author: TAMILIA, Judge:

text:
    555 A.2d 1344
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Francis Ordean REESE, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Feb. 1, 1989.
    Filed March 1, 1989.
    Reargument Denied April 5, 1989.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 1, 1989.

      Barbara J. Entwistle, Gettysburg, for appellant.
    Roy A. Keefer, Assistant District Attorney, Gettysburg, for Com., appellee.
    Before TAMILIA, POPOVICH and JOHNSON, JJ.
   TAMILIA, Judge:

This is an appeal from the trial court’s Order dismissing appellant’s Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) petition which was filed on February 23, 1987.

Appellant was tried hj a jury and convicted on April 26, 1977 of rape, burglary;, Indecent assault and simple assault. His sole defense was offered through two alibi witnesses, but, according to appellant, his appointed counsel failed to request a specific jury instruction on the alibi defense. Counsel also failed to object to a concealment instruction even though no evidence was in the record to show appellant knew of the offense or that he was to be arrested for it.

Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two to ten years for the burglary, concurrent with an equal sentence for the rape; indecent and simple assault merged with rape for sentencing purposes. This Court upheld, without Opinion, appellant’s judgment of sentence in Commonwealth v. Reese, 270 Pa.Super. 607, 417 A.2d 773 (1979).

On November 12, 1979, appellant filed a pro se PCHA petition and the court subsequently appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel did not revise or supplement the petition but did represent appellant at the hearing. The petition was denied and appellant filed a second pro se petition on July 26, 1984. Again, counsel was appointed and this time counsel amended the petition to include the allegation appellant was denied his appellate rights under the first PCHA petition because he never received notice of the decision which was made on May 21, 1982. Following a hearing, the PCHA court denied the second petition as to new allegations contained therein but granted appellant leave to appeal nunc pro tunc the Order dismissing the first petition.

This Court filed a Memorandum Opinion on December 6, 1985 disposing of appellant’s two issues raised in his first petition concerning ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failure to call certain witnesses. We affirmed the Order of the PCHA court and appellant, for the third time, filed a PCHA petition on February 23, 1987, the denial of which is the subject of the instant appeal.

Newly appointed counsel supplemented appellant’s third petition and at a pre-trial conference, the court concluded only four issues had not been finally litigated and merited review. By Order of July 27, 1988, the court dismissed appellant’s petition after a hearing on the matter.

The statute governing appellant’s request for relief is former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543 which lists four factors appellant must prove before becoming eligible for relief. Before we can address appellant’s issues, we must determine the threshold issue of whether appellant’s repetitive PCHA petitions have precluded our review under part (4) of section 9543 which states appellant is not entitled to relief if the error resulting in his conviction and sentence has been finally litigated or waived. Former section 9544 provides definition to our analysis.

§ 9544. When an issue is finally litigated or waived

(a) Issues Anally litigated. — For the purpose of this subchapter, an issue is finally litigated if:

(1) It has been raised in the trial court, the trial court has ruled on the merits of the issue and the petitioner has knowingly and understanding^ failed to appeal the trial court’s ruling.
(2) The Superior Court has ruled on the merits of the issue and the petitioner has knowingly and understandingly failed to avail himself of further appeals.
(3) The Supreme Court has ruled on the merits of the issue.

(b) Issues waived. — For the purposes of this subchapter, an issue is waived if:

(1) The petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised before the trial, at the trial, on appeal, in a habeas corpus proceeding or any other proceeding actually conducted or in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this subchapter.
(2) The petitioner is unable to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure to raise the issue.

(c) Presumption. — There is a rebuttable presumption that a failure to appeal a ruling or to raise an issue is a knowing and understanding failure.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a), (b), (c). (Emphasis added.)

Appellant argues his issues are not waived because his “layered” ineffective assistance of counsel claim constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” which preserves his issues for our review. Prior decisions of our Supreme Court have held or acknowledged that ineffectiveness of all prior counsel constitutes extraordinary circumstances which, when raised, preserves the issues for consideration. See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 495 Pa. 26, 432 A.2d 182 (1981); Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 420 A.2d 431 (1980). However, the recent case of Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 549 A.2d 107 (1988), resolves the problem of repetitive PCHA petitions which result from a lack of finality of decisions under the PCHA where all a defendant must do is claim “ineffectiveness of counsel.”

In Lawson, the Court found it necessary to sua sponte address the problem of repetitive PCHA petitions which were emasculating the legislative intent to obtain finality in criminal verdicts. The Court enunciated a standard whereby convicted persons are provided ample opportunity to assert valid, legitimate complaints of error while, at the same time, abuse of the court system by prisoners is foreclosed.

Today we have reached a consensus which proved so elusive in Commonwealth v. Alexander, supra, and Commonwealth v. Watlington, supra. This accommodation has been reached by the realization that we cannot permit our continuing concern for assuring that persons charged with crime receive competent representation in their defense to be exploited as a ploy to destroy the finality of judgments fairly reached. We therefore conclude that a second or any subsequent post-conviction request for relief will not be entertained unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.
We hold today that the mere assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is not sufficient to override the waiver and “finally litigated” provisions in the P.C.H.A., as to permit the filing of repetitive or serial petitions under the banner of that statute. A repetitive or serial petition may be entertained only for the purpose of avoiding a demonstrated miscarriage of justice, which no civilized society can tolerate.

Id., 519 Pa. at 513, 549 A.2d at 111-112.

Appellant’s original judgment of sentence was affirmed by this Court. Subsequently, appellant filed three PCHA petitions and had new counsel appointed with each petition. Denial of his first petition was reviewed by this Court and we affirmed the PCHA court. We find appellant has had ample opportunity to assert any legitimate claims, has exhausted his collateral remedies and is currently abusing the judicial system by continuing to file petitions, all under the guise of “ineffectiveness of counsel” which, up until now, has provided sufficient basis to warrant judicial review. Since appellant has not made a prima facie showing of a miscarriage of justice, we affirm the Order dismissing his petition.

Order affirmed.

      . The Post Conviction Hearing Act has been modified in part, repealed in part, and renamed the Post Conviction Relief Act by Act of April 13, 1988, No. 47, §§ 3, 4, 1988 Pa.Legis.Srv. 227, 229-232. The new provision applies to all actions for collateral relief instituted on or after the effective date, therefore, the instant petition must be evaluated under the former act.

       The new provisions enacted by the General Assembly in the Act of April 13, 1988, clearly reflect a legislative perception that courts had been too generous in entertaining claims for relief under the former statute. For example, under the new 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii), a petitioner seeking relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must plead and prove that counsel’s stewardship “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place."


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HOFFMAN, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    555 A.2d 1347
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Bernard Francis SEMATIS, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Jan. 11, 1989.
    Filed March 30, 1989.

      David Ferleger, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Nicholas J. Gasenta, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Downingtown, for Com., appellee.
    Before WIEAND, MELINSON and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   HOFFMAN, Judge:

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence for kidnapping while in visible possession of a firearm. Appellant contends that (1) the imposition of the statutorily required five to ten years incarceration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in light of his unique circumstances, (2) in the alternative, if the mandatory sentencing Act is constitutional, “total confinement” should be construed to include involuntary mental health treatment, and (3) the trial court erred in failing to order implementation of such a mental health treatment plan. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order below.

On October 21, 1987, appellant pled guilty but mentally ill to kidnapping, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901(a)(1). At the hearing, appellant admitted to holding a hostage for six and one-half hours while in visible possession of a firearm. On February 1, 1988, appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than ten years plus the cost of prosecution for kidnapping. Appellant filed a motion to modify or vacate the sentence which was denied on March 1, 1988. This timely appeal followed.

Appellant initially contends that the mandatory sentencing statute, which provides for a minimum term of imprisonment of five years where a crime is committed by someone in possession of a firearm, is unconstitutional when applied to an individual who enters a plea of guilty but mentally ill. Appellant notes that he has no prior criminal record, he has the support of his family, and he is mentally ill. He argues that the legislature could not have intended that the mandatory five year sentence should apply to a person in these circumstances. We disagree.

The Mandatory Sentencing Act provides in relevant part:

(a) Mandatory sentence. — Any person who is convicted in any court in this Commonwealth of ... kidnapping, ... shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
(c) Authority of court in sentencing. — There shall be no authority in any court to impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any lesser sentence than provided for in subsection (a) or to place such offender on probation or to suspend sentence____

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(a) & (c). The Guilty But Mentally Ill statute provides in relevant part:

(a) Imposition of sentence. — A defendant found guilty but mentally ill or whose plea of guilty but mentally ill is accepted under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314 (relating to guilty but mentally ill) may have any sentence imposed on him which may lawfully be imposed on any defendant convicted of the same offense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9727.

In Commonwealth v. Michael, 352 Pa.Super. 345, 507 A.2d 1263 (1986), we held that the mandatory sentencing statute applies to individuals who enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill.

Section 9727 unambiguously provides that a defendant whose plea of guilty but mentally ill is accepted under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314 is subject to any sentence which may be lawfully imposed upon any defendant convicted of the same offense____ Since an individual convicted of robbery while in visible possession of a firearm would be subject to the mandatory sentence provisions of Section 9712, so too is an individual whose plea of guilty but mentally ill to the same offense is accepted under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314. The provisions of Section 9712(c) leave no room for discretion, and there is no authority for the sentencing court to impose a lesser sentence than the Act provides. Where an individual is convicted of the offense of robbery and is found to have visibly possessed a firearm, he may only be lawfully sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years. Hence, pursuant to Section 9727, where an individual enters a plea of guilty but mentally ill to the same offense, the same sentencing mandate would apply.

Id., 352 Pa.Superior Ct. at 350, 507 A.2d at 1265. Our Supreme Court has adopted the reasoning in Michael, and held that the fact that a defendant pled guilty but mentally ill did not authorize a deviation from the mandatory minimum sentence required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712. See Commonwealth v. Larkin, 518 Pa. 225, 542 A.2d 1324 (1988). In light of the Supreme Court holding in Larkin, and our holding in Michael, appellant’s first argument must fail.

Appellant contends, in the alternative, that the phrase “total confinement” as used in the statute does not necessarily mean confinement in a correctional institution. Thus, appellant claims that the lower court erred in not imposing a sentence of “total confinement” consisting of involuntary mental health treatment when it found that appellant was in need of such treatment. We disagree. The Sentencing Code mandates that:

All persons sentenced to total or partial confinement for:

(1) maximum terms of five or more years shall be committed to the Bureau of Correction for confinement;

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9762(1). We cannot disregard the plain words of a statute when the language is free and clear from all ambiguities. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); see also Erie-West- em Pennsylvania Port Authority v. Rugare, 29 Pa.Comm. 83, 370 A.2d 768 (1977). Here, appellant pled guilty to kidnapping while in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to a mandatory minimum of five years incarceration. The trial court therefore had no choice but to commit appellant to the Bureau of Corrections as is required by § 9762(1).

Appellant finally contends that the trial court erred in failing to order implementation of a mental health treatment plan pursuant to § 9727. Because we already have held that the trial court had no choice but to commit appellant to the Bureau of Corrections, this derivative claim necessarily must fail. We recognize, of course, that the trial court, before imposing sentence, found that appellant was in need of treatment for mental illness. Because appellant was committed to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, however, it becomes the Bureau’s responsibility and not the trial court’s to formulate a treatment program in accordance with § 9727. Moreover, we note that the legislature has vested the Bureau of Corrections with the authority to devise such a program. Thus, § 9727(b) provides:

(1) An offender who is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment at the time of sentencing shall, consistent with available resources, be provided treatment as is psychiatrically or psychologically indicated for his mental illness. Treatment may be provided by the Bureau of Correction, by the county or by the Department of Public Welfare in accordance with the “Mental Health Procedures Act.”
(2) The cost of treatment of offenders found guilty but mentally ill, committed to the custody of the Bureau of Correction and transferred to a mental health facility, shall be borne by the Commonwealth.

Id. at § 9727(b).

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Affirmed.

      . See Mandatory Sentencing Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(a).

      . See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314(b).


author: OLSZEWSKI, Judge:

text:
    555 A.2d 1350
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Dennis LATSHAW, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Dec. 7, 1988.
    Filed March 28, 1989.
    Samuel K. Gates, York, for appellant.
    Mark A. Bellavia, Assistant District Attorney, York, for Com., appellee.
    Before WIEAND, OLSZEWSKI and TAMILIA, JJ.
   OLSZEWSKI, Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence after appellant was convicted for a violation of § 3743(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code. Appellant presents one issue for review: whether the trial court erred in its determination that appellant had violated § 3743 where the Commonwealth’s witness refused to take the information offered by appellant. We reverse.

On June 26, 1987, appellant and Mrs. Judith Kessler were involved in an automobile accident. Appellant’s vehicle sustained minor damage; the damage, however, to Mrs. Kessler’s vehicle was substantial. After the accident, appellant offered to exchange licenses and insurance information. Mrs. Kessler declined the offer and walked into a nearby bakery to call her husband. According to Mrs. Kessler, she wanted to speak with her husband to determine what information she would need, although it is unclear from the record whether this intention was made known to appellant. When Mrs. Kessler returned to the accident scene, appellant was gone. No information had been exchanged.

After speaking to a police officer regarding the accident, Mrs. Kessler left the scene to return home. While driving, Mrs. Kessler noticed appellant’s van parked near a high school. After taking his license number, Mrs. Kessler called the police. Subsequently, appellant was issued a traffic citation.

At a hearing before a magistrate on July 29, 1987, appellant was found guilty of violating § 3743 of the Motor Vehicle Code. This conviction was subsequently upheld by the Court of Common Pleas of York County on November 25, 1987. Post-trial motions were denied. Appellant then filed the instant appeal.

Appellant raises one issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in its determination that appellant violated § 3743(a) where the Commonwealth’s witness refused to take the information offered by appellant. According to appellant, the fact that Mrs. Kessler refused to accept his offer of information prior to consulting with her husband precludes a finding of guilt. In short, appellant argues that by offering the information to the witness, he has substantially complied with § 3743(a).

In its opinion, the trial court counters that § 3743, being a criminal statute, is to be strictly construed. Pointing to the specific language of § 3743, and by incorporation § 3744, the trial court reasoned that an individual involved in an accident with another must, regardless of whether there has been a request, provide his name, address, and vehicle registration number before leaving the scene. In the case at bar, according to the trial court, no facts were introduced at trial which would indicate that appellant gave the required information to Mrs. Kessler. For this reason, the trial court determined that appellant was guilty. We disagree.

Other courts in this state have had the opportunity to interpret § 3743 and § 3744 and their predecessor 75 P.S. § 1027. In Commonwealth, Dept. of Trans. v. Stamoolis, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 617, 297 A.2d 532 (1972), our Commonwealth Court determined that § 1027 was aimed at hit-and-run drivers who attempt to flee the scene of an accident in which they have been involved without making known their identity, in an effort to avoid criminal and civil liability. Therefore, in situations where such was not the case, the Court stated that § 1027 should not be so narrowly and technically interpreted so as to reach an absurd result. Id. at 620, 297 A.2d at 534. In short, the Court concluded that a finding of innocence would be warranted where a defendant was in substantial compliance with the statute. Id.

In Commonwealth v. Gosnell, 327 Pa.Super. 465, 476 A.2d 46 (1984), a panel of this Court was faced with the issue of whether a defendant properly identified himself pursuant to § 3742(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code, and by incorporation § 3744. There, the defendant, while driving along a poorly lit road struck what he believed to be a pothole. After traveling approximately three blocks, he returned to investigate, finding the victim lying on the road. He then phoned the police and, upon their arrival, gave his name, address, and phone number and assisted the police and paramedics in the victim’s care. He did not tell the police that he suspected that he may have hit the victim; approximately seven hours later, however, he returned to the police and told them of his suspicion. Reaffirming the analysis set forth in Stamoolis, our Court reversed the conviction of the defendant. The Court refused to apply a strict interpretation of § 3744 to the specific facts of the case, reasoning that the defendant’s actions were in substantial compliance with the statute. This reasoning is equally applicable to the case at bar.

In the present case, both parties to the accident agree as to certain facts. First, both agree that shortly after the accident, Mrs. Kessler told appellant that she believed she was the one at fault. Second, it is undisputed that appellant made an offer to exchange licenses and insurance information and Mrs. Kessler refused. Exactly why she refused is unclear from the record. Mrs. Kessler claims she wanted to talk to her husband to see exactly what information she would need. The witness was not sure, however, whether she made this intention known to appellant, or had indicated that she wished him to remain at the scene. Faced with these facts, the trial court chose to apply a strict interpretation of the statute and held that appellant’s guilt was based solely on the fact that no identification information had been exchanged. We find this to be error.

We are not here faced with a situation in which a hit-and-run driver sought to avoid criminal or civil liability. Appellant, though not revealing his identity, did offer to show the witness his driver’s license and insurance information. Mrs. Kessler had the choice of whether to accept it or refuse. She chose the latter. The mere fact that she may have later regretted her decision has no bearing on the result of this case. We hold, therefore, that under the facts of the present situation appellant has substantially complied with the provisions of § 3743, and by incorporation § 3744, so as to preclude a finding of guilt. Accordingly, we have no alternative but to reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Judgment of sentence reversed. Appellant is discharged. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

      . Section 3743(a) provides in pertinent part:
      The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 3744 (relating to duty to give information and render aid).
      75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3743.
      Section 3744 provides in pertinent part:
      The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving, and shall upon request exhibit his driver's license and information relating to financial responsibility to any person injured in the accident or to the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the accident ...
      75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3744.


author: JOHNSON, Judge:

text:
    555 A.2d 1352
    John W. SHEEHAN and Beverly Sheehan, his wife v. CINCINNATI SHAPER COMPANY, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Dec. 15, 1988.
    Decided March 9, 1989.

      Charles Kirshner, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
    John J. Morgan, Pittsburgh, for appellees.
    Before BROSKY, DEL SOLE and JOHNSON, JJ.
   JOHNSON, Judge:

Cincinnati Shaper Company (Shaper) appeals from a judgment in a strict liability action in favor of John and Beverly Sheehan. We are asked to consider whether the rule precluding the introduction of industry standards in a strict liability action as pronounced in Majdic v. Cincinnati Machine Co., 370 Pa.Super. 611, 537 A.2d 334 (1988) should be extended to preclude the introduction of OSHA regulations as well. We conclude that it should and thus affirm.

Employed as a machine operator for Pittsburgh Bridge and Iron Works (PBI), John Sheehan was responsible for cutting steel strips on a shear designed, manufactured and sold by Shaper. On September 29, 1982 while Sheehan was adjusting the position of the last piece of steel to be cut by putting his right hand around an awareness barrier, the shear malfunctioned, resulting in the amputation of several of Sheehan’s fingers. The Sheehans brought a strict liability action against Shaper alleging that the shear was defective because it lacked adequate warnings and safety devices and because the shear malfunctioned by making repeat rotations while it was programmed to rotate only once. After trial by jury, a verdict award in the amount of $150,000 was returned against Shaper. Delay damages were added to the verdict. Post-trial motions were filed and denied. This appeal followed.

Shaper contends that the trial court committed error at trial as follows:

I. IN REFUSING TO PERMIT DEFENDANT TO PUT OSHA STANDARDS INTO EVIDENCE?
II. IN REFUSING TO PERMIT DEFENDANT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT IT OFFERED TO PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER AN IMPROVED GUARD FOR THE SHEAR?
III. WHEN AFTER AFFIRMING DEFENDANT’S POINTS FOR CHARGE NUMBERED 4, 6 AND 18, IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THOSE POINTS, AND CONTINUING TO REFUSE EVEN AFTER SPECIFICALLY BEING REQUESTED TO DO SO?
IV. IN FAILING TO ADVISE THE JURY THAT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL MISREPRESENTED THE EVIDENCE AND MADE A KNOWINGLY FALSE STATEMENT?

Principally, Shaper alleges that the trial court erred by refusing to permit Shaper to admit OSHA standards into evidence. The OSHA standards proffered allegedly would show that the buyer of the equipment, PBI, has a duty to provide safety mechanisms for the shear that injured Sheehan. Shaper contends that because providing a safety guard was PBI’s responsibility, PBI’s failure to buy the improved guard offered to them is relevant to the issue of causation and therefore should have been admitted. Although Shaper attempts to couch its argument in terms of causation, it fails to explain how OSHA standards are relevant to that issue. The essence of Shaper’s argument is that Shaper acted reasonably by designing the shear without a safety guard since OSHA standards place the responsibility of providing a safety guard on the buyer/employer.

Liability in a strict liability action will attach where the manufacturer distributes a defective product and the existing defect is a substantial factor in causing injury to another. Foley v. Clark Equipment Co., 361 Pa.Super. 599, 605-606, 523 A.2d 379, 382 (1987). The reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct in choosing a particular design is not an issue. Majdic v. Cincinnati Machine Co., 370 Pa.Super. at 617, 537 A.2d at 337. We conclude that the OSHA regulations proffered would introduce into a strict liability action the reasonableness of Shaper’s failure to provide the new safety device for this machine, an issue irrelevant to whether liability attaches. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by sustaining Sheehan’s objections to the introduction of this evidence.

This court addressed the question of whether industry customs and standards may be introduced to show that an employer, rather than the manufacturer, had the responsibility to provide necessary safety equipment in Majdic, supra. In that strict liability action, the plaintiff’s hands were seriously injured when they came into contact with the point of operation of a power press machine. At trial, the court permitted the defendant to introduce evidence of industry standards and customs which directed the burden of supplying protective equipment for the machine upon the employer. Specifically, the proffered industry standards were federal safety standards which had been published by American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Majdic v. Cincinnati Machine Co., 370 Pa.Super. at 629, 537 A.2d at 343 (Judge Wieand dissenting).

Relying on our supreme court’s decision in Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Division, Duff-Norton Co., Inc., 515 Pa. 334, 528 A.2d 590 (1987), we held that the introduction of industry standards in a strict products liability case was impermissible because such evidence had the effect of introducing the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct into an action which focuses, for public policy reasons, upon the existence of a defect. We find the case before us is indistinguishable from Majdic. Shaper also sought to introduce government regulations which would have had the effect of shifting the jury’s attention from the existence of a defect to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s [Shaper’s] conduct. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in precluding the introduction of this evidence.

At issue II, Shaper alleges that evidence of Shaper’s offer to provide an improved safety device, at cost to PBI, should have been admitted on three grounds. First, Shaper claims that the evidence should have been admitted to show causation since PBI’s failure to install the new safety device was possibly the cause of Sheehan’s accident. This evidence would also introduce into a strict liability action the reasonableness of Shapers’s conduct and is therefore inadmissible. In addition, a manufacturer has a nondelegable duty to insure that his product is safe as of the time the product leaves its control. Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559 n. 12, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 n. 12 (1978). Accordingly, Shaper’s offer to sell PBI a replacement guard after the shear left Shaper’s control is irrelevant.

Secondly, Shaper alleges that evidence of his offer was admissible to show that PBI was warned of the defect in its own machine. Our review of the record discloses that Shaper did not offer to show that it warned PBI that their own machine was defective but rather offered to show that PBI was given the opportunity to buy a better, government recommended safety device. Evidence that Shaper offered PBI a new and improved safety device does not suffice to show that PBI knew that their own machine was defective. Moreover, Shaper would not be relieved of responsibility for the accident even if PBI was aware of the defect in the shear and had a duty to take corrective measures. As guarantor of its product, Shaper’s duty to warn of any defects in the shear extended to the ultimate user, Sheehan. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 100, 337 A.2d 893, 902 (1975). The alleged notice to PBI does not serve to make Sheehan aware that the shear was defective.

Thirdly, Shaper alleges that evidence of the new safety device was admissible to impeach Dr. Kadunc’s testimony regarding PBI's knowledge of a defect. Shaper contends that Dr. Kadunc denied that PBI had received information regarding the safety device on their shear. Our review of the record discloses that Dr. Kadunc’s testimony was that he was aware that PBI received correspondence regarding the new safety device but was unaware that PBI received any information notifying them that their own machine was defective. Accordingly, the proffered evidence, correspondence showing that a new guard was available, could not rebut Dr. Kadunc’s assertion. Since Dr. Kadunc concedes that he was aware of Shaper’s correspondence to PBI, there is no conflict.

At issue III, Shaper alleges that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on abnormal and unintended uses. The points for charge at issue are as follows:

4. If an injury results from abnormal usage of the product, then there is no liability on the manufacturer.
6. A duty to warn exists only when those to whom the warning would go can reasonably be assumed to be ignorant of the fact which the warning is communicating.
13. Even where there is proof of a product in a defective condition which is unreasonably dangerous to a user, no liability ensues unless the injury occurred during an intended use of the product. A manufacturer has the right to expect that his product will be used in the normal and customary fashion.

So long as the trial court properly covers the law on the issues raised in the case, he is given wide latitude in charging the jury. Burch v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 320 Pa.Super. 444, 455, 467 A.2d 615, 621 (1983). Neither point 4 nor 13 is reasonably raised by the issues in this case. The evidence produced at trial by both parties suggested that Sheehan used the shear in a standard manner. Our review of the record does not disclose evidence which would suggest that Sheehan used the shear abnormally or in a manner unintended by the manufacturer. Nor does Shaper make specific reference to such evidence in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). Also, with consideration of the jury charge as a whole, we find that point 6 concerning Sheehan’s knowledge of a defect was adequately discussed in the trial court’s charge to the jury. Accordingly, the proffered points for charge were properly omitted from the charge of the jury. We find no prejudice in the trial court’s decision to omit these points after having approved of them.

At issue IV, Shaper alleges that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that Sheehan’s counsel incorrectly asserted during closing argument that Sheehan’s expert witness was “independent.” Shaper admitted during a side bar conference with the court that no evidence was introduced regarding the independence of Sheehan’s expert. The trial judge found that the independence of this witness was to be determined by the jury and therefore instructed the jury to consider whether the parties’ witnesses had an interest in the suit, and if so, whether that interest affected their credibility. Accordingly, even if Sheehan’s counsel’s remarks were inappropriate, the error was cured by the charge given to the jury.

Judgment affirmed.