text:
    441 A.2d 775

    Commonwealth v. Lohr, Appellant.

      Submitted November 10, 1981.
    Mark A. Criss, for appellant; John Brydon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    441 A.2d 775
    Commonwealth v. Mann, Appellant.
    Submitted March 3,1981.
    John C. Tylwalk, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; David J. Brightbill, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   The judgments of sentence of the lower court are affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 775
    Commonwealth v. Schumann, Appellant.

      Argued April 6, 1981.
    Dean P. Arthur, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael S. Goodwin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 776
    Commonwealth v. Shook, Appellant.
    Submitted November 10, 1981.
    Thomas P. Ruane, Jr., for appellant; Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 776
    Kennedy, Appellant v. Waterman Steamship & Del. Oper. Co.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 4, 1982.
    Argued December 5, 1980.
    Stanley B. Gruber, for appellant; Thomas Lane- Anderson, for Waterman, appellee; Thomas E. Seus, for Delaware, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 776
    Penn State Construction v. Cambria Savings v. Associated-East Mortgage Company, Appellant.
    Argued May 20, 1981.
    E. J. Strassburger, for appellant; James F. O’Malley, for Penn State, appellee; Richard J. Green, Jr., for Cambria, appellee.
    Before MONTGOMERY, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 777
    Pilkington v. Connor & Yentis et al. Appeal of Lucille Connor.
    Submitted April 8, 1981.
    Howard Farber, for appellant; Samuel S. Blank, for Pilkington, appellees; Fred R. Cohen, for Yentis, appellee; George A. Pagano, for Volunteer Firemen’s, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    January 14, 1982.
    441 A.2d 777
    Commonwealth v. Allen, Appellant.
    Submitted October 28, 1981.
    Richard S. Levine, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., concurred in the result.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 777
    Commonwealth v. Camp, Appellant.
    Submitted March 18, 1981.
    Bruce A. Barrett, for appellant; John Dawson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed on the opinion by the Honorable P. Richard Thomas, President Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Crawford County.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 778
    Commonwealth v. DiGiacomo, Appellant. Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    (at No. 983).
    (at No. 984).
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.
    Argued October 27, 1981.
    Thomas R. Ceraso, for appellants; Stella Smetanka, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The order is hereby affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 778
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted October 27, 1981.
    William Jon McCormick, for appellant; Herman Bigi, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 778
    Commonwealth v. Lang, III, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 7, 1982.
    Submitted October 28, 1981.
    Paulette J. Balough, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Dara A. DeCourcy, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence in the above case is hereby affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 779
    Commonwealth v. Mattei, Appellant.
    Submitted October 28, 1981.
    Ross S. Bash, for appellant; Albert M. Nichols, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 779
    Commonwealth v. McMenamin, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Robert X. Medonis, for appellant; Kathryn L. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WIEAND and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., concurred in the result and filed a memorandum concurring opinion.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 779
    Commonwealth v. Nelson, Appellant.
    Submitted April 29, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 779
    Commonwealth v. Sippel, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 6, 1982.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 780
    Deneen v. Bartlett. Deneen, Appellant v. Bartlett. Appeal of Kenneth S. Bartlett.
    Argued May 22, 1981.
    W. D. Phillips, for Bartlett, appellant (at No. 756) and appellee (at No. 760); Jack L. Bergstein, for Deneen, appellant (at No. 760) and appellee (at No. 756).
    Before CERCONE, P. J., MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 800
    Dixon, etc. v. Zokaites, et al., Appellants.
    Argued October 27, 1981.
    George E. Loebig, for appellants; John T. Richards, III, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    January 19, 1982.
    443 A.2d 368
    Biezup, Appellants v. Weber, et al.
    Reargument Denied April 16, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 1, 1982.
    Argued October 6, 1981.
    Frank J. Eisenhart, Jr., for appellants; Marvin L. Wilenzik, for Weber, Newman, First Pennsylvania Bank, Fidelity Bank, Friedland, et al. and Montgomery County, appellees; Larry J. Folmar, for Lower Merion Township, appellee; Mark A. Hutchinson, for Davis, et al., appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 780
    Brower v. Berlo Vending Company, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 26, 1982.
    Argued October 5, 1981.
    George A. Amacker, III, for appellant; Robert A. McAteer, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is affirmed on the clear and comprehensive opinion of the learned and distinguished Honorable Ned L. Hirsh, Judge of that Court.


text:
    441 A.2d 780
    John Cardullo & Sons, Appellant v. Vigilante, et ux.
    Argued November 18, 1981.
    James A. Lammendola, for appellant; Michael C. Rainone, for appellees.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The order is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Ethan Allen Doty of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.


text:
    441 A.2d 781
    Carr v. State Farm Ins. Co., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted June 1, 1982.
    Argued June 24, 1981.
    Alan Dion, and Frederick E. Smith, Jr., for appellant; Eugene A. Spector, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 781
    City of York v. Rizzuto, Appellant.
    Submitted March 24, 1981.
    Samuel K. Gates, for appellant; J. Robert Katherman, County Solicitor, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 781
    Commonwealth v. Allen, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 25, 1982.
    Submitted March 2,1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Bart-hold, Assistant District Attorney for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

BROSKY, J., filed a memorandum concurring and dissenting opinion.


text:
    441 A.2d 782
    Commonwealth v. Clifford Boyd a/k/a Eugene Boyd, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 3, 1982.
    Submitted May 27, 1981.
    Charlotte A. Nichols, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and WIEAND, JJ.
   The order is affirmed on the clear and persuasive opinion of the learned and distinguished Honorable Abraham J. Gafni of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.


text:
    441 A.2d 782
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Argued November 5, 1981.
    J. Scott O’Keefe, for appellant; Sarah B. Vandenbraak, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 782
    Commonwealth v. Carter, Appellant.
    Submitted October 5, 1981.
    Kenneth L. Mirsky, for appellant; Steven Cooperstein, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 782
    Commonwealth v. Cauley, Appellant.
    Argued November 18, 1981.
    Jeffrey S. Rosenblum, for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The order is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion by Judge Charles L. Durham of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.


text:
    441 A.2d 783
    Commonwealth v. Egnotovich, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied September 2, 1982.
    Argued December 4, 1980.
    Peter G. Loftus, for appellant;. Michael J. Krushinski, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence and order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 783
    Commonwealth v. Griffin, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 23, 1982.
    Argued June 11, 1980.
    Taylor P. Andrews, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; J. Michael Eakin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 783
    Commonwealth v. Henderson, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Brendan J. Vanston, for appellant; James E. Davis, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of the Honorable Roy A. Gardner, President Judge.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 784
    Commonwealth v. Hill, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 6, 1982.
    Argued March 23, 1981.
    John J. Krafsic, Jr., for appellant; Rolf Bienk, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 784
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted June 11, 1980.
    James A. Peruto, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 784
    Commonwealth v. McCloskey, Appellant.
    Argued January 19, 1981.
    Nicholas J. Emper, for appellant; David Fritchey, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 785
    Commonwealth v. Nelson, Appellant.
    Submitted March 4, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 785
    Commonwealth v. Patterson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 6, 1982.
    Submitted September 23, 1981.
    Peter J. O’Donnell, for appellant; William A. Helm, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   The order appealed from is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 785
    Commonwealth v. Pelzer, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Michaél DeFino, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of February 14, 1980, is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 785
    Commonwealth v. Scotti, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 26, 1982.
    Argued May 28, 1981.
    Juanita Hester, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; David M. McGlaughlin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ■ McEWEN and WIEAND, JJ.
   We affirm on the thorough opinion of Judge Richard S. Lowe of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.

WIEAND, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 786
    Commonwealth v. Scruggs, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 6, 1982.
    Argued October 5, 1981.
    L. Carter Anderson, for appellant; Deborah Fox, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 786
    Commonwealth v. Simonson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 6, 1982.
    Submitted October 6, 1981.
    Basil G. Russin, Public Defender, for appellant; Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 786
    Commonwealth v. Stewart, II, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 25, 1982.
    Submitted March 4, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, did not file a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 787
    Commonwealth v. Vallone, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 20, 1982.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence dated July 14, 1980 is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 787
    Commonwealth v. Wise, Appellant.
    Submitted March 4, 1981.
    Brian R. Williams, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 787
    Commonwealth v. Wynn, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Francis J. Moran, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, WIEAND and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 787
    Com. ex. rel. Townsend v. Phillips, III. Appeal of Connie L. Townsend.
    Submitted December 4, 1980.
    John H. Broujos, for appellant; Linwood B. Phillips, III, appellee, in propria persona, did not file a brief.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 788
    Hogan, Appellant v. State Farm Ins. Co.
    Argued September 10, 1981.
    Donald T. Rogers, for appellant; Joseph J. Musto, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 788
    In re Commitment of Michael L. Appeal of Michael L.

      Submitted April 8, 1981.
    Charles B. Coleman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Alfred W. Crump, Jr., did not file a brief on behalf of Mental Health/Mental Retardation, participating party.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 788
    Lewandowski, Appellant v. Shinn et ux.
    Argued June 23, 1981.
    Michael J. Pepe, Jr., for appellant; S. Simpson Gray, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    443 A.2d 367
    Reese, Appellant v. Sister Suzanne Marie, etc.
    Reargument Denied April 5, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 11, 1982.

      Argued December 8, 1981.
    Paul A. Reese, appellant, in propria persona; Christopher S. Under-hill, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 789
    Seipe, Appellant v. Bolta.
    Submitted January 19, 1981.
    Robert C. Rowe, for appellant; Thomas A. Behney, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J. leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 789
    Estate of Smullen. Appeal of Gleeson, Jr.
    Argued November 18, 1981.
    Francis Gleeson, in propria persona and for Smullen, appellants; Joseph E. Greene, Jr., for McGee, Schoepp, American Oncologic Hosp., and Parens & Patriae for Charities, participating parties; Charles E. Donohue, Deputy Attorney General, for Inheritance Tax Dept., participating party.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Decree affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of the court below.


text:
    443 A.2d 368
    Spann v. Hayden, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied April 5, 1982.
    Submitted October 19, 1981.
    Steve A. Hyman, for appellant; James Spann, appellee, in propria persona.
    Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 789
    Studivant v. Cilo, Appellant.
    Argued June 11, 1980.
    Joseph T. Murphy, for appellant; Mark R. Criker, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order of the lower court affirmed. ,

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 789
    Titanich, Appellant v. Titanich.
    Before BROSKY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 790
    Tose, Appellant v. Tose.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 30,1982.
    Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J. leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 790
    Tose v. Tose a/k/a Montes a/k/a Davis, Appellant.

      Argued September 16, 1981.
    Jean B. Green, for appellant; Richard M. Heller, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and WATKINS, JJ.
   Decree affirmed. Having made an independent study of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the court below properly granted a decree in divorce in this case.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J. leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 790
    Tucci v. State Farm Ins. Co., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted June 1, 1982.
    Argued June 24, 1981.
    Frederick E. Smith, Jr. and Alan Dion, for appellant; Sam Merovitz, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 791
    Weiss v. Weiss, Appellant.

      Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and WATKINS, JJ.
   Affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J. leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    January 22, 1982.
    441 A.2d 791
    Catarouch, Appellant v. Catarouch.
    Argued November 10, 1981.
    Sharon L. Smith, for appellant; Querino R. Torretti, for appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 791
    Commonwealth v. Biancone, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 1981.
    Timothy A. Crawford, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J. leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 791
    Commonwealth v. Coward, Appellant.
    Submitted September 10, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 792
    Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    James T. Vernile, for appellant; Michael Kane, District Attorney, did not submit a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    441 A.2d 792
    Commonwealth v. Grannas, Appellant.
    Submitted March 11, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, DiSALLE and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J. leaving the bench of tjie Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 792
    Commonwealth v. Mathis, Jr., Appellant.

      Argued May 1, 1981.
    Denise L. Jones, submitted a brief on behalf of appellant; Michael R. Cauley, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, MONTGOMERY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 793
    Commonwealth v. McFadden, Appellant.
    Submitted October 28, 1981.
    Alphonse P. Lepore, Jr., for appellant; Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J. leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    441 A.2d 793
    Commonwealth v. Young, Appellant.

      Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 793
    Cribbs v. Haines, Appellant.
    Argued November 9, 1981.
    Harry R. Ruprecht, for appellant; Mary K. McDonald, Assistant County Solicitor, for appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 794
    Pusateri v. Pusateri, Appellant.
    Argued April 16, 1980.
    Robert A. Banks, for appellant; John J. Ross, submitted a brief on behalf of appellee.

      Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Orders of the lower court affirmed.

LIPEZ, J. filed a memorandum dissenting statement.


text:
    441 A.2d 794
    Schohn, et al., Appellants v. Mazzarini, et al. v. Jackson.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.
    Argued April 30, 1981.
    William G. Boyle, for appellants; Michael J. Kearney, Jr., for Mazzarini, et. al, appellees; Frederick N. Egler, for Jackson, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    January 29, 1982.
    441 A.2d 794
    Christ Community Baptist Church, Appellant v. Richer et al.
    Argued March 12, 1980.
    D. Bruce Hanes, for appellant; John C. Butera, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    441 A.2d 794
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Submitted April 20, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 795
    Commonwealth v. Corbin, Appellant.
    Submitted May 1, 1981.
    John Halley, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 795
    Commonwealth v. Croumbley, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.

      Submitted April 8, 1981.
    Mitchell Scott Strutin, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 795
    Commonwealth v. Durant, Appellant.
    Submitted November 12, 1980.
    Angelo P. Arduini, for appellant; Thomas P. Agresti, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 796
    Commonwealth v. Flynn, Appellant.

      Submitted June 3, 1981.
    Charles B. Coleman, Assistant Public Defender for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed on the opinion of the Honorable W. Richard Eshelman, Court of Common Pleas of Berks County.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    441 A.2d 796
    Commonwealth v. Himes, Appellant.
    Argued November 10, 1980.
    Hiram A. Carpenter, III, for appellant; D. Brooks Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 796
    Commonwealth v. Himes, Appellant.

      Argued November 10, 1980.
    Hiram A. Carpenter, III, for appellant; D. Brooks Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 796
    Commonwealth v. Johnakin, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied September 10, 1982.
    Submitted May 4, 1981.
    Daniel-Paul Alva, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 797
    Commonwealth v. Kordelski, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 7, 1982.

      Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and BROSKY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 797
    Commonwealth v. Manjack, Appellant.
    Submitted November 9, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 797
    Commonwealth v. Nelson, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John Halley, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SPAETH and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence entered August 12, 1977 is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 798
    Commonwealth v. Quinn, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Joseph Michael Smith, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 798
    Commonwealth v. Sperber, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.

      Argued April 7, 1981.
    Benjamin Pomerantz, for appellant; Lee Ruslander, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 798
    Commonwealth v. Summers, Appellant.
    Submitted March 31, 1981.
    Barry W, Van Rensler, for appellant; Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 799
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, Appellant.
    Argued December 2, 1980.
    Robert S. Robbins, for appellant; Ann C. Lebowitz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before SPAETH, BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 799
    Gouger, et ux., Appellants v. Sullivan et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.
    Argued September 9, 1981.
    Paul H. Edelman, for appellants; Sidney D. Kline, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 799
    Karen Park, Inc. v. Geller, Appellant.
    Argued October 19, 1981.
    Norman M. Abrams, submitted a brief on behalf of appellant; Charles I. Richman, for appellee.
    Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    441 A.2d 799
    Urban Redev. Auth. of PGH v. Grubor, Appellants.
    Argued November 13, 1980.
    James L. McAneny, for appellant; William J. Tarter, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    February 5, 1982.
    442 A.2d 830
    All American Homes, Inc. v. Vasko, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 4, 1982.
    Argued December 1,1980.
    Mark S. Love, for appellant; Marshall E. Anders, submitted a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., filed a memorandum dissenting statement.


text:
    442 A.2d 334
    Bernstein, Appellant v. Bernstein.
    Submitted June 12, 1980.
    A. Martin Herring, for appellant; Peter Bowers, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order of court affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 334
    Christine, Appellant v. Christine.
    Argued September 23, 1981.
    P. Nelson Alexander, for appellant; Michael J. Brillhart, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 335
    Commonwealth v. Bass, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    David L. Pollack, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin, Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, WIEAND and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    442 A.2d 335
    Commonwealth v. Bonetsky, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Colie B. Chappelle, for appellant; William Platt, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VQORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 335
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Brown. Commonwealth, Appellant v. Krieger.

      Argued December 2, 1980.
    Kristine F. Hughey, III, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Thomas B. Schmidt, III, for Brown, appellee (at No. 1094); Edward M. Foley, for Krieger, appellee (at No. 1095).
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirm the grant of a new trial as to both appellees. We relinquish jurisdiction.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 335
    Commonwealth v. Cunningham, Appellant.
    Submitted May 5, 1981.
    Ronald R. Pellish, for appellant; Richard B. Russell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., and SPAETH and CAVA-NAUGH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 336
    Commonwealth v. Dade, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.

      Argued April 13, 1981.
    Donald R. Calairo, for appellant; Kemal Alexander Mericli, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    442 A.2d 336
    Commonwealth v. Gilchrist, Appellant.
    Argued May 11, 1981.
    Alan L. Director, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 336
    Commonwealth v. Katzman, Appellant.

      Argued September 30, 1981.
    Richard H. Martin, for appellant; Dara A. DeCourcy, Assistant Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed on the opinion by the Honorable Ralph J. Cappy, Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County.


text:
    442 A.2d 337
    Commonwealth v. Lambert, Appellant.
    Submitted November 10, 1981.
    Richard L. Levine, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 337
    Commonwealth v. Law, Appellant.

      Submitted September 11,1980.
    Colie B. Chappelle, for appellant; Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 337
    Commonwealth v. McGuigan, Appellant.
    Argued June 24, 1981.
    Peter J. Mangan, for appellant; Sheryl Ann Dorney, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 337
    Commonwealth v. Nichols, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied August 30, 1982.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Warren R. Baldys, for appellant; William S. Diesser, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 338
    Commonwealth v. Pickron, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 25, 1982.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, WIEAND and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    442 A.2d 338
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Primavera.

      Submitted November 5, 1981.
    Maxine J. Stotland, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., filed a memorandum concurring statement.


text:
    442 A.2d 338
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 11, 1982.
    Argued December 16, 1981.
    S. Robert Levant, for appellant; Gail Thackery, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    444 A.2d 1303
    Commonwealth v. Scott, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied May 18, 1982.

      Argued September 21, 1981.
    Francis M Socha, Assistaat Public Defender, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy district Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 339
    Commonwealth v. Scott, Appellant.
    Submitted March 4, 1981.
    Albert J. Flora, for appellant; Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., and WICKERSHAM and BRO-SKY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 339
    Commonwealth v. Seeley, Appellant.

      Submitted June 3, 1981.
    Bruce S. Miller, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 339
    Commonwealth v. Sheeley, Appellant.
    Submitted September 22, 1981.
    James L. Goldsmith, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 340
    Commonwealth v. Sherman, Appellant.

      Submitted March 9, 1981.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, DiSALLE and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 340
    Commonwealth v. Stone, Appellant.
    Submitted September 30, 1981.
    Thomas R. Ceraso, for appellant; Albert Nichols, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 340
    Deamer, Appellant v. Deamer.
    Submitted September 21, 1981.
    William A. Helm, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant; John N. Miller, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 340
    Guelich v. Guelich, Appellant.
    Argued November 10, 1981.
    Joanne R. Wilder, for appellant; James A. Naddeo, for appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The order is affirmed. Having made an independent study of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the court below properly awarded custody to the petitioner in this case, and properly denied the petition of the respondent for modification.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    442 A.2d 341
    Healey v. Capone, et ux., Appellants.
    Submitted April 1, 1981.
    Edward A. Reilly, for appellants; Michael J. Eagen, Jr., for appellee.

      Before CERCONE, P.J., and HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The decree entered October 16, 1980 is affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 341
    Hurlburt v. Potter County Children and Youth Services, Appellant. In re Hamilton and Hurlburt. Appeal of Potter County Children and Youth Services. Appeal of James Hurlburt.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 16, 1982.
    Argued September 10, 1981.
    John B. Leete, for Children and Youth Services, Appellant (at Nos. 436 and 635), appellee (at No. 740), and participating party (at No. 731); Edith Benson, for James Hurlburt, appellant (at No. 740), appellee (at Nos. 635 and 731), participating party (at No. 436) and for Duane and Gloria Hurlburt, appellees (at Nos. 436 and 740), participating parties (at Nos. 635 and 731).
    Before HESTER, McEWEN and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    444 A.2d 1303
    Kovaleski v. Kovaleski, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied May 20, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 14, 1982.
    Argued January 21, 1981.
    Barry A Yelen, for appellant; Arthur Silverblatt, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 341
    Pino, Appellant v. Big Boulder Ski Shop Inc., et al.
    Argued May 12,1981.
    Cary R. Sandler, for appellant; Hugh Emory, for appellees.
    Before MONTEMURO, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 342
    Commonwealth v. Downing, Appellant.
    Argued April 15, 1981.
    Raymond H. Bogaty, for appellant; Herman M. Rogers, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence dated April 1, 1980 is affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 342
    Commonwealth v. Mortimer, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.
    Argued April 15, 1981.
    J. Ronald Kushner, for appellant; William G. Martin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Breene.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 342
    Commonwealth v. Plowman, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.
    Argued April 15,1981.
    Joseph C. Bárnhart, for appellant; William G. Martin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence dated June 24, 1980 is affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 343
    Commonwealth v. Schepnner, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Gregory C. Schepnner, appellant, in propria persona; Shad Connelly, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence dated October 11, 1979 is affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 343
    Schweibinz, et al., Appellants v. Outboard Marine Corp., et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 28, 1982.
    Argued September 28, 1981.
    Kenneth W. Behrend, for appellants; Andrew J. Banyas, III, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 343
    Commonwealth v. Baksalary, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 28, 1982.
    Submitted February 24, 1981.
    Burton A. Rose, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

WIEAND, J., filed a memorandum concurring opinion.


text:
    442 A.2d 343
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Submitted April 20, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 344
    Commonwealth v. Budd a/k/a Clark, Appellant.
    Submitted May 6, 1981.
    Francis J. Pasquini, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Bart-hold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 344
    Commonwealth v. Hartung, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 26, 1982.
    Submitted September 9, 1981.
    James P. McHugh, for appellant; Edward Weiss, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 344
    Commonwealth v. Hughson, Appellant.
    Submitted May 6, 1981.
    Stuart Wilder, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Anthony J. Mazullo, Jr., did not submit a brief on behalf of Mental Health Board, participating party.
    Before SPAETH, CAVANAUGH and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order of commitment affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 345
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted May 12, 1981.
    Michael J. Stack, Jr., for appellant; Gaele. McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 345
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted May 6, 1981.
    Buford W. Tatum, II, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Bart-hold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 345
    Commonwealth v. Lafferty, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 20, 1982.
    Submitted September 9, 1981.
    Donald G. Joel, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 345
    Commonwealth v. Moore, Appellant.
    Submitted February 24, 1981.
    John Mercuri, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ernest D. Preate, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 346
    Commonwealth v. Noakes, Appellant.
    Submitted May 5, 1981.
    Alan, M. Bredt, for .appellant; Gaele. McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 346
    Commonwealth v. Novitski, Appellant.
    Submitted April 1, 1981.
    Taylor P. Andrews, Public Defender, for appellant; J. Michael Eakin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence dated September 2,1980 is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Hoffer.


text:
    442 A.2d 346
    Commonwealth v. Richardson, Appellant.
    Submitted May 11, 1981.
    Thomas L. McGill, Jr., for appellant; Garold E. Tennis, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 347
    Commonwealth v. Rider, Appellant.
    Submitted January 26, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 347
    Daniels v. Daniels, Appellant.
    Argued December 14, 1981.
    Jonathan DeYoung, for appellant; P. Richard Klein, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 347
    Fischetti et al., Appellants v. Ruscombmanor Twnshp.
    Submitted March 21, 1980.
    Alfred W. Crump, Jr., for appellants; Robert I. Cottom, for Ruscombmanor Township, Everhart, Seidel and Matthias, appellees; Kenneth E. Sands, Jr., for Moyer and Minnick, appellees.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 347
    Lizt, et al., Appellants v. Bellefonte Apts. Co., et al.
    Argued June 23, 1981.
    Thomas P. Kennedy, for appellants; James Zaydon, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

Decision was rendered prior to DiSALLE, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    442 A.2d 348
    Morris et ux., Appellants v. Kardos et ux.
    Submitted April 1, 1981.
    David A. Martino, for appellants; El wood M. Malos, for appellees.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 348
    Smith v. Smith, et al., Appellants.

      Submitted May 5, 1981.
    Theodore L. Krohn, for appellants; Ralph J. Johnston, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J, SPAETH and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 348
    Toner v. Protective Insurance Co., et al. Appeal of Protective Insurance Company.
    Argued January 26, 1981.
    Joel Feldscher, for appellant; Thomas Bruno, for The Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan, appellee; S. David Fineman, for Toner, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


author: BROSKY, Judge:

text:
    444 A.2d 144
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Edward C. DOBSON, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Sept. 11, 1980.
    Filed April 12, 1982.

      Barry H. Oxenburg, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Nancy D. Wasser, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   BROSKY, Judge:

On September 28, 1979, appellant, Edward Dobson, was convicted of unlawful taking or disposition and acquitted of theft by receiving stolen property. Post-verdict motions were filed and denied. Dobson asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective. He is represented on appeal by new counsel. We remand.

Dobson remonstrates that his trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons:

1. Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel where said counsel failed to raise and/or litigate the issue of double jeopardy or that prosecution was barred by a former prosecution and acquittal for the same offense.
2. Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue the violation of appellant’s rights to a prompt trial.

We must first review the procedural history of this case which is critical to our resolution of the appeal.

On January 12, 1979, Dobson was arrested and charged with theft by unlawful taking or disposition, theft by receiving stolen property, and simple assault. His trial began in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia on May 7, 1979, however, a mistrial for which Dobson moved was granted on May 8, 1979. On June 11, 1979, a second trial was held in Municipal Court after which a recorded verdict was entered finding Dobson guilty of simple assault and not guilty of theft by unlawful taking or disposition and theft by receiving stolen property. The record, however, contains evidence that the trial court intended to convict Dobson of theft by unlawful taking or disposition and theft by receiving stolen property alone.

A de novo appeal was then filed. Trial counsel stated in his notice of appeal that Dobson appealed from convictions of theft by unlawful taking and theft by receiving stolen property. The de novo trial was held in the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court non-jury. A verdict was entered following that trial finding Dobson guilty of theft by unlawful taking or disposition but acquitting him of theft by receiving stolen property.

The record reveals that no motions were filed by either party to correct the record verdict. We discussed the procedures by which a verdict is corrected in Commonwealth v. Allen, 287 Pa.Super. 88, 99, 429 A.2d 1113, 1118 (1981). We said:

Defendant Allen’s next argument is that the lower court erred in sentencing him on the conspiracy count since he was never found guilty of conspiracy. On the conspiracy count the court sentenced him to ten years’ probation to run concurrent with the robbery sentence. In support of this argument defendant refers to the remarks of the judge at the end of the closing arguments. The judge stated that he found the defendants guilty of two counts of robbery and one count of possession of an instrument of crime. N.T. April 27, 1978, 213. Since the judge never stated that he was guilty of conspiracy, Allen argues that his sentence was improper. We are not persuaded by this argument. Nowhere does the judge state that he found the defendant not guilty of any of the charges. More importantly, however, the information for the conspiracy count shows a verdict of guilty was recorded on April 27, 1978, the date the trial ended, and was signed by the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Huett, 462 Pa. 363, 341 A.2d 122 (1975), establishes that recorded verdicts prevail over oral verdicts unless the party attacking them sustains his burden of proving that they did. not reflect the “obvious intention of the trier of facts.” Id., 462 Pa. at 368, 341 A.2d at 124 (emphasis original).
In Commonwealth v. Huett, supra, the trial judge in a non-jury trial announced that the defendant was guilty, inter alia, of second degree murder. However, the verdict was recorded as voluntary manslaughter. At sentencing when the judge attempted to sentence the defendant for voluntary manslaughter the prosecutor objected and moved to correct the verdict. A hearing was held on the motion at which the court clerk testified that she believed that she had recorded the wrong verdict in the indictment. Nevertheless she also admitted that she had no “positive memory” about making a mistake and that the stenographer may have erred. The lower court granted the motion and on appeal the Supreme Court vacated the sentence and reimposed the sentence the lower court had announced it would impose when it thought the verdict was voluntary manslaughter.
The court stated that “[bjefore the recorded verdict may be altered or amended, there must be a finding, and sufficient evidence to support that finding, that the recorded verdict did not reflect the obvious intention of the trier of facts. Moreover, the burden of proof is upon the moving party.” Id., 462 Pa. at 368, 341 A.2d at 123 (emphasis in original).

Turning to the merits of Dobson’s claim, we note that we are guided in our determination of whether Dobson’s trial counsel was ineffective by the standard enunciated in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). That is,

. . . [0]ur inquiry ceases and counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interest. The test is not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation of the record. Although weigh the alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel’s decisions had any reasonable basis. (Footnote deleted.)

Id., 427 Pa. at 605, 235 A.2d at 352-353 (emphasis in original). See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 485 Pa. 353, 402 A.2d 999 (1979).

We must determine first, however, whether the ineffectiveness claim is of arguable merit. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 490 Pa. 312, 416 A.2d 485 (1980), Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 259 Pa.Super. 240, 393 A.2d 806 (1978). If it is not, our inquiry ends there. In Commonwealth v. Wideman, 453 Pa. 119, 306 A.2d 894 (1973), our Supreme Court said that the failure to pursue an issue of double jeopardy at any time post-trial amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, we are satisfied that the issue is one of arguable merit.

The Commonwealth contends that trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to pursue a futile double jeopardy claim. It argues that the record clearly supports its position that Dobson was convicted of unlawful taking or disposition and theft by receiving stolen property. Nevertheless, we cannot reach that conclusion where no motion was brought to correct the record verdict pursuant to the procedures outlined in Commonwealth v. Huett, 462 Pa. 363, 341 A.2d 122 (1975). We cannot hold now that the verdict should have been corrected. Hence, we are unable to find that trial counsel had “some reasonable basis ” for his failure to bring posttrial motions on double jeopardy grounds. Therefore, we remand to the trial court to permit Dobson to file such a motion nunc pro tunc.

Next, Dobson argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to assert that Dobson’s right to a prompt trial was violated pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 6013(g). However, in his post-verdict arguments, the record discloses that Dobson only claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a Rule 6013(c) motion to dismiss before his second municipal court trial. Thus, while Dobson claimed that Rule 6013(g) was violated in his supplemental post-verdict motions, in compliance with Commonwealth v. Gravely, 486 Pa. 194, 404 A.2d 1296 (1979), he abandoned that contention when at post-verdict argument he asserted only a 6013(c) motion. Thus, for purposes of appellate review, the issue is waived. Commonwealth v. Penny, 279 Pa.Super. 32, 420 A.2d 729 (1980).

Accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court to permit Dobson to file a post-verdict motion claiming a violation of his right not to be held in jeopardy twice, nunc pro tunc.


text:
    444 A.2d 147
    Paul MASH, Executor of the Estate of Julia Kameliski, Deceased, Petitioner, v. OLD HOME MANOR, INC., a corporation and Leasure Coal Company, a corporation, Defendants. Kathryn M. FREAR; Robert A. Malakos and Mary Jane Malakos; Edna Dias; and James W. Fry and Adeline A. Fry, Petitioners, v. OLD HOME MANOR, INC., a corporation, Defendant. Sam ERITANO, Sr. and Ruth Eritano; Antonette Folino; Catherine Kuzminsky, widow and Harry Kuzminsky; and Loretta Eritano, Petitioners, v. OLD HOME MANOR, INC., a corporation, Defendant. Stanley ROCK and Rose Rock; Marlin B. Stephens; Robert A. Cameron and Jean Cameron; John Wilko and Mary J. Wilko; Charles Kameliski and Mary Kameliski, Petitioners, v. OLD HOME MANOR, INC., a corporation, Defendant. Stanley J. MROCZKA and Marisa Mroczka; John Kuzminsky and Ethel Kuzminsky; Alvina Girolami; Samuel Girolami and Mary Jane Girolami; Emerson A. Bufagna and Dora M. Bufagna; Nick DeRubis and Fannie DeRubis; and Barry R. Smith and Dora M. Smith, Petitioners, v. OLD HOME MANOR, INC., a corporation, Defendant. Harry J. WIDMAR and Sandra L. Widmar; Angeline Wirick; and Ernest Widmar, Jr. and Sylvia J. Widmar, Petitioners, v. OLD HOME MANOR, INC., a corporation, Defendant. Paul MASH, Executor of the Estate of Julia Kameliski, Deceased; Kathryn M. Frear; Robert A. Malakos and Mary Jane Malakos; Edna Dias; James W. Fry and Adeline A. Fry; Sam Eritano, Sr. and Ruth Eritano; Antonette Folino; Catherine Kuzminsky, widow and Harry Kuzminsky; Loretta Eritano; Stanley Rock and Rose Rock; Marlin B. Stephens; Robert A. Cameron and Jean Cameron; John Wilko and Mary J. Wilko; Charles Kameliski and Mary Kameliski; Stanley J. Mroczka and Marisa Mroczka; John Kuzminsky and Ethel Kuzminsky; Alvina Girolami; Samuel Girolami and Mary Jane Girolami; Emerson A. Bufagna and Dora M. Bufagna; Nick DeRubis and Fannie DeRubis; Barry R. Smith and Dora M. Smith; Harry J. Widmar and Sandra L. Widmar; Angeline Wirick and Ernest Widmar, Jr. and Sylvia J. Widmar, Petitioners, v. Honorable Gilfert M. MIHALICH, Honorable Charles H. Loughran and Honorable Joseph A. Hudock, Judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, Respondents, Old Home Manor, Inc., a Corporation, Intervenor.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Feb. 10, 1982.
    Filed April 12, 1982.

      John E. Evans, Jr., Pittsburgh, for petitioners at Nos. 1326 and 1331.
    John E. Hall, Pittsburgh, for respondent at No. 1326 and intervenor at No. 1331.
    Howland W. Abramson, Philadelphia, for respondents at No. 1331.
    Before BROSKY, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   BROSKY, Judge:

These actions were commenced, apparently in 1978 and 1979, to recover damages resulting from a 1977 flood which the plaintiffs contended was caused by the tortious conduct of Old Home Manor, Inc. The complaints were filed in Westmoreland County. The petitioners before us seek review of an order of change of venue from Westmoreland to Indiana County. They claim that a change of venue was ordered only for the convenience of the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas and was therefore improper. Because we agree with respondents’ position that the Petition for Review is not the proper vehicle for this argument, we quash the petitions.

Rule 311 of the Pa.R.A.P. provides for interlocutory appeals as of right. Rule 311(c) states:

(c) Changes of venue, etc. An appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action or proceeding changing venue, transferring the matter to another court of coordinate jurisdiction, or declining to proceed in the matter on the basis of forum non conveniens or analogous principles.

This appeal should have been brought pursuant to Rule 311. Instead, the petitioners were presented to this court pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Pa. Rules of Appellate Procedure which is entitled “Judicial Review of Governmental Determinations.” Rule 1501(b) provides that the chapter does not apply to any appeal within the scope of Chapter 9 of the Rules, which governs appeals from lower courts. The note to Rule 1501 states in part:

Subdivision (b) of this rule is necessary because otherwise conventional appeals from a court (which is included in the scope of the term “governmental unit”) to an appellate court would fall within the scope of this chapter under the provision of Paragraph (a)(2) of this rule.

Chapter 9 of the Rules applies to all appeals except those specifically excluded by Rule 901. Appeals pursuant to Rule 311 are not excluded. Therefore, since this appeal is one covered by Chapter 9 of the Rules, Chapter 15 does not apply. We would add that if we were to recognize this as a Chapter 15 proceeding, then any order of a lower court could so be heard, resulting in a circumvention of the prescribed appellate procedure.

Petitions quashed.

      . The petitions are identical in substance and differ only in the respondents named. There was disagreement between the parties as to whether the judges should have been named parties. Because we have determined that the petitions must be dismissed on other grounds, we need not reach this issue.


author: WIEAND, Judge:

text:
    444 A.2d 149
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Walter A. BROWN, Jr., Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Jerry Lee BANKS, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued May 26, 1981.
    Filed April 12, 1982.

      Kevin H. Way, Assistant Public Defender, Williamsport, for appellant at No. 1588.
    James R. Protasio, Assistant Public Defender, Mount Carmel, for appellant at No. 1688.
    Kenneth Osokow, Assistant District Attorney, Williams-port, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and McEWEN, JJ.
   WIEAND, Judge:

Jerry Lee Banks and Walter Brown were tried non-jury, convicted, and sentenced for robbery, burglary, and conspiracy to commit a criminal act. Their separate appeals have been consolidated because they raise the same principal issue. That issue is whether evidence obtained by police following appellants’ arrests should have been suppressed because Williamsport police officers made the arrests outside the limits of the City of Williamsport. We conclude that the arrests were proper and, finding no merit in appellants’ remaining arguments, affirm the judgments of sentence.

On October 14, 1979, at or about 8:45 p. m., police in the City of Williamsport responded to a report that a robbery had been committed at the home of Raymond Hinebauch on Freedom Road. Two elderly victims of the robbery told police that four men wearing ski caps had perpetrated the crime. They specifically identified one of the appellants, Jerry Banks, by name, for he had previously been known to them. Included in the items taken during the robbery was a purse containing $500. Police scoured the neighborhood but were unable to find the robbers or identify the direction in which they fled. Two units, therefore, proceeded to the residence of Jerry Banks. This was located less than one mile from the Hinebauch home but outside the city limits of Williamsport in Loyalsock Township. The officers drove slowly, making a visual search of the area for the robbers and for evidence that might assist them at a later time. A short distance from the Hinebauch home they found lying in the road a knit ski cap of the type worn by the four men.

Approximately thirty minutes after the initial broadcast had gone out over police radio, the two police vehicles arrived at the Banks home. Through the windows of the house police were able to observe four men, including Banks. One officer knocked on the door; whereupon, Banks responded and opened the door. The officer read Miranda warnings to Banks and obtained Banks’ consent for the four policemen to enter the home. Miranda warnings were thereafter read also to the other three men and their names and addresses were obtained. No further questions were asked, however, pending the arrival of a superior officer.

Several minutes later, Lt. William Miller of the Williams-port Police Department arrived and asked one of the four men with whom he was acquainted, Boyd Beatty, to accompany him outside. While both men sat in a police car, Miller read Beatty his Miranda rights, after which Beatty gave a statement implicating the four men. Arrests were made and a search of the persons of the men produced a woman’s purse containing twenty $20 bills, a wallet with $45, and a pocket knife. All of the men except Banks waived their Miranda rights and gave statements concerning the robbery.

After appellants had been arraigned, omnibus pre-trial motions were filed, consolidated for hearing, and heard before the Honorable Charles Greevy. The hearing, which consumed six separate sessions between January 17, 1980, and March 8, 1980, resulted in an order denying motions to suppress evidence. This order, it is asserted on appeal, was erroneous. The evidence, it is argued, was obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest.

The starting point for any discussion of extra-territorial arrest must be the statutory authority for “intrastate hot pursuit,” contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8901. This provision is as follows:

“Any police officer of any political subdivision may arrest with or without warrant any person beyond the territorial limits of such political subdivision for a summary or other offense committed by such person within such political subdivision if the officer continues in pursuit of such person after commission of the offense. The police officer shall exercise under this section only the power of arrest which he would have if he were acting within the territorial limits of his political subdivision.”

All parties agree that the instant offense occurred within Williamsport. They are also agreed that the key to resolution of the issue is the definition of “pursuit.” We must decide, therefore, whether the Williamsport police “continue[d] in pursuit of [the felons] after commission of the offense.”

We observe initially that 42 Pa.C.S. § 8901 is not a penal statute. Therefore, it should be liberally construed to effect its object and to promote justice. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928; Commonwealth v. Fiume, 292 Pa.Superior Ct. 54, 436 A.2d 1001 (1981); Commonwealth v. Holderman, 284 Pa.Superior Ct. 160, 425 A.2d 752 (1981); Commonwealth v. Robb, 238 Pa. Superior Ct. 62, 352 A.2d 515 (1975).

“Pursue” is defined as “to follow, usually determinedly in order to overtake, capture .. .. ” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1968. There have not been a great number of cases dealing with pursuit in this Commonwealth, and those which have been decided are factually clearer than the instant case. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Silvers, 286 Pa.Superior Ct. 161, 428 A.2d 622 (1981) (vehicle matching description given over police radio spotted, officer chased car for five miles with siren on); Commonwealth v. Holderman, supra (officer observes traffic violation, follows car short distance); Commonwealth v. Robb, supra (car runs red light, policeman follows for one and one-half miles as car is driven erratically).

The instant case is more closely analogous to the decision in United States v. Getz, 381 F.Supp. 43 (E.D.Pa.1974). There, police officers from the City of Easton received notice that a bank had been robbed. A radio broadcast indicated that the getaway car had been seen on Route 611; and two officers immediately followed to that route. Seeing no car which answered the description, the officers proceeded to what was believed to be another possible escape route, where they continued their search for the vehicle. A second broadcast was then received, reporting that the car had been parked in the vicinity of an inn in a neighboring township. The officers immediately went to the inn, where the occupants of the vehicle were identified and arrested. The defendants argued that the police had not been in “hot” pursuit of the perpetrators and that the arrest outside the jurisdiction, therefore, had been illegal. The court responded to and rejected this argument as follows:

“Defendants argue that the arrest was invalid because the officers were not in ‘hot’ pursuit. Apparently, defendants contemplate that only a fender-smashing Hollywood style chase scene would satisfy the requirement of the statute. We do not read the act so restrietively. The statute on its face provides only that the arrest may be effected beyond the territorial limits of the officers’ jurisdiction so long as ‘such officer continues in pursuit of the offender . . . ’ It does not specify that the officer must be in ‘hot’ pursuit. The phrase ‘continues in pursuit’ supports the conclusion that the statute contemplates ‘fresh pursuit.’ In the instant case, Officers Young and Scalzo were in continuous pursuit of the evasive robbers from the time of the initial communication at 2:20 P.M. until the arrest at 2:55 P.M., a period of time encompassing 35 minutes. The officers proceeded diligently in their search for the fleeing robbers and there was no hiatus or interruption in their efforts. Accordingly, we conclude that the arrest was made beyond the territorial limits of the officers’ jurisdiction while the officers were in pursuit of the felons within the purview of 19 P.S. § 11.”

United States v. Getz, id. at 46.

We agree with this interpretation. The language of the statute does not speak of “hot pursuit.” Rather, the statute requires that an officer “continue in pursuit” of the offender. This, as the federal court observed, contemplates “fresh pursuit,” a term which is considerably more meaningful than “hot pursuit.” See: Black’s Law Dictionary, where the terms “pursuit” and “hot pursuit” are deemed synonymous with “fresh pursuit.”

The facts in the instant case parallel those in Getz. In the latter case, the police officers had a description of an automobile; in the instant case, Williamsport police had even more substantial information, i.e., the identity of one of the perpetrators. Although Easton Officers Young and Scalzo could not follow the car from the scene of the crime, they conducted a visual search of the area for the getaway car, as did the Williamsport police. The Getz pursuit took approximately 35 minutes; the pursuit in the instant case lasted approximately 30 minutes. Finally, the officers in Getz were well aware that the inn where the car was found was outside of their jurisdiction, but nevertheless proceeded into the neighboring township, parked their car, and entered the inn without calling for assistance from any other police departments. The circumstances dictated that they enter and capture the criminals as quickly as possible. The Williamsport police followed the same procedure: when learning that the suspect’s home was outside of the city limits, they nonetheless proceeded there immediately, searching all the while for the four men who had perpetrated the robbery. Upon arrival, they went directly to the door and found Banks at home.

Appellants argue that the instant case differs from Getz in that the police knew the identity of a suspect and the location of his residence; and, therefore, it was not essential that they make an immediate arrest without assistance from police having jurisdiction. We disagree. First, the Williamsport police were not certain of their final destination, for they did not know whether Banks could be found at home. In fact, other police units had been dispatched to look for Banks in other locations which he was known to frequent. Secondly, there was surely a need to make a swift apprehension. The arresting officer, Lt. Miller, testified at the suppression hearing that police units had been sent to Banks’ home because police feared that the four men would “split up the money” and “go in four different directions.” Finally, whether the pursuing police could have summoned officers from Loyalsock Township is not a controlling issue. The statute’s applicability is not controlled by necessity and is not defeated by the availability of other assistance, or by police knowledge of destination, or by any other factual distinction which can be argued after the fact. The statute speaks solely of pursuit: did the officer continue in pursuit of the perpetrator after commission of an offense? Was the pursuit fresh?

We conclude that a liberal, common sense interpretation of the statute requires that the arrest made by the Williamsport police be held legal. Their pursuit of four felons who committed a robbery within their jurisdiction was fresh (they began searching for Banks immediately upon hearing the broadcast of the robbery), continuous (the entire thirty minute period between notice of the crime and arrival at the Banks home was spent investigating the robbery and searching for the robbers), and uninterrupted (no other crimes were reported or calls were received to take those police units away from the investigation and pursuit of the robbers). Therefore, we hold that the arrest of appellants beyond the territorial limits of the City of Williams-port was legal, and the lower court’s decision refusing to suppress evidence because of an illegal arrest was proper.

Appellants also contend, even if their arrest followed fresh pursuit, that the police nevertheless lacked probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest. It is axiomatic that warrantless arrests must be based on probable cause. “The law is clear that a warrantless arrest is not lawful unless there is probable cause therefor. . . . Whether there is probable cause to arrest without a warrant depends on whether, at the moment a suspect is taken into custody, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed the offense. . . .

“Thus, in order to arrest without a warrant, the officer must have a reasonable belief in the probability of criminal activity by the person to be arrested. However, that belief need not be grounded in the officer’s direct, personal knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances. It may, instead, rest solely on information supplied by another person where there is a ‘substantial basis’ for crediting that information. ...” Commonwealth v. Urbina, 290 Pa.Superior Ct. 117, 120, 434 A.2d 157, 159 (1981), quoting Commonwealth v. Stokes, 480 Pa. 38, 43-44, 389 A.2d 74, 76 (1978).

In the instant case, the police unquestionably had probable cause to arrest Banks, for he had been identified by the victims as one of the robbers. See: Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 271 Pa.Superior Ct. 206, 412 A.2d 886 (1979); 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest § 46. They also knew that the perpetrators of the robbery were four in number; and upon arrival at the Banks residence found it occupied by four men, including Banks who had been identified by name as one of the robbers. These facts were sufficient to warrant prudent men in believing that the four men were the same men who had committed the offense only one-half .hour earlier. See generally: Commonwealth v. Powers, 484 Pa. 198, 398 A.2d 1013 (1979); Commonwealth v. Vessells, 273 Pa.Superior Ct. 100, 416 A.2d 1108 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hartley, 264 Pa.Superior Ct. 219, 399 A.2d 745 (1979); Commonwealth v. Payton, 253 Pa.Superior Ct. 422, 385 A.2d 410 (1978).

Appellant Brown raises two additional issues on appeal. The first issue is whether he intelligently and knowingly waived his Miranda rights before making an inculpatory statement to the police. He contends that the statement was involuntary because he had consumed alcohol and ingested drugs during earlier hours on the same day. Although defense witnesses testified that Brown was staggering when police arrived, police witnesses testified that he exhibited no visible indicia of intoxication. The hearing judge, who also had the opportunity to listen to a tape recording made of Brown’s statement, found that Brown was alert and able to waive his Miranda rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

“The burden rests with the Commonwealth to show voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of credible evidence .... Our duty on review is to determine whether the record supports the factual and legal findings of the court below and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. In making this determination, we are to consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted.” Commonwealth v. Hunt, 263 Pa.Superior Ct. 504, 509, 398 A.2d 690, 692 (1979), citing Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 460 Pa. 516, 333 A.2d 892 (1975). Having made an independent review of the record, we conclude that it supports the factual and legal findings of the suppression court. The court could reasonably choose to believe the Commonwealth’s evidence regarding Brown’s condition at the time the statement was made. Commonwealth v. Moore, 454 Pa. 337, 311 A.2d 620 (1972). Certainly, “there is no basis for us to hold as a matter of law that the court’s finding of voluntariness of the confession was not adequately supported and well within the court’s discretion.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 447 Pa. 457, 461, 291 A.2d 103, 104 (1972); Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra.

The final issue raised by appellant Brown is that the court below erred in granting a Commonwealth motion to extend the time within which to commence trial under Rule 1100. The robbery had occurred on October 14, 1979, and the run date for Rule 1100 purposes was April 12,1980. Suppression hearings were conducted through March 3, 1980, and a determination was made by order of March 18, 1980. The Commonwealth sought to consolidate the charges against Brown and two of the accomplices for trial purposes, but his request was denied. Following that decision, the next scheduled criminal trial session in Lycoming County was March 31 to April 11, 1980. In that period, two of Brown’s co-defendants were tried. Appellant’s case was called for trial on April 10, when the Commonwealth appeared and was prepared to proceed to trial. Brown objected to being tried before jurors to be drawn from the same panel which had convicted a co-defendant. Because a new jury panel would not be drawn until the next scheduled trial session, Brown requested and the trial court granted a motion for continuance. The court directed the case to be listed immediately for the next term. The following day, April 11,1980, the Commonwealth filed its motion' to extend, and this was granted. Brown was tried on the first day of the next criminal, trial session. At that time, he waived his right to a jury trial and was tried noil-jury.

Brown complains that the extension of time was improperly granted. We disagree. If it had not been for appellant’s objection to the jury, trial would have commenced on April 10, prior to the expiration of 180 days. This objection by appellant could have been deemed a waiver. Commonwealth v. Favors, 273 Pa.Superior Ct. 109, 416 A.2d 1113 (1979). Nevertheless, the Commonwealth prudently requested an extension after Brown’s motion for continuance had been granted. These circumstances evidenced due diligence by the Commonwealth and warranted the trial court in granting the requested extension. This court has determined that jury unavailability will be deemed judicial delay. Commonwealth v. Davis, 261 Pa.Superior Ct. 204, 395 A.2d 1388 (1978); Commonwealth v. Metzger, 249 Pa.Superior Ct. 107, 375 A.2d 781 (1977). For such delay, a Commonwealth petition to extend in order to provide a new jury panel is justified. Commonwealth v. Corbin, 268 Pa.Superior Ct. 526, 408 A.2d 1128 (1979).

Finding the arguments of Brown and Banks to be without merit, we affirm the judgments of sentence entered against them.

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.

      . The issue of mutual aid agreements has not been raised. Compare: Commonwealth v. Novick, 293 Pa.Superior Ct. 241, 438 A.2d 974 (1981).

      . This provision of the Judicial Code is substantially a reenactment of The Act of August 6, 1963, P.L. 511, No. 267, § 1, as amended, Act of November 2, 1973, P.L. 330, No. 109, § 1, 19 P.S. § 11 which reads:
      “Any police officer in the employ of a county, city, borough, town or township may arrest, with or without a warrant, any felon or person who has committed a misdemeanor or summary offense beyond the territorial limits of the political subdivision employing such officer for such offense committed by the offender within the political subdivision employing the police officer if such officer continues in pursuit of the offender after commission of the offense: Provided, however, that a police officer shall exercise only the power of arrest that he would have if he were acting within the territorial limits of the political subdivision employing him.”
      This section, originally entitled “arrest beyond territorial limits in pursuit of felon,” was amended in 1973 to include summary offenders and misdemeanants. This amendment was in response to the decision of this court in Commonwealth v. Troutman, 223 Pa.Superior Ct. 509, 302 A.2d 430 (1973).

      . Appellants argue that a technical arrest took place when the initial entry into the Banks home was made by four police officers. This was 5 to 10 minutes before Lt. Miller arrived and produced an inculpatory statement from Boyd Beatty. We agree with the lower court that a determination of the precise moment of arrest is unnecessary, because those first officers to reach the Banks residence already had probable cause to arrest.

      . Banks’ appellate brief also questions the warrantless entry of his home. This issue was not raised in post-trial motions; consequently, it has been waived and has not been preserved for appellate review.

      . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).


text:
    444 A.2d 155
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Barbara CAMPBELL, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Jan. 25, 1982.
    Filed April 12, 1982.

      Sara M. Webster, Assistant Public Defender, Doylestown, for appellant.
    Stephen B. Harris, Assistant District Attorney, Doylestown, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CHULLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   WIEAND, Judge:

Barbara Campbell was found guilty by a jury of retail theft. After post-trial motions had been dismissed and sentence imposed, an appeal was filed in this Court. The only matter preserved for appellate review is the trial court’s decision to allow the Commonwealth to re-open its case and present evidence showing probable cause for stopping and detaining appellant at the time of her arrest after the District Attorney, during a suppression hearing, had represented to the court that the arresting officer was unavailable to testify and the court had granted a defense motion to suppress. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling and affirm the judgment of sentence.

Trial of the charge against appellant for retail theft was assigned to the Honorable George T. Kelton on the morning of June 4, 1981. When he undertook to hear appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, the following occurred:

MR. MC HUGH: ... at the time the arresting officer was Anthony Manscola who was employed by the Middle-town Township Police Department.
Mr. Manscola is no longer employed by the Middletown Township Police Department and is not available for trial today.
As such, Your Honor, I am not prepared to proceed on this motion and will concede that any items that were taken from Miss Campbell by Officer Manscola would not be introduced into evidence in any event.
THE COURT: Then, in effect, you are conceding, I should grant the motion to suppress the offering of evidence of any items so seized by the Middletown Township Police Department from the defendant?
MR. MC HUGH: That is correct, Your Honor, any items seized by the Middletown Township Police.
THE COURT: Then the motion is granted.
MR. MC HUGH: I believe that is correct, Your Honor, and the Commonwealth does not intend to introduce any statements of the defendant or any physical evidence seized by Middletown Township Police.
THE COURT: In any event, there being no objection to the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized by the Middletown Township Police, and there being representation by the Commonwealth that there were no statements made that are proposed to be offered into evidence, the motion to suppress is granted.
MS. WEBSTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: This case will go before Judge Biehn. In the case of the Commonwealth v. Campbell, the pre-trial proceedings now having been completed, will be assigned now to Judge Biehn in Courtroom Five for trial.

By the time Judge Biehn was ready to commence trial on the afternoon of the same day, Anthony Manscola had been found and appeared as a Commonwealth witness. A request to re-open the suppression hearing was granted, and with Manscola’s testimony the Commonwealth was able to establish the probable cause which justified, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3929(d), the stopping and detention of appellant at the time the stolen merchandise was found on her person. By using as evidence this stolen merchandise, the Commonwealth was able to obtain a conviction by the jury which heard the case.

The general rule is that prior to rendering its decision, a court may, in its discretion, permit either side to re-open its case to present additional evidence. Commonwealth v. Irving, 485 Pa. 596, 603, 403 A.2d 549, 552 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020, 100 S.Ct. 676, 62 L.Ed.2d 651 (1980); Commonwealth v. Deitch Co., 449 Pa. 88, 100, 295 A.2d 834, 841 (1972); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 271 Pa.Superior Ct. 228, 240, 412 A.2d 897, 903 (1979); Commonwealth v. Ridgely, 243 Pa.Superior Ct. 397, 403, 365 A.2d 1283, 1286 (1976). The decision to permit re-opening should be even more flexible where, as here, the issue is not guilt but the admissibility of evidence. Commonwealth v. Branch, 292 Pa.Superior Ct. 425, 430-31, 437 A.2d 748, 750-51 (1981); Commonwealth v. Griffin, supra. Compare: Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 231 Pa.Superior Ct. 327, 330-31, 331 A.2d 856, 859 (1974) (Case remanded in the interests of justice to permit the Commonwealth to introduce into the record the warrant containing information necessary to establish a valid search and seizure).

In the instant case, appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s request to re-open its case came too late. She contends that the allowance of Officer Manscola’s testimony was error because Judge Kelton had earlier announced that in the absence of evidence, the motion to suppress evidence would be granted. This, however, was merely a ruling on the admissibility of evidence and could be modified, altered or reversed if warranted by new evidence. Moreover, it was a ruling prompted by the failure of a Commonwealth witness to appear. When the witness later appeared, the prior evidentiary ruling could be reconsidered in the light of testimony offered by that witness. When the testimony established that stolen merchandise found on appellant’s person had been lawfully seized, the basis for the prior exclusion of evidence ceased to exist, and the trial judge could properly receive such evidence.

The judgment of sentence is affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurs in result.


author: BECK, Judge:

text:
    444 A.2d 157
    Elva LYNCH and Madge Lynch, Appellants, v. James HOOK and R-J Land Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Aug. 31, 1981.
    Filed April 12, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 19, 1982.

      George Retos, Jr., Washington, for appellants.
    Milton D. Rosenberg, Washington, for appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   BECK, Judge:

Appellants are two of the three children and heirs of the widow Ora D. Lynch, who died intestate owning an interest in a 155 acre rural tract of land in Greene County, Pennsylvania. They contend that in 1972, James Hook, Esquire, the attorney for the Estate of Ora D. Lynch induced them to sell this tract of land to R-J Land Company, a corporation owned by him and members of his family, without disclosing his interest in that corporation, and without obtaining the prior approval of the Orphan’s Court.

In 1978, appellants brought suit in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County to compel the appellees to reconvey the tract of land to them. The lower court issued a Decree Nisi dismissing the complaint. The appellants filed exceptions which were dismissed by the lower court. On May 21, 1980, the order affirming the Decree Nisi was entered.

It is well settled that transactions between attorneys and clients will be sustained only when good faith and full disclosures attend such transactions. “The relation [attorney and client] is so confidential in its nature that it calls for the exercise of the most perfect good faith . . . [and] no shadow of anything like deception or unfair dealing upon the part of an attorney, can be countenanced.” Kribbs v. Jackson, 387 Pa. 611, 621, 129 A.2d 490, 495, 496 (1957). Accord, Points v. Gibboney, 340 Pa. 522, 17 A.2d 365 (1941). The law “often declares transactions between ... [attorneys and their clients] void, which between other persons would be unobjectionable. Unless the transaction is fair and conscionable, it is deemed a constructive fraud.” Kribbs, supra, quoting Shoemaker v. Stiles, 102 Pa. 549 (1883). When the propriety of a transaction between attorney and client has been put at issue, the burden is on the attorney to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his conduct has conformed to these strict standards. Meara v. Hewitt, 455 Pa. 132, 314 A.2d 263 (1974).

In their appeal, appellants first contend that the attorney did not disclose that he had an interest in the R-J Land Company at the time that the transaction took place. The trial court found as fact that at the time of the signing of the deed transferring the tract to R-J Land Company, the appellants were aware that the attorney, his father, and his brother had an interest in that company. An appeals court cannot sit as a trier of issues of fact and must accept the finding of facts of the lower court as the basis of its review. The scope of appellate review of a decree in equity is particularly limited and such a decree will not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by evidence or demonstrably capricious. Sack v. Feinman, 489 Pa. 152, 413 A.2d 1059 (1980). After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that adequate evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact. (Record, 29a-32a, 227a-239a, 256a-271a, 275a-285a.)

Appellants next argue that Section 3356 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3356 requires an attorney for an estate, like the estate’s “personal representative,” to obtain prior approval from the Orphan’s Court before purchasing property from the estate.

This argument requires us to hold that an attorney for an estate is a “personal representative” under Section 3351 of the Probate Code. This contention is meritless. We begin with the reminder that under the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. 1903(a), “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to ... their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such other as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in this act, shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.” The term “personal representative” has a meaning specifically defined in the Probate Code, i.e. “executor or administrator of any description.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. This definition of “personal representative” when contained in the Probate Code itself, is controlling for the section here to be construed. Riverside Iron and Steel Corp. v. City of Monongahela, 52 Wash.Co. 163, aff’m, 7 Pa.Cmwlth. 269, 298 A.2d 918 (1972). The terms “executor” and “administrator” are in turn defined in the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1991. This Act describes an “executor” as a “fiduciary named in a will to execute its provisions and administer the estate of the testator,” and an “administrator” as a “fiduciary appointed under authority of law by a register of wills or court to administer the estate of a decedent.” Since the decedent died intestate, the attorney cannot be an executor, nor is he an administrator since he was not appointed by a register of wills or court to that position. Therefore, the attorney cannot be classed as a “personal representative” under the Probate Code, and his behavior is not controlled by the requirements of Section 3356.

In summary, at common law, an attorney is bound by strict requirements of “perfect good faith” and fair dealing in transactions with his client. If such an attorney-client transaction is questioned, the attorney bears the burden of showing full disclosure and that the transaction was “fair and conscionable.” Meara v. Hewitt, supra. Accord, Ruth v. Crane, 392 F.Supp. 724 (E.D.Pa.1975). An attorney for an estate, however, is not subject to the additional restrictions relating to purchases from an estate imposed by statute on a “personal representative,” i.e., an executor or administrator of an estate. This distinction is reasonable, because an attorney to an estate, unlike a “personal representative,” lacks the power to sell personal and real property belonging to the estate. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3351. The function of Section 3351 of the Probate Code is to ensure that these special powers of the personal representative are not abused to the detriment of the beneficiaries of the estate.

The order of the court below is affirmed.

      . Appellants do not now contend that they received less than fair value for the tract of land in question.

      . 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3356 states: “In addition to any right conferred by a governing instrument, if any, the personal representative, in his individual capacity, may bid for, purchase, take a mortgage on, lease, or take by exchange, real or personal property belonging to the estate, subject, however, to the approved of the court, and under such terms and conditions and after such reasonable notice to parties as it shall direct .... ”

      . 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3351 states: “Except as otherwise provided by will, if any, the personal representative may sell, at public or private sale, any personal property whether specifically bequeathed or not, and any real property not specifically devised .... ”