author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    ANDRE JOSEPH v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT, ET AL.
    (AC 32033)
    Bishop, Lavine and Schaller, Js.
    Argued January 4
    officially released March 22, 2011

      Andre Joseph, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

      Richard T. Sponzo, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Andre Joseph, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the decision of the employment security division board of review (board) denying his motion to open the decision of the board. The board denied the plaintiffs motion to open after it adopted the decision of the appeals referee, which affirmed the decision of the defendant administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, finding the plaintiff ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his appeal because the board and appeals referee incorrectly determined that he was ineligible for benefits under General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (2) (B). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiffs appeal. The plaintiff began working for United Healthcare Services, Inc. (United), on July 30, 2007, as a senior accountant. On November 10, 2008, United named Debbie Lee its accounting supervisor. When Lee introduced herself to the plaintiff, he told her that the former accounting supervisor and his coworkers did not know proper accounting methods and accused them of fraud. On December 9, 2008, Lee held a coaching meeting with the plaintiff to train him in the accounting methods she expected him to employ when completing his accounting reconciliations. When the plaintiff sent Lee his work, however, the final product was different from what they had discussed. On December 11, 2008, Lee identified areas to the plaintiff in which she wanted him to improve, including understanding the reconciliation process. The plaintiff continued to send Lee work that was different from what he had been instructed to do.

On December 16,2008, Lee sent the plaintiff an e-mail invitation to a department meeting, but the plaintiff replied by stating that he would not attend because he thought United was “trying to set him up. ” On December 18, 2008, Lee sent the plaintiff another e-mail and told him that he needed to complete his reconciliations. One day later she provided the plaintiff with the instructions for completing the reconciliations. The plaintiff was unable to balance the accounts using Lee’s methods.

On January 6, 2009, the plaintiffs reconciliations were past due because he was unable to complete his work using the methods Lee had prescribed. Lee sent the plaintiff an e-mail and again explained the methods she wanted him to use. The plaintiff replied to Lee and wrote that “you do not have the technical accounting skills to be a supervisor and that will be your downfall.” Lee responded that she had twenty years of accounting experience, to which the plaintiff wrote that she had twenty years of “non value added experience non contemporary.” Lee forwarded this series of e-mails to her supervisor and to accounting manager Susan Pascutti. Lee stated that the plaintiff was insubordinate and requested that he be discharged for failure to follow instructions. United discharged the plaintiff for insubordination on the same day that the e-mails were exchanged.

After he was discharged from his employment, the plaintiff filed for unemployment compensation benefits. On February 9, 2009, the defendant ruled that the plaintiff was ineligible for benefits, pursuant to § 31-236 (a) (2) (B), because he was “discharged by United . . . for deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest.” On February 19, 2009, the plaintiff appealed the defendant’s decision to the employment security appeals division, and a hearing was conducted by an appeals referee. The referee dismissed the plaintiffs appeal and affirmed the determination of the defendant, concluding that “[w]hether displaying apoor attitude or making objectionable remarks to the employer constitutes wilful misconduct generally depends on whether the claimant’s conduct is spontaneous or deliberate. . . . The [plaintiffs] January 6, 2009 e-mail remarks were offensive. He did not send them during a heated discussion, and no mitigating circumstances excused his conduct. He merely did not want to follow Lee’s directions. The [plaintiff] directed these e-mails to Lee to personally insult her and undermine her supervisory authority. . . . Thus, the referee finds [that] the [plaintiffs] January 6 e-mails rise to the level of wilful misconduct in the course of employment.” (Citation omitted.)

On April 7, 2009, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the board, which adopted the referee’s findings of fact and decision. The boar d also added that “ [i]n the case before us, the employer discharged the [plaintiff] immediately after he sent his supervisor two highly insulting and demeaning e-mail messages questioning her accounting and supervisory abilities. . . . [W]e find that the [plaintiff s] refusal to follow the company’s format and his attempt to undermine his supervisor’s authority by challenging her ability to supervise constituted wilful misconduct.”

The plaintiff filed a motion to open the board’s decision, claiming that he was discharged as a whistle-blower for challenging United’s practices. The board denied the plaintiffs motion to open, and the plaintiff appealed the decision to the Superior Court. The defendant filed a motion for judgment dismissing the plaintiffs appeal, which the court granted on January 21, 2010. This appeal followed.

The plaintiffs sole claim is that the court improperly dismissed his appeal of the board’s decision because the board and appeals referee incorrectly concluded that he was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to § 31-236 (a) (2) (B). “In appeals under . . . [General Statutes] § 31-249b, the Superior Court does not retry the facts or hear evidence but rather sits as an appellate court to review only the record certified and filed by the board of review. . . . The court is bound by the findings of subordinate facts and reasonable factual conclusions made by the appeals referee where . . . the board of review adopted the findings and affirmed the decision of the referee. . . . Judicial review of the conclusions of law reached administratively is also limited. The court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the board . . . has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Nonetheless, issues of law afford a reviewing court a broader standard of review when compared to a challenge to the factual findings of the referee.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marquand v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 124 Conn. App. 75, 79, 3 A.3d 172 (2010).

In our review of the record, we conclude that the court properly dismissed the plaintiffs appeal because the board and appeals referee did not act arbitrarily or illegally, nor did they abuse their discretion in finding that the plaintiff was ineligible for benefits under § 31-236 (a) (2) (B) for behavior constituting wilful misconduct in the course of employment. United’s decision to terminate the plaintiffs employment was precipitated by the plaintiffs sending disparaging e-mails to Lee. The appeals referee concluded, and the board agreed, that the e-mails that the plaintiff sent to Lee insulted her personally and undermined her supervisory authority, and, therefore, his actions rose to the level of wilful misconduct in the course of employment. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support this finding.

The judgment is affirmed.

       The plaintiffs former employer, United Healthcare Services, Inc., and the board were originally named as defendants. Only the named defendant is a party to this appeal.

       General Statutes § 31-236 (a) provides in relevant part: “An individual shall be ineligible for [unemployment compensation] benefits . . . (2) . . . (B) if, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual has been discharged or suspended for . . . wilful misconduct in the course of the individual’s employment . . . .”

       On April 28,2008, United’s previous accounting supervisor, Ann Howard, issued the plaintiff a corrective action plan because he was not performing his professional responsibilities, namely, accounting reconciliations, according to her directions. The plaintiff notified the company’s management that he believed Howard used improper accounting methods, but Tim Tuohy, United’s controller, and Susan Pascutt i, United’s accounting manger, advised the plaintiff that he was unable to balance the reconciliations because he was not doing them correctly.

       The referee also concluded that “the [plaintiff] engaged in ongoing improper conduct. The employer has the right to establish and enforce performance standards in order to achieve an effective operation of the business. Management has the prerogative of monitoring and criticizing the job performance of its employees. ... An employee’s deliberate failure to follow an employer’s reasonable request or order constitutes wilful misconduct where the employee does not have good cause to refuse. ... No evidence demonstrates [that United’s previous accounting supervisor, Ann] Howard or Lee used improper accounting methods. The [plaintiffs] inability to balance the reconciliations is not a compelling reason for his refusing to follow Lee’s instructions to improve his job performance or attend her meetings.” (Citations omitted.)

       General Statutes § 31-249b provides in relevant part: “At any time before the board’s decision has become final, any party, including the administrator, may appeal such decision, including any claim that the decision violates statutory or constitutional provisions, to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford or for the judicial district wherein the appellant resides. ...”

       General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (16) provides in relevant part: “ ‘[W]ilful misconduct’ means deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest, or a single knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, when reasonably applied, provided such violation is not a result of the employee’s incompetence . . . .”
      Furthermore, § 31-236-26a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part: “(b) To determine that misconduct is deliberate, the [administrator must find that the individual committed the act or made the omission intentionally or with reckless indifference for the probable consequences of such act or omission. . . . (c) To find that deliberate misconduct is in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest, the [a]dministrator must find that: (1) the individual knew or should have known that such act or omission was contrary to the employer’s expectation or interest; and (2) at the time the individual committed the act or made the omission, he understood that the act or omission was contrary to the employer’s expectation or interest and he was not motivated or seriously influenced by mitigating circumstances of a compelling nature. . . .”

       The plaintiff argues that he was wrongfully discharged for his effort to correct United’s bad accounting practices. Specifically, he claims that he did not follow United’s practices because they were improper and illegal. It is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiffs defiance of his employer’s instructions was done in good faith or whether acting in good faith permits the plaintiff to collect unemployment benefits pursuant to § 31-236 (a) (2) (B) because both the board and the referee concluded that United discharged the plaintiff for wilful misconduct as a consequence of the e-mails he sent to Lee on January 6, 2008.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MIHALAKOS, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    CRAIG E. TUCKMAN v. KAREN R. TUCKMAN
    (AC 30913)
    Graendel, Harper and Mihalakos, Js.

      Argued October 19, 2010
    officially released March 22, 2011

      Charles W. Fleischmann, for the appellant (defendant).

      Daniel Jonah Krisch, with whom was Kenneth J. Bartsehi, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

MIHALAKOS, J.

In this marital dissolution action, the defendant, Karen R. Tuckman, appeals from the judgment of the trial court with respect to the court’s financial orders. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by improperly (1) failing to award her alimony, (2) awarding her an insufficient amount of child support and (3) determining that the investment assets held by the Karen Blueweiss Trust were part of the marital estate. Because we agree with the defendant as to her second claim, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following relevant information. The defendant and the plaintiff, Craig E. Tuckman, were married on November 3, 1990. They have two children, a son, bom in 1994, and a daughter, bom in 1996. Both parties have substantial income and assets available to them. In 2005 and 2006, the defendant had an income of $530,000 and $945,000, respectively. The defendant’s assets included a one-third stake in BJK Partners (BJK), an investment partnership with her two older brothers, and a one-third ownership interest in Offices Limited, Inc., a family office furniture business. According to the parties’ financial affidavits, at the time of trial, the defendant’s share of BJK was valued at approximately $2.7 million, while her share of Offices Limited, Inc., was valued at $1.25 million. The defendant also earned well over $2 million through her BJK investment partnership between 1996 and 2007. In 2006 and 2007, the plaintiff, who worked in the commodities division at Merrill Lynch, each year earned a base compensation of $200,000 with a bonus of $1.5 million. In 2008, the plaintiff was set to begin employment at Citicorp, where he was to receive base pay along with a bonus of $1.25 million in 2009 and 2010.

On September 13, 2006, the plaintiff brought this dissolution action by complaint in which he sought a dissolution of the marriage and an appropriate order regarding custody, child support and educational support of their minor children. Thereafter, the defendant filed an answer and cross complaint in which she sought a dissolution of the marriage, alimony, joint custody of the minor children, child support, educational support, an assignment of the plaintiffs estate, an order directing the plaintiff to provide security in satisfaction of any judgment rendered and attorney’s fees.

Following a trial, on January 8, 2009, the court, Hon. Howard T. Owens, Jr., judge trial referee, issued its memorandum of decision, dissolving the parties’ marriage, adopting the parties’ agreed parenting plan and setting forth its financial orders. The court found, as it related to fault, that “neither party is to blame — it is just a marriage that despite the parties’ efforts, it did not succeed.” In so finding, the court issued the following financial orders: (1) no periodic alimony to either party; (2) $250 per week in support of each child to the defendant; (3) property of the parties to be divided with 67 percent going to the defendant and 33 percent to the plaintiff, with the exception of the Neuberger-Berman account, which went to the defendant; (4) possession of the marital home to the defendant and half of its equity, or $528,183, to be paid to the plaintiff within sixty days; (5) denial of the defendant’s request for attorney’s fees; and (6) additional orders relating to personal property and medical insurance and expenses.

The plaintiff and the defendant filed numerous motions for articulation and to reargue. In response, the court rectified its judgment and clarified several statements in its memorandum of decision. The court denied the defendant’s requests to reconsider its decisions on alimony, asset division and attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

“[T]he standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court wall not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. ... It is within the province of the trial court to find facts and draw proper inferences from the evidence presented. ... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . [T]o conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the court either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did. . . . Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pellow v. Pellow, 113 Conn. App. 122, 124-25, 964 A.2d 1252 (2009).

We first address the defendant’s second claim, which is that the court improperly awarded only $250 per child per week to the defendant in child support. We agree with the defendant and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

In its memorandum of decision, the court ordered that “[a]s a contribution toward expenses related to the children when they are with [the defendant], the [plaintiff] shall pay child support to [her] in the amount of $250 per week for each child.” Therefore, the court’s total support order for the two children was $500 per week.

In Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 89-91, 995 A.2d 1 (2010), our Supreme Court discussed the statutes and regulations enacted by our legislature that govern child support. “[General Statutes §] 46b-84 provides in relevant part: (a) Upon or subsequent to the annulment or dissolution of any marriage or the entry of a decree of legal separation or divorce, the parents of a minor child of the marriage, shall maintain the child according to their respective abilities, if the child is in need of maintenance. Any postjudgment procedure afforded by chapter 906 shall be available to secure the present and future financial interests of a party in connection with a final order for the periodic payment of child support. . . .

“(d) In determining whether a child is in need of maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide such maintenance and the amount thereof, the court shall consider the age, health, station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and sources of income, estate, vocational skills and employ-ability of each of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of the child. . . ,”

“The legislature also has provided for a commission to oversee the establishment of child support guidelines, which must be updated every four years, to ensure the appropriateness of child support awards .... General Statutes § 46b-215a. . . . Moreover, the legislature has thrown its full support behind the guidelines, expressly declaring that [t]he . . . guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a and in effect on the date of the support determination shall be considered in all determinations of child support amounts . . . . In all such determinations, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of such awards which resulted from the application of such guidelines is the amount of support .... A specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular case, as determined under criteria established by the [commission] under section 46b-215a, shall be required in order to rebut the presumption in such case. (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) General Statutes § 46b-215b (a).” Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 89-91.

Section 46b-215a-l (6) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies defines a “[cjhild support award” as “the entire payment obligation of the noncustodial parent, as determined under the . . . guidelines . . . .” The guidelines specifically provide that “[w]hen the parents’ combined net weekly income exceeds $4,000, child support awards shall be determined on a case-by-case basis, and the current support prescribed at the $4,000 net weekly income level shall be the minimum presumptive amount.” Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2b (a) (2). Pursuant to the guidelines, for families with a combined net income of $4000 per week, the basic child support obligation for two children is $636. Id., § 46b-215a-2b (f).

In Maturo, the court addressed the fashioning of a child support award when the parents’ combined net weekly income exceeds $4000. “[A]n award of child support based on a combined net weekly income of $8000 must be governed by the same principles that govern a child support award based on a combined net weekly income of $4000, even though the former does not fall within the guidelines’ schedule. . . . [Although courts may, in the exercise of their discretion, determine the correct percentage of the combined net weekly income assigned to child support in light of the circumstances in each particular' case, including a consideration of other, additional obligations imposed on the noncustodial parent, any deviation from the schedule or the principles on which the guidelines are based must be accompanied by the court’s explanation as to why the guidelines are inequitable or inappropriate and why the deviation is necessary to meet the needs of the child.” (Emphasis in original.) Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 95-96.

Based on the relevant statutes, regulations and case law, it is clear that, in this case, the court deviated from the principles that govern child support awards pursuant to the guidelines. At trial, the court heard evidence that both parties earn significant incomes. According to the plaintiffs testimony, his base salary in 2006 was $200,000 with a bonus of $1.5 million ($1.125 million in cash), with an expected similar salary and bonus structure from 2007 to 2010 while employed at Merrill Lynch and Citicorp. Although the plaintiffs income clearly places this case outside the child support guidelines table, that does not absolve the court from its duty to make factual findings related to the guidelines simply because the “income of a particular family exceeds some talismanic number on a chart.” Id., 113.

“Neither this court, nor the trial court, is at liberty, where a particular family enjoys a relatively high income, to disregard the significant progress that has been made in standardizing child support awards since the advent of the guidelines. See 42 U.S.C. § 667 (b) (2) (1988). Removing consideration of the guidelines from child support decisions deprives high income families of the fairness and consistency the guidelines require and leaves the trial and appellate courts adrift, unan-chored to the core principles that guide support awards in cases falling within the guidelines’ schedule.” Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 113. Based on the record before us and the court’s memorandum of decision, we cannot conclude that the court properly fashioned its child support order. The court’s order failed to follow the guidelines’ tables, and, more importantly, its memorandum of decision failed to make any reference to the guidelines. Thus, we are left to speculate as to whether the court acknowledged the guidelines but deviated from them without making findings on the record as to how application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate, or, in the alternative, disregarded the guidelines entirely. In either case, the court violated the statutory provisions by failing to articulate its reasons for deviating from the child support guidelines. We, therefore, conclude that the court abused its discretion when it awarded $250 per child per week to the defendant.

We are, thus, left to determine what remedy to afford the plaintiff. “[W]hen an appellate court reverses a trial court judgment based on an improper alimony, property distribution, or child support award, the appellate court’s remand typically authorizes the trial court to reconsider all of the financial orders.” Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 277, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999). “With respect to the financial orders predicated on those findings of fact, [the] issues involving financial orders are entirely interwoven. The rendering of a judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 378, 999 A.2d 721 (2010). Although the majority of appellate decisions involving improper financial orders in dissolution cases remand for reconsideration as to all financial orders, our Supreme Court has remanded for the sole purpose of refashioning a court’s child support order. “[E]very improper order . . . does not necessarily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court’s financial orders. A financial order is severable when it is not in any way interdependent with other orders and is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to other factors. ... In other words, an order is severable if its impropriety does not place the correctness of the other orders in question.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 124-25.

In Maturo, the trial court made specific findings on the record as to why it deviated from the guidelines in fashioning its child support order. Id., 99-100. The trial court first awarded the plaintiff $636 per week, the amount designated in the schedule for two children with a combined net weekly family income of at least $4000 per week, but also awarded the plaintiff 20 percent of the defendant’s annual net cash bonus, which varied from $489,449.50 to $1.368 million. Id., 96. Our Supreme Court determined that the trial court’s child support award of 20 percent of the defendant’s bonus, awarded on top of its award of the statutory guidelines amount, was both improper and severable from the remaining financial orders. Id., 124-25. The court did, however, remand as to the entire child support order. Id.

Similarly, in a recent case, Kiniry v. Kiniry, 299 Conn. 308, 325-26, 9 A.3d 708 (2010), our Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to establish a presumptive child support amount prior to fashioning its child support orders. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s child support orders were severable from the other financial orders entered by the court because “[tjhere [was] no interdependence or link between the child support orders, which are based on the parties’ net income, and the asset allocation.” Id., 345. In that case, by way of an articulation, the trial court determined the net weekly incomes of both parties and explained its reasoning for deviating from the child support guidelines, referenced therein, in deciding not to award child support to the defendant. Id., 320.

In the present case, the court failed to make a finding as to the net income of the plaintiff or to refer to the child support guidelines, as is statutorily required. We are, thus, left with a trial court decision that is devoid of guidance as to how the court fashioned its child support order within the entire mosaic of its financial orders. Without such guidance, we cannot determine whether the court’s financial awards would remain intact after reconsidering its child support award. Based on the ambiguous nature of the court’s child support order as it relates to the guidelines, we cannot conclude that the child support order is severable from the remaining financial orders. Accordingly, a new trial on all financial issues is required. See Brooks v. Brooks, 121 Conn. App. 659, 672, 997 A.2d 504 (2010).

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       In its memorandum of decision, the court referenced § 46b-84 only as it related to health insurance and medical expenses.

       The parties dispute whether the defendant, as is required, submitted a child support guidelines sheet. In some instances, such a failure is fatal to an appellant’s claim that the court fashioned an improper child support order. See Bee v. Bee, 79 Conn. App. 783, 787, 831 A.2d 833, cert, denied, 266 Conn. 932, 837 A.2d 805 (2003). Although no guidelines sheet can be found in the record, the following colloquy between trial counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant allows us to conclude that the defendant submitted a guidelines sheet:
      “[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Okay. Your Honor, the defendant did submit a child support guideline worksheet at the beginning of trial. [The plaintiffs counsel] questioned, he couldn’t recall whether anyone submitted any. We did submit a child support guideline worksheet, which is mandated by the rules of practice, if you want the court to be responsible for that information. . . .
      “[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: . . . [I]f the defendant’s attorney tells Your Honor that he submitted it, I don’t question that. But, you know, this isn’t or wasn’t a guidelines case, and there would be a basis for deviation because of the substantial assets that you awarded to [the defendant], in any event. But, again, if ail [the defendant’s counsel] is looking [for] is for you to reference that you considered his worksheet, I don’t have an issue with that. ”

       Because we remand this case for a new trial as to all financial orders, we need not address the defendant’s remaining claims.


author: ALVORD, J.

text:
    CHARTER OAK LENDING GROUP, LLC v. JANET AUGUST ET AL.
    (AC 31303)
    Beach, Alvord and Pellegrino, Js.

      Argued November 18, 2010
    officially released March 22, 2011

      William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, was Hugh D. Hughes, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Jill Hartley, with whom was Stephen C. Schoettmer, for the appellees (named defendant et a!.).
   Opinion

ALVORD, J.

The plaintiff, Charter Oak Lending Group, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor of the defendants Janet August, Lia Stites, Barbara Coles, James McKenna, Patricia Holland, Patricia Kay and John Migliaro, its former employees, and their new employer, the defendant CTX Mortgage Company, LLC (CTX). The plaintiff filed a multicount complaint against the defendants claiming that they had conspired to misappropriate the plaintiffs proprietary and confidential information. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs casein-chief, the defendants moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8 for failure to make out a prima facie case. The court deferred its ruling on those motions, and the defendants presented then-evidence. After the trial had concluded, the court ruled on those motions, dismissing several counts of the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8 and subsequently issued a memorandum of decision finding in favor of the defendants with respect to the remaining counts.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) dismissed the counts of its complaint that alleged misappropriation of its trade secrets in violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), General Statutes § 35-50 et seq., (2) dismissed the counts of its complaint against the individual defendants that alleged breach of their fiduciary duty to refrain from disclosing the plaintiffs confidential information and trade secrets, (3) concluded that its claim that the defendants violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., was without any legal basis or factual foundation, (4) concluded that it failed to prove the elements of a civil action for conspiracy against the defendants and (5) concluded that the report of the plaintiffs expert on damages failed to establish a causal link between the defendants’ actions and the plaintiffs decline in value. We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

By way of background, the plaintiff, a mortgage broker and lender, was formed in 1999 with its principal place of business in Fairfield County. The business, owned by Donald DeRespinis and his wife, Debra Kil-lian, had contractual arrangements with lenders to provide those lenders with customers seeking loans. The individual defendants were mortgage specialists or loan originators, who had been hired and trained by the plaintiff. They were responsible for obtaining customers and their relevant contact information for the business. Each mortgage specialist was paid a commission based on the fee earned by the plaintiff on the loan closing. The individual defendants had no written contracts of employment and were not asked to sign confidentiality or noncompetition agreements.

DeRespinis had developed a customized computer program called Loan Manager (program) for the business. The plaintiffs mortgage specialists were expected to input their customers’ contact information, including the names of the people who referred the customers to them, into the program. DeRespinis periodically upgraded the program, which tracked the communications between the mortgage specialists and their customers and the progress of the loan transactions. A mortgage specialist could access only that information in the program that related to his or her own customer.

In November, 2004, two of the individual defendants attended a seminar called “Passion for Production.” Upon arrival, they realized that the actual purpose of the event was to recruit loan originators for CTX. At the event, CTX demonstrated the use of its media center program, which facilitated continuous contact between loan originators and their customers. On November 12, 2004, which was close in time to the CTX event, the plaintiff held a meeting for its mortgage specialists. Partially in anticipation of a downturn in the real estate market, the plaintiff had decided to implement a new plan that affected the compensation of the mortgage specialists. They were told that their commissions were to be reduced and that certain other benefits were being eliminated. Some of the mortgage specialists expressed their dissatisfaction with the new plan to Killian.

On December 1, 2004, four of the individual defendants tendered resignation letters that indicated they were terminating their employment with the plaintiff effective immediately. The remaining individual defendants left on or before January 7, 2005. Within that five week period, ten of the plaintiffs employees, including the seven individual defendants, resigned and accepted employment with CTX, the plaintiffs competitor. The plaintiff, claiming that its confidential information and loans had been diverted to CTX, filed the present action. In its operative complaint filed October 19, 2005, the plaintiff alleged civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of CUTSA, violation of CUTPA, conversion, statutory theft and computer related offenses in violation of General Statutes § 53a-251.

The plaintiff concluded its case-in-chief after ten days of trial and rested. At that point, the defendants orally moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8, claiming that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case as to all counts of the complaint. The court indicated that it was reserving its decision until the completion of the trial. Counsel for the defendants stated they would file written motions and accompanying memoranda of law, and counsel for the plaintiff indicated that he would file responses to those motions. The defendants then proceeded to present their evidence, and the trial concluded that same day.

By memorandum of decision issued August 27, 2008, the court dismissed the counts of the plaintiffs complaint that alleged violation of CUTSA, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion and statutory theft. The court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss with respect to the counts that alleged violation of CUTPA, unauthorized computer access and civil conspiracy. The parties filed subsequent briefs addressed to the surviving counts of the complaint, and the court heard argument on April 30, 2009. On July 8, 2009, the court issued its memorandum of decision, rendering judgment in favor of the defendants as to all of the remaining counts. This appeal followed.

I

DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO PRACTICE BOOK § 15-8

The plaintiffs first claim on appeal is that the court improperly dismissed the counts of its complaint that alleged violation of CUTSA and breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court applied an incorrect legal standard in granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss under Practice Book § 15-8 and that it had provided sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. We agree.

“The standard for determining whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, under Practice Book § 15-8, is whether the plaintiff put forth sufficient evidence that, if believed, would establish a prima facie case, not whether the trier of fact believes it. . . . For the court to grant the motion [for judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8], it must be of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. In testing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court compares the evidence with the allegations of the complaint. ... In order to establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove. . . . [T]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiffs] favor.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 86 Conn. App. 842, 846, 863 A.2d 735 (2005). VCiether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case is a question of law, over which our review is plenary. In re Devon W., 124 Conn. App. 631, 640, 6 A.3d 100 (2010).

A

CUTSA Claims

The plaintiff claims that the court ignored conflicting evidence and decided questions of fact when it dismissed the counts of its complaint alleging violation of CUTSA. We conclude that the court applied an incorrect legal standard for a motion for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8.

In its August 27, 2008 memorandum of decision, the court initially stated the proper standard to be used in determining whether such a motion should be granted. Shortly thereafter, however, the court indicated that the individual defendants were “independent contractors” and made certain findings that led to its dismissal of the CUTSA counts. The court stated: “The court further finds based on the more credible evidence that there does not exist any written agreements or verbal understandings concerning confidentiality or secrecy between the named defendants and the plaintiff involving any particular aspect of [the plaintiffs] operations, data resources systems, programs, training or financial matters.” (Emphasis added.) Further, in discussing proprietary interests in customer and referral lists, the court stated: “Although [the plaintiff] supplies support and a particular program to develop and process loan applications through the agent/broker, the customer itself, based on the more credible evidence, appears to have a sustaining allegiance to the agent-broker-originator, not to the plaintiff support company.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, referring to testimony concerning the lack of efforts by the plaintiff to treat the customer information as confidential, the court stated that “[t]he fact that customer surveys were a matter of public display . . . would militate, along with other evidence adduced at trial, against a finding that the so-called contact-customer lists were ‘trade secrets’ . . . .”

The language in the memorandum of decision indicates that the court impermissibly made findings as to disputed facts, weighed the credibility of the witnesses and drew inferences against the plaintiff. “[Although the trial court in its memorandum of decision at times framed its determination in terms of its findings, that is not the proper inquiry in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Practice Book § 15-8. On such a motion, the court is confined to determining whether the plaintiffs evidence, if believed and if given the benefit of all favorable inferences, makes out a prima facie case. . . . The court, on such a motion, may not make findings of fact, either favorable or unfavorable to the plaintiff.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 399, 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S. Ct. 1239, 146 L. Ed. 2d 99 (2000). Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiff that the court applied an incorrect legal standard in granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss under Practice Book § 15-8.

The defendants claim that, despite the above quoted statements of the court, the record nevertheless reflects that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case under CUTSA. They argue that the scant evidence presented by the plaintiff, even taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, could not satisfy the elements for a CUTSA claim because the information at issue was not a trade secret. We disagree.

General Statutes § 35-51 (d) defines a trade secret as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, process, drawing, cost data or customer list that: (1) [djerives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that its customer list was a trade secret as defined in CUTSA, that the information in that list was intended to be utilized exclusively for the plaintiffs benefit and that the defendants misappropriated such information. Accordingly, to make out aprima facie case for a violation of CUTSA, the plaintiff was required to present sufficient evidence that, if believed, would prove that the information in its customer list had independent economic value and that the plaintiff made reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. See Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 251 Conn. 59, 78, 752 A.2d 1037 (1999).

A careful review of the record reveals that the plaintiffs evidence met the relatively low standard necessary to withstand the defendants’ Practice Book § 15-8 motion. See Falker v. Samperi, 190 Conn. 412, 420, 461 A.2d 681 (1983). DeRespinis testified that (1) customer information is inputted into Loan Manager, the computer program he created that is used to develop contacts and customer lists and to generate business from those lists, (2) the individual defendants had computer access only to the information pertaining to their own customers, (3) the program tracked business, including loans in progress and loans that already had closed, (4) the plaintiff maintained computer security in that the information was encrypted, the servers were secured in a locked room and access was obtained through the use of passwords, (5) for the individual defendants to work from home, the plaintiff had to assist them in setting up their home computers to allow remote access, (6) either he or his assistant periodically would track remote access to the program by reviewing the logs to determine what type of access had been granted, (7) the plaintiff additionally maintained physical security of its building by way of an alarm system, (8) each authorized individual was provided with his or her user identification and password for the program and a password for access to the plaintiffs building, (9) the plaintiffs employees were not authorized to share their user identifications or passwords with other employees, (10) except for obtaining credit reports and appraisals and processing documents necessary for obtaining loans, the plaintiffs employees were not permitted to share customer information with third parties, (11) the plaintiffs employee handbook, which contained a section on confidentiality, was reviewed with all employees at the time of their initial employment and annually thereafter with respect to any changes in the policy, (12) the plaintiff never sold its customer lists, (13) the plaintiff did not advertise and obtained its business solely through the use of the confidential information it had developed and (14) the plaintiff permitted customer information to be stored only in the program.

Killian testified that (1) other than the program, information as to the identity of customers who closed loans with the plaintiff could not be obtained from any single source, (2) having the customers’ information in the program, such as dates concerning the change in interest rates or the expiration dates of prepayment penalties, gave the plaintiff a competitive advantage because it could identify refinance opportunities for continued service to those customers, (3) none of the individual defendants was given permission to take customer information with them when they left the plaintiffs employment, (4) the plaintiffs employees were told that any information collected in connection with a loan transaction was not to be disclosed to third parties other than the necessary contacts for obtaining the financing, (5) provisions in the employee handbook addressing issues of confidentiality, proprietary data and conflicts of interest were discussed with the individual defendants, (6) newly hired employees were given a copy of the employee handbook and instructed to review it and (7) the information in the program was critical because it gave the plaintiff the opportunity to build a future revenue stream from repeat customers.

We conclude that the foregoing testimony, if believed and if given the benefit of all favorable inferences, makes out a prima facie case for a violation of CUTSA. Accordingly, the court improperly dismissed those counts of the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8.

B

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims

The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly dismissed the counts of its complaint that alleged that the individual defendants breached their duty of loyalty to refrain from disclosing the plaintiffs confidential information and trade secrets. It argues that the court improperly determined that the information in its customer list was not confidential, that the defendants owed no fiduciary duty to the plaintiff and that there was no evidence of self-dealing.

In the section of its August 27, 2008 memorandum of decision that discussed the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims against the individual defendants, the court first noted that “[s]uch a breach relates back to the trade secret claim which has been dismissed.” Next, after quoting from Connecticut case law that addressed fiduciary relationships, the court stated: “The court finds that the relationship between the plaintiff and the individual defendants was aprincipal-agent relationship and not fiduciary in nature. Further, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support its claim of fiduciary breach through self-dealing, and therefore those [cjounts . . . relating to the claim of breach of fiduciary duty as to the individual defendants are hereby dismissed pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8.”

As discussed in part I A of this opinion, the court improperly dismissed the counts in the plaintiffs complaint alleging that the defendants’ violated CUTSA. The court applied an incorrect legal standard when it determined that “based on the more credible evidence . . . there does not exist any written agreements or verbal understandings concerning confidentiality or secrecy between the named defendants and the plaintiff involving any particular aspect of [the plaintiffs] operations, data resources systems, programs, training or financial matters.” (Emphasis added.) In dismissing the counts addressed to breach of fiduciary duty, the court relied in part on its previous determination that there was no violation of CUTSA. Because that determination was improper, it cannot be the basis for the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claims.

Further, the court found that the relationship between the parties was a principal-agent relationship and not fiduciary in nature. As previously noted, the court “may not make findings of fact, either favorable or unfavorable to the plaintiff’ in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Practice Book § 15-8. Thomas v. West Haven, supra, 249 Conn. 399. Nevertheless, the court’s determination that the relationship was one of principal and agent is inconsistent with its subsequent determination that the relationship was not fiduciary in nature. “An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.” Taylor v. Hamden Hall School, Inc., 149 Conn. 545, 552, 182 A.2d 615 (1962). “Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 639 n.12, 804 A.2d 180 (2002). “The relationship of principal and agent implies trust or confidence by the principal in the agent, and the agent is obligated to exercise the utmost good faith, loyalty and honesty toward his principal or employer. . . . The general duty of loyalty includes . . . the duty not to compete . . . and the duty not to disclose confidential information.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis, 86 Conn. App. 527, 535, 862 A.2d 837 (2004), affd, 276 Conn. 310, 885 A.2d 758 (2005). Accordingly, the court improperly dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claims on that stated ground.

With respect to the court’s finding that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support its claim that the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duty by engaging in self-dealing, we reiterate the standard that “the court is confined to determining whether the plaintiffs evidence, if believed and if given the benefit of all favorable inferences, makes out a prima facie case.” (Emphasis in original.) Thomas v. West Haven, supra, 249 Conn. 399. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the individual defendants were employees and agents of the plaintiff, that they were fiduciaries with respect to matters within the scope of their agency, that they were subject to a duty not to compete with the plaintiff with respect to matters within the scope of their agency and that they breached their fiduciary duty by engaging in self-dealing in order to gain an unfair competitive advantage while employed by the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff made out a prima facie case if it presented evidence that the individual defendants were agents of the plaintiff and that they engaged in self-dealing before they terminated their employment and agency relationship with the plaintiff.

A careful review of the record reveals that the plaintiffs evidence met the relatively low standard necessary to withstand the defendants’ Practice Book § 15-8 motion. See Falker v. Samperi, supra, 190 Conn. 420. The plaintiff clearly introduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate an agency relationship because the court made that explicit finding in its memorandum of decision. The evidence presented that would support a finding or inference of self-dealing included the following testimony and exhibits. DeRespinis testified that (1) he became aware that customers who had contacted the plaintiff for purposes of obtaining mortgage loans had been diverted to CTX by the individual defendants shortly after they had resigned from the plaintiffs employment, (2) loan transactions that were being tracked in the plaintiffs program ultimately closed at CTX, (3) the plaintiff did not authorize the transfer of those loans and received no commissions or partial commissions for them, (4) the customer information in the plaintiffs program was the same information provided by the individual defendants to CTX, (5) Kil-lian telephoned him on December 1,2004, the same day that four of the individual defendants left the plaintiff s employment, to alert him to unusual activity on the plaintiffs program, (6) the unusual activity consisted of program notifications that several customers were being “suspended” from the program, which was an indication that those customers no longer wanted to do business with the plaintiff and (7) a loan for a customer of Kay was scheduled to close with the plaintiff but closed at CTX less than two weeks after Kay left the plaintiffs employment.

Additional testimony included the following. William Dolbier, the branch manager for CTX, testified that he had received an e-mail from Coles prior to her resignation from the plaintiff. In that communication, Coles indicated that she had several files that needed to be placed in CTX’s system and needed his help in doing so. Kay admitted, during her testimony at trial, that she had taken several “screen shots” from the plaintiffs program while employed by the plaintiff and gave them to CTX. She also confirmed that one of her customers had originated a loan with the plaintiff while Kay was the plaintiffs employee but that the loan closed at CTX shortly before she began her employment at CTX. Kay confirmed that she received a commission for that closing from CTX. August also testified that she had printed screen shots from the plaintiffs program while at the plaintiffs offices.

McKenna testified that he had removed copies of documents from his filing cabinet at the plaintiffs premises prior to his resignation. He indicated that the copies filled seven boxes and that he put those files in tote bags and took them down the back stairs. McKenna also testified that he closed a loan at CTX for a customer who initially had contacted the plaintiffs offices while McKenna was still employed by the plaintiff. The credit report for the customer was pulled by the plaintiff. On December 1, 2004, however, that customer signed a loan application with CTX. McKenna had given the customer’s name to a branch manager at CTX. McKenna’s first day of employment at CTX was December 2, 2004, and he received a commission from CTX for that loan closing.

Another witness, Joseph Walkovich, testified that he left a message for Coles in November, 2004, at the plaintiffs offices indicating an interest in refinancing his mortgage loan. He indicated that a meeting was scheduled for December 1, 2004, but Coles cancelled the meeting at the last minute. The meeting was rescheduled to December 9, 2004, and Walkovich met Coles at CTX. Coles confirmed Walkovich’s personal information for the loan application, which led him to believe that she already had his information with her. Walkovich never had been asked if he wanted to transfer his loan application from the plaintiff to CTX. The loan closed with CTX on January 7, 2005. Walkovich further testified that Coles told him that her departure from the plaintiffs employment had been amicable, and he assumed there had been some type of arrangement allowing Coles to take his file with her.

In addition to the foregoing testimony, the plaintiff submitted several exhibits. One exhibit was a compilation from the production ledger of loans closed at CTX that consisted of the names of individuals who had been the plaintiffs customers. Another exhibit was a summary prepared by the plaintiff identifying suspicious loan transactions or suspicious documentation that had been inputted into the plaintiffs program by the individual defendants.

We conclude that the foregoing testimony, if believed, and the exhibits, if credited, and if given the benefit of all favorable inferences, made out a prima facie case for breach of the individual defendants’ fiduciary duty to refrain from self-dealing. Accordingly, the court improperly dismissed those counts of the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8.

II

CUTPA CLAIMS

The plaintiffs next claim is that the court improperly concluded that the CUTPA allegations against the defendants lacked any legal basis or factual foundation. The court made that conclusion in its July 8,2009 memorandum of decision, which was issued after it had dismissed the plaintiffs CUTSA and breach of fiduciary duty claims pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8.

In rendering judgment in favor of the defendants on the CUTPA counts, the court prefaced its discussion with the following statement: “Those counts that had been dismissed under Practice Book § 15-8 have been enumerated in the court’s decision of August 27, 2008, and will be referenced as necessary in relationship to the remaining counts that will be addressed in this memorandum of decision which relies in part on the findings made in that decision of August 27, 2008.” (Emphasis added.) In the section of its decision that specifically addresses the CUTPA claims, the court noted: “In this case, any CUTPA violations would be derivative from the various other counts which have been addressed in the August 27 decision. The fact that many of the underlying allegations concerning trade secrets, conversion and statutory theft and breach of fiduciary duty have already been dismissed in the court’s August 27 decision under Practice Book § 15-8 would suggest that the remaining underpinnings for any kind of a CUTPA claim have been marginalized.” (Emphasis added.) In the last paragraph of that section, the court concluded: “The fact that certain elements of the plaintiffs complaint have already been dismissed only weakens and negates the viability of the remaining counts in the plaintiffs amended complaint and therefore leaves the CUTPA counts as enumerated without any legal basis or factual foundation.”

This is a situation in which the court's conclusion as to the viability of the CUTPA counts is inextricably intertwined with its previous, and erroneous, determination that the CUTSA and breach of fiduciary duty counts should be dismissed for failure to make out a prima facie case. The court’s judgment in favor of the defendants is dependent on the court’s analysis in its August 27,2008 memorandum of decision. Accordingly, the judgment as to the CUTPA counts cannot stand.

Ill

CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIMS

The plaintiffs next claim is that the court improperly concluded that it failed to prove the elements of a civil action for conspiracy against the defendants. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court’s conclusion was based on its erroneous determination that the plaintiffs information was not confidential and on its dismissal of the CUTSA counts. We agree and reverse the court’s judgment as to the civil conspiracy claims.

In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to divert the plaintiffs customers and confidential information to CTX. In its July 8,2009 memorandum of decision, the court properly noted that a claim of civil conspiracy is legally insufficient unless it is based on some underlying cause of action. “[T]here is no such thing as a civil action for conspiracy. The action is for damages caused by acts committed pursuant to a formed conspiracy rather than by the conspiracy itself.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marshak v. Marshak, 226 Conn. 652, 669, 628 A.2d 964 (1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vakilzaden, 251 Conn. 656, 666, 742 A.2d 767 (1999) (en banc). Under a civil conspiracy theory, the requisite elements are: “(1) a combination between two or more persons, (2) to do a criminal or an unlawful act or a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means, (3) an act done by one or more of the conspirators pursuant to the scheme and in furtherance of the object, (4) which act results in damage to the plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 665.

Accordingly, as stated by the court, the “interdependence between this civil conspiracy count and all of the other remaining CUTPA counts . . . needs to be addressed in [an] interrelated fashion . . . .” The court mentioned only the CUTPA counts because it already had dismissed the CUTSA counts. Again, the court’s judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to the civil conspiracy claim is dependent on the court’s analysis in its August 27,2008 memorandum of decision. Accordingly, the judgment as to the civil conspiracy count cannot stand.

IV

DAMAGES

The plaintiffs final claim is that the court improperly concluded that the report of the plaintiffs expert on damages failed to establish a causal link between the defendants’ actions and the plaintiffs decline in value. The plaintiff argues that the “court’s findings on damages hinge upon the plaintiffs alleged failure to prove liability” and that, in this case, “[a] reversal on liability warrants a reversal on damages.” We agree.

The court addressed the plaintiffs claimed monetary losses, as determined and analyzed in the report of the plaintiffs expert, in a single paragraph at the end of its July 8, 2009 memorandum of decision. Given its dismissal of the plaintiffs CUTSA and breach of fiduciary duty claims, and its linked determinations that the plaintiff failed to prove its CUTPA and civil conspiracy claims, the court’s evaluation of the plaintiffs claim for damages inevitably was colored by its previous erroneous determinations. The issues of liability are intertwined with the issue of damages, and a new trial on both is required in the interest of justice.

The judgment is reversed only as to the counts alleging violation of CUTSA, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of CUTPA and civil conspiracy, and the case is remanded for a new trial on those counts. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Deborah Bourgeois, Catharine Leo and Sherry Sawyer also were named as defendants in this action. The plaintiff withdrew the complaint as to those defendants after the trial had commenced. Hereafter, we refer to the individual defendants by name where appropriate, and collectively as the individual defendants.

       The plaintiff consistently refers to the individual defendants as mortgage specialists. Such positions are described as loan officers or loan originators by other lending institutions and mortgage companies.

       Practice Book § 15-8 provides: “If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil matter tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested, a defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority may grant such motion if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. The defendant may offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made.”

       The plaintiff does not challenge the court’s dismissal of its counts alleging conversion and statutory theft in this appeal.

       The plaintiff has not appealed from the judgment rendered in favor of the individual defendants with respect to the count against them alleging computer related offenses in violation of § 53a-251.

       “A motion for judgment of dismissal has replaced the former motion for nonsuit for failure to make out a prima facie case. . . . When such a motion has been granted, the question is whether sufficient facts were proved to make out a prima facie case. . . . The right of the court to grant such a motion is to be sparingly exercised . . . where the granting of a nonsuit must depend in any appreciable degree upon the court’s passing upon the credibility of witnesses, the nonsuit should not be granted . . . where a case is close, the preferable course is to deny a motion for a nonsuit . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 391, 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S. Ct. 1239, 146 L. Ed. 2d 99 (2000). “A party has the same right to submit a weak case as he has to submit a strong one.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 392.

       In the August 27, 2008 memorandum of decision, the court stated: “As indicated in the earlier finding of facts, each of the said ‘employees’ of [the plaintiff] was considered an independent contractor, for both tax and functional purposes.” The individual defendants never claimed that they were independent contractors, nor did they ever dispute the plaintiffs claim that they were former employees of the business. The testimony at trial was that the plaintiff withheld taxes from their paychecks, issued W-2 forms and provided certain benefits pursuant to a 401 (k) matching plan.

       The question of whether information sought to be protected by CUTSA rises to the level of a trade secret is a question of fact. Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, supra, 251 Conn. 68. The question of whether a parly has made reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of a purported trade secret is a “highly fact-specific inquiry.” Id., 80.

       Self-dealing is defined as “[pjarticipation in a transaction that benefits oneself instead of another who is owed a fiduciary duty.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009). “Knowledge acquired by an employee during his employment cannot be used for his own advantage to the injury of the employer during employment.” Town & Country House & Homes Service, Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 317, 189 A.2d 390 (1963).

       A screen shot is a printed copy of information taken from the screen of an individual computer.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RONNIE HAMMER
    (AC 32145)
    Gruendel, Alvord and Dupont, Js.
    Argued January 5
    officially released March 22, 2011

      Ellen M. Aspell, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Elizabeth A. Ullman, with whom was Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

ALVORD, J.

In this interpleader action, the plaintiff, the state of Connecticut (state), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Ronnie Hammer. On appeal, the state claims that the court erred by ordering immediate disbursal of a $20,000 settlement check to the defendant without affording the state a trial on the merits of its interpleader complaint. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a trial on the merits of the inter-pleader complaint.

The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows. On January 28, 1994, the defendant, a state employee, suffered a slip and fall accident outside her workplace, resulting in her injury. In addition to her workers’ compensation claim, the defendant instituted a third party action against the snow removal company responsible for clearing the area where she fell, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-293 (tort action). The state intervened as a third party plaintiff and asserted a lien on the possible recovery from the tort action, claiming that it had paid workers’ compensation in excess of $300,000. The tort action settled for $20,000 during 2003. Both parties represent that pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, the state agreed to forgive its lien contingent on the $20,000 settlement being placed in escrow, only to be disbursed to the defendant when the workers’ compensation claim was “disposed of.” Pursuant to the settlement of the tort action, a check in the amount of $20,000 was delivered to the defendant’s counsel on November 26, 2003. The defendant refused to endorse the check. It remains in her counsel’s possession, un-negotiated, and since has expired.

On January 23, 2008, after the defendant refused to accept and to endorse the check or to dispose of the workers’ compensation claim as per the tort action settlement agreement, the state brought this inter-pleader action. The state claimed that because the defendant breached the tort action settlement agreement, its lien on the settlement proceeds was still valid. Therefore, the state contended that the $20,000 settlement money should be used to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees and to reimburse the state for its workers’ compensation lien.

The defendant, by way of her conservator, Albert DeLardi, answered the state’s complaint as a self-represented party. On August 5,2009, the court held a pretrial conference (August pretrial), on the record, during which both the defendant and her conservator were sworn in. During the August pretrial, the court suggested and both parties agreed that the settlement check would be placed in an escrow account only to be disbursed upon the resolution of the workers’ compensation case (August agreement). The court requested that the state draft a court order memorializing this agreement.

As the court directed, the state drafted a court order reflecting the August agreement. The defendant refused to approve the order, without explanation. On October 13, 2009, the state filed a motion to enforce the order of the court. The defendant objected to the motion on the ground that, inter alia, the drafted order was not an appropriate representation of the August agreement.

The court held a hearing on the motion on November 9, 2009, and conducted two status conferences on the record, on November 16,2009 (November status conference) and March 16, 2010 (March status conference). At the hearing on the motion, the court again ordered that the settlement money be held in escrow until the workers’ compensation claim was resolved, per the August agreement. Additionally, at the motion hearing, the court sought further information as to the status of the workers’ compensation settlement and, therefore, ordered that the defendant’s workers’ compensation counsel appear before the court.

The defendant’s workers’ compensation counsel attended the November status conference and represented to the court that the state waived its lien in exchange for a full and final settlement of the workers’ compensation claim, and that such settlement never occurred. The state agreed with this update.

At the March status conference, the court departed from its pretrial order effectuating the August agreement and instead, over the state’s objection, ordered that the $20,000 check be disbursed immediately to the defendant. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the state claims that the trial court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendant without affording the state a trial on the merits of its interpleader complaint. We agree with the state that the disposition of this interpleader action by unilateral order of the court at a status conference was improper.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 23-44, issues in an inter-pleader action may be closed “as in other cases.” Thus, we turn for guidance to general civil pretrial procedure. A civil case may be disposed of at pretrial by settlement, judgment by stipulation, or withdrawal. See Practice Book § 14-12. When the case is not disposed of, “then the judicial authority may (1) continue the matter for a reasonable period if the parties agree to participate in any form of alternative dispute resolution, (2) enter appropriate orders to assure that the case is readied for trial, (3) order the case assigned for trial on a date certain or a week certain in the future or, (4) assign the case to a specific judge for trial on a date certain. . . .” Practice Book § 14-12.

In the present case, when both parties assented to the August agreement that the $20,000 be held in escrow until a resolution of the workers’ compensation case, the court had the pretrial authority to dispose of the issues according to that settlement. Subsequently, the August agreement was memorialized when the state drafted the court order, yet the defendant refused to approve the order. Instead of proceeding with the trial, the court disposed of the case during a status conference, denying both parties the opportunity to introduce evidence, present witnesses or argue the merits of the case before the court. Accordingly, the state was denied its right to argue substantively the merits of the claims.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       See General Statutes § 52-484, titled, “Action in nature of interpleader,” which provides in relevant part: “Whenever any person has, or is alleged to have, any money or other property in his possession which is claimed by two or more persons, either he, or any of the persons claiming the same, may bring a complaint in equity, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, to any court which by law has equitable jurisdiction of the parties and amount in controversy, making all persons parties who claim to be entitled to or interested in such money or other property. ...”

       General Statutes § 31-293 (a) provides in relevant part: “When any injury . . . has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than an employer ... a legal liability to pay damages for the injury, the injured employee may claim compensation under [the Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.] . . . but the payment or award of compensation shall not affect the claim or right of action of the injured employee against such person, but the injured employee may proceed at law against such person to recover damages for the injury; and any employer or the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, having paid, or having become obligated to pay, compensation under [the Workers’ Compensation Act] may bring an action against such person to recover any amount that he has paid or has become obligated to pay as compensation to the injured employee. . . . Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, when any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of [the Workers’ Compensation Act] has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than an employer ... a legal liability to pay damages for the injury and the injured employee has received compensation for the injury from such employer . . . pursuant to the provisions of [the Workers’ Compensation Act] the employer . . . shall have a hen upon any judgment received by the employee against the party or any settlement received by the employee from the party, provided the employer . . . shall give written notice of the hen to the party prior to such judgment or settlement.”

       This court was not provided with the transcripts from the 2003 settlement hearing in the tort action or a copy of the settlement agreement.

       At the time of the settlement of the tort action, the parties to the workers’ compensation claim had agreed on the terms of that claim’s settlement. Those terms included giving the defendant (the plaintiff in the workers’ compensation action) an additional $150,000 of compensation and payment of medical expenses, in addition to the $300,000 of compensation she already had received.

       DeLardi is not an attorney, but he entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant, proceeding as a self-represented party. By representing the defendant, DeLar di engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. “Any person who is not an attorney is prohibited from practicing law, except that any person may practice law, or plead in any court of this state ‘in his own cause.’ General Statutes § 51-88 (d) (2). The authorization to appear [self-represented] is limited to representing one’s own cause, and does not permit individuals to appear [sell-represented] in a representative capacity.” Expressway Associates II v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp. of Connecticut, 34 Conn. App. 543, 546, 642 A.2d 62, cert, denied, 230 Conn. 915, 645 A.2d 1018 (1994).

       Upon receipt of the state’s draft order, the defendant’s conservator indicated via e-mail that “[i]n its present form, it is objectionable to me.”

       Practice Book § 23-44 provides: “No trial on the merits of an interpleader action shall be had until (1) an interlocutory judgment of interpleader shall have been entered; and (2) all defendants shall have filed statements of claim, been defaulted or filed waivers. Issues shall be closed on the claims as in other cases.”


text:
    ANGEL GONZALEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 31179)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Bishop and Robinson, Js.
    Argued January 6
    officially released March 22, 2011

      Michael Stone, special public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

      Raheem L. Mullins, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patricia M. Froehlich, state’s attorney, and Kelly A. Masi, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Angel Gonzalez, appeals following the habeas court’s denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment denying his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal, (2) improperly denied his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of failure to investigate and (3) improperly prevented the petitioner from presenting his claim that his criminal trial counsel had failed to ensure that he was aware of the sentencing and probation implications of his plea agreement. We conclude that the court properly denied the petition for certification to appeal following the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

On October 18, 2002, the petitioner pleaded guilty to charges of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92a, and attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a. On December 13, 2002, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to sixty years incarceration, execution suspended after twenty years, and thirty-five years probation. During these proceedings, attorney Kimberly Colfer represented the petitioner.

In his second amended habeas petition, filed on February 6,2009, the petitioner alleged that he had received ineffective assistance from Colfer. Specifically, he claimed, inter alia, that Colfer had failed to advise him adequately regarding the consequences of entering into the plea agreement and had failed to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation. Following a trial in which the petitioner’s legal expert, the petitioner and Colfer testified, the habeas court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court determined that the petitioner had failed to prove that Colfer had provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, the court concluded that there was no evidence of prejudice. The court subsequently denied the petition for certification to appeal.

“Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a petition for certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). First, he must demonstrate that the denial of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion. . . . Second, if the petitioner can show an abuse of discretion, he must then prove that the decision of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.

“To prove an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim involves issues that] are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . .

“We examine the petitioner’s underlying claimfs] of ineffective assistance of counsel in order to determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal. Our standard of review of a habeas court’s judgment on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well settled. In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary. . . .

“In Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction .... That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense [by establishing a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s mistakes, the result of the proceeding would have been different]. . . . Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Farnum v. Commissioner of Correction, 118 Conn. App. 670, 674-75, 984 A.2d 1126 (2009), cert, denied, 295 Conn. 905, 989 A.2d 119 (2010).

“For ineffectiveness claims resulting from guilty pleas, we apply the standard set forth in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), which modified Strickland’s prejudice prong. ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 124 Conn. App. 740, 743-44, 6 A.3d 152 (2009). “Under . . . Hill . . . the evidence must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. ... In its analysis, a reviewing court may look to the performance prong or to the prejudice prong, and the petitioner’s failure to prove either is fatal to a habeas petition.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gudino v. Commissioner of Correction, 123 Conn. App. 719, 723-24, 3 A.3d 134, cert, denied, 299 Conn. 905, 10 A.3d 522 (2010). Finally, we note that “[i]n a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner’s burden of proving that a fundamental unfairness had been done is not met by speculation . . . but by demonstrable realities.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Farnum v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 118 Conn. App. 675.

We first address the petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to conduct an adequate investigation. The habeas court concluded that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding of prejudice. We agree and conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal with respect to this issue.

“ [Constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel includes competent pretrial investigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crocker v. Commissioner of Correction, 101 Conn. App. 133, 143, 921 A.2d 128, cert, denied, 283 Conn. 905, 927 A.2d 916 (2007). “[WJhere the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate . . . the determination whether the error prejudiced the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Toles v. Commissioner of Correction, 113 Conn. App. 717, 723, 967 A.2d 576, cert, denied, 293 Conn. 906, 978 A.2d 1114 (2009). In the present case, the petitioner failed to demonstrate what prejudice he suffered as a result of counsel’s conduct. Specifically, he failed at the habeas trial to identity evidence that should have been discovered by trial counsel and failed to demonstrate how that evidence would have changed his decision to plead guilty. “The burden to demonstrate what benefit additional investigation would have revealed is on the petitioner. United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1989) . . . .” (Citation omitted.) Holley v. Commissioner of Correction, 62 Conn. App. 170, 175, 774 A.2d 148 (2001); see also Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 584, 941 A.2d 248 (2008) (petitioner failed to present evidence to take claim from realm of speculation to demonstrable reality). We conclude, therefore, that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal on this issue.

We next address the petitioner’s claim that the court improperly prevented him from presenting the claim that Colfer failed to ensure that he was aware of the sentencing and probation implications of his plea agreement. We conclude that any alleged error was harmless.

During direct examination, the petitioner was asked: “If you knew at the time you entered the plea bargain that you were going to be sentenced to a total sentence of sixty years, suspended after twenty years, and thirty-five years of probation, would you have [pleaded] guilty to the charges?” The counsel for the respondent, the commissioner of correction, objected on the ground that the question went beyond the scope of the pleadings. The petitioner’s counsel countered that the question related to a claim raised in the petition for a writ of habeas coipus. The court sustained the objection.

“The petition is in the nature of a pleading .... [T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court .... Our review of the [habeas] court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 114 Conn. App. 778, 786, 971 A.2d 766, cert, denied, 293 Conn. 915, 979 A.2d 488 (2009). Additionally, we note that “[t]he harmless error standard in a civil case is whether the improper ruling would likely affect the result. . . . Generally, a trial court’s ruling will result in a new trial only if the ruling was both wrong and harmful.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 106, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010). A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a civil action; Collins v. York, 159 Conn. 150, 153, 267 A.2d 668 (1970); therefore, in order to prevail, the petitioner must be able to satisfy the harmless error standard.

During the habeas trial, the petitioner testified that he understood that at the time he entered his plea, there was an agreement that he would receive a sentence of sixty years, suspended after twenty years to serve, and thirty-five years probation. Additionally, Colfer testified that she believed that the petitioner understood the terms of the plea agreement. Finally, during the court’s canvass during the sentencing proceeding, the petitioner indicated that he understood the terms of the sentence recommendation. We conclude, therefore, that any error was harmless and that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal on this issue.

The appeal is dismissed.

       During the habeas trial, the petitioner’s criminal trial counsel summarized the facts underlying these charges. “The general nature of the charges involved allegations that [the petitioner] had kidnapped his common-law wife at gunpoint from their mutual place of work, attempted to shoot her, but the gun had misfired in some way, then driven her to his home initially and then to the girls’ baby-sitter, where she had gotten out of the car and gotten the gun away from him — but the — but at the same time, the girls had gotten into the car — then driven away with the girls; and then he had sexually assaulted one of the girls.”

       Counsel for the petitioner directed the court’s attention to paragraph eight of the petition, which stated: “But for the [petitioner's trial attorney’s actions and/or omissions as described above, the [p] etitioner would not have entered into the plea agreement, would have requested to go to trial instead and there was a reasonable probability that the [p] etitioner would have been found [not] guilty at such a trial.”
      After additional discussion with the court, the petitioner’s counsel also referred to subparagraph six (a), which had alleged in part that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing “to adequately and correctly advise the [p] etitioner regarding the consequences of the plea agreement into which the [petitioner entered, including . . . the maximum and minimum sentences on each of the charges the [p] etitioner faced if he went to trial and were found guilty . . . .”


text:
    DAVID BINGHAM ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS ET AL.
    (AC 31741)
    Bishop, Gruendel and Robinson, Js.
    Argued January 19
    officially released March 22, 2011

      David Bingham, pro se, and Robert Fromer, pro se, the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Nancy E. Arnold, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).

      Charles L. Howard, with whom was Amber N. Samo, for the appellee (defendant town of Preston).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from the sale and transfer of a parcel of real property by the defendant department of public works (department) to the defendant town of Preston (town). The plaintiffs, David Bingham and Robert Fromer, brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 22a-16 and 22a-20, to prevent what they allege to be the negative environmental impacts reasonably likely to result from the sale and transfer. The plaintiffs now appeal from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants. On appeal, they claim that the court improperly (1) dismissed a well pleaded complaint without reason, (2) granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (3) denied their motion for reconsideration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed factual and procedural history is relevant to our resolution of the claims. On October 13, 2004, the town accepted the department’s offer to sell portions of the site on which the defunct Norwich State Hospital had been operated. In April, 2005, the plaintiffs petitioned the department to declare that the sale and transfer was subject to the Environmental Policy Act, General Statutes § 22a-l et seq. After the department ruled to the contrary, the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, which dismissed the appeal for lack of standing. That judgment was affirmed by our Supreme Court in Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 945 A.2d 927 (2008).

On March 18,2009, the plaintiffs filed a new, amended verified complaint, essentially seeking to enjoin the sale and transfer pending an environmental impact evaluation pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-lb or, alternatively, to void the sale and transfer agreement, and to issue a permanent injunction to protect the property’s environmental resources. The defendants separately filed motions to dismiss the complaint in April, 2009, on the ground that the claims were not justiciable. Following the filing of objections and replies, the court conducted a hearing on the motions. The court then rendered judgment on November 12, 2009, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the claims were not ripe for adjudication, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute them and that the claims were rendered moot by the sale and transfer of the subject property.

After examining the record on appeal and considering the briefs and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Because the trial court thoroughly and correctly assessed the issues that are the basis of this appeal, we adopt the court’s comprehensive and well reasoned memorandum of decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issue. See Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 51 Conn. Sup. 590, 16 A.3d 865 (2009). Any further discussion by this court would serve no useful purpose. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Hemingway, 297 Conn. 317, 321, 2 A.3d 857 (2010).

The judgment is affirmed.

       General Statutes § 22a-16 provides in relevant part: “[A]ny person . . . may maintain an action in the superior court for the judicial district wherein the defendant is located . . . for declaratory and equitable relief against . . . any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof ... or other legal entity, acting alone, or in combination with others, for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction . . . .”

       General Statutes § 22a-20 provides in relevant part: “Sections 22a-14 to 22a-20, inclusive, shall be supplementary to existing administrative and regulatory procedures provided by law and in any action maintained under said sections, the court may remand the parties to such procedures. Nothing in this section shall prevent the granting of interim equitable relief where required and for as long as is necessary to protect the rights recognized herein. ... At the initiation of any person entitled to maintain an action under said sections, such procedures shall be reviewable in a court of competent jurisdiction to the extent necessary to protect the rights recognized herein. In any judicial review, the court shall be bound by the provisions, standards and procedures of said sections and may order that additional evidence be taken with respect to the environmental issues involved.”