text:
    FRANCIS PEARCE v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN
    (AC 22958)
    Foti, Flynn and Healey, Js.
    Argued February 20
    officially released April 29, 2003

      Thomas E. Farver, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Michael McAuliffe, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

FLYNN, J.

The plaintiff, Francis Pearce, appeals from the decision of the workers’ compensation review board (board) affirming the determination by the workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) that the plaintiffs claim for benefits was untimely. We affirm the board’s decision.

The following facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, after passing a preemployment physical in 1978, began working for the New Haven fire department. In August, 1988, the plaintiff began seeing Dr. Mark Kasper, his family physician. On August 16, 1988, the plaintiffs blood pressure was taken three times, with readings of 180 over 94,178 over 104 and 156 over 94, respectively. Kasper informed the plaintiff that he had an elevated reading. During 1988, Kasper also asked the plaintiff to report to him on a monthly basis in order to have his blood pressure checked.

On June 1, July 12 and November 21,1989, and January 11, June 12 and August 9, 1990, the plaintiffs blood pressure continued to be elevated with readings ranging from 140 over 98 to 170 over 110. Kasper advised the plaintiff to change his diet and to lose weight. A blood pressure monitor was also prescribed to assist the plaintiff with the daily monitoring of his blood pressure, and Kasper requested that the plaintiff keep a diary of his blood pressure readings.

The plaintiff saw Kasper on a regular basis between 1988 and 1990, and Kasper discussed with the plaintiff his high blood pressure on nearly every visit. Kasper thought that the plaintiffs high blood pressure results might be due to “white coat hypertension” because the results were higher when taken at the physician’s office.

The plaintiff did not see Kasper between 1990 and 1998, but, while at the Hospital of Saint Raphael in 1993, the plaintiffs blood pressure was recorded at 172 over 100. Kasper wrote a letter to the plaintiff on October 17, 1995, requesting that he come to Kasper’s office because Kasper was concerned about the plaintiffs blood pressure and cholesterol. Additionally, James Dougherty, a cardiologist, after reviewing the plaintiffs medical chart, concluded that “there is extensive data in the record dating back to 1988, 1989 and 1990 where multiple blood pressure readings were obtained which clearly demonstrate modest, sustained essential hypertension.” The plaintiff, however, was not diagnosed with hypertension until October 15, 1998.

On November 13,1998, the plaintiff filed a form 30C, claiming a date of injury of October 15, 1998, resulting from his diagnosis of hypertension and being prescribed medication for that condition. The plaintiff claimed entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 7-433c, commonly referred to as the Heart and Hypertension Act. After formal hearings were held, the commissioner determined that the plaintiffs claim for benefits was untimely, and he dismissed the claim.

Following the denial of his motion to “correct the finding of dismissal,” the plaintiff appealed to the board, which affirmed the determination of the commissioner that the plaintiffs claim was untimely. This appeal followed.

“At the outset, we must determine the appropriate standard of review when a decision of a commissioner is appealed to the [board]. A decision of a commissioner granting or denying an award may be appealed to the [board] pursuant to General Statutes [§ 31-301] . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Six v. Thomas O’Connor & Co., 235 Conn. 790, 797, 669 A.2d 1214 (1996). General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 31-301 provides in relevant part: “(a) At any time within ten days after ... a decision of the commissioner . . . either party may appeal ... to the [board] ....

“(b) The appeal shall be heard by the [board] as provided in section 31-280b. The [board] shall hear the appeal on the record of the hearing before the commissioner, provided, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the board that additional evidence or testimony is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceedings before the commissioner, the [board] may hear additional evidence or testimony.

“(c) Upon the final determination of the appeal by the [board], but no later than one year after the date the appeal petition was filed, the [board] shall issue its decision, affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the commissioner. The decision of the [board] shall include its findings, conclusions of law and award.

“It is clear that under General Statutes § [31-301] and § 31-301-8 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies the review division’s hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. Although the review division may take additional material evidence, this is proper only if it is shown to its satisfaction that good reasons exist as to why the evidence was not presented to the commissioner. Otherwise, it is obliged to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.....[Our Supreme Court has] stated: [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . The conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 538-39, 542 A.2d 1118 (1988).

“It matters not that the basic facts from which the [commissioner] draws this inference are undisputed rather than controverted. ... It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The [commissioner] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 540.

The plaintiff claims that the commissioner improperly concluded that his claim for benefits was untimely because he was not diagnosed with, placed on medication for, or disabled by hypertension until October 15, 1998. The plaintiff argues that the commissioner should have corrected his findings to include the fact that the defendant was not placed on high blood pressure medication until October 15, 1998. This fact, the plaintiff argues, would establish that he was not disabled until that date.

The defendant argues that the plaintiff suffered from hypertension in the years 1988,1989 and 1990, and that, as the commissioner concluded, the plaintiff should have filed a notice of claim at that time. The plaintiff acknowledges that he had high blood pressure readings between 1988 and 1990; his dispute, however, appears to be with the manner in which the commissioner interpreted § 7-433c to require a firefighter that is told he or she has high blood pressure readings to file a claim despite not being placed on medication, losing time from work or being disabled. We are persuaded that, in reviewing the relevant legal principles in conjunction with the facts found by the commissioner, the board correctly upheld her decision that the plaintiff’s claim for benefits was untimely, regardless of the additional facts that the plaintiff sought to have added to the commissioner’s findings.

A review of the relevant statutory provisions is necessary to resolve the plaintiff’s claim properly. “The statute concerning heart disease and hypertension was originally drafted as part of the Workers’ Compensation Act and provided police officers and firefighters with a rebuttable presumption that heart disease and hypertension were causally connected to their occupations. Morgan v. East Haven, 208 Conn. 576, 580, 546 A.2d 243 (1988). In 1969, this rebuttable presumption was made conclusive and the statute was soon declared unconstitutional in Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 143, 285 A.2d 318 (1971). In response to that problem, § 7-433c was enacted in its present form in 1977 as legislation separate and distinct from the Workers’ Compensation Act. Morgan v. East Haven, supra, 581.” Zaleta v. Fairfield, 38 Conn. App. 1, 7, 658 A.2d 166, cert. denied, 234 Conn. 917, 661 A.2d 98 (1995).

“General Statutes § 7-433c gives a special compensation to those who qualify, in the sense that they have no burden of proof that the disease resulted from the employee’s occupation or that it occurred in the course of employment. The mere fact that the employee has hypertension or heart disease and dies or is disabled because of it is all that is necessary. The employee does not need to prove that his heart disease is causally connected to his employment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salmeri v. Dept. of Public Safety, 70 Conn. App. 321, 337, 798 A.2d 481, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 919, 806 A.2d 1055 (2002). “In order to collect the benefits provided by § 7-433c, a claimant need show only that he or she is a uniformed member of a paid fire department or a regular member of a paid police department, whose preemployment physical examination revealed no evidence of hypertension or heart disease, who now suffers a condition or an impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease that has resulted in death or disability, and has suffered a resultant economic loss.” Zaleta v. Fairfield, supra, 38 Conn. App. 5. “[0]nce the conditions of § 7-433c are met, benefits must be paid by the municipality in accordance with the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Salmeri v. Dept. of Public Safety, supra, 338-39.

Nevertheless, “[our Supreme Court] has stated on many occasions that [t]he procedure for determining recovery under § 7-433c is the same as that outlined in chapter 568, presumably because the legislature saw fit to limit the procedural avenue for bringing claims under § 7-433c to that already existing under chapter 568 rather than require the duplication of the administrative machinery available [under the act] and further burden the courts and the municipalities [with additional litigation from claims by firemen and policemen pursuant to this legislation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gauger v. Frankl, 252 Conn. 708, 712, 752 A.2d 1077 (2000).

“[A] claimant for workers’ compensation benefits must provide both notice of injury; General Statutes § 31-294b . . . and notice of a claim. General Statutes § 31-294c .... Funaioli v. New London, 52 Conn. App. 194,195, 726 A.2d 626 (1999) (first report of injury together with letter from claimant’s lawyer stating that claimant not requesting hearing at this time sufficient to satisfy notice of claim requirement of § 31-294c). [T]he written notice intended is one which will reasonably inform the employer that the employee is claiming or proposes to claim compensation under the [Workers’ Compensation] Act. Rehtarchik v. Hoyt-Messinger Corp., 118 Conn. 315, 317, 172 A. 353 (1934); Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 295, 303, 620 A.2d 176, cert. denied, 225 Conn. 916, 623 A.2d 1024 (1993). The purpose of § 31-294 [notice of injury and of claim for compensation], in particular, is to alert the employer to the fact that a person has sustained an injury that may be compensable . . . and that such person is claiming or proposes to claim compensation under the Act.....Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc., supra, 303.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pernacchio v. New Haven, 63 Conn. App. 570, 575-76, 776 A.2d 1190 (2001).

The commissioner found that the plaintiff, although receiving repeated counsel from his family physician, Kasper, that his blood pressure was elevated during the years 1988,1989 and 1990, failed to notify the defendant that he had elevated readings. Such notification is required by §§ 31-294b and 31-294c, despite whether those symptoms cause immediate permanent or partial disability. The reason for prior notice is to inform the employer of a possibility of a claim for benefits being filed at a later time. See id., 576. The employee need not be disabled at the time he or she files a notice that symptoms are being experienced related to hypertension or heart disease; the notice is required to alert the employer to a potential claim. See id., 573-76 (firefighter filed report of injury for high blood pressure in 1989, diagnosed with hypertension in 1992, placed on medication for hypertension in 1994 and filed notice of claim for compensation, form 30C, in 1996 with the stated date of injury of 1989); see also Funaioli v. New London, supra, 52 Conn. App. 195-98.

In this case, the plaintiff failed to file a notice of injury or claim until 1998, despite having been repeatedly informed by his physician that his blood pressure readings, during 1988, 1989 and 1990, were elevated. Accordingly, the commissioner’s conclusion that the plaintiffs claim for benefits was untimely reflects a proper application of the law to the facts of this case.

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Kasper explained that “white coat hypertension” results from someone becoming anxious because of an office visit, causing his or her blood pressure to increase.

       The commissioner included in her findings that Kasper also testified that his thinking on the subject of “white coat hypertension” had changed over the years. Kasper now believes that “if you have office hypertension, you have hypertension.”

       A form 30C is the document prescribed and recommended by the workers’ compensation commission for use in filing a notice of claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act. See General Statutes § 31-294c.

       General Statutes § 7-433c (a) provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 568 or any other general statute, charter, special act or ordinance to the contrary, in the event a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department or a regular member of a paid municipal police department who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease, suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents, as the case may be, shall receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided under chapter 568 if such death or disability was caused by a personal ipjury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment, and from the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered, he or his dependents, as the case may be, shall receive the same retirement or survivor benefits which would be paid under said system if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment, and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment. . . .”

       Section 31-301-8 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “Ordinarily, appeals are heard by the compensation review [board] upon the certified copy of the record filed by the commissioner. In such cases the [board] will not retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the commissioner, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusion reached. It cannot review the conclusions of the commissioner when these depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Its power in the corrections of the finding of the commissioner is analogous to, and its method of correcting the finding similar to the power and method of the Supreme Court in correcting the findings of the trial court.”

       General Statutes § 31-294b provides in relevant part: “Any employee who has sustained an injury in the course of his employment shall immediately report the injury to his employer, or some person representing his employer. ...”

       General Statutes § 31-294c (a) provides in relevant part: “No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury, provided, if death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the deceased employee, may make claim for compensation within the two-year period or within one year from the date of death, whichever is later. Notice of a claim for compensation may be given to the employer or any commissioner and shall state, in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting from the accident, or the date of the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease and the nature of the disease, as the case may be, and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed. . . .”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL A. INZITARI
    (AC 22625)
    Flynn, West and McDonald, Js.
    Argued March 17
    officially released April 29, 2003

      Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Frank J. MacPhail, certified legal intern, with whom were David I. Cohen, state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state’s attorney, and James Bemardi, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Michael A. Inzitari, appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of two counts of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-lll (a) (2) and (4). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial filed on the basis of the charges against him and the events of September 11, 2001. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The charges against the defendant, who was a security guard and volunteer firefighter, arose out of a fire he and Walter D’Agostino set at 737 Canal Street in Stamford on December 3, 2000. The defendant had viewed the television movie “Backdraft” and wanted to see an all-night fire. Section 53a-lll (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building ... he starts a fire . . . and ... (4) at the scene of such fire . . . a . . . firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk of bodily injury.” General Statutes § 53a-111 (a). During the trial, the state presented evidence of a firefighter who had slipped on a roof and another firefighter who had sustained a rib injury when he slipped on frozen water from a fire hose.

The evidence portion of the trial commenced on September 10, 2001. On the morning of September 11,2001, terrorists hijacked four airplanes and crashed them into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon and a field in western Pennsylvania. The jurors were sent home on September 11, 2001. Trial resumed on September 12, 2001, at which time the defendant filed a motion for a mistrial, claiming that the publicity surrounding the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, would prevent him from receiving a fair and impartial trial due to the prejudice created by the news coverage, particularly with respect to the firefighters who lost their lives in New York City, because he was charged with arson that subjected firefighters to substantial injury. The defendant also requested that he be permitted to voir dire the jurors individuahy as to their ability to be fair and impartial as a result of the terrorist attack. The state opposed the motion, arguing, in part, that the events of September 11, 2001, were acts of terrorism committed by individuals of Middle Eastern heritage and were not at ah similar to the charges against the defendant.

To resolve the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, the court addressed the jury, explaining the need for a fair and impartial trial for the defendant. The court then conducted an individual voir dire of the jurors. Following the voir dire of the entire jury panel, and in consultation with counsel, the court excused two jurors who beheved that due to the events of September 11, 2001, they could no longer be fair and impartial.

The court ruled on the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, stating: “Based upon the inquiry that the court has made, given the disclosures that have been given, the court feels that the court has gone out of its way to make sure that the defendant in this particular case is given a fair and impartial trial, that the events of yesterday will not influence the ability of the remaining jurors to be fair and impartial in this case. It’s quite clear that the remaining jurors have without question indicated their ability to go on and serve and give everybody a fair trial in this matter. Since the basis of the motion goes to that very question, I feel that there is no inevitable prejudice here, there is no damage to the defendant’s case and that the implication of his right to a fair trial and impartial juiy has been covered in detail by the court, and the remaining jurors will give him that, a fair and impartial trial. Therefore, your motion is denied.”

“The standard for review of an action upon a motion for a mistrial is well established. While the remedy of a mistrial is permitted under the rules of practice, it is not favored. [A] mistrial should be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial . . . and the whole proceedings are vitiated. ... If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided. . . . On appeal, we hesitate to disturb a decision not to declare a mistrial. The trial judge is the arbiter of the many circumstances which may arise during the trial in which his function is to assure a fair and just outcome. . . . The trial court is better positioned than we are to evaluate in the first instance whether a certain occurrence is prejudicial to the defendant and, if so, what remedy is necessary to cure that prejudice. . . . The decision whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taft, 258 Conn. 412, 418, 781 A.2d 302 (2001); see Practice Book § 42-43.

We have considered the arguments of the defendant here and in the trial court, the nature of the charges against him and the tragic events of September 11,2001, and conclude that the court properly denied the motion for a mistrial and the request to voir dire the jury. The remedial steps taken by the court are similar to those approved by our Supreme Court in State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 437, 773 A.2d 287 (2001). Here, the court took the necessary steps to ensure that the jury was fair and impartial and that the defendant’s trial was free from substantial and irreparable prejudice.

The judgment is affirmed.

       The court, merged the conviction of the two counts for sentencing and sentenced the defendant to eight years in prison and seven years of special probation.

       The court denied the defendant’s request to voir dire.

       The court addressed the jury in relevant part as follows: “Good morning, folks. I want to thank you for your attention of duty here in coming in today. The events of yesterday were deeply disturbing to all of you, I’m sure.
      “One of the issues that I have to inquire into as a judge and to make sure that what we all do is to make sure that we give [the defendant] a fair and impartial trial in a case such as this. This man is charged with arson in the first degree in two counts of this information, as I read to you in this case.
      “The issue in my mind, and as well as counsel ... as to whether or not anything rose to a level yesterday, in your mind, or created something in your mind which would not allow you to give this man a fair and impartial trial in terms of charges in this case. It’s critically important to our system that as you sit there and listen to the evidence in the case that you give this man a fair shake. We all want to be treated fairly and in an unbiased fashion.
      “So, in just a moment, I intend to have you out individually to ask whether or not, given what has happened yesterday, you feel that you can sit here and listen to the balance of the evidence in this case and give this man a fair and impartial trial in this particular case.”

       One of the jurors was concerned about her friends who worked at the World Trade Center.

       Neither the defendant’s motion for a mistrial in the wake of September 11, 2001, nor the court’s denying it are unique. See United States v. Merlino, 204 F. Sup. 2d 83, 89-90 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[defendants were not charged with terrorism, but with common garden-variety crimes, distinctive only for their audacity, and not for any resemblance to the heinous attacks of the terrorists”).


author: DUPONT, J.

text:
    STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. RICHARD W. GIFFORD
    (AC 22762)
    Schaller, Flynn and Dupont, Js.

      Argued February 21
    officially released April 29, 2003

      Richard W. Gifford, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

      Michael P. Bowler, assistant bar counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

DUPONT, J.

The defendant, Richard W. Gifford, appeals from the judgment of the trial court suspending him from the practice of law for a period of one year. On appeal, he claims that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, (2) his procedural due process rights were violated and (3) the court improperly concluded that he had violated rules 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the defendant’s claims on appeal. The defendant is an attorney licensed by the state of Connecticut. In May, 1993, Ann Weichman retained the defendant to pursue a federal age discrimination claim against her former employer, the Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers). The defendant took the matter on a contingency basis, but never provided Weichman with a written fee agreement.

In June, 1993, the defendant filed an action on behalf of Weichman in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut at Bridgeport. Thereafter, in December, 1993, the defendant attended Travelers’ deposition of Weichman. The defendant did not file a trial memorandum as ordered by the District Court and did not respond to Travelers’ motion to dismiss, which was based on the defendant’s failure to comply with the order. Thus, on June 15, 1994, the District Court granted Travelers’ motion and dismissed the case.

Throughout this period, from June, 1993, until the case was dismissed one year later, the defendant did not inform Weichman of the developments in, or status of, her case, which she repeatedly inquired about through telephone calls and letters. After five years of waiting to hear from the defendant, Weichman filed a complaint with the plaintiff, the statewide grievance committee (grievance committee), in April, 1999. In accordance with Practice Book § 2-32, the grievance committee forwarded the complaint to the defendant for his response. The defendant never responded. On July 25, 2000, the grievance committee presented the defendant for misconduct not occurring in the presence of the court. See Practice Book § 2-47.

The presentment essentially contained three charges: The failure to communicate with a client and to represent her diligently; the failure to provide a written fee agreement in a contingency fee case; and the failure to answer the grievance complaint. The court ordered a hearing for September 13, 2000. The defendant was served with process on August 5, 2000, at his usual place of abode. On September 8, 2000, the defendant filed a request to revise the complaint, which was subsequently denied. At the September 13 hearing, the court ordered the defendant to file his answer and special defenses within two weeks. The defendant then filed an answer to the complaint and special defenses on September 27, 2000. On October 2, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the court denied. The defendant filed a trial memorandum on December 17, 2000.

Subsequently, on April 18,2001, the court held a hearing on the presentment. The defendant was not present at the hearing and had no notice that a hearing would take place on that day. The court held the hearing in his absence. The grievance committee offered exhibits and the testimony of the complaining witness, Weichman.

Following the hearing, by letter dated September 6, 2001, the grievance committee’s attorney inquired with the court as to the status of the grievance against the defendant. The defendant, having also received a copy of this same letter, responded to the court on September 7, 2001, indicating his lack of knowledge of the April 18, 2001 hearing either by notice from the court clerk’s office or opposing counsel.

Thereafter, notice of a status conference and a second evidentiary hearing was sent to both parties. At the November 8, 2001, status conference, the defendant waived his right to cross-examine Weichman. The defendant renewed his waiver of that right at the second evidentiary hearing held on November 16, 2001. The defendant then presented exhibits and testimony. Both parties submitted trial briefs. On January 23, 2002, the court, in a memorandum of decision, concluded, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that was elicited at both evidentiary hearings, that the defendant had violated rules 1.3, 1.4 (a) and (b), 1.5 (c) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (1). The defendant was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

I

JURISDICTION

The defendant’s first claim on appeal is that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. He argues that because Weichman’s case was in federal court, the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over any misconduct. The grievance committee argues that the defendant, as an attorney licensed in Connecticut, is subject to this state’s discipline for actions in any court. We agree with the grievance committee.

The resolution of the defendant’s first claim requires an interpretation of rule 8.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides: “A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction although engaged in practice elsewhere.”

In rendering our interpretation of rule 8.5, we note that “the rules regulating attorney grievance procedures exist within the broader framework of the relationship between attorneys and the judiciary. The practice of law is ... a profession the main purpose of which is to aid in the doing of justice .... An attorney as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, is continually accountable to it for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been accorded him. . . . This unique position as officers and commissioners of the court . . . casts attorneys in a special relationship with the judiciary and subjects them to its discipline.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 240 Conn. 671, 677, 694 A.2d 1218 (1997); see also Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 237-38, 558 A.2d 986 (1989).

Although we could find no Connecticut appellate case interpreting rule 8.5, the broad supervisory role of the judiciary in governing attorney conduct causes us to conclude that the plain language of the rule subjects the defendant, a licensed Connecticut attorney, to discipline by Connecticut courts for his actions in federal District Court. The state is the primary jurisdiction that sponsors a lawyer and is the governmental entity that primarily presents a lawyer to the public, thereby creating in the state a basic interest in the ethical performance of a lawyer. See In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d 189, 201 (9th Cir. 1958), rev’d on other grounds, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S. Ct. 1376, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1473 (1959). The commentary to rule 8.5 provides: “In modem practice lawyers frequently act outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice, either in another state or outside the United States. In doing so, they remain subject to the governing authority of the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice.”

We therefore conclude that the court had subject matter jurisdiction of the defendant’s presentment.

II

NOTICE

The defendant next claims that his procedural due process rights were violated because the court heard testimony of the complaining witness at the hearing held April 18, 2001, without notice to, or the presence of, the defendant. The grievance committee argues that because the defendant did not preserve this due process claim, we should not afford it review. Alternatively, the grievance committee argues that the court’s holding of a second hearing on November 16, 2001, and the defendant’s waiver of his right to cross-examine the complaining witness satisfied the defendant’s due process rights. Both parties have briefed the defendant’s claim. We agree that the claim was not properly preserved, but we will review it under the precepts of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

An unpreserved claim is reviewable under Golding if the claim is constitutional in nature and if there is an adequate record for review. State v. Thurman, 10 Conn. App. 302, 306, 523 A.2d 891, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 805, 528 A.2d 1152 (1987). Here, the record is adequate for review, and the claim is a constitutional one. It is undisputed that the defendant had no notice of the hearing held on April 18, 2001. The defendant claims that he was denied procedural due process because of his lack of notice. This claim is constitutional in nature.

Attorney disciplinary proceedings are adversary and quasi-criminal in nature, and, as such, the subject attorneys are entitled to due process of law. Statewide Grievance Committee v. Botwick, 226 Conn. 299, 306, 627 A.2d 901 (1993). “A license to practice law is a property interest that cannot be suspended without due process.” Id. Procedural due process is a required constitutional right adhering to those attorneys who are subject to disciplinary action so that they are not unjustly deprived of their reputations or livelihoods. Id., 307. A defendant attorney is entitled to notice of the charges and a fair hearing. Kucej v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 239 Conn. 449, 463, 686 A.2d 110 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1276, 117 S. Ct. 2457, 138 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1997).

Although the defendant was entitled to due process, which includes notice of any hearing related to the charges against him, due process is a flexible concept, and a determination of the particular process that is due a defendant depends on the particular circumstances. Statewide Grievance Committee v. Botwick, supra, 226 Conn. 306-307.

The evidence presented at the April 18, 2001 hearing in the absence of the defendant was the testimony of the complaining witness and the grievance committee’s exhibits. After learning of the hearing and the evidence presented, the defendant did not object to any of the exhibits or to the testimony taken in his absence. In fact, at the November 8, 2001 status conference and the subsequent November 16, 2001 hearing, the defendant specifically declined to conduct a cross-examination of the complaining witness. The defendant was given an opportunity at the second evidentiary hearing to offer any evidence he saw fit. He was given an opportunity to brief the issues and, in fact, did submit a trial brief. The court specifically stated in its memorandum of decision that it considered the evidence from both evidentiary hearings. Therefore, after review, we conclude that the defendant was not deprived of procedural due process.

Ill

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The defendant’s final claims on appeal relate to the court’s conclusions that he violated rules 1.3, 1.4 (a) and (b), and 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Basically, the findings concern (1) the defendant’s failure to communicate with his client and to represent her diligently, and (2) the defendant’s failure to provide a written fee agreement in a contingency fee case.

The defendant argues that the facts as found by the court do not support a conclusion that he violated any of the rules. “Where the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct, and find support in the facts set out in the court’s memorandum of decision. . . . The court’s conclusions must stand unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Dixon, 62 Conn. App. 507, 512, 772 A.2d 160 (2001).

With respect to the failure to communicate or to represent his client diligently, the defendant argues that because he believed Weichman’s claim was frivolous, he was excused from continuing to work on her case. The defendant argues that in the course of a deposition of his client, he discovered that her testimony was inconsistent with the allegations she had made before the commission on human rights and opportunities. As a result, the defendant did not believe her and discontinued any further work on her case.

The grievance committee argues that regardless of whether the defendant’s beliefs were justified, he still was required to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct until the attorney-client relationship was terminated and, thus, that the court properly concluded that he had violated each of the relevant rules. We agree with the grievance committee.

Rule 1.3 requires that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” The commentary to this rule provides in relevant part: “Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. ...” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the court correctly concluded that the defendant had violated this rule when, after hearing Weichman’s deposition testimony, he completely abandoned the case and did not carry the matter through to its conclusion.

Additionally, because the defendant had a duty to carry the case through to a conclusion, unless the relationship was terminated, he violated rule 1.4 (a) in failing to communicate with Weichman regarding the status of her case or to respond to her requests for information, and rule 1.4 (b) in failing to explain his concerns with her case and to give her an opportunity to make decisions regarding her representation.

The defendant also argues that rule 11 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prevented him from presenting to the court any frivolous claims or pleadings for an improper purpose. He claims that if he had filed a memorandum of law or opposed the motion to dismiss in Weichman’s federal case, he would have been subject to sanctions. His solution was to advise the client of his lack of belief in her cause so that he could withdraw his appearance in the case and so that she could hire other counsel. As the court correctly concluded, the defendant’s actions established by clear and convincing evidence that he violated rules 1.3, and 1.4 (a) and (b).

In reference to the court’s finding that he violated rule 1.5, the defendant argues that because he never billed for his services or collected a fee, he could not have violated rule 1.5. Rule 1.5 (c) provides in relevant part: “A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered .... A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined . . . .” The rule contemplates that there may be no recovery in a case in which a fee is contingent on the outcome, but does not exempt such cases from the purview of the rule.

In its memorandum of decision, the court specifically credited Weichman’s testimony that the agreement between her and the defendant was a contingency agreement and that she never had received a written fee agreement. The defendant does not deny these facts, although he argues that Weichman’s testimony did not establish the terms of the agreement. There is no exception within the rule, and the defendant does not cite any law or decision that requires an agreement to be in writing only when the attorney collects or bills a fee. At the time any contingency fee arrangement is initially discussed, it is not then known whether the contingency will occur. A plaintiffs cause may result in a judgment for the defendant, without any payment for legal services ever becoming due. If rule 1.5 (c) applied only when the fee became due, the rule would have no purpose. We conclude that the court correctly concluded that the defendant’s failure to provide a written agreement to his client was a violation of rule 1.5.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The court also found that the defendant had violated Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (1) and rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by his failure to answer the grievance complaint. The defendant does not challenge these findings on appeal.

       The grievance committee filed an amended complaint on August 10, 2000, and orally amended the complaint on November 16, 2001.

       At this time, a case management conference was scheduled for October 6, 2000.

       The defendant claimed that the substantive allegations of the presentment arose solely from his representation in federal court and, therefore, only that court could discipline him. In a well reasoned decision, the court held on November 27,2000, that rule 8.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically gives the state courts of Connecticut jurisdiction over misconduct committed in federal court by an attorney licensed in Connecticut.

       Although the defendant had filed responsive pleadings in the case, he did not file an appearance and therefore did not receive notice of the hearing from the court clerk’s office. The grievance committee’s attorney and a court clerk indicated that they had not orally notified the defendant of the hearing.

       There is no transcript of the November 8, 2001 status conference. The November 16, 2001 hearing transcript makes clear, however, that the defendant initially waived the right to cross-examine Weichman at the conference.

       The defendant moved for a stay of the suspension order on February 13, 2002, because the automatic stay provisions of Practice Book § 61-11 do not apply to attorney grievance actions. The stay was denied, and this court denied relief on March 26, 2002. Although the defendant will have served his one year suspension by the time this opinion is published, the appeal is not rendered moot because of the collateral consequences involved in suspension actions. See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Whitney, 227 Conn. 829, 837-38 n.13, 633 A.2d 296 (1993).

       The defendant cites several cases for the proposition that a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the actions of attorneys in its court. Contrary to the defendant’s assertions, we read these cases to stand for the proposition that “[t]he two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers, among whom . . . lawyers are included.” Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281, 77 S. Ct. 1274, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1342 (1957). Therefore, an attorney licensed by both courts is usually subject to the independent jurisdiction of either or both; Rules of Professional Conduct 8.5, commentary; although the sanctions of either cannot affect the other’s jurisdiction to sanction or to prescribe the type of sanction. See id.; In re Landerman, 7 F. Sup. 2d 1202, 1203 (D. Utah 1998) (state court’s discipline does not control federal court’s actions); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 10 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1963) (same); see also Rules of Professional Conduct 8.5, commentary.

       The record indicates that according to the clerical routine, notice is sent to those parties entering an appearance. Because the defendant did not file an appearance, he did not receive notice of the April 18, 2001 hearing. For purposes of this review, we do not consider whether the various pleadings filed by the defendant constituted an appearance. See Practice Book § 3-7 (a).

       Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: “(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney ... is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ... (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery .... (c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible or the violation. . . .”

       We note that the defendant never received any indication that rule 11 sanctions were being considered.

       The grievance committee alleged that the defendant had violated rules 1.5 (b) or (c). Because the court specifically found that Weichman and the defendant had a contingency agreement, only subsection (c) applies.

       Rule 1.5 (c) provides in relevant part: “Upon conclusion of a contingent, fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GARY VERDOLINI
    (AC 22763)
    Foti, Bishop and Stoughton, Js.
    Argued February 13
    officially released April 29, 2003

      Kirstin B. Coffin, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and, Jason Germain, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Gary Verdolini, appeals from the judgments of the trial court revoking his probation and committing him to the custody of the commissioner of correction for a term of three years, execution suspended after two years, followed by probation for one year. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) improperly admitted testimony regarding one of the conditions of probation, (2) improperly admitted hearsay evidence and (3) failed to consider all of his circumstances in finding a violation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s appeal. On March 28, 2001, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 2 la-279 (a), assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 and failure to appear in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-172. His sister, Lisa Verdolini, was the victim of the assault. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years imprisonment, execution suspended, and three years probation on each of the possession of narcotics counts, and one year of imprisonment, execution suspended, with three years probation on the assault count.

The conditions of probation required that the defendant refrain from violating any federal or state criminal law, report to his probation officer as directed, keep the probation officer informed of his whereabouts, and submit to any medical and psychological examination, urinalysis, alcohol and drug testing and counseling sessions as required. The special conditions included that the defendant submit to substance abuse evaluation, have no contact with the victim and engage in no assaults, threats or violence relative to her. The conditions of probation were explained to the defendant on March 28 and April 30, 2001.

On April 30, 2001, Mark Adams, a probation officer, referred the defendant to The Connection, an organization that takes probation referrals for substance abuse evaluation and treatment. Adams notified him of an appointment scheduled for May 7, 2001. The defendant failed to keep the appointment, but he appeared without an appointment on May 8, 2001. At that time, Todd Annis, a service coordinator at The Connection, instructed the defendant on that organization’s rules and advised him to apply to the department of social services for medical entitlement benefits. The defendant, however, failed to follow through in applying for or securing the benefits. After failing to keep a second appointment with Annis, scheduled on June 12, 2001, the defendant was discharged from the program for noncompliance.

On June 11,2001, Lisa Verdolini reported to the defendant’s probation officer that on June 9, 2001, the defendant had arrived at her residence, that he had been drinking and using drugs, and that he had pushed her, threatened her and flicked ashes on her head. On June 19, 2001, the victim gave a written statement to a probation officer describing the incident.

On June 21, 2001, an arrest warrant for violation of probation was issued. The warrant application charged the defendant with violating the conditions of his probation in that he had failed submit to medical and drug testing and counseling as required, and had failed to comply with the special conditions of probation requiring substance abuse evaluation and treatment, and forbidding assaults, threats and violence against the victim. After a hearing, the court found the defendant in violation of his probation. This appeal followed.

We first set forth our standard of review regarding probation revocation proceedings. “In a probation revocation proceeding, the state bears the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms of his probation. . . . This court may reverse the trial court’s finding that a defendant violated the terms of his probation only if such finding is clearly erroneous. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support it . . . or . . . the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. ... In making this determination, every reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . This court defers to the trial court’s discretion in matters of deteraiining credibility and the weight to be given to a witness’ testimony. . . . Furthermore, [i]n making its factual determination, the trial court is entitled to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Widlak, 74 Conn. App. 364, 371-72, 812 A.2d 134 (2002).

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly admitted testimony regarding one of the conditions of probation and failed to limit the state to the basis for the violation of which he had been given notice in the arrest warrant. Specifically, he argues that the court improperly allowed, over his objection, David Maus, a probation officer, to testify regarding the condition that the defendant was to have no contact with the victim. The basis for the objection was that a violation of that condition had not been alleged in the warrant. We are not persuaded.

Initially, we point out that at the time of the objection, evidence concerning the no contact condition, and of the defendant’s awareness of it, already had been introduced without objection through documents and a witness at the hearing. Because the evidence already had been introduced, Maus’ testimony was merely cumulative. Thus, even if the ruling were assumed to be improper, it would not furnish a reason for reversal of the judgments. See State v. Moore, 65 Conn. App. 717, 721, 783 A.2d 1100, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 940, 786 A.2d 427 (2001). The defendant clearly had notice of the condition, as is shown by the evidence adduced at the hearing. Furthermore, the defendant does not challenge the court’s conclusion that he failed to submit to specified examination, testing or counseling. Therefore, because the defendant does not contest the court’s finding of that violation, it is unnecessary to address the defendant’s argument that he was not afforded adequate notice of an additional violation. See State v. Maye, 70 Conn. App. 828, 838-39, 799 A.2d 1136 (2002); see also State v. Samuel, 57 Conn. App. 64, 67-68, 747 A.2d 21, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 909, 753 A.2d 942 (2000).

II

The defendant next claims that the court abused its discretion in allowing unreliable hearsay into evidence. Specifically, the defendant challenges the testimony given by Maus during the hearing. During his testimony, Maus stated that he had spoken to the victim on the telephone on June 11, 2001. As he began to testify about what she said, the defendant objected that the statements were hearsay. The state responded that rehable hearsay was admissible, and the objection was overruled. Thereafter, Maus testified as to what the victim had told him about the assault by the defendant on June 9, 2001. Maus advised the victim to come to his office and to give a written statement, and he testified that a probation officer, Veronica Mann, later took the statement. He also testified that the victim had been his probation client, and that he had met with her several times and found her to be reliable and credible.

The defendant also challenges the court’s admission into evidence of the victim’s statement. The victim’s statement was offered by the state as a business record, and the defendant objected that it would be a denial of due process to admit it without the right to cross-examine the victim. The court overruled the objection. The defendant made no objection that the statement was inadmissible hearsay.

Finally, the defendant challenges the court’s admission of the client activity report prepared by Annis as a business record. The defendant objected that it was hearsay. After Maus testified that it was a reliable source, the court overruled that objection. The defendant made no claim that the report was not admissible as a business record.

It is the duty of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review. See, e.g., State v. Feliciano, 74 Conn. App. 391, 402, 812 A.2d 141 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 952, 817 A.2d 110 (2003). When error is claimed in an evidentiary ruling, the brief or appendix must include a verbatim statement of the question or offer, the objection and ground therefor, the claim for admissibility and the ruling. See Practice Book § 67-4 (d) (3); State v. Francis D., 75 Conn. App. 1, 8, 815 A.2d 191, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 909, 819 A.2d 842 (2003).

The defendant has failed to comply with that requirement except as to the telephone call between Maus and the victim. It is well settled that probation proceedings are informal and that strict rules of evidence do not apply to them. See State v. Baxter, 19 Conn. App. 304, 314, 563 A.2d 721 (1989). Hearsay evidence may be admitted in a probation revocation hearing if it is relevant, reliable and probative. Id., 320. The probation officer had interacted with the victim sufficiently to determine that she was reliable and credible, and the court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the objection to his testimony on hearsay grounds.

Ill

Finally, the defendant claims that the court failed to consider all of his circumstances in finding a violation of probation. We disagree.

The state produced ample evidence to support the court’s finding that the defendant had violated the conditions of his probation. At the hearing, the defendant’s probation officer testified that he had reviewed the conditions of probation with the defendant on three occasions. The evidence showed that The Connection had discharged the defendant for noncompliance. A service coordinator at The Connection testified that the defendant had failed to report for two scheduled appointments on May 7, 2001, and on June 12, 2001, and failed to acquire the necessary medical benefits as instructed. Although the defendant and his mother testified that during the June 9, 2001 incident, he was defending his mother, that would not necessarily excuse an assault on his sister. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated that “[b]ased on the evidence and the arguments, I am going to find that, and based on the warrant and considering the record as a whole, on the reliable and probative evidence, that it has been established by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions of violation of probation were violated. And, specifically, that he did not submit to any medical or psychiatric or psychological examination, urinalysis, alcohol or drug testing or counseling sessions as required by the court [and] that he violated the [condition of probation prohibiting] assault, threats or violence [against] the victim.” On the basis of our review, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation.

The judgments are affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MAURICE NELSON
    (AC 23270)
    Schaller, Dranginis and Bishop, Js.
    Argued February 18
    officially released April 29, 2003

      David B. Rozwaski, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state’s attorney, and James Bemardi, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Maurice Nelson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after he entered a plea of guilty under the doctrine of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) and 53a-55a (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied (1) his counsel’s motion to withdraw and (2) the defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant initially was charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, and assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1) in connection with the shootings of George Adolphe and Roxanne Harrison Nelson, the defendant’s wife. Roxanne Harrison Nelson survived the assault and named the defendant as the individual who shot her and Adolphe. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the defendant was sentenced to a term of thirty-five years imprisonment, with five years as a mandatory minimum, to run concurrently with the sentence he was to receive in New York for a homicide. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his counsel’s motion to withdraw. We decline to review that claim.

“It is well established that an unconditional plea of guilty, made intelligently and voluntarily, operates as a waiver of all nonjuiisdictional defects and bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to pretrial proceedings. ... In general, the only allowable challenges after a plea are those relating either to the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea or the exercise of the trial court’s jurisdiction.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 80, 751 A.2d 298 (2000).

“An Alford plea operates as the functional equivalent of a plea of nolo contendere. ... As such, an Alford plea has the same legal effect as a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on all further proceedings within the indictment. . . . Therefore, a defendant who has submitted an unconditional plea under the Alford doctrine, like a defendant who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere without condition, can challenge only the court’s jurisdiction or the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Banks, 24 Conn. App. 408, 412-13, 588 A.2d 669 (1991).

The defendant, by pleading guilty under the Alford doctrine, waived his right to challenge the court’s denial of his counsel's motion to withdraw, as the claim does not challenge the court’s jurisdiction or the voluntariness ol’ the plea.

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, the defendant claims that his guilty plea was not made voluntarily and knowingly because “the problems he was having with his representation” impacted his ability “to have a proper defense prepared and to prove his innocence.” We disagree.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. During jury selection, the defendant, through his attorney, sought a continuance of his case because he did not believe that his case had been investigated sufficiently by his attorney. In the alternative, the defendant sought to have the court assign him a new attorney. The court, in response, found that the defendant’s attorney was performing adequately and denied the request.

On May 18,2001, the defendant filed a grievance with the statewide grievance committee, claiming that his attorney (1) discriminated against him because of his race and ethnicity, (2) was best friends with the prosecutor, (3) was conspiring with the prosecutor to lose the case, (4) threatened him to plead guilty, (5) intentionally selected a mostly white jury and (6) failed to investigate the case adequately. Thereafter, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. Following a hearing on the motion and after counsel stated that he was competent to continue to act as the defendant’s counsel, the court denied the motion, finding that the defendant’s claims in his grievance were without basis.

On the following day, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with the state. The court canvassed the defendant, and, finding that the plea had been entered into voluntarily and knowingly, accepted the plea. On June 22, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he was innocent and that his attorney was ineffective. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion, finding that the defendant’s claims were conclusory and unsupported by the facts.

“[0]nce entered, a guilty plea cannot be withdrawn except by leave of the court, within its sound discretion, and a denial thereof is reversible only if it appears that there has been an abuse of discretion. . . . The burden is always on the defendant to show a plausible reason for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gasser, 74 Conn. App. 527, 531, 812 A.2d 188, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 954, 818 A.2d 781 (2003).

It is the defendant’s contention that the court should have permitted him to withdraw his plea because of the “problems he was having with his representation.” The court’s canvass of the defendant, however, reveals that he was satisfied with the representation that he had received. “It is well established that [a] trial court may properly rely on . . . the responses of the [defendant] at the time [he] responded to the trial court’s plea canvass . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 536. We conclude, therefore, that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty under the Alford doctrine.

The judgment is affirmed.

       The following colloquy took place between the court and the defendant:
      “The Court: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney about your case and your decision to plead guilty?
      “[Defendant]: Briefly.
      “The Court: Well, that’s not the question I put to you, sir.
      “[Defendant]: Yes. Yes.
      “The Court: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney—
      “[Defendant]: Sure.
      “The Court: — about your case and your decision to plead guilty?
      “[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
      “The Court: Are you satisfied with your attorney’s advice and his representation?
      “[Defendant]: Yes
      “The Court: Now, it has been brought to my attention that you have, in fact, filed a grievance against your attorney in connection with his representation of you and that you may have made some remarks concerning his representation of you at a hearing on a motion to withdraw filed by [your attorney]. Notwithstanding all of that, despite all of that, have you been satisfied with your attorney’s advice and representation before today and today and now?

        “[Defendant]: I’m satisfied with it right now.
      “The Court: That’s not the question that I’ve put to you. Have you been satisfied with your attorney in his representation of you before today, today and now?
      “[Defendant]: Yes.”