author: WICKERSHAM, Judge:

text:
    444 A.2d 127
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Zachary L. RICKETTS, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Sept. 11, 1980.
    Filed April 12, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Aug. 6, 1982.

      Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   WICKERSHAM, Judge:

Zachary L. Ricketts was convicted of having altered or obliterated marks of identification. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6117 provides as follows:

§ 6117. Altering or obliterating marks of identification
(a) Offense defined.—No person shall change, alter, remove, or obliterate the name of the maker, model, manufacturer’s number, or other mark of identification on any firearm.
(b) Presumption.—Possession of any firearm, upon which any such mark shall have been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated, shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has changed, altered, removed, or obliterated the same.
Act of December 6,1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, eff. June 6, 1973.

Following his Philadelphia County Municipal Court trial, non-jury, he was sentenced to pay court costs of $50.00 and $10.00 to the Victim’s Compensation Fund.

Following his conviction, Zachary Ricketts filed a petition for writ of certiorari which petition was denied and this appeal followed.

The underlying facts of this case were set forth accurately by the Honorable Charles L. Durham in his opinion under date of February 20, 1980 in which he held that the municipal court judge did not err in finding the defendant guilty as charged and accordingly held that defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari was properly denied.

The facts are undisputed. Officer Joseph Hasara, Badge No. 3220, 12th District Philadelphia Police Department, testified that in response to information received, he and his partner proceeded to the 1100 block of South 49th Street where they observed a Negro male walking south on 49th Street who matched the description of the male he received. (N.T. 4). As the police approached him, the defendant threw a brown checkered jacket over the railroad bridge onto the tracks. (N.T. 4, 13, 16-17). The defendant was placed up against a fence and frisked. (N.T. 4). Officer Hasara walked to the tracks and retrieved the jacket while his partner watched the defendant. Upon retrieving the jacket, Officer Hasara felt a hard object inside the breast pocket. The ‘object’ was a silver .32 caliber Clerke revolver with a two and one-half (2V2) to three (3) inch barrel. The plastic grips of the revolver were secured with wire. (N.T. 4-6). The officer testified that he received nine (9) years training in weapons, six (6) years in the Air Force and three (3) in the police Department. This training included the use, handling, appearance and maintenance of firearms, including .32 caliber weapons. (N.T. 8). During this training period the officer learned that the serial numbers on .32 caliber weapons are found either on the base of the handle or on the base of the cylinder if it is open or removable. (N.T. 9). After examining the retrieved .32 caliber weapon, the officer noticed that the serial number was scratched out. He could see only a partial number.

Lower ct. op. at 2-3.

In Commonwealth v. Mason, 483 Pa. 409, 397 A.2d 408 (1979), Justice Roberts in discussing section 6117 said:

To establish its case, the Commonwealth relies on the ‘presumption’ in section 6117(b) of the Crimes Code. Section 6117(b) provides:
(b) Presumption.—Possession of any firearm, upon which any such mark shall have been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated, shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has changed, altered, removed, or obliterated the same.’
The Commonwealth properly notes that the use of the term ‘presumption’ in section 6117(b) does not settle its intended legal effect. The Model Penal Code provides that statutory presumptions establishing crimes 'or elements of a crime, create inferences, not rebuttable presumptions:
‘[WJhen there is evidence of the facts which give rise to the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury, unless the Court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact. . . . ’
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 1.12. Accord, 9 Wigmore § 2513 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence (2d ed. 1972) § 346 (‘Both the right of the defendant to trial by jury and his right to have the prosecution prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt are constitutionally protected. A rule that shifted the burden of producing evidence with regard to an element so as to require the jury to find against the defendant in the absence of rebutting evidence or that required that the defendant persuade the jury of the non-existence of such an element would violate both these rights’); F.R.Ev. 303(b) (Proposed). We have held that, “virtually all so-called ‘criminal presumptions’ are really no more than permissible inferences.” Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188, 193, 329 A.2d 204, 208 (1974). We adopt the . position argued by the Commonwealth that § 6117(b) creates a permissible inference.

Id., 483 Pa. at 412-13, 397 A.2d at 410-11.

It was, of course, the burden of the Commonwealth to establish beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime charged. Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370, 344 A.2d 877 (1975); Commonwealth v. Darush, 256 Pa.Super. 344, 389 A.2d 1156 (1978). Instantly, there is no doubt that Zachary L. Ricketts was in possession of a silver .32 caliber Clerke revolver and that the serial number of the weapon was scratched out. Possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, however, is not the crime. Under section 6117(a), the offense is “obliteration.” In Mason, our supreme court concluded that mere possession of a weapon with an obliterated mark was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the crime covered by section 6117 of the Crimes Code. Our case, however, goes factually beyond that point and is more analogous to Commonwealth v. Shore, 259 Pa.Super. 404, 393 A.2d 889 (1978). In Shore, the defendant not only had possession of the altered weapon but attempted to get rid of it when he saw the approaching police. As we said in Shore:

In the instant case, the court below in its verdict indicated that it did not rely on the presumption but relied upon the fact that the defendant had possession of the altered weapon and attempted to get rid of it when he saw the approaching police, so indicating by inference the guilty knowledge of its altered condition. This reasoning leads to a logical conclusion but it is strengthened by the addition of the presumption provided in the act itself. We find that the defendant’s possession of the altered weapon, his attempt to get rid of it when he saw the police and the presumption justify the inference that the defendant altered the identification marks on the weapon. There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

Id., 259 Pa.Super, at 406-07, 393 A.2d at 891.

Instantly, as the police approached the defendant he threw his brown jacket over the railroad bridge onto the tracks. The police retrieved his jacket and the altered .32 caliber revolver was taken from the inside breast pocket. As in Shore, we had not only an altered weapon, and possession of it by the appellant Zachary L. Ricketts, but his attempt to get rid of it when he saw the approaching police, so indicating by inference his guilty knowledge of its altered condition. We find under all the facts and circumstances of this case that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      . In this appeal, two questions are raised:
      1. Did not the trial court err in convicting appellant of violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 6117, by virtue of appellant’s innocent possession of a gun which bore a partially obliterated serial number, in the absence of evidence that appellant obliterated the serial number or was even aware that the number had been altered?
      2. Even assuming that appellant’s mere possession of the gun justifiably leads to the conclusion that he obliterated the serial number, is not the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction where the Commonwealth failed to establish that the gun was operable and therefore a ‘firearm’ within the meaning of Section 6117.
      Brief for Appellant at 2.

      . There is no merit whatsoever to the second question involved in this appeal, to wit, that the Commonwealth failed to establish that the gun was operable. In this connection, we adopt the following portion of the appellee’s brief in response thereto:
      A ‘firearm’ is defined in 18 Pa.C.S. [§ 6102] as ‘.. . any pistol or revolver with a barrel less than twelve inches, any shotgun with a barrel less than 24 inches or any rifle with a barrel less than 15 inches .. . ’ No requirement of operability is built into the statute. Where the legislative intent is clear and unambiguous, no such requirement may be read in by the courts.
      ... The purpose of requiring serial numbers on firearms is to be able to trace the path a particular firearm has taken, for example from its legitimate owner to a thief who intends to use it for violence. For this purpose, it makes no difference whether the gun is currently operable. Even if it is not, the societal interest in keeping track of its whereabouts, identifying it and returning it to its legitimate owner remains strong. An inoperable gun-which may at some time be made operable-with an obliterated serial number is as dangerous in the stream of illicit commerce as an operable gun.
      Appellee’s Brief at 3.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    444 A.2d 130
    The LAUREL NATIONAL BANK, Appellant v. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE COMPANY.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 14, 1980.
    Filed April 12, 1982.

      Edward Peduzzi, Ebensburg, for appellant.
    R. Thomas Strayer, Johnstown, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   WICKERSHAM, Judge:

The instant appeal arises from an order awarding appellant, Laurel National Bank (“Laurel Bank”), insurance coverage as mortgagee under one mortgage but denying it coverage on the same property and under the same policy under its second mortgage. Laurel Bank contends that both mortgages should be covered by the insurance policy and that the amount due under the policy should not be limited to its pre-foreclosure debt.

The following transactions occurred on November 28, 1975. Dorance L. Jensen and his wife, Mary L. Jensen, conveyed a parcel of land to H. Lynn Hale and Ann Hale in consideration of a $38,000 purchase price. The Hales then executed and delivered a mortgage on this parcel in favor of Laurel Bank to secure a loan for $25,000. The Hales also executed a second mortgage on the premises in favor of the Jensens to secure a loan of $27,000. The Jensens then assigned the Hales’ second mortgage to Laurel Bank, the first mortgagee. The Hales also secured a homeowner’s insurance policy on the newly purchased property through appellee, Mutual Benefit Insurance Company (“Mutual Benefit”). The policy provided coverage for loss from fire in the amount of $50,000 for the dwelling and $5,000 for appurtenant structures, and $25,000 for unscheduled personal property. The policy contained a standard mortgage clause naming Laurel Bank as mortgagee.

The Hales defaulted on their mortgage payments almost immediately. Laurel Bank then foreclosed on both mortgages and on personal property covered in a security agreement. A sheriff’s sale was held on October 22, 1976 and the real and personal property was struck to Laurel Bank for costs, approximately $14,000.

On November 19, 1976, fire destroyed the house and personal property which were financed by the two mortgages. Mutual Benefit was notified of the fire damage by Laurel Bank soon thereafter and at that time first became aware of the mortgage foreclosure.

The only issue concerns the extent of Laurel Bank’s interest in the insured property and the amount of insurance proceeds it is entitled to recover for the loss because of its interest. While a mortgagee has an insurable interest, the mortgagee is usually insured only to the extent of the mortgage debt since the amount of the debt represents its personal interest in the property. Chestnut Corporation v. Bankers Bond and Mortgage Co., 395 Pa. 153, 149 A.2d 48 (1959).

The problem in the instant case is that the bank’s interest, and therefore the amount of insurance proceeds it may recover, is not easily determined. Prior to the fire, Laurel Bank bid in its interest and foreclosed its two mortgages. The bank ceased to be a mortgagee when it ripened its interest into ownership. Since the foreclosure of the mortgage normally extinguishes the mortgage debt, and the loss was sustained after the foreclosure, the first question becomes whether Laurel’s interest even remained covered by the insurance contract. Our research has not uncovered any Pennsylvania precedent on this point so we must turn to the case law of other jurisdictions.

In resolving this issue, we again note that Mutual Benefit’s insurance policy contained a standard mortgage clause. The pertinent language of this clause reads as follows:

Loss, if any, under this policy, shall be payable to the mortgagee (or trustee), named on the first page of this policy, as interest may appear, under all present or future mortgages herein described in which the aforesaid may have an interest as mortgagee (or trustee), in order of precedence of said mortgages, and this insurance, as to the interest of the mortgagee (or trustee) only therein, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described property, nor by any foreclosure or other proceedings or notice of sale relating to the property, nor by any change in the title or ownership of the property, nor by the occupation of the premises for purposes more hazardous than are permitted by this policy; provided, that in case the mortgagor or owner shall neglect to pay any premium due under this policy, the mortgagee (or trustee) shall, on demand, pay the same. Provided also, that the mortgagee (or trustee) shall notify this Company of any change of ownership or occupancy or increase of hazard which shall come to the knowledge of said mortgagee (or trustee) and, unless permitted by this policy, it shall be noted thereon and the mortgagee (or trustee) shall, on demand, pay the premium for such increased hazard for the term of the use thereof, otherwise this policy shall be null and void. (Emphasis supplied).

It’s clear from this language that the parties contemplated the possibility of foreclosure. Moreover, the insurer agreed to provide coverage for the mortgagee’s interest in the property even if there was a “foreclosure or other proceedings or notice of sale relating to the property” or a “change in the title or ownership of the property.” The foreclosure referred to in the contract must mean a foreclosure by the mortgagee since the purchase of the property by anyone else at the foreclosure proceedings would extinguish the mortgagee’s insurable interests. As an appellate court in Illinois stated, “[I]t is apparent that the provisions of the mortgage clause in question [a standard mortgage clause] were clearly intended to cover the mortgagee’s interest as it succeeded to ownership through foreclosure.” Guardian Savings & Loan Association v. Reserve Insurance Co., 2 Ill.App.3d 77, 79, 276 N.E.2d 109, 111 (1971).

The provision requiring the mortgagee to notify the insurer of any “change in ownership” must be construed as requiring notice only when someone other than the mortgagee acquires the property. The reference in the first paragraph to “foreclosure or other proceedings” and “change in . . . ownership” refers to two different occurrences. Since only a “change in ownership” is spelled out as requiring notification in the second paragraph of the clause, an increase in the mortgagee’s interest through foreclosure must not require notification. This is in accordance with the theory that under a policy containing a standard mortgage clause, the mortgagee’s interest is regarded as separately insured, and his acquisition of title to the insured property is generally regarded as an increase of interest, rather than a change of ownership. See 43 AM.JUR.2d, Insurance, § 890 (1969). From this construction, it follows that the acquisition of title by the mortgagee cannot be used by an insurer to deny coverage under the provision requiring notice when there is a “change of ownership”. Our holding is supported by the case law of numerous jurisdictions. Guardian Savings & Loan Association v. Reserve Insurance Co., supra; Federal National Mortgage Association v. Great American Insurance Co., 157 Ind.App. 347, 300 N.E.2d 117 (1973); Fort Scott Building & Loan Association v. Palatine Insurance Co., 74 Kan. 272, 86 P. 142 (1906); Federal National Mortgage Association v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 46 Mich.App. 587, 208 N.W.2d 573 (1973); Shores v. Rabon, 251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556 (1960).

The question remains, however, whether the “change in ownership” in the policy provision applies when the mortgagor’s period of redemption has expired. Since we held that the provision requiring notice only pertained to someone not a party to the original contract, we fail to see the significance of the passage of the period of redemption. The insurance company should explicitly incorporate a provision in the contract requiring notice that the period of redemption after foreclosure has passed if it desires such notice. See Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Agricultural Insurance of Watertown, New York, 172 S.C. 109, 173 S.E. 295 (1934); Oregon Mortgage Co. Ltd. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 122 Wash. 183, 210 P. 385 (1922).

In applying the above legal propositions to the case before us, it is clear that Laurel Bank’s insurable interests continued to be covered under the standard mortgage clause in the policy even though it increased its interest by bidding in the mortgage debt at the foreclosure proceedings. At the time of the loss, the mortgagor’s period of redemption had passed. See 13 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 645 (“In Pennsylvania, the mortgagor has no common-law equity to redeem the property after the sheriff’s sale, and no such right is conferred by statute.”) (citation omitted). Since the mortgagors, the Hales, made no effort to redeem the property, they cannot claim any portion of the insurance proceeds. The bank, as owner, therefore, is entitled to the full amount of insurance proceeds due under the policy.

The above is true even though the insurance proceeds and the value of the damaged property were more than the value of the remaining mortgage debt. Mutual Benefit’s insurance policy protected the insurable interests of the mortgagors, the Hales, and the mortgagee, Laurel Bank. The mortgagor’s rights to any insurance proceeds were cut off by foreclosure but the mortgagee’s rights to any insurance proceeds increased while remaining insured under the policy by the standard mortgage clause. If we held that Laurel Bank was only entitled to its remaining mortgage debt, the insurance company would receive a windfall since the mortgagors’ (the Hales’) rights had been extinguished. See Malvaney v. Yager, 101 Mont. 331, 54 P.2d 135 (1936).

The instant case is similar to the leading case of Continental Insurance Company of New York v. Rotholz, 222 Ala. 574, 133 So. 587 (1931). In Rotholz, the mortgagee foreclosed and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale within the policy coverage time and prior to the loss by fire. In answering the insurer’s contention that there had been a change of ownership and that no notice had been given of the change, the court replied that the standard mortgage clause created an independent contract and the elevation of the mortgagee to owner by foreclosure prior to the fire loss did not affect the operation of the clause. The court further held that the fact that the mortgage debt had been satisfied prior to suit did not preclude recovery under the policy by the mortgagee when the loss occurred subsequent to the satisfaction of the mortgage debt.

After quoting Rotholz with approval, the court in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Wilborn, 291 Ala. 193, 279 So.2d 460 (1973) stated:

In the “foreclosure prior to loss” situation (Rotholz) the foreclosure (or other change or increase of ownership or change of title as contemplated by the loss payee clause) occurs in the context of the insured property existing in its undamaged condition and the satisfaction of debt takes into account the value of such property in its undamaged condition prior to loss and the need for the insurance to follow the property. . . . [T]he value of the undamaged property at the time of foreclosure is an incident to the satisfaction of the debt.

Id. 279 So.2d at 464.

Both Wilborn and Rotholz were careful to note that where the loss precedes the foreclosure, the rule is different since the mortgagee may satisfy the mortgage indebtedness by two different means. First, he may recover up to the limits of the policy the full amount of the mortgage debt under the standard mortgage clause. The second alternative is to satisfy the mortgage debt through foreclosure and then recover the balance due, if there is any, under the insurance policy as owner. In contrast to the instant case,

the foreclosure occurs in the context of the insured property having been damaged and the satisfaction of the debt takes into account the damaged conditions of the property at the time of foreclosure. [T]o allow recovery of insurance proceeds by the mortgagee after full satisfaction of the debt would amount to mortgagee’s unjust enrichment.

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Wilborn, supra 291 So.2d at 464. Accord: Rosenbaum v. Funcannon, 308 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1962); Lembo v. Parks, 6 Mass.App. 850, 372 N.E.2d 1316 (1978).

A general rule may be formulated to establish that under a policy containing a standard mortgage clause, the-mortgagee’s interest is protected as it may appear before or after foreclosure or other methods of change of ownership or title for the insurance follows the property. The exception to this general rule is that if the mortgage indebtedness is fully satisfied after loss by foreclosure or other means, the mortgagee may not recover any proceeds under the insurance policy.

In adopting this general rule, we hold that the mortgagee, Laurel Bank, was covered at the time of the loss as owner. In so holding, we have overruled the lower court’s finding that the bank’s compensation for damages to the insured property is limited to the amount of pre-foreclosure debt. The authority cited by the court below, Federal National Mortgage Association v. Great American, supra, also held that a mortgagee which had increased its interest to ownership following foreclosure was entitled to insurance proceeds for a subsequent loss because the standard mortgage clause had created a separate, independent contract. Without any analysis or explanation, however, that court then limited the mortgagee’s recovery to its pre-foreclosure debt even though it clearly held that the mortgagee’s increased interests as owner were covered. We do not find Great American to be convincing authority for limiting the extent of insurance proceeds recoverable by the mortgagee in this situation.

Finally, we wish to note that the trial court’s criticism of City of Chicago v. Maynur, 28 Ill.App.3d 751, 329 N.E.2d 312 (1975) is not applicable to the instant case. The Illinois rule announced in Maynur also held that the mortgagee in the “loss after foreclosure” situation may collect to the full extent of the loss rather than only to the extent of its pre-foreclosure debt, even though the loss exceeds the debt. In criticizing Maynur, the lower court noted that the mortgagor would be entitled to the amount in excess of the mortgage debt since the redemption period had not yet expired. We again note that the Hales’ redemption period had passed so that in the instant situation there is no possibility that Mutual Benefit would have to pay a portion of the claim twice. See Consolidated Mortgage Corporation v. American Security Insurance Company, 69 Mich.App. 251, 244 N.W.2d 434 (1976) (Dissent).

In conclusion, we find that Laurel Bank increased its interests into ownership and that its increased interest continued to be covered under Mutual Benefit’s policy. Since the loss occurred after the foreclosure, Laurel Bank, as owner, is entitled to the full amount of insurance proceeds which would have been payable to the Hales, the original owners and mortgagors.

Judgment reversed and this case is remanded to determine the amount of insurance proceeds due appellant.

LIPEZ, J., concurs in the result.

      . Since we have determined that Laurel Bank’s insurable interest was that of owner and not that of mortgagee, we need not address the lower court’s holding that the bank’s second mortgage was not covered by Mutual Benefit’s policy. In any event, we note that the mortgagors were required to secure and maintain a liability insurance policy with a loss payable clause in favor, of the mortgagor and mortgagee “as their respective interest may appear.” “The purpose of such a provision is purely to protect the mortgagee’s interest, and such interest continues until the mortgage debt is paid.” Guarantee Trust and Safe Deposit Insurance Company of Shamokin v. Home

        Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Broome County, New York, 180 Pa.Superior Ct. 1, 7, 117 A.2d 824, 827 (1955).
      5 Couch, Insurance 2d § 29:82 (1960) provides:
      As a general rule, if the mortgagor covenants to keep the mortgaged property insured for the better security of the motgagee [sic], the latter will have an equitable lien upon the proceeds of insurance carried by the mortgagor, in case of a loss, to the extent of his interest in the property destroyed, even though the policy contains no mortgage clause and is payable to the mortgagor. The rule is likewise applied even though there is no formal covenant but merely an agreement of the parties, and it is oral.
      The equitable lien doctrine is followed in Pennsylvania. Pearson Mfg. Co. v. Pittsburgh Steamboat Co., 309 Pa. 340, 163 A. 680 (1933); First National Bank of Jessup v. Cappellini, 149 Pa.Superior Ct. 14, 26 A.2d 119 (1942). Therefore, Laurel Bank’s second mortgage would have been covered under the policy even though it was not specifically set forth in the policy. This is logical since the purpose of the provision is to protect the mortgagee and there were no conflicting claims over the proceeds.
      In view of our decision today, we need not reach Laurel Bank’s second contention that the lower court erred in sustaining Mutual Benefit’s objection to Laurel Bank’s offer into evidence of the renewal insurance policy as issued by Mutual Benefit involving the same parties and subject matter as the original policy.

      . Laurel Bank took a direct appeal to this court from the Order dated June 15, 1979 dismissing exceptions en banc. We quashed the appeal as being interlocutory. 295 Pa.Superior Ct. 255, 441 A.2d 756. Final judgment was thereafter entered and on February 9, 1982 we granted appellant’s petition for reconsideration and now reach the merits of the appeal.


text:
    444 A.2d 135
    Richard R. DENARDO v. Daniel C. CARNEVAL, D.O. Appeal of Daniel C. CARNEVAL, D.O. Appeal of Richard R. DENARDO.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted April 16, 1980.
    Filed April 12, 1982.

      Judgment against defendant affirmed; remanded for new trial on issue of damages.

      James T. Marnen, Erie, for appellant in No. 785 and for appellee in No. 786.
    James D. McDonald, Jr., Erie, for appellant, in No. 786 and for appellee in No. 785.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   WICKERSHAM, Judge:

Richard R. DeNardo filed a complaint in trespass against Doctors Osteopathic Hospital and Daniel C. Carneval, D.O., in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County in which he alleged that on or about April 9, 1975 he was admitted to Doctors Osteopathic Hospital with a chief complaint of right hip pain, right lower back pain and right leg pain with radiation to the knee accompanied by chills and fever. He alleged further that on April 29, 1975, while so hospitalized, Daniel C. Carneval, D.O., an individual engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery, performed a right retro-peritoneal exploration (in the psoas area) with intra-abdominal exploration resulting in drainage of an apparent retro-peritoneal abscess. Plaintiff was discharged from Doctors Osteopathic Hospital on May 7, 1975.

He further alleged that his symptoms returned; he was readmitted to the hospital on June 7,1975 and on June 9, Dr. Carneval again performed a retroperitoneal exploration on the right with re-exploration of the right psoas abscess and insertion of irrigating tubes and drains. He was discharged from the hospital on July 7,1975 and admitted to a different medical facility, Hamot Medical Center in Erie, the same day. While there, complete gastrointestinal tract studies were performed which showed constrictive narrowing in the terminal ileum. An exploratory laparotomy, was performed on July 14, 1975 including resection of the terminal ileum and ascending colon and exploration of the retroperitoneal area with drainage of the abscess. He was discharged from Hamot Medical Center July 29, 1975.

The thrust of the complaint filed by Richard R. DeNardo is that while he was being treated by Dr. Carneval at Doctors Osteopathic Hospital, he was suffering from regional ileitis with abscess formation involving the terminal cecum and the ileum with the fistulous tract extending into the right ileopsoas space, which in turn created a right ileopsoas abscess. He alleges further that this problem was ultimately correctly diagnosed by the treating physicians at Hamot Medical Center during his hospitalization there from July 7 through August 21, 1975.

In Count I of his complaint he alleged that the negligence of Dr. Carneval consisted of failing to properly diagnose and treat his condition and of failing to secure a reliable evaluation of his condition including complete studies of his gastrointestinal tract. He set forth various medical expenses that he incurred in excess of $10,000.00 and lost wages from his occupation as a teacher in excess of $1,700.00. Count II of his complaint set forth similar allegations against the Doctors Osteopathic Hospital. The complaint was filed September 9, 1976.

An answer was filed on behalf of Daniel C. Carneval and Doctors Osteopathic Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment. By order dated April 18, 1978 the Honorable Lindley R. McClelland denied the motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, however, on October 31, 1978 all parties by stipulation agreed that Doctors Osteopathic Hospital be discharged from the suit and the court approved such stipulation.

The matter proceeded to trial, non-jury, before the Honorable James B. Dwyer, President Judge, Orphan’s Court Division who on November 6, 1978 found “in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $7,500.00.” Exceptions were filed to the verdict by both Richard R. DeNardo and Daniel C. Carneval which exceptions were dismissed May 31, 1979 by the Erie County Court en banc including Judges Dwyer, McClelland and the Honorable William E. Pfadt. Judgment was duly entered on the verdict and both parties have appealed to our court.

I. IS EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT A FAILURE TO PERFORM CERTAIN DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURES DEVIATES FROM THE ACCEPTED STANDARD OF CARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE SUCH DEVIATION WHEN IT IS SHOWN THAT SUCH EXPERTS IN THEIR OWN PRACTICE EITHER DID NOT PERFORM SUCH PROCEDURES OR OBTAINED AN INCONCLUSIVE OR INCORRECT DIAGNOSIS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S ILLNESS BY PERFORMING SAME?

The thrust of the first question raised by Dr. Carneval in this appeal is that he was not negligent in his treatment of Mr. DeNardo and that plaintiff’s evidence did not establish medical malpractice.

It would be instructive to determine the test before us and our scope of appellate review in this area. In Smith v. Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 194 A.2d 167 (1963) our supreme court said:

In considering this contention certain well settled principles in this area of the law must be kept in mind: (a) in the absence of a special contract, a physician neither warrants a cure nor guarantees the result of his treatment . . .; (b) ‘A physician who is not a specialist is required to possess and employ in the [diagnosis and] treatment of a patient the skill and knowledge usually possessed by physicians [of good standing] in the same or a similar locality giving due regard to the advanced state of the profession at the time of the treatment; and in employing the required skill and knowledge he is also required to exercise the care and judgment of a reasonable man’ . . .; (c) the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove either (1) that the physician did not possess and employ the required skill or knowledge or (2) that he did not exercise the care and judgment of a reasonable man in like circumstances . . .; (d) the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and exclusive control are not applicable in this area of the law . . .; (e) in malpractice cases which involve an appraisal of the care and skill of a physician a lay jury presumably lacks the necessary knowledge and experience to render an intelligent decision without expert testimony and must be guided by such expert testimony . . .; (f) the only exception to the requirement that expert testimony must be produced is ‘where the matter under investigation is so simple, and the lack of skill or want of care so obvious, as to be within the range of the ordinary experience and comprehension of even non-professional persons * * *’ . . .; (g) a physician is not liable for an error of judgment . . .; (h) if a physician employs the required judgment and care in arriving at his diagnosis, the mere fact that he erred in his diagnosis will not render him liable, even though his treatment is not proper for the condition that actually exists (Richards v. Willard, 176 Pa. 181, 35 A. 114 (fracture as a sprain); Duckworth v. Bennett [320 Pa. 47, 181 A. 558], supra, (fracture as arthritis); Ward v. Garvin [328 Pa. 395, 195 A. 885], supra, (wrong diagnosis of injury to foot).

Id., 412 Pa. at 98-100, 194 A.2d at 170-171 (footnotes and citations omitted).

In McMahon v. Young, 442 Pa. 484, 276 A.2d 534 (1971) the supreme court discussed the test for determining whether a doctor’s testimony was legally competent evidence. The court said:

... As we said in Menarde v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954), summarizing the case law on the subject:
‘ * * * [T]he expert has to testify, not that the condition of claimant might have, or even probably did, come from the accident, but that in his professional opinion the result in question came from the cause alleged. A less direct expression of opinion falls below the required standard of proof and does not constitute legally competent evidence (citing cases).’
The issue is not merely one of semantics. There is a logical reason for the rule. The opinion of a medical expert is evidence. If the fact finder chooses to believe it, he can find as fact what the expert gave as an opinion. For a fact finder to award damages for a particular condition to a plaintiff it must find as a fact that that condition was legally caused by the defendant’s conduct. . . . Perhaps in the world of medicine nothing is absolutely certain. Nevertheless, doctors must make decisions in their own profession every day based on their own expert opinions. Physicians must understand that it is the intent of our law that if the plaintiff’s medical expert cannot form an opinion with sufficient certainty so as to make a medical judgment, there is nothing on the record with which a jury can make a decision with sufficient certainty so as to make a legal judgment.

Id., 442 Pa. at 485, 276 A.2d at 535.

Our scope of review of the record of a trial before a judge without a jury was clearly set forth in Rubinstein v. J. E. Kunkel Co., 244 Pa.Super. 474, 368 A.2d 819 (1976):

Initially, ‘[ajppellate review of the record of a trial before a judge without a jury is limited to a determination of whether the findings of fact of the court below are supported by competent evidence and whether or not the lower court committed error of law.’ . .. Further, when an appellate court reviews a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, it must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner.... At the same time, a party cannot prevail if the evidence is so insubstantial that the factfinder must speculate about a factual issue.

Id., 244 Pa.Super. at 479-80, 368 A.2d at 822. (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s medical expert witnesses Robert G. Timmons, M.D., and M. Lawrence Brockmyer, M.D., testified that Dr. Carneval breached the standard of care owed by a physician. They both testified that Dr. Carneval failed to recognize following the April 29, 1975 surgery that the source of Mr. DeNardo’s abscess was in the abdomen. They further testified that Dr. Carneval’s subsequent failure to conduct proper diagnostic tests, including the barium enema and G.I. series, to better define the source of this problem after the April surgery and again following the reoccurrence of Mr. DeNardo’s symptoms in June of 1975 and the performance of a second surgical procedure without that information constituted a breach of the standard of care. As the lower court stated in its en banc Opinion dated May 31, 1979 “[t]he evidence showed that the defendant should have made further studies and/or tests to determine plaintiff’s actual condition at” the point where he returned for further medical treatment following the first operation. Lower ct. op. at 2. The lower court en banc further concluded that the defendant’s lack of further investigation violated the standard of knowledge and skill possessed by area physicians of good standing and did not demonstrate the care and judgment of a reasonable man.

We conclude from our independent review of the record that there was adequate evidence upon which the court could make such conclusions in finding for the plaintiff as it did. We further find that the standards set forth in Smith v. Yohe, supra, and McMahon v. Young, supra, were met and that under Rubinstein v. J. E. Kunkel Co., supra we have determined that the findings of fact of the court below are indeed supported by competent evidence and that no error of law was committed by the lower court. We have viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner in reaching these conclusions.

II. ARE DAMAGES PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE FAILURE TO PERFORM CERTAIN DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURES WHERE IT IS SHOWN THAT THE LATER PERFORMANCE OF SUCH PROCEDURES BY DIFFERENT PHYSICIANS FAILED TO CONCLUSIVELY OR CORRECTLY DIAGNOSE THE SOURCE OF PLAINTIFF’S SYMPTOMS?

It was, of course, the position taken by Richard R. DeNardo at trial that Dr. Carneval, having breached the standard of care imposed upon him, thereby increased the risk of physical harm to the patient DeNardo, and that such harm did in fact result. Such was the testimony of Dr. Timmons and Dr. Brockmyer, both noting the prolongation of DeNardo’s hospitalization caused by the defendant’s breach. They also noted the pain, discomfort and deterioration in DeNardo’s condition relating to the delay in proper treatment.

Mr. Justice Kauffman in Jones v. Montefiore Hospital, 494 Pa. 410, 431 A.2d 920 (1981) stated:

Proximate cause is a term of art, and may be established by evidence that a defendant’s negligent act or failure to act was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm inflicted upon a plaintiff.. . .
... Section 323(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) has long been recognized as part of the law of Pennsylvania, . . . the effect of that section was to relax the degree of certainty ordinarily required of a plaintiff’s evidence to provide a basis upon which a jury may find causation:
[Ojnce a plaintiff has demonstrated that defendant’s acts or omissions, in a situation to which Section 323(a) applies, have increased the risk of harm to another, such evidence furnishes a basis for the fact-finder to go further and find that such increased risk was in turn, a substantial factor in bringing about the resultant harm; the necessary proximate cause will have been made out if the jury sees fit to find cause in fact.
. . . Thus, medical opinion need only demonstrate, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that a defendant’s conduct increased the risk of the harm actually sustained, and the jury then must decide whether that conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

Id. 494 at 416-17, 431 A.2d at 923-24.

Our review of the record convinces us that plaintiff through his medical expert witnesses demonstrated that defendant’s acts or omissions increased the risk of harm to his patient DeNardo, such evidence furnishing a basis for the trial judge, factfinder, to go further and find that such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor in bringing about the resultant harm.

III. DOES A TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL EXPENSES NOT PLEADED IN PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT?

Dr. Carneval alleges as his third question involved in this appeal that the trial judge erred in admitting plaintiff’s exhibits 8, 18 and 19 representing the statement of charges from Hamot Medical Center, statement of charges from Dr. Brockmyer and statement of charges from Dr. Timmons respectively. This was a matter of discretion with the trial judge and no error resulted. The appeal of Daniel C. Carneval is without merit.

Turning to the appeal filed by Richard R. DeNardo we will discuss the second issue raised, having already covered the first and third issues in reviewing the appeal of Dr. Carneval.

2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD MEDICAL EXPENSES WHICH WERE PROXIMATELY RELATED TO THE DEFENDANT’S NEGLIGENCE BECAUSE THOSE BILLS WERE PAID IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BY A COLLATERAL SOURCE, THE PLAINTIFF’S GROUP MEDICAL INSURANCE CARRIER?

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in refusing to award damages for medical bills incurred by the plaintiff in his treatment but paid by plaintiff’s group medical insurance carrier.

Plaintiff’s brief presents the issue as follows:

After the record was closed, the trial court requested that counsel for both parties advise the court whether Blue Cross/Blue Shield had a subrogation claim for the bills paid on the Plaintiff’s behalf. Counsel advised the court that there was apparently no subrogation claim. The court then advised counsel that the related bills would not be awarded absent a subrogation claim. That off the record discussion was confirmed in the opinion of the court below. No bills were awarded.
The Plaintiff filed exceptions to the decision of the trial court relating to the Court’s refusal to award medical bills because they had been paid by the Plaintiff’s group medical insurance carrier. The Court en banc denied the Plaintiff’s exception stating as follows:
Plaintiff filed exceptions to the trial court’s excluding from the Plaintiff’s damages the medical and hospital bills paid for by Blue Cross Insurance, since Plaintiff’s • counsel had informed the Court—at the request of the Court—that Blue Cross did not subrogate its claim. We do not believe that the Defendant should be punished by having to pay to the Plaintiff any sums to which the Plaintiff is not properly entitled to as compensatory damages. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Exceptions will also be dismissed.

Brief of Richard R. DeNardo at 40.

We hold that the refusal of the trial court to award medical expenses to the plaintiff was erroneous. We remand for a new trial limited to damages.

Pennsylvania law is clear; the victim of a tort is entitled to the damages caused by the tortfeasor’s negligence regardless of compensation the victim receives from other sources. Boudwin v. Yellow Cab Company, 410 Pa. 31, 188 A.2d 259 (1963); Lobalzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15, 185 A.2d 557 (1962). As was well said in Moidel v. Peoples Natural Gas Company, 397 Pa. 212, 154 A.2d 399 (1959), “Clearly, the fact that an injured party has received compensation from a source other than the wrongdoer is without relevancy in a suit brought by the injured party against the wrongdoer to recover damages.”

In Trump v. Capek, 267 Pa.Super. 355, 406 A.2d 1079 (1979), we said:

This is an appeal from an order granting appellee’s motion for new trial. Appellee sued appellant in trespass to recover damages sustained when appellee’s tractor was struck from behind by appellant’s car. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant. The question on appeal is whether evidence of payment to appellee under a government pension plan—evidence that both sides agree was inadmissible under the collateral source rule—was so prejudicial that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury to disregard it failed to protect appellee’s rights adequately.
The lower court sitting en banc granted appellee a new trial on the basis of Palandro v. Bollinger, 409 Pa. 296, 186 A.2d 11 (1962), in which the Supreme Court held that it was prejudicial—and incorrigible—error for the trial judge to have admitted evidence that the city had paid the plaintiff’s salary and medical expenses through disability payments. (The jury had returned a verdict for the defendant). The Court agreed with the lower court that this evidence had undermined the plaintiff’s case in the eyes of the jury.

Id., 267 Pa.Super, at 356, 406 A.2d at 1079-80.

Instantly, we had a non-jury proceeding where the lower court not only considered evidence that the plaintiff DeNardo had received Blue Cross and Blue Shield coverage as to some or all of his medical expenses—but refused therefore to award any amount for medical expenses caused by the negligence of defendant Carneval. This was error.

Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court, affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff Richard R. DeNardo against the defendant Daniel C. Carneval, D.O. but awarding a new trial on the issue of damages only. The appeal by Daniel C. Carneval is dismissed.

LIPEZ, J., concurs in the result.

      . In Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital, 496 Pa. 465, 437 A.2d 1134 (1981) (Opinion by Mr. Justice Nix) our supreme court held that res ipsa loquitur is applicable in medical malpractice cases. See Gilbert v. Korvette’s, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (1975), where our supreme court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D formulation of res ipsa loquitur.

      Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965) provides:
      § 323. Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
      (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
      (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.

      . Of course, Blue Cross and Blue Shield may then be entitled to subrogation. See Associated Hospital Service of Philadelphia v. Pustilnik, 497 Pa. 221, 439 A.2d 1149 (1981).


author: BROSKY, Judge:

text:
    444 A.2d 141
    Seth DONSON, Appellant, v. William F. SATTERTHWAITE and Margaret M. Satterthwaite. Seth DONSON v. William F. SATTERTHWAITE and Margaret M. Satterthwaite, Appellants.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 9, 1980.
    Filed April 12, 1982.

      David T. Rammler, Philadelphia, for appellant in No. 1357 and for appellee in No. 1393.
    Allen Weinberg, Philadelphia, for appellants in No. 1393 and for appellees in No. 1357.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   BROSKY, Judge:

These cross appeals stem from an action commenced by Seth Donson to recover the sum of $2,600 from the Satterthwaites, whose tenant he had been. The sum sought to be recovered was a security deposit made by a group of students who leased the premises in question. The Satterthwaites filed a counterclaim for damages to the property in excess of the deposit. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found in favor of the defendant landlords on the complaint and the tenants on the counterclaim. Both parties have appealed. Neither party has filed exceptions to the decision of the lower court nor has judgment been entered. The appeals are quashed.

To appeal the decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, the appellants must have filed exceptions and final judgment must have been entered.

Pa.R.C.P. 1038 governs trials held without juries. It provides in pertinent part:

(d) Within ten (10) days after notice of the filing of the decision, exceptions may be filed by any party to the decision or any part thereof, to rulings on objections to evidence or to any other matters occurring during the trial. Each exception shall set forth a separate objection precisely and without discussion. Matters not covered by exceptions are deemed waived unless, prior to final judgment, leave is granted to file exceptions raising these matters. No motion for a new trial, for judgment non obstante veredicto, in arrest of judgment or to remove a nonsuit may be filed. (Emphasis added.)

See Blake v. Mayo Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc., 245 Pa.Super. 274, 369 A.2d 400 (1977); Matczak v. Matczak, 275 Pa.Super. 164, 418 A.2d 663 (1980).

Even had exceptions been filed and denied, the appeal would have to be quashed for failure to enter final judgment. An appeal from an order dismissing exceptions is interlocutory and unappealable. Coren v. Didomencio, 291 Pa.Super. 331, 435 A.2d 1252 (1981); Penstan Supply, Inc. v. Hay, 283 Pa.Super. 558, 424 A.2d 950 (1981).

Appeals quashed.


text:
    444 A.2d 142
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Edward SEELEY, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Sept. 11, 1980.
    Filed April 12, 1982.

      Chester T. Cyzio, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Andrew B. Cohn, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   BROSKY, Judge:

Appellant, Edward Seeley, was convicted of criminal conspiracy and burglary. Post-verdict motions were filed and denied. On June 27, 1979, Seeley was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of IP/2 to 23 months imprisonment for burglary and a consecutive term of 10 years probation for conspiracy. This appeal followed.

The following questions are raised on appeal:

(A) Did the trial court commit reversible error by sustaining the Commonwealth’s objections during the defense’s cross-examination of the assigned investigating detective?
(B) Did the trial court commit reversible error by sustaining the Commonwealth’s objections during the cross-examination of the alleged accomplice and co-conspirator of the defendant?
(C) Did the improper and prejudicial remarks of the prosecutor during his closing address to the jury make a new trial imperative?
(D) Did the Commonwealth fail to prove the issues of venue and the jurisdiction of the trial court?

We are unable to reach any of the merits of the claims raised by Seeley because he did not properly present these issues before the trial court in post-verdict motions and therefore has not properly raised the contentions on appeal.

We note that the post-verdict motions filed by Seeley state:

1) The verdict is contrary to the evidence.
2) The verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.
3) The verdict is contrary to the law.
4) The trial court committed error in rulings as to the admission and as to the exclusion of evidence.
5) Such additional reasons as may be set forth by brief or oral argument.

There is no evidence in the record which demonstrates that the post-verdict motions were ever supplemented as point five indicates that Seeley reserved the options of doing. Thus, as to Seeley’s first two questions submitted in his brief, there was no specific motion complaining that cross-examination of specific witnesses was improperly limited. Therefore, the issues are waived. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(c); Commonwealth v. Gravely, 486 Pa. 194, 404 A.2d 1296 (1979); Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975). Similarly, no specific post-verdict motion ever was raised contending that prosecutorial misconduct occurred. Thus, the issue is waived. Commonwealth v. Gravely, supra, Commonwealth v. Blair, supra.

The final question raised by Seeley is properly preserved, however, if is without merit. Seeley argues that the trial court lacked venue and jurisdiction over the instant case. In Commonwealth v. Brinton, 275 Pa.Super. 304, 310, 418 A.2d 734, 737 (1980), we said:

In Commonwealth v. Creamer, 236 Pa.Super. 168, 172, 345 A.2d 212, 214 (1975), this Court said: “It is well-established law in the Commonwealth that before a county assumes jurisdiction over a crime, some overt act must have occurred therein. Commonwealth v. Tumolo, 223 Pa.Super. 189, 299 A.2d 15 (1972), aff'd, 455 Pa. 424, 317 A.2d 295 (1974); Commonwealth v. Simeone, 222 Pa.Super. 376, 294 A.2d 921 (1972). Where a conspiracy is alleged, an overt act committed in a county by any one of the conspirators is sufficient for that county to assert jurisdiction over all. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 410 Pa. 160, 189 A.2d 255 (1963); Commonwealth v. Simeone, supra.
“The case law of the Commonwealth is replete with examples of a county’s assertion of jurisdiction when some part of the criminal activity or conspiracy occurred therein. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, Commonwealth v. Tumolo, supra; Commonwealth v. Marino, 213 Pa.Super. 88, 245 A.2d 868 (1968), aff’d, 435 Pa. 245, 255 A.2d 911 (1979), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1077, [90 S.Ct. 1526, 25 L.Ed.2d 811,] reh. denied, 398 U.S. 945 [, 90 S.Ct. 1849, 26 L.Ed.2d 284] (1970); Commonwealth v. Petrosky, 194 Pa.Super. 94, 166 A.2d 682 (1960); Commonwealth v. Prep, 186 Pa.Super. 442, 142 A.2d 460 (1958); Commonwealth v. Mezick, 147 Pa.Super. 410, 24 A.2d 762 (1942).”

We are satisfied that the Common Pleas Court of the County of Philadelphia properly exercised jurisdiction in the instant case. The Commonwealth presented testimony of Philadelphia police indicating the factual circumstances of the criminal incident out of which the charges against Seeley arose. It is clear that “some part of the criminal activity”, id., in fact all the criminal activity occurred in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    December 4, 1981.
    441 A.2d 441
    Commonwealth v. Garrison, Appellant.
    Submitted January 12, 1981.
    David G. Metinko, for appellant; Kathryn L. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, SHERTZ and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


author: PRICE, J.,

text:
    441 A.2d 442
    Commonwealth v. Harris, Appellant.
    Argued January 7, 1981.
    Mark S. Sigmond, for appellant; Donald Corriere, District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

PRICE, J.,

did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 442
    Commonwealth v. Hosler, Appellant.
    Argued December 5, 1980.
    Ronald R. Pellish, for appellant; Richard B. Russell, District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 442
    Commonwealth v. Oney, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted March 31, 1981.
    Michael R. Muth, Public Defender, for appellant; James F. Marsh, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence dated August 25, 1980 is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr. filed June 26, 1980 as confirmed by his Statement pursuant to Pa.R.App.P. § 1925(a) filed January 14, 1981.


text:
    441 A.2d 442
    Commonwealth v. Potter, Appellant.
    Submitted April 6, 1981.
    Ronald M. Lucas, for appellant; Robert A. Mix, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The orders of the lower court are hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 443
    Commonwealth v. Rivera a/k/a Ortiz, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Gary S. Fronheiser, for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence by the Court below is hereby affirmed on the able opinion of the Honorable W. Richard Eshelman, President Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Berks County.


text:
    441 A.2d 443
    Commonwealth v. St. Clair, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Argued January 20, 1981.
    Donald M. Moser, for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before HESTER, DiSALLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 443
    Commonwealth v. Sharkey, Appellant.
    Submitted March 30, 1981.
    Gary R. Heslin, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge James D. McCrudden.


text:
    441 A.2d 444
    Commonwealth v. Southard, Appellant.
    Submitted January 5, 1981.
    Joseph F. Sklarosky, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before PRICE, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence and order affirmed.

PRICE, J.,

did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 444
    Commonwealth v. Toner, Appellant.
    Submitted March 30, 1981.
    F. Kirk Adams, for appellant; Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion and order of Judge Diggins.


text:
    441 A.2d 763
    Commonwealth ex. rel. Ermel v. Ermel, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied March 12, 1982.
    Submitted January 28, 1981.
    Malcolm M. Limongelli, for appellant; Ettore S. Agolino, for appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 444
    Commonwealth ex rel., Roth v. Owens, Appellant.
    Argued December 5, 1980.
    John P. Lawler, for appellant; Nicholas Sabatine, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 445
    Gillis v. Metropolitan Hosp. and Cooper, D.O. Appeal of Metropolitan Hospital. Appeal of Howard B. Cooper, D.O.
    Argued December 5,1980.
    E. Parry Warner and A. Grant Sprecher, for Metropolitan Hospital, appellant (at No. 356) and appellee (at No. 425); Joseph P. Green, for Cooper, appellant (at No. 425) and appellee (at No. 356); Alan Schwartz, for Gillis, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSRY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment and order are affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of the court below.

BROSKY, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 445
    In re Commitment of Gary Curtis Mayo. Appeal of Gary Curtis Mayo.
    Submitted April 8, 1981.
    Charles B. Coleman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Donald Pixler, for participating party (Mental Health/Mental Retardation)
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 445
    Sherman et ux. v. Yentis, ex ux., Appellants.
    Argued January 27, 1981.
    G. David Rosenblum, for appellants; Matthew S. Biron, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of June 2, 1980, is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 445
    Stine et al., Appellants v. Lobb et al. v. Stine.
    Submitted January 13, 1981.
    Timothy E. Durant, for appellants; Joseph J. Lee, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, SHERTZ and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 446
    Waisel v. Berger, Appellant.
    Argued December 2, 1980.
    Richard C. Angino, for appellant; Richard W. Cleckner, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    December 11, 1981.
    442 A.2d 334
    Campo et al. v. Campo et al. Appeal of Frances Campo.
    Reargument Denied March 16, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 30, 1982.
    Argued June 11, 1980.
    Robert H. Dickman, for appellant; Harry C. Liebman, for appellees.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Affirmed.

PRICE, J.,

did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 446
    Commonwealth v. Andrews, Appellant.
    Submitted September 10, 1981.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 446
    Commonwealth v. Bell, Appellant.
    Submitted February 25, 1981.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and WIEAND, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 447
    Commonwealth v. Carter, Appellant.
    Submitted April 1, 1981.
    Paul C. Vangrossi, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The order denying PCHA relief is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 1195
    Commonwealth v. Dominguez a/k/a Moreno, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied April 20, 1982.
    Argued April 21, 1981.
    William K. Sayer, for appellant; James F. Marsh, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

MONTEMURO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.


text:
    441 A.2d 447
    Commonwealth v. Evans, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 26, 1982.
    Submitted April 8, 1981.
    Robert Lee Moore, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 447
    Commonwealth v. Evans, Appellant.
    Submitted April 8, 1981.
    W. Michael Babb, for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 447
    Commonwealth v. Fodor, Appellant.
    Submitted December 2, 1980.
    John P. Karoly, Jr., for appellant; William H. Platt, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 448
    Commonwealth v. Gregory, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 7, 1982.

      Submitted February 24, 1981.
    Gerald C. Grimaud, for appellant; James E. Davis, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and WIEAND, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 448
    Commonwealth v. Jones, Appellant.
    Submitted March 3, 1981.
    Charles A. Cunningham, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

BROSKY, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 448
    Commonwealth v. Rivera, Appellant.

      Submitted March 3, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 449
    Commonwealth v. Sawyer, Appellant.
    Argued May 20, 1981.
    John T. Bender, for appellant; Stella R. Smetanka, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, DiSALLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 449
    Commonwealth v. Turner, Appellant.

      Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Joseph M. Budicak, for appellant; John L. Brown, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 449
    Commonwealth v. Valentine, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 18, 1982.
    Submitted March 3, 1981.
    Melvin B. Goldstein, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 449
    Shreffler v. Shreffler. Appeal of Violet Shreffler, Venango County Children and Youth Services, participating party.

      Argued September 28, 1981.
    David M. Axinn, for appellant; Walter Bloom, District Attorney, for appellee and participating party.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 450
    Leisurelife Corp. of Am., Appellant v. Wayne City Bk. & Tr.
    Argued December 4, 1980.
    Carl E. Person, for appellant; Richard W. Baglet, Jr., for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 450
    Peoples First National Bank and Trust v. Kovalick Peoples First National Bank and Trust v. Garo, Inc. Appeal of Gabriel J. Kovalick and RosaLinda Kovalick.

      Argued May 11, 1981.
    James A. Schneider, for appellants; Robert J. Gillespie, Jr., for appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 450
    Rutkowski, Jr. v. Minner et al. Appeal of Robert Minner.
    Argued September 10, 1981.
    Glenn D. Hains, for appellant; Marvin L. Portney, for John Frank and Henrietta Rutkowski, appellees; William T. MacMinn, for John Frank Rutkowski, Jr., appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    December 18, 1981.
    441 A.2d 451
    Commonwealth v. Alexander, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 26, 1982.

      Submitted January 19, 1981.
    Donald M. Moser, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, DiSALLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 451
    Commonwealth v. Bowman, Appellant.
    Argued December 4, 1980.
    Janet W. Mason, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Donald A. Mancini, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 451
    Commonwealth v. Brant, Appellant.

      Submitted January 19, 1981.
    John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, DiSALLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 452
    Commonwealth v. Burgess, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 26, 1982.
    Submitted April 6, 1981.
    Barry M. Miller, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 452
    Commonwealth v. Cheeseman, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 26, 1982.

      Submitted October 5, 1981.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 452
    Commonwealth v. Foulds, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.
    Argued April 6, 1981.
    Robert P. Petyak, for appellant; R. Michael Kaar, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 453
    Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, Appellant.

      Argued June 2, 1981.
    George E. Goldstein, for appellant; David M. McGlauglin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 453
    Commonwealth v. Larew, Appellant.
    Submitted January 14, 1981.
    Vincent J. Roskovensky, II, for appellant; Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, SHERTZ and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 453
    Commonwealth v. Long, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 13, 1982.

      Submitted January 28, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

JOHNSON, J., filed a memorandum dissenting opinion.


text:
    441 A.2d 453
    Commonwealth v. Maldonado, Appellant.
    Submitted March 4, 1981.
    Gary S. Fronheiser, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 454
    Commonwealth v. Merchel, Appellant.

      Submitted March 11, 1981.
    Julius E. Fioravanti, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, DiSALLE and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 454
    Commonwealth v. Opher, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    John F. Street, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 454
    Commonwealth v. Persa, Appellant.
    Submitted September 16, 1981.
    Stanley M. Vasiliadis, for appellant; Donald B. Corriere, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 455
    Commonwealth v. Price, Appellant.
    Submitted May 21, 1981.
    Steve P. Leskinen, for appellant; Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, DiSALLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 455
    Commonwealth v. Richardson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 26, 1982.
    Submitted February 9, 1981.
    Donald R. Calaiaro, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, DiSALLE and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 455
    Commonwealth v. Rowe, Appellant.
    Submitted April 20, 1981.
    George Gershenfeld, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Bart-hold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 455
    Commonwealth v. Rozanski, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Michael Kleeman, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   . Judgment of sentence is affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., filed a memorandum dissenting statement.


text:
    441 A.2d 456
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Elaine De-Masse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence dated October 4, 1979 is affirmed.

BROSKY, J., filed a memorandum concurring opinion.


text:
    441 A.2d 456
    Commonwealth v. Zarzycki, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 26, 1982.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Herbert V. Giobbi, for appellant; Donald Corriere, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of the lower court en banc.


text:
    441 A.2d 456
    Floorkrafters Linoleum Co., Appellant v. Leon, et al.
    Argued May 4, 1981.
    Blasco Mattioni, for appellant; Angelo L. Scaricamazza, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 457
    Fogel v. Calabrese, etc., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 18, 1982.
    Argued January 27, 1981.
    Leonard B. Edelstein, for appellant; Morris Paul Baran, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order dated March 5, 1980 is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 457
    Jackson, Appellant v. Simonds.

      Argued August 31, 1981.
    Michael R. Ford, for appellant; Thomas J. Jackson, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and WIEAND, JJ.
   We quash the appeal from that part of the lower court’s order granting the motion to consolidate Case Nos. 11941 and 11942, and we affirm that part of the lower court’s order vacating the non-jury verdict and awarding a new trial in Case No. 11941.


text:
    443 A.2d 366
    McCorry v. McCorry, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied April 13, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 1, 1982.
    Argued February 11, 1981.
    Frank P. Krizner, for appellant; Leo M. Stepanian, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, DiSALLE and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 457
    Nixon etc., v. Sharon Steel Corporation et al. Appeal of The Hansen Manufacturing Company.
    Argued September 29, 1981.
    Jane Ann Thompson, for appellant; James A. McGregor, for appellees.

      Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Summary judgment in favor of Sharon Steel Corporation affirmed.


text:
    December 29, 1981.
    441 A.2d 458
    Claypoole v. Woods, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 19, 1982.
    Submitted November 10, 1980.
    Stephen Israel, for appellant; Edward J. Kabala, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

BROSKY, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 458
    Commonwealth v. Adams, Appellant.
    Submitted January 26,1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Bart-hold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 458
    Commonwealth v. Beatty, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 31, 1982.
    Submitted January 6, 1981.
    Arthur J. King, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 459
    Commonwealth v. Cochran, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 18, 1982.

      Submitted May 4, 1981.
    Abram Frank Reynolds, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 459
    Commonwealth v. DeShields, Appellant.
    Argued March 24, 1981.
    Richard K. Renn, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Richard H. Horn, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 459
    Commonwealth v. Ferguson, Appellant.

      Submitted September 23, 1981.
    Peter B. Foster, for appellant; Marion E. Mac Intyre, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Appeal quashed without prejudice.

McEWEN, J., filed a memorandum concurring statement.


text:
    441 A.2d 460
    Commonwealth v. Gallagher, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.
    Argued June 23, 1981.
    Shaubut C. Walz, III, Public Defender, for appellant; C. Joseph Rehkamp, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence dated March 20, 1980 is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Quigley.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 460
    Commonwealth v. Gill, Appellant.
    Submitted September 21, 1981.
    Spero T. Lappas, for appellant; David B. Dowling, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 460
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Heberling.
    Argued May 4, 1981.
    Amil M. Minora, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellant; Raymond L. Hamill, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 461
    Commonwealth v. Holmes, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 2, 1982.

      Argued June 22, 1981.
    James P. Gedghegan, for appellant; David M. McGlaughlin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 461
    Commonwealth v. Hunter, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 461
    Commonwealth v. Jewett, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 8, 1982.

      Argued October 5, 1981.
    Austin J. McGreal, for appellant; Mary Ann Cox, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 461
    Commonwealth v. Johnstone, Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 1981.
    Robert Bruce Evanick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Anthony L. DeLuca, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 462
    Commonwealth v. Kale, Sr., Appellant.

      Submitted February 4, 1981.
    Robert B. Keys, Jr., for appellant; David J. Brightbill, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 462
    Commonwealth v. Lee, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    John A. Goldstan, for appellant; J. Michael Morrissey, District Attorney, did not file a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 1195
    Commonwealth v. Mohn, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied April 22, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 16, 1982.

      Argued June 22, 1981.
    Joshua D. Lock, for appellant; William A. Behe, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The opinion and order dated April 8, 1980, denying the first motion .for a new trial is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Dowling.

The judgment of sentence dated April 14, 1980, and the denial on August 13, 1980 of the subsequent motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, are affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., concurred in the result.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 462
    Commonwealth v. Pitt, Appellant.
    Argued September 16, 1981.
    Larry Pitt, appellant, in propria persona; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 463
    Commonwealth v. Savoy, Appellant.
    Submitted January 7, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Nancy D. Wasser, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 463
    Commonwealth v. Wallace, Appellant.
    Submitted February 25, 1981.
    Ferris P. Webby, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant; Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 463
    Commonwealth v. Zeek, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 31, 1982.
    Argued June 22, 1981.
    David R. Harris, for appellant; William A. Behe, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence dated November 15, 1979 is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Lipsitt.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 463
    Commonwealth ex rel., Given v. Grimm, Appellant.
    Argued December 4, 1980.
    Kenneth R. Werner, for appellant; Joseph P. Mylotte, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 464
    In the Interest of Brand. Appeal of Brown.
    Submitted June 24, 1981.
    John L. Walder, for appellant; Thomas A. Landis, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee; Richard F. Faux, Assistant County Solicitor, for Children and Youth, participating party; Albert L. Chase, for Children’s Aid, participating party.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 464
    Levy, Appellant v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.
    Argued September 11, 1981.
    John I. McMahon, for appellant; Robert J. Spiegel, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 464
    Old Republic Insurance, Co. v. Rich, Appellant.

      Argued May 26, 1981.
    Donald H. Nikolaus, for appellant; Arthur Berman, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and WIEAND, JJ.
   The order is affirmed on the clear, orderly and comprehensive opinion of the learned and distinguished Honorable D. Richard Eckman of the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas.


text:
    441 A.2d 464
    O’Neill, Appellant v. Airco, Inc., et al.
    Argued January 28, 1981.
    Neil J. Rovner, for appellants; Clyde W. McIntyre, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 465
    Reamer, et al., Appellants v. Yarborough, et al.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    Kenneth L. Rotz, for appellants; John McCrea, III, for appellees.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.

CERCONE, P. J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 465
    Richetti, Appellants v. Central Penn National Bank.
    Argued May 5, 1981.
    Arnold J. Wolf, for appellant; Andrew N. Schwartz, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 465
    Stanton, et ux., Appellants v. Ruddy.
    Argued April 15, 1980.
    Irving M. Portnoy, for appellants; Charles W. Garbett, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Summary judgment affirmed.


text:
    January 5, 1982.
    441 A.2d 763
    Blank, Appellants v. Wise Foods, Inc.

      Argued December 1, 1980.
    Stuart A. Cilo, for appellants; Donald Brobst, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the comprehensive opinions of Judge Myers.


text:
    441 A.2d 764
    Commonwealth v. Blunt, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence dated October 26, 1979 is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 764
    Commonwealth v. Bonniger, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Robert E. Dalton, Jr., for appellant; John Cowley, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 764
    Commonwealth v. Cole, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Robert F. Pappano, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 764
    Commonwealth v. Consentino, Appellant.
    Submitted October 5, 1981.
    Herbert V. Giobbi, for appellant; Donald Corriere, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 765
    Commonwealth v. Cunningham, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11,1980.
    Anthony D. Reagoso, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 765
    Commonwealth v. Dowling, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Sarah B. Vandenbraak, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 765
    Commonwealth v. Egelsky, Appellant.
    Argued March 18, 1981.
    Raymond Bogarty, for appellant; Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 367
    Commonwealth v. Frost, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied April 13, 1982.
    Argued April 16, 1980.
    Bernard S. Shire, for appellant; Benjamin L. Costello, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 766
    Commonwealth v. Hall a/k/a Bishop, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 23, 1982.

      September 10, 1981.
    Robert F. Pappano, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 766
    Commonwealth v. Harrison, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 23, 1982.
    Argued September 11, 1980.
    Arthur J. King, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; David M. McGlaughlin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 766
    Commonwealth v. Hawkins, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 1, 1982.

      Argued October 6, 1981.
    Charles L. Pelletreau, for appellant; Garold E. Tennis, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 367
    Commonwealth v. Hawkins, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied April 13, 1982.
    Argued April 29, 1981.
    G. William Bills, Jr., for appellant; Dara A. DeCourcy, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 766
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, Appellant.

      Argued September 11, 1980.
    Glenn S. Gitomer, for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WICKERSHAM and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    441 A.2d 767
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 4, 1982.
    Submitted' April 16, 1980.
    Louis R. Dadowski, for appellant; Charles W. Johns, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 767
    Commonwealth v. Kellam, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 23, 1982.

      Argued October 5, 1981.
    George T. Guarnieri, for appellant; Steven Cooperstein, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 767
    Commonwealth v. LaRosa, Appellant.
    Argued October 6, 1981.
    Thomas E. Coval, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 768
    Commonwealth v. Lomax a/k/a Faulkner, Appellant.
    Submitted February 2, 1981.
    John J. Poserina, Jr., for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 768
    Commonwealth v. McKinney, Appellant.
    Submitted September 13, 1979.
    Daniel M. Preminger, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 768
    Commonwealth v. Mendez a/k/a Balgas, Appellant.
    Submitted March 3, 1981.
    Carol K. McGinley, Assistant Public Defender for appellant; Richard Tomsho, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 768
    Commonwealth v. Potts, Appellant.

      Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 769
    Commonwealth v. Reid, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 22, 1982.
    Submitted September 9,1981.
    Peter A. Levin, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 769
    Commonwealth v. Schwartz, Appellant.

      Before CERCONE, P. J., and SPAETH and CAVA-NAUGH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 769
    Commonwealth v. Shifflett, Appellant.
    Submitted March 4, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WICKERSHAM and BRO-SKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

BROSKY, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 770
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 18, 1982.

      Submitted June 11, 1980.
    Peter V. Marks, Sr., for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 770
    Escarte, Appellants v. Albert M. Greenfield & Co., et al.
    Argued September 8, 1980.
    Marvin W. Factor, for appellants; Joseph S. Finkelstein, for Greenfield, appellee; Henry I. Jacobson, for Rothstein, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 770
    Fisher, Appellant v. Burlington, Ind., Inc.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 26, 1982.
    Argued June 12, 1980.
    Donald E. Matusow, for appellant; William C. Foster, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed on the opinion of the court below.


text:
    441 A.2d 770
    Genelius v. Genelius, Appellant.
    Argued November 11, 1980.
    John Sughrue, submitted a brief on behalf of appellant; Ronald E. Archer, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 771
    In the Interest of Juan Ayala. Appeal of: Anna Ayala.
    Argued December 5,1980.
    Lydia Hernandez-Velez, for appellant; Harry Frank, Assistant County Solicitor, for Public Welfare, participating party; Dave Mullins, submitted a brief on behalf of Child Advocate, participating party.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


author: SHERTZ, J.,

text:
    441 A.2d 771
    Kraus, Appellants v. Howard Burt and Hill, etc., et al.
    Argued April 14, 1981.
    Theodore E. Breault, for appellants; William C. Robinson, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of Nonsuit entered September 12, 1980 is affirmed.

SHERTZ, J.,

filed a memorandum concurring opinion.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 771
    Krawitz v. Griggs, et ux., Appellants.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 26, 1982.
    Submitted March 18, 1980.
    David A. Martino, for appellants; Edwin Krawitz, appellee, in propria persona.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the opinion of Judge Thomson of the court below.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 772
    Kremer v. Simon Realty, Corp., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Argued October 5, 1981.
    Samuel Rappaport, for appellant; Lyndon J. Parker, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 772
    Taylor, Appellant v. The Woods Schools.
    Argued December 1, 1980.
    Alton G. Grube, for appellant; Charles O. Marte, Jr., for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 830
    Trinsey, Jr., Appellant v. First Redley Square Corp.
    Petition to Reconsider Judgment Denied April 2, 1982.

      Argued October 6, 1981.
    Richard B. Perlman, for appellant; Franklin H. Spitzer, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order of court affirmed.


text:
    January 8, 1982.
    441 A.2d 772
    Commonwealth v. Asper, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.
    Argued April 29, 1981.
    John Woodcock, Jr., for appellant; Stephen D. Wicks, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

CERCONE, P. J., filed a memorandum concurring and dissenting opinion.


text:
    441 A.2d 772
    Commonwealth v. Barron, Appellant.

      Argued March 10,1981.
    James F. Metka, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, DiSALLE and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 773
    Commonwealth v. Beechwood, Jr., Appellant.
    Argued April 7, 1981.
    John Joseph Szajna, for appellant; Robert P. Brendza, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 773
    Commonwealth v. Dorsey, Appellant.

      Submitted April 7, 1981.
    William F. Ochs, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, did not file a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The appeal is dismissed.


text:
    441 A.2d 773
    Commonwealth v. Drake, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 7, 1982.
    Argued January 20, 1981.
    A. Charles Peruto, Jr., for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 774
    Commonwealth v. Gilliam, Appellant.

      Submitted December 5, 1980.
    J. Hugh O’Donnell, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, WIEAND and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 774
    Commonwealth v. Grant, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 18, 1982.
    Submitted November 9, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Kemal A. Mericli, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 774
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 6, 1982.

      Submitted November 10, 1981.
    Paulette J. Balogh, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 775

    Commonwealth v. Lee, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted March 16, 1981.
    Donald Calaiaro, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.