author: BEACH, J.

text:
    CONSTRUCTION KEN-NECTION, INC. v. DIANNE CIPRIANO ET AL.
    (AC 31778)
    Beach, Robinson and Sheldon, Js.

      Argued January 30
    officially released July 3, 2012.

      James Stedronsky, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      R. Bradley Morris, for the appellee (named defendant et al.)

      William C. Franklin, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas W. Mott, for the appellee (defendant Naugatuck Valley Savings and Loan).
   Opinion

BEACH, J.

The plaintiff, Construction Ken-nection, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court concluding that the mechanic’s lien it filed in connection with a residential construction project for the defendants Dianne Cipriano and Joseph Cipriano (collectively, Ciprianos) was invalid and, accordingly, dismissing the plaintiffs action to foreclose its mechanic’s hen, which the plaintiff claims is prior in right to the construction mortgage held by the defendant Nauga-tuck Valley Savings and Loan. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges as clearly erroneous the factual findings of the court that the Ciprianos did not knowingly consent to the expanded work done or proposed by the plaintiff, that certain work that was purportedly done was not within the contract, that the filing of the hen was beyond the ninety day statutory limitation, and that the plaintiff failed to estabhsh probable cause that any amounts claimed were within the terms of the contract, verbal amendments or change orders. Because the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the court and as gleaned from the record, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiffs appeal. On January 6, 2005, the plaintiff and the Ciprianos entered into a written contract providing that the plaintiff would construct a log home in Harwinton for $155,000, excluding site work such as foundation excavation and septic system installation. The contract provided: “Any alterations or deviations from the above scope of work involving extra costs, will be executed only upon written orders, and will become an extra charge [over] and above the estimate.” After the contract was signed, the Ciprianos had a septic system installed at a cost of $30,000. Subsequently, in or around early February, 2005, the parties learned that, in order to obtain a building permit to build the house, a new driveway would have to be constructed on the lot. The parties then modified and extended their contract by oral agreement that the plaintiff would perform site work, including building the driveway, at a cost of $45,000 to $50,000. It is undisputed that there were no change orders executed in writing.

On or about January 18, 2006, the Ciprianos obtained a construction loan secured by a mortgage from Nauga-tuck Valley Savings and Loan in the amount of $240,000 in order to finance both the cost of the original contract and the cost of the site work. Without informing the Ciprianos, Kenneth Beaudoin, co-owner of the plaintiff, estimated in January, 2006, that the total work would cost approximately $283,000, which apparently included the original contract amount of $155,000, plus the amounts agreed on for site work, as well as estimates for additional work that he believed the project required, but that went beyond the scope of the parties’ initial contract and subsequent oral agreement. Beau-doin did not provide a written estimate of this total to the Ciprianos until May, 2006. The plaintiff had commenced work on November 19, 2005, and, pursuant to invoices issued by the plaintiff, the Ciprianos had made periodic payments on January 20, 2006, January 25, 2006, May 23, 2006, and July 20, 2006. The court found: “The [Ciprianos] were not fully aware of all the changes that went beyond the scope of the initial contract and the costs associated therewith.”

On August 3, 2006, the plaintiff requested a payment of $44,325. The Ciprianos informed the plaintiff that they could no longer afford to continue paying for the construction of their log home. The funding on behalf of the Ciprianos from Naugatuck Valley Savings and Loan was suspended pursuant to bank guidelines because an insufficient amount of work had been performed since the previous construction loan draw request. The last invoice that the plaintiff sent to the Ciprianos reflected an outstanding balance of $63,303, due on August 29, 2006. The plaintiff filed a mechanic’s lien in that amount on December 14, 2006. In October, 2007, the plaintiff commenced an action to foreclose the mechanic’s hen, and the court rendered judgment in favor of the Ciprianos on December 2, 2009. Both the plaintiff and Naugatuck Valley Savings and Loan moved for an articulation, and the court subsequently issued a supplemental memorandum of decision on March 4, 2010. In that decision, the court set forth the parties’ respective positions as follows: “The [Cipri-anos’] position is that by August 3, 2006, substantial performance on the subject residence had [been] completed. The plaintiffs position is that additional work [namely, dormer siding work] was done on the residence on or about September 21,2006, which brings the mechanic’s hen filing within the ninety-day perimeter of General Statutes § 49-34.The [Ciprianos] raised various special defenses to the December 14, 2006 mechanic’s hen, which include: the untimely filing of the hen; that certain work and billings were beyond the written or oral agreements; and that [they] did not consent to some of the work.”

The court made the following findings of fact, which were, in their entirety:

“1. The [Ciprianos] did not knowingly consent to the expanded work done or proposed by the plaintiff, nor did they agree to the costs associated with such work.
“2. The work that was purportedly done by the plaintiff on September 21 and/or September 22, 2006, was not within the contract, nor was the work ‘ongoing’ at that time. Moreover, even if that work was within the contract, it was done after an approximately one and one-half month delay. As a result, those dates do not represent the last day of substantial completion within the terms of the written or oral contract.
“3. The ninety-day period for lien filing purposes commenced on August 3, 2006, the last day on which agreed upon services or materials were furnished, thus representing the date of substantial completion. Therefore, the December 14,2006 lien filing was beyond the ninety-day statutory limitation.
“4. The plaintiff failed to establish probable cause that the amount ‘justly due’ and owing to the plaintiff was within [the] terms of the contract or any verbal amendments to the said contract and/or change orders to the underlying base contract.”

On appeal, the plaintiff challenges each of these factual findings as clearly erroneous. We conclude that the plaintiffs arguments lack merit.

We first set forth the applicable standard of review. “On appeal, it is the function of this court to determine whether the decision of the trial court is clearly erroneous. . . . This involves a two part function: where the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision; where the factual basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous. That is the standard and scope of this court’s judicial review of decisions of the trial court. Beyond that, we will not go. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rollar Construction & Demolition, Inc. v. Granite Rock Associates, LLC, 94 Conn. App. 125, 130, 891 A.2d 133 (2006).

We next set forth the relevant law. “[I]n Connecticut, the mechanic’s hen is a creature of statute and gives a right of action which did not exist at common law. . . . The purpose of the mechanic’s lien is to give one who furnishes materials or services the security of the building and land for the payment of his claim by making such claim a hen thereon .... Moreover, [t]he guidelines for interpreting mechanic’s lien legislation are . . . well established. Although the mechanic’s lien statute creates a statutory right in derogation of the common law ... its provisions should be liberally construed in order to implement its remedial purpose of furnishing security for one who provides services or materials. . . . Our interpretation, however, may not depart from reasonable compliance with the specific terms of the statute under the guise of a libera! construction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 129. Pursuant to § 49-34, a mechanic’s hen must be filed within ninety days after the plaintiff ceases providing services or furnishing materials. “No mechanic’s lien may exceed the price which the owner has agreed to pay for the building being erected or improved, and the owner is entitled, furthermore, to credit for payments made in good faith to the original contractor before receipt of notice of such a hen or hens. General Statutes §§ 49-33 and 49-36.” Seaman v. Climate Control Corp., 181 Conn. 592, 596, 436 A.2d 271 (1980).

We conclude that there is evidence in the record to support the court’s factual findings. The plaintiff claims that the siding work purportedly done on September 21 and/or September 22 was contemplated by the contract and, therefore, that it was clearly erroneous for the court to refer to such work as “ ‘expanded work’ ” and to conclude that it was not within the contract. The plaintiffs argument fails. The contract specifically provided for work in the amount of $155,000 and that any alterations involving additional costs must be agreed to in writing. Unbeknownst to the Ciprianos, however, payments they previously had made were apphed toward certain other work that the plaintiff performed that was beyond the scope of the parties’ initial contract and that was not executed in writing as contemplated by the initial contract. Additionally, work beyond the scope of the original price contemplated by the contract was performed prior to work covered by the contract price. The plaintiff considered amounts paid at the time to be compensation for the unauthorized work, while the Ciprianos thought that their payments were for work within the contract price. As the project approached completion, then, the Ciprianos ran out of money before the job was done. In effect, the plaintiff filed a mechanic’s hen to secure payment of amounts that had never been agreed to by the Ciprianos. The plaintiff did not execute written change orders, as required by the contract, and, accordingly, any sum the Ciprianos paid to the plaintiff for work should have been applied toward the original contract price. Dianne Cipriano testified that she informed the plaintiff several times that she could spend up to approximately $200,000 on the construction. Accordingly, the court’s finding that the Ciprianos did not knowingly consent to the price for expanded work done or proposed by the plaintiff was not clearly erroneous. Similarly, because there is evidence that the price of the work was beyond the price contemplated by the contract, the court’s finding that the plaintiff failed to establish probable cause that the amount “justly due” to the plaintiff was within the contract was not clearly erroneous.

Additionally, the court found: “The work that was purportedly done by the plaintiff on September 21 and/or September 22, 2006, was not within the contract . ...” If work was performed on September 21 and/or September 22, then the court’s finding that there was no agreement by the parties to the amounts paid for such work to be completed was not clearly erroneous. As previously stated, the plaintiff applied payments that the Ciprianos had made toward work that was beyond the price contemplated by the initial contract without informing the Ciprianos that such additional work would exceed the approximately $200,000 that they had communicated to the plaintiff that they had to pay for the construction. Prior to the plaintiffs purported return in September, the Ciprianos informed the plaintiff that, because they could not obtain money from the bank, they could not continue to pay him. Dianne Cipriano testified that Beaudoin responded that “he would not do another ounce of work in [the] house until he got his money.” “[W]e note that the court’s ruling rested in large part on its evaluation of testimonial evidence. It is axiomatic that we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to afford their testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 690, 695, 915 A.2d 916, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 905, 920 A.2d 311 (2007). Therefore, it was not clearly erroneous for the court to find that work purportedly done in September, if any, was not within the contract.

The court’s finding that August 3, 2006, represented the date on which the ninety day period commenced for lien filing purposes was not clearly erroneous. Pursuant to § 49-34, the plaintiff was required to file a mechanic’s hen within ninety days after it ceased performing the services or furnishing the materials for the construction of the home. The plaintiffs time records reflect that work was performed on the Ciprianos’ construction project on August 4, 2006, and the parties do not dispute that work within the contract was performed on this date. Likewise, the court’s finding that the December 14, 2006 hen filing was beyond the statutory limitation is not clearly erroneous because December 14, 2006, is clearly more than ninety days after August 3 or August 4, 2006.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       Kenneth M. Beaudoin is the principal representative and co-owner of the plaintiff, Construction Ken-nection, Inc. He signed documents relevant to this case in his official capacity. The plaintiff acted through Beaudoin in the course of the relevant transactions.
      After oral argument before this court, the plaintiff moved to substitute as the plaintiff Anthony Nóvale, bankruptcy trustee for the estate of Construction Ken-nection, Inc. That motion was granted on February 24, 2012. For the sake of convenience and clarity, we still use the term “plaintiff’ to refer to Construction Ken-nection, Inc.

       Lorraine Cipriano was also named as a defendant because of her ownership interest in the property subject to the lien but is not a party to this appeal. Dick’s Artesian Well Drilling, Inc., and Hocon Gas of Torrington, LLC, were also named as defendants in this action but are not parties to this appeal.

       The Ciprianos previously had obtained a loan from Wachovia Mortgage Corporation in the amount of $155,000, later revised to $185,168 to cover the cost of the installation of the septic system, in addition to the cost of constructing the home. Of the principal $240,000 of the loan from Naugatuck Valley Savings and Loan, $35,759.45 was used to pay off the loan from Wachovia Mortgage Corporation and other closing costs, and $9240.55 was paid as net proceeds to the Ciprianos. These payments left $195,000 to be drawn down on the amount secured by the construction mortgage.

       The amount was subsequently acjjusted because of a payment in the amount of $10,895, which left a claimed balance under the mechanic’s lien of $52,408.

       The mechanic’s lien was dated December 12, 2006, but recorded on the land records on December 14, 2006.

       The court’s decision in favor of the defendants, entitled “ORDER RE: MECHANIC’S LIEN,” read in its entirety: “After hearing and based on the more credible evidence and pursuant to [General Statutes] § 49-33 et seq., the [c]ourt finds that the plaintiffs mechanic’s lien dated December 12, 2006, has not been substantiated by a fair preponderance of the evidence and judgment concerning the subject mechanic’s lien enters in favor of the defendants.”

       It is unclear from the record whether the plaintiff performed work on August 3, 2006, August 4, 2006, or both days. The discrepancy is immaterial to the issues on appeal.

       General Statutes § 49-34 provides: “A mechanic’s lien is not valid unless the person performing the services or furnishing the materials (1) within ninety days after he has ceased to do so, lodges with the town clerk of the town in which the building, lot or plot of land is situated a certificate in writing, which shall be recorded by the town clerk with deeds of land, (A) describing the premises, the amount claimed as a hen thereon, the name or names of the person against whom the hen is being filed and the date of the commencement of the performance of services or furnishing of materials, (B) stating that the amount claimed is justly due, as nearly as the same can be ascertained, and (C) subscribed and sworn to by the claimant, and (2) not later than thirty days after lodging the certificate, serves a true and attested copy of the certificate upon the owner of the building, lot or plot of land in the same manner as is provided for the service of the notice in section 49-35.”

       On March 11, 2010, Naugatuck Valley Savings and Loan filed a timely motion for review of the court’s denial of its motion for further articulation. It sought to have the trial court articulate the following: (1) whether it found that the plaintiff performed any services at the subject property on September 21 or 22, 2006, (2) whether those services, if performed, were requested by the Ciprianos and (3) even if the plaintiff performed the services at the subject property on September 21 or 22, whether the court found that substantial completion of the plaintiffs services occurred on or before August 4, 2006, as argued by the defendants at trial, or whether substantial completion occurred on September 21 or 22. On May 12, 2010, this court granted the motion but denied the relief request therein.

       Beaudoin testified, for instance, that he did not inform the Ciprianos of work outside the scope of the initial contract, such as site work for adding gravel due to wet conditions and adding geotextile fabric, prior to doing such work.

       Dianne Cipriano testified that she did not have an understanding while she was receiving invoices from the plaintiff that Beaudoin thought the construction would cost $283,000.

       General Statutes § 49-35b (a) requires that a lienor “establish that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of [the] lien.”

       See footnote 8 of this opinion.

       The court did not make a finding as to whether work was performed on these dates. Clearly, if work was not performed on these dates, the mechanic’s lien was not timely filed because the last date on which services were performed or materials furnished, prior to the purported dates in September, was August 3 or 4,2006. The mechanic’s lien was filed December 14,2006, well beyond the ninety day statutory period calculated from August 3 or 4, 2006.

       Because we conclude that the court’s finding that any work purportedly done on September 21 and-22 was not within the contract is not clearly erroneous, we need not review the court’s finding in the alternative that “even if that work [purportedly done on September 21 and/or September 22, 2006] was within the contract, it was done after an approximately one and one-half month delay. As a result, those dates do not represent the last day of substantial completion within the terms of the written or oral contract.”

       See footnote 7 of this opinion.

       See footnote 7 of this opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    RUTH WEISSMAN v. KOSKOFF, KOSKOFF AND BIEDER, P.C.
    (AC 33224)
    Beach, Alvord and Bear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs April 23
    officially released July 3, 2012

      Ruth Daniella Weissman filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Anthony M. Fitzgerald and Sherwin M. Yoder filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Ruth Weissman, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, P.C., as to her entire complaint. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in denying her request for extension of time to respond to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff’s appeal. On July 21, 2010, the plaintiff served a three count complaint in connection with her employment by the defendant from May, 2002, to June, 2004. She alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in count one; slander, defamation, false light and invasion of privacy in count two; and civil conspiracy in count three. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on three grounds: the complaint failed to state a cause of action and repleading could not cure the failure, the claim of breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing had been released and that claim also was barred by the statute of limitations on contracts.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47, the plaintiff filed a request for extension of time to respond to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, seeking, inter alia, to conduct additional discovery concerning particular alleged misrepresentations by the defendant on which the plaintiff had based counts two and three of the complaint. The defendant filed a reply brief in support of its own motion and in opposition to the plaintiffs request for extension of time. The court heard oral argument on the defendant’s motion on September 24, 2010. On January 19, 2011, the court denied the plaintiffs request for additional time to conduct discovery and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to her entire complaint.

Practice Book § 17-47 provides: “Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that such party cannot, for reasons stated, present facts essential to justify opposition, the judicial authority may deny the motion for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.” Our Supreme Court has stated: “[U]nder [§ 382] [now Practice Book § 17-47], the opposing party must show by affidavit precisely what facts are within the exclusive knowledge of the [party to be deposed] and what steps he has taken to attempt to acquire these facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Great Country Bank v. Pastore, 241 Conn. 423, 438, 696 A.2d 1264 (1997). “A party opposing a summary judgment motion pursuant to [Practice Book § 17-47] on the ground that more time is needed to conduct discovery bears the burden of establishing a valid reason why the motion should be denied or its resolution postponed, including some indication as to what steps that party has taken to secure facts necessary to defeat the motion. . . . The trial court has wide discretion under [Practice Book § 17-47] to determine whether the party seeking additional time to conduct discovery already has had a sufficient opportunity to establish facts in opposition to the summary judgment motion, and we will not disturb its exercise of that discretion absent a clear showing of abuse.” (Citations omitted.) Peerless Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 241 Conn. 476, 489, 697 A.2d 680 (1997).

The plaintiff argues that the court “erroneously assumed” that specific statements from employees of the defendant could not be elicited through discovery. The court has broad discretion in ruling on requests for additional time for discovery. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, supra, 241 Conn. 489. In the present case, the plaintiffs affidavit provided only speculation as to actionable statements and failed to show which facts were within the knowledge of those she wanted to depose. She did not provide any indication as to what steps she had taken to obtain such facts required to defeat the defendant’s motion. Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to carry her burden to demonstrate that the court clearly abused its discretion in denying her request.

The judgment is affirmed.

       The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in granting on the merits the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We have considered this claim and conclude that it lacks merit.

       The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue/reconsider and a request to amend her complaint, both of which were denied. She also subsequently filed a motion for rectification, on which the court ordered minor rectifications.


author: LAVINE, J.

text:
    CHALIKONDA ENTERPRISES, INC. v. NORTHPOINT COMPUTER SYSTEMS, LLC
    (AC 33711)
    Lavine, Robinson and Espinosa, Js.

      Argued May 14
    officially released July 3, 2012

      Edward Kanowitz, for the appellant (defendant).

      Stephen J. Curley, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

LAVINE, J.

The defendant, Northpoint Computer Systems, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court confirming an arbitration award in favor of the plaintiff, Chalikonda Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Irisln-telli Solutions, Inc. (Irislntelli). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs application to confirm the arbitration award and (2) granted the application to confirm the arbitration award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The court made the following findings of fact. On February 8, 2010, Steven A. Certilman, an arbitrator, issued an award in favor of Irislntelli against the defendant in the amount of $21,909 plus one half of the costs. Thereafter, Irislntelli filed an application to confirm the arbitration award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417. The matter appeared on the July 6, 2010 short calendar. At that time, the defendant had not filed an appearance and had not opposed the application to confirm the arbitration award. The court therefore confirmed the arbitration award and rendered judgment thereon. On July 26, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to reargue or reconsider along with documents to the effect that Irislntelli was not a legal entity entitled to commence a proceeding in the Superior Court. The court granted the motion for reargument, which took place on October 12, 2010.

Following reargument, the court issued a memorandum of decision dated October 21, 2010, finding that the defendant had entered into a written agreement signed by Prasad Chalikonda on behalf of Irislntelli as its president. The agreement called for Chalikonda to provide consulting services on behalf of the defendant to its client, General Electric, for a period of one year at the rate of $106 per hour starting on July 14, 2008. Chalikonda established the plaintiff on July 7, 2008. On August 6, 2010, Chalikonda, as the plaintiffs president, registered the trade name Irislntelli Solutions, Inc., in Stamford. The defendant argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Irislntelli is not a legal entity, citing America's Wholesale Lender v. Pagano, 87 Conn. App. 474, 477, 866 A.2d 698 (2005), which states that “a plaintiff bringing an action solely in a trade name cannot confer jurisdiction on the court. ” The court agreed with the defendant that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Irislntelli was not a legal entity. The court vacated its July 6, 2010 judgment and dismissed the action without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding in the name of a proper party.

The plaintiff then filed an application to confirm the arbitration award dated November 4, 2010. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the application claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had no connection to the arbitration proceeding and therefore lacked standing. The court denied the motion to dismiss on May 26, 2011.

The court issued a memorandum of decision again confirming the arbitration award on May 24, 2011. The memorandum of decision contains the following facts and legal analysis. On July 1, 2008, Irislntelli and the defendant entered into a consulting agreement by signing the defendant’s form consulting agreement that provided for arbitration of any dispute concerning the consulting agreement. The consulting agreement was signed by Chalikonda as president of Irislntelli. The consulting agreement called for the defendant to retain the services of Mslntelli personnel to advise and to consult with the defendant’s clients. Pursuant to the consulting agreement, the defendant placed Chalikonda with General Electric to provide information technology services at the rate of $106 per hour for eight hours a day for twelve months.

The court also found that Chalikonda commenced an arbitration proceeding against the defendant in the name of Irislntelli in 2009. The claim alleged that Chali-konda was self-employed and had a subchapter S corporation called Irislntelli. The claim also alleged that the defendant placed Chalikonda with a large client in Stamford, billed the client for his services and compensated Chalikonda at a lesser hourly rate. In its application to confirm the arbitration award, the plaintiff identified Chalikonda as the plaintiffs president, director, secretary and agent. The business, mailing and residence addresses of the plaintiff and Chalikonda are identical. The court stated that, pursuant to § 52-417, an arbitration award shall be confirmed unless it is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed by General Statutes §§ 52-418 and 52-419. The conditions under which an award may be vacated, modified or corrected are limited, and a motion to do so must be filed by a party within thirty days of notice of the arbitration award. See General Statutes § 52-420 (b). The court found that the arbitrator issued his award to the defendant’s counsel by at least February 12, 2010. At no time since then has the defendant filed a motion to vacate, modify or correct the award under either §§ 52-418 or 52-419.

Moreover, the court found that, although the defendant argued that the plaintiff was not a party to the arbitration award and that the consulting agreement is between the defendant and Irislntelli, the plaintiff used that trade name when it was founded in 2008. In the demand for arbitration against the defendant, Chali-konda identified himself as the claimant and described the claim as one for payment of his services as a self-employed information technology consultant. The court also found that Chalikonda, who represented himself, improperly has used names such as Irislntelli to describe his business. Throughout the arbitration and confirmation process, however, the claim has been for monies the defendant owes Chalikonda as compensation for his services. The arbitrator issued an award finding Chalikonda’s claim was meritorious pursuant to a mutually agreed upon arbitration proceeding. The court found that the defendant has never filed a motion on any basis under § § 52-418 or 52-419 seeking to vacate the arbitration award.

Despite the fact that the first confirmation proceeding was dismissed because Irislntelli was not a legal entity entitled to invoke the statutory process, the present proceeding to confirm the arbitration award was brought by the plaintiff seeking payment for the services performed by its employee and officer, Chalikonda, under its trade name Irislntelli. The court found that the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff had no relationship to the arbitration proceeding for the services provided by its employee lacked merit. The court confirmed the arbitration award and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $22,534 plus costs and postjudgment interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. The defendant appealed, claiming that the court improperly denied its motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs application to confirm the arbitration award.

“A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court. . . . [0]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [denial] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . Factual findings underlying the court’s decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . The applicable standard of review for the denial of a motion to dismiss, therefore, generally turns on whether the appellant seeks to challenge the legal conclusions of the trial court or its factual determinations.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 477-78, 964 A.2d 73 (2009).

The record before us contains the defendant’s consulting agreement signed by its president, Pamela Cianci, and Chalikonda on behalf of Irislntelli. Attached to the consulting agreement is a task order signed by Cianci on behalf of the defendant and by Chalikonda on behalf of Irislntelli. The task order states: “Start Date: on or about July 14, 2008” and “[t]his Task Order, as referred to in the Master Consulting Agreement, dated July 1, 2008, and entered into by [the defendant] and Irislntelli . . . the above named parties have executed this Task Order on the date set forth above.” The record also contains the arbitration award, which states in relevant part: “On the claim of Irislntelli . . . against [the defendant] ... I find for [Irislntelli] and award the sum of Twenty One Thousand Nine Hundred Nine and 00/100 Dollars ($21,909.00).” The record also discloses that no motion was filed within thirty days of the arbitration award; see General Statutes § 52-420 (b); to vacate, modify or correct the arbitration award. See General Statutes §§ 52-417, 52-418 and 52-419.

The November 4, 2010 application to confirm the arbitration award alleges in relevant part that the plaintiff “doing business as Irislntelli . . . seeking an order confirming a certain arbitration award involving matters between [the plaintiff] and [the defendant] complains and says as follows: 1. On July 1, 2008, [the plaintiff] and [the defendant] entered into a written agreement for arbitration . ...” In confirming the award, the court found that “the award is sought to be confirmed by a proper legal entity [the plaintiff] seeking payment for work performed by its employee and officer . . . Chalikonda, under its trade name Irislntelli .... [The defendant’s] argument that [the plaintiff] has no relationship to an award of compensation for the work of its employee lacks merit.” We agree and conclude that the record supports the court’s findings of fact and legal conclusion to confirm the arbitration award.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 52-417 provides in relevant part: “At any time within one year after an award has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration notified thereof, any party to the arbitration may malee application to the superior court . . . for an order confirming the award. The court . . . shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419.”

       General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides in relevant part: “Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court . . . shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”

       General Statutes § 52-419 (a) provides in relevant part: “Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court . . . shall make an order modifying or correcting the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If there has been an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (2) if the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted; or (3) if the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.”

       General Statutes § 52420 (b) provides: “No motion to vacate, modify or correct an award may be made after thirty days from the notice of the award to the party to the arbitration who makes the motion.”

       At oral argument before this court, counsel for the defendant conceded that the defendant does not claim that it does not owe the money awarded by the arbitrator.