author: HOFFMAN, Judge: CIRILLO, Judge,

text:
    461 A.2d 312
    COLUMBIAN ROPE COMPANY, Appellant, v. RINEK CORDAGE COMPANY, Rinek Rope Company & E. Jerome Brose, Esq.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued May 10, 1982.
    Filed June 3, 1983.

      David C. Keiter, Harrisburg, for appellant.
    Thomas R. Elliott, Easton, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   HOFFMAN, Judge:

Appellant, a creditor, contends that the lower court erred in denying its claim against Jerome Brose, the former president of a debtor corporation, and against Rinek Rope Co. [Rope], which received the debtor’s remaining assets in a bulk transfer. We find the claim against Brose was properly denied. However, because the bulk transfer to Rope was “concealed” within the meaning of 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111, the six-month statute of limitations did not begin running until appellant discovered the bulk transfer. Accordingly, we reverse the lower court’s order dismissing appellant’s claim against Rope, and remand for findings of fact as to whether appellant commenced its action within six months of discovering the bulk transfer.

During 1971, appellant sold yarn to its original debtor, appellee Rinek Cordage Co. [Cordage], a rope manufacturer. Cordage paid $22,683.48 less than the agreed price, and in December, 1972, executed a promissory note for that amount. Shortly thereafter, Cordage, in financial difficulty, offered its creditors fifty cents on the dollar, but appellant refused the offer. On April 1, 1974, Cordage sold its entire inventory to appellee Rope in exchange for Rope’s president forgiving a $17,588.55 debt Cordage owed him. It is undisputed on this'appeal that this sale constituted a bulk transfer. Rope, however, neither notified appellant or Cordage’s other creditor, nor made any provision to apply the proceeds of the sale for the creditors’ benefit. On November 12, 1976, appellant filed a complaint in assumpsit against Cordage, Rope, and Brosé, seeking to recover the outstanding debt from any or each of them. Rope, in amended new matter, alleged that appellant’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations of the Uniform Commercial Code-Article 6, 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111, because the action was commenced more than six months after the bulk transfer. Appellant asserted, however, that its action was timely because commenced within six months of its discovering the “concealed” bulk transfer. After trial, the lower court held that the bulk transfer had not been concealed, and thus that appellant’s action against Rope was barred. The lower court en banc denied appellant’s post-trial motions, prompting this appeal.

Appellant contends that Rope’s complete failure to give notice of the bulk transfer constituted a concealment of the bulk transfer, and thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run against it until its discovery of the transfer. We agree. The Uniform Commercial Code, Article 6, concerning bulk transfers, as enacted in Pennsylvania, 13 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6111, is designed to remedy the “major bulk sales risk” of the merchant, owing debts, who sells away virtually all his stock in trade and disappears leaving his creditors unpaid. Uniform Commercial Code, § 6-101, Comments 2, 4. See generally Hawkland, Sales & Bulk Sales, (3d ed. 1976); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 19-1 at 757 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that in the absence of a bulk sales law creditors cannot ordinarily follow goods into a transferee’s hands and have very limited remedies in this circumstance). The statute’s basic mechanism is to require the prospective transferee to give advance notice to the transferor’s creditors of the impending bulk sale. 13 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6104, 6105, 6107. The transferee must also take steps to insure that the proceeds are applied to the benefit of the transferor’s creditors. Id. § 6101. The prior notice affords the creditors an opportunity to participate in structuring the transfer or commence legal action against their debtor, the transferor, before the assets are sold away. To promote compliance, the statute establishes three alternative time limitations for creditor actions against the transferee. First, if the transferee gives the statutory notice and otherwise complies with the statute, the bulk transfer will be “effective” against any creditor of the transferor. Id. § 6105. The complying transferee will be shielded immediately upon the transfer from the creditors’ actions. Creditors will therefore be required to act expeditiously against their debtor, the transferor, within the ten or more days between the statutory notice and the transfer or they will effectively lose their opportunity to collect their debt. Second, if the transferee does not give the required notice, the transfer will be “ineffective” against the transferor’s creditors, id. § 6105, who may then commence actions for the transferor’s debts against the transferee within the six months following the transfer. Id. § 6111. Third, if the transferee’s failure to give notice is not simply non-compliance with the statute but amounts to “concealment” of the bulk transfer, the transferee is subject to actions by the transferor’s creditors commenced within six months of when the creditor discovers the concealed bulk transfer. Id. § 6111. The question we face here is whether a completely undisclosed bulk transfer should be treated as “concealed” for purposes of the U.C.C.’s statute of limitations.

Case law is divided upon what constitutes concealment of a bulk transfer. No prior Pennsylvania appellate decision has interpreted this statutory term. Some courts have required “active” or “affirmative” concealment. Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A Liquidating Co., 290 F.Supp. 356, 358 (W.D.Pa.1968). Accord Aerolineas Argentinas v. Hansen & Yorke Co., 12 U.C.C.Rep.Serv. 329 (N.Y.Civ.Ct. 1973) (dicta). Others have held that “complete failure to comply with the notice provisions of [U.C.C.] Article 6 ... was tantamount to a concealment of a transfer of assets within the meaning of Sections 6-111.” E.J. Trum, Inc. v. Blanchard Parfums, Inc., 33 App.Div.2d 689, 306 N.Y.2d 316, 6 U.C.C.Rep.Serv. 1261 (1969) (emphasis added) (reversing summary judgment and remanding for findings on whether creditor commenced action within six months of discovering the bulk transfer). Accord, McKissick v. Foremost McKesson, Inc., 441 F.2d 811, 8 U.C.C.Rep.Serv. 301 (5th Cir.1971) (dicta). We find that the complete failure to give notice of the impending bulk transfer is not merely noncompliance, but “concealment.”

Treating complete failure to give notice merely as noncompliance and not concealment would undermine the legislature’s scheme to promote advance notice of bulk transfers. Although the transferee who gives no notice will not obtain protection from the transferor’s creditors immediately upon the transfer—as does the transferee who fully complies—he would, under the restrictive interpretation of concealment, run only a small risk of creditor action within six months after the completely undisclosed transfer. Sending the statutory notice stirs up the transferor’s creditors, possibly delaying the transfer and increasing the risk of creditor action adverse to the transferee’s interests. Less formal notice would likely have similar consequences, and also gives creditors essential information to promptly begin action. However, when no notice at all is given, creditors have little means to discover the completely undisclosed transfer, identify the transferee, and commence action all within six months of the transfer. Prudent transferees would thus, despite the legislative intent, regularly choose the alternative of complete non-disclosure unless such complete non-disclosure were considered concealment. See J. White & R. Summers, supra (noting and criticizing those attorneys who advise transferees not to comply with the notice provisions of Article 6).

Interpreting “concealment” to include complete nondisclosure is, on the other hand, consistent with the legislature’s scheme and eminently fair to both transferees and creditors. The transferee’s protection from creditors is more reliably based on the notice given. The time limits on creditors’ actions becomes more reasonably related to their opportunity to act. The discovery rule statute of limitations that applies upon concealment, 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111, provides no windfall to laggard creditors, is commercially realistic, and thus need not be reserved solely as a sanction for intentionally deceptive conduct. Creditors must still act within six months of discovering the transfer so that transferees are spared prolonged liability for the transferor’s stale debts. In addition, even informal notice may, in appropriate circumstances, place the creditor on notice and start the limitations period running. Aerolineas Aargentinas v. Hansen & Yorke, Inc., supra (creditor’s letter mentioning “when one company buys out another” showed creditor had discovered the bulk transfer by time of letter).

Finally, the legislative scheme does not suggest that the concealment must be intentional or affirmative. Although affirmative acts of concealment, such as evasive answers to creditors’ inquiries or orders that employees remain silent about the transfer or the new ownership, might assist a creditor’s showing concealment, they are not central to the legislative scheme. Similarly, unlike in common-law actions for fraud, the transferee’s intent or scienter is not relevant to the harm the bulk transfer statute seeks to prevent. Inadvertent as well as conscious failures to make any disclosure of a bulk transfer both occasion the major bulk sales risk of a transferor merchant disposing of his stock in trade and disappearing, leaving his creditors unpaid. Moreover, to require proof of intent or affirmative deception as a prerequisite to finding “concealment” under 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111 would be to presume that a transferee might ordinarily purchase all of the transferor’s stock in trade, thus rendering the transferor a hollow shell, without considering or making provision for the transferor’s creditors. Such an unrealistic presumption would defy the standards of “reasonable” commercial practice, id. § 1102(b)(2), the Code’s good faith provisions, id. § 1203, and the legislature’s intent that we liberally construe the Code to effect its purposes, id. § 1102. Consequently, a complete failure to notify the transferor’s creditors should be considered “concealment” of the bulk transfer for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations under 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.

Applying these principles, the record reveals that the bulk transfer here was wholly undisclosed, and thus concealed. No notice, formal or informal, was sent to Cordage’s two outstanding creditors, apparently because Rope’s and Cordage’s officers did not think it necessary. (N.T. at 11). The circumstances in no way revealed to creditors that the transfer had occurred. Both transferor and transferee operated out of the same business address, with Cordage owning the premises and Rope leasing space. Both used the “Rinek” name. Even after the transfer, Cordage’s president was not scrupulous in differentiating between the two entities. Letter from Jerome Brose to Michael Hole, April 25, 1974 (“I have completed refinancing of the Rinek real estate” (emphasis added)). Moreover, although Rope had existed separately since 1971, and used stationery showing its own name—Rinek Cordage forms with “Cordage” blacked-out and “Rope” rubber-stamped above—such a precaution did not reveal the fact of the bulk transfer on April 1, 1974. Accordingly, even though the record contains no proof of deceptive intent, the bulk transfer was effectively “concealed” from creditors by the complete nondisclosure. 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111. We thus reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the action against Rope, and remand for findings of fact to determine whether appellant commenced action within six months of its discovering the bulk transfer.

Appellant contends also that the lower court erred in denying its claim against Jerome Brose, president of Cordage. Appellant argues that Brose entered into a contract to assume personal liability for Cordage’s debt by the following letter to appellant dated April 25, 1974:

I have completed the refinancing of the Rinek real estate. It took the form of a conveyance to me, personally, of the real estate and my bond and mortgage to the bank.
Enclosed please find a check for $6984.80 representing interest due to March 1, 1974 of $1894.80 and $5,000 in principal reduction.
Kindly send future invoices to me at this address. We have about half of the space rented. As we get more tenants I should be able to effect more principal amortization.
Thank you for your generous forbearance to date and kindest regards.
/s/ Jerome Brose

Brose sent a check from an attorney’s account in his name along with this letter, written on Brose’s law firm stationery. We agree with the lower court that this letter did not constitute an offer by Brose to assume personal liability for Cordage’s debt. To support a contract an offer must make a promise that is sufficiently definite on essential elements, when read in light of circumstances, to enable a determination of whether the contract has been performed. Fahringer v. Strine’s Estate, 420 Pa. 48, 216 A.2d 82 (1966); Butler v. Kemmerer, 218 Pa. 242, 67 A. 332 (1907); Potter v. Leitenberger Machine Co., 166 Pa.Superior Ct. 31, 70 A.2d 390 (1950). This letter is unclear on the essential issue of the intended parties to the contract. Writing on law firm stationery and paying from an attorney’s account, Mr. Brose did not reveal whether he was acting on his own behalf, or as an agent of “Rinek,” in paying the debt and offering to receive future invoices. Similarly, the testimony on the record does not reveal that Brose personally assumed the debt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in favor of Brose.

The Order denying the claim against Jerome Brose is affirmed.

As to that portion of the lower court’s Order dismissing action against Rinek Rope Co., we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

JURISDICTION IS RELINQUISHED.

CIRILLO, J., files a dissenting opinion.

CIRILLO, Judge,

dissenting:

I find that I must respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion which holds that failure to give notice of an impending bulk transfer is not merely non-compliance within the meaning of 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111, but constitutes “concealment.”

Under 12A P.S. § 6-105, a transferee is required to give notice to the creditors of the transferor. It states:

§ 6-105. Notice to Creditors
In addition to the requirements of the preceding Section, any bulk transfer subject to this Article except one made by auction sale (Section 6-108) is ineffective against any creditor of the transferor unless at least ten days before he takes possession of the goods or pays for them, whichever happens first, the transferee gives notice of the transfer in the manner and to the persons hereafter provided (Section 6-107).

Therefore, bulk transfers covered by Article 6 are not subject to attack if the compliance procedures of the statute are followed. If the complying transfer is not a fraudulent conveyance and does not amount to a preference, the goods are beyond the reach of simple creditors unless they can reduce their claims to judgment and levy on the goods during the ten day period between notice and transfer. Therefore, a claim of ineffectiveness rises when the transferee has failed to provide notice to the creditors of the transferor. When this occurs, the creditor has a cause of action not only against the transferor, but also against the transferee.

The period in which the creditor must bring this action is not unlimited. The failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Article activates Section 6-111, which requires that an action be brought within six months of the date of the transfer or the claim will be barred. However, if there has been a concealment of the transfer, the general six month statute of limitations is inapplicable, and the creditor can bring his claim at any time within six months after he learns of the transfer.

The majority has held that we must adopt the view that “concealment,” as it is used in Section 6-111, can refer simply to a failure to give the requisite notice of the transfer to the creditors as required by Section 6-105. However, if we subscribe to this view, it will totally nullify the general six month statute of limitations under Section 6-111. Specifically, the effect of such a holding would be to exempt every action under Section 6-111 from the applicability of the general six month statute of limitations. Clearly, such a result was not the intention of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code. On the contrary, I would adopt the view of the Federal District Court in the case of Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A Liquidating Co., 290 F.Supp. 356 (W.D.Pa.1968), which held, as an interpretation of Pennsylvania law, that concealment within the meaning of 6-111 “refers to affirmative concealment and not to mere nondisclosure or failure to give ‘public notice’.” Id. at 359. I believe that it is a more plausible conclusion.

Therefore, I would hold that “concealment” under 12A P.S. § 6-111 requires some sort of affirmative act on the part of the transferee to shield the transfer from the creditor. My review of the record discloses that there is no evidence of such behavior on the part of Rinek Rope Company. Consequently, I find that appellant’s claim should be barred by the six month statute of limitations.

Therefore, I dissent.

      . Creditors who have obtained judgments against the transferor may, however, “levy" against goods in the transferee’s hands for six months even after a complying transfer. 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.

      . We need not determine here what degree of compliance with the notice and other statutory requirements is sufficiently substantial to afford transferees protection immediately upon the transfer. Nor need we determine what defects or omissions in an otherwise complete attempt to comply should deprive it of such protection. See generally J. White & R. Summers, supra, Ch. 19.

      . See Annot., Bulk Transfers: Construction & Effect of U.C.C. Article 6, 47 A.L.R.3d 1114 § 11 (1973) (collecting cases). See also Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A Liquidating Co., 290 F.Supp. 356 (W.D.Pa.1968) (interpreting Pennsylvania bulk sales law); Thompson v. Farrier Industries, 16 Pa.D. & C.3d 463 (1980) (bankruptcy law allots .trustee in bankruptcy two years from filing of bankruptcy petition to commence actions against bankrupt transferor’s creditors, thus trustee not barred by U.C.C.’s statute of limitations when bankruptcy petition was filed within six months of bulk transfer).

      . This has subsequently been re-codified as 13 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6111. However, the provisions are substantially the same. Since this action was initiated prior to the change, we will refer to the old statute.

      . Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales, 3rd Ed. at 209-215 (1976). If there is full compliance with the Article, then creditors have six months to examine the schedule of property and the list of creditors. If they find that the transfer was fraudulent or preferential, they may be able to invalidate the transfer under the laws of fraudulent conveyance or Article 9.

      . The formal requirements of this notice are set forth in 12A P.S. § 6-107.

      . See, Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 6-111:02 (1982).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    June 3, 1983.
    461 A.2d 864
    Batten, et al., Appellants v. Business Loans, et al.
    Argued January 20, 1982.
    Steven M. Dranoff, for appellants;
    Nicholas Scafidi, for appellees.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 865
    Commonwealth v. Allen, Appellant.
    Argued May 20, 1982.
    Peter N. Georgiades, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    • Before HESTER, McEWEN and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 865
    Commonwealth v. Bowman, Appellant.
    Submitted January 27, 1983.
    Jeffery M. Cook, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

CIRILLO, J., filed a memorandum concurring opinion.


text:
    461 A.2d 865
    Commonwealth v. Dixon, Jr., Appellant.
    Argued March 17, 1983.
    John J. O’Brien, submitted a brief on behalf of appellant;
    Phyllis R. Streitel, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    463 A.2d 23
    Commonwealth v. Epps, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 15, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Dec. 14, 1983.
    Argued January 27, 1983.
    Francis M. Socha, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 866
    Commonwealth v. Forbes, Appellant.
    Submitted May 10, 1982.
    Edgar R. Casper, for appellant;
    Samuel E. Teeter, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 866
    Commonwealth v. Gambling Devices/Proceeds. Appeal of Anthony Cheseroni.
    Submitted February 16, 1983.
    Stephen Cohen, for appellant;
    Douglas L. Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 866
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted March 1, 1983.
    Robert Thomas Panowicz, for appellant;
    Robert J. Gillespie, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., CAVANAUGH and WIEAND, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 866
    Commonwealth v. Little, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted January 26, 1983.
    Samuel K. Gates, for appellant;
    Roy Alan Keefer, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

CIRILLO, J., filed a memorandum concurring opinion.


text:
    461 A.2d 867
    Commonwealth v. Lyons, Appellant.
    Argued January 25,1983.
    Paul W. Brann, for appellant;
    Graham C. Showalter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 867
    Commonwealth v. Murray, Appellant.
    Submitted February 24, 1982.
    Gilbert J. Scutti, for appellant;
    Vram Nedurian, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., BROSKY and BECK, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 867
    Commonwealth v. Rivenbark, Appellant.

      Submitted February 15, 1983.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald Thomas Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 868
    Commonwealth v. Stevenson, Appellant.
    Submitted February 16, 1983.
    Anthony D. Reagoso, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 868
    Commonwealth v. Torbeck, Appellant.
    Submitted February 10, 1983.
    John Joseph Cerra, for appellant;
    Wil-
    liam H. Platt, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 868
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted October 18, 1982.
    Lee Mandell, for appellant;
    Gaele M. Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 868
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted January 27, 1983.
    James Lee Goldsmith, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 869
    Commonwealth v. Wongus, Appellant.
    Argued February 17,1983.
    Daniel H. Greene, for appellant;
    Mariana Coleman Sorensen, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 869
    Commonwealth v. Wyatt, Appellant.
    Submitted February 17, 1983.
    Buford W. Tatum, II, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 869
    Hall, Appellant v. Septa.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 15, 1983.
    Argued February 4, 1983.
    Jeffrey M. Stopford, for appellant;
    Norman Hegge, Jr., for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 870
    Klein v. Lavan. Appeal of: Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
    Argued April 19, 1983.
    Edward J. Marcantonio, for appellant;
    Lewis Kates, for appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 870
    Prestopino, Appellants v. Supermarkets Corp.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 12, 1983.
    Argued February 23, 1982.
    Eugene A. Spector, for appellants;
    George E. Moore, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and BECK, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 870
    Scogna v. Scogna, Appellant.
    Argued April 19, 1983.
    Edward J. Schwabenland, for appellant;
    Gary M. Gusoff, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 870
    Township of Marple v. Kim & Hertzog, Appellants.

      Argued March 16, 1983.
    George Brady, III, for appellants;
    Michael F.X. Gillin, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 871
    Tutka, et al., Appellants v. 7-Up Bottling Company.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 23, 1983.
    Argued November 3, 1982.
    Ralph M. Russo, for appellants;
    Anthony A. Witlin, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    463 A.2d 486
    Busler, et al., Appellants v. Dubos, et al.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 19, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 7, 1984.

      Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    June 10, 1983.
    461 A.2d 871
    Commonwealth v. Day, Appellant.
    Submitted March 29, 1982.
    Nino V. Tinari, for appellant;
    Joseph John Hylan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Judge Lawrence A. Brown is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 871
    Commonwealth v. Dickerson, Appellant.
    Submitted March 22, 1983.
    William T. Cannon, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 872
    Commonwealth v. Foulke, Jr., Appellant.
    Argued February 16, 1983.
    Henry J. Lunardi, for appellant;
    Dennis Craig McAndrews, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 872
    Commonwealth v. Harrington, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 4, 1983.
    Argued April 20, 1983.
    Dennis Daniel Brogan, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Phyllis R. Streitel, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 872
    Commonwealth v. Holmes, Appellant.
    Submitted April 26, 1983.
    Joseph S.U.
    Bodoff, for appellant; Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 872
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. McClary, Bascom, Clark, Jordan, Butts, Wallace and Williams.
    Argued June 2, 1981.
    Steven H. Goldblatt, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant;
    Holly Maguigan, for McClary, appellee;
    Phyllis H. Subin, Assistant Public Defender, for Bascom, appellee;
    Ronald B. Merriweather, for Clark, appellee;
    Harvey A. Yanks, for Jordan, appellee;
    George Gershenfeld, for Butts, appellee;
    Richard B. Moore, for Wallace, appellee;
    Paul T. Sosnowski, for Williams, appellee.

      Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and SHERTZ, JJ.

       SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

   The order of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Charles L. Durham is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 873
    Commonwealth v. Mitchell, Appellant.
    Submitted April 21, 1983.
    John Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 873
    Commonwealth v. Morgret, Appellant.
    Submitted April 26, 1983.
    Anthony D. Miele, for appellant;
    Frederick D. Lingle, District Attorney, did not file a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 873
    Miller v. Miller, Appellant.
    Argued April 21, 1983.
    Blaine Joseph DeSantis, for appellant;
    James R. Hevalow, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 874
    Pucci, Appellants v. Columbia Gas of Pa.
    Argued January 11, 1983.
    Robert J. Taylor, for appellants;
    John David McBride, for appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 874
    Rosenthal, et al, Appellant v. Amer. Cas. Co., et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 20, 1984.
    Argued April 6, 1982.
    Fincourt B. Shelton, for appellants;
    Zygmunt R. Bialkowski, Jr., for appellees.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ. Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 874
    Strange v. Strange, Appellant.
    Argued April 19, 1983.
    Emy Lore Frany, for appellant;
    Priscilla M. Walrath, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 874
    Toll, Appellant v. Toll.

      Argued April 19, 1983.
    Carolyn Engel Temin, for appellant;
    John H. Martin, III, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    June 17, 1983.
    461 A.2d 875
    Baldwin, et al, Appellants v. Hempfield Area, et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 30, 1983.
    Argued January 13, 1983.
    Thomas E. Rodgers, for appellants;
    Dennis J. Slyman, for Hempfield Area, appellees;
    Thomas J. Godlewski, for
    Hempfield Township, appellee; Dennis Brian Rafferty, for Maxwell, appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgments affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 875
    Capobianco, Appellant v. Tilli.

      Argued April 7, 1983.
    Jerry R. Knafo, for appellant;
    Daniel Tilli, appellee, in propria persona.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 875
    Commonwealth v. Brady, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 30, 1983.
    Submitted February 17, 1983.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed. „


text:
    461 A.2d 875
    Commonwealth v. Carrero, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 7, 1984.
    Submitted June 8, 1982.
    Nicholas M. Zanakos, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Richard H. Pepper, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 876
    Commonwealth v. Casiano, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 1, 1983.
    Argued March 23, 1981.
    Allen H. Smith, for appellant;
    Michael E. Bortner, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    461 A.2d 876
    Commonwealth v. Chumley, Appellant.
    Submitted March 30, 1983.

      Randall Chumley, appellant; in propria persona;
    Donald E. Williams, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 876
    Commonwealth v. Garrison, Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 1983.
    Joanne Frisby Tyler, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 877
    Commonwealth v. Gieder, Appellant.
    Submitted June 9, 1982.
    Dyran Michael Emuryan, for appellant;
    David E. Fritchey, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 877
    Commonwealth v. Holz, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 8, 1984.
    Argued January 19, 1982.
    Frances M. Walsh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald Thomas Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 877
    Commonwealth v. Lennon, Appellant.
    Submitted March 22, 1983.
    Marlene Cooperman, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   P.C.H.A. order dated May 8, 1981 is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 878
    Commonwealth v. Lowe, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 4, 1983.
    Submitted March 30, 1983.
    Diane Barr Quinlin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 878
    Commonwealth v. Lozano, Appellant.
    Argued January 19, 1983.'
    L. Carter Anderson, for appellant;
    Michael Clarke, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before. CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 878
    Commonwealth v. Quinn, Appellant.
    Argued September 8, 1980.
    Emilio DiMatteo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jean Marie Celia, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

HOFFMAN, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    461 A.2d 878
    Commonwealth v. Seibert, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 18, 1873.
    Submitted February 8, 1983.
    Mildred A. Molino, for appellant;
    James Martin Connell, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 879
    Commonwealth v. Watson, Appellant.
    Submitted April 6, 1982.
    John Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 879
    Commonwealth v. Wholey, Appellant.
    Submitted April 26, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 879
    Commonwealth ex rel. Boehmer, Appellant v. Boehmer.

      Submitted March 22, 1983.
    Robert S. Trigg, for appellant; Edward R. Lecates, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 879
    Engles, et al. v. Counts, Appellants.
    Argued March 24, 1981.
    Daniel W. Shoemaker, for appellants;
    Donald L. Reihart, for appellees.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgments affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    461 A.2d 880
    Evans, Appellant v. Vernon, et al., v. Williams.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 20, 1983.
    Argued February 22, 1983.
    Samuel Joseph Davis, for appellant;
    William M. Radcliffe, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    461 A.2d 880
    1ST Pa Bank N.A. v. Elliott, et ux., Appellants.
    Argued December 13, 1982.
    Geoffrey Graham, for appellants;
    John A. VanLuvanee, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The order of September 21, 1981 is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 880
    Lee, Jr., Appellant v. Scotti, et al.
    Argued February 22, 1983.
    Otis Lee, appellant; in propria persona;
    William J. Ivill, Jr., for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    461 A.2d 881
    Madey v. Madey, Appellant.
    Submitted January 12, 1983.
    Paul Bog-don, for appellant;
    Armand R. Cingolani, Jr., for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., POPOVICH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order from which appeal is taken is affirmed.


text:
    463 A.2d 487
    McNeill, Appellant v. McNeill.
    Reconsideration Denied Aug. 24, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 16, 1984.
    Submitted February 16, 1983.
    Edward A. McNeill, appellant, in propria persona;
    Michael Alan Shechtman, did not file a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.

CERCONE, P.J., concurred in the result.


text:
    461 A.2d 881
    Penstan Supply v. Hay, et al. Appeal of Construction Concepts and Henry M. Whitehead.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 21, 1983.
    Argued February 23, 1983.
    George Gvozdich, Jr., for appellants;
    Randolph M. Wisnouse, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    463 A.2d 487
    Quigley, et al. v. Trinsey, et al., Appellants.
    Reconsideration Denied Aug. 23, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 8, 1984.
    Argued June 8, 1982.
    John S. Trinsey, Jr., appellant, in propria persona;
    Franklin H. Spitzer, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    463 A.2d 486
    Quigley, et al. v. Trinsey, et al., Appellants.
    Reconsideration Denied Aug. 23, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 8, 1984.
    Argued June 8, 1982.
    John S. Trinsey, Jr., appellant, in propria persona;
    Franklin H. Spitzer, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 881
    Reynard, Ltd., Appellant v. NHA. Pants Co.
    Argued February 23, 1982.
    Joel Martin Scheer, for appellant;
    Cheryl Ann Klepper, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 881
    Spencer, Appellants v. Sucharski.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 3, 1983.

      Argued March 2, 1983.
    Fred Lowenschuss, for appellants;
    Catherine N. Jasons, for appellees.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., CAVANAUGH and WIEAND, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 882
    Tilli, Appellant v. Capobianco.
    Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part Sept. 29, 1983.
    Argued April 7, 1983.
    Daniel Tilli, appellant, in propria persona;
    Jerry R. Knafo, for Capobianco, et al., appellees;
    David F. Snyder, for Commonwealth, appellee;
    Paul Gelman, for Freedberg, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    463 A.2d 486
    Wallace, Appellant v. Russell.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 26, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Dec. 19, 1983.

      Argued March 1, 1982.
    Allen L. Feingold, submitted a brief on behalf of appellant;
    Mitchell S. Greenspan, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 882
    Zumick v. Pikovsky, Appellant.
    Submitted April 26, 1983.
    David J. Kaltenbaugh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Christopher F. Sheridan, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 882
    Carter, Appellant v. Williams, et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 3, 1983.
    Argued April 13, 1983.
    David B. Keeffe, for appellant;
    Lucille Marsh, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 882
    Commonwealth v. Bing, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 3, 1983.
    Submitted March 24, 1983.
    Joseph J. Huss, for appellant;
    William A.
    Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    June 24, 1983.
    461 A.2d 883
    Commonwealth v. Blanchard, Appellant.
    Submitted March 22, 1983.
    Larry Elliott Stone, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 883
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Submitted March 22, 1983.
    Susan Claire DeYoung, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 883
    Commonwealth v. Browne, Appellant.
    Submitted April 5, 1983.
    John Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 884
    Commonwealth v. Bryant, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 9, 1983.

      Submitted February 22, 1982.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 884
    Commonwealth v. Carbonara, Appellant.
    Argued February 24, 1983.
    John L. Doherty, for appellant;
    Kemal A. Mericli, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 884
    Commonwealth v. Daughtry, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 4, 1983.

      Submitted February 1, 1983.
    John P. Cotter, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 884
    Commonwealth v. Fairell, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 1, 1983.
    Submitted April 20, 1983.
    Silvio Fausto Modafferi, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 885
    Commonwealth v. Forcillo, Appellant.
    Submitted April 27, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 885
    Commonwealth v. Katzin, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 26, 1983.
    Submitted April 27, 1983.
    Andrew G. Gay, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 885
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Klein.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 10, 1984.
    Argued February 1, 1983.
    Mark Stuart Gurevitz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant;
    Anita M. Cohen, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

WIEAND, J. dissented.


text:
    461 A.2d 886
    Commonwealth v. Kotlik, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 16, 1983.
    Submitted April 27, 1983.
    Stanley M. Vasiliadis, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    James Martin Connell, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 886
    Commonwealth v. Maris, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 3, 1983.
    Submitted April 27, 1983.
    Stuart M. Wilder, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael J. Kane, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    465 A.2d 46
    Commonwealth v. Nelson, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 30, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Feb. 8, 1984.
    Argued April 6, 1982.
    Taylor Putney Andrews, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Theodore B. Smith, III, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 886
    Commonwealth v. Selby, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 3, 1983.
    Submitted May 4, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 886
    Commonwealth v. Trivett, Appellant.
    Submitted March 22, 1983.
    John R. Gailey, Jr., for appellant;
    Douglas H. Gent, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 887
    Commonwealth v. Washington, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 6, 1983.
    Submitted February 16, 1983.
    Brian R. Williams, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 887
    Commonwealth v. Waters a/k/a Pork, Appellant.
    Submitted March 10, 1983.
    James Lee Goldsmith, for appellant;
    Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 887
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. White.
    Argued February 22, 1982.
    Robert Lee Steinberg, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant;
    Aaron Morton Matte, Assistant Public Defender, submitted a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 888
    Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, Appellant.

      Argued March 25, 1981.
    Sanford A. Krevsky, for appellant;
    Rolf W. Bienk, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.

       PRICE, J. did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 888
    Easter v. Jones, Appellant.
    Argued January 6, 1983.
    Geoffry F. Walsh, for appellant;
    Jonathan Dryer, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The order dated January 22, 1981 is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 888
    Family Vill. Incorp. v. Albert, et al., Appellants.
    Argued November 16, 1982.
    Robert L. Seigle, for appellants;
    William M. Shields, for appellee.

      Before BROSKY, McEWEN and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 888
    Frank v. Life Assurance. Appeal of Life Assurance Company of Pennsylvania. Appeal of Norman Levy.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 20, 1984.
    Argued March 15, 1983.
    Gilbert Newman, for appellant (at No. 2592) and for appellees (at No. 2575);
    Richard P. Hunter, Jr., for Frank, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 889
    In re Estate of Hamill, Dec’d. Appeal of Grace L. Hamill, Income Beneficiary.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 7, 1983.
    Argued April 12, 1983.

      T. Dean Lower, for appellant;
    Thomas G. Ashton, for participating party.
    Before HESTER, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 889
    Jumper v. Myers, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted February 3, 1983.
    John F. Goryl, for appellant;
    Philip A. Arnold, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 889
    Linkenheimer v. Hall, et al., Appellants.
    Argued February 9, 1983.
    W. David Marcel-lo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellants;
    Dudley N. Anderson, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 889
    Mayercheck, Appellant v. Mayercheck.
    Argued April 27, 1983.
    Joseph Mayercheck, appellant, in propria persona;
    Gordon D. Fisher, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Appeal dismissed as moot.


text:
    461 A.2d 890
    Smythe, et ux. v. Pedersen, et al. Appeal of Quincy C. Norwood.
    Argued April 5, 1983.
    John Philip Diefenderfer, for appellant;
    Robert A. Godwin, for Smythe, appellees;
    Ronald L. Stockham, for Pedersen, appellees; Francis J. Sullivan, for Fidelity, appellees.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 890
    State Farm Mutual v. Iadonisi, Appellant.

      Argued April 7, 1983.
    B. Alan Dash, for appellant;
    Alan Jay Dion, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 890
    Tranguch, Appellant v. Hoffer.
    Argued March 9, 1982.
    Richard J. Marusak, for appellant;
    Chester F. Dudick, Jr., for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 891
    Wilson v. Simon, Appellants.
    Argued April 21, 1983.
    Allan Molotsky, for appellants;
    William P. Fedullo, for appellees.

      Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 891
    Zimmerman, Appellant v. Zimmerman.
    Argued November 16, 1982.
    Lynne Z. Gold-Bikin, for appellant;
    Wayne Carl Zimmerman, appellee, in propria persona.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    461 A.2d 318
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ali O’NEALEL, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Feb. 24, 1982.
    Filed June 3, 1983.

      Henry J. Schireson, Wynnewood, for appellant.
    Joseph A. Smyth, District Attorney, Norristown, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

This appeal is taken from an order which summarily dismissed a petition for post-conviction relief filed by appellant, pro se. We vacate the order of the lower court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant was found guilty of burglary, criminal trespass and weapons charges on bills of information numbers 3464 and 3464.1 of 1978, following a jury trial which concluded on May 18, 1979. Pursuant to a plea agreement involving three further bills of information charging appellant with three other burglaries and related offenses committed in Montgomery County, appellant withdrew his motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial upon those charges of which he was found guilty at trial and agreed to combine that case, for sentencing purposes, with the three sets of charges on bills of information at numbers 579 of 1979, 832 of 1979 and 832.1 of 1979, upon which he agreed to enter pleas of guilty. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the district attorney was to recommend an aggregate sentence on the four sets of charges of not less than four and a half nor more than ten years, to run consecutively to any sentence then being served. After an extended guilty plea colloquy held on May 29, 1979, the Honorable Lawrence A. Brown accepted the guilty plea on bills of information at numbers 579 of 1979, 832 of 1979 and 832. of 1979, and sentenced appellant in accordance with the plea agreement to four concurrent terms of imprisonment of not less than four and a half nor more than ten years on the four bills of information ’, to run consecutively to any sentence he was then serving. No direct appeal was taken.

Appellant, by undated letter received by the sentencing judge on June 18, 1979, informally requested reconsideration of his sentence and the trial judge refused the request in a letter to appellant without granting a hearing. Appellant then filed, on July 17, 1981, a pro se “Petition for the Writ of Error Coram Nobis and for the Appointment of Counsel,” which was summarily dismissed by the trial judge on the same date, without a hearing and without granting the request for appointment of counsel. Appellant filed this appeal from the order dismissing his pro se petition and counsel was appointed to assist him in this appeal.

We are disposed to treat the uncounseled petition of appellant for the writ of error coram nobis and for appointment of counsel as a request for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, since the procedure established therein encompasses “all common law and statutory procedures ... including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 19 P.S. § 1180-2. See Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35, 285 A.2d 465 (1971); Commonwealth v. Runkle, 250 Pa.Super. 130, 378 A.2d 488 (1977).

Prior to the adoption of former Pa.R.Crim.P. 1503(a), a petition for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act required the Common Pleas Court to appoint counsel for indigent petitioners except in those cases where it was able to determine that the claim was patently frivolous and without a trace of support in the record. 19 P.S. § 1180-12; Commonwealth v. Blair, 470 Pa. 598, 369 A.2d 1153 (1977). The right of the trial court to summarily dismiss an uncoun-seled petition was, thus, contingent upon the substantive claim raised therein. Commonwealth v. Blair, supra.

The promulgation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1503(a), (adopted January 24, 1968; effective August 1, 1968) effected a change in the procedure a court is required to follow when presented with an uncounseled petition for post-conviction relief. Although § 12 of the now repealed Act, 19 P.S. 1180-12, provides that “[t]he appointment of counsel shall not be required if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and without a trace of support in the record ... ”, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1507 operated to suspend and supercede this provision to the extent that it was inconsistent with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1503(a) and 1504. Commonwealth v. Finley, 497 Pa. 332, 334 n. 1, 440 A.2d 1183, 1184 n. 1 (1981); Commonwealth v. Holland, 496 Pa. 514, 515, 437 A.2d 1159, 1160 (1981); Commonwealth v. Blair, supra; Commonwealth v. Adams, 465 Pa. 389, 350 A.2d 820 (1976); Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 436 Pa. 139, 259 A.2d 460 (1969). Pa.R.Crim.P. 1503(a) requires the court to appoint counsel, upon request, in post-conviction proceedings, after the petitioner has satisfied the court of his financial inability to obtain counsel. Commonwealth v. Finley, supra; Commonwealth v. Blair, supra; Commonwealth v. Adams, supra. Summary disposition of a petition, without appointment of counsel, is permitted only under the circumstances set forth in Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504 which provides:

Appointment of counsel shall not be necessary and petitions may be disposed of summarily when a previous petition involving the same issue or issues has been finally determined adversely to the petitioner and he either was afforded the opportunity to have counsel appointed or was represented by counsel in proceedings thereon.

The language of this rule has been strictly construed by the courts of this Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Finley, supra; Commonwealth v. Blair, supra. Thus, an initial pro se petition for post-conviction relief brought by an unrepresented petitioner may not be summarily dismissed unless “a previous petition involving the same issue or issues has been finally determined adversely to the petitioner” in a counseled proceeding or one in which he knowingly waived his right to the assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Finley, supra; Commonwealth v. Lee, 494 Pa. 216, 431 A.2d 226 (1981); Commonwealth v. Cheatham, 308 Pa.Super. 151, 454 A.2d 66 (1982); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504.

Since appellant did allege that he was indigent and requested the appointment of counsel in his pro se petition, his first request for post-conviction relief, the trial judge was bound to make a determination as to the indigency of appellant and, if he found appellant was indigent, he should have appointed counsel to assist him in the preparation of an amended petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. Commonwealth v. Finley, supra; Commonwealth v. Adams, supra; Commonwealth v. Blair, supra. It is not determinative that the issues raised in the pro se petition were considered by the court to lack arguable merit. Only after counsel has had an opportunity to review and amend the petition should a decision be made as to whether to grant a hearing. Commonwealth v. Cheatham, supra. Therefore, we must vacate the order of the Common Pleas Court and remand the case to the trial court to determine whether appellant is indigent and, if so, to appoint counsel to assist him. Appellant should then be given, upon request, an opportunity to file an amended and counseled petition before any disposition can be made. Commonwealth v. Holland, supra. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

So ordered.

      . Sentence was suspended upon payment of costs on bill of information number 3464.1 of 1978 in view of the sentence imposed at number 3464 of 1978.

      . Appellant raised several allegations of error in his pro se petition including (1) that he was improperly advised of his right to petition for reconsideration of sentence; (2) failure of the sentencing judge to consider his background and character in imposing sentence; and (3) an irregularity in the signing of the bills of information upon which he was found guilty after trial. He also requested the right to reserve presentation of further “argument” (claims of error) pending the appointment of counsel. We shall not consider the merits of the substantive claims raised in the petition in light of the disposition we reach herein. Commonwealth v. Hobson, 286 Pa.Super. 271, 428 A.2d 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 Pa.Super. 236, 418 A.2d 700 (1980).

      . Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. 1580 (1965), § 1 et seq., 19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq., repealed, Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53 § 2(a) [1397] effective June 27, 1980, as amended by Act of June 26, 1980, P.L. 265, No. 77 § 2 delaying repeal until June 27, 1981 as further amended by the Act of June 26, 1981, P.L. 123, No. 41, § 1 delaying repeal until June 26, 1982, repealed by Act of May 13, 1982, P.L. 417, No. 1982-122, § 3, replaced by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq., Act of May 13, 1982, P.L. 417, No. 1982-122, § 2 effective immediately-

      . The former rules of Criminal Procedure relative to Post Conviction proceedings, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1501-1507, were adopted January 24, 1968, effective August 1, 1968, but were rescinded December 11, 1981, effective June 27, 1982, and replaced by the present rules Pa.R.Crim.P. 1501-1509, which were adopted December 11, 1981, effective June 27, 1982. All references in this opinion to the rules relating to post-conviction proceedings are to the former rules that were in effect at the time the court summarily dismissed the pro se petition, unless otherwise noted.

      . Rule 1503. Appointment of Counsel
      (a) Except as provided in Rule 1504, when an unrepresented petitioner satisfies the court that he is unable to procure counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent him. The court, on its own motion, shall appoint counsel to represent a petitioner whenever the interests of justice require it.

      . Such a disposition could include, of course, summary disposition pursuant to present Rule 1507(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure (adopted December 11, 1981, effective June 27, 1982).


text:
    461 A.2d 321
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Juan PAGAN, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued June 7, 1982.
    Filed June 3, 1983.

      Eugene A. Bonner, Media, for appellant.
    Helen T. Kane, Assistant District Attorney, Media, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

Appellant, Juan Pagan, was convicted by the Honorable Clement J. McGovern, Jr., of possession of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). Following the denial of post-verdict motions, appellant was sentenced to pay a $500 fine for the former offense and to undergo imprisonment for two to twenty-three months for the latter. In this appeal, appellant raises several claims, all of which were considered and rejected below. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence for possession of a controlled substance and reverse the judgment of sentence for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.

Appellant’s principal claim is that the evidence supporting his convictions was insufficient, contrary to the law and evidence and against the weight of the evidence. In deciding the sufficiency of evidence, we must accept as true all the evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which the factfinder could have based its verdict and then ask whether that evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Stasiak, 305 Pa.Super. 257, 263, 451 A.2d 520, 523 (1982); Commonwealth v. Banahasky, 250 Pa.Super. 495, 499, 378 A.2d 1257, 1259 (1977). We agree with the lower court’s conclusion that the evidence supports appellant’s conviction of possession of a controlled substance and feel that no further discussion is warranted.

However, we cannot agree with the court’s determination that the evidence also justifies appellant’s conviction of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Only 19.9 grams of marijuana (less than one ounce) were discovered inside the searched premises, well below the quantity considered to constitute a “small amount.” 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31). An inference of intent to deliver may be drawn from a large quantity of controlled substances, Commonwealth v. Bowermaster, 297 Pa.Super. 444, 444 A.2d 115 (1982) (4.1 pounds of marijuana); Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 277 Pa.Super. 503, 419 A.2d 1261 (1980) (over ten pounds of marijuana); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 256 Pa.Super. 140, 389 A.2d 640 (1978) (approximately one-half pound of marijuana); Commonwealth v. Harmes, 255 Pa.Super. 147, 386 A.2d 551 (1978) (seven pounds of marijuana); Commonwealth v. Kishbach, 247 Pa.Super. 557, 373 A.2d 118 (1976) (one-quarter pound of marijuana, ten “hits” of morphine and one hundred “hits” of acid). Similarly, the absence of an intent to deliver may be inferred where, as here, only a small amount of a controlled substance has been discovered. We note that the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence that possession of 19.9 grams of marijuana would be a quantity consistent with delivery for sale. See Commonwealth v. Asbury, 312 Pa.Super. 357, 458 A.2d 999 (1983) (insufficient evidence of possession with intent to deliver: 31 pills of prazepam and chlordiacepoxide, schedule IV drugs; no testimony as to whether possession consistent with personal use of with intent to deliver). That conclusion also cannot be drawn from the manner in which the marijuana was packaged, particularly in light of the absence of any additional drug paraphernalia. See Commonwealth v. Bagley, 296 Pa.Super. 43, 442 A.2d 287 (1982) (insufficient evidence of possession with intent to deliver: only 15.3 grams of heroin; no drug paraphernalia or other evidence of delivery or intent to deliver). Compare Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra, (sufficient evidence of possession with intent to deliver: approximately one-half pound of marijuana divided into a number of small packages and stored in larger bag; small scale commonly used in preparing marijuana for sale found on premises). In the present case we have only a small amount of marijuana consistent with personal use together with only ambiguous evidence of paraphernalia used in the narcotics trade.

Under these circumstances, we must reverse the judgment of sentence for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and appellant is discharged as to that offense.

Appellant also contends that the lower court erred in; (1) allowing the introduction into evidence of a sheet of notebook paper and a box of manila envelopes; (2) foreclosing an inquiry into the disposition of prior arrests made by the Commonwealth’s informant, and; (3) permitting defense witness Concepcion Rodrigurez to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to his counsel’s question as to whether any of the evidence seized belonged to one Jose Diaz.

We have carefully reviewed the briefs and record and conclude that appellant’s arguments are adequately disposed of in the lower court’s opinion. We wish only to add one comment with respect to the admissibility of the Commonwealth’s exhibits, in particular the sheet of notebook paper.

It is unclear from the record exactly what was contained on the sheet of notebook paper. At sidebar, in response to a defense request for an offer of proof, the prosecutor stated that the sheet contained names of individuals alongside amounts of money apparently paid. This evidence, the prosecutor argues, was relevant to prove the charge of possession with intent to deliver. (N.T. 22-24). The lower court agreed and admitted the evidence for this purpose. (Opinion of lower court at 9-10). However, when Officer Butler was asked by the prosecutor to describe what was on the sheet, appellant’s counsel objected stating: “The paper speaks for itself.” The court then responded: “It does.” (N.T. 24). The contents of that exhibit were never further developed at trial.

We are somewhat uncertain about the exact contents of the sheet of notebook paper and, under other circumstances, this might well affect our evaluation of its admissibility. However, since we have concluded that the evidence including the notebook is insufficient to justify appellant’s conviction of possession with intent to deliver, the admission of the challenged evidence, even if improper, was harmless error under Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978). A similar conclusion must be made regarding the manila envelopes which were also admitted for the purpose of proving the charge of possession with intent to deliver.

Judgment of sentence for possession of a controlled substance affirmed. Judgment of sentence for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance reversed.

ROWLEY, J., concurs in result.

      . Appellant also argues that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and against the weight of evidence. He does not, however, state how this was so. In any event, we do not find that the verdict was so contrary to the weight of the evidence “as to shock one’s sense of justice and to make the award of a new trial imperative.” Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 290 Pa.Super. 182, 185, 434 A.2d 191, 192 (1981). Nor do we find the verdict otherwise contrary to the evidence.
      We further reject appellant’s contention that the verdict is contrary to law because the quantity of marijuana discovered should have resulted in his being charged under 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(31). That sub-section provides as follows:
      (a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
      (31) Notwithstanding other subsections of this section, (i) the possession of a small amount of marihuana only for personal use; (ii) the possession of a small amount of marihuana with the intent to distribute it but not to sell it; or (iii) the distribution of a small amount of marihuana but not for sale. For purposes of this subsection, thirty (30) grams of marihuana or eight (8) grams of hashish shall be considered a small amount of marihuana.
      While it may have been appropriate to charge appellant under that subsection, we cannot say that the verdict was unlawful simply because he was instead charged under 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) and § 780-113(a)(30). There is nothing in The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act which requires that an accused be prosecuted under any particular subsection of the Act based upon the amount of controlled substances he or she is alleged to possess. Rather, an accused can be charged with, and prosecuted for, any offense which the Commonwealth thinks it can prove. In this case, the Commonwealth did meet its burden of proving appellant guilty of possession of marijuana, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).

      . See footnote 1, supra.


author: WICKERSHAM, Judge:

text:
    461 A.2d 324
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gary Allen CASNER, a/k/a Gary Rossman, a/k/a Gary Rozier, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Sept. 15, 1982.
    Decided May 27, 1983.

      Peter J. O’Donnell, Lewistown, for appellant.
    William A. Helm, District Attorney, Lewistown, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and MONTEMU-RO, JJ.
   WICKERSHAM, Judge:

This case comes to us after President Judge R. Lee Ziegler of the Mifflin County Court of Common Pleas denied Gary Allen Casner’s petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act. Casner pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery on May 9, 1978. A sentence of two and one-half to five years imprisonment was imposed on August 16, 1978.

Casner filed a pro se petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act; appointed counsel filed an amended PCHA petition. The court below conducted hearings on Casner’s petition. At these hearings Casner testified, as did the public defender who represented Casner up to the time of sentencing. On April 30, 1980, Judge Ziegler denied Cas-ner’s petition; this appeal timely followed.

The facts underlying Casner’s conviction were developed at Casner’s guilty plea hearing and may be summarized as follows. A police officer testified that on December 31, 1977, at about six-thirty in the evening he was called to investigate a robbery complaint. The victim of the crime told the police officer that a man pushed his way into her home. Once inside the man told her he was a government agent investigating a murder and that he would have to search the house. When the victim challenged the intruder, he took some money and a wallet from her. There was a brief struggle over the wallet; the man pushed the victim, took the wallet again and fled. The police officer stated that the victim was shaken and upset when he arrived.

The victim of the crime also testified at the guilty plea hearing. The victim said that the man who took her money struck her in the face and threw her about the room. As the man left her home, he said he would come back and kill her.

When a defendant enters a guilty plea the only legally cognizable issues in a post conviction proceeding are those which affect either the voluntariness of the guilty plea or the legality of the sentence. Moreover, a challenge' to the voluntariness of the guilty plea will not be entertained in the absence of a motion to withdraw the plea in the trial court. Commonwealth v. Harris, 492 Pa. 381, 386 n. 2, 424 A.2d 1242, 1244 n. 2 (1981). Casner has not filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea but the rule announced in Harris, id., is not applicable to this case.

In Commonwealth v. Miller, 495 Pa. 177, 179-80, 433 A.2d 1, 2 (1981) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:

Ordinarily a party on appeal who seeks to challenge a guilty plea must first have filed a motion to withdraw the plea in the court where it was entered____ However, where as here, an appellant attacks a plea of guilty on the basis that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness contributed to the plea and where appellant was represented post-trial by the same counsel, we have permitted appellate review of the claim on the merits.

(Footnotes and citations omitted). See also, Commonwealth v. Williams, 496 Pa. 486, 437 A.2d 1144 (1981). Casner has alleged that ineffectiveness of his trial counsel caused the entry of an involuntary plea and his present PCHA petition is the first time he has had different counsel. Therefore, his claims are properly before this court. Commonwealth v. Swift, 299 Pa.Super. 77, 81 n. 2, 445 A.2d 156, 157 n. 2 (1982); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 289 Pa.Super. 1, 4, 432 A.2d 1020, 1021 (1981); Commonwealth v. Maute, 263 Pa.Super. 220, 397 A.2d 826 (1979).

The first two of the many issues raised in this appeal are:

Where Defendant was not advised of three (3) of the essential features of his right to trial by jury during the colloquy immediately preceding entry of his guilty plea, but was advised of such features both orally and in writing at arraignment approximately six (6) weeks prior to entry of guilty plea, was the guilty plea involuntary by reason of the inadequate colloquy?
Where guilty plea colloquy was inadequate and Trial Counsel neither attempted to make Defendant aware of his rights nor appealed pursuant to Defendant’s request, did Defendant waive his claim of involuntariness of his plea?

Specifically, Casner says that his guilty plea colloquy was fatally defective because he was not apprised that:

(1) A jury verdict would have to be unanimous, and
(2) that the jury would be selected from members of the community, and
(3) that Casner had the right to participate in jury selection.

In response to Casner’s argument the Commonwealth contends that the details of Casner’s right to a jury trial were adequately explained in a written form Casner signed at his arraignment. According to the Commonwealth, Cas-ner’s rights were protected by the written explanation offered at his arraignment. Casner signed the arraignment form, which indicated that he was represented by counsel and that he understood the various rights read to him by the court.

Both case law and supreme court rule have established the essential elements of a guilty plea colloquy. Before a trial judge accepts a plea of guilty he or she must, at a minimum, inquire into the following areas:

(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he has the right to trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed innocent until he is found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts such agreement?

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 319, Comment and Commonwealth v. Willis, 471 Pa. 50, 369 A.2d 1189 (1977). In this case, Casner complains that he did not receive an adequate explanation of his right to a trial by jury.

At the guilty plea colloquy of May 9, 1978, the trial judge asked Casner: “Do you understand that you have a right to trial by jury?” Casner replied: “Yes, sir.” Record at 9. Taken alone, this colloquy is inadequate under the rule of Commonwealth v. Washer, 253 Pa.Super. 209, 384 A.2d 1305 (1978). In Washer, this court adopted the position that before a defendant can waive his right to a jury trial, the record must establish that the defendant knew the essential elements of a jury trial. These crucial elements of a jury trial are that the jury be chosen from members of the community, that the verdict be unanimous and that the accused be allowed to participate in jury selection. Id., 253 Pa.Superior at 213-14, 384 A.2d at 1308.

The elements of a jury trial set forth by the court in Washer, supra, were provided to Casner in a written form read at his arraignment. The arraignment form read:

Casner indicated on the form that he understood the rights explained therein and signed the form. This arraignment form clearly encompasses all of the elements enumerated in Washer, the question is whether the use of a written form can supplement a guilty plea colloquy.

The appellants in Washer phrased the issue thusly, contending “that their guilty pleas were not voluntarily and knowingly entered because... a printed questionaire and information sheet may not supplement an on-the-record guilty plea colloquy.” Washer, supra, 253 Pa.Superior at 210, 384 A.2d at 1306. The Washer court did not decide the issue because it found “that the record as a whole, including the guilty plea colloquy and the written forms, did not establish that appellant’s pleas were voluntarily and knowingly entered. Consequently, we do not reach the broader issue of whether Rule 319(a) permits such written forms to supplement an on-the-record colloquy.” Id., 253 Pa.Superi- or at 211-12, 384 A.2d at 1307.

Under the particular facts of this case we believe that the written arraignment form adequately supplemented the guilty plea colloquy. Here, the written form provided a complete list of the essential attributes of a jury trial as required by Washer, supra. The trial judge read the arraignment form to Casner at arraignment. The defendant himself provided written acknowledgment that he understood his rights as explained by the arraignment form. Accordingly, Casner’s guilty plea colloquy was adequate and, therefore, counsel was not ineffective.

Casner also argues that several instances of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to enter an involuntary guilty plea and that these contentions are not waived because this is the first time Casner has had different representation than trial counsel. We will consider Casner’s allegations of ineffectiveness seriatim.

Casner believes that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate an alibi defense. Casner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview three witnesses who would testify that Casner spent the day of the robbery drinking at a local bar. Trial counsel testified that Casner’s statement about drinking all day was offered as an explanation, not as an alibi defense; further, counsel stated that Casner was willing to plead and that Casner disagreed with the amount of money taken in the robbery.

Casner did not tell his trial counsel that he was innocent of the offense charged and took issue only with the amount of money stolen. Counsel was, therefore, under no duty to investigate possible alibi witnesses, for Casner virtually admitted the crime and said he would plead. There was no ineffectiveness.

Casner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for suppression of the victim’s identification of Casner. Casner believes that the identification was impermissibly tainted because it was a one-on-one identification after the victim saw Casner in handcuffs. Casner concedes that the reliability of an identification is to be judged by the totality of the circumstances and that a circumstance that can be considered is the opportunity of the witness to see the criminal. See Commonwealth v. Ransome, 485 Pa. 490, 402 A.2d 1379 (1979), Common wealth v. Johnson, 301 Pa.Super. 13, 15, 446 A.2d 1311, 1312 (1982).

Presently, the victim of the robbery had an excellent opportunity to see Casner during the commission of the crime. The victim had Casner in view throughout his intrusion into her home and gave consistent testimony at a preliminary hearing and the guilty plea hearing. Given that the victim had a good, long look at Casner in her lighted home, there was no ineffectiveness in failing to file a motion to suppress the identification. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 274 Pa.Super. 464, 418 A.2d 499 (1980).

Nor was counsel ineffective for failing to request a lineup. There is no constitutional right to a line-up, see Commonwealth v. Sexton, 485 Pa. 17, 23, 400 A.2d 1289, 1292 (1979); Commonwealth v. Liverpool, 294 Pa.Super. 133, 439 A.2d 786 (1982), and the suggestiveness of a confrontation is only a factor to be considered in determining the reliability of identification evidence. Id., 294 Pa.Superior at 140, 439 A.2d at 789-90. Again, the victim saw Casner during the crime in her own home. This provided an independent basis for her identification of Casner despite the lack of a line-up. Trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to request a fruitless procedure.

Casner’s trial counsel was not ineffective and thus Cas-ner’s guilty plea was not induced by incompetent counsel.

Order affirmed.

      . 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-51.

      . Appellant’s statement of questions involved in his appeal extends over 2Vi pages of his brief. Although we have carefully considered all these allegations of error we wish to call to the attention of appellant’s counsel Rule 2116 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. The rule provides:
      Rule 2116. Statement of Questions Involved
      (a) General rule. The statement of the questions involved must state the question or questions in the briefest and most general terms, without names, dates, amounts or particulars of any kind. It should not ordinarily exceed 15 lines, must never exceed one page, and must always be on a separate page, without any other matter appearing thereon. This rule is to be considered in the highest degree mandatory, admitting of no exception; ordinarily no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of questions involved or suggested thereby. Whenever possible each question must be followed immediately by an answer stating simply whether it was affirmed, negatived, qualified or not answered by the court or other government unit below. If a qualified answer was given to the question, appellant shall indicate, most briefly, the nature of the qualification, or if the question was not answered and the record shows the reason for such failure, the reason shall be stated briefly in each instance without quoting the court or other government unit below.
      Emphasis added.

      . Casner phrases these issues as follows:
      3. Where Defendant informed Trial Counsel of the identity of witnesses who were available to testify and whose testimony would have been helpful in establishing a defense, but Trial Counsel failed to contact such witnesses and otherwise investigate the facts of the case, was Defendant denied his right to competent counsel?
      4. Where Defendant was identified by the victim of the crime on a “one-on-one" identification during Defendant’s preliminary hearing, while Defendant was handcuffed and after the victim had had an opportunity to observe Defendant being led from the jail to the place where the hearing was held, and Trial Counsel thereafter refused to file a motion to suppress the identification though requested by Defendant to. do so, was Defendant denied his right to competent counsel?
      5. Where Defendant was identified by the victim of the crime in a "one-on-one” identification at Defendant's preliminary hearing, while Defendant was handcuffed and after victim had had an opportunity to observe Defendant being led from the jail to the place where the hearing was held, and Trial Counsel thereafter refused to request a line-up though requested by Defendant to do so, was Defendant denied his right to competent counsel?
      6. Where Trial Counsel represented Defendant at guilty plea proceeding during which the court below failed to advise Defendant of three (3) essential features of his right to trial by jury and Trial Counsel failed to take any action to have such essential features explained to Defendant, was Defendant denied his right to competent counsel?
      7. Where Trial Counsel failed to properly investigate the case, failed to move to suppress a suggestive identification, failed to request a line-up after a suggestive identification, and failed to insure that Defendant was advised of all of the essential features of his right to trial by jury, did Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness cause Defendant to enter an involuntary guilty plea?
      8. Where Defendant was represented at all times during which claims of ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel could have been raised, prior to the appointment of independent counsel for purposes of post-conviction proceeding, was a waiver of Defendant’s claim of ineffectiveness precluded by the existence of “extraordinary circumstances”.


author: BROSKY, Judge:

text:
    461 A.2d 616
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Robert E. HINKSON, I.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued June 16, 1982.
    Filed April 29, 1983.
    Reargument Denied July 11, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 20, 1984.

      Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, Hermitage, for Commonwealth, appellant.
    Charles F. Gilchrest, Sharon, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   BROSKY, Judge:

This is an appeal from the order of the lower court granting in part appellee’s motions to suppress physical evidence and certain statements on the basis of its finding of an unlawful warrantless search. Appellant, the Commonwealth, contends that the search was lawful in that consent to search was given and because exigent circumstances were present. We agree that exigent circumstances existed and reverse the order of the court below.

On July 12, 1981, at about 12:40 a.m., Troopers James Dibler and John Balaska of the Pennsylvania State Police were on patrol when they received a radio message directing them to go to the Campbell residence concerning a shooting incident. The officers drove to that residence, arriving there at about 1 a.m.

There, they spoke with two witnesses, Dale and Brad McFarland, who told the officers they had been at the scene of a recent shooting. The witnesses told the troopers that earlier that evening, they had been riding in a truck driven by Brian McFarland and occupied by two other passengers. They stated that just as the truck passed appellee’s residence, the driver was shot in the shoulder by a rifle. This occurred at about 12:20 a.m. The witnesses told the troopers that the victim had already been taken to the hospital. The officers also learned from the witnesses that appellee had a reputation for violence toward passing motorists (e.g., shooting at snowmobiles, threatening motorcyclists with an axe, and swinging a snowplow at a snowmobile). This information was corroborated by a local police officer who arrived to aid in the investigation. An investigation of the truck revealed that two shots had struck the vehicle, one broke a rear window and hit Brian McFarland, the other hit the truck’s tailgate. Trooper Dibler concluded from his observations that the weapon used was a .243 caliber rifle.

The troopers then went to interview another witness who lived about one-half mile from appellee. This witness, Simon Summers, told the troopers that he heard the victim’s truck proceed up the road in the area of appellee’s residence and that shortly thereafter he heard five shots fired from that area.

The troopers then decided to interview appellee and proceeded to his residence after requesting and receiving additional assistance. They arrived at the home at about 2:30 a.m. Trooper Dibler testified that as they arrived at the house they observed that it was the only one with lights on in the nearby area. Trooper Balaska testified that they-knew appellee, Robert Hinkson, had a wife and several children, but had no further information about them.

The troopers then deployed themselves around the house and requested over a P.A. system that appellee come out of his house. Within fifteen to thirty seconds, appellee came out of the house with his hands on his head. Two troopers led appellee away from the house and informed him of his constitutional rights. Appellee stated he wished to have an attorney, and there was no questioning by the police.

At this point, Trooper Balaska went up to the house and knocked on the front door. When appellee’s wife came to the door, the trooper identified himself and asked if everyone in the house was okay. Mrs. Hinkson then invited the trooper into the residence. Once inside, the trooper informed Mrs. Hinkson that he was there as a result of shots being fired and asked if there were any guns in the house. Appellee’s 15-year old son answered “yes” and asked the trooper if he would like to see them. The trooper said yes and followed the son through various rooms in the house, including appellee’s bedroom, from which various guns and bullets were collected.

At the time of this search, Trooper Balaska did not know exactly what crime had been committed or what had occurred concerning the three reported but unaccounted for shots. The trooper considered the possibility based on his experience and knowledge of these types of incidents that someone was held hostage or hurt in the house and his initial primary purpose in entering the house was to see whether anyone else was hurt.

The relevant result of the search was a .243 caliber rifle, five spent cartridges, and a box of live .243 shells. The officer examined the gun and spent shells and concluded from the strong odor of gun powder that the gun and shells had been recently fired. This evidence, along with a statement by the son that the .243 caliber rifle and shells belonged to the defendant, was suppressed by the court below.

We initially note that “[a]s a general rule a search or seizure without a warrant is deemed unreasonable for constitutional purposes. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454, 91 S.Ct. 2022 [2031], 29 L.Ed.2d 564.” Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 102, 389 A.2d 101, 106 (1978). However, the realities and practicalities of law enforcement dictate that where exigent circumstances exist, the warrant requirement is excused. United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314 (3rd Cir.1980); Holzer, supra. Exigent circumstances arise where the need for prompt police action is imperative, either because evidence is likely to be destroyed, id., or because there exists a threat of physical harm to police officers or other innocent individuals. Velasquez, supra.

An inquiry to determine whether exigent circumstances exist involves a balancing of the individual’s right to be free from unreasonable intrusions against the interest of society in investigating crime quickly and adequately and preventing the disappearance of evidence necessary to convict criminals. United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3rd Cir.1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 833, 94 S.Ct. 173, 38 L.Ed.2d 68 (1973); United States v. Hayes, 518 F.2d 675 (6th Cir.1975). It requires an examination of all of the surrounding circumstances in a particular case, Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 239 A.2d 290 (1966). These circumstances will vary from case to case and the inherent necessities of the situation at the time must be scrutinized.” Rubin, at 268.

Before we decide whether exigent circumstances were present in the instant case, we must first determine if probable cause, for a search existed. The police officers in the instant case knew the following: that a man had been. shot in front of appellee’s residence; that appellee had a reputation for using a gun and thus that there were probably firearms in the house; that five shots had been fired, of which only two had been accounted for; that other family members lived in the house; and that at 2:20 a.m., appellee’s residence was the only one in the area with lights on. We conclude that under these circumstances probable cause to search clearly existed in this case.

Thus, we now move to a consideration of whether exigent circumstances existed. For the reasons that follow herein, we conclude that the warrantless search in the instant case was justified by the existence of exigent circumstances. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.

First, we find that the police reasonably concluded that someone in the house could have been held hostage or have been hurt. See United States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir.1980). When the officer entered the house, he knew that three of the five reported shots were unaccounted for. We also note that while the officer did have probable cause to believe that someone in the house had fired the shots, he could not be certain that that person was appellee.

The officer did, in fact, testify that at the time he approached the house, he was not convinced that it was appellee who had fired the shots. Also, he testified that based on his experience he knew that in this type of situation, family members are sometimes injured or held hostage; and that despite Mrs. Hinkson’s response to his question, he remained concerned that somebody in the house might be hurt.

We conclude that such continuing concern of the officer was reasonable under the circumstances; a prudent policeman would certainly have had to consider the possibility that Mrs. Hinkson was under duress or simply attempting to protect her husband. Thus, even though appellee was outside the house, police had to consider the possibility that someone in the house was injured or that a hostage situation existed. We find that these circumstances were exigent and therefore justified the warrantless search.

Second, we find that the police acted properly in order to protect the public safety. See Jones, supra. As we noted above, a man had already been shot outside the house and the police could not be certain of who in the house had fired the shots. For the police to have delayed action while a search warrant was obtained would have unduly risked the lives of the public and the troopers.

Since we find that the warrantless search was justified by exigent circumstances, we must reverse that part of the order below which suppressed the physical evidence and the statement of Robert Hinkson, Jr. as to his father’s ownership of the .243 caliber rifle and used and unused shells.

Order reversed.

      . "The Commonwealth may only appeal from a pre-trial order if it involves a pure question of law and if it effectively terminates or substantially handicaps a prosecution.” Commonwealth v. DeFelice, 248 Pa.Super. 516, 522, 375 A.2d 360, 363 (1977). In the instant case, the Commonwealth meets these requirements. First, the Commonwealth appeals from an order finding that a warrantless search was not justified by consent or exigent circumstances. Second, the Commonwealth alleges and the record supports the fact that the evidence suppressed is the only link between appellee and the incident in question in this case.

      . Because we find that the search was justified by exigent circumstances, we do not address the question of consent.

      . Probable cause is, of course, a prerequisite to any search. Commonwealth v. Pinno, 433 Pa. 1, 248 A.2d 26 (1968).

      . Trooper Dibler testified that in his opinion it would have taken about three and a half hours to obtain a search warrant.

      . The only apparent ground for suppressing the statement of Robert Hinkson, Jr. was as fruit of an unlawful search. Since we have found the search to have been lawful, the statement should not be suppressed.