author:
GRUENDEL, J.
      BISHOP, J.,

text:
    MICHAEL J. LAGUEUX v. THOMAS B. LEONARDI, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
    (AC 35257)
    Gruendel, Lavine and Bishop, Js.

      Argued October 30, 2013
    officially released February 18, 2014

      Michael J. Lagueux, self-represented, the appellant-cross appellee (plaintiff), filed a brief.

      Patrick T. Ring, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee-cross appellant (defendant).
   Opinion

GRUENDEL, J.

The plaintiff, Michael J. Lagueux, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining in part and remanding in part his administrative appeal of the denial of his application for an insurance producer license by the defendant, Thomas B. Leonardi, Insurance Commissioner for the state of Connecticut (commissioner). The main issue in this case is the applicability of certain statutes, one of which generally concerns applications for various insurance licenses, General Statutes § 38a-769, and the others, General Statutes §§ 38a-702a through 38a-702k, which specifically detail the qualifications and requirements for an insurance producer license. This case also concerns whether the commissioner is given discretion beyond § 38a-702a et seq. to deny an application for an insurance producer license. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that although the court correctly concluded that § 38a-769 does not apply to insurance producer licenses, the court erred in not holding that the plaintiff was entitled to such a license under General Statutes § 38a-702f. He also claims that the court improperly concluded that the commissioner has discretion to deny applicants an insurance producer license on the grounds set forth in General Statutes §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81. The commissioner cross appeals, claiming that the court erred in concluding that § 38a-769 (c) and (d) do not apply to individuals applying for an insurance producer license. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review of the plaintiffs appeal. The plaintiff applied for a Connecticut resident insurance producer license through the Department of Insurance (department) on June 30, 2011. The plaintiff, as required by General Statutes § 38a-702e, recounted the facts surrounding certain previous criminal convictions in his application. These convictions included four counts of harassment in the second degree in 1996; another two counts of harassment in the second degree in 1996; criminal trespass in the second degree in 1998; and one count of harassment in the second degree in 1999. The plaintiff also disclosed a probation violation from 1999. In his application, he explained: “On [June 3, 1999], I was convicted for violation of Connecticut General Statute [§] 53a-32 .... I paid the psychiatrist $240 per session twice a month and lost days of work to show up [to] be lectured about how repeat offenders like me who spent time in prison had to be rehabilitated so as not to relapse into criminal acts of aggression against society once again. I never explained to my boss at work why I didn’t show up because I hated working in construction anyways. It was nothing but a bunch of drunks and druggies and I neither drank nor did drugs and it felt like I only went to work to pay taxes, union dues, gas, and the shrink who would rather bust my balls because I wrote these completely pathetic letters to women who would rather send me to prison than to go out on a date with me or give me the time of day to let me know that they already had a boyfriend, a husband, or were just flat out not interested in my completely neurotic ass. I lost my job and I went to my last appointment and told the shrink in confidence that my $240 paid to him would be better spent hiring a whore to get me laid and that his services were no longer needed as far as I was concerned. I refused to set up another appointment with him and I didn’t show up to my probation officer’s appointment until after work at my new job was complete. . . .”

After reviewing the plaintiffs application, the department denied his request for an insurance producer license. The department’s letter stated in relevant part that “[bjecause the [department is charged with protecting the public interest, under sections 38a-702k, 38a-774 and 38a-769 of the Connecticut General Statutes, we are denying your request for a [producer’s license.” Amy Stegall, program manager for the fraud and investigations unit, testified before the hearing officer about the department’s decision. She stated that insurance producer licensees are frequently in contact with members of the public in their businesses and homes, have access to consumers’ personal information, and are subject to stress in their sales roles when policies are not sold. She further testified that the nature of the plaintiffs offenses and the language used in the letter accompanying his application “caused concern because of [his] hostile tone, [the fact that he] did not comply with court ordered actions and willingly violated his probation.” The department thus denied the plaintiffs application.

The plaintiff appealed the department’s decision. A hearing was conducted and the hearing officer, Mark R. Franklin, affirmed the decision of the department. He found that § 38a-769 (c) and (d) continued to apply to insurance producers despite the enactment of No. 01-113 of the 2001 Public Acts (P.A. 01-113), in which the legislature adopted § 38a-702a et seq., a statute addressing applications and licensing requirements specifically for insurance producers, and amended § 38a-769. He supported his conclusion by stating that other statutes still referenced “insurance producers] licensed under [§] 38a-769.” The hearing officer then concluded that the record supported the department’s decision to deny the plaintiff an insurance producer license. The plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied by the commissioner. The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court.

The court reversed and remanded the plaintiffs appeal to the department, finding that the commissioner committed an error of law by applying § 38a-769 (c) and (d) to the plaintiffs application for an insurance producer license. The court stated that § 38a-769 was inconsistent with § 38a-702aetseq., as the latter statutes addressed the licensing requirements specific to insurance producers. In addition, it stated that the references in other statutes to “insurance producers licensed under [§] 38a-769” were written before the enactment of P.A. 01-113 and its revision of § 38a-769. As a result, the court found that the language in § 38a-769 (c) and (d) no longer applied to insurance producers. It further held that §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81 were the only statutes that could be read together with § 38a-702a et seq. to give discretion to the commissioner to deny an applicant an insurance producer license. This appeal and cross appeal followed.

Resolution of this appeal entails interpretation of the aforementioned statutory provisions. “The following well settled principles of statutory interpretation govern our review. . . . Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § l-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter ....

“[Pjursuant to § l-2z, [the court is] to go through the following initial steps: first, consider the language of the statute at issue, including its relationship to other statutes, as applied to the facts of the case; second, if after the completion of step one, [the court] conclude [s] that, as so applied, there is but one likely or plausible meaning of the statutory language, [the court] stop[s] there; but third, if after the completion of step one, [the court] conclude [s] that, as applied to the facts of the case, there is more than one likely or plausible meaning of the statute, [the court] may consult other sources, beyond the statutory language, to ascertain the meaning of the statute.

“It is useful to remind ourselves of what, in this context, we mean when we say that a statutory text has a plain meaning, or, what is the same, a plain and unambiguous meaning. [Our Supreme Court] has already defined that phrase. By that phrase we mean the meaning that is so strongly indicated or suggested by the language as applied to the facts of the case, without consideration, however, of its purpose or the other, extratextual sources of meaning . . . that, when the language is read as so applied, it appears to be the meaning and appears to preclude any other likely meaning. . . . Put another way, if the text of the statute at issue, considering its relationship to other statutes, would permit more than one likely or plausible meaning, its meaning cannot be said to be plain and unambiguous.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 137 Conn. App. 307, 313-14, 48 A.3d 694, cert. granted on other grounds, 307 Conn. 918, 54 A.3d 562 (2012).

I

The plaintiff claims that since the enactment of P.A. 01-113 in 2002, § 38a-769 has been superseded and is obsolete with regard to insurance producers. More specifically, he argues that the legislature explicitly excluded insurance producers from § 38a-769 (a), thus rendering its other subsections entirely inapplicable to insurance producers. The commissioner cross appeals, claiming that despite the enactment of P.A. 01-113, § 38a-769 (c) and (d) still apply to applicants for an insurance producer license. He argues that the legislature excluded insurance producers only from subsection (a) of § 38a-769 and not its other subsections. Therefore, the commissioner concludes that the legislature intended insurance producers to be subject to these other subsections, or else it would have specifically excluded them from each provision, as it did in subsection (a). We agree with the plaintiff.

In a case of statutory interpretation, we are guided by the presumption “that the legislature, in amending or enacting statutes, always [is] presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 709, 998 A.2d 1 (2010). We also presume that the legislature does “not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 710. “Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute ... we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391, 404, 999 A.2d 682 (2010). “[C]om-mon sense must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended . . . and, further, if there are two [asserted] interpretations of a statute, we will adopt the . . . reasonable construction over [the] one that is unreasonable.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, supra, 710.

It is also “a well-settled principle of construction that specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling. . . . [If] there are two provisions in a statute, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one case or subject within the scope of a general provision, then the particular provision must prevail; and if both cannot apply, the particular provision will be treated as an exception to the general provision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 137 Conn. App. 315. Furthermore, “[w]here a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject ... is significant to show that a different intention existed. . . . That tenet of statutory construction is well grounded because [t]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have upon any one of them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 310, 819 A.2d 260 (2003).

Pursuant to § l-2z, we begin with the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes. P.A. 01-113 enacted chapter 701a of the General Statutes and revised § 38a-769. Title 38a governs insurance, and part 1 of chapter 701a, entitled “Insurance Producers and Agents,” specifically addresses the qualifications and procedures for the licensing of insurance producers. Chapter 702, of which § 38a-769 is a part, generally applies to “Licensing.”

The relevant sections of part 1 of chapter 701a are set forth. Section 38a-702e (a), pertaining to applications for a license, provides in relevant part: “A person applying for a resident insurance producer license shall make application to the commissioner on the uniform application .... The commissioner shall not approve the application unless the commissioner finds that the individual (1) is at least eighteen years of age; (2) has not committed any act that is a ground for denial, suspension or revocation set forth in section 38a-702k; (3) has completed, where required by the commissioner, a prelicensing course of study for the lines of authority for which the person has applied; (4) has paid the fees set forth in section 38a-ll; and (6) has successfully passed the examinations for the lines of authority for which the person has applied.”

Section 38a-702f, pertaining to producer licenses, provides in subsection (a) that “any person who has met the requirements of sections 38a-702d [Examination. Fees.] and 38a-702e shall be issued an insurance producer license. ...” Section 38a-702k, entitled “Denial, nonrenewal or revocation of producers license. Hearings. Penalties.” sets forth the causes for which the “commissioner may place on probation, suspend, revoke or refuse to issue or renew an insurance producer’s license . . . .” General Statutes § 38a-702k (a).

Chapter 702 generally addresses licensing. Section 38a-769, in particular, pertains to applications for a license. Prior to the enactment of P.A. 01-113, General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 38a-769 (a) required a person or entity desiring to perform certain insurance related tasks to make a written application to the commissioner for a license. Insurance producers were included in those required to make such application. In P.A. 01-113, the legislature amended subsection (a) of § 38a-769 specifically to exclude insurance producers from having to apply for a resident or nonresident license under that provision. See P.A. 01-113, § 20.

A plain reading of § 38a-769 suggests that after the 2002 revisions, insurance producers are no longer subject to its provisions. Subsection (a) identifies the persons or entities that must apply for a resident or nonresident license. Insurance producers are exempt from having to apply for such licenses. The other subsections of § 38a-769 refer to the applicants for a license, most plausibly those applicants listed in subsection (a) who are applying for a resident or nonresident license. Although the commissioner argues that the legislature only excepted insurance producers from subsection (a), it seems illogical and redundant if it had to amend each following subsection to again exclude insurance producers from its provisions. It is more reasonable to presume that the legislature excluded insurance producers from subsection (a), the section that lists the applicants who must apply for a license, leaving the other subsections without revision, intending for them to refer back to subsection (a). For example, subsection (c) states in relevant part, “ [e] ach applicant for a license shall furnish satisfactory evidence to the commissioner that the applicant is a person of good moral character and that the applicant is financially responsible. . . .” The most reasonable interpretation is that the applicant referenced in subsection (c) is one of those applicants listed in subsection (a). Since insurance producers are specifically excluded from subsection (a), the logical interpretation is that § 38a-769, in its entirety, is inapplicable to insurance producers.

The most compelling evidence, however, is reading §§ 38a-702a et seq. and 38a-769 in tandem. In 2002, the legislature enacted a specific statute governing all qualifications and licensing requirements for insurance producers, while simultaneously amending the general statute on licensing explicitly to exclude insurance producers from having to apply for a license under subsection (a). Since P.A. 01-113 both enacted § 38a-702a et seq. and revised § 38a-769, we find it persuasive that the legislature intended § 38a-769 to apply to all persons or entities applying for a license, except those applying for an insurance producer license, who have been excepted from its provisions, and for whom a new statute was created to govern such licensees. Furthermore, we acknowledge that “specific terms covering [a] given subject matter . . . prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 137 Conn. App. 315. Thus, since § 38a-702a et seq. was enacted specifically to govern licensing for insurance producers, it controls over the general statute on licensing.

We nevertheless conclude that under the facts of this case, the meaning of the statute is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation. Subsections (c) and (d) of § 38a-769 only refer to “each applicant for a license.” They do not make a specific reference to subsection (a) or even make a general statement such as “each applicant for such a license,” which would impliedly refer to those licenses set forth in subsection (a). As a result, it is plausible that subsections (c) and (d) of § 38a-769 apply to all licensing applicants, including those applying for an insurance producer license. Because of this ambiguity, we must consult other sources beyond the statutory language to ascertain the meaning of the statute. See Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 137 Conn. App. 314 (“if the text of the statute at issue, considering its relationship to other statutes, would permit more than one likely or plausible meaning, its meaning cannot be said to be plain and unambiguous” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

In 1999, the federal legislature, in passing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, addressed state flexibility in multistate licensing reforms. See 15 U.S.C. § 6751. In response to this legislation, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (association) adopted the Producer Licensing Model Act (model act), which governs the qualifications and procedures for the licensing of insurance producers. In 2002, our state legislature mirrored this model act by enacting P.A. 01-113, entitled “An Act Concerning the Licensing of Insurance Producers.” The bill analysis of this act published by the Office of Legislative Research of the General Assembly suggests that “[t]he act [concerning the licensing of insurance producers] modifies the commissioner’s responsibilities in determining whether an applicant is suitable. It requires her to find that such applicant (1) is at least [eighteen] years of age; (2) has not committed any act that is grounds for denial, suspension, or revocation; and (3) where required, has completed a pre-licens-ing course for the lines of authority applied for. Prior law required the commissioner to satisfy herself that each applicant was properly qualified, trustworthy, and that granting a license was in the public interest. ” Office of Legislative Research, Bill Analysis, P.A. 01-113, Substitute Senate Bill No. 1096, p. 2.

In introducing P.A. 01-113, Senator Thomas A. Bozek commented: “[T]his is a commissioner’s bill. It’s somewhat technical but it’s designed after a model act at the [association] . . . and it rewrites all the provisions of licensing insurer’s agents in the State of Connecticut and allows for the provisions for reciprocity in other states and other insurance agencies that deal with the State of Connecticut, insurance agents.” 44 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 2001 Sess., p. 2194. Representative Michael J. Jarjura similarly stated, “[t]his legislation ... is in response to some changes made at the federal level. This proposal would bring Connecticut into compliance with the federal provisions passed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. . . . Connecticut being . . . known as the insurance capital of the world, it is hoped that we could lead off and bring the rest of the country into compliance with the modernization of these licensing procedures within the insurance industry.” 44 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13,2001 Sess., p. 4386. Lastly, then Commissioner Susan F. Cogswell testified before the Insurance and Real Estate Committee, stating that: “This proposed legislation modified the licensure requirements for individuals and companies seeking to sell insurance in our state and meets the requirements set out in Gramm-Leach-Bliley. . . . The proposed legislation streamlines the licensing of agents, increases reciprocity with other states, and clarifies the extent and the nature of offenses that would disqualify an individual from obtaining or maintaining a license. We have had the opportunity to . . . prove that states are very capable of modernizing insurance regulation while at the same time protecting the consumers and preserving a high moral and professional standard for individuals who engage in the business of insurance.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Insurance and Real Estate, Pt. 2, 2001 Sess., p. 248.

That legislative history is persuasive evidence that the legislature was attempting to create one uniform body of law to govern insurance producers. The bill analysis for P.A. 01-113 explicitly states that it was under prior law, referring to § 38a-769, that the commissioner had discretion to deny an applicant a license based on trustworthiness and on the interests of the public. Furthermore, Commissioner Cogswell emphasized that “[P.A. 01-113] modified the licensure requirements for individuals and companies seeking to sell insurance in our state and . . . streamlines the licensing of agents.” The language employed by Senator Bozek describes the intent of the legislature when he stated that “[it] rewrites all the provisions of licensing insurer’s agents in the State of Connecticut.” (Emphasis added.) It would therefore make little sense to allow § 38a-769, a general statute on licensing, to alter the legislative intent of enacting § 38a-702a et seq. After considering the legislative history of § 38a-702a et seq., we are convinced that § 38a-769 no longer applies to insurance producers. The court, therefore, did not err in holding that insurance producers are not subject to the general licensing requirements set forth in § 38a-769.

II

Despite our affirmance of the court in concluding that § 38a-769 no longer applies to insurance producers, we must still determine whether the court properly found that the commissioner possessed discretion beyond § 38a-702a et seq. to deny the plaintiff an insurance producer license. We agree with the court that the commissioner retained such discretion.

At the outset, we note the guiding principles we must consider on the issue of statutory interpretation. First, “we are required to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 748, 865 A.2d 428 (2005). Second, there is a presumption that the legislature has created a harmonious and consistent body of law when amending or enacting statutes. State v. Courchesne, supra, 296 Conn. 709. Lastly, “[t]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or [lack thereof] will have [on] any one of them. And it is always presumed to have intended that effect which its action or [lack thereof] produces.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382, 398, 978 A.2d 49 (2009).

The plaintiff claims that §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81 are obsolete with regard to insurance producer licenses since the enactment of § 38a-702a et seq. The commissioner, in contrast, argues that General Statutes § 38a-702k does not deprive the commissioner the discretion to deny an applicant an insurance producer license. We agree with the commissioner.

The plaintiff argues that because § 38a-702k enumerates all of the disqualifying conduct the commissioner may consider in denying an applicant an insurance producer license, he has no discretion to deny an applicant a license based on the criteria set forth in § 46a-80. The plaintiff concludes that because the commissioner stipulated that he had met all the requirements set forth in §§ 38a-702d and 38a-702e and was not disqualified under § 38a-702k, the department is required, under the mandatory language in § 38a-702f, to issue the plaintiff an insurance producer license. For three reasons, we do not find this argument persuasive.

First, we note that “[t]he use of the word ‘shall,’ though significant, does not invariably create a mandatory duty because statutes must be construed as a whole to ascertain the legislative intention.” Tramontano v. Dilieto, 192 Conn. 426, 433-34, 472 A.2d 768 (1984). The plaintiffs reading of the statute would render all other statutes regarding the same subject matter void. And, just as the legislature does not intend to enact meaningless provisions, nor does it intend to enact meaningless statutes. In interpreting statutes, we must presume that no part is superfluous. Lopa v. Brinker International, Inc., 296 Conn. 426, 433, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010). In addition, “[t]his court has consistently shown a disposition to look through the literal meaning of words and forms of procedure to the essential purposes to be served.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tramontano v. Dilieto, supra, 433. Despite the use of the word “shall” in § 38a-702k, we are persuaded that the legislature never intended that the commissioner would be limited solely to its enumerated factors. There is no indication that the list contained in § 38a-702k is meant to be exhaustive, and the statute does not specifically state that the list is exclusive.

Second, even if “shall” in this context were construed as a mandatory duty, it does not preclude reading § 38a-702k harmoniously with § 46a-80. We have always noted that, “[i]n cases in which more than one [statutory provision] is involved, we presume that the legislature intended [those provisions] to be read together to create a harmonious body of law . . . and we construe the [provisions], if possible, to avoid conflict between them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 305 Conn. 539, 552, 46 A.3d 112 (2012). Chapter 814c entitled “Human Rights and Opportunities” existed in 2002 when the legislature enacted P.A. 01-113. We therefore presume that the legislature was aware of General Statutes §§ 46a-79 through 46a-81 and intended to produce one consistent body of law.

As a statute on human rights, chapter 814c is very broad and encompasses the insurance producer statute within its provisions. This interpretation is supported by the text of § 46a-81 (a), which provides: “Except as provided in section 36a-489, the provisions of sections 46a-79 to 46a-81, inclusive, shall prevail over any other provisions of law which purport to govern the denial of licenses ... on the grounds of a lack of good moral character, or which purport to govern the suspension or revocation of a license, permit, certificate or registration on the grounds of conviction of a crime.” In reading the statutory language, it is clear that §§ 46a-79 through 46a-81 are applicable to all statutes that govern the denial of licenses based on conviction of a crime, and continue to apply absent a specific exception in the statute. Significantly, the legislature did not amend § 46a-81 (a) after enacting P.A. 01-113 specifically to exclude § 38a-702a et seq. from its provisions.

Third, we are not persuaded that §§ 38a-702a et seq. and 46a-80 are inconsistent, as suggested by the dissent. Subsection (a) of § 46a-80 provides in relevant part that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c) of this section ... a person shall not be disqualified from employment by the state or any of its agencies, nor shall a person be disqualified to practice, pursue or engage in any occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business for which a license, permit, certificate or registration is required to be issued by the state or any of its agencies solely because of a prior conviction of a crime.” Subsection (c) of § 46a-80 then states: “A person may be denied employment by the state or any of its agencies, or a person may be denied a license, permit, certificate or registration to pursue, practice or engage in an occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business by reason of the prior conviction of a crime if after considering (1) the nature of the crime and its relationship to the job for which the person has applied; (2) information pertaining to the degree of rehabilitation of the convicted person; and (3) the time elapsed since the conviction or release, the state, or any of its agencies determines that the applicant is not suitable for the position of employment sought or the specific occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business for which the license, permit, certificate or registration is sought.” Section 46a-80, addressing a person’s prior convictions and whether that person could be disqualified from employment by reason of those prior convictions, is not inconsistent with § 38a-702a et seq. Rather, § 46a-80 is complementary to § 38a-702a et seq., ensuring that a person is treated fairly with regard to a previous criminal conviction. There is nothing in § 38a-702a et seq. to suggest that these provisions are incompatible with § 46a-80, or that such statute cannot be used to provide supplemental discretion to the commissioner. Thus, in accordance with the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that §§ 46a-80 and 38a-702a et seq. reasonably can be harmonized into a consistent body of law.

The most persuasive evidence that the legislature intended §§ 38a-702k and 46a-80 to be read together, however, is that our legislature was emulating federal legislation when it enacted § 38a-702a et seq. In 2001, consistent with the mandate of the Gramm-Leach-BUley Act, the association set forth a model act for states reforming insurance producer statutes. It also created the State Licensing Handbook (handbook) to ensure that each state was properly regulating insurance producer licenses. Our legislature mirrored the model act when it enacted P.A. 01-113.

Pursuant to § 38a-702e, an applicant is required, through the uniform application, to disclose prior criminal history. More specifically, as noted in the bill analysis, P.A. 01-113 “requires resident or nonresident individual applicants to use the uniform application authorized by the [association] when applying for a license.” Office of Legislative Research, Bill Analysis, P.A. 01-113, Substitute Senate Bill No. 1096, p. 2. The association’s uniform application requires an applicant to disclose any prior convictions of a crime. The association specifically notes that “ ‘Crime’ includes a misdemeanor, a felony or a military offense.” The handbook further provides that “[w]hen an application contains a disclosure with a ‘yes’ answer to a criminal history question, in determining whether to issue a license, states should consider the following factors”: (1) whether the application is for a resident or nonresident producer license; (2) the severity and nature of the offense; (3) the frequency of the offenses; (4) the date of the offense; (5) the completion of the terms of sentencing; and (6) the evidence of the applicant’s rehabilitation. With regard to the second factor, the severity and nature of the offense, the handbook provides: “Felony convictions should always be considered in determining whether to issue a license to an individual .... A criminal conviction is only relevant to the licensing decision if the crime is related to the qualifications, functions, or duties of an insurance producer. Examples include theft, burglary, robbery, dishonesty, fraud, breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duties, any conviction arising out of acts performed in the business of insurance, or any actions not consistent with public health, safety, and welfare.”

We agree with the Superior Court that the legislature intended the commissioner to be able to consult other disqualifying criteria beyond § 38a-702a et seq. and to use his discretion to grant or deny a license. The association specifically states in its handbook that felony convictions are always relevant and that other criminal convictions are only relevant when the crime is related to the role of an insurance producer. This is persuasive evidence that the commissioner has discretion to deny an insurance producer license based on all disclosed criminal convictions, whether they are misdemeanor or felony convictions. It would be illogical to assume that our legislature, in following federal guidelines, would require a disclosure of all criminal convictions, both felony and misdemeanor, but would then require the commissioner to ignore any disclosed misdemeanor convictions. The handbook states that criminal convictions are relevant when the commissioner is determining whether to issue an insurance producer license. Therefore, we presume that the legislature followed the federal guidelines both in using the association’s uniform application and in giving the commissioner the discretion to deny a license based on disclosed criminal convictions. We thus conclude that the commissioner possesses the discretion to refuse an insurance producer license based on the criteria set forth in § 46a-80.

Since we conclude that the commissioner has discretion beyond § 38a-702a et seq. to deny a license, we must determine whether the court properly remanded the case to the department. In the present case, the hearing officer found that the commissioner properly denied the plaintiffs application under both § 38a-769 (c) and (d), together with §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81. The hearing officer did not, however, distinguish the analysis under § 38a-769 (c) and (d) from §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81. Therefore, as the court stated, “the hearing officer never [made] complete factual findings on §§ 46a-80 . . . and 46a-81 . . . [and] conclude [d] the discussion of these sections by raising again § 38a-769.” We agree with the court and remand the case to the hearing officer to determine whether the commissioner’s decision to deny the plaintiff an insurance producer license was appropriate under §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion LAVINE, J., concurred.

BISHOP, J.,

dissenting. As noted by the majority, the principal issue raised in this appeal requires this court to engage in statutory interpretation. Specifically, our task is to determine whether the General Assembly’s 2001 enactment of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Model Act, as embodied by General Statutes § 38a-702a et seq., entirely replaced provisions of General Statutes § 38a-769 as they related to insurance producers. This appeal further requires us to determine whether the provisions of General Statutes § 46a-80, regarding human rights and opportunities in government employment generally, apply to the licen-sure of insurance producers. While I agree with the majority’s well reasoned opinion that § 38a-702a et seq. supplanted § 38a-369 as it related to insurance producers, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the provisions of § 46a-80 apply to insurance producers. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

In 2001, the General Assembly enacted No. 01-113 of the 2001 Public Acts (P.A. 01-113), titled “An Act Concerning the Licensing of Insurance Producers,” which largely tracks the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Model Act. In an analysis of the bill, the General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Research made the following observation: “The bill also modifies the commissioner’s responsibilities in determining whether an applicant is suitable. It requires her to find that such applicant (1) is at least [eighteen] years of age; (2) has not committed any acts that are grounds for denial, suspension or revocation; and (3) where required, has completed a pre-licensing course for the lines of authority applied for. Current law requires the commissioner to satisfy himself that each applicant is properly qualified, trustworthy, and that granting a license is in the public interest.” Office of Legislative Research, Amended Bill Analysis for Substitute Senate Bill No. 1096 as amended by Senate Amendments A and B, p. 3. As to any actions that may be grounds for denial, suspension or revocation, the language of the statute states specifically that such grounds are those which are set forth in § 38a-702k, which concerns denial, nonrenewal or revocation of a producer license. In pertinent part, this statute sets forth the bases on which the commissioner may refuse to issue an insurance producer license. They are as follows: “(1) Providing incorrect, misleading, incomplete or materially untrue information in the license application; (2) violating any insurance laws, or violating any regulation, subpoena or order of the commissioner or of another state’s commissioner; (3) obtaining or attempting to obtain a license through misrepresentation or fraud; (4) improperly withholding, misappropriating or converting any moneys or properties received in the course of doing an insurance business; (5) intentionally misrepresenting the terms of an actual or proposed insurance contract or application for insurance; (6) having been convicted of a felony; (7) having admitted or been found to have committed any insurance unfair trade practice or fraud; (8) using fraudulent, coercive or dishonest practices, or demonstrating incompetence, untrustwor-thiness or financial irresponsibility in the conduct of business in this state or elsewhere; (9) having an insurance producer license, or its equivalent, denied, suspended or revoked in any other state, province, district or territory; (10) forging another’s name to an application for insurance or to any document related to an insurance transaction; (11) improperly using notes or any other reference material to complete an examination for an insurance license; (12) knowingly accepting insurance business from an individual who is not licensed; (13) failing to comply with an administrative or court order imposing a child support obligation; or (14) failing to pay state income tax or comply with any administrative or court order directing payment of state income tax.” General Statutes § 38a-702k. Importantly, the statute provides elsewhere: “(a) Unless a person is denied a license pursuant to section 38a-702k, any person who has met the requirements of sections 38a-702d and 38a-702e shall be issued an insurance producer license.” General Statutes § 38a-702f (a).

The enactment of P.A. 01-113 also impacted § 38a-769 in a manner significant to the issues on review. Prior to the enactment of P.A. 01-113, General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 38a-769 (a) provided in relevant part: “Any person, partnership, association or corporation . . . desiring to act within this state as an insurance producer, a public acftuster, casualty adjuster, motor vehicle physical damage appraiser, certified insurance consultant, surplus lines broker or desiring to engage in any insurance-related occupation for which a license is deemed necessary by the commissioner, shall make a written application to the commissioner for a resident license.” As a result of P.A. 01-113, the inclusion of “an insurance producer” from the list of those occupations covered by § 38a-769 was eliminated and the statute’s catchall reference to “any insurance-related occupation for which a license is deemed necessary by the commissioner” was modified by the addition of the clause “other than an occupation as an insurance producer.”

As reasoned by the majority, the clear import of the enactment of P.A. 01-113 was to create an entirely new process for the processing of applications for those desirous of obtaining licensure to produce insurance. To conclude, as argued by the commissioner, that remnants of the old process, which gave the commissioner discretion based on subjective factors in assessing applications for licensure, still apply would require us to ignore the wholesale changes to the statutory scheme for the licensure of insurance producers effectuated by the adoption of § 38a-702a et seq.

In sum, I agree completely with the majority’s analysis that the enactment of P.A. 01-113 had the effect of replacing previous provisions of § 38a-369 with the new and more restrictive provisions of § 38a-702a et seq. Our agreement, however, ends at that point.

In concluding that the commissioner retains discretion to make subjective determinations in processing applications from would-be insurance producers, the majority takes its analysis two steps too far. First, the majority construes the term “shall” in § 38a-702f to mean less than the term’s normal connotation, and, secondly, the majority concludes that, notwithstanding the language of § 38a-702a et seq. dealing specifically with insurance producers, the commissioner retains discretion pursuant to § 46a-80 to reject an application to produce insurance on the basis of an applicant’s general unsuitability. In reaching this conclusion, the majority may have fashioned a better policy than the General Assembly enacted but, in doing so, I believe, respectfully, the majority has overstepped judicial bounds by creating rather than interpreting statutory law.

In dismissing the direction in § 38a-702f that, unless an applicant has been denied a license pursuant to § 38a-702k, the applicant “shall be issued an insurance producer license,” the majority adopts the notion that the term “shall” need not always mean what it says. That is, the term “shall” need not always connote mandatory action. To be sure, decisional law supports the general notion that the use of the term “shall” can denote directory and not mandatory language in certain contexts. Pointedly, we are instructed that when the word “shall” is juxtaposed with a substantive action verb, it creates a mandatory duty. See Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 101, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010). Our court has expressed the axiom of statutory construction in this manner: “The test to be applied in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to a matter of substance or a matter of convenience. . . . If it is a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. ... If, however, the . . . provision is designed to secure order, system and dispatch in the proceedings, it is generally held to be directory .... Definitive words, such as must or shall, ordinarily express legislative mandates of a nondirectory nature. ... As we recently noted, the word shall creates a mandatory duty when it is juxtaposed with [a] substantive action verb.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 140 Conn. App. 455, 464, 59 A.3d 320, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 911, 61 A.3d 1099 (2013). Here, the word “shall” cannot fairly be said to regard only a matter of convenience or procedural nicety as it relates to the substantive subject of the ability of a person or entity to engage in business within the state. Indeed, it could be argued that the use of the term “shall” in this context gives to an applicant not statutorily disqualified, an expectancy in the order of a property right.

In addition to concluding that the term “shall” is not mandatory, the majority concludes that the commissioner retains authority pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81 to reject an application for lack of suitability. In coming to this view, the majority also concludes that without importing the discretionary provisions of §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81 into the more limiting authority set forth in § 38a-702a et seq., the latter statute would lead to an absurd result. I respectfully disagree.

Section 46a-80 (c) provides, in part, that a person may be denied a license to engage in an occupation in Connecticut by reason of a prior conviction of a crime if “after considering (1) the nature of the crime and its relationship to the job for which the person has applied; (2) information pertaining to the degree of rehabilitation of the convicted person; and (3) the time elapsed since the conviction or release, the state, or any of its agencies, determines that the applicant is not suitable for the position of employment sought or the specific occupation . . . for which the license ... is sought.” The majority reasons that since General Statutes § 38a-702e requires that an applicant for licensure as an insurance producer must utilize the uniform application which, in turn, requires an applicant to disclose any criminal history, it would be absurd to conclude that the commissioner does not have the authority, as set forth in §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81, to deny licensure to one convicted of a crime who has not shown adequate rehabilitation. In reaching its conclusion, the majority appears to have ignored the well accepted axiom of statutory construction that when there are two statutes dealing with the same subject, one more general than the other, the more specific statute will control if the statutes cannot be harmonized. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 125, 24 S. Ct. 797, 49 L. Ed. 114 (1904); Charlton Press, Inc. v. Sullivan, 153 Conn. 103, 110, 214 A.2d 354 (1965). Of course, if the two statutes can be harmonized, then our task is to construe them as consistent with each other, thereby giving effect to both. See Kupersmith v. Kupersmith, 146 Conn. App. 79, 87, 78 A.3d 860 (2013). I believe this principle is applicable to the issue at hand. In my view, the commissioner must apply the specific provisions of § 38a-702a et seq. and not the provisions of § 46a-80, in assessing an insurance producer application because the inconsistent provisions of the two statutes cannot reasonably be harmonized. In short, the application of the broader and subjective discretionary parameters of § 46a-80 to the insurance producer context would render meaningless the strictures of § 38a-702e and the requirements of § 38a-702f that any person not disqualified under § 38a-702e shall be given a license to produce insurance. Since the statutes are inconsistent, they cannot be applied without torturing the language of one of them.

Indeed, the General Assembly appears to have recognized the potential conflict between the specific authority of particular departments of government and the authority of government, generally, to consider an applicant’s criminal record and the extent of rehabilitation in granting or denying employment or licensure. By the provisions of § 46a-81, the General Assembly has made the provisions of General Statutes §§ 46a-79 through 46a-81 controlling over “any other provisions of law which purport to govern the denial of licenses ... on the grounds of a lack of a good moral character, or which purport to govern the suspension or revocation of a license, permit, certificate or registration on the grounds of conviction of a crime.” On the basis of my review of § 38a-702a et seq., § 46a-81 does not apply to the licensure of insurance producers because that statutory scheme does not grant the commissioner discretion to deny a license due to an applicant’s lack of good moral character nor does it permit suspension or revocation of a license on the grounds of conviction of a crime.

In addition to the language of § 46a-81 making that chapter’s provisions applicable to certain other governmental contexts, the General Assembly has shown its ability to incorporate § 46a-80 into more specific licen-sure statutes. For example, General Statutes § 20-316 (a), which delineates the grounds for refusing to license real estate brokers and salespersons provides, in pertinent part: “No license under this chapter shall be denied ... to any applicant who has been convicted of forgery, embezzlement, obtaining money under false pretenses, extortion, criminal conspiracy to defraud or other like offense or offenses . . . except in accordance with the provisions of section 46a-80.” Similarly, General Statutes § 36a-541, concerning the licensure of sales finance companies, while setting forth several criteria for licensing, provides: “Any denial of an application by the commissioner shall, when applicable, be subject to the provisions of section 46a-80.” While General Statutes § 36a-489 (a) (1) sets forth the parameters of the banking commissioner’s discretion in dealing with licensing applications for mortgage lenders and brokers, that statute provides as well: “The commissioner shall not issue an initial license for a mortgage lender, mortgage correspondent lender or mortgage broker unless the commissioner, at a minimum, finds that: (A) The applicant meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section 36a-488; (B) notwithstanding the provisions of section 46a-80, the applicant, the control persons of the applicant and the qualified individual or branch manager with supervisory authority at the office for which the license is sought have not been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in a domestic, foreign or military court during the seven-year period preceding the date of the application for licensing or at any time preceding the date of application if such felony involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, a breach of trust or money laundering, provided any pardon or expungement of a conviction shall not be a conviction for purposes of this subdivision . . .

The point of these examples is that they are apt demonstrations of the General Assembly’s awareness of the provisions of § 46a-80 and that, when enacting legislation regarding specific areas of licensing, the General Assembly has reflected this awareness by incorporating or delineating the provisions of § 46a-80 from specific licensing legislation. Given the General Assembly’s history of having incorporated the provisions of § 46a-80 into certain specific licensing statutes, I believe, respectfully, it is not our place to fill in what we may consider to be a legislative void where the General Assembly has chosen not to do so. That the General Assembly chose not to incorporate § 46a-80 into the scheme for licensing insurance producers should not be ignored.

Finally, we cannot dismiss the clear legislative mandates and limitations of § 38a-702a et seq. on the basis that strict application of the statutory scheme would lead to absurd results. Here, I believe the majority conflates the notion of absurdity as it is used in statutory interpretation with a public policy concern that, perhaps, the commissioner should be vested with the discretion he wishes to exercise in this instance.

In support of the trial court’s judgment, the commissioner has argued, with apparent success, that construing § 38a-702a et seq. without also incorporating § 46a-80 into its provisions would lead to the absurd result that, while an applicant must disclose his or her criminal history on the mandated application form, the commissioner, nonetheless, does not have the authority pursuant to § 38a-702a et seq. to deny an application for licensure on the basis of an applicant’s criminal background. The commissioner’s point in this regard is that in construing § 38a-702a et seq., we must incorporate the provisions of § 46a-80 regarding the allowable treatment of an applicant’s criminal record because, otherwise, it makes no sense to require applicants to utilize a form that includes a recitation of one’s criminal record. In acceding to this argument, the majority ignores the provision of § 38a-702k, which expressly gives the commissioner the authority to reject an application from one who has been convicted of a felony. Thus, it is entirely reasonable and not absurd that the statutory scheme for the licensing of insurance producers as set forth in § 38a-702a et seq. requires an applicant to set forth his or her past criminal record as the completion of the application provides a vehicle for determining whether an applicant may be statutorily disqualified for having a felony conviction.

To be sure, it may well be bad public policy not to permit the insurance commissioner the discretion to weigh whether an applicant for an insurance producer license is a trustworthy applicant or a person of good moral character or a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor who has not been rehabilitated, but judicial notions of a beneficial public policy are not part of the court’s task in statutory interpretation. Moreover, it is beyond the bounds of statutory interpretation for a court to refuse to enforce the clear language of a statute on the basis that the statute, as written, makes bad public policy. Enacting legislation is uniquely the function of the legislative branch. Fixing flawed statutes is as well. In this instance, I would not affirm the trial court’s judgment. Rather, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case with direction that the matter be further remanded to the administrative hearing officer for a determination, after a hearing, of whether the applicant is entitled to an insurance producer license on the basis of the criteria and process as set forth in § 38a-702a et seq.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

       We refer in this opinion to General Statutes §§ 38a-702a through 38a-702k as § 38a-702a et seq. and refer to individual sections as necessary.

       Although the plaintiff alleged in the September 13, 2012 administrative appeal to the Superior Court that he did not agree with some of the hearing officer’s factual findings, he does not challenge any of those findings in his appeal to this court.

       Specifically, General Statutes § 38a-702k (a) provides that these causes include: “(1) Providing incorrect, misleading, incomplete or materially untrue information in the license application; (2) violating any insurance laws, or violating any regulation, subpoena or order of the commissioner or of another state’s commissioner; (3) obtaining or attempting to obtain a license through misrepresentation or fraud; (4) improperly withholding, misappropriating or converting any moneys or properties received in the course of doing an insurance business; (5) intentionally misrepresenting the terms of an actual or proposed insurance contract or application for insurance; (6) having been convicted of a felony; (7) having admitted or been found to have committed any insurance unfair trade practice or fraud; (8) using fraudulent, coercive or dishonest practices, or demonstrating incompetence, untrustworthiness or financial irresponsibility in the conduct of business in this state or elsewhere; (9) having an insurance producer license, or its equivalent, denied, suspended or revoked in any other state, province, district or territory; (10) forging another’s name to an application for insurance or to any document related to an insurance transaction; (11) improperly using notes or any other reference material to complete an examination for an insurance license; (12) knowingly accepting insurance business from an individual who is not licensed; (13) failing to comply with an administrative or court order imposing a child support obligation; or (14) failing to pay state income tax or comply with any administrative or court order directing payment of state income tax.”

       Subsection (a) of General Statutes § 38a-769 now provides: “Any person, partnership, association or corporation that is resident in this state or has its principal place of business in this state, or a nonresident of this state who is not licensed in any other state, desiring to act within this state as a public adjuster, casualty adjuster, motor vehicle physical damage appraiser, certified insurance consultant, surplus lines broker or desiring to engage in any insurance-related occupation for which a license is deemed necessary by the commissioner, other than an occupation as an insurance producer, shall make a written application to the commissioner for a resident license. Any other person, partnership, association or corporation desiring to so act or to engage in any insurance-related occupation for which a license is deemed necessary by the commissioner, other than an occupation as an insurance producer, shall make a written application to the commissioner for a nonresident license. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

       The applicants referenced in subsection (a) of § 38a-769 include public adjusters, casualty adjusters, motor vehicle physical damage appraisers, certified insurance consultants, surplus lines brokers and anyone desiring to engage in any insurance-related occupation for which a license is deemed necessary by the commissioner, other than an insurance producer.

       Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).

       We note that, although the comments of the Office of Legislative Research are not, in and of themselves, evidence of legislative intent, our Supreme Court has observed that they properly may bear on the legislature’s knowledge of intexpretive problems that could arise from a bill. See, e.g., Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102, 124 n.15, 942 A.2d 396 (2008).

       The commissioner claims that its application of § 38a-769 (c) and (d) to insurance producers established a time-tested inteipretation that cannot be disturbed. However, “[i]t is well established that an administrative agency’s decision under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., with respect to the construction of a statute is not entitled to special deference when [as in the present case] that determination has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] ... a governmental agency’s time-tested interpretation .... Instead, [w]ell settled principles of statutory interpretation govern our review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) University of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Commission, 303 Conn. 724, 733, 36 A.3d 663 (2012). Moreover, “[cjonclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must [only] stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Celentano v. Rocque, 282 Conn. 645, 652, 923 A.2d 709 (2007). We agree with the court that the department has not established a time-tested interpretation. Despite the department’s continuous use of § 38a-769 (c) and (d) since the enactment of § 38a-702a et seq., we do not find the interpretation to be reasonable. In addition, we note that no appellate court has ever addressed this issue and therefore the interpretation has not been subject to judicial scrutiny.

       We agree with the well written dissent that it is our job to interpret, rather than create, statutory law. We respectfully disagree, however, that we have gone two steps too far. Rather, we strive only to give meaning to the entire statutory scheme as created by the legislature, ensuring that, where possible, the statutes are read harmoniously and consistently.

       Although the dissent aptly notes that “we are instructed that when the word ‘shall’ is juxtaposed with a substantive action verb, it creates a mandatory duty,” case law also suggests that if “the legislative provision is designed to secure order, system and dispatch in the proceedings, it is generally held to be directory, especially where the requirement is stated in affirmative terms unaccompanied by negative words.” Fidelity Trust Co. v. BVD Associates, 196 Conn. 270, 278, 492 A.2d 180 (1985). Section 38a-702k can be read as such. It is designed to give the commissioner discretion in suspending, revoking, or refusing to issue or renew an insurance producer’s license. It provides order in such proceedings, giving the commissioner a nonexhaustive list of causes he may use in order to deny such license.

       See A. Aiudi & Sons, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 267 Conn. 192, 209-10, 837 A.2d 748 (2004) (holding that § 500 of the Plainville Zoning Regulations was not exclusive list of special exceptions where § 500 provided in relevant part that “[t]he following uses are declared to possess such special characteristics that each must be considered as a special exception”).

       The dissent cites several examples, such as General Statutes § 20-316a, where the legislature has specifically provided that its provisions are “subject to the provisions of section 46a-80.” Simply because other statutes have provisions that directly refer to §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81 bears no significance on the present case. There is no requirement that the legislature specifically delineate when statutes must be read harmoniously with another statute. Moreover, suggesting that § 46a-80 only operates when engaged by another statute is contrary to the controlling language in § 46a-80.

       General Statutes § 38a-702e (a) provides in relevant part: “A person applying for a resident insurance producer license shall make application to the commissioner on the uniform application and declare under penalty of refusal, suspension or revocation of the license that the statements made in the application are true, correct and complete to the best of the individual’s knowledge and belief. . . .”

       The factors listed in § 46a-80 (c) are consistent with, and almost identical to, the factors listed in the association’s handbook. This is further evidence that the legislature intended § 46a-80 to be read along with § 38a-702a et seq.

       The hearing officer stated in his decision: “Because there is an element of criminal conduct in determining whether [the plaintiffs] application is in the public interest, and whether he is trustworthy and a person of good moral character; it is important to consider the requirements of [§] 46a-80.” The hearing officer then recited the relevant language in both §§ 46a-80 and 46a-81, and analyzed whether the commissioner properly denied the plaintiffs application by reviewing the information provided in the plaintiffs application. He discussed the time that elapsed from the plaintiffs last conviction and the relevancy of the offense to the responsibility of an insurance producer. The hearing officer went on to conclude, however, that “§ 38a-769 (c) provides that each applicant for a producer license ‘shall furnish satisfactory evidence to the commissioner that the applicant is a person of good moral character and that the applicant is financially responsible,’ and [§] 38a-769 (d) indicates that the commissioner may issue a license upon finding that the applicant ‘meets the licensing requirements of this title and is in all respects properly qualified and trustworthy and that the granting of such license is not against the public interest.’ Thus, there is a relationship between the nature of the crimes and the qualifications of having good moral character, being trustworthy and ensuring that the issuance of a license is in the public interest.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DiPENTIMA, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    TERRY ALIANO v. MICHAEL ALIANO
    (AC 34830)
    DiPentima, C. X, and Sheldon and Foti, Js.

      Argued October 16, 2013
    officially released February 18, 2014

      John F. Morris, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Timothy P. Lenes, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J.

The plaintiff, Terry Aliano, appeals from the denial of her postdissolution motion for contempt filed against the defendant, Michael Aliano. On appeal, she claims that the court improperly found that the defendant’s failure to pay a lump sum financial award was not wilful noncompliance with the terms of the parties’ dissolution judgment. We disagree, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our discussion. The parties were married on February 24, 2007. In March, 2010, the plaintiff commenced an action seeking a dissolution of the marriage. On November 2, 2011, following a bifurcated trial, the court issued two memoranda of decision; one addressing custody and access regarding the parties’ minor child and one addressing the various financial issues. The court found that the defendant was the president and chief executive officer of a number of family businesses founded by his deceased father, Ronald Aliano (decedent). The estate of the decedent was the subject of a probate dispute involving a woman who claimed to be an heir of the decedent. Nevertheless, the defendant was expected to “inherit a significant portion of the estimated $10 million estate.” The court issued a number of financial orders, including awarding alimony to the plaintiff for a limited time period and dividing the parties’ property. With respect to the defendant’s expected inheritance from the decedent’s estate, the court ordered in paragraph 12 of its decision: “The [defendant] shall make a payment to the [plaintiff] in the amount of $100,000 within 30 days of his receiving his inheritance so long as such receipt is in excess of $250,000.”

On June 21, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the defendant had wilfully failed, refused or neglected to pay her the $100,000 as required by the court’s judgment. She further claimed that “[o]n March 30, 2012, the Norwich Probate Court distributed the business known as American Ambulance Service, Inc., in equal parts between [the defendant] and . . . Rhonda Aliano Quinn (the [defendant's sister). The said distribution was the major asset of the estate valued in excess of $4,700,000.” In addition to seeking a finding of contempt and payment of the $100,000, the plaintiff requested that the court order the defendant to pay statutory interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a and attorney’s fees related to the prosecution of her contempt motion.

The court held a hearing on July 16, 2012, where the plaintiff called as a witness Andrew Messier, the executor of the decedent’s estate and the trustee for two of the trusts associated with the estate. Messier testified that the defendant received 60 percent of the shares of stock of an ambulance company owned by the decedent. The value of the stock received by the defendant was $2,350,000. This was the only distribution from the estate to the defendant.

The plaintiff testified that she had not received the $100,000 payment and that the defendant had not informed her of his receipt of a portion of his inheritance. The defendant testified that he had not received any cash or negotiable instruments from the decedent’s estate and that a trial was pending in the Probate Court regarding all of the other assets of that estate. The defendant stated that he anticipated receiving a substantial amount of cash from the decedent’s estate. During cross-examination, in response to a question about whether he had ever made an effort to communicate with the plaintiff about the inheritance issue, the defendant stated: “It’s my understanding I did not have to pay that until which time I got all my inheritance, and it was cash. [My attorney] was aware I would be paying [the plaintiff] when I got the liquid assets to pay her. I don’t have the money to pay her right now.” He then iterated that he had not received his total inheritance, and the portion that he had was in the form of stock.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated: “This was an interesting legal argument . . . but I don’t think it goes to what the court’s intention was in paragraph [12] of the judgment. It was the court’s intent that [the defendant] would pay that sum of cash when he received cash. And the court knew that he was going to receive real estate; the court knew he was going to receive stock in a closely held corporation, but the court specifically used as the trigger point when he received in excess of $250,000, and he hasn’t yet done that. So, I don’t find he is in contempt. And I don’t find the trigger has been pulled yet. Frankly, if he received $250,000 in negotiable securities, in marketable securities, in a publically traded company that could be sold on the open market, I would read the situation differently. I don’t view he has the liquid money from his inheritance yet. ... It says in excess of $250,000. That was my intent. And it is not my intent that, [the defendant], in case you axe thinking that all of your inheritance has to be complete, but when you receive $250,000 of liquid assets, marketable securities, you should pay [the plaintiff] $100,000. That contempt, if there is one, would be viewed differently.”

Counsel for the plaintiff inquired whether the court was clarifying the dissolution judgment so that the $100,000 obligation would be triggered only if the defendant received an inheritance of cash. The court responded: “I’d rather not do that because there isn’t a motion to clarify. If and when he receives something that is readily convertible to cash, I would certainly entertain your motion for contempt if it wasn’t effectuated, but if it is a building that might be sold, might not be sold, that is probably in that gray area that I won’t go that far. When there is cash, when there is stock in a publicaily traded corporation, that I consider to be readily available cash.” The plaintiffs counsel then questioned whether the court was altering the terms of the dissolution judgment, to which the court responded, “[t]hat’s not what I am doing.” The following colloquy then occurred between the plaintiffs counsel and the court:

“[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: I understand you are not doing that, and I am troubled because it sounds like it is going in that direction, because he is involved with litigation with a [person claiming to be an heir of the decedent] that could be going on for years. We could be sitting here for years waiting for the [probate] litigation to finish as it goes through the appellate process. Your order is simple and one sentence; as long as it is more than $250,000. I claim we have to satisfy that hurdle. For Your Honor to add to the record marketable securities or cash, it changes the nature and that becomes an issue.

“The Court: There is no motion to clarify. The court has not clarified, modified or changed the judgment. It is what it is. I think I was suggesting to [the defendant] that if and when he receives the ability to pay, he should pay [the plaintiff], but I am not ruling on a motion that is not before me, and I am not changing the judgment.

“[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: I can’t get a ruling on the fact that he has received more than two and one-half million dollars of assets so far? I am trying to figure out how to justify that.

“The Court: To the extent that I have muddied the order sufficiently, I will vacate the order that I just made. I will vacate the findings that I just made. I am going to vacate the dicta which I just made. The motion for contempt is denied.”

The plaintiff then filed the present appeal, arguing that the court’s order was clear and unambiguous and that the court abused its discretion by modifying the property order and by failing to find the defendant in contempt. Because the trial court had vacated all of its findings underlying the order, vacated the order, and then denied the motion for contempt without providing the reasoning for doing so, we issued the following order on November 5, 2013: “Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 61-10 (b) and 60-5, the trial court ... is hereby sua sponte ordered to articulate, within thirty days of this order, the factual findings and legal basis underlying its denial of the motion for contempt.”

On November 21, 2013, the court issued its articulation regarding the denial of the plaintiffs motion for contempt. The court stated that “[t]he defendant had inherited stock in a closely held family business. He inherited no dollars. Stock in a closely held family business is not dollars.” The court also articulated that the defendant had not received any other distribution from the Probate Court, he did not possess $100,000 of cash at the time of the hearing on the contempt motion and therefore was unable to pay that sum to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant had inherited any cash or that “the stock in a closely held family business was liquid or otherwise readily convertible into dollars or that there existed a market for said shares.” The court also determined that its order was ambiguous because it did not state whether the $250,000 trigger to pay $100,000 to the plaintiff must be in “actual dollars or other assets valued at $250,000.” It further concluded that “[t]he defendant’s failure to pay to the plaintiff $100,000 upon receiving shares of stock in his family business was not a wilful disobedience of a clear and understandable order; rather, it illustrates a good faith disagreement as to what was meant in that court order. The defendant had a good faith belief that his receipt of stock in the family business was not the condition precedent triggering his obligation to pay to the plaintiff $100,000. . . . The defendant’s interpretation of the court order was reasonable and made in good faith. Any violation was excused by what can only be a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.”

We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant legal principles and our standard of review. “Contempt is a disobedience [of] the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense. . . . Contempt may be civil or criminal in character. . . . A civil contempt is one in which the conduct constituting the contempt is directed against some civil right of an opposing party and the proceeding is initiated by him. . . . [T]he punishment [for civil contempt] is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hardy v. Superior Court, 305 Conn. 824, 834, 48 A.3d 50 (2012); see also Eric S. v. Tiffany S., 143 Conn. App. 1, 9, 68 A.3d 139 (2013).

“[O]ur analysis of a judgment of contempt consists of two levels of inquiry. First, we must resolve the threshold question of whether the underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt. . . . This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. . . . Second, if we conclude that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a review of the trial court’s determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.” (Citations omitted.) In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 693-94, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007); Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. App. 178, 191, 26 A.3d 657, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946, 30 A.3d 1 (2011); Lynn v. Lynn, 130 Conn. App. 319, 327, 23 A.3d 771 (2011); see also Martocchio v. Savoir, 130 Conn. App. 626, 630, 23 A.3d 1282, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 901, 31 A.3d 1178 (2011).

In the present case, the court articulated that its order requiring the defendant to pay $100,000 to the plaintiff after he received $250,000 of his inheritance “was ambiguous because it did not specify whether the inheritance of $250,000 must be in actual dollars or other assets valued at $250,000.” We are not bound by the trial court’s assessment of the clarity of the order at issue; rather, that presents a legal question subject to de novo review by this court. See In re Leah S., supra, 284 Conn. 693-94; Przekopski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 131 Conn. App. 191. Nevertheless, we need not resolve this issue in the present case. Even if we assume, without deciding, that the order was clear and unambiguous, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion for contempt.

In its articulation, the court stated that at the time of the hearing on the plaintiffs motion, “the defendant did not possess $100,000 of cash and so was unable to pay that sum, even if it had been due.” It also stated that the defendant “had a good faith belief that his receipt of stock in the family business was not the condition precedent triggering his obligation to pay to the plaintiff $100,000” and therefore, was a good faith disagreement as to what was meant by the order, and was not wilful disobedience. It concluded that “[a]ny violation was excused by what can only be a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.”

At the outset, we note that “[t]he fact that an order has not been complied with fully does not dictate that a finding of contempt must enter.” Auerbach v. Auerbach, 113 Conn. App. 318, 326, 966 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 901, 971 A.2d 40 (2009). “A finding of contempt is a question of fact, and our standard of review is to determine whether the court abused its discretion in [finding] that the actions or inactions of the [alleged contemnor] were in contempt of a court order. . . . To constitute contempt, a party’s conduct must be wilful. . . . Noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of contempt. . . . [T]he credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact and the drawing of inferences are all within the province of the trier of fact. . . . We review the findings to determine whether they could legally and reasonably be found, thereby establishing that the trial court could reasonably have concluded as it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quaranta v. Cooley, 130 Conn. App. 835, 840-41, 26 A.3d 643 (2011); see also Adamo v. Adamo, 123 Conn. App. 38, 49-50, 1 A.3d 221, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 916, 4 A.3d 830 (2010).

The court articulated that the defendant lacked the ability to pay $100,000 to the plaintiff. At the hearing, the defendant testified: “I don’t have the money to pay [the plaintiff] right now.” The court’s finding, as set forth in its articulation, was based on the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. In making the finding of the defendant’s inability to pay, the court credited the defendant’s testimony. We defer to the court’s assessment of the credibility of the defendant. See Behrns v. Behrns, 124 Conn. App. 794, 811, 6 A.3d 184 (2010) (trial judge sole arbiter of credibility and reviewing court unable to pass on credibility of witness). This finding also provides us with a basis to conclude that the court’s denial of the motion for contempt did not constitute an abuse of discretion. “The inability of a party to obey an order of the court, without fault on his part, is a good defense to the charge of contempt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Auerbach v. Auerbach, supra, 113 Conn. App. 328; see also Ahmadi v. Ahmadi, 294 Conn. 384, 398, 985 A.2d 319 (2009) (“The contemnor must establish that he cannot comply, or was unable to do so. . . . It is [then] within the sound discretion of the court to deny a claim of contempt when there is an adequate factual basis to explain the failure.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); Brody v. Brody, 145 Conn. App. 654, 662, 77 A.3d 156 (2013).

The court also stated in its articulation that it found that the defendant’s interpretation of the court order was reasonable and made in good faith, and thus did not amount to wilful disobedience. “The contempt remedy is particularly harsh . . . and may be founded solely upon some clear and express direction of the court. ... A good faith dispute or legitimate misunderstanding of the terms of an alimony or support obligation may prevent a finding that the payor’s nonpayment was wilful. This does not mean, however, that such a dispute or misunderstanding will preclude a finding of wilfulness as a predicate to a judgment of contempt. Whether it will preclude such a finding is ultimately within the trial court’s discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Behrns v. Behrns, supra, 124 Conn. App. 808; see also Martocchio v. Savoir, supra, 130 Conn. App. 630.

At the hearing, the defendant testified: “It’s my understanding I did not have to pay that until which time I got all my inheritance, and it was cash. [My attorney] was aware I would be paying [the plaintiff] when I got the liquid assets to pay her.” The court was free to credit that testimony and to determine that the nonpayment was based on the defendant’s good faith dispute or legitimate misunderstanding of the terms of the court’s order. As such, we cannot say this constituted an abuse of discretion.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The plaintiff is now known as Teny McDonald.

       This court has not been provided with the transcripts of the underlying dissolution action.

       “Our law for awarding attorney’s fees in contempt proceedings is clear. General Statutes § 46b-87 provides that the court may award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a contempt proceeding. The award of attorney’s fees in contempt proceedings is within the discretion of the court. ... In making its determination, the court is allowed to rely on its familiarity with the complexity of the legal issues involved. Indeed, it is expected that the court will bring its experience and legal expertise to the determination of the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kravetz v. Kravetz, 126 Conn. App. 459, 471, 11 A.3d 1141 (2011).

         Practice Book § 61-10 (b) provides in relevant part: “If the court determines that articulation of the trial court decision is appropriate, it may remand the case pursuant to Section 60-5 for articulation by the trial court within a specified time period. After remand to the trial court for articulation, the trial court may, in its discretion, require assistance from the parties in order to provide the articulation. Such assistance may include, but is not limited to, supplemental briefs, oral argument and provision of copies of transcripts and exhibits.” The official commentary to § 61-10 provides in relevant part: “Subsection (b) was adopted to effect a change in appellate procedure by limiting the use of the forfeiture sanction imposed when an appellant fails to seek an articulation from the trial court pursuant to Section 66-5 with regard to an issue on appeal, and the court therefore declines to review the issue for lack of an adequate record for review. In lieu of refusing to review the issue, when the court determines that articulation is appropriate, the court may now remand the case to the trial court for an articulation and then address the merits of the issue after articulation is provided. The adoption of subsection (b) is not intended to preclude the court from declining to review an issue where the record is inadequate for reasons other than solely the failure to seek an articulation, such as, for example, the failure to procure the trial court’s decision pursuant to Section 64-1 (b) or the failure to provide a transcript, exhibits or other documents necessary for appellate review.”
      Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part: “If the court deems it necessary to the proper disposition of the cause, it may remand the case for a further articulation of the basis of the trial court’s factual findings or decision. . . .”

       For this court to determine whether the order requiring the defendant to pay $100,000 to the plaintiff following his receipt of the stock portion of his inheritance was clear and unambiguous, we would examine the relevant memorandum of decision that dissolved the marriage of the parties and contained the financial orders of the court. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Custom Design Services, Inc., 126 Conn. App. 274, 280-81, 11 A.3d 1094 (2011). The following course of action would be our guide: “[T]he construction of a judgment is a question of law for the court. . . . As a general rule, judgments are to be construed in the same fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as that which is expressed.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lashgari v. Lashgari, 197 Conn. 189, 196-97, 496 A.2d 491 (1985); see also Christiano v. Christiano, 131 Conn. 589, 592-93, 41 A.2d 779 (1945); Lynn v. Lynn, supra, 130 Conn. App. 328 ("[i]n [interpreting a judgment], it assists a reviewing court to keep in mind the theory on which the case was tried and on which the trial court decided it” [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]). As stated in footnote 2 of this opinion, we have not been provided with the transcripts of the proceedings underlying the two memoranda of decision that dissolved the parties’ marriage and contained the attendant child custody and financial orders. Without these transcripts, we are precluded from examining the circumstances surrounding the making of the court’s judgment and the order at issue.