author: SPAETH, President Judge:

text:
    468 A.2d 1117
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Dennis E. FISHER, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Sept. 9, 1983.
    Filed Dec. 9, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 26, 1984.

      Michael R. Kostelansky, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.
    Joseph Giebus, Assistant District Attorney, Wilkes-Barre, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   SPAETH, President Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence for criminal trespass. We quash the appeal as filed too late.

Whether an appeal has been filed in time is a jurisdictional question that may be raised by this court sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Jones, 307 Pa.Super. 558, 453 A.2d 1028 (1982). The notice of an appeal “shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). The date of the entry of the order in a case such as this is the day the court imposes sentence on the defendant, informs him of his right to appeal within 30 days, and enters the judgment on the docket. Commonwealth v. Gottshalk, 276 Pa.Super. 102, 419 A.2d 115 (1980); Commonwealth v. Dorman, 272 Pa. Super. 149, 414 A.2d 713 (1979).

The record discloses that on December 16, 1980, appellant was sentenced and informed of his right to appeal “within 30 days from today.” N.T. 12/16/80 at 7. Appellant was also informed of his right to have counsel appointed to represent him in exercising this right. Id. Although, as transmitted to us, the record contains no docket entries, it does contain the original judgment of sentence, dated “12-16-80” and signed by the sentencing judge.

The notice of appeal to this court was filed on January 21, 1981. Except in circumstances not of record here we cannot enlarge the time for taking an appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 105(b) and note thereto; Commonwealth v. Gottshalk, supra, 276 Pa.Superior Ct. at 105, 419 A.2d at 117.

The appeal is quashed.

      . Defendant filed the notice of appeal pro se. This does not alter the result. See Commonwealth v. Gottshalk, supra, 276 Pa.Superior Ct. at 105 n. 4, 419 A.2d at 117 n. 4.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MONTEMURO, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    468 A.2d 1118
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania Ex rel. Marion JACOBS, a/k/a Frank Davis v. A.S. DIGIACINTO, Warden of Northampton County Prison, Easton, Pennsylvania. Appeal of Marion JACOBS, a/k/a Frank Davis.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted July 26, 1983.
    Filed Dec. 9, 1983.

      Gary Neil Asteak, Easton, for appellant.
    James J. Narlesky, Assistant District Attorney, Easton, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   MONTEMURO, Judge:

In this appeal denying habeas corpus relief to the appellant, Marion Jacobs, a/k/a Frank Davis, we are called upon to determine whether the substantive and procedural safeguards afforded by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act [hereinafter Extradition Act] apply to persons held' under out-of-state parole violation detainers. We can determine no valid rationale to except parole violation detainers from the purview of the Extradition Act, and consequently reverse the order of the lower court.

The relevant facts of this case are as follows: On October 9, 1981, the appellant was arrested on multiple charges stemming from an incident in Northampton County. He was unable to post bail and was therefore incarcerated in Northampton County Prison to await trial.

On October 22, 1981, New Jersey authorities lodged a detainer against the appellant based on a violation of his New Jersey parole. On November 13, 1981, the Commonwealth petitioned for, and received, an additional sixty days in which to process the appellant’s extradition to New Jersey. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9138. On January 22, 1982, the appellant, through counsel, filed a petition for writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging that more than ninety days had elapsed since the detainer had been lodged during which no action had been taken, and that, as such, the detainer should be lifted. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9131.

A hearing on the petition was held on January 29, 1982. On February 2, 1982, the lower court issued an order denying appellant’s petition. In an opinion filed along with the order, the trial court found that the Agreement on Detainers was inapplicable because the appellant was awaiting trial on charges in Pennsylvania, and was not under an imposed sentence of imprisonment following a conviction. The court further found that the Extradition Act did not require that the detainer be lifted because it was premised on a parole violation, not a pending criminal proceeding. The court distinguished between the two situations on various policy grounds and held that the safeguards of the Extradition Act do not apply to parole violation detainers until the detainer becomes the sole basis for custody. Because the appellant was being held on criminal charges in addition to the detainer, the provisions of the Extradition Act were found inapplicable, and relief was denied.

Our courts have often held that the lodging of a detainer against one already in custody on other charges is an “arrest.” Commonwealth ex rel. Knowles v. Lester, 456 Pa. 423, 426, 321 A.2d 637, 639-40 (1974); Commonwealth v. Jacobs, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Coffman v. Aytch, 238 Pa.Super. 584, 361 A.2d 652 (1976). We do not find any basis for distinguishing detainers based on parole violations, from those based on criminal prosecutions. The Extradition Act itself makes no exception for detainers based on parole violations. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9134. The detainer constitutes an additional, albeit redundant, restriction on the appellant’s liberty, and is, therefore, an arrest as provided for in the Extradition Act.

The Extradition Act provides that “the judge, or issuing authority must ... commit [the detained] to county jail for such a time, not exceeding 30 days ... as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the Governor ... of the state having jurisdiction of the offense____” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9136. As stated, the detained party can be recommitted for a period not exceeding sixty days. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9138. If a Governor’s warrant is not produced by the Commonwealth within ninety days, the detainer must be lifted. Commonwealth ex rel. Knowles v. Lester, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Goodroe v. Roth, 230 Pa.Super. 70, 326 A.2d 886 (1974).

Based on the above analysis, we have no alternative but to reverse the lower court’s order and grant the relief requested by the appellant. The Commonwealth and the New Jersey authorities should have taken the appropriate steps to procure a Governor’s warrant and implement extradition proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Extradition Act.

If the proper warrant had been procured, the Governor of this state would have had the discretion, during the pendency of the criminal prosecution in Pennsylvania, to “surrender him on demand of the executive authority of [New Jersey] or hold him until he ha[d] been tried and discharged or convicted and punished in this Commonwealth.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9140. In the latter event, New Jersey’s interest is still protected inasmuch as the extradition is merely deferred. Commonwealth ex rel. Houser v. Seip, 385 Pa. 545, 124 A.2d 110 (1956). Additionally, should the appellant be tried and convicted on the charges in Northampton County, he would then be within the purview of the Agreement on Detainers, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101 et seq.

The Order of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the detainer is discharged. Case remanded. Jurisdiction is not retained.

      . Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9121, etseq.

      . On October 23, 1981, the New Jersey authorities lodged a second detainer against the appellant based on robbery charges in Salem County, New Jersey. The Commonwealth filed for an extension of sixty days to process the extradition papers. The extension was granted. At the extradition hearing, appellant requested permission to file an application for habeas corpus which was denied. The court then ordered extradition on the robbery charges. The appeal was taken from this order and this court reversed the order and remanded the case to afford the appellant an opportunity to file an application for habeas corpus. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 319 Pa.Super. 531, 466 A.2d 671 (1983).

      . Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101.


author:
      HESTER, Judge:
      HOFFMAN, Judge,

text:
    468 A.2d 1121
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Cynthia E. BEARISH.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted April 14, 1983.
    Filed Dec. 9, 1983.
    Michael Paul McIntyre, Assistant District Attorney, Allentown, for Commonwealth, appellant.
    John M. Yarema, Emmaus, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   HESTER, Judge:

On April 24, 1980, a complaint was filed against appellee Cynthia E. Bearish, charging her with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. A preliminary hearing was initially scheduled for May 20, 1980, but was not held on that date or on the next scheduled date, June 2. The magistrate’s office attempted to reschedule the preliminary hearing for June 24, 1980, a date agreeable to all but appellee. The secretary was informed that appellee would be on vacation and therefore “unavailable” on that date. The secretary then scheduled the preliminary hearing for July 7, 1980, the “first available date.” The hearing was eventually held on August 12, 1980.

On October 31, 1980, the Commonwealth filed a petition for extension of time for commencing trial. Appellee filed a petition to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, on November 3, 1980. The lower court granted the Commonwealth’s petition and denied appellee’s petition by orders dated November 7, 1980, on which date a jury also found appellee guilty. On September" 23, 1981, argument was held on appellee’s post-trial motions, and the court en banc, by order dated March 15, 1982, granted the motion in arrest of judgment and ordered appellee dismissed pursuant to Rule 1100. The Commonwealth has appealed to our court from this order.

The Commonwealth argues that the lower court erred in failing to exclude two periods of time in calculating the time in which appellee had to be brought to trial. One of these periods was June 24 to July 7, 1980, a period of thirteen days. The Commonwealth argues that appellee was “unavailable” within the meaning of Rule 1100 on June 24, the day which the magistrate wished to set for the preliminary hearing, and that the days through July 7, the earliest date available, should therefore be charged to appellee. We agree.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d)(1) provides: “In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from: (1) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney ____” In Commonwealth v. Smith, 262 Pa.Super. 258, 396 A.2d 744 (1978), six judges of our court held that a delay caused by the defendant’s attorney’s vacation would not be treated as a “continuance”, but rather as a period excludable because of the unavailability of the defendant’s attorney. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 262 Pa.Super. 151, 396 A.2d 690 (1978), trial was set for August 4, but the case was still not reached by August 7, at which time the trial was set for September 15. Our court excluded the entire period from August 7 through September 15 as being caused “by appellant’s counsel’s unavailability”, since the date had been chosen so as not to interfere with the attorney’s vacation.

We see no. basis for distinguishing the case before us from Smith and Jackson. We find that the period from June 24 to July 7,1980 was excludable because of appellee’s unavailability. Excluding these thirteen days means that the Commonwealth had until November 3, 1980, to bring Ms. Bearish to trial. The Commonwealth’s petition for extension of time filed on October 31, 1980, was therefore timely filed.

Because the lower court en banc refused to exclude either period of time claimed excludable by the Commonwealth, and concluded that Rule 1100 required appellee’s discharge, the court did not consider appellee’s other arguments in the post-trial motions. We therefore remand this case for disposition of the remaining issues. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

HOFFMAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

HOFFMAN, Judge,

dissenting:

The majority finds the period from June 24, 1980 to July 7, 1980 excludable under rule 1100 and the Commonwealth’s petition to extend therefore timely filed. I disagree and, accordingly, dissent.

The majority agrees with the Commonwealth’s assertion that June 24 through July 7 should be excluded because appellee was on vacation and was thus “unavailable.” I find this conclusion erroneous. The Commonwealth’s argument is based upon Commonwealth v. Smith, 262 Pa.Superior Ct. 258, 896 A.2d 744 (1978). In Smith, the trial date had been listed, and one week before the trial, defendant’s attorney advised the court that he would be unavailable on that date because of vacation. Therefore, the trial was continued to a later date. The court held that defendant’s attorney’s vacation time was excludable. The court acknowledged that the distinction between a delay caused by a continuance and a delay caused by unavailability is often hazy, especially if the defendant requests a continuance because of unavailability.

Here, however, the preliminary hearing date had not been scheduled; rather, the magistrate’s office contacted all of the parties to determine the acceptability of June 24 as the preliminary hearing date. Upon learning that appellee would be on vacation, the magistrate scheduled the preliminary hearing for July 7, a date more convenient for all parties. Therefore, appellee’s unavailability did not disrupt a scheduled hearing date and the delay in the preliminary hearing was in effect a continuance. Because the period of the continuance was less than thirty days, I find none of the time excludable under rule 1100(d)(2).

Although not addressed by the majority, I also find the period of time from April 24 to May 5 not excludable as well. The Commonwealth asserts the excludability of this period because appellee’s allegedly volitional act in refusing to pick up her notice made her unavailable, causing the delay in the preliminary hearing from May 20 to June 2. For excludable periods, the Commonwealth must show both defendant’s unavailability and its due diligence in attempting to determine defendant’s whereabouts. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 472 Pa. 553, 372 A.2d 826 (1977). Appellee’s whereabouts, although unknown, could have been determined by due diligence. Appellee lived and worked in Allentown; thus the Commonwealth had means of locating her either at her home or place of employment. While sending a summons via certified mail is a reasonable form of notice, appellee did not in fact receive the notice and the Commonwealth has presented no evidence that appellee was at fault for not receiving it. Therefore, I hesitate to find appellee “unavailable,” and would not exclude April 24 to May 5.

Because under rule 1100 I would not exclude either period discussed by the Commonwealth, I would find its petition to extend untimely and the lower court’s dismissal of the charges correct.

      . We find Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 Pa. 399, 380 A.2d 782 (1977), relied upon by the lower court en banc, distinguishable from the case before us. In Wade, a continuance was granted by the lower court for the purpose of permitting the defendant to obtain counsel. Since the defendant did not have counsel at the time he was granted the continuance, it would have been anomalous for the Supreme Court to find that counsel had been "unavailable” within the meaning of Rule 1100(d)(1).


text:
    468 A.2d 1123
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert HICKS, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Oct. 3, 1983.
    Filed Dec. 16, 1983.

      Eláine G. DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Com., appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge and HESTER and LI-PEZ, JJ.
   SPAETH, President Judge:

This appeal is from an order summarily dismissing appellant’s petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA). We vacate the order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On February 13 and 14, 1973, appellant was tried before a judge sitting without a jury, and was found guilty of aggravated robbery and assault and battery. Appellant’s post-verdict motions were denied, and he was sentenced to 3 to 15 years in prison for aggravated robbery; sentence for assault and battery was suspended.

Appellant appealed the judgment of sentence, alleging that he had been denied due process of law because the Commonwealth had failed to disclose to the defense that the victim would change his testimony at trial from that given at the preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing the victim testified that appellant’s co-defendant had attacked him while appellant stood by; at trial the victim testified that appellant had attacked him while appellant’s co-defendant stood by. This court held that the prosecution had not contravened the standard set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 228 Pa.Super. 76, 324 A.2d 397 (1974).

On January 14, 1981, appellant filed a pro se PCHA petition, requesting a new trial because his trial counsel had been ineffective. Appellant alleged that counsel should have interviewed the victim or conducted discovery of the prosecution, or both, and that if he had, he would not have been surprised at trial by the victim’s changed testimony, and his pre-trial and trial tactical decisions would have been different. Appellant further alleged that he was without financial resources and requested that the trial court appoint an attorney to represent him.

By opinion and order dated June 2, 1981, the trial court denied appellant’s petition without a hearing and without appointing counsel. The court stated that appellant’s claim had been raised and disposed of on direct appeal, and further, that appellant’s claim was without merit. It is from this order of June 2, 1981, that the present appeal arises.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1503(a) deals with the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. It provides:

(a) Except as provided in Rule 1504, when an unrepresented petitioner satisfies the court that he is unable to procure counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent him. The court, on its own motion, shall appoint counsel to represent a petitioner whenever the interests of justice require it.

Rule 1504 provides:

Appointment of counsel shall not be necessary and petitions may be disposed of summarily when a previous petition involving the same issue or issues has been finally determined adversely to the petitioner and he either was afforded the opportunity to have counsel appointed or was represented by counsel in proceedings thereon.

Appellant did not fall within the exception provided in Rule 1504 because he had not filed a previous PCHA petition. Commonwealth v. Finley, 497 Pa. 332, 440 A.2d 1183 (1981); Commonwealth v. O’Nealel, 315 Pa.Super. 7, 461 A.2d 318 (1983). The trial court was therefore required by Rule 1503(a) to determine whether appellant was unable to procure counsel, and if satisfied that he was unable to, to appoint counsel to represent him.

It is true that Section 12 of the PCHA provided in relevant part that “[t]he appointment of counsel shall not be required if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and without trace of support in the record as provided by Section 9 of the act.” 19 P.S. § 1180-12. But to the extent that Section 12 was inconsistent with Rule 1503, it had been superseded. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1507. It was therefore of no significance that the trial court considered appellant’s claim to be without merit. “Counsel for a PCHA petitioner can more ably explore legal grounds for complaint, investigate underlying facts, articulate claims for relief and promote efficient administration of justice.” Commonwealth v. Finley, 497 Pa. at 335, 440 A.2d at 1184. Nor did the appointment of counsel to represent appellant on appeal cure the trial court’s error. For an inadequate PCHA petition can not be cured on appeal. Pa.R.App.P. 302(a) (issues not raised in lower court are waived and cannot be raised for first time on appeal). Cf. Commonwealth v. Massie, 294 Pa.Super. 115, 439 A.2d 777 (1982) (independent counsel on appeal is not an adequate substitute for independent counsel at evidentiary hearing).

The trial court having failed to comply with Rule 1503(a), its order will be vacated and the case remanded. If pursuant to Rule 1503(a) the court appoints counsel, appellant must be permitted to amend his petition with the aid of counsel before the court determines whether appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition. Commonwealth v. O’Nealel, supra.

The order of the trial court is vacated and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

      . Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, No. 554, 19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq., repealed and replaced by Act of May 13, 1982, P.L. 417, No. 122, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq.


author: WICKERSHAM, Judge:

text:
    468 A.2d 1125
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. 1978 TOYOTA. Appeal of Oliver T. BELL, Jr.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted March 8, 1983.
    Filed Dec. 16, 1983.

      Peter J. Mangan, York, for appellant.
    Floyd Paul Jones, Assistant District Attorney, York, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, and WICKERSHAM and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   WICKERSHAM, Judge:

In this case Oliver T. Bell, Jr., appeals from an order of the York County Court of Common Pleas directing that Bell’s car be forfeited to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth filed a petition for forfeiture; Bell answered the petition and filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held before the Honorable James E. Buckingham, who denied Bell’s motion for summary judgment. After hearing testimony about the events which provided the grounds for the Commonwealth’s forfeiture petition Judge Buckingham granted the petition. This appeal timely followed.

At the hearing a state trooper testified that on March 17, 1980, he was working with an informant at a roadside rest in York County. The trooper stated that when Bell drove up in his car, a 1978 Toyota, the informant got in. After the trooper got a signal that the drug buy had been consummated he arrested Bell. The trooper advised Bell of his constitutional rights and noticed that Bell had difficulty speaking. Upon investigation, the trooper discovered that Bell’s speech impediment was caused by his having a plastic bag containing white powder in his mouth; a field test revealed that the white powder was cocaine. Before Bell passed out from a cocaine overdose, he told the police officer that he had come to the roadside rest to sell about an ounce of cocaine.

Bell eventually pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine in violation of 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) , which prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance by a person not registered under the Drug Law. Bell .was also charged with possession with intent to deliver (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30)) but this charge was nol prossed in exchange for Bell’s cooperation with state and federal law enforcement officials.

Now Bell argues that his guilty plea to the charge of possession of a controlled substance precludes the Commonwealth from seeking forfeiture of his car. It is true, as Bell points out, that the Drug Law states that no conveyance shall be forfeited for possession of a controlled substance. 35 P.S. § 780-128(a)(4)(iv). Bell contends that because he pleaded guilty to possession, the Commonwealth could not use a forfeiture hearing to prove any other offense.

We disagree. The Drug Law provides that a vehicle is subject to forfeiture if it is used to transport, sell, receive or conceal controlled substances. 35 P.S. § 780-128(a)(4). Forfeiture proceedings under § 780-128 are civil in form, but quasi-criminal in character. The object of § 780-128 is to impose a penalty on those who are significantly involved in criminal enterprises in violation of the Drug Law. Commonwealth v. Landy, 240 Pa.Super. 458, 469, 362 A.2d 999, 1005 (1976). The Commonwealth must prove a forfeiture case .by a preponderance of the evidence. Id., 240 Pa.Superior Ct. at 469, 362 A.2d at 1005. Thus, conviction of a crime is not necessary to support forfeiture proceedings; the Commonwealth need simply prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a vehicle was involved in, as here, the sale or transport of a controlled substance.

The case of V.J.R. Bar Corp. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 480 Pa. 322, 390 A.2d 163 (1978) is instructive. Several employees of the V.J.R. Bar Corporation were charged with gambling on the licensed premises; the charges were later dismissed. Nevertheless, the Liquor Control Board fined the V.J.R. Bar Corporation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Board could impose sanctions on liquor license holders even when the underlying conduct does not produce criminal charges or when charges do not result in convictions. Id., 480 Pa. at 326, 390 A.2d at 165. The Liquor Control Board did not find criminal guilt or impose a punishment under the criminal law but rather acted within its authority and imposed a civil sanction. Similarly, the court below did not find Bell guilty of possession with intent to deliver but only imposed a sanction authorized by civil law.

Bell also argues that the Commonwealth did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his car was used to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of a controlled substance. Our review of the record persuades us that the testimony of the state police officer demonstrates that Bell’s car was at least used to facilitate the transportation and possession of a controlled substance.

Order affirmed.

      . The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 1 et seq., hereinafter the Drug Law.


author: WIEAND, Judge:

text:
    468 A.2d 1127
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Marvin YOUNG, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 5, 1983.
    Filed Dec. 16, 1983.

      Harold Diamond, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth,- appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   WIEAND, Judge:

Marvin Young was tried nonjury and was found guilty of intimidating a witness or victim. On direct appeal from the judgment of sentence, Young contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred in receiving evidence of prior criminal activity. There is no merit in these contentions; and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

On July 23, 1980, Alexander Jefferson was shot in the back. Police arrested Young and charged him with the shooting. At the preliminary hearing, Young attempted to persuade Alexander not to testify, suggesting that they settle out of court. Jefferson declined to accommodate Young. In March, 1981, prior to trial, Young spoke to Jefferson on the telephone. He again suggested that they settle their differences out of court. He said: “I am warning you. We can settle this any other way besides in the white man’s courtroom. I am warning you I am a sharpshooter in the service.” Young told Jefferson that he could shoot him from a distance of two blocks, and it was best that Jefferson not show up in court. He also told Jefferson to keep his brother out of it and indicated that Jefferson’s brother could be taken care of also. Finally, Young said: “If you don’t want anymore bloodshed you better not show up in court.”

The Crimes Code, at 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(a) provides:

A person commits an offense if, with the intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct will obstruct, impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the administration of criminal justice, he intimidates or attempts to intimidate any witness or victim to:
(3) Withhold any testimony, information, document or thing relating to the commission of a crime from any law enforcement officer, prosecuting official of judge.
(5) Elude, evade or ignore any request to appear or legal process summoning him to appear to testify or supply evidence.

The evidence in this case was sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that appellant had done more than express a desire to settle his differences with Jefferson and, in fact, had threatened Jefferson in order to intimidate Jefferson to absent himself from appellant’s trial and withhold evidence. This was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Cf. Commonwealth v. Vitacolonna, 297 Pa.Super. 284, 443 A.2d 838 (1982); Commonwealth v. Madison, 263 Pa.Super. 206, 397 A.2d 818 (1979).

There also is no merit in appellant’s contention that the trial court erred by receiving testimony of the original shooting. The shooting of Jefferson and the bringing of criminal charges against appellant because of the shooting were both relevant and material to prove the charge that appellant had attempted to intimidate the victim thereof. As such, the evidence of the earlier shooting was properly received. See: Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 446 A.2d 583 (1982); Commonwealth v. Miller, 303 Pa.Super. 504, 450 A.2d 40 (1982); Commonwealth v. Detrie, 263 Pa.Super. 75, 397 A.2d 2 (1979); Commonwealth v. Markle, 245 Pa.Super. 108, 369 A.2d 317 (1976). The Commonwealth was not required to try its case in a vacuum; It could show not only that Jefferson had been the victim of a crime but also that he had been in possession of relevant information concerning the crime when an attempt was made to intimidate him.

The judgment of sentence is affirmed.

      . This section repealed and superseded 18 Pa.C.S. § 4907, which made it a criminal offense to attempt to "induce or otherwise cause a witness or informant to ... withhold any testimony, information, document or thing except on advice of counsel____”


text:
    November 4, 1983.
    468 A.2d 820
    Acks v. Acks, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Ronald Perry, for appellant; William H. Poole, Jr., for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 821
    Commonwealth v. Andrews, Appellant.
    Submitted June 16, 1983.
    Philip T. Seymour, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    468 A.2d 821
    Commonwealth v. Arocho, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 15, 1984.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    William John Fulton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 821
    Commonwealth v. Barnes, Appellant.
    Submitted July 28, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

BECK, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    468 A.2d 822
    Commonwealth v. Bing, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Larry Elliott Stone, for appellant; Nicholas Subashi, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 822
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Submitted September 9, 1983.
    Ralph W. Litzenberger, for appellant; Elviria C. Labarre, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    469 A.2d 274
    Commonwealth v. Capers, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 12, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 24, 1984.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Michael H. Small, for appellant; Robert W. Feeman, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 822
    Commonwealth v. Coviello, Appellant.
    Argued February 23, 1982.
    Charles Witaconis, for appellant; Amil Minora, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Berks County Common Pleas Court Judge Forrest G. Schaeffer, Jr. is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 822
    Commonwealth v. Evans, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 9, 1984.
    Submitted June 1, 1983.
    Edward Blumstein, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 823
    Commonwealth v. Godwin, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 17, 1984.
    Submitted June 17, 1983.
    Jack J. Bulkin, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, McEWEN and WATKINS, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Michael E. Wallace is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 823
    Commonwealth v. Hickson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 16, 1984.
    Submitted May 31, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, • appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 823
    Commonwealth v. Kochel, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 13, 1984.
    Argued January 27, 1983.
    Stuart S. Sacks, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of, sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 824
    Commonwealth v. Long, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 21, 1984.
    Argued January 27, 1983.
    Francis M. Socha, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 824
    Commonwealth v. McNeill, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Mar. 7, 1984.
    Submitted March 10, 1982.
    Joseph J. Schafle, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 824
    Commonwealth v. Miller, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Mar. 7, 1984.
    Argued September 15, 1983.
    William G. Brown, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; F. Ned Hand, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 824
    Commonwealth v. Parker, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    William John Fulton, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.

WIEAND, J., filed a memorandum dissenting statement.


text:
    468 A.2d 825
    Commonwealth v. Pearces, Appellant.
    Submitted September 13, 1983.
    Thomas J. Turner, III, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 825
    Commonwealth v. Richardson, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Judith A. Calkin, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 825
    Commonwealth v. Rucker, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 27, 1984.
    Submitted June 16, 1983.
    Carl S. Primavera, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order and judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 826
    Commonwealth v. Sahonic, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Frederick S. Wolf, for appellant; William L. Thurston, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order and judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 826
    Commonwealth v. Snyder, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 18, 1984.
    Argued February 4, 1983.
    Brian C. Engelhardt, for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Berks County Common Pleas Court Judge Arthur Ed Saylor is affirmed with the exception of the judgment of sentence for criminal conspiracy which is vacated.

WIEAND, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    468 A.2d 826
    Commonwealth v. West, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 7, 1984.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Timothy W. Misner, for appellant; John F. Nelson, III, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 827
    Commonwealth v. White, Appellant.
    Submitted January 27, 1983.
    John Dale Kuhn, Public Defender, for appellant; Gary E. Hartman, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed;


text:
    468 A.2d 827
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 27, 1984.
    Submitted February 1, 1983.
    James A. Peruto, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Albert F. Sabo is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 827
    Estate of Heffner. Appeal of Edna Strayer. Appeal of Nolan E. Heffner.
    Argued January 26, 1983.
    Allen H. Smith, submitted a brief on behalf of Strayer, appellant (at No. 235) and participating party (at No. 254); Nevin Stetler, for Heffner, appellant (at No. 254) and participating party (at No. 235); Barbara Osburn Stump, for Herman, participating parties.

      Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.


text:
    469 A.2d 274
    Muller v. Midstates Equipment. Appeal of Midstates Equipment Service, Inc.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 13, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 7, 1984.
    Argued September 13, 1983.
    Louis S. Criden, for appellant; Cornelius Van Galen, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and HESTER, JJ.
   Orders affirmed at No. 418 Philadelphia 1983 and Appeal dismissed at No. 419 Philadelphia 1983.

CAVANAUGH, J., filed a memorandum dissenting opinion.


text:
    468 A.2d 828
    Tonetti, Appellant v. Tonetti.

      Argued April 7, 1983.
    John J. Keller, appellant; Anthony M. Muir, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    November 10, 1983.
    468 A.2d 828
    Burger v. Halls Motor Transit Co., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 29, 1984.
    Argued May 19, 1983.
    David Harry Patterson, for appellant; Joseph J. Malizia, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and BROSKY, JJ.
   The lower court order denying appellant's motion for a new trial and judgment N.O.V. is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 828
    Commonwealth v. Bailey, Appellant.
    Submitted June 7, 1983.
    John A. Halley, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CERCONE, President Judge, SPAETH and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 828
    Commonwealth v. Clark, Appellant.
    Submitted January 18, 1982.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele M. Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 829
    Commonwealth v. Crawford, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 26, 1984.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Henry W. Mitchell, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 829
    Commonwealth v. Giddings, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 7, 1984.
    Submitted June 23, 1983.
    Steven J. Zwicky, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 829
    Commonwealth v. Hughes, Appellant.
    Argued June 1, 1983.
    Nancy Larkin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Stephen B. Harris, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

BECK, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    468 A.2d 829
    Commonwealth v. Isenberg, Appellant.
    Argued May 26, 1983.
    John Woodcock, Public Defender, for appellant; Karen L. Steele, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 830
    Commonwealth v. Jones, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 3, 1984.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Daniel W. Stern, for appellant; Charles J. Rehkamp, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 830
    Commonwealth v. Maxwell, Appellant.
    Submitted April 14, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed as to the robbery conviction, while the simple assault conviction is vacated.


text:
    468 A.2d 830
    Commonwealth v. Mitchell, Appellant.
    Submitted September 9, 1983.
    Harry A. Rubright, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Richard B. Russell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 830
    Commonwealth v. O’Brien, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Judith A. Calkin, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 831
    Commonwealth v. Peoples, Appellant.
    Submitted September 9, 1983.
    Lewis J. Bott, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Joseph Giebus, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 831
    Commonwealth v. Perkins, Appellant.

      Submitted May 31, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 831
    Commonwealth v. Ritchey, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 22, 1984.
    Submitted May 24, 1983.
    Robert D. Gleason, for appellant; David J. Tulowitzki, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 832
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, Appellant.

      Submitted May 31, 1983.
    Joseph J. Schafle, Jr., for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 832
    Commonwealth v. Seymore, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Larry Elliott Stone, for appellant; Nicholas Subashi, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 832
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
    Submitted March 8, 1983.
    Steven V. Manbeck, for appellant; William A. Helm, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CERCONE, President Judge, WICKERSHAM and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 832
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
    Submitted March 8, 1983.
    Steven V. Manbeck, for appellant; William A. Helm, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, WICKERSHAM and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 833
    Commonwealth v. Trivitt, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Walton Vail Davis, for appellant; Roy Alan Keefer, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order of August 9, 1982 affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 833
    In re Benz. Appeal of Roberta E. Benz and Wyoming National Bank.
    Argued September 7, 1983.
    Elliot Bruce Edley, for appellants; Harry Hiscox, for participating party.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 833
    In re Estate of Scott. Appeal of Charles W. Scott. Appeal of John A. Scott.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 26, 1984.
    Argued June 15, 1983.
    James P. Gannon, for Charles Scott, appellant (at No. 1330) and participating party (at No. 1331); Frank H. Morgan, Jr., for John Scott, appellant (at No. 1331) and participating party (at No. 1330); William A. Pietrangelo, for Redavid Law Firm, participating party.

      Before CERCONE, President Judge, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    469 A.2d 691
    In re Noti Children. Appeal of Ann Marie Noti.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 19, 1984.
    Argued September 6, 1983.
    David A. Scholl, for appellant; Jack Anthony Panella, for participating party.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 834
    In the Interest of C.A.M., a minor. Appeal of W.M. and P.M., his wife.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    Thomas M. Piccione, for appellants; Phillip L. Clark, Jr., for appellee; John W. Hodge, for participating party.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order vacated. Case remanded for rehearing. Jurisdiction is relinquished.


text:
    November 18, 1983.
    468 A.2d 834
    Burger, Appellant v. Hall’S Motor Co.
    Argued May 19, 1983.
    Joseph J. Malizia, for appellant; David Harry Patterson, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and BROSKY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 834
    Commonwealth v. Bartlett, Appellant.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    John Halley, for appellant; Kemal A. Mericli, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 834
    Commonwealth v. Bidwell, Appellant.
    Submitted October 18, 1983.
    John Krisa, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ernest D. Preate, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 835
    Commonwealth v. Carrero, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 26, 1984.
    Argued June 2, 1983.
    Anthony C. Santore, for appellant; Donald B. Corriere, District Attorney and Nicholas E. Englesson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 835
    Commonwealth v. Fearn, Appellant.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    Donald R. Calaiaro, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Melinda G. Tell, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 835
    Commonwealth v. Gilbert, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 26, 1984.
    Submitted February 9, 1983.
    Harris Roy Rosen, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 836
    Commonwealth v. Giovannitti, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 17, 1984.
    Argued February 3, 1983.
    Francis M. Walsh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the late, distinguished and esteemed Common Pleas Court Judge Milton O. Moss is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 836
    Commonwealth v. Glover, Appellant.
    Submitted May 18, 1983.
    Curnel L. Bridges, Jr., for appellant; John Philips Luneau, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, BROSKY and BECK, JJ.
   The order of the court below is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 836
    Commonwealth v. Guy, Jr., Appellant.
    Argued May 24, 1983.
    Carmela R.M. Presogna, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Timothy J. Lucas, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 836
    Commonwealth v. Henderson, Appellant.
    Submitted April 20, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 837
    Commonwealth v. Hughley, Appellant.

      Submitted October 13, 1983.
    Daniel McGee, Public Defender, for appellant; Ray Frank Gricar, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 837
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 26, 1984.
    Argued May 24, 1983.
    Carmela R.M. Presogna, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael L. Cauley, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

ROWLEY, J., concurred in the result.

CAVANAUGH, J., filed a memorandum dissenting opinion.


text:
    468 A.2d 837
    Commonwealth v. Kline, Appellant.
    Submitted February 9, 1983.
    John J. Speicher, for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 838
    Commonwealth v. Long, Appellant.
    Submitted September 13, 1983.
    Kenneth R. Dixon, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 838
    Commonwealth v. Martin, Appellant.

      Submitted July 27, 1983.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Edward F. Browne, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 838
    Commonwealth v. McFall, Appellant.
    Argued May 31, 1983.
    Arnold Silverstein, for appellant; Steven J. Cooperstein, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 838
    Commonwealth v. Olexa, Appellant. Commonwealth v. McDonald, Appellant.

      Argued April 28, 1983.
    Blane A. Black, for appellants; Frank Carl Roney, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 839
    Commonwealth v. Rivera, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 18, 1984.
    Submitted October 20, 1983.
    Stanley M. Vasiliadis, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; John L. O’Brecht, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    469 A.2d 691
    Commonwealth v. Roy, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 24, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 24, 1984.

      Argued March 9, 1982.
    Althea M. Dooley, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 839
    Commonwealth v. Sharp, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 12, 1984.
    Submitted March 16, 1983.
    Charles P. Mirarchi, III, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 839
    Commonwealth v. Simpson, Appellant.
    Submitted June 15, 1983.
    Anthony G. Bateman, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 840
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 6, 1984.
    Submitted October 19, 1983.
    Bruce Alan Herald, for appellant; F. Hand, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The order of the learned Chester County Common Pleas Court Judge Leonard Sugerman is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 840
    Commonwealth v. Summa, Appellant.
    Submitted October 20, 1983.
    Charles R. Witaconis, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ernest D. Preate, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of learned Lackawanna County Common Pleas Court Judge James M. Munley is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 840
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, Appellant.
    Submitted May 13, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 840
    Commonwealth v. Walton, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 12, 1984.
    Submitted April 19, 1983.
    Jimmie Moore, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 841
    Commonwealth v. Zduniak, Appellant.
    Submitted October 25, 1983.
    James Nevant, II, for appellant; Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 841
    Com. ex rel. Walling v. Roth. Appeal of: Richard H. Walling.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 28, 1984.
    Argued October 12, 1983.
    Jeffery R. Sommer, for appellant; Stephen G. Heck-man, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, participating party.

      Before SPAETH, President Judge, POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 841
    Estate of Atkinson. Appeal of: Lochner.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 2, 1984.
    Argued September 7, 1983.
    Edwin F. Lochner, appellant, in propria persona; Jerome B. Apfel, for Moore, participating party; Lawrence Barth, for Commonwealth, participating party; Richard W. McConaghy, for Ad Litem, participating party.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 842
    Gessler Landscape, Inc., Appellant v. Benson & Benson, Inc., et al. Appeal of: Benson & Benson, Inc.
    (at No. 1638).
    Argued May 4, 1983.
    Harry F. Dunn, Jr., for Gessler,. appellant (at No. 1553) and appellee (at No. 1638); John O’Rourke, Jr., for Benson & Benson, Inc., appellant (at No. 1638) and appellee (at No. 1553).
    Before McEWEN, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 842
    Harris, Appellant v. E.W. Smith, Co.
    Argued February 1, 1983.
    Leonard Schaeffer, for appellant; Manya L. Kamerling, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Lois G. Forer is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 842
    Hohensee, Appellant v. Graupp.
    Submitted October 11, 1983.
    Ervin Hohensee, appellant, in propria persona; Jay N. Abramowitch, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The order of the trial court is affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 50
    Latham, Appellant, v. Kayati.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 19, 1984.
    Reargument Nunc Pro Tunc Denied Aug. 1, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 7, 1984.
    Argued May 4, 1983.
    Allen L. Feingold, for appellant; Peter A. Dunn, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order and judgment affirmed.


text:
    469 A.2d 275
    Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 19, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 7, 1984.
    Argued September 15, 1983.
    Jack M. Bernard, for appellant; Albert Momjian, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, JOHNSON and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 842
    Monito v. Dechicchis, Appellant v. McKeesport.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    James Cole, for appellant; Edward P. Zemprelli, for Monito, appellee; James E. Lomeo, for McKeesport, appellee; Lewis J. Nescott, for Redev. of City of McKeesport, appellee; James T. Farrell, for McKeesport Nat’l Bank, appellee; Larry P. Gaitens, for Mcllvane and Gallagher, appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    468 A.2d 843
    Segady, Appellant v. Harford Mutual Ins. Co.
    Argued May 26, 1983.
    Edward C. Milburn, for appellant; John H. Bingler, Jr., for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 843
    Skripkar et al. v. Skripkar, Appellant.
    Submitted February 23, 1983.
    Walter C. Faderewski, for appellant; Judd F. Crosby, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.

MONTEMURO, J., concurred in the result.

SPAETH, J., filed a memorandum dissenting opinion.


text:
    468 A.2d 843
    Sottile, Appellant v. Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co.
    Submitted October 25, 1983.
    Charles Peter Wasovich, for appellant; John L. McIntyre, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order reversed and case remanded with a procedendo.


text:
    469 A.2d 691
    Taylor v. Taylor, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 24, 1984.

      Argued May 24, 1983.
    Carole L. Taylor, appellant, in propria persona; Sanford P. Gross, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    469 A.2d 1143
    Triffin, Appellant v. Fernow.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 31, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 29, 1984.
    Argued October 11, 1983.
    Robert Triffin, appellant, in propria persona; Michael H. Van Bus-kirk, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, P.J., and MONTEMURO and POPO-VICH, JJ.
   The order of the trial court is affirmed.


text:
    November 25, 1983.
    468 A.2d 844
    Adler, Appellants v. Xerox Corp.

      Argued October 5, 1983.
    Howard J. Creskoff, for appellants; S. David Fineman, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order vacated and case remanded for disposition of the petition to open. Jurisdiction is relinquished.


text:
    468 A.2d 844
    Adoption of Nichole R. Appeal of: Paula P. and Alan D.P.
    Argued September 7, 1983.
    Joseph V. Restifo, for appellants; Warren R. Hamilton, for participating party.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 844
    Barletta v. Barletta, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted March 19, 1984.
    Argued September 21, 1983.
    Pasco L. Schiavo, for appellant; Richard M. Goldberg, for appellee.

      Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CERCONE, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    469 A.2d 1143
    Collier, Appellant v. Hackman.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 31, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 1, 1984.
    Argued October 3, 1983.
    Allen L. Feingold, for Collier, appellant; Barbara Axelrod, Deputy City Solicitor, for City of Phila., appellee; and Pamela Gagne, for Pangborne Co., for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 844
    Com. Nat’l Bank v. Arabia, III, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    C. Joseph Rehkamp, Jr., for appellant; William A. Kramer, II, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order of June 16, 1982 affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 845
    Commonwealth v. Addeo, Appellant.
    Submitted May 2, 1983.
    Mary McNeill Zell, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 845
    Commonwealth v. Boglin, Appellant.
    Argued October 4, 1983.
    Jeffrey Toaltoan, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 845
    Commonwealth v. Bonner, Appellant. Commonwealth v. Walls, Appellant.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    John H, Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellants; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 846
    Commonwealth v. Bradley, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    John Francis Lyons, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 846
    Commonwealth v. Burhannan, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Scott A. Evans, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence of August 4, 1982 is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 846
    Commonwealth v. Butler, Appellant.
    Submitted October 3, 1983.
    Stanley M. Vasiliadis, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; James Martin Connell, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 846
    Commonwealth v. Cook, Appellant.

      Submitted October 3, 1983.
    Alexander Hemphill, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence for criminal trespass is vacated and set aside. The judgments of sentence for burglary and criminal conspiracy are affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 847
    Commonwealth v. Cortes, Appellant.
    Submitted March 24, 1983.
    Clayton R. Wilcox, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gary E. Hartman, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 847
    Commonwealth v. Davinport, Appellant.

      Submitted June 21, 1983.
    Peter Alan Levin, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.

BROSKY, J., filed a memorandum concurring opinion.


text:
    468 A.2d 847
    Commonwealth v. DeKeyser, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 7, 1984.
    Submitted July 27, 1983.
    Francis J. Moran, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 848
    Commonwealth v. Dennis, Appellant.
    Appeal Granted April 3, 1984.
    473 A.2d 572.

      Submitted September 15, 1983.
    Leon Wilbert Tucker, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 848
    Commonwealth v. Dennis, Appellant.
    Argued February 4, 1983.
    David Rudovsky, for appellant; Ronald Thomas Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Judge William W. Vogel is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 848
    Commonwealth v. Devlin, Appellant.

      Submitted June 15, 1983.
    John Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 849
    Commonwealth v. Fuller, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 7, 1984.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    John A. Halley, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 849
    Commonwealth v. Gibson, Appellant.
    Submitted September 9, 1983.
    Robert W. Suter, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Peter M. Hileman, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 849
    Commonwealth v. Gunderman, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted October 3, 1983.
    Jack A. Panella, for appellant; Nicholas E. Englesson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 849
    Commonwealth v. Henderson, Appellant.
    Argued January 7, 1983.
    Michael E. Garner, for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before SPAETH, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 850
    Commonwealth v. Holland, Appellant.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    Paulette J. Balogh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 850
    Commonwealth v. Jasper, Appellant.
    Argued February 3, 1983.
    Francis M. Walsh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; J. William Ditter, III, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Judge William W. Vogel is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 850
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Lorah.
    Argued June 1, 1981.
    Stuart Suss, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Lawrence Hracho, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and SHERTZ, JJ.

       SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

   The order of the learned Berks County Common Pleas Court Judge Warren K. Hess is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 851
    Commonwealth v. McClain, Appellant.
    Submitted October 12, 1983.
    Joann Selleck, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; F. Ned Hand, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 851
    Commonwealth v. McDaniels, Appellant.
    Submitted September 13, 1983.
    Lee Barry Balefsky, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 851
    Commonwealth v. Mengenie, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 6, 1984.
    Argued May 2, 1983.
    Louis G. Hasner, for appellant; Helen T. Kane, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, MONTGOMERY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 851
    Commonwealth v. Nedab, Appellant.
    Submitted October 13, 1983.
    Melvin B. Goldstein, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 852
    Commonwealth v. Nunes, Appellant.
    Submitted May 25, 1983.
    Carmela R.M. Presogna, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael R. Cauley, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 852
    Commonwealth v. Parks, Appellant.
    Submitted October 3, 1983.
    Edmund L. Levine, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, HESTER and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 852
    Commonwealth v. Perschka, Appellant.
    Submitted May 26, 1983.
    Chester B. Scholl, Jr., for appellant; Samuel J. Orr, IV, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 853
    Commonwealth v. Plessinger, Appellant.

      Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Bradley Leroy Griffie, for appellant; John R. Walker, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The order imposing judgment of sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for the filing of post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc within ten days. Jurisdiction is not retained.


text:
    468 A.2d 853
    Commonwealth v. Rickard, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Susan Claire DeYoung, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 853
    Commonwealth v. Rittenbaugh, Appellant.
    Submitted April 28, 1983.
    Robert Rittenbaugh, appellant, in propria persona; Thomas G. Mundhenk, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 853
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted March 22, 1984.
    Submitted March 16, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 854
    Commonwealth v. Rogers, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 3, 1984.

      Argued September 20, 1983.
    William T. Cannon, appellant; Marianne E. Cox, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 854
    Commonwealth v. Santos, Appellant.
    Submitted October 4, 1983.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Edward F. Browne, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 854
    Commonwealth v. Santos, Appellant.
    Submitted September 21, 1983.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Edward F. Browne, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ.
   Jurisdiction relinquished, and the judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 855
    Commonwealth v. Stago, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 7, 1984.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    James Lee Goldsmith, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CHULLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The February 25, 1982 order is vacated; the September 19, 1978 judgment of sentence is reinstated; and the case is remanded for a new PCHA hearing.


text:
    468 A.2d 855
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, Appellant.
    Submitted October 11, 1983.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before SPAETH, President Judge, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SPAETH, President Judge, filed a memorandum concurring statement.


text:
    468 A.2d 855
    Commonwealth v. Wells, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Susan Claire DeYoung, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 856
    Commonwealth v. Woodward, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    John Francis Lyons, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    469 A.2d 1143
    Commonwealth v. Worthey, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 31, 1984.
    Submitted May 3, 1983.
    Thomas L. McGill, Jr., for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, MONTGOMERY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Case remanded to the Common Pleas Court so that the court may conduct an evidentiary hearing upon the two claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel and judgment of sentence affirmed as to all other issues. Jurisdiction is relinquished.


text:
    468 A.2d 856
    Eberts v. Eberts, Appellants.
    Submitted June 23, 1983.
    Daniel George Spengler, for appellants; John L. O’Brecht, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 856
    Greiner v. Greiner, Appellant.
    Argued June 7, 1983.
    Henry Barry Bier, for appellant; Joseph M. Wymard, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, SPAETH and HESTER, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 856
    Hale v. Hale, Appellant.
    Argued September 21, 1983.
    Albert C. Oehrle, for appellant; Robert B. Surrick, for appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ.
   The order of March 4, 1983 is affirmed except as it relates to counsel fees. The case is remanded for a determination of the amount and reasonableness of the counsel fees to be awarded. Jurisdiction is not retained.

CIRILLO and CERCONE, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    468 A.2d 857
    Heindel v. Ellis, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Edward R. Lecates, for appellant; John D. Miller, Jr., for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 857
    In re Appt. of Deputy Constable. Appeal of: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    Argued September 22, 1983.
    Wallace H. Bateman, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Thomas E. Timby, for participating party.
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 857
    In re Eisenhower. Appeal of Donald Funk and Robert Funk.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 8, 1984.
    Argued September 7, 1983.
    Elliott D. Goldberg, for appellants; Robert F. Blanck, for St. John’s, participating party; and W. Cremers, Jr., for Ogles-by, participating party.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    469 A.2d 692
    In Matter of Estate of Ivan R. Lehr, Sr. Appeal of Ronald E. Lehr.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 26, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 24, 1984.
    Argued March 9, 1983.
    Daniel K. Medill, for appellant; Lillian M. Morgan, for participating parties.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 858
    Karlton, Appellant v. Ross, et al.
    Argued May 3, 1983.
    Richard H. Anderson, for appellant; David Ross, appellee, in propria persona; Marilyn Ross, appellee, in propria persona; John Mezzanotte, for Dickinson, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, MONTGOMERY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

McEWEN, J., filed a memorandum concurring statement.


text:
    468 A.2d 858
    Liberty Fed’l Savings etc. v. Ratmansky, Appellant.
    Argued September 6, 1983.
    Steven R. Sosnov, for appellant; Stanley F. Mankas, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed. •


text:
    468 A.2d 858
    Lomax v. Kaplan Trucking Co., et al. Appeal of Kaplan Trucking Company, Debts Company, Inc. and James B. Murphy.

      Argued February 10, 1983.
    Robert Perna Corbin, for appellants; Thomas Scott Brown, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    469 A.2d 275
    Mueller, Appellants, v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 19, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 11, 1984.
    Argued September 20, 1983.
    Allen Feingold, for appellants; L. Oliver Frey, for appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order opening judgment affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 858
    Murray et ux. v. Abcon, Inc., Etc., Appellant.
    Argued September 7, 1983.
    Thomas E. Waters, Jr., for appellant; Daniel M. Haug, for appellees.

      Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Final decree affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 859
    Rouse, Appellant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., Appellant.
    (at No. 875)
    Argued September 22, 1983.
    Barry Douglas Floyd, for Rouse, appellant (at No. 875) and appellee (at No. 989); Walter J. Timby, Jr., for New Hampshire, appellant (at No. 989) and appellee (at No. 875).
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ.
   Accordingly, the appeals at No. 875 and No. 989 Philadelphia 1982 are hereby quashed.


text:
    468 A.2d 859
    Sandusky, Appellant v. Plank.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 12, 1984.
    Argued September 7, 1983.
    Susan Bolno, for appellant; Kevin Canavan, for appellee.

      Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    468 A.2d 859
    Seifert v. Allstate Ins. Co., Appellant.
    Argued September 7, 1983.
    Robert M. Donovan, for appellant; Samuel A. Litzenberger, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


author: BECK, Judge:

text:
    468 A.2d 1129
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Steven SMERECHENSKI.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted May 18, 1983.
    Filed Dec. 16, 1983.

      Marianne E. Cox, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellant.
    Dennis J. Cogan, Philadelphia, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, BROSKY and BECK, JJ.
   BECK, Judge:

The Commonwealth appeals an order granting appellee’s motion to quash the return of the Municipal Court transcript.

Appellee Steven Smerechenski was charged with involuntary manslaughter, murder, and possession of an instrument of crime arising out of the shooting death of his son Steven on November 27, 1980, inside the family residence. The deceased was nineteen years of age and a member of the armed forces at the time of the incident. The only witness to the shooting was Nancy Smerechenski, wife of appellee and natural mother of the deceased.

Prior to the preliminary hearing a Philadelphia Municipal Court judge ruled that Nancy Smerechenski was competent to testify against her husband at a preliminary hearing. After the preliminary hearing, appellee was held for court. Appellee then filed a motion in the Court of Common Pleas to quash the return of the Municipal Court transcript which was granted. The Court of Common Pleas ruled that appellee’s wife was not competent to testify against him. Since she was the only witness to testify against him at the preliminary hearing, the Common Pleas Court ruled that a prima facie case had not been made out. It issued appellee’s requested order and discharged him.

This appeal by the Commonwealth from the lower court order, which in effect granted habeas corpus relief to appellee, is properly now before us. Commonwealth v. Hess, 489 Pa. 580, 414 A.2d 1043 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971).

The sole issue for our consideration is whether the nineteen year old decedent was a minor child under Pennsylvania law for purposes of the criminal spousal testimony statute, Section 5913 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913. We hold that a nineteen year old decedent is a minor making appellee’s wife competent to testify against him.

The criminal spousal testimony statute does not provide an absolute bar to adverse spousal testimony in criminal proceedings. It provides in relevant part:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in a criminal proceeding husband and wife shall not be competent or permitted to testify against each other, except that ... in any criminal proceeding against either for bodily injury or violence attempted, done or threatened upon the other, or upon the minor children of said husband and wife, or the minor children of either of them, or any minor child in their care or custody, or in the care or custody of either of them, each shall be a competent witness against the other____

Section 5913 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913 (emphasis added).

The basis of this appeal is the interpretation of the words “minor children” in the statute. Appellee claims, and the Common Pleas Court concluded, that the term refers to individuals under the age of eighteen years. The Commonwealth as appellant contends that the legislature intended the age of majority, with respect to the criminal spousal testimony statute, to be twenty-one years. As we are in agreement with appellant, we reverse.

The Commonwealth has not passed a comprehensive Act defining the age of minority. Instead, it has enacted piecemeal legislation specifically providing non-minority status for eighteen year olds for specified purposes. At the same time it has left intact the definition of minority (an individual under twenty-one years) in the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq. Although on policy grounds we see no reason why the legislature has not redefined minority to the younger age, we nevertheless, are bound by the legislature’s action.

Since the criminal spousal testimony statute does not itself define “minor children,” we must look to the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 for guidance. The Act defines “minor” as “[a]n individual under the age of 21 years.”

We are also persuaded by three recent decisions of the Commonwealth Court in which that court interpreted the word “minor” in the context of other statutes. In Fink v. Department of Public Welfare, 44 Pa.Commw. 210, 403 A.2d 214 (1979), aff'd, 491 Pa. 415, 421 A.2d 205 (1980), the Commonwealth Court addressed the issue of whether the age of majority for the purpose of receiving public assistance is eighteen or twenty-one years. The statute in question, Section 4(a) of The Support Law, Act of June 24, 1937, P.L. 2045, as amended, 62 P.S. § 1974(a), refers to “unemancipated minor children.” The word “minor” is not defined in either The Support Law or the Public Welfare Code, Act of June 13, 1967, P.L. 31, as amended, 62 P.S. § 101 et seq. The Commonwealth Court, therefore, was guided by Section 1991 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 for the definition of “minor.”

Similarly, in Borough of Wilmore v. New, 54 Pa.Commw. 145, 419 A.2d 1383 (1980), the Commonwealth Court considered Section 307(5) of the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 561(5) which includes the term “minor child.” The Court again relied on Section 1991 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 for the applicable definition of “minor.” See also Mikalonis v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 25 Pa.Commw. 166, 361 A.2d 483 (1976) (same).

Further support for our conclusion is drawn from Section 1922(4) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Barnosky v. Maroney, 414 Pa. 161, 199 A.2d 424 (1964). Our Supreme Court, in interpreting the predecessor to the criminal spousal testimony statute, Section 2(b) of the Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, as amended, 19 P.S. § 683, held that “minor children” referred to individuals under the age of twenty-one years. In that case, a father shot and killed his son, who was over eighteen years of age. The boy’s mother was found competent to testify against the father.

Section 1922(4) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 mandates that:

In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among other, may be used:
... (4) That when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.

Therefore, it is presumed that in enacting the present criminal spousal testimony statute in 1976 the legislature intended to interpret the word “minor” as an individual under the age of twenty-one years.

For the aforesaid reasons, we reverse the order of the Common Pleas Court.

      . This is in contrast to common law, where one spouse was disqualified from testifying for or against the other. 1 E. Coke, A Commentarie upon Littleton 6b (1628). The rationale for the doctrine was two-fold: first, that the accused, as an interested person, was not permitted to testify in his own behalf; second, that the wife did not have a separate legal existence from the husband. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980). The rule of marital incompetency in criminal actions remained unchanged in Pennsylvania until 1887, when favorable spousal testimony, Section 1 of the Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, 19 P.S. § 681, and certain adverse spousal testimony. Section 2(b) of the Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, as amended, 19 P.S. § 683, first became admissible. The modern justification for the marital incompetency rule is the preservation of domestic peace, harmony, and the sanctity of marriage. Trammel; Commonwealth v. Galloway, 271 Pa.Super. 305, 413 A.2d 418 (1979). For an excellent discussion of spousal testimony in both civil and criminal proceedings in this jurisdiction, see Comment, Spousal Testimony in Pennsylvania, 86 Dick.L.Rev. 491 (1982).

      . For example, the legislature has lowered the voting age to eighteen years. Section 701 of the Pennsylvania Election Code, Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. § 2811; A person eighteen years of age or older may now make a will. Section 2 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, Act of June 30, 1972, P.L. 508, as amended, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501. Similarly, persons over eighteen years of age have the right to enter into binding and legally enforceable contracts. Section 1 of the Act of June 16, 1972, P.L. 472, 73 P.S. § 2021.

      . Section 1991 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991.


author: JOHNSON, Judge:

text:
    468 A.2d 1131
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Albert FRANK, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Jan. 19, 1982.
    Filed Dec. 16, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 3, 1984.

      Kingsley A. Jarvis, Norristown, for appellant.
    Joseph Hylan, Assistant District Attorney, Norristown, for Com., appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   JOHNSON, Judge:

Appellant Albert Frank was convicted in a non-jury trial of knowingly issuing a bad check in violation of 18 Pa.C. S.A. § 4105. That section provides:

(a) Offenses defined. — A person commits an offense if he issues or passes a check or similar sight order for the payment of money, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee.
' (b) Presumption. — For the purposes of this section as well as in any prosecution for theft committed by means of a bad check, an issuer is presumed to know that the check or order (other than a post-dated check or order) would not be paid, if:
(1) the issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check or order was issued; or
(2) payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon presentation within 30 days after issue, and the issuer failed to make good within ten days after receiving notice of that refusal.
(c) Grading. — An offense under this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree if the amount of the check or order exceeds $200; otherwise it is a summary offense.

Post-trial motions were dismissed and appellant was sentenced to two years probation. He here appeals from the judgment of sentence. We reverse.

On June 3, 1980, Perma Metals provided appellant’s business, Afeo Steel Company, with a shipment of steel. On July 11, 1980 appellant issued a check in the amount of $5,185.44 to Perma Metals for the June 3rd shipment. Perma Metals deposited the check and it was returned marked “Insufficient Funds.” Perma Metals notified appellant who advised it to redeposit the check. The check was again not honored and was returned a second time marked “Do Not Present Again.”

At trial the custodian of the bank records testified that on July 11, 1980, the Afeo account had a balance of $1,258.66 and that after that date the balance was never as high as $5,185.44. The account was closed out on September 4, 1980. On cross-examination, the bank representative testified regarding a check that had been “misrouted” from the Afeo account on July 14, 1980. That check was in the amount of $5,185.44. Such check was apparently credited. to another account and a credit adjustment to the Afeo account was not made until September 12, 1980.

Appellant testified that, while he was advised that the check to Perma Metals bounced and admittedly he did not make good on the check within ten days of so being informed, at the time he issued the check he had reason to believe that sufficient funds were present to cover it. He testified as to the financing arrangement that existed with his bank. The bank would hold certain Afeo receivables and then advance a certain percent of the value of the receivables. Appellant claimed that the “misrouted” check represented such an advance pursuant to the financing arrangement. Appellant therefore believed that the check to Perma Metals would be honored. He introduced into evidence a letter from the bank evidencing the arrangement. The bank’s record custodian was unfamiliar with the arrangement.

Additionally, he contended that on July 11, 1980 he was unaware that a $7,061.27 check made out to Afeo, as payee, had bounced. Looking to the bank records introduced, including the notice to appellant dated July 18, 1980, we find support for such contention. The bank statements indicate that a check in the amount of $7,061.27 was returned to Afco’s bank because of insufficient funds.

On appeal, Appellant argues that in light of the above circumstances, the Commonwealth failed to prove the necessary elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.

In reviewing appellant’s claim we must keep in mind that:

The test to be applied by our Court in appraising the sufficiency of the evidence is a two step inquiry. First, we must regard all the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, accepting as true all evidence upon which the fact finder could have based the verdict and then we must ask whether that evidence, along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 265 Pa.Superior Ct. 494, 402 A.2d 546 (1979); Commonwealth v. Eddington, 255 Pa.Superior Ct. 25, 386 A.2d 117 (1978); Commonwealth v. Luther, 266 Pa.Superior Ct. 240, 403 A.2d 1329 (1979).

Commonwealth v. Volk, 298 Pa.Super. 294, 300, 444 A.2d 1182, 1184 (1982); see also Commonwealth v. Griffith, 242 Pa.Super. 484, 364 A.2d 374 (1976). Since in the current case appellant admits to the facts that, he issued the check and it was not honored, and that he failed to make good on it after being advised that it had bounced, the only issue to be resolved was whether appellant knew at the time of issuance that the account was without sufficient funds. Appellant need not have intended to defraud, but need only have had knowledge of the lack of funds. See Commonwealth v. Mutnik, 486 Pa. 428, 406 A.2d 516 (1979).

The trial court did not address the circumstances raised in defense by appellant, but instead relied upon § 4105(b), as did the prosecution, to presume knowledge on appellant’s part that the check would not be paid. Yet, during trial, the court itself realized that a person, who deposits a check and draws against such check prior to that check clearing the drawee bank, could be excused from criminal liability for writing a bad check if the check deposited did not clear. (N.T. pp. 41-42). Unfortunately, the trial judge did not adhere to his own understanding.

The bank representative, called by the prosecution, testified regarding the “misrouted” check. A bank document introduced by the defendant supported such testimony. The representative discussed the check payable to appellant which was not honored; exhibits entered by both sides confirmed such. The trial judge may have been within his authority in not accepting appellant’s testimony regarding the financial arrangement with the bank, see Commonwealth v. Conti, 236 Pa.Super. 488, 345 A.2d 238 (1975). However, appellant introduced a document from the bank setting forth the arrangement. In light of such document and the “misrouted” check and the bounced check, a reasonable doubt arose as to appellant’s knowledge at the time of issuance. Of course from the record we might infer that appellant should have known that the check dishonored on July 18 would be dishonored as it appears to have been returned before. Similarly, a degree of uncertainty surrounds the “misrouted” check. However, appellant’s guilt must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt and it was not.

Judgment of sentence reversed and appellant is discharged.

      . The return entries indicate an amount of $7,062.27. The July 18, 1980 notice indicates that a one-dollar service charge was tacked on and debited from Afco’s account.

      . Appellant also challenges the trial court’s reliance upon the presumption contained in § 4105(b) and the constitutionality of such presumption. Having found that the judgment must be vacated due to insufficient evidence, we need not address these other issues.