author: DUPONT, J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KEITH SCHECK
    (AC 27595)
    McLachlan, Gruendel and Dupont, Js.

      Argued November 14, 2007
    officially released February 26, 2008

      Jodi Zils Gagne, for the appellant (defendant).

      Tami Stanford, certified legal intern, with whom were Bruce R. Lockwood, assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief, John A. Connelly, state’s attorney, and John J. Davenport, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

DUPONT, J.

The defendant, Keith Scheck, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the jury, of the crimes of attempt to commit assault in the first degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2), 53a-59 (a) (1) and 53a-8, and conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-59 (a) (1). The defendant claims that the trial court should have (1) granted his motions for a judgment of acquittal and (2) denied the state’s motion in limine to preclude certain testimony. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The following factual and procedural history is relevant. The defendant was arrested for his participation in the attempted shooting of the victim, Jeffrey Wilde, by his accomplice, Kenneth Wells. Prior to this shooting, Wilde had been arrested on charges of unlawful restraint in the second degree and assault in the third degree involving Wells’ girlfriend, Mary Homa. These charges against Wilde were pending at the time of the defendant’s trial. Before trial, the state filed a motion in limine to preclude defense counsel from inquiring into the factual allegations of any alleged assault by Wilde against Homa. The state’s motion acknowledged that the defense could inquire about the existence of the pending case against Wilde. The motion was granted, prohibiting any inquiry into the details of that alleged assault, particularly Homa’s claims that they were of a sexual nature. Other facts will be supplied in the discussion of the defendant’s two claims.

I

The defendant claims that insufficient evidence supported his conviction, arguing specifically that he did not have the requisite intent to attempt to commit an assault. He made two motions for a judgment of acquittal, one after the jury’s verdict and the other at the time of his sentencing. The court noted that intent was a question of fact for the jury and that the jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt that the state had proven its case. Accordingly, the court denied both of the defendant’s motions. We agree with the ruling of the court.

“In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [fact finder] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Silva, 93 Conn. App. 349, 351-52, 889 A.2d 834, cert. granted on other grounds, 277 Conn. 931, 896 A.2d 103 (2006).

“The crime of attempted assault requires proof of intent to cause serious physical injury. General Statutes 53a-59 (a) (1).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walton, 34 Conn. App. 223, 231, 641 A.2d 391, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 902, 644 A.2d 916 (1994). “[Conspiracy is a specific intent crime. Intent is divided into two parts: (1) the intent to agree to conspire; and (2) the intent to commit the offense that is the object of the conspiracy. . . . Intent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct . . . and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom. ... In a conspiracy prosecution, when determining both a defendant’s specific intent to agree and his specific intent that the criminal acts be performed, the jury may rely on reasonable inferences from facts in the evidence and may develop a chain of inferences, each link of which may depend for its validity on the validity of the prior link in the chain.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 94 Conn. App. 424, 433, 892 A.2d 990, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 901, 901 A.2d 1224 (2006).

“The issue of the intent of the defendant is one of fact to be resolved by the jury. ... It is the right and duty of the jurors to draw all reasonable and logical inferences from the facts as they find them to exist. . . . The jury has the further duty of determining the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the effects of conflicting evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rogers, 38 Conn. App. 777, 791, 664 A.2d 291, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 918, 665 A.2d 610 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1084, 116 S. Ct. 799, 133 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1996).

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could have found certain facts. Wells and the defendant had been good friends for twenty years. On the night of the alleged crimes, Wells picked up the defendant at the Naugatuck train station. They went to at least two bars and drank beer for approximately seven hours, eventually ending up at Wells’ residence. They discussed the fact that criminal charges were pending against Wilde, arising out of the alleged assault involving Wells’ girlfriend, Homa, who was also the mother of Wells’ son.

The defendant knew that the discussion regarding Wilde’s alleged assault of Homa upset Wells. On February 10, 2003, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Wells took his shotgun and went to his car, where the defendant and Homa joined him. The defendant saw Wells carry the shotgun into the car. Wells drove the defendant and Homa from his residence to Wilde’s apartment. Wells and the defendant got out of the car and walked up to the porch of Wilde’s second floor apartment. The defendant saw Wells carry the shotgun as they approached the porch. With Wells standing behind him holding the shotgun, the defendant knocked on the door and moved alongside Wells.

Upon hearing knocking at his door, Wilde woke up, went to the door, heard two separate and distinct male voices talking and saw two silhouettes at his door. He turned away from the door intending to get his sweatpants. After waiting approximately one minute, Wells fired the first shotgun blast into the apartment door. The defendant then ran to the car, and he and Homa drove off leaving Wells at the scene. The gunshot missed Wilde by approximately one foot. He immediately went to his living room to telephone 911. Wells then fired a second gunshot from the bottom of the porch. The second gunshot also missed Wilde, who remained in his living room talking to the 911 dispatcher.

On the basis of the evidence, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant intended to aid Wells in the assault of Wilde and cause serious physical injury to him. Not only was the defendant aware that Wells harbored ill feelings toward Wilde, but he knew (1) that Wells intended to go to Wilde’s residence that morning, (2) that Wells was in an enraged, intoxicated state and (3) that he was armed with a shotgun. Nevertheless, the defendant joined Wells, who was armed, on Wilde’s porch, knocked on the door so that Wilde would approach it and stood aside as Wells fired through it. Thus, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant’s conviction. Although the defendant testified that he traveled with his friend to mediate the situation, the jury apparently did not find his testimony credible. Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support its finding of guilty of both crimes with which the defendant had been charged.

II

The defendant claims that the court acted improperly in granting the state’s motion in limine to preclude the details of Homa’s uncharged accusations of sexual misconduct against Wilde. We disagree.

Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine “to have the court preclude any questions by defense counsel which seek to elicit an answer from any witness concerning the factual allegations in ... a currently pending criminal file [against Wilde].” In the motion, the state acknowledged that questions regarding the existence of a pending case against Wilde were appropriate inquiry for the defense when Wilde testified because it would be relevant to Wilde’s motive and interest in the outcome of the case against the defendant. The state argued that “the factual circumstances of the incident . . . should not [have been] the subject of inquiry by the defense since they [did] not implicate the veracity of the witness, Jeffrey Wilde.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Outside the presence of the jury, the defendant argued that Homa’s allegations of uncharged sexual misconduct against Wilde were relevant to show that Wells had a motive to assault Wilde and to show that the defendant had no such motive. In response, the state argued that Wilde was not charged with sexual assault but rather unlawful restraint and assault. According to the state, evidence of the uncharged misconduct was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. The court granted the state’s motion in limine, ruling that the defense could inquire about the complaint Homa filed and the names of the two criminal charges, specifically unlawful restraint in the second degree and assault in the third degree, but could not inquire about the details of the allegations.

“[T]he constitutional right to present a defense does not include the right to introduce any and all evidence claimed to support it. . . . The trial court retains the power to rule on the admissibility of evidence pursuant to traditional evidentiary standards.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevenson, 53 Conn. App. 551, 565 n.12, 733 A.2d 253, cert. denied, 250 Conn. 917, 734 A.2d 990 (1999). The question of admissibility of proffered evidence is usually one of evidentiary, but not constitutional, dimension. See State v. Shabazz, 246 Conn. 746, 753 n.4, 719 A.2d 440 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1179, 119 S. Ct. 1116, 143 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1999).

We review the defendant’s evidentiary claim by employing the abuse of discretion standard. “The admission of evidence of prior uncharged misconduct is a decision properly within the discretion of the trial court. . . . [E]very reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . [T]he trial court’s decision will be reversed only where abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. William C., 103 Conn. App. 508, 517, 930 A.2d 753, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 928, 934 A.2d 244 (2007). Our “review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landry v. Spitz, 102 Conn. App. 34, 59, 925 A.2d 334 (2007).

“ [E]vidence is relevant if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. . . . Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier [of fact] in the determination of an issue. . . . One fact is relevant to another if in the common course of events the existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain or more probable. . . .

“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value. ... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one’s case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted. . . . The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury. . . . The trial court . . . must determine whether the adverse impact of the challenged evidence outweighs its probative value.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosa, 104 Conn. App. 374, 378, 933 A.2d 731 (2007).

“Connecticut Code of Evidence § 4-5 (b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible for purposes other than those specified in subsection (a), such as to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal activity, or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony. . . . Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that [prior misconduct] evidence may be used to complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings. . . .

“To determine whether evidence of prior misconduct falls within an exception to the general rule prohibiting its admission, [the court has] adopted a two-pronged analysis. . . . First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. Second, the probative value of such evidence must outweigh the prejudicial effect of the other crime evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. William C., supra, 103 Conn. App. 516-17.

“[T]here are situations where the potential prejudicial effect of relevant evidence would suggest its exclusion. These are: (1) where the facts offered may unduly arouse the jury’s emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) where the proof and answering evidence it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) where the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) where the [party against whom the evidence is offered], having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Warren, 100 Conn. App. 407, 420, 919 A.2d 465 (2007).

In the present case, the court, relying on State v. Pittman, 209 Conn. 596, 553 A.2d 155 (1989), concluded that the existence of a criminal complaint against Wilde and the names of the two charges against him were relevant, but the details underlying the charges, particularly the uncharged sexual assault allegation, were not. The court did not find credible the defendant’s argument that the details of the uncharged sexual assault allegation were relevant to his lack of a motive for the crimes with which he was charged. Regardless of whether the details of a sexual assault may have been relevant to Wells’ motive to assault Wilde, those details would not tend to disprove any motive of the defendant. Excluding the testimony related to the uncharged misconduct, the defendant had evidence supporting his claim that Wells had a clear motive to assault Wilde that he did not. The details of the uncharged sexual misconduct were not relevant to the defendant’s motive or lack of a motive. Even if minimally relevant or probative of the defendant’s defense, namely, his lack of intent, the details of a sexual nature were likely to distract the jury from the primary issues of the case. Thus, the court’s decision to preclude the uncharged sexual misconduct evidence was not an abuse of discretion, and we conclude that the court properly granted the state’s motion in limine.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The defendant argues that he should have been charged with the crime ol' reckless endangerment, rather than the crimes involving assault in the first degree. We are not concerned with the charges that the state could have brought but rather whether the offenses as charged supported the verdict. Furthermore, the defendant did not seek an instruction to the jury on lesser included offenses.

       The state claims that this issue is not reviewable on appeal because it was not preserved and is not constitutional, thereby precluding a review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). We conclude that it was sufficiently preserved for review. See State v. Shabazz, 246 Conn. 746, 752-53, 719 A.2d 440 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1179, 119 S. Ct. 1116, 143 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1999).

       In the usual case, it is the defendant who argues that the inclusion of evidence will have a prejudicial effect that will outweigh its probative value. Here, the state argues for its preclusion.

       The motive for the crimes with which the defendant was charged, on the basis of the evidence, may have been his longtime friendship with Wells.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    BRIDGEPORT FIRE FIGHTERS LOCAL 998 v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT
    (AC 28031)
    McLachlan, Harper and Peters, Js.
    Argued November 29, 2007
    officially released February 26, 2008

      JohnR. Mitola, associate city attorney, for the appellant (defendant).

      Daniel P. Hunsberger, Sr., with whom, on the brief, was P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, the city of Bridgeport, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application of the plaintiff, the Bridgeport Fire Fighters Local 998, to vacate an arbitration award. The defendant challenges the court’s conclusion that the state board of mediation and arbitration (board) improperly failed to address every aspect of the issue submitted for resolution. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts and procedural history are not in dispute. The plaintiff and the defendant are parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Article twenty-six of that agreement provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll acting Assistant Chief assignments shall be filled by offering such assignments to Fire Captains in the order of their seniority who have been deemed qualified by the Fire Chief.” The plaintiff brought grievances on behalf of two captains in the fire department, Bruce Elander and William Haug, alleging that the defendant violated this provision. The grievances were not resolved to the satisfaction of the plaintiff at the municipal level. Thereafter, in accordance with article six of the collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiff submitted the consolidated dispute to arbitration by the board. The “issue” submitted was as follows: “Did the City of Bridgeport violate Article 26 of the collective bargaining agreement as alleged in the Elander/Haug grievance? If so, what shall the remedy be?”

Following a hearing before the board, the board issued a memorandum of decision denying the grievance. A majority of the members of the board concluded that the plaintiff had failed to present any evidence that either Haug or Elander were, at relevant times, senior captains to whom the provision at issue applied. The board reasoned that, in essence, the plaintiff was asking it to “speculate” that, “given their seniority status, Elander and Haug must have been denied an acting assignment during this period.” The board based its decision on this ground alone.

The plaintiff subsequently filed in the Superior Court an application to vacate the award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418 (a). The plaintiff argued that the board “failed to render an award on the issue” submitted to it and thus “exceeded [its] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” In an oral ruling, the court sided with the plaintiff, concluding that the board merely had determined that no remedy was available for Elander or Haug, but had failed to resolve the question of whether the defendant had violated the collective bargaining agreement. The court granted the application to vacate and directed the board to determine, first, if the defendant had violated article twenty-six and, second, if such a violation had occurred, to determine an appropriate remedy. The court implicitly determined that the issue submitted required the board to determine whether the defendant had violated article twenty-six with regard to any firefighter and, later, to determine whether Elander or Haug were entitled to a remedy related to such violation. In this vein, the court noted that the board’s conclusion that neither Elander nor Haug was entitled to any remedy “may be absolutely proper.”

The defendant appeals from the court’s decision, arguing that the court essentially “changed the submission and ordered the [board] to determine a different submission.” The defendant argues that the board properly interpreted the issue submitted to relate only to whether it had violated article twenty-six with respect to Elander or Haug, that the award properly conformed to the submission and that the court improperly failed to curtail its analysis to determining only whether the award conformed to the submission. The plaintiff continues to maintain that the board “exceeded the scope of the submission” by declining to determine whether the defendant had violated the agreement. The plaintiff argues that the court properly vacated the board’s award because, under § 52-418 (a) (4), the members of the board “exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”

“Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined. . . . When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties’ agreement. . . . When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission. . . . Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution. . . .

“The significance ... of a determination that an arbitration submission was unrestricted or restricted is not to determine what the arbitrators are obligated to do, but to determine the scope of judicial review of what they have done. Put another way, the submission tells the arbitrators what they are obligated to decide. The determination by a court of whether the submission was restricted or unrestricted tells the court what its scope of review is regarding the arbitrator’s decision.

“Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, we have . . . recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute ... (2) the award violates clear public policy . . . [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 80-81, 881 A.2d 139 (2005).

We agree with the assertion made by both parties that the submission at issue was unrestricted; neither the parties’ agreement nor any other provision restricted the powers of the board. See Alderman & Alderman v. Pollack, 100 Conn. App. 80, 85, 917 A.2d 60 (2007); Rocky Hill Teachers’ Assn. v. Board of Education, 72 Conn. App. 274, 278 n.6, 804 A.2d 999, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 907, 810 A.2d 272 (2002). Thus, we review only the ground raised by the plaintiff in the trial court, with which the court agreed, which is that the board contravened § 52-418 (a) (4).

The court concluded that the board improperly had failed to resolve at least an aspect of the actual issue submitted by the parties. Essentially, the court reasoned that the board had either disregarded or misunderstood the nature of the issue submitted for resolution. We disagree. “ ‘[T]he arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue must be upheld so long as it is rationally derived from the parties’ submission’ . . . .” Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 99, quoting American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Milwaukee Local v. Runyon, 185 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999). “[A]n award must be final as to the matters submitted so that the rights and obligations of the parties may be definitely fixed.” Local 63, Textile Workers Union v. Cheney Bros., 141 Conn. 606, 617, 109 A.2d 240 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959, 75 S. Ct. 449, 99 L. Ed. 748 (1955). As noted, the issue submitted was whether the defendant had violated the agreement “as alleged in the Elander/Haug grievance” and, “[i]f so, what shall the remedy be?” The board’s decision reflects that it interpreted this submission to relate to two specific firefighters, Elander and Haug, and whether they were entitled to any remedy as a result of a violation of article twenty-six by the defendant.

The board’s interpretation of the issue submitted by the parties was entirely reasonable, and its analysis of the issue properly was tailored to reach a final award that resolved the issue for the interested firefighters whom the parties had identified by name. Once it determined that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that either Elander or Haug had been harmed by any violation of article twenty-six, it reasonably deemed it unnecessary to determine whether any violation of that provision had occurred as to any other firefighter. Although the board might have resolved the issue presented by first determining whether the defendant had violated that provision as alleged, there simply is no basis in law or logic to conclude that it was obligated by the submission to do so.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the plaintiffs application to vacate the arbitration award.

       The court neither issued a written memorandum of decision nor created a memorandum of decision from its oral ruling in accordance with Practice Book § 64-1 (a). It does not appear that the defendant took appropriate action under Practice Book § 64-1 (b) to perfect the record. Nevertheless, we are able to review the claim raised because the unsigned transcript of proceedings before the trial court adequately reveals the basis of the court’s decision. See, e.g., State v. James, 93 Conn. App. 51, 57 n.6, 887 A.2d 923 (2006).

       General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides in relevant part: “Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides . . . shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects ... (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”


author: LAVINE, J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EUGENE ALPHONZO BRYANT
    (AC 27581)
    Bishop, Lavine and Pellegrino, Js.

      Argued November 29, 2007
    officially released February 26, 2008

      Auden Grogins, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Timothy F. Costello, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael L. Regan, state’s attorney, and Lonnie Braxton II, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

LAVINE, J.

The defendant, Eugene Alphonzo Bryant, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of irrelevant, uncharged misconduct and bad character, and (2) the prosecutor’s repeated impropriety deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On June 21,2004, Michael Meehan, a New London police officer, was working as an undercover agent for the vice intelligence unit. During the afternoon, Meehan was sitting in an unmarked police vehicle overlooking the parking lot of a Citgo gasoline station and convenience store near Williams Street, watching the pay telephones in the parking lot. Meehan observed a Caucasian woman, Carli Star Rolfe, standing by the telephones when a blue motor vehicle operated by a black male approached. The man, later identified as the defendant, spoke to the woman and then drove away.

Meehan saw the defendant return to the Citgo parking lot, park his vehicle and enter the convenience store. When he emerged from the store, the defendant was carrying a Chore Boy copper scouring pad. He reentered the vehicle, drove it to a parking space facing a concrete wall behind the pay telephones and again spoke to Rolfe, this time showing her a substance wrapped in a paper towel. Rolfe entered the passenger’s side of the vehicle. Meehan watched the defendant tear off a piece of the scouring pad and stuff it into a tube. The defendant then took something off the dashboard of the vehicle and put it in the tube. Meehan saw the defendant pass the tube to Rolfe. She put one end in her mouth while the defendant flicked a lighter at the other end.

Meehan, intent on making an arrest, called his partner, Scott Jones, for backup. Dressed in plain clothes, Meehan walked toward the defendant’s vehicle. As Meehan approached the vehicle, the defendant got out the passenger’s side door, leaped over the concrete wall and ran up a steep bank heavily covered with vegetation. Meehan ordered the defendant to stop and identified himself as a police officer. The defendant did not stop but ran so fast that his shoes came off. Meehan lost sight of the defendant and requested the assistance of a canine tracking unit. While the police waited for the canine unit, they traced the license plate of the vehicle being used by the defendant. The owner of the vehicle said that the defendant had the car. A police search of the defendant’s name revealed that he was wanted on two warrants for misdemeanor failures to appear.

Police Officer Chad Stringer and his canine partner arrived at the Citgo parking lot. The canine picked up the defendant’s scent and led the police up the embankment and eventually to the front door of a house at the comer of Terrace Court and Grove Street. The door to the house was locked. The canine briefly lost the defendant’s scent but picked it up again and tracked it to a vehicle parked in a driveway off Terrace Court. Inside the vehicle, the police officers found the defendant barefoot, lying on the floor of the backseat, sweating profusely, wearing disheveled clothing covered with vegetation. The police arrested the defendant.

While the defendant’s vehicle was parked in the Citgo parking lot, Meehan searched it and found several pieces of a rock like substance on the dashboard and the scouring pad. Meehan conducted a field test of the rock like substance and testified that it tested positive for cocaine.

In a bill of particulars, the defendant was charged with possession of narcotics in violation of § 21a-279 (a), possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of General Statutes § 2 la-267 (a) and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. At trial, the defendant denied that he had prepared the crack cocaine, brought it to the scene, seen drugs in the vehicle or used the scouring pad to make a pipe. The jury found the defendant guilty of possession of narcotics but not guilty of the other two charges. The court sentenced the defendant to six years in prison. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant’s first claim is that the court improperly failed to strike or otherwise cure the prejudicial effect of irrelevant, uncharged misconduct and bad character testimony concerning him. The defendant claims that the admission of the misconduct evidence constituted a violation of his right to a fair trial under both the state and federal constitutions. We do not agree.

The defendant bases his claim on the following portions of the prosecutor’s direct examination of two witnesses, Stringer and Jeffrey Kalolo, a sergeant in the New London police department. The prosecutor questioned Stringer as follows about his familiarity with the house to which the canine had tracked the defendant:

“[The Witness]: Once we got [onto Terrace Court], my canine partner continued to track down Terrace Court down toward Grove Street. He was favoring the right side of the street, Terrace Court, toward Grove ... I believe it’s 24 Grove Street. ... He stopped at the front door of that house. . . .
“[Defense Counsel]: Just for the record, can we have—that house—the description for the record by counsel of what that house is?
“The Court: Would you describe . . .
“[The Prosecutor]: Are you familiar with this house?
“[The Witness]: I am familiar with that house—the house.
“[The Prosecutor]: What is this house?
“[The Witness]: The house is—the house on the corner of Terrace Court and Grove is—the last of my knowledge during that time it was the residence of . . . Timmy Bryant. And the last dealings I had there, I was the canine officer to assist narcotics and I believe statewide during a drug raid and seizure warrant.
“[Defense Counsel]: I’m going to ask that that be stricken. That’s not relevant why he was at the residence.
“The Court: It’s relevant insofar as he recognized and is able to describe the location, but don’t pursue.
“[The Prosecutor]: The state would not pursue. I think [I] was asking in response to the issue raised by opposing counsel.
“The Court: What happened on that day had nothing to do with this defendant.” (Emphasis added.)

The prosecutor thereafter queried Kalolo as follows about his familiarity with the defendant:

“[The Prosecutor]: Did you know who you were tracking when you started the track?
“[The Witness]: At the beginning of the track, no.
“[The Prosecutor]: When did it become known to you who you were tacking?
“[The Witness]: Somewhere as we’re coming up the hill the information came out that we were possibly looking for [the defendant].
“[The Prosecutor]: But you were not sure that it was [the defendant]?
“[The Witness]: When we started the track?
“[The Prosecutor]: Right.
“[The Witness]: No.
“[The Prosecutor]: Once you observed the person in the backseat of this vehicle on the floor, did you know who it was?
“[The Witness]: Yes.
“[The Prosecutor]: And how did you know?
“[The Witness]: From past contacts with him. . . .
“[The Prosecutor]: And have you had reason to operate on this street in the past?
“[The Witness]: Yes.
“[The Prosecutor]: So, you’re familiar with where this street was?
“[The Witness]: Yes.
“[The Prosecutor]: Was there anything that stood out in your mind when you were on this hill and it became known to you who you were possibly tracking?
“[The Witness]: Yes.
“[The Prosecutor]: What?
“[The Witness]: Prior to becoming a sergeant, I was assigned to the vice intelligence unit. We have had occasion to do an investigation into sales of drugs coming from the Bryant residence.
“[Defense Counsel]: Again, Your Honor, I’ve just got to ask how is this relevant to directly elicit whether or not there were sales of drugs at other residences; it’s not relevant here. I’m concerned with why—
“[The Prosecutor]: The state was not intending to elicit that information, had no idea what the answer would be from the officer and would ask that it be stricken.
“The Court: I’ll tell the jury. A prior incident that may or may not involve drugs isn’t before us today, doesn’t involve necessarily this particular defendant.” (Emphasis added.)

“This court reviews evidentiary claims by an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Lucas, 63 Conn. App. 263, 273, 775 A.2d 338, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 930, 776 A.2d 1148 (2001). “Our standard of review of an evidentiary ruling is dependent on whether the claim is of constitutional magnitude. If the claim is of constitutional magnitude, the state has the burden of proving the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Otherwise, in order to establish reversible error on an evidentiary impropriety, the defendant must prove both an abuse of discretion and a harm that resulted from such abuse.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Swinton, 268 Conn. 781, 797-98, 847 A.2d 921 (2004).

At trial, defense counsel objected to the two instances of claimed error on the basis of relevance. On appeal, the defendant claims that his right to a fair trial was violated because the evidence concerned irrelevant, uncharged misconduct and bad character evidence.

We agree with the state that the testimony to which the defendant objects on appeal did not implicate him directly and, therefore, did not constitute misconduct or bad character evidence concerning him. Stringer testified that he recognized the house where his canine partner tracked the victim’s scent after defense counsel asked for a description of the house. Stringer also testified, when asked whether he was familiar with the house, that he had participated in the execution of a search and seizure warrant at the house, which was the residence of Timmy Bryant. There was no evidence that the defendant and Timmy Bryant are related or that the defendant was involved in the incident. When the defendant objected to the testimony on relevancy grounds, the court indicated that the testimony was relevant to identify the location, and the prosecutor noted that the testimony was the result of defense counsel’s request for such identification. The court promptly instructed the prosecutor not to pursue the warrant execution, and the state obeyed the court’s instruction. The court also stated in the presence of the jury that “[w]hat happened on that day had nothing to do with this defendant.”

Kalolo also was familiar with the street and house because he had been to the house as a member of a vice unit investigation and referred to the house as the Bryant residence. When defense counsel objected to the relevancy of Kalolo’s testimony, the court instructed the jury that Kalolo’s prior experience at the residence was not part of the trial and did not necessarily involve the defendant. Moreover, the defendant testified that he lived in Montville, not New London. Although the prosecutor asked that the testimony be stricken, the court did not do so specifically, but immediately instructed the jury that there was no evidence to associate the defendant with the prior events and that those events were not part of the defendant’s trial. The jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions unless there is evidence to the contrary in the record. See State v. Flowers, 278 Conn. 533, 547, 898 A.2d 789 (2006). We conclude, therefore, that the court did not improperly fail to strike the evidence or otherwise abuse its discretion.

II

The defendant’s second claim is that repeated prosecutorial impropriety deprived him of a fair trial. Specifically, the defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly (1) asked police witnesses about their prior dealings with the defendant and (2) asked the defendant on cross-examination whether the state’s witnesses were credible.

Our Supreme Court has stated: “In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we engage in a two step process. . . . First, we must determine whether any impropriety in fact occurred; second, we must examine whether that impropriety, or the cumulative effect of multiple improprieties, deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. ... To determine whether the defendant was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial, we must determine whether the sum total of [the prosecutor’s] improprieties rendered the defendant’s [trial] fundamentally unfair, in violation of his right to due process. . . . The question of whether the defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial [impropriety], therefore, depends on whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s verdict would have been different absent the sum total of the improprieties.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bell, 283 Conn. 748, 760, 931 A.2d 198 (2007).

A

The defendant’s first claim of prosecutorial impropriety concerns the prosecutor’s examination of several of the police officers who participated in the defendant’s capture and arrest or were present at the time. The defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly questioned three of the officers in such a way that they testified about the defendant’s prior uncharged misconduct. We conclude that the prosecutor did not improperly examine Meehan, Stringer and Kalolo so as to admit evidence of the defendant’s prior uncharged misconduct or bad character. Evidentiary matters “cannot be claimed to establish a violation of fundamental constitutional rights.” State v. Henry, 27 Conn. App. 520, 529, 608 A.2d 696 (1992).

As we concluded in part I, the state’s examination of Stringer and Kalolo elicited evidence of events that took place at the house where the canine traced the defendant’s scent. Despite the defendant’s claim that that evidence, which the court instructed the jury to disregard, was evidence of prior uncharged misconduct or bad character, it did not concern the defendant. See part I. The testimony was an evidentiary matter, not a constitutional violation.

The defendant also claims that the prosecutor improperly examined Meehan as to his familiarity with the defendant. The following exchange took place:

“[The Prosecutor]: Now, a few moments back, I had inquired if you knew who was driving the car while you were in pursuit of this person. Did you have reason to ascertain or believe you knew who the alleged accused was?

“[The Witness]: Not during the initial pursuit. Once . . . somebody called in the plate number of the car they gave us, the plate came back, and the name didn’t mean anything to me. And I remember radioing headquarters, [C]ould you call the registered owners of the vehicle [and] ask [them] who has the car, and that’s when I was told by headquarters that the accused, [the defendant], had the car and, at the time, headquarters ran his name and said he was wanted on two misdemeanor failure to appear warrants out of the New London police department.”

Thereafter, the prosecutor asked Meehan whether he had ever arrested the defendant. Defense counsel objected to the question, and the court sustained the objection. The prosecutor rephrased the question and

asked Meehan if he had dealings with the defendant in the past. The following exchange took place:

“[The Prosecutor]: Have you had dealings with the [defendant] in the past?
“[The Witness]: Yes, I have.
“[The Prosecutor]: . . . You had dealings with him. Were they recent?
“[The Witness]: No.
“[The Prosecutor]: Could you give an approximate time prior to this stop?
“[The Witness]: I think several times when I was a member of the state police department. I think I gave him some tickets for operating under suspension. I may have had personal contact with him once or twice in New London. Nothing sticks out that I can really ....
“[The Prosecutor]: There was no personal vendetta?
“[The Witness]: No.
“[The Prosecutor]: No bias?
“[The Witness]: No, sir.
“[The Prosecutor]: So, when you saw this vehicle, you were just doing your job. Would it be fair to say?
“[The Witness]: Yes, sir.
“[The Prosecutor]: And it wasn’t until—you testified until you got that radio message that you knew who was driving?
“[The Witness]: Correct.”

The prosecutor’s line of questioning pertained to the identity of the defendant, which the state was required to prove, even if it was not disputed. Meehan’s testimony concerning the defendant’s traffic violations was given in response to the prosecutor’s question about how long ago Meehan had had dealings with the defendant. Meehan’s answer was unresponsive to the question, but the defendant failed to bring that to the court’s attention. The objective of the prosecutor’s question, on the basis of his subsequent questions, was that Meehan had no current interaction with the defendant and was not out to get the defendant. We conclude, therefore, that there was no prosecutorial impropriety.

B

The defendant claims that the second instance of prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the state’s cross-examination of him. He claims that the prosecutor improperly asked him to comment on the veracity of other witnesses in violation of State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 702-12, 793 A.2d 226 (2002). We disagree.

In Singh, our Supreme Court “adopted the well established evidentiary rule [in other jurisdictions] that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on another witness’ veracity. . . . The primary reason for this prohibition ... is that determinations of credibility are for the jury, and not for witnesses. . . . See State v. Schleifer, 102 Conn. 708, 724, 130 A. 184 (1925) ([i]t is never permissible, though often done, to ask a witness to characterize the testimony or statement of another witness); see also Nimely v. New York, 414 F.3d 381, 398 (2d Cir. 2005) Qt]he credibility of witnesses is exclusively for the determination by the jury, and witnesses may not opine as to the credibility of the testimony of other witnesses at the trial . . . ). Thus, questions that ask a defendant to comment on another witness’ veracity [are improper because they] invade the province of the jury. . . . Moreover, [a]s a general rule, [such] questions have no probative value and are improper and argumentative because they do nothing to assist the jury in assessing witness credibility in its fact-finding mission and in determining the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn. 778-79.

The defendant cites the following portion of the prosecutor’s cross-examination to support his Singh violation claim:

“[The Prosecutor]: . . . And you’re saying that all the witnesses that you heard testify, figment of their imagination, what they saw?
“[Defense Counsel]: He can’t testily, and it’s not appropriate for him to testify to anything other witnesses—he can testify to what he knows, he can’t comment on other witnesses’ testimony.
“[The Prosecutor]: The state claims it.
“The Court: Well, you could rephrase that question, but I think that he can comment on the other witnesses and what he heard because he disputes what they say. I think I’ll overrule that objection.
“[Defense Counsel]: Again, I guess asking him to say whether or not what they claim was a figment of their imagination; he can ask . . .
“The Court: That’s why I asked him to rephrase. I’ll overrule your objection.
“[The Prosecutor]: Do you agree with the testimony of the prior witnesses?
“[The Defendant]: No.
“[The Prosecutor]: Do you agree that you were there?
“[The Defendant]: Of course.
“[The Prosecutor]: You do agree you were in the car?
“[The Defendant]: Of course.
“[The Prosecutor]: You do agree that the young female sat in your car?
“[The Defendant]: Yes, I do.
“[The Prosecutor]: You do agree that you left that car? . . .
“[The Defendant]: Of course.
“[The Prosecutor]: How did you exit that car?
“[The Defendant]: I jumped across [the woman] and ran. . . .
“[The Prosecutor]: Now, on the date and time you left the car, is your testimony here today that you saw an officer with a gun?
“[The Defendant]: I seen a person with a gun.
“[The Prosecutor]: You saw a person with a gun?
“[The Defendant]: Yes.
* * *
“[The Prosecutor]: So, you would not agree with the testimony that was given by the dog handler, who said [that] when the dog led him to that car, the response from your mouth was, I give up?
“[The Defendant]: That’s not true. That was untrue. That was untrue.
“[The Prosecutor]: More than one officer said that he heard you say that [and that] you had your hands up. You say that it’s untrue?
“[The Defendant]: It’s definitely untrue.
* * *
“[The Prosecutor]: So, you’re in agreement with everything, all the testimony here today but not as to the fact that they identified themselves as police officers?
“[The Defendant]: I’m not in agreement to what they testified to. To what I testified to, that’s what I’m in agreement.”

We agree with the court that the question concerning the officers’ imaginations needed to be rephrased. The subsequent questions that the prosecutor asked did not seek to have the defendant characterize the testimony, or credibility, of other witnesses, but rather were designed to ferret out the facts of the case. The defendant testified that he disagreed with prior testimony. The prosecutor’s follow-up questions sought to elicit the facts with which the defendant did not agree. The same information could have been elicited by questions such as, “Were you there?” and, “Were you with a female?” The substance of the answers provided by the defendant were facts about which he had firsthand knowledge. The questions about whether the defendant agreed with certain facts, therefore, were not questions asking him to characterize the testimony of other witnesses and, thus, were not improper. See State v. Santiago, 269 Conn. 726, 743, 850 A.2d 199 (2004). The questions at issue are distinguishable from the improper questions asked in State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn. 779, in which the prosecutor asked the defendant whether a witness was “wrong,” which is a characterization of testimony.

On the basis of our review of the questions posed by the prosecutor that the defendant claims were improper, we find that only one of them required the defendant to respond with a characterization of the testimony of others, i.e., “More than one officer said that he heard you say that [and that] you had your hands up. You say that it’s untrue?” That question, however, was in response to the defendant’s own, unprompted characterization of the officer’s testimony as “not true.” Under circumstances in which a witness sua sponte opens the door, the prosecutor is free to pursue that line of questioning. See State v. Sells, 82 Conn. App. 332, 338, 844 A. 2d 235, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 911, 853 A.2d 529 (2004). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was no prosecutorial impropriety or a denial of the defendant’s constitutional rights.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       According to Rolfe, the defendant asked her if she was a “hooker” and if she would sleep with him for drugs. Rolfe told the defendant that she was not a prostitute and directed him to Crystal Avenue for such services. The defendant left but returned to ask Rolfe a second time to go with him. Rolfe declined once again. The defendant then showed her a substance in a paper towel and told her that he had just “cooked it up.” The defendant asked Rolfe if she wanted some and if he could use her cigarette lighter. Rolfe decided to let the defendant use her lighter and entered his vehicle from the passenger side door. She left the door open as she sat in the vehicle.

       Rolfe was also arrested. By the time Rolfe testified at trial, she had pleaded guilty to illegal possession of narcotics and drug paraphernalia, and had completed her sentence of one year of probation. The state offered no consideration in exchange for Rolfe’s testimony.

       The police never recovered the pipe that Meehan saw the defendant using, and there was conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant knew Meehan was a police officer.

       The defendant has failed to provide an analysis of the claimed constitutional violations under either the state or federal constitutions. We do not review constitutional claims that are inadequately briefed. See State v. Cancel, 275 Conn. 1, 3 n.2, 878 A.2d 1103 (2005). The defendant represented in his brief that the appropriate standard of review for this claim is the abuse of discretion standard. The abuse of discretion standard applies to evidentiary, not constitutional, claims. See id.

       “The rules governing the admissibility of evidence of a criminal defendant’s prior misconduct are well established. Although evidence of prior unconnected crimes is inadmissible to demonstrate the defendant’s bad character or to suggest that the defendant has a propensity for criminal behavior . . . such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as to prove knowledge, intent, motive, and common scheme or design, if the trial court determines, in the exercise of judicial discretion, that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial tendency. . . . That evidence tends to prove the commission of other crimes by the accused does not render it inadmissible if it is otherwise relevant and material .... In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only [when] injustice appears to have been done.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robles, 103 Conn. App. 383, 398, 930 A.2d 27, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 928, 934 A.2d 244 (2007). “The standard by which the admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct is measured generally will depend on two factors; the purpose for which the evidence is offered, and the type of crime with which the defendant has been charged.” State v. Randolph, 284 Conn. 328, 340-41, 933 A.2d 1158 (2007).
      In this instance, although the defendant’s identity was not contested, the state nonetheless was required to prove his identity to the jury. Moreover, the defendant asked that the state provide a foundation for the location of the house where the defendant was found hiding in a motor vehicle.

       The defendant has argued that if we do not conclude that the prosecutorial impropriety violated his right to due process, then his conviction should be reversed pursuant to our supervisory authority, citing State v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 451, 797 A.2d 1088 (2002). We decline the defendant’s invitation to exercise our supervisory powers in this case.