author: HESTER, Judge: CAVANAUGH, Judge,

text:
    437 A.2d 752
    Patricia A. MOYER v. Theodore R. MOYER, Jr., Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Dec. 5, 1980.
    Filed Nov. 20, 1981.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 15, 1982.

      Menno B. Rohrer, Lancaster, for appellant.
    Robert S. Trigg, Lancaster, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   HESTER, Judge:

Presently before the court is appellant’s appeal from the Order of the lower court directing a Master in Partition to remit to the Domestic Relations Office of Lancaster County, any funds due appellant and in the possession of said Master, realized from the sale of real estate formerly owned by appellant and appellee as tenants by the entireties. Prior to the time the parties were divorced, appellant was in arrears in support payments for his minor children in an amount in excess of $2,300.00.

Appellant alleges that the court erred in its March 21, 1980 (support) order when it directed a Master in a separate and distinct partition action to remit funds payable to the appellant to a person or entity other than the appellant.

We concur with the action of the lower court and, hence, affirm.

The operative facts may be briefly summarized as follows: Appellee filed a support action on February 28, 1978 against the appellant. At hearing on April 28, 1978, the appellant was ordered to pay $60.00 per week for the support of his minor children. That order has continued in full force and effect at all times relevant to this matter. The parties were divorced by Decree in Divorce dated September 29, 1978 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.

On February 2,1979, (obviously subsequent to the entry of the Decree in Divorce between the parties) appellee filed an action in partition against the appellant in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County pursuant to 68 P.S. § 501 etc.

Appellant did not file an answer to appellee’s Complaint in Partition and thereafter Harry R. Harmon was appointed as Master in Equity. In this capacity, he sold the real estate in question at public sale, which sale was confirmed nisi by the court on January 18, 1980. Exceptions by the appellant to the proposed decree nisi were dismissed on February 15, 1980, and this order also provided that no distribution of funds from the proceeds of public sale shall take place prior to a filing of a proposed Schedule of Distribution by the Master. Neither Exceptions to the February 15, 1980 order nor a proposed Schedule of Distribution have been filed to date.

Returning now to the April 28, 1978 support order, appellee brought a Petition for Rule to Show Cause why appellant should not be held in contempt for his failure to comply with same. A hearing was held on October 4,1979, at which time the lower court directed the appellant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. At the close of the hearing, the court ordered the appellant to pay $500.00 on the arrearages and continued the support order in effect.

On March 21, 1980, the court held another hearing on the support action on a further Rule to Show Cause why appellant should not be held in contempt. The court noted that the appellant had previously been held in contempt and was informed that he had failed to comply with the October 4, 1979 order requiring the payment of $500.00. Following the March 21, 1980 hearing, the court found that the current arrearages were in excess of $2,660.00 and was further advised that Harry R. Harmon, Esquire, the Master in Equity, was holding proceeds from the sale of the real estate pursuant to appellee’s action in partition. The court thus directed the Master in Partition to remit to the Domestic Relations Office to be credited towards the arrearages, any balance of the funds held by him which were otherwise due and payable to the appellant.

Whenever any husband and wife, hereafter acquiring property as tenants by entireties, shall be divorced, they shall thereafter hold such property as tenants in common of equal one-half shares in value and either of them may bring suit against the other to have the property sold and the proceeds divided between them.
As affected 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 2(a) [1092], effective June 27, 1980. 68 P.S. § 501 etc.

Appellant complains that that portion of the March 21, 1980 Order which directs the Master to remit the funds held by him, constituted an abuse of the lower court’s discretion. Appellant argues that said directive violates 68 P.S. § 503 which provides:

§ 503. Division of proceeds; liens; record of divorce decree; payments into court
The proceeds of any sale had under the provisions of this act, after the payment of the expenses thereof, shall be equally divided between the parties, subject, however, to the deduction therefrom of the amount of any lien entered of record jointly against both of the respective parties, together with any interest due thereon and docket costs; and the amount of any liens entered of record against either of such parties, together with interest due and costs taxed thereon shall be deducted from the share of the party against whom such lien is filed, and paid to the person or persons to whom the same is due and payable: Provided, however, That no decree of divorce as aforesaid shall be effective to change the existing law relating to liens upon property held by tenants by the entireties, except a decree of divorce that is valid in this Commonwealth, and not until the said decree of divorce, or a certified copy thereof, shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county where the property is situate, which decree shall be indexed in the grantor’s index against each of the said tenants by the entireties. As affected 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 2(a) [1092], effective June 27, 1980.

as well as Lykiardopoulos v. Lykiardopoulos, 453 Pa. 290, 309 A.2d 548 (1973). Appellant contends that since the support arrearages had not been reduced to judgment, they may not be considered a lien of record. Our Supreme Court in Lykiardopoulos (supra), 453 Pa. at 294, 309 A.2d 548 held:

The statutory language is clear—only liens of record may be deducted from the proceeds of the partition sale. At common law, property which was held in tenancy by the entireties during marriage remained entireties property even after a divorce. O’Malley v. O’Malley, 272 Pa. 528, 532, 116 A. 500 (1922). The Act of May 10, 1927, as amended, which converts a tenancy by the entireties into a tenancy in common after a divorce and permits either party to partition the property, is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Lazare v. Lazare, 365 Pa. 591, 594, 76 A.2d 190 (1950). While the Act provides for the satisfaction of all recorded liens, there is no provision in the Act which will permit the appellant to charge her unliquidated and unrecorded support claims against the appellee’s share of the proceeds. The statute provides for the payment of recorded liens out of the proceeds of the partition sale and they are the only charges permissible. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis added).

Hence, appellant requests that we annul that portion of the appealed-from Order.

Contrariwise, appellee argues that at the March 21, 1980 hearing, it was established that she had procured the entry of a judgment against the appellant for the amount of the support arrearages for the expressed purpose that same may be paid out of the proceeds of the sale from the partition action in satisfaction of a recorded lien. In support of her contention, she directs the court’s attention to a previously-filed Petition to Strike Judgment by appellant which was still pending at the time of the March 21, 1980 hearing. Appellee contends that it was in this context that the lower court entered the Order from which the instant appeal has been brought.

Since we feel that the lower court acted properly in entering its Order, we shall refuse to annul any portion of same and affirm the action of the lower court.

The holding in Lykiardopoulos (supra) is distinguishable on its facts from the case at bar. In Lykiardopoulos, our Supreme Court affirmed a lower court holding that a wife’s claim for support for herself and for her minor children constituted a personal obligation and could not be considered as part of the partition proceeding while in the case at bar appellant’s support arrearages were liquidated and recorded de minimus in the sense that appellant had actual knowledge of same. We conclude that an Order of Support constitutes a sufficient “record” so as to put appellant on actual notice that the proceeds of sale may be used to satisfy his support arrearages.

In our system of justice, a minor dependent child’s entitlement to support and maintenance is founded in statute:

ACTIONS FOR SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE
§ 131. Right of action; jurisdiction; spouses competent witnesses
If any man shall separate himself from his wife or children without reasonable cause, and, being of sufficient ability, shall neglect or refuse to provide suitable maintenance for his said wife or children, action may be brought, at law or in equity, against such husband for maintenance of said wife or children, in the court of common pleas of the county where service may be had on the husband as in other actions at law or in equity or in the county where the desertion occurred, or where the wife or children are domiciled, and the said court shall have power to entertain a bill in equity in such action, and shall make and enforce such orders and decrees as the equities of the case demand, and in such action, at law or in equity, the husband and wife shall be fully competent witnesses. 1907, May 23, P.L. 227, § 1; 1909, April 27, P.L. 182, § 1(1); 1955, Dec. 15, P.L. 878, § 1. 48 P.S. § 131. (Emphases added). (As affected 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 2(a), [902] effective June 27, 1980.)

To the extent that one may opine that we are either deviating from, or carving out, an exception to the literal language of Section 503 quoted above ..., so be it.

As Section 131 dealing with a minor’s entitlement to support and maintenance demands, the court “shall make and enforce such orders and decrees as the equities of the case demand, . . . . ” In the instant case, it is crystal clear that the equities demanded that the court below entered the provision in the appealed-from Order which directed the Master to remit appellant’s portion of the proceeds from the sale towards the payment of accumulated arrearages in support.

Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., files a dissenting opinion.

CAVANAUGH, Judge,

dissenting:

The majority has improperly created its own exceptions to 68 P.S. § 503.

      . § 501. Divorced tenants by entireties hold as tenants in common; suit for sale and division of proceeds

      . As part of the March 21, 1980 Order of the lower court directed that the previously entered support order for the support of the parties five minor children be modified from $60.00 per week to $45.00 per week effective June 5, 1980 at which time Theodore, III was to graduate from high school and was to be removed from the order. This aspect to the March 21, 1980 Order is not relevant to this appeal.

      . There is nothing in the record to indicate whether or not the judgment had, in fact, been entered of record. Be that as it may, we still feel that the lower court acted properly when it ordered the Master in Equity to remit the funds held by him to the office of the Domestic Relations Division in an effort to liquidate the arrearages on appellant’s support order.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: SPAETH, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    437 A.2d 756
    George KOPCHAK and Ethel Kopchak, his wife, of South Union Township, Fayette County, Pennsylvania, Appellants, v. Don L. SPRINGER and Eileen M. Springer, his wife; Robert F. Baker and Jennifer L. Baker, his wife; Myoung S. Kim and Moon Ja Kim, his wife, all of South Union Township, Fayette County, Pennsylvania.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Jan. 13, 1981.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.
    Joseph R. Rygiel, Uniontown, for appellants.

      John R. Hoye, Jr., Uniontown, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, SHERTZ and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   SPAETH, Judge:

This is an action in equity in which appellants, who were plaintiffs below, seek an adjudication that they have a right of way over appellees’ property, and that as defendants, appellees are liable in damages for trespassing upon the easement and for the cost of restoring appellants’ property to its former condition. We cannot reach the merits, however, because appellants have failed to have a final decree entered on the docket. Instead, they have appealed from the order of the lower court dismissing exceptions to the decree nisi. Therefore, we must quash this appeal.

An order dismissing exceptions following a nonjury trial is interlocutory and nonappealable until judgment has been entered. Murray v. Abcon Inc., 294 Pa. Superior Ct. 7, 435 A.2d 1301 (1981). This result is required by Rule 301 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) Entry upon docket below. No order shall be appeal-able until it has been entered upon the appropriate docket in the lower court . . .
(c) Orders not appealable. A direction by the lower court that a specified judgment, sentence or other order shall be entered, unaccompanied by actual entry of the specified order in the docket, or a direction that a verdict of a jury be recorded or entered, or an order denying a motion for a new trial, does not constitute an appealable order. Any such order shall be reduced to judgment and docket before an appeal is taken.

In Murray v. Abcon Inc., supra, this court explained the procedure for parties who wished to take an appeal from a lower court order:

Appeals cannot be taken from a decree nisi. Bogosian v. Foerderer Tract Committee, 264 Pa.Superior Ct. 84, 90, 399 A.2d 408, 410 (1979) .... [Exceptions in equity actions must be filed within ten days of the decree nisi. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1518, 1519 . . . Like other civil cases, upon the dismissal of exceptions, the court shall ‘affirm, modify or change the decree nisi accordingly, or enter any other appropriate order.’ Pa.R.Civ.P. 1519(b) ... if the final decree is not duly entered on the docket, see Pa.R.Civ.P. 1521, it shall be entered upon praecipe of any party. See Pa.R.A.P. 301(d); Pa.R.Civ.P. 237, 1039. We believe that the equity procedures are sufficiently analogous of those in other civil cases, see Pa.R.Civ.P. 1501 and Explanatory Note to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1 to require that a final decree be entered on the docket as a condition precedent to appeal. See Mercadante v. Ranieli, 271 Pa.Superior Ct. 563, 414 A.2d 397 (1979).

Because no final decree was entered in this case, we must quash this appeal.

So ordered.


author: HESTER, Judge: VAN der VOORT, Judge,

text:
    437 A.2d 757
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Linda Susan SMITH. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Linda Susan SMITH, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Dec. 2, 1980.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.

      Van der Voort, J., filed concurring and dissenting statement.
    Michael E. Moyer, Assistant District Attorney, Allentown, for Commonwealth, appellant in No. 136 and for Commonwealth, appellee in No. 554.

      Armando C. Salazar, Assistant Public Defender, Allentown, for Smith, appellant in No. 554 and for appellee in No. 136.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   HESTER, Judge:

This is an appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. The procedural history and facts relevant to the issue on appeal are as follows:

Appellant was convicted by a jury of robbery, theft, recklessly endangering another person and terroristic threats. Post-trial motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were timely filed, and the Motion for New Trial was denied. The Motion in Arrest of Judgment was granted as to the conviction for Recklessly Endangering Another Person. After appellant was sentenced, this timely appeal followed.

Appellant contends her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by needlessly bringing out the fact that one of the alibi witnesses had a criminal record.

Our Supreme Court has held that counsel is not ineffective whenever there is some reasonable basis for his actions designed to effectuate his client’s interests. Com. ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).

As her defense, appellant presented only the testimony of two alibi witnesses. She did not testify in her own defense. Upon direct examination of one of the alibi witnesses, trial counsel voluntarily revealed a prior conviction for corruption of a minor, which had allegedly occurred during the mid-fifties, some 23 years prior to the date of trial. On cross-examination, the witness volunteered that the offense was, in fact, statutory rape.

Appellant argues that the offense does not involve dishonesty or false statements and could not have been used by the Commonwealth for impeachment purposes. Commonwealth v. Moore, 246 Pa.Super. 163, 369 A.2d 862 (1977).

In Commonwealth v. Reidenbaugh, 266 Pa.Super. 315, 404 A.2d 697 (1978), trial counsel elicited the fact that the defendant had prior convictions for fornication and corrupting the moral of a minor. There, we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine counsel’s reasons for introducing the testimony. We held that counsel may have done so in order to bolster the credibility of the defendant.

Here, however, the alibi testimony could have been crucial to appellant’s defense and was submitted by a witness, not the defendant. The alibi of appellant was further substantiated by another witness, (the wife of the prior witness,) who had testified to his prior criminal record.

Revealing a prior conviction for a major felony such as statutory rape, where the Commonwealth would have been unable to do so on cross-examination, could have constituted ineffectiveness.

Appellant was charged with the commission of a serious crime. The victim testified that the appellant stated, during the holdup: “I have a gun. I will blow your head off in five seconds,” and “I have a gun, open your register.” (N.T.13). Trial counsel had decided not to put appellant on the stand. It was important for the defense that the testimony of the alibi witnesses be as credible as possible. We are here requested to evaluate defense counsel’s strategy.

As we stated in Reidenbaugh (supra), 266 Pa.Super. at page 701 of 404 A.2d:

The possibility that trial counsel’s strategy was as argued by the Commonwealth seems remote, but not impossible. Much would depend on the atmosphere at trial: how well or badly appellant seemed to have fared with the jury on the substance of his direct testimony; how much or little he seemed in need of some extra touch to persuade the jurors that he was trying on this occasion to tell the truth. Given our inability, as an appellate court, to appraise these factors, we are persuaded by the Commonwealth’s suggestion that the proper procedure in this case is to remand the case for a hearing under Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975).

Because of appellant’s ineffectiveness claim, we are constrained to vacate the judgment of sentence and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the claim. See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977).

Defense trial counsel’s questioning of Richard Hottenstein, an alibi witness concerning his 23-year old conviction for Statutory Rape, requires an evidentiary hearing to explore counsel’s reasons for such questioning.

In the event the lower court should find counsel was ineffective, then it shall grant appellant a new trial. On the other hand, if the court finds counsel was not ineffective, it shall order the judgment of sentence reinstated. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment of sentence vacated and case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Commonwealth has appealed the granting of appellant’s Motion in Arrest of Judgment as to the conviction for Recklessly Endangering Another Person.

In vacating appellant’s conviction on this charge, the court below stated:

Defendant’s final argument is that there was insufficient evidence to find her guilty of the crime of recklessly endangering another person, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. Conviction of this crime requires a showing of actual present ability to inflict injury and “if the charge was assault by pointing a revolver and threatening to shoot, the Commonwealth would have to show that the revolver was loaded.” Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 261 Pa.Super.Ct. 109, 395 A.2d 1337, 1340 (1978).
In the case at hand, the evidence showed that defendant pointed a black object which was concealed under her coat, said that she had a gun and that she would blow the clerk’s head off in five seconds. We conclude that the assault consisted of threatening to shoot a gun, and therefore that the Commonwealth was obligated to show that the revolver was loaded. Since evidence to this effect was not submitted, we agree that there was insufficient evidence to convict defendant of recklessly endangering another person. (N.T.13-14).

We are of the opinion that this is a correct evaluation of our holding in Trowbridge. We will affirm the court below as to its vacation of appellant’s conviction of Recklessly Endangering Another Person.

VAN der VOORT, J., files a concurring and dissenting statement.

VAN der VOORT, Judge,

concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the remand ordered by the majority for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel. I respectfully dissent to the granting of the motion in arrest of judgment on the charge of recklessly endangering another person. I particularly dissent to that part of our opinion which recites what appears to be dictum in the case of Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 261 Pa.Superior Ct. 109, 114, 396 A.2d 1337, 1340 (1978) as follows: “[I]f the charge was assaulting by pointing a revolver and threatening to shoot, the Commonwealth would have to show that the revolver was loaded.” I believe that when the Commonwealth has proved that a defendant has pointed what appears to be a deadly weapon at another person and threatened to shoot, that such proof is sufficient to support a verdict of recklessly endangering another person. Hence my dissent in Trowbridge.

I would reverse the action of the Court below in arresting judgment on the charge of recklessly endangering another person and remand it along with the other charges in this case for an evidentiary hearing on the claimed ineffectiveness of counsel.


author: WICKERSHAM, Judge:

text:
    437 A.2d 760
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Deborah Louise HOMSHER, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted March 2, 1981.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, Lancaster, for appellant.
    Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, Lancaster, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WICKERSHAM and BRO-SKY, JJ.
   WICKERSHAM, Judge:

On May 20, 1978, Trooper Lawrence E. Albert of the Pennsylvania State Police conducted an investigation at 20 Michele Lynn Drive, Lancaster, Pennsylvania. He had a search warrant for an apartment on the second floor occupied by one Fred Homsher which related to alleged gambling. When Trooper Albert executed his search warrant, he found Fred Homsher, his wife Judith Homsher and his daughter Deborah Homsher, appellant, in the apartment. During the course of the search, which included the living room and several bedrooms, certain items were taken from a small three tier nightstand just adjacent to the bed in the room identified as that of the daughter, Deborah Homsher.

A I seized those items personally and maintained them into evidence.
Q What did you see?
A The time of the seizure would be four thirty-three p. m., and the following items were seized from the top drawers of the three tier nightstand: Twelve cigarettes which were hand rolled, and containing a brown vegetation, seven various type pipes which contained residue or what appeared to be a residue of hash, five blue heart-shaped pills, one clip which is referred to as a roach clip which contained some type of burned material at the very end, two pipe heads which contained some type of burned ash, and one plastic baggie with another plastic baggie stuck inside.
Q From your examination of the items that you seized were you able to make a preliminary determination of what that vegetable substance was?
A It appeared to be marijuana.
Q At the time you seized these were any discussed by any of the occupants in the apartment?
A Well, when I was called into that bedroom, Trooper Taylor was talking to Deborah Homsher and he advised her that she didn’t have to say anything to us, may remain silent, she didn’t have to say anything, at which time I readvised her of her Miranda Rights at four forty hours.
Q And after you readvised her of her Miranda Rights at four forty, what happened?
A I said, she said to me that these items that we have, then she said these items in my room from my pocketbook, they are my items.

Record at 31-32.

In March of 1979, Deborah Louise Homsher was tried before the Honorable Wilson Bucher and a jury on a charge of possessing a small amount of marijuana, to wit, less than thirty grams, only for personal use. The jury found her guilty of the charge and she took this direct appeal.

The contention of the appellant is that at time of the search she lived in the apartment of her father Fred Homsher. Further that the police had information relating to her father’s gambling activities and had obtained a search warrant for his premises. She claims that the Pennsylvania State Police knew during the course of their search of the apartment that it was her room and not her father’s room into which the police extended their search of the premises. She argues that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy guaranteed her by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. She alleges that the search of her room therefore exceeded the scope of the search warrant and violated the holdings of Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973) and Commonwealth v. Banahasky, 250 Pa.Super. 495, 378 A.2d 1257 (1977).

We do not agree. This case is much closer to Commonwealth v. Sellers, 236 Pa.Super. 191, 344 A.2d 689 (1975).

In Sellers, Pittsburgh Police Officers secured a warrant authorizing a search of a two and half story brick building occupied by Harold Ford, a suspected drug dealer. When the officers arrived at the location indicated in the warrant, they were directed to Harold Ford’s third floor bedroom.

I. Whether it was error to deny the request to suppress the contraband found in the appellant’s bedroom?
II. Whether it was trial error for the court to deny the appellant’s testimony concerning a “strip search” when said testimony would have shown to the jury appellant’s state of mind at the time when she allegedly gave an inculpatory statement?
There, the officers observed Ford standing in the doorway to the bedroom and appellee lying nude in a bed in the room. The officers testified that there were numerous articles of women’s clothing in the bedroom, as well as a handbag sitting on a nightstand.
The officers proceeded to execute the search of the room and its contents. As part of the search for narcotic drugs, the officers examined the handbag located on the nightstand. They removed from this pocketbook a pack of cigarettes which contained ten silver packets of heroin. No other contraband was discovered. Neither appellee nor Ford indicated in any manner that the handbag belonged to appellee before the officers carried out the search. However, after papers and cards identifying appellee were discovered inside the pocketbook, she admitted ownership. The officers also discovered letters addressed to appellee at the Shetland Avenue address.
The lower court concluded that appellee was nothing more than a guest in the house and as such, her possessions could not be searched under the existing warrant. This determination was based on the cases of Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973), and Commonwealth v. Reece, 437 Pa. 422, 263 A.2d 463 (1970). However, a close examination of the factual situations in Platou and Reece reveal substantial differences from the facts in the instant case.
In Platou, police obtained a warrant to search the apartment of Robert Wander. Although the officers were informed that Peter Platou was a guest in the apartment, and there was no evidence to the contrary, the police searched his two suitcases which were in the apartment at the time. Our Supreme Court, emphasizing that the police knew Platou was a visitor, held that the search of the suitcases was not covered under a warrant authorizing a search of the apartment because the warrant did not cover guests and their belongings and could not arbitrarily be so extended.
The facts of Reece indicate that the police staged a raid on a suspected drug party and searched the people present. After the police had been on the scene for several hours, Robert Reece entered the apartment ostensibly to find a friend who was at the party. The police identified themselves and proceeded to search Reece. The search was declared unconstitutional because the warrant authorized only a search of the apartment and did not include guests. The court noted that Reece gave the officers no reason to justify a warrantless search, and that his mere belated presence at the scene of a crime was not enough to justify an arrest.
In the case at bar, there is positive evidence that appellee was, in fact, not a mere visitor at the apartment. The clothing in the bedroom indicated the presence of more than just a casual visitor. And more significant, the mail addressed to appellee at the Shetland Avenue address belies any argument that appellee did not maintain a residence in Ford’s house. Finally, neither appellee nor Ford indicated that appellee did not live in the house until after the search had been completed.
Even if we assume that appellee was merely a visitor, we would still be constrained to uphold the search of the handbag. Prior to the search, there was no indication that it belonged to a guest or was not to be considered as part of the general contents of the room. ... Just as the police were expected to search the dresser drawers, closet, and clothing found in the room, they would also be expected to search any bags and pocketbooks lying around which could obviously be used to secret heroin. It would have been a dereliction of duty for the officers to fail to inspect areas and objects which were apparently part of the premises covered by the warrant and under the control of Ford....

Commonwealth v. Sellers, supra, id., 236 Pa.Super. at 194-195, 344 A.3d at 690-91.

In Commonwealth v. Wheatley, 266 Pa.Super. 1, 402 A.2d 1047 (1979), the Commonwealth appealed from an order suppressing a handgun which constituted the basis for charging Wheatley, appellee, with violating the Uniform Firearms Law. The handgun was located in the pocket of Wheatley’s jacket which was hanging on a kitchen chair. It was found by police who were executing a valid warrant to search for heroin and drug paraphernalia in the dwelling of Janet Craighead, the woman with whom Wheatley was living.

After reviewing Platon and Sellers, Judge Wieand speaking for our Court said:

Nevertheless, there are several common threads which are apparent in the Platon and Sellers decisions. The first is that a warrant to search a person’s premises or effects includes the authority to search things under the control of that person. The second principle which emerges is that control by the person named in the warrant will more readily be found where the effects belong to a resident of the premises than where the item to be searched belongs to a casual visitor.

Commonwealth v. Wheatley, id., 266 Pa.Super. at 6, 402 A.2d at 1050.

Instantly, we hold that it would have been a dereliction of duty for the officers to fail to inspect areas and objects which were obviously part of the premises covered by the search warrant and under the control of Fred Homsher. Appellant was not a guest but a resident of the apartment occupied by her father, Fred Homsher and gambling paraphernalia could very easily have been secreted throughout her bedroom. The police had a perfect right to search as they did and we affirm the action of the suppression court below.

In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), the police agents had an arrest warrant for Ricky Lyons when they entered the home of Hoyt Gaultney in search of Lyons. While in the Gaultney home, looking for Lyons, the officers discovered cocaine and other incriminating evidence. The United States Supreme Court through Justice Marshall said:

The question before us is a narrow one. The search at issue here took place in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. Except in such special situations, we have consistently held that the entry into a home to conduct a search or make an arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant.

Id. at 211, 101 S.Ct. at 1647, 68 L.Ed.2d at 45.

Instantly, the police had a search warrant for the apartment occupied by Fred Homsher. The police were looking for gambling paraphernalia and had every right, pursuant to the search warrant, to carefully go through the rooms and the contents of the rooms. The incriminating evidence thereby discovered was admissible at trial against appellant, Deborah Homsher.

The final contention on appeal was waived as it was not raised by appellant before the lower court nor was it discussed by the lower court in its opinion, Only those issues included in post-verdict motions will be considered preserved for appellate review. Commonwealth v. Gravely, 486 Pa. 194, 404 A.2d 1296 (1979).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      . The validity of the search warrant is not in question here.

      . At trial, Michael J. Rostolsky, represented Deborah Louise Homsher and on this appeal Thomas G. Klingensmith, of the office of the public defender. She presents two questions for our consideration.


author: MONTEMURO, Judge:

text:
    437 A.2d 763
    Anne S. PRICE v. Morris B. GELLER and Joel S. Geller, Appellants.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 21, 1981.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.

      Norman M. Abrams, Jenkintown, for appellants.
    James L. Price, Philadelphia, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and WATKINS, JJ.
   MONTEMURO, Judge:

This case is before the court on appeal from an Order denying appellants’ petition to Open Judgment.' Appellee, Anne S. Price, confessed judgment pursuant to a warrant of attorney contained in a bond against appellants, Morris B. Geller and Joel S. Geller.

After the taking of depositions, and after oral argument, the lower court denied the Petition. On appeal, appellants contend that sufficient evidence had been produced to raise issues of fact which should have been decided by a jury. We agree and reverse for the following reasons.

The facts of the case are as follows:

In September of 1972, Somerton Manor Apartments was sold by Sorenson Associates, Inc., the principals of which were James L. Price and his wife, Anne S. Price, to Somerton Manor Apartments, Inc., the principals of which were Morris B. Geller, Joel S. Geller, George Green, and a corporation, Rosenthal and Rosenthal, Inc. Before the sale, a first mortgage was held by Fidelity Bond and Mortgage Company. At the time of the sale, a second mortgage was created with Rosenthal and Rosenthal, Inc., as mortgagee, and a third mortgage for $60,000 with Sorenson Associates, Inc., as mortgagee. The Gellers executed a collateral bond for $60,000 to the Prices in connection with the third mortgage. Sometime thereafter, Somerton Manor Apartments, Inc. transferred title to the property to Somerton Manor Apartments, a limited partnership, comprised of the same principals as the corporation. On November 8, 1976, the Gellers transferred their interest in the partnership to Stephen Rosenthal, one of the principals of Rosenthal and Rosenthal. Stephen Rosenthal agreed to indemnify the Gellers against any liability which they might incur on the collateral bond.

In the Spring of 1975, the Prices stopped receiving mortgage payments from Somerton Manor Apartments. At the time of the cessation of payments, the outstanding balance was approximately $31,600.

On March 25, 1975, Rosenthal and Rosenthal instituted mortgage foreclosure proceedings on its second mortgage. When the Prices learned of this they contacted Rosenthal and Rosenthal to work out a settlement on the third mortgage. They were referred to Ed Fitzgerald, the attorney for the partnership. On October 24, 1977, as a result of the negotiations, the Prices sold the third mortgage to Rosenthal and Rosenthal for $15,000 and executed a mortgage satisfaction piece which was recorded. The Prices did not return the bond and the warrant associated with the third mortgage.

On November 14, 1977, the Prices demanded payment by the Gellers for the balance due on the third mortgage. The Gellers responded by telling the Prices that they had sold their interest to Stephen Rosenthal. On June 23,1978, Price confessed judgment on the collateral bond against the Gellers. In their petition to open, the Gellers alleged that the $15,000 payment to Price was intended to satisfy both the mortgage and the collateral bond.

A confessed judgment should be opened if evidence is produced which, in a jury trial, would require the issue to be submitted to the jury. Reliance Insurance Company v. Liberati, 489 Pa. 591, 414 A.2d 1049 (1980); Pa.R.C.P. 2959(e).

The payment of either a mortgage or a collateral bond discharges both, “and a release of extinguishment of either, without actual payment, is a discharge of the other, unless otherwise intended by the parties.” Fleming v. Parry, 24 Pa. 47 (1854). The issue in this case, therefore, is whether the testimony created an issue of fact concerning the intentions of the parties to extinguish the collateral bond. Under Fleming v. Parry, id., the effect of the mortgage release is to create a presumption of the extinguishment of the collateral bond.

A review of the testimony in the depositions leads us to conclude that appellants did produce sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact which should be decided at trial.

Stephen Rosenthal, the assignee of the Gellers’ interest in the apartment building, testified as follows:

Q. When you spoke to Mr. Fitzgerald or you mailed to Mr. Fitzgerald the fifteen thousand dollars, what instructions were given to him regarding the money?
A. To satisfy—that money was in payment for satisfaction of the third mortgage on the property and other obligations. It was a total satisfaction of that mortgage.
Q. As you recollect, was the amount owed as a result of that third mortgage any other collateral obligations greater than fifteen thousand dollars, less than fifteen or . . .
A. It was greater.
Q. And this sum then was given by way of compromise of the debt that was due?
A. Absolutely.
N.T. 74a

This testimony by Rosenthal, the party who under the indemnification agreement with the Gellers would ultimately be responsible for the obligation on the mortgage and bond, is in direct contrast to the testimony of appellee. Mr. Price testified that a release of the collateral bond was never intended. It is not necessary to delve any further into the testimony since as we previously stated, it is not appropriate to rule on the credibility or sufficiency of the testimony, but only to decide whether an issue of fact has been presented. Pa.R.C.P. 2959(e).

Accordingly, the order of the lower court is reversed.

      . Depositions were taken of James L. Price, Morris B. Geller, Joel S. Geller and Stephen Rosenthal.

      . The fact that appellees retained the bond is one factor rebutting this presumption.


author: MONTGOMERY, Judge:

text:
    437 A.2d 765
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Thomas GREY, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Sept. 9, 1981.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 5, 1982.

      Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Mary Ann E. Cox, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   MONTGOMERY, Judge:

Appellant Thomas Grey was convicted before the Honorable Lisa Richette, sitting without a jury, of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. Following denial of post-verdict motions and sentencing, he filed this direct appeal. We affirm.

The charges against Appellant arose out of two separate sales of methamphetamine hydrochloride to undercover police officer Jerome Harris. Appellant and Officer Harris were initially introduced, on March 22, 1979, by one Evelyn Lewis, a police informant. At that time, Appellant sold one-half ounce of methamphetamine to Officer Harris. Miss Lewis witnessed this transaction. About two months later, on May 23, 1979, a second sale took place which Miss Lewis did not witness. Appellant was arrested on July 3, 1979.

Appellant’s first contention on this appeal is that the Commonwealth, in addition to disclosing the identity of Miss Lewis, had a duty to produce her in court. This claim is without merit. The cases cited by Appellant deal only with disclosure of an informant’s name and whereabouts prior to trial, or with production of an informant where the informant was the sole eyewitness. See, e. g., United States v. Jones, 492 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1974). In the instant case Miss Lewis’s identity was disclosed to Appellant as was her last known address. In addition, the court and Officer Harris attempted to locate Miss Lewis in November of 1979, the time of Appellant’s hearing on his formal motion to produce her. Thus, the Commonwealth revealed as much information as it had and was under no duty to physically produce Miss Lewis. Commonwealth v. Manley, 252 Pa.Super.Ct. 77, 380 A.2d 1290 (1977). Also, Appellant has not shown that Miss Lewis’s testimony would even be helpful to him, as is required for the court to order disclosure. Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa.Super.Ct. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973). Miss Lewis witnessed only one of the two transactions and could not have been helpful to Appellant as to the second sale. Appellant did claim there were witnesses to the second transaction, however, he did not call any of them, which tends to refute any claim of prejudice Appellant might make. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 254 Pa.Super.Ct. 186, 385 A.2d 588 (1978).

Appellant also contends that the 41-day delay between the second transaction and the date of arrest constitutes a deprivation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is clear that a defendant is entitled to relief under the Due Process Clause only if he is prejudiced by the delay and if the purpose of the delay is to gain a tactical advantage over him. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). The length of the delay is irrelevant as long as there is no statute of limitations problem. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa. 340, 390 A.2d 172 (1978) (delay of over six years). In the few cases sustaining a claim of this nature, the defendant showed a significant loss of memory and a concomitant inability to discover witnesses, an inability of the government’s witness to testify from memory and a complete lack of justification for the delay. Commonwealth v. DeRose, 225 Pa.Super.Ct. 8, 307 A.2d 425 (1973); Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965). As we noted above, we do not believe Appellant’s inability to obtain the testimony of Miss Lewis was prejudicial to him. Appellant makes no other claim of lost witnesses, loss of memory or anything else that would show the actual prejudice required. Commonwealth v. Daniels, supra. Therefore, we must reject this claim.

Affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurs in the result.


author: HOFFMAN, Judge:

text:
    437 A.2d 767
    Bernice SELBY, Administratrix of the Estate of Anthony Frank Selby, Deceased, Appellant, v. Edward I. BROWN.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 6, 1981.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.

      George J. O’Neill, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Charles P. Menszak, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN, and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   HOFFMAN, Judge:

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in denying her petition to proceed in forma pauperis. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the order of the lower court.

Appellant commenced this action after her minor child was struck and killed by appellee’s automobile. Following a trial by jury, appellant was awarded a $43,200 verdict. This Court subsequently granted appellee a new trial. Selby v. Brown, 250 Pa. Superior Ct. 134, 378 A.2d 862 (1977). After retrial, the jury returned a verdict for appellee, prompting appellant’s motion for new trial or judgment n. o. v. Because she was unable to meet the cost of transcribing the notes of testimony as required by rule 240(d) of the Philadelphia C.P. Rules of Court, appellant petitioned the court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court accepted all of appellant’s averments as correct, but nonetheless refused the petition on the ground that it was the obligation of appellant’s counsel to meet the necessary costs. We granted appellant’s petition to appeal from the lower court’s interlocutory order. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b).

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in denying her petition despite accepting all the averments of her poverty. She argues that the common law right to proceed in forma pauperis was not abrogated by her contingent-fee agreement with counsel and that such an agreement does not shift the financial burdens of litigation to her counsel. We agree. It is the recognized policy of this Commonwealth that when a plaintiff is proved to be in poverty, he has the right to prosecute his suit free from costs. Davila v. Soto, 250 Pa. Superior Ct. 42, 44, 378 A.2d 443, 444 (1977); Mitek v. Ste-Mel Signs, Inc., 222 Pa. Superior Ct. 395, 294 A.2d 813 (1972). Such a policy is firmly rooted in the common law and “provides relief from filing fees and court costs to indigent persons in the commencement and prosecution of civil actions.” Thompson v. Garden Court, Inc., 277 Pa. Superior Ct. 460, 463, 419 A.2d 1238, 1240 (1980). A contingent-fee agreement often provides “the only practical means by which one having a claim against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute his case.” Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-20. However, the costs of prosecution remain the responsibility of the client regardless of the outcome of the litigation.

A contract for a reasonable contingent fee where sanctioned by law is permitted by Canon 13, but the client must remain responsible to the lawyer for expenses advanced by the latter. “There is to be no barter of the privilege of prosecuting a cause for gain in exchange for the promise of the attorney to prosecute at his own expense.” (Cardozo, Ch. J. in Matter of Gilman, 251 N.Y 265, 270-271, 167 N.E. 437.)

ABA Opinion 246 (1942). See also Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-103(B) (permitting an attorney to advance costs “provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses”). We cannot agree with the lower court that the right to proceed in forma pauperis is waived by the signing of a contingent-fee agreement. Because the costs of prosecuting an action remain that of the plaintiff and not counsel, we can find no justification for denying appellant the right to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the lower court and grant appellant’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis.

So ordered.

       Philadelphia C.P. Rules of Court 240(d) required appellant to certify whether the transcript is essential to a proper disposition of the post-trial motions, and then to file a copy if it is. Appellant certified that the transcript was necessary and ordered it to be transcribed, but was unable to pay the estimated $1,170.00 expense.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    437 A.2d 768
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Philip SPITZER, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Dec. 5, 1980.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.
    Saul L. Langsam, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Edward F. Browne, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Lancaster, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a summary conviction for reckless driving. A review of the record discloses that the appellant failed to file any post-trial motions. Consistent with this court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Koch, 288 Pa.Super. 290, 431 A.2d 1052 (1981) and the comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123 (effective July 1, 1981), we remand for the filing of post-trial motions. We also remand for compliance with Pa.R.A.P. rules 1923 and 1925.

Case remanded. We are not retaining jurisdiction over this case.


text:
    437 A.2d 769
    George A. SHADIE, George R. Shadie, and Ronald G. Shadie, t/a Shadie Electrical Associates, Appellants, v. NANTICOKE UAW HOUSING COMPANY, and Keystone UAW Housing Corporation.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Dec. 2, 1980.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.
    B. Todd Maguire, Wilkes-Barre, for appellants.

      David L. Shenkle, Doylestown, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

The appeal was taken in this case from the following lower court order: “Now this 28th day of April, 1980, at 3:45 P.M., EDT, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that Defendants’ motion for a more specific pleading is sustained; further, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, unless Plaintiffs file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of service hereof.” Such an order is not final and appealable. Pa.R.A.P. 301(c).

Appeal quashed.


author:
PER CURIAM:
      VAN der VOORT, Judge,

text:
    437 A.2d 769
    Geraldine McFETRIDGE, Executrix of the Estate of Richard T. McFetridge, Deceased, Appellant, v. AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS COMPANY, INC. v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION and Welding and Steel Fabrication Company, Inc.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 13, 1980.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.

      Steven H. Wyckoff, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
    Avrum Levicoff, Pittsburgh, for Air Products & Chemicals Co., Inc., appellee.
    Daniel F. Cusick, Pittsburgh, for Westinghouse Elec. Corp., appellee.
    Charles Kirshner, Pittsburgh, for Welding and Steel Fabrication Co., Inc., appellee.
    Before HESTER, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

Appeal was taken in this case from a lower court order denying plaintiff’s motions to remove compulsory nonsuits and for a new trial. Because the order has not been reduced to judgment and docketed on the basis of Pa.R.A.P. 301(c) the appeal is untimely. Durkin & Sons, Inc. v. Nether Providence Township School Authority, et al., 291 Pa.Superior Ct. 402, 435 A.2d 1288 (1981).

Appeal quashed.

VAN der VOORT, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

VAN der VOORT, Judge,

concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the action of the majority in quashing this appeal insofar as it pertains to the refusal of. plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. I respectfully dissent to that part of the decision by the majority insofar as it pertains to the denial of plaintiff’s motion to remove the compulsory non-suits. See my concurring and dissenting opinion in Durkin & Sons, Inc. v. Nether Providence Township School Authority, et al, 291 Pa.Superior Ct. 402, 435 A.2d 1288 (1981).


text:
    437 A.2d 770
    Mildred HAYES, Appellant, v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 21, 1981.
    Filed Nov. 30, 1981.
    Thomas R. Kline, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Norman Hegge, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellee.
    Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

This appeal from an order denying appellant’s exceptions following a nonjury trial was taken before a final judgment was entered on the docket. It is interlocutory and must be quashed. Pa.R.A.P. 301(c). See, e. g., Heffner v. Bock, 288 Pa. Superior Ct. 345, 346, 430 A.2d 318, 319 (1981).

Appeal quashed.


text:
    February 6, 1981.
    433 A.2d 97
    Commonwealth v. Anderson, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Edward F. Browne, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 97
    Commonwealth v. Badman, etc., Appellant.
    Argued March 3,1980.
    Raymond J. Lobos, for appellant; Thomas C. Clark, District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 98
    Commonwealth v. Grant, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Kathryn L. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., SHERTZ, and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

CERCONE, P. J., concurred in the result.


text:
    433 A.2d 98
    Commonwealth v. Hanna, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Hugh C. Clark, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 98
    Commonwealth v. Holmes, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    James A. Swetz, for appellant; James F. Marsh, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 99
    Commonwealth v. Hunter, Appellant.
    Argued March 3, 1980.
    Robert L. Walsh, for appellant; Floyd P. Jones, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 99
    Commonwealth v. Oberdick, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted March 12, 1979.
    Laurence T. Himes, Jr., for appellant; Daniel R. Kehm, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 99
    First Mortgage Co. of Pennsylvania v. Denagy, Appellant.
    Argued June 9, 1980.
    Robert A. Godwin, for appellant; Richard F. Stern, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 99
    March, Appellant v. Halterman.
    Argued March 4, 1980.
    Gibson B. Smith, for appellant; Gerald E. Ruth, submitted a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Appeal dismissed.


text:
    433 A.2d 100
    McCoy, Appellant v. McCoy.

      Argued April 16, 1980.
    William H. Eckert, for appellant; Neil R. Rosen, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 100
    Pond, Sr. v. Pond, Appellant.
    Submitted March 21, 1980.
    Joseph M. A. Nelabovige, for appellant; Jay Tract, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 100
    Schreiber, et ux., Appellants, v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co.
    Argued December 2, 1980.
    Dennis L. Friedman, for appellants; David Sorin, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    February 13, 1981.
    433 A.2d 100
    Commonwealth v. Boyer, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Alan B. Ziegler, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 101
    Commonwealth v. Carter, Appellant.
    Argued April 14, 1980.
    Vincent R. Baginski, for appellant; Victor H. Pribarric, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

VAN der VOORT, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    433 A.2d 101
    Commonwealth v. Colquitt, Appellant.
    Submitted April 16, 1980.
    Harry E. Knafelc, for appellant; John L. Brown, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 101
    Commonwealth v. Daniels, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John P. Liekar, for appellant; Daniel L. Chunko, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 102
    Commonwealth v. Donaldson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 17, 1981.

      Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Arthur J. King, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; John T. Salvucci, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 102
    Commonwealth v. Ford a/k/a Africa, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Joel W. Todd, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed on the able and comprehensive opinion of Judge Paul Ribner.


text:
    433 A.2d 102
    Commonwealth v. Hale, Appellant.

      Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Alan Frank, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 102
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 103
    Commonwealth v. Martin, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Dec. 21, 1981.
    Submitted March 21,1980.
    William Caprio, III, for appellant; William S. Kieser, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    433 A.2d 103
    Commonwealth v. McLean, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied April 8, 1981.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Jesse E. Shearin, for appellant; Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 103
    Commonwealth v. Stephany, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Ronald R. Pellish, for appellant; Richard B. Russell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 104
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11,1980.
    William F. Ochs, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant; George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower Court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 104
    Commonwealth v. Yingling, Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    Kenneth L. Rotz, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gary E. Hartman, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 104
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Zindel, Jr.
    Submitted December 8, 1978.
    Edward M. Rendell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Donald Marino, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and HESTER and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 105
    Commonwealth ex rel. Toonder v. Toonder. Appeal of F. Geoffrey Toonder. Appeal of Andrea M. Toonder.
    Submitted March 21, 1980.
    Jack I. Kaufman, for appellant (at Nos. 1048 and 1049) and for appellee (at Nos. 1110 and 1111); John E. Roberts, for appellant (at Nos. 1110 and 1111) and for appellee (at Nos. 1048 and 1049).
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed as it relates to custody but modified as to claim of the mother for expenses and counsel fees. Costs on appeal are allowed to Andrea M. Toonder.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    433 A.2d 105
    Bragg, Appellant v. Colonial Life Insurance Co., etc. Amann, Appellant v. Colonial Life Insurance Co., etc.
    Argued April 16, 1980.
    Henry E. Rea, Jr., for appellants; John H. Scott, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 105
    Erdlen v. Sieracki, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 22, 1981.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Maurice A. Nernberg, Jr., for appellant; Howard S. Auld, Jr., for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 105
    In the interest of Strayer. Appeal of Ella Jane Strayer, Natural Mother. Lawrence County Children’s Services, Participating Party.
    Submitted April 12, 1979.
    Eric A. Rohrbaugh, for appellant; Norman J. Barilla, for appellee; Charles W. Garbett, for participating party.
    Before SPAETH, WATKINS and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    433 A.2d 106
    Lisk Plumbing etc. v. Corbett et ux., Appellants.
    Argued November 15, 1979.
    Allen E. Macleod, for appellants; W. Thomas Laffey, Jr., for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Affirmed.

HOFFMAN, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    433 A.2d 106
    Redling v. Washington Hospital, Appellant.
    Argued November 11, 1980.
    Phillip J. Binotto, Jr., for appellant; Sanford S. Finder, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 106
    Shostak, Appellant v. Franklin Life Insurance Co.
    Argued June 11, 1980.
    John V. Hasson, for appellant; Jeffrey G. Weil, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    February 20, 1981.

      433 A.2d 106
    Burton v. Burton, Appellant.
    Argued April 15, 1980.
    Louise Porac, for appellant; Daniel Webster, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 107
    Capital Cons. Discount Co. v. Hickey, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 10, 1981.
    Argued April 15, 1980.
    John Stember, for appellant; Donnell D. Reed, submitted a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 107
    Chambers Development Co., etc. v. Fasulo, etc., Appellant. U. S. Utilities Service Corp., etc. v. Fasulo, Appellant.

      Argued November 15, 1979.
    Stanley W. Greenfield, for appellant; Howard T. Gilfillan, for appellees.
    Before PRICE, HESTER and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 107
    Coyle, et ux. v. Jorgenson, Appellant.
    Argued June 10, 1980.
    Stuart R. Lundy, for appellant; Richard A. Gutman, for appellees.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 108
    Commonwealth v. Allen, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted December 8, 1978.
    Barbara A. Joseph, for appellant; Edward G. Rendell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, SPAETH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 108
    Commonwealth v. Ansani, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John J. Morgan, for appellant; Robert F. Hawk, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 108
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 108
    Commonwealth v. Bumbaugh, Appellant.

      Argued June 11,1980.
    Ellen M. Burgraff, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; J. Michael Eakin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 109
    Commonwealth v. Chaney, Appellant.
    Submitted March 21, 1980.
    Frank R. Cori, Public Defender, for appellant; Richard D. Russell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 109
    Commonwealth v. Derry, Appellant.

      Submitted September 13, 1979.
    George Philip Stahl, Jr., for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

CERCONE, P. J., concurred in the result.


text:
    433 A.2d 109
    Commonwealth v. Everett, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John Halley, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 110
    Commonwealth v. Giddens, Appellant.

      Submitted December 6, 1979.
    Robert Lee Moore, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; J. Michael Morrissey, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.

       Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 110
    Commonwealth v. Harris, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Kathryn L. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 110
    Commonwealth v. Hawkins, Appellant.

      Submitted December 8, 1978.
    Joseph G. Caruso, for appellant; Edward G. Rendell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, SPAETH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 110
    Commonwealth v. Kanegis, Appellant.
    Argued December 5, 1980.
    David Rudovsky, for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 111
    Commonwealth v. McCafferty, Appellant.
    Submitted December 6, 1979.
    Arthur J. King, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.

      Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 111
    Commonwealth v. Plummer, Appellant.
    Argued June 11, 1980.
    Robert T. Panowicz, for appellant; William Keller, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 111
    Commonwealth v. Reggie, Appellant.
    Submitted December 6, 1979.
    Basil G. Russin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.

       Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 112
    Commonwealth v. Reppert, Appellant.
    Submitted December 6, 1979.
    Robert E. Giering, for appellant; J. Michael Morrissey, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.

       Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 112
    Commonwealth v. Rutherford, Sr., Appellant.
    Submitted September 13, 1979.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald L. Buckwalter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 112
    Commonwealth v. Seals, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 112
    Commonwealth v. Turney, Appellant.
    Submitted December 2, 1980.
    Edward S. Lawhorne, for appellant; Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 113
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Argued September 9, 1980.
    Francis M. Walsh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 113
    Commonwealth v. Walter Williams a/k/a Bernard Duffy, Appellant.
    Submitted December 6, 1979.
    Timothy A. Crawford, Jr., for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.

       Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is sitting by designation.

   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 113
    In re Appt Deputy Constableboro Trainer Del. Appeal of John J. Flannery.
    Argued December 4, 1980.
    James Cunilio, for appellant; Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 114
    Wasser v. Knapp et ux., et al. Appeal of Charles W. Phillips and Evelyn A. Phillips and Kenneth A. Roth and Sylvia A. Roth.
    Argued March 10, 1980.
    Michael P. Shay, for appellants; E. Jerome Brose, for Wasser, appellee; Raymond DeRaymond, for Knapp et ux., et al., appellees.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    February 27, 1981.
    433 A.2d 114
    Campbell et al., Appellants, v. Gov. Employees Insurance Co.
    Argued June 11, 1980.
    Joseph Mellace, for appellants; David M. McCormick, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Orders affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 114
    Commonwealth v. Fisher, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13,1980.
    Nino V. Tinari, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 114
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, Appellant.
    Argued June 11, 1980.
    Thomas H. A. Gallagher, for appellant; Robert R. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed on the opinion of the lower court.

BROSKY, J., filed a memorandum concurring opinion.


text:
    433 A.2d 115
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Dec. 18, 1981.
    Submitted December 6,1979.
    Daniel H. Greene, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.

       Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 115
    Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick, Appellant.
    Submitted December 6, 1979.
    Brian S. Quinn, for appellant; Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.

       Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is sitting by designation.

   We affirm the order of Judge Toal dated March 23, 1979 denying appellant’s post conviction hearing petition.


text:
    433 A.2d 115
    Commonwealth v. Lecrone, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    H. Stanley Rebert, Public Defender, for appellant; William T. Hast, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 116
    Commonwealth v. Macon, Appellant.
    Argued December 3, 1980. Charles M. Schwartz, for appellant; Sara A. DeCourcy, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 116
    Commonwealth v. McCall, C., Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    Bruce D. Foreman, for appellant; Marion E. MacIntyre, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 116
    Commonwealth, Appellant, v. McCall, L.
    Argued June 11, 1980.
    Charles A. Fisher, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; A. Benjamin Johnson, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Order affirmed on the lower court opinion.

BROSKY, J., filed a memorandum concurring and dissenting opinion.


text:
    433 A.2d 117
    Commonwealth v. Riley, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted March 12, 1979.
    Robert B. Evanick, Public Defender, for appellant; Michael K. Worrall, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before VAN der VOORT, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 117
    Commonwealth v. Riley, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted March 12, 1979. Daniel
    M. Pell, for appellant; Donald L. Reihart, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before VAN der VOORT, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 117
    Commonwealth v. Riley, Sr., Appellant.
    Submitted March 12, 1979.
    Daniel M. Pell, for appellant; John C. Uhler, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before VAN der VOORT, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 117
    Commonwealth v. Scherf, Appellant.

      Argued December 2, 1980.
    Michael Yanoff, for appellant; David McGlaughlin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the opinion of the lower court.


text:
    433 A.2d 118
    Commonwealth v. Shepherd, Appellant.
    Argued March 19,1980.
    William R. Keen, Jr., for appellant; Robert J. Donatoni, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed on the lower court.

CAVANAUGH, J., filed a memorandum dissenting statement.


text:
    433 A.2d 118
    Commonwealth v. Sheppard, Appellant.
    Argued March 6, 1980.
    Alan M. Cashman, for appellant; Barbara Osburn Stump, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 118
    Commonwealth v. Simon, Appellant.
    Submitted September 13, 1979.
    John G. McDougall, for appellant; Adam D. Bavolack, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed on the lower court opinion.


text:
    433 A.2d 119
    Commonwealth v. Warren, Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    Bruce D. Foreman, for appellant; Marion E. MacIntyre, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Dismissal of the PCHA petition is affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 119
    Commonwealth ex rel. Maguire v. Maguire, Appellant.
    Argued March 19, 1980.
    Janet DuffyCarson, for appellant; Brian P. Sullivan, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the lower court opinion.


text:
    433 A.2d 119
    Fiske, Appellant, v. Fiske.
    Reargument Denied July 8, 1981.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Sept. 29,1981.
    Argued March 20, 1980.
    Arthur L. Jenkins, Jr., for appellant; Scott E. Townsley, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the adjudication, stipulation and opinion of the court below.


text:
    433 A.2d 119
    Gotwalt, Appellant, v. U. S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co.
    Argued March 6, 1980.
    Allen H. Smith, for appellant; Robert J. Stewart, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the opinion of the lower court.


text:
    433 A.2d 120
    Koszyk v. Sun Oil Co., Appellant.
    Argued December 5, 1980.
    T. E. Byrne, Jr., for appellant; James E. Beasley, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the opinion of the lower court.


text:
    433 A.2d 120
    Meloni v. Fiori, et al., Appellants.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 7, 1981.

      Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Richard P. McBride, for appellants; Alan Dion, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 120
    Nedbaletz v. Urbano, etc., Appellant.
    Reargument Denied May 27, 1981.
    Argued April 11, 1979.
    John W. Jordan, IV, for appellant; Michael A. Della Vecchia, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WATKINS and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 120
    Polito v. Polito, Appellant.
    Submitted November 16, 1979.
    Karen M. Baskin, for appellant; R. H. Somerton, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   Decree affirmed. Having made an independent study of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the court below properly granted a decree in divorce in this case.


text:
    433 A.2d 121
    Primiano, Jr., Appellant, v. San Felice, Jr., et al.
    Argued December 1, 1980.
    Joseph R. Siegert, for appellant; Bennett Block, for appellees.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the lower court opinion.


text:
    433 A.2d 121
    Reynolds et ux. v. Apex Financial Corp. Appeal of Amy Reynolds.
    Submitted March 21, 1980.
    Phillip H. Williams, for appellant; Richard F. Stern, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

SPAETH, J., filed a memorandum concurring statement.


text:
    433 A.2d 121
    Trimiew etc. et al., Appellants, v. Keystone Insurance Co.

      Argued June 11,1980.
    Joseph Mellace, for appellants; John G. Jenemann, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 122
    Walsh et al. v. Hinman, M. D. et al. Appeal of The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 26, 1982.
    Argued June 12, 1980.
    Fredric L. Goldfein, for appellant; John J. McCarty, for Walsh, appellee. Albert L. Bricklin, for Hinman, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the opinion of the lower court.

LIPEZ, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    433 A.2d 122
    Yeaple v. Yeaple, Appellant.
    Argued March 6, 1980.

      Gerald E. Ruth, for appellant; Samuel M. Learned, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 122
    Yeaple, Appellant, v. Yeaple.
    Argued March 6, 1980.
    Gerald E. Ruth, for appellant; Samuel M. Learned, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    March 6, 1981.
    433 A.2d 122
    Commonwealth v. Arzonica, Appellant.
    Argued March 3, 1980.
    James W. Harris, for appellant; John C. Uhler, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 123
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Bailey.
    Argued June 10, 1980.
    Lee Ruslander, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Robert Shaffer, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 123
    Commonwealth v. Banks, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14,1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 123
    Commonwealth v. Barbee, Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    Jeffrey M. Cook, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Marion E. MacIntyre, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed on the able opinion of Honorable Warren G. Morgan of the Court of Common Pleas.


text:
    433 A.2d 124
    Commonwealth v. Bethlehem, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Kathryn L. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 124
    Commonwealth v. Boring a/k/a McCurdy a/k/a Dunson, Appellant.
    Submitted November 16, 1979.
    Paul D. Boas, for appellant; Charles W. Johns, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and MONTGOMERY and LI-PEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 124
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1981.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Kathryn L. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 124
    Commonwealth v. Chevrette, Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    Bruce D. Foreman, for appellant; Marion E. MacIntyre, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 125
    Commonwealth v. Christenberry, Appellant.
    Argued March 4, 1980.
    Daniel W. Shoemaker, for appellant; Floyd P. Jones, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court revoking parole is hereby affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 125
    Commonwealth v. Clinton, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 125
    Commonwealth v. Collier, Appellant.
    Argued March 6, 1980.
    Allen H. Smith, for appellant; Dorothy Livaditis, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 126
    Commonwealth v. Collins, Appellant.

      Submitted June 13,1980.
    Robert S. Esposito, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, JJ.

       Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 126
    Commonwealth v. Eppihimer, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 9, 1981.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 126
    Commonwealth v. Gaumer, Appellant.

      Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Peter Rybak, Public Defender, for appellant; Donald Corriere, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 126
    Commonwealth v. Green, Appellant.
    Submitted March 21, 1980.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 127
    Commonwealth v. Griffin, Appellant.

      Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Louis R. Dadowski, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 127
    Commonwealth v. Hull, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Donald Calaiaro, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 127
    Commonwealth v. King, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John P. Liekar, for appellant; Daniel L. Chunko, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 128
    Commonwealth v. Long, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Paulette J. Balogh, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 128
    Commonwealth v. Lopez, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 10, 1981.
    Submitted December 3, 1979.
    John J. Speicher, for appellant; J. Michael Morrissey, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before PRICE, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 128
    Commonwealth v. Makary, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 16, 1981.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 128
    Commonwealth v. Mingo, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Paulette J. Balogh, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 129
    Commonwealth v. Pilkington, Appellant.
    Submitted December 6, 1979.
    Nino V. Tinari, for appellant; Kenneth Biehn, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.

       Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 129
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 129
    Commonwealth v. Shelton, Appellant.

      Submitted March 21, 1980.
    John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 130
    Commonwealth v. Speace, a/k/a Speaks, Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    David Schaumann, for appellant; John C. Uhler, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 130
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    H. Stanley Rebert, Public Defender, for appellant; Sheryl A. Dorney, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order and judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 130
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order of court affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 130
    Commonwealth v. Zvolensky, Appellant.
    Submitted December 6, 1979.
    James E. O’Brien, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ernest D. Preate, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.

       Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 131
    Enders v. Enders, Appellant.
    Argued March 4, 1980.
    Allen H. Smith, for appellant; Daniel Wolfson, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   We affirm the order of the lower court.


text:
    433 A.2d 131
    Evergreen Lake Inc., Appellant v. First Valley Bank et al.
    Argued December 6, 1979.
    Mark A. Hutchinson, for appellant; Gailey C. Keller, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 131
    Foster, Appellant v. Foster.
    Submitted September 13, 1979.
    Leslie F. Kidd, for appellant; John C. Anderson, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., and WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CERCONE, P.J., filed a memorandum dissenting statement.


text:
    433 A.2d 131
    McConnell et ux., Appellants v. Estate of Wells et al.
    Argued December 3, 1979.
    Craig S. Boyd, for appellant; John C. Bradley, Jr., for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The chancellor’s decree is affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 132
    Handwerk Inc. v. Keystone Aviation Inc., Appellant.

      Submitted March 5, 1980.
    John R. Zonarich, for appellant; John S. Davidson, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 132
    Lutzic etc., Appellant v. Joynt et ux.
    Argued November 10, 1980.
    Morton B. DeBroff, for appellant; Bernard S. Rubb, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 132
    Richberg, Appellant v. Richberg, Jr.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Aug. 3, 1981.
    Submitted March 21, 1980.
    S. David Fineman, for appellant; Paul A. Liebman, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    March 13, 1981.
    433 A.2d 132
    Commonwealth v. Bell, Appellant.
    Submitted March 21, 1980.
    Elaine De-Masse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 133
    Commonwealth v. Dorris, Appellant.
    Submitted March 12, 1980.
    Joseph F. Iracki, for appellant; Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   We affirm the judgments of sentence on the two counts of simple assault.

The judgments of sentence for both simple assaults and criminal mischief are affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 133
    Commonwealth v. Heckman, Appellant.
    Reargument en banc Denied June 1, 1981.
    Argued September 8, 1980.
    Wayne F. Shade, for appellant; J. Michael Eakin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 133
    Commonwealth v. Hull, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Donald C. Feniello, for appellant; Janet Moschetta, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The order of the court below is affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 134
    Commonwealth v. Jones, Appellant.
    Submitted March 21, 1980.
    Nicholas V. Pinto, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 134
    Commonwealth v. Lynn, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 134
    Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong v. Armstrong, Appellant.
    Argued March 11, 1980.
    Mark S. Sigmon, for appellant; James R. Fiorentino, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 134
    Fisher v. Hartig Extruders Co. etc. et al., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 17, 1981.
    Argued April 16, 1980.
    Thomas J. Reinstadtler, for Hartig, appellant (at No. 922) and for appellee (at No. 978); Richard G. Spagnolli, for Fisher, appellee. Eileen R. Kalinoski, for Washington Penn, appellant (at No. 978) and for appellee (at No. 922).
    Before CAVANAUGH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., filed a memorandum concurring and dissenting opinion.


text:
    433 A.2d 135
    Obert-Thorn, Appellants v. Fred Betz and Sons, Inc.
    Argued September 9,1980.
    Daniel L. Thistle, for appellant; Marjorie C. Lawrence, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    433 A.2d 135
    Ottinger v. Marston Industries, Inc. et al. Appeal of: Marston Industries, Inc.
    Submitted March 13, 1980.
    Jonathan Wheeler, for appellant; Lawrence G. Metzger, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 135
    Poole et al., Appellants v. Lewis et al.

      Argued September 9, 1980.
    Joseph Mellace, for appellants; F. James Gallo, for Lewis, appellee. Diane C. Rothberg, did not file a brief on behalf of Philadelphia General Clinics, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    March 20, 1981.
    438 A.2d 136
    Bishop et al. v. Duquesne Brewing Co., et al., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 31, 1981.
    Argued November 16, 1979.
    Richard I. Thomas, for appellants; Foster S. Goldman, Jr., for appellees.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and MONTGOMERY and LI-PEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 136
    Commonwealth v. Blake, Sr., Appellant.

      Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Henry W. Gent, III, for appellant; F. Walter Bloom, III, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and SHERTZ and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 136
    Commonwealth v. Broadie, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John Halley, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order of lower court affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 136
    Commonwealth v. Dandar, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Ronald Dandar, appellant, in propria persona; Shad Connelly, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 137
    Commonwealth v. Geletie, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 3, 1981.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Kathryn L. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order of the lower court entered November 13, 1979 affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    433 A.2d 137
    Commonwealth v. George, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John Halley, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, DiSALLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 137
    Commonwealth v. Herring, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    433 A.2d 138
    Commonwealth v. Jamieson, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Joseph C. Jamieson, appellant, in propria persona; Paul J. Susko, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Orders of the lower court entered August 13, 1979 and August 24, 1979 affirmed.