying at a motel in East Lyme. The defendant went to Losey’s room. From that point on, a surveillance team closely monitored the activities of the defendant and Losey.

Losey and the defendant met in the motel room. From there, the two proceeded to a Household Finance Company office where the defendant drew a check from her line of credit. She showed the check to Losey, who was assured that it could be cashed at any bank. She was immediately arrested. That same day, the police obtained a warrant and searched the apartment of the defendant and her husband. The police found marihuana seeds, three small marihuana plants, scales commonly used for purposes that are not related to drugs, three hunting rifles and a handgun.

The defendant was brought to trial for attempted sale of marihuana in violation of General Statutes §§ 21a-278 (b) and 53a-49 (a) (2). She sought to establish a defense based on entrapment within the purview of General Statutes § 53a-15. The jury, however, returned a verdict of guilty and judgment was rendered accordingly. This appeal followed.

I

Before reaching the dispositive issue, we first address the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly declined to apply Florida law in denying her motion to dismiss. In her view, because the investigative activities at issue in this case would warrant a dismissal in Florida, the trial court should have dismissed the case. We are not persuaded.

We note that the defendant does not challenge this state’s jurisdiction over the case. It is clear, in any event, that Connecticut is the proper forum in which to prosecute the defendant because the attempted drug transaction at issue was consummated in this state. A. Spinella, Connecticut Criminal Procedure (1985) § 3A. A finding that Connecticut has criminal jurisdiction over this case leads inescapably to the application of this state’s criminal code. Indeed, both the charge of attempted distribution of drugs and the defense of entrapment are specifically embodied in our General Statutes. See General Statutes §§ 21a-278 (b) and 53a-15. Accordingly, we cannot properly look to the law of another jurisdiction simply because its laws are more favorable to the defendant.

The defendant’s claim is rooted in the policy consideration that Connecticut should not “becom[e] dumping grounds for prosecutions that would be dismissed in the courts of sister states.” Whether that problem currently exists or is likely to arise in the future is an issue for the legislature to consider with the aid of empirical data. The legislature is, of course, free to amend our penal code accordingly. We decline, however, to pave the way for a criminal justice system in which our courts piece together the myriad criminal codes across the nation. The trial court properly declined to apply Florida law in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

II

The defendant’s principal argument is that she was unable to present her defense of entrapment because she did not have access to information concerning Buckley, a government informant. We find merit in this contention.

The following additional facts are pertinent to this aspect of the appeal. Testimony of witnesses for the state and the defendant established that Buckley, a prison inmate who knew the defendant’s son, informed Losey of the defendant’s interest in buying marihuana for distribution. According to the defendant, Buckley’s involvement went far beyond that of a mere informant. In her view, Buckley was intimately involved in the negotiations that led to the undercover drug transaction. The defendant also believed that Buckley and Losey worked together in trying to effectuate the deal.

The procedural history of this case reveals that throughout the course of the litigation the defendant made every effort to learn more about Buckley’s involvement with the undercover deal. Before trial, the defendant twice requested information regarding government informants, i.e., names, addresses, and promises made by the government to informants. The defendant made an offer of proof in support of this motion explaining that Buckley had repeatedly telephoned her and had urged her to purchase marihuana. The defendant further asserted that with more information regarding the role of Buckley, her attorney would be able effectively to cross-examine Losey and to establish her defense of entrapment. The court denied the defendant’s motion.

In the course of trial, Losey testified that Buckley had informed him of the defendant’s interest in buying marihuana. The defendant subsequently renewed her motion for disclosure, again insisting that information concerning Buckley was critical to her case. The court denied the motion. The defendant made several other fruitless attempts to learn more about Buckley and even to compel the state to produce Buckley as a witness. Ultimately, the defendant was unable to contact Buckley or to call him as a witness.

The defendant did, however, offer limited testimony as to telephone calls made by Buckley, albeit without reference to his name. The gravamen of her testimony was that some unidentified “voice” had urged her to effectuate the drug deal. The defendant testified that Buckley was an inmate and that he and her son were good friends. According to the defendant, Buckley urged her to buy drugs and advised her that the proceeds would enable her to hire a private attorney to represent her son in his pending criminal appeal.

Mindful of this factual background, we consider the applicable legal principles. Whether the government must disclose information concerning an informant depends on a well established balancing test originally set forth in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957). There, the United States Supreme Court held that disclosure must be analyzed on a case by case basis, “balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.” Id., 62. While the Supreme Court’s holding in Roviaro was not rooted in the federal constitution, its balancing test has repeatedly guided our courts in resolving similar issues. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 204 Conn. 654, 657-59, 529 A.2d 1236 (1987); State v. McDaniel, 176 Conn. 131, 133, 405 A.2d 68 (1978).

Under the Roviaro balancing test, case law has delineated the extent to which disclosure “might have been helpful to the defense.” (Emphasis added.) Roviaro v. United States, supra, 63-64; United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089, 109 S. Ct. 1555, 103 L. Ed. 2d 858 (1989) (requiring disclosure to be material to the defense). Before a court will compel disclosure, the informant typically must be a participant in the alleged crime or an eyewitness thereto. State v. Conger, 183 Conn. 386, 392-93, 439 A.2d 381 (1981); State v. McDaniel, supra, 134. By contrast, courts generally agree that if the informant provides information to law enforcement officers without any further involvement, disclosure must yield to the protection of the informant. W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 23.3.

Federal courts have further developed the Roviaro balancing test for cases in which the defendant has distinctly invoked the defense of entrapment. In such cases, the events leading wp to the commission of the crime “may be as material as that detailing their actual commission, or more so.” (Emphasis added.) DiBlasio v. Keane, 932 F.2d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir. 1991). Thus, information pertaining to an informant involved in setting up the crime may disclose an entrapment. Roviaro v. United States, supra, 64. Furthermore, “if the informant arranged for the illegal transaction but was not present when it occurred, it would seem that disclosure would be called for were the defendant to claim entrapment.” (Emphasis added.) W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra.

In this case, application of the Roviaro balancing test clearly favors disclosure. According to the defendant’s testimony, Buckley played an integral role in persuading her to purchase marihuana. Although the evidence is sparse, it is undisputed that there is a link between Losey and Buckley. Testimony also indicates that Buckley was an inmate and friend of the defendant’s son. It is highly plausible, therefore, that Buckley was an active participant in the drug transaction, working in conjunction with the government. The defendant testified, moreover, that Buckley played on her fears regarding the brutality of her son’s prison conditions. This testimony persuades us that information concerning Buckley was material to the defense of entrapment.

In the state’s view, because Buckley did not participate in the crime, the defendant was not entitled to disclosure concerning this informant. We disagree. As previously stated, the defendant testified that Buckley pressured her into the transaction throughout her negotiations with Losey. While it is true that Buckley was not the sole participant in the undercover transaction, the defendant’s testimony indicates that he was instrumental in seeing that the defendant and Losey consummated the deal. In fact, given Buckley’s apparent relationship with the defendant’s son, it is likely that Buckley wielded considerable influence over her decision to purchase drugs. There is, thus, a sufficient likelihood that Buckley played a critical role in arranging the undercover drug deal.

The state further posits that Buckley’s alleged entrapment of the defendant is the product of sheer speculation. This argument is misplaced, however, because the defendant did offer some evidence to support her theory, i.e., her testimony regarding what the “voice” said to her on the telephone. See DiBlasio v. Keane, supra, 1043. Moreover, the state’s argument is somewhat circular, since without disclosure the defendant cannot fully develop her theory as to Buckley’s involvement.

We hold that the nondisclosure of Buckley’s whereabouts deprived the defendant of her right to present a defense. On retrial, therefore, the state must reveal this information. Alternatively, the state may produce Buckley as a witness in lieu of disclosing his present location.

Because a new trial is necessary, we will consider those remaining claims that are likely to affect the proceedings on remand.

III

The defendant next asserts that the trial court improperly declined to recognize a defense based on “objective entrapment.” This argument, if accepted, is likely to impact evidentiary rulings and, ultimately, the jury instructions on remand. Hence, it is necessary to resolve this issue as part of the present appeal.

Throughout this century, federal and state courts have debated the appropriate scope of the entrapment defense. The debate hinges largely on whether entrapment should focus on investigatory practices or on the criminal predisposition of a particular defendant. See C. Whitebread & C. Slobogin, Criminal Procedure: An Analysis of Cases and Concepts § 1901, pp. 468-69 (3d Ed. 1993). The United States Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 413 (1932), settled the matter in the federal courts, holding that entrapment exists “when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the court refused to conceptualize entrapment as solely an issue of police practices, focusing also on the defendant’s tendency toward engaging in criminal activity. See also Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540, 118 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1992) (where defense of entrapment is at issue, “the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents” [emphasis added]).

In much the same fashion as the United States Supreme Court, the legislature of this state settled the debate with the enactment of General Statutes § 53a-15. Under this provision, the defense of entrapment obtains if “the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because [she] was induced to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant . . . and . . . the defendant did not contemplate and would not otherwise have engaged in such conduct. ” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 53a-15. This provision makes abundantly clear that entrapment exists only if the defendant was not predisposed to committing the crime at issue. State v. Avery, 152 Conn. 582, 583-84, 211 A.2d 165 (1965); State v. Grant, 8 Conn. App. 158, 164, 511 A.2d 369 (1986).

An understanding of a defendant’s predisposition requires a subjective inquiry that considers whether “the criminal intent or the willing disposition to commit the crime originates in the mind of the accused . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McNally, 173 Conn. 197, 201, 377 A.2d 286 (1977); State v. Marino, 23 Conn. App. 392, 396, 580 A.2d 990, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 818, 580 A.2d 63 (1990). Of course, in assessing the defendant’s predisposition, the nature and severity of the government inducement is a necessary reference point. State v. McNally, supra; State v. Marino, supra. Logically, the greater the pressure from the government, the greater the likelihood that an innocent person will engage in criminal conduct. Under the statute, however, the inducement by itself cannot give rise to the defense. General Statutes § 53a-15.

The defendant argues that Connecticut should adopt an objective standard for entrapment that focuses on the egregiousness of the government inducement, without regard to the defendant’s predisposition to commit a particular crime. The defendant insists that the adoption of an objective standard would not usurp the function of the legislature but, rather, is a necessary incident to our court’s supervisory authority over criminal justice. We disagree with the defendant’s position.

It is not a proper function of this court’s to rewrite statutes. State v. Hanson, 210 Conn. 519, 529, 556 A.2d 1007 (1989); State v. Perrucio, 192 Conn. 154, 163 n.4, 471 A.2d 632, appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 801, 105 S. Ct. 55, 83 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1984). While our penal code does not preclude our courts from recognizing defenses in addition to those created by statute; General Statutes § 53a-4; State v. Woods, 23 Conn. App. 615, 583 A.2d 639 (1990); State v. Messler, 19 Conn. App. 432, 562 A.2d 1138 (1989); we are not free to fashion a defense that would undermine a provision of the code. General Statutes § 53a-4. An adoption of the objective standard by this court would abrogate the present statute almost entirely. A defense based solely on the nature of the police practices is wholly inconsistent with the statute’s requirement that the defense entrapment focus on the defendant’s criminal predisposition. In fact, if we were to accept the defendant’s view, a person predisposed to commit the crime charged would disregard the statute and present a defense solely on the basis of objective entrapment. This would surely undermine the current statute and is contrary to our case law addressing this matter. See State v. McNally, supra. In the final analysis, the unambiguous terms of the statute require that the defendant “would not otherwise have engaged in [the proscribed] conduct.” General Statutes § 53a-15.

Furthermore, we do not accept the defendant’s suggestion that we adopt the defense of objective entrapment pursuant to our supervisory powers over criminal justice. In rejecting this claim, we stress that § 53a-15, while focusing on the defendant’s criminal predisposition prior to the inducement, necessarily requires inquiry into the nature of the investigative practices. State v. McNally, supra. Thus, the defendant’s claim that we disregard § 53a-15 and adopt an objective standard for entrapment is without merit.

IV

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly precluded inquiry into the potential bias of the state’s expert witness. We agree with the defendant.

At trial, the state called Special Agent David Hoyt of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). As an expert witness, Hoyt testified to the usual tactics of the DEA in monitoring drug trafficking and in using informants. Hoyt also explained the price, quantity and quality of various grades of marihuana. Defense counsel then cross-examined Hoyt and sought to establish the witness’ bias. The asserted bias was due to the fact that Hoyt’s employer, the United States government, stood to gain from a guilty verdict insofar as such a verdict would enhance the likelihood of a successful forfeiture action against the defendant. The trial court sustained the state’s objection to this line of inquiry and noted defense counsel’s exception to the ruling.

A defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses presented against her is basic to our system of criminal justice. “[A]n important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Arline, 223 Conn. 52, 60, 612 A.2d 755 (1992); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959). In fact, “[t]he exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is so significant that in a criminal case curtailment of this right may amount to a denial of confrontation or due process rights.” 3 J. Weinstein, Evidence § 607[03], p. 607-29; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). Therefore, a trial court must permit a defendant to present facts to the jury and allow the jury to draw inferences germane to the assessment of a witness’ reliability. Davis v. Alaska, supra, 318; State v. Arline, supra.

Our resolution of this claim must comport with well established guidelines for determining whether a defendant’s right of cross-examination has been unduly restricted. “ ‘[W]e consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.’ ” State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 331, 618 A.2d 32 (1992), quoting State v. Roma, 199 Conn. 110, 116, 505 A.2d 717 (1986). We also note that a trial court is accorded broad discretion when defining the appropriate scope of cross-examination. State v. Santiago, supra. The confrontation clause, however, requires that the trial court allow “all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate area of inquiry . . . .’’Id.

In this case, the defendant asks us to decide for the first time whether the ultimate success of a pending forfeiture proceeding is a legitimate area of inquiry on cross-examination. Although neither this court nor our Supreme Court has decided this precise issue, our Supreme Court recently addressed a similar matter in State v. Santiago, supra. There, defense counsel sought to establish a relationship between the state’s witness and the Hartford police department to show bias. Id., 329-30. The court held that “[i]t is always relevant to the issue of bias that a witness may have a relationship to the prosecuting authorities in a criminal case.” Id., 332. Despite the possibility that the witness’ relationship with the police may not have been “particularly illuminating of motive or bias,” the court in Santiago held that “the weight to be accorded such evidence was a matter for the jury.” Id.; State v. Oehman, 212 Conn. 325, 331-32, 562 A.2d 493 (1989). Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

Here, defense counsel sought to establish a relationship between Hoyt and the United States government that might have affected the jury’s assessment of Hoyt’s reliability as a witness. A guilty verdict would collaterally estop the defendant from disputing the facts supporting the conviction in the civil forfeiture action. See United States v. Monkey, 725 F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Land & Buildings Located at 420 Moon Hill Road, 721 F. Sup. 1, 3 (D. Mass. 1988). Hoyt’s testimony, if supportive of a guilty verdict, would benefit his employer, the United States government. Thus, the relationship between Hoyt and the United States government is relevant to the potential existence of bias. While the existence of a motive to distort the truth may be somewhat attenuated in this case, the weight to be accorded such evidence was a matter for the jury. State v. Santiago, supra.

Additionally, the trial court’s ruling was phrased in such absolute terms that the defendant was unable to elicit any testimony from Hoyt that covered the field of inquiry at issue. In fact, the ruling reduced defense counsel’s cross-examination to a brief inquiry into the prices of various grades of marihuana. Thus, we conclude that the trial court unduly narrowed the scope of the bias inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Roma, supra. In the event that on remand the state calls as a witness Hoyt or anyone else with a similar relationship to the civil forfeiture proceeding, the defendant may examine that witness’ potential bias stemming from involvement with the forfeiture action.

V

We next consider the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence concerning firearms that the police found at her residence. As previously stated, the officers arresting the defendant had obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s residence. Pursuant to the warrant, they seized several different guns. At trial, Losey, over objection, testified that the officers had seized these guns from the defendant’s residence. The defendant contends that evidence pertaining to the presence of firearms was inadmissible because it was not relevant to the crime of attempted distribution of narcotics or the defense of entrapment.

The trial court is vested with wide discretion when considering whether evidence is relevant in a particular case. State v. Boles, 223 Conn. 535, 549, 613 A.2d 770 (1992); State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 392, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987). Unless the trial court has abused its discretion or an injustice has occurred, a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. State v. Boles, supra. Evidence is relevant only if it has some “tendency to establish the existence of a material fact.” (Internal quotations marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 376, 545 A.2d 1048 (1988). “[T]he fact that evidence is susceptible of different explanations or would support various inferences does not affect its admissibility, although it obviously bears upon its weight. So long as the evidence may reasonably be construed in such a manner that it would be relevant, it is admissible.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299, 316, 613 A.2d 242 (1992); State v. Joly, 219 Conn. 234, 252, 593 A.2d 96 (1991).

In this case, we do not discern an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Our Supreme Court has noted that possession of firearms is common among drug traffickers. State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 281, 559 A.2d 164, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 866, 110 S. Ct. 188, 107 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1989). Evidence of the presence of firearms at the defendant’s residence, therefore, was properly submitted to the jury as a factor tending to show that the defendant kept firearms in connection with the attempted distribution of marihuana. While it may be true, as the defendant argues, that the defendant’s husband used these guns solely for hunting, this was a question for the jury. Furthermore, it is not necessary that each piece of the state’s evidence be susceptible of a single interpretation. Rather, the question is whether one possible interpretation tends to establish that the defendant intended to distribute drugs. We conclude that the trial court properly admitted the testimony of Losey relating to the presence of guns at the defendant’s residence.

VI

The defendant also contends that the trial court improperly precluded the admission of evidence that charges against the defendant associated with the presence of small quantities of marihuana at her residence had been dismissed. We disagree.

As previously stated, we accord broad discretion to the trial court when reviewing evidentiary rulings, particularly those involving the issue of relevancy. State v. Boles, supra. In this case, the court ruled that the defendant could not present evidence that other criminal charges against her had been dismissed. Despite the defendant’s argument to the contrary, the trial court properly ruled that this evidence was not relevant to the defendant’s predisposition. This evidence does not tend to establish an entrapment. Instead, reference to these charges seems to cut against the defense since the fact that the defendant was actually charged with other crimes indicates the possibility of additional criminal acts. Furthermore, the defendant was permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant’s husband accepted full responsibility for the prior charges against the defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding the dismissal of other criminal charges.

VII

The defendant’s final argument is that the trial court improperly prohibited the defendant from inquiring into the attitudes of prospective jurors toward the defense of entrapment. We agree with the defendant.

In selecting the jury, defense counsel proposed to ask the following questions. (1) “Our defense is entrapment. That is, we’ll be claiming that this is an action that the defendant would not have engaged in except for the actions of the undercover officer. Do you have any feelings about that?” (2) “Do you have any strong feelings one way or another about various law enforcement techniques, in particular about undercover investigations? That is, using police officers in order to act as if they’re drug dealers in order to make an arrest?” The trial court sustained the state’s objections to both questions and noted defense counsel’s exception. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly excluded these lines of inquiry.

Our state constitution provides that in “all civil and criminal actions tried by a jury, the parties shall have the right to challenge jurors peremptorily, with the number of such challenges to be established by law.” Conn. Const., art. I, § 19, as amended by art. IV of the amendments. In addition, the legislature has created a statutory right to a voir dire examination of each prospective juror in a criminal action. See General Statutes § 54-82f. Thus, it is well settled that “[t]he right to question each juror individually by counsel shall be inviolate. ...” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Couture, 218 Conn. 309, 318, 589 A.2d 343 (1991), quoting State v. Dolphin, 203 Conn. 506, 511, 525 A.2d 509 (1987).

It is equally well established that ‘ ‘[t]he court has wide discretion in conducting the voir dire . . . and the exercise of that discretion will not constitute reversible error unless it has clearly been abused or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dahlgren, 200 Conn. 586, 601, 512 A.2d 906 (1986). In defining the scope of voir dire examination, the court should allow an attorney ample latitude in questioning a prospective juror in order to ensure the discovery of prejudices that he may harbor, even those prejudices that “ ‘will even subconsciously affect [a prospective juror’s] decision of the case ....’” (Emphasis added.) State v. Dolphin, supra, 512, quoting State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 142, 120 A.2d 152 (1956).

In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors on their attitudes toward undercover law enforcement. It is axiomatic that undercover law enforcement is an acceptable method by which criminals are apprehended. Whether a prospective juror generally favors such police practices is not pertinent to whether he or she harbors prejudices that might affect the fairness of the ultimate verdict. The trial court’s discretionary ruling, therefore, was appropriate in this regard.

Defense counsel’s attempt to ascertain the attitudes of potential jurors toward the defense of entrapment, however, is a different matter. The defense of entrapment goes to the heart of this case. Accordingly, the attitudes of potential jurors toward this defense is of critical importance to the defendant. It is conceivable that a juror would not accept the defense of entrapment even if convinced that an entrapment had occurred. Unless defense counsel distorts the essence of the entrapment defense, the trial court should allow the attorney to pursue this line of inquiry. State v. Higgs, supra. On remand, defense counsel is entitled to greater latitude in conducting the voir dire to ensure that the jury ultimately empaneled is free of prejudices concerning the defense of entrapment.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The following facts are based predominantly on testimony adduced at trial. Some of the facts, however, are drawn from tape recorded conversations which were not made part of the record for appeal. To the extent that the parties are in agreement, we accept their references to the content of these tapes.

       In Krajewski, the court held that the defendant’s due process rights had been violated because the state gave an informant carte blanche to set up drug deals and suggested that he would not get a reduced sentence unless he rendered substantial assistance.

       Augustus Buckley’s involvement with the transaction at issue was primarily set forth by the defendant when she testified. The trial court, however, permitted her to refer to Buckley only as a “voice” with whom she spoke. We use his name here to avoid confusion.

       The defendant’s husband testified that the guns and marihuana were his.

       General Statutes § 53a-15 provides: “In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, for the purpose of institution of criminal prosecution against the defendant, and that the defendant did not contemplate and would not otherwise have engaged in such conduct.”

       At this point, the defendant essentially explained that she could not afford the expenses associated with transporting Buckley to Connecticut for trial.

       Over defense counsel’s objection, the court would not permit the defendant to refer to the “voice” as Augustus Buckley.

       Because a new trial is necessary, we will not address the defendant’s claim that the trial court should have permitted the defendant to testify as to the identity of the person who telephoned her. Our conclusion that the state must either disclose Buckley’s whereabouts or produce him as a witness alters the nature of this claim considerably and we will not speculate as to how this issue may again arise during the course of proceedings on remand.
      Nor do we find merit in the defendant’s contention that the court should have granted her motion for acquittal. In support of the motion, the defendant argues the existence of entrapment as a matter of law. Because, in essence, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the issue of entrapment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict to determine whether the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Pearl, 28 Conn. App. 521, 526, 613 A.2d 304 (1992). We conclude that the evidence sufficiently supports the judgment of conviction. It is, of course, possible that on retrial the defense of entrapment will obtain with the benefit of additional evidence pertaining to the involvement of Buckley.

       Cf. State v. Milum, 197 Conn. 602, 611, 500 A.2d 555 (1985) (holding that accused has right to cross-examine witness on issue of a witness’ potential bias that stemmed from the fact that the witness had instituted a civil action for damages against the defendant arising from the crime charged).

       We note that the record is ambiguous with respect to the status of the federal forfeiture proceeding. It is, however, necessary to address this claim because, if the forfeiture action is pending at the time of retrial, Hoyt’s potential bias may still be at issue.

       We note that State v. Dolphin, 203 Conn. 506, 512, 525 A.2d 509 (1987), and its progeny are the only cases discussing the proper scope of voir dire when an attorney seeks to uncover a prospective juror’s attitude toward law enforcement. Through this line of cases our Supreme Court established that when a police officer’s testimony is crucial, a prospective juror’s attitude toward the credibility of the officer is within the scope of voir dire.

       See also United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 694 (8th Cir. 1985) (expressing reservations about trial court’s limited voir dire regarding defense of entrapment), rev’d on other grounds, 476 U.S. 734, 106 S. Ct. 2216, 90 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1986); United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (disapproving of trial court’s refusal to question jurors regarding self-defense, but finding no prejudice in light of subsequent jury instruction).