author: WIEAND, Judge: HOFFMAN, Judge,

text:
    458 A.2d 190
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Matthew CONNORS, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued March 1, 1982.
    Filed Feb. 11, 1983.
    Reargument Denied April 26, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 13, 1983.

      Perry Paul deMarco, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Eric Beller, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   WIEAND, Judge:

Matthew Connors was tried by jury and found guilty of murder in the first degree and rape. Post verdict motions were denied, and appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and a consecutive term of ten to twenty years for rape. On direct appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it (1) received in evidence, over objection, four photographs of the body of the eleven year old victim and (2) when it refused to allow prior testimony of a defense witness to be read to the jury. He also contends that the prosecuting attorney was guilty of misconduct which deprived him of a fair trial. We find no merit in these contentions and, therefore, affirm the judgment of sentence.

The opinion of the learned trial judge includes the following recitation of the manner in which the crime was discovered. “On Monday, August 21, 1978, at 7:30 A.M. Ms. Darlene Snipes was exiting her eighteenth floor apartment at the Fairhill Project on her way to work. In following her usual routine, she peered down the fire escape stairwell to check for intruders before she left her apartment. As she did, she noticed a black male, later identified as the defendant, lying on his back between the seventeenth and eighteenth floors. Ms. Snipes related that the defendant’s shirt was bloody in the chest area and he appeared to be sleeping. Alarmed by his presence, Ms. Snipes hurriedly locked her door and proceeded to work where she promptly notified police of the suspicious nature of the defendant’s presence.

“Police Officer Francis O’Connor of the 22nd District was dispatched to the Project where he arrived at 8:25 A.M. and was escorted by maintenance men to the stairwell in question. Upon arrival, Officer O’Connor, along with his partner, Officer Morton Spiser, observed the body of a young Negro female lying on the stairwell who appeared to be dead. The officers secured the scene and summoned the Assistant Medical Examiner for the City of Philadelphia, Dr. Halbert Fillinger. Dr. Fillinger arrived at 10:30 A.M. and pronounced the victim, Corinthia Fields, dead. It was later determined that Ms. Fields’ death was the result of one hundred ninety-six stab wounds in and around the chest and abdomen. The eleven year old victim had also been raped.”

The Commonwealth’s evidence established that appellant had taken Corinthia Fields to his apartment on the eighteenth floor between 3:30 A.M. and 7:30 A.M., where he raped her. Thereafter, he took her to the firetower stairwell and, on the landing between the seventeenth and eighteenth floors, killed her by repeated stabbings with an ice pick.

Later the same day, at or about 11:00 A.M., the janitor found a discarded ice pick in the incinerator of the building. It had human blood on it. It had not been there on the prior day.

Testifying on his own behalf, appellant stated that at the time of the rape and killing he had been in bed with Mrs. Laura Creer at her home, located a half-hour walk from appellant’s apartment. She testified, however, that appellant had left her home at 3:00 A.M. She did not see him again until 9:00 A.M. She also identified the ice pick found in the incinerator as similar to one that was missing from her home on the day of the killing.

The Commonwealth’s pathologist, upon making an external examination of the victim’s body, had made a preliminary diagnosis of death by shotgun blast. It was not until August 25 that he concluded that death had been caused by 193-196 thrusts of a sharp, thin instrument similar to an ice pick. The first public reference had been to a shotgun blast; the first media reference to death by stabbing did not appear until August 26. Appellant was arrested on August 23, when he acknowledged having heard that Corinthia Fields “had been shot, stabbed and that she is pregnant.”

Appellant’s first trial ended in a mistrial. A second trial produced convictions. Appellant does not dispute the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence but contends that trial errors require a new trial.

The four photographs complained of by appellant were black and white and were properly received. They were relevant to the Commonwealth’s case and clearly non-inflammatory. Three of them portrayed the fully clothed body of Corinthia Fields in the position in which it was found in the stairwell. These photos also tended to rebut, by virtue of the child’s position as shown thereon, appellant’s contention that it was the child and not he whom Darlene Snipes had seen when she left for work on August 21. The fourth photograph portrayed the chest area of the victim and demonstrated the markings made by the death producing wounds. The photograph had been taken after the child’s chest area had been cleaned and blood had been removed. It was relevant not only to show the cause of death but to explain the confusion in the initial diagnosis.

The admission of photographs is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Woodward, 483 Pa. 1, 394 A.2d 508 (1978); Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 459 Pa. 511, 329 A.2d 844 (1974); Commonwealth v. Kaster, 300 Pa.Super. 174, 446 A.2d 286 (1982); Commonwealth v. Parks, 281 Pa.Super. 38, 421 A.2d 1135 (1980). There was no abuse of discretion in the instant case. The photographs were neither gruesome nor inflammatory. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980); Commonwealth v. Woodward, supra; Commonwealth v. Hilton, 461 Pa. 93, 334 A.2d 648 (1975); Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, supra.

Ms. Irma Epps had testified at appellant’s first trial. However, she failed to appear at the second trial. Appellant asked the court to declare her unavailable and to admit her prior testimony pursuant to Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5917. This statute provides:

Whenever any person has been examined as a witness, either for the Commonwealth or for the defense, in any criminal proceeding conducted in or before a court of record, and the defendant has been present and has had an opportunity to examine or cross-examine, if such witness afterwards dies, or is out of the jurisdiction so that he cannot be effectively served with a subpoena, or if he cannot be found, or if he becomes incompetent to testify for any legally sufficient reason properly proven, notes of his examination shall be competent evidence upon a subsequent trial of the same criminal issue. For the purpose of contradicting a witness the testimony given by him in another or in a former proceeding may be orally proved.

It is a reenactment of the Act of May 23,1887, P.L. 158, No. 9, § 3, 19 P.S. § 582, which in the past has frequently been interpreted by the courts of this state. The seminal question is whether the witness cannot be found. Writing in support of affirmance in Commonwealth v. Walloe, 472 Pa. 473, 372 A.2d 788 (1977), Justice Pomeroy stated:

A witness “cannot be found” within the meaning of the above-quoted Act, however, “only if a good-faith effort to locate the witness and compel his attendance at trial has failed.” Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 34, 331 A.2d 213, 214 (1975). The burden of demonstrating such a “good-faith effort” is on the party seeking to introduce the prior testimony, Commonwealth v. Blair, supra, and “[t]he question of the sufficiency of the preliminary proof as to the absence of a witness is largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 203 Pa.Super. 511, 516, 201 A.2d 256, 259 (1964), quoted in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 463 Pa. 301, 305, 344 A.2d 842, 844 (1975). Accord, Commonwealth v. Beach, 445 Pa. 257, 261, 284 A.2d 792, 794 (1971). Thus, the question here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that appellant had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that [the witness] was unavailable to testify.

Id., 472 Pa. at 476, 372 A.2d at 790. See generally: Anno., 3 ALR 4th 87, Sufficiency of Efforts to Procure Missing Witness’ Attendance to Justify Admission of His Former Testimony—State Cases. We look, then, to the circumstances surrounding Ms. Epps’ failure to appear.

On March 3, 1980, when trial commenced, defense counsel already knew that he intended to call Irma Epps as a witness, for a subpoena had been served on her on March 1. It directed her to appear on March 10. When she failed to appear, counsel placed two telephone calls to her on the same day and learned that the witness did not intend to appear because she was in fear for her safety and that of her children. Counsel did not inform the court of her refusal to attend, however, but caused the witness to be served with a second subpoena on March 11. Again, she failed to appear. Then, on March 12, counsel informed the court of his conversations with Ms. Epps and requested a bench warrant. The judge issued the warrant somewhat reluctantly, observing that counsel could have expedited the trial by informing the court of the witness’s refusal on March 10. Two continuances were granted. However, Ms. Epps still had not appeared when the case was ready to go to the jury on March 14. At that time the court made a finding that Ms. Epps had not been “unavailable” under the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5917 and refused to admit her prior testimony.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Ms. Epps had, in fact, been found by the process servers and by defense counsel. Compare: Commonwealth v. Blair, supra (witness “not found” when subpoena went unserved, calls to her home were not answered, and search of her home verified her absence). She had not only been found, but she was available. Counsel waited until late in the trial, two days after he had determined that the witness was refusing to appear, before requesting the issuance of a bench warrant. In Commonwealth v. Walloe, supra, counsel refused an offer for the issuance of a bench warrant during an earlier stage of the trial and chose less drastic means to achieve attendance. There was no abuse of discretion in the court’s later determination that the witness was available. In the instant case, the defense failed to establish that the witness was “unavailable”; it demonstrated, rather, that the witness had been available but that counsel delayed too long the “drastic steps” which would have compelled her attendance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow her prior testimony to be read to the jury. See: Commonwealth v. Faison, 452 Pa. 137, 305 A.2d 44 (1973) (error to admit prior testimony where witness’s unavailability was not shown; there had been no attempt to compel attendance, only unsuccessful phone calls).

Moreover, Ms. Epps’ testimony was irrelevant, and the refusal to permit it to be read to the jury was harmless. Her testimony at the prior trial had been that she recovered an ice pick from a fire which had occurred at Laura Creer’s house on November 17, 1978, almost three months after the killing of Corinthia Fields. The ice pick was not more specifically identified and was not shown to have any connection whatsoever to the crimes for which appellant was being tried. The finding of an ice pick in or near the home of the Commonwealth’s witness, Laura Creer, almost three months later was too tenuous to permit a logical inference that she was mistaken or false in testifying that her ice pick was missing on August 21, the date of the killing. Cf. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, 316, 314 A.2d 242, 249 (1974); Commonwealth v. Klick, 272 Pa.Super. 61, 65, 414 A.2d 669, 671 (1979).

Appellant’s contention that he was deprived of a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct consists of three parts, which we consider seriatim. Gladys Christian, a woman who had been living with appellant at his apartment until she left on August 18, testified as a Commonwealth witness that she had made up the bed before leaving and that there were then no blood stains on the sheets. The prosecutor’s use of the words “fierce arguments” in connection with questions pertaining to Ms. Christian’s reason for leaving was not prejudicial. There were no suggestions that appellant had been responsible for the arguments and no intimation of violence or criminal activity of any kind. Furthermore, as the trial court observed, as a result of a preceding sidebar conference, “the prosecutor took specific precautions to prevent the eliciting of any prejudicial testimony, by prefacing his question with an instruction to Ms. Christian not to reveal what happened during the course of the alluded to argument.” There was no error in the trial court’s ruling on the prosecutor’s question.

The second area of alleged prosecutorial misconduct pertains to questions propounded to Darlene Snipes, the Commonwealth witness who had observed appellant in the stairwell. The assistant district attorney asked her on redirect examination whether the residents of the Fairhill Project had been upset about the child’s murder. Appellant contends that the intent of the question was to prejudice him. The question, however, had another purpose. Defense counsel had attempted to show by cross-examination of the witness that her neighbors had been nervous and upset because of a lack of security in the building. He argued that security was so lax that anyone could have entered the stairwell and killed Corinthia Fields. The question asked by the prosecutor was intended to rebut the implication created by defense counsel’s cross-examination by shifting the basis for neighborhood concern. It referred only to the time after the killing and did not permit an inference that the neighbors had been afraid of appellant prior to the death of Corinthia Fields. Further pursuit of this line of questioning, moreover, was precluded by the trial court’s ruling.

Appellant’s last contention is that prejudicial and improper comments were made by the prosecuting attorney during closing argument. The standard for testing a prosecutor’s comments was set forth in Commonwealth v. Baranyai, 296 Pa.Super. 342, 346, 442 A.2d 800, 802 (1982) as follows: “The Supreme Court has made clear ‘... that the prosecuting attorney enjoys an office of unusual responsibility, and that his trial conduct should never be vindictive or attempt in any manner to influence the jury by arousing their prejudices.’ Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 287, 285 A.2d 492, 494 (1971); Commonwealth v. Toney, 439 Pa. 173, 180, 266 A.2d 732, 736 (1970).” However, not every intemperate or improper remark by the prosecutor requires a new trial. Commonwealth v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 426 A.2d 1111 (1981); Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 482 Pa. 598, 394 A.2d 483 (1978); Commonwealth v. Perkins, 473 Pa. 116, 373 A.2d 1076 (1977); Commonwealth v. Williams, 295 Pa.Super. 369, 441 A.2d 1277 (1982); Commonwealth v. Smith, 289 Pa.Super. 356, 433 A.2d 489 (1981); Commonwealth v. Youngkin, 285 Pa.Super. 417, 427 A.2d 1356 (1981). Before a new trial is required, the language must be such that its “unavoidable effect ... would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not weigh the evidence and render a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. Mikesell, 475 Pa. 589, 595, 381 A.2d 430, 433 (1977); Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 61, 337 A.2d 873, 882 (1975); Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 394, 248 A.2d 289, 292 (1968); Commonwealth v. Baranyai, supra, 296 Pa.Super. at 346, 442 A.2d at 802; Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, 295 Pa.Super. at 376, 441 A.2d at 1281; Commonwealth v. Youngkin, supra, 285 Pa.Super. at 430, 427 A.2d at 1362.

The comments complained of by appellant in the instant case were well within the bounds of proper advocacy and did not have the effect of causing a fixed bias or hostility on the part of the jury. The first averment of misconduct is a statement that a verdict of not guilty would acquit appellant and render the Commonwealth powerless to retry him. When placed in context, it is apparent that this remark was entirely innocuous. It was spoken during the prosecutor’s admittedly correct explanation of the jury’s role in the criminal justice system and was not an impassioned plea to convict. Similarly, there is no prejudice apparent in the prosecutor’s statement that he observed the area of the crime and concluded that the crime was a vicious one. This comment was not only supported by the evidence but conceded by defense counsel. Having been directed against the crime and not against appellant, it is difficult to perceive the impropriety thereof or that any prejudice could have been caused thereby.

Finally, appellant argues that a rhetorical question asking why Darlene Snipes would “put a charge of murder on this man, knowing this defendant and knowing a lot of things about this defendant?” was improper. We disagree. The statement did not imply that the prosecutor had evidence remaining undisclosed which suggested prior misconduct by appellant. When taken in context it is apparent that the intent of the comment was to ask the jury why the witness, a neighbor of appellant, should identify him as the person seen in the stairwell unless she were certain. In view of the importance of her testimony to the Commonwealth’s case, the comment was not inappropriate.

The judgment of sentence is affirmed.

HOFFMAN, J., files a dissenting opinion.

HOFFMAN, Judge,

dissenting:

The admissibility of photographs of a corpse in a homicide case is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 493 Pa. 281, 289, 426 A.2d 550, 554 (1981); Commonwealth v. Schroth, 479 Pa. 485, 488, 388 A.2d 1034, 1036 (1978) (collecting cases). “To determine whether such photographs are admissible, we have utilized a two-tier analysis. The trial judge must initially decide whether the photographs possess inflammatory characteristics.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 630, 414 A.2d 1381, 1386 (1980). See Commonwealth v. Schroth, supra, 479 Pa. at 489, 388 A.2d at 1037; Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 280, 372 A.2d 687, 697 (1977). Then, if “the photographs possess gruesome or inflammatory qualities likely to inflame the passions of the viewer, our cases require the application of the ‘essential evidentiary value’ balancing test,” Commonwealth v. Schroth, supra 479 Pa. at 489, 388 A.2d at 1037, i.e., “whether the photographs are of such essential evidentiary value that their need clearly outweighs the liklihood of their inflaming the passions of the jurors.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, supra 489 Pa. at 630, 414 A.2d at 1386. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 273 Pa.Superior Ct. 337, 417 A.2d 677 (1979). Because I believe the photographs admitted in this matter are inflammatory and of nominal evidentiary value, I would hold that the lower court erred in admitting them.

Commonwealth Exhibit # 2 (C-2) is a 10V2" x I3V2" black and white photograph depicting the naked chest of the 11 year old victim, ravaged by 193 stab wounds. Although the wounds have been cleaned, the upper chest, where most of the wounds are found, remains stained with dried blood. I cannot agree with the majority that this picture is without “inflammatory characteristics.” See Commonwealth v. Hudson, supra. The mutilated chest of an 11 year old child, whether the wounds have been cleaned or not, certainly possesses sufficient inflammatory characteristics as to likely inflame the passions of the viewer and thus requires us to determine whether it was of “such essential evidentiary value” that the need for it clearly outweighed the likelihood of its inflaming the passions of the jury. The majority finds that the photo was relevant to show the cause of death and the initial confusion of the coroner as to the cause of death. Although the photo may be arguably relevant for those purposes, the Commonwealth has utterly failed to show that the need for the photo outweighed the prejudice to appellant. The medical examiner testified to the exact nature of the wounds and the cause of death. Although he stated that he initially believed the wounds to have been from a shotgun because of their quantity, further examination revealed that they were stab or puncture wounds. Appellant never contested the cause of death, but rather posited an alibi defense. As in Commonwealth v. Chacko, 480 Pa. 504, 391 A.2d 999 (1978), “[t]here is no indication that the photograph[ ] [was] necessary to supplement the otherwise specific testimony of the [medical examiner].” 480 Pa. at 508, 391 A.2d at 1001. See also Commonwealth v. Garrison, 459 Pa. 664, 331 A.2d 186 (1975) (cause of death uncontested and injuries could be adequately described by pathologist); Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzino, 455 Pa. 378, 317 A.2d 225 (1974) (slides merely cumulative to testimony of pathologist); Commonwealth v. Powell, 428 Pa. 275, 241 A.2d 119 (1968) (pathologist could have testified without use of pictures). Thus, the picture was cumulative, at best, and certainly insufficient to rise to the level of “essential.” Accordingly, the lower court abused its discretion in permitting its introduction.

Similarly, the lower court’s admission of Commonwealth Exhibits 4a and 4b (c-4a, c-4b) into evidence was an abuse of discretion. C-4a and C-4b are 9" x 13" black and white photographs presenting a full frontal view of the victim’s corpse. The body, clad in bedroom slippers, cut-off shorts, and blood-soaked tee-shirt, is shown lying prostrate on the stairwell landing, with the upper torso bent at a 45 degree angle. The child’s face, as well as several wounds to the stomach area not covered by the tee-shirt, are fully exposed and visible. It is beyond comprehension to me that the majority finds these pictures neither gruesome nor possessing inflammatory characteristics. The wounds, blood and face of the eleven year old victim are all clearly depicted, graphically illustrating the savage attack. More inflammatory characteristics are difficult to imagine. Because of the inflammatory nature of the pictures, we again must balance their essential evidentiary value with their likelihood of arousing the passions of the jury. The majority holds that the photos were admissible to show the position of the body, thereby rebutting appellant’s contention that a witness had observed the child’s body and not appellant lying on the steps prior to the incident. The exact position of the body was testified to by the police officer responding to the call. Moreover, Commonwealth Exhibit # 4c (C-4c) provided an eye-level view of the position of the body, thereby rebutting appellant’s contention, without showing the victim’s face, wounds, or bloody clothes. See Commonwealth v. Schroth, supra, (view of naked back of decedent without face, blood or wounds visible held not inflammatory). Thus, because these gruesome and inflammatory pictures amounted to nothing more than cumulative evidence and should not have been admitted, I dissent.

       I note that during the course of deliberations, the jurors specifically asked for and were given C-2 and apparently were also given C-4a, b, and c. (N.T. March 14, 1980, at 991-93). It is clear from the jury’s interest in these marginally relevant photos that their admission did, in fact, divert the jury’s attention from its proper fact-finding function.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM:

license: Public Domain

text:
    458 A.2d 198
    Glenn CHAZAK, Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 5, 1981.
    Filed Feb. 11, 1983.
    Reargument Denied April 26, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 31, 1983.
    Allen L. Feingold, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    David M. McCormick, Philadelphia, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and LIPEZ, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

1) Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is affirmed insofar as it sustains Appellee’s preliminary objections to that portion of Appellant’s suit referring to a no-fault claim.

2) Appellant’s appeal from that portion of the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which permitted Appellant to file a petition to compel the appointment of an arbitrator unless Appellee appointed an arbitrator is quashed as being an attempted appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court.

3) Appellant is granted twenty days from the date of receipt of the record by the trial court within which to file a petition to compel the appointment of an arbitrator unless within said time Appellee appoints an arbitrator.


author: WIEAND, Judge:

text:
    458 A.2d 198
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Henry SPELLER, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted October 19, 1982.
    Filed March 11, 1983.

      Barry H. Denker, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   WIEAND, Judge:

Henry Speller was tried in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia and convicted of making terroristic threats, a misdemeanor, and harassment, a summary offense. He appealed to the Court of Common Pleas where, following a trial de novo, he was again found guilty of the same offenses. A sentence of imprisonment for not less than 3 months nor more than 23 months, to be followed by a consecutive three year period of probation, was imposed for terroristic threats; a one day suspended sentence was imposed for harassment. Speller has appealed. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for terroristic threats, that he was improperly tried for harassment, that prejudicial error occurred in evidentiary rulings made by the trial court and that trial counsel was ineffective.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we employ a two step test. First, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, accepting as true all evidence upon which the finder of fact could properly have based its verdict. Next, we must determine whether that evidence, together with all reasonable inferences drawn from it, was sufficient to enable the trier of the facts to find every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 669, 450 A.2d 975, 977 (1982); Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 498 Pa. 455, 467, 447 A.2d 234, 240 (1982); Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 44, 444 A.2d 653, 658 (1982); Commonwealth v. Horner, 497 Pa. 565, 568, 442 A.2d 682, 683 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hardwick, 299 Pa.Super. 362, 363, 445 A.2d 796, 796 (1982).

The crime of terroristic threats is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706 as follows:

A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.

A violation of the statute is proved by evidence that (1) a threat to commit a crime of violence was made and (2) such threat was communicated with intent to terrorize. Commonwealth v. Ferrer, 283 Pa.Super. 21, 23, 423 A.2d 423, 424 (1980); Commonwealth v. Ashford, 268 Pa.Super. 225, 229, 407 A.2d 1328, 1329 (1979); Commonwealth v. Holguin, 254 Pa.Super. 295, 305, 385 A.2d 1346, 1351 (1978). “The offense does not require that the accused intend to carry out the threat; it does require an intent to terrorize. The harm sought to be prevented is the psychological distress which follows from an invasion of another’s sense of personal security.” Commonwealth v. Hardwick, supra 299 Pa.Super. at 365, 445 A.2d at 797. See: Model Penal Code § 211.3, revised comments (1980). See also: Commonwealth v. Green, 287 Pa.Super. 220, 429 A.2d 1180 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bunting, 284 Pa.Super. 444, 426 A.2d 130 (1981); Commonwealth v. Ashford, supra; Commonwealth v. Holguin, supra.

On the evening of October 19, 1979, appellant and several friends were gathered in front of the neighborhood store operated by Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Alan Stephen on North Sixteenth Street in the City of Philadelphia. The Stephens were then preparing dinner in their apartment, which adjoined the store. They were able to see appellant from the window of their apartment, and appellant was able to see them. Using profanity, appellant called the complainants names and shouted, “We’re going to get you out of here tonight.” He also yelled that he would burn their house and make a parking lot of their garage. Mrs. Stephen also heard appellant threaten in a loud voice that it would be “the last night on earth” for them and that he would blow up their house and “finish the job he started two years ago.” This was a reference, the evidence showed, to an altercation on March 28, 1978, in which appellant had inflicted a serious head injury to Mr. Stephen with a blackjack. The incident had been the basis for appellant’s subsequent conviction for assault and had marked the commencement of a pattern of harassing tactics by appellant. These tactics included the circulation of petitions against the Stephens, throwing bricks and bottles at them, and dragging customers from their store.

The threats made on October 19, 1979 were sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for making terroristic threats. They included threats of physical violence to the Stephens and also a threat to destroy their property by fire. These clearly were threats to commit crimes of violence. Commonwealth v. Ferrer, supra; Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 269 Pa.Super. 279, 409 A.2d 888 (1979). That there was a settled purpose to terrorize, as distinct from a spur of the moment threat resulting from transitory anger, was shown by the history of incidents initiated by appellant and calculated to harass and annoy the Stephens. It was unnecessary for the Commonwealth to prove that appellant intended to carry out his threats or that he had the ability to do so.

Appellant contends that it was error to allow evidence of the prior assault committed by appellant against Mr. Stephen as well as other “incidents.” As a general rule, evidence of prior criminal acts by an accused is inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Morris, 493 Pa. 164, 175, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (1981). See: Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 297 Pa.Super. 66, 76, 443 A.2d 301, 306 (1982); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 296 Pa.Super. 376, 378, 442 A.2d 817, 818 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 295 Pa.Super. 429, 437, 441 A.2d 1308, 1311 (1982); Commonwealth v. Krajci, 283 Pa.Super. 488, 498, 424 A.2d 914, 919 (1981). However, a long standing exception to this rule exists where the evidence of prior criminal acts is probative of a defendant’s motive or intent. Commonwealth v. Styles, 494 Pa. 524, 528, 431 A.2d 978, 980 (1981); Commonwealth v. Brown, 489 Pa. 285, 296, 414 A.2d 70, 75 (1980); Commonwealth v. DeVaughn, 488 Pa. 629, 631, 413 A.2d 660, 661 (1980); Commonwealth v. Laughman, 306 Pa.Super. 269, 271 n. 1, 452 A.2d 548, 549 n. 1 (1982); Commonwealth v. Gonzales, supra 297 Pa.Super. at 76-77, 443 A.2d at 306; Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa.Super. 50, 63, 418 A.2d 605, 612 (1980).

In the instant case, the evidence concerning appellant’s prior conviction for assaulting Mr. Stephen was related closely to the crime for which appellant was being tried. Stephen had testified against appellant at the assault trial and had thereby contributed to appellant’s conviction. Stephen also testified that between sentencing in January, 1979 on the assault charge and October, 1979 there had been more than one hundred “incidents” involving him and the appellant. In the trial for terroristic threats, the prior conviction and the history of related incidents were relevant to show appellant’s motive and also to negative transitory anger and show an intent to terrorize. See: Commonwealth v. Faison, 437 Pa. 432, 446, 264 A.2d 394, 401 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bracero, 296 Pa.Super. 368, 372-373, 442 A.2d 813, 815 (1982). See also: Commonwealth v. Meredith, 490 Pa. 303, 308 n. 2, 416 A.2d 481, 484 n. 2 (1980); Commonwealth v. Roman, 465 Pa. 515, 523-524, 351 A.2d 214, 218 (1976); Commonwealth v. Peterson, 453 Pa. 187, 197-198, 307 A.2d 264, 269 (1973). Additionally, evidence of the prior assault was admissible to explain the full impact of appellant’s threat to “finish the job” he had started two years before. Appellant’s threats on October 19, 1979 were part of a series of harassing acts directed against the Stephens; and evidence of these prior acts, as they culminated in the offenses for which appellant was being tried, was clearly relevant. See: Commonwealth v. Faison, supra 437 Pa. at 446, 264 A.2d at 401. See also: Commonwealth v. Green, 290 Pa.Super. 76, 80-81, 434 A.2d 137, 139 (1981).

Appellant also contends that it was improper to permit the prosecuting attorney to cross-examine him regarding the incident of March 23, 1978 and the subsequent conviction for assault. The cross-examination pertained to advice by appellant’s probation officer to stay away from the neighborhood in which the Stephens resided. The cross-examination was conducted from beginning to end without defense objection. Moreover, the propriety of the cross-examination of appellant conducted by the prosecuting attorney was not raised in post-verdict motions. Under these circumstances the propriety of appellant’s cross-examination has been waived and is not properly before us for appellate review. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123. See: Commonwealth v. Silver, 499 Pa. 228, 452 A.2d 1328 (1982); Commonwealth v. Cargo, 498 Pa. 5, 444 A.2d 639 (1982); Commonwealth v. Dunston, 496 Pa. 552, 437 A.2d 1178 (1981); Commonwealth v. Butts, 495 Pa. 528, 434 A.2d 1216 (1982); Commonwealth v. Stauffer, 309 Pa.Super. 176, 454 A.2d 1140 (1982); Commonwealth v. Seeley, 297 Pa.Super. 498, 444 A.2d 142 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 268 Pa.Super. 536, 408 A.2d 1132 (1979).

Although conceding the sufficiency of the evidence to show harassment, appellant contends that this charge was not before the trial court and that his conviction thereof was improper. Harassment, being a course of conduct intended to and which does in fact alarm or seriously annoy another person and which serves no legitimate purpose, is a summary offense. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(3). See: Common wealth v. Duncan, 239 Pa.Super. 539, 363 A.2d 803 (1976). Criminal proceedings were instituted by filing a private complaint, approved by the District Attorney, which charged appellant with harassment and terroristic threats. Pursuant thereto a summons was issued. After the charges had been heard and appellant had been found guilty in the Municipal Court, he appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. The District Attorney, upon receiving notice of the appeal, prepared and filed an information as commanded by Pa.R.Crim.P. 6010. That information contained only a charge of terroristic threats. The record shows that the charge of harassment was not included in the information because, in the opinion of the District Attorney, an information was unnecessary to bring before the court for hearing de novo an appeal from a summary conviction. See: Pa.R.Crim.P. 67(f). The information charging a misdemeanor and the appeal from the summary conviction for harassment were consolidated for trial before the same judge in order to avoid separate trials in violation of Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973), addendum op., 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 3172, 41 L.Ed.2d 1139 (1974) . However, appellant objected to being tried for harassment because the District Attorney had not included a harassment charge in the information. The trial court overruled the objection, appellant waived trial by jury, and both the misdemeanor and summary charge were heard by the trial judge without jury.

The procedure adopted by the Commonwealth was defective. A summary case is “a case in which the only offense or offenses charged are summary offenses.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 3(p). Where one or more of the offenses charged is a misdemeanor, the case is a court case. Pa.R.Crim.P. 3(f). The effect of this distinction is amplified by the comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 51 as follows:

“A criminal proceeding shall be brought under Chapter 50 of these Rules [Summary Cases] in cases in which all the offenses charged are either summary offenses or ordinance violations. If one or more of the charges is a misdemeanor or felony, the summary offense, if known at the time, shall be charged in the same complaint, and the case shall proceed as a court case .... ”

Similarly, the comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 101 suggests:

“Whenever a misdemeanor or felony is charged, even if a summary offense is also charged in the same complaint, the case should proceed as a court case____”

The same distinction has been carried into Chapter 6000 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which contains the procedure for criminal cases in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. Thus, Pa.R.Crim.P. 6002, which establishes procedure in summary cases, applies only to proceedings “in which a person is accused only of one or more non-traffic summary offenses.” On the other hand, Pa.R.Crim.P. 6003 establishes the procedure applicable to Non-Summary Municipal Court cases. It has application to cases “which charge any misdemeanor under the Crimes Code.”

The complaint in the instant case had charged appellant with the misdemeanor of terroristic threats and the summary offense of harassment, and he had been found guilty as charged. The case was not a summary case but a court case. Similarly, when appellant filed his appeal for trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas, the case was not a summary case; it was a court case. Therefore, the District Attorney was required by Rule 6010 to file an information containing the charges on which appellant was to be tried. Unfortunately, the District Attorney failed to treat it as a court case. The information required by Rule 6010 should have included, but did not, all charges, i.e., the misdemeanor and the summary offense. The information was the formal accusation in the court case. See and compare: Pa.R.Crim.P. 6006(a)(3) (the Municipal Court judge following sentence must advise the defendant that if he appeals from a verdict of guilty, the Municipal Court charge will be considered by the District Attorney as the basis for the preparation of an information); Pa.R.Crim.P. 225 (if several offenses are joined in a single information, there shall be a separate count for each offense charged); Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(d) (in all court cases the issues at trial are to be defined by the information).

What, then, is the effect of the failure to include the summary charge of harassment in the information? The information has not been amended to include a count of harassment. Consequently, appellant has never been charged formally in the court case with harassment.

The law is clear that a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense which is not the accusation made against him. Commonwealth v. Komatowski, 347 Pa. 445, 453, 32 A.2d 905, 909 (1943); Commonwealth v. Longo, 269 Pa.Super. 502, 503, 410 A.2d 368, 369 (1979). To invoke the jurisdiction of the court to try an accused for a criminal offense, “it is necessary that the Commonwealth confront the defendant with a formal and specific accusation of the crimes charged.... The right to formal notice of charges, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and by Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, is so basic to the fairness of subsequent proceedings that it cannot be waived even if the defendant voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court.” Commonwealth v. Little, 455 Pa. 163, 168-169, 314 A.2d 270, 273 (1974). See also: Commonwealth ex rel. Fagan v. Francies, 53 Pa.Super. 278 (1913). Compare: Commonwealth v. Diaz, 477 Pa. 122, 126, 383 A.2d 852, 854 (1978).

In the instant case, the court case against appellant was de novo. Its scope was defined by the formal charges contained in the information. Appellant could neither be tried for nor convicted of offenses not alleged in the information. It was improper, therefore, for the trial court to find appellant guilty of harassment. The offense was not formally charged and was not a constituent of the offense of making terroristic threats; it should have been charged separately.

On direct appeal, appellant is represented by counsel who was not trial counsel. Appellate counsel alleges for the first time that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and/or call as witnesses those neighbors who, allegedly, were present on October 19, 1979 and heard no threats made. It appears that there may be arguable merit in this contention. See: Commonwealth v. Bailey, 480 Pa. 329, 390 A.2d 166 (1978) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Mabie, 467 Pa. 464, 359 A.2d 369 (1976); Commonwealth v. Abney, 465 Pa. 304, 350 A.2d 407 (1976); Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975); Commonwealth v. White, 303 Pa.Super. 550, 450 A.2d 63 (1982); Commonwealth v. Guerrisi, 297 Pa.Super. 245, 443 A.2d 818 (1982); Commonwealth v. Pittman, 295 Pa.Super. 234, 441 A.2d 436 (1982); Commonwealth v. Burrell, 286 Pa.Super. 502, 429 A.2d 434 (1981). However, we are unable to decide this issue on the present state of the record. In the first place, we have only counsel’s allegation that neighbors were present at the time of the alleged offense and possessed relevant information. We do not know what these neighbors would have said if called to testify. Additionally, we do not know whether trial counsel was aware of the identity of the alleged witnesses. Finally, if he knew of them, it does not appear whether there was reason for not compelling their attendance at trial. Because these facts are missing, it is necessary that we remand for an evidentiary hearing. If the hearing court determines that trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance, a new trial should be granted. If, on the other hand, the court finds that counsel’s assistance was not ineffective, a judgment of sentence should be reimposed.

The judgment of sentence for harassment is vacated, and appellant is discharged. The judgment of sentence for terroristic threats is vacated, and the cause is remanded for an evidentiary hearing consistent with the foregoing opinion.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.

      . In Commonwealth v. Sullivan, supra, spur of the moment threats resulting from anger were held to fall short of the necessary intent to terrorize. See also: Commonwealth v. Ferrer, supra; Commonwealth v. Ashford, supra; Commonwealth v. Green, supra.

      . This issue is properly raised on direct appeal. See: Commonwealth v. Upsher, 497 Pa. 621, 625 n. 3, 444 A.2d 90, 92 n. 3 (1982); Commonwealth v. Wade, 480 Pa. 160, 172 n. 7, 389 A.2d 560, 566 n. 7 (1978) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 276 n. 6, 372 A.2d 687, 695 n. 6 (1977); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 302 Pa.Super. 203, 209 n. 3, 448 A.2d 598, 601 n. 3 (1982); Commonwealth v. Watts, 294 Pa.Super. 319, 321, 439 A.2d 1220, 1221 (1982); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 288 Pa.Super. 205, 208, 431 A.2d 360, 362 (1981).


text:
    March 4, 1983.
    458 A.2d 257
    Bower, Appellant v. Franchise Stores Realty Corp. Bower, Appellant v. Carvel Corporation.
    Argued October 19, 1982.
    Leon H. Kline, for appellant;
    Karl Kapp Baldys, for appellees.
    Before WIEAND, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 257
    Boyer, et al., Appellants v. Allentown & Sacred Hosp.
    Argued June 9, 1982.
    Boyd H. Walker, for appellants;
    J. Eaton, III, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 258
    Commonwealth v. Balmer, Appellant.
    Argued November 4, 1982.
    Joseph P. Zawrotny, for appellant;
    Michael Turner, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 258
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.

      Submitted January 5, 1982.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, CAVANAUGH and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 258
    Commonwealth v. Davis, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 18, 1983.
    Submitted April 14, 1981.
    George H. Newman, for appellant;
    Paul J. Susko, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., CAVANAUGH and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    459 A.2d 20
    Commonwealth v. Goodwin, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied May 13, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 11, 1983.

      Submitted June 3, 1982.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 259
    Commonwealth v. Holmes, Appellant.
    Submitted September 15, 1982.
    Ronald Segal, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The order of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Alfred F. Sabo is affirmed. •


text:
    458 A.2d 259
    Commonwealth v. Husovsky, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 12, 1983.

      Argued March 9, 1982.
    Nicholas M. Zanakos, for appellant;
    Mark S. Refowich, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 259
    Commonwealth v. Leavy, etc., Appellant.
    Submitted June 15, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 260
    Commonwealth v. Mitchell, Appellant.
    Submitted May 12, 1981.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before MONTEMURO, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 260
    Commonwealth v. O’Shea, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 17, 1983.
    Submitted January 20, 1982.
    Basil G. Russin, Chief Public Defender, for appellant;
    Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 260
    Commonwealth v. Padin, Appellant.
    Submitted September 14, 1982.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CERCONE, P.J., McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 260
    Commonwealth v. Phillips, Appellant.
    Submitted June 4, 1982.
    Austin J. McGreal, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order denying PCHA relief affirmed.


text:
    461 A.2d 864
    Commonwealth v. Scherer, Appellant.
    Submitted December 13, 1982.
    Joseph C. Michetti, for appellant;
    Frank S. Morrison, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 261
    Commonwealth v. Whittman, Appellant.
    Submitted April 23, 1982.
    William P. Fedullo, for appellant;
    Richard L. McMonigle, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and WIEAND, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 261
    Hager etc, Appellants v. Federal Kemper Ins., Co.
    Argued December 9, 1981.
    John R. Bonner, for appellants;
    Richard A. Gray, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 261
    Newell, et al. v. Cable, et al., Appellants.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 21, 1983.

      Argued January 13, 1982.
    Christ C. Walthour, for appellants;
    Thomas P. Ruane, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, BECK and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    March 11, 1983.
    459 A.2d 430
    Calabrese et al., Appellants v. Orr.
    Reargument Denied May 20, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 21, 1983.
    Argued June 4, 1982.
    Scott A. Bennett, for appellants;
    Bernard J. Smolens, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 261
    Commonwealth v. Brocklehurst, Appellant.
    Submitted November 9, 1982.
    Charles F. Gilchrest, for appellant;
    Samuel J. Orr, IV, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 262
    Commonwealth v. Butler, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 21, 1983.
    Submitted October 19, 1982.
    Michael Wilder, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael J. Kane, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 262
    Commonwealth v. Carrero, Appellant.
    Submitted October 19, 1982.
    John Elder, for appellant;
    George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 262
    Commonwealth v. Dicker, Appellant.
    Submitted December 13, 1982.
    Paul Perry de Marco, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    459 A.2d 430
    Commonwealth v. Ford, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied May 20, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 2, 1983.
    Submitted September 9, 1982.
    George Henry Newman, for appellant;

      Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 262
    Commonwealth v. Fox, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 3, 1983.
    Submitted November 9, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 263
    Commonwealth v. Gee, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 21, 1983.
    Submitted January 12, 1983.
    Ivan S. Abrams, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., POPOVICH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 263
    Commonwealth v. Hahn, Appellant.
    Submitted January 25, 1983.
    Joseph J. Huss, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    459 A.2d 430
    Commonwealth v. Iseley, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    March 11, 1983.
    Reargument Denied May 25, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 30, 1983.

      Argued November 15, 1982.
    Theodore Q. Thompson, for appellant;
    Stephen B. Harris, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 263
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, Appellant.
    Submitted January 19, 1983.
    John Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 264
    Commonwealth v. James, Appellant. Commonwealth v. Palmer, Appellant.
    Petitions for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 13 and 24, 1983.

      Argued February 17, 1982.
    Lindon DiCicco, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald Thomas Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 264
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted December 7, 1982.
    Vincent M. Lorusso, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 264
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Argued January 7, 1983.
    Colie B. Chappelle, for appellant;
    A. Sheldon Kovach, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 264
    Commonwealth v. Ljungman, Appellant.
    Submitted January 25, 1983.
    Nils H. Ljungman, appellant, in propria persona;
    Merril W. Kerlin, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Appeals quashed.


text:
    458 A.2d 265
    Commonwealth v. Majors, Appellant.
    Submitted September 9, 1982.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 265
    Commonwealth v. Morris, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 14, 1983.
    Submitted June 4, 1982.
    Burton A. Rose, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 265
    Commonwealth v. Sawyer, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 25, 1983.
    Submitted May 20, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, McEWEN and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 266
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 8, 1983.
    Submitted June 9, 1982.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Edward F. Brown, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    459 A.2d 431
    Commonwealth v. Story, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied May 24, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 29, 1983.
    Submitted November 9, 1982.
    Sanford M. Aderson, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 266
    Commonwealth v. Thompson, Appellant.
    Submitted January 26, 1983.
    Hugh S. Rebert, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Thompson J. McCullough, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 266
    Commonwealth v. Ward, Appellant.
    Submitted September 8, 1982.
    Raymond E. Kumor, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 266
    Smith v. Gibbs, Appellant.

      Argued November 8, 1982.
    Daniel T. Zamos, for appellant;
    Jean Evelyn Gray-bill, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 267
    Drozdibob v. Gerovac, Appellant.
    Submitted June 15, 1982.
    John Francis Salopek, for appellant;
    J. Lauson Cashdollar, did not file a brief on behalf of appellee;
    Craig E. Wynn, participating party, in propria persona.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 267
    In re Est. of Pederick. Appeal of Gregory.
    Appeal Granted May 16, 1983.
    Argued February 3, 1982.
    Thomas J. Mettee, for appellant;
    Edmund P. Butler, for participating party.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and McEWEN, JJ.
   The order of the learned Philadelphia County Orphans’ Court sitting en banc is affirmed.

ROWLEY, J., filed a memorandum dissenting opinion.


text:
    458 A.2d 267
    Dezarn, et ux., Appellants v. American Hosp. Supply, et al.
    Argued November 8, 1982.
    Daniel Berger, for appellants;
    Thomas J. Lowery, for Amer. Hosp., appellee;
    James Arthur Wood, for Geosette Langenheim, appellee;
    Mary Drake Korsmeyer, for Monongahela Valley, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 268
    Walker, et al., Appellants v. Brink Builders et al.

      Submitted June 15, 1982.
    Thomas Daniel Heberle, for appellants;
    Will J. Schaaf, for appellees.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    458 A.2d 268
    Watson v. Steinour, Appellant.
    Argued January 6, 1982.
    Daniel K. Deardorff, for appellant;
    Philip A. Arnold, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, CAVANAUGH and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 268
    Wilkins v. Ugite Gas, Inc., etc., et al. Appeal of Ugite Gas, Inc.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 11, 1983.
    Argued May 19, 1982.
    Joseph A. Macerelli, for appellant;
    James F. Manley, for appellees.
    Before ROWLEY, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 268
    Yesko, Appellant (at No. 782) v. Baillie Industries, Inc., et al. Yesko v. Baillie Industries, Inc., et al., Appellant. Yesko v. Baillie Industries, Inc., et al. Appeal of Bailie Industries, Inc.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 11, 1983.
    Argued June 15, 1982.
    James Cole, for Yesko, appellant (at No. 782) and appellee (at Nos. 814 and 818); David B. Adams, for Borough of Forest Hills, appellant (at No. 814) and appellee (at Nos. 782 and 818);
    James E. Coyne, for Bailie Industries, appellant (at No. 818) and appellee (at Nos. 782 and 814); Jeffrey T. Morris, for Atomatic Manufacturers, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    March 18, 1983.
    458 A.2d 269
    Cohen Esq. etc. v. Murphy etc., Appellant.

      Argued March 18, 1980.
    George Gershenfeld, for appellant;
    Richard R. Block, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, SPAETH and WATKINS, JJ.

      This decision was reached prior to the death of Judge Price.

   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 269
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Argued November 16, 1982.
    Samuel Kagle, for appellant;
    Garold E. Tennis, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 269
    Commonwealth v. Butler, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 20, 1983.
    Submitted September 14, 1981.
    William P. James, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WATKINS and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    460 A.2d 366
    Commonwealth v. Campbell, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied June 3, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 21, 1983.
    Argued June 16, 1982.
    Charles F. Gilchrest, for appellant;
    Edward R. Niederriter, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 270
    Commonwealth v. Rush a/k/a Hodges, Appellant.
    Submitted October 26, 1982.
    Arthur J. King, for appellant;
    Joseph John Hylan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, WICKERSHAM and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 270
    Commonwealth v. Souza, Appellant.
    Argued January 6, 1983.
    John S. Manos, for appellant;
    Eric Beller, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 270
    Commonwealth v. Toledo, Appellant.
    Submitted June 22, 1982.
    Anita M. Cohen, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Thomas N. Shiomos is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 270
    Commonwealth v. Walker, Appellant.
    Submitted June 16, 1982.
    William Gleason Barbin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    D. Gerard Long, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 271
    Commonwealth v. Walker, Appellant.
    Submitted September 14, 1981.
    Joseph Hugh O’Donnell, Jr., submitted a brief on behalf of appellant;
    Michelle Lehr, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and WATKINS, JJ.

       DiSalle, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 271
    Commonwealth v. Whaley, Appellant.
    Submitted January 11, 1983.
    Jeffrey A. Connelly, for appellant;
    Paul J. Susko, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., POPOVICH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 271
    Commonwealth v. Wooley, Appellant.
    Submitted April 28, 1982.
    Donald B. Calaiaro, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CERCONE, P.J., WICKERSHAM and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 272
    Evans v. Evans, Appellant.
    Submitted March 30, 1982.
    Samuel Spear, for appellant;
    Mary Evans, appellee, in propria persona.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The order of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge John R. Meade is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 272
    Flynn, Appellant v. Flynn.
    Submitted September 15, 1981.
    Anthony D. Miele, for appellant;
    David B. Keeffe, did not submit a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and WATKINS, JJ.

       DiSALLE, J. did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 272
    Gottlieb, Appellant v. Gottlieb.
    Argued December 14, 1982.
    Michael Gottlieb, appellant, in propria persona;
    Joseph R. Dannunzio, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 272
    Green, Appellant v. McCarthy, Inc., et al.
    Argued May 25, 1982.
    Arnold Levin, for appellant;
    Stephen R. Basser, for appellees.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 273
    Hendrickson v. Rucker, Appellant.

      Argued June 4, 1982.
    Francis X. Brennan, for appellant;
    Richard F. Furia, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed as modified.


text:
    458 A.2d 273
    Konek, Appellant v. Diehl et al.
    Argued May 3, 1982. Wardell F. Steigerwalt, for appellant;
    Bernard V. O’Hare, Jr., submitted a brief on behalf of appellees.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    March 25, 1983.
    458 A.2d 273
    Beichner v. Beichner, Appellant.
    Submitted January 13, 1983.
    Joseph T. Strong, for appellant;
    Ralph L.S. Montana, for appellee.

      Before CERCONE, P.J., POPOVICH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 273
    Commonwealth v. Butler, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 13, 1983.
    Submitted January 7, 1982.
    Barry R. Scat-ton, for appellant;
    Daniel Lee Howsare, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, CAVANAUGH and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 274
    Commonwealth v. Derr, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 7, 1983.
    Submitted September 14, 1981.
    Alan Ellis, for appellant;
    Gailey C. Keller, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, WATKINS and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 274
    Commonwealth v. Eaton, Appellant.
    Submitted May 24, 1982.
    Michael J. McAllister, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 274
    Commonwealth v. Green, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 27, 1983.
    Submitted June 17, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 275
    Commonwealth v. Hill a/k/a Jones, Appellant.
    Submitted March 24, 1982.
    Anthony S. Federico, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    ' Before CERCONE, P.J., WICKERSHAM and ROWLEY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 275
    Commonwealth v. Hoffman, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 1982.
    Deborah K. Hoff, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    John F. Nelson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., WICKERSHAM and ROWLEY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 275
    Commonwealth v. Killen, Appellant.
    Argued January 20, 1983.
    Silvio Fausto Modafferi, for appellant;
    Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 275
    Commonwealth v. Lantz, Appellant.
    Argued January 6, 1983.
    Charles B. Swigart, for appellant;
    Harvey B. Reeder, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 276
    Commonwealth v. Mahosky, Appellant.

      Submitted December 7, 1982.
    Peter T. Campana, for appellant;
    Kenneth D. Brown, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 276
    Commonwealth v. Pallotto, Appellant.
    Submitted November 3, 1982.
    Gary R. Egoville, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 276
    Commonwealth v. Petroski, Appellant.
    Argued June 17, 1982.
    Ronald P. Rusinak, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Timothy P. Creany, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of December 22, 1981 is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 277
    Commonwealth v. Rearick, Appellant.
    Submitted October 28, 1981.
    John J. Morgan, for appellant;
    Robert F. Hawk, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 277
    Commonwealth v. Salemo, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 13, 1983.
    Submitted November 8, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;

      Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 277
    Commonwealth v. Shelton, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 13, 1983.
    Argued March 18, 1981.
    Carl M. Moses, for appellant;
    James P. Epstein, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and MONTEMURO, JJ.

      This decision was reached prior to the death of Judge Price.

   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 277
    Commonwealth v. Wigfall, etc., Appellant.
    Submitted June 16, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 278
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted June 8, 1982.
    Rolfe C. Marsh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    David E. Fritchey, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., CAVANAUGH and ROWLEY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 278
    Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Hnat, Appellant.
    Argued June 9, 1982.
    John P. Thomas, for appellant;
    Danielle E. Williams, appellee, in propria persona.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 278
    Coren et al. v. DiDomenico et al. Appeal of Matthew J. DiDomenico and Aurelio Nardoni.
    Argued June 7, 1982.
    Miraglia C. Lecky, for appellants;
    Gary Alan Hurwitz, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 279
    Fritchman, Appellant v. Scott, et al.
    Argued January 18, 1983.
    David A. Scholl, for appellant;
    James R. Fiorentino, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed in part and reversed in part.


text:
    458 A.2d 279
    Estate of Herman. Appeal of Jack W. Isenberg, Objector.

      Submitted January 13, 1983.
    Robin Isenberg, for appellant;
    Robert Dale Austin, Jr., for appellee;
    Fremont J. McKenrick, for A1 Isenberg, participating party.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., POPOVICH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 279
    In the Interest of Hudson, a minor. Appeal of Dolores Hudson, Natural Mother.
    Argued January 12, 1983.
    Lorraine D. Taylor, for appellant;
    Mark P. Cancilla, for appellee; Helen M. Tremont, for Child. & Youth Ser., participating party.
    Before POPOVICH, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 279
    Montgomery Farm v. Macarro, Appellants.

      Submitted January 7, 1982.
    David Angelo Martino, for appellants;
    Paul G. Moyer, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, CAVANAUGH and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    March 31, 1983.
    458 A.2d 280
    All Metals Fabricating v. Barr, Appellants.
    Argued April 14, 1982.
    James Falcon, for appellants;
    Thomas J. Godlewski, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The order of the trial court is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 280
    Campbell, Appellant v. Campbell.
    Argued November 8, 1982.
    Thomas George Wagner, for appellant;
    Stephen E. Capone, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 280
    Clemens et al. v. Hastings et al., Appellants.
    Submitted June 7, 1982.
    William H. Wiest, for appellants;
    Robert Eugene Benion, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    458 A.2d 280
    Collette et al., Appellants v. Arborio, Inc.
    Argued June 2, 1982.
    John T. Stieh, for appellants;
    Cal Leventhal, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The order is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 281
    Collette et al., Appellants v. Covart.

      Argued June 2, 1982.
    John T. Stieh, for appellants;
    Sanford D. Beecher, Jr., for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The order is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 281
    Commonwealth v. Bey, Appellant.
    Submitted June 4, 1982.
    Vincent M. Lorusso, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 281
    Commonwealth v. Bolden, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 1983.
    Kimberly Hamilton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Sheryl A. Serratta, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 282
    Commonwealth v. Campbell, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 30, 1983.
    Argued May 26, 1982.
    Gwanita G. Hester, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Joseph A. Smyth, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

WIEAND, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    458 A.2d 282
    Commonwealth v. Cheeseboro, Appellant.
    Submitted December 14, 1982.
    Peter Rosalsky, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 282
    Commonwealth v. Cleary, Appellant.
    Submitted June 15, 1982.
    Paulette J. Balogh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 282
    Commonwealth v. Davalos, Appellant.
    Submitted February 3, 1983.
    Harry R. Seay, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Angelo A. Guarino is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 283
    Commonwealth v. Devore, Appellant.
    Submitted April 27, 1982.
    Richard W. Epstein, for appellant;
    Samuel J. Orr, IV, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 283
    Commonwealth v. DiGiorgio, Appellant.
    Argued January 18, 1983.
    Steven R. Geroff, for appellant;
    Ronald D. Castille, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 283
    Commonwealth v. Jones, Appellant.

      Submitted April 21, 1982.
    Robert F. Pappano, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and WIEAND, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.

WIEAND, J., filed a memorandum dissenting statement.


text:
    458 A.2d 284
    Commonwealth v. Jones, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 1983.
    Silvio Fausto Modafferi, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 284
    Commonwealth v. Kremp, Appellant.
    Argued January 13, 1983.

      Edgar M. Snyder, for appellant;
    Kenneth Benson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 284
    Commonwealth v. Martin, Appellant.
    Submitted November 3, 1982.
    Thomas V. Hunt, for appellant;
    Gaele M. Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 284
    Commonwealth v. Mausteller, Appellant.
    Submitted December 13, 1982.
    Scott Wayne Naus, for appellant;
    Gailey C. Keller, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 285
    Commonwealth v. Shegog, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 4, 1983.
    Argued January 13, 1983.
    Thomas Allen J. Crawford, Jr., for appellant;
    Melinda G. Tell, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 285
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
    Submitted June 8, 1982.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 285
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Tribuiani.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 20, 1983.
    Argued January 19, 1982.
    Joseph Hylan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant;
    Maurino J. Rossanese, for appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 286
    Commonwealth ex rel., Ambler v. Ambler. Appeal of Barbara Ambler Sweeney.
    Argued January 11, 1983.
    James Hook, for appellant;
    John A. Stets, for appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 286
    Drumheller, et ux v. Lindenmuth, Appellant.
    Submitted February 24, 1982.
    Robert M. Davison, for appellant;
    Robert C. McFadden, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 286
    Heimbach, Appellants v. C. Porter Manufacturing Co.
    Argued September 8, 1982.
    Samuel A. Litzenberger, for appellants;
    Fredric David Rubin, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 286
    Hutchison et ux., Appellants v. Valley Buick Inc.

      Argued June 17, 1982.
    Mark Daniel Speaker, for appellants;
    John R. Luke, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 287
    In re Estate of Tettemer. Appeal of Upper Saucon Township.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 22, 1983.
    Argued May 10, 1982.
    Thomas F. Traud, Jr., for appellant;
    Karl Y. Donecker, for participating party.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 287
    Interstate etc. v. A.F.A. Protective etc. Appeal of Protective Systems.
    Submitted June 21, 1982.
    Gary Francis DiVito, for appellant;
    John A. Shrader, for appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 287
    Mayercheck v. Mayercheck, Appellant.
    Argued January 11, 1983.
    Gordon David Fisher, for appellant;
    Eric C. Rome, for appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    460 A.2d 366
    Toppitzer v. White, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied June 9, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 2, 1983.
    Argued January 20, 1983.
    Helen T. White, appellant, in propria persona;
    James C. Brennan, for appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    458 A.2d 287
    Yoder, Appellant v. Smith.
    Submitted June 17, 1982.
    David E. Holland, for appellant;
    Edward James Lucht, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The consolidated order of November 25, 1981 is affirmed.