text:
    State of Connecticut v. John Riddle
    (13101)
    Foti, Landau and Spear, Js.
    Argued November 29, 1994
    decision released February 14, 1995

      Richard V. Ackerson, supervisory assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Ronald G. Weller, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Lisa Riggione, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Foti, J.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of inciting injury to persons or property in violation of General Statutes § 53a-179a. He received a sentence of four years incarceration, execution of that sentence suspended after two years, with five years probation to follow. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) refused to allow into evidence a portion of an audiotape, and (2) instructed the jury by failing to relate the issues of law to the facts of the case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. The defendant is a former Waterbury police officer. In 1989, while still on the police force, he was suspended from service as a result of an investigation conducted by Chief Inspector Robert Deeley. In March, 1991, the defendant’s employment with the police department was terminated by order of William Lamb, superintendent of police. The defendant blamed both men for his troubled life thereafter.

In May, 1992, on an unrelated matter, the defendant was sentenced to the Cheshire correctional center where he shared a cell with Richard Filipelli. At some point, the defendant discussed the reason for his being incarcerated and also his anger toward Deeley and Lamb. He discussed his former employment with the Waterbury police department and told Filipelli that Deeley and Lamb were responsible for the termination of his employment and for ruining his life. He said he wanted to kill them. In June, 1992, the defendant asked Filipelli if he “knew anyone who could do someone,” meaning to kill someone. Filipelli responded that he knew people who could satisfy his request, and that he knew “people that more or less hurt people for a living.” The defendant then told Filipelli that he wanted Deeley and Lamb killed.

Filipelli first told his wife about the conversations that he had had with the defendant, and later reported them to the authorities. With Filipelli’s permission, a wireless transmitter was concealed on his person to record his conversations with the defendant. No recordings were initially made because of technical problems. On June 18,1992, the police, through Filipelli, tried to get the defendant to speak on the telephone so that they could record the conversation. He refused to come on the line to speak to the “guys . . . going to do the hit.” The defendant instead drew a detailed map on a napkin or paper towel with directions to Lamb’s house and gave it to Filipelli so that directions could be given over the telephone. The map also included a physical description of Lamb.

On June 22,1992, a tape recorder was concealed on Filipelli’s body and he taped a forty-five minute conversation that he had with the defendant.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly refused to admit into evidence a portion of that forty-five minute tape. He claims that the court (1) abused its discretion and (2) violated his due process rights as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, in that the court interfered with his right to present a defense.

A

Prior to placing Filipelli on the stand as a witness, the state indicated to the trial court that it intended to offer the entire forty-five minute tape recording into evidence. The defendant objected, claiming that the recording was so defective, garbled and inaudible as to be misleading to the jury. In the absence of the jury, the trial judge listened to the tape recording. The judge noted that he had seated himself in the jury box so that he could listen to the tape from the jury’s position and vantage point. The cassette recorder was placed next to the judge. After listening to the entire tape recording, the judge stated that the tape was very difficult to hear and was “quite garbled.” The judge then noted that the conversation on the tape became more discernible toward the end of the tape where the defendant stated “[i]t was Lamb who got the ball rolling.”

Following the state’s offer into evidence of the entire tape, the court indicated that it was inclined to let in only the portion at the end of the tape where the conversation was clearer and more discernible. At that point, the defendant argued that if the court was going to allow in part of the tape, it should allow in the entire tape. The defendant alleged that the more discernible parts of the tape were damaging to him while portions of the “garbled” conversations contained evidence favorable to him, and he should be allowed to explain what was said on the entire tape. The court noted that, even though it was allowing only a portion of the tape in, it was not precluding the defendant from referring to other portions of the tape if necessary. The court felt that admitting the entire tape would not be helpful to the jury.

The court then admitted into evidence the latter portion of the tape that the court had deemed audible. Thereafter, during the defendant’s testimony, the entire tape, including that portion not admitted as a full exhibit, was marked for purposes of identification. Parts of the excised tape were played in the jury’s presence, with the permission of the trial court.

The defendant thereafter offered the tape as a full exhibit, claiming that the beginning portion of the tape was necessary to put the conversation in context. He claimed that the dialogue in the beginning portion showed that he knew Filipelli was a “snitch” and, therefore, any seemingly incriminating statements made in the latter portion could not be taken seriously. The court noted: “Well, we’re running into an on-going problem with this tape. And the court made an initial ruling that the portion that has not been allowed in is very difficult to hear. It’s somewhat inaudible. There is a lot of background noise to it. And I think would pose a problem to the jury in hearing the tape. Now you’ve both pretty much elicited portions of the unintroduced aspect of the tape through testimony. [Defense counsel] introduced, through this witness, those conversations. You have that in evidence. It doesn’t eliminate the problem that the court has with what it perceives as difficulty for the jury to hear these portions. And this is like whittling away, I think, at the court’s initial ruling, which was not to allow that beginning portion of the tape because of the problems of that. And the court is still inclined to that. And you have, on the other hand, you have been allowed to introduce testimony you seek as to that subject matter. The jury has that before them.” The court refused to admit the entire tape as a fall exhibit.

During jury deliberations, the jury twice requested to hear excerpts from the excluded portion of the tape. The court replayed both excerpts for the jury.

The state’s position throughout the trial was to have the entire tape admitted. The defendant sought to have the entire tape excluded. He does not now challenge the admitted portion, but rather claims that all portions not admitted should have been because they might have aided in placing his subsequent conversation in context. The defendant concedes that he was in no way limited on the cross-examination of any witness, that transcripts of the excluded portions of the tape were obtained and introduced, and that he was allowed to play excerpts of the excluded portion of the tape in the presence of the jury when examining witnesses who were speaking or being spoken to on the tape. The defendant was also allowed to admit as a full exhibit one excerpt from the contested portion of the tape during his cross-examination of the police detective who was the investigating officer. The defendant was further permitted to comment on the excised portion of the tape during his closing argument to the jury. The defendant agrees that while he and Filipelli could understand some brief parts of the excluded portion of the tape because they had been present, it would be extremely difficult for the jury to discern what was being said, or by whom.

Whether a recording, or part of a recording, should be admitted into evidence is a question to be determined within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Hauck, 172 Conn. 140, 149, 374 A.2d 150 (1976). “In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done. . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 458, 464, 374 A.2d 1107 (1977).

In light of the trial court’s precautions and the latitude afforded the defendant, we find no abuse of the court’s discretion. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the defendant placed before the jury all that he wanted other than the unintelligible excised portions of the tape itself. He had, in the transcripts and testimony, the benefit of a functional equivalent of that evidence, and the excised portion was at best cumulative. See State v. Correia, 33 Conn. App. 457, 463, 636 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 911, 642 A.2d 1208 (1994) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit witness’ statement as full exhibit because defense counsel was allowed to read statement to jury and any further evidence would have been cumulative). We see no purpose in subjecting the jury to long portions of static or unintelligible gibberish, when anything that was possibly discernible was allowed through testimony or transcript. The trial court carefully reviewed the tape. In addition to our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we also conclude that the defendant was not prejudiced by the procedure employed by the court.

B

The defendant argues that the trial court’s ruling interfered with his constitutional right to present a defense. We do not agree. “When defense evidence is excluded on evidentiary grounds, such exclusion may give rise to a claim of denial of the right to present a defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 289-90, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973).” In re Adalberto S., 27 Conn. App. 49, 57, 604 A.2d 822, cert.. denied, 222 Conn. 903, 606 A.2d 1328 (1992). A defendant is bound by the rules of evidence in presenting a defense. State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 375-76, 545 A.2d 1048 (1988). The right to present a defense is subject to appropriate supervision by the trial court in accordance with established rules of procedure and evidence. State v. Carter, 228 Conn. 412, 426-27, 636 A.2d 821 (1994). The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution does not require that the defendant be permitted to present every piece of evidence that he wants to present. State v. James L., 26 Conn. App. 81, 83, 598 A.2d 663 (1991). As previously discussed, the evidence that was presented was the functional equivalent to the excised portion of the tape. Furthermore, the defendant’s theory of defense was that he did not commit the crime because he knew that Filipelli was a snitch. Our review of the record discloses that the trial court more than adequately allowed the defendant to get his claimed defense before the jury.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court failed, in instructing the jury, to relate adequately the issues of law to the facts of the case, in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process. While conceding that this claim was not properly preserved, the defendant seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). Pursuant to Golding, a defendant can prevail on an unpreserved claim only if all of the following criteria are met: “(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 239-40.

The state concedes, and we agree, that the defendant has met the first two prongs of Golding. We cannot conclude, however, that an alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and, therefore, we conclude that the defendant has failed to meet the third prong of Golding.

We first must disagree with the defendant’s position that a trial court, in instructing a jury, has an absolute duty to comment on the evidence. The court may, under appropriate circumstances, exercise its discretion and choose not to comment on the evidence. State v. Hernandez, 218 Conn. 458, 462, 590 A.2d 112 (1991). Whether the trial court’s charge adequately relates the issues of law to the facts of a case depends on the particular circumstances of that case. We have recently decided four cases involving this issue. In State v. Lemoine, 33 Conn. App. 743, 641 A.2d 131, cert. granted, 230 Conn. 909, 644 A.2d 920 (1994), and State v. Wolff, 29 Conn. App. 524, 616 A.2d 1143 (1992), we determined on the basis of the particular circumstances of each case that the courts’ instructions failed to relate adequately the issues of law to the facts of the case. In State v. Shanks, 34 Conn. App. 103, 640 A.2d 155 (1994), and State v. Crosby, 36 Conn. App. 805, 814, 654 A.2d 371 (1995), we determined otherwise. .

Our review of the entire charge in this matter leads us to conclude that the court’s instruction did not mislead the jury, and that in this matter the contents of the instructions more closely parallel those in Shanks and Crosby. This matter did not involve complex factual or legal issues and did not require extensive comment on the evidence by the trial court. The trial court instructed that there were two crimes and two victims, and that each crime was separate and distinct. The court particularized which count pertained to which victim. The instructions were thorough, the information and the relevant statutes were read, and the law explained. Indeed, the jury was quite capable of separating the two counts as can be seen from the acquittal on the second count. Because we cannot determine that the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists, we conclude that the defendant has failed to meet the third prong of Golding.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-179a (a) provides: “A person is guilty of inciting injury to persons or property when, in public or private, orally, in writing, in printing or in any other manner, he advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits the unlawful burning, injury to or destruction of any public or private property or advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits any assault upon any organization of the armed forces of the United States, as defined by section 27-103, or of this state, as defined by section 27-2, or the police force of this or any other state or upon any officer or member thereof or the organized police or fire departments of any municipality or any officer or member thereof, or the killing or injuring of any class or body of persons, or of any individual.”

       The jury found the defendant not guilty of the second count of inciting injury to persons or property.

       The defendant has failed to provide a separate analysis of his claimed rights under the Connecticut constitution. We will therefore consider only his claims under the federal constitution. State v. Mercer, 208 Conn. 52, 67 n.9, 544 A.2d 611 (1988).

       The court stated the following: “As I pointed out earlier . . . this tape is generally — at least the . . . beginning portion of it — is in quite a fuzzy state. It is very difficult to discern what is being said. There are loud noises in the background. It is hazy. It is very difficult to try to ascertain what is being said. As the tape progressed and toward the end there was a colloquy that started with . . . the defendant speaking, ‘[t]hat it was Lamb [who] got the ball rolling.’ I think at that point the tape becomes clearer. I think from that point, that the conversation is relevant. That is discernible. The court is inclined ... to let that portion of the tape be heard to the end.”

       See footnote 3.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Schaller, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Reinaldo Ramos
    (12487)
    Landau, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued October 26, 1994
    decision released February 14, 1995

      Kent Drager, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Linda N. Howe, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, and John Blawie, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Schaller, J.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53U-49 and 53a-54a (a), robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), and carrying a pistol on his person without a permit in violation of General Statutes §§ 29-35 and 29-37 (b). The jury did not render a verdict on the alternative charge of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) disallowed a requested instruction to the jury on reckless assault in the second degree as a lesser included offense of the alternative charge of intentional assault in the first degree, (2) disallowed the defendant’s cross-examination of an eyewitness about her feelings and reactions to watching a shooting, (3) failed to grant the defendant’s motion to preclude the eyewitness’ testimony even though she had viewed the defendant in shackles, and (4) (a) instructed the jury panel by providing a misleading and prejudicial example of the function of the presumption of innocence, (b) allowed the prosecutor to commit misconduct, (c) instructed the jury concerning its duty, and (d) instructed the jury in a manner that diluted the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On September 16, 1991, Carmen Ortiz, a resident of Father Panik Village, was looking out her window onto the courtyard when she saw a Caucasian man, the victim, seated outside. The victim was holding a key chain and what appeared to Ortiz to be a $10 bill. A Hispanic male carrying a gun approached the victim and demanded his money. After the victim refused to hand over the money, the man pointed the gun at the victim’s head. After shooting the victim in the side of the head, the man grabbed the money and ran. Ortiz, a certified nurse’s aid, went into the courtyard to give the victim first aid. The victim survived the attack.

Ortiz recognized the Hispanic man as someone known as Indio, a person whose muscular physique she had admired in the past. Having given the police a sworn statement describing the robbery incident, Ortiz identified the perpetrator from a photographic array containing a picture of a man known as Indio. The picture that she chose was that of the defendant. The victim later positively identified the defendant as the robber. The defendant was arrested for the robbery and the shooting.

In addition to charging the jury on robbery in the first degree and carrying a pistol without a permit, the trial court instructed the jury that the attempted murder and first degree assault were alternative charges, with respect to which the jury could find the defendant guilty of one or neither but not both.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly declined the defendant’s request to instruct the jury on reckless assault in the second degree as a lesser included offense of intentional assault in the first degree. The defendant argues that whether the gun was fired intentionally or recklessly was a question for the jury to decide and, therefore, the trial court should have allowed the jury to consider the lesser included offense. We disagree.

The trial court’s refusal to “instruct the jury on warranted lesser included offenses cannot be held harmless merely because the defendant was convicted of a greater offense . . . .” State v. Hall, 213 Conn. 579, 588, 569 A.2d 534 (1990); see State v. Monte, 131 Conn. 134, 137, 38 A. 2d 434 (1944). “ ‘A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser offense if, and only if, the following conditions are met: (1) an appropriate instruction is requested by either the state or the defendant; (2) it is not possible to commit the greater offense, in the manner described in the information or bill of particulars, without having first committed the lesser; (3) there is some evidence, introduced by either the state or the defendant, or by a combination of their proofs, which justifies conviction of the lesser offense; and (4) the proof on the element or elements which differentiate the lesser offense from the offense charged is sufficiently in dispute to permit the jury consistently to find the defendant innocent of the greater offense but guilty of the lesser.’ State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588, 427 A.2d 414 (1980) . . . .” (Citation omitted.) State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 138, 646 A.2d 169 (1994).

The state argues that the defendant failed to meet all four Whistnant conditions. We enter the Whistnant analysis through the third condition. See State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 66, 621 A.2d 728 (1993). In order for the defendant to satisfy the third prong of Whistnant, he must offer some evidence justifying conviction of the lesser crime. “The critical element distinguishing murder from its lesser included offenses is intent .... We must determine if the ‘evidence suggests at least a possibility’ that the defendant acted with a lesser intent than that of the specific intent to kill. State v. Falby, 187 Conn. 6, 30, 444 A.2d 213 (1982). If ‘we cannot as a matter of law exclude this possibility’; id.; then the defendant was entitled to lesser included offense instructions.” State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 138-39.

In this case, the state offered ample evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant possessed the intent to kill the victim. No evidence was educed from which the jury could reasonably have inferred that the gun was fired recklessly. The defendant was carrying a gun when he approached the victim and demanded his money. After the victim refused, the defendant raised his gun to the victim’s head and shot him. There was no evidence that this was a sudden or spontaneous incident that caused the victim to suffer a near fatal injury. See id., 139. The defendant did not accidently get caught up in an unexpected incident that resulted in the victim’s injury. On the contrary, the evidence indicated that the defendant created the incident. The defendant not only decided to rob the victim, but also chose to use a gun to commit the crime. The only reasonable inference that the jury could have drawn is that the defendant either intended to kill or intended to cause serious physical injury when he pointed the gun to the victim’s head before he fired the weapon. Our Supreme Court in Sivri found that the third prong of Whistnant was satisfied because there was a possibility that there was a lesser intent than intent to kill. Id. In Sivri, the defendant was convicted of murder on the basis of the presence of a large amount of the victim’s blood in the defendant’s home. Id. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of homicide. Id., 137-38. Our Supreme Court determined from the large amount of blood and the setting, a family room in a residence, that the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that “ ‘there was a sudden or spontaneous incident’ ” that resulted in the victim’s unintended death. Id., 139. Unlike in this case, the jury in Sivri reasonably could have inferred a lesser intent on the defendant’s part on the basis of the lack of evidence as to intent. In this case, the state has provided sufficient evidence to support a finding of intent to kill while no evidence was offered that would justify conviction on the lesser offense. Accordingly, the third prong of Whistnant was not satisfied.

The defendant also failed to satisfy the fourth prong of Whistnant. “The fourth prong of Whistnant requires that we determine if the proof on intent that differentiates the lesser offense from the offense charged was sufficiently in dispute to permit the jury consistently to find the defendant innocent of the greater offense but guilty of the lesser.” Id., 139-40. In this case, the proof of intent came from an eyewitness who saw the defendant raise the gun to the victim’s head before firing it. The testimony of the witness was not contradicted; moreover, it was buttressed by the evidence of the head injury suffered by the victim. We cannot say, therefore, that the proof of intent was sufficiently in dispute to permit the jury consistently to find the defendant not guilty of the attempted murder charge but guilty of reckless assault in the second degree. We conclude that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on the lesser included offense was not improper.

II

The defendant next asserts that the trial court improperly interfered with the defendant’s confrontation right to cross-examine the state’s key witness. When the state objected to defense counsel’s question concerning the witness’ feelings on seeing the shooting, defense counsel claimed the question on the ground that the witness had “indicated some sort of infatuation with [the defendant] from a distance.” The defendant now argues that when the trial court sustained the state’s objection to a question concerning Ortiz’ feelings about seeing someone suffer a gunshot, the court precluded the defendant from inquiring into the witness’ ability to perceive the event accurately. This preclusion, the defendant argues, impeded the defendant’s ability to cross-examine the state’s witness and violated the defendant’s sixth amendment confrontation right.

In order for this court to review an issue on appeal, the appellant must have objected specifically to the testimony in question and have given the proper grounds for the objection. State v. Williams, 231 Conn. 235, 645 A.2d 999 (1994); State v. Christiano, 228 Conn. 456, 637 A.2d 382, cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 83, 130 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1994). “This court is not in any way bound to consider claims of law not properly raised at trial. State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 741, 631 A.2d 288 (1993); State v. Brice, 186 Conn. 449, 457, 442 A.2d 906 (1982).” State v. Carter, 34 Conn. App. 58, 73, 640 A.2d 610, cert. granted, 229 Conn. 919, 644 A.2d 915 (1994). “Review of evidentiary rulings is limited to the specific legal ground raised on the objection.” State v. Anderson, 28 Conn. App. 833, 844, 614 A.2d 438, rev’d, 227 Conn. 518, 631 A.2d 1149 (1993); see also Practice Book § 288.

The reasons for the objection that the defendant now gives differ from the reasons given at trial. The defendant asks for review of this claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). The defendant failed, however, to brief this issue adequately under the four prong analysis presented in Golding. We decline to review this claim further because of the inadequate briefing of the issue. See State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 510 n.17, 594 A.2d 906 (1991); State v. Merritt, 36 Conn. App. 76, 97, 647 A.2d 1021, cert. granted, 231 Conn. 926, 648 A.2d 165 (1994); State v. Yopp, 35 Conn. App. 740, 750, 646 A.2d 298 (1994); see also Practice Book § 4065.

III

The defendant next asserts that the trial court improperly failed to grant his motion to preclude Ortiz from testifying. The defendant argues that Ortiz’ testimony was prejudiced because she saw the defendant in shackles in the hallway during a trial recess. The defendant asserts that he could not cross-examine Ortiz about the effect of this viewing without revealing to the jury that the defendant was incarcerated and in shackles.

When the defendant objected to the witness’ testimony, the trial court indicated that the objection was premature and should be raised at the same time as a pending motion to suppress an out-of-court photographic identification. Although the trial court then denied the defendant’s motion to preclude Ortiz from testifying based on the hallway viewing, the court stated that the defendant would be allowed to reassert the objection when the photographic array issue was raised. At that later time, however, the defendant failed to reassert his objection to Ortiz’ testimony based on the hallway viewing.

Because the defendant failed to pursue his original objection, the issue was effectively abandoned. Practice Book § 4185 provides: “The court on appeal shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial . . . .” Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he purpose of requiring trial counsel to object properly is not merely formal: it serves to alert the trial court to purported error while there is time to correct it without ordering a retrial.’ State v. Christiano, 228 Conn. 456, 464, 637 A.2d 382 (1994).” State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 246. The trial court offered the defendant the opportunity to renew his objection at a more fitting time. The defendant’s failure to pursue the objection at that time did not sufficiently alert the trial court that the issue had been raised. To the extent that this claim was not preserved at trial, the defendant urges review under State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 233. Again, the defendant failed to brief this issue according to the analysis laid out in Golding; accordingly, we decline to review this claim further. State v. Tweedy, supra, 219 Conn. 510 n.17; State v. Merritt, supra, 36 Conn. App. 97; State v. Yopp, supra, 35 Conn. App. 750; see also Practice Book § 4065.

IY

The defendant next asserts that the trial court improperly (1) instructed some of the prospective jurors with a misleading and prejudicial example of the function of the presumption of innocence, which included a suggestion of checking witnesses with a lie detector test, (2) allowed the prosecutor to commit misconduct, (3) instructed the jury in a manner that failed to explain the jury’s role concerning the determination of the credibility of witnesses, and (4) instructed the jury in a manner that diluted the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Conceding that these claims were not properly preserved at trial, the defendant asks for review of these issues under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233.

Despite the mention of Golding as the standard of review requested for these claims, the defendant’s failure to analyze the claims under Golding’s four prong test prevents us from reviewing these claims. The defendant’s brief did not include analysis of whether the record was adequate for this court to review the claimed constitutional violations, whether the issues involved are of constitutional magnitude, whether the trial court clearly violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, and whether the state failed to demonstrate that the error was harmless. We are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. State v. Tweedy, supra, 219 Conn. 510 n.17; State v. Merritt, 36 Conn. App. 97; State v. Yopp, supra, 35 Conn. App. 750; see also Practice Book § 4065. This is true even though the defendant requests review of these issues under Golding. State v. Merritt, supra, 97; State v. Yapp, supra, 750. Our Supreme Court has held that constitutional analysis must be conducted in a principled manner. State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). Because Golding review requires the implication of a constitutional issue, we conclude that lack of analysis of these claims under the four prongs of Golding prevents us from reviewing the issues further.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.”

       General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person . . . .”

       General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a-133 or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (1) Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (2) is armed with a deadly weapon; or (3) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument; or (4) displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm . . . .”

       General Statutes § 29-35 provides in pertinent part: “(a) No person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his person, except when such person is within his dwelling house or place of business, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28. . . .”

       General Statutes § 29-37 (b) provides: “Any person violating any provision of subsection (a) of section 29-35 may be fined not more than one thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned not less than one year nor more than five years, and, in the absence of any mitigating circumstances as determined by the court, one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court. The court shall specifically state the mitigating circumstances, or the absence thereof, in writing for the record. Any pistol or revolver found in the possession of any person in violation of any provision of subsection (a) of section 29-35 shall be forfeited.”

       Because we affirm the judgment, we decline to review the defendant’s final claim that if we were to reverse the judgment, the defendant’s violation of probation would also have to be reversed.

       Under Golding, “a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

       A more complete discussion of this issue is contained in part IV of this opinion. Although the inadequate analysis in the defendant’s brief does not require us to conduct a full Golding analysis, we note that the defendant’s argument that his inability to pose the question at issue interfered with his sixth amendment confrontation rights lacks merit. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness is “not absolute and is subject to reasonable limitation.” State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 401, 497 A.2d 956 (1985); see also State v. Lee, 229 Conn. 60, 640 A.2d 553 (1994); State v. Harris, 227 Conn. 751, 631 A.2d 309 (1993). Although the trial court sustained the state’s objection to one question, the court did not preclude the defendant from pursuing the line of questioning in a permissible manner. The defendant’s right to confrontation was not impeded.

       A more complete discussion of inadequate briefing is contained in part IV of this opinion


text:
    Smith and Smith Building Corporation v. Joseph DeLuca
    (13426)
    Dupont, C. J., and Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 3, 1994
    decision released February 14, 1995

      William A. Phillips filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Janine M. Becker and Daniel Shepro filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Schaller, J.

The defendant appeals from the judgment rendered pursuant to General Statutes § 52-410, granting the plaintiff’s application to compel the defendant to proceed with arbitration. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that no consideration existed for the plaintiff’s agreement to nullify the written construction contract. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found the following facts, which were essentially undisputed. The court stated that “[o]n May 3, 1993, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a construction contract whereby the plaintiff was to construct a home for the defendant. Article VIII of the agreement provided that all disputes arising under the contract were to be resolved by arbitration. The construction work came to be delayed as the defendant decided to hire more and more subcontractors of his own, who caused delays. As a result of the delays, the plaintiff was not being paid. He asked the defendant for partial payment and the defendant agreed. Therefore, the plaintiff presented the defendant with an invoice for a $5000 fee plus additional expenses. The defendant paid the plaintiff the $5000. However, on the bottom of the invoice were written the words ‘Contract dated May 3, 1993 null & void’ .... [W]hen the defendant paid the plaintiff $5000, the defendant did not offer the plaintiff anything beyond what was already due the plaintiff under the May 3 contract.” The court also found that the plaintiff had agreed to nullify the contract.

On the basis of those findings, the trial court determined that there was no new consideration for the agreement to nullify the May 3 contract. The trial court found that the attempted nullification was ineffective and, as a result, the parties remained bound by the arbitration provision. The court granted the plaintiffs application and ordered the parties to proceed with arbitration.

As a threshold matter, we note that “ ‘[a]n order directing the parties to proceed with arbitration is a final judgment from which one can appeal. Dewart v. Northeastern Gas Transmission Co., 139 Conn. 512, 514, 95 A.2d 381 (1953).’ ” Delio v. Earth Garden Florist, Inc., 28 Conn. App. 73, 79-80, 609 A.2d 1057 (1992); see also Success Centers, Inc. v. Huntington Learning Centers, Inc., 223 Conn. 761, 769, 613 A.2d 1320 (1992). Thus, we have the requisite jurisdiction.

The defendant claims that the parties' nullification of the contract was effective because it was adequately supported by new consideration. The consideration, the defendant contends, consisted of their “mutuality of commitment” to “settle any claims or cross claims that could be made for performance, lack of performance, misfeasance or other transgressions prior to October 1, 1993” and by the mutual extinguishment of rights under the May 3 contract, including the right to arbitrate claims under the contract. The defendant also contends that, in addition to “[t]he wiping out of mutual obligations under the May 3 contract,” the $5000 payment that he made in advance of what was called for under the normal payment schedule constituted consideration for the nullification.

The defendant appropriately relies on Yale Cooperative Corp. v. Rogin, 133 Conn. 563, 567, 53 A.2d 383 (1947), to support his position. In that case, the plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the defendant from using the plaintiffs name or a similar one. In 1941, the parties entered into an agreement that gave the defendant the right to use the plaintiff’s name on a dictionary that was to be published by the defendant. No time was fixed for the performance of the agreement. The defendant arranged for the publication of three types of dictionaries in accordance with the agreement, and sold many of them. In February, 1943, “the parties terminated the contract by mutual agreement.” Id. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly found a rescission of the contract.

The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim and held that, by virtue of their mutual promises, the parties had effectively rescinded the agreement. “The parties to this contract could as validly agree to rescind it as they could agree to make it originally. Savage Arms Corporation v. United States, 266 U.S. 217, 45 S. Ct. 30, 69 L. Ed. 253 [1924] .... ‘Mutual assent to abandon a contract, like mutual assent to form one, may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties.’ . . . The mutual release of obligation under a contract affords sufficient consideration for a rescission.” (Citations omitted.) Yale Cooperative Corp. v. Rogin, supra, 133 Conn. 567-68, citing 6 S. Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1938) p. 5170.

In that case, the rescission was not explicitly effected by the parties. The Supreme Court determined, therefore, that the issue was whether the subordinate facts found by the trial court validly supported its finding and conclusion that the contract was terminated by mutual agreement of the parties. The court reviewed the facts found and inferences drawn by the trial court and concluded that the facts and inferences were sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion.

Our Supreme Court’s conclusion in Yale Co-operative Corp. that parties are free to terminate an agreement by mutual assent has been followed in later cases. “[T]he well-established rule [is] that rescission or abandonment of contracts, like entry into a contractual relation, depends upon the intent of the parties and that the relevant intent is to be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rowe v. Cormier, 189 Conn. 371, 372-73, 456 A.2d 277 (1983); see also Hess v. Dumouchel Paper Co., 154 Conn. 343, 347, 225 A.2d 797 (1966); Gaer Bros., Inc. v. Mott, 147 Conn. 411, 416, 161 A.2d 782 (1960); 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 283, comment (a) (1981); 15 S. Williston, Contracts (3d Ed. Jaeger 1972 and 1994 Sup.) § 1826.

Decisions of this court and our Supreme Court concerning the consideration necessary to support modification of contracts are fully consistent with Yale Co-operative Corp. v. Rogin, supra, 133 Conn. 563. In Harris Calorific Sales Co. v. Manifold Systems, Inc., 18 Conn. App. 559, 563-64, 559 A.2d 241 (1989), we held that “[m]utual promises qualify as sufficient consideration for a binding contract. . . . For a valid modification, there must be mutual assent to the meaning and conditions of the modification . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In Manzin v. United Bank & Trust Co., 6 Conn. App. 513, 516, 506 A.2d 169 (1986), we stated that “[m]utual promises qualify as sufficient consideration for a binding contract.” Our Supreme Court, in Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 178, 474 A.2d 795 (1984), concluded that “[i]nherent in the trial court’s conclusion was a finding that the parties exchanged mutual promises to postpone the performance of the contract. These mutual promises are sufficient consideration to support the modification.”

Those cases make clear that a rescission or nullification of a contract may be effected solely on the basis of an exchange of mutual promises by the parties without other forms of consideration. The plaintiff counters, however, that there was no evidence before the trial court to show that “there was any obligation under the contract left to release.” The existence of the present action indicates unmistakably that issues concerning the parties’ contractual obligations are unresolved. As the defendant argues, by mutually agreeing to declare the May 3 contract “null and void,” the parties were mutually agreeing to relinquish their mutual right to arbitrate disputes arising under the contract.

In contrast to the situation in Yale Co-operative Corp., the nullification of the contract in this case was explicit. At the time of the $5000 payment by the defendant, the parties noted the words, “Contract dated May 3,1993 null & void,” on the invoice submitted by the plaintiff to the defendant. We conclude that the trial court incorrectly concluded that no new consideration existed for the parties’ agreement to nullify their May 3, 1993 contract. In this case, the parties’ mutual promises were sufficient to constitute a nullification of the contract.

The judgment ordering the parties to proceed with arbitration is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the application for an order to proceed with arbitration.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Cedric L. Burden
    (12258)
    Heiman, Schaller and Freedman, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 13
    decision released October 4, 1994

      Gary J. White, assistant public defender, filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, Eugene Callahan, state’s attorney, and Robert Katz, assistant state’s attorney, filed a brief for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Stright Sewage Disposal Company, Inc. v. Peter P. Ogilvie et al.
    (12677)
    O’Connell, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued September 14
    decision released October 4, 1994

      Frank W. LiVolsi, Jr., for the appellant-appellee (plaintiff).

      Ridgely W. Brown, with whom, on the brief, was Benjamin E. Gershberg, for the appellees-appellants (named defendant et al.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. John T. O’Reilly et al.
    (12905)
    Dupont, C. J., and Foti and Lavery, Js.
    Argued September 13
    decision released October 4, 1994

      John T. O'Reilly, pro se, the appellant (named defendant).

      Theodore V. Raczka, with whom, on the brief, was Nancy Bazan, legal intern, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    Jo Ann Barufkin v. Eugene Barufkin
    (12339)
    O’Connell, Foti and Lavery, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 16
    decision released October 4, 1994

      William J. Nulsen filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Daniel W. Adelman filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Andrew Tscheppe v. H. B. Ives Company et al.
    (13086)
    Dupont, C. J., and Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 16
    decision released October 4, 1994

      James C. Mulholland filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Kevin J. Maher filed a brief for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    KW Contractors, Inc. v. Colossale Concrete, Inc., et al.
    (12684)
    O’Connell, Foti and Lavery, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 16
    decision released October 4, 1994

      Otto P. Witt filed a brief for the appellants (defendants).

      Mona E. Herman and Mark J. Ferraro filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Amelia Constantinople, Executrix (Estate of Joseph Constantinople), et al. v. St. John Vianney Church
    (12954)
    O’Connell, Foti and Lavery, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 16
    decision released October 4, 1994

      Roger B. Calistro and Cynthia C. Bott filed a brief for the appellant (named plaintiff).

      Mark R. Cramer filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Roy Pinto v. B. C. Hardware Superior Products et al.
    (12937)
    Dupont, C. J., and Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 16
    decision released October 4, 1994

      James M. Hughes filed a brief for the appellants (defendants).

      Edward D. O’Brien filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    Boardsen Associates v. Joseph T. O’Neil
    (13182)
    Dupont, C. J., and Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 16
    decision released October 4, 1994

      Michael Bradley filed a brief for the appellant (Deirdre A. Smith).

      Robert B. McLaughlin filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Bernard Thomas v. Commissioner of Correction
    (12463)
    Lavery, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued September 20
    decision released October 11, 1994

      Denise Ansell, special public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and John Dropick, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    CTB Meriden Properties, Inc. v. Janet S. Curry et al.
    (13127)
    O’Connell, Foti and Heiman, Js.
    Argued September 20
    decision released October 11, 1994

      F. Woodward Lewis, Jr., for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

      Thomas A. Kaelin, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Joanne R. Pfau v. Richard Pfau
    (12606)
    Lavery, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued September 23
    decision released October 11, 1994

      David R. Kritzman, for the appellant (defendant).

      Raynald B. Cantin, with whom was John F. Morris, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    CTB Meriden Properties, Inc. v. Catherine S. Zygmont et al.
    (13128)
    O’Connell, Foti and Heiman, Js.
    Argued September 20
    decision released October 11, 1994

      F. Woodward Lewis, Jr., for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

      Thomas A. Kaelin, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    First Constitution Bank v. Mark David Associates et al.
    (13434)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 21
    decision released October 11, 1994

      Richard J. Kilcullen filed a brief for the appellant (defendant Anita Howland-Moritz).

      Francis G. Pennarola filed a brief for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Erik Nielsen et al. v. John Rooney et al.
    (12809)
    Foti, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued September 26
    decision released October 11, 1994

      Jan A. Marcus, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Robert C. Shenfeld, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher S. Rooney, pro hac vice, for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Ira B. Grudberg v. George C. Leining et al.
    (13278)
    Foti, Landau and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued September 26
    decision released October 11, 1994

      George C. Leining, pro se, with whom, on the brief, was Rose A. Leining, pro se, the appellants (named defendant et al.).

      J. Michael Sulzbach, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Clara Cellino v. Shop Rite Supermarkets, Inc., et al.
    (12786)
    Lavery, Landau and Heiman, Js.
    Argued September 22
    decision released October 11, 1994

      Bryan F. Meccariello, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Elizabeth M. Buckmir, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Elizabeth Beninato v. Specialty Framing, Inc., et al.
    (12914)
    Landau, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 23
    decision released October 11, 1994

      Stephen P. Bertucio filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      James L. Pomeranz filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    Patti J. Meyer v. John M. Leibold et al.
    (12992)
    Landau, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs September 23
    decision released October 11, 1994

      Jerome A. Mayer, for the appellants (defendants).

      Gordon R. Paterson, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


author: Foti, J. O’Connell, J.,

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Scott Cavell
    (10605)
    O’Connell, Foti and Heiman, Js.
    Submitted September 19
    decision released October 18, 1994

      Richard Emanuel, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Susan C. Marks, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and John Massameno, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Foti, J.

This matter is before us on remand from our Supreme Court. We previously considered it in State v. Cavell, 34 Conn. App. 276, 641 A.2d 426, remanded for reconsideration, 231 Conn. 902, 645 A.2d 1021 (1994). The Supreme Court ordered us to reconsider our judgment in light of State v. Robinson, 230 Conn. 591, 646 A.2d 118 (1994). Having reconsidered, we affirm our prior judgment.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this opinion Heiman, J., concurred.

O’Connell, J.,

dissenting. For the reasons set forth in State v. Cavell, 34 Conn. App. 276, 295-303, 641 A.2d 426, remanded for reconsideration, 231 Conn. 902, 645 A.2d 1021 (1994) {O’Connell, J., dissenting), I adhere to my dissent from that decision.


text:
    Recovery Alliance, Inc. v. Department of Revenue Services, Division of Special Revenue
    (12361)
    Foti, Hennessy and Cretella, Js.
    Argued September 29
    decision released October 18, 1994

      Francis W. Benner, for the appellant-appellee (plaintiff).

      Richard M. Sheridan, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee-appellant (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Dorothy Rolla v. Barbara Murray
    (12353)
    Dupont, C. J., and Lavery and Schaller, Js.
    Argued September 27
    decision released October 18, 1994

      Barbara Murray, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

      Glen A. Canner, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Ingo von Ruckteschell v. Margrit von Ruckteschell et al.
    (12511)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued September 27
    decision released October 18, 1994

      Arthur J. Peitler, for the appellant (defendant).

      M. Katherine Webster-O’Keefe, with whom, on the brief, was Barbara W. Reynolds, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Lynne Farrish-Leduc et al. v. John Charles Dunagan
    (12823)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued September 27
    decision released October 18, 1994

      David M. Sheridan, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Thomas J. O’Neill, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Patricia Harvey v. Ralph Harvey
    (12435)
    Poti, Landau and Heiman, Js.
    Argued September 28
    decision released October 18, 1994

      Sandra M. McDonough, for the appellant-appellee (plaintiff).

      Ralph Harvey, pro se, the appellee-appellant (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Gerrod Ellis
    (13386)
    O’Connell, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued September 28
    decision released October 18, 1994

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Nancy Gillespie, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John Connelly, state’s attorney, Bradford Ward, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and Eva Lenczewski, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The defendant concedes that the jury instruction issues that he raises have been resolved adversely to his claims by our Supreme Court. We are bound by those rulings. See Burton v. Planning Commission, 13 Conn. App. 400, 409, 536 A.2d 995 (1988), aff'd, 209 Conn. 609, 553 A.2d 161 (1989); State v. Thurman, 10 Conn. App. 302, 309 n.5, 523 A.2d 891, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 805, 528 A.2d 1152 (1987).

The judgment is affirmed.

       This appeal was taken originally to the Supreme Court. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this court.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Larry Davis
    (11907)
    Dupont, C. J., and Lavery and Heiman, Js.
    Argued October 24
    decision released November 15, 1994

      John T. Walkley, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Leah Hawley, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Robert J. O'Brien, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Federal Deposit Insurance Company, Receiver of New Connecticut Bank and Trust Company, N.A. v. George Lussier et al.
    (13285)
    Landau, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued October 26
    decision released November 15, 1994

      Dale C. Roberson, with whom was John Callahan, for the appellants (defendants).

      John S. Haverstock, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting a new sale date.


text:
    John F. Ashton v. Heinke P. Ashton
    (12308)
    Foti, Lavery and Heiman, Js.
    Argued October 25
    decision released November 15, 1994

      Abraham I. Gordon and Ronald D. Japha, with whom, on the brief, was Richards. Scalo, for the appellant (defendant).

      Mark F. Katz, with whom, on the brief, was Gordon Erickson, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Michael Giansanti et al. v. Zoning Commission of the Town of Stratford et al.
    (12644)
    O’Connell, Foti and Heiman, Js.
    Submitted on briefs October 28
    decision released November 22, 1994

      Davis W. Ganim filed a brief for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      William F. Gildea, special assistant town attorney, and Richard P. Gilardi, assistant town attorney, filed a brief for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

After examining the record on appeal and considering the briefs of the parties, the matter having been submitted to the court upon waiver of oral argument, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Vahig A. Vartanian
    (12753)
    Schaller, Spear and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued October 27
    decision released November 22, 1994

      G. Russell Stewart III, for the appellant (defendant).

      Leah Hawley, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were C. Robert Satti, Sr., state’s attorney, and Stephen Carney, deputy assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Troy Butler
    (12460)
    Dupont, C. J., and Foti and Schaller, Js.
    Argued November 2
    decision released November 22, 1994

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Pamela S. Meotti, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Gary W. Nicholson, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Bienvenido Santiago
    (12521)
    Foti, Schaller and Cretella, Js.
    Argued November 1
    decision released November 22, 1994

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      James G. Clark, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state’s attorney, Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, assistant state’s attorney, and Eve Brunts, law student intern, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. David J. Vumback et al.
    (12800)
    O’Connell, Lavery and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued November 2
    decision released November 22, 1994

      David J. Vumback, pro se, the appellant (named defendant).

      Craig B. Henrici, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting a new sale date.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Jeffrey R. Allard
    (12934)
    O’Connell, Lavery and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued November 2
    decision released November 22, 1994

      Bruce E. Newman, for the appellant (defendant).

      Ronald G. Weller, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Maxine Wilensky, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Fairfield First Bank and Trust Company v. Spiro Armenis et al.
    (13015)
    Lavery, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 3
    decision released November 22, 1994

      Ridgely W. Brown filed a brief for the appellant (named defendant).

      Thomas B. Pursell filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Yolanda Gianfranciso v. A and P Tea Company
    (13275)
    Lavery, Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 3
    decision released November 22, 1994

      Victor M. Ferrante and Edward L. Cleary filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      James T. Baldwin filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The decision of the workers’ compensation review board is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Geraldo Torres
    (13650)
    O’Connell, Foti and Landau, Js.
    Argued November 8
    decision released November 29, 1994

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, and C. Robert Satti, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

This case is controlled by State v. Kelly, 23 Conn. App. 160, 580 A.2d 520, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 831, 583 A.2d 130 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 981, 111 S. Ct. 1635, 113 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1991).

The judgment is affirmed.

         This appeal was taken originally to the Supreme Court. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this court.


text:
    Garret Bush III et al. v. Water Pollution Control Authority of the Town of Waterford et al.
    (12534)
    Heiman, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued November 7
    decision released November 29, 1994

      Conrad Ost Seifert, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Lois J. Lawrence, for the appellee (named defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Antonio D. Farinha
    (12956)
    Dupont, C. J., and Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued November 7
    decision released November 29, 1994

      Michael R. Hasse, for the appellant (defendant).

      Lawrence J. Tytla, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was C. Robert Satti, Sr., state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    David Buonome et al. v. Anthony Boni
    (13042)
    Dupont, C. J., and Lavery and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 3
    decision released November 29, 1994

      Michael J. Whalen filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Leonard A. Fasano filed a brief for the appellees (plaintiffs).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    General Electric Employees Federal Credit Union v. Peter S. Zakrzewski
    (13651)
    O’Connell, Poti and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 3
    decision released November 29, 1994

      David E. Koskoff filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The case is controlled by Staples v. Hendrick, 89 Conn. 100, 93 A. 5 (1915).

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Rafael Lopez
    (11676)
    O’Connell, Foti and Landau, Js.
    Argued November 8
    decision released November 29, 1994

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Joan E. Alexander, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Mark Birney v. Richard Barretta, Jr.
    (12746)
    Lavery, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued November 8
    decision released November 29, 1994

      Albert Carocci, for the appellant (defendant).

      Joseph F. Mulvey, with whom, on the brief, was Melvin Silverman, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Shelly Benedetto v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.
    (13657)
    O’Connell, Foti and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 3
    decision released November 29, 1994

      Leonard M. Crone filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Scott B. Clendaniel filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    CTB Realty Services, Inc. v. Geoffrey Foston et al.
    (13492)
    Heiman, Speak and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 2
    decision released December 20, 1994

      Geoffrey Foston, pro se, the appellant (named defendant), filed a brief.

      Joseph E. Faughnan and Peter G. Kruzynski filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Roberto Vergara
    (13387)
    Foti, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued December 2
    decision released December 20, 1994

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Mary H. Lesser, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Patricia A. Swords, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.

       This appeal was taken originally to the Supreme Court. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this court.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Sixto Nieves
    (13020)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Cretella, Js.
    Argued December 1
    decision released December 20, 1994

      Mark F. Gross, for the appellant (defendant).

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, and JohnF. Blawie, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Yankee Realty Corporation v. North Haven Lanes, Inc., et al.
    (12577)
    O’Connell, Laveey and Heiman, Js.
    Argued November 29
    decision released December 20, 1994

      Kevin P. Walsh, with whom, on the brief, was Michael F. O’Connor, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Edward Wood Dunham, with whom, on the brief, was Eleanor S. DeVane, for the appellees (defendant Joseph R. Greco et al.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Paul G. Dowen
    (13379)
    O’Connell, La very and Heiman, Js.
    Argued November 29
    decision released December 20, 1994

      Gilbert Shasha, for the appellant (defendant).

      Rita M. Shair, assistant state’s attorney, with whom were C. Robert Satti, Sr., state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Peter McShane, assistant state’s attorney, and Stephanie A. Lane, certified legal intern, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

This case is controlled by State v. Tucker, 226 Conn. 618, 629 A.2d 1067 (1993), and State v. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299, 613 A.2d 242 (1992).

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. David Green
    (13438)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued November 28
    decision released December 20, 1994

      Timothy C. Moynahan, with whom, on the brief, were Cheryl E. Heffernan and Ronald J. Barba, for the appellant (defendant).

      Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Michael Dearington, state’s attorney for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Christine Konans v. Zigfrid J. Konans
    (12921)
    O’Connell, Foti and Lavery, Js.
    Argued December 5
    decision released December 20, 1994

      Deborah McGill-Membrino, with whom, on the brief, was Paula N. Anthony, for the appellant (defendant).

      William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Cynthia C. Bott and Rosemary E. Giuliano, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State Street Bank and Trust Company v. John D. LaGreco et al.
    (12964)
    Heiman, Schaller and Spear, Js.
    Argued December 5
    decision released December 20, 1994

      John D. LaGreco, pro se, the appellant (named defendant), filed a brief.

      Anne R. Hoyt, with whom, on the brief, were Deborah L. Dorio and William F. Beckert, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    Bank of Hartford, Inc. v. Harriet T. Parker
    (13229)
    Foti, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued December 2
    decision released December 20, 1994

      Harriet T. Parker, pro se, the appellant (named defendant).

      Scott F. Lewis, with whom, on the brief, were Mona E. Hermand and Arthur M. Lewis, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case

is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Theresa Williams
    (13279)
    Foti, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued December 2
    decision released December 20, 1994

      Vito A. Castignoli, for the appellant (defendant).

      Rita M. Shair, assistant state’s attorney, with whom were Michael J. Weber, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Mary M. Galvin, state’s attorney, and Karen McCormack, certified legal intern, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Dorothy Buckwalter-Blum v. Harold Blum
    (13112)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Landau, Js.
    Argued December 7
    decision released December 8, 1994

      David P. Ball, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Dianne M. Andersen filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. James H. Hairston et al.
    (13173)
    O’Connell, Foti and Lavery, Js.
    Argued December 5
    decision released December 27, 1994

      Daniel P. Kulakofsky, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

      William K. Eisenman, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.


text:
    Patricia C. Peterson v. The Hartford Courant et al.
    (13142)
    Landau, Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 2
    decision released December 27, 1994

      Rene D. Crawford filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Kevin D. O’Leary and William H. Narwold filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Anthony Fucci v. Mildred A. Rudnick et al.
    (13469)
    Landau, Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 2
    decision released December 27, 1994

      Anthony Fucci, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff) filed a brief.

      David J. Robertson filed a brief for the appellee (defendant W. R. Grieger Company).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Agnes-Sue Associates et al. v. Nicholas L. Cerino
    (13038)
    Foti, Lavery and Schaller, Js.
    Argued December 7
    decision released December 27, 1994

      Richard L. Albrecht, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      James G. Green, Jr., with whom was Thomas J. Rechen, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Percell Blakeney
    (12187)
    Foti, Hennessy and Cretella, Js.
    Argued December 12, 1994
    decision released January 3, 1995

      Percell Blakeney, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and David Strollo, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Stanley V. Tucker v. Town of Torrington
    (12760)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Lavery, Js.
    Argued December 9, 1994
    decision released January 3, 1995

      Stanley V. Tucker, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

      Albert G. Vasko, corporation counsel, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Ernest Santoro v. Nellie Santoro
    (13001)
    Foti, Lavery and Schaller, Js.
    Argued December 13, 1994
    decision released January 3, 1995

      John R. Williams, with whom, on the brief, was Vito A. Castignoli, for the appellant (defendant).

      Charles E. Tiernan III, with whom, on the brief, was Mary Beattie Schairer, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Judith B. Lee v. William T. H. Lee
    (13193)
    Dupont, C. J., O’Connell and Lavery, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 9, 1994
    decision released January 3, 1995

      Arnold M. Potash and Jeffrey D. Ginzberg filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Paul E. Potanka filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Katherine C. Sosnowski, Trustee v. Ralph A. Monti
    (13453)
    O’Connell, Foti and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs November 3, 1994
    decision released January 3, 1995

      Paul R. Vallillo filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      James P. Brennan and Anthony D. Santoro filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

This is the defendant lessee’s appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff lessor in a summary process action based on a written lease that by its terms expired on July 31,1994. “While a writ of restoration may issue upon a reversal of a summary process judgment, it can only issue if the lease has not expired by its terms.” Evergreen Manor Associates v. Farrell, 9 Conn. App. 77, 78, 515 A.2d 1081 (1986). Under the circumstances here, there is no practical relief that this court can give. It is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions disconnected from the granting of actual relief. Id.

The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Donald B. Gates v. City of Hartford et al.
    (13530)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Lavery, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 9, 1994
    decision released January 3, 1995

      Lawrence S. Dressier, Howard A. Lawrence and W. Paul Flynn filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Michael E. Satti and Ann M. Siczewicz filed a brief for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. William Jones
    (13536)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Lavery, Js.
    Argued December 9, 1994
    decision released January 3, 1995

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      PamelaS. Meotti, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Michael Pepper, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.

       This appeal was taken originally to the Supreme Court. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this court.


text:
    Board of Education of the Town of Southington v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1303-072
    (13758)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Lavery, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 9, 1994
    decision released January 3, 1995

      J. William Gagne, Jr., and Harry B. Elliott, Jr., filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Thomas N. Sullivan and Mark J. Sommaruga filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Bradley H. B. Honan et al. v. Milton Burton et al.
    (13017)
    Landau, Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Argued December 12, 1994
    decision released January 3, 1995

      Nancy Burton, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Bruce A. Chamberlain, for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Isabel E. Faria v. First National Supermarkets, Inc.
    (12856)
    Lavery, Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Argued December 6, 1994
    decision released January 17, 1995

      Alexander Scheirer, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Duncan J. Forsyth, with whom was Julie F. Grey, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from the judgment rendered following the granting of the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict in a slip and fall case. An examination of the transcript and the record shows that there was no evidence as to the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s fall. See Flemington v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 86, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994); Doe v. Manheimer, 212 Conn. 748, 757-59, 563 A.2d 699 (1989); Wu v. Fair-field, 204 Conn. 435, 438, 528 A.2d 364 (1987). All other issues are moot.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Cynthia G. Grosch v. Douglas R. Grosch
    (12496)
    Laveky, Schallek and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued January 3
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Joseph A. Hourihan, with whom, on the brief, were Joan Keating-McKeon and Robert J. Sickinger, law student intern, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Paul Litman, with whom, on the brief, was Kent Mawhinney, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Hartford Stage Company v. Nautilus Insurance Company
    (12624)
    O’Connell, Foti and Heiman, Js.
    Argued January 4
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Kevin M. Bresnahan, with whom, on the brief, was Michael E. Riley, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Thomas E. Stevens, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Juan Velez
    (12822)
    Heiman, Speak and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued January 9
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Michael J. Graham, for the appellant (defendant).

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James Thomas, state’s attorney, and Thomas Prior, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Arthur Lee Vaught
    (12806)
    Landau, Spear and Freedman, Js.
    Argued January 6
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Christopher M. Cosgrove, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Leah Hawley, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Warren Maxwell, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Richard Lewis v. Connecticut Motor Club, Inc., et al.
    (12930)
    Lavery, Landau and Heiman, Js.
    Argued September 22, 1994
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Laurence V. Parnoff, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      James E. Wildes, with whom, on the brief, was Alfred Forino, for the appellees (defendants).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Mary Collins v. John C. Kucej
    (13190)
    Dupont, C. J., and Schallee and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 6
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Linda P. Dunphy filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Mary A. Conklin filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    James R. Desing v. Lynda J. Desing
    (13463)
    Foti, Laveey and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 6
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Lisa J. Cappalli and Leonard P. Coviello filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Charles F. Stelljes filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    George E. Tibball v. Carol Jean Tibball
    (13486)
    O’Connell, Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 6
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Wesley W. Horton, Karen L. Murdock arid John Reed, legal intern, filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Joy Kony Peshkin and Bruce A. Foodman filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Elizabeth M. Murphy et al. v. Stop and Shop Companies, Inc.
    (13585)
    Dupont, C. J., and Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 6
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Dion W. Moore filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Gerald P. Dwyer filed a brief for the appellee (named plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Department of Correction
    (13083)
    O’Connell, Foti and La very, Js.
    Argued January 4
    decision released January 24, 1995

      J. William Gagner, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Harry B. Elliott, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Robert A. Whitehead, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Charles A. Overend, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Larry Adams
    (13404)
    O’Connell, Landau and Schaller, Js.
    Argued January 9
    decision released January 24, 1995

      Linda S. Denholtz, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, and Brian Kennedy, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    October Twenty-Four, Inc. v. Tomasso Brothers, Inc., et al.
    (13139)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Foti, Js.
    Argued January 3
    decision released January 31, 1995

      Peter J. Zagorsky, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., with whom was Stephen J. Anderson, for the appellee (named defendant).

      Thomas P. Byrne, with whom, on the brief, was Steven E. Byrne, for the appellee (defendant town of Plainville et al.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    C. J. Mozzochi v. William Rogers et al.
    (13119)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Foti, Js.
    Argued January 3
    decision released January 31, 1995

      C. J. Mozzochi, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

      Mark R. Kravitz, with whom was Eric Neff, for the appellees (defendant Victor Perpetua et al.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Inc. v. Custom Pools by L.A. Socci, Inc.
    (13123)
    Foti, Lavery and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 6
    decision released January 31, 1995

      John V. Bologna filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

      Joseph A. Maker filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    October Twenty-Four, Inc. v. Tomasso Brothers, Inc., et al.
    (13138)
    Dupont, C. J., and O’Connell and Foti, Js.
    Argued January 3
    decision released January 31, 1995

      Peter J. Zagorsky, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., with whom was Stephen J. Anderson, for the appellee (named defendant).

      Thomas P. Byrne, with whom, on the brief, was Steven E. Byrne, for the appellee (defendant town of Plainville et al.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Domenica Lawson v. Alan R. Rappelt et al.
    (13225)
    Foti, Laveey and Landau, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 6
    decision released January 31, 1995

      Garrett M. Moore and Gregory E. O’Brien filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Lois A. Frankforter filed a brief for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Walter Poe
    (13235)
    Lavery, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued January 3
    decision released January 31, 1995

      Lori Welch-Rubin, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas M. Conroy, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and James Turcotte, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.

       Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this court.


text:
    Cynthia Gray, Administratrix (Estate of Shanequa Gray), et al. v. Hospital of Saint Raphael
    (13247)
    Landau, Heiman and Spear, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 6
    decision released January 31, 1995

      Karen E. Souza filed a brief for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Charles P. Reed and Shaun S. Sullivan filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Jeffrey MacLachlan
    (13304)
    (13305)
    Landau, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued January 5
    decision released January 31, 1995

      Stephen F. Cashman, for the appellant (defendant).

      Kimberly A. Graham, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were C. Robert Satti, state’s attorney, and Stephen Carney, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Steve M. Cooper v. Karen P. Cooper
    (13282)
    Dupont, C. J., and Schaller and Hennessy, Js.
    Submitted on briefs January 6
    decision released January 31, 1995

      Vito A. Castignoli filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Joseph J. Mager, Jr., filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Chris P. Stergos v. Beverly J. Stergos
    (13026)
    Laveky, Heiman and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued January 10
    decision released February 7, 1995

      Lloyd Frauenglass, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Jeffrey D. Mickelson, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Lawrence J. Brunoli
    (13610)
    (13611)
    Lavery, Heiman and Hennessy, Js.
    Argued Janury 10
    decision released February 7, 1995

      Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, for the appellant (defendant).

      Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Frank S. Maco, state’s attorney, and James Fletcher, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company v. Alan Brooks et al.
    (13313)
    O’Connell, Landau and Spear, Js.
    Argued January 10
    decision released February 7, 1995

      Lawrence S. Hillman, for the appellant (defendant Francine Brooks).

      David F. Weber, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Thomas Tatum v. Commissioner of Correction
    (13732)
    Lavery, Heiman and Schaller, Js.
    Argued January 11
    decision released February 7, 1995

      James B. Streeto, special public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, and Gerard P. Eisenman, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    In re Crystal S. et al.

    (13671)
    Dupont, C. J., and Foti and Spear, Js.
    Argued January 12
    decision released February 14, 1995

      Patricia J. Sloan, for the appellant (respondent mother).

      Mary-Anne Ziewacz Mulholland, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).

       In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 4166B.2, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Appellate Court.

   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Town of Weston et al. v. Barry L. Reade et al.
    (13673)
    Dupont, C. J., and Lavery and Schaller, Js.
    Argued January 13
    decision released February 14, 1995

      David S. Grossman, for the appellant (named defendant).

      Christopher J. Jarboe, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    Mortgage Properties Corporation v. David Wagner et al.
    (13765)
    Dupont, C. J., and Lavery and Schaller, Js.
    Argued January 13
    decision released February 14, 1995

      David R. Wagner, pro se, the appellant (named defendant).

      Paul A. De Genaro, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.