author: FOTI, J.

text:
    ROSALIE B. ZANONI ET AL. v. KAREN R. LYNCH
    (AC 22873)
    Foti, Dranginis and Flynn, Js.

      Argued June 9
    officially released September 9, 2003

      Paul Zanoni, pro se, and Rosalie B. Zanoni, pro se, the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Timothy S. Fisher, with whom were Allison A. Wood and, on the brief, Charles D. Ray, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

FOTI, J.

An appeal to the Superior Court challenging a decree of the Probate Court for the district of Newington underlies the present appeal. The Probate Court decree authorized the defendant, Karen R. Lynch, to sell certain real property in which the plaintiffs, Rosalie B. Zanoni and Paul Zanoni, claimed to have acquired absolute title. Both plaintiffs now appeal from the judgment of the trial court upholding the Probate Court’s decree. The plaintiffs claim (1) that the trial court improperly concluded that the Probate Court was authorized to order the sale of the subject property, (2) that the trial court improperly failed to conclude that Rosalie Zanoni had acquired absolute title to the subject property and (3) that genuine issues of material fact existed that precluded the trial court from rendering summary judgment in the defendant’s favor. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history underlie this appeal. Helen A. Benny, who died on August 7, 1989, was the plaintiff Rosalie Zanoni’s mother. In her August 31, 1965 will, Benny devised two parcels of real property, one in Wethersfield and one in Old Lyme, to Rosalie Zanoni. That real property was in Benny’s estate at the time of her death. On August 25, 1994, Rosalie Zanoni deeded the Old Lyme property to her husband, the plaintiff Paul Zanoni. The plaintiffs reside at the Wethersfield property. Benny’s will further directed that all expenses and taxes owed by her estate were to be paid out of the estate’s residue. In accordance with Benny’s will, the Probate Court appointed Rosalie Zanoni as the executrix of Benny’s estate. The Probate Court subsequently removed Rosalie Zanoni as executrix of the estate and appointed Richard Pikor as administrator de bonis non cum testamento annexo (d.b.n.c.t.a.). Pikor later resigned and the defendant was appointed successor administrator d.b.n.c.t.a.

On December 8, 1993, the Probate Court issued a decree determining that Benny’s estate faced debts, taxes and testamentary expenses, and that the parcels of real property devised to Rosalie Zanoni were the “only assets of real value in [Benny’s] estate.” The Probate Court further concluded that it had the authority, under General Statutes § 45a-428 (a), to authorize the sale of the property, which Benny specifically had devised, to pay the debts and expenses of the estate. The Probate Court stated that “while title to the [specifically devised] realty may be deemed to pass upon death, the title [in the specific devisee] is not absolute since it is subject to the fiduciary’s right to sell it to satisfy debts and taxes [of the estate].” The Probate Court ordered that the subject premises devised to Rosalie Zanoni in Benny’s will “are subject to the right of the fiduciary to petition the court for their sale to meet the obligations of the estate for taxes, debts and expenses.”

On December 27, 1994, the Probate Court issued a subsequent decree at the defendant’s request to sell one or both parcels of the subject property to pay the estate’s debts. The court found that there was “no liquidity in the estate even to begin to pay expenses in the priority required” and that alternative methods of raising revenue to satisfy the estate’s debts, apart from simply selling the subject property, had proven unfeasible. Accordingly, the Probate Court ordered the sale of the Old Lyme property, and authorized the defendant to enter the premises and to take steps to prepare the property for sale.

On January 12, 1995, the plaintiffs, claiming that the Probate Court’s order interfered with their quiet enjoyment of the Old Lyme property, appealed to the Superior Court. The plaintiffs sought a determination of title for the subject property, an order vacating the Probate Court’s December 27, 1994 decree and permanent injunctions preventing the defendant from either trespassing on or attempting to sell the subject property. The plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion for summary judgment, Rosalie Zanoni submitted an affidavit in which she averred that she was willing to meet the just obligalions of the estate. Paul Zanoni also averred in an affidavit that he was willing to “meet the just obligations of the Estate ... so far as such obligations represent a lien against the real property.” The plaintiffs argued that Rosalie Zanoni had absolute title and all the rights and privileges of ownership over the subject property, and that because the plaintiffs had voiced their objection to the sale of such property, the Probate Court could not find that the sale was in the parties’ best interest.

The defendant timely filed an objection to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and a cross motion for summary judgment. The defendant claimed, essentially, that Rosalie Zanoni did not have an absolute ownership right in the subject property and that the Probate Court possessed the authority to order such property sold to meet the debts of the estate because the other assets of the estate were insufficient to pay the estate’s obligations. On October 30, 1995, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment. The trial court affirmed the Probate Court’s order that authorized the sale of the subject property and denied the plaintiffs’ claim that Rosalie Zanoni had acquired absolute title to the subject property. The plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to reargue the motions disposed of by the trial court’s decision. The court denied that motion, and the plaintiffs timely appealed to this court.

Before addressing each of the claims raised by the plaintiffs, we first set forth the applicable standard of review that applies to all of the claims. “The standard of review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . Although the moving party has the burden of presenting evidence that shows the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must substantiate its adverse claim with evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. ... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of ... a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment]. ... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hernandez v. Cirmo, 67 Conn. App. 565, 567-68, 787 A.2d 657, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 931, 793 A.2d 1084 (2002). Our review of the court’s decision to grant the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment is plenary; we must determine whether the court’s conclusions were legally and logically correct. See H.O.RS.E. of Connecticut, Inc. v. Washington, 258 Conn. 553, 560, 783 A.2d 993 (2001).

I

The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the Probate Court was authorized to order the sale of the subject property. We disagree.

The Probate Court, in its December 8, 1993 decree, stated: “[W]hen an estate is deemed solvent because there are assets sufficient to pay expenses and taxes, but the only such asset is real property which has been specifically devised, the court may authorize the sale of such real property after personal notice of the pendency of an application for a decree to authorize such sale has been given to the specific devisee. General Statutes § 45a-428 (a).” The Probate Court, in its December 27, 1994 decree, ordered the sale of the Old Lyme property.

The trial court, relying on General Statutes §§ 45a-428 (a) and 45a-426 (b), concluded that “title to specifically devised real property passes subject to the administration of the estate.” The trial court further relied on the Probate Court’s findings that “there are outstanding claims against the estate and . . . that there are no real assets other than the specifically devised real property . . . .” The trial court characterized the estate as “insolvent or solvent with no real assets other than the specifically devised real property.”

General Statutes § 45a-428 is entitled “Sale or mortgage of real property specifically devised. Procedures for solvent and insolvent estates.” Subsection (a) provides: “If the Court of Probate finds that the estate of a deceased person is insolvent and if the real property has been specifically devised or if the court finds that the estate of such person is solvent but that there are no assets of the estate, other than real property specifically devised or forbidden by will to be sold or mortgaged, from which debts, taxes and administration charges against the estate may be paid, the court shall order personal notice of the pendency of the application for a decree authorizing the sale or mortgage of such real property to be given to all devisees of such real property whose existence, names and residences can be ascertained by the court and shall order such notice as it deems advisable to be given to all such devisees whose existence, names and residences cannot be ascertained by the court.”

The plaintiffs argue that the trial court misinterpreted § 45a-428 as a source of authority for the Probate Court to order the sale of the subject property. They posit that “the statute requires the Probate Court to notify the devisees and to obtain the written consent of the devisees. There is no authority to sell real property to be found in [that] section. If the legislature intended to authorize the Probate Court to order the sale of real property [it] would have included words to that effect.”

“Statutory construction . . . presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. . . . According to our long-standing principles of statutory construction, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. ... In determining the intent of a statute, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. ... In construing a statute, common sense must be used, and courts will assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Regency Savings Bank v. Westmark Partners, 70 Conn. App. 341, 344-45, 798 A.2d 476 (2002).

The plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 45a-428 runs contrary to the statute’s plain language. Subsection (a) describes two different scenarios. Under the first are insolvent estates with real property that has been specifically devised. Under the second are solvent estates with no assets from which debts, taxes and administration charges against the estate may be paid other than real property that has either been specifically devised or is forbidden by the terms of a will from being sold or mortgaged. If either of those scenarios exists, the statute grants authority to the Probate Court to “order personal notice of the pendency of the application for a decree authorizing the sale or mortgage of such real property”; General Statutes § 45a-428 (a); to the persons described.

Subsection (b) of § 45a-428 begins with the words “[e]xcept as provided in this section . . . .” Those words logically signal that the legislative enactment that follows applies to scenarios other than those that are described elsewhere in the section, here, those described in subsection (a). By its terms, subsection (b) applies to solvent estates with real property that is either specifically devised or is forbidden by will to be sold or mortgaged. In such scenarios, the Probate Court lacks authority to order the sale of such property “without the written consent of the specific devisees or other parties interested as distributees of such real property or of the guardians ad litem or guardians or conservators of the estates of those not legally competent to so consent.” General Statutes § 45a-428 (b).

To the extent that the plaintiffs argue that § 45a-428 required the Probate Court to obtain Rosalie Zanoni’s written consent to order a sale of the subject property, the argument lacks merit. That is so because the trial court specifically found that the facts of the present case implicated subsection (a), not subsection (b). That is, this was not a case in which the estate was solvent. Instead, the court found that the estate was either “insolvent or solvent with no real assets other than the specifically devised real property.”

Without citing any authority, the plaintiffs claim that the legislature intended § 45a-428 to serve solely as a notice requirement or to somehow “limit the activity of the Probate Court and protect the rights of legatees and devisees.” The plaintiffs likewise argue that the statute does not explicitly grant authority to the Probate Court to order the sale of the subject property. Instead, the statute expressly requires that the Probate Court afford notice to the class of persons affected by its terms.

We recognize that § 45a-428 does not expressly state that the Probate Court possesses the authority to order the sale that necessitates such notice in the first place. Our review of the statute’s scant legislative history does not shed light on the issue. It would be entirely irrational, however, for the legislature to have required that the Probate Court afford interested parties personal notice of the pendency of the application for a decree authorizing the sale or mortgage of real property if, in fact, the Probate Court lacked the authority to grant such application and to order such sale or mortgage. Were we to interpret § 45a-428 as the plaintiffs suggest, we would essentially render subsection (a) meaningless. “We ordinarily do not read statutes so as to render parts of them superfluous or meaningless.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 135, 836 A.2d 224 (2003).

Our interpretation of § 45a-428 is harmonious with other legislative enactments that concern the same subject matter and that refer to the Probate Court’s authority, by virtue of § 45a-428, to order the sale or mortgage of real property. For instance, General Statutes § 45a-166 (a) provides in relevant part: “The Court of Probate in ordering a sale under the provisions of sections 45a-164 to 45a-169, inclusive, and 45a-428 shall direct whether the sale shall be public or private. . . .” (Emphasis added.) See also General Statutes § 45a-165 (a), which provides: “When any conservator, guardian, administrator, executor or trustee, who has been authorized under the provisions of sections 45a-164 to 45a-169, inclusive, and 45a-428 to sell or mortgage any real property, has died, resigned or been removed without having sold or mortgaged such real property, the court of probate by which such sale or mortgage was authorized may, upon written application by his duly appointed successor, authorize the sale or mortgage of the real property remaining unsold or unmortgaged upon his giving such probate bond, if any, and upon such further notice, if any, as said court orders.”

For those reasons, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the Probate Court possessed the authority to order the sale of the subject property.

II

The plaintiffs’ next claim is somewhat related to their first claim. The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly failed to conclude that Rosalie Zanoni had acquired “absolute title” to the subject property at Benny’s death, which title thereby precluded the Probate Court’s order to sell the subject property. We disagree.

“It is fundamental jurisprudence that title to real estate vests immediately at death in a deceased’s heirs, or in devisees upon the admission of a will to probate. . . . The recording of a probate certificate of devise or descent is necessary only to perfect marketable title. That certificate furnishes evidence that the heir’s or devisee’s title is no longer in danger of being cut off by a probate sale to pay debts of the estate and also because it furnishes a record of who received the title. Such a probate certificate is not a muniment of title, however, but merely a guide or pointer for clarification of the record. . . . The fiduciary of the decedent’s estate does not take title to the real estate . . . and a fiduciary has no right to interfere with the devolution of title unless the property is needed to satisfy claims against the estate.” (Citations omitted.) Cardillo v. Cardillo, 27 Conn. App. 208, 212, 605 A.2d 576 (1992); see also Foote v. Brown, 81 Conn. 218, 224, 70 A. 699 (1908) (title to specifically devised real property passes immediately at decedent’s death and carries with it right of immediate possession); 96 C.J.S. 819, Wills § 1099 (1957) (“[u]nless the will is invalid, the legal title to land devised passes to the devisee directly by the will itself, which operates as a conveyance”); G. Wilhelm, Connecticut Estates Practice, Management of Estates (2002) § 7:45 (legal title to real property vests immediately in devisee).

As previously suggested, the fiduciary of a decedent’s estate possesses a limited statutory right to interfere with the passage of title to a devisee. “Upon the death of a testator, the title to the real property devised in his will vests in the devisees, subject to the control of the court and possession of the executor during administration.” 31 Am. Jur. 2d 498, Executors and Administrators § 740 (2002). “[U]nder the conditions and for the purposes prescribed by statute, as where the personal property is insufficient to pay the debts of the decedent’s estate, his real property and interests therein may be regarded as assets to which his personal representatives may resort.” 33 C.J.S. 780, Executors and Administrators § 135 (1998). The Probate Court’s authority to order the sale of real property is “special and statutory and the authority must be strictly followed, otherwise the order of sale will be void. . . . [T]he burden is on the proponent, in this case the administrator, to establish in the Probate Court, and in the Superior Court, on appeal, the statutory predicate for the court’s order.” (Citations omitted.) Satti v. Rago, 186 Conn. 360, 365-67, 441 A.2d 615 (1982).

The foregoing authorities leave no doubt as to the fact that although title to specifically devised real property passes to a decedent’s devisees at his death, such title is not absolute. As we concluded in part I, § 45a-428 afforded the Probate Court the authority to order the sale of the specifically devised property.

Ill

The plaintiffs finally claim that the court improperly granted the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue existed as to five material facts. We disagree.

Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the following issues of fact existed: (1) whether Benny’s will “directed otherwise” with regard to a stated disposition of the subject property, (2) whether the defendant’s affidavit contained conclusory statements concerning the solvency of the estate but no supporting evidence, (3) whether the specific devisee’s objections were ignored, (4) whether the sale of the property was in the estate’s best interest and (5) whether the sale of the property was in Rosalie Zanoni’s best interest. Given the court’s proper interpretation of § 45a-428, which we addressed in part I, only the second of those issues was at all material to the court’s analysis. Accordingly, we shall limit our inquiry to that issue, namely, whether a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the estate’s solvency.

We look to the evidence properly submitted by the parties to determine whether, as the court found, it demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact existed. In support of her cross motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted an affidavit. She averred therein that (1) the two parcels of real estate are the only assets of real value in the estate, (2) the total amount of outstanding claims and expenses exceed the value of the estate, and (3) it was necessary to sell the properties to pay the debts and expenses of the estate. The defendant also submitted the decree of the Probate Court dated December 8, 1993, in which the Probate Court found that “the two specifically devised parcels of real estate are the only assets of real value in the estate” and that Rosalie Zanoni “has contributed funds from time to time to pay specific expenses, but those contributions have been voluntary on her part.” The defendant also submitted the decree of the Probate Court dated December 27, 1994, in which the Probate Court found that “there is no liquidity in the estate to even begin to pay expenses in the priority required” and “alternative methods of raising cash for the estate, either from contributions from the beneficiaries or by placing a mortgage on one or both of the properties” had not proven to be a possibility.

The plaintiffs, in support of their motion for summary judgment and in opposition to the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, submitted affidavits to the court. Rosalie Zanoni averred, inter alia, that (1) she was the specific devisee of the subject property, (2) she objected to the sale of the subject property, (3) she was willing to meet the just obligations of the estate and previously had met certain of the estate’s obligations, and (4) that there were outstanding judgments against the estate. Paul Zanoni averred, inter aha, that (1) Rosalie Zanoni had deeded the subject property to him in August, 1994, (2) he had provided $500 to settle a claim against the estate and (3) he was “willing to provide further funds to meet the just obligations of the Estate ... so far as such obligations represent a lien against the real property.”

The court, having reviewed the evidence submitted to it, made note of the plaintiffs’ main argument in opposition to the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, which was that because the plaintiffs were willing to pay the estate’s just debts, the estate could not be considered insolvent. The court rejected that argument and concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the estate’s solvency. The court determined that on the basis of the evidence before it, “the estate would be considered insolvent or solvent with no real assets other than the specifically devised property.”

Having reviewed the evidence presented to the court, we likewise conclude that the defendant demonstrated that no issue of material fact existed. In opposing a motion for summary judgment, “the opposing party must substantiate its adverse claim with evidence disclosing the existence of [an issue of material fact].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hernandez v. Cirmo, supra, 67 Conn. App. 567. The plaintiffs did not do so. Instead, they argued that the Rosalie Zanoni, as the specific devisee, had absolute title to the estate and that “all the claims against the estate are contrivances which have been fabricated to satisfy an obsession to deprive the devisee of her inheritance.” The plaintiffs also argued that because Rosalie Zanoni already owned the subject property, she would be precluded from purchasing the property in a sale because “the result would be an unnecessary circulation of money.” The plaintiffs submitted to the court, in addition to their affidavits, Benny’s will, Benny’s certificate of death, Paul Zanoni’s quitclaim deed to the Old Saybrook property and the Probate Court’s December 27, 1994 decree. The plaintiffs did not refute the facts set forth in the defendant’s affidavit or in the decrees of the Probate Court. The plaintiffs acknowledged the fact that the estate had creditors and offered to pay the estate’s debts. They did not, however, refute the facts central to the defendant’s case, which were that the estate had outstanding claims and that the only assets of real value in the estate were the parcels of real property.

For all of those reasons, we conclude that the court properly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the estate’s solvency for purposes of § 45a-428, the statute that the court properly applied to the facts of this case.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       See General Statutes § 45a-186 (a).

       General Statutes § 45a-426 (b) provides: “Specific legacies shall not be taken or sold for the payment of debts and charges against the estate of the testator when there is other property, real or personal, sufficient and available therefor and not specifically devised or bequeathed; but real property may be sold in lieu thereof, when it is necessary for such purpose, unless such will otherwise directs.”
      Although we agree with the plaintiffs that § 45a-426 (b) did not grant authority to the Probate Court to order the sale of the subject premises, we nevertheless conclude that the court properly relied on General Statutes § 45a-428 as a source of authority for the sale.

       Likewise, the plaintiffs’ claim that the Probate Court lacked the authority to order the sale in contravention of their objection is unfounded. Under General Statutes § 45a-428 (a), the Probate Court needed only to provide notice to the specific devisee of the sale. The statute does not require the Probate Court to obtain the specific devisee’s written consent prior to ordering the sale.

       The plaintiffs argue that “[ajuthority to sell specifically devised real property is found in [General Statutes §§ 45a-162 through 45a-169].”
      General Statutes § 45a-162, entitled “Sale of choses in action and other property,” provides in relevant part: “Before the final settlement of any estate, the Court of Probate may order tire sale of the credits and choses in action belonging to such estate, and may at any time order the sale of personal property, and in the case of an insolvent debtor’s estate of all or any property, as it finds for the interest of the estate, in a manner and after notice which it judges reasonable. The court, in making orders for the sale of the property described in this section, may order it to be sold at public or private sale at the discretion of the person authorized to make the sale. . . .”
      The plaintiffs argue that a Probate Court, could use authority granted to it by that, enactment only if an insolvent debtor’s estate was before it and it found that the sale was in the estate’s interest. The plaintiffs contend that neither circumstance exists here.
      General Statutes § 45a-164, entitled “Sale or mortgage of real property,” provides in relevant part in subsection (a): “Upon the written application of the conservator of the estate of any person, guardian of the estate of any minor, temporary administrator, administrator or trastee appointed by the court, including the trustee of a missing person, or the executor or trustee under any will admitted to probate by the court. . . the court may authorize the sale or mortgage of the whole or any part of . . . any real property in this state of such person, minor, missing person, deceased person or trustee, or of any real property the legal title to which has been acquired by such temporary administrator, administrator, executor or trustee, if the court finds it would be for the best interests of the parties in interest to grant the application.”

        The plaintiffs argue that a Probate Court could use authority granted to it by that enactment only if it found that the sale was for the benefit of the sole specific devisee, Rosalie Zanoni. The plaintiffs contend that such a finding was wholly unwarranted.
      The plaintiffs’ attempt to persuade us that either of those legislative enactments controls the present dispute is unavailing. General Statutes § 45a-428 pertains directly to the subject matter at issue in the present case, specifically devised real property. As such, § 45a-428 governs the court’s actions in the present dispute. “When statutes relate to the same subject matter, they must be read together and specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over other general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Massad v. Eastern Connecticut Cable Television, Inc., 70 Conn. App. 635, 640, 801 A.2d 813, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 926, 806 A.2d 1060 (2002).

       Despite their claim that Rosalie Zanoni acquired “absolute title,” the plaintiffs nonetheless posit that the defendant “might appropriate [the] real estate” if (1) Benny was an insolvent debtor, (2) Rosalie Zanoni consented to the sale of the properly or (3) the Probate Court found that it was in the best interest of the interested parties.

       The plaintiffs also argue that General Statutes § 45a-368 evidences a legislative intent that title pass absolutely to devisees. That section imposes liability for an estate’s expenses, claims, funeral expenses and taxes for which the estate is liable on beneficiaries who have received assets from an estate to the extent that such beneficiaries have received estate assets. The plaintiffs argue that under that statute, “there is no necessity to hold the estate open until all claims are satisfied. A specific devisee can elect to take his inheritance subject to the potential liability [from creditors of the estate].” They further argue that case law predating the enactment of § 45a-368 in 1987, “which left an estate open until all claims had been satisfied or all property exhausted, should be disregarded.” We find no merit in the plaintiffs’ argument.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    PAUL ZANONI ET AL. v. KAREN R. LYNCH ROSALIE B. ZANONI ET AL. v. KAREN R. LYNCH ROSALIE B. ZANONI ET AL. v. KEITH B. GALLANT ET AL.
    (AC 22858)
    Foti, Dranginis and Flynn, Js.

      Argued June 9
    officially released September 9, 2003

      Paul Zanoni, pro se, and Rosalie B. Zanoni, pro se, the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Timothy S. Fisher, with whom were Allison A. Wood and, on the brief, Charles D. Ray, for the appellees (defendants).
   Opinion

FOTI, J.

The plaintiffs, Paul Zanoni and Rosalie B. Zanoni, appeal from the trial court’s rendering of summaiy judgments in favor of the defendant or the defendants, as the case may be, in ten separate appeals from the Probate Court for the district of Newington. The plaintiffs also appeal, with regard to one of the ten appeals, from the court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. We will address the separate issues raised with regard to the appeals in turn. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

All ten of the plaintiffs’ appeals to the Superior Court concern the disposition of two parcels of real property, one in Old Lyme and the other in Wethersfield, which had been specifically devised to Rosalie Zanoni by her mother, Helen A. Benny. Benny died on August 7, 1989. Rosalie Zanoni subsequently transferred her interest in the Old Lyme property to her husband, Paul Zanoni.

Originally, Rosalie Zanoni was the executrix of Benny’s estate. The Probate Court subsequently removed her as executrix of the estate and appointed Richard Pikor as administrator de bonis non cum testamento annexo (d.b.n.c.t.a.). After Pikor resigned from that position, the Probate Court appointed the defendant, Karen R. Lynch, as successor administrator d.b.nc.ta. The Probate Court later appointed the defendant, Keith B. Gallant, as successor administrator d.b.nc.ta.

Other related matters are germane to the present appeal. On December 8,1993, the Probate Court issued a decree determining that it possessed authority, under General Statutes § 45a-428 (a), to authorize the sale of the properties that Benny had specifically devised to Rosalie Zanoni to pay the debts and expenses of the estate. The Probate Court determined that the properties constituted the only assets of real value in Benny’s estate and that they were subject to the administrator’s right to petition the Probate Court for their sale to meet the estate’s obligations. Lynch subsequently petitioned the Probate Court for a decree to sell one or both parcels of real property. On December 27, 1994, the Probate Court ordered Lynch to sell the Old Lyme property and authorized Lynch to take steps to effectuate its order. The court later ordered the sale of the Wethersfield property as well.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court from the Probate Court’s decision. They claimed that the order interfered with their quiet enjoyment of the property and sought a determination of title for the property, an order vacating the Probate Court’s decree and permanent injunctive relief preventing Lynch from attempting to sell the property. The Superior Court subsequently granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Lynch and denied the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiffs. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Rosalie Zanoni had acquired “absolute title” to the subject property and concluded that the Probate Court, given its findings, had the authority to order the sale of the property under § 45a-428. Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 95-0546174 (October 30, 1995). To a large extent, the preclusive effect of the Superior Court’s decision in that appeal, which this court affirmed in Zanoni v. Lynch, 79 Conn. App. 309, 830 A.2d 304 (2003), warrants the outcome we reach today.

In another prior matter that is germane to the present appeals, Rosalie Zanoni brought an action against Paul A. Hudon, who had been the conservator of Benny’s estate from February, 1989, until her death on August 7, 1989. In June, 1989, Rosalie Zanoni and Hudon, in his capacity as conservator of Benny’s estate, entered into a sales and purchase agreement for the Old Lyme property. Rosalie Zanoni paid Hudon $16,500, but, contrary to the terms of the agreement, did not pay Hudon the balance of the purchase price on the closing date or at any time prior to Benny’s death. When Hudon filed his final account with the Probate Court in September, 1989, he listed the $16,500 as an asset of the estate. In November, 1989, the Probate Court approved Hudon’s final account, and Hudon transferred the $16,500 to the fiduciary of Benny’s estate. Rosalie Zanoni thereafter brought an action against Hudon, both individually and in his capacity as conservator of Benny’s estate, seeking damages for unjust enrichment, conversion and breach of contract, as well as for declaratory relief. Rosalie Zanoni claimed that she was entitled to the $16,500 that she had paid to Hudon as conservator in her failed attempt to purchase the Old Lyme property. The court concluded that the Probate Court properly concluded that the disputed $16,500 was part of the estate’s funds. The court also concluded that Hudon had acted properly with regard to the funds. Zanoni v. Hudon, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 91-0391234 (August 25,1994). This court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in Zanoni v. Hudon, 48 Conn. App. 32, 708 A.2d 222, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 928, 711 A.2d 730 (1998). In September, 1996, the Probate Court declared Benny’s estate to be insolvent, a decision from which the plaintiffs did not appeal.

The plaintiffs filed ten separate appeals in the Superior Court, all of which challenged the Probate Court’s decrees concerning the subject properties. Five of those appeals are related to the Probate Court’s decrees authorizing the administrator to sell the subject properties. The other five appeals challenged Probate Court decrees ordering the administrator to pay homeowner’s insurance premiums for the subject properties from certain estate assets. In 2001, the court consolidated the plaintiffs’ related pending appeals, including the ten appeals that underlie this appeal, and transferred the appeals from the judicial district of Hartford to the complex litigation docket of the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland. The defendants thereafter filed motions for summary judgment in all ten appeals.

With regard to the appeals that challenged the decrees related to the sale of the properties, the defendants claimed that the doctrine of res judicata applied and barred the appeals. Specifically, the defendants claimed that the parties already had litigated fairly and fully in a prior appeal the issue of whether the Probate Court possessed the authority to order the sale of the properties under the circumstances of this case. The defendants argued that because the prior court in that previous appeal already had resolved the issue adversely to the plaintiffs, that judgment precluded the plaintiffs’ attempts to relitigate the issue.

With regard to the appeals that challenged the decrees related to the payment of insurance premiums, the defendants likewise claimed that the doctrine of res judicata applied and barred the appeals. Specifically, the defendants claimed that the court’s prior judgments adverse to the plaintiffs as to the administrator’s right to sell the properties and the disposition of the $16,500 paid to Hudon barred those appeals related to the propriety of orders to the administrator to pay homeowners’ insurance premiums for the properties.

The court issued two separate memoranda of decision rendering summary judgments in favor of the defendant administrators in all ten cases. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment in the five appeals related to the payment of insurance premiums. One memorandum, filed January 17, 2002, concerned the five appeals related to the sale of the property. Another memorandum, filed February 15, 2002, concerned the five appeals related to the payment of insurance premiums. The court concluded in those decisions that prior actions, in which the court held that the Probate Court properly had authorized the sale of the properties and in which the court held that disputed estate assets were properly part of Benny’s estate, collaterally estopped the plaintiffs from prevailing in the ten present appeals. The present appeals to this court followed.

The plaintiffs raise several claims on appeal. First, the plaintiffs claim that with regard to the court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment in one of their appeals from the Probate Court, Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 94-0076985 (January 17, 2002), the court improperly (1) concluded that Rosalie Zanoni did not acquire absolute title to the properties specifically devised to her in Benny’s will, and (2) failed to conclude that it was the fiduciary’s duty to obtain and to record a certificate as described in General Statutes § 45a-450. Second, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly applied the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in rendering judgment in the defendants’ favor in the appeals related to the sale of the properties. Third, in regard to the appeals related to the payment of insurance premiums, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) concluded that the defendants had an insurable interest in the properties and (2) permitted the defendants to pay expenses of administration from a restricted account containing the $16,500 that the court already had determined, in a prior proceeding, properly was part of the estate’s assets. We disagree with all of the plaintiffs’ claims and will address each of them in turn. Before doing so, however, we first set forth the standard of review that applies to the plaintiffs’ claims.

“The standard of review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book § 17-49. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 450, 820 A.2d 258 (2003).

I

We first address the claims related specifically to the court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in Zanoni v. Lynch, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 94-0076985.

As a preliminary matter, we will address an issue of reviewability. The defendants cite Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 541 n.7, 590 A.2d 914 (1991), and argue that “the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable where the case has been heard on the merits and resolved against the moving party, as this one has.” We disagree. In Gurliacci, our Supreme Court adopted the rule that “absent exceptional circumstances, a denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable where a full trial on the merits produces a verdict against the moving party.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Here, the judgment did not follow a full trial on the merits; it resulted from the court’s decision to render summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. Under those circumstances, the stated rationale for the rule adopted in Gurliacci, which was that a decision based on more evidence should preclude review of a decision based on less evidence, does not apply.

The following limited procedural history provides some context for the present claims. In this particular appeal, the plaintiffs appealed from the Probate Court’s December 8, 1993 decree in which the Probate Court rated that it possessed the authority to order the sale of the subject property to meet the estate’s obligations and that the fiduciary had the right to petition the Probate Court for their sale. In their appeal, the plaintiffs sought an order to preclude the fiduciary from attempting to sell the properties and an order requiring the fiduciary to obtain certificates of devise, as provided in § 45a-450. On September 18, 1995, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it denied the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment.

A

We will first address the claim that the court improperly failed to conclude that it was the fiduciary’s duty to obtain and to record a certificate of devise as described in § 45a-450.

With regard to the requested relief, the trial court noted that Rosalie Zanoni, in October, 1991, had requested that the Probate Court order the fiduciary to record a certificate of devise. The trial court observed that the Probate Court did not grant the request and that Rosalie Zanoni did not appeal from that denial. The trial court also noted that the decree that formed the basis of the appeal, the Probate Court’s December 8, 1993 decree, did not address the issue of whether Rosalie Zanoni was entitled to a certificate of devise, but instead addressed the fiduciary’s right to petition the court for the sale of the properties.

We agree with the court that the issue of whether Rosalie Zanoni was entitled to a certificate of devise was not before it. Accordingly, the court properly declined to order the fiduciary to record a certificate of devise.

B

The plaintiffs next claim that the court improperly concluded that Rosalie Zanoni did not acquire absolute title to the properties specifically devised to her in Benny’s will. We disagree.

The plaintiffs requested that the trial court declare the Probate Court’s December 8, 1993 decree a nullity and prohibit the fiduciary from attempting to sell the properties. Rosalie Zanoni argued that she was prepared to meet the “just obligations” of the estate and that absolute title had passed to her at Benny’s death.

The court rejected Rosalie Zanoni’s claim. The court held that title to real property passes “ ‘subject to the rights of administration’ ” and that given the circumstances of the estate, § 45a-428 (a) empowered the Probate Court to order the sale of the properties. The court reasoned that the rationale for its ruling was demonstrated by the facts of this case. The court stated: “[Rosalie] Zanoni obligates herself to pay ‘just’ debts of the estate. The point is that she has serious questions about the propriety of some of the claims. Chaos, however, would reign if specific devisees could take absolute title and creditors had to litigate their claims seriatim in the courts against various parties or, worst of all, in Probate Court where there would be no assets in an estate which has been rendered insolvent because the real estate has absolutely vested in a specific devisee prior to a final accounting.”

This court already has held that under the circumstances of this case, the Probate Court properly ordered the fiduciary to sell the specifically devised property. Zanoni v. Lynch, supra, 79 Conn. App. 320. Accordingly, we agree with the court’s ruling and have no need to revisit the issue here.

II

The plaintiffs next claim that the court improperly applied the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in rendering judgment in the defendants’ favor in the appeals related to the sale of the properties. We disagree.

The trial court aptly characterized the issue before it with regard to the five appeals related to the Probate Court’s decrees concerning the sale of the properties. The court stated that “[t]he purported basis of these appeals is identical, [namely] that these parcels were specifically devised to Rosalie Zanoni by Helen Benny in her will and that General Statutes § 45a-428, which permits the Probate Court to order the sale of such real property if the estate is insolvent, is inapplicable.” The court thereafter noted that the issue raised in these appeals already had been resolved in Zanoni v. Lynch, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 95-0546714. The trial court noted that the Probate Court, in that previous decision, rejected the claims raised here and ruled that “the estate was indisputably insolvent and that § 45a-428 confers the authority to sell specifically devised real estate under that circumstance to satisfy the debts of the estate and deceased.” The trial court thereafter determined that under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the plaintiffs were precluded from prevailing in the present appeals.

“[T]he doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, commonly referred to as issue preclusion and claim preclusion, respectively, have been described as related ideas on a continuum. [C]laim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits. . . . [I]ssue preclusion . . . prevents a party from relitigating an issue that has been determined in a prior suit. . . . Notwithstanding the differences between the two doctrines, we have noted their conceptual closeness ... as well as their similarity of purpose.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 57-58 n.16, 808 A.2d 1107 (2002).

“The principles underlying the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, are well settled. [A] valid, final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties, or those in privity with them, upon the same claim or demand. . . . Furthermore, the doctrine of claim preclusion . . . bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. . . . Probate court decrees . . . are final judgments for the purpose of the doctrine of res judicata.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaynor v. Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 595-96, 804 A.2d 170 (2002).

The principles underlying the related doctrine of collateral estoppel also are well established. “The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality. . . . Collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. . . . Issue preclusion arises when an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment .... Collateral estoppel express [es] no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly ligitaged, and finally decided, it comes to rest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, supra, 262 Conn. 58. Summary judgment is an appropriate method for resolving issues of res judicata or collateral estoppel. See Dontigney v. Roberts, 73 Conn. App. 709, 710, 809 A.2d 539 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 944, 815 A.2d 675 (2003).

We conclude that the court properly rendered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor with regard to the appeals related to the sale of the properties. Those appeals do raise the same issue, namely, whether the Probate Court, under the circumstances of this case, properly ordered the sale of the properties. The Probate Court’s decree rested on conclusions concerning the estate’s solvency, the status of the plaintiffs’ ownership rights in the subject property and the applicability of § 45a-428. The court, in its decision of October 30,1995, addressed all of those issues and resolved them adversely to the plaintiffs. The court rendered a valid final judgment on the merits. The doctrine of res judicata bars the plaintiffs from raising those claims in these appeals. By doing so, they seek relief on the basis of claims that already have been rejected as a matter of law in another court. Further, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the plaintiffs from relitigating issues that underlie the former adverse judgment.

Ill

Finally, the plaintiffs challenge the court’s decision to render summaiy judgment in the defendants’ favor in the appeals related to the payment of insurance premiums. With respect to that claim, the plaintiffs argue that the court improperly (1) concluded that the defendants had an insurable interest in the properties and (2) permitted the defendants to withdraw funds from a restricted account containing $16,500 that, the plaintiffs argue, belongs to Rosalie Zanoni. We disagree.

In its February 15,2002 memorandum of decision, the court rendered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor with regard to those five appeals. The court noted, and we agree, that the parties did not dispute the facts underlying those appeals. The court summarized the relevant facts as follows: “The Newington Probate Court uttered orders authorizing the administrator to purchase liability insurance coverage for two parcels of land on March 25, 1994; March 27, 1995; March 18, 1996; March 20, 1997; ahd March 3,1998. The pleadings indicate that the Zanonis make no attack as to the reasonableness of the cost of such coverage, but rather assail the ability of the Probate Court to order the procurement of any such insurance coverage. It also appears undisputed that such coverage was, in fact, obtained and paid for by the administrator in compliance with the orders.” The court thereafter concluded, in regard to the plaintiffs’ claims that the challenged decrees were improper because (1) the estate lacked any insurable interest in the properties and (2) the $16,500 from which the insurance premiums were paid were not estate funds, that the claims had been determined adversely to the plaintiffs in prior proceedings, and that principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the plaintiffs from bringing those appeals.

We already have discussed the principles underlying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in part II and need not reiterate them here. We will now discuss each aspect of the plaintiffs’ claims to determine whether the court properly concluded that these doctrines barred the plaintiffs’ appeals concerning the payment of insurance premiums.

A

In regard to the plaintiffs’ claim that the Probate Court decrees were improper because the estate lacked an insurable interest in the properties, the court noted that in the prior action, Zanoni v. Lynch, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 95-0546174, the plaintiffs’ same claim was rejected. The court here stated that “the first ground for the plaintiffs’ appeals in these five cases is rooted in the same claim which was defeated in [the earlier action. The court’s] rulings regarding the insolvency of the estate, the applicability of § 45a-428, and the retention of these parcels as estate assets available to pay estate debts collaterally estop the plaintiffs from raising the absence of insurable interest based on title resting in Rosalie Zanoni.”

We agree with the court’s analysis. The plaintiffs, in those appeals, attempted to religate a claim that already had been raised and addressed in the prior proceeding. The court, in the prior proceeding, resolved the issue of the estate’s rights in the property; it ruled that the Probate Court properly ordered the administrator to sell the properties to satisfy the debts of the estate. That determination resolved affirmatively the issue of whether the estate had an insurable interest in the properties. In reaching its decision, the court rejected the same legal claim on which the plaintiffs based these appeals, namely, that Rosalie Zanoni had acquired absolute title to the properties at the time of Benny’s death. Because the plaintiffs have raised the claim before, and a judicial tribunal has fully and fairly addressed the merits of the claim, the court properly barred the plaintiffs from relitigating the issue in these appeals.

B

In regard to the plaintiffs’ claim that the Probate Court decrees were improper because they authorized the defendants to withdraw funds from an account containing $16,500 that was not part of Benny’s estate, the court noted that this issue had been resolved in the prior action, Zanoni v. Hudon, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 91-0391234. The court observed that in that prior action, which this court affirmed in Zanoni v. Hudon, supra, 48 Conn. App. 32, the trial court specifically determined that those moneys were “assets of the estate and [that] the plaintiff [Rosalie Zanoni had] no claim to these funds.”

The court properly determined that the issue had been raised previously and was decided on the merits against the plaintiffs. The determination, in the prior action, that the $16,500 that the plaintiffs had paid to Benny’s conservator in their failed attempt to purchase Benny’s real property was in fact an asset of Benny’s estate was not tangential to the court’s holding; it was the very issue on which the plaintiffs prosecuted the prior action. In that case against the conservator of Benny’s estate, the plaintiffs sought the return of the money that they had paid to him. The court determined that the moneys were part of the estate’s assets and, consequently, that there could be no dispute that the defendant administrators could have used them to pay premiums on insurance policies for properties in which the estate had an insurable interest. The trial court in the prior proceeding, and this court on appeal as well, fully and fairly addressed the merits of the issue of whether the $16,500 was an asset of the estate, and the trial court here properly determined that the plaintiffs were barred from raising the claim again or from relitigating the issue.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

         See General Statutes § 45a-186 (a), which, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, permits appeals to the Superior Court from “any order, denial or decree of a court of probate in any matter . . . .”

       Rosalie Zanoni appealed to the Superior Court from the Probate Court’s approval of the final account, but the court later dismissed the appeal.

       The five appeals related to the sale of the property are: (1) Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 94-0076985 (January 17, 2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s December 8,1993 decree in which the Probate Court reasoned that it possessed the authority to order the sale of the subject property to meet the estate’s obligations:
      (2) Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 94-0076994 (January 17, 2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s January 11,1994 decree that (1) authorized and directed the defendant to sell both the Old Lyme and Wethersfield properties, and (2) ordered the plaintiffs to cooperate with the defendant in her attempt to sell the properties and to grant the defendant access to the properties.
      (3) Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 95-0077000 (January 17, 2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s May 23, 1995 decree that approved a contract for the sale of the Old Lyme property and that authorized certain expenditures for the sale.
      (4) Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 97-0077240 (January 17, 2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s July 14, 1997 decree that ordered the defendant to sell both parcels of land by public auction and to procure liability insurance for both properties.
      (5) Zanoni v. Gallant, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 98-0076746 (January 17, 2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s September 21, 1998 order that again authorized the defendant fiduciary to sell both real properties in accordance with its decree of July 14, 1997.

       The five appeals related to the payment of insurance premiums on the subject property are: (1) Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 94-0076997 (February 15,2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s March 25,1994 decree authorizing the defendant to use estate assets to pay homeowners’ insurance premiums for the subject properties.
      (2) Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 95-0076998 (February 15,2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s March 27,1995 decree authorizing the defendant to use estate assets to pay homeowners’ insurance premiums for the subject properties.
      (3) Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 96-0077004 (February 15,2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s March 18,1996 decree authorizing the defendant to use estate assets to pay homeowners’ insurance premiums for the subject properties.
      (4) Zanoni v. Lynch, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 97-0076995 (February 15,2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s March 20,1997 decree authorizing the defendant to use estate assets to pay homeowners’ insurance premiums for the subject properties.
      (5) Zanoni v. Gallant, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. 98-0076999 (February 15,2002). The plaintiffs, in that appeal, challenged the Probate Court’s March 3, 1998 decree authorizing the defendant to use estate assets to pay homeowners’ insurance premiums for the subject properties.

       The plaintiffs also claim that we should reverse the court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment because the court, in ruling on their motion, improperly ruled that the decision in Zanoni v. Lynch, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 95-0546174, precluded the relief sought by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argue that the court, in that “earlier” decision, failed to address the issue of title to the properties and that the court here improperly treated the issue as decided in that prior proceeding. We fail to see how that occurred because the decision at issue in this case, denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, predated the decision in Zanoni v. Lynch, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 95-0546174, by twelve days. In any event, we will address the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as they relate to the decision in Zanoni v. Lynch, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 95-0546174, in the context of the plaintiffs’ other claims.

       Before addressing the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the court addressed the defendants’ claim that the issues raised in the five appeals challenging the orders to pay insurance premiums was moot. It stated that it “would be deciding whether to authorize insurance coverage for two parcels of land for years which have long passed and for which coverage was already purchased and provided.” The court agreed with the defendants that it could not afford any practical relief to the plaintiffs in those appeals. The court, however, determined that the issue was of such a nature that it was capable of repetition but evaded review and proceeded to address the claims raised in the appeals.

       The plaintiffs also argue on appeal that the defendant administrators lacked an insurable interest in the properties because they did not have title to or possession of the properties and because they did not own the properties. The plaintiffs also argue that in the prior proceeding, Zanoni v. Lynch, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 95-0546174, the court did not address the issue of title to the subject properties and that the court here improperly treated the issue as one that had been litigated in that prior proceeding. That argument lacks merit. The court, in the prior proceeding, determined that although title passed to Rosalie Zanoni at Benny’s death, such title passed “subject to the administration of the estate.” The court determined that under the circumstances of the case, the administrator had the right to interfere with Rosalie Zanoni’s title and, in fact, sell the property.

       The plaintiffs also argue that the defendant administrators were not authorized to draw on those funds, which were in a restricted account, to pay the premiums because Benny’s will specified that all expenses were to be paid from the estate’s residue. We note that here, the decrees of the Probate Court, and not Benny’s will, authorized the defendant administrators to draw on those funds as they did. Nonetheless, the trial court did not address that issue, and we therefore decline to pass judgment on an issue that was not addressed by the trial court. See State v. Ritz Realty Corp., 63 Conn. App. 544, 549, 776 A.2d 1195 (2001).


author: SCHALLER, J.

text:
    MARGARET MCHENRY v. EDWARD NUSBAUM ET AL. MARGARET MCHENRY v. ELLEN B. LUBELL ET AL.
    (AC 23102)
    Sehaller, Flynn and Peters, Js.
    Argued June 3
    officially released September 9, 2003

      Margaret McHenry, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff in both cases).

      Paul E. Pollock, for the appellees (defendants in the first case).

      David J. Robertson, for the appellees (defendants in the second case).
   Opinion

SCHALLER, J.

In this consolidated matter, the plaintiff, Margaret McHenry, appeals from the judgments of the trial court dismissing her action against the defendants, attorney Edward Nusbaum, his law firm, Nusbaum and Parrino, and Susan Moch, an attorney in that law firm, and a separate action against attorney Ellen B. Lubell and her law firm, Weisman and Lubell. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court improperly rendered judgments of dismissal for failure to prosecute the actions with reasonable diligence, (2) the court abused its discretion by delaying decisions, ignoring filings, removing files from the courthouse and striking claims, (3) she was unable to receive a fair trial in the Superior Court in Bridgeport and (4) she was denied due process because several of the defendants are attorneys. We agree with the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly rendered judgments of dismissal and, accordingly, reverse the judgments of the trial court.

I

The following pertinent facts and procedural history are necessary to our resolution of this appeal. This matter has its genesis in the dissolution of marriage proceedings between the plaintiff and her now former husband. Because of the lengthy procedural history underlying this appeal, we will discuss the procedural history of the two cases separately.

A

On November 20,1995, the plaintiff, through counsel, filed a complaint against Lubell and her law firm, Weisman and Lubell, sounding in negligence. Lubell had represented the plaintiff in the dissolution of marriage action. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 8, 1996, against Lubell and her law firm, removing attorneys Lawrence Weisman and Andrew R. Tarshis as defendants.

On September 22, 1997, the plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed another complaint against Lubell, Tarshis and the law firm. The complaint was in four counts: Deliberate intent to defraud, aiding and abetting the tortuous conduct of another party, negligence and breach of contract. On October 8, 1997, Lubell and her law firm filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint dated September 22, 1997, pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine. The plaintiff subsequently withdrew the original action against Lubell and her law firm and filed amended complaints on November 21 and December 1, 1997.

On December 12, 1997, and again on February 13, 1998, Lubell and her law firm filed requests to revise the plaintiffs amended complaint. Lubell and her law firm then filed a motion for a nonsuit, claiming that the plaintiff had failed to revise her complaint in accordance with their December 12, 1997 request to revise. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for a non-suit on March 19, 1998, which was overruled on April 21, 1998. On March 19, 1998, the plaintiff also filed a motion for leniency from the court because she was acting pro se. The court, Melville, J., denied the motion, reminding the plaintiff that “technicalities are a necessary part of litigation if it is to proceed in an orderly and efficient manner so that all who use our courts receive justice.” On May 6, 1998, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue the court’s denial of her motion for leniency and its overruling of her objection to the motion for a nonsuit, which was denied by the court, Melville, J., on June 15, 1998.

On June 11,1998, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the December 12, 1997 request to revise the complaint that was filed by Lubell and her law firm. The motion was ordered denied in accordance with the memorandum of decision issued by the court, Skolnick, J., on July 22, 1998. In the July 22, 1998 memorandum of decision, the court found that the request to revise had been granted automatically because the plaintiff failed to respond to the request to revise within thirty days from the date that it was filed. Accordingly, the court ordered the plaintiff to file a new amended complaint responding to the defendant’s request to revise.

On June 29,1998, the plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate the case against Lubell and her law firm with the case against Nusbaum and his law firm. That motion was granted on July 13, 1998. The plaintiff thereafter filed amended complaints against Lubell and her law firm on August 7 and again on August 10,1998, claiming deliberate intent to defraud, negligence, breach of contract, legal negligence and malpractice, civil conspiracy, unfair trade practices, recklessness, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Lubell and her law firm filed an objection to the plaintiffs amended complaints dated August 7 and August 10, 1998, claiming that those complaints added new causes of action that had not been included in the original complaint, namely, legal negligence and malpractice, unfair trade practices, civil conspiracy, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lubell and her law firm also filed a motion for a nonsuit against the plaintiff for her failure to revise her complaint in accordance with their December 12, 1997 request to revise. On August 14, 1998, the plaintiff filed a motion to extend the time to close the pleadings, which was originally set for August 15, 1998, until September 30, 1998. The motion was denied by the court, Mottolese, J., on September 4, 1998.

The plaintiff filed another amended complaint on August 21, 1998, to which Lubell and her law firm objected. The complaint again was based on deliberate intent to defraud, negligence, breach of contract, legal negligence and malpractice, civil conspiracy, unfair trade practices, gross negligence, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On August 28, 1998, the plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time so that she could secure counsel to represent her, which was granted. The plaintiff, however, was unable to obtain counsel and continued to proceed pro se.

The plaintiff, on July 14, 1999, filed a motion for an extension of time to close the pleadings and to claim the matter to the trial list. On November 5, 1999, the plaintiff filed another amended complaint. The complaint again alleged deliberate intent to defraud, negligence, breach of contract, legal negligence and malpractice, civil conspiracy, unfair trade practices, recklessness, gross negligence, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On December 3, 1999, the court, Moran, J., ruled that the plaintiffs November 5, 1999 amended complaint “shall be deemed filed.”

On March 22, 2000, Lubell and her law firm filed a motion for an order that the plaintiff revise her revised complaint from November 5, 1999, so that it conforms to their December 12,1997 request to revise. The court, Moran, J., ordered compliance on or before May 1, 2000. On May 1, 2000, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint that alleged deliberate intent to defraud, negligence, breach of contract, legal malpractice, civil conspiracy, unfair trade practices, recklessness, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lubell and her law firm objected to the plaintiffs revised complaint and filed a motion for a nonsuit against the plaintiff for failure to comply with then-request to revise. At a hearing on September 5, 2000, the court, Rush, J., held that the plaintiffs complaint, dated May 1, 2000, was “validly filed and any objections to the amendment of the complaint . . . are overruled.” The court further permitted the plaintiff to file another revised complaint by September 11, 2000.

The plaintiff filed a revised amended complaint on September 11, 2000. The complaint alleged deliberate intent to defraud, negligence, breach of contract, legal malpractice, civil conspiracy, unfair trade practices, recklessness, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lubell and her law firm sought to strike the plaintiffs amended complaint for failure to allege facts sufficient to support the claims raised. The court, Melville, J., granted the motion to strike. In response, the plaintiff filed another revised complaint on October 30, 2000, alleging deliberate intent to defraud, negligence, breach of contract, legal malpractice, civil conspiracy, unfair trade practices, recklessness, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud by nondisclosure. Lubell and her law firm responded by filing another motion to strike the plaintiffs complaint.

On August 2, 2001, in its memorandum of decision, the court, Skolnick, J., struck from the plaintiffs complaint her claims of legal malpractice, civil conspiracy, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., recklessness and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as the plaintiffs prayer for attorney’s fees and punitive damages. Thereafter, the plaintiffs complaint consisted of claims for deliberate intent to defraud, negligence, breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress and fraud by nondisclosure.

On August 17, 2001, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue the court’s decision striking some of her claims, as well as another amended complaint, to which Lubell and her law firm filed an objection. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff, in addition to including the claims that survived the motion to strike that had been filed by Lubell and her law firm, included those claims that the court previously had struck. The court, Skolnick, J., denied the plaintiffs motion to reargue on February 25, 2002.

In the September 18 and 25, 2001 editions of the Connecticut Law Journal, all parties were notified of the docket management program. According to the notice, calendars were to be sent to all counsel and pro se parties of record identifying the cases that were selected for the program, in which the plaintiffs case was included. To comply with the terms of the notice, the plaintiff was required to file a withdrawal, dispose of the case, file a certificate of closed pleadings or file a request for exemption from the program by May 3, 2002. The plaintiff filed a request for exemption from the program, which was denied by the court on May 3, 2002. On the same day, the court rendered a judgment of dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint for failure to prosecute her action with reasonable diligence.

B

On September 22,1997, the plaintiff filed a complaint against Nusbaum and his law firm, Nusbaum and Parrino. Nusbaum had represented the plaintiffs now former husband during the dissolution proceedings. The complaint against Nusbaum and his law firm was in two counts: Deliberate intent to defraud and aiding and abetting the tortuous conduct of another party. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Nusbaum and his law firm on November 21, 1997.

On May 14, 1998, Nusbaum and his law firm filed a request that the plaintiff revise her complaint, to which the plaintiff objected. The plaintiffs objection was sustained without prejudice to Nusbaum and his law firm. On June 5, 1998, the plaintiff filed another amended complaint. On June 29,1998, the plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate the action with the action against Lubell and her law firm, which was granted on July 13, 1998. Nusbaum and his law firm filed a motion for a nonsuit against the plaintiff for her failure to revise her complaint in accordance with their May 14, 1998 request to revise. The motion was denied because an amended complaint had been filed. The plaintiff filed a third amended complaint on August 12,1998, claiming deliberate intent to defraud, aiding and abetting the tortious conduct of another party, unfair trade practices, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and legal malpractice. The plaintiff then filed a motion for an extension of time to close the pleadings.

The plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint on September 25, 1998, claiming deliberate intent to defraud and aiding and abetting the tortuous conduct of another party. Nusbaum and his law firm filed an objection to the amended complaint, which was overruled by the court, Thim, J. Nusbaum and his law firm responded by filing a request, on February 5, 1999, for the plaintiff to revise her complaint. On July 16, 1999, the plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to close the pleadings. The motion was granted by the court, Melville, J., for fifteen days from the date of any rulings on any outstanding pleadings. The court, however, also ruled that no further extensions of time to close the pleadings would be allowed.

In November, 2001, the parties were notified that this case was selected for the docket management program. Under the notice and order of the court, the procedures for compliance required the plaintiff to file a withdrawal of her case, dispose of the case, file a certificate of closed pleadings or file a request for exemption from the program. On January 2, 2002, the plaintiff filed another amended complaint, alleging deliberate intent to defraud, civil conspiracy, unfair trade practices, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional pain, and fraud by nondisclosure. The plaintiff filed a request for exemption from the docket management program on February 22, 2002, which was not ruled on by the court. On May 3, 2002, the plaintiffs action was dismissed for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence.

II

The plaintiff appeals from the dismissals of her actions against Lubell and her law firm and against Nusbaum and his law firm. We reverse the judgments.

“Practice Book § 17-19 provides is relevant part that [i]f a party fails to comply with an order of a judicial authority . . . the party may be nonsuited or defaulted by the judicial authority. Because the nonsuit here was a penalty for the plaintiffs failure to close the pleadings, we apply the modified standard of review set forth by our Supreme Court in Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 17-18, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001), for claims challenging a trial court’s order for sanctions. First, the order to be complied with must be reasonably clear. In this connection, however, we also state that even an order that does not meet this standard may form the basis of a sanction if the record establishes that, notwithstanding the lack of such clarity, the party sanctioned in fact understood the trial court’s intended meaning. This requirement poses a legal question that we will review de novo. Second, the record must establish that the order was in fact violated. This requirement poses a question of fact that we will review using a clearly erroneous standard of review. Third, the sanction imposed must be proportional to the violation. This requirement poses a question of the discretion of the trial court that we will review for abuse of that discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dimyan, 68 Conn. App. 844, 846-47, 793 A.2d 1157, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 925, 797 A.2d 520 (2002).

A

The plaintiff claims that it was a “misuse of the court’s discretion to dismiss [her case against Lubell and her law firm] in light of the court’s delay and [her] vigilance in trying to move the case along.” We agree.

In November, 2001, calendars were sent to counsel and to pro se parties of record, identifying the cases that had been placed in the docket management program. The plaintiffs case against Lubell and her law firm had been placed in the program. Under the procedures set forth in the September 18 and 25,2001 editions of the Connecticut Law Journal, to comply with the guidelines of the docket management program, the plaintiff was required to file a withdrawal, dispose of the case, file a certificate of closed proceedings or file a request from exemption from the program. Failure to comply with the procedures of the program would have resulted in the dismissal of the case on May 3, 2002. The plaintiff filed a request for exemption from the program, which was denied by the court on May 3, 2002, with the court stating that the pleadings had to be closed as to the governing complaint. The court then dismissed the plaintiffs action against Lubell and her law firm for failure to prosecute the case with reasonable diligence.

We conclude that the court improperly dismissed the plaintiffs case against Lubell and her law firm. To comply with the terms of the notice pertaining to the docket management program, the plaintiff was required, among other things, to file a request for exemption from the program, which she timely filed. Under the terms of the notice, if a request for exemption was denied, counsel and pro se parties of record were to have been notified of the denial and the case would be automatically continued to May 3,2002, for compliance. Upon receipt of the denial, counsel and pro se parties of record were required to take the necessary steps to comply with the notice by either filing a withdrawal, disposing of the case or filing a certificate of closed pleadings. Failure to comply with the notice would result with the dismissal of the case on May 3, 2002.

In this case, however, the court did not deny the plaintiffs request for exemption until May 3,2002, when it dismissed her case against Lubell and her law firm. Until the plaintiff received notice of the denial of her request for exemption, she was not required to comply with the order of the court. At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff stated that she received notice of the court’s denial of her request for exemption on May 5, 2002. Therefore, the plaintiff was not required to take the necessary steps to comply with the order of the court in her action against Lubell and her law firm until May 5, 2002. By dismissing the plaintiffs action on May 3, 2002, before the plaintiff received notice of the court’s denial of her request for exemption, the court abused its discretion.

B

The plaintiff also claims that the court abused its discretion when it rendered a judgment of dismissal in her case against Nusbaum and his law firm. We agree.

The plaintiff was notified that her case was selected for the docket management program in November, 2001. As previously stated, to comply with the notice and the order of the court under the program, the plaintiff was required to file a withdrawal, dispose of the case, file a certificate of closed pleadings or file a request for exemption from the docket management program by May 3, 2002. The plaintiff timely filed a request for exemption on February 22, 2002. The court, however, failed to rule on the plaintiffs request for exemption before dismissing her case on May 3, 2002. Under the terms of the notice and the order of the court, once the plaintiff filed the request for exemption, she was not required to take the necessary steps to comply with the notice and the order of the court until she received notice of the court’s denial. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion when it dismissed the plaintiffs action against Nusbaum and his law firm without first giving the plaintiff the opportunity to comply with the terms of the notice and the order of the court.

The judgments are reversed and the cases are remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       We decline to address the plaintiffs claims that various decisions from various judges who have ruled on different aspects of her actions constitute bias, prejudice and misconduct or that she was denied her right to due process. This court is not the proper forum to review the plaintiffs vague complaints against members of the judiciary. General Statutes § 51-51g et seq. provides the proper procedure for reviewing such complaints. Further, the plaintiff has failed to brief her claims in an intelligible way. Therefore, we decline to review them. See Dontigney v. Roberts, 73 Conn. App. 709, 712, 809 A.2d 539 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 944, 815 A.2d 675 (2003).

       The complaint against Lubell and her law firm had listed as defendants Lawrence Weisman and Andrew R. Tarshis, both of whom were attorneys at the law firm. Weisman and Tarshis subsequently were removed as defendants in an amended complaint.