author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    TERRELL STATON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34267)
    DiPentima, C. X, and Alvord and Bear, Js.
    Argued January 7
    officially released February 25, 2014

      Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

      Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Stephen J. Sedensky III, state’s attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Terrell Staton, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal, and that the court improperly denied his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On June 26, 2006, Danbury police Officer Michael Pederson noticed a red Dodge Neon (vehicle) with a license plate that appeared to be a “little ragged” and did not look like it “fit” the vehicle. As he was watching the vehicle, he observed it making a right turn through a stop sign without coming to a complete stop. Pederson activated his emergency lights and, when the vehicle did not stop, he also activated his siren and contacted police dispatch. The vehicle began to drift into oncoming traffic, and the driver of the vehicle jumped out, stumbled, and then proceeded to run down an “alleyway” while the vehicle was still in motion. The unoccupied vehicle collided head-on with an oncoming car.

Pederson followed the driver and observed him running up a driveway alongside 40 Williams Street (building) before losing sight of him. Behind the building was a completely enclosed parking lot with a four to five foot high fence. Pederson waited for other police officers to arrive, including the state police canine unit. The responding canine unit officer, Jason Cassavechia, and his police dog, Dakota, proceeded to the abandoned vehicle so that Dakota could identify the scent of the driver. Dakota then tracked the scent to the parking lot behind the building where Pederson had last seen the driver. After conducting a search of the nearby area, Pederson, Cassavechia, and Dakota returned to the parking lot, whereupon Dakota resumed tracking along the fence line before barking at the petitioner, who was discovered in the bushes at the edge of the parking lot. The petitioner was subdued and placed under arrest.

At trial, the petitioner pleaded not guilty and claimed that it was his friend, Warren Battle, who was the driver of the vehicle, and that the petitioner had been in the parking lot because he was searching for Battle and the vehicle following a telephone call he received from Battle. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the petitioner was convicted of reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64, interfering with a police officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a, operating an unregistered vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-12 (a), improper use of a marker in violation of General Statutes § 14-147 (c), and failing to obey a traffic signal in violation of General Statutes § 14-301. The petitioner did not file a direct appeal, but instead filed a petition and, thereafter, an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner claims that his trial counsel, Jennifer Tun-nard, provided ineffective assistance by failing to call Battle as a witness who, the petitioner contends, would have testified as to the petitioner’s innocence, and by failing to obtain a capias for Battle. The habeas court denied the petition in a January 9, 2012 oral decision. The court concluded that the petitioner failed to meet either of the two prongs required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and denied his petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed.

“The standard of review and the hurdles a petitioner must overcome to obtain appellate review of a habeas court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after certification to appeal has been denied are well known. . . . This standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. ... A petitioner who establishes an abuse of discretion through one of the factors listed above must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits. ... In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion [a reviewing court] necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Linarte v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn. App. 500, 503, 89 A.3d 1 (2014).

“Our standard of review of a habeas court’s judgment on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well settled. In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alcena v. Commissioner of Correction, 146 Corm. App. 370, 372, 76 A.3d 742 (2013). “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner generally must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, [supra, 466 U.S. 687] .... To satisfy the performance prong . . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. ... To satisfy the prejudice prong, a claimant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. . . . The claim will succeed only if both prongs are satisfied.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Varchetta v. Commissioner of Correction, 146 Conn. App. 744, 749, 80 A.3d 591 (2013).

The record reveals the following additional facts that are relevant to our discussion. The petitioner told Tun-nard it was not he, but rather Battle who had been the driver of the vehicle on June 26, 2006. As part of her investigation, Tunnard sent Thomas Murphy, an investigator, to interview Battle at Bridgeport Correctional Center on February 12, 2008, where he was being held on an unrelated matter. Battle admitted that he was the operator of the vehicle, but informed the investigator that “he suffers from memory loss and has trouble recalling details.” Battle declined to give Murphy a written statement, “as he believe[d] he would be arrested for this incident.” On September 24,2008, the day before the bench trial, investigators for the state, John Maho-ney and Donald Brown, spoke with Battle at a private residence in Danbury. Battle stated that he remembered the incident of June 26, 2006, but that he was not there; he was not the driver of the vehicle nor was he in the vehicle. He also told the investigators that “he was using drugs at the time, and couldn’t remember much.” Battle refused to discuss the incident with the investigators further and stated that he wanted to speak to an attorney. Battle appeared before the court as a subpoenaed witness during the bench trial on September 25, 2008, and stated that he wanted to have an attorney present before being called as a witness by the petitioner. Following a brief colloquy, the court instructed Battle to call his attorney. Battle never returned to the courtroom, and, following a recess to attempt to track him down, Tunnard rested the petitioner’s case. In rendering its decision, the trial court expressly found that Peder-son gave credible testimony that it was the petitioner who was the driver of the vehicle.

On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the habeas court’s decisions denying certification to appeal and on the merits should be reversed because “[a] reasonable attorney in Tunnard’s position would not have foregone Battle’s exculpating testimony just because Battle failed to show up in court,” and her failure to call Battle as a witness fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The petitioner also argues that “Battle’s testimony would have raised reasonable doubt [as to] whether the petitioner was the driver of the [vehicle] . . . .” The petitioner posits that “[i]f the trial court had been aware that a third party had admitted to being the driver of the [vehicle], there is more than a reasonable probability that the court would have harbored reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty, and there is more than a reasonable probability that the court would have found the petitioner not guilty.” Consequently, the petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by Tunnard’s ineffective assistance in failing to call Battle as a witness.

There was substantial evidence supporting the habeas court’s conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish the prejudice prong for ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court heard Battle’s testimony, which Battle claimed was consistent with how he would have testified at the petitioner’s criminal trial. This testimony contained contradictions, and Battle repeatedly asserted that he could not recall the events of June 26, 2006. The habeas court also had the opportunity to hear testimony from Pederson, as well as Tunnard and the petitioner, before concluding that “the petitioner has not shown that there [is] a reasonable probability that the outcome ... of the proceedings would have been different in view of [Pederson’s] testimony identifying the petitioner as the person who left the scene of the crime, who he saw personally, and then chased through the neighborhood and ultimately arrested.” It was entirely within the habeas court’s purview so to conclude. “The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. . . . This court does not retry the case or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, we must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maldonado v. Commissioner of Correction, 141 Conn. App. 455, 464-65, 62 A.3d 528, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 941, 66 A.3d 883 (2013).

We conclude that the habeas corut did not err in determining that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of Tunnard’s failure to call Battle as a witness or to obtain a capias. Accordingly, the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail, and the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal from the judgment denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This is not a case in which the issues are debatable among jurists of reason, a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or the issues raised by the petitioner are adequate to cause this court to proceed to consider them.

The appeal is dismissed.

       The petitioner also claimed that Tunnard provided ineffective assistance by failing to cross-examine witnesses properly. No evidence, however, was offered on this claim, therefore the habeas court found in favor of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, on the claim. This finding has not been challenged on appeal.

       “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. Do you recall the night of June 26, 2006?
      “[Battle]: Somewhat. I don’t really—no, not really, no.

      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: You remember borrowing a car from [the petitioner]?
      “[Battle]: Yes.
      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. Did you return the car to [the petitioner]?
      “[Battle]: No.
      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. Who did you return the car to?
      “[Battle]: I never returned the car.
      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. Do you know what happened to the car?
      “[Battle]: No.
      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. Did you leave it somewhere?
      “[Battle]: No.

      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Do you know if it was at nighttime?
      “[Battle]: No. I don’t recall too much of the situation. It was awhile ago.
      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. And you don’t know what happened to the car?
      “[Battle]: No.
      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: And do you know—you left the car there. Correct?
      “[Battle]: Ri—
      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Do you know where you left it?
      “[Battle]: No.
      “[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. You left it somewhere?
      “[Battle]: Yeah.

      “[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Okay. You just left the car?
      “[Battle]: Right.
      “[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Okay. And you left it, and you walked away?
      “[Battle]: No. Idon’t—I don’t really recall the situation. Ma’am, my memory is like totally—if I can answer straight up, I would.

        “[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Do you recall—callpng] [the petitioner] at all and saypng], hey, dude, I left your car. Here’s where it is. Go get it.
      “[Battle]: I don’t remember.
      “[The Respondent’s Counsel]: You don’t?
      “[Battle]: No.”

       As we have determined that the petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced, we need not analyze whether trial counsel’s representation was deficient.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    VICTOR COLON v. AUTOZONE NORTHEAST, INC., ET AL.
    (AC 35397)
    Alvord, Keller and Bishop, Js.
    Argued January 6
    officially released February 25, 2014

      John T. Bochanis, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      William S. Wilson II, for the appellee (named defendant).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Victor Colon, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in a negligence and premises liability action in favor of the defendant AutoZone Northeast, Inc. (AutoZone). On appeal, the plaintiff claims the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant because material questions of fact existed as to whether: (1) the defendant had control of the area where the plaintiff was assaulted; and (2) the defendant should have foreseen that a dangerous condition existed when customers exited the defendant’s store. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant factual and procedural background is as follows. The plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted by an unknown assailant on or about July 14, 2009, in the parking lot outside of the defendant’s store at a strip mall located at 300 North Avenue, Bridgeport. On July 14, 2011, the plaintiff brought a negligence and premises liability action against the defendant. The defendant filed an answer denying the allegations, and asserted as a special defense that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against the defendant upon which relief could be granted because the defendant did not have possession or control over the parking lot in which the plaintiff allegedly was assaulted. On May 23, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment solely on the ground that it “owed no duty to the plaintiff because it did not have possession or control over the parking area where the plaintiff was allegedly assaulted” and therefore was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff filed an objection, and the defendant filed a reply. Oral argument was heard on the motion and on December 26,2012, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a written memorandum of decision. The court concluded that under the terms and conditions of the lease, the defendant was not in control or possession of the parking lot and owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, and, therefore, no genuine issues of material fact existed and the defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff reiterates his claims that material questions of fact existed as to whether the defendant had control of the area where the plaintiff was allegedly assaulted, and whether the defendant should have foreseen that a dangerous condition existed when customers exited the store. We are not persuaded.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review. “Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. ... A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case. . . . [T]he scope of our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 312-13, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).

With respect to the governing legal principles, “[t]he essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury. . . . The existence of a duty is a question of law .... If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mirjavadi v. Vakilzadeh, 310 Conn. 176, 191, 74 A.3d 1278 (2013). “[Liability can be predicated upon negligence in the control and possession of premises, as opposed to mere ownership thereof. . . . Thus, the dispositive issue in deciding whether a duty exists is whether the [defendant] has any right to possession and control of the property. . . . Retention of control is essentially a matter of intention to be determined in the light of all the significant circumstances. . . . The word control has no legal or technical meaning distinct from that given in its popular acceptation . . . and refers to the power or authority to manage, superintend, direct or oversee.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mills v. The Solution, LLC, 138 Conn. App. 40, 59-60, 50 A.3d 381, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 928, 55 A.3d 570 (2012). “Although questions of fact ordinarily are not decided on summary judgment, if the issue of control is expressed definitively in the lease, it becomes, in effect, a question of law.” Fiorelli v. Gorsky, 120 Conn. App. 298, 309, 991 A.2d 1105, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 933, 10 A.3d 517 (2010).

We have carefully reviewed the record and briefs in this case and agree with the trial court that the defendant met its burden of proving that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The defendant asserted that its demised premises did not include any portion of the “Common Areas” of 300 North Avenue, which its lease expressly defined as including “all automobile parking areas, driveways, entrances and exits . . . .’’In support of its claim, the defendant submitted a copy of the lease, affidavits, and other supporting evidence to establish that it did not have control or possession over the parking lot in which the plaintiff was allegedly injured, and therefore owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, did not provide the trial court with any evidence to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant had possession or control over the parking lot, and the court found that his “memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment fail[ed] to include any contradictory affidavits and contain[ed] only bald statements of fact . . . .” “The party opposing summary judgment must present a factual predicate for his argument to raise a genuine issue of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mills v. The Solution, LLC, supra, 138 Conn. App. 62. “[B]are assertions by the nonmovant are not enough to withstand summary judgment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Macellaio v. New-ington Police Dept., 145 Conn. App. 426, 436, 75 A.3d 78 (2013). Here, the defendant successfully demonstrated the absence of a material dispute as to the possession and control of the parking lot, and the plaintiff failed to present any factual predicate to raise an issue of material fact. Accordingly, the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The judgment is affirmed.

       The plaintiff also named Three Hundred North, LLC (Three Hundred North), as a defendant in the complaint. It has been established that Three Hundred North is the current owner and landlord of the property at 300 North Avenue, Bridgeport, and that AutoZone and Three Hundred North are parties to a lease agreement for AutoZone’s store at 300 North Avenue. Three Hundred North was not a party to the underlying motion for summary judgment, nor is it a party to this appeal. Therefore, we refer to AutoZone as the defendant in this opinion.

       The defendant also asserted by way of special defenses that “[a]ny injuries, losses, or damages which the plaintiff may have suffered . . . were directly and proximately caused by his own negligence,” and that the plaintiff’s actions “may be time barred by the applicable statute of limitations.”

       Article 10 of the lease provides in relevant part: “All of said Common Areas shall be for the general use, in common of tenants, their agents, employees, customers and invitees. [The defendant], its agents, employees, customers and invitees are hereby granted the right to use all of [the] Common Areas for their intended purposes .... Landlord shall have the right to change the area, level, location and arrangement of the Common Areas, provided such changes do not adversely affect [the defendant], and to restrict parking by tenants, their officers, agents and employees to designated parking areas. . . . Landlord shall keep the Common Areas in the Shopping Center (including without limitation, sidewalks, driveways, services areas, curbs and parking areas) in good order and repair, reasonably free from snow, ice and debris and reasonably lighted during the normal business hours of the major tenants, including [the defendant], in the Shopping Center. Landlord agrees to carry public liability insurance covering the parking areas and other Common Areas .... Landlord agrees to save and hold [the defendant] harmless from any loss or suit brought by any person for injuries sustained, or property damage arising out of Landlord’s negligence with respect to the landlord’s duties under Article 10.”
      The lease also stated that the defendant’s demised premises “are to be located in the cross hatched area outlined in red on Exhibit A.” The cross hatched area in exhibit A, which was submitted to the trial court by the defendant along with a sworn affidavit attesting to its truth and accuracy, does not include any “Common Areas” such as the parking lot and sidewalk.

       Likewise, the plaintiff failed to submit any admissible evidence to raise a material question of fact as to whether the assault was or should have been foreseeable. Accordingly, his claim that the alleged criminal attack was foreseeable and his proposition based upon Ford v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, 155 Conn. 24, 229 A.2d 346 (1967), that the defendant “[could] be liable for dangerous conditions adjacent to its property if it should have foreseen a dangerous condition” must fail.


author: BEAR, J.

text:
    TURI ROSTAD v. LEON HIRSCH
    (AC 34656)
    Beach, Alvord and Bear, Js.

      Argued October 30, 2013
    officially released March 4, 2014

      Benjamin D. Gettinger, with whom, on the brief, was Hugh F. Keefe, for the appellant-cross appellee (defendant).

      Debra C. Ruel, with whom was James M. Ruel, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).
   Opinion

BEAR, J.

The plaintiff, Turi Rostad, and the defendant, Leon Hirsch, both appeal from the judgment of the trial court regarding the plaintiffs requests for attorney’s fees, statutory interest, past due child support, and past due “special child support.” In his appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in awarding (1) past due child support to the plaintiff for the period from May 1, 2008 to June 1, 2009; (2) interest under General Statutes § 37-3a on the January 19, 2010 pen-dente lite award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff; and (3) additional attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs counsel, Rome McGuigan, P.C. (Rome McGuigan). In her cross appeal, the plaintiff claims in turn that the trial court erred in not awarding (1) past due child support to her for the period from May 15, 2005 to April 30, 2008; (2) past due “special child support” under the child support and arrearage guidelines, § 46b-215a-l et seq. of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies; and (3) more than $200 in attorney’s fees to attorneys Andrew Devlin and Thomas Asch. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the present appeals. This matter previously was before this court in Rostad v. Hirsch, 128 Conn. App. 119, 120-21, 15 A.3d 1176 (2011), which we cite for the following relevant facts: “On June 12, 2008, the plaintiff . . . filed an amended complaint alleging that the defendant . . . was the . father of her minor son, then fifteen years of age, and seeking an order of support and maintenance for the boy. The same day, the plaintiff filed a motion for genetic testing. The defendant denied his paternity and pleaded special defenses of laches, equitable estoppel, waiver and unclean hands.

“After several months of pretrial litigation, including the defendant’s extensive discovery requests and his unsuccessful interlocutory appeal to this court, he submitted to genetic testing that established his paternity. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiffs motions for child support and for pendente lite attorney’s fees in the amount of $145,489.03 for Rome McGuigan . . . $25,000 for attorney Andrew Devlin and $10,000 for attorney Thomas Asch. The defendant’s appeal challenge [d] only the attorney’s fees award.”

This court reversed the judgment of the trial court as to the award with respect to the amounts specified for Devlin and Asch: “By its own reasoning, the court justifiably could award attorney’s fees only in a nominal amount, if at all, to attorneys not licensed in this state who, at best, reinforced the highly professional services performed by highly competent in-state attorneys. In light of the facts found by the court, its awards to Devlin and Asch were an abuse of discretion.” Id., 128. This court affirmed the award in all other respects. We will refer to this previous appeal and the procedural history pertaining to the plaintiffs motion for pendente lite attorney’s fees as Rostad I.

Shortly thereafter, on June 21, 2011, the plaintiff filed a pendente lite motion for a scheduling order, in which she sought “an order from the court scheduling a trial in this matter for the final adjudication of the claims for relief set forth in [her] amended verified petition, dated June 1[2], 2008.” These claims included, inter alia, her “claim for support, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 46b-215 (a) (7), for the period of May 15,2005 through May 31,2009”; her “claim for reasonable attorney’s fees, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 46b-171 (a) (1) (B), to include the remand by the Appellate Court with regard to certain orders set forth in [the trial court]’s . . . memorandum of decision, dated January 10, 2010”; and her “claim for an order of interest, pursuant to . . . § 37-3a, as damages with regard to those attorney’s fees withheld from [the plaintiff] by [the defendant] during the pendency of the appeal . . . and which were affirmed by the Appellate Court.” (Footnotes omitted.) We will refer to this present appeal and the procedural history pertaining to the plaintiffs June 21, 2011 motion as Rostad II.

Oral argument on the motion was held on December 1, 2011, and April 17, 2012. In addition to the claims raised in the motion, the plaintiff also sought the adjudication of a claim that she raised during oral argument, rather than in the motion, pertaining to expenses that she and her son had incurred in defending themselves against a breach of contract action filed in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Haven by the defendant’s counsel, Lynch, Traub, Keefe & Errante, P.C., as trustee for a then unidentified principal later revealed to be the defendant. Rostad I, supra, 128 Conn. App. 126 n.4. The defendant’s counsel alleged in the breach of contract action that the present paternity action constituted a breach of an agreement that the defendant entered into with the plaintiff after her son’s birth, and it sought to recover payments that the plaintiff and her son had received pursuant to the agreement. The court in the breach of contract action ultimately granted the plaintiffs motion to strike the complaint on the ground that the agreement contained an arbitration clause that governed all related disputes. The plaintiff then sought attorney’s fees for the breach of contract action in the present paternity action, as part of the award of attorney’s fees at issue in Rostad I, supra, 120. The time frame for the request was the time frame of the breach of contract action, June, 2008 to October, 2008. The trial court denied that request, as noted by this court in Rostad I. Id., 126.

At oral argument before the trial court in Rostad II, the plaintiff acknowledged that she had not challenged the court’s denial of that request. She then requested that the court instead award past due “special child support” under the child support guidelines, in the amount that she and her son had incurred as expenses in defending themselves in the New Haven action.

The court rendered its judgment on May 3, 2012. It granted the plaintiffs requests for (1) past due child support for the'period from May 1, 2008 to June 1, 2009, in the amount of $81,055; (2) 10 percent interest under § 37-3a on the pendente lite award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, in the amount of $23,310; and (3) additional attorney’s fees for work performed by the plaintiffs counsel since September, 2009, in the amount of $127,552.58. The court denied, however, the plaintiffs requests for (1) past due child support for the period from May 15, 2005 to April 30, 2008, and (2) past due “special child support.” With respect to this court’s remand regarding the award of attorney’s fees to Devlin and Asch, the trial court held that they each were entitled to nominal attorney’s fees of $100 only. This appeal followed. The defendant filed his appeal on May 21, 2012, while the plaintiff filed her cross appeal on May 31, 2012. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant claims that the court erred in granting the plaintiffs request for interest under § 37-3a on the pendente lite award of attorney’s fees because § 37-3a requires a “wrongful withholding” of money after it becomes payable, and he had no legal duty to pay the award while his good faith appeal was pending. We are not persuaded.

Section 37-3a provides in relevant part: “(a) Except as provided in sections 37-3b, 37-3c and 52-192a, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions or arbitration proceedings under chapter 909, including actions to recover money loaned at a greater rate, as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. . . .”

“The decision of whether to grant interest under § 37-3a is primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court. . . . Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did. ” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s & Cos. Collective, 121 Conn. App. 31, 61, 994 A.2d 262, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 918, 996 A.2d 277 (2010).

The court reasoned in awarding interest under § 37-3a to the plaintiff: “This is primarily an equitable determination. The court must find that the detention of money was ‘wrongful.’ ‘Wrongful’ simply means that the detention was without the legal right to do so. Interest may be awarded even if the liable party had a good faith basis for retention. The primary purpose of § 37-3a is not to punish persons who have detained money owed to others in bad faith, but, rather, to compensate parties [who] have been deprived of the use of their money. ... In this case, the court will exercise its discretion to award interest at 10 percent per annum on the awards of [attorney’s fees] from when they were due until they [were] paid. Although the appeal taken by the defendant of the awards to Rome McGuigan was not taken in bad faith, the delay caused by the appeal benefited the defendant and wrongfully deprived the plaintiff of the funds.” (Citation omitted.)

Our resolution of the defendant’s claim is governed by DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 310 Conn. 38, 74 A.3d 1212 (2013), which previously had been before our Supreme Court in DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 297 Conn. 105, 998 A.2d 730 (2010). Upon remand to the trial court, the plaintiff filed a motion for postjudgment interest under General Statutes § 37-3b. The trial court denied the motion and held that “the wrongful detention standard of § 37-3a also applies to an award of postjudgment interest under § 37-3b. . . . [I]n the context of [§ 37-3a], wrongful is not synonymous with bad faith conduct. Rather, wrongful means simply that the act is performed without the legal right to do so. . . . The trial court therefore concluded that, because the judgment had been stayed by operation of Practice Book § 61-11, the defendants had a legal right to withhold payment of the judgment while their appeal was pending, and, consequently, their failure to pay the judgment during the pendency of the appeal reasonably could not be characterized as wrongful.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 310 Conn. 45-46.

Our Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court: “We . . . conclude that, although the trial court properly determined that the same standard applies to both provisions, the standard that the court actually did apply was incorrect.” Id., 43-44. It elaborated: “[I]n the context of § 37-3a, a wrongful detention of money, that is, a detention of money without the legal right to do so, is established merely by a favorable judgment on the underlying legal claim, so that the court has discretion to award interest on that judgment, without any additional showing of wrongfulness, upon a finding that such an award is fair and equitable. Consequently, contrary to the determination of the trial court, the fact that a defendant has a legal right to withhold payment under the judgment during the pendency of an appeal is irrelevant to the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest under § 37-3a.” Id., 48-49.

Our Supreme Court further provided: “[U]nder § 37-3a, proof of wrongfulness is not required above and beyond proof of the underlying legal claim. ... In other words, the wrongful detention standard of § 37-3a is satisfied by proof of the underlying legal claim, a requirement that is met once the plaintiff obtains a judgment in his favor on that claim. Because, in the present case, the trial court concluded that [the plaintiff] was required to prove, in addition to the underlying claim, that the defendants’ detention of her money was wrongful—a standard that, in the trial court’s view, could be met only upon proof that the defendants were actually obligated to pay the judgment during the pen-dency of their appeal—the legal standard that the court applied was incorrect.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 52.

Our Supreme Court stated with respect to the applicable standard of review: “[A]n award of interest under § 37-3a ... is discretionary with the trial court. Interest is awarded . . . when the court determines that such an award is appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the use of his or her money. . . .

“[Section] 37-3a . . . does not identify the factors to be considered by the trial court in exercising its discretion under the statute. Accordingly, the court is free to consider whatever facts may be relevant to its determination. Judicial discretion, however, is always a legal discretion, exercised according to the recognized principles of equity. . . . Such discretion . . . imports something more than leeway in decision making and should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and should not impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . .

“Inherent [therefore] in the concept of judicial discretion is the idea of choice and a determination between competing considerations. ... A court’s discretion must be informed by the policies that the relevant statute is intended to advance. ... As we have indicated, regardless of whether a statute provides for mandatory or discretionary postjudgment interest, the policy behind any such provision is to compensate the successful party for the loss of the use of the money that he or she is awarded from the time of the award until the award is paid in full.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 54-55.

The court in the present matter noted this policy in exercising its discretion to award 10 percent interest per annum on its pendente lite award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. Given the court’s invocation of the well established policy underlying § 37-3a, as well as the undisputed fact of the award in favor of the plaintiff, the affirmance of the award in large part by this court, and the defendant’s delay in paying the award, we conclude that the court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did with respect to its award of interest under § 37-3a.

II

Both parties claim that the court erred with respect to its judgment on the plaintiffs requests for attorney’s fees. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by awarding additional attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs counsel because the amount of the award was disproportionate in relation to both applicable precedent and the amount and nature of the underlying work done by the plaintiffs counsel. The plaintiff claims in turn that the court abused its discretion by awarding only $200 to Devlin and Asch as attorney’s fees because the record demonstrates that Devlin and Asch performed a significant amount of work from April 1, 2008, to May 12, 2008, before the plaintiffs counsel became involved in the present matter. We are not persuaded by either claim.

“It is well established that we review the trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. . . . This standard applies to the amount of fees awarded . . . and also to the trial court’s determination of the factual predicate justifying the award. . . . [T]his state follows the general rule [known as the American rule] that, except as provided by statute or in certain defined exceptional circumstances, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorney’s fee from the loser.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kupersmith v. Kupersmith, 146 Conn. App. 79, 96, 78 A.3d 860 (2013).

“An award of attorney’s fees is not a matter of right. Whether any award is to be made and the amount thereof lie within the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate the particular circumstances of a case. ... A court has few duties of a more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel fees. The issue grows even more delicate on appeal; we may not alter an award of attorney’s fees unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion, for the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of each case. . . . Because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of each case, we will not substitute our opinion concerning counsel fees or alter an award of attorney’s fees unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) LaMontagne v. Musano, Inc., 61 Conn. App. 60, 63-64, 762 A.2d 508 (2000).

“General Statutes § 46b-171 provides that a successful plaintiff in a paternity action is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, but the trial court has broad discretion in determining the amount of attorney’s fees that will be allowed under the statute.” Donato v. Cornado, 22 Conn. App. 583, 585-86, 578 A.2d 161 (1990). “[Section] 46b-171 does not require a court to consider specific statutory factors in fashioning awards, but merely requires that exercise of the court’s broad discretion be reasonable.” Pagliaro v. Jones, 75 Conn. App. 625, 635-36, 817 A.2d 756 (2003).

A

We first address the defendant’s claim regarding the plaintiffs request for post-August, 2009 attorney’s fees. In granting the request, the court determined: “These fees include defense of the appeal taken to the Appellate Corut. . . . The rates charged are fair and the expenditures of time are reasonable. The defendant has argued that the previous fees to Rome McGuigan are higher than any fees ever awarded in Connecticut in a paternity case. Perhaps this is true. But, it does not help the court to determine if the fees are justified. The fees, although high, were necessitated by the aggressive defense interposed by the defendant.” The defendant claims that the court abused its discretion because the amount of the award is unreasonable, insofar as (1) it is unprecedented, and (2) the majority of the work that the plaintiffs counsel has done since September, 2009, has involved the appeal, which this court decided in April, 2011, and the matter of attorney’s fees, not child support. We disagree.

The defendant’s claim links the award’s reasonableness under § 46b-171 (a) (1) (B) primarily to the award’s quantitative component, rather than to the abuse of discretion criteria of “whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kupersmith v. Kupersmith, supra, 146 Conn. App. 96. Adopting the defendant’s argument would be akin to substituting the defendant’s judgment regarding the reasonableness of the award for the court’s judgment, and we decline to do so. The court based its calculation of the award on detailed invoices and trial testimony provided by the plaintiffs counsel. Given its reliance on this information, its familiarity with the complex procedural history of this matter, and the broad latitude afforded to it by § 46b-171 (a) (1) (B), we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiffs request for additional attorney’s fees in the amount of $127,552.58.

B

We next address the plaintiffs claim that the court abused its discretion in awarding only $200 in attorney’s fees to Devlin and Asch because it “focused too heavily on the term ‘nominal’ [in this court’s previous decision on this matter] and insufficiently upon its prior findings of fact.” We are not persuaded.

The following procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. This court concluded with respect to the first award of attorney’s fees to Devlin and Asch: “By its own reasoning, the court justifiably could award attorney’s fees only in a nominal amount, if at all, to attorneys not licensed in this state who, at best, reinforced the highly professional services performed by highly competent in-state attorneys. In light of the facts found by the court, its awards to Devlin and Asch were an abuse of its discretion. . . . The judgment is reversed only as to the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to attorneys Andrew Devlin and Thomas Asch, and the case is remanded for a redetermination of what fees, if any, they are entitled to recover.” Rostad v. Hirsch, supra, 128 Conn. App. 128-29. Upon remand, the court “reviewed the previous findings concerning these fees together with the guidance of the Appellate Court and . . . determined that Devlin and Asch are entitled to no more than nominal fees in the amount of $100 each.”

The plaintiff filed a motion for articulation on November 21, 2012, in which she requested “an articulation as to the factual and legal basis for the court’s determination that reasonable attorney’s fees for Andrew Dev-lin and Thomas Asch were limited to one hundred dollars . . . each.” The court provided in its January 30, 2013 corrected articulation: “The basis for the court’s award to attorneys Devlin and Asch is found in the language of the Appellate Court’s decision in the remand of this case. . . . Based on the language . . . I believed that, in order for my redetermination to be ‘justifiable,’ it would have to be ‘only in a nominal amount, if at all.’ Because I had previously found that attorneys Devlin and Asch had, in fact, done some work which contributed to the plaintiffs case, I awarded nominal damages of $100 to each.” (Citations omitted.) The plaintiff then filed a motion for review on February 19, 2013. In an order dated March 28, 2013, this court granted the motion but denied the request for relief therein.

It is well recognized “that the opinion of an appellate court, so far as it is applicable, establishes the law of the case upon a retrial, and is equally obligatory [on] the parties to the action and [on] the trial court. . . . The rule is that a determination once made will be treated as correct throughout all subsequent stages of the proceeding except when that question comes before a higher court . . . .” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) American Diamond Exchange, Inc. v. Alpert, 302 Conn. 494, 509, 28 A.3d 976 (2011). This court’s conclusion that the trial court’s reasoning warranted at most a nominal award of attorney’s fees to Devlin and Asch was the law of the case on remand, and accordingly, the trial court’s focus on this court’s use of the word “nominal” was correct, not an abuse of discretion. “Nominal is defined by Webster, Third New International Dictionary as being so small, slight, or negligible as scarcely to be entitled to the name: trifling, insignificant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Granite Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Acme Pump Co., 165 Conn. 364, 368, 335 A.2d 294 (1973).

Ill

The plaintiff claims that the court erred in denying her request for past due “special child support” consisting of attorney’s fees that she and her son incurred in defending themselves in the New Haven action because the child support and arrearage guidelines, § 46b-215a-l et seq. of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, and Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 995 A.2d 1 (2010), required the court to analyze her claim in accordance with the guidelines. The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in denying her claim on the ground that it could not separate the attorney’s fees allocable to her and her son because Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Services, LLC, 308 Conn. 312, 63 A.3d 896 (2013), states that such apportionment of intertwined claims is unnecessary for attorney’s fees purposes. We are not persuaded.

The following procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. As previously noted, the plaintiff first sought to recover attorney’s fees for the breach of contract action through her pendente lite motion for attorney’s fees, filed on April 13, 2009, and revised on October 16, 2009 to amend the statutory basis of the motion to § 46b-171 (a) (1) (B). The court denied the request and stated in its January 19, 2010 memorandum of decision: “The defendant argues that attorney’s fees incurred in defense of the New Haven action should not be assessed to the defendant pursuant to § 46b-171.1 agree. Although neither party can cite to binding precedent, it seems clear to me that § 46b-171 relates to attorney’s fees incurred in the prosecution of a paternity case, not in defending related matters. The New Haven action is a related matter. . . . The court is mindful that Connecticut adheres to the American rule that attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception. . . . Here, the statutory exception provided by § 46b-171 is limited to the prosecution of a paternity action.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff did not appeal from this or from any part of the court’s January 19, 2010 judgment.

On December 1,2011, the first day of trial, the plaintiff framed her past due “special child support” claim as follows: “[T]his actually is special child support under guidelines 46b-215a, dash 3, paren 6, parentheses capital ‘C,’ parentheses capital ‘D.’ And this is the cost to the mother of defending the child in this New Haven lawsuit.” In a subsequent brief ordered by the court, the plaintiff elaborated: “The [plaintiff] asserts that, pursuant to ... § 46b-171 (a) (1) (A) and § 46b-215, the [defendant] should be ordered to pay the [plaintiffs] New Haven litigation expenses in the form of past due child support.”

She further explained: “The court should make a finding on the record that such an increase in its award of past due child support is for the benefit of the minor child ... in that the minor child’s ‘needs’ during the time period in question . . . included the need for competent legal representation .... In addition the court should make a finding on the record that the following deviation criteria, as set forth within § 46b-215a-3 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, justify such an increase in the award of past due child support: Subdivision (1) (A) (‘substantial assets, including both income-producing and non-income producing property’); subdivision (1) (B) (‘the parent’s earning capacity’); subdivision (2) (A) (‘education expenses’); subdivision (6) (C) (‘[b]est interests of the child’); and subdivision (6) (D) (‘[o]ther equitable factors’).”

The plaintiff framed her request for past due “special child support” as separate and distinct from her claim for past due child support for the same period: “[T]he court should order the [defendant] ... to reimburse the [plaintiff] for the New Haven litigation expenses she incurred to defend the minor child and herself .... The court should issue such an order in addition to whatever child support award it would have otherwise issued had the New Haven action never been initiated . . . .”

In denying the plaintiffs request for past due “special child support,” the court wrote: “I have decided not to award ‘special child support’ because I do see this as an attempt to circumvent my original decision not to award fees for the New Haven case. The plaintiff has not presented any controlling case law supporting her creative argument that the court would be justified in awarding child support for defense of an independent action. Second, even if the court were inclined to award as child support the attorney’s fees incurred in defending the child in an independent action, there is no basis for the court to separate those fees from the fees incurred in defending the plaintiff.”

“The standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. ... It is within the province of the trial court to find facts and draw proper inferences from the evidence presented. ... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McKeon v. Lennon, 131 Conn. App. 585, 597, 27 A.3d 436, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 901, 31 A.3d 1178 (2011).

“ ‘Child support award’ means the entire payment obligation of the noncustodial parent, as determined under the child support and arrearage guidelines, and includes current support payments, health care coverage, child care contribution, and periodic payment on arrearages.” Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-l (6). “[T]he purpose of a child support order is to provide for the care and well-being of minor children . . . .” Battersby v. Battersby, 218 Conn. 467, 473, 690 A.2d 427 (1991). The plaintiff argues that the attorney’s fees incurred in relation to the breach of contract action qualify as child support because they were expenditures made for the benefit of her son. Yet, she does not separate the attorney’s fees she incurred in defending her son as his parent and next friend from those she incurred in defending herself, and the record is devoid of any evidence with which the court could have undertaken such a separation. The plaintiff seeks to recover the entirety of the attorney’s fees charged for the New Haven action by her counsel, and she contends that she is entitled to do so under Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Services, LLC, supra, 308 Conn. 333, in which our Supreme Court held: “[W]hen certain claims provide for a party’s recovery of contractuál attorney’s fees but others do not, a party is nevertheless entitled to a full recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees if an apportionment is impracticable because the claims arise from a common factual nucleus and are intertwined.”

The court determined in its January 19, 2010 memorandum of decision that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the amount at issue under our law regarding attorney’s fees, and she has not challenged that conclusion on appeal. By citing to Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc., however, the plaintiff asks us to apply our law regarding attorney’s fees so that she may seek to recover the entirety of the amount at issue under a wholly separate and distinct area of our law, that governing child support, even though part of the amount was incurred primarily for her benefit, not her son’s benefit. We decline to apply Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc., in the matter advocated by the plaintiff. For the reasons set forth in this section, and in the absence of clear statutory, regulatory, or other governing precedent supporting the plaintiffs position, we decline to hold that the court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs request for past due “special child support.”

The plaintiff has chosen to seek an award of attorney’s fees on the basis of the concept of child support in this case, instead of establishing her and her son’s rights to attorney’s fees in the New Haven action that she successfully defended. In the absence of an appropriate legal basis, her claim for such past due “special child support” must fail. See Kupersmith v. Kupersmith, supra, 146 Conn. App. 96; Rostad v. Hirsch, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. FA-08-4007181-S (January 19, 2010) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 247, 248), rev’d in part on other grounds by Rostad I, supra, 128 Conn. App. 129. We thus reject the plaintiffs argument that the court abused its discretion in denying her request for past due “special child support” consisting of attorney’s fees incurred during the New Haven action.

IV

Both parties claim that the court erred with respect to its judgment on the plaintiffs requests for other past due child support. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by awarding past due child support to the plaintiff in the amount of $81,055 for the period from May 1, 2008 to June 1, 2009, because the court should have credited him for his previous voluntary payments to the plaintiff and her son. The plaintiff claims in turn that the court abused its discretion by denying her request for past due child support for the period from May 15, 2005 to April 30, 2008, because it did not come to its conclusion in accordance with the relevant case and statutory law. We are not persuaded by either claim.

Section 46b-215 (a) (7) provides in relevant part: “(A) The court or family support magistrate may also determine, order and enforce payment of any support due because of neglect or refusal to furnish support for periods prior to the action. In the case of a child bom out of wedlock whose parents have not intermarried, a parent’s liability for such support shall be limited to the three years next preceding the filing of a petition or written agreement to support pursuant to this section. (B) In the determination of support due based on neglect or refusal to furnish support prior to the action, the support due for periods of time prior to the action shall be based upon the obligor’s ability to pay during such prior periods, as determined in accordance with the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a. . . .”

The court determined with respect to the plaintiffs request for past due child support: “It is undisputed that the defendant agreed to contribute to the child’s support from birth and that he faithfully performed the agreement reached by the parties until this action was brought. As a result of that agreement, the defendant paid in excess of $500,000 for the support of the child. The court is unable to find a neglect or refusal to pay support under these circumstances, at least until the defendant stopped paying support when this action was instituted. The defendant stopped paying any support as of May 1,2008, and he did not resume paying support until the temporary support order was issued, effective June 1, 2009. For this thirteen month period it is found that the defendant refused or neglected to pay support.” In accordance with its May 27, 2009 child support order of $6235 per month, the court awarded $81,055 in past due child support for the thirteen month period of May 1, 2008 to June 1, 2009.

“We review the propriety of an order awarding child support retroactively under an abuse of discretion standard.” Dowling v. Szymczak, 309 Conn. 390, 408, 72 A.3d 1 (2013). Again, “[a]n appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. ... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lefebvre v. Lefebvre, 75 Conn. App. 662, 666, 817 A.2d 750, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 921, 822 A.2d 243 (2003).

“Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Danehy v. Danehy, 118 Conn. App. 29, 32, 982 A.2d 273 (2009).

A

The defendant argues that the court abused its discretion because it did not credit him for $632,000 in voluntary child support payments that he previously had made to the plaintiff and her son when it awarded $81,065 in past due child support for the period from May 1, 2008 to June 1,2009. The only authority to which the defendant cites is Culver v. Culver, 127 Conn. App. 236, 248, 17 A.3d 1048, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 929, 23 A.3d 724 (2011), for the general proposition that “our courts have recognized that the decision to allow or disallow credit lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Culver undermines the defendant’s position, however, because this court decided in Culver that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in declining to credit certain of the defendant’s voluntary child support payments against the plaintiffs past due child support claim: “[W]e agree with the defendant that the court could have exercised its equitable discretion to reheve him of all or some portion of his support obligation, but it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to have declined to do so.” Id., 249.

We likewise conclude that the court in the present matter did not abuse its discretion when it awarded past due child support for the period from May 1, 2008 to June 1, 2009, during which the defendant’s nonpayment of any support is undisputed. We are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that he should have received credit for payments that he made before the period during which he paid no support, especially given (1) the court’s consideration of these payments in its denial of the request for past due support for the period from May 15, 2005 to April 30, 2008, and (2) the lack of any relevant authority that supports this argument. Nor are we persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the award is contrary to public policy because it effectively is 'a punishment for his act of noblesse oblige in paying'voluntary child support. There similarly is a lack of any relevant authority that supports this argument. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim.

B

The plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion in denying her request for past due child support for the period from May 15, 2005 to April 30, 2008 because it “did not abide by the statutory directives set forth in General Statutes § 46b-215b (a) and required under [Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 80],” i.e., that the court “consider the [child support guidelines] when . . . adjudicating] the plaintiffs claim for past due child support for the three years preceding the initiation of the action.” We are not persuaded.

Section 46b-215b (a) provides in relevant part: “The child support and arrearage guidelines issued pursuant to section 46b-215a, adopted as regulations pursuant to section 46b-215c, and in effect on the date of the support determination shall be considered in all determinations of child support award amounts, including . . . past-due support amounts . . . and payment on arrearages and past-due support within the state. In all such determinations, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of such awards which resulted from the application of such guidelines is the amount to be ordered. A specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular case, as determined under the deviation criteria established by the Commission for Child Support Guidelines under section 46b-215a, shall be required in order to rebut the presumption in such case.”

In turn, Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 94-96, provides in relevant part: “[T]he applicable statutes, as well as the guidelines, provide that all child support awards must be made in accordance with the principles established therein to ensure that such awards promote equity, uniformity and consistency for children at all income levels. . . . General Statutes § 46b-84 specifically instructs that courts shall consider various characteristics and needs of the child in determining whether support is required, the amount of support to be awarded and the respective abilities of the parents to provide such support. Although the guidelines grant courts discretion to make awards on a case-by-case basis above the amount prescribed for a family at the upper limit of the schedule when the combined net weekly income of the parents exceeds that limit, which is presently $4000 . . . the guidelines also indicate that such awards should follow the principle expressly acknowledged in the preamble and reflected in the schedule that the child support obligation as a percentage of the combined net weekly income should decline as the income level rises. Thus, an award of child support based on a combined net weekly income of $8000 must be governed by the same principles that govern a child support award based on a combined net weekly income of $4000, even though the former does not fall within the guidelines’ schedule. Finally, although courts may, in the exercise of their discretion, determine the correct percentage of the combined net weekly income assigned to child support in light of the circumstances in each particular case, including a consideration of other, additional obligations imposed on the noncustodial parent, any deviation from the schedule or the principles on which the guidelines are based must be accompanied by the court’s explanation as to why the guidelines are inequitable or inappropriate and why the deviation is necessary to meet the needs of the child.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

The following procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. In her November 21, 2012 motion for articulation, referenced in part II B of this opinion, the plaintiff stated: “The trial court did not articulate how it determined that the $30,000 per year that [the defendant] paid for the benefit of the minor child between May 15, 2005, and April 30, 2008, was the appropriate level of child support under ... § 46b-215 and the analysis required pursuant to [Maturo], [The plaintiff] seeks an articulation as to the factual and legal basis for the court’s determination that by paying child support at the rate of $30,000 per year, the defendant . . . did not neglect or refuse to pay the level of child support required under a Maturo analysis and under ... § 46b-215 for the time period May 15, 2005 to April 30, 2008.”

The court stated in turn in its January 30, 2013 corrected articulation: “I have little to add to what is expressed in the memorandum of decision of May 3, 2012. I said that I agreed with the defendant’s claim that he could not be liable for retroactive support for the period from May 15, 2005 to April 30, 2008, because he never neglected or refused to pay support during this time period. During this period he was paying support to the plaintiff of $30,000 per year pursuant to an agreement with the plaintiff. This is a substantial amount of support which I did not believe could be characterized as neglect or refusal to pay support.”

Ordinarily, the abuse of discretion standard applies to a court’s financial orders in domestic relations matters, but because our resolution of this claim hinges on our construction of the statutory scheme underlying the plaintiffs claim, our review initially is plenary. See Robinson v. Robinson, 86 Conn. App. 719, 724, 862 A.2d 326 (2004).

“The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextuai evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” General Statutes § l-2z. Section 46b-215 (a) (7) (B) plainly and unambiguously provides that the guidelines factor into a court’s determination of support under section 46b-215 (a) (7) (A) only when there first has been a finding of neglect or refusal: “In the determination of support due based on neglect or refusal to furnish support prior to the action, the support due for periods of time prior to the action shall be based upon the obligor’s ability to pay during such prior periods, as determined in accordance with the child support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-215a . . . (Emphasis added.) Without a finding of neglect or refusal to furnish support prior to the action, there is no determination of support to be made under § 46b-215 (a) (7) (A) and therefore no need to refer to the guidelines in the manner required by § 46b-215 (a) (7) (B).

The plaintiffs reliance upon Maturo and § 46b-215b (a) for the proposition that the guidelines factor into all court determinations of child support, including past due child support, ignores the plain and unambiguous language of § 46b-215b (c), which provides in relevant part: “In any proceeding for the establishment ... of a child support award, the child support and arrearage guidelines shall be considered in addition to and not in lieu of the criteria for such awards established in ...[§] 46b-215 . . . .” Therefore, in crafting an award of past due child support in a paternity action on the basis of neglect or refusal to pay such support, a court must first consider the organization and requirements of § 46b-215 (a) (7) and its subparagraphs, rather than the legal standards specified by the plaintiff.

Given our interpretation of the statutory scheme that underlies the plaintiffs claim for past due child support in the paternity statutory context, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs request for the period from May 15, 2005 to April 30, 2008. Pursuant to the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant performed his obligations by paying approximately $90,000 in child support to the plaintiff for the support of their son during this period, and the plaintiff accepted and applied those payments for the benefit of their son. The court did not clearly err when it concluded, without referring to the guidelines, that the defendant neither neglected nor refused to furnish support dining this period. The sum of the defendant’s payments during this period is not insubstantial, and the plaintiffs extensive trial testimony demonstrated that she used these payments to help cover a significant part of the costs for her son’s private school education and his engagement in extracurricular activities. We thus reject the plaintiffs claim.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 46b-215 (a) (7) (A) provides: “The court or family support magistrate may also determine, order and enforce payment of any support due because of neglect or refusal to furnish support for periods prior to the action. In the case of a child bom out of wedlock whose parents have not intermarried, a parent’s liability for such support shall be limited to the three years next preceding the filing of a petition or written agreement to support pursuant to this section.”
      The plaintiff initially filed her paternity action on May 15, 2008. May 15, 2008, therefore, is the date upon which the three year period specified in § 46b-215 (a) (7) (A) is determined, even though the operative complaint is the amended version filed on June 12, 2008. On May 27, 2009, the court entered a child support order that required the defendant to pay child support to the plaintiff in the amount of $6235 per month, starting on June 1, 2009.

       The court also denied the plaintiffs request for additional attorney’s fees with respect to work performed by Devlin since the January 19, 2010 pendente lite award. That denial is not at issue in the present appeal.

       Even though DiLieto postdates the trial court judgment, “[a]s a general rule, judicial decisions apply retroactively. ... A decision will not be applied retroactively only if (1) it establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling past precedent on which litigants have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed ... (2) given its prior history, purpose and effect, retrospective application of the rule would retard its operation; and (3) retroactive application would produce substantial inequitable results, injustice or hardship.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fortin v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 139 Conn. App. 826, 835 n.4, 59 A.3d 247, cert. granted on other grounds, 308 Conn. 905, 61 A.3d 1098 (2013). None of these considerations are at issue in the present matter.

       The court made the pendente lite award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff on January 19, 2010. The defendant paid $145,000 to the plaintiff on May 18,2011, and $25,000 to her on September 1,2011; the sum of these amounts represents the amount of the award that this court upheld.

       General Statutes § 46b-171 (a) (1) (B) provides in relevant part: “The court or family support magistrate shall order the defendant to pay [a] sum [of support and maintenance awarded under § 46b-171 (a) (1) (A)] to the complainant . . . and shall grant execution for the same and costs of suit taxed as in other civil actions, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee, and may require the defendant to become bound with sufficient surety to perform such orders for support and maintenance. . . (Emphasis added.)

       General Statutes § 46b-171 (a) (1) (A) provides in relevant part: “If the defendant is found to be the father of the child, the court or family support magistrate shall order the defendant to stand charged with the support and maintenance of such child, with the assistance of the mother if such mother is financially able, as the court or family support magistrate finds ... to be reasonably commensurate with the financial ability of the defendant, and to pay a certain sum periodically until the child attains the age of eighteen years or as otherwise provided in this subsection. . . .”

       Despite the plaintiffs reference to several deviation criteria, she largely relies upon two of them in subdivision (6), which provides in relevant part: “In some cases, there may be special circumstances not otherwise addressed in this section in which deviation from presumptive support amounts may be warranted for reasons of equity. Such circumstances are limited to the following . . . (C) Best interests of the child. (D) Other equitable factors.” Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-3 (b).

       The issue of whether the attorney’s fees that the plaintiff incurred in defending her son as his parent and next friend constitute “special child support” that she may seek from the defendant does not affect our resolution of the plaintiffs claim. As the court noted: “[E]ven if the court were inclined to award as child support the attorney’s fees incurred in defending the child in an independent action, there is no basis for the court to separate those fees from the fees incurred in defending the plaintiff.” Therefore, we express no opinion regarding the issue.

       Even if the plaintiff breached the agreement between the parties, that does not relieve the defendant of his continuing obligation to his son to provide child support within the reasonable limits of his ability to do so: “The common-law duty of parents to provide for their children preceded recognition and enforcement of that duty in our statutory scheme. . . . The [parent’s] duty to support ... is a continuing obligation, which ordinarily exists even apart from any judgment or decree of support. ... A parent has both a statutory and common law duty to support his minor children within the reasonable limits of his ability. • ■ • Our statutes reflect the parental duty of child support. See, e.g., General Statutes § 46b-37 (b) (it shall be the joint duty of each spouse to support his or her family); General Statutes § 46b-84 (a) Qu]pon or subsequent to the . . . dissolution of any marriage or the entry of a decree of legal separation or divorce, the parents of a minor child of the marriage, shall maintain the child according to their respective abilities, if the child is in need of maintenance . . .); General Statutes § 46b-215 (a) (1) ([t]he Superior Court . . . may make and enforce orders for payment of support against any person who neglects or refuses to furnish necessary support to such person’s . . . child under the age of eighteen . . . according to such person’s ability to furnish such support . . These statutes embody the strong public policy interest of the state pertaining to matters of needed or necessary child support. It is ... in the interest of society that the child be supported by those obligated to support the child and that the child not be required to seek public assistance to satisfy those needs unless otherwise necessary.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 119 Conn. App. 194, 201-202, 986 A.3d 1119 (2010), rev'd on other grounds, 305 Conn. 539, 46 A.3d 112 (2012).

        “Noblesse oblige—From one to whom much is given, much is expected.” (Emphasis in original.) Hayes v. Alabama Court of Judiciary, 437 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Ala. 1983).


author: PETERS, J.

text:
    KONOVER RESIDENTIAL CORPORATION, AGENT FOR CHFA-SMALL PROPERTIES, INC. v. HUSSEIN ELAZAZY ET AL. KONOVER RESIDENTIAL CORPORATION, AGENT FOR CHFA-SMALL PROPERTIES, INC. v. RAFI KHAN ET AL. KONOVER RESIDENTIAL CORPORATION, AGENT FOR CHFA-SMALL PROPERTIES, INC. v. MELISSA TORRIERO KONOVER RESIDENTIAL CORPORATION, AGENT FOR CHFA-SMALL PROPERTIES, INC. v. JANUSZ STOLARCZYK ET AL. KONOVER RESIDENTIAL CORPORATION, AGENT FOR CHFA-SMALL PROPERTIES, INC. v. RAZIN SYED ET AL.
    (AC 35068)
    (AC 35069)
    (AC 35070)
    (AC 35072)
    (AC 35073)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Gruendel and Peters, Js.

      Argued October 10, 2013
    officially released March 4, 2014

      John L. Giulietti, for the appellants (defendants in each case).

      Benjamin B. Manchak, with whom were Joshua A. Hawks-Ladds and Edward Czaczkes, for the appellee (plaintiff in each case).
   Opinion

PETERS, J.

A municipally funded low to moderate income housing project in Simsbury requires its tenants annually to recertify their income and their family composition to demonstrate their continued eligibility to lease apartments in the project. The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that the owner of the project was entitled to bring a summary process action to regain possession of the property of tenants who refused to comply with this requirement. We affirm the judgments of the court.

On June 30, 2011, the plaintiff, Konover Residential Corporation, as agent for CHFA-Small Properties, Inc., brought five separate summary process actions to evict the defendants from five apartments at Tuller Circle in Simsbury, known collectively as Eno Farms Cooperative Association (Eno Farms). In accordance with Eno Farms’ stated objective of providing housing for very low to moderate income families, their leases required them, like all previous tenants, to file annual reports that certify their income and the composition of their family. Alleging that the defendants had failed to provide the required recertifications, the plaintiff initiated proceedings for the defendants’ summary removal from Eno Farms by serving each of them with a notice to quit. In response, the defendants filed motions to dismiss in which they challenged both the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs complaint and the substantive propriety of the plaintiffs claims for relief. They also filed answers and special defenses. None of the defendants’ pleadings challenged the accuracy of the plaintiffs allegation that they had failed to comply with the disclosure requirements in their leases. After an evidentiary hearing, the court resolved all issues in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants have appealed, and this court consolidated their appeals. We affirm the judgments of the court.

I

Alleging that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the notice requirements of the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (act), the defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs summary process actions. In their consolidated appeal from the court’s denial of these motions, the defendants renew their contention that the recent foreclosure of the mortgage on the underlying property of Eno Farms precludes their eviction from their apartments for any reason. Like the trial court, we are not persuaded.

As the court observed: “In a summary process action based on the plaintiffs claim that the defendants’ conduct constituted a violation of the rental agreement or lease of any of the rules or regulations adopted by the parties, the plaintiffs must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence: (1) [t]he existence of a rental agreement (oral or written; weekly or monthly or yearly); (2) [t]he plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the premises; (3) [t]he address of the subject premises; (4) [t]he substance of the violative conduct [or] noncompliance complained of; (5) [s]ervice of the noncompliance letter in accordance with . . . General Statutes § 47a-15; (6) [p]roper service of a notice to quit, including service date and termination date; and (7) [t]hat the defendant [continued] possession of the premises.” (Footnote added.) On appeal, we must decide whether the evidence presented to the court supported its conclusion that the plaintiff had met its burden of proof in each of these respects. See Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831, 845, 43 A.3d 750, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47 A.3d 884 (2012).

The court made the following findings of fact that the defendants do not contest. The plaintiff is the management agent for the owner of the Eno Farms apartment complex. The defendants occupy their apartments under continually renewing leases for one year terms. None of the leases manifest an intent to confer upon the tenants any rights of ownership in the underlying property.

Several recorded instruments and the defendants’ rental agreements mandate that the premises be rented only as very low to moderate income housing. To enforce this mandate, the terms of the defendants’ leases and addenda thereto expressly require them annually to recertify their income and family composition. The defendants’ right to occupy the premises leased to them is expressly conditioned on their compliance with this recertification requirement. Each of the defendant-lessees has failed to recertify as required by the terms of the leases. The plaintiff properly served each of the defendants with notice of their noncompliance with these recertification requirements.

The court concluded that, as a matter of law, the defendants’ lease agreements did not violate any federal or state statute. Specifically, it rejected the defendants’ contention that the recent foreclosure of a mortgage on the ninety-nine year ground lease on Eno Farms’ real property permits them to invoke the act. The defendants’ appeals challenge the validity of the court’s interpretation and application of the act.

Our standard of review for claims of statutory misconstruction is well established. “[0]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § l-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for inteipre-tive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013).

There is no disagreement about the policy decision reflected in the enactment of the act. The act is designed to protect residential tenants from immediate eviction when, as a result of foreclosure proceedings, there has been a change in the identity of their landlords and in the new landlord’s plans for the property. To protect tenants from such unforeseen changes, the act provides that the immediate successor in interest of a foreclosed property must provide all tenants with at least ninety days notice prior to bringing an action for eviction due to the foreclosure. The act was intended to afford bona fide tenants the opportunity to remain in their apartments for the time they needed to find alternate housing.

On its face, this act is not a good fit for the defendants’ refusal to honor the disclosure requirements in their leases. The record discloses no factual or legal relationship between the mortgage foreclosure and the defendants’ failure to recertify their financial circumstances. Under the defendants’ construction of the act, any tenant could invoke the fact of the mortgage foreclosure to justify noncompliance with any and all provisions of their individual leases, including, for example, the obligation to pay rent We are not persuaded that Congress intended Ae act to have such far-reaching consequences.

II

Next, the defendants also claim Aat the court improperly failed to dismiss the plaintiffs summary process actions because of the plaintiffs failure to give the defendants timely notices to which they were allegedly entitled by General Statutes §§ 47a-15 and 47a-23. The defendants maintain, without the citation of auAority, that the court should have addressed the relevance of these statutes eiAer sua sponte or in response to their motion to reargue, which the court denied without a hearing. The defendants do not, however, claim that Aey were in fact unaware of their contractual obligations or their breach thereof. Nor do they claim that they were misinformed about the plaintiffs intention to terminate the defendants’ residence at Eno Farms because of their refusal to comply with an unambiguous and material provision of their leases. Similarly, the defendants claim that the court improperly failed to dismiss the plaintiffs summary process action because General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 8-436 and General Statutes § 47-2 rendered illegal the lease provisions requiring income certification. Again, the defendants fail to provide any authority in support of their argument, which was not addressed substantively by the trial court.

We are not persuaded that the defendants’ statutory claims are properly before us. “We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baranowski v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 119 Conn. App. 85, 89 n.4, 986 A.2d 334 (2010). As the defendants have neither explained the significance of the statutes on which they rely, nor identified any possible impropriety by the court in interpreting them, these claims must be considered abandoned.

Ill

Finally, the defendants claim that the court erred in concluding that their special defense of ownership was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We disagree.

The court, in denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluded that the issue of ownership was “determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them” and that the issue was “fully, fairly and apparently exhaustively litigated.” In claiming that this conclusion was in error, the defendants have provided no analysis of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Without an argument as to how the court erred in applying the doctrine, we cannot address this claim and therefore deem it to be abandoned.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The defendants in each of the underlying actions are: Hussein Elazazy, Fathia Rassyoun, Rana Elazazy, and Reem Elazazy in AC 35068; M. Rafi Khan, Frahana Khan, Nabila Khan, and Hamila Khan in AC 35069; Melissa Torriero in AC 35070; Janusz Stolarczyk and Agata Stolarczyk, in AC 35072 and Razin Syed, Rizuana Afag, Anunar Syed, Shaima Afaq, and Marium Afaq in AC 35073.

       See Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Eno Farms Ltd. Partnership, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-07-5008995 (June 12, 2009) (48 Conn. L. Rptr. 66).

       The act provides in relevant part: “In the case of any foreclosure on a federally-related mortgage loan or on any dwelling or residential real property after the date of enactment of this title, any immediate successor in interest in such property pursuant to the foreclosure shall assume such interest subject to . . . the provision, by such successor in interest of a notice to vacate to any bona fide tenant at least 90 days before the effective date of such notice . . . .” Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1660 (2009).

         General Statutes § 47a-15 provides in relevant part: “Prior to the commencement of a summary process action ... if there is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement . . . and the landlord chooses to evict based on such noncompliance, the landlord shall deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than fifteen days after receipt of the notice.”

       For additional authority, see Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Eno Farms Ltd. Partnership, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-07-5008995 (June 12, 2009) (48 Conn. L. Rptr. 66). Therein Judge Satter also found that some Eno Farms tenants, in particular those who were part of a so-called Association, had interfered with the orderly collection of rental payments, and therefore ordered the Association to be dissolved. That judgment was not appealed.

       General Statutes § 47a-23 provides in relevant part: “When the owner or lessor . . . desires to obtain possession or occupancy of . . . any apartment in any building . . . and . . . when a rental agreement or lease of such property, whether in writing or by parol, terminates for . . . violation of the rental agreement or lease . . . such owner or lessor . . . shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of such land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, at least three days before the termination of the rental agreement or lease . . .

       General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 8-436 (a) provides in relevant part: “The [Commissioner of Economic and Community Development] shall not require limited equity cooperatives to establish . . . income tests for eligibility for continued occupancy ...” This statute has since been repealed. Public Acts 2006, No. 06-93, § 22.

       General Statutes § 47-2 provides in relevant part: “All estates granted for the . . . relief of the poor ... or for any other public and charitable use, shall forever remain to the uses to which they were granted, according to the true intent and meaning of the grantor, and to no other use whatever.”