author: HENNESSY, J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ADAM CARMON
    (AC 16414)
    Foti, Landau and Hennessy, Js.

      Argued October 28, 1997
    officially released March 3, 1998

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      James A. Killen, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

HENNESSY, J.

The defendant, Adam Carmon, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1), and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) precluded him from cross-examining a witness on the reliability of her identification of him, (2) admitted the statement of a key state witness called during the defendant’s case for impeachment purposes, (3) refused to allow certain testimony by the police officer who had arrested one of the state’s witnesses, and (4) instructed the jury to consider the information as evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the night of February 3, 1994, Charlene Troutman was in the living room of her apartment located on Orchard Street in New Haven waiting for a taxicab. With her, among others, was her seven-month old granddaughter. Shots fired from the street passed through the living room window killing the granddaughter and leaving Troutman permanently paralyzed. At the time the shots were fired, Jaime Stanley and Raymond Jones were stopped at a traffic light near Troutman’s apartment and saw a man firing into the apartment. As the shooter ran away, both Stanley and Jones saw his face. Both witnesses identified the defendant during trial as the person who had fired the shots through the window of Troutman’s apartment.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly precluded the defendant from cross-examining Stanley regarding the reliability of her identification of the defendant as the shooter, thereby denying him his federal and state constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. In particular, the defendant wanted to question Stanley about mistaken identifications that she may have made in the past. The trial court held that evidence of possible misidentifications in the past, on unrelated events, was irrelevant to the issue of whether she had in fact seen the defendant on the night of the shooting. We agree.

“The sixth amendment to the [United States] constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to confront the witnesses against him. State v. Milum, [197 Conn. 602, 608-609, 500 A.2d 555 (1985)]. The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965) . . . (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 248-49, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), on appeal after remand, 234 Conn. 683, 663 A.2d 339 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140, 116 S. Ct. 972, 133 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1996). “[This] constitutional standard is met when defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which the jurors, as the sole triers of the facts and credibility, can appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” State v. Dobson, 221 Conn. 128, 137, 602 A.2d 977 (1992).

“One has the right to elicit any relevant fact that is contrary to the witness’s direct testimony or to draw attention to inconsistencies in his direct testimony. ... A witness can be impeached by proof that he has made prior statements, either out-of-court or in a former proceeding, that are inconsistent with his in-court testimony. Raffile v. Stamford Housewrecking, Inc., 168 Conn. 299, 362 A.2d 879 (1975) (pleadings); Schurgast v. Schumann, 156 Conn. 471, 482, 242 A.2d 695 (1968); State v. Keating, 151 Conn. 592, 597, 200 A.2d 724 (1964).” C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) §§ 7.24.2, 7.24.3, pp. 207-208.

The determination of whether a matter is relevant or collateral, and the scope and extent of cross-examination of a witness, generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 482, 522 A.2d 249 (1987); State v. Ontra, 178 Conn. 480, 488, 423 A.2d 134 (1979); Todd v. Bradley, 99 Conn. 307, 323-24, 122 A. 68 (1923). On appeal, the defendant properly states that this discretion arises only after the defendant has cross-examined the witness in a manner that satisfies his constitutional protections. State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 402, 497 A.2d 956 (1985); State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 508, 438 A.2d 749 (1980).

Furthermore, we do not disagree with the defendant’s assertion that “a defendant should be given sufficient latitude on cross-examination to expose to the jury the facts from which the jurors, as the sole triers of the facts, can appropriately weigh the reliability of the in-court [as well as the out-of-court] identification.” State v. Milner, 206 Conn. 512, 527-28, 539 A.2d 80 (1988). We disagree, however, with his characterization of the question he posed to the witness.

In this case, the defendant extensively cross-examined Stanley about her ability to identify, and the conditions under which she identified, the defendant. Stanley testified that she was in a position that enabled her clearly to see the defendant. In particular, Stanley testified that she saw the defendant fire a gun, stop, turn and face her, return to his original position and fire through the window a second time. Stanley testified that she was focused on the defendant because of his actions.

Thereafter, the defendant posed a question to the witness that asked, in a very general way, if she had ever mistaken a person for someone else. That question was asked in the midst of extensive and detailed questioning and had no relevance to the circumstances surrounding the shooting and the subsequent identification of the defendant as the shooter.

“Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. Pitt v. Kent, 149 Conn. 351, 357, 179 A.2d 626 (1962). One fact is relevant to another if in the common course of events the existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain or more probable. State v. Blake, 69 Conn. 64, 76, 36 A. 1019 (1897). No precise or universal test of relevancy, however, is possible, and the question must be answered in each case according to the dictates of logic and experience. Plumb v. Curtis, 66 Conn. 154, 166, 33 A. 998 (1895).” C. Tait & J. LaPlante, supra, § 8.1.1, p. 225.

We agree with the trial court that under the facts of this case, the fact that the witness may have incorrectly identified another person at some point in her life was irrelevant. This information would not have tended to show that her identification of the defendant on the evening of the shooting was unreliable. Without more, this question was not relevant to her ability to identify the defendant on the evening of the shooting.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the February 18,1994 statement of Arthur Brantley for impeachment purposes. The issue to be addressed is whether the statement Brantley made on February 18, 1994, was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement for the purpose of rehabilitating his credibility as a witness. The defendant presents two arguments in support of his assertion that the February 18 statement should not have been admitted: first, the statement should not have been admitted under the Whelan doctrine as a prior inconsistent statement because it was in fact consistent with his trial testimony and, second, the statement should not have been admitted for the purpose of rehabilitation as the statement was made after the prior inconsistent statements were made. To hold otherwise would violate the general rule that “ ‘a party cannot strengthen the testimony of his own witness by showing that he has made previous statements to the same effect as his testimony. . . State v. McCarthy, 179 Conn. 1, 18, 425 A.2d 924 (1979). We agree that the statement should not have been admitted under Whelan and therefore do not reach his second argument. We find the error to be harmless, however, under the facts of this case.

Additional facts are necessary to our resolution of this claim. The day after the shooting, February 4,1994, the police questioned Brantley because they had learned that Brantley had been involved in a heated argument with Troutman and other members of her family on the afternoon of the shooting. At that time, Brantley denied any involvement in or knowledge of the shooting. That statement was not made under oath. The next day, February 5, in response to police questions, he stated that after an altercation with the Troutmans on February 3, he went to Fair Haven to seek the aid of Anthony Little and to find a gun to get revenge for his treatment by the Troutmans. That statement was made under oath.

On February 7, Brantley told the police that on the evening of the shooting he, Anthony Little and Demetrious Bates drove to the Troutman residence with the intent to rob the Troutmans. While he and Little remained in the car, Bates went to Troutman’s apartment window and fired several shots. Bates got back into the car and they drove away.

On February 18, Brantley told the police that the only truth to the statements he had given on February 5 and 7 was that he had gotten into a fight at the Troutman apartment. Brantley said that the altercation occurred when the Troutmans did not give him the money they owed him for drugs that he had sold to them previously.

At trial, the defendant called Brantley to the stand for the purposes of contesting the identification of the defendant as the shooter and presenting an alternative theory of liability. Once on the stand, however, Brantley testified that he was neither present at the shooting nor involved in any manner. Thereafter, the defendant was successful in having the court admit the two prior inconsistent statements given under oath by Brantley for substantive purposes under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).

Under cross-examination by the state, Brantley testified that the two statements he had given under oath were not true and the only true statement was the one given on February 18. On the basis of that testimony, the court admitted into evidence, ostensibly under the Whelan doctrine, the February 18 statement Brantley made to the police in which he denied any involvement in the shooting.

“As a general rule, a witness’ prior consistent statements are inadmissible at trial. . . . Such statements clearly are barred by the hearsay rule if sought to be used to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein . . . also, they generally are prohibited even when offered for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the witness’ damaged credibility. . . . The rationale upon which this rale is based is that the witness’ story is not made more probable or more trustworthy by any number of repetitions of it. . . .

“This rule, however, is not absolute. The trial court, within its discretion, may admit a prior consistent statement if offered to rehabilitate a witness who has been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement ... by the suggestion of bias, motive, or interest arising after the time the prior consistent statement was made . . . by a claim of recent fabrication . . . or by a claim of faulty memory. . . . When a prior consistent statement is admitted under any of these exceptions, it is admitted to affect credibility only and not to establish the truth of the statement.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Valentine, 240 Conn. 395, 412-13, 692 A.2d 727 (1997).

The defendant claims that the statement given to the police by Brantley on February 18, two weeks after the last of the two Whelan statements were made, does not fall within the exception set forth in Valentine. In response, the state claims that although the statement made by Brantley on February 18 did not predate the earlier inconsistent statements given on February 5 and 7, it was given “about the same time” and, accordingly, should be admitted as an exception. See State v. McCarthy, supra, 179 Conn. 20. At trial, the court admitted the defendant’s February 18 statement that Whelan had “changed the rules” concerning the admissibility of prior consistent statements and instructed the jury that it was to consider the February 18 statement for impeachment purposes only, not for substantive purposes.

Although a prior consistent statement is admissible to rebut a suggestion of bias or interest, it “must be made at a time when the potential for bias or interest did not exist.” State v. Randolph, 190 Conn. 576, 587, 462 A.2d 1011 (1983). Because Brantley’s “consistent” statement was made several weeks after the two closely timed Whelan statements, we conclude that the trial court improperly admitted the February 18 statement under Whelan or Valentine. That does not, however, end our inquiry. The next question to be addressed is whether the admission of the statement was so harmful that the defendant must be afforded a new trial.

The defendant argues that admitting the statement was a harmful abuse of discretion. The defendant properly characterizes the admission of Brantley’s February 18 statement to show that Brantley had given various versions of his involvement in the shooting, thereby weakening his credibility as a witness. The Whelan statements were admitted, however, after Brantley had exhibited a tendency to make inconsistent statements.

The defense admits that it called Brantley to present evidence that someone other than the defendant had committed the crime. Accordingly, the defendant reasons that any evidence that tended to weaken Brantley’s credibility as a witness would be detrimental to the defendant’s case and therefore constitute reversible error. This argument fails.

Evidence of Brantley’s tendency to make inconsistent statements regarding the Troutman shooting was first introduced to the jury by the defendant himself. The defendant’s questioning of Brantley regarding his involvement prompted him to testify that he had given false statements on February 5 and 7. As a result of that testimony, the defendant was able to introduce those statements for substantive purposes. Likewise, the February 18 statement was introduced by the state to show that the witness’ testimony, either live or taken from his sworn statements, was not trustworthy. Therefore, the February 18 statement can be characterized as additional evidence that Brantley’s testimony was an accumulation of inconsistencies. Therefore, we conclude that admitting Brantley’s February 18 statement was improper; however, it was not harmful under the facts of this case.

Ill

The defendant next claims that the court improperly precluded him from presenting the testimony of a police officer regarding the location of drugs that were seized from the person of Jones. Jones, who testified as an eyewitness to the shooting, had been arrested and charged with possession of a firearm, possession of narcotics with intent to sell and interfering with a peace officer. Jones testified that he had been charged with those offenses but denied his guilt. In order to impeach him, the defendant sought to introduce testimony through the arresting officer as to the circumstances of the arrest. The state’s objection on relevance was sustained by the trial court.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the officer should have been allowed to testify to show that Jones had possessed a firearm and narcotics and that he had interfered with a peace officer, contrary to his testimony. The defendant argues that this evidence would have established Jones’ lack of credibility. Furthermore, it would tend to show bias or interest in that due to the pending charges, he was motivated to be a favorable witness for the state and thereby fabricate his testimony.

The state contends that the proffered testimony had no relevance to the crimes charged against the defendant other than its potential to contradict Jones’ testimony regarding the pending charges. The trial court ruled that the area of inquiry requested by the defendant concerned a collateral issue having little significance to the testimony of the witness or the issue in the case and should be excluded. We agree.

The determination of whether a matter is relevant or collateral rests within “the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Colton, supra, 227 Conn. 248. Here, the defendant was allowed to cross-examine Jones about the arrest, the pending charges, and an incident wherein Jones and the defendant engaged in a physical confrontation concerning the sale of drugs in the neighborhood. We are not persuaded that the defendant’s request to call the arresting officer to testify for the impeachment of Jones was appropriate.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant had been afforded sufficient latitude to impeach Jones and to attempt to show his bias, motive or interest for testifying in a manner favorable to the state’s case.

IV

The defendant next claims that the trial court failed to give a proper instruction to the jury when it omitted language that informed the jury that the information was merely a formal way of charging the defendant with a crime and that it was not evidence. The defendant argues that this omission was in fact an affirmative directive to the jury to consider the information as evidence. We disagree.

The defendant did not object to the instructions given by the trial judge to the jury nor did he file a written request to charge. Despite this, the defendant claims that this issue should be reviewed pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or, in the alternative, under the plain error doctrine pursuant to Practice Book § 4061. The defendant contends that as a result of this omission, his constitutional right to the presumption of innocence was violated, and the state’s burden to prove each element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt was lessened.

In support of his claim of a constitutional violation, the defendant relies on the case law of jurisdictions in which it is within the trial judge’s discretion to give the information to the jury. These jurisdictions also require that the information be accompanied by a proper limiting instruction. The defendant claims that the omitted limiting instruction is critical because without it, the jury may improperly consider the information as evidence of the guilt of the accused.

We are not persuaded that the case law from other jurisdictions is applicable. Practice Book § 858 provides in relevant part: “The judicial authority shall submit to the jury: (1) The information upon which the defendant was tried; and (2) All exhibits received in evidence. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 858 is not a discretionary rule. Therefore, case law from states in which submitting the information to the jury is a discretionary function is not persuasive.

In State v. Hernandez, 21 Conn. App. 235, 241, 573 A.2d 5 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 218 Conn. 458, 590 A.2d 112 (1991), this court expressly rejected a claim similar to that of the defendant in the present case. In Hernandez, this court held that a defendant’s claim that a jury would be misled into viewing the information as evidence of guilt, absent a contrary instruction, particularly where the jury was properly instructed on the presumption of innocence and the state’s burden of proof, was not probable. We find that Hernandez controls this case.

Here, the instruction given to the jury was as follows: “You will have with you in the jury room the exhibits which are admitted into evidence. You will have with you the information which I read to you. As I have indicated, the exhibits are evidence just as much as the testimony from the mouths of the witnesses.” The wording of the instruction to the jury did not state that the information was evidence, but rather that it would be with them in the jury room. This is required by the rules of practice. Furthermore, the trial court explicitly stated in its preliminary charge to the jury panel that the information “is not evidence of anything”; it was “merely a statement by the state’s attorney of what they accused the defendant of doing.” Although prehminary instructions to the jury panel cannot have the same efficacy as a final instruction to the jury, it must be recognized as having some impact on it. See State v. Kelly, 23 Conn. App. 160, 170, 580 A.2d 520, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 831, 583 A.2d 130 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 1635, 113 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1991).

We conclude that the failure of the trial court to include an affirmative statement that the information is not evidence in the final charge cannot be characterized as plain error because it is not so obvious “ ‘that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’ ” State v. Vas, 44 Conn. App. 70, 74, 687 A.2d 1295, cert. denied, 240 Conn. 910, 689 A.2d 474 (1997). We decline the defendant’s invitation to review this claimed error under Golding because the defendant has failed to demonstrate that, in light of Hernandez, a constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived him of a fair trial. State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       During the defendant’s cross-examination of Stanley, the following exchange took place:
      “[Defense Counsel]: Let me ask you a question. You ever see somebody, think you know him, walk right up to him, think you know him all along, get right up to him and say, ‘Oh, gee, you are not the person I thought you were’?
      “[State’s Attorney]: Object.
      “Q. You ever do that?
      “[State’s Attorney]: Object. Totally irrelevant. Has nothing to do with this case.
      “The Court: Objection sustained.
      “[Defense Counsel]: I’m going to claim that, Your Honor. I thought everybody has done that.
      “The Court: I don’t know that everybody has done that, [counsel]. There is no evidence that everybody has done that. There is an objection. I have sustained the objection. Please just ask your next question.”

       In an alternative argument, the defendant contends that the question was relevant to show “an inherent lack of identification or at least an inherent fallibility of identification” on the part of the witness. The court ruled that as part of the defendant’s exploration of the reliability of this witness’ identification of the defendant as the shooter, asking whether the witness had ever mistaken a person for someone else was not sufficiently analogous to render the question relevant. For the reasons set forth previously, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

       Brantley went to Troutman’s apartment the afternoon of the shooting to collect money owed to him by Troutman and her son, Richard, for drugs he had sold them. An altercation took place in connection with a dispute over the failure of the Troutmans to pay Brantley.

        Whelan stands for the proposition that a prior inconsistent statement may be used a1 trial for substantive as well as impeachment purposes where the statement is signed by a declarant who has personal knowledge of the facts stated therein and who testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination.

       In McCarthy, the defendant made three statements within two or three days of each other. “There is nothing in the record or the portion of the transcript referred to us by the defendant to indicate any motive, bias or interest which occurred between the second and third statement that would taint it with revenge or self-interest. As all of the statements may be considered as having been made at or about the same time, the issue of sequence is not critical.” State v. McCarthy, supra, 179 Conn. 20.

       “The first two conditions [of Golding] are determinations of whether a defendant’s claim will be reviewed, and the third condition involves a review of the claim itself.” State v. Graham, 33 Conn. App. 432, 442, 636 A.2d 852, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 906, 640 A.2d 117 (1994).

       Under the third prong of Golding, “a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved constitutional claim of instructional error only if, considering the substance of the charge rather than the form of what was said, it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled. ... In determining whether the jury was misled, it is well established that [a] charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding them to a correct verdict in the case.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pearsall, 44 Conn. App. 62, 68, 687 A.2d 1301, cert. denied, 240 Conn. 910, 689 A.2d 473 (1997). We conclude that the charge given by the trial court was legally correct and sufficient in presenting the case to the jury. The jury was repeatedly instructed on the requirements of the crime charged and that the state had the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions, viewed in their entirety, gave the jury the proper guidance required under the law. See State v. Vas, supra, 44 Conn. App. 76.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: SCHALLER, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    MICHAEL CONSTANTOPOULOS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16293)
    Schaller, Dupont and Daly, Js.
    Argued November 6, 1997
    officially released March 3, 1998

      Todd A. Edgington, assistant public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

      Gerard P. Eisenman, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Richard F. Jacobson, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
   Opinion

SCHALLER, J.

The petitioner appeals from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After reviewing the record and briefs and hearing from the parties at oral argument, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to prove his claim.

The habeas court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s petition was predicated on a review of the petitioner’s claims that his attorney failed (1) to ensure that the petitioner’s guilty plea was voluntary, and (2) to assist the petitioner effectively in connection with his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. In February, 1989, when the petitioner was sixteen years old, he was involved in an ongoing dispute with some other young men in his Bridgeport neighborhood. The petitioner had been involved in several altercations with Reginald Hillyard and Chantel Gray. On February 2, 1989, Hillyard and Gray were in a car that struck the rear of the petitioner’s car. Hillyard exited his car, threatened the petitioner and revealed that he was carrying a gun under his shirt. The petitioner drove away to avoid Hillyard, and a high speed car chase ensued on Interstate 95 between Bridgeport and South Norwalk. Upon returning to Bridgeport, the petitioner drove to his residence. As he pulled into the driveway, he noticed that Hillyard and Gray were still in pursuit.

The petitioner and Hillyard got out of their cars and continued their argument. Hillyard shot at the petitioner, who returned the fire. Gray ran from the scene after the first shots were fired. The petitioner shot Hillyard five times, causing his death. Gray was later found shot to death approximately one-half mile from the petitioner’s residence.

The petitioner was charged in a three count information with two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and one count of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35. The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on all counts and the case proceeded to trial. The petitioner was represented at trial by attorney Raymond Ganim of Stratford. After the state presented all of its evidence and rested its case, the state and the petitioner engaged in plea bargaining. According to the agreement originally proposed, the petitioner would plead guilty to a substituted information charging one count of murder for the death of Hillyard, one count of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3) for the death of Gray, and one count of carrying a pistol without a permit. In exchange, the state would argue for a capped thirty year sentence of imprisonment. The state did not agree to this arrangement, but did agree to an arrangement whereby the petitioner would plead guilty in exchange for a capped forty year sentence with the right to argue for less. Knowing this, the petitioner pleaded guilty to all counts in the substituted information. On September 21, 1990, the trial court accepted the petitioner’s guilty plea after conducting the required canvass pursuant to Practice Book § 711.

The trial court scheduled the sentencing hearing for November 13,1990. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the petitioner had second thoughts about his guilty plea and attempted to contact his attorney. When these efforts proved unsuccessful, he drafted a handwritten pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. When the petitioner presented this motion to Ganim at the sentencing hearing, it was the first time that Ganim had been notified of the petitioner’s desire to withdraw his guilty plea. Ganim orally presented the petitioner’s motion to the trial court at the sentencing hearing. The trial court offered to allow Ganim to formalize the motion in typewritten form and present it to the court the next day. Ganim declined this offer and read the petitioner’s pro se motion into the record at the sentencing hearing before the trial court. The trial court requested a playback of the September 21 guilty plea canvass. The trial court then denied the petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him to thirty-five years on the charge of murder, twenty years on the charge of manslaughter in the first degree, and five years on the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit, all to run concurrently for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. No direct appeal was ever filed in this case.

I

The petitioner first claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to ensure that his guilty plea was voluntary. In support of this claim, he makes several assertions. First, the petitioner claims that his attorney failed to object to the trial court’s failure to canvass him completely and properly with respect to all the elements required by Practice Book § 711. Second, the petitioner claims that his attorney failed to advise him of the availability of lesser included offenses and relevant defenses to the murder and manslaughter charges. Finally, the petitioner claims that his attorney failed to discuss and review with him the statutory elements of the crimes to which he was pleading. We address each of these arguments in turn.

A

The petitioner first claims that counsel failed to ensure that his guilty plea was voluntary because his attorney failed to object to the trial court’s noncompliance with all of the elements of Practice Book § 711 during the guilty plea canvass. Specifically, the petitioner claims that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to object to the trial court’s failure to address the mandatory minimum sentences and the nonsuspendable portions of the sentences with respect to the char ges of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of §§ 711 (2) and (3). We do not agree.

When reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two part test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). To prevail on this claim, the petitioner must demonstrate both (1) deficient performance by his attorney and (2) actual prejudice. Id. To resolve this issue, this court may analyze the prejudice prong without reaching the issue of deficient performance. “In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id., 697.

In the guilty plea context, the prejudice requirement of Strickland is satisfied when the petitioner demonstrates that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). Accordingly, the petitioner in this case must show that had his attorney objected to the trial court’s alleged failure to comply with § 711 (2) and (3), he would not have pleaded guilty and would have allowed the trial to continue to completion.

In this case, the petitioner faced a potential sentence of life imprisonment for two murders. If he had allowed the trial to proceed to completion, he may have been found guilty of the murders of both Hillyard and Gray. Pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-35a, the petitioner, who was seventeen years old at the time of trial, was facing the possibility of twenty-five years to fife imprisonment for each count of murder. Therefore, the petitioner faced the potential of lengthy incarceration. The total effective sentence of thirty-five years imprisonment, which the petitioner received, is substantially less than the maximum sentences that he faced on both counts of murder. While it is possible that he may have been acquitted on both charges, he decided to plead guilty on the bases of the advice of counsel and the urging of his mother, who was his court-appointed guardian ad litem. We cannot infer, on this record, that the failure to advise the petitioner of the mandatory minimum sentences and the nonsuspendable portions of those sentences would have modified his desire to minimize his exposure at age seventeen to potential life imprisonment.

More significantly, the petitioner agreed to a term of imprisonment that exceeded any mandatory minimum sentence. During the plea bargaining process, the original proposal called for a capped sentence of thirty years imprisonment in exchange for the petitioner’s guilty plea. This offer was rejected by the state in favor of an offer of a capped sentence of forty years imprisonment with the right to argue for less. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced because he was not advised of the mandatory minimum sentence on the various charges since he knew that he would be subject to a term of imprisonment far exceeding any mandatory minimum sentence. See State v. Domian, 235 Conn. 679, 688-90, 668 A.2d 1333 (1996) (failure of trial court to advise defendant of mandatory minimum sentence did not constitute reversible error when defendant was aware of actual sentencing possibilities). Therefore, the petitioner knowingly pleaded guilty because his decision was based on his knowledge of the actual prison sentences that he faced as a result of the plea bargaining process. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to establish that he would have changed his plea to not guilty had the trial court complied with the requirements of § 711 (2) and (3).

B

The petitioner next claims that his guilty plea was involuntary because his attorney failed to advise him of the relevant defenses and the availability of lesser included offenses to the murder and manslaughter charges. Specifically, the petitioner claims that if he had been aware of the defenses of self-defense, extreme emotional disturbance and defense of property, he would not have elected to plead guilty. We are not persuaded.

The essence of the petitioner’s claim here is that had his attorney advised him of these potentially relevant defenses, which may have resulted in either outright acquittal or the reduction of the murder charge to a first degree manslaughter charge, the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty but would have elected to have the trial continue to completion. Once again, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate the required prejudice that resulted from his attorney’s alleged failures.

To evaluate such a claim properly, it is customary for the reviewing court to decide whether the affirmative defense at issue would have succeeded at trial. Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. 59; Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139, 162-63, 662 A.2d 718 (1995). If it is likely that the affirmative defenses of self-defense, extreme emotional disturbance or defense of property would have succeeded at trial, then the petitioner has demonstrated the required prejudice to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

When reviewing this claim, we “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under these circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Levine v. Manson, 195 Conn. 636, 640, 490 A.2d 82 (1985).

In this case, the petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he was planning to make a self-defense argument to the jury during his closing statement. In addition, he considered the defenses of extreme emotional disturbance and defense of property but decided against employing them. These decisions could be considered sound trial strategy under the circumstances of this case. At the time of trial, Ganim had been a member of the bar for over forty years and had handled between fifty and 100 murder cases during that time. We cannot conclude that informing the petitioner of these defenses would necessarily have changed his plea. Ganim recommended to the petitioner that he should accept the state’s plea offer in an attempt to minimize his exposure to a life sentence. Ganim presumably weighed the likelihood of success on the self-defense claim and, as did the petitioner’s mother, recommended that the petitioner accept the state’s plea bargain offer. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to discuss the potentially relevant defenses and the lesser included offenses to the murder charge.

C

The petitioner’s final allegation in support of his claim that his guilty plea was not voluntary is that his attorney failed to discuss with him all of the elements of the crimes with which he was charged. We previously determined that the petitioner did not prove the required prejudice caused by his counsel’s failure to ensure that he be advised of the mandatory minimum sentence, the nonsuspendable portion of his sentence and the potentially relevant defenses to the charge of murder. Since there was no demonstration of prejudice on those issues, we conclude that the failure to be advised of the specific elements of the crimes with which he was charged would also not cause prejudice. It is not likely that the petitioner would have withdrawn his guilty plea and elected to have the trial proceed to completion because he had been advised of the elements of the crimes with which he was charged.

II

The petitioner next claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to reduce his handwritten pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea into a formal typewritten motion at the sentencing hearing on November 13, 1990. As part of this claim, the petitioner further alleges that his counsel did not articulate to the trial court the specific legal basis from Practice Book § 721 on which he would rely to have the petitioner’s guilty plea withdrawn, and that counsel should have formally researched and briefed the issue. We are not persuaded.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court offered Ganim a one day continuance so that the motion could be typewritten to present fully the issue of plea withdrawal. Ganim declined the trial court’s offer and read the petitioner’s pro se motion into the record. The trial court requested a playback of the guilty plea canvass from September 21, 1990, to determine whether it was legally sufficient. The trial court then denied the petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

The petitioner again has failed to demonstrate that any prejudice resulted from Ganim’s performance. The petitioner does not point to any additional legal arguments that Ganim could have made to the trial court in support of the motion had he allowed the sentencing hearing to be continued to the next day. We conclude that the motion was properly before the trial court in satisfactory form to enable the court to rule on the motion, and the petitioner was not prejudiced in any way because it was not typewritten. In addition, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different if Ganim had submitted the motion to withdraw the guilty plea in typewritten form. Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “(a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person ....
      “(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a . . . .”

       General Statutes § 29-35 provides in relevant part: “(a) No person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his person, except when such person is within his dwelling house or place of business, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28. . . .”

       General Statutes § 53a-55 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when . . . (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.
      “(b) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.”

       Practice Book § 711 provides: “The judicial authority shall not accept the plea [of guilty or nolo contendere] without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that he fully understands:
      “(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;
      “(2) The mandatory minimum sentence, if any;
      “(3) The fact that the statute for the particular offense does not permit the sentence to be suspended;
      “(4) The maximum possible sentence on the charge, including, if there are several charges, the maximum sentence possible from consecutive sentences and including, when applicable, the fact that a different or additional punishment may be authorized by reason of a previous conviction; and
      “(5) The fact that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and the fact that he has the right to be tried by a jury or a judge and that at that trial he has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself.”

       The petitioner appears to address the issue of trial court error directly in this claim. Therefore, he would have us implicitly conclude that the trial court improperly failed to comply with Practice Book § 711.
      A habeas corpus petitioner can raise trial court error only if the cause and prejudice requirement of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977), has been satisfied. See Baez v. Commissioner of Correction, 34 Conn. App. 236, 641 A.2d 147 (1994); Bowers v. Commissioner of Correction, 33 Conn. App. 449, 636 A.2d 388, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 929, 640 A.2d 115 (1994). The petitioner clearly states in his brief, however, that his claim relates solely to his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to object to the trial court’s inadequate canvass under § 711. Therefore, we do not engage in a cause and prejudice analysis under Wainwright.

       General Statutes §53a-35a provides in relevant part: “For any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and the term shall be fixed by the court as follows . . . (2) for the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor more than life . . . .”

       The petitioner attempts to equate reversible error in a direct appeal with prejudice in a habeas corpus proceeding in order to prove the required prejudice underStricklandv. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668. The petitioner cites no authority for such a proposition. Our review of the law confirms that no such precedent exists. Therefore, the petitioner’s claim is without merit.


author: SHEA, J.

text:
    JERRY R. DALMASO v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
    (AC 16660)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Schaller and Shea, Js.
    Argued December 9, 1997
    officially released March 3, 1998

      Mark M. Wrenn, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Robert L. Marconi, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

SHEA, J.

The plaintiff, Jerry R. Dalmaso, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court affirming the order of the defendant department of motor vehicles that his license to operate a motor vehicle be suspended for six months as a result of his refusal to submit to a chemical test of his breath to determine the alcohol content of his blood, as provided by subsections (a) and (b) of General Statutes § 14-227b. Before declining the test, the plaintiff requested permission to telephone his attorney, but the police insisted that he take the test before they would allow such a telephone call. The plaintiffs determination to consult his attorney before submitting to the test was treated by the police and also by the motor vehicle department hearing officer as a refusal of the test, thereby subjecting him to a license suspension pursuant to subsection (b). The sole issue presented by the appeal is whether the denial of the plaintiffs request to call his attorney before submitting to the test invalidates the conclusion of the hearing officer that the plaintiff had refused the test. The trial court concluded that it did not and dismissed the appeal. From that judgment the plaintiff appeals to this court. We affirm the judgment.

On December 22, 1995, at 6:03 p.m., the plaintiff stopped his vehicle in response to the emergency light signal of a police patrol vehicle. The police officer, who followed the plaintiff as he drove along several streets in Waterbury, observed the plaintiffs vehicle crossing the yellow line and stopping for no apparent reason. When the officer walked up to the plaintiffs vehicle and spoke to him, he noticed the odor of alcohol on the plaintiffs breath. The officer then administered a field test for sobriety, which the plaintiff failed. After a brief struggle with the plaintiff, the officer arrested him for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) and transported him to the Waterbury police station. There, the arresting officer requested the plaintiff to submit to a breath test to determine the alcohol content of his blood, advising him that a refusal to take the test would result in a suspension of his operator’s license. The plaintiff responded that he wanted to speak to his attorney. At the motor vehicle department hearing, the officer testified that he knew the plaintiff wanted to speak to his attorney before taking the test. He conceded that after the plaintiff had been permitted to make a telephone call, the police did not again request that the plaintiff submit to the test.

The plaintiff claims that the decision of the motor vehicle department hearing officer to suspend his license for six months should be reversed because of the admitted failure of the Waterbury police department to comply with subsection (b) of § 14-227b providing that a person arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor must be “afforded a reasonable opportunity to telephone an attorney prior to the performance” of a blood, urine or breath test. As the plaintiff recognizes, however, previous decisions of our Supreme Court and this court have construed § 14-227b (f) to restrict a license suspension hearing, as the statute expressly provides, to the determination of the following four issues: “(1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis . . . and (4) was such person operating the motor vehicle. . . .”

In Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 6-8, 509 A.2d 489 (1986), our Supreme Court, relying on the provision of § 14-227b that a suspension hearing “shall be limited to a determination” of the four specified issues, held that, in such a proceeding, it was of no significance that the presumably intoxicated driver may not have understood the consequences of a refusal to submit to chemical testing after having been properly informed thereof by the arresting officer. The court again relied on that restriction in affirming a license suspension in Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 509-10, 529 A.2d 177 (1987), even though the police had not followed the procedures prescribed in subsections (b) and (c) of § 14-227b. The court recognized the significant difference in consequences that may follow a criminal prosecution for violating the prohibition in § 14-227a (a) for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and the license suspension that may follow a refusal to submit to chemical testing for the purpose of determining blood alcohol content. “It is only by strictly following the statutory requirements that an operator’s refusal of chemical testing can be used in a criminal prosecution against him for operating under the influence or with impaired ability. On the other hand, the restriction of a license suspension hearing to the four issues specified in subsection [¶] of § 14-227b is indicative of the legislative view that the failure to comply precisely with the requirements of subsection (b) should not prevent suspension of the license of a person, arrested with probable cause for believing he was operating under the influence or with impaired ability as a result of intoxicating liquor, who has refused to submit to the prescribed tests.” Volck v. Muzio, supra, 514.

This court also has adhered to the interpretation of subsection (f) of § 14-227b that confines a license suspension hearing to a determination of the four issues specified therein, despite deviations from the procedures that subsection (b) commands in making arrests for driving while under the influence of intoxicants. In both Kramer v. DelPonte, 26 Conn. App. 101, 101-102, 598 A.2d 670 (1991), and Piorek v. DelPonte, 28 Conn. App. 911, 911-12, 610 A.2d 201 (1992), we disregarded indications in each case that the police had not permitted the arrested drivers to telephone attorneys before requesting them to be tested, as subsection (b) provides. In those cases, we implicitly rejected the very claim raised by the plaintiff in this appeal: that the failure of the police to allow an opportunity to telephone an attorney prior to offering the chemical tests vitiates the conclusion of the hearing officer that the arrested drivers had refused those tests. Without legislative action to enlarge the scope of a license suspension hearing beyond the four issues specified in subsection (f), we have no reason to modify the well established view that noncompliance with subsection (b) is irrelevant in such a proceeding.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 14r-227b provides in relevant part: “(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical analysis of his blood, breath or urine and, if said person is a minor, his parent or parents or guardian shall also be deemed to have given his consent.
      “(b) If any such person, having been placed under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor, and thereafter, after being apprised of his constitutional rights, having been requested to submit to a blood, breath or urine test at the option of the police officer, having been afforded a reasonable opportunity to telephone an attorney prior to the performance of such test and having been informed that his license or nonresident operating privilege may be suspended in accordance with the provisions of this section if he refuses to submit to such test or if he submits to such test and the results of such test indicate that the ratio of alcohol in his blood was ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight, and that evidence of any such refusal shall be admissible in accordance with subsection (f) of section 14-227a and may be used against him in any criminal prosecution, refuses to submit to the designated test, the test shall not be given; provided, if the person refuses or is unable to submit to a blood test, the police officer shall designate the breath or urine test as the test to be taken. The police officer shall make a notation upon the records of the police department that he informed the person that his license or nonresident operating privilege may be suspended if he refused to submit to such test or if he submitted to such test and the results of such test indicated that the ratio of alcohol in his blood was ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight. . . .”

       General Statutes § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. . . .”

       General Statutes § 14-227b (f) provides in pertinent part: “The [license suspension] hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis or did such person submit to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicated that the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person was ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight; and (4) was such person operating the motor vehicle. . . .”

       The deviation from subsection (b) of § 14-227b was the failure of the police to arrest the operator before offering him the chemical tests. The deviation from subsection (c) was the failure to have the report of the arresting officer concerning such refusal “endorsed by a third person who witnessed [the operator’s] refusal.”


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PAUL MARCHITTO
    (AC 16558)
    O’Connell, C. X, and Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued September 15
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

This case is controlled by State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 411 A.2d 3 (1979), and State v. Vas, 44 Conn. App. 70, 687 A.2d 1295, cert. denied, 240 Conn. 910, 689 A.2d 474 (1997).

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    GILBERI PARTNERSHIP v. DARRYL S. DAVIS ET AL.
    (AC 16385)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Schaller, Js.
    Argued September 16
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DONNIE MCDANIEL
    (AC 16022)
    Lavery, Landau and Daly, Js.
    Argued September 17
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PURITO REYES
    (AC 16008)
    Lavery, Landau and Daly, Js.
    Argued September 17
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ANN MARIE BRITT v. WALLACE MANUFACTURING COMPANY ET AL.
    (AC 16712)
    Lavery, Landau and Daly, Js.
    Argued September 17
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    JAMES W. CAHILL v. ESSEX SAVINGS BANK
    (AC 16588)
    Landau, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued September 18
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN R. CARTWRIGHT
    (15704)
    Foti, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued September 18
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    FRANCISCO MONTANEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 15860)
    Foti, Lavery and Schaller, Js.
    Argued September 23
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PAUL D. HILL
    (AC 15872)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Hennessy and Shea, Js.
    Argued September 24
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

This case is controlled by State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994).

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    CURT K. ROSSELL ET AL. v. JEFFREY ROFFMAN ET AL.
    (AC 16285)
    Spear, Hennessy and Healey, Js.
    Argued September 24
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KEITH BRASWELL
    (AC 15025)
    Spear, Dupont and Healey, Js.
    Argued September 24
    officially released October 7, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ADAM ROBERTS
    (AC 15605)
    Spear, Dupont and Healey, Js.
    Argued September 25
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    RICHARD TRAFTON v. JEFFREY CORREA, AGENT FOR GOVERNOR JOHN R. ROWLAND
    (AC 16003)
    Lavery, Hennessy and Dupont, Js.
    Argued September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    JOHN M. GROTTOLE ET AL. v. FRANK DEMILO ET AL.
    (AC 16644)
    Lavery, Hennessy and Dupont, Js.
    Argued September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MICHAEL PLANETA v. BAHAMA BOBS HARTFORD, INC., ET AL.
    (AC 16086)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    SUSAN M. STRUMPF v. DAVID J. STRUMPF
    (AC 16490)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MARY ST. JOHN-CULLEN v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES
    (AC 16797)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    GREGORY CARUSO v. MICHAEL KOZLOWSKI, COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES
    (AC 16662)
    Foti, Landau and Schaller, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    LAURENCE Z. COHEN v. AMERICAN SAW AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY ET AL.
    (AC 16617)
    Foti, Landau and Schaller, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MARY MCINTOSH v. JOHN H. MCINTOSH
    (AC 16671)
    Foti, Landau and Schaller, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    LAURIE BISHOP v. STEVENS FORD, INC.
    (AC 16901)
    Foti, Landau and Schaller, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STEPHEN BATTISTA v. NICHOLAS DENIGRIS
    (AC 16571)
    Foti, Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND v. STEVEN G. CANNA ET AL.
    (AC 16580)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Foti and Daly, Js.
    Argued September 29
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The record on appeal is inadequate. See Practice Book § 4061.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    RODERICK JOHNSON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16445)
    Foti, Dupont and Stoughton, Js.
    Argued September 29
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RONALD SCHIAVO
    (AC 16443)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Schaller, Js.
    Argued September 30
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    DANIEL LUCE v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION/PRATT AND WHITNEY AIRCRAFT DIVISON ET AL.
    (AC 16725)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Dupont and Stoughton, Js.
    Argued September 29
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

This case is controlled by Pascarelli v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 44 Conn. App. 397, 689 A.2d 1132, cert. denied, 240 Conn. 926, 692 A.2d 1282 (1997).

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. FRANCISCO ORTIZ
    (AC 15048)
    O’Connell, C. J. and Landau and Schaller, Js.
    Argued September 30
    officially released October 21, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    DIME SAVINGS BANK OF NEW YORK v. BARBARA A. WHITING ET AL.
    (AC 16497)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Schaller and Daly, Js.
    Argued September 29
    officially released October 28, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ANTHONY HOPKINS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16191)
    Lavery, Landau and Dupont, Js.
    Argued September 30
    officially released October 28, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ARTHUR BRANNEN, JR.
    (AC 15945)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued October 1
    officially released October 28, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ZEENA LOBO v. VINCENT D’SOUZA
    (AC 16436)
    O’Connell, C. X, and Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 28, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ELIZABETH C. DOLGNER v. JON M. ALANDER, COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    (AC 16595)
    Foti, Lavery and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 28, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
    (AC 16360)
    Foti, Lavery and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 28, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    DENISE M. LONGO v. RICHARD M. LONGO
    (AC 16618)
    Foti, Lavery and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 28, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STEVEN J. PIZZELLA v. STATE PLUMBING AND PIPING WORK EXAMINING BOARD
    (AC 16745)
    Foti, Lavery and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 26
    officially released October 28, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GEORGE HAWKINS
    (AC 16337)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Landau and Dupont, Js.
    Argued October 27
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JUANITA MARTIN
    (AC 12071)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Landau and Dupont, Js.
    Argued October 27
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    KATHLEEN O. MINNEMAN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NORWICH ET AL.
    (AC 16746)
    Foti, Lavery and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued October 27
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    ANTHONY J. BORELLI v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16597)
    Foti, Lavery and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued October 27
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ROSCOE JOHNSON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 17012)
    Lavery, Spear and Daly, Js.
    Argued October 28
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ERROL DUNKLEY
    (AC 15387)
    Lavery, Spear and Daly, Js.
    Argued October 28
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WAYNE WHITE
    (AC 16059)
    Foti, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued October 28
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    FRANK VANDEVER v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 15988)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Sehaller and Cretella, Js.
    Argued October 29
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    PEDRO ROBLES v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16246)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Schaller and Cretella, Js.
    Argued October 29
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    THOMAS FARNIE v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES
    (AC 16440)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Spear and Daly, Js.
    Argued October 30
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    KEITH M. COMMERFORD v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16450)
    Lavery, Schaller and Daly, Js.
    Argued October 30
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. THOMAS J. FARRELL
    (AC 16040)
    Landau, SchaUer and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued October 31
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    WILLIAM F. BENNETT v. DAVID A. GIBSON
    (AC 16608)
    Foti, Landau and Daly, Js.
    Argued November 3
    officially released November 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KAREEM FARRIOR
    (AC 16324)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Spear, Js.
    Argued November 6
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARLIK MOURNING
    (AC 16679)
    Schaller, Dupont and Daly, Js.
    Argued November 6
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MARCON CAPITAL CORPORATION v. CHARAN K. SODHI ET AL.
    (AC 16915)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Spear, Js.
    Argued November 6
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIE JOSEPH FULLER
    (AC 16061)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued November 4
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    PAUL S. VARSZEGI v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16971)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued November 4
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DARREN J. KELLEY
    (AC 15879)
    Foti, SchaUer and Healey, Js.
    Argued November 4
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES M. STERBINSKY
    (AC 15934)
    Lavery, Hennessy and Dupont, Js.
    Argued November 7
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    BREINA SCHAIN v. BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD OF CONNECTICUT, INC.
    (AC 16647)
    Lavery, Hennessy and Dupont, Js.
    Argued November 7
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN WALZER
    (AC 15073)
    Schaller, Hennessy and Dupont, Js.
    Argued November 10
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    LAURIE M. AHEARN v. MICHAEL Y. AHEARN
    (AC 17147)
    Foti, Dupont and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 13
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ANTONIO DEOLIVERIA v. ROSS AND ROBERTS, INC., ET AL.
    (AC 16726)
    Foti, Dupont and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 13
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    LITCHFIELD ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. MARY ANN HOWELL ET AL.
    (AC 16980)
    Lavery, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 13
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    JANET AVILES v. DAVID FEVRER
    (AC 17054)
    Lavery, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 13
    officially released December 2, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    DEAN DESROSIER v. TOWN OF NEWINGTON ET AL.
    (AC 16752)
    Schaller, Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 13
    officially released December 9, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    DOREEN M. SIMPSON v. BRUCE L. SIMPSON
    (AC 16722)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 13
    officially released December 9, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    JEFFREY C. STANGER ET AL. v. MARION H. WOLF ET AL.
    (AC 17030)
    Foti, Dupont and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 13
    officially released December 9, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RODNEY JACKSON
    (AC 15963)
    Laveiy, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued December 1
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    SAYBROOK BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. JOHN T. O’REILLY ET AL.
    (AC 16986)
    SchaUer, Hennessy and Dupont, Js.
    Argued November 10
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days..


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GREGORY MOODY
    (AC 16550)
    Foti, Landau and Daly, Js.
    Argued December 1
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    NORWICH SAVINGS SOCIETY v. GEORGE R. FLONNES ET AL.
    (AC 16944)
    Foti, Spear and Stoughton, Js.
    Argued December 3
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    BANK OF NEW HAVEN v. JUDITH A. ESPOSITO ET AL.
    (AC 17304)
    Landau, Schaller and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting a new sale date.


text:
    EILEEN C. STERN ET AL. v. INSPECTIONS INCORPORATED ET AL.
    (AC 16782)
    Landau, Schaller and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    PATRICK KELLY v. STOP AND SHOP COMPANIES, INC.
    (AC 17110)
    Landau, Schaller and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MARINA LUSSIER v. PHILLIP LUSSIER
    (AC 16759)
    Landau, SchaUer and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    SUSAN DOLAN v. BRENDA GERMOND
    (AC 17141)
    Foti, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ALAN SCHLESINGER v. PETER PROKOPIS ET AL.
    (AC 16816)
    Foti, Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ROGER ROY v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, ELECTRIC BOAT DIVISION, ET AL.
    (AC 17118)
    Foti, Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CARLOS RIVERA
    (AC 16055)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Daly, Js.
    Argued December 4
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BOBBY WILSON
    (AC 16609)
    Landau, Schaller and Daly, Js.
    Argued December 4
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ANDREW J. BOBKOWICZ v. LUNN INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL.
    (AC 16069)
    (AC 16165)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Foti and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued December 2
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    BRIAN STANFORD v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16622)
    Lavery, Landau and Spear, Js.
    Argued December 2
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    JANET FRANCO v. KENNETH FRANCO
    (AC 16547)
    Schaller, Hennessy and Spallone, Js.
    Argued December 8
    officially released December 23, 1997
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    JOHN CONSOLI v. CYNTHIA CONSOLI
    (AC 16811)
    Lavery, Spear and Healey, Js.
    Argued December 9, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    GERRITY COMPANY, INC. v. PACE CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL.
    (AC 16632)
    Foti, Landau and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 8, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MARIA POLLASTRO v. SABATINO POLLASTRO
    (AC 16666)
    O’Connell, Schaller and Shea, Js.
    Argued December 9, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    THOMAS SUTKOWSKI v. RICHARD TARRO ET AL.
    (AC 15421)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Dupont, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    HELEN D. LEGNOS v. PETER J. LEGNOS
    (AC 16837)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Dupont, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STANISLAW CZAPLICKI v. EUFEMIA CZAPLICKI
    (AC 16961)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Dupont, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 5, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    JACK BIRNBERG ET AL. v. MEERA SANKARAN ET AL.
    (AC 16444)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Sehaller and Cretella, Js.
    Argued December 15, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EVERETT EDWARDS
    (AC 16518)
    Foti, Landau and Daly, Js.
    Argued December 12, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    HATCH AND BAILEY COMPANY v. JOHN MALLOZZI ET AL.
    (AC 16475)
    Foti, Landau and Daly, Js.
    Argued December 12, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    DENA WEST v. KEITH E. WORTZ
    (AC 16297)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Spear, Js.
    Argued December 11, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DEON WALKER
    (AC 15725)
    Landau, Spear and Dupont, Js.
    Argued December 15, 1997
    officially released January 6, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    DMITRY TOLCHINSKY ET AL. v. TOWN OF EAST LYME ET AL.
    (AC 16733)
    Schaller, Hennessy and Daly, Js.
    Argued December 16, 1997
    officially released January 13, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    OLDEFIELD FARMS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. LAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ET AL.
    (AC 16077)
    Laveiy, Landau and Daly, Js.
    Argued December 16, 1997
    officially released January 13, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    NEIL JOHNSON v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
    (AC 16846)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Landau, Js.
    Argued December 16, 1997
    officially released January 13, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    BERKELEY FEDERAL BANK AND TRUST FSB v. JEFFREY W. NAVIN ET AL.
    (AC 17126)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Daly, Js.
    Argued December 16, 1997
    officially released January 13, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SATBIR S. PAUL
    (AC 16480)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued January 12
    officially released February 3, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    JOHN DENBY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16721)
    Lavery, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued January 14
    officially released February 3, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    NORMA CARROLL v. MANCHESTER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
    (AC 15772)
    Lavery, Schaller and Sullivan, Js.
    Argued January 14
    officially released February 3, 1998
   Per Curiam.

This case is controlled by Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 663 A.2d 398 (1995).

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH v. THEODORE LENCZYK
    (AC 16472)
    Lavery, Schaller and Sullivan, Js.
    Argued January 14
    officially released February 3, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LARRY STOVALL, SR.
    (AC 16099)
    Spear, Dupont and Daly, Js.
    Argued January 12
    officially released February 3, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    GILBERT R. GAUVIN v. ESTATE OF RAYMOND O. GAUVIN
    (AC 16484)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Foti and Daly, Js.
    Argued January 13
    officially released February 3, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    JOAO RAFAEL v. ANTONIO VINCENTE ET AL.
    (AC 16812)
    Foti, Sullivan and Dupont, Js.
    Argued January 15
    officially released February 3, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MARVIN E. WOODARD v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16465)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Hennessy and Dupont, Js.
    Argued January 21
    officially released February 10, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    CITIZENS SAVINGS BANK v. ANTHONY R. BASILICA ET AL.
    (AC 17086)
    Schaller, Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued January 21
    officially released February 10, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The constitutional claim was withdrawn at oral argument. We find no merit in the remaining issues.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    DANIEL MOLIENGO v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES
    (AC 16619)
    Lavery, Hennessy and Daly, Js.
    Argued January 20
    officially released February 10, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    JAMES A. PABILONIA v. GIACOMO J. GUARNACCIA, JR., ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF HOMER C. OEHLERS)
    (AC 17016)
    Lavery, Hennessy and Daly, Js.
    Argued January 20
    officially released February 10, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgments are affirmed.


text:
    STANLEY CHANCE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16872)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Landau and Schaller, Js.
    Argued January 15
    officially released February 10, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    CITY OF WATERBURY v. EILEEN HOSIER
    (AC 17047)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Landau and Schaller, Js.
    Argued January 15
    officially released February 10, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STEVEN B. KULMAC v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16805)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Foti and Spear, Js.
    Argued January 16
    officially released February 10, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY PARIS
    (AC 16300)
    Lavery, Landau and Spallone, Js.
    Argued January 16
    officially released February 10, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MIDSTATES RESOURCES CORPORATION v. REX K. COLLUM ET AL.
    (AC 17448)
    Lavery, Spear and Dupont, Js.
    Argued January 22
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    THEODORE LENCZYK v. CONNECTICUT DENTAL COMMISSION ET AL.
    (AC 16815)
    Foti, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued January 22
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    KWEKU J. HANSON v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
    (AC 16907)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Hennessy and Stoughton, Js.
    Argued January 26
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    ARTHUR R. BARLOW v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 16686)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Hennessy and Stoughton, Js.
    Argued January 26
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    ROBERT H. VALENTI ET AL. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE TOWN OF STONINGTON ET AL.
    (AC 16235)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Hennessy and Stoughton, Js.
    Argued January 26
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ODELL SMITH
    (AC 16217)
    Landau, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued January 27
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    WANDA DAWE v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES
    (AC 16831)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Spear, Js.
    Argued January 28
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    SAVOY LINEN SERVICES, INC. v. IRENE V. DEMATTEO ET AL.
    (AC 16834)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Lavery and Landau, Js.
    Argued January 27
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MICHAEL KONOVER ET AL. v. ROBERT PATRON ET AL.
    (AC 16962)
    Foti, Schaller and Sullivan, Js.
    Argued January 28
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    FRANK FRANC ET AL. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF BETHEL
    (AC 16473)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Foti and Spear, Js.
    Argued January 28
    officially released February 17, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    PAUL PANNONE v. GILMAN DUBE
    (AC 17021)
    Schaller, Spear and Dupont, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 29
    officially released February 24, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MARK RICHARD v. OLSTEN TEMPORARY SERVICES ET AL.
    (AC 17271)
    Schaffer, Spear and Dupont, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 29
    officially released February 24, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    KEVIN SELLERS ET AL. v. CHUN SI CHEN ET AL.
    (AC 17027)
    Lavery, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 29
    officially released February 24, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    FREDERICK CURRIER v. PATRICIA CURRIER
    (AC 17148)
    Lavery, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 29
    officially released February 24, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    CYNTHIA L. BENSON v. WALTER A. BENSON
    (AC 17182)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Foti and Sullivan, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 29
    officially released February 24, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    WILLIAM PLATZ v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES
    (AC 17177)
    O’Connell, C. J., and Foti and Sullivan, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 29
    officially released February 24, 1998
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.