author: SHELDON, J.

text:
    TROY HARRIS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 33704)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Foti, Js.

      Argued October 16
    officially released December 3, 2013

      William A. Snider, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

      Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and David Clifton, deputy assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
   Opinion

SHELDON, J.

The petitioner, Troy Harris, appeals from the dismissal of his second postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he has challenged his conviction of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, and assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5) on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of his first habeas petition, the petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his underlying criminal trial. In support of his second habeas petition, the petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in his first postconviction habeas corpus proceeding, where he initially sought to challenge his attempted murder and first degree assault conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his underlying criminal trial is based upon the alleged failure of trial counsel, Robert Berke, to investigate all possible exculpatory and/or alibi witnesses prior to that trial. The petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his first habeas proceeding is based upon the failure of his first habeas counsel, Justine Miller: (1) to call Tammi Jamison, one of the state’s chief witnesses against him in his underlying criminal trial, to testify in his favor at the habeas trial; (2) to subpoena Jamison’s psychiatric records to the habeas trial; and (3) to subpoena certain other alibi witnesses to testify in support of his defense of alibi at the habeas trial.

On June 7, 2011, after hearing two days of evidence from three witnesses—the petitioner, Jamison, and Miller—the second habeas court, T. Santos, J., dismissed the second habeas petition upon concluding that the petitioner had failed to prove that his first habeas counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, as required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). For the following reasons, we agree with the second habeas court that the petitioner failed to prove that the performance of his first habeas counsel was constitutionally deficient, and thus, we conclude that the judgment of that court, dismissing the petitioner’s second habeas petition, must be affirmed.

The petitioner’s current claims arise against the background of the following procedural history and facts, as described by this court in reviewing the petitioner’s underlying conviction on direct appeal. “On May 16, 2000, John Simpson drove Howard Dozier and Hector Quinones to Washington Street in Waterbury to pick up Ray Ramos. At that time, the [petitioner] was residing at 39 Washington Street with Tammi Jamison, the mother of his child. Simpson stopped the vehicle he was driving on Washington Street in a driveway between the [petitioner’s] house and the house where they were picking up Ramos, and all three men exited the car. Dozier walked up the street and encountered the [petitioner] standing on his porch at 39 Washington Street. Dozier and the [petitioner] had a brief conversation. As Dozier turned his back to the [petitioner] in an attempt to return to the vehicle in which he had arrived, the [petitioner] began firing an Uzi machine gun at Dozier. Dozier ran back to the vehicle and he and Simpson drove off. The [petitioner] continued to fire at the vehicle, and Simpson, who was driving, was shot in his neck.

“The [petitioner] was tried to a jury, which found him guilty of attempting to murder Simpson and Dozier, as well as the first degree assault on Simpson. The [petitioner] received a total effective sentence of forty years imprisonment.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Harris, 85 Conn. App. 637, 639-40, 858 A.2d 284, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 901, 863 A.2d 695 (2004).

Following the affirmance of his conviction on direct appeal, the petitioner filed his first postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner challenged his underlying conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the trial on that petition, where the petitioner was represented by Miller, he sought to prove that his trial counsel, Berke, had been ineffective in failing properly to investigate all possible exculpatory and/or alibi witnesses who might have supported his defense at trial. Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, 121 Conn. App. 240, 243, 994 A.2d 685, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 926, 998 A.2d 1193 (2010). The habeas court rejected that claim in a written memorandum of decision, wherein it denied the petitioner’s first habeas petition upon concluding that the petitioner had failed to prove that his trial counsel’s performance had been constitutionally deficient.

In reviewing the petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his first habeas petition following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal, this court described the habeas court’s relevant factual findings and legal conclusions as follows: “In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that Berke did not render ineffective assistance of counsel and that his failure to call several individuals as alibi witnesses at the criminal trial was a valid strategic decision. The court credited Berke’s testimony that he tried to discourage the petitioner from testifying at the criminal trial but that the petitioner wanted to testify regardless of whether the alibi witnesses did so. The petitioner’s testimony differed from that which would have been offered by the putative alibi witnesses. The court noted that as conflicting as the petitioner’s own versions of his alibi were, the addition of alibi witnesses would likely have made matters worse for the petitioner. The court thereafter denied his petition for certification.” Id.

In his appeal from the denial of his first habeas petition, the petitioner made three arguments to this court. First, he claimed that, when deciding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the habeas court improperly had applied the presumption of attorney competence set forth in Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 688. Second, he claimed that the habeas court improperly had defined the concept of exculpatory evidence, thereby, assertedly, making it futile for him to present evidence regarding the psychiatric history of Jamison, which Berke had failed to elicit dining trial. Third, he claimed that the court improperly avoided certain ethical issues when determining that Berke’s decision not to present alibi witnesses at the trial had been a strategic decision. See Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 121 Conn. App. 242. This court was not persuaded by the petitioner’s arguments, and thus ordered that his appeal from the denial of his first habeas petition be dismissed.

Following that dismissal, the petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which, as later amended, alleged that his first habeas counsel, Miller, had been ineffective because: (1) “[she] failed to call Tammy Jamison who would recant her trial testimony and say that [the petitioner] did not shoot the victims”; (2) “[she] did not subpoena Jamison’s medical records which documented] her mental disorder”; and (3) “[she] did not subpoena alibi witnesses to testify at the habeas trial.” The second habeas trial took place over two days, on May 31 and June 7, 2011, on which, to reiterate, the petitioner presented testimony from himself, Jamison, and Miller. On June 7, 2011, following the presentation of evidence and closing arguments, the court, T. Santos, J., issued a decision from the bench, in which it dismissed the petition upon finding that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proving, under the first prong of Strickland, that Miller’s performance was ineffective. Based upon the court’s finding that the petitioner had failed to establish the performance prong of Strickland, it did not reach the prejudice prong of Strickland. On June 8, 2011, the petitioner filed apetition for certification to appeal from the dismissal of his amended second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was granted on June 16, 2011. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

“In Strickland v. Washington, [supra, 466 U.S. 687], the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction .... That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. . . . Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. . . . Because both prongs . . . must be established for a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court may dismiss a petitioner’s claim if he fails to meet either prong.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction, 128 Conn. App. 425, 430, 17 A.3d 1089, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 926, 22 A.3d 1277 (2011).

“To satisfy the performance prong [of the Strickland test] the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boyd v. Commissioner of Correction, 130 Conn. App. 291, 294-95, 21 A.3d 969, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 926, 28 A.3d 337 (2011). “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Orellana v. Commissioner of Correction, 135 Conn. App. 90, 98, 41 A.3d 1088, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 913, 45 A.3d 97 (2012).

“As applied to a claim of ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel, the Strickland standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that his prior habeas counsel’s performance was ineffective and that this ineffectiveness prejudiced the petitioner’s prior habeas proceeding. Thus . . . the petitioner will have to prove that . . . prior habeas counsel, in presenting his claims, was ineffective and that effective representation by habeas counsel establishes a reasonable probability that the habeas court would have found that he was entitled to reversal of the conviction and a new trial . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 133 Conn. App. 96, 101-102, 33 A.3d 883, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 941, 37 A.3d 153 (2012).

“In a habeas appeal, although this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous, our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Griffin v. Commissioner of Correction, 119 Conn. App. 239, 241, 987 A.2d 1037, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 912, 989 A.2d 1074 (2010). With the foregoing principles in mind, we now address the merits of the petitioner’s claim.

We begin with the petitioner’s claim that Miller’s representation was ineffective because she failed to call Jamison as a witness and to subpoena her psychiatric records at the first habeas trial. The following additional facts, adduced at the petitioner’s second habeas trial, are relevant to our resolution of this claim.

Miller and the petitioner met in person at the correctional facility at which the petitioner was housed to discuss potential issues to be raised in his first habeas petition. After that meeting, Miller decided that the focus of the petition should be on trial counsel’s failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses. Miller testified at the second habeas trial that she believed this strategy was “solid” because Berke had failed to call most of the alibi witnesses at the petitioner’s criminal trial. Miller spent considerable time bringing the alibi witnesses to court for the first habeas trial and hired a private investigator to interview these witnesses before they testified. Each such alibi witness, except Jamison, all of whom who had been subpoenaed to the habeas trial by Miller, testified at the trial that the petitioner was in Ansonia on the night in question, not in Waterbury, where the shooting took place.

Miller also subpoenaed Jamison, who had been interviewed by a private investigator, Gregory Senick, prior to the habeas trial. Jamison had told Senick that she wanted to recant her testimony from the petitioner’s criminal trial, where she had stated that the petitioner was at her apartment in Waterbury at the time of the shooting and that she had seen him take a gun from the ceiling of the bathroom and take it outside of the apartment. Based on Senick’s report of the interview, Miller planned to call Jamison to testify at the habeas trial to recant her prior testimony at the criminal trial. With that plan in mind, Miller decided not to subpoena Jamison’s psychiatric records to the habeas trial, for such records, if disclosed, might undermine the reliability of the expected retraction of her trial testimony. Miller testified at the second habeas trial that she did not subpoena the records because “right up until eight days before we went to trial, Ms. Jamison was gonna come in and testify and help [the petitioner],” and thus she “didn’t want to impeach her own witness” or “have anything to do with anything that could put [Jamison’s] abilities into question.” Additionally, Miller believed that it would be legally impossible for her to obtain Jamison’s psychiatric records for use in a civil habeas proceeding without Jamison’s consent.

On April 21,2008, however, one week before the start of the petitioner’s first habeas trial, Miller received an e-mail from another investigator from Senick’s office, advising her that Jamison no longer wanted to recant her testimony from the criminal trial, and that she “was not going to be cooperative in terms of doing that.” Miller testified at the petitioner’s second habeas trial that, “in spite of the second e-mail,” she “nevertheless subpoenaed Ms. Jamison” to testify at the first habeas trial. On the morning of the first habeas trial, however, Miller spoke with Jamison and found her to be “extremely, extremely upset . . . [and] hostile.” Based on her interaction with Jamison on the morning of the first habeas trial, Miller “decided that there would be no way that [Jamison] could possibly help [the petitioner] because she more or less indicated . . . that if [she] called her to testify, that she would—wanted nothing to do with him and would do everything not to help him. So, [Miller] figured [she]’d better leave [Jami-son] alone.”

With regard to her decision not to subpoena Jami-son’s psychiatric records, Miller testified that, “[w]hether or not she had any mental issues at that point, I don’t think would have necessarily gone to show that she had mental issues back in the year 2000 when this underlying crime that gave rise to the criminal trial occurred. So, in other words, I wouldn’t have used [her psychiatric records] because it really didn’t make a difference what her mental state was in 2008 because I guess the issue was her mental state at the time the crime was committed.” Moreover, Miller testified that at the first habeas trial, she had questioned the petitioner’s criminal trial counsel, Berke, about the existence of Jamison’s psychiatric records, to which Berke had responded that he had attempted to obtain such records from institutions but was advised that none existed.

“ [T]here is a strong presumption that the trial strategy employed by a [habeas petitioner] ⅛ counsel is reasonable and is a result of the exercise of professional judgment . . . .” (Citation omitted.) Iovieno v. Commissioner of Correction, 67 Conn. App. 126, 128, 786 A.2d 1113 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 916, 792 A.2d 851 (2002). “[C]ounsel will be deemed ineffective only when it is shown that a [petitioner] has informed his attorney of the existence of the witness and that the attorney, without a reasonable investigation and without adequate explanation, failed to call the witness at trial.” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 297, 497 A.2d 35 (1985). “[O]ur habeas corpus jurisprudence reveals several scenarios in which courts will not second-guess [habeas] counsel's decision not to investigate or call certain witnesses or to investigate potential defenses, such as when . . . counsel learns of the substance of the witness’ testimony and determines that calling that witness is unnecessary or potentially harmful to the case . . . .” (Footnote omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 306 Conn. 664, 681-82, 51 A.3d 948 (2012). Further, “[t]he failure of [habeas] counsel to call a potential defense witness does not constitute ineffective assistance unless there is some showing that the testimony would have been helpful in establishing the asserted defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dunkley v. Commissioner of Correction, 73 Conn. App. 819, 824, 810 A.2d 281 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 953, 818 A.2d 780 (2003).

Turning first to the performance prong of Strickland, we conclude that the second habeas court’s finding that Miller’s decisions not to call Jamison as a witness or to subpoena her psychiatric records were reasonable exercises of professional judgment was not clearly erroneous. The petitioner has not demonstrated that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed ... by the [s]ixth [a]mendment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 306 Conn. 680. The petitioner has failed to prove that either calling Jamison as a witness or subpoenaing her psychiatric records would have supported the claims presented in his habeas appeal. Rather, the habeas court found that the evidence presented to it tended to show that such testimony and evidence would not have helped the petitioner’s case in any way. Miller considered the fact that if Jamison were called as a witness, her testimony would not help the petitioner’s case because she would not recant her testimony from the criminal trial. Therefore, Miller decided that calling Jamison as a witness would not be helpful in establishing the petitioner’s alibi defense. The petitioner has not demonstrated that such investigation and trial strategy by Miller was an unreasonable exercise of professional judgment, and we will not second-guess Miller’s decision not to call Jamison based on her knowledge of the substance of Jamison’s testimony and her determination that such testimony would have been harmful to the petitioner’s case.

With regard to Jamison’s psychiatric records, the habeas court found that Miller reasonably relied upon her questioning of Berke at the first habeas trial, in which he stated that he attempted to obtain Jamison’s records, but that none existed. The court also found that Miller reasonably decided that such records would not aid in the petitioner’s defense because Jamison’s mental state in 2008 had no bearing on her mental state at the time of the alleged crime in 2000. The court further concluded that, “it has not been proven by the petitioner that [the records] existed at all,” and that the testimony of Jamison about her one day stay at Waterbury Hospital in 1999 would not “have been very helpful at all to the petitioner.” It was also reasonable that Miller did not want to impeach her own witnesses by calling into question Jamison’s credibility through the introduction of her psychiatric records. Recognizing that there is a strong presumption that the strategy employed by habeas counsel is reasonable and is a result of the exercise of professional judgment, we conclude that the petitioner has not demonstrated that the habeas court’s determination that Miller did not perform deficiently by not subpoenaing Jamison’s psychiatric records was improper.

We farther conclude that the habeas court properly found that Miller’s performance was not deficient under the first prong of Strickland. The court found that Miller “reasonably” decided not to call Jamison in light of the reports presented by the private investigators and based on her interaction with Jamison on the morning of the habeas trial. The court also found that it was reasonable for Miller not to have subpoenaed Jamison’s psychiatric records, if they even exist, because such records would not benefit the petitioner’s claim and would cause Miller to impeach her own witness. The record reveals that there is little uncertainty that Miller, for strategic and tactical reasons, elected not to call Jamison as a witness or subpoena her psychiatric records. Because the petitioner has failed to establish the first prong of the Strickland test, the performance prong, we need not reach the second prong of that test, the prejudice prong. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s claim was proper.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       In his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner also asserted that Miller was ineffective because she “did not subpoena alibi witnesses to testily at the habeas trial.” To the contrary, Miller subpoenaed three alibi witnesses to the habeas trial who indeed did testify that the petitioner was in Ansonia, not in Waterbury, on the night in question. Jami-son, who admittedly would not have recanted her testimony from the criminal trial, would not have aided the petitioner’s alibi defense and thus, Miller’s decision not to call her as an alibi witness at the habeas trial did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court found that “there really is no claim that there were no alibi witnesses called” because indeed Miller called three alibi witnesses, and thus, it was not “proven by the petitioner that any of the decisions made by Ms. Miller during her presentation at the habeas trial were at all unprofessional or ineffective.” We agree with the habeas court’s factual determination that there was no merit to the petitioner’s claim that Miller was ineffective by failing to call certain alibi witnesses at the habeas trial.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    JOSEPHINE MILLER v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT
    (AC 35261)
    Sheldon, Keller and Harper, Js.
    Argued September 11
    officially released October 1, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    EDDIE SCHMIDT v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34435)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Alvord, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 13
    officially released October 1, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    JAMES T. COSTELLO v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT
    (AC 35175)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Alvord, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 13
    officially released October 1, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MAURICE BILLIE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34029)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Robinson and Bishop, Js.
    Argued September 16
    officially released October 1, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    GILBERT I. v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 33893)
    Gruendel, Robinson and Keller, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 13
    officially released October 1, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    RONALD SINGLETON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 33849)
    Beach, Bear and Sheldon, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 13
    officially released October 1, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    FRANKIE TRIMMER v. SCOTT SEMPLE, WARDEN, ET AL.
    (AC 34938)
    Alvord, Bear and Flynn, Js.
    Argued September 12
    officially released October 1, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    PAIGE WHEATLAND v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34080)
    Gruendel, Lavine and Sheldon, Js.
    Argued September 12
    officially released October 1, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    CITY OF NORWICH v. SHERI A. SPEER ET AL.
    (AC 35355)
    Gruendel, Robinson and Pellegrino, Js.
    Argued September 18
    officially released October 8, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    GARY POTTS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34335)
    Beach, Keller and Harper, Js.
    Argued September 18
    officially released October 8, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    NICKETA WRIGHT v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34251)
    Lavine, Robinson and Schaller, Js.
    Argued September 19
    officially released October 8, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    DIOSDARDO PACHECO v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 33788)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Mihalakos, Js.
    Argued September 23
    officially released October 8, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    MICHAEL ALLDREDGE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34675)
    Robinson, Sheldon and Borden, Js.
    Argued September 24
    officially released October 15, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    CLYDE MEIKLE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34575)
    Gruendel, Bear and Foti, Js.
    Argued September 27
    officially released October 15, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. SHERI A. SPEER
    (AC 35324)
    Robinson, Sheldon and Borden, Js.
    Argued September 24
    officially released October 22, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    JOSE A. AYUSO v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 35051)
    Graendel, Lavine and Robinson, Js.
    Submitted on briefs October 11
    officially released October 29, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL SCATENA
    (AC 34881)
    Beach, Bear and Lavery, Js.
    Argued October 9
    officially released October 29, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    NEWTOWN SAVINGS BANK v. RICHARD L. FENAROLI ET AL.
    (AC 35339)
    Beach, Bear and Lavery, Js.
    Argued October 9
    officially released October 29, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


author: Per Cuiiam.

text:
    BEVERLY HERBERT v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ET AL.
    (AC 35121)
    Graendel, Lavine and Bear, Js.
    Argued September 23
    officially released October 29, 2013
   Per Cuiiam.

The decision is affirmed.


text:
    NORA LYNNE VALENTINE v. JOEL ROBERT VALENTINE
    (AC 35320)
    DiPentima, G. J., and Graendel and Peters, Js.
    Argued October 10
    officially released October 29, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT
    (AC 35092)
    Beach, Alvord and Bear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs October 11
    officially released October 29, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    GABRIEL BLOOMFIELD v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34553)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Keller, Js.
    Submitted on briefs October 11
    officially released October 29, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    GEORGE HAWKINS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34927)
    Lavine, Kobinson and Borden, Js.
    Argued October 15
    officially released November 5, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    BRYANT EBRON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34423)
    Lavine, Keller and Schaller, Js.
    Argued October 17
    officially released November 12, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    LEE OWENS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34561)
    Lavine, Alvord and SchaUer, Js.
    Argued October 22
    officially released November 12, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    BRADSHAW SMITH v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.
    (AC 35180)
    Gruendel, Robinson and Bishop, Js.
    Argued October 21
    officially released November 12, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    BERNARD SMALLS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 33269)
    Gruendel, Robinson and Bishop, Js.
    Argued October 21
    officially released November 12, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES L. DARDEN
    (AC 34942)
    Gruendel, Keller and Bishop, Js.
    Argued October 28
    officially released November 19, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    DAVID DOMINY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34523)
    Beach, Keller and Flynn, Js.
    Argued October 24
    officially released November 19, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    RADCLIFFE RAYNOR v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34636)
    Beach, Sheldon and Borden, Js.
    Argued October 29
    officially released November 19, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    CARL COLAS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 33364)
    Beach, Alvord and Bear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs October 30
    officially released November 19, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVID PALMER
    (AC 34994)
    Lavine, Robinson and Sheldon, Js.
    Argued November 12
    officially released December 3, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    VERNOL GARY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 34149)
    Gruendel, Keller and Borden, Js.
    Argued November 14
    officially released December 3, 2013
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.


author: BEAR, J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES E. WALKER
    (AC 33550)
    Beach, Alvord and Bear, Js.

      Argued September 24—
    officially released December 10, 2013

      Matthew Eagan, certified legal intern, with whom were Timothy H. Everett, assigned counsel, and, on the brief, Randall Blowers, Matthew Loftus and Claire M. Howard, certified legal interns, for the appellant (defendant).

      Nancy L. Walker, special deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dear-ington, state’s attorney, and Stacey Haupt Miranda, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

BEAR, J.

The defendant, James E. Walker, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a) (5) and 53a-48. On appeal, the defendant claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the evidence rested entirely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, (2) the court erred in excluding the defendant from a critical stage of the proceeding when trial counsel’s possible conflict of interest was discussed in chambers, and it then failed to conduct an adequate inquiry on the record into the possible conflict before asking the defendant if he had an objection, and (3) the court improperly permitted the state to introduce testimony regarding latent fingerprint evidence despite the loss of such evidence while in police custody. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. Ron Alex James and the defendant were longtime friends. The defendant also knew James’ girlfriend, Jamie Walker. On September 12, 2005, Jamie Walker rented a gray 2005 Ford Focus. She gave the rental company two telephone numbers, one of which was 203-535-6997. That telephone number, however, was registered to Elizabeth Tyson, James’ mother, who informed police that James used a cell phone that was associated with that number, and that this was James’ contact number. On September 20, 2005, at 1:29 a.m., a two minute call was placed from James’ cell phone to 203-535-8869, the number of the telephone that was used by the defendant.

Also on September 20, 2005, just before 2 a.m., Shan-iya Bell was looking out of a second floor window in her apartment on Sherman Parkway in New Haven when she saw two African-American males, approximately five feet, nine inches, or five feet, ten inches, walking toward the parking lot of her building. One of the men was wearing blue shorts and the other was wearing blue pants. She saw one of the men remove a silver and black gun from the back of his pants. Bell dialed 911. One of the men then went back up the road to a parked gray Ford Focus, entered the vehicle and moved it forward. Both men then ran across the parking lot of Bell’s building, heading toward Dixwell Avenue. Still on the telephone with 911, Bell heard several gunshots and saw the same two men run back through the parking lot, back to the gray Ford Focus. The men then proceeded to make a U-tum in the vehicle and head south on Sherman Parkway.

In the meantime, Robert Pouncey and his friend, Cha-carra Stevens, were lying on a bed in a first floor apartment, located at 429 Dixwell Avenue, that Pouncey shared with his mother, brother and five year old daughter, when Pouncey heard metal clicking outside of his bedroom window. There then was a series of more than ten gunshots, and both Pouncey and Stevens were hit by several bullets and sustained life-threatening or major injuries. Neither of them saw the shooter or shooters through the window, which had a fan in it. Pouncey’s mother, who was home at the time of the shooting, called the police. On the ground below the window, police found seven shell casings that had been ejected from a semiautomatic weapon. They also found five fired bullets inside the bedroom.

Officer Robert Levy was in his police cruiser when he received a dispatch regarding the shooting, and he learned that Officer George Smith was attempting to stop a vehicle that the police believed may have been involved in the shooting. Levy drove to the intersection of Munson and Crescent Streets, where Smith had pulled over a gray Ford Focus. As the officers approached the vehicle, the vehicle sped off. The officers then engaged in pursuit of the vehicle, but lost sight of it. Other officers also had been called to help with the pursuit of the Ford Focus, when Officer George Baker and Officer Sherie Biros saw a black and red baseball cap in the middle of Diamond Street, which later proved to contain, inter alia, James’ DNA. As they stopped to pick up the cap, they saw a gray Ford Focus parked in the driveway of 55 Diamond Street. The car was the same vehicle that Jamie Walker, James’ girlfriend, had rented on September 12,2005. Officers Levy and Smith arrived at the scene and found two cell phones in the Ford Focus, one of which was associated with the number 203-535-6697, James’ number. The owner of 55 Diamond Street did not know to whom the gray Ford Focus belonged, nor had he seen the car in his driveway prior to the police knocking on his door during the early morning hours of September 20, 2005.

The Ford Focus was towed to the police garage and was examined for prints. Some of the prints found on the outside of the vehicle belonged to James; one of the prints lifted from the front passenger side front door belonged to the defendant. The police also conducted an investigation of the area around where the Ford Focus was found. The police discovered a sneaker, which appeared new, in front of a wooden fence, and there were blue fibers on top of the fence, which indicated to police that the suspects had climbed the fence in an attempt to escape. In an area on the other side of the fence, they found a loaded Beretta nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol, which later was determined to be the same pistol that had discharged seven shell casings and some of the bullets found at Pouncey’s home. Police were not successful in obtaining DNA from the Beretta, but the sneaker contained DNA, of which the defendant proved to be a major contributor. The police arrested the defendant.

James Dickerson, an acquaintance of the defendant, who was incarcerated in the same facility as the defendant, told police that the defendant admitted to him his involvement in the shootings on Dixwell Avenue. Dickerson testified at the defendant’s trial that he had come forward with this information in the hope of getting favorable consideration on his pending drug charges. He testified that the defendant had told him that he and James had gone to Pouncey’s house in a car belonging to James’ girlfriend in order to seek revenge against Pouncey for having robbed him. He further testified that the defendant had told him that both he and James had fired guns through Pouncey’s bedroom window at Pouncey and his female friend, that they had fled in the car after the shooting and that they had abandoned the car thereafter.

Following the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree. The jury, however, found the defendant not guilty of assault in the first degree, pursuant to § 53a-59 (a) (5), as either an accessory or as a principal. The defendant received a sentence of nineteen years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because the evidence against him consisted primarily of the testimony of Dickerson, a jailhouse informant. Relying on State v. Sanchez, 204 Conn. 472, 528 A.2d 373 (1987) (recognizing vitality of one witness plus corroboration rule to prove perjury), the defendant argues that, “as in perjury prosecutions, prosecutions that rely centrally on evidence given by a jailhouse informant in exchange for consideration in his own case should be recognized as a like exception to the general rule that one witness is enough to prove an element of a crime.” The state argues that the defendant’s claim has no legal support whatsoever, and, moreover, that Dickerson’s testimony, in fact, “was corroborated in several important respects.” (Emphasis in original.) We conclude that the defendant’s claim lacks merit.

“As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [trier of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Butler, 296 Conn. 62, 76, 993 A.2d 970 (2010).

In this case, the defendant agrees that this is our traditional standard of review, and he does not contest that the state met its burden of proof under our two part sufficiency of the evidence test. He argues, however, that we should adopt a “one ’witness plus corroboration” rule in cases where the testimony of a jailhouse informant is the central piece of evidence offered by the state, much like our Supreme Court has done in cases involving perjury. See State v. Sanchez, supra, 204 Conn. 477-78. The defendant cites to no case in Connecticut or in any other jurisdiction where this rule has been extended in the manner he requests. He merely argues that “[t]he jury should not have been permitted to reach [a guilty verdict] in the absence of corroborating evidence.” We decline the defendant’s invitation to change our law, and, in the absence of any argument that the evidence was insufficient under our traditional two part test, we conclude that this claim does not merit further discussion.

II

The defendant next claims that the court erred in excluding him from a critical stage of the proceeding when trial counsel’s possible conflict of interest was discussed in chambers, and the court then failed to conduct an adequate inquiry on the record into the possible conflict before asking the defendant if he had any objection to counsel continuing to represent him. The defendant asks that we review these related unpre-served claims pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or that we invoke the plain error doctrine. See Practice Book § 60-5. We conclude that the defendant has not established that he is entitled to relief either under Golding or the plain error doctrine.

The following additional facts are necessary for our consideration of the defendant’s claims, which will be considered separately. On the morning of October 25, 2010, the following colloquy occurred:

“The Court: Good morning, everybody. We are back to jury selection in [the present case]. The attorneys have brought a matter to the court’s attention this morning which should be put on the record. [Attorney Stacey] Haupt [the prosecutor], I don’t know if you want to go first or—
“[The Prosecutor]: That’s fine. [Something] was brought to my attention ... by Attorney Jack Doyle [regarding] the [plea] agreement between . . . Dickerson and the state’s attorney office. . . . Attorney Doyle realized that Attorney [Richard] Silverstein [defense counsel] . . . had spoken to Mr. Dickerson at the request of Attorney Jamie Alosi to try to talk to him about taking some type of deal. However, it was prior to Mr. Dickerson cooperating in this case. I don’t believe that deal came to fruition, but I just thought it should be brought to the court’s attention . . .
“The Court: All right.
“[The Prosecutor]: . . . Attorney Silverstein in some respect had conversations with one of the state’s witnesses.
“The Court: Let me flush that out a bit. Apparently, Mr. Dickerson, and it’s already a matter of knowledge and public record in this case, is going to testify against [the defendant]. Mr. Dickerson, and I think you put this on the record earlier, and if not, it should be. Mr. Dickerson was on trial in front of this court, represented by Attorney Alosi. At some point, he entered a plea upstairs, and I had nothing to do with the plea. I had nothing to do with the sentencing. My involvement was picking a jury up to the point where the matter was resolved. Apparently, [Attorney] Silverstein, you can add to that factual situation. Listen up, Mr. Walker, I just want to make sure you understand this.
“[Defense Counsel]: Mr. Dickerson was brought in to begin jury selection in a matter which he eventually pled guilty to and is seeking to have consideration for based on Inis testimony or anticipated testimony in this case. I happened] to be on the sixth floor. He was in the bullpen upstairs with his attorney, and his attorney, who I know, had told me about the case he was proceeding to trial on. . . . [I]t was a sale case, and she had indicated to me that the sale that Mr. Dickerson was accused of making was captured on videotape and she showed me a photograph of what I believe was Mr. Dickerson. So, she [asked] me ... [if I would] talk to him, so I did. I may have even volunteered. I know Mr. Dickerson. So, I went in and [spoke] to him and I said, I hear you’re going to trial. He said, yes. I said, I hear they’ve got you on video. He says, it’s not me. I said, well, here’s the photograph, the still photo from the videotape. It sure looks like you, to me. He says, it’s not me. I said, well, what was your offer. He explained to me what the plea [offer] was that he could accept short of going to trial.
“I was also aware that he had been on parole at the time of the arrest, and he was essentially doing dead time if there was not some provision in the anticipated plea agreement that would be good time back to the day of the arrest. I believe his lawyer told me that that was part of the [plea offer], that he would receive credit [from] the day of the arrest. I said to him . . . you have almost two years in on this matter, they’re offering you three. I think, or three and a half. I don’t really recall. But I believe it was anticipated that a plea on a charge assuming he took the plea [offer] . . . would result in maybe six months or nine months more of incarceration. He said he wasn’t taking it.
“I said to him, I believe you’ve got a prior sale, and they’re going to probably charge you sale by a nondrug-dependent person, sale within 1500 feet of a housing project, day care or school. I explained to him that everywhere in New Haven fits that definition. I said, if they charge you with possession—well, they wouldn’t charge you with possession. Those two charges alone, as a subsequent offender, he’s looking at a minimum of eight years of incarceration that would have to run consecutive to the parole that was almost over.
“Given his prior history, I told him if he went to trial and was unsuccessful, he would probably receive double-digit time. He said he didn’t care. I said, you’re a big boy. It’s your decision. I didn’t tell him to take the [offer]. I didn’t go over the evidence other than to say I viewed a photograph, a still photograph, of the videotape of the sale. I told him, if it wasn’t him, it was a pretty good look-alike.
“I said, you’re also going to have testimony from the police officer, the cooperating witness that it was, in fact, you. I said, in my opinion, the evidence was substantial. Then again, I didn’t spend more than five or six minutes with him, nor did I, other than the layout, which he probably already heard from his attorney, have anything that would impact on [the] decision he made. Then he proceeded to come down here and begin jury selection with Your Honor.
“Subsequent to that, it would appear, and I didn’t know until, let’s say, a month to six weeks after that he had given that statement because it wasn’t being handled by [the prosecutor] at that time, this case. . . .
“My client was incarcerated, having not made bond, and, at some point ... I became aware that Dickerson had made a statement. As soon as I became aware, I asked [the prosecutor] to send me a copy of that statement. ... I spoke to them about the parameters of the new plea agreement that Mr. Dickerson had entered into based on his cooperation and I was told essentially what happened. I was given a copy of the statement, and that’s where we are today. My client is aware I had a limited interaction with Mr. Dickerson prior to him giving inculpatory evidence or [an] anticipated statement that inculpates him, and I explained to [the defendant] that this in no way would impede my cross-examination of Mr. Dickerson. I don’t think that that conversation is probably relevant to the deal he eventually entered into, and I would probably not, in my cross-examination, unless it came out that we knew each other, but we had known each other prior to me speaking to him up in court, and I wouldn’t get into any details of the conversation. I don’t think that would hamper my cross-examination of him at all. [The defendant] has indicated to me that he wants me to continue to represent him.
“The Court: You heard that, Mr. Walker? You’re comfortable with that?
“The Defendant: Yes, yes.
“The Court: Let me tell you what I’m concerned about to protect your rights. As your lawyer, [Attorney] Sil-verstein owes you a duty of undivided loyalty. He can’t represent two people at the same time that have any kind of conflict. From what I’ve heard here today, I haven’t seen any. Whatever he did with Mr. Dickerson was unrelated to whatever deal Mr. Dickerson now has going, and he can go after that deal hand and claw, and there’s nothing that I can see in his prior contact with Mr. Dickerson that is even relevant to the situation that developed after he spoke to [Attorney] Silverstein. I don’t see any conflict. I don’t see any violation of the law by [Attorney] Silverstein, and I want to make sure you’re comfortable with it so we can get on with the trial, and you’ve got to let me know. Are you okay with it?
“The Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: Good, all right, then we’ll pick it up. Let’s bring the panel out. Thank you.”

A

The defendant argues that the “trial court’s in-chambers inquiry into defense counsel’s possible conflict of interest violated the defendant’s right to be present at all critical stages of the prosecution, thus necessitating a new trial.” The state responds that the record is not adequate for us to review this claim because it does not contain any information that would confirm that a chambers’ conference actually occurred, what it entailed if it did occur, or whether it constituted a critical stage of the proceedings. It argues that “the record does not disclose whether the court and attorneys engaged in any significant conversation outside of the defendant’s presence.” (Emphasis in original.) We agree with the state.

“We begin with a fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence: a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of his or her prosecution. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117, 104 S. Ct. 463, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1983) (the right to personal presence at all critical stages of the trial and the right to counsel are fundamental rights of each criminal defendant). Indeed, [a] defendant’s right to be present ... is scarcely less important to the accused than the right of trial itself. . . . State v. Simino, 200 Conn. 113, 127, 509 A.2d 1039 (1986). Although the constitutional right to be present is rooted to a large extent in the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, courts have recognized that this right is protected by the due process clause in situations [in which] the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 108, 54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed. 674 (1934); see State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 691-92, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987) (recognizing that right to be present similarly is guaranteed by article first, § 8, of our state constitution), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061, 108 S. Ct. 1017, 98 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1988).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724, 732, 859 A.2d 898 (2004).

“In State v. Sam, 98 Conn. App. 13, 23, 907 A.2d 99, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 944, 912 A.2d 478 (2006), we noted that ‘an in camera inquiry regarding a potential conflict of interest may constitute a critical stage of a prosecution at which ... a defendant has a constitutional right to be present.’ . . . Nevertheless, it does not follow that all in-chambers discussions constitute a critical stage of the prosecution. In State v. Lopez, [supra, 271 Conn. 724], our Supreme Court stated that ‘[i]n judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.’ . . . Id., 732; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95, 906 A.2d 4, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935, 909 A.2d 962 (2006); State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 431-32, 546 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 441 (1988). It further noted that a defendant may be afforded the right either to object or to waive an objection to his absence from a conference held in chambers if the existence of such a conference subsequently is placed on the record. State v. Lopez, supra, 737 n.13.” (Emphasis altered.) State v. Hazel, 106 Conn. App. 213, 220, 941 A.2d 378, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 903, 947 A.2d 343 (2008). “Applying the test set forth in Lopez to determine whether a particular in camera proceeding qualifies as a critical stage of the prosecution is a necessarily fact intensive inquiry. Thus, it is imperative that the record reveal the scope of discussion that transpired.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Chambers, 296 Conn. 397, 412-13, 994 A.2d 1248 (2010).

In the present case, our thorough search of the record reveals no information as to whether a meeting occurred in chambers or whether there was a discussion in court off the record in the presence or absence of the defendant, whether or how counsel alerted the court clerk’s office that something needed to be put on the record that morning, or whether the attorneys did something else in the presence or absence of the defendant to alert the court that there was an issue that needed to be put on the record. We are unable to speculate on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an in-chambers conference or an in-court conference in or out of the presence of the defendant. As our Supreme Court explained in Chambers, as the result of the failure of the defendant to supply us with a factual record establishing any or some of the foregoing possible scenarios, “we cannot determine the extent to which a fair and just hearing would have been thwarted by the defendant’s absence or whether his presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the criminal charges.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 413; see also State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 492-93, 964 A.2d 73 (2008) (claim inadequate for review where defendant failed to provide factual record to support claim that in-chambers discussion regarding potential conflict of interest occurred at critical stage of proceeding, outside of defendant’s presence).

The failure of the defendant to request a hearing before the trial court to establish a factual predicate for appellate review of this claim renders the record inadequate for any meaningful review. “[I]t is incumbent upon the [defendant] to take the necessary steps to sustain [his] burden of providing an adequate record for appellate review. . . . Our role is not to guess at possibilities . . . but to review claims based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court. . . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court . . . any decision made by [any appellate court] respecting [the defendant’s claims] would be entirely speculative. . . . State v. Canales, 281 Conn. 672, 583-84, 916 A.2d 767 (2007); see also State v. Dalzell, 282 Conn. 709, 720, 924 A.2d 809 (2007) (for any Golding claim, incumbent on defendant to take necessary steps to sustain burden of providing adequate record for appellate review); State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 63, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212, 127 S. Ct. 1328, 167 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2007).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hazel, supra, 106 Conn. App. 221-22.

Accordingly, we will not speculate about the constitutional implications of any alleged discussions that may have taken place out of the defendant’s presence, nor will we reverse the defendant’s conviction and order a new trial on the basis of such speculation. We conclude that the defendant’s claim is inadequate for review under Golding and does not warrant the invocation of the plain error doctrine.

B

The defendant also claims that the “trial court did not conduct an adequate inquiry on the record into trial counsel’s actual and active conflict of interest so as to make it possible for the defendant to understand and decide advisedly whether to waive his right to conflict-free counsel.” The state argues that the “court adequately explored the possible conflict of interest and properly determined that no actual conflict existed that would adversely affect [Attorney] Silverstein’s ability to represent the defendant.” We agree with the state.

“We begin our analysis of the defendant’s claim by setting forth the applicable standard of review. Almost without exception, we have required that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised by way of habeas corpus, rather than by direct appeal, because of the need for a full evidentiary record for such [a] claim. ... On the rare occasions that we have addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, we have limited our review to allegations that the defendant’s sixth amendment rights had been jeopardized by the actions of the trial court, rather than by those of his counsel. . . . We have addressed such claims, moreover, only where the record of the trial court’s allegedly improper action was adequate for review or the issue presented was a question of law, not one of fact requiring further evidentiary development. . . . We, therefore, review the defendant’s claim as a question of law and, as with all questions of law, our review is plenary. . . .

“The sixth amendment to the United States constitution as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, guarantee to a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. . . . Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. . . . [0]ne of the principal safeguards of this right is the rule announced by this court that [a trial] court must explore the possibility of conflict . . . when it knows or reasonably should know of a conflict ....

“There are two circumstances under which a trial court has a duty to inquire with respect to a conflict of interest: (1) when there has been a timely conflict objection at trial ... or (2) when the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists. ... A trial court’s failure to inquire in such circumstances constitutes the basis for reversal of a defendant’s conviction. ... In the absence of an affirmative duty by the trial court to inquire, however, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance in order to obtain reversal of his conviction.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Parrott, 262 Conn. 276, 285-87, 811 A.2d 705 (2003).

“To safeguard a criminal defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel, a trial court has an affirmative obligation to explore the possibility of conflict when such conflict is brought to the attention of the trial [court] in a timely manner. ... In discharging this duty, the trial court must be able, and be freely permitted, to rely upon [defense] counsel’s representation that the possibility of such a conflict does or does not exist. . . . The reliance in such an instance is upon the solemn representation of a fact made by [the] attorney as an officer of the court. . . . The course thereafter followed by the court in its inquiry depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Drakeford, 261 Conn. 420, 427, 802 A.2d 844 (2002).

In the present case, on the morning of October 25, 2010, the court stated that counsel had brought a matter to its attention that needed to be placed on the record. The state and Attorney Silverstein each addressed the court regarding Attorney Silverstein’s previous discussion with Dickerson. The court also asked the defendant to pay attention to what was being discussed. After explaining his discussion with Dickerson to the court, Attorney Silverstein assured the court that his cross-examination of Dickerson in the present case would not be impeded by that previous discussion and that the defendant was aware of counsel’s previous interaction with Dickerson, but wanted him to continue his representation. The court very clearly asked the defendant if he was comfortable with Attorney Silverstein continuing to represent him, and the defendant, very clearly, said yes. The court then proceeded to explain to the defendant that, although it did not see a conflict, it was concerned about the defendant’s rights and that Attorney Silverstein owed him a duty of loyalty. The court, again, asked the defendant if he was “okay” with Attorney Silverstein continuing to represent him, and the defendant, again, clearly said yes.

We conclude that the court’s inquiry into the potential conflict of interest was sufficient under the circumstances presented. Attorney Silverstein told the court that he had discussed this matter with the defendant and that the defendant wanted him to continue representing him. The court also directly asked the defendant if he was comfortable with his attorney continuing to represent him, and the defendant, on two occasions, said yes. The defendant did not indicate in any way to the court that he was concerned that Attorney Silverstein’s trial performance would be impeded by the prior interaction with Dickerson. Attorney Silverstein also assured the court that his brief interaction with Dickerson would not affect his cross-examination of Dickerson. The court, certainly, is permitted to rely on such representations of an officer of the court; State v. Drakeford, supra, 261 Conn. 427; see also State v. Parrott, supra, 262 Conn. 289; and the defendant’s responses to its questions and statements. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court conducted a sufficient inquiry into counsel’s potential conflict of interest in the presence of the defendant to ensure that his constitutional rights were not violated.

Ill

The defendant also claims that the court improperly permitted the state to introduce testimony regarding latent fingerprint evidence despite the loss of such evidence while in police custody. Specifically, he argues: “The defendant’s right to confront his accusers and his right to due process of law were violated because the state was permitted to offer testimony that a partial latent fingerprint on the outside of the ‘getaway car’ belonged to the defendant even though the print lifted from the car was lost, making it impossible for the defendant to hire his own analyst and impossible to cross-examine the state’s. witness effectively.” The defendant further argues that the court “failed to apply the Morales-Asherman test to determine how to remedy the due process violation.” See State v. Morales, 232 Conn. 707, 657 A.2d 585 (1995); State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S. Ct. 1749, 84 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1985). The state argues that the defendant has abandoned his confrontation clause claim by failing to brief it on appeal and that there is an inadequate record to review his due process claim because he never made such a claim before the trial court, and the trial court, therefore, did not make the findings necessary to permit a proper review of the claim on appeal. After a thorough review of the record in this case, we agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to our conclusion. During trial, on November 3, 2010, after the court released the jury for its afternoon break, the following colloquy occurred:

“The Court: All right, the jury’s out and, at the request of counsel to expedite the evidence today, I think, excuse me, I think [defense counsel] wants to address something with respect to . . . Detective [George] Shelton, who is the—on tap to be the next witness in the case.
“[Defense Counsel]: Well, Your Honor, I became aware after reading the transcript of the first trial that the latent identifiable prints that were lifted were lost. You indicated when that was brought to your attention at the first trial that that goes to weight and not admissibility. I’m claiming that it curtails my client’s fifth amendment privilege to cross-examine on the accuracy of the identifications made by Detective Shelton because, by losing the evidence, they made it impossible for me to conduct an independent examination of that evidence.
“The Court: Made it possible for you?
“[Defense Counsel]: Made it impossible for me to conduct—
“The Court: When did you make that request?
“[Defense Counsel]: I didn’t make a request. I became aware that they were lost, so I’m moving, I mean, is there any question that I was given a transcript of the case some months ago? I’m saying now, it was lost then, it’s been lost since 2005; I’m assuming that that’s not a fact in dispute, that it’s unavailable. And what would be the point of making a request for evidence that is unavailable that I know is unavailable? So, I’m operating under the assumption, and a correct one, that after 2005 that evidence is unavailable. I assume that had it been available I would have been told by the state, so I’m operating under the assumption that a year ago it was unavailable, and it’s unavailable here today. And because it is unavailable, I can file all the requests I wanted to examine that evidence, but what would be the point? I was aware.
“The Court: How long has this case been pending, [the defendant’s] case been pending?
“[Defense Counsel]: I assume since 2008. ... I know it’s unavailable, the court knows it’s unavailable a year ago, and the fact that it is unavailable made it impossible for me to do an independent test ... on those latent fingerprints. ... If you’re saying that if the ruling comes down, had I made a request to view something I knew was unavailable and that makes my argument better, well, then, then, really, what you’re saying is, by not making a request to see evidence I know is not available and [has] been lost, that it was my fault.
“The Court: I’m not casting fault anywhere, sir. . . . I’m just trying to get the chronology of things.
“[Defense Counsel]: You allow him to testify because he never claimed that he wanted to examine those fin-geiprints. I’m telling you it was impossible for me to examine the fingerprints. Had they been available, I would have.
“The Court: Your point is clear, sir.
“[Defense Counsel]: And, as we know, fingerprints, unlike DNA, is subject to interpretation. I’m given a report that doesn’t even tell me how many points, identification points, he used when he did those comparisons. I’m just left with a conclusory report that says, yes, it’s his fingerprint, not even how many points of identification. And the court is aware, having done this a long time, one of the things they do in fingeiprint identification—
“The Court: How would the lifts themselves tell you what was the nature of the analysis conducted by Mr. Shelton because that’s what’s missing, is the lifts themselves, sir.
“[Defense Counsel]: And the lifts themselves would tell me how many points of comparison he used.
“The Court: How would that tell you what Mr. Shelton did when he made his analysis?
“[Defense Counsel]: Well, I mean, it would subject that analysis to interpretation if I provided my own expert who said ... it wasn’t. . . . And, look, I didn’t lose the evidence, Your Honor. . . . Let’s remember who’s at fault if the evidence is not available.
“The Court: Sir, I’m listening to you. . . . And I’m not reaching any conclusions. I’m just trying to understand . . . what your argument is. . . . So far, the argument, as I understand it, correct me if I’m wrong, is that it’s not your fault that the prints were lost, and you need them to satisfy your client’s fifth amendment rights with respect to cross-examination.
“[Defense Counsel]: And I would have gone further. I don’t even know how many points, if it was a five point, which is the minimum, right, as opposed to a nine point comparison. If there’s a five point, then an expert would say no, I only see four points. That’s deficient; there’s a problem here with this identification.
“The Court: Okay.
“[Defense Counsel]: They can’t hide the ball from me and then make the argument that you don’t have the ball; therefore, you can’t play. I mean, that’s what they’re—what they did in this case, and it’s . . . and I should have asked to play even though I know the ball has been hidden.
“The Court: Are you done, sir?
“[Defense Counsel]: Yes.
“The Court: You’re not suggesting that I am telling you that it’s your fault that the prints were lost or that you didn’t ask for them. You’re not making that claim, are you?
“[Defense Counsel]: Well, I think that I want to be sure that if my claim falls for the fact that I didn’t file a piece of paper asking for something I know is not available for a comparison test . . . then that would be my fault.
“The Court: I don’t think we’re going to get there, sir. State?
“[The Prosecutor]: True that fingerprint lifts are lost and they were lost, as Your Honor knows, in the last trial. I don’t know, however, how that affects what this person—what Detective Shelton did in order to compare them. All that stuff is great—ripe for cross-examination, but I don’t think it prevents him from testifying about what he did with the lifts when he had them.
“The Court: “[Defense counsel]?
“[Defense Counsel]: Can I make one more point?
“The Court: You can after I ask my question. . . . Your claim is that all of the testimony of Shelton should be excluded?
“[Defense Counsel]: Right.
“The Court: All right, okay. Make your further claim.
“[Defense Counsel]: My last one, all right? ... I talked to the—to my brain trusts, too, okay, on this matter, and I know that there are certain cases that say when something is used up during the examination, for instance, narcotics cases where there is just a, a residue, right, and it can’t be tested.because it was used up during the testing process, they say, okay, it comes in. Sorry, we don’t have any, you know, it’s been used up so you can’t test it. But this is something quite different. Fingerprints don’t get used up, okay? Fingerprints stay in the condition they are when they’re lifted. So, I guess the analogy I would make is, if you allow somebody to come in and say they did a ballistic examination of a projectile and said it was fired from that weapon and not have the projectile itself, all right, and the defense made a request for that projectile to do an independent testing, I can’t see a court allowing somebody to come in and say, here are my results. Sorry, we don’t have the projectile, we lost it, sorry you can’t test it independently to test our conclusions, because I can cross-examine this witness all I want, but absent that physical evidence, I’m stuck with a jury believing his conclusions because there’s no way to test the credibility of that conclusion or the accuracy of that conclusion absent the jury comparing it themselves to the known and the unknown or absent having an expert do the same for us. I think it’s a real problem, okay, and I’m doing this outside the presence of the jury because I do not think, given that there’s DNA in this case, and that’s another problem I have, Your Honor.
“The Court: Let’s do the prints right now, sir.
“[Defense Counsel]: Okay. Given that there is DNA in the case, it’s uncontroverted my client is a mixture, why do they need that? And I think that should go into your—
“The Court: Isn’t it a different form of evidence, sir?
“[Defense Counsel]: I understand, but I think it should go into your decision as to whether or not the prejudicial effect of—against my client as to the probative effect and, in the inverse, the prejudices this will have against the state’s case if you were to side with me. It’s not fatal to their case.
“The Court: Done?
“[Defense Counsel]: Yes. . . . Something will come back. Something will come to me on the way home as I’m driving home but.
“The Court: All right, all right. And I mean that in all sincerity. Are you done with your argument?
“[Defense Counsel]: Yes. . . .
“The Court: All right, motion’s denied, [defense counsel]. The factual basis, as I understand, is that [Detective William P.] Farrell took the prints, lifted—lifted the prints from the latent and then in some fashion gave them to Shelton. Shelton is the next witness who will testify about the examination that he made of the prints and the conclusions or findings that he made from his personal examination. I don’t know of any rule, and I said this earlier, I don’t know of any rule that would preclude Shelton from testifying about what he personally did and concluded based on his own involvement in the case. Clearly, the prints or the lifts are gone. That may go to the weight of his testimony, but in terms of admissibility, I don’t think the law precludes his testimony.
“You’ve mentioned a number of ways in your argument as to questions that could be asked of the witness to undermine the credibility of his opinion. You can have ample cross-examination to undermine his testimony and the probative value of these prints. It’s not duplicative evidence; it’s different evidence from a different source in a different way; it’s more probative than prejudicial; and to the extent you claim that it’s duplicative because there’s also DNA evidence against [the defendant] that undermines your argument of prejudice. For all those reasons, the objection is overruled and you have your record, sir.
“[Defense Counsel]: I did think of one thing. You say that . . . you could think of no rule of law. Well, it’s a very basic rule: You cannot testify about something that is not in evidence, and that’s the rule because in order for him to testify about the prints if the prints were available, the prints would have to be admitted, would they not? . . .
“The Court: Your cross-examination . . . rights are amply protected based on the examination you—I am sure you will conduct, sir. That completes my ruling. It’s on the record. Let’s take a five minute recess and pick it up with [Detective] Shelton.”

Although the confrontation clause of the federal constitution was the basis for the defendant’s objection before the trial court, on appeal, the defendant makes only a cursory claim that the admission of testimony concerning the latent fingerprint evidence would violate his rights under the confrontation clause. He provides no analysis, nor argument on this issue. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has failed to brief a federal confrontation clause claim on appeal. See State v. Claudio C., 125 Conn. App. 588, 600, 11 A.3d 1086 (2010) (“[W]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited. . . . [Assignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910, 12 A.3d 1005 (2011).

The defendant, however, has briefed and analyzed a claim that the court violated his right to due process, under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, by permitting testimony about the latent fingerprints, despite the loss of the actual prints while in police custody. He argues that the court improperly failed to conduct the Morales-Asherman balancing test before ruling that the testimony was admissible. We conclude that the defendant failed to raise this state due process claim before the trial court, and, although he requests Golding review; see State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40; we conclude that we do not have a sufficient record on appeal to consider this claim. See State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 300, 636 A.2d 351 (1994) (although Golding review requested, because defendant did not clearly raise state constitutional claim before trial court, state not put on notice that it was required to defend against such claim, and, therefore, neither state nor trial court—nor court on appeal—had benefit of complete factual inquiry).

“In State v. Morales, [supra, 232 Conn. 720], our Supreme Court determined that article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution requires a balancing test rather than a showing of bad faith: We refer to this test as the Asherman test. [State v. Asherman, supra, 193 Conn. 724.] Although the United States Supreme Court in [Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988)] held that due process under the federal constitution does not require a trial court to apply such a balancing test . . . due process under our state constitution does. [T]he trial court must employ the [Asherman] balancing test, weighing the reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against the degree of prejudice to the accused. . . . State v. Joyce, 243 Conn. 282, 301, 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077, 118 S. Ct. 1523, 140 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1998). The factors to be considered include [1] the materiality of the missing evidence, [2] the likelihood of mistaken interpretation of it by witnesses or the jury, [3] the reason for its nonavailability to the defense and [4] the prejudice to the defendant caused by the unavailability of the evidence. State v. Asherman, supra, 724.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jason B. v. Commissioner of Correction, 141 Conn. App. 674, 676-77, 62 A.3d 1144 (2013).

A review of the record in the present case reveals that, because the defendant did not raise this claim before the trial court, the court did not make findings related to factors one, two or three, namely, the materiality of the missing evidence, the likelihood of the mistaken interpretation of it by witnesses or by the jury, or the reasons for the nonavailability of the evidence to the defense, including the good faith or bad faith of the police in losing the evidence. See id. Without the necessary findings, some of which require credibility determinations, we are unable to consider the defendant’s claim on appeal. See State v. Darden, 239 Conn. 467, 469-71, 687 A.2d 132 (1996) (determination of Ash-erman factors requires factual findings). Accordingly, the defendant’s claim is not entitled to Golding review because the record is inadequate for review.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       “Under Golding ... a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567, 596, 10 A.3d 1005, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908, 132 S. Ct. 314, 181 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2011).

       Our Supreme Court has explained: “The plain error doctrine is a rule of reversibility reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings. . . . That is, it is a doctrine that this court invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling that, although either not properly preserved or never raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal of the trial court’s judgment, for reasons of policy. . . . [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roger B., 297 Conn. 607, 618, 999 A.2d 752 (2010).

       Contrary to defense counsel’s statement, we note that the sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: “In ail criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”

       Although our Supreme Court in Darden remanded the case to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing and to apply the Asherman balancing test, such a remand was appropriate in that case because the defendant had raised a state due process claim before the trial court, and the court had not conducted the necessary balancing test in light of then newly decided State v. Morales, supra, 232 Conn. 707. State v. Darden, supra, 239 Conn. 469-71. In the present case, the defendant never raised a state due process claim nor asked the court to apply the now well established Asherman factors. Accordingly, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.


author: SCHALLER, J.

text:
    CONNECTICUT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MUNSILL-BORDEN MANSION, LLC, ET AL.
    (AC 34495)
    Lavine, Robinson and Schaller, Js.
    Argued September 19—
    officially released December 10, 2013

      Mei-wa Cheng, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

      Sarah Black Lingenheld, with whom, on the brief, was Ross G. Fingold, for the appellee (defendant Edward G. Kriedel III).
   Opinion

SCHALLER, J.

In this action on a cross complaint to recover amounts due on a promissory note, the defendants, Munsill-Borden Mansion, LLC (Munsill-Borden), and Claude M. Brouillard, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the cross claim plaintiff, Edward G. Kriedel III. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) excluded parol evidence and (2) applied certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), General Statutes § 42a-3-101 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On December 16, 2005, Munsill-Borden executed a mortgage on its real property in favor of Connecticut Bank & Trust Company in order to secure a $400,000 debt. Approximately two years later, on September 21, 2007, Munsill-Borden executed another mortgage on the same property in favor of the plaintiff in order to secure a $100,000 debt as reflected in a promissory note executed on the same date and made payable to the plaintiff. The note names Munsill-Borden as the maker and is signed by Brouillard as “[m]ember and personal [gjuarantor.”

On February 17,2009, Connecticut Bank & Trust instituted a foreclosure action against Munsill-Borden. In addition to Munsill-Borden, the complaint named, inter alia, Kriedel and Brouillard, in his capacity as a junior lienholder on the property, as defendants. Following the institution of the foreclosure action, the plaintiff filed a cross complaint against the defendants seeking to recover the amount due on the subordinate note and alleging, inter alia, that Brouillard was personally liable on the note as a guarantor. Thereafter, the defendants filed an answer, special defense, and counterclaim to the cross complaint alleging, inter alia, that Brouillard was not personally liable on the note. A trial to the court followed on September 29, 2009. The primary question before the court was whether Brouillard was personally hable on the note.

During trial, the defendants’ counsel cahed Brouillard as the defendants’ sole witness. On direct examination, the defendants’ counsel asked Brouillard if he intended or agreed to guarantee the note. The plaintiffs counsel objected to this inquiry on parol evidence grounds. The court sustained the objection, prompting the defendants’ counsel to state: “I think it’s important ... for evaluating the promissory notes [and Brouillard’s] liability under the [note] to understand its history and how it . . . came into being. If you don’t understand the circumstances into which the note was created, then it’s very difficult to ascertain why certain things are missing. For example, a personal guarantee agreement which would otherwise be . . . part and parcel of a commercial mortgage and note.” The court then altered its earlier ruling and permitted the defendants’ counsel to “give that background.”

After eliciting background testimony, the defendants’ counsel handed Brouillard the note and asked him where he had executed it. During Brouillard’s response to the question, the plaintiffs counsel objected on parol evidence grounds. The court sustained the objection, and the defendants’ counsel expressed disagreement with the ruling. The court did not alter its ruling after hearing the defendants’ counsel. Thereafter, the defendants’ counsel began to ask Brouillard if he said anything to the plaintiffs counsel when they met at a restaurant to execute the note. Before Brouillard could answer, the plaintiffs counsel objected on parol evidence grounds. The court sustained the objection, and the defendants’ counsel expressed disagreement with the ruling. The court did not alter its ruling. The defendants’ counsel then asked Brouillard if he observed any “guarantee language” in the note. Brouillard answéred in the negative and stated that “the only signatory . . . is Munsill-Borden Mansion, LLC.” The defendants’ counsel subsequently asked Brouillard if it was his “sole intent” to execute the note only on behalf of Munsill-Borden. The plaintiffs counsel, once again, objected on parol evidence grounds. The court sustained the objection, and the defendants’ counsel did not express disagreement with the ruling.

Following trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff oh the counterclaim and cross complaint. In its memorandum of decision, the court determined that Munsill-Borden and Brouillard, personally, were hable for payment of the note. The court noted the defendants’ contention that Brouillard did not personally guarantee the debt or execute the note in his individual capacity. The court, however, determined that “[Brouillard’s] testimony [was] not convincing in light of the clear language of the note and [was] constricted by the parol evidence rule.” The defendants subsequently appealed the court’s judgment.

The defendants first claim that the court erred in its application of the parol evidence rule. Specifically, the defendants contend that that the court improperly excluded extrinsic evidence that was admissible pursuant to various exceptions to the parol evidence rule. The plaintiff, however, contends that the defendants’ parol evidence claim was not preserved for appellate review. We agree with the plaintiff.

“[T]he parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract. . . . [However] the parol evidence rule does not bar the admission of evidence that varies or contradicts the written terms of an integrated contract if it is offered: (1) to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument; (2) to prove a collateral oral agreement which does not vary the terms of the writing; (3) to add a missing term in writing which indicates on its face that it does not set forth the complete agreement; or (4) to show mistake or fraud.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Leonetti v. MacDermid, Inc., 310 Conn. 195, 211, 76 A.3d 168 (2013).

On appeal, the defendants contend that the court improperly excluded extrinsic evidence that was admissible to show ambiguity, a collateral agreement, and fraud. The defendants maintain that their expressions of disagreement with the court’s parol evidence rulings during trial preserved their claim for appellate review. Our rules of practice provide that we are “not bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at trial or arose subsequent to the trial.” Practice Book § 60-5. We have “said many times that [we] will not review a claim that is not distinctly raised at trial. . . . A claim is distinctly raised if it is so stated as to bring to the attention of the court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked. ... A claim briefly suggested is not distinctly raised.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dockter v. Slowik, 91 Conn. App. 448, 462, 881 A.2d 479, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 919, 888 A.2d 87 (2005). To preserve a claim alleging an improper evidentiary ruling, “trial counsel must object properly. ... In objecting to evidence, counsel must properly articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise nature of the objection and its real purpose, in order to form an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling. . . . Once counsel states the authority and ground of [the] objection, any appeal will be limited to the ground asserted. . . . These requirements are not simply formalities. They serve to alert the trial court to potential error while there is still time for the court to act. . . . Assigning error to a court’s evidentiary rulings on the basis of objections never raised at trial unfairly subjects the court and the opposing party to trial by ambush.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634, 645, 945 A.2d 449 (2008); see Practice Book § 5-5.

The defendants expressed disagreement with several of the court’s parol evidence rulings during trial, but never indicated that the excluded evidence was admissible to show ambiguity, a collateral agreement, or fraud. Although the defendants made a statement which prompted the court to alter its ruling, they did not state any recognizable exception to the parol evidence rule as a basis for admitting the evidence. Instead, the defendants suggested that the circumstances surrounding the note’s creation were necessary to evaluate Brouillard’s liability and understand the absence of certain documents. This statement did not indicate that the evidence was admissible pursuant to an exception to the parol evidence rule. The defendants’ counsel subsequently stated that the court should admit the excluded evidence because Brouillard was only testifying to “his understanding” of the note. The defendants did not argue that the court should admit the excluded evidence pursuant to any exception to the parol evidence rule. “ [ W] e have consistently declined to review claims based on a ground different from that raised in the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baker v. Cordisco, 37 Conn. App. 515, 522, 657 A.2d 230, cert. denied, 234 Conn. 907, 659 A.2d 1207 (1995). The defendants cannot challenge the court’s evidentiary rulings by arguing that evidence was admissible pursuant to exceptions to the parol evidence rule that were never asserted during trial. Accordingly, we decline to review the defendants’ unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly excluded extrinsic evidence that was admissible pursuant to certain exceptions of the parol evidence rule.

II

The defendants next claim that the court improperly applied several provisions of the UCC. The plaintiff contends that this claim, like the defendants’ parol evidence claim, was not preserved for appellate review. We agree with the plaintiff.

Our rules of practice provide that “[a]ny party intending to raise any question of law which may be the subject of an appeal must either state the question distinctly ... in a written trial brief ... or state the question distinctly ... on the record . . . .” Practice Book § 5-2. “It is fundamental that claims of error must be distinctly raised and decided in the trial court. . . . [We] will not address issues not decided by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App 373, 379-80, 962 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903, 967 A.2d 507 (2009). “The [appellate] court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial.” Practice Book § 60-5.

It is evident from the record that the defendants failed to raise any cognizable UCC claim during any stage of the trial proceedings. Additionally, the record indicates that the court neither considered nor ruled on any provision of the UCC. Indeed, the record is wholly devoid of any reference, express or implied, to the UCC. Accordingly, we decline to review the defendants’ unpreserved UCC claim. See State v. Misenti, 112 Conn. App. 562, 566, 963 A.2d 696, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 904, 967 A.2d 1220 (2009).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The cross claim instituted by Kriedel is the subject of the present appeal. Hereafter, for convenience, we refer to Kriedel as the plaintiff and to Connecticut Bank & Trust Company by name. Because Munsill-Borden Mansion, LLC, and Brouillard were the only defendants on the cross claim, we refer to them, collectively, as the defendants, and individually by name where appropriate.
      Matthew Kriedel, Mei-wa Cheng and Ravenwood Properties, LLC, were also named as defendants in the underlying foreclosure complaint, however, they are not parties to this appeal. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

       “[The Defendants’ Counsel]: I’m going to show you . . . the promissory note . . . [and] can [you] tell me who . . . prepared [the] note?
      “[The Witness]: This note was prepared by [the plaintiffs counsel].
      “[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Okay. And where did you execute this note?
      “[The Witness]: I signed this note on behalf of Munsill-Borden ... as the maker. My signature appears in the lower right-hand comer of the . . . note .... There’s also a notation that says by Claude M. Brouillard, member and personal guarantor. Now, while I am the personal guarantor under the first mortgage note . . . [the one] being foreclosed. . . .
      “[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going to continue on my objection. . . . [T]his is beyond the scope of note. . . . The note should rest on its face under the parol evidence rule, plain and simple.
      “[The Court]: Okay. Sustained.
      “[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Okay. Well, Your Honor, [Brouillard] is only testifying as to . . . what is contained within the note.
      “[The Court]: Yeah, but it is there.
      “[The Defendants’ Counsel]: And his understanding of what is contained in the note, Your Honor.
      “[The Court]: Objection sustained.”

       “[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Okay. . . . [A]t [the time you met with the plaintiffs counsel to execute the note] did you indicate to [him] that ....
      “[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, if it has to do with the contents of the note, then Your Honor has already ruled on that and the note stands on itself.
      “[The Defendants’ Counsel]: I’m not asking [Brouillard] as to the content of the note, only'... his understanding [of] what he was signing.
      “[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: It doesn’t . . . matter, Your Honor. The parol evidence rule prevents that. The document must stand on its face.
      “[The Court]: Sustained.
      “[The Defendants’ Counsel]: I’m going to object to that, Your Honor, and I will ask one more clarification from Mr. Brouillard here.”

       The appeal form lists Mei-wa Cheng and Eavenwood Properties, LLC (Ravenwood), as appellants in addition to the defendants. The plaintiff contends that Cheng and Eavenwood lack standing to appeal because they were not parties to the cross claim that is the subject of the present appeal. The defendants did not respond to this argument. We agree with the plaintiff that Cheng and Eavenwood lack standing to appeal. Neither Cheng nor Eavenwood were named as defendants in the cross complaint, and their interests do not appear to be affected by the judgment rendered against the defendants. Accordingly, Cheng and Eavenwood are not aggrieved by the judgment on the cross complaint. We therefore dismiss the appeals of Cheng and Eavenwood for want of aggrievement. See State v. Scott, 139 Conn. App. 333, 338, 55 A.3d 608 (2012) (“the statutory right to appeal is limited to appeals by aggrieved parties from final judgments” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

       The defendants also direct our attention to their motion for a new trial, motion to open the judgment, and motion to reargue or reconsider the court’s judgment where they contend that their parol evidence claim was preserved. In each postjudgment motion, the defendants set forth an allegation that the court’s parol evidence rulings were improper and prevented them from “their diligent attempts to offer evidence ... to issues [they] expected to try, namely ambiguity and assent to the agreement.” The motions also set forth allegations that the court’s parol evidence rulings prevented them from trying the issues of consideration, “the existence of a guaranty agreement,” and that the court misapplied the parol evidence rule.
      On January 5, 2010, the court denied the defendants’ motion to reargue or reconsider. Although it does not appear that the court ruled on the motion for a new trial or the motion to open the judgment, our review of these motions reveals that the defendants did not distinctly argue that the evidence excluded at trial was admissible pursuant to an exception to the parol evidence rule. See Practice Book § 5-2 (“[a]ny party intending to raise any question of law which may be the subject of an appeal must . . . state the question distinctly to the judicial authority”). The defendants’ mere use of the term “ambiguity” and their general allegations that the court “misapplied” the parol evidence rule may have suggested such a claim, but “[a] claim briefly suggested is not distinctly raised.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dockter v. Slowik, 91 Conn. App. 448, 462, 881 A.2d 479, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 919, 888 A.2d 87 (2005). We conclude that the defendants’ postjudgment motions failed to preserve their parol evidence claim for appellate review.
      We also note that the defendants failed to file a timely posttrial brief. In fact, it was only after the court rendered judgment that the defendants filed a posttrial brief. Thus, the court was not alerted “to potential error while there is still time to act. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Carreiro, 94 Conn. App. 626, 632, 894 A.2d 993, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 914, 899 A.2d 620 (2006).