text:
    479 A.2d 1037
    James SUPP v. ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Appeal of LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 30, 1983.
    Filed July 6, 1984.

      John Baginski, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
    Colleen N. Kilbert, Pittsburgh, for Supp, appellee.
    William R. Haushalter, Pittsburgh, for Erie, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and HESTER, JJ.

      . Section 204(a) of the No-Fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.204(a), states:
      (a) Applicable security. — The security for the payment of basic loss benefits applicable to an injury to:
      (1) an employee, or to the spouse or other relative of any employee residing in the same household as the employee, if the accident resulting in injury occurs while the victim or deceased victim is driving or occupying a motor vehicle furnished by such employee’s employer, is the security for the payment of basic loss benefits covering such motor vehicle or, if none, any other security applicable to such victim;
      (2) an insured is the security under which the victim or deceased victim is insured;
      (3) the driver or other occupant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury who is not an insured is the security covering such vehicle;
      (4) an individual who is not an insured or the driver or other occupant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury is the security covering any motor vehicle involved in such accident.
      For purposes of this paragraph, a parked and unoccupied motor vehicle is not a motor vehicle involved in an accident, unless it was parked so as to cause unreasonable risk of injury; and
      (5) any other individual in the applicable assigned claims plan.

   ROWLEY, Judge:

This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment entered after a court en banc dismissed the exceptions of the appellant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, to the findings and conclusions of the trial judge. We reverse.

Because a declaratory judgment action follows “as nearly as may be” the practice and procedure in an action in equity, Pa.R.C.P. No. 1601(a), we will review the determination of the trial court as we would a decree in equity. Our scope of review is narrow.

A chancellor’s findings of fact, when approved by the court en banc, have the force and effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by adequate evidence. Herwood v. Herwood, 461 Pa. 322, 336 A.2d 306 (1975). However, the chancellor’s inferences and conclusions, which are drawn from the facts, and the application of the law are always subject to review. Adler v. Montefiore Hospital Association of Western Pennsylvania, 453 Pa. 60, 311 A.2d 634 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131, 94 S.Ct. 870, 38 L.Ed.2d 755 (1974).

McDole v. Duquesne Brewing Co. of Pittsburgh, 281 Pa. Super. 78, 83, 421 A.2d 1155, 1158 (1980) (quotations and citation omitted).

The record fully supports the court’s findings of fact which are substantially as follows.

For some months prior to August 29, 1978, James Supp had been driving a truck for Ajax Forging and Casting Company (Ajax). Supp acted as driver for Ajax pursuant to an agreement, designated as a “lease”, between Ajax and Transpersonnel, Inc. (Transpersonnel). By this agreement, Transpersonnel agreed to procure the services of truck drivers and assign them to Ajax. Transpersonnel agreed to perform all payroll operations and carry Workmen’s Compensation insurance for each of the drivers assigned under the agreement. On its part, Ajax was given the power to “dispatch, direct the loading and unloading of vehicles, select routes, direct the drivers to pick-ups, deliveries and other matters related to the day-to-day operation of the vehicles utilized by” it. Foremen at various Ajax plants instructed Supp as to what to carry, where to carry it and, occasionally, how to get to his destination. Supp reported his time and mileage to Transpersonnel because he was paid on an hourly basis when loading or unloading his truck and on a mileage basis when he was behind the wheel.

On August 29, 1978, Supp was driving a truck rented by Ajax from Ryder Truck Rental (Ryder). Ajax had instructed him to drive the truck. This truck was covered by a policy of no-fault motor vehicle insurance purchased by Ajax and issued by appellant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual). Supp was travelling west on Interstate 279 near Pittsburgh when he was involved in an accident. In order to avoid hitting the motorists near him, Supp drove into a concrete barrier, injuring himself in the process.

The Workmen’s Compensation carrier engaged by Tran-spersonnel paid Supp $213.00 per week during the period he was disabled, August 29, 1978 to May 14, 1979. However, Supp allegedly suffered work loss of $434.35 per week. In order to recover the wages lost in excess of the amount received from the Workmen’s Compensation carrier, Supp made a claim for no-fault wage loss benefits with both Liberty Mutual, the carrier which issued to Ajax the policy covering the truck, and with Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie), which had issued a no-fault motor vehicle insurance policy to Supp covering his personal automobile. Both carriers denied coverage and Supp instituted this declaratory judgment action against Liberty Mutual and Erie in order to determine which carrier had provided the applicable security. A hearing, limited to the issue of liability, was held on May 14, 1981. On June 17, 1981, the trial judge filed detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding that Liberty Mutual had provided the applicable security and was, therefore, liable for the payment of no-fault benefits to Supp. Liberty Mutual filed exceptions which were heard by a court en banc and dismissed by an opinion and order dated January 7, 1982. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Liberty Mutual presents two arguments in support of reversal. First, Liberty Mutual contends that, because the trial court found Ajax to be Supp’s “employer”, recovery against it was barred by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, Art. 1, § 101 et seq., as amended, 77 P.S. § 1 et seq., and several decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. Wagner v. National Indemnity Co., 492 Pa. 154, 422 A.2d 1061 (1980) (plurality opinion), affirming, 266 Pa.Super. 110, 403 A.2d 118 (1979); Augostine v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 293 Pa.Super. 50, 437 A.2d 985 (1981); Adams v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 285 Pa.Super. 79, 426 A.2d 1150 (1981); and Turner v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 256 Pa.Super. 43, 389 A.2d 591 (1978). See also Motley v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 502 Pa. 335, 466 A.2d 609 (1983), affirming, 303 Pa.Super. 120, 449 A.2d 607 (1982). Second, Liberty Mutual argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Ajax was Supp’s employer and, therefore, the only “applicable security” under § 204(a) of the No-Fault Act, Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, Art. II, § 204(a), 40 P.S. § 1009.204(a), is that issued by Erie to Supp personally. Because we find Liberty Mutual’s first argument persuasive, we need not consider the second.

Our review of the record indicates that the trial court correctly concluded that Ajax was Supp’s employer.

[]The crucial test in determining whether a servant furnished by one person to another becomes the employe of the person to whom he is loaned is whether he passes under the latter’s right of control with regard to not only the work to be done but also as to the manner of performing it____
[]A servant is the employe of the person who has the right of controlling the manner of his performance of the work, irrespective of whether he actually exercises that control or not.

Mature v. Angelo, 373 Pa. 593, 595-596, 97 A.2d 59, 60 (1953) (citations omitted).

There can be no dispute that the agreement between Tran-spersonnel and Ajax provided that Ajax possessed such power and right to control Supp’s work-related activities. Although for the most part Supp was not restricted in selecting his routes, Ajax did in fact exercise this power several times by directing Supp in the route to follow from one plant to another. The portion of the agreement quoted above also leaves little doubt that Ajax possessed the right to direct the manner in which Supp performed his other employment-related duties as well. Transpersonnel’s performance of payroll functions and its payment of Workmen’s Compensation insurance premiums do not vitiate Ajax’s control over Supp. These record-keeping and insurance coverage functions are peripheral matters which do not control the determination of who was Supp’s employer. Ashman v. Sharon Steel Corp., 302 Pa.Super. 305, 314, 448 A.2d 1054, 1058 (1982); Keller v. Old Lycoming Twp., 286 Pa.Super. 339, 351, 428 A.2d 1358, 1364 (1981); English v. Lehigh County Authority, 286 Pa.Super. 312, 325, 428 A.2d 1343, 1350 (1981), allocatur granted 7/17/81. Moreover, Supp contacted Transpersonnel only when he had a problem with his paycheck or when someone at Ajax directed him to drive an overweight truck. The first contact dealt with the peripheral bookkeeping function discussed above. The second contact, according to Supp’s uncontradicted testimony, concerned not the power to direct Supp to drive the truck but who would pay the fine if he was caught. Neither of these two types of contact are sufficient to conclude that Ajax did not have control over Supp’s employment-related activities. We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Supp was an employee of Ajax at the time of the accident.

The trial court recognized that Liberty Mutual, the carrier that had issued the applicable insurance policy to Ajax, Supp’s employer, would ordinarily not be liable for the payment of no-fault benefits to its insured’s employees. Wagner v. National Indemnity Co., supra. See also Ellisor v. Allstate Ins. Co., 325 Pa.Super. 318, 472 A.2d 1138 (1984). The court ruled, however, that because Ajax had not itself provided Workmen’s Compensation insurance or benefits for Supp this case was an exception to the general rule embodied in Wagner and its progeny.

[T]he appellate courts ... determined that once an employee is eligible or has received Workmen’s Compensation benefits, his employer shall not be fastened with the additional burden of his work loss benefits under the No-Fault Act. We can readily understand and accept that holding with respect to an employer who has paid Workmen’s Compensation benefits to his employee. But that is not the fact situation in this case. Here, the plaintiff received no benefits whatsoever from Ajax and Ajax does not have that liability.

Tr.Ct.Op. 1/7/82 at 4.

However, the holding of Wagner and the other cases dealing with this situation are not predicated on who pays Workmen’s Compensation benefits or premiums on a Workmen’s Compensation insurance policy but on who is an employer within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. It is to employers and, derivatively, to their insurers, that the immunity from liability attaches pursuant to § 303 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 77 P.S. § 481. In Wagner, the Supreme Court noted the two instances in which an employer’s no-fault carrier would remain liable for basic loss benefits despite the immunity conferred by § 303. First, if the employee was injured in an employer-furnished vehicle and the “employee was not using the vehicle for any work-related activity”, the employer’s no-fault carrier would be the applicable source of restoration benefits under § 204(a)(1) because the injury to the employee “was not covered by workmen’s compensation.” Wagner v. National Indemnity Co., 492 Pa. at 163, 422 A.2d at 1066. Second, if the injury arises out of the operation of an employer-furnished vehicle and the victim is an employee’s “spouse or other relative ... residing in the same household as the employee,” even if the injury occurred during the employee’s work-related activity, the employer’s carrier would again be the applicable source under § 204(a)(1) because the bar of the Workman’s Compensation Act “applies only when the spouse or relative attempts to claim through the employee for a work-related injury” to that employee. Id., 492 Pa. at n. 4, 422 A.2d at 1066 n. 4. In this second instance, the injured spouse or relative would be making a claim against the employer’s no-fault carrier for his or her own injuries, not for damages sustained as a result of an injury to the employee. These exceptions to the bar of § 303 are thus predicated on the inapplicability of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to the injury sustained by the claimant. Where the Act applies, the bar is complete.

Moreover, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the fact that the “lending employer” pays for Workmen’s Compensation insurance is no impediment to finding the “borrowing employer” to be immune from suit pursuant to § 303. The means used to fulfill the statutory obligation to provide Workmen’s Compensation coverage do not affect the immunity conferred by § 303. Keller v. Old Lycoming Twp., supra; English v. Lehigh County Authority, supra. Consequently, despite the nature of the claim being asserted and despite the indirect method by which Workmen’s Compensation was provided, the bar of § 303 is not avoided.

In the case before us, there is no dispute that the Workmen’s Compensation Act applies. Supp was injured while driving the truck from one destination to another as directed by his employer, Ajax. Supp claimed and was paid benefits as required by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The fact that someone other than Ajax paid the premiums on the Workmen’s Compensation policy is immaterial. Keller v. Old Lycoming Twp., supra; English v. Lehigh County Authority, supra. The Workmen’s Compensation Act bars suit against Ajax as Supp’s employer and this also bars recovery against Ajax’s insurer, Liberty Mutual. Motley v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., supra; Wagner v. National Indemnity Co., supra; Augostine v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., supra; Turner v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, supra. The trial court erred in holding that Liberty Mutual was liable for basic loss benefits due Supp. Because Liberty Mutual is not the proper source of basic loss benefits, the only other possible source is Erie, Supp’s personal no-fault carrier, under § 204(a)(2) of the No-Fault Act.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for the entry of judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and against Erie Insurance Exchange.

Jurisdiction is not retained.

      . Throughout its brief, Erie argues that “the security on the truck was provided for Ryder by Liberty Mutual. Liberty did not provide the security on the vehicle for Ajax.” Brief for Appellee at 6. However, this assertion is directly contrary to the trial court’s finding that "Ajax rented the Ryder truck and covered it with its own no-fault insurance plan.” Tr.Ct.Op. 6/17/81 at 11. See also Tr.Ct.Op. 1/7/82 at 1-2. While Liberty Mutual stipulated at trial that it did act as carrier for Ryder, there was uncontradicted evidence that the truck driven by Supp was covered by a policy issued by Liberty Mutual to Ajax.

      . Section 303 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 481, states:
      (a) The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employes, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined in section 301(c)(1) and (2) or occupational disease as defined in section 108.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MONTEMURO, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    479 A.2d 1041
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Scott Charles DAVIS, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Jan. 11, 1984.
    Filed July 13, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Feb. 7, 1985.

      John R. Carroll, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Floyd P. Jones, Assistant District Attorney, York, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, DEL SOLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   MONTEMURO, Judge:

This matter is before the court on the appeal of Scott Charles Davis from a mandatory life sentence after conviction of first degree murder. Appellant maintains that under a section of the Juvenile Act, his judgment of sentence must be reversed and his case remanded for proceedings under the Mental Health Procedures Act (hereinafter “MHPA”).

On June 7, 1980, the appellant shot and killed Roderick Kotchin, who had been his friend, employer, and neighbor. At the time of the incident, appellant was fifteen years of age. Appellant was arrested under the criminal system, and his counsel filed a petition for transfer of the case from criminal court to juvenile court in accordance with § 6322(a) of the Juvenile Act.

On September 30, 1980, a hearing was held within the criminal system on appellant’s transfer petition. Expert testimony offered by the appellant as well as the Commonwealth indicated that appellant was mentally ill. The lower court issued its opinion and order on November 10, 1980, denying transfer to the juvenile system. That opinion stressed that appellant had failed to prove that he was amenable to treatment within the juvenile system. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A). Citing Commonwealth v. Pyle, 462 Pa. 613, 342 A.2d 101 (1975), the lower court found that appellant had not established that he could be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile system’s jurisdiction when appellant reached twenty-one years of age.

On December 22, 1980, appellant filed a motion for rehearing of his petition to transfer the proceedings to the juvenile system. The motion alleged that appellant was even more seriously ill than had previously been believed. Appellant argued both that: (1) under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(B), transfer to the juvenile system must be made upon a finding that a child charged with murder is mentally ill and committable, and (2) under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6356, where any hearing indicates that a child is mentally ill and committable, the court must proceed under the MHPA.

After argument, the lower court entered an order and memorandum opinion denying appellant’s rehearing petition. That opinion of March 13, 1981, discussed appellant’s first argument and held under Commonwealth v. Pyle, supra, that even a finding that a child is committable does not, per se, require transfer to the juvenile system. The lower court’s memorandum opinion did not address appellant’s second argument under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6356.

The appellant was tried on May 4-7, 1981, and the jury found him guilty of first degree murder. It is significant that appellant never contended that his mental illness caused him to be either incompetent to stand trial or rendered him legally insane. Appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on the basis that § 6356 of the Juvenile Act mandated a separate procedure and disposition of all mentally ill children, and that he should not have been prosecuted in the criminal system. Relying on the opinion already filed pertaining to appellant’s status, the lower court denied the motion in arrest of judgment.

Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment at a state correctional facility, and this timely appeal followed. Herein, appellant specifically does not contend that the lower court erred in refusing to transfer this case to the juvenile system. Appellant argues, rather, that the lower court erred in failing to proceed under the MHPA once it was evident at the September 30, 1980, hearing, that he was mentally ill. We note that appellant subsequently filed for voluntary commitment in accordance with § 7407 of the MHPA. The record before us is silent as to whether or not appellant has been voluntarily committed and transferred to a mental health facility.

The crux of this appeal involves § 6356 of the Juvenile Act, which appellant attempts to take advantage of. That statute provides:

§ 6356. Disposition of mentally ill or mentally retarded child
If, at a dispositional hearing of a child found to be delinquent or at any hearing, the evidence indicates that the child may be subject to commitment or detention under the provisions of the act of October 20, 1966 (3rd Sp.Sess., P.L. 96, No. 6), known as the ‘Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966,’ or the act of July 9, 1976 (P.L. 817, No. 143), known as the ‘Mental Health Procedures Act’, the court shall proceed under the provisions of the appropriate statute. (Footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

Appellant asserts that the words “or at any hearing” encompass a hearing requesting transfer to the juvenile court system. Thus, he argues that since the evidence of appellant’s September 30, 1980, transfer hearing indicated that appellant was mentally ill and subject to commitment, the court had to proceed under the MHPA. Appellant contends that once the lower court refused to follow the command of § 6356, the remedy is a reversal of his conviction and a remand for proceedings under the MHPA. Furthermore, he reasons that we need not worry about the juvenile court losing jurisdiction on appellant’s twenty-first birthday, for the reason that a commitment under the MHPA continues until treatment is successful. The underlying theme of appellant’s position is that, by enactment of § 6356, the legislature created a special category for all mentally ill and mentally retarded children — a category which automatically deprives the juvenile and criminal courts of their respective jurisdictions in favor of straight civil commitment with its singular emphasis on curing and caring for the distinct problems of the mentally ill and mentally retarded.

While appellant’s argument is ingenious, we find that: first, § 6356 can only be utilized within the confines of the Juvenile Act; secondly, that even if § 6356 could be relied upon by appellant, the hearing of September 30, 1980, did not indicate that appellant might be subject to commitment under the MHPA; and, thirdly, that even if § 6356 could be relied upon and appellant had been committable, the relief of reversal and remand would be inappropriate.

Appellant attempts to benefit from § 6356 of the Juvenile Act without initially invoking the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Act itself. He points to the language of § 6356 which appears to trigger its application whenever “any hearing” indicates that a child may be subject to commitment. Admittedly, the legislature’s designation of “any hearing” is ambiguous, especially since it follows the precise designation of a “dispositional hearing of a child found to be a delinquent.” This lack of precision, however does not support a construction of § 6356 that it reaches beyond the strict perimeter of the Juvenile Act of which it is a part.

We begin with the principle that individual provisions in a comprehensive legislative scheme should not be read abstractly, but rather with a view to their place in the entire structure. Sohmer v. Sohmer, 318 Pa.Super. 500, 465 A.2d 665 (1983). One of the stated goals of the Juvenile Act is to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental development of children — but for only those children who come within the provisions of the Juvenile Act. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1). Section 6356 is clearly an implementation of this goal, and so appellant must first demonstrate that he comes within the provisions of the Juvenile Act.

Section 6303(a) of the Juvenile Act defines its scope: This chapter [The Juvenile Act] shall apply exclusively to the following:
(1) Proceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent.
(2) Transfers under section 6322 (relating to transfer from criminal proceedings).
(3) Proceedings arising under Subchapter E (relating to dispositions affecting other jurisdictions).
(4) Proceedings under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, as set forth in section 731 of the act of June 13, 1967 (P.L. 31, No. 21), known as the ‘Public Welfare Code.’ (Footnote omitted).

It is manifest that appellant does not fit within subsection (1), (3), or (4) above. While at first glance, appellant’s hearing under § 6322 to determine transfer appears to qualify under subsection (2) above, the Juvenile Act attaches to transfers only after a case has been transferred:

Where the petition alleges conduct which if proven would constitute murder, the court shall require the offense to be prosecuted under the criminal law and procedures, except where the case has been transferred pursuant to section 6327____

42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(e) (emphasis added).

Thus, the hearing of September 30, 1980, did not qualify as one of the proceedings to which the protections of the Juvenile Act attached. Since appellant does not now contend that his case should have been transferred to the juvenile system, he has no basis for his reliance on § 6356. We cannot interpret § 6356 out of its context in the comprehensive scheme of the Juvenile Act.

We note that by interpreting § 6356 to apply only to hearings within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the mentally ill child charged with murder and who is not transferred out of the criminal system, is not left without attention to his special needs. The criminal system provides a mentally ill person with safeguards which are tailored to the type and degree of a defendant’s mental illness. A defendant’s mental illness may: preclude his criminal responsibility (legal insanity), diminish his capacity as to certain crimes, temporarily prevent him from being prosecuted (incompetent to stand trial), or afford him mental health treatment in conjunction with sentencing (guilty but mentally ill — 42 Pa.C.S. § 9727, 50 P.S. § 7405). Furthermore, a convicted person may himself request commitment under the MHPA. 50 P.S. § 7407.

Both the juvenile and criminal systems, therefore, have been designed to deal with the mentally ill who are subject to their respective jurisdiction, while at the same time accomplishing their dissimilar goals. There is no reason for the legislature to have carved out a separate procedure beyond the auspices of either the juvenile or criminal systems for disposition of the mentally ill child.

Secondly, we must point out that, even if appellant could have properly resorted to § 6356, it would have afforded him no relief. That section requires that there be evidence indicating that a child may be subject to commitment. No evidence was presented at the hearing of September 30, 1980, which would indicate that appellant, although undis-putably mentally ill, might have been subject to commitment.

A person may be subject to involuntary commitment under the MHPA only upon a showing that he is severely mentally disabled and poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself. 50 P.S. §§ 7301, 7304. The requirement that the danger be a present one is effectuated by the necessity that the danger to himself or to others be demonstrated within the past thirty days. 50 P.S. § 7301(b). Thus, the evidence would have had to have indicated that within the previous thirty days: (1) the appellant had inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and there was a reasonable probability that such conduct would be repeated, 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1); or (2) the appellant had been unable to care for himself and there was a threat of danger that he would die or seriously harm himself, that he had attempted suicide, or that he had mutilated himself, 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2).

Under the MHPA, therefore, appellant could only have been involuntarily committed for Kotchin’s murder within a thirty day period subsequent to the murder. By the time of the hearing on September 30, 1980, almost four months had elapsed from the murder, and so commitment could not have been based on that act. The hearing having revealed no other acts of danger to himself or others which had occurred within the prior thirty days, there was no evidence indicating that appellant might have been subject to commitment at that time. The hearing judge would have been under no compulsion by virtue of § 6356, to proceed under the MHPA.

Thirdly, even if § 6356 could be relied upon by appellant outside of the Juvenile Act and he had been committable, the relief he requests would be inappropriate. Appellant argues that appropriate relief would be a reversal of his conviction and a remand for “further proceedings under the MHPA.” Understandably, appellant does not outline which proceedings under the MHPA should be followed upon such a reversal — should a court determine whether a defendant is currently subject to involuntary commitment? What if the defendant were no longer mentally ill? What if the defendant was still mentally ill but no longer subject to involuntary commitment under the clear and present danger standard? Under these scenarios, appellant would have this court sanction a reversal of a conviction for murder without even the alternative restraint imposed by commitment. The Commonwealth’s only recourse at such a juncture would be to repeat the whole process of prosecution.

Carrying appellant’s argument one step further, we assume that upon remand a determination of commitment is made. Appellant is confined until his condition no longer evidences a clear and present danger to himself or other, 50 P.S. 7304(a)(2), and is then released. Appellant takes the position that the interests of society are thereupon discharged because the community’s safety has effectively been dealt with by appellant’s treatment, and no further prosecution could follow.

These alleged remedies for failure to proceed under the MHPA are completely at variance with the function of that act. Mental health proceedings were never meant to supplant the operation of the criminal system, but were structured as completely collateral proceedings which could exist contemporaneously with criminal prosecution. Commonwealth v. Ballem, 391 Pa. 626, 139 A.2d 534 (1958). See also, Commonwealth ex rel. McGurrin v. Shovlin, 435 Pa. 474, 257 A.2d 902 (1969) (dissenting opinion of C.J. Bell). The purpose of mental health proceedings in conjunction with criminal prosecution is merely to “inform the conscience of the court”, Commonwealth v. Ballem, supra 391 Pa. at 636, 139 A.2d at 538, unless either lack of criminal responsibility or incompetency to proceed is demonstrated. 50 P.S. §§ 7402, 7403. It is only in these two situations that concerns regarding a defendant’s mental health interrupt the criminal process. Appellant was neither legally insane nor incompetent to stand trial, and so even if he had been involuntarily committed based on dangerous propensities, his criminal prosecution would have advanced. Appellant’s contention that failure to proceed under the MHPA requires a reversal and remand, is therefore, unsound.

Finally, we note that the treatment which appellant seeks for his mental illness is accessible to him through a petition for voluntary commitment, which he has pursued. The availability of voluntary treatment is greater since there is no need for strict due process safeguards, and, furthermore, the MHPA explicitly sets forth a preference for mental health treatment on a voluntary basis. 50 P.S. § 7102.

Accordingly, the judgment of sentence is affirmed.

      . 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502.

      . 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq.

      . 50 P.S. § 7101 et seq; Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, No. 143, § 101 et seq.

      . Contrary to appellant’s assertions, the lower court never found as a fact that appellant was committable. The lower court found only that appellant was suffering from a mental illness, which might well support a finding of commitment.

      . At trial, evidence of appellant’s mental illness was offered only to show diminished capacity; i.e., that he could not have formed an intent to kill or malice.

      . We need not determine which hearings within the jurisdiction of the juvenile system were intended to trigger § 6356 as "any hearing”. Interpretation of the words "any hearing” to mean virtually every hearing under the Juvenile Act, would have the undesirable effect of making superfluous the precise designation of "dispositional hearings of children found to be delinquent.” See, Matter of Employees of Student Services, Inc., 495 Pa. 42, 432 A.2d 189 (1981) (whenever possible each word in a statutory provision is to be given meaning and not to be treated as surplusage). The history of this section and its derivation from § 29 of the Proposed Juvenile Act, Joint State Government Commission, Harrisburg, Pa., 1970, and § 35 of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (1979), suggest, however, that hearings to transfer a child to adult court were the only other hearings which were intended to invoke mental health proceedings. This design meshes with the provisions contained in those acts for transfer to adult court, which require a finding that the child is not committable to a mental institution. Unfortunately, the legislative history is silent as to why § 6356 and its almost identical predecessor under the prior Juvenile Act, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464 No. 333, adopted the catchall language “or at any hearing.”

      . It would be absurd to suggest that a court make a determination as to whether or not a defendant had been committable at a point in the past.


text:
    June 21, 1984.
    478 A.2d 104
    Commonwealth v. Biggs, Appellant.
    Submitted April 24, 1984.
    Patrick J. Flannery, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Robert J. Gillespie, Jr., District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, BECK and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 104
    Commonwealth v. Boynes, Appellant.
    Submitted May 24, 1984.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before DEL SOLE, MONTEMURO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 105
    Commonwealth v. Mehok, Appellant.
    Argued May 22, 1984.
    Garland D. Cherry, Jr., for appellant; Dennis McAndrews, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before DEL SOLE, MONTEMURO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 105
    Commonwealth v. Seals, Appellant.

      Submitted April 24, 1984.
    Vivian A. Sye Payne, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, BECK and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order denying PCHA relief is vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Jurisdiction relinquished.


text:
    478 A.2d 105
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 9, 1985.
    Argued May 17, 1984.
    Peter B. Skeel, for appellant; Howard C. Klebe, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, POPOVICH and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    June 22, 1984.
    478 A.2d 105
    Beal, Appellant, v. SEPTA.

      Argued March 29, 1984.
    Philip E. Bevens, for appellant; Norman Hegge, Jr., for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and McEWEN, JJ.
   The order of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Abraham J. Gafni is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 106
    Campbell v. Pomerantz, Appellant.
    Submitted May 4, 1984.
    Nicholas J. Lisi, for appellant; Joseph L. London, for appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, DEL SOLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 106
    Commonwealth v. Abdullah, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 7, 1985.
    Submitted April 16, 1984.
    Vincent M. Lorusso, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

      Before MONTEMURO, CERCONE and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 106
    Commonwealth v. Adams, Appellant.
    Submitted May 18, 1984.
    Robert D. Gleason, for appellant; David J. Tulowitz-ki, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 106
    Commonwealth v. Allen, Appellant.
    Submitted May 18, 1984.
    Paul Bogdon, for appellant; Melinda G. Tell, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence and order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 107
    Commonwealth v. Bertrand, Appellant.
    Argued March 15, 1984.
    Ronald J. Harper, for appellant; Denis Cohen, Assistant District Attorney,, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WEIAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.

WIEAND, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    478 A.2d 107
    Commonwealth v. Bey, Appellant.
    Submitted November 28, 1983.
    Paul S. Herzberg, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 107
    Commonwealth v. Blanda, Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 1984.
    Anthony W. Debemardo, Jr., for appellant; Alfred B. Bell, Assistant District Attorney, for appel-lee.
    Before POPOVICH, HOFFMAN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   We reverse the order of the lower court and dismiss the bills of information filed against appellant.


text:
    481 A.2d 361
    Commonwealth v. Bolden, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 31, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Feb. 18, 1985.
    Submitted October 14, 1983.
    David N. Rutt, for appellant; William A. Mitchell, Assistant District Attorney, for appel-lee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   The order of the learned Washington County Common Pleas Court Judge Thomas D. Gladden is affirmed.

BECK, J., files a dissenting memorandum.


text:
    478 A.2d 108
    Commonwealth v. Booker, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 3, 1984.
    Submitted January 31, 1984.
    Colie B. Chappelle, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK, and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 108
    Commonwealth v. Branch, Appellant.
    Submitted November 28, 1983.
    James W. Wilson, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 108
    Commonwealth v. Brinkley, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 1, 1984.
    Submitted May 18, 1984.
    Paulette J. Balogh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Melinda G. Tell, Assistant District Attorney, for appel-lee.
    Before McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 108
    Commonwealth v. Brookins, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 27, 1984.
    Submitted April 12, 1984.
    Diane B. Quinlin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for appel-lee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 109
    Commonwealth v. Caldwell, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 15, 1984.
    Submitted March 19, 1984.
    Marilyn J. Gelb, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and ROWLEY and BECK, JJ.
   Order denying PCHA affirmed.

SPAETH, President Judge, concurred in the result.


text:
    478 A.2d 109
    Commonwealth v. Campbell, Appellant.
    Submitted June 22, 1983.
    Jeffery P. Shender, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence as to recklessly endangering another person is vacated; in all other respects, judgments of sentence are affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 109
    Commonwealth v. Chalik, Appellant.
    Submitted March 19, 1984.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and ROWLEY and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 110
    Commonwealth v. Chronister, Appellant.
    Submitted March 13, 1984.
    John J. O’Brien, for appellant; Ray F. Gricar, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WIEAND, and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 110
    Commonwealth v. Crawford, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 9, 1984.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Brian R. Williams, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 110
    Commonwealth v. Davis, Appellant.
    Submitted March 5, 1984.
    Charles H. Junod, Jr., for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 110
    Commonwealth v. Dilbeck, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 9, 1984.

      Submitted November 28, 1983.
    Joseph P. Sklarosky, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Joseph Giebus, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 111
    Commonwealth v. Edmond, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 17, 1984.
    Submitted September 23, 1983.
    Marilyn C. Zilli, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for appel-lee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 111
    Commonwealth v. Eggers, Appellant.

      Submitted February 27, 1984.
    Michael D. Mason, for appellant; Douglas W. Ferguson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 111
    Commonwealth v. Elliott, Appellant.
    Argued March 22, 1984.
    Louis E. Slawe, for appellant; Dawn L. Morton, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before BECK, TAMILIA and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 111
    Commonwealth v. Ellis, Appellant.
    Submitted May 4, 1984.
    Sharon L. Steingard, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

      Before CIRILLO, DEL SOLE and POPOVICH, JJ,
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 112
    Commonwealth v. Filby, Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 1984.
    Robert C. Brady, for appellant; Frank C. Roney, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, HOFFMAN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    478 A.2d 112
    Commonwealth v. Foreman, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 9, 1984.
    Submitted February 21, 1984.
    George Gershenfeld, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 112
    Commonwealth v. Gilliam, Appellant.
    Submitted March 5, 1984.
    Augustine J. Rieffel, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    479 A.2d 624
    Commonwealth v. Gilmore, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 28, 1984.
    Argued December 8, 1983.
    Emmanuel H. Dimitriou, for appellant; Charles A. Haddad, Assistant Attorney General, for appel-lee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 112
    Commonwealth v. Glass, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 25, 1985.
    Submitted March 5, 1984.
    Vivian A. Sye Payne, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 113
    Commonwealth v. Graham, Appellant.
    Submitted April 16, 1984.
    Aaron C. Finestone, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, CERCONE and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 900
    Commonwealth v. Gravely, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 16, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 7, 1985.

      Submitted November 28, 1983.
    Mitchell S. Strutin, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 113
    Commonwealth v. Griffin, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 7, 1985.
    Submitted April 16, 1984.
    George A. Vaughn III, for appellant; Edgar Bayley, Jr., District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, CERCONE and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 113
    Commonwealth v. Griggs, Appellant.
    Argued March 22, 1984.
    Daniel M. Preminger, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before BECK, TAMILIA and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 113
    Commonwealth v. Hanna, Appellant.
    Submitted May 4, 1984.
    Karl F. Longenbach, for appellant; Michael Vedomsky, Assistant District Attorney, for appel-lee.
    Before CIRILLO, DEL SOLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 114
    Commonwealth v. Hart, Appellant.
    Submitted November 28, 1983.
    Larry D. Feldman, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 114
    Commonwealth v. Hubbard, Appellant.
    Submitted November 28, 1983.
    David Zwanetz, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 114
    Commonwealth v. Hughes, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 6, 1984.
    Submitted February 27, 1984.
    Andrew Hughes, appellant in propria persona; Ralph F. Kraft, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 114
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted May 4, 1984.
    Lewis J. Bott, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Joseph Giebus, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, DEL SOLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 115
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted November 28, 1983.
    Vincent A. Couchara, for appellant. Joseph J. Hylan, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 115
    Commonwealth v. Jones, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 30, 1984.

      Submitted May 18, 1984.
    Paulette J. Balogh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 115
    Commonwealth v. Jordan, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 16, 1984.
    Submitted November 28, 1983.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Appeal dismissed.


text:
    478 A.2d 116
    Commonwealth v. Kalchick, Appellant.

      Submitted April 2, 1984.
    Michael A. McGinley, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Adam D. Bavolack, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Remanded for an evidentiary hearing and for findings of fact on the issue of the alleged ineffective assistance of guilty plea counsel. Jurisdiction is retained meanwhile.


text:
    478 A.2d 116
    Commonwealth v. Keenan, Appellant.
    Submitted November 28, 1983.
    Robert F. Pappano, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Helen T. Kane, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 116
    Commonwealth v. Kerpan, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Nov. 21, 1984.

      Argued January 10, 1984.
    Edward Guido, Public Defender, for appellant; Gregory B. Abeln, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence upon the conviction of arson-endangering persons and the judgment of sentence upon attempted theft by deception are affirmed. The judgment of sentence imposed upon the conviction for arson-endangering property is vacated.


text:
    478 A.2d 117
    Commonwealth v. King, Appellant.
    Submitted May 4, 1984.
    Catherine A. Porter, for appellant; Thomas G. Mundhenk, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, DEL SOLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 117
    Commonwealth v. Koons, Appellant.

      Submitted February 3, 1984.
    Joseph J. Yeager, for appellant; Joseph Giebus, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 117
    Commonwealth v. LaMantia, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 9, 1985.
    Argued September 29, 1983.
    Thomas G. Johnson, for appellant; Gregory A. Olson, District Attorney, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the distinguished Indiana County Common Pleas Court Judge Robert C. Earley is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 117
    Commonwealth v. Martinez, Appellant.
    Submitted March 19, 1984.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Richard A. Sheetz, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 118
    Commonwealth v. Martz, Appellant.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    James R. Protasio, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ellen L. Cohen, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 118
    Commonwealth v. McFarland, Appellant.
    Submitted April 2, 1984.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 118
    Commonwealth v. McKeithan, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 17, 1984.
    Submitted April 2, 1984.
    Marlene Cooperman, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order denying P.C.H.A. relief affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 118
    Commonwealth v. Morrison, Appellant.
    Submitted April 16, 1984.
    B. Fincourt Shelton, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, CERCONE and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 119
    Commonwealth v. Murray, Appellant.
    Submitted March 19, 1984.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Edward F. Browne, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and ROWLEY and BECK, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 119
    Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Neishell.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Oct. 1, 1984.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Michael Krushinski, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Michael Neishell, appellee, in propria persona.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

ROWLEY, J., dissented.


text:
    478 A.2d 119
    Commonwealth v. Organiscak, Appellant.
    Submitted April 11, 1984.
    William J. McCormick, for appellant; John Pettit, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 120
    Commonwealth v. Padgett, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 28, 1985.
    Submitted February 24, 1984.
    James W. Harris, for appellant; Sheryl A. Dorney, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, P.J., and CIRILLO and CERCONE, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 120
    Commonwealth v. Pettyjohn, Appellant.
    Submitted April 2, 1984.
    Thomas L. McGill, Jr., for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 120
    Commonwealth v. Pippet, Appellant.
    Submitted April 16, 1984.
    Richard J. Hodgson, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, CERCONE and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 120
    Commonwealth v. Pleasant, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 3, 1984.

      Submitted April 2, 1984.
    James A. Lammendola, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 121
    Commonwealth v. Pue, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 9, 1985.
    Submitted April 2, 1984.
    Joseph T. Kelley, Jr., for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 121
    Commonwealth v. Scurry, Appellant.

      Submitted April 16, 1984.
    Thomas L. McGill, Jr., for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, CERCONE and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 121
    Commonwealth v. Simms, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted March 4, 1985.
    Submitted May 18, 1984.
    Leonard I. Sharon, for appellant; Dara A. DeCourcy, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 122
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 16, 1984.
    Submitted February 27, 1984.
    Donald R. Calaiaro, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Melinda G. Tell, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 122
    Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Stewart.
    Argued January 19, 1984.
    Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Michael Dignazio, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, HESTER and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

HESTER, J., filed dissenting memorandum.


text:
    478 A.2d 122
    Commonwealth v. Stokes, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 5, 1984.
    Submitted February 21, 1984.
    George Gershenfeld, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 122
    Commonwealth v. Tatum, Appellant.
    Submitted February 24, 1984.
    George A. Vaughn, III, for appellant; Edgar Bayley, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and CIRILLO and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CERCONE, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    478 A.2d 123
    Commonwealth v. Toy, Appellant.
    Submitted April 2, 1984.
    John J. Garagozzo, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 123
    Commonwealth v. Wells, Appellant.
    Argued September 22, 1983.
    Gilbert J. Scutti, for appellant; Leslie A. Sudcock, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 123
    Commonwealth v. West, Appellant.
    April 24, 1984.
    Alexander Zdrok, for appellant; Kenneth D. Brown, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, BECK and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence of the learned Lycoming County Common Pleas Court President Judge Thomas C. Raup is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 124
    Commonwealth v. Whitley, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 7, 1984.
    Submitted May 18, 1984.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant; Melinda G. Tell, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 124
    Commonwealth v. Wilson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 1, 1984.
    Argued March 8, 1984.
    Susan Antonelli Flynn, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, MONTEMURO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 124
    Commonwealth v. Wogan, Appellant.
    Submitted February 24, 1984.
    Albert H. Masland, for appellant; John M. Eakin, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and CIRILLO and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 125
    Com. ex rel. Clifford v. Ricchuitti, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 8, 1984.
    Argued April 21, 1983.
    Blaine J. DeSantis, for appellant; Michael A. McGinley, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 125
    Com. ex rel. Fester, Appellant, v. Fester.
    Submitted April 16, 1984.
    Thomas A. James, Jr., for appellant; Alvin J. Luschas, for appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, CERCONE and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CERCONE, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    478 A.2d 125
    Drexel Leasing Corp. v. Boland, Appellant.
    Argued May 3, 1984.
    Neil Keum, for appellant; Jeffrey R. Solomon, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BROSKY and McEWEN, JJ.
   The order of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Julian King is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 125
    General Accident, Appellant, v. Travelers.
    Argued March 15, 1984.
    Victoria H. Roberts, for appellant; David M. McCormick, for appel-lee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

WIEAND, J., filed a dissenting memorandum.


text:
    478 A.2d 126
    Gerzoff, Appellants, v. Schultz Gerzoff, Appellants, v. Dorazio
    (at No. 2123).
    (at No. 2122).
    Argued March 6, 1984.
    Allen L. Feingold, for appellants; Michael B. Tolcott, for Dorazio, appellees (at 2122); Phillip B. Silver-man, for Schultz, appellees (at 2122 and 2123).
    Before ROWLEY, MONTEMURO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Appeals quashed.


text:
    478 A.2d 126
    Holevas v. Reppas, Appellant.
    Argued April 4, 1984.
    Timothy P. Ruth, for appellant; John Thompson, Jr., for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, OLSZEWSKI and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 126
    In the Interest of Mark B.
    Submitted May 18, 1984.
    Richard S. Levine, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Melinda G. Tell, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, participating party.
    Before McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 127
    In the Interest of Chillemi.

      Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 127
    In Matter of Russo.
    Submitted February 21, 1984.
    Lawrence D. MacDonald, for appellant; Anthony J. Miernicki, for participating party.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 127
    Kolick v. Bendler, Appellant.
    Argued March 28, 1984.
    Bridgett A. Nawrock, for appellant; Mindy M. Brook, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and McEWEN, JJ.
   Order of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Samuel H. Rosenberg is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 900
    Kossowsky, Appellant, v. Travelers.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 16, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 11, 1985.
    Argued February 8, 1984.
    Saul Davis, for appellant; Amy S. Cunningham, for appellees.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 127
    Kupetz v. Kupetz, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 12, 1984.
    Submitted May 18, 1984.
    Gregory Ku-petz, appellant, in propria persona; William J. Haberstroh, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 128
    LaFuria, et ux., Appellants, v. Clark, et ux.
    Submitted March 26, 1984.
    John R. Wingerter, for appellant; William Morton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 128
    Mayercheck v. Mayercheck, Appellant.
    Argued April 10, 1984.
    Gordon D. Fisher, for appellant; Joseph A. Mayercheck, appellee in propria persona.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 128
    Morgan, Appellant v. Morgan, Appellant
    (at No. 604)
    (at No. 605).

      Argued March 21, 1984.
    Charles R. Coslett, for appellant (at No. 604) and appellee (at No. 605); Michael J. Cefalo, for appellant (at No. 605) and appellee (at No. 604).
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK and TAMI-LIA, JJ.
   Order of the lower court is affirmed.

SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    478 A.2d 129
    Mull, Appellant v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Appellant
    (No. 1710)
    (No. 1785).
    Argued March 21, 1984.
    John P. Campana, for appellant (at No. 1710), for appellee (at No. 1785); Robert A. Gallagher, for appellant (at No. 1785), for appellee (at No. 1710).
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK and TAMI-LIA, JJ.
   Order of June 9, 1983 affirmed at 1710 Philadelphia 1983.

Order of June 24, 1983 affirmed as modified at 1785 Philadelphia 1983.

SPAETH, President Judge, concurred in the result.


text:
    479 A.2d 624
    Nationwide v. Talisnick, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 29, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 9, 1985.
    Argued April 25, 1984.
    James Womer, for appellant; James C. Haggerty, for appellee.
    Before McEWEN, BECK and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Alfred J. DiBona, Jr. is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 129
    Peck, Appellants, v. The City of New Kensington, et al. Adamsky, Appellants, v. The City of New Kensington, et al.
    (at No. 286).
    (at No. 301).
    Argued April 12, 1984.
    David B. Wasson, for appellants; David F. Taylor, for appellees (at No. 286), and for participating party (at No. 301).
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 129
    Peretin, Appellant, v. Pessolano.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 26, 1984.
    Argued January 26, 1984.
    Anne M. McArdle, for appellant; Robert S. Grigsby, for appellees.
    Before WIEAND, TAMILIA and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

WIEAND, J., concurred in the result.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    478 A.2d 129
    Pronto Enterprises, Appellant, v. City of Monessen, etc.
    Argued April 11, 1984.
    Sanford S. Finder, for appellant; Jack R. Sparacino, for City of Monessen, appellee; Daniel Myshin, for Gaydos; appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 130
    Ryan Homes, Inc., Appellant, v. Courtney, et al.
    Argued May 17, 1984.
    George R. Specter, for appellant; Scott L. Melton, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, POPOVICH and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 130
    Silverman, et al., Appellants, v. Chaplin, M.D., et al.
    Argued April 24, 1984.
    Daniel L. Thistle, for appellants; James B. Jordan, for Chaplin, appel-lee; Richard A. Kolb, for Lankenau, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, CIRILLO and BECK, JJ.
   The order of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Abraham J. Gafni is affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 130
    Surket v. Lovett, Appellant.

      Argued January 31, 1984.
    Samuel B. Hornstein, for appellant; John S. Kerdock, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 130
    Thayer, Appellant, v. Rosier.
    Argued March 14, 1984.
    Michael E. Fingerman, for appellant; Charles S. Silver, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 131
    Williams v. Smith.
    Argued January 11, 1984.
    Janet S. Holcombe, for appellant; Harold Goldner, for Williams, appellee; Joseph I. Papalini, for Smith; appel-lees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment reversed and an appeal from the award of arbitrators shall be allowed. We relinquish jurisdiction.


text:
    478 A.2d 131
    Yandell, Appellants, v. Phillips Gas and Oil Co.
    Argued November 30, 1983.
    Henry A. Hudson, Jr., for appellants; Jay W. Dawson, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, WIEAND and HESTER, JJ.
   That part of the judgment in favor of appellants and against appellee on the question of appellee’s liability for compensatory damages is affirmed. That part of the judgment awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $125.00 is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the law side of the court not inconsistent with this opinion. The appeal, insofar as it is from the trial court’s opinion dealing with the questions of an injunction and punitive damages, is quashed. Jurisdiction is relinquished.


text:
    June 25, 1984.
    478 A.2d 131
    Commonwealth v. Rose, Appellant.

      Submitted February 7, 1984.
    Thomas A. Bowlen, for appellant; Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    June 26, 1984.
    478 A.2d 132
    Commonwealth v. Tucci, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 2, 1984.
    Submitted May 3, 1984.
    Gary N. Asteak, for appellant; Antonia Grifo, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BROSKY and McEWEN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    June 29, 1984.
    481 A.2d 361
    Commonwealth v. Beck, Appellants.
    Reargument Denied Sept. 4, 1984.
    Submitted April 10, 1984.
    Claude V. Falkenhan, for appellants; David L. Cook, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The judgments of sentence are vacated and these matters are remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.

ROWLEY, J., noted his dissent.


text:
    478 A.2d 132
    Commonwealth v. Bryant, Appellant.
    Submitted February 22, 1982.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and BECK, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded to the court of common pleas for a rehearing of appellant’s (1) post-verdict motions and (2) sentencing. The rehearings are to be conducted by a judge or judges other than the challenged trial judge. Jurisdiction is relinquished to the court of common pleas.


text:
    478 A.2d 132
    Commonwealth v. Carelock, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 9, 1985.
    Submitted February 24, 1984.
    Susan C. DeYoung, Assistant Public De-. fender, for appellant; Katherene E. Holtzinger, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and CERILLO and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 133
    Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Dellock.
    Submitted May 9, 1984.
    Kent D. Watkins, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Frank R. Cori, Public Defender, for appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 133
    Commonwealth v. Greenlee, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 8, 1985.
    Submitted February 27, 1984.
    John A. Halley, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed in part and vacated in part.


text:
    478 A.2d 133
    Commonwealth v. Kehl, Appellant.
    Submitted April 30, 1984.
    Scott W. Naus, Public Defender, for appellant; Gailey C. Keller, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 133
    Commonwealth v. Knecht, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 21, 1984.
    Argued December 6, 1982.
    Thomas R. Wilson, for appellant; Lee Ruslander, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
   Order and judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 134
    Commonwealth v. Mellinger, Appellant.
    Submitted April 16, 1984.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Edward F. Browne, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, CERCONE and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 134
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 2, 1984.
    Submitted April 30, 1984.
    Norris E. Gelman, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 134
    Commonwealth v. Saxton, Appellant.
    Submitted July 27, 1983.
    Albert J. Cepparulo, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Upon completion of such proceedings, the complete record shall be recertified and returned to this Court for disposition of appéllant’s remaining claims. Jurisdiction is retained.


text:
    478 A.2d 135
    Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Slotcavage.
    Submitted May 9, 1984.
    Kent D. Watkins, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Thomas K. Noonan, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 135
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, Appellant.
    Argued January 10, 1984.
    M.K. Smith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Phyllis R. Streitel, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 135
    Commonwealth v. Tunsil, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 9, 1985.
    Submitted March 21, 1984.
    Nancy Lib-erson, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK and TAMI-LIA, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 136
    Commonwealth v. Turner, Appellant.
    Submitted April 2, 1984.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence vacated, and case remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction is not retained.


text:
    478 A.2d 136
    Commonwealth v. Wallace, Appellant.
    Submitted May 4, 1984.
    Daniel McGee, for appellant; Dennis C. Pfannenschmidt, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, DEL SOLE and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 136
    Dwyer v. Mayer, Esq., Appellant.
    Argued March 20, 1984.
    Harry R. Mayer, for appellant; Bruce E. Roger, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK and TAMI-LIA, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    479 A.2d 625
    Fidelity Bank v. Daly DeAngelis, et al. v. Com. Title
    (at Nos. 3196 and 816).
    (at Nos. 3197 and 817).
    Reargument Denied Aug. 29, 1984.

      Argued November 22, 1983.
    Edwin K. Daly, Jr., appellant, in propria persona (at Nos. 3196 and 3197) and appellees (at Nos. 816 and 817); Marvin L. Wilenzik, for appellees (at Nos. 817 and 3197) and participating party (at Nos. 3196 and 816).
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and WATKINS and CERCONE, JJ.
   The order of the trial court is reversed; the case is remanded for a hearing after proper notice to all interested parties. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

WATKINS, J., filed a dissenting memorandum.


text:
    478 A.2d 136
    Galano, et ux., Appellants, v. Argiro, et al.
    Submitted March 23, 1984.
    Gordon C. Post, Jr., for appellants; Thomas M. Piccione, for Argiro and Yarema, appellees; Charles W. Garbett, for Dietterle, appellees.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and POPOVICH and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment vacated; case is remanded for a new trial.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.


text:
    478 A.2d 137
    Gordon v. Gordon, Appellant.
    Submitted April 11, 1984.
    William M. Panella, District Attorney, for appellant; Frank J. Piatek, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order of Court of May 16, 1983 is vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

ROWLEY, J., filed a concurring and dissenting memorandum.


text:
    478 A.2d 137
    Hinkson, Appellants, v. Hinkson.
    Submitted May 9, 1984.
    I.B. Sinclair, for appellants; D. Pratt Mannix, for appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    478 A.2d 137
    Moore, Appellant, v. Ranck.
    Submitted May 24, 1982.
    Nathaniel Moore, appellant, in propria persona; J. Michael Flanagan, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

WIEAND, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    478 A.2d 138
    Rangos v. Rangos, Appellant.
    Argued April 11, 1984.
    George Shorall, for appellant; Girard N. Evashavik, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.