text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DARANTE H.

    (AC 33588)
    Robinson, Bear and Espinosa, Js.

      Argued September 19
    officially released December 11, 2012

      Bradford Buchta, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state’s attorney, and Tatiana A. Messina, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

       In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79-3, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Appellate Court.

   Opinion

BEAR, J.

The defendant, Darante H., appeals from the judgment of the trial court adjudicating him a youthful offender in violation, of General Statutes § 54-76b for having committed the crime of larceny in the sixth degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 and 53a-125b. On appeal, the defendant claims that the judgment should be reversed because (1) the court made clearly erroneous factual findings that were critical to the court’s adjudication and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the adjudication. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the court found or which are apparent from the record, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On October 21, 2010, the defendant and the victim were in a high school ceramics class. The defendant told the victim that his cell phone battery was not functioning properly. Shortly thereafter, the victim left her cell phone on her desk as she stepped away. When the victim returned to her desk, class had ended and her cell phone was missing. The victim reported to the school security officer that her cell phone had been taken. During lunch period, the victim asked the defendant if he knew what had happened to her cell phone; the defendant stated that he did not know. The defendant, however, then gave the victim the subscriber identity module card (SIM card) that had been inside her cell phone.

After the victim’s mother picked up the victim and the victim’s friend from school, she drove toward the friend’s home, which was located near the defendant’s home. The victim saw the defendant near his home and identified him to her mother as the person who had taken her cell phone. Her mother stopped, exited the vehicle, asked the defendant about the cell phone and requested that he return it. The victim’s mother then called the police, who subsequently arrested the defendant.

The day after his arrest, the defendant informed the school security officer that he had been arrested and that he knew who had possession of the victim’s cell phone. The school security officer approached the student whom the defendant identified, but the student denied taking the cell phone. A few days later, however, the student gave the cell phone to the school security officer, who returned the phone to the victim.

The returned cell phone did not contain the victim’s battery or micro secure digital card (SD card). The next day, the school security officer questioned the defendant in the presence of his aunt. The defendant then removed a functioning battery from his cell phone and gave it to the school security officer. The school security officer in turn gave the battery to the victim. He also gave her the missing micro SD card, but the record is silent as to how he obtained that card.

On May 25, 2011, the state charged the defendant by way of a substitute information with being a youthful offender for committing larceny in the sixth degree. A court trial ensued, and, on June 6, 2011, the court adjudicated the defendant a youthful offender for committing larceny in the sixth degree and sentenced the defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction for thirty days, execution suspended, and one year of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessay.

I

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court’s finding of guilt was based on clearly erroneous factual findings and the adverse credibility inferences drawn from those findings. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court erred in finding that (1) the cell phone “materialize[d] without a battery,” (2) there was conflicting testimony regarding the defendant’s original battery, (3) there was conflicting testimony regarding the number of batteries and (4) there was no need for the defendant’s grandmother to have purchased another batteiy for the defendant. The state argues that the court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous because each factual finding challenged by the defendant is supported by evidence in the record.

“The law governing [our] limited appellate review is clear. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. ... In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable presumption ... in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 154-55, 920 A.2d 236 (2007).

A

The defendant claims that the court’s finding that the cell phone “materialize [d] without a battery” is clearly erroneous. The defendant argues that the court erred in making such a finding when “it was essentially undisputed that the phone, including the battery, was . . . returned to the [victim].” The defendant further argues that this erroneous finding adversely affected the corut’s assessment of the evidence in that it prevented the court from considering whether the battery in the cell phone returned to the victim was the original battery from her phone. He further argues that this finding suggests that the court misunderstood the actual number of batteries at issue, which “could have impacted [the court’s] understanding of the other testimony presented by the defense regarding the defendant’s battery.” The state argues that the court’s finding that the cell phone was returned without a battery was merely a technically imprecise use of language. Specifically, the state argues that the court merely was making an inference that the victim’s cell phone, when returned, contained a battery other than her original battery and that such an inference is supported by the evidence. We agree with the state.

The record reveals that two witnesses testified as to whether the cell phone contained a battery when it was returned to the victim. First, the victim testified as follows regarding the condition of her cell phone when it was returned to her:

“Q. And so, after you got your phone back, was the phone okay? Was there anything wrong with it?
“A. The battery was messed up in the back and my SIM [card] and my chip was missing. . . .
“Q. So, it was not your battery that you had originally installed?
“A. No.”

Also, the school security officer testified as follows as to whether the cell phone had a batteiy when it was given to him, before he returned it to the victim:

“Q. Did [the victim’s cell phone] have a battery when [the student] gave it to you?
“A. I’m not sure if it had a battery or not. I believe so.”

On the basis of this testimony, the court reasonably could have found that the battery in the victim’s cell phone, when it was returned to her, was a defective battery, different from the battery that was in the phone at the time it was taken. The court, therefore, reasonably could have concluded that the victim’s cell phone did not contain her original functioning battery and that she effectively was left with no battery. We agree with the state that the court’s statement that the cell phone “materialize [d] without a battery” reasonably can be understood to relate to the defective nature of the battery that was present when the cell phone was returned to the victim. See Werblood v. Birnbach, 41 Conn. App. 728, 733, 678 A.2d 1 (1996) (court’s misstatement of child being able to attend same school for next four years interpreted as child being able to attend school in same school district for next four years).

B

The defendant claims that the court erred in finding that there was conflicting testimony regarding his original cell phone battery. The defendant argues that his testimony and his aunt’s testimony demonstrate that his original cell phone battery did not work. The defendant further argues that this testimony is consistent with the victim’s testimony that the defendant told her that his cell phone battery did not work. The state argues that this was not the only testimony regarding the defendant’s cell phone battery and that the evidence supports the court’s finding that there was conflicting testimony. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to the disposition of this claim. The defendant and his aunt both testified that the defendant’s original cell phone battery did not work. The defendant’s aunt also testified that she did not have an opportunity to view the defendant’s original defective battery. The defendant, however, testified that he gave his aunt his defective battery and that she disposed of it. The testimony regarding whether the defendant gave his original defective battery to his aunt and whether she disposed of it was in conflict. We conclude, therefore, that the court’s finding that there was conflicting testimony regarding the defendant’s original cell phone battery is not clearly erroneous.

C

The defendant also claims that the court erred in finding that there was conflicting testimony regarding the number of batteries at issue, not counting the battery in the victim’s cell phone when it was taken. The defendant argues that his testimony and his aunt’s testimony demonstrate that there were three batteries at issue and that their testimony is logical and consistent. The state argues that the evidence supports the court’s finding that there was conflicting testimony regarding the number of batteries. We agree with the state.

The defendant and his aunt both testified that the defendant’s original cell phone battery did not work, that his aunt bought him a replacement battery, that he gave this replacement battery to the school security officer and that his grandmother bought him a second replacement battery. The defendant’s grandmother, however, testified that she was not aware of anyone other than herself buying a replacement battery for the defendant’s cell phone.

The defendant’s testimony and his aunt’s testimony provided a basis for the court to conclude that there were three batteries: the defendant’s original defective battery; the battery purchased by the defendant’s aunt; and the battery purchased by the defendant’s grandmother. The grandmother’s testimony, however, provided a basis for the court to conclude that there were only two batteries: the defendant’s original defective battery and the battery that she purchased. On the basis of the testimony of these three witnesses, the court reasonably could have concluded that there was conflicting testimony regarding the number of batteries.

D

Finally, the defendant claims that the court’s factual finding that there was no need for his grandmother to buy a second new battery is clearly erroneous. Our review of the record, however, reveals that the court did not find that there was no need for the grandmother to buy a second battery. Rather, the court found that “there would have been no need for the grandmother to go out and buy another battery if, in fact, the aunt, the guardian, had bought a battery herself.” We construe the defendant’s claim, therefore, as challenging the court’s finding that the defendant’s aunt did not buy him a battery. The state argues that the evidence supports the court’s finding that the defendant’s aunt did not buy the defendant a battery. We agree with the state.

“Questions of whether to believe or to disbelieve a competent witness are beyond our review. As a reviewing court, we may not retry the case or pass on the credibility of witnesses. . . . Our review of factual determinations is limited to whether those findings are clearly erroneous. . . . We must defer to the [finder] of fact’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses that is made on the basis of its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. White, 127 Conn. App. 846, 851, 17 A.3d 72, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 911, 27 A.3d 371 (2011).

As stated previously in this opinion, the defendant and his aunt testified that the defendant’s original battery did not work, that his aunt bought him a replacement battery, that he gave this replacement battery to the school security officer and that his grandmother bought him a second replacement battery. In setting forth its factual findings, the court stated: “[I]f [the defendant] didn’t take the battery ... his phone should have had a battery in it, there would’ve been no need to buy two additional batteries, even if the phone was taken and the battery, only one additional battery would’ve been needed because . . . [the defendant] still would’ve had the battery to his phone. ... I can’t credit any credibility to the aunt’s testimony, because there would’ve been no need for the grandmother to go out and buy another battery if, in fact, the aunt, the guardian, had bought a battery herself.” The court also stated: “The bottom line is the court does not credit [the defendant’s] testimony as credible.” The grandmother, whom the court found to be a credible witness, testified that she was not aware of anyone other than herself buying a replacement battery for the defendant’s cell phone. The grandmother also testified that she did not recall when she bought the battery for the defendant’s cell phone.

Because the court’s finding that the defendant’s aunt did not buy him a battery was based on a credibility determination, which we cannot second-guess; see State v. White, supra, 127 Conn. App. 851; we conclude that the finding is not clearly erroneous.

II

The defendant next claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he wrongfully obtained or withheld the victim’s cell phone. The defendant argues that certain facts and favorable inferences demonstrate his innocence. The state argues that the cumulative impact of the evidence was more than sufficient to enable the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant wrongfully obtained or withheld the victim’s cell phone. We agree with the state.

“[T]he [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. . . . The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim employs a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [trier of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the [trier] if there is sufficient evidence to support [the] verdict. . . .

“It is axiomatic that the [trier of fact] must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ... If it is reasonable and logical for the [trier of fact] to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the [trier] is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. ... On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [defendant’s guilt].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reid, 123 Conn. App. 383, 391-92, 1 A.3d 1204, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 929, 5 A.3d 490 (2010).

“[I]t does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. ... It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. ... In evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .

“[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the trier, would have resulted in an acquittal.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. White, supra, 127 Conn. App. 850.

Section 53a-119 provides in relevant part: “A person commits larceny when, with the intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner. . . .”

In the present case, the court, acting as the trier of fact, found the following relevant facts on the basis of the testimony presented to the court over the corase of the two day trial. The defendant informed the victim that his battery was not functioning properly during their ceramics class and, shortly thereafter, the victim’s cell phone was taken. Later that day, the defendant gave the victim the SIM card for her cell phone. On the basis of these findings, the court reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had a criminal connection to the victim’s cell phone. See State v. Rivera, 39 Conn. App. 96, 104, 664 A.2d 306 (“possession of recently stolen property raises a permissible inference of criminal connection with the property” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 921, 665 A.2d 908 (1995). The court also found that the school security officer obtained the victim’s cell phone from another student, but the battery in the cell phone was not its original functioning battery. The school security officer then questioned the defendant about the battery, and the defendant provided him with a functioning battery, which he took from his cell phone, that the victim identified as her cell phone’s original battery.

Although the defendant and his aunt testified that the battery the defendant handed over was a replacement battery that she had purchased for the defendant, the court found that this testimony was not credible and concluded that the defendant’s aunt did not purchase a replacement battery for him. The court credited the grandmother’s testimony that she purchased a replacement battery for the defendant. The court reasonably could have inferred from this testimony that the grandmother purchased this replacement battery after the defendant returned the victim’s battery, which had been in the victim’s cell phone when it was taken, to the school security officer.

The court concluded that the credible testimony given and the inferences drawn from this testimony demonstrated that the defendant had a defective battery; the victim’s cell phone was taken; the defendant gave the victim the SIM card to her cell phone; the victim’s cell phone was returned to her with a defective battery; and, then the defendant gave the school security officer a functioning battery that the victim identified as her cell phone’s original battery. The court stated that on the basis of the evidence, it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant wrongfully obtained or withheld the victim’s cell phone.

Mindful of our standard of review, we conclude that on the basis of the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the court reasonably could have concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant wrongfully obtained or withheld the victim’s cell phone.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       “A SIM card ... is a portable memory chip used in [certain cell] phones. It is a crucial component in mobile telecommunications as it identifies and stores the telephone number and connects the cell phone to the mobile carrier’s network. Since SIM cards also have a (limited) memory element, they can also be used as portable stores for one’s phone contacts.” Tech-opedia Technology Dictionary, available at http://www.techopedia.com/defi-nition/23747/subscriber-identity-module-card-sim-card (last visited November 29, 2012).

       An SD card provides “a non-volatile form of flash memory for portable and mobile devices.” Techopedia Technology Dictionary, available at http:// www.techopedia.com/definition/2808/secure-digital-card-sd-card (last visited November 29, 2012).

       The state also charged the defendant with being a youthful offender for committing the crimes of interfering with an officer and disorderly conduct. The defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the disorderly conduct and larceny in the sixth degree charges. At the close of the defendant’s case, the court granted the defendant’s motion as to the disorderly conduct charge but denied the motion as to the larceny in the sixth degree charge. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found the defendant not guilty of being a youthful offender by way of interfering with an officer.

       Alternatively, the state argues that the defendant failed to establish that any clearly erroneous factual findings by the court were harmful, i.e., that any such erroneous factual finding would undermine confidence in the defendant’s conviction. We do not reach the state’s alternative argument because we conclude that the court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous.

       “Neither this court nor our Supreme Court is bound by the issues as framed by the parties in their statement of the issues. Bather, our analysis is addressed to the contents of the brief. . . . Moreover, a review of the case history in this state reveals that, in determining what issues are to be addressed on appeal, it has been the practice to examine the contents of the brief rather than rely on the statement of the issues.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miscellaneous Fireworks, 132 Conn. App. 679, 681 n.1, 34 A.3d 992 (2011).

       General Statutes § 53a-125b (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of larceny in the sixth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service is five hundred dollars or less.” The court found that the cell phone had a value and that the battery was valued at thirty-five dollars. The defendant does not challenge those findings on appeal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WASHINGTON A. PEARSON
    (AC 32946)
    Graendel, Lavine and Espinosa, Js.

      Submitted on briefs October 12
    officially released December 11, 2012

      Washington A. Pearson, pro se, the appellant (defendant), filed a brief.

      Michael L. Regan, state’s attorney, and Denise B. Smoker and Michael Kennedy, senior assistant state’s attorneys, filed a brief for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The self-represented defendant, Washington A. Pearson, appeals from a judgment of conviction following his nolo contendere plea to one count of burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-102 (a) (2). The defendant appears to claim that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because the state did not follow proper extradition procedures to gain custody of him, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, codified as General Statutes § 54-186 et seq. As the defendant has not provided this court with an adequate brief or record for review, we are unable to resolve his claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history that are largely uncontested. On April 8, 2005, the defendant, a resident of Lynn, Massachusetts, was charged in Connecticut with possession of a weapon in a vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38 and possession of burglar’s tools in violation of General Statutes § 53a-106. The court set bond for these charges at $50,000. On April 11, 2005, the defendant posted bond and, thereafter, returned to Massachusetts. While out on bond, the defendant was convicted of a felony in his home state and was sentenced to a term of incarceration of seven to ten years. On May 13, 2008, the state charged the defendant with failure to appear and issued a warrant for his rearrest. On November 24, 2008, the state sent a certified copy of the arrest warrant to the Old Colony correction facility in Massachusetts, where the defendant was incarcerated. The letter accompanying the copy of the arrest warrant stated: “I am requesting the certified arrest warrant be lodged as a detainer. Extradition of Mr. Pearson has been authorized from the State of [Massachusetts].”

The defendant arrived in Connecticut from Massachusetts on November 3, 2009, to face the charges against him from April, 2005, as well as an additional charge of burglary in the second degree. After the defendant had pleaded not guilty and trial had begun, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of burglary in the second degree subject to the condition that he would not waive any jurisdictional claims that could be raised on appeal. The court rendered judgment in accordance with his plea and sentenced the defendant to twenty-five months of incarceration to run consecutive to the sentence he already was serving in Massachusetts. From that judgment the defendant appeals.

Practice Book § 67-4 requires, inter alia, that an appellant’s brief concisely set forth the issue raised on appeal, the applicable standard of review and legal authorities cited in support of his or her position. Additionally, Practice Book § 61-10 states that the appellant bears the responsibility of furnishing an adequate record to review the issue presented. Furthermore, “[our appellate courts] repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to [the] court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. T.R.D., 286 Conn. 191, 213-14 n.18, 942 A.2d 1000 (2008).

In his brief to this court, the defendant does not set forth the claims he wishes this court to address. Rather, he merely alludes to a claim that his extradition was invalid because it was not approved by the executive authority of either Connecticut or Massachusetts and because the state did not properly lodge a detainer with Massachusetts. The defendant does not articulate how, even if these assertions were true, his claim has legal significance with respect to his nolo contendere plea and sentencing. In fact, in his brief to this court, he does not cite to a single legal authority in support of his position. Moreover, he presents us with a record bereft of facts relating to his extradition. Although he submitted two letters from executive offices in Massachusetts and Connecticut stating that there are no materials on file relating to his extradition, this serves only to highlight the dearth of facts on which to base our review. As the record and brief now before us indicate, the defendant has not complied with the rules and principles of appellate review, in form or substance. We are, therefore, unable to review his claim.

The judgment is affirmed.

       As the defendant’s appellate brief does not set forth any statement of the issue or issues he wishes to present on appeal, we address the claim as gleaned from the brief and record before us.

       The state entered a nolle prosequi with respect to the charge of possession of burglar’s tools and dropped the charge of possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle.

       When the defendant entered his nolo contendere plea, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was pending in federal court, in which he raised a jurisdictional claim similar to the one seemingly raised here.

       After the court rendered judgment and sentenced him, the defendant filed motions seeking to dismiss the charges and to withdraw his nolo contendere plea. The trial court denied both motions on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See State v. Luzietti, 230 Conn. 427, 432, 646 A.2d 85 (1994). On appeal, the defendant does not appear to be challenging the court’s denial of these motions, but rather the validity of the underlying judgment and sentencing.

       Practice Book § 67-4 provides in relevant part: “The appellant’s brief shall contain the following ... (a) A concise statement setting forth . . . the principal issues involved in the appeal . . . (b) A table of authorities cited in the brief . . . [and] (d) [A] separate, brief statement of the standard of review the appellant believes should be applied.”

       Practice Book § 61-10 provides in relevant part: “It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review. The appellant shall determine whether the entire trial court record is complete, correct and otherwise perfected for presentation on appeal. For purposes of this section, the term ‘record’ . . . includes all trial court decisions, documents and exhibits necessary and appropriate for appellate review of any claimed impropriety.”


author: SHELDON, J.

text:
    EDWARD KRAMER v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION ET AL.
    (AC 34257)
    DiPentima, C. X, and Espinosa and Sheldon, Js.

      Argued October 11
    officially released December 11, 2012

      Susan M. Hankins, for the appellant (petitioner).

      Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Nora R. Dannehy, deputy attorney general, for the appellees (respondents).
   Opinion

SHELDON, J.

In this case, the petitioner, Edward Kramer, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his proposed extradition to the state of Georgia, pursuant to a governor’s warrant issued by the governor of this state upon the demand and requisition of the governor of Georgia, to face further prosecution on charges of sexual molestation allegedly pending against him in that state since August, 2000. The petitioner claims that the habeas court erred in dismissing his petition based upon findings that he had failed to prove either: (1) that the requisition documents upon which his extradition was demanded by the governor of Georgia are insufficient on their face to establish that he was ever substantially charged with a crime in Georgia; or (2) that, regardless of the facial sufficiency of the requisition documents, he is not a fugitive from Georgia because any once-pending charges against him in that state have effectively been dismissed. For the reasons set forth in the well reasoned opinion of the habeas court, which we quote with approval and discuss in part herein, we reject the petitioner’s challenges, and thus affirm the habeas court’s judgment dismissing his application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Under the extradition clause of the United States constitution, any state may require any other state to deliver up any person deemed to be a fugitive from justice from the demanding state. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. The procedures for interstate extraditions are set forth in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (act), General Statutes § 54-157 et seq., which implements the mandate of the extradition clause of the United States constitution. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 286-87, 99 S. Ct. 530, 58 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1978). Under the act, the governor of this state has a mandatory duty to comply with a demand by the executive authority of another state for the extradition of any person who, having been charged with a crime in the demanding state, is a fugitive from justice from that state and is found in this state. A person arrested on the charge of being a fugitive from justice from another state can choose either to waive extradition or to contest it. By contesting extradition, an alleged fugitive requires the state to release him from its custody unless a governor’s warrant is issued within the time allowed by law. If a governor’s warrant is duly issued, the state can continue to hold the alleged fugitive until such time as he is extradited, subject to his right to contest the lawfulness of his proposed extradition by seeking release on a writ of habeas corpus.

“Once the governor has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than, decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.” Id., 289. “The issuance of a governor’s warrant constitutes prima facie evidence that the person named therein is a fugitive, and introduction of the warrant into evidence shifts the burden of showing the contraiy to the petitioner contesting the legality of his arrest.” Barrita v. Blake, 190 Conn. 631, 635, 461 A.2d 1375 (1983). The petitioner must establish the illegality of his arrest as a fugitive beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

In reviewing a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas coipus, “[t]he habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . Historical facts constitute a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators. . . . Accordingly, [t]he habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. . . . The application of the habeas court’s factual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 306 Conn. 664, 677, 51 A.3d 948 (2012).

The following undisputed facts and procedural history, as found by the habeas court, are relevant to our examination of the issues presented in this appeal. “On August 25, 2000, Judge Patricia Holman, Magistrate Court, Gwinnett County, Georgia, signed Criminal Arrest Warrant No. 00 W05780, finding ‘sufficient cause made known to me in the above affidavit . . . and other sworn testimony ... to arrest the Accused . . . .’ The affidavit states under oath that the petitioner ‘did perform an indecent act upon a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, the victim, by placing his mouth on the penis of the victim . . . and performing an act of sodomy on the [thirteen] 13 year old victim, in violation of Georgia law.’

“[Because the] petitioner, upon his arrest pursuant to the August 25, 2000 warrant, did not ‘bond out,’ he was entitled under Georgia procedure to a ‘commitment hearing’ before another magistrate, who received evidence that was subject to cross-examination and made a finding of probable cause to bind the case over to the Superior Court. In Superior Court, a grand jury was convened, after two other victims surfaced, and returned the indictment charging [the] petitioner in six [felony] counts [specifically, two counts of aggravated child molestation and four counts of child molestation].

“As of May, 2008, [the] petitioner was at liberty in Georgia on a $75,000 surety bond, subject to electronic monitoring. The terms of [the] petitioner’s release on bond were modified under the consent order of May 21, 2008; under that order, [the] petitioner’s bond remained at $75,000, with surety, he was removed from electronic monitoring, and the bondsman was authorized to return a real estate deed to [the] petitioner so that the realty could be sold or rented. In lieu of electronic monitoring, the order subjected [the] petitioner to specifically detailed reporting requirements regarding his whereabouts; [the] petitioner was required to report directly (telephonically) to the district attorney or his designee. The order specifically stated as a condition of the release that [the] petitioner was to have no unsupervised contact with any person under the age of sixteen years. Subject to the reporting requirements, [the] petitioner was granted permission under the order ‘to travel between the states of New York, New Jersey and Georgia as the needs of his mother’s medical attention and his own shall dictate.’ Under the modification order, and subject to the reporting requirements, [the] petitioner was permitted to leave his residence with proper notice to the district attorney or his designee and ‘get other accommodations, either closer to Shepard Hospital when he is receiving treatment at Shepard, or in New York City next to Sloan Kettering during the period of time his mother is under care at that institution, or in New Jersey, if he is being given medical attention there . . . .’ The order also provided that [the] petitioner ‘shall appear in the Gwinnett County Superior Court at any time set by [that] Court or the District Attorney.’ . . .

“On April 22, 2009, a ‘status hearing’ was held before a judge of the Georgia Superior Court concerning ‘what to do with regard to the trial of [the petitioner’s] case.’ [The] [petitioner was present with counsel, who, just prior to the hearing, had filed a motion for a continuance with respect to a scheduled trial date. A lengthy discourse ensued between the court and those present (petitioner’s counsel, petitioner, and the district attorney). The transcript of that hearing . . . reveals that the court was thoroughly familiar with the long procedural history of the case and [the] petitioner’s difficult medical condition. . . . The central issue concerned his physical ability to participate in his trial, not mental competency to stand trial. In view of [the] petitioner’s medical state, the court had made, or proposed, a number of accommodations respecting trial scheduling, reduced hours of trial time, procurement of medical equipment, etc. [The] [petitioner repeatedly stated that he wanted a trial, but despite a number of continuing inquiries by the court, he remained uncertain as to his ability to remain attentive [during trial], even with the suggested accommodations in place.

“Following the April 22, 2009 hearing, the Georgia court entered an order providing, in part, as follows: ‘The court being cognizant of the [petitioner’s] expressed desire for a trial on these charges directly inquired as to whether [the petitioner] was prepared to go forward with the accommodations which the court was prepared to make for his medical conditions. [The petitioner] directly informed the Court that he was not able to proceed under these circumstances. THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the . . . case be continued at the request of [the petitioner] and until further order of this Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that . . . the case shall not be scheduled for trial until such time that [the petitioner] files an appropriate motion and presents convincing evidence to this court that he is physically and mentally able to effectively assist counsel and effectively participate in a trial under the accommodations set forth by the court.’ ”

On September 13, 2011, the petitioner was charged in Connecticut with risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. On the next day, the petitioner was arraigned on that charge and a $50,000 bond was set in that file. On that same day, the Georgia district attorney, upon learning of the charges against the petitioner in Connecticut, “filed an ‘Emergency Motion to Revoke Bond,’ referencing a violation of the condition of release contained in the May 21,2008 bond modification order: [specifically, that the petitioner have] ‘no unsupervised contact with any person under the age of sixteen.’ On September 14, 2011, the Georgia Superior Court ordered that [the] petitioner immediately be taken into custody and transported to the Gwin-nett County jail to be held [pending] a hearing on the district attorney’s motion.” Consequently, on September 21, 2011, a bench warrant was issued in Georgia. “On September 28, 2011, the petitioner was arrested [in Connecticut] and charged with being a fugitive from justice [from Georgia] in violation of General Statutes § 54-169 . . . and ... a bond of $100,000 [was] set ... on that file. On October 7, 2011, [the petitioner was released from custody on a surety bond]. On October 27, 2011, [the] . . . petitioner . . . was served with the governor’s warrant and [was arrested]. [He remains] in custody without bond [pursuant to] the Connecticut rendition warrant.”

On November 22, 2011, the petitioner filed this application for release on habeas corpus, challenging the legality of his arrest as a fugitive under the governor’s warrant. He based his challenge to the legality of his fugitivity arrest under the governor’s warrant on the following grounds: (1) that the requisition documents upon which his extradition was demanded by the governor of Georgia are insufficient on their face to establish that he was ever substantially charged with a crime in Georgia; and (2) that, regardless of the facial sufficiency of the requisition documents, he is not a fugitive from Georgia because any once-pending charges against him in that state have effectively been dismissed. The case was heard before the habeas court on December 21, 2011. By way of a written memorandum of decision filed on January 17, 2012, the habeas court dismissed the petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioner argued that the requisition documents provided by the demanding state of Georgia are not facially in order because they fail to establish that he is substantially charged with a Georgia crime. That argument, in turn, is based principally upon the fact that his original arrest warrant, as signed and approved by Judge Holman of the Magistrate Court for Gwinnett County, Georgia, on August 25, 2000, was based expressly upon a finding of “sufficient cause,” rather than probable cause, to believe that he had committed a crime or crimes in that state. The habeas court rejected this claim based upon the testimony of Daniel J. Porter, the district attorney of Gwinnett County, Georgia. Porter testified that Georgia’s arrest warrant statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 17-4-40, permits the issuance of an arrest warrant only upon a finding of probable cause. He further testified, however, that under Georgia law, “sufficient cause is . . . synonymous with probable cause.” The court thus reasoned that “the wording of the arrest warrant statute (‘issue . . . based on probable cause’), together with the content of the supporting affidavit . . . having been ‘incorporated by reference’ in the magistrate’s finding of ‘sufficient cause,’ support [the] [commissioner of correction’s] contention (and [Porter’s] testimony) that [the] petitioner’s arrest by warrant was grounded on a determination of ‘probable cause.’ ” On this clearly stated basis alone, the habeas court properly rejected the petitioner’s first challenge to the legality of his arrest under the governor’s warrant.

The petitioner based his second challenge to the legality of his fugitivity arrest under the governor’s warrant — the claim that he is not a fugitive from Georgia because all once-pending charges against him in that state have been effectively dismissed — upon the contention that the demanding state of Georgia has surrendered to him all control over the future prosecution of this case by ordering the indefinite continuation of his trial until such time as he moves the court to commence the trial based upon proof that he will be physically capable of getting through it despite his difficult medical condition. The habeas court rejected this claim, on the basis of the following well-founded assessment of the procedural posture of the petitioner’s Georgia prosecution, in stating: “[T]here is no indication, or even a suggestion, that the Georgia district attorney’s office ever expressed an intention not to proceed with the prosecution of the petitioner. A fair reading of the transcript of the April 22, 2009 hearing indicates that, at the time, the district attorney was prepared for trial, had spoken to witnesses, and was intending to move the prosecution through to conclusion. The charges have remained pending since the arrest and indictment and, according to. the testimony before this court, the district attorney now intends to continue his efforts to get the case promptly tried. Thus, the [indefinite continuance] order entered [on] April 22, 2009, does not alter or vitiate [the petitioner’s] present status as a fugitive from justice.” The court then cited to controlling Connecticut case law concerning the meaning of fugitivity, which provides that “[t]o be regarded as a fugitive from justice it is not necessary one shall have left the State in which the crime is alleged to have been committed for the very purpose of avoiding prosecution, but simply that, having committed there an act which by the law of the State constitutes a crime, he afterwards has departed from its jurisdiction, and when sought to be prosecuted is found within the territory of another State.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clark v. Commissioner of Correction, 281 Conn. 380, 393-94, 917 A.2d 1 (2007). Following Clark, the court concluded that the petitioner is indeed a fugitive from Georgia because he “is charged with crimes in Georgia, he has left Georgia, the Georgia authorities wish to prosecute him on the pending charges, and he is in Connecticut.” The court thus dismissed the petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus. This appeal followed.

We have carefully examined the record on appeal and considered the briefs and arguments of the parties. On that basis, we conclude that there is no error in the habeas court’s above-described determinations that the extradition documents are in order and that the petitioner is a fugitive from Georgia. The habeas court thus properly held that the requirements set forth in Michigan v. Doran, supra, 439 U.S. 289, had been satisfied and properly dismissed the petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The petitioner named as respondents Peter Murphy, warden of the Mac-Dougall-Walker Correctional Institution, and state police Detective David Gutierrez.

       See General Statutes § 54-166.

       The petitioner conceded to the habeas court that he is the person named in the request for extradition and thus did not challenge the third requirement set forth in Michigan v. Doran, supra, 439 U.S. 289.

       At oral argument before this court, the petitioner withdrew his claim that he had not been charged with a crime in Georgia.


text:
    RONALD BOZELKO v. MICHAEL MILICI
    (AC 34173)
    Graendel, Beach and Espinosa, Js.
    Argued October 17
    officially released December 11, 2012

      Ronald Bozelko, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

      Joseph Zullo, with whom, on the brief, was Alfred J. Zullo, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Ronald Bozelko, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the defendant, Michael Milici, to dismiss the plaintiffs petition for a new trial for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant. In 2006, the plaintiff commenced an underlying action entitled Bozelko v. D’Albero, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-06-5009158, against, inter alia, the defendant. In July, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed an objection. On August 25, 2008, the court granted the motion for summary judgment “absent objection or opposition.”

On April 13, 2009, the plaintiff assigned his interest in the action to Edward Jacobs by way of an assignment agreement that states in relevant part: “I, Ronald D. Bozelko ... in consideration of $1.00 and other valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, paid to me by Edward Jacobs, Executor of the Estate of Antonina Cap . . . assign to [Jacobs] all of my right, title and interest in certain causes of action and claims, asserted or not asserted, which causes of action are now in suit and are pending in the Superior Court at New Haven, specifically, [D’Albero]

In August, 2011, in the present action, the plaintiff filed a petition for a new trial in D ’Albero. In his petition, he argued that he was entitled to a new trial because he never received notice of the order granting the motion for summary judgment and because there was reasonable cause to grant a new trial, as the matter had not been adjudicated on the merits. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition for a new trial because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant argued that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the petition for a new trial. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that, pursuant to the assignment agreement, the plaintiff assigned his right, title and interest in the underlying action to Jacobs and that the plaintiff no longer had a specific, personal and legal interest in the matter. The court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the petition for a new trial.

“The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. . . . Because a determination regarding the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law, [the standard of] review is plenary. . . . Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]. . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213-15, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).

The plaintiff claims that he has standing to bring a petition for a new trial regarding the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in D’Albero. He argues that because the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on August 25,2008, the subsequent assignment of the entire action to Jacobs did not include any cause of action against the defendant. We are not persuaded.

Although at the time of the assignment agreement and substitution, summary judgment already had been rendered in D ’Albero in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff did not have standing to bring a petition for a new trial regarding any claims against the defendant in DAlbero. Pursuant to the assignment agreement, the plaintiff assigned to Jacobs “all of my right, title and interest in certain causes of action and claims, asserted or not asserted,” in DAlbero. This necessarily included the claim — yet unasserted at the time of the assignment — of a petition for a new trial.

As a result of the assignment, the plaintiff lacks standing to bring apetition for a new trial. “A valid assignment transfers to the assignee exclusive ownership of all of the assignor’s rights to the subject assigned and extinguishes all of those rights in the assignor.” Mall v. LaBow, 33 Conn. App. 359, 362, 635 A.2d 871 (1993), cert. denied, 229 Conn. 912, 642 A.2d 1208 (1994). As assignee, Jacobs stepped into the shoes of his assignor, the plaintiff. See Leonard v. Bailwitz, 148 Conn. 8, 13, 166 A.2d 451 (1960). Jacobs was substituted as the plaintiff in D’Albero. Because the plaintiff assigned his rights and interests in D’Albero to Jacobs, he has not demonstrated that he has a specific, personal and legal interest in the petition for a new trial that has been specially and injuriously affected. Accordingly, the court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs petition for a new trial for lack of standing.

The judgment is affirmed.

       The plaintiff brought a single action against multiple defendants, including Milici. Milici is the only defendant from D’Albero who is involved in this action. We will refer to Milici as the defendant for purposes of this appeal.

       The plaintiff also seems to argue that the court improperly took judicial notice of the assignment mD’Albero instead of holding an evidentiary hearing regarding the assignment. “[WJhere a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts.” Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 652, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). In this case, the parties agree in their appellate briefs that the assignment was part of the record in DAlbero. The assignment itself was not factually disputed; rather, the argument on the motion to dismiss concerned the import of the assignment. The trial court had the power to take judicial notice of the assignment in DAlbero. See Jewett v. Jewett, 265 Conn. 669, 678 n.7, 830 A.2d 193 (2003) (“[tjhere is no question that the trial court may take judicial notice of the file in another case” [internal quotation marks omitted]).
      Because we determine that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the petition for a new trial, we need not address his additional claims.

       As of the time of the court’s decision on the motion to dismiss, D’Albero was still pending in the trial court.

       Following the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Jacobs reportedly reassigned his interest in D’Albero back to the plaintiff. In his motion to dismiss, the defendant questioned the plaintiffs standing at the time the petition for a new trial was brought. The subsequent reassignment of the action back to the plaintiff does not affect whether he had standing at the time he brought the petition for a new trial. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank, National Assn. v. Bialobrzeski, 123 Conn. App. 781, 790, 3 A.3d 176 (2010) (standing to be determined at time action commenced where motion to dismiss challenged standing to bring action); Cimmino v. Household Realty Corp., 104 Conn. App. 392, 395, 933 A.2d 1226 (2007) (determining standing at time action commenced), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 912, 943 A.2d 470 (2008); America’s Wholesale Lender v. Silberstein, 87 Conn. App. 485, 488-89, 866 A.2d 695 (2005) (same).


author: ESPINOSA, J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DWAYNE ANDRE ADAMS
    (AC 34066)
    Beach, Espinosa and SchaUer, Js.

      Argued September 25
    officially released December 11, 2012

      Deborah G. Stevenson, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and Dennis J. O’Connor, former supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

ESPINOSA, J.

The defendant, Dwayne Andre Adams, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2) and three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). The defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly admitted certain constancy of accusation testimony, (2) the court improperly admitted certain expert testimony that indirectly bolstered the victim’s credibility, (3) prosecutorial impropriety deprived him of a fair trial, (4) the evidence did not support the jury’s finding of guilt as to any of the charges of which he was convicted and (5) the court improperly denied his motion for a new trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found that, in late 2008, the eight year old victim and her parents lived next door to the defendant, his wife and their three children in Hartford. It was not uncommon for the victim to spend the night at the defendant’s residence. On these occasions, the victim would sleep alone in the children’s bedroom at the defendant’s residence while the defendant and his family slept in the living room. Sometime during the late evening hours of December 26, 2008, and the early morning horns of December 27, 2008, the defendant entered the bedroom where the victim was asleep. The defendant woke the victim, removed her pajama pants and underwear and engaged in penile-vaginal intercourse with her. Also, the defendant forced the victim to perform fellatio on him. The victim tried, unsuccessfully, to prevent the assault. Following the assault, the defendant instructed the victim to clean herself and threatened her not to tell anyone about the incident.

The following day, the victim told her mother about the incident. The victim’s mother reported the incident to the police, and the victim was examined and treated at the Connecticut Children’s Medical Center. Police collected physical evidence related to the victim’s complaint. The underwear worn by the victim on the night of the incident was stained with seminal fluid; the results of subsequent DNA testing of this evidence revealed that the defendant likely was the contributor of this DNA. In the ensuing days, the victim was evaluated and treated at the Children’s Advocacy Center at Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

First, the defendant claims that the court improperly permitted the state to introduce constancy of accusation testimony from the victim’s mother; Tanya Ortiz, a Hartford police officer; Audrey Courtney, an advanced practice registered nurse who conducted a physical examination of the victim at the Children’s Advocacy Center; and Lisa Murphy-Cipolla, a clinical child interview supervisor who conducted a forensic interview of the victim at the Children’s Advocacy Center. We do not reach the merits of this unpreserved claim.

The defendant did not preserve any aspect of this claim at trial. On appeal, the defendant argues that the claim is reviewable (1) because he has a constitutionally protected right to review of any and all claims on appeal; (2) under the doctrine set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989); (3) under the doctrine set forth in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973); (4) under the plain error doctrine codified in Practice Book § 60-5; and (5) under the exercise of this court’s inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. See, e.g., State v. Mukhtaar, 253 Conn. 280, 290 n.11, 750 A.2d 1059 (2000).

We readily reject the defendant’s initial, novel contention that he has a right to review of any claim raised on appeal, regardless of its nature or whether it was raised before the trial court. This assertion conflicts with ample and well settled appellate precedent; see, e.g., State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40; that we are not at liberty to overrule. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 107 Conn. App. 666, 684-85, 946 A.2d 319 (It is axiomatic that an appellate court is “bound by Supreme Court precedent and [is] unable to modify it ... . [W]e are not at liberty to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court but are bound by them. . . . [I]t is not within our province to reevaluate or replace those decisions.” [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 288 Conn. 902, 952 A.2d 811 (2008).

The defendant’s invocation of Golding is unsuccessful because, as he acknowledged in argument before this court, our Supreme Court unambiguously has held that a claim that a court improperly admitted constancy of accusation testimony is not of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Samuels, 273 Conn. 541, 558, 871 A.2d 1005 (2005); State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 290-93, 677 A.2d 917 (1996). Unless “[a] claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right,” it is not reviewable under Golding. State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239. For the reasons set forth previously, we decline the defendant’s express invitation to overrule those decisions of our Supreme Court.

The defendant’s recourse to State v. Evans, supra, 165 Conn. 70, likewise is of no avail. It was observed in Golding, and reiterated in numerous appellate decisions, that the doctrine set forth in Golding was meant to “facilitate a less burdensome, more uniform application of the . . . Evans standard in future cases . . . .” State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239. Thus, there is no basis in our case law for the proposition that, following Golding, Evans provides an independent or distinct avenue for review for unpreserved claims of error, let alone claims that are not of constitutional magnitude. Thus, we do not engage in review pursuant to Evans.

The plain error doctrine is invoked sparingly and is reserved for those situations in which a reviewing court concludes that the failure to grant relief with regard to an unpreserved claim of error would result in a manifest injustice. See, e.g., State v. Roger B., 297 Conn. 607, 618, 999 A.2d 752 (2010). Having carefully reviewed the defendant’s argument, we conclude that the defendant has not demonstrated that the unpreserved evidentiary error of which he complains rises to the level of plain error.

Finally, the defendant summarily states that this court should grant relief in the exercise of its supervisory powers. We note that this request is devoid of any citation to authority or analysis, yet we readily conclude that the defendant’s claim does not warrant such an extraordinary level of relief. This court sparingly invokes its supervisory authority to address issues that affect the integrity of the judicial system as a whole and, in rare instances, to address conduct in a particular case that “is unduly offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jimenez-Jaramill, 134 Conn. App. 346, 381, 38 A.3d 239, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 913, 45 A.3d 100 (2012). Such concerns are not implicated by the defendant’s unpreserved evidentiary claim.

II

Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly admitted testimony from Courtney and Murphy-Cipolla that indirectly bolstered the victim’s credibility. We do not reach the merits of this unpreserved claim.

The defendant acknowledges that this claim is unpre-served. He argues, as stated in part I of this opinion, that he is entitled to appellate review of any and all claims raised on appeal. We rejected this argument in part I of this opinion. The defendant argues, alternatively, that the claim is reviewable under Golding. The claim that the testimony at issue improperly bolstered the victim’s credibility is not reviewable under Golding because it is evidentiary, not constitutional, in nature. See, e.g., State v. Toccaline, 258 Conn. 542, 550, 783 A.2d 450 (2001); State v. Dearing, 133 Conn. App. 332, 343-45, 34 A.3d 1031, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 913, 40 A.3d 319 (2012); State v. Richard W., 115 Conn. App. 124, 136-37, 971 A.2d 810, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 917, 979 A.2d 493 (2009). Although the defendant claims that the admission of the evidence infringed on his right to a fair trial, we observe that one does not change the true nature of an evidentiary claim merely by referring to it in constitutional terms. See, e.g., State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35, 46, 540 A.2d 42 (1988). For reasons similar to those set forth in part I of this opinion, we reject the defendant’s request, distinct from his request under Golding, for review under Evans. Finally, having reviewed the evidentiary claim, we are not persuaded that it implicates the plain error doctrine, as argued by the defendant.

Ill

Next, the defendant claims that he was deprived of a fair trial as a result of the prosecutor’s having introduced the constancy of accusation evidence at issue in part I of this opinion. We disagree.

As the defendant correctly notes, a claim of prosecu-torial impropriety may be raised on appeal even if it was not the subject of a defense objection at trial. State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 572-75, 849 A.2d 626 (2004). In evaluating claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we determine, first, if impropriety occurred and, second, if it did, whether it infringed on the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. See State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 551-52, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008).

Here, the defendant deems it improper that the prosecutor elicited testimony from state’s witnesses that, in his opinion, constituted inadmissible constancy of accusation evidence. There is no argument that, in eliciting the testimony at issue, the prosecutor disregarded any prior ruling of the trial court. As observed in part I of this opinion, the defendant did not raise a constancy of accusation objection to the testimony at trial. Even were we to accept as true the defendant’s assertion that the prosecutor elicited inadmissible constancy of accusation evidence, the defendant cites to no authority, and we are not aware of any, for the proposition that such action on the part of the prosecutor was particularly egregious such that it rose to the level of prosecutorial impropriety. Apart from referring to the principle that a prosecutor must seek impartial justice, the defendant does not support his argument by reference to any authority that supports the proposition that the introduction of the witnesses’ testimony arguably constituted impropriety. Thus, we reject the defendant’s attempt to transmute his unpreserved evidentiary claim into a claim of prosecutorial impropriety.

IV

Next, the defendant claims that the evidence did not support the jury’s verdict of guilt as to any of the charges of which he was convicted. We disagree.

We review a claim of evidentiary sufficiency by applying a two part test. “First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [I]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the [finder of fact] is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence. The rule is that the [finder of fact’s] function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ovechka, 292 Conn. 533, 540-41, 975 A.2d 1 (2009).

In support of this claim, the defendant argues: “The evidence before the jury consisted of the victim’s testimony, the testimony of constancy of accusation witnesses whose testimony was largely inadmissible, medical personnel who saw the victim after any incident occurred and who could not testify as to the incident itself but whose testimony was offered in large part to bolster the credibility of the victim, chain of custody witnesses, results of a physical examination showing no trauma to the victim, and forensic evidence that in large part did not conclusively prove the defendant’s participation in the act.”

Beyond the arguments set forth previously, the defendant’s sufficiency analysis does not focus on the evidence as it relates to any specific essential elements of the crimes at issue. Absent a more tailored sufficiency analysis by the defendant, we will address only the broad arguments set forth previously, none of which is persuasive. There is no legal basis for the defendant’s argument that, with regard to any count of the state’s information, the state was required to present forensic evidence that conclusively proved the defendant’s criminal liability. Likewise, there is no legal basis for the defendant’s argument that, with regard to any count of the state’s information, the state was required to present the results of a physical examination showing trauma to the victim. To the extent that the defendant interjects an argument that the evidence included inadmissible constancy of accusation testimony and inadmissible testimony that bolstered the victim’s credibility, we note that such testimony is properly considered by a reviewing court in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 73 Conn. App. 173, 180, 807 A.2d 500 (“a claim of insufficiency of the evidence must be tested by reviewing no less than, and no more than, the evidence introduced at trial”), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 923, 812 A.2d 865 (2002).

The defendant, in his analysis of the evidence, appears to belittle the significance of the victim’s testimony. That is, the defendant appears to argue that without physical evidence that conclusively corroborated the victim’s version of events, the state did not satisfy its burden of proof. The victim’s testimony, which strongly was corroborated by the results of the forensic testing of the victim’s underwear, constituted sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction. At trial, the victim identified the defendant and testified concerning the events that transpired during the late evening hours of December 26, 2008, and the early morning hours of December 27, 2008. The victim recalled that the defendant came into the bedroom in which she was sleeping, woke her and sexually assaulted her. The victim testified that the defendant inserted his penis in her vagina, her “bottom” and her mouth. The victim testified that, after the assault, the defendant instructed her to clean herself with a tissue, cleaned his penis with a tissue and told her that if she “told anybody” he would “mess [her] up.” On the basis of the victim’s testimony, as well as the physical evidence that supported it, the jury reasonably could have found that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, in the maimer charged in counts one and three, and risk of injury to a child, in the manner charged in counts four, five and six.

V

Finally, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion for a new trial. We decline to review this unpreserved claim.

On June 29, 2010, the defendant filed a “motion for a new trial.” The body of the motion stated: “The defendant . . . hereby moves this Honorable Court to grant him a new trial as it is required in the interests of justice. The interests of justice mandate a new trial, as required by Rule 42-53 of the Connecticut Rules of Practice.” On October 14,2010, the same day as the court’s sentencing hearing, the court took up the motion for a new trial. Upon inquiry by the court, the defendant’s attorney stated: “Practice Book § 42-53 states that in the interests of justice, a new trial may be granted the defendant, and, on his behalf, I make that pro forma motion, again, this morning. I believe I made one toward the end of the trial, orally, as well.” The prosecutor replied: “Obviously, we oppose, and I would emphasize the words, pro forma.” The court stated: “Well, [the motion] cites the interests of justice and nothing more. It’s denied.”

In argument before this court, the defendant states: “[T]here was a clear abuse in the exercise of the trial court’s discretion when it improperly allowed the constancy of accusation evidence to be admitted, when it allowed with impunity the prosecutor’s improprieties and when it denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal.” The defendant asserts that, by filing the motion for a new trial on June 29, 2010, these grounds were adequately preserved for appellate review.

Because, in his written motion for a new trial and in argument before the trial court concerning the motion, the defendant did not set forth any specific grounds on which the motion was based, we readily conclude that the defendant did not preserve the grounds on which he now argues the court should have granted him a new trial. It would be fundamentally unfair, both to the trial court and to the state, for this court to conclude that the strikingly vague motion raised before the trial court encompassed the present claim. Accordingly, we conclude that the present claim is unpreserved and is unreviewable.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The jury returned a verdict of not guilty with regard to one count of sexual assault in the first degree arising from an allegation that the defendant engaged in penile-anal intercourse with the victim during the incident underlying the charges of which the defendant was convicted. Additionally, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty with regard to one count of risk of injury to a child and one count of sexual assault in the third degree arising from another alleged incident in October, 2008. In addition to the imposition of a fine, the court imposed a total effective sentence of fifty years incarceration, twenty years mandatory to serve, followed by fifteen years of special parole.

       In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

       See also Practice Book § 60-5 (“[t]he [reviewing] court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at trial or arose subsequent to the trial”).

       Additionally, the defendant argues that the claim is reviewable pursuant to Sokolowski v. Medi Mart, Inc., 24 Conn. App. 276, 279-80, 587 A.2d 1056 (1991), because the evidence at issue was introduced after the court cautioned the state that expert witnesses may not testify regarding the victim’s credibility. The defendant’s interpretation of Sokolowski is flawed. This court, in Sokolowski, reviewed the defendant’s evidentiary claim on appeal after determining quite clearly that the defendant adequately preserved his objection to the admission of the evidence by virtue of a motion in limine that raised the same evidentiary ground as that raised on appeal. Id., 280.

       Although it does not affect the reviewability of the claim, for even unpre-served sufficiency of the evidence claims are reviewable on appeal; see State v. Lewis, 303 Conn. 760, 767 n.4, 36 A.3d 670 (2012); the record reflects that the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the state’s case-in-chief. The court denied the motion.

       Also, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient because “[t]he state . . . admitted during closing argument that the physical evidence [related to the victim’s condition] showed everything to be normal, that no trauma occurred and that all of the witnesses were acting simply in response to the [victim’s] accusation, not in response to any evidence that the action occurred.” Having reviewed the state’s argument in its entirety, we disagree with the defendant’s characterization of it. We observe, nonetheless, that the defendant’s argument in this regard is puzzling because the state did not bear the burden of presenting evidence of physical trauma to the victim or the burden of showing that any of the law enforcement or medical professionals who played a role in this case did so in response to anything more than the victim’s allegation of abuse.

       The defendant argues that if this deems his claim to be unpreserved, this court should review the claim “for all of the reasons cited in [the portion of his brief devoted to claim I].” This abstract assertion, unsupported by adequate legal analysis related to the particular claim to which it applies, is wholly inadequate. “We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. T.R.D., 286 Conn. 191, 213-14 n.18, 942 A.2d 1000 (2008). This same rationale applies to the defendant’s unsupported assertion that the present claim warrants extraordinary review.