text:
    Linda A. Cuneo v. Fredric D. Cuneo
    (4472)
    Borden, Daly and O’Connell, Js.
    Argued October 6
    decision released December 8, 1987

      Louis I. Parley, for the appellant (defendant).

      Robert G. Zanesky, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Borden, J.

The defendant appeals challenging the financial and visitation orders entered incident to the judgment dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff. The defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in its determination regarding the relative fault of the parties for the marital breakdown, (2) in its orders regarding the allocation of the assets and liabilities of the parties, and regarding alimony and support, and (3) in an evidentiary ruling regarding visitation of the defendant with the parties’ minor children. We find error in part.

The trial court, Hon. William L. Tierney, state trial referee, found the following facts: The parties were married for twenty-two years. The basic cause of the marital breakdown was the physical and mental abuse of the plaintiff by the defendant, but the plaintiff contributed in a lesser degree to the breakdown by her erratic and violent treatment of the defendant. The parties have four sons, ages twenty, eighteen, fifteen and twelve. The two older sons live part-time with the defendant and receive financial assistance from him for their education. The two younger sons live with the plaintiff.

The court further found that the plaintiff, age forty-five, is a college graduate, teaches high school, and is in good health. She worked at the beginning of the marriage to help the defendant through law school, and except for a short period of time has taught classes for the past six years. The court further found that the plaintiff earns $15,000 per year, and has no assets except for a one-half interest in the marital residence in Wilton. The residence is valued at $160,000 to $180,000, and is subject to a mortgage of $28,000. That house was purchased with the proceeds of the sale of the parties’ previous residence, which in turn was purchased through a mortgage, contributions from both parties and a loan from the defendant’s mother. The court also found that the plaintiff will never have the earning capacity of the defendant, and needs assistance for the future.

The court also found that the defendant, age forty-six, is in good health, and is a practicing attorney working for the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) at an annual salary of $65,000. He has worked there for seventeen years. In addition to his one-half interest in the marital residence, he has a savings plan with NBC in the amount of $6400, and a retirement plan in the amount of $9000. He has debts, payable to members of his family, of $46,000.

The court awarded the custody of the two minor children to the plaintiff, subject to reasonable visitation by the defendant. The court also ordered the defendant’s one-half interest in the house conveyed to the plaintiff, subject to the existing mortgage, and ordered the plaintiff to hold the defendant harmless with respect to the mortgage. The court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff unallocated alimony and support in the amount of $400 per week, which amount was to be reduced to $300 in September, 1987, and to $200 in December, 1991, and which is to terminate in September, 1992. The termination date is not subject to modification.

I

The defendant first claims that, with respect to the court’s determination regarding the relative fault of the parties for the marital breakdown, the court erred in two respects: (1) the determination is unsupported by the evidence; and (2) it contradicts the court’s determination, made during the trial, that both parties were “strictly at fault” for the breakdown. This claim is without merit.

The first aspect of the defendant’s claim is no more than an attempt to have this court reweigh the evidence and find facts. This we will not do. Voloshin v. Voloshin, 12 Conn. App. 626, 631, 533 A.2d 573 (1987). We have fully reviewed the entire record of this case. The court’s determination is supported by the evidence, and cannot be disturbed.

The second aspect of the defendant’s claim is more troublesome, but does not involve error. The trial began on October 9, 1984, when both the defendant and the plaintiff testified. Near the end of that day’s testimony, while the defendant was on the stand for the second time, there was a colloquy among the court and counsel regarding, inter alia, the causes of the marital breakdown. When the interchange between the two counsel became heated, the court interjected: “All right. There’s no question about it. I’ve heard this ad nauseam now, and I’ve come to the conclusion that they’re both strictly at fault in this breakdown. Neither one side carries the burden of it at all. If you want to just keep throwing more mud in here, you can and I suppose I’m forced to listen.”

The defendant claims that the court’s remark, that “they’re both strictly at fault in this breakdown,” constituted a factual determination which the court could not alter absent subsequent evidence on that issue in the case. Therefore, the defendant argues, the court’s finding in its memorandum of decision, namely, that the defendant’s conduct was the basic cause of the breakdown, was erroneous. We disagree.

The court should refrain from arriving at its factual findings until it has heard and duly considered all the evidence; Giamattei v. DiCerbo, 135 Conn. 159, 161-62, 62 A.2d 519 (1948); and it should also refrain from making any comments indicating that it has decided any factual issues until it has heard and considered that evidence. Id. That does not mean, however, that where a court has made such a premature comment, it is bound thereby. It is fundamental to the notion of a judicial factual hearing that the factual determinations arrived at after hearing all the evidence and after due deliberation on that evidence constitute the court’s finding of facts. Id.; see Grayson v. Grayson, 4 Conn. App. 275, 494 A.2d 576 (1985), appeal dismissed, 202 Conn. 221, 520 A.2d 225 (1987).

The court’s remark in this case, obviously made in the midst of a heated exchange between counsel and during the heightened emotion of a contested dissolution case, was inappropriate. It did not, however, constitute a finding of fact which the court could not alter after due deliberation on the evidence. The remark does not undermine the court’s finding of fact regarding the causes of the marital breakdown, expressed in its memorandum of decision after its deliberation on the evidence.

II

The defendant next claims that the court erred in its orders regarding the unallocated alimony and support, and regarding the division of the parties’ assets and liabilities. The defendant presents several bases for this claim. Only two of these bases require any discussion; the others simply attempt to induce us to substitute our discretion for that of the trial court. The defendant argues that the court’s financial orders are flawed because (1) they were based on findings of fact which are clearly erroneous, and (2) they were based on financial affidavits which were out of date, and the court improperly refused to consider current affidavits. We agree with the second of these contentions.

With respect to the first contention, the defendant argues that the court’s finding that he earned $65,000 per year is flawed because it ignores his testimony that he had additional income of $1350 per month, or $16,200 per year. We are at a loss, however, to see how the defendant can complain of such an error, since its rectification could only be to his financial detriment, and the plaintiff does not claim error on appeal regarding that finding. The defendant’s second contention, namely, that the court’s financial orders were based on improper financial affidavits, does have merit. We conclude, however, that its merit extends only to the court’s order regarding the division of the parties’ assets and liabilities. This facet of the defendant’s claim must be viewed in its procedural context.

The first two days of the trial of the case were October 9 and 10, 1984, when the parties introduced evidence regarding the causes of the breakdown of the marriage, and their respective financial situations. Both parties introduced their then current financial affidavits, and testified regarding them. At the end of the hearing on October 10, 1984, the court granted the defendant’s request, made in accordance with an earlier suggestion by the court during the trial, to refer the question of the defendant’s visitation with the two minor children to the family relations office for a recommendation. The court suggested that the parties file their formal demands within thirty days, but specifically reserved decision on the entire case until it received the family relations report and held a hearing thereon. The report was not completed until April 19,1985, more than six months later. On April 30, 1985, the defendant appeared in court in response to a telephone call that he appear for a hearing. The plaintiff and her counsel did not appear, and the plaintiffs counsel later represented to the defendant’s counsel that he had not received a similar telephone call. The case was rescheduled for May 21,1985, but it could not proceed on that date because the family relations officer was unavailable. The case was again rescheduled for May 30, 1985.

On that date, the defendant and his counsel appeared, but neither the plaintiff nor her counsel appeared. The defendant’s counsel indicated to the referee that he wished to present limited testimony and that he had told the plaintiff’s counsel the previous day that he intended to go forward, and he requested that the matter proceed. The referee denied the defendant’s request and continued the case until August 1,1985, which was the referee’s next available date.

Both parties appeared on August 1, 1985. The defendant sought to file a new financial affidavit, and to testify with respect to it. He claimed that although his new affidavit would show that he was earning more money than his previous affidavit and testimony disclosed, there had been other “changes in the economic picture.” In response to the plaintiff’s objection that both sides had completed the evidence regarding the parties’ finances, the defendant requested that the court “reopen the evidence with regard to the finances.” The court refused to accept any new affidavits, and the defendant marked his new affidavit as an exhibit for identification. That affidavit disclosed, inter alia, a value of the parties’ marital home of $220,000.

We have recently reiterated the requirement that a ruling on a postjudgment request for attorney’s fees be based on the parties’ current financial positions, where there was timely and adequate notice of such a claim to the court. See Bielen v. Bielen, 12 Conn. App. 513, 515, 531 A.2d 941 (1987). That requirement is simply part of the broader principle that the financial awards in a marital dissolution case should be based on the parties’ current financial circumstances to the extent reasonably possible. Practice Book § 463. The same reasoning applies in this case.

We recognize that in the ordinary marital dissolution case there may be some time lag between the presentation of the evidence and the decision of the trial court; see, e.g., General Statutes § 51-183b (requiring that a decision in a trial to the court be rendered within four months of the close of the hearing); and that the decision to reopen any aspect of the case regarding which the parties have completed their evidence is committed to the trial court’s discretion. See Elliott v. South Isle Food Corporation, 6 Conn. App. 373, 379-80, 506 A.2d 147 (1986). The facts of this case, however, lead us to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the defendant’s new affidavit and his testimony with respect to it.

First, nearly ten months had elapsed since the presentation of the parties’ financial affidavits and testimony on October 9 and October 10, 1984. Where the trial court was alerted to the claim that the economic picture had changed, the court’s laudable desire to bring the proceedings to an end should not have foreclosed at least a limited inquiry into the parties’ then current finances.

Second, none of the delay was attributable to the defendant, and some of it was attributable to the plaintiff. The two month delay between May 30, 1985, and August 1, 1985, was solely the result of the failure of the plaintiff and her counsel to appear for the hearing scheduled for May 30, 1985.

Third, the affidavit which the court refused to consider discloses that the value of the principal asset of the parties, namely, their marital residence, had increased since the time of the parties’ initial affidavits by $40,000 to $60,000. This is a sizable difference, particularly where, as here, the other assets of the parties were valued at a total of $15,400.

We do not suggest that, had the court considered the defendant’s second affidavit and his testimony with respect to it, the court would have been compelled to find the home to be worth $220,000. Nor do we suggest that, even if the court had found the value of the home to be $220,000, it would have been compelled to make a different allocation of the parties’ assets and liabilities, or that the court on remand will be compelled to do so. Whether the court on remand will make the same or different orders regarding the division of the assets and liabilities of the parties will be a matter for the discretion of the court based on the financial situation of the parties at the time of the new hearing.

The defendant argues that this error of the court requires a remand with respect to all of the financial orders, because the orders regarding alimony and support are integrally connected to the orders regarding the allocation of the parties’ assets and liabilities. On the facts of this case, we disagree.

It is true that often “[t]he rendering of a judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other.” Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2 Conn. App. 416, 424, 479 A.2d 826 (1984). This is not such a case. The finances of the parties were not complicated. Furthermore, it is clear from the court’s memorandum of decision that the focus of the unallocated alimony and support order was on the short term needs of the plaintiff while the minor children were still in her charge, whereas the focus of the allocation of assets and liabilities was on the plaintiffs need for some financial security in the long term. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the error extends only to the orders regarding the assets and the liabilities of the parties.

The defendant’s final claim of error involves an evidentiary ruling of the court. It is clear that this ruling was related only to the issue of visitation, despite the defendant’s suggestion that it also was related to the financial orders. We have fully reviewed this claim, and find it to be without merit.

There is error in part, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for a new hearing limited to the issue of the allocation of the assets and liabilities of the parties.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The defendant correctly points out, and the plaintiff does not claim otherwise, that the court was incorrect in describing the defendant as a “practicing attorney.” Although he has a law degree, and practiced law briefly upon graduation from law school, it was undisputed that his employment at NBC is not as a lawyer. This factual error does not, however, affect the disposition of this case.

       The defendant also correctly points out that the court’s finding of $9000 as the value of his retirement fund is at odds with the only evidence on that issue. That evidence was the defendant’s exhibit and testimony that the value was approximately $6600. Since we find error regarding the procedure which preceded the court’s determination of the division of the assets and liabilities of the parties, on remand the court should consider the current, correct value of the defendant’s retirement fund.

       The defendant’s counsel indicated that he intended to call one of the older sons to testify “as to what went on in the household, and things like that.” The plaintiff’s counsel objected that the children should not be brought into the case for that purpose and told the defendant’s counsel, “Don’t start bringing witnesses in here like that.” The defendant’s counsel replied, “Don’t yell at me like that. You know quite well that your client is much the difficulty that you might want to make my client to be, and I will not take to that.”

       Another attorney was present who stated on behalf of the plaintiff’s counsel that the plaintiffs counsel had no objection to the family relations officer’s report, and that the plaintiffs counsel requested two weeks to file his formal demands. This attorney did not, however, file an appearance for the plaintiff and was not prepared to represent the plaintiff in any hearing with regard to the report.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Foti, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Housing Authority v. Mary Melvin
    (4459)
    Dupont, C. J., Stoughton and Foti, Js.

      Argued November 3
    decision released December 8, 1987

      Richard McCarthy, for the appellant (defendant).

      John F. Merchant, with whom, on the brief, was Jerome J. Rosenblum, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Foti, J.

The defendant tenant appeals in this summary process action from an execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant claims that the court erred (1) in granting the plaintiffs application for execution of judgment without scheduling a hearing pursuant to Practice Book § 387A, and (2) in denying the defendant’s motion for a hearing on the plaintiff’s application for execution of judgment. We find no error.

The facts are not in dispute. In May, 1984, the defendant entered into a one year lease, which was automatically renewable, for an apartment managed by the plaintiff. The rental agreement required monthly payments of $132 which was subject to an annual adjustment approved by the agency for housing and urban development (HUD). The defendant became delinquent in her rent payments and, on March 6, 1985, entered into a stipulated agreement that called for a judgment of possession of the unit in favor of the plaintiff with a stay of execution through December 31,1985. The stipulated agreement required her to pay $132 per month for use and occupancy “subject to HUD-approved adjustments.” The defendant was also required to make monthly payments of $53 to remunerate the plaintiff for a $1591 rent arrearage. On May 13, 1985, the defendant was notified that, pursuant to the HUD-approved rent adjustment, her use and occupancy fee would increase by $28 per month beginning July 1, 1985. The defendant failed to pay the increased amount; rather, she submitted checks in the amount due prior to the adjustment. On July 26,1985, the plaintiff notified the defendant that it intended to seek her immediate eviction for failure to pay the increased amount, and applied for a summary process execution of judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 387A.

The defendant moved for a hearing on the plaintiffs application for a summary process judgment, which the court denied. The defendant’s objection to the court’s consideration of the plaintiff’s application without a hearing was overruled.

The defendant contends that a hearing was required on the plaintiff’s application for judgment because the use and occupancy fee that resulted from the HUD-approved adjustment was not a “sum certain” as that term is used in Practice Book § 387A. The defendant claims that the court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff without holding a hearing. We disagree.

The defendant’s original lease established rent contingent on an annual adjustment approved by HUD. An administrative appeal process was established for contesting these adjustments. Thus, when the defendant entered into the stipulated agreement, she was made well aware of the process by which rents could be increased or decreased and the process for contesting those adjustments. The defendant now claims that the adjusted amount was not a “sum certain” because it was not an exact dollar amount, but was an amount based on an independent agency’s determination.

A “sum certain” is merely a term of art for a sum which is “capable of reduction to certainty.” Anderson v. Bridgeport, 134 Conn. 260, 264, 56 A.2d 650 (1947). In contract actions, the price must be capable of being ascertained from the contract. “By this is not meant that the exact amount in figures must be stated in the agreement; however, where that is not the case, the price must, by the terms of the agreement, be capable of being definitely ascertained.” 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 82.

A sum certain which can be determined from the face of the agreement is distinguished from implied obligations which call on the trier of fact to determine a reasonable price. H. B. Toms Tree Surgery, Inc. v. Brant, 187 Conn. 343, 346, 446 A.2d 1 (1982). In this case, the stipulated agreement represented a contract obligation of the defendant to pay for use and occupancy; that amount was capable of being ascertained with certainty subsequent to the HUD-approved adjustment.

The trial court’s conclusion that the stipulated agreement represented a “sum certain” merely gave effect to the intentions of the parties expressed in the agreement. White Oak Corporation v. Department of Revenue Services, 198 Conn. 413, 422, 503 A.2d 582 (1986). Thus, the court’s conclusion that Practice Book § 387A does not require a hearing on the plaintiff’s application for execution of judgment was supported by the subordinate facts.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       “[Practice Book] Sec. 387A. summary process executions
      “Whenever a summary process execution is requested because of a violation of a term in a judgment by stipulation, a hearing shall be required. If the violation consists of nonpayment of a sum certain, an affidavit with service certified in accordance with Sec. 120 shall be accepted in lieu of a hearing. ...”

       Attached to the defendant’s original lease was the following provision:
      “Redetermination of Rent, Dwelling Size and Eligibility
      “a. Once a year Management will conduct a regular redetermination of rental.
      “b. Tenant agrees to furnish such information and certifications regarding family composition and income as may be necessary for management to make determinations with respect to rent eligibility, appropriateness of dwelling size, and monthly rent.
      “c. Tenant agrees to transfer to an appropriate size dwelling unit based on family composition, upon appropriate notice from management that such a dwelling unit is available.
      “d. If the regular redetermination shows that the rent being charged the family must be changed, the rent shall be adjusted in accordance with the change in income.
      “e. Rent as fixed in Section 2 or 3d will remain in effect for the period between regular rent redetermination unless during such period:
      “(1) Rent shall be subject to change by reasons of change of income, family composition or extent of exceptional medical or other unusual expenses in accordance with HUD established schedules and criteria.
      “(2) It is found that Tenant has misrepresented to Management the facts upon which his rent is based, so that the rent he is paying is less than he should have been charged. If this is found, then the increase in rent may be made retroactive or the lease may be terminated.
      “f. In the event of any rent adjustment pursuant to Sections 3d or 3e, Management will mail or deliver a ‘Notice of Rent Adjustment’ to Tenant in accordance with Section 10 thereof. In the case of rent decrease, the adjustment will become effective the first day of the following month. In case of rent increases, the adjustment will become effective the first day following the first full calendar month, unless the rent increase results from a finding of intentional misrepresentation under Section 3e (2) above.”

       The lease contained the following provision:
      “Grievance Procedure
      “All grievances or appeals arising under this lease shall be processed and resolved pursuant to the grievance procedure of Management which is in effect at the time such grievance or appeal arises, which procedure is posted in the Project Office and incorporated herein by reference.”

       The record is devoid of any attempt by the defendant to challenge the HUD-approved adjustment of her use and occupancy fee.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Henry Coleman
    (4626)
    Borden, Daly and Bieluch, Js.
    Argued June 10
    decision released July 30, 1987

      Denise Derby, for the appellant (defendant).

      Christopher Malany, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin McMahon, assistant state’s attorney and William Korey, legal intern, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

Oral argument in this appeal was held on June 10,1987. After oral argument, the defendant died. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed as moot. State v. Grasso, 172 Conn. 298, 299, 374 A.2d 239 (1977).

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Goon Git Lee et al. v. Irvin Chipperini et al.
    (5285)
    Hull, Borden and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 1
    decision released September 22, 1987

      Thomas G. Moukawasher and Joseph E. Moukawasher filed a brief for the appellants (defendants).

      Sidney Axelrod filed a brief for the appellees (plaintiffs).
   Per Curiam.

In this quiet title action, the defendants appeal from the judgment of the trial court finding the issues for the plaintiffs on the complaint and on the defendants’ counterclaim. The defendants claim that the facts found by the court are clearly erroneous, and that the court applied improper rules of law. We have fully reviewed the record and conclude that the facts found are adequately supported by the record, and that the court did not apply any improper rule of law.

There is no error.


text:
    Harry Paris v. Connecticut Transit Company
    (5596)
    Dupont, C. J., Spallone and Bieluch, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 1
    decision released September 22, 1987

      Gary Greene and Robert M. Fitzgerald, certified legal intern, filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      OwenP. Eagan filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

There is no error.


text:
    Sidney Fitzgerald, Jr. v. Robco Pools, Inc.
    (5353)
    Dupont, C. J., Spallone and Bieluch, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 1
    decision released September 22, 1987

      William J. Wholean filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Lawrence R. Pellett filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

There is no error.


text:
    Lucille Trimbach v. Michael Trimbach
    (5555)
    Dupont, C. J., Borden and Spallone, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 1
    decision released September 30, 1987

      William C. Bieluch, Jr., filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Reuben S. Midler filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

We have scrutinized the record and briefs submitted with this appeal. After affording the defendant’s claims of error the appropriate scope of review, we find them to be without merit.

There is no error.


text:
    Douglas Barnes v. Northeast Utilities et al.
    (5778)
    Dupont, C. J., Spallone and Stoughton, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 14
    decision released September 30, 1987

      Gilbert Shasha and David M. Fabricant filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Anthony M. Fitzgerald and Maureen Danehy Cox filed a brief for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

There is no error.


text:
    Elizabeth Clark v. Fred Damiani
    (5448)
    Hull, Borden and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 1
    decision released September 30, 1987

      James L. Radda filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Barbara E. Crowley filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The plaintiff brought suit for damages arising out of a lengthy campaign of telephone harassment. The defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to dissolve a $25,000 prejudgment remedy granted to the plaintiff by the state trial referee, Hon. Harold M. Mulvey.

As we have made clear on frequent occasions, the role of the trial court in considering an application for a prejudgment remedy is a limited one. Gibbs v. Mase, 11 Conn. App. 289, 295-96, 526 A.2d 7 (1987); Babiarz v. Hartford Special, Inc., 2 Conn. App. 388, 393, 480 A.2d 561 (1984). In ruling on the defendant’s motion to dissolve, the court was doing no more than “ deter minfing] probable success by weighing probabilities.” Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 176, 474 A.2d 795 (1984). The trial court has broad discretion to determine the appropriateness of a prejudgment remedy and should “not be overruled in the absence of clear error.” Id.

The role of this court in reviewing the court’s decision on a prejudgment remedy is extremely limited. “It is not to duplicate the trial court’s weighing process, but rather to determine whether its conclusion was reasonable. “In the absence of clear error, this court should not overrule the thoughtful decision of the trial court, which has had an opportunity to assess the legal issues which may be raised and to weigh the credibility of at least some of the witnesses.” Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, supra, 176. Thus, this court’s review is limited to whether the trial court’s conclusion was reasonable. Price Saver, Inc. v. Maynard, 5 Conn. App. 90, 91, 496 A.2d 991 (1985).

We find that the conclusion of the court had a reasonable basis and that it did not commit clear error. The court was well within its broad discretion in finding that a jury could reasonably award the plaintiff $25,000 damages based on the evidence it heard.

There is no error.


text:
    Marilyn Griffiths v. Lawrence Griffiths
    (5226)
    Hull, Borden and Daly, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 1
    decision released September 30, 1987

      Jeffrey D. Lynch and James J. Maher filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Deborah L. Nemeth filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

In this appeal from the judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties, the defendant-husband claims that the trial court, Hon. Joseph W. Bogdanski, state trial referee, erred in its determination of the awards of alimony and child support. In addition, the defendant claims that the court erred in terminating the stay of execution of the judgment.

“A trial court is endowed with broad discretion in domestic relations cases. Our review of such decisions is confined to two questions: (1) whether the court correctly applied the law, and (2) whether it could reasonably have concluded as it did. Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 4, 495 A.2d 704 (1985); Flynn v. Flynn, 7 Conn. App. 745, 746, 510 A.2d 1005 (1986). As an appellate court, we do not review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached. Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). The goal of our analysis is simply to decide whether the trial court’s conclusion was reasonable. The trial court has the advantage of reviewing and assessing the demeanor, attitude and credibility of the witnesses and is therefore better equipped than we to assess the circumstances surrounding the dissolution action. Thus, we do not retry the facts. Leo v. Leo, supra; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492, 498, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980).” Palazzo v. Palazzo, 9 Conn. App. 486, 488, 519 A.2d 1230 (1987).

In reviewing the record and arguments presented in this appeal, it is clear that the court did not err in its determination of the financial awards. We conclude that the court determined its financial awards and division of assets by correctly applying the law after carefully reviewing the evidence presented.

The defendant’s second claim is that the court erred in terminating the stay of execution of the judgment. We will not review this claim of error because the defendant failed to file a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 4053. See Practice Book § 4049.

There is no error.

       Practice Book § 4049 provides that a motion for review under § 4053 is the “sole remedy of any party desiring the supreme court to review an order concerning a stay of execution . . . . ”


text:
    Jeffrey Anderson v. John J. Connole et al.
    (5681)
    Borden, Spallone and Stoughton, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 28
    decision released October 15, 1987

      Albert S. Bill, Jr., filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Andrew J. O’Keefe and Maureen Sullivan Dinnan filed a brief for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

There is no error.


text:
    Ann M. Lorusso v. Ronald J. Nemeyer
    (4922)
    Borden, Daly and O’Connell, Js.
    Argued October 6
    decision released October 15, 1987

      Richard P. Weinstein, with whom, on the brief, were Kerry M. Wisser and Michael A. Pepper, for the appellant (defendant).

      Ira B. Grudberg, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

There is no error.


text:
    James E. Bellemare v. General Dynamics Corporation
    (5330)
    Dupont, C. J., Spallone and Stoughton, Js.
    Argued October 15
    decision released October 26, 1987

      James E. Bellemare, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

      Alexandra Davis, with whom was Arthur G. Telegen, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

After a plenary examination of the record, transcripts and briefs filed in this matter, and after having afforded those claims of error, which are properly before this court, the appropriate scope of review, we conclude that there is no merit to the plaintiff’s averments of error.

This case is controlled by Gionfrido v. Wharf Realty, Inc., 193 Conn. 28, 32-33, 474 A.2d 787 (1984), In re Mongillo, 190 Conn. 686, 690-91, 461 A.2d 1387 (1983), and Rodriguez v. Mallory Battery Co., 188 Conn. 145, 151, 448 A.2d 829 (1982).

There is no error.


text:
    Theresa M. Rubenoff v. Alan T. Rubenoff
    (4837)
    Dupont, C. J., Stoughton and Foti, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 6
    decision released November 9, 1987

      Joseph P. Kenny filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      John Crosskey filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

There is no error.


text:
    William Miller et al. v. John G. Kalivas et al.
    (5286)
    Borden, Bieluch and O’Connell, Js.
    Argued November 10
    decision released November 17, 1987

      Andre L. Nagy, with whom, on the brief, was James J. Hooghuis, legal intern, for the appellant (defendant John Kalivas).

      Judith Dixon, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
   Per Curiam.

There is no error.


author: FOTI, J.

text:
    CICERO BOOKER, JR. v. MICHAEL J. JARJURA ET AL.

    (AC 29940)
    (AC 29941)
    Harper, Alvord and Foti, Js.

      Argued October 15, 2009
    officially released March 23, 2010

      Frederick W. Krug, for the appellant-appellee (plaintiff).

      Howard K. Levine, for the appellees-appellant (defendant Maria Giordano et al.).

       According to the Superior Court judgment file in this matter, although the name of Michael J. Jarjura, the mayor of the city of Waterbury, appears in the caption of this case and on the “Application for Hearing on Writ of Quo Warranto,” his name was not on the summons and he was not in fact served or intended as a party in this action. Jarjura was properly a party in another action previously filed by the same plaintiff challenging other appointments that he had made. Accordingly, for convenience sake, the caption of this appeal is consistent with the caption of the case as indicated in the judgment file.

   Opinion

FOTI, J.

These consolidated appeals concern an action brought by the plaintiff, Cicero Booker, Jr., the minority leader of the board of aldermen of the city of Waterbury, for quo warranto and mandamus. The plaintiff challenged the propriety of certain appointments of city electors to various boards and commissions by the mayor of Waterbury, Michael J. Jarjura, and the zoning commission of the city of Waterbury. The plaintiff also sought an injunction directing the zoning commission to make appointments to minority positions on the zoning commission only from persons named on a list provided by the minority leader of the board of aldermen. On November 27, 2007, the plaintiff filed a second amended, verified complaint against the defendants Dov Braunstein, Nancy Howse, Maria Gior-dano and the members of the zoning commission. The first count was a claim for quo warranto against Braunstein and Howse; however, the plaintiff subsequently withdrew the claim as to Howse. Count two was a claim for quo warranto against Giordano. The third count was a claim for mandamus against the members of the zoning commission. By memorandum of decision filed May 2, 2008, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff on count one, granted the application for a writ of quo warranto as to Braunstein and ordered him ousted from his position on the inland wetlands and watercourses commission of the city of Waterbury. The court, however, denied the plaintiffs application for a writ of quo warranto as to Giordano, as well as the claim for a writ of mandamus against the members of the zoning commission. On May 19, 2008, the plaintiff appealed from the court’s judgment in favor of Giordano and the members of the zoning commission on counts two and three of the complaint (AC 29940). On May 21, 2008, Braunstein appealed from the court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff on count one (AC 29941). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following factual and procedural history of these consolidated appeals is pertinent to their resolution. On December 1, 2005, the plaintiff, a member of the Independent political party and a recently elected member of the board of aldermen, was elected to the minority leader position on the board as provided for in the Waterbury charter. Pursuant to the charter, the mayor has the duty to appoint city electors, subject to the approval of the board of aldermen, to various boards and commissions. On January 30, 2006, the plaintiff submitted to Jarjura a list of individuals he believed eligible for appointment to various boards and commissions. On February 24, 2006, Jarjura submitted to the board of aldermen a list of individuals for appointment to various boards and commissions, including individuals who were to serve as minority party members. Jarjura’s list included individuals for minority party member appointment to boards and commissions who were not on the list the plaintiff had provided, including Braunstein.

On May 23, 2007, there was a minority seat vacant on the zoning commission. As of that date neither Jarj-ura nor the board of aldermen had acted to fill the vacancy on the zoning commission. On that date, pursuant to the charter, the members of the zoning commission voted unanimously to appoint Giordano, a Republican, to the vacant seat. Giordano did not appear on the plaintiffs list of recommended minority party members for appointment to the zoning commission. Other facts relevant to these appeals will be set forth as necessary. We now address each appeal in turn.

I

AC 29940

In this appeal, the plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the court denying his application for a writ of quo warranto as to Giordano and his claim for mandamus as to the members of the zoning commission. We will discuss each of the plaintiffs claims in trun.

A

Quo Warranto

“A complaint in the nature of a quo warranto may be brought [w]hen any person . . . usurps the exercise of any office . . . [and] the Superior Court may proceed ... to punish such person ... for such usurpation, according to the corase of the common law and may proceed therein and render judgment according to the course of the common law. ... A quo warranto proceeding under the common law lies only to test the defendant’s right to hold office de jure. ... In such an action, the burden is on the defendant to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a complete title to the office in dispute. . . . The title to be challenged in a quo warranto proceeding must be to a public office.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dumais v. Underwood, 47 Conn. App. 783, 788, 707 A.2d 333, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 918, 714 A.2d 4 (1998); see also General Statutes § 52-491. In this claim, the plaintiff argues that the court incorrectly inteipreted the Waterbury charter as not restricting those appointments to minority seat vacancies made by board and commission members, pursuant to chapter 4, § 4-2 (b) (2) of the charter; see footnote 8 of this opinion; to those individuals on the minority leader’s list. Essentially, the plaintiff claims that the restriction found in § 4-2 (b) (1) of the charter, which reads: “No minority member of any such board shall be eligible to act as such unless his name shall be one of those listed by such minority leader in accordance with the provisions hereof’; see footnote 6 of this opinion; applies to all minority member appointments and not merely those made by the mayor. We disagree.

The plaintiffs claim requires us to interpret the Waterbury charter. We first address the appropriate standard of review. As with any issue of statutory construction, the interpretation of a charter presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary. See Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission, 116 Conn. App. 171, 186, 976 A.2d 739, cert. granted on other grounds, 293 Conn. 931, 980 A.2d 915 (2009). When construing a statute, “[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § l-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Canterbury v. Deojay, 114 Conn. App. 695, 716, 971 A.2d 70 (2009).

The plaintiff argues that the limitation found in § 4-2 (b) (1) cautioning that “[n]o minority member of any such board shall be eligible to act as such unless his name shall be one of those listed by such minority leader in accordance with the provisions hereof,” not only applies to appointments to minority vacancies made by the mayor but also to such appointments made by the members of boards or commissions pursuant to § 4-2 (b) (2). See footnote 8 of this opinion. This is so, the plaintiff contends, because the last sentence of § 4-2 (b) (2) declares that such appointments are subject to “this [cjharter.” This term, the plaintiff continues, read in conjunction with the restriction found in § 4-2 (b) (1), requires that all appointments to minority vacancies must come from the list of minority party members provided by the minority leader of the board of aldermen. The plaintiff concludes that this is the only logical and reasonable inteipretation of the charter provisions regarding appointment of minority party members to boards or commissions because any other conclusion would create the “anomalous situation in which different eligibility standards would apply, depending on whether the appointment is made by the mayor or by the members of a board or commission.” Furthermore, the plaintiff cautions, a contrary interpretation in which such appointments are not restricted by the requirement that they appear on the minority leader’s list would allow the mayor to circumvent those very requirements “by not making minority appointments and then having political allies on boards or commissions with vacant minority seats fill those seats without regard to the minority leader’s list.” Finally, the plaintiff suggests that such a construction would thwart the purpose of limiting appointments to minority vacancies to persons named on the minority leader’s list and create an inharmonious scheme of appointing electors to minority vacancies on boards and commissions.

After a careful review of the charter as a whole, we conclude that the language of § 4-2 (b) (1) is strictly a limitation on the appointment power of the mayor and as such does not confine appointments to minority seat vacancies, made pursuant to § 4-2 (b) (2), to individuals present on the minority leader’s fist. A closer look at chapter four of the Waterbury charter supports this conclusion. We first note that chapter four of the Waterbury charter is simply titled “The Mayor,” and § 4-2 of that chapter, headed “Duties,” starts with the phrase: “It shall further be the duty of the Mayor,” with ensuing subsections that delineate the mayor’s various duties, as well as certain limitations. Section 4-2 (b) (1) is headed: “Appointment of Minority Party Members of Boards.” This subdivision clearly creates a mandatory limitation on the mayor’s power to appoint minority party members to vacant minority seats on city boards and commissions. The “Mayor . . . shall make no appointment of a minority party member of any board for which provision is made in said Charter to be filled by appointment by the Mayor except from a list of those eligible for appointment submitted by said minority leader of the Board of Aldermen.” (Emphasis added.) Waterbury Charter, c. 4, § 4-2 (b) (1). This restriction, by its unambiguous terms, applies only to minority vacancies that, as the charter declares, are “to be filled by appointment by the Mayor . . . .” Id. Moreover, nowhere in § 4-2 (b) (1) is there mention of the power of appointment to minority seat vacancies by the board of aldermen or boards or commissions.

Notwithstanding that “[s]aid appointments [made pursuant to § 4-2 (b) (2)] are subject to the requirements of . . . this Charter,” we cannot agree that this language makes applicable the restriction found in § 4-2 (b) (1) that “[n]o minority member of any such board shall be eligible to act as such unless his name shall be one of those listed by such minority leader in accordance with the provisions hereof’ to those appointed under § 4-2 (b) (2). It would be illogical to conclude that restrictions expressly placed on the mayor’s power of appointment in § 4-2 (b) (1) also are applicable to appointments made pursuant to § 4-2 (b) (2) in the absence of any mention of the appointment power of the board of aldermen or boards or commissions in the former subdivision or any restrictions on minority appointments in the latter. On the basis of our review of the charter, it is clear that the language in § 4-2 (b) (2) is referring to other provisions that delineate generally, regardless of party affiliation, who may serve on various boards and commissions. Therefore, we conclude that the court properly denied the plaintiffs application for a writ of quo warranto against Giordano, and this claim fails.

B

Mandamus

“[M]andamus is an extraordinary remedy to command the performance of a duty and . . . the burden rests on the party seeking performance of the duty to establish his legal right to its performance.” Ross v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn. App. 55, 63, 982 A.2d 1084 (2009). At trial, the court denied the plaintiffs application for a writ of mandamus against the members of the zoning commission. He sought a temporary and permanent injunction requiring members of the zoning commission to make minority appointments to the zoning commission pursuant to § 4-2 (b) (2) only from the list of minority party members provided by the minority leader of the board of aider-men. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the charter requires that all appointments to minority vacancies must come from the list of minority party members provided by the minority leader of the board of aider-men. For the reasons set forth in part I A of this opinion, this claim fails.

II

AC 29941

In this appeal, Braunstein appeals from the court’s finding him ineligible to act as a member of the inland wetlands and watercourses commission and, therefore, granting the plaintiffs application for quo warranto; see part I A of this opinion; as to him and ordering him ousted from his position. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following additional facts will aid in our analysis of Braunstein’s claims. On September 7, 2006, the plaintiff, in a previous action, Booker I; see footnote 1 of this opinion; filed a two count, verified complaint for mandamus against Jarjura and quo warranto against five individuals appointed to various boards and commissions by Jarjura. The central issue in Booker I concerned the interpretation of § 4-2 (b) (1) of the city charter. Specifically at issue was the phrase “minority party member,” which had been added to § 4-2 (b) (1) as part of a 2002 revision. The defendants argued that under the clear and unambiguous language of the revised charter, the mayor was limited to the minority leader’s list only if he wanted to appoint someone to a board or commission who belonged to the same political party as the minority leader. This was so because in the 2002 revision, the word “party” was added to § 4-2 (b) (1) so that it now reads, “the Mayor of said City shall make no appointment of a minority party member of any board . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The defendants asserted that because none of the defendant board and commission members belonged to the same political party as the plaintiff, they rightfully held their positions. The plaintiff argued that when making minority appointments to boards and commissions, the mayor may appoint only individuals who appear on the minority leader’s list and that only those individuals are eligible to serve on the boards and commissions as minority members.

On April 30, 2007, by memorandum of decision, the court granted the writ of mandamus “with regard to boards and commissions that can have majority representation, and therefore, fall under the purview of § 4-2 (b) (1) [and ordered] Jarjura ... to appoint people to be minority members of these boards and commissions only if they are members of the ‘minority party’ as defined by the court and on the minority leader’s list as recommended for appointment for that particular board or commission.” In response to the plaintiffs quo warranto action, the court also ousted three of the five defendant board and commission members “because they [were] members of the ‘minority party’ as defined by this court, and they [did] not appear on the plaintiffs list as recommended for the positions for which they were appointed.”

The court supported its conclusions on the basis of its interpretation of the legislative intent of the 2002 charter revision commission when it inserted the word “party” into § 4-2 (b) (1). After concluding that § 4-2 (b) (1) was “unclear and ambiguous,” the court reviewed a transcript of the charter revision commission’s question and answer session at its June 19, 2002 public hearing. On the basis of that review, the court concluded that “the meaning of the term ‘minority party members,’ as stated in § 4-2 (b) (1), refers to the nonmajority political parties represented on the board of aldermen.” The court continued, “[i]n the present case, only Republicans and Independents are ‘minority party members.’ [Moreover] pursuant to § 4-2 (b) (1), when making minority appointments to boards and commissions, the mayor is confined to appointing people who appear on the minority leader’s list as ‘minority party members.’ Should the mayor attempt to make a minority appointment of a member of the ‘minority party’ and that person does not appear as designated for such appointment on the [minority leader’s] list, then that person will not be eligible to serve as per the last sentence of § 4-2 (b) (1), which prohibits minority members of boards or commissions from serving unless they appear on the minority leader’s list. In addition, should the mayor attempt to make a minority appointment of an individual not belonging to the ‘minority party,’ as defined by the court, then that person will be ineligible to serve regardless of whether that name appears on the minority leader’s list.” Booker I was not appealed.

At trial in this case, the plaintiff essentially argued that because Braunstein was appointed to his position on the inland wetlands and watercourses commission from the same February 24,2006 list that Jarjura submitted and from which the five Booker I defendant board and commission members were appointed, the reasoning of Booker I applied, and, therefore, he did not rightfully hold his position. Braunstein first argued that the ruling in Booker I could not apply to him because he was not a party to that action. He further argued that the rule announced in Booker I was incorrect in that it was unworkable, contradicted our Supreme Court precedent and that the trial court’s interpretation of the charter was improperly founded on comments made by a member of the public at the June 19, 2002 public hearing. Braunstein also contended that by its plain language, the terms of § 4-2 (b) (1) did not apply to his appointment because although he was appointed to a commission, that subdivision only applies to appointments to boards and then only to boards for which provision is made in the charter. After a hearing on December 10, 2007, the court, by memorandum of decision filed May 2,2008, granted the plaintiffs application for quo warranto as to Braunstein and, therefore, ordered him ousted from his position on the inland wetlands and watercourses commission. The court expressly based its ruling on its “interpretation in Booker I of the legislative intent of the 2002 charter revision commission in inserting the word ‘party’ into § 4-2 (b) (1).”

On appeal, Braunstein makes four specific claims. First, he claims that the court improperly refused to consider arguments he made that had not been made by the defendants in Booker 7. Alternatively, Braunstein contends that if in actuality the court had addressed those claims in reaching its decision, the court improperly (1) concluded that § 4-2 (b) (1), by its unambiguous terms, applies to commissions as well as boards; (2) relied on the Booker I interpretation of “minority party member” because that interpretation was (a) unworkable and in contravention to our Supreme Court precedent and (b) incorrectly made on the basis of comments from a member of the public given at a public hearing of the charter revision commission; and (3) concluded that the term “minority party members” was not unconstitutionally vague. We now address each of Braunstein’s claims in trun. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

A

Braunstein’s first claim requires little discussion. His contention that the court improperly refused to consider arguments that he had made at trial that had not been made by the defendants in Booker I is undermined by the court’s statement that “even if the entire factual situation in [this case] was a matter of first impression to this court, this court would still rule in the same manner and grant the [application] for a writ of quo warranto as it pertains to Braunstein.” This statement indicates that the court had, indeed, sufficiently considered those arguments. Cf. In re Emerald C., 108 Conn. App. 839, 852 n.9, 949 A.2d 1266 (“[w]e have repeatedly held that this court will not consider claimed errors on the part of the trial court unless it appears on the record that the question was distinctly raised at trial and was ruled upon and decided by the court adversely to the appellant’s claim” [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923, 958 A.2d 150 (2008). This is the exact position Braunstein apparently adopts in his brief to this court when he stated that “[i]t appears . . . that the trial court did answer [those] arguments, and the parties [submitting this consolidated brief] are proceeding on that basis.” Because we conclude that the court sufficiently considered Braunstein’s arguments, this claim has no merit.

B

Next, Braunstein claims that the court improperly concluded that § 4-2 (b) (1), by its unambiguous terms, applies to his appointment to the inland wetlands and watercourses commission. Specifically he argues that by the plain language of § 4-2 (b) (1), the limitation concerning the minority leader’s fist applies only to boards, not commissions, and then only to boards for which provision is made in the charter. See footnote 6 of this opinion. Braunstein contends that the inland wetlands and watercourses commission is a commission that exists pursuant to § 31.005 of an omnibus ordinance that concerned the implementation of charter provisions to appointive boards and commissions as required by § 6C-1 of the charter and thus is distinct from “boards for which provision is made in the charter . . . .” We disagree.

We note that because Braunstein’s claim involves the interpretation of the Waterbury charter, our standard of review is plenary. See Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 116 Conn. App. 186; see also part IA of this opinion. Because, after considering the text of § 4-2 (b) (1) and its relationship to other provisions in the charter, we conclude that it is unclear and ambiguous with respect to the question of whether the limitations it places on minority appointments are restricted only to boards for which provision is made in the charter and not other such boards or commissions. We, therefore, turn to extratextual evidence in order to determine the meaning of the statutory language under these circumstances. See Canterbury v. Deojay, supra, 114 Conn. App. 716; General Statutes § l-2z.

Section 4-2 (b) (1) first appeared in the charter as § 2152 in 1947 and remained unchanged until 2002 when, after a charter revision, it was recodified into its present form. See Spec. Acts, No. 108, § 2 (1947). The only change made in that 2002 revision and recodification was the insertion of the word “party,” so that it now reads, “the Mayor of said City shall make no appointment of a minority party member of any board . . . .” Waterbury Charter, c. 4, § 4-2 (b) (1). The remaining text of the section was left unchanged. That is to say, from its inception through to its revision and recodification and its present incarnation, the restriction in the charter on the mayor’s power of appointment to minority seats has always referred to appointments to “boards.”

Our Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Giusti v. Barbino, 170 Conn. 113, 365 A.2d 408 (1976), had the opportunity, in a different context, to interpret then § 2152 of the charter. In that case, the minority leader of the board of aldermen submitted to the mayor a list of names of persons eligible for minority party appointment to several boards and commissions, including the commission on aging, the civil service commission and the zoning commission. Id., 113-14. That list also matched the candidate to the board or commission to which they were candidates for appointment. Although the mayor did appoint from that list, he cross matched some of the appointees so that they would serve on boards or commissions for which they were not recommended by the minority leader. We note that not only were the appointments—made pursuant to the virtually identical predecessor of the provision at issue here—made to commissions, but that that circumstance was expressly stated as part of our Supreme Court’s interpretation of that provision in an officially published decision. We conclude that under these circumstances, we are entitled to presume that the 2002 charter revision commission revised and recodified § 2152 into § 4-2 (b) (1) with the knowledge of that existing precedent and the circumstances underlying the claims made, as well as the effect its own action or nonaction may have had on them. Cf. Achillion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Law, 291 Conn. 525, 535, 970 A.2d 57 (2009) (“[t]he legislature is presumed to be aware and to have knowledge of all existing statutes and the effect which its own action or nonaction may have on them” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 298, 188 A.2d 863 (1963) (“[i]t is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that the legislature is presumed to know all the existing statutes, the judicial interpretation of them, and the effect that its action or nonaction will have on them”). As noted previously, although the charter revision commission is presumed to have been aware of the mayor’s practice of making minority appointments to commissions as well as boards from a list provided by the minority leader of the board of aldermen as required under § 2152, the only change the charter revision commission made was to add the word “party” after “minority” in both the text and the title of that section. Although we are aware that the charter revision commission’s inaction is not necessarily an affirmation of the practice under review, we also presume that the charter revision commission was aware of that practice as exposed in State ex rel. Giusti v. Barbino, supra, 170 Conn. 113, and that its subsequent nonaction may be understood as a validation of that practice. See, e.g., Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 284 Conn. 645, 665, 935 A.2d 1004 (2007). Absent any evidence to the contrary, we, therefore, conclude that the charter revision commission intended for appointments of minority party members under § 4-2 (b) (1) to include such appointments to boards and commissions.

C

Next, Braunstein claims that the court improperly relied on its Booker I interpretation of “minority party member” because that interpretation was unworkable and in contravention of our Supreme Court precedent, and was incorrectly made on the basis of comments from a member of the public given at a public hearing of the charter revision commission. We disagree.

Because Braunstein’s claim involves the interpretation of the Waterbury charter, our standard of review is plenary. See Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 116 Conn. App. 186; see also part I A of this opinion. On the basis of our review of the charter, we conclude that the court was correct in determining that the term “minority party member” is unclear and ambiguous. When the language of a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we “look for interpretive guidance to the legislative histoiy and circumstances surrounding its enactment [and] to the legislative policy it was designed to implement . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 751, 756, 900 A.2d 1 (2006). After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments and our review of the record, including the testimony of Paul K. Pemerewski, Jr., as well as the available legislative history, we conclude that the court was correct in determining that the meaning of the term “minority party members,” as used in § 4-2 (b) (1), refers to the nonmajority political parties represented on the board of aldermen. Moreover, this result is not unworkable nor, as our research reveals, in contravention of any applicable precedent.

The record reflects that, at the June 19, 2002 public hearing, Lawrence DePillo, a Waterbury community activist, had an opportunity to address the charter revision commission. Present at that meeting were Pemer-ewski, the chairman of the charter revision commission, along with seven of its other eight members. Also present and participating were Dennis M. Buckley and Steven G. Mednick, attorneys who the city had hired to work with the charter revision commission. Buckley was hired to act as a consultant to the charter revision commission, and Mednick was hired as special counsel to the charter revision commission. At the outset, Per-nerewski stated that the purpose of the meeting was “to meet with [members of the public] who have some questions and explain what [the charter revision commission] did so that whether you agree with what [the charter revision commission] did or disagree with what [the charter revision commission] did, at least you’ll understand what [the charter revision commission] did . . . .”

DePillo raised the issue of past mayoral abuses in minority appointments to boards and commissions. Essentially, DePillo was concerned about the appointment of unaffiliated electors—that is, electors with no party affiliation—to seats on boards or commissions and, as a result, by not filling them with members of the majority party, the mayor thereby maintained his or her ability to appoint the maximum allotted majority members to those boards or commissions. A discussion ensued among DePillo, Pemerewski, Laurie Singer-Russo, an alderman and member of the charter revision commission, as well as Buckley and Mednick. Buckley pointed out that in such a circumstance, the minority leader’s right to designate minority members for vacancies would be reduced by the mayor’s actions. Mednick responded that the charter revision commission had not yet modified the charter in order to address that issue. He then suggested that “[o]ne thing I would do that we didn’t do because we really didn’t focus on this section is, I make clear that it’s [mjinority [p]arty members on [b]oards as opposed to [m]inority [m] embers of [b]oards—using the current language is, [m]inority [m]embers—[we’re] talking about parties here.”

Pemerewski testified at trial concerning the process of the charter revision in general, as well as the revision and recodification of § 4-2 (b) (1) specifically. Pemer-ewski testified that until the June 19,2002 hearing, other than changing the numbering of that provision, the charter revision commission intentionally had left that provision unchanged. Moreover, he testified that prior to the June 19, 2002 public hearing, the charter revision commission had chosen not to revise portions of the charter that, according to his testimony, like § 4-2 (b) (1) pertained to the “political process” surrounding the charter rather than the “governmental process . . . .” In other words, it was not until after the discussion at the public hearing took place, as detailed previously, that the charter revision commission decided to revise § 4-2 (b) (1) to include the word “party.”

We find compelling to our conclusion that the court properly interpreted the legislative intent behind the charter revision commission’s insertion of the word “party” into § 4-2 (b) (1) the sequence of events that ostensibly led to that revision. That sequence of events supports our conclusion that the court’s interpretation of the term “minority party member” as meaning a member of a nonmajority political party represented on the board of aldermen was proper. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not improperly rely on its Booker I interpretation of “minority party member” in concluding that Braunstein was ineligible to serve as a member of the inland wetlands and watercourses commission.

D

Last, Braunstein claims that the court improperly concluded that the “portion of § 4-2 (b) (1) dealing with ‘minority party members’ ” was not unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, he argues that “[p] rescribing the process of appointing members of boards and commissions . . . without providing a definition of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ as those terms are used in the charter provisions, [denies] fair warning and [is] the epitome of standardless enforcement.” We disagree.

“The constitutional injunction that is commonly referred to as the void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. ... If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties. . . . For statutes that do not implicate the especially sensitive concerns embodied in the first amendment, we determine the constitutionality of a statute under attack for vagueness by considering its applicability to the particular facts at issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maurice M., 116 Conn. App. 1, 6-7, 975 A.2d 90, cert. granted on other grounds, 293 Conn. 926, 980 A.2d 913 (2009).

We read Braunstein’s claim first to challenge § 4-2 (b) (1) as unconstitutionally vague as applied because it failed to give him adequate notice that his actions were prohibited by that provision. This argument is untenable. “The proper test for determining if a statute is vague as applied is whether a reasonable person would have anticipated that the statute would apply to his or her particular conduct. . . . The test is objectively applied to the actor’s conduct and judged by a reasonable person’s reading of the statute .... When we apply these principles to the facts of the present case, our fundamental inquiry is whether a person of ordinary intelligence would comprehend that the defendant’s acts were prohibited under the ordinance.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skidd, 104 Conn. App. 46, 57, 932 A.2d 416 (2007). Section 4-2 (b) (1) is a restriction on the mayor’s appointment power; see footnote 6 of this opinion; and, therefore, is properly read as applying, in this case, to Jarjura’s conduct and not Braunstein’s conduct. As a result, his argument that the charter denied him fair warning has no merit.

Braunstein next challenges the charter as unconstitutionally vague because it lacks definitions for “majority” and “minority,” and, as a result, he was the victim of arbitrary enforcement. Although the charter does not define the terms “majority” and “minority,” “[t]he lack of an express definition does not, in and of itself, render a statute void for vagueness. ... If a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skidd, supra, 104 Conn. App. 58. The American Heritage Dictionary defines a majority as “the greater number or part of something ... [a] number more than half of the total number of a given group.” American Heritage Dictionary (2d College Ed. 1982). It defines minority as the “smaller in number of two groups forming a whole. ” Id. In part IIC of this opinion we concluded that the court’s interpretation that “the meaning of the term ‘minority party members,’ as stated in § 4-2 (b) (1), refers to the nonmajority political parties represented on the board of aldermen” was correct. As a result, we conclude that the meaning of “minority party member” can be ascertained fairly and that the charter is not unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, we conclude that the restriction found in § 4-2 (b) (1) that “[n]o minority member of any such board shall be eligible to act as such unless his name shall be one of those listed by such minority leader in accordance with the provisions” was not arbitrarily enforced against Braunstein.

The judgment in AC 29940 and AC29941 is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Jarjura is not a defendant in the present case even though his name appears in the caption. He was, however, a defendant in a separate action, Booker v. Jarjura, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-06-4011301-S (April 30, 2007) (43 Conn. L. Rptr. 405). No appeal was taken from the judgment in that case. That action is, however, inextricably intertwined with the action underlying this appeal. The trial court in this action referred to that case as Booker I, and for consistency, we use that reference as well throughout this opinion.

       Also named as defendants were John Egan, Joseph D’Orso, Guiseppe Pisani, Stephen Mannetti, Ernest Brunelli and Paul K. Pemerewski, Jr.

       Braunstein, a Republican, had been appointed by Jarjura, a Democrat, to Waterbury’s inland wetlands and watercourses commission.

       On February 11, 2009, this court granted the plaintiffs December 30, 2008 motion to consolidate AC 29940 and AC 29941.

       Chapter 4, § 4-2, of the Waterbury charter provides in relevant part: “It shall further be the duty of the Mayor . . . (b) to fill by appointment vacancies in offices, including, but not limited to . . . boards and commissions in all cases in which the power of appointment is vested in the Mayor, unless otherwise specifically set forth in this Charter . . .
      Chapter 3, § 3A-2, of the Waterbury charter provides in relevant part: “The Board of Aldermen shall have the following powers . . . (e) to reject, by an affirmative vote of ten (10) members, within thirty (30) days of submission, all appointments made by the Mayor pertaining to . . . appointive positions, boards and commissions required by this Charter or Ordinances . . . .”

       Chapter 4, § 4-2 (b) (1), of the Waterbury charter provides in relevant part that “ [n] otwithstanding any other provision of the Charter. . . the Mayor . . . shall make no appointment of a minority party member of any board for which provision is made in said Charter to be filled by appointment by the Mayor except from a list of those eligible for appointment submitted by said minority leader of the Board of Aldermen. The Mayor shall notify said minority leader of the time or dates for the making of all appointments of such minority members, and the minority leader shall thereupon and prior to the time for making such appointments, submit to the Mayor a list of those whom he shall select as eligible for such appointments which shall be made up of not less than twice the number to be appointed. No minority member of any such board shall be eligible to act as such unless his name shall be one of those listed by such minority leader in accordance with the provisions hereof.”

       Also included on Jarjura’s list for appointment were Lisa Mason, Nancy Carmody, Vincent Russo, Giovanni Perugini and Jose Diaz. Because Jarjura had proposed to appoint those individuals to minority seats on various boards and commissions even though they did not appear on the plaintiffs January 30,2006 list, the plaintiff brought an action for quo warranto against them in Booker I. See footnote 1 of this opinion. At that time, the plaintiff also brought a mandamus action against Jarjura, seeking both a temporary and permanent injunction requiring him as mayor and pursuant to the charter, to make appointments to minority positions on boards and commissions only from among those people named on a list submitted by the minority leader of the board of aldermen. In the case underlying this appeal, the plaintiff contended that he overlooked Braunstein’s appointment when he brought the quo warranto action in Booker I, even though Braunstein’s appointment was contemporaneous to those named in that action.

       Chapter 4, § 4-2 (b) (2), of the Waterbury charter provides in relevant part: “[I]f the Mayor fails to announce the appointment of a replacement member in the event of a vacancy on said board or commission: (i) during the first six (6) months of the term of office, within ninety (90) days following the effective date of that vacancy or (ii) during the remainder of the term of office, within sixty (60) days following the effective date of that vacancy, then the Board of Aldermen shall fill the vacancy within sixty (60) days thereafter by a majority vote of those present. If the Board of Aldermen fails to fill the vacancy during the sixty (60) day period, then the remaining members of the board or commission for which the vacancy exists shall fill the vacancy by appointment. Said appointments are subject to the requirements of the General Statutes pertaining to minority party representation and this Charter.”

       General Statutes § 52-491 provides in relevant part: “When any person . . . usurps the exercise of any office . . . the Superior Court may proceed, on a complaint in the nature of a quo warranto, to punish such person . . . for such usurpation, according to the course of the common law and may proceed therein and render judgment according to the course of the common law.”

       See Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 161, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004) (“In arriving at the intention of the framers of [a] charter the whole and every part of the instrument must be taken and compared together. In other words, effect should be given, if possible, to every section, paragraph, sentence, clause and word in the instrument and related laws.” [Internal quotation marks omitted]).

       “The title . . . of legislation [is], while not conclusive, [a] valuable [aid] to construction.” Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 68 n.17, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985); but see Corneroli v. D’Amico, 116 Conn. App. 59, 67 n.2, 975 A.2d 107 (if language of statute clear and not subject to interpretation, titles are of less significance in construction), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 928, 980 A.2d 909 (2009).

       For example, chapter 6, § 6A-5, of the Waterbury charter provides: “Except as otherwise provided by ordinance, no person may serve on a board or commission unless such person is an elector of the City. If any person who is a member of a board shall move from the City, such person’s membership on such board or commission shall immediately terminate.”

       The plaintiffs arguments in support of this claim mirror those made in support of his claim in part IA of this opinion.

       Because the court, in ruling against Braunstein, in this case, expressly adopted its reasoning from Booker I, a comprehensive account of that case is required.

       At the time, the board of aldermen consisted of nine Democrats, four members of the Independent party and two Republicans. The plaintiff was a member of the Independent party. Each of the defendant boar d and commission members was a member of the Republican party.

       The defendants also argued in Booker I that if the court did not adopt the defendants’ interpretation of § 4-2 (b) (1), then that provision was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, should be void. The court found that § 4-2 (b) (1) was not unconstitutionally vague.

       Those three individuals were Lisa Mason, Giovanni Perugini and Jose Diaz. See footnote 7 of this opinion. The court, however, ruled that Nancy Carmody and Vincent Russo met the requirements to serve on their respective commissions because § 4-2 (b) (1) does not apply to those commissions, as no one political party can hold the majority of seats on them.

       In its memorandum of decision, the court in this case stated that it would not consider Braunstein’s arguments “pertaining to the 2002 charter revision commission’s intent in inserting the word ‘party’ into § 4-2 (b) (1) and the argument that § 4-2 (b) (1) applies to boards but not commissions [because they] could have been raised in Booker I but [were] not . . . .” The court, however, further stated that “even if the entire factual situation in [this case] was a matter of first impression to this court, this court would still rule in the same manner and grant the [application] for a writ of quo warranto as it pertains to Braunstein.”

       Braunstein also argues that the court misapplied the law of the case doctrine. See General Electric Capital Corp. of Puerto Rico v. Rizvi, 113 Conn. App. 673, 681, 971 A.2d 41 (2009). We disagree. Although the court based its ruling against Braunstein on its “interpretation in Booker I of the legislative intent of the 2002 charter revision commission in inserting the word ‘party’ into § 4-2 (b) (1),” the court clearly was adopting the reasoning it had used in Booker I and not treating that decision as the law of the case. See id.
      Braunstein also frames this claim as an improper application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. See Labow v. Rubin, 95 Conn. App. 454, 461-63, 897 A.2d 136, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 933, 909 A.2d 960 (2006). Because we conclude that the court did address the arguments put forth by Braunstein, this argument has no merit.

       Chapter 6, § 6C-1, of the Waterbury charter provides: “The Board of Aldermen shall adopt ordinances setting forth the organizational structure and powers of the boards and commissions set forth in Part C ... of this Chapter.” Part C of chapter six specifically creates several boards and commissions, the inland wetlands and watercourses commission not among them. Those included are, among others, the board of commissioners of public health, § 6C-2; the board of park commissioners, § 6C-3; the city plan commission, § 6C-4; the board of police commissioners, § 6C-5; and the zoning commission, § 6C-7.

       The word “party” was also inserted into the heading of § 4-2 (b) (1) so that it now reads: “Appointment of Minority Party Members of Boards.”

       Pernerewski testified at the December 10, 2007 hearing. He was the chairman of the 2002 charter revision commission and the majority leader on the board of aldermen at the time of trial, as well as a member of the zoning commission.

       Counsel for Braunstein conceded both to the trial court in this case and at oral argument before this court that there was no extant legislative history with regard to the passage of § 2152. Moreover, our research reveals that the transcript of the exchange that occurred at the June 19, 2002 public hearing on the charter revision that the court relied on in Booker I is the full extent of the available legislative history concerning the insertion of the word “party” into § 4-2 (b) (1).

       We note that at all times relevant, the board of aldermen consisted of nine Democrats, four members of the Independent party and two Republicans. See footnote 15 of this opinion. Although the board consisted of three discrete groups in the form of political parties, this circumstance is not inconsistent with the definition of minority as the “smaller in number of two groups forming a whole” found in the American Heritage Dictionary (2d College Ed. 1982). This is evident in the court’s definition of “minority party member” as, essentially, a member not in the majority. By that definition, a minority party member is a member of a group “smaller in number of two groups forming a whole,” those groups being the majority and nonmajority members of the board of aldermen.