author: DUPONT, C. J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARK T. WALL
    (12765)
    Dupont, C. J., and Lavery and Spear, Js.

      Argued October 26, 1995
    decision released March 19, 1996

      Richard E. Hayber, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Ronald M. Dearst/yne, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   DUPONT, C. J.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of criminal impersonation in violation of General Statutes § 53a-130 (a) (3), disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (2), reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222 (a), reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63 (a) and reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied him both a statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial and a constitutional right to a speedy sentencing after conviction, (2) the state failed to prove an element of criminal impersonation, (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury, (4) the trial court improperly prohibited the testimony of witnesses, and (5) the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The jury heard evidence from which the following facts reasonably could have been found. On September 28, 1989, at about 4:30 p.m., two cars resembling police cruisers were in pursuit of a person on a dirt bike in the town of Plymouth. The defendant and a second individual were driving at a high rate of speed in cars equipped with flashing lights, radio antennas, sirens and alternating or “wig-wag” headlights. The defendant and the other driver, traveling at speeds of over 50 mph, came within several feet of hitting a small boy and traveled in residential areas where children were playing on or near the road. The defendant and the other driver left the area after they failed to apprehend the driver of the dirt bike. The defendant was never a member of the Plymouth police department, the Connecticut state police, or the Litchfield county sheriffs department.

The jury found the defendant guilty of all charges tried to it on August 13, 1991, and the trial court sentenced him on June 30, 1993.

I

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

A

Speedy Trial

The defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss and motion for judgment of acquittal which he based on his alleged failure to receive a speedy trial within the requisite statutory period. On April 13, 1990, the defendant was placed under arrest and released soon after. The defendant filed a number of motions after his arrest, and on April 19, 1991, a little over one year from the arrest, he filed a motion for a speedy trial. On May 14, 1991, the trial court advised the parties that jury selection would commence the following day. Defense counsel informed the court, however, that he would be unavailable until the following week. On May 29, 1991, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion. Voir dire commenced on June 12, 1991.

The trial court based its denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on a finding that the defendant had waived his statutory right to a speedy trial when he sought a postponement of the trial’s commencement in order for counsel to attend a personal function. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly found that he waived his statutory right to a speedy trial because, although he agreed to a tolling of the period, he did not consent to a continuance to a time convenient for the court’s docket. Because we find that the filing of the motion for a speedy trial was improper because it was untimely, we need not determine whether the defendant’s actions constituted a waiver of his statutory right to a speedy trial.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 956D, “[i]f the defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable time limit set forth in Secs. 956B and 956C, and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of the filing of a motion for speedy trial by the defendant at any time after such time limit has passed, the information shall be dismissed with prejudice, on motion of the defendant filed after the expiration of such thirty day period. ...” Practice Book § 956B (b) requires that a defendant who is not incarcerated be brought to trial within twelve months after his arrest or the filing date of the information, whichever is later, excluding any time as allowed under Practice Book § 956C. As a prerequisite to filing a motion for a speedy trial, the time limitations set forth in § 956B, excluding certain time periods in accordance with § 956C, must have expired.

The defendant failed to discount any excludable time in calculating the date that he could have filed a motion for a speedy trial. The defendant was arrested on April 13, 1990, and was released shortly thereafter. The trial court entertained several pretrial motions made by the defendant. Section 956C provides that excludable periods of time are “(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to . . . (4) the time between the commencement of the hearing on any pretrial motion and the issuance of a ruling on such motion; (5) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the judicial authority. . . ,”

It is evident from the transcripts provided and the trial court file that several motions were filed after the defendant’s arrest. The defendant filed motions to dismiss, for a bill of particulars, for disclosure and production, for access to the file of a codefendant, to suppress certain statements of others, and for return of the car allegedly driven by the defendant in the course of committing the crime. Hearings were held on May 11, 1990, July 13, 1990, August 13, 1990 and March 19, 1991. The transcript of the hearing on March 19, 1991, indicates that it was to be continued to another date, but no other transcript is on file with this court. On March 19, 1991, the trial court ordered the defendant to fax relevant cases to the court on March 20, 1991, and continued the hearing to another date. Whether those cases were in fact given to the court is unknown. The trial court, without written decision, denied all the motions on June 14, 1991. Five days are excluded in accordance with § 956C (a) (4) because of the hearings that were held and the court’s request for cases from the defendant. In addition, the time for the trial court’s issuance of its rulings on the motions, must also be excluded, up to thirty days. Practice Book § 956C (5). The pretrial motions resulted, therefore, in at least a total of thirty-five days of excludable time.

The twelve month time period, as calculated by the requirements of the rules of practice had not expired when the defendant filed his motion for a speedy trial. The earliest date the defendant could have filed his motion for a speedy trial was May 19, 1991. He filed it on April 19, 1991, and therefore, it was not timely. We affirm the denial of the motion because, as a matter of law, the denial was mandated by the applicable statutes and rules. See State v. Brown, 40 Conn. App. 483, 485-87, 671 A.2d 1316 (1996); State v. Green, 38 Conn. App. 868, 875, 663 A.2d 1085 (1995).

Where the trial court reaches the correct result on a basis different from that determined on review to support that result, we will sustain the trial court’s action. See State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 17, 480 A.2d 489 (1984) (Shea, J., concurring); State v. Green, supra, 38 Conn. App. 875. We do not decide, therefore, whether the trial court was correct in determining that the defendant had waived his statutory right to a speedy trial because the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion was correct for other reasons as a matter of law.

The defendant also asserts that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. “The Supreme Court of the United States and this court have identified four factors which form the matrix of the defendant’s constitutional right to speedy adjudication: ‘[Ijength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.’ Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972); State v. Lloyd, 185 Conn. 199, 208, 440 A.2d 867 (1981); State v. Nims, 180 Conn. 589, 591, 430 A.2d 1306 (1980). A balancing test is to be applied on a case by case basis. None of the factors standing alone demands a set disposition; rather it is the total mix which determines whether the defendant’s right was violated. State v. Nims, supra, 591-92.” State v. Johnson, 190 Conn. 541, 544-45, 461 A.2d 981 (1983).

The defendant has failed to provide an analysis of any of the Barker factors; see State v. Mozell, 37 Conn. App. 574, 580-81, 657 A.2d 686, cert. denied, 234 Conn. 910, 660 A.2d 355 (1995); and merely states that the fourteen month delay between the date of his arrest and the beginning of his trial prejudiced his defense. “The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 530; see also Pelletier v. Warden, 32 Conn. App. 38, 47, 627 A.2d 1363, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 920, 632 A.2d 694 (1993). Our courts have not held that any particular length of delay is presumptively prejudicial, but have stated that an extensive delay warrants an inquiry into the other factors of Barker. See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, 194 Conn. 96, 100, 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828, 106 S. Ct. 90, 88 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1985) (three and one-half years); State v. Davis, 192 Conn. 739, 740-41, 474 A.2d 776 (1984) (twenty-six months); State v. Cleary, 3 Conn. App. 349, 350-51, 488 A.2d 831 (1985) (thirty-eight months). There is “no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specific number of days or months.” Barker v. Wingo, supra, 523.

Although no exact length of time has been established to be sufficient to presume prejudice, a delay of over two years is sufficient to cause investigation into the other factors of Barker. See State v. Almgren, 12 Conn. App. 364, 369, 530 A.2d 1089 (1987). In the present case, the delay was fourteen months, the defendant was not incarcerated before or after the trial, the defendant has given no basis for his claim of prejudice to his defense, the reason for the initial delay was his own counsel’s request for a postponement, and the delay was not a purposeful action by the state, but was related to the smooth administration of the criminal docket. Even if fourteen months is considered the catalyst for further inquiry, that inquiry, which includes the weighing of the other Barker factors, leads us to conclude that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

B

Speedy Sentencing

The defendant argues that the approximately twenty-two month delay between conviction and sentencing violated his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the sixth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. The defendant made this claim in a motion in arrest of judgment and for dismissal dated June 29, 1993. The defendant was sentenced on June 30, 1993.

The state argues that the record is inadequate for us to review this claim because the trial court denied the defendant’s motion without any indication of the reason for doing so. If the state were correct, we would not need to reach the defendant’s claim that the delay in sentencing was a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. We, therefore, must first decide whether the record is adequate for review.

A record is adequate to review such a claim if the record sufficiently supplies a factual basis for us to conclude as a matter of law whether a constitutional right to a speedy sentence was denied to the defendant. The question of whether the defendant was denied a constitutional right to a speedy sentence based on the facts in the record “is a legal conclusion that, if made by a trial court, is subject to plenary review by an appellate court. See State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 693, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).” State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 379, 645 A.2d 529 (1994). Accordingly, if there is, in the trial record, a sufficient underlying set of facts on which an appellate court can answer the question of whether a right to a speedy sentence was violated, the record is adequate for review. Id., 379-80.

The record shows that the defendant was convicted on August 13, 1991, and was sentenced on June 30, 1993, and indicates that several posttrial motions were filed. On August 16, 1991, the defendant moved for an acquittal, based on an alleged denial of a right to a speedy trial, and moved for a new trial, citing numerous claims. On December 31, 1991, the trial court heard oral argument on the motions. The defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the motions on March 26, 1992. The trial court denied the motions on April 2, 1993, with a memorandum of decision. We conclude that the record sufficiently supplies this court with factual predicates on which to make a determination of whether the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy sentence was denied.

The defendant asserts that the sixth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of our constitution recognize a speedy trial right that extends to the sentencing phase of criminal prosecutions. There is no state appellate decision nor any United States Supreme Court decision that has definitively established such a right, although at least one federal District Court has done so, and there are Connecticut cases that come to the brink of the establishment of such a right.

The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S. Ct. 481, 1 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1957). Although it reviewed the claim to determine whether the defendant had been sentenced within a reasonable time so as not to violate his speedy trial or due process rights, the court refused to determine whether the sixth amendment encompassed such a speedy sentencing right, but, rather, assumed arguendo that it did. Id., 361. After this decision, numerous federal and other state courts have made the same assumption “arguendo” in addressing a claim of this nature, but have not specifically established the right to a speedy sentencing. See, e.g., Tinghitella v. California, 718 F.2d 308, 312-13 (9th Cir. 1983); Brady v. Superintendent, 443 F.2d 1307, 1310 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149, 1151 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872, 91 S. Ct. 109, 27 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1974); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1968); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170, 178-79, 542 P.2d 686 (1975); Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 544, 350 A.2d 640 (1976); Commonwealth v. Pounds, 140 Pa. 621, 626-27, 417 A.2d 597 (1980).

At least one federal circuit, however, has cited Pollard and found that a speedy sentencing right exists under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution. In Juarez-Casares v. United States, 496 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1974), the court expressly held that a speedy trial right under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution extends to the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings. “[T]he imposition of sentence is part of the trial for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee, so, in exercising his discretion, the trial judge is bound by both the rule and the Sixth Amendment.” Id., 192, citing Pollard v. United States, supra, 354 U.S. 361.

Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 514, was decided fifteen years after Pollard. Although Barker deals with a delay in bringing the defendant to trial, rather than a delay in sentencing after conviction, the Supreme Court, in the course of discussing of the speedy trial right, stated that “delay between arrest and punishment may have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation.” Id., 520. “ ‘[I]t is desirable that punishment should follow offence as closely as possible; for its impression upon the minds of men is weakened by distance, and, besides, distance adds to the uncertainty of punishment, by affording new chances of escape.’ ”Id., 520n.l0, quoting J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (Ogden Ed. 1931) p. 326. We use this dicta as the beginning of our analysis of whether a right to a speedy sentencing is a constitutional right under Connecticut law.

Our research reveals only two Connecticut cases that have considered the issue of whether a speedy sentencing right exists, but both were decided when Connecticut had a statute, General Statutes § 54-91, which required a court to sentence a defendant within ten days of conviction unless a stay was ordered. The statute was repealed in 1976 and no similar statute was enacted. In State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 214 A.2d 362 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921, 86 S. Ct. 1372, 16 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1966), the court reviewed a claim that a delay in the sentencing of a witness in one case was a violation of the defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial in another case. The court determined that even if the witness had a constitutional right to a speedy sentencing, the defendant could not claim the benefit of the witnesses’ right. In dicta, the court stated that absent a request by a defendant for an immediate sentencing, a waiver of any such right may be deemed to have occurred. Id., 80. The case did not refer to § 54-91.

In State v. Moore, 158 Conn. 461, 262 A.2d 166 (1969), no constitutional right was claimed and § 54-91 was cited. In dicta, the court used strong language to support the proposition that it is improper for a trial court to fail to sentence a defendant promptly. “An appeal lies only from a final judgment, and there can be no judgment in a criminal case until sentence is pronounced. ... A person accused of crime and formally presented before a criminal court must not be left in the limbo of a temporary stay of sentence by the device of a suspended judgment. . . . In a criminal case it is never proper for the court to suspend judgment, although the court may properly render judgment by imposing sentence and then suspend the execution of the sentence for an ascertainable period, thereby protecting the right of appeal.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 463.

In the absence of any specific statute or rule of practice governing a right to a speedy sentence, we next examine cases concerning other situations claimed to be encompassed by the speedy trial right. Although our appellate courts have not recognized a speedy trial right for prearrest delays, a speedy trial right to appeal has been recognized. State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 560, 638 A.2d 578 (1994); State v. Files, 183 Conn. 586, 589, 441 A.2d 27 (1981). In DePastino, the defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial claiming an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. The defendant’s appeal was delayed for almost three years because of difficulty in obtaining the trial transcript. “In determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, this court has balanced, on a case by case basis, several factors first identified by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, [supra, 407 U.S. 530]. Gaines v. Manson, [194 Conn. 510, 521, 481 A.2d 1084 (1984)]; State v. Files, supra [589]. . . . We apply the same factual matrix to the defendant’s claim of a lack of a speedy appeal.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DePastino, supra, 560.

The underlying purpose of the speedy trial right is to avoid prejudice to the defendant. “Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 532. Although an individual, asserting a speedy sentencing right has already received a trial, concerns of prejudice can still exist because of a delay in sentencing.

When sentencing has not yet occurred, the appellate rights of a defendant are put in limbo. State v. Moore, supra, 158 Conn. 463. Because there is included in the constitutional speedy trial right, a right to a speedy appeal to the extent an appeal right has been granted by the legislature; see State v. DePastino, supra, 228 Conn. 560; we conclude that the constitutional speedy trial right embodies a right to a speedy sentencing. Without such a right, the defendant’s right to a speedy appeal has been denied.

The next question we must decide is whether that right of the defendant was violated on the facts of this case. The case of Juarez-Casares v. United States, supra, 496 F.2d 190, is instructive. Juarez-Casares involves a defendant who was charged, on March 17, 1970, with eleven counts of aiding and abetting aliens to elude examination and inspection by the United States immigration officials. The defendant pleaded guilty on March 26, 1970. On July 28, 1970, the court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to the federal correctional institution in La Tuna, Texas, to produce the defendant, in court for sentencing the next day, but he had been transferred elsewhere and the writ was returned unserved. In June, 1971, the defendant was released, but was reincarcerated for a separate offense. On November 10,1972, the court issued another writ to produce the defendant for sentencing, and he appeared on November 14, 1972. The defendant challenged the thirty-two month delay in sentencing. Id., 191.

In determining whether a defendant’s speedy trial right had been violated by a delay in sentencing, the court stated that “[i]f there has been an unreasonable delay, and if that delay results in prejudice to the defendant, then a violation has occurred.” Id., 192. After attributing the delay solely to the lack of due diligence by the state, the court found that the defendant had been prejudiced by the “extreme delay” because the defendant received a harsher penalty than if he had been sentenced within a reasonable amount of time after the conviction. Id. This finding was based on the following statement made by the trial court during sentencing: “ ‘The court deferred sentencing, and if [the defendant] had not got in this other trouble I might not have given him time to serve, but it is obvious that this man is not going to profit by his past experiences . . . .’ The court stated to [the defendant], ‘It is possible I would have imposed a different sentence if you had behaved yourself. I was waiting to see what you were going to do. You get out and get right back into the same thing. . . Id., 191-92. The court then imposed the maximum sentence of six months, on each count, to be served consecutively. Id., 192.

The Juarez-Casares court tested whether the defendant’s right to a speedy sentencing had been violated by assessing the prejudice to the defendant, namely that the delay caused an increased punishment. Because we have no Connecticut decision or statutory guidance, we must establish for ourselves what additional factors are relevant in determining if a defendant’s right to a speedy sentencing has been denied. We have determined that the factors in the related case of Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 530, which relate to a speedy trial, may be adapted and expanded to a speedy sentencing situation. Such judicial creativity is countenanced when needed to establish rules for situations that do not quite fit the original situation for which other rules were created. Newman v. Newman, 235 Conn. 82, 99, 663 A.2d 980 (1995). These factors are the length of the delay, whether the defendant has had a prolonged confinement while awaiting sentencing, whether the delay was purposeful by the state, whether the delay was caused by the defendant, whether the defendant sought to be sentenced, how he asserted his right to be sentenced, whether the failure to sentence created a danger that coercion would be used to obtain cooperation on unrelated matters, whether the lack of a judgment lessened the chance of vindication on appeal, and whether the defendant’s ability to settle affairs, plan for the future and engage in rehabilitation were disturbed.

As in the right to a speedy trial, we use the length of the delay in sentencing as a triggering mechanism because, until there is an extensive delay, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. No fixed amount of time will necessarily implicate a violation of the right to a speedy trial, but rather all the factors of the test must be taken into account. The length of the delay is significant because “it affects the legitimacy of the reasons for delay and the likelihood that it had prejudicial effects.” Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 48 n.12, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1970). In the present case, the defendant was convicted on August 13, 1991, and was not sentenced until June 30, 1993, a delay of almost two years. The length of delay from conviction to sentencing warrants an inquiry into other relevant factors.

Although there was a twenty-two month delay between the conviction and sentencing, the record shows that posttrial motions contributed to the delay in sentencing. On August 16,1991, the defendant moved for an acquittal, on the basis of an alleged denial of a right to a speedy trial, and for a new trial, citing numerous issues, namely that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict, that the jury was prejudiced by the trial court’s questioning and conduct, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that lacked foundation, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury, that the conviction of certain charges violated the defendant’s double jeopardy right, that the trial court improperly allowed hearsay and prejudicial testimony, and that the arrest warrant was defective. On December 31, 1991, the trial court heard oral argument on the motions. The defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the motions on March 26, 1992. The trial court denied the motions on April 2, 1993, with a thorough and thoughtful memorandum of decision, totaling fifty-three pages. Although approximately seven months of the delay is attributed to the defendant, the court took approximately twelve months to decide the issue from the time that the defendant’s memorandum was filed. The defendant, however, made no motion to schedule sentencing, and has neither been incarcerated nor has he served any portion of the sentence finally imposed. The defendant does not argue, and the record does not indicate, that this delay was purposeful or oppressive, or that the delay was used for improper purposes or to obtain some advantage for the state.

This court must also review whether and how the defendant asserted his speedy sentencing right. “Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain.” Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 531. The defendant’s assertion of his speedy sentencing right, therefore, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Id., 532.

The defendant took no action for one year while the court decided posttrial motions, and never raised the delay in sentencing as an issue until the day before his scheduled sentencing. The defendant does not offer any explanation for this failure. In accordance with Barker, that failure makes it difficult for the defendant to prevail. Id.

Finally, this court must determine what prejudice, if any, was caused by the delay. The defendant argues that he was prejudiced because the conviction “hung over his head” for many months, thus preventing him from obtaining gainful employment and from traveling, and causing him great anxiety, which affected his health. Although the speedy trial right recognizes an interest in minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused, this interest, when adapted to the speedy sentencing right, must receive less consideration because a defendant’s guilt has already been determined by a conviction. If the defendant in the present case had concerns over the prejudicial effect the delay would have on him personally and on his appellate defense, he could have asserted the right sooner than almost two years after conviction and one day before sentencing.

The defendant also argues that the delay might have impaired his ability to present a defense in the event the case had to be remanded for a new trial because after so much time, witnesses might have difficulty recalling the details of the incident. This argument, however, is merely speculative and does not show actual prejudice. Nor has the defendant shown actual prejudice arising from the failure to obtain a speedy appeal, or from an increased punishment, or from excessive confinement, or from a specific inability to settle his affairs or to plan his future, or from coercion by the state to obtain cooperation in some other matter.

We conclude that no violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to speedy sentencing exists.

II

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The defendant next argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. The defendant claims that the state failed to prove an element of criminal impersonation because it did not prove that the defendant did not have arrest authority in Plymouth. The defendant argues that there are five classes of public officials with arrest authority in Plymouth and that the state introduced evidence as to only three of those classes, namely, Plymouth police officers, Litch-field county sheriffs, and Connecticut state police officers. The defendant claims that the state produced no evidence that the defendant was not a Plymouth town constable or that he was not a public official from another town or county permitted to make an arrest out of that jurisdiction in Plymouth, and that, therefore, the state did not prove that the defendant did not have arrest authority in Plymouth.

“ ‘When a claim on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we undertake a two part task. We first review the evidence presented at trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict. We then determine whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [State v. Simino, 200 Conn. 113, 116-17, 509 A.2d 1039 (1986)].” State v. Summerville, 13 Conn. App. 175, 184-85, 535 A.2d 818 (1988).

Subdivision (3) of General Statutes § 53a-130 (a) requires that the state prove that (1) the defendant pretended to be a public servant and (2) the defendant intended to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or to act in reliance upon that pretense. In order for the state to prove the first element of this charge, it must prove that the person charged is not a public servant. “In other words, the state ha[s] the burden of proving the negative fact that the defendant was not a public servant at the time of the offense.” State v. Giorgio, 2 Conn. App. 204, 210, 477 A.2d 134 (1984). The state, however, need not prove that the defendant was not a public seivant anywhere in Connecticut or elsewhere.

The information charged the defendant with criminal impersonation in Plymouth, and the state was not required to research the records of 168 other towns and cities to prove that the defendant was not a public servant elsewhere because such knowledge is peculiarly within the control of the defendant. Id., 210-11. A statute need not list all the possible ways in which it could be violated. Id., 210.

The defendant introduced evidence that sometime prior to September 28, 1989, he had been an auxiliary police officer in Torrington, but the state’s evidence showed that the auxiliary police unit of Torrington was deactivated in 1986, which was evidence sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant had no arrest authority conferred by Torrington at the time he allegedly was impersonating a public servant. The defendant testified that he was not performing any duties for Torrington at the time of the alleged offense.

The state also presented evidence that the defendant was a resident of Torrington at the time of the incident. The jury could infer reasonably from that evidence that the defendant was not a resident of Plymouth and, therefore, could not be a constable in Plymouth.

Although members of a local police force are authorized to make arrests for felonies outside the jurisdiction of that local force; see State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 86, 510 A.2d 172 (1986); and a member of a local police force who observes a criminal offense within the local jurisdiction may pursue the offender outside that jurisdiction; see State v. Harrison, 30 Conn. App. 108, 114-17, 618 A.2d 1381 (1993), aff'd, 228 Conn. 758, 638 A.2d 601 (1994); there was no evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant was a member of a local police force with arrest authority, or that he was attempting to make a felony arrest.

We conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal because the state had presented evidence from which a jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not a public servant at the time of the alleged incident.

III

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on several issues. Our standard of review in cases in which the defendant claims that the instructions were constitutionally deficient is whether it is reasonably possible that the instructions misled the jury. State v. Wolff, 29 Conn. App. 524, 530, 616 A.2d 1143 (1992). In assessing the claim, the jury charge must be read as a whole, not in artificial isolation from the overall charge. State v. Miller, 36 Conn. App. 506, 511, 651 A.2d 1318, cert. denied, 232 Conn. 912, 654 A.2d 357 (1995). “The principle function of a jury charge is to assist the jury in applying the law correctly to the facts which they might find to be established . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taylor, 37 Conn. App. 464, 469, 657 A.2d 659, cert. denied, 234 Conn. 907, 660 A.2d 859 (1995).

A

The defendant claims that the trial court misled the jury when it told the jury that “even if the defendant was a Torrington auxiliary policeman, that position would not give him police authority in the town of Plymouth.” He argues that his alleged status as an auxiliary police officer in Torrington may serve as a defense to the charge of criminal impersonation. The defendant testified that the auxiliary police in Torring-ton had been placed on inactive status by the chief of police in 1986 and, as a result, he testified that he was not assigned any duties subsequent to that order. He also testified that he had not been assigned any duties on the day of the alleged incident that gave rise to the criminal charges. Furthermore, he testified that he was not in Plymouth on the date alleged and had not chased a person on a dirt bike. The trial court was correct that there was no evidence from which a jury could conclude that his status in Torrington gave him arrest authority in Plymouth, and, therefore, the charge was proper and did not mislead the jury.

B

The defendant’s next two claims challenge the trial court’s instructions on the elements of criminal impersonation. First, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury that the state had the burden of proving that the defendant was not an officer or employee of any government branch, subdivision, or agency. Second, the defendant claims that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that they could convict only if they found that the defendant knew that he did not have authority to make an arrest in Plymouth. These issues overlap with his claim that the state failed to prove all the elements of criminal impersonation.

Section 53a-130 (a) (3) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of criminal impersonation when he . . . pretends to be a public servant . . . with intent to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense.” State v. Giorgio, supra, 2 Conn. App. 209-10, relying on General Statutes § 53a-146 (3), defines public servant as “ ‘an officer or employee of government, elected or appointed, and any person participating as adviser, consultant or otherwise, paid or unpaid, in performing a governmental function.’ ”

The state had the burden of proving that the defendant, in Plymouth, on September 28, 1989, pretended to be a public servant, that is a public servant with arrest authority in Plymouth. We have previously discussed that the state did not have the burden of proving that the defendant was not a public servant anywhere. The defendant’s request for such an instruction was properly ignored.

The defendant claims that the court should have given an instruction that the defendant must be found not guilty if the state failed to prove that the defendant knew that he had no authority to make an arrest in Plymouth. The defendant did not request this charge, but because there is an adequate record for its review, and it concerns a constitutional claim relating to a misstatement of an element of the crime, we will review it. State v. Denby, 235 Conn. 477, 483, 668 A.2d 682 (1995); State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). The jury was instructed that the state was required to prove that the defendant pretended to be a public servant, a police officer with arrest authority in Plymouth, intending to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or to act in reliance on that pretense.

The defendant argues that it is not enough the state prove that the defendant “pretends to be a public servant . . . with intent to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority”; General Statutes § 53a-130 (a) (3); but must prove that the defendant also knew that he was not a police officer.

The court began its charge by stating the elements of § 53a-130 (a) (3) as follows: “One the defendant was not a public official. Two, he pretended to be a public official. And three, he acted as though he were a public official intending that other people would think he was a public official and submit to his pretended authority or otherwise act in reliance on this pretended authority.”

“Pretend” in common parlance is to make-believe, to feign, or to conduct a sham. To pretend implies an awareness on the part of the actor. The word is not defined in the penal code, nor is it defined in any Connecticut case cited by either party. Where a statute uses language that requires no legal definition because it has a commonly accepted meaning, there is no need to define it for the jury. Southington v. State Board of Labor Relations, 210 Conn. 549, 561, 556 A.2d 166 (1989). The defendant testified that Torrington’s auxiliary police unit had an inactive status, that he had been assigned no duties by the Torrington police department for more than three years, and that at the time the offenses were allegedly committed he was not performing any duties for the Torrington police department. The state introduced evidence to show he had no arrest authority in Plymouth, and that he used a personal vehicle equipped to look like a police cruiser. It was unnecessary for the court to define “pretend,” or to state that the defendant must know that he was not a police officer in order to be found guilty. The everyday usage of the word in the case sufficiently apprised the jury of the meaning of “pretends” as used in the element of “pretends to be a public servant” in § 53a-130 (a) (3).

The defendant is attempting to read the mental state of “knowledge” into the statute. Section 53a-130 establishes an element of intent, not knowledge, for criminal impersonation. “When the commission of an offense defined in this title, or some element of an offense, requires a particular mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms ‘intentionally’, ‘knowingly’, ‘recklessly’ or ‘criminal negligence’, or by use of terms, such as ‘with intent to defraud’ and ‘knowing it to be false’, describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.” General Statutes § 53a-5; see State v. Denby, supra, 235 Conn. 482. Thus, the intent to pretend is implied in the second element because the third element requires that there be an intent to have others submit to the pretended authority or act in reliance on the pretended authority. Furthermore, it would be difficult to pretend to be a public official without intending to do so, given the usual meaning of “pretend.”

Section 53a-130 (a) (3) expressly requires the mental state of “intent.” “A person is guilty of criminal impersonation when he . . . pretends to be a public servant . . . with intent to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority . . . .” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 53a-130 (a) (3). The statute does not establish a requirement that, in order to be convicted of criminal impersonation, the state must prove that the defendant “knew” he was not a police officer. “An ‘intent’ element is not synonymous with a ‘knowledge’ element . . . .” State v. Denby, supra, 235 Conn. 482. The penal code defines knowledge and intent differently. General Statutes § 53a-3 (12) provides: “A person acts ‘knowingly’ with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exists . . . .” “A person acts ‘intentionally’ with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct . . . .” General Statutes § 53a-3 (11). The court properly charged the jury. An element of the offense is intent, not knowledge, and we conclude that it was not reasonably possible that the jury was misled as to an element of criminal impersonation.

IV

EVIDENTIARY CLAIM

The defendant argues that the trial court improperly precluded testimony of two Torrington police officers. The defendant, in an offer of proof, claimed that they would confirm and corroborate the defendant’s testimony that he was a member of a deactivated auxiliary unit in Torrington. Our standard of review in determining whether a trial court improperly precluded testimony is abuse of discretion. State v. Aspinall, 6 Conn. App. 546, 554, 506 A.2d 1063 (1986). “The trial judge must consider many factors in ruling on relevancy. The court must determine whether the proffered evidence is corroborative or coincidental, whether it is probative or tends to obfuscate, and whether it clarifies or obscures. In arriving at its conclusion, the trial court is in the best position to view the evidence in the context of the entire case, and we will not intervene unless there is a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.” Id.

The defendant and another witness had already presented evidence that the defendant was an inactive auxiliary police officer in Torrington. The trial court ruled that evidence regarding the defendant’s status as an auxiliary police officer had no relevance unless the defendant presented evidence that on September 28, 1989, the day of the chase, the defendant was using his personal vehicle to chase the dirt bike operator in his capacity as an officer performing an official duty. The defendant failed to present such evidence.

The defendant argues that a showing that the defendant was chasing the dirt bike in his official capacity is not necessary in light of State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994). The defendant, however, incorrectly argues that Andrews supports his assertion that the defendant needed to prove only that he was an auxiliary police officer in order to negate an element of criminal impersonation. In Andrews, an off duty Shelton auxiliary police officer witnessed a vehicle driving in an erratic manner in Derby, telephoned the police on his cellular phone, and then followed the defendant. The car of the auxiliary police officer was equipped with a blue flashing light that was used to pull over the defendant when the officer observed that the defendant could not keep his vehicle on the road. The defendant was instructed to wait for the Derby police to arrive, and the defendant, without a request, gave his license and registration to the officer, who returned the items to the defendant. The defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. He moved to suppress the evidence and to dismiss the case on the ground that his fourth amendment right, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, was violated. Id., 594. The trial court denied the motions, and the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere, conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motions. Id., 592.

On appeal, the defendant reasserted his fourth amendment claim. This court rejected this argument because the court found that there was no state action arising from the officer’s conduct that would trigger a fourth amendment right. Id., 598. Taking into account the capacity in which the officer was acting when he initially confronted the situation and examining his conduct thereafter, it concluded that there was no state action. Id. Andrews, therefore, does not support the proposition that an auxiliary police officer from a deactivated unit, outside of his jurisdiction, need not be actively engaged in performing his duties in order to have arrest authority in that foreign jurisdiction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the two witnesses’ testimony.

V

SENTENCE AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Finally, the defendant claims that the sentence he received constituted cruel and unusual punishment. “The federal constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment proscribes not only physically barbarous punishments but also penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the offense. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 57 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1978).” State v. Thompson, 197 Conn. 67, 80, 495 A.2d 1054 (1985). The defendant stated at sentencing that the court went beyond its power to impose some of the conditions of probation but was not any more specific than that. He made no constitutional argument. On appeal, he argues the conditions of probation are cruel and unusual, but cites no cases and makes no argument as to why that is so. He makes no argument that the conditions are beyond the power of the court to impose. We refuse to consider such a nebulous claim.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       The charge of illegal use of emergency flashing lights in violation of General Statutes § 14-96q was tried to the court, and the defendant was found not guilty on that count.

       General Statutes § 54-82m provides: “Rules re speedy trial to be adopted by judges of superior court effective July 1, 1985. In accordance with the provisions of section 51-14, the judges of the superior court shall make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure to assure a speedy trial for any person charged with a criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985. Such rules shall provide that (1) in any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of a criminal offense shall commence within twelve months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date, of the arrest, whichever is later, except that when such defendant is incarcerated in a correctional institution of this state pending such trial and is not subject to the provisions of section 54-82c, the trial of such defendant shall commence within eight months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of arrest, whichever is later; and (2) if a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit set forth in subdivision (1) and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of a motion for a speedy trial made by the defendant at any time after such time limit has passed, the information or indictment shall be dismissed. Such rules shall include provisions to identify periods of delay caused by the action of the defendant, or the defendant’s inability to stand trial, to be excluded in computing the time limits set forth in subdivision (1).”

       The filing date of the information is not clear from the record. We have used the date of the defendant’s arrest for purposes of our calculations for his statutory speedy trial.

       The following colloquy occurred between defense counsel and the trial court,:
      “The Court: ... I would advise you, Mr. Marcus [defense counsel], that we are going to start, or I did intend to start jury selection tomorrow in this case. . . .
      “Mr. Marcus: The problem—
      “The Court: The time estimates are always shaky.
      “Mr. Marcus: As I stated, Your Honor, there are motions pending which I think some of them would best be heard before the jury selection, but that is Your Honor’s prerogative. And secondly, as I stated before the record was being made, that Thursday and Friday of this week I’ll be in Saint-Louis attending my son’s college graduation and Monday afternoon at 2:00 p.m.—
      “The Court: That’s no problem.
      “Mr. Marcus: Judge Norlro is resuming a juvenile trial that I’m on that commenced yesterday afternoon. So that I would, of course, want to be excused Thursday and Friday obviously.
      “The Court: Well, I don’t think it makes a heck of a lot of sense to haul you in here tomorrow to pick—start a jury.
      “Mr. Marcus:... As I say, my client’s girlfriend is lessee of the car that’s been held for a year, they are ready for quick disposition, but again, I do have a personal life as well as a professional life, and I don’t want to miss the graduation.
      “The Court: Well, you made a speedy trial motion.
      “Mr. Marcus: And we meant it.
      “The Court: It puts the heat on the court to do something about it, and I’m trying to do it now, but I can’t waste the next three days. I’m going to pick a jury in another case.
      “Mr. Marcus: As Your Honor will.
      “The Court: And then that may put you, you know, another several weeks.

        “Mr. Marcus: Well, that’s unfortunate. Of course the speedy trial motion was not frivolously filed and there are no [the defendant disputed that he said ‘no’ and claims that he most probably said ‘known’] constitutional considerations. Obviously, however, my personal unavailability Thursday and Friday of this week could be obviously a tolling factor and I admit that and my client understands that.
      "The Court: Well, it tolls it for more than just two days because I can’t sit here and twiddle my thumbs and not be utilizing the facilities that the court and jury that we are paying hundreds of dollars a day to come in, so I may pick another case, but you’ll be next.
      “Mr. Marcus: I’ll ask Your Honor to try to facilitate this case as much as possible. There has been a car—
      “The Court: I will.
      “Mr. Marcus:—seized. It’s been seized for over a year now since April of ’90. The lessee—
      “The Court: I’ll do my best.
      “Mr. Marcus:—is being sued for seventeen thousand.
      “The Court: I understand. I told you that I’ll do my best to get you on very shortly, but I’m not going to sit here and twiddle my thumbs for three days, so—
      “Mr. Marcus: I understand. . . .
      “The Court: . . . I’m going to try to get you on. I was going to get you on as the next case. Maybe it will be the next case.
      “Mr. Marcus: I hope so. I say, Your Honor, this is the situation where the defendant is certainly interested in a speedy trial.
      “The Court: Fine. Okay.
      “Mr. Marcus: And I just have this one situation that comes up every four years. Hopefully won’t come up again for many years. My son is graduating from college, I certainly don’t want to miss that.
      “The Court: Okay. Have a good time.
      “Mr. Marcus: Thank you, Your Honor.”

       Practice Book § 956B (b) provides in relevant part: “Except as otherwise provided herein and in Sec. 956C, the trial of a defendant charged with a criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985, shall commence within twelve months from the filing of the information or from the date of the arrest, whichever is later. . . .” If an individual is “continuously incarcerated” and meets other specified conditions, the trial must be held within eight months. Practice Book § 956B (b).
      Since the defendant was not incarcerated, the twelve month limitation applies in this case.

       Prior to July 25, 1995, the words of § 956C (4) were “delay resulting from the hearing on any pretrial motion.” This rule was in effect at the time the defendant moved for a speedy trial. The rule was amended to change the interpretation of that section as interpreted in State v. Ortiz, 14 Conn. App. 493, 498-99, 542 A.2d 734 (1988), and State v. Charlton, 30 Conn. App. 359, 364-65, 620 A.2d 1297, cert. denied, 225 Conn. 922, 625 A.2d 824 (1993). The purpose of the change in language was to make clear that the period of time to be excluded was only that amount of time that “may fairly be said actually to delay the start of the trial.” Commentary, Practice Book Revisions Being Considered by the Rules Committee of the Superior Court, 56 Conn. L.J., No. 45, p. 75C (May 9, 1995).

       Although State v. Torres, supra, 230 Conn. 379-80, reviews the adequacy of the record in the context of a claim made under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. 672, did not involve a claim for review under Golding. The court’s review is plenary in either case, and, therefore, the record receives the same de novo scrutiny.

       The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in x'elevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State . . . .”

       Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution px-ovides in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and by coxmsel . . . and in all prosecutions by indictment or information, to a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury. . . .”

       Rule 32 (a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 54-91, which was repealed by No. 76-336, § 10, of the 1976 Public Acts, provided: “Whenever any person is convicted of an offense for which the punishment may be confinement in the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, the court before which he has been convicted shall pass sentence within ten days from the date of conviction unless there is a stay of sentence by order of the court.” The predecessor to § 54-91 was General Statutes (1949 Rev.) § 8807 and provided: “Whenever any person shall be convicted of an offense for which the punishment may be confinement in the State Prison, the court before which he shall have been convicted shall pass sentence within ten days from the date of conviction unless there be a stay of sentence by order of the court.” The stay provided would presumably be necessary in the event a presentence investigation were necessary. See General Statutes § 54-91a.

       A six month delay in executing an arrest warrant does not violate a defendant’s speedy trial right. State v. Baker, 164 Conn. 295, 297, 320 A.2d 801 (1973). “ ‘On its face, the protection of the [Sixth] Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been “accused” in the course of that prosecution.’ ” Id., 296, quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971); see also State v. Hodge, 153 Conn. 564, 571, 219 A.2d 367 (1966) (where defendant argued that three week delay between incident and his arrest violated his right against unreasonable seizures of his person, court analyzed this claim from due process and unreasonable seizure perspective and employed test similar to one outlined in Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 530).

       In State v. Files, supra, 183 Conn. 588, the defendant moved to set aside the judgment based on Practice Book § 3109 (now § 4055), which provided: “If a party shall fail to defend against an appeal with proper diligence, the supreme court may, on motion by any other party to the appeal or on its own motion, set aside in whole or in part the judgment under attack . . . .” Our Supreme Court in Files utilized the speedy trial balancing test as delineated in Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 530. “In our review of a defendant’s right to have his appeal defended by the state with due diligence, Practice Book § 3109, we can find guidance in the analogous rules that have been developed to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” State v. Files, supra, 588. This case has since been used to support the proposition that the speedy trial right applies to the appeal phase. State v. DePastino, supra, 228 Conn. 560.

       The defendant also claims that if the state failed to prove that the defendant was not a police officer with arrest authority in Plymouth, the crime of reckless driving would also require a judgment of acquittal because police officers are exempt from the motor vehicle laws of this state. In view of our conclusion that the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not a public servant and had no arrest authority in Plymouth, this claim has no merit.

       By law, a Plymouth town constable must be a resident of Plymouth. See General Statutes §§ 9-185, 9-186 and 9-200.

       The judge instructed the jury as follows: “Now, in the first count, the defendant is charged with the crime of criminal impersonation .... Criminal impersonation, the statute is called § 53a-130, provides as follows and pertinent parts: A person is guilty of criminal impersonation when he pretends to be a public servant with intent to induce another to submit to such pretend official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense. Thus there were three main elements to this charge. You must determine each of them to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order for you to find the defendant guilty. I will explain each of these three elements to you in detail, but briefly the three main elements are: One, the defendant was not a public official. Two, he pretended to be a public official. And three, he acted as though he were a public official intending that other people would think he was a public official and submit to his pretended authority or otherwise act in reliance on this pretended authority.

        “What are we talking about in this case? Now, in this case the defendant is charged with pretending to be a public official, a police official. A police official having police authority in the town of Plymouth. He is charged with acting so with the intent to induce other persons or other persons to submit to his pretended police authority or otherwise act in reliance on that pretense. Now the first thing you must determine was, did the defendant have police authority in the town of Plymouth? It’s the state’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have police authority in Plymouth. In order for the defendant to be found guilty, you must find that he did not have police authority in Plymouth. Now, there has been evidence about the defendant’s having been a member of the auxiliary police in Torrington. I charge you that even if the defendant was a Torrington auxiliary policeman, that position would not give him police authority in the town of Plymouth. Again, it’s the state’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have police authority in Plymouth.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    CHERYL SCHULT v. JEFFREY SCOT SCHULT
    (13482)
    Dupont, C. J., O’Connell and Landau, Js.
    Argued October 3, 1995
    decision released March 19, 1996

      Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, with whom, on the brief, were Susan Cartier and Ronald DeMatteo, certified legal interns, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      John J. Bennett, for the appellee (intervenor).

      Elizabeth Gleason, guardian ad litem.

      Colette Griffin, for the minor child.
   DUPONT, C. J.

This appeal arises from the judgment dissolving the marriage between the plaintiff, Cheryl Schult, and the defendant, Jeffrey Scot Schult. The plaintiff and the defendant had only one child, who was born on October 6, 1988. The principal issue in this appeal is the proper construction and application of General Statutes § 46b-56b which creates a rebuttable presumption “that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent” in any dispute as to the custody of a minor child involving a parent and a nonparent. The trial court relied on a “showing that it would be detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody,” as provided in the statute, to rebut that presumption. Accordingly, the court awarded sole physical and legal custody of the child to his maternal grandmother, Joan Radin, who is an intervenor in the dissolution action. The plaintiff appeals from that judgment and from a subsequent judgment rendered on two postjudgment motions.

The plaintiff filed a dissolution action on March 7, 1991, seeking (1) dissolution of her marriage to the defendant, (2) custody of their child, (3) child support, (4) alimony and (5) reasonable counsel fees. The defendant filed a cross complaint on April 26, 1991, which did not dispute the relief of dissolution of marriage, but which sought (1) custody of the child, (2) in the alternative to sole custody, joint legal custody of the child, and (3) child support.

In order to understand fully the unfortunate situation with which the trial court was confronted, it is necessary to spell out in some detail the background of the parties and the sequence of events that led to this appeal. The plaintiff was married to the defendant on February 14,1986. Their child has a history of emotional and psychological problems and developmental delays.

On April 18, 1991, shortly after the action for dissolution of marriage was initiated, the defendant moved out of the family home. On that same date, Steve Norman moved into the family home as a boarder. On the evening of November 19, 1991, Norman was baby-sitting while the plaintiff, a licensed nurse practitioner, was at work. The child was three years old at the time. Norman testified that about five minutes after the child had gone to bed, he came out of the bedroom and was crying. Norman observed that the child had a mark above his eye and treated the injury with an ice pack. After fifteen to twenty minutes, the child stopped crying and went back to bed. The following morning, Norman noticed that the child was limping and would not put any pressure on his leg. When the plaintiff returned home at 7:30 a.m., Norman told her that “we’ve got a problem.”

The plaintiff called Karen Laugel, their pediatrician, who was in her office in Bridgeport. The plaintiff and Norman took the child in the plaintiffs car to Laugel’s office. After examining the child, Laugel stated that “it looks like a broken leg.” Feeling that the child’s injury was “very worrisome for the possibility of abuse” and that the child’s injury could not “be explained by falling out of the bed,” Laugel instructed the plaintiff and Norman to bring the child to Bridgeport Hospital where the child could be treated for his injury and where an investigation would be initiated for child abuse. Laugel also told the plaintiff and Norman that she would meet them at the hospital shortly.

The plaintiff and Norman then took the child to the University of Connecticut Health Center, John Dempsey Hospital (Dempsey Hospital), where the child was admitted on November 20, 1991. After approximately two hours at the hospital, Norman told the plaintiff that he had to go home and feed the animals and left the hospital. After remaining at home for approximately two hours, Norman then drove the plaintiffs car to Stratford, where he checked into a Days Inn at about 8:30 p.m. The following day, November 21, Norman drove around New York City and returned to the Days Inn in Stratford for the evening. On November 22, Norman drove to the Boston area and checked into a motel in Devon, Massachusetts. On November 23, three days after he had left the hospital, Norman returned to Dempsey Hospital. The doctors at Dempsey Hospital did not conclude that the child had been abused and released the child to the plaintiff on November 25. The child’s discharge diagnosis stated that he had suffered a fractured leg.

At the request of Laugel, the department of children and family services (DCF) conducted an investigation for abuse. After meeting with the child, the plaintiff, Norman, and several doctors at Dempsey Hospital, DCF concluded that the origin of the child’s injury was unknown and that abuse could not be confirmed.

On January 3, 1992, Radin filed a motion for third party intervention pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-57, asserting that she was the child’s maternal grandmother. On that same day, the trial court granted the motion and issued the following oral order regarding the custody of the child: “I’m going to say that this was the attorneys agreement. That there would be joint legal custody in the mother and the maternal grandmother with primary physical residence with the maternal grandmother.” After that order, the custody battle became increasingly bitter and was marked by disputes between the plaintiff and the intervenor concerning visitation rights. Almost three years after the initiation of the underlying matter, and over two years after the date of the child’s injury, the trial court rendered judgment, granting sole physical and legal custody of the child to the intervenor.

In its accompanying memorandum of decision, the trial court made the following finding: “The court finds as a fact that [the child’s] leg was broken by [Norman], that [Norman] told [the plaintiff] when she came home what he had done and they both decided to tell the story that [the child’s] leg was broken while [he] was alone in the bedroom in bed. When they told [Laugel] they did not know what happened to [the child], [Laugel] told them that she felt there was some abuse involved and that an investigation would be made for child abuse. They did not follow the doctor’s order to go to Bridgeport Hospital but went eventually to John Dempsey Hospital in Farmington. [Norman] left that hospital as soon as he could and testified that he wanted to get away, that he did not know what was going to happen to him. Under these circumstances, it is clear that it would not be in the best interest of [the child] for him to be given into [the plaintiffs] custody with [Norman] there, knowing that he got away with breaking [the child’s] leg as the court has found and with the opportunity to abuse [the child] further. The court cannot conceive of a situation more detrimental to [ the child] than to permit [the plaintiff] to have custody of [the child] now. Under the above circumstances, [the plaintiff] sided with [Norman] against [the child]. She should not be given the opportunity to do that again.” (Emphasis added.)

Upon rendering judgment awarding sole physical and legal custody of the child to the intervenor, the trial court also ordered that the plaintiff shall have rights of “reasonable visitation” with the child and specifically ordered that the plaintiff “shall have visitation on Saturdays from 2:30 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Sundays, and one weekday afternoon per week.” On April 6, 1994, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt and order, claiming that the intervenor had wilfully failed to comply with the court’s order of visitation. The intervenor then filed a motion for modification on May 26, 1994, requesting the court to terminate the plaintiffs right to overnight visitation. The intervenor’s motion for modification also sought a court order preventing the plaintiff from conducting visitation at the plaintiffs residence and from conducting visitation when Norman is present. After conducting hearings, the trial court issued a second memorandum of decision on August 1, 1994, in which it denied the inteivenor’s motion for modification. The trial court did not grant the plaintiffs motion for contempt, and issued an order permitting the plaintiff to have the child for overnight visitation each weekend and for visitation one afternoon each week.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims the trial court (1) improperly concluded that the intervenor should be awarded custody of the child and that it would be detrimental to him to be in the custody of the plaintiff because the court misconstrued § 46b-56b, and made factual findings not supported by the evidence, (2) failed to issue orders to assist the family in eventual reunification and improperly allowed the attorney for the minor child to argue against the recommendation of the child’s guardian ad litem, and (3) improperly granted temporary custody of the minor child to the intervening nonparent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

We note initially that “[t]he factual findings of a trial court on any issue are reversible only if they are clearly erroneous. . . . This court cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosick v. Equipment Maintenance & Service, Inc., 33 Conn. App. 25, 40-41, 623 A.2d 1134 (1993).

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that it would be detrimental for the child to be in the custody of his mother. The presumption in favor of a parent over a nonparent mandated by § 46b-56b “may be rebutted by showing that it would be detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court found as a fact that the child’s leg was broken by Norman, that the plaintiff knew that Norman broke the child’s leg, and that Norman was apart of the plaintiffs household. As a result of those findings, the trial court concluded that it could not conceive of a situation more detrimental to the child than to permit the plaintiff to have custody and, as a result of that conclusion, awarded legal and physical custody of the child to the intervenor.

Our determination as to whether the trial court misconstrued or improperly applied § 46b-56b to the facts of this case rests on two factors. First, we review the trial court’s findings to ensure that the findings are based on reliable and sufficient evidence. If we conclude that the findings are based on reliable and sufficient evidence, we must then determine whether those findings are sufficient to rebut the presumption that it would be in the child’s best interest to be in the custody of his mother.

From our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence. The trial court’s most critical findings are that Norman broke the child’s leg and that the plaintiff sided with Norman against the child. Presumably, the latter finding arises from the subsidiary finding that the plaintiff knew that Norman broke her child’s leg and that she continued to live with Norman.

In its memorandum of decision, the trial court further noted that both the plaintiff and Norman failed to follow Laugel’s instructions to take the child to Bridgeport Hospital for treatment and instead drove an extra hour to Dempsey Hospital in Farmington. The trial court could reasonably have found that fact to be especially relevant in light of Laugel’s testimony that she had given the plaintiff an admissions note allowing the child to be admitted directly to pediatrics without having to wait in the emergency room. Laugel also testified that she felt the child’s fractured leg was inconsistent with the claim that he had twisted his leg on the waterbed.

The trial court also took note of Norman’s questionable absence from the hospital and the area for nearly three days and the fact that Norman did not telephone the plaintiff to tell her where he was during this period. Norman’s reason for his absence was that “he wanted to be away, to think about everything that was going to happen” to him. Further, the trial court considered Norman’s nervous demeanor while giving testimony. In light of the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that could have been drawn therefrom, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings.

We must next determine whether the trial court’s findings were sufficient to rebut the presumption that it would be in the child’s best interest to be in the custody of a parent. The trial court correctly recognized that § 46b-56b mandates a presumption in favor of a parent over a nonparent, and permits that presumption to be rebutted only by a showing that it would be detrimental to the child for the parent to have custody.

A rebuttable presumption is equivalent to prima facie proof of a fact and can be rebutted only by the opposing party’s production of sufficient and persuasive contradictory evidence that disproves the fact that is the subject of the presumption. Anderson v. Litchfield, 4 Conn. App. 24, 28, 492 A.2d 210 (1985). A presumption requires that a particular fact be deemed true until such time as the proponent of the invalidity of the fact has, by the particular quantum of proof required by the case, shown by sufficient contradictory evidence, that the presumption has been rebutted. Id. The failure of a trial court to discuss a presumption or the standard of proof is not sufficient to reverse a finding that a presumption has been rebutted. Id., 29-30.

The powerful language used by the trial court in finding that it could not “conceive of a situation more detrimental to [the child than] to permit [the plaintiff] to have custody of the child,” indicates that the trial court determined that the statutory presumption in favor of a parental custody had been rebutted in this case. We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs arguments that the trial court improperly concluded that the presumption was rebutted. The trial court properly applied § 46b-56b in determining, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that it would be to the child’s detriment if the court were to permit the plaintiff to have custody in light of the court’s findings of fact that Norman had broken the child’s leg, that the plaintiff had sided with Norman over that incident of abuse and that Norman, nevertheless, remained a member of the plaintiffs household.

II

A

The plaintiffs second claim is that the trial court failed to issue orders to assist a family in eventual reunification. The plaintiffs assertion that a trial court is required to issue orders to assist the family in eventual reunification is premised on the notion that a dissolution action, where custody of a minor child is at issue, is the equivalent of an action case involving termination of parental rights brought pursuant to General Statutes §§ 45a-706 through 45a-765. We disagree with that premise. A termination of parental lights is defined in General Statutes § 45a-707 (g) as “the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent . . . .”

In the present case, the rights of the plaintiff as the child’s mother were not permanently terminated. Unlike cases involving the termination of parental rights, the court’s order did not require the complete severance of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent. The trial court ordered that the plaintiff shall have the right to consult with the intervenor on any and all matters concerning the child’s health and well-being. Furthermore, the trial court ordered visitation allowing the plaintiff to have the child for overnight visitation each weekend and for one afternoon each week. We conclude that there is no authority for the proposition that a trial court is required to issue orders designed eventually to return a child to the custody of a natural parent in the context of an action for dissolution of marriage and §§ 46b-56b and 46b-57. The trial court, however, does have continuing jurisdiction to issue further future orders in the event a motion for modification of custody is subsequently made and the circumstances merit any modification of its existing orders. General Statutes § 46b-56.

B

The plaintiff also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the attorney for the child to argue against the recommendation of the child’s guardian ad litem. The attorney for the child and the guardian ad litem had divergent views as to whether the child’s mother or grandmother should have custody. Both the attorney for the child and the guardian ad litem were appointed by the court. The attorney for the child was appointed on a motion by the defendant, and, subsequently, the guardian ad litem was appointed on a motion by the plaintiff. The former believed that custody should be with the grandmother, and the latter believed that custody should be with the plaintiff.

The guardian ad litem testified, as a witness for the plaintiff, that, on the bases of the 300 hours that she had worked on this case and her numerous observations of the child with his mother, she did not “see any detriment at all to [the child] if he would return to his mother.” The trial court, over objection, permitted the attorney for the child to cross-examine the guardian ad litem and to give a recommendation to the court that the child should remain with the intervenor. The plaintiff argues that the conspicuous lack of participation by the attorney for the child evidenced by her absence from some court proceedings and by her limited role in the case after the appointment of the guardian ad litem, should have precluded the trial court from permitting the attorney for the child to give a recommendation that was purportedly based on the child’s best interest. The plaintiff claims that this alleged error was not harmless because it served to nullify the testimony of the guardian ad litem, thereby causing prejudice to the plaintiff.

The guardian ad litem challenges whether the attorney for the minor child had the authority to make a recommendation as to the child’s best interests, when such a recommendation was in direct conflict with the recommendation of the child’s guardian ad litem. In her brief, the guardian ad litem claims that the trial court’s decision to permit the attorney for the minor child to make a recommendation, purportedly based upon the child’s best interest, “was so egregious as to deny a fair trial on the question of custody.”

General Statutes § 46b-54 (a) permits the trial court to appoint an attorney to represent a minor child during a dissolution proceeding if “the court deems it to be in the best interests of the child or children” “The purpose of appointing counsel for a minor child in a dissolution action is to ensure independent representation of the child’s interest and such representation must be entrusted to the professional judgment of appointed counsel within the usual constraints applicable to such representation. Schaffer v. Schaffer, 187 Conn. 224, 224 n.1, 445 A.2d 589 (1982).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knock v. Knock, 224 Conn. 776, 791, 621 A.2d 267 (1993).

The obligations and limitations of the role of counsel for children in custody cases have not yet been definitively determined by the appellate courts of this state. Furthermore, although one appellate case has recognized that there is a potential for conflict between the roles of guardians ad litem and counsel for children when both are appointed by the court, the precise issue of this case has not been resolved. Newman v. Newman, 235 Conn. 82, 96, 663 A.2d 980 (1995).

In Knock, the role of counsel for a child in custody cases was not delineated because the counsel was unable to demonstrate any prejudice arising from the conflict between the trial court’s belief that the counsel should only minimally participate in the trial and the counsel’s belief that she should participate by cross-examining witnesses, making evidentiary objections, and otherwise fully participating in the trial, including the preparation and submission of oral and written arguments. Because the counsel was able to participate fully in the trial, “[t]he trial court’s view of counsel’s role . . . did not impair her ability to represent her client in an appropriate manner.” Knock v. Knock, supra, 224 Conn. 792. Although Knock did not resolve the parameters of a minor child’s counsel’s role in a dissolution action, and did not involve both a guardian ad litem and counsel for a child, this statement of the court implies that counsel acted appropriately.

Knock establishes that any testimony that is relevant to assess what is in the best interest of a child in custody cases may be heard by a trial court without an abuse of discretion occurring. The trial court in Knock heard relevant testimony relating to the issue of custody from four witnesses, a court-appointed evaluator, a family relations counselor, a licensed psychologist, and an expert on the subject of battered women’s syndrome. Two witnesses opined that custody should be with the father, one witness opined that custody should be with the mother, and the fourth witness opined that the mother manifested battered woman’s syndrome. Id., 779. The trial court did not rely solely on any one person’s testimony and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in allowing and considering testimony relevant to its determination of whether the best interests of the child required custody to be with the mother or the father. Unlike the present case, there was no claim that the child’s counsel should not have been heard on the issue of custody, nor was there a conflict between a counsel and a guardian ad litem. In the present case, the counsel was not a witness and gave no testimony, although the guardian ad litem testified as a witness for the plaintiff and argued that the plaintiff should have custody.

In Newman v. Newman, supra, 235 Conn. 82, the issue to be resolved by the court was whether an appeal should be dismissed if counsel appointed pursuant to § 46b-54 takes the appeal rather than a guardian ad litem or counsel, as the child’s next friend. In the course of concluding that such counsel could pursue an appeal without the appointment of a guardian ad litem if the trial court determines that it is in the best interests of the child to appeal, the Supreme Court shed some light on whether such counsel may be heard on the issue of custody, and the distinction between the roles of counsel and guardian ad litem.

A guardian ad litem is usually appointed by a court to bring a civil action on behalf of a child. Id., 95. The counsel appointed pursuant to statute in dissolution actions and recognized by judicial precedent is an indication that “the law deems it sufficient to protect [the interests of children] by way of an appointment of an attorney, rather than also requiring a simultaneous appointment of a guardian ad litem or the naming of a next friend . . . .” Id., 97. The role of the counsel is an advocate for the child; id., 102; and that counsel shall be heard on all matters pertaining to the interests of the child so long as the court deems the representation to be in the best interests of the child. Id., 99-100, citing General Statutes § 46b-54 (c).

In the present case, although there was a conflict of opinion between the attorney for the child and the guardian ad litem, the claimed abuse of discretion does not arise because of a conflict of roles, but because of a conflict in the resolution of whether the mother or grandmother should have custody of the child. We do not need, therefore, to determine or examine the parameters of the roles of the two court-appointed persons, but rather, must decide whether the trial court should have allowed the counsel to offer her opinion as to custody when it differed from that of the guardian ad litem.

Pursuant to § 46b-54 (c), the attorney for the minor child “shall be heard on all matters pertaining to the interests of any child, including the custody, care, support, education and visitation of the child, as long as the court deems such representation to be in the best interests of the child.” The trial court, therefore, was obligated to hear the position of the attorney for the child as long as the court deemed that opinion to be relevant to the best interests of the child. An opinion as to who should be given custody of a minor child, as determined by the “best interests of a child,” is not strictly a legal conclusion, but it is a conclusion that counsel for a child may submit to the court, as a recommendation, for the court’s consideration, in the proper circumstances. There is no indication in the record that the counsel for the child had no basis at all for her recommendation or that the trial court relied solely on it. There was relevant testimony, including that of the guardian ad litem, as well as the opinion of the child’s counsel, which the trial court had before it, in determining who should have custody of the child. We conclude that the trial court correctly permitted the attorney for the child to offer her recommendation concerning the custody of the child. The weight it gave to that recommendation became one more ingredient in the ultimate issue of custody that the trial court had to decide.

Ill

The plaintiffs final claim is that the trial court improperly granted temporary custody to the intervening non-parent. Any issues involving the order of temporary custody, however, are moot because that order merged with the trial court’s final dissolution decree granting sole legal and physical custody of the child to the intervenor. See Hall v. Hall, 186 Conn. 118, 439 A.2d 447 (1982). In such a case “[t]he order of temporary custody is therefore academic. Appellate courts will not consider academic questions, particularly where no appropriate relief may be afforded. Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 17, 19, 411 A.2d 1 (1979).” In re Carl O., 10 Conn. App. 428, 434, 523 A.2d 1339, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 964 (1987).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 46b-56b provides: “In any dispute as to the custody of a minor child involving a parent and a nonparent, there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent, which presumption may be rebutted by showing that it would be detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody.”

       The child has resided with the intervenor since January 3, 1992.

       The trial court’s initial judgment relates to the dissolution of the marriage and the custody of the child. The later judgment concerns two postjudgment orders relating to contempt and to the denial of the intervenor’s motion for modification of the plaintiffs visitation rights.

       It is undisputed that the mother, the father, and the intervening grandmother all love the child. Although both the mother and the father initially sought custody, the father eventually agreed that it was in the best interest of the child to award custody to the grandmother. The defendant father is not a party to this appeal.

       The relevant part ol' the child’s discharge diagnosis from Dempsey Hospital, dated November 25, 1991, provides as follows: “Physical Examination: The physical exam on admission was significant for dry, cracked lips, bruises under the left eye and on the left hand dorsum about 5 x 5 cm in size, swollen right fourth digit with decreased flexion, left knee warm with decreased range of motion, left medial thigh with abrasion 5 cm above the knee, and bruising of the lateral aspect of the left thigh.
      “A bone scan showed recent fracture of the left proximal tibia in the area of the growth plate. This fracture is also noted on x-ray. The bone scan also showed increased uptake in the distal ulna and in the fourth digit of the right hand. The left leg was splinted by Orthopaedics, and the patient was kept on bedrest."

       General Statutes § 46b-57 provides: “In any controversy before the superior court as to the custody of minor children, and on any complaint under this chapter or section 46b-l or 51-348a, if there is any minor child of either or both parties, the court if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of [section 46b-90 et seq.j, may allow any interested third party or parties to intervene upon motion. The court may award full or partial custody, care, education and visitation rights of such child to any such third party upon such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. Before allowing any intervention, the court may appoint counsel for the child or children pursuant to the provisions of section 46b-54. In making any order under this section the court shall be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to Ihe wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference.”

       The plaintiff and Norman have a child bom May 20, 1993, and the three live together.

       Pursuant to Practice Book § 4051, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation seeking the trial court, to further articulate the factual basis for the “six instances of trauma that the court found the child sustained between April 8, 1991 and November 19, 1991” and “[w]hich of these instances does the court find were the result of abuse by [Norman].” The plaintiff also sought articulation as to “[w]hat evidence supports the conclusion that [the plaintiff] colluded with [Norman] regarding the broken leg incident of November 19, 1991.” The trial court response was that “[t]he only one of these instances the court found was the result of abuse by [Norman] was the one on November 19, 1991.” The trial court also responded that “[t]he court considered the fact the plaintiff sided with [Norman] against [the child] on the issue of the broken leg.”

       General Statutes § 45a-717 (h) provides in relevant, part: “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights . . . the court shall consider ... (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.....”

       We note that the plaintiff does not have standing to raise a claim on behalf of her child. Taft v. Bettcher, 35 Conn. App. 421, 646 A.2d 875 (1994). In the present case, however, the plaintiff has standing due to her claim that the trial court’s alleged error prejudiced her own case.

       General Statutes § 46b-54 provides: “Counsel for minor children. Duties, (a) The court may appoint counsel for any minor child or children of either or both parties at any time after the return day of a complaint under section 46b-45, if the court deems it to be in the best interests of the child or children. The court may appoint counsel on its own motion, or at the request of either of the parties or of the legal guardian of any child or at the request of any child who is of sufficient age and capable of making an intelligent request.
      “(b) Counsel for the child or children may also be appointed on the motion of the court or on the request of any person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section in any case before the court when the court finds that the custody, care, education, visitation or support of a minor child is in actual controversy, provided the court may make any order regarding a matter in controversy prior to the appointment of counsel where it finds immediate action necessary in the best interests of any child.
      “(c) Counsel for the child or children shall be heard on all matters pertaining to the interests of any child, including the custody, care, support, education and visitation of the child, so long as the court deems such representation to be in the best interests of the child.”

       Nothing in § 46b-54 conditions the court’s power to appoint an attorney for a minor child on the presence or appointment of a guardian ad litem and there is nothing in the statute to suggest that for purposes of an ongoing dissolution trial, a guardian ad litem must, or should, be appointed.

       We note that diverse standards are set out in the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.14, and the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Standards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings, standard 2.7 (prohibits counsel for “impaired child" from advocating or recommending particular result). It may be that these standards conflict with General Statutes § 46b-54 (c).

       At the time the trial court issued its order of temporary custody, Madigan v. Madigan, 224 Conn. 749, 757, 620 A.2d 1276 (1993), holding that temporary orders for custody are immediately appealable, had not yet been decided.