author: CIRILLO, President Judge:

text:
    588 A.2d 917
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles PERRY, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Nov. 5, 1990.
    Filed Feb. 5, 1991.
    Reargument Denied April 30, 1991.

      Robert J. Leibowitz, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
    Donna G. Zucker, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and TAMILIA and CERCONE, JJ.
   CIRILLO, President Judge:

Charles Perry appeals from a judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm.

Perry was charged with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“I.D.S.I.”), statutory rape, corruption of minors, indecent assault, simple assault, indecent exposure, endangering the welfare of children, and unlawful restraint. The charges were filed as a result of Perry’s sexual molestation of L.R., his stepdaughter from 1980 to 1986 when she was seven to thirteen years old.

On December 15, 1988, the Commonwealth filed a notice that it intended to toll the statute of limitations applicable to the offenses of statutory rape, corruption of minors, endangering the welfare of children, and indecent assault which occurred on or after September 8, 1985 through 1986. Thereafter, Perry filed both a response to the Commonwealth’s notice and a motion in limine requesting that the Commonwealth be precluded from prosecuting all of the charges except for the rape charge. The Honorable Legróme D. Davis denied Perry’s motion.

Following a non-jury trial, Perry was convicted of rape, I.D.S.L, statutory rape, corruption of minors, endangering the welfare of children, and indecent assault. Subsequently, the trial court heard post-verdict motions and granted Perry’s motion to arrest judgment on the rape conviction. All other motions were denied. The court also sentenced Perry to five to ten years imprisonment for the statutory rape conviction and a concurrent term of imprisonment of seven to fifteen years on the I.D.S.L conviction. All other sentences were suspended. Perry’s motion for reconsideration of sentence was denied. In this timely appeal, Perry is represented by new counsel. The following issues are presented for our review:

1) Did the trial court err in tolling the statute of limitations?
2) Did the trial court err in admitting testimony of isolated occurrences of prior misconduct?
8) Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to offer expert testimony on the issue of the physical attributes of the defendant and the complainant?

In his first issue, Perry argues that the trial court erred by tolling the statute of limitations applicable to all of the charges except rape. Perry contends that the tolling provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5554 is inapplicable to this case.

The Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552, provides a statute of limitations for criminal proceedings:

(a) General rule. — Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a prosecution for an offense must be commenced within two years after it is committed.
(b) Major offenses. — A prosecution for any of the following offenses under Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses) must be commenced within five years after it is committed:
Section 3121 (relating to rape).
Section 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse).
******

42 Pa.C.S. § 5552.

The Act also provides for tolling of the statute of limitations in criminal proceedings:

Except as provided by section 5553(e), (relating to disposition of proceedings within two years [for certain summary offenses]), the period of limitation does not run during any time when:
******
(3) A child is under 18 years of age, where the crime involves injuries to the person of the child caused by the wrongful act, or neglect, or unlawful violence, or negligence of the child’s parents or by a person responsible for the child’s welfare, or any individual residing in the same home as the child, or a paramour of the child’s parent.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5554(3) (emphasis added).

Perry reminds this court that the tolling provision of section 5554(3) applies only in criminal cases involving “injuries to the person of the child.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5554(3). Perry contends that because this operative language is not defined in Title 42, we should apply the definition of “personal injury” contained in the restitution provision of our Crimes Code. Perry states that in Commonwealth v. Balisteri, 329 Pa.Super. 148, 478 A.2d 5 (1984), this court interpreted the personal injury provision of section 1106 to include emotional or mental disturbances for purposes of imposing restitution. Id., 329 Pa.Superior Ct. at 155-56, 478 A.2d at 9. Perry also correctly states that we limited the definition of “personal injury” in section 1106(h) to “situation[s] where an actor’s conduct precipitates a mental or emotional disturbance requiring actual treatment.” 329 Pa.Super. at 156 n. 8, 478 A.2d at 9 n. 8 (emphasis in original).

Here, Perry states that there was absolutely no showing during the pre-trial determination of his motion in limine that his step-daughter suffered bodily injury, emotional disturbance or received actual treatment as a consequence of his alleged sexual assaults. Therefore, Perry contends that our holding in Balisteri required the trial court to refrain from tolling the statute of limitations applicable to all of the charges except rape. We find Perry’s argument unpersuasive.

The case law simply does not support Perry’s contention that a sexual assault victim must make a pre-trial showing that he/she suffered physical or emotional injury requiring treatment as a prerequisite to application of the tolling provision of section 5554(3). Commonwealth v. Bell, 378 Pa.Super. 573, 549 A.2d 205 (1988), alloc. denied, 523 Pa. 640, 565 A.2d 1165 (1989); Commonwealth v. Thek, 376 Pa.Super. 390, 546 A.2d 83 (1988). For example, in Bell, supra, this court applied the tolling provision of section 5554(3) to a situation nearly identical to the one presently before us. In that case, Bell was charged with rape, statutory rape, indecent assault, corruption of minors and endangering the welfare of children in connection with his alleged sexual molestation of his minor daughter over a four and one-half year period. At his preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth introduced testimony of the victim to establish that Bell had committed the acts underlying the charges beginning in 1980 and continuing until August, 1984. In response, Bell filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Modification of Bail wherein he alleged that he could not be prosecuted for the offenses charged since the Commonwealth failed to file a complaint within the two year statute of limitations contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(a). After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the charges as time-barred.

On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that section 5554(3) should be applied retroactively to toll the two year statute of limitations period relating to the crimes which Bell allegedly committed before its effective date. We agreed and held that the trial court had erroneously dismissed the offenses which Bell allegedly committed on or after September 8, 1983 as time barred because the two year statute of limitations applicable to the prosecution of the offenses was tolled on September 8, 1985, the effective date of section 5554(3). Bell, 378 Pa.Super. at 576-77, 549 A.2d at 207. In Bell, section 5554(3) was applicable because the victim testified that her father had sexually assaulted her on numerous occasions over a four and one-half year period. This court did not impose upon the Commonwealth, as Perry advocates today, a required showing of physical injury or actual treatment of the victim, in order to invoke section 5554(3).

Perry’s attempt to analogize the definition of “personal injury” in the restitution statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, which we addressed in Balisteri, supra, with that contained in section 5554(3) must also fail. If the legislature intended to assign the same meaning to “injuries to the person of the child,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5554(3), as it has for “personal injury,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, we believe it would have provided a provision to that effect in Title 42. Moreover, unlike Balisteri, section 5554(3) has never been interpreted to require pre-trial proof of physical injury by means of extrinsic evidence of treatment or expert testimony. Bell, supra; Thek, supra. Even if we were to apply the rationale stated in Balisteri to section 5554(3), we think Judge Davis could have reasonably inferred that the victim suffered psychological or physical harm of some kind as a result of Perry’s repeated sexual assaults. Consequently, we conclude that Judge Davis correctly denied Perry’s motion requesting that the Commonwealth be precluded from tolling the statute of limitations for the charges of statutory rape, corruption of minors, endangering the welfare of children and indecent assault.

Perry also argues that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the victim as it related to her allegations of Perry’s sexual misconduct. Perry contends that the victim’s testimony alleged only prior isolated incidents of misconduct which are inadmissible because they do not constitute a series of acts indicating a continuousness of sexual intercourse. Perry, however, failed to make a timely objection to the victim’s references to his prior sexual assaults, nor did he make any motion to have her testimony stricken from the record. Consequently, we need not address the merits of Perry’s claim. Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 423, 326 A.2d 272, 274 (1974) (“[A] party may not remain silent and take chances on a verdict and afterwards complain of matters which, if erroneous, the Court would have corrected.”); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa.Super. 318, 490 A.2d 438 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 370 Pa.Super. 179, 536 A.2d 354 (1987) (en banc).

Next, Perry argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer expert testimony on his physical attributes and those of the victim. Perry claims that trial counsel was prepared to elicit testimony from a number of lay witnesses concerning his physical attributes and those of the victim in an effort to show that the alleged sexual intercourse of February, 1986 could not have occurred without physical injury to the victim. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to this line of questioning because Perry did not have a physician to provide expert testimony.

Perry contends that there was no reasonable basis for trial counsel’s failure to petition for a medical examination of the victim and to secure a review of the examination results by a physician. In his written post-verdict motions, Perry claimed that the alleged sexual intercourse of February, 1986 could not have taken place without physical injury to the victim because of the “relative physical sizes of the sexual organs of the defendant and the complainant ...” According to Perry, since the victim testified that she did not suffer any physical injuries from his alleged assaults, expert medical testimony would have been a significant factor to be weighed by the trial court. Perry concludes that such testimony would have convinced the trial court that the victim’s testimony was not credible. Accordingly, Perry requests that we remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing so that he may request a medical examination of the victim and offer expert medical testimony.

When confronted with a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a reviewing court must first ascertain whether the issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit; counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to assert a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, 559 A.2d 504 (1989); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183 (1985). if this threshold is met, it must be determined whether the course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to serve the interest of the client. Commonwealth v. McBee, 513 Pa. 255, 520 A.2d 10 (1986); Commonwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa. 363, 508 A.2d 1167 (1986), cert. denied, Buehl v. Pennsylvania, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 187, 102 L.Ed.2d 156 (1988). In addition, a defendant claiming ineffectiveness of counsel must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). Moreover, since the law presumes that counsel was effective, the burden of establishing ineffectiveness rests squarely upon the appellant. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 354 Pa.Super. 11, 510 A.2d 1253 (1986).

In his opinion addressing Perry’s post-verdict motions, Judge Davis noted that under the Crimes Code, “ ‘sexual intercourse’ as an element of statutory rape ‘[i]n addition to its ordinary meaning, includes intercourse ... with some penetration, however slight.’ ” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101 (emphasis added). Judge Davis reasoned that because the victim credibly testified that Perry put his penis in her vagina and that “it hurt,” this was sufficient evidence of penetration under section 3101. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bowes, 166 Pa.Super. 625, 74 A.2d 795 (1950) (testimony of victim supported sodomy conviction notwithstanding lack of direct evidence of penetration). Consequently, Judge Davis concluded that Perry’s proffered testimony relating to the relative physical size of their sexual organs would have been irrelevant. We agree. Moreover, it necessarily follows that testimony of an expert witness relating to the relative size of the victim’s and Perry’s sexual organs would have also been irrelevant to the trial court’s evaluation of the victim’s testimony. Thus, Perry has made no showing that this strategy is of arguable merit. Durst, 522 Pa. at 4-5, 559 A.2d at 505-06; Ellis, supra. Therefore, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for his failure to either petition the trial court for a medical examination of the victim or offer expert testimony to support Perry’s claim that the alleged sexual intercourse of February, 1986 could not have occurred without physical injury to the victim. Durst, Pursell, supra.

Since we have concluded that there is no merit to Perry’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we find that Perry is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(1).

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(1).

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3127.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 2902.

      . The definitional subsection reads in pertinent part:
      “Personal injury.” Actual bodily harm, including pregnancy directly resulting from the crime.

        18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h).

      . I.D.S.I. has the same five year statute of limitations that is applicable to the crime of rape. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(b). Therefore, the prosecution of Perry for his touching of the child’s vagina with his mouth in 1985 (involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) was not barred by the statute of limitations on April 9, 1988, the day when the criminal complaint was filed, even if no tolling occurred.

      . During the pre-trial hearing the victim testified that Perry touched her clothes and licked her vagina on numerous occasions between 1980 and 1986. She also testified as follows:
      ******
      Q: Where was he touching you?
      A: (No response).
      Q: What part of your body?
      A: My vagina.
      Q: Okay. What happened then?
      A: Then he went under my clothes.
      Q: Okay. And this is still with his hand?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Where was he touching you underneath your clothes, [L.R.] ...?
      A: My vagina.
      Q: Okay. And then what happened?
      A: Then somehow he was on top of me and his clothes were off. Then he put his penis in my vagina.
      ******
      Q: You say "his penis.” Did it go inside your vagina, [L.R.] ...?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Did that hurt?
      A: Yes.

      . The informations were filed against Perry on April 9, 1988. Since the Commonwealth did not file a pre-trial notice that it intended to toll the two year statute of limitations applicable to the offenses of simple assault, indecent exposure, and unlawful restraint which Perry allegedly committed before April 9, 1986, we conclude that the trial court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to prosecute these charges. See Commonwealth v. Bethlehem, 391 Pa.Super. 162, 570 A.2d 563 (1989), alloc. denied, 525 Pa. 610, 577 A.2d 542 (1990); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 355 Pa.Super. 176, 512 A.2d 1270 (1986), alloc. denied, 514 Pa. 623, 522 A.2d 49 (1987). However, since Perry was not convicted of any of these crimes, this error does not affect the validity of the sentence imposed upon him.

        In his opinion, Judge Davis noted that although section 5554(3) does not define the phrase “injuries to the person," the Crimes Code is divided into several categories. Judge Davis reasoned that because the legislature placed statutory rape and I.D.S.I. under the category "Offenses Involving Danger to the Person,” it thereby intended that these offenses involve injury to the person. Simple assault, indecent assault, indecent exposure, and unlawful restraint also fall within this category, while endangering the welfare of children falls under the heading of "Offenses against the Family." Corruption of minors, the remaining offense with which Perry was charged, is a "Miscellaneous Offense." While the legislature’s general categorization of these offenses is not dispositive of Perry’s first issue, it is helpful to the extent that a victim of an “Offense[j Involving Danger to the Person” is likely to suffer harm or injury of some variety.

      . Perry relies upon Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 385 Pa.Super. 317, 561 A.2d 5 (1989), alloc. granted, 524 Pa. 625, 574 A.2d 67 (1990), to support this claim.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HOFFMAN, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    588 A.2d 922
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gregory S. LEIB, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 3, 1990.
    Filed Feb. 14, 1991.
    Reargument Denied April 11, 1991.

      John G. Bergdoll, III, York, for appellant.
    Gerald A. Lord, Asst. Dist. Atty., York, for Com., appellee.
    Before OLSZEWSKI, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   HOFFMAN, Judge:

This appeal is from a judgment of sentence for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Appellant raises numerous issues for our review. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Appellant was arrested in York County on June 13, 1987 and charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders a person incapable of safe driving, and driving while the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood is 0.10% or greater. The facts that led to his arrest are as follows. At approximately 4:15 that morning, officer Shane Becker of the Spring Grove police received a report of a vehicle stopped in the middle of Church Road, less than a mile from the police station. See N.T., October 23, 1989, at 10. When he responded to that report, Officer Becker observed appellant’s vehicle parked in the middle of the road. Officer Becker approached the vehicle, and found appellant, unconscious and slumped over the steering wheel. Id. at 14-15. After approximately three minutes of shaking and shouting, Officer Becker managed to awaken appellant, who “smelled of alcohol,” id. at 15, and whose eyes were “glassy, bloodshot, [and] watery.” Id. at 18. Officer Becker then administered a field sobriety test, which appellant failed. Id. at 19-20. Officer Becker placed appellant under arrest, and took him to the hospital, where appellant consented to a blood test. Id. at 21. Appellant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was .263 at the time the test was administered, approximately 45 minutes after appellant’s arrest. See N.T., June 2, 1989, at 15.

On October 20, 1987, appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion to suppress evidence and quash the complaint against him. After additional briefing, hearing and argument on June 2, 1989, that motion was denied by order dated August 10, 1989. A jury trial was held on October 23,1989, and appellant was convicted on both counts. Post-trial motions were timely filed and were denied by order dated November 16, 1989. On February 12, 1990, appellant was sentenced to 30 days-to-twelve months incarceration. This timely appeal followed.

Initially, we note our disapproval of the brief appellant’s counsel, John G. Bergdoll, Esq., has filed. The Statement of Questions covers two pages and thirty lines, thereby violating Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). In addition, although he purports to raise but seven issues in the statement, Mr. Berg-doll in fact has burdened this court with more than fifteen separate arguments. Some of the arguments verge on boilerplate, are unintelligible, or raise points that Mr. Berg-doll recognizes have been rejected by Courts in this Commonwealth. This indiscriminate approach brings to mind the remarks by the Honorable Ruggerio J. Aldisert of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, who reflected:

“With a decade and a half of federal appellate court experience behind me, I can say that even when we reverse a trial court it is rare that a brief successfully demonstrates that the trial court committed more than one or two reversible errors. I have said in open court that when I read an appellant’s brief that contains ten or twelve points, a presumption arises that there is no merit to any of them. I do not say that it is an irrebuttable presumption, but it is a presumption that reduces the effectiveness of appellate advocacy. Appellate advocacy is measured by effectiveness, not loquaciousness.”

United States v. Hart, 693 F.2d 286, 287 n. 1 (3d Cir.1982) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Sirbaugh, 347 Pa.Super. 154, 160-61, 500 A.2d 453, 456 (1985). In the interest of judicial economy, we will not address at length all of the many arguments advanced by Mr. Bergdoll; however, despite our disapproval of Mr. Bergdoll’s approach, we have carefully considered each of the arguments, and we determine that appellant is not entitled to relief.

I. SUFFICIENCY AND RULE 1100 CLAIMS.

Appellant first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, appellant argues that because there is no evidence as to when he operated the vehicle and what condition he was in at any time he operated it, see Appellant’s Brief at 9, the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree.

Our standard of review of sufficiency claims is well-settled:

[w]here a defendant challenges his conviction on appeal the test of sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing all evidence admitted at trial, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier of fact could have found that each element of the offenses charged was supported by evidence and inferences sufficient in law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 506 Pa. 469, 472-73, 485 A.2d 1102, 1103 (1984); see also Commonwealth v. Quarles, 361 Pa.Super. 272, 280-81, 522 A.2d 579, 583 (1987). Appellant was convicted of violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(1) and (4), which provide:

§ 3731. Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance
(a) Offense defined. — A person shall not drive operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of any vehicle while:
(1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving____
******
(4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is 0.10% or greater.

Id. We explained the significance of the broader “in control” language in Commonwealth v. Crum, 362 Pa.Super. 110, 523 A.2d 799 (1987):

[T]he concept of “actual physical control” has recently been embodied in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard jury instructions for driving under the influence of alcohol.
[(2) The crime of driving under the influence can be committed not only by a person who drives but also by one who “operates” or is “in actual physical control” of the movement of a vehicle. A person does not drive unless he actually has the vehicle in motion, however, a person may operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a standing vehicle. These terms are more comprehensive than the term drive. (They cover certain situations where a person under the influence is a threat to public safety even though he is not driving at the time.) Thus a person operates a vehicle if he is in actual physical control of either the machinery of the motor vehicle or the movement of the vehicle itself.]

Id., 362 Pa.Superior Ct. at 114-15, 523 A.2d at 801-802 (quoting Pa.SSJI (Crim.) 173731). Finally, we note that, generally speaking, a finder of fact is free to believe all, part or none of a witness’s testimony. Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 351 Pa.Super. 412, 419-20, 506 A.2d 415, 419 (1986).

Here, appellant testified that he had been driving home when his vehicle broke down, and that he had consumed the beer that raised his BAG to .263 while awaiting aid. See N.T., October 23, 1989 at 47-61. However, the testimony at trial established the following uncontroverted facts. There were several open beer containers in appellant’s vehicle, the keys were in the ignition, and appellant was found slumped over the steering wheel unconscious. Furthermore, appellant smelled of alcohol, failed a sobriety test administered at the scene, and had a BAG of .268% forty five minutes after he was found. These facts clearly were sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. In his own testimony, appellant admitted both that he had been driving .and drinking on the day in question. The jury’s verdict simply reflects its disbelief of appellant’s claim that he consumed the alcohol after his vehicle broke down, and, of course, the jury was free to disbelieve the self-serving aspects of this testimony. See Verdekal, supra. Thus, we are satisfied that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a sufficient basis existed for the jury to have reasonably found that appellant was in control of his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol as prohibited by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 8731(a)(1) and (4). See generally, Commonwealth v. Crum, supra (evidence sufficient to uphold conviction of appellant charged under § 8781(a)(1) based on police determination that he was intoxicated after discovering him unconscious at the wheel of his vehicle stopped at the side of the road); Commonwealth v. Matsinger, 288 Pa.Super. 271, 431 A.2d 1043 (1981) (evidence that defendant was found asleep behind wheel of vehicle with motor running and in gear sufficient to support inference that defendant had control of vehicle).

Appellant’s second contention is that the trial court erred in allowing him to go to trial because the Commonwealth failed to timely file for an extension of time as required by Rule 1100. Specifically, appellant argues that because the Commonwealth failed to file an application for extension of time before the end of the January 1989 term, as directed by the trial court, the case should have been dismissed.

Our standard of review of trial court decisions regarding whether the Commonwealth has met the necessary burden to justify granting an extension of time is well-settled.

____[W]hen this court is reviewing the trial court’s ruling “that the Commonwealth has met its burden, we shall consider only the evidence presented by the Commonwealth and so much evidence as presented by the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted.”

Commonwealth v. Newman, 382 Pa.Super. 220, 229, 555 A.2d 151, 155 (1989) (citations omitted).

Rule 1100 provides, in relevant part, that:

Rule 1100 Prompt Trial
... (a)(2). Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant after June 30, 1974 shall commence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date on which the complaint is filed____
******
(f) At any time before trial, the defendant or his counsel may apply to the court for an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of such motion shall be served upon the attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall also have the right to be heard thereon. Any order granting such motion shall dismiss the charges with prejudice and discharge the defendant.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2) & (f). When the Commonwealth is unable to bring a defendant to trial within the time specified by Rule 1100, it has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it acted with due diligence and was still unable to have the case ready for trial. See Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 505 Pa. 152, 477 A.2d 1309 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 362 Pa.Super. 282, 524 A.2d 507 (1987). The test set out above is the only test to be applied in determining whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial. See Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 467 Pa. 436, 359 A.2d 174 (1976); Commonwealth v. Garbett, 256 Pa.Super. 488, 390 A.2d 208 (1978). Finally, where the Commonwealth, despite due diligence, cannot timely bring a defendant to trial because of complex pre-trial motions filed by a defendant, its failure to do so does not entitle a defendant to discharge. See Commonwealth v. Reeves, 378 Pa.Super. 29, 548 A.2d 260 (1988); Commonwealth v. Atkinson, 364 Pa.Super. 384, 528 A.2d 210 (1987).

Here, the record reveals that although the trial was held over two years after the complaint against appellant was filed, Judge Rauhauser granted the Commonwealth several extensions to bring the case to trial. See, e.g., R.R. at al3-al4. On December 15, 1988, Judge Rauhauser entered the order in question directing that the case be brought to trial before the end of the January 1989 term. However, the Commonwealth failed to bring the case to trial within that time, and appellant now contends that because of this failure the trial court should have dismissed the charges against him. We disagree. The Commonwealth’s March 10; 1989 Application to Extend Time for Commencement of Trial states that in spite of its due diligence in attempting to bring the case to trial, pending pre-trial defense motions prevented it from trying the case at that time. The trial court accepted this explanation, and granted the Commonwealth’s Application. Because the Commonwealth’s argument is supported by the record, see R.R. at a3-al2, we cannot say that the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth’s Application. See Commonwealth v. Reeves and Commonwealth v. Atkinson, supra. Appellant’s argument, therefore, is meritless.

II. CLAIMS REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE BLOOD TEST.

Appellant next raises two arguments concerning the admissibility of the blood test results. Specifically, appellant argues that his constitutional rights were violated because the blood test results were illegally obtained; and that the implied consent law is unconstitutional. We disagree.

Appellant’s first claim is that the Commonwealth’s “seizure” of the blood test results violated the fourth amendment. Appellant’s argument in this regard is somewhat confusing. Appellant apparently suggests that, even where a defendant consents to a blood test, the Commonwealth cannot obtain the results of that test unless the defendant consents to the release of the results, a warrant

is issued, or exigent circumstances exist. We concur in the suppression court’s conclusion that the initial test of appellant’s blood was proper. See N.T., October 23, 1989 at 21; Trial Court Order, August 10, 1989. Thus, appellant’s derivative argument concerning the admissibility of the test results clearly is meritless. See Commonwealth v. Hipp, 380 Pa.Super. 345, 357, 551 A.2d 1086, 1091-92 (1988); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 365 Pa.Super. 28, 32, 528 A.2d 1346, 1347-48 (1987), appeal denied 517 Pa. 598, 535 A.2d 1057 (1987); see also Commonwealth v. Haynos, 363 Pa.Super. 1, 525 A.2d 394 (1987), appeal denied 517 Pa. 604, 536 A.2d 1329 (1987).

Appellant’s second claim is that the implied consent law, 75 Pa.C.8.A. § 1547, is unconstitutionally vague. There is a strong presumption in favor of constitutionality, and a party who challenges the constitutionality of an Act of the General Assembly has a “heavy burden” of persuasion. E.g., Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 247, 470 A.2d 1339, 1340 (1983) (plurality opinion). For legislation to be declared unconstitutional, it must “clearly, palpably and plainly” violate the constitution. Id. The Mikulan plurality summarized the principles governing due process/void for vagueness challenges as follows:

The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). “As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983). The principle [sic] aspect of the doctrine is the requirement that legislation establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement for, without such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute might permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilictions [sic].” Id., 461 U.S. at 358, 103 S.Ct. at 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d at 909 quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). In Commonwealth v. DeFrancesco, 481 Pa. 595, 393 A.2d 321 (1978), this Court applied the above principles to uphold a disorderly conduct/refusal to disperse statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5502, against a due process/vagueness challenge, and identified the “root of the vagueness doctrine” as a
“rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited----”
481 Pa. at 608, 393 A.2d 321 quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972).

Similarly in Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 354 A.2d 244 (1976), we held that a penal statute

“must give reasonable notice of the conduct which it proscribes to a person charged with violating its interdiction.” 467 Pa. at 5, 354 A.2d 244. However, statutes alleged to be vague are not “to be tested against paradigms of draftsmanship. Rather, the requirements of due process are satisfied if the statute in question contains reasonable standards to guide the prospective conduct.” Id., 467 Pa. at 6, 354 A.2d 244.

504 Pa. at 251-52, 470 A.2d at 1342-43.

We are satisfied that the implied consent statute is sufficiently specific to protect against arbitrary governmental conduct, and to give reasonable notice of the proscribed conduct at which it is aimed. Initially, it should be emphasized that § 1547 itself does not proscribe any particular conduct, but merely provides a manner through which violations of § 3731 (driving under the influence) may be proved. The statute is tailored to detect only the conduct proscribed by § 3731. Appellant nevertheless argues that the statute is vague for two reasons: first, because there are “no standards for allowing testing except those of reasonable grounds and arrest” and, second, because the statute “allows testing to be admitted although improper devices may be used, improper methods may be used and despite that any test presented in evidence may have no evidentiary value whatsoever in that no time limit is set on the time for testing.” Brief for Appellant at 16. These arguments are meritless. The “reasonable grounds” required by the statute (and which this Court has construed to mean “probable cause”, see Commonwealth v. Cieri, 346 Pa.Super. 77, 87, 499 A.2d 317, 322 (1985)), is not a vague standard at all, but merely restates the constitutional requirement necessary to conduct a search (such as a blood test) when a person is suspected of driving under the influence. Similarly, even a cursory review of subsection (c), which specifies in great detail the procedures governing chemical tests, indicates that the “methods” and “devices” to be used for testing arc sufficiently described as to survive an attack on vagueness grounds. Accordingly, appellant is not entitled to relief on this ground.

III. CLAIMS REGARDING CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF BLOOD.

Appellant’s next set of claims concerns “the procedures, persons, and devices” that were used to analyze his blood sample. Appellant argues that the blood test results should not have been admitted into evidence because the Commonwealth failed to show that “the procedures, persons, and devices” used to test his blood were “specifically” approved by the Department of Health and, therefore, the Commonwealth's burden under subsection (c) of the implied consent statute was not met. Section 1547(c) provides in relevant part:

(c) Test results admissible in evidence. — In any summary proceeding or criminal proceeding in which the defendant is charged with a violation of section 3731 or any other violation of this title arising out of the same action, the amount of alcohol or controlled substance in the defendant’s blood, as shown by chemical testing of the person’s breath, blood or urine, which tests were conducted by qualified persons using approved equipment, shall be admissible in evidence.
(2) Chemical tests of blood or urine shall be performed by a clinical laboratory licensed and approved by the Department of Health for this purpose using procedures and equipment prescribed by the Department of Health. For purposes of blood and urine testing, qualified person means an individual who is authorized to perform those chemical tests under the act of September 26, 1951 (P.L. 1539, No. 389), known as “The Clinical Laboratory Act.”

Id. (footnote omitted). The Clinical Laboratory Act, see 35 P.S. § 2151 et seq., in turn vests the Department of Health with the power to adopt rules and regulations governing testing procedures. Id. § 2161.1. The Commonwealth, of course, bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the test results were admissible under the implied consent statute. See Commonwealth v. Culp, 378 Pa.Super. 213, 218-19, 548 A.2d 578, 581 (1988).

Here, a review of the pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of the test results reveals that the Commonwealth met its burden under § 1547(c). At the hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Dr. Robert Elser, the director of clinical chemistry and clinical toxicology at York Hospital. Dr. Elser testified that the blood test in question was performed at York Hospital, in a laboratory that was state licensed and approved by the Department of Health, and that the equipment and procedure used in testing were approved by the Department of Health. See N.T., June 2, 1989 at 14. Dr. Elser further testified that the people performing the tests in the York Hospital laboratory were qualified personnel under the Clinical Laboratory Act. Id. With specific regard to appellant’s blood sample, Dr. Elser stated that the laboratory test was performed by Ms. Cindy Sharp, whose qualifications were that she had a four year degree in medical technology, and she had worked at the hospital for at least eighteen years. Id. at 11-18. When considered in light of our case law on the subject, this evidence clearly was sufficient to establish that the laboratory, equipment, procedures, and personnel employed to test appellant’s blood were qualified and approved in accordance with the implied consent statute. See Commonwealth v. Garofalo, 386 Pa.Super. 363, 563 A.2d 109 (1989); Commonwealth v. Kravontka, 384 Pa.Super. 346, 558 A.2d 865 (1988); Commonwealth v. O’Hayer, 345 Pa.Super. 73, 497 A.2d 649 (1985).

IV. CLAIMS REGARDING “IMPROPER INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION PROCEDURES”.

Appellant’s first argument regarding the Commonwealth’s investigation and prosecution procedures is that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause, and therefore appellant should never have been arrested. Because there was no probable cause, appellant argues, the fruits of that arrest (the BAC test) should have been suppressed. We disagree.

As noted above, when officer Becker first found appellant, he was unconscious. After several attempts to awaken him, officer Becker was able to rouse appellant. However, appellant smelled of alcohol, his eyes were watery and his speech was slurred. See N.T., October 23, 1989 at 18. After Appellant failed a field sobriety test, he was arrested. Id. at 19-20.

A legal arrest without a warrant depends upon probable cause. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the police at the time of arrest, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a suspect has committed or is committing a crime. Commonwealth v. Kazior, 269 Pa.Super. 518, 410 A.2d 822 (1979) (citations omitted). We have carefully reviewed the record, and we are satisfied that the above-mentioned facts were sufficient to provide officer Becker with probable cause to arrest appellant. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the BAC results obtained incident to that arrest. See Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 321 Pa.Super. 323, 468 A.2d 500 (1983).

Appellant also argues that all statements he made to the arresting officer before he was “Mirandized ” should have been suppressed. In support of this proposition, appellant cites only to this Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Bruder, 365 Pa.Super. 106, 528 A.2d 1385 (1987), allocatur denied, 518 Pa. 635, 542 A.2d 1365 (1988), rev’d sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S.Ct. 205, 102 L.Ed.2d 172 (1988). Appellant’s claim is patently meritless, as our decision in Bruder was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. See also Commonwealth v. Peth, 522 Pa. 136, 560 A.2d 139 (1989) (per curiam), reversing 374 Pa.Super. 265, 542 A.2d 1015 (1988) (Opinion by HOFFMAN, J.) (following Superior Court panel opinion in Bruder).

Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth did not establish a corpus delicti. Appellant offers no argument in support of this claim; hence, we cannot consider this claim.

Appellant also argues that he is entitled to relief because of a delay in his preliminary arraignment. Appellant, however, makes no factual argument in this regard. Instead, appellant’s entire argument is devoted to a summary of the contents of Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 and 140, followed by a boilerplate statement that “[ijt is contended that the rules set forth above were not complied with and further that such rules are contrary to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States”. Brief for Appellant at 33-34. Because we cannot discern the basis for appellant’s contention regarding his preliminary arraignment, he is not entitled to relief on this ground.

Appellant’s final argument concerning the Commonwealth’s investigation and prosecution procedures is that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to make prejudicial statements to the jury in his closing. We disagree.

It is well-settled that improper actions by the Commonwealth do not constitute grounds for relief unless they result in prejudice to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Taraschi, 327 Pa.Super. 179, 475 A.2d 744 (1984); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 462 Pa. 495, 341 A.2d 492 (1975) (error by prosecutor grounds for new trial only when such error contributed to conviction by moving mind of jury toward conviction); Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973) (prosecutorial misconduct basis for new trial only when harmful to defendant). Here, although he does not cite to the place in the record where the statement occurred, appellant argues that the Commonwealth erred in “characterizing to the Jury the blood alcohol level as high and several ‘times’ the legal limit without supporting evidence ...” See Appellant’s Brief at 41-42. However, the court itself instructed the jury that the legal limit for intoxication is .10 BAG, see N.T., October 23, 1989 at 109, and appellant’s BAC was .263 when he was tested approximately 45 minutes after he was arrested. Id, at 37. The Commonwealth’s statement was directly supported by facts contained in the record, and therefore was not erroneous. Thus, appellant’s argument is without merit.

V. WHETHER APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISPOSITION IN LIEU OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

Appellant’s final argument is that the trial court erred in denying his request for a preliminary disposition in lieu of criminal proceedings under the drug dependent statute. See id. This precise argument was raised and rejected by this court in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 385 Pa.Super. 58, 560 A.2d 165 (1989). In Snyder, speaking through Judge Beck, we held that “a preliminary disposition under the drug dependent statute, 35 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 78Q-118(a), is inapplicable where a person is charged with driving under the influence.” Id., 385 Pa.Superior Ct. at 71, 560 A.2d at 171. To the extent appellant asks us to revisit this issue, we note that it is well-settled that “[u]ntil a decision of the Superior Court is overruled by the Supreme Court, that decision is the law of this Commonwealth.” Baker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 309 Pa.Super. 81, 92, 454 A.2d 1092, 1098 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Antanovich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 320 Pa.Super. 322, 467 A.2d 345 (1983) (en banc). See also Yudacufski v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 499 Pa. 605, 612, 454 A.2d 923, 926 (1982). This rule, of course, is not absolute; thus, in “compelling circumstances,” a court may decide not to follow existing precedent. Id. As our Supreme Court noted in Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976):

[WJhile the principle of stare decisis is a wise course of judicial action, it is not an ironclad rule and is to be controlling only where applicable. So that, when it is determined that a past precedent is no longer in accord with modern realities, and the rationale justifying the old rule no longer finds support, then the pledge of certainty gives way ‘to new conditions and to the persuasion of superior reasoning.’ Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 23, 203 A.2d 796, 806 (1964)....

Id., 469 Pa. at 282, 365 A.2d at 152. Appellant, who has previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated, has failed to show in what respect the approach in Snyder has lost its vitality, or any other compelling circumstance that might undermine Snyder’s precedential value. Instead, he merely levels an attack at the reasoning employed in that case. Under these circumstances, we must decline appellant’s invitation not to follow Snyder. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing appellant’s request for preliminary disposition under the Controlled Substance Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.

CONCLUSION

After carefully reviewing each of appellant’s numerous claims of error, we are satisfied that he is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      . 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a).

        . 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(4).

      . A BAC of .263 is equivalent to an actual blood alcohol content of .263%. These terms will be used interchangeably as they appear in the record.

      . We should note that Mr. Bergdoll’s approach makes it extremely difficult to conduct effective appellate review. Mr. Bergdoll filed an omnibus pre-trial motion in which he raised over twenty-five claims. After trial, Mr. Bergdoll raised more than ten additional issues, and also incorporated by reference all of the pre-trial claims. The opinions below understandably did not address all of these claims; as a result, in many instances we do not have the benefit of the trial court's views on the claims raised on this appeal. In addition, the Commonwealth has briefed only seven of the issues raised by appellant. Thus, we are further hampered in that we do not have the benefit of the Commonwealth's view on the bulk of appellant’s claims.

      . By order of December 31, 1987, effective immediately, our Supreme Court amended Rule 1100. We must apply the prior rule in effect at the time of appellant’s trial.

      . Appellant also asserts that (1) the administration of the blood test violated his right to counsel, and (2) Pennsylvania’s implied consent law "violates the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and also Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Appellant also argues that (3) Section 3731 is unconstitutional. Appellant provides no argument in support of these assertions; accordingly, we cannot consider these claims.

      . In a sub-argument labelled "Admissibility of Blood Test”, appellant also argues that a single sample of blood, drawn "sometime after the event of driving", is insufficient to prove that appellant’s blood alcohol content exceeded .10% at the time he was driving. See Brief for Appellant at 18-25. The thrust of appellant’s argument is that, for the Commonwealth to prove a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(4), it must introduce evidence relating the test results back to the time that he was driving the car. This sufficiency claim, which is distinguishable from the claims in the text concerning the manner of testing appellant’s blood, is waived, in that it was not "set forth in the statement of questions involved or suggested thereby.” See P.R.A.P. 2116(a); Commonwealth v. Duden, 326 Pa.Super. 73, 473 A.2d 614 (1984). Even if the claim is not waived, however, it clearly is meritless, as this Court has explicitly and repeatedly refused to impose a requirement on the Commonwealth to relate blood alcohol tests back to the time a defendant was driving. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Slingerland, 358 Pa.Super. 531, 518 A.2d 266 (1986); Commonwealth v. Speights, 353 Pa.Super. 258, 509 A.2d 1263 (1986).
      Appellant also argues that the hospital’s samples of his blood should have been preserved, and that because the samples were not preserved, that they should have been suppressed. See Appellant’s Brief at 29. This court has explicitly rejected appellant’s argument in Commonwealth v. Gamber, 352 Pa.Super. 36, 506 A.2d 1324 (1986). Appellant has not attempted to show that Gamber is no longer valid authority, and our research reveals that the decision has not been overruled. Thus, we are bound by Gamber, and appellant’s argument is meritless.

      . We note that this case clearly is distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Culp, supra, a case upon which appellant places great emphasis. In Culp, the Commonwealth not only attempted to prove that the laboratory was an approved facility by having the court take judicial notice of that fact, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garofalo, supra, 386 Pa.Super. at 369, 563 A.2d at 112 (trial court took judicial notice of fact that laboratory was approved for blood alcohol testing; held, trial court affirmed); Commonwealth v. Kravontka, supra, 384 Pa.Super. at 357, 558 A.2d at 871, but also attempted to prove, solely through judicial notice, that a department of health approval necessarily meant that the procedures, personnel and equipment were properly qualified and approved to perform the tests mandated by the Clinical Laboratory Act. The Culp Court held, in conformity with Garofalo and Kravontka, that judicial notice was proper to show only that the laboratory in question had been approved. See 378 Pa.Super. at 219, 548 A.2d at 581 (judicial notice of the Pennsylvania Bulletin (which lists approved facilities) “merely is dispositive of the fact that the Department of Health approved the hospital’s laboratory for testing purposes.”).

      . Appellant makes no specific argument in support of this claim, but instead simply restates the standards governing a probable cause analysis.

      . See N.T. Sentencing, February 2, 1990 at 1.


author: POPOVICH, Judge:

text:
    588 A.2d 932
    James DALKIEWICZ and Joseph Dalkiewicz, T/A Dale and Dale Design Development Company v. REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF LUZERNE COUNTY and Borough of Edwardsville. Appeal of REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF LUZERNE COUNTY.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 16, 1990.
    Filed March 11, 1991.
    Reargument Denied April 23, 1991.

      Joseph M. Blazosek, West Pittston, for appellant.
    James R. Anzalone, Wilkes-Barre, for Dalkiewicz, appellee.
    Before DEL SOLE, POPOVICH and BROSKY, JJ.
   POPOVICH, Judge:

This case involves an appeal from the December 26,1989, order (reduced to judgment thereafter) denying the post-trial motions of the defendant/appellant (Redevelopment Authority of Luzerne County) and granting the plaintiffs/appellees’ (James and Joseph Dalkiewicz, t/a Dale and Dale Design Development Co.) request for specific performance. We affirm.

The record indicates that a complaint in equity was filed by the plaintiffs seeking, inter alia, an order of specific performance directing the defendant to “sell and convey” four parcels of real estate, and to approve the construction of four single-family dwellings thereon, in accordance with a June 16, 1982, agreement between the defendant and the plaintiffs. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint in Equity at Paragraph 5; Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint in Equity at Paragraph (c). The plaintiffs had presented “good-faith” deposits totalling $1,508.00 to the defendant to secure the sale of the parcels to them. . It was the contention of the Redevelopment Authority that the monies received were “as a good faith deposit, but it ... expressly denied that any such receipt constitute^] a written agreement” between the plaintiffs and the defendant “as either ... an option or Agreement of Sale.” See Defendant’s Answer to Amended Complaint at Paragraph 5.

Both parties agree that in June of 1985, the two met to discuss the impact of the Urban Development Action Grant (hereinafter “UDAG”), a federally funded program applied for by the plaintiffs in 1982 to assist low-income families to obtain housing at a “no-interest” rate.

It was the position of the plaintiffs that an agreement had been entered into on June 21, 1985, reaffirming its status as “developer” of the four lots in the Borough of Edwardsville. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint in Equity at Paragraph 22. Also discussed was whether a reapportionment of the properties indicated an increase in value, and, if such were the case, the plaintiffs still intended to pay the price to develop the lots. Id. at Paragraphs 21(a) and 25. The defendant denied that such an agreement had been reached on June 21, 1985, and, in new matter, the bar of the Statute of Frauds was asserted. See Defendant’s Amended Complaint at Paragraphs 27 and 50.

One of the lots and a portion of a second were recommended by the Edwardsville Borough to be “developed” by one Rowland Roberts, the then newly hired Chief of Police for the borough. Thereafter, the defendant “approved” Roberts for the lots designated by the borough, while the plaintiffs were designated as “developer” on the remaining portion of the four lots. Disenchanted with the decision of the defendant and the borough, the instant lawsuit was commenced. Following the submission of pleadings by the respective parties, a hearing was conducted beginning on May 11, 1987. Subsequently, the court entered an order, accompanied by an opinion, directing the defendant to transfer legal title to the four parcels at issue to the plaintiffs. After the submission and denial of post-trial motions, this appeal ensued and raises six issues which, when distilled, are reduced to the question: Did an agreement exist between the parties sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and entitle the plaintiffs to specific performance?

The Statute of Frauds requires that agreements for the sale of land be signed and in writing. Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 388 Pa.Super. 37, 40, 564 A.2d 990, 992 (1989). This requirement can be met by creation of a written memorandum that need not consist of one single document. Target Sportswear v. Clearfield Foundation, 327 Pa.Super. 1, 10-11, 474 A.2d 1142, 1147-1148 (1984).

As recited by the Target Court, quoting Section 208 of the Restatement of Contracts, the validity of such a memorandum can be established as follows:

The memorandum can consist of several writings,
(a) if each writing is signed by the party to be charged and the writings indicate that they relate to the same transaction, or
(b) though only one writing is signed if
(i) the signed writing is physically annexed to the other writing by the party to be charged, or
(ii) the signed writing refers to the unsigned writing, or
(iii) it appears from examination of all the writings that the signed writing was signed with reference to the unsigned writings.

Id., 327 Pa.Superior Ct. at 11, 474 A.2d at 1148. The question we must decide is whether there existed a document or documents sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds with regard to the sale of the parcels in Edwards-ville Borough by the Redevelopment Authority to the plaintiffs.

First, we have evidence of the plaintiffs being listed as “developer” on the “Identification of Ownership” sheets naming the lots in question (Disposition Parcels Nos. 2-34 through 2-37). Each document has the signature of “Jane M. Thomas”, below which appears the date (9/19/84) and verbiage: “Authorized Agent”. See Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 2-5. We also have receipts on the defendant's stationery (four in number and as is relevant to our determination) that show the plaintiffs having made “good-faith” deposits (totalling $1,508.00) for the disposition of the parcels at issue (# 2-34 to # 2-37). As with the previously discussed exhibits, each was affixed with the signature of “Jane Thomas” at the end thereof and below which appeared the legend: “Authorized Signature” of the defendant. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint in Equity at Exhibit “A”; Trial Court’s Opinion at 5-6.

Second, of record appears a typed agreement by and among Edwardsville Borough, the defendant and the plaintiffs dated August 16, 1982. The agreement provided in pertinent part that: the borough had obtained a grant from the federal Housing and Urban Development agency (hereinafter “HUD”) in the amount of $112,320.00 to finance nine dwelling units in the borough; the plaintiffs had been designated by the borough as a “developer”; the defendant was willing to sell the nine parcels to the “developer”/plaintiffs; and that the agreement was being executed to satisfy HUD requirements. Additionally, in Section 2 of the agreement it read:

The Authority has designated [the plaintiffs] as the developer of the parcels. The Authority will enter into a separate Redevelopment Agreements [sic ] with [the plaintiffs] pursuant to which the nine (9) parcels in question will be conveyed directly to them. * * *

None of the parties disputes the fact that the parcels referred to in the 1982 agreement included the same parcels which are the subject of the present dispute. And, although various matters had yet to be satisfied (HUD’s review and approval of the evidentiary material required by the agreement, building permits by the borough and approval of the plaintiffs’ agreement by the Redevelopment Authority), the parties were “not aware of any reason why the governmental approvals not yet obtained w[ould] not be forthcoming as a matter of due course.”

Finally, the record indicates that the plaintiffs prepared “design” plans as of July 1, 1982, with regard to the manner and method it would construct the dwellings. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint in Equity at Exhibit “B”.

As concluded by the trial court, and we concur in its finding from our review of the evidence, “it is clear that there was a writing or writings sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.” Trial Court Opinion at 6.

With the ruling of the trial eourt granting the plaintiffs’ request for specific performance, and the same being supported by record evidence and the law, we see no reason to disturb the trial court’s determination.

Affirmed.

      . In adherence to our Rules of Civil Procedure, which encompass the procedure in an action in equity (see Pa.R.Civ.P. 1501 et seq.), we would observe that the instant suit was brought in equity, and, as such, the ruling appealed should have been from a final decree of the court below.
      The error in identifying the appeal as having been perfected from an order, in contradistinction to a final decree, is not fatal to our resolution of the issue raised since it is a misstep of procedure not affecting the substantial rights of the parties or the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the appeal. See generally Pa.R.Civ.P. 126.

      . The initial suit had named Edwardsville Borough as a defendant. However, a motion for summary judgment was granted to Edwards-ville Borough dismissing it from the lawsuit.

      . A fifth parcel, designated Disposition Parcel No. 2-26, was sold and conveyed to the plaintiffs’ nominee, a Mr. Charles Stajewski, by the defendant. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint in Equity at Paragraphs 5 and 26; Defendant’s Answer to Amended Complaint at Paragraph 16. Thus, it is not listed as an object of the dispute between the litigants, even though the dollar amount of $630.00 is referenced by the plaintiffs as a "good-faith" deposit paid to the defendant to purchase the parcel. let

      . 33 P.S. § 1.

      . Ms. Thomas is the secretary for the Redevelopment Authority and is the individual the plaintiffs dealt with on at least thirty occasions to make payment of “good-faith" deposits leading to the securement of parcels of land in the past from the Redevelopment Authority.

      . We would note that the plaintiffs’ Complaint in Equity contains a document captioned: "Part II — Redeveloper’s Statement For Public Disclosure", dated June 9, 1982, and names the plaintiffs as "re-developer” of the property owned by the defendant in Edwardsville.

      . The following signatures appear on page 5 of the agreement: James O. Hankey signed on behalf of Edwardsville Borough; Thomas E. Lehman, III (as Chairman) and Raymond M. Marusak (as Secretary) for the defendant on 8/16/82; lastly, James Dalkiewicz wrote his name for the plaintiffs as of 12/22/82.

      . It was the testimony of James Dalkiewicz that "plans” were submitted to the Redevelopment Authority in 1982, along with the "good-faith” deposits, to secure the lots in Edwardsville Borough. This was consistent with what Dalkiewicz had done in the past with Redevelopment Authority property. In fact, on seventy-three prior occasions where money had been paid on the lots, the plaintiffs actually entered into possession of the land and built structures “thirty times”. Agreements of sale were signed in each of the thirty instances “at the closing”. As told by Mr. Dalkiewicz:
      ... before we took possession of the land, we entered onto thirty of them and started [construction] before we even took possession and prior to the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement of Sale----
      This was noted by the trial court in its remarks that, because the parties had dealt with each other in the past in a similar fashion, the fact that the Redevelopment Authority had engaged in a course of conduct in its dealings with the plaintiffs (which was not in conformity and compliance with all the rules and regulations which it now was attempting to assert as a defense to the enforcement of a binding agreement) was not favorable to its case. The trial court characterized the defendant as having “lured” the plaintiffs into a "sense of false security based upon past dealings and [it] therefore h[e]ld that it would ... be inequitable and unjust to allow the Defendant Authority to act in such a bad faith and capricious manner, as they [were] ... attempting] to do, in refusing to sell Plaintiffs the subject parcels.” Trial Court Opinion at 7-8. Cf. Thatcher's Drugs v. Consol. Supermarkets, 391 Pa.Super. 524, 571 A.2d 490 (1990) (A contract need not exist to seek the protective sphere of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, whose objective it is to prevent the perpetuation of an injustice upon one claiming its benefits).
      In reliance on the Authority’s conduct, the plaintiffs deposited fifty truck-loads of land-fill on the lots in question over the course of three years to bring the property even with or above the road surface.
      Moreover, there was testimony from both sides that the parties, represented by counsel at the June, 1985 meeting, dealt with the Edwardsville Borough lots. Thus, the parties and counsel were actively involved in discussion seeking to reassess the properties and reach an amicable resolution of the matter. Cf. Mackey v. Adair, 99 Pa. 143 (1881) (Presence of client at making of an agreement regarding land circumvents a defense that one acting on behalf of client did not have authority to act).
      Representatives of the Authority, if the testimony of Attorney Gurdin and Mr. Dalkiewicz is to be believed, were present when all parties reaffirmed the plaintiffs’ 1982 agreement to have the lots transferred to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the action of the court is subject to affirmance on a basis supplemental to its initial ground for ordering specific performance in favor of the plaintiffs. In either instance, we find that the facts, as reviewed by this Court, justify an affirmance of the action of the trial court.


text:
    588 A.2d 936
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David CORRADINO, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Dec. 11, 1990.
    Filed March 26, 1991.

      Gerald P. Deady, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.
    Karen Tomaine, Asst. Dist. Atty., Clarks Summit, for Com., appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, TAMILIA and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   HOFFMAN, Judge:

This appeal is from the judgment of sentence for violating § 6115 of the Uniform Firearms Act, see 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6124. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) admitting into evidence computer printouts; and (2) denying his demurrer. We affirm.

The facts giving rise to the prosecution below were aptly summarized by the trial court as follows:

This matter had its origination in an occurrence which took place on May 26, 1986 when the body of a [D]own [Vjalley police officer was found shot to death. Nearby was found the body of one David Williams, also shot to death, and, in his hand, his thumb on the trigger, a .44 caliber Ruger Red Hawk pistol. State Troopers Eugene McDonald and Carl M. Allen investigated the scene. It was determined from the serial number on the revolver that the weapon was owned by David Corradino, the Defendant herein. On May 27, 1986, the Defendant was interviewed at his home by State Trooper Stanley J. Jazewski, Detective Michael Dessoye of Luzerne County and Capt. William Thomas of the Avoca Police Department. He made a statement, at that time, that he had loaned the pistol to Williams on May 25, 1986. The Defendant was ultimately arrested on June 3, 1986.

Trial Court Opinion at 1. Appellant was charged with violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6115, which provides that:

No person shall make any loan secured by mortgage, pledge or deposit of a firearm; nor shall any person lend or give a firearm to another or otherwise deliver a firearm contrary to the provisions of this subchapter.

Id. The case proceeded to trial on February 19, 1987, but a mistrial was declared after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Appellant was retried before a jury on June 8-9, 1987. At the close of the Commonwealth’s ease, appellant demurred. The demurrer was denied, and the defense rested without presenting evidence. Appellant then was found guilty. Post-trial motions were filed and denied, and, on February 16, 1990, appellant was sentenced to a one-year term of probation. This timely appeal followed.

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence two computer printouts. The first printout was a request made to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), asking whether the Ruger Red Hawk that was found in David Williams’s hand had been reported stolen. The second printout was the reply from NCIC, which indicated that there was no report that the gun had been stolen. The printouts were relevant, of course, because if the gun had not been stolen, it was more likely that appellant had violated § 6115. Appellant claims, however, that these reports were inadmissible hearsay. He argues that the printouts were “official records,” and thus the Commonwealth was required to authenticate them pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6103 and § 5328. This claim may be rejected summarily.

Section 6103, “Proof of Official Records,” provides, in relevant part:

(a) General Rule. — An official record kept within this Commonwealth by any court, district justice or other government unit, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied by a certificate that the officer has the custody. The certificate may be made by any public officer having a seal of office and having official duties with respect to the government unit in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of this office, or if there is no such officer, by:
(1) The Department of State, in the case of any Commonwealth agency.
(2) The clerk of the court of common pleas of the judicial district embracing any county in which the government unit has jurisdiction, in the case of any government unit other than a Commonwealth agency.

Id. § 6103(a). Section 5328(a) contains similar language and governs, inter alia, official records kept within the United States. It has been noted that “[t]he effect of these statutes is to provide a means for satisfying the authentication requirement, and, in effect, to dispense with the need for the custodian of the records to appear in court as required under the business records statute.” L. Packel & A. Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence § 803.8, at 593 (1987 & Supp.1990).

After reviewing these sections, we agree with the trial court’s observation that “[i]t is readily apparent, from the titles and texts, that these two statutes apply to official records of governmental units which computer prin[t]outs from the National Crime Information Center are not.” Trial Court Opinion at 8. Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the admissibility of the printouts should be determined under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. As is noted in McCormick on Evidence:

With the explosive development of electronic data processing, most business and business-type records are generated by so-called computers. Courts have agreed that their admissibility in evidence is governed by the hearsay exception for regularly kept records, whether at common law or in the form of a statute or rule.

E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 314, at 885 (3d ed. 1984 & Supp.1987).

In Pennsylvania, the admissibility of business records is governed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108, which provides in relevant part:

(b) General Rule. — -A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
(c) Definition. — As used in this section “business” includes every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation of institutions whether carried on for profit or not.

Id. Our Supreme Court has noted that the purpose of this legislation is to:

merely require that the basic integrity of the record keeping is established. Where it can be shown that the entries were made with sufficient contemporaneousness to assure accuracy and that they were made pursuant to the business practices and not influenced by the litigation in which they are being introduced, a sufficient indicia of reliability is provided to overcome their hearsay nature.

In re Estate of Indyk, 488 Pa. 567, 572, 413 A.2d 371, 373 (1979) (footnote omitted). See Williams v. McClain, 513 Pa. 300, 305, 520 A.2d 1374, 1376 (1987) (“The basic justification for the business records exception to the hearsay rule is that the purpose of keeping business records builds in a reliability which obviates the need for cross-examination”) (citations omitted); see also L. Packel & A. Poulin, supra, § 803.6, at 582. “Whether a document should be admitted under the ‘business record’ exception is within the discretionary power of the trial court provided such is exercised within the bounds of [§ 6108].” Thomas v. Allegheny & Eastern Coal Co., 309 Pa.Super. 333, 340, 455 A.2d 637, 640 (1982).

Here, it is apparent that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the printouts under the business records exception. State Trooper Carl M. Allen testified in detail concerning the identity of the printouts, when they were made, how they were obtained, and their mode of preparation. See N.T. June 8, 1987, at 106-08, 128-31. This testimony provided a sufficient indication of the reliability of the printouts to warrant their admission. Accordingly, appellant is not entitled to relief on this ground.

Appellant next contends that the court erred in denying his demurrer. Our Supreme Court has noted that:

The test to be applied in ruling on a demurrer is whether, accepting as true all of the prosecution’s evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, it is sufficient to support a finding by the fact-finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Turner, 491 Pa. 620, 622, 421 A.2d 1057, 1058 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. David, 345 Pa.Super. 578, 580, 498 A.2d 975, 976 (1985).

In the present case, appellant was accused of violating § 6115 of the Uniform Firearms Act, which provides, in pertinent part: “nor shall any person lend or give a firearm to another or otherwise deliver a firearm contrary to the provisions of this subchapter.” The trial court instructed the jury that it could find appellant guilty under § 6115 if it determined that his lending of the firearm was contrary to § 6111 of the Act, which governs the sale and registration of firearms. N.T. June 9, 1987 at 318-19. Thus, the court apparently reasoned that loans of firearms were subject to the registration requirements of the Act.

Appellant notes that § 6111, by its terms, governs only the sale of firearms, and that there is nothing in that section, or any other section of the Act, to suggest that the registration procedures outlined in § 6111 apply to the lending of a firearm. Because there is no section other than § 6115 which addresses the lending of a firearm, appellant argues, the Commonwealth failed to show that his lending of the firearm was contrary to any other provision of the Uniform Firearms Act, and thus his demurrer should have been granted.

A court must construe the words of a statute according to their plain meaning. E.g., Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 335, 446 A.2d 583, 587 (1982); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a) (“[wjords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage”). The primary object of all statutory interpretation, of course, “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1921(a); see also Commonwealth v. Snyder, 385 Pa.Super. 58, 65, 560 A.2d 165, 169 (1989). When the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the interpretation is relatively simple; in such circumstances, “the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); see also Coretsky v. Board of Comm’rs of Butler Twp., 520 Pa. 513, 517, 555 A.2d 72, 74 (1989). When, however, the words of a statute are not explicit, legislative intent may be ascertained by considering, inter alia, the occasion and necessity of the statute, the circumstances in which it was enacted, the mischief to be remedied, and the object to be attained by the legislation. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c); see also Commonwealth v. Snyder, supra 385 Pa.Super. at 65-66, 560 A.2d at 169.

Here, as a matter of statutory construction, we must agree with appellant that the registration provisions of the Act do not govern the lending of a firearm. The only reference to “lending” of firearms is in § 6115. For example, § 6111, which is entitled “Sale of firearms,” speaks in terms of “sellers” and “purchasers” of firearms, and imposes registration and time constraints on the sale and delivery of firearms. Similarly, § 6116, which governs “false evidence of identity” in securing firearms, speaks in terms of persons “purchasing or otherwise securing delivery” of firearms, or “applying for a license to carry the same.” The Act is silent on the question whether “loans” of a firearm must be registered. In short, there is no textual support for a conclusion that the legislature intended that loans of a firearm should be subject to the registration provisions contained in § 6111.

Our conclusion that the Act does not require that loans of firearms be registered, however, does not end the inquiry. Appellant’s argument proceeds on the assumption that § 6115 is not a blanket prohibition against lending firearms, but only prohibits lending a firearm contrary to other provisions of the Act. We cannot agree. A plain reading of the section, as well as a consideration of the purpose of the Act, indicates that the section is intended to prohibit all lending of firearms. The heading of § 6115 reads “Loans on, or lending or giving firearms prohibited. Id. (emphasis supplied). The heading affixed to a section of a statute, of course, is not controlling. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1924. However, it “may be used to aid in the construction” of the statute, id., and the heading of § 6115 suggests that the General Assembly intended that all loans of firearms be prohibited. The structure of § 6115 provides further support for this conclusion. The word “firearm” is mentioned twice in the clause at issue. The first part of the clause provides that “nor shall any person lend or give a firearm to another,” which suggests an absolute ban on lending or delivering a firearm. The second reference to firearm reads “or otherwise deliver a firearm contrary to the provisions of this subchapter.” It would appear, therefore, that § 6115 draws a distinction between lending or giving a firearm, on one hand, and delivering a firearm, on the other. Moreover, after reviewing the Act as a whole in light of this distinction, we agree with the Commonwealth that the “contrary to the provisions” qualification is properly limited only to other deliveries of a firearm.

The distinction that the section draws between “lending or giving” and “delivering” is sensible. As we have noted above, the only mention of the word “lend” occurs in § 6115. Because no other section regulates loans of firearms, the lending of a firearm could never be contrary to any other provision of the Act, and thus the qualification would be meaningless when loans are involved. The Act, however, does impose numerous restrictions on other types of delivery of firearms. The qualification in § 6115, therefore, appears to be a careful attempt to insure that when a firearm is “delivered” other than by loan or gift (which are absolutely prohibited), such delivery must comply with the registration requirements of the Act.

A consideration of the legislative intent that animates the Act provides further support for this construction. The apparent purpose of the Act is to regulate the possession and distribution of firearms, which are highly dangerous and are frequently used in the commission of crimes. As the trial court aptly noted in its Opinion:

The intention of the General Assembly must be ascertained by considering the mischief to be remedied and the object to be attained. „.. Under the Uniform Firearms Act, the mischief to be remedied was the unimpeded circulation of dangerous instruments and the object to be attained was the regulation and registration of transfers of same. The General Assembly has prohibited the transfer of certain defined firearms to various categories of individuals. The enforcement of these prohibitions is through a system of registration under sec. 6111 designed to uncover information about those who seek to acquire firearms.

Trial Court Opinion at 13-14 (citation omitted). The Act thus insures that a record is made of who possesses firearms, and that the fitness requirements (i.e., proscriptions premised on age, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6110, certain prior convictions, id. § 6105, § 6110, drug addictions, id. § 6110, etc.) in the Act are met. The ban on loans in § 6115 furthers this intention because such transfers are unlikely to be recorded. The section thus prevents persons who are prohibited from acquiring firearms by purchase from acquiring them through loan, gift or other transfer. If persons could give or lend firearms at will, these registration and fitness requirements would be rendered meaningless. Similarly, the requirement that other deliveries, when made, must comply with other provisions in the Act also furthers the legislative intent, as it insures that transfers that are of a type that are permitted and can be recorded (for example, sales of firearms), will be recorded.

In summary, we hold that proof that a person loaned a firearm is sufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6115. And, in this case, appellant’s admission that he loaned the firearm to David Williams was sufficient to support a finding of guilt. Thus, the court did not err in denying appellant’s demurrer. See Commonwealth v. Turner, supra; Commonwealth v. David, supra.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      . Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an inculpatory statement that he made to police. Appellant argues that the statement should not have been admitted because the Commonwealth did not first establish the corpus delicti of the crime charged. After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court has adequately addressed and properly disposed of this contention in its opinion. Thus, we need not address the claim further.
      In addition, appellant maintains that the court below should have granted his demurrer because the Commonwealth failed to prove the corpus delicti In light of our agreement with the trial court’s disposition of the substantive aspect of appellant’s corpus delicti argument, this derivative claim necessarily must fail.

      . Appellant has confined his argument on appeal to his assertion that the printouts were official records; thus, he does not suggest that Trooper Allen’s testimony was insufficient to qualify the printouts under the business records exception.

      . Because appellant did not present a defense after the trial court’s adverse ruling on his demurrer, the propriety of the court’s ruling on the demurrer is preserved for appellate review. Commonwealth v. David, 345 Pa.Super. 578, 580, 498 A.2d 975, 976 (1985).

      . Thus, appellant suggests that the § 6115 is intended only to prevent, for example, loans of firearms to convicts, see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105, or to minors, id. § 6110.

      . Appellant also argues that, if § 6115 is interpreted to prohibit the lending of firearms, it is unconstitutional. Appellant's argument in this regard is not at all clear. To the extent that he suggests that the statute is unconstitutional because it does not contain an express intent element, the argument is meritless. Our Supreme Court has noted that § 302 of the Crimes Code defines the general requirements for criminal culpability for offenses in Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 200, 535 A.2d 575, 579 (1987). Section 302(a) provides:
      (a) Minimum requirements of culpability. — Except as provided in section 305 of this title (relating to limitations on scope of culpability requirements), a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.

        Id. We should also note that the fact that the statute does not specifically mention the intent required is not unusual. As Professors LaFave and Scott have stated:
      Although it is true that burglary is not generally expressly defined as "intentionally breaking and entering," etc., larceny as “intentionally taking and carrying away,” etc., or rape as "intentionally having sexual intercourse,” etc., such an intention is nevertheless a requirement for each of these crimes. Sometimes it is spoken of as a "general intent” to distinguish it from the "specific intent” which a crime may specifically, by its definition, require, over and above any required intention to engage in the forbidden conduct (as burglary requires a specific intent to commit a felony, larceny a specific intent to steal).
      W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 3.5(a), at 303 (1986). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S.Ct. 240, 243, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1951) ("mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of intent should not necessarily be construed as dispensing with it”) (quoted in Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa.Super. 282, 311, 419 A.2d 457, 473 (1980) (SPAETH, J., concurring)). Here, appellant has made no argument, either in the court below or on this appeal, concerning the adequacy of the court’s jury instruction on criminal intent. In addition, in light of appellant’s confession, there can be no question of appellant’s culpability in lending the firearm to David Williams.

      . We are aware that the Court’s jury instruction was erroneous, as it directed the jury that it had to find both that appellant loaned the gun, and that the lending of the gun was contrary to the registration requirements in the Act. Because the instruction, as given, was more protective of appellant, however, the erroneous inclusion of this added element of the crime did not prejudice appellant.