author: BECK, Judge:

text:
    448 A.2d 48
    CBS INC., d/b/a/ WCAU-TV v. CAPITAL CITIES COMMUNICATIONS, INC., d/b/a WPVI-TY, Appellant. PHILADELPHIA NEW YEAR SHOOTERS AND MUMMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CAPITAL CITIES COMMUNICATIONS, INC. d/b/a WPVI-TV and Lawrence J. Pollock and Charles R. Bradley. Appeal of CAPITAL CITIES COMMUNICATIONS, INC. d/b/a WPVI-TV, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Oct. 20, 1981.
    Filed July 9, 1982.

      Elihu A. Greenhouse, Philadelphia, for appellants.
    Gregory M. Harvey, Philadelphia, for CBS, appellee at No. 91.
    Janet M. Sonnenfeld, Philadelphia, for Philadelphia New Year at No. 92.
    Before BECK, MONTEMURO and WATKINS, JJ.
   BECK, Judge:

These appeals are from Declaratory Judgments entered in two actions consolidated for trial below. Appellees WCAUTV and Philadelphia New Year Shooters and Mummers Association, Inc. (the latter appellee hereinafter referred to as Association) brought suit seeking to have a clause contained in an agreement, entered into between appellant WPYI-TV and appellee Association on October 5, 1977, declared void and unenforceable. We hold that the challenged “option” portion of the agreement, if enforceable at any time, had expired prior to any attempt to exercise it, and affirm judgment for appellees. Appellant WPVI-TV filed a counterclaim in the WCAU suit claiming tortious interference with a contractual relation. Appellee Association sought in its action a further declaration that the agreement of October 5,1977 was voidable in its entirety for fraud, and sought an accounting. Appellant WPVI-TV filed no counterclaim in this action, but prayed in its answer for a declaration interpreting the contract in accordance with its claims.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In Philadelphia, tradition hails the mummers who parade annually through the city on New Year’s day. For as long as any living Philadelphian can remember, the Mummers’ Parade of elaborately costumed string bands, portraying serious, comic, theatrical and historical themes, with prizes awarded to those judged best in each of the traditional “divisions,” has been a major New Year’s day event. The parade is televised and transmitted live. It has become an anticipated and lustrous part of the City’s holiday celebration.

Appellee Association is an unincorporated association of string bands whose membership is comprised of some of the string bands (24 of them) which compete in the Mummers’ Parade and two string bands which do not. Some time prior to 1974, pursuant to a series of written agreements, appellant WPVI-TV began to make payment to appellee Association in return for which it received the “exclusive right to telecast the performances” of the members of the Association during the Mummers’ Parade. For many years, the Mummers’ Parade was telecast by and on WPVI-TV (Channel 6) and not by any other television station.

In September of 1977, the Vice-President and General Manager of WPVI-TV, Lawrence J. Pollock, the Program Director of WPVI-TV, Charles R. Bradley, the President of the Association, Frederick Calandra, and members of the “Television Committee” of the Association met at a restaurant. The prior written agreement between WPVI-TV and the Association, dated November 5, 1974 “expired January one, 1977” and the meeting was held in order to discuss the terms of a new agreement.

At trial, Mr. Bradley testified that he stated to Mr. Calandra that the station would like to have a “first refusal option” in the agreement and explained to him “what a first refusal option was.” No other witness gave testimony with regard to the negotiation of the 1977 agreement. The written agreement was prepared by counsel for appellant WPVI-TV and was executed under date October 5, 1977.

The agreement contained a preamble describing the subject matter, and then set forth the following terms:

1. Association hereby grants STATION the exclusive right to telecast the performances of its members in the said PARADE, and to record and telecast preview programs and other programs in which the performances by its members may be shown.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 hereof, the STATION agrees to pay ASSOCIATION the following consideration for the said rights for the following years:
A. $13,000.00 for the PARADE scheduled for January 1, 1978;
B. $14,000.00 for the PARADE scheduled for January 1, 1979;
C. $15,000.00 for the PARADE scheduled for January 1, 1980;
and STATION agrees to supply to ASSOCIATION $10,-000.00 worth of television advertising for the Mummers’ Annual Show of Shows held at the City’s Civic Center.
3. It is agreed that if a PARADE is not held in any year during the term of and any extensions of the term of this agreement, no consideration shall be paid for each year or years when such PARADE is not sponsored and officially recognized by the City of Philadelphia, or in any year in which the PARADE is not held.
4. Failure to telecast the PARADE in any year or years for reasons as set forth in Paragraph 3 hereof shall not effect the rights of the parties for other years during the term of this agreement or any extension hereof.
5. STATION is hereby granted the first option and privilege to renew this agreement beyond the termination date as set forth herein upon the same terms and conditions of any bona fide offer received by ASSOCIATION beyond the termination date as set forth herein.
ASSOCIATION agrees to give STATION notice of all details of any other bona fide offer received by ASSOCIATION, and STATION is hereby granted two months after receipt of such notice in which to exercise such first refusal option by written notice of election to do so. Upon exercise of such first refusal option, the terms and conditions of this agreement shall be extended in conformity therewith.

The agreement contained no terms other than the foregoing. Despite several references to “the term of this agreement” and “the termination date as set forth herein,” no term of the agreement or designated termination date is anywhere set forth in the agreement.

By letter dated February 20, 1980, appellee WCAU-TV offered terms for similar “exclusive” rights for a three year period, including an offer of escalating payments in the annual amounts of $30,000., $35,000., and $40,000. By letter dated April 29, 1980, appellant WPVI-TV offered a five-year agreement in terms including escalating payments in the annual amounts of $40,000., $45,000., $50,000., $55,000., and $60,000. The letter stated, inter alia, “In addition, Channel 6 will want to maintain the option and similar renewal agreement for a period beyond the proposed five years covered by this agreement, as exists in the current contract.” By letter to appellee Association dated May 30, 1980, appellee WCAU-TV, by its Vice-President and General Manager, Jay R. Feldman, stated that it had been advised “that a perpetual first refusal option for exclusive broadcast rights to Mummer events, such as might be claimed on the basis of your expired contract with WPVITV, would constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore would not be legally enforceable.” The letter again offered a three year contract increasing the escalating annual payments to $70,000., $80,000., and $100,000. Joseph A. Purul, Chairman of the TV Committee of appellee Association, wrote to appellant WPVI-TV, by letter dated and hand-delivered June 3, 1980, “to advise that WCAU-TV” had made an offer, and describing the terms of the offer. The letter concluded: “Inasmuch as thé Mummérs’ Association body will make a determination on Thursday, June 19, 1980, which Channel will televise the Parade, it behooves you to submit your new proposal on or before that date if you so desire. If you do not intend to pursue the matter any further kindly advise.”

On June 16, 1980, Mr. Pollock, in behalf of appellant WPVI-TV, met with the TV Committee of the Association and read aloud letter dated June 16, 1980 addressed to the Association, “attri: Joseph A. Purul, Jr., Esquire.” The letter thanked him for the June 3 letter “in which you gave us notice of the other offer, as provided in our 1977 agreement,” and stated “WPVI-TV elects to exercise its first refusal option.” The letter then stated, inter alia, “We offer a three-year rights package of $75,000 the first year, $87,500 the second year, and $100,000 the third year” and offered to “match or exceed” all the terms of the WCAU-TV proposal.

Following the June 16 meeting, the Association received three additional offers:

June 18—WCAU-TV—increasing their payments to equal those set forth by appellant
June 19—KYW-TV—offering $100,000. each year for three years
June 19—WCAU-TV—increasing their payments to $100,000. per year for three years.

None of these offers was communicated to appellant WPVITV by appellee Association. Each of the two additional offers by appellee WCAU-TV contained language identical to the earlier offer stating its view that the “first refusal option ... would not be legally enforceable.”

On June 19, 1980, representatives of the 24 Association members who appear in the Mummers’ Parade met and voted 23 to 1 to accept the June 19 offer by WCAU-TV. Accordingly, Mr. Calandra initialed WCAU’s June 19 letter of intent and returned it to them. On June 23, 1980, WCAU-TV delivered to WPVI-TV its letter of the same date notifying appellant of the intent of WCAU-TV to enter into a contract with appellee Association on the terms of the June 19 letter of intent, a copy of which was enclosed. Following conversations between respective counsel for the parties, on June 30,1980 appellees brought the separate suits against appellant which resulted in the judgment from which this appeal is taken.

The court below held that:

A. Paragraph 5 of the agreement in suit [quoted above at page (5)] could only legally be construed to require appellee Association to give appellant notice of bona fide offers which it has determined to accept.

B. paragraph 5 could be so construed based upon testimony by appellant’s expert witness that this was the understanding in the television industry of the term “bona fide offer.”

C. As so construed, the agreement was legally binding and enforceable, and it was unnecessary to consider, or rule with regard to, the expiration of the “first refusal option.”

D. The purported exercise of the “first refusal option” by appellant as set forth in its letter of June 16, 1980 was ineffectual in that it did not relate to an offer which appellee Association was determined to accept.

E. Appellant was duly notified of the bona fide offer which appellee Association was determined to accept by the letter from appellee WCÁU-TV dated June 23,1980 and the filing of complaints June 30, 1980.

F. Appellant WPVI-TV failed to exercise its first refusal option during the two months following notice from WCÁU-TV and the filing of complaints, and appellee Association is therefore free to contract with others.

Exceptions filed by appellant were denied, and judgment was entered for appellees and against appellant.

ASSERTIONS ON APPEAL

Appellant asserts that it was error to hold that it had not validly exercised its “first refusal option” by the letter dated June 16, 1980. In the alternative, appellant asserts that it was- error to hold that either notice from a stranger to the contract or notice by the filing of complaint constitutes compliance with the notice requirement of the contract.

PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO REVIEW OF CONTRACT PROVISION

As well stated in Bobali Corporation v. Tamapa Company, 235 Pa.Super. 1, 340 A.2d 485 (1975) alloc. ref. construction of contract options and rights of first refusal must be in accordance with the principles of contract construction and:

In construing the terms of a contract we are guided by well-defined and fundamental canons of construction. Our Supreme Court has adopted the following principles:
‘The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intention if it can be done consistently with legal principles.’ (Citations omitted.) ‘Contracts must receive a reasonable interpretation, according to the intention of the parties at the time of executing them, if that intention can be ascertained from their language, (citing cases.)’ Percy A. Brown & Co. v. Raub, 357 Pa. 271, 287 [54 A.2d 35] (1947). Id., 235 Pa.Super. 5-6, 340 A.2d at 488.

We must first look to the writing itself, for if the terms of the agreement are clear and precise, performance must be required in accordance with the intent as expressed in the agreement without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic evidence.

The question before us is whether the clause containing the right of first refusal is ambiguous so as to require interpretation. It is established that the intent of the parties to a written contract is the writing itself and when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be found only in the express (sic) language of the agreement. Felte v. White, 451 Pa. 137, 302 A.2d 347 (1973) (other citations omitted). Thus, it is said that the agreement that is clear and unambiguous speaks for itself and is not subject to interpretation by reference to any circumstances other than those recited in the written agreement, (citations omitted). Steuart v. McChesney & Joyce, 284 Pa.Super. 29, 424 A.2d 1375, 1377 (1981).

Where, however, the terms of the agreement are ambiguous and the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained by reference to the writing, the agreement will be construed strictly against the party who prepared the agreement, particularly in the event such party is in a superior bargaining position to the other contracting party. In addition, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show the common understanding and intent of the parties at the time the contract was entered into.

However, no extrinsic evidence may be introduced in an attempt actually to alter, amend, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract as written. Such evidence is barred by the Parol Evidence Rule. Similarly, the court, may not construe a contract in such a manner as to write a new contract for the parties, but is confined to reasonable construction of the language as actually contained in the writing. It is well-established

that ‘The parties have the right to make their own contract, and it is not the function of this court to rewrite it, or to give it a construction in conflict with the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.’ Hagarty v. Wm. Akers, Jr., Co., Inc., 342 Pa. 236, 239 [20 A.2d 317] (1941); R. F. Felte, Inc. v. White, 451 Pa. 137 [302 A.2d 347] (1973).

Bobali Corporation v. Tamapa Company, supra, 235 Pa. Super. 6, 340 A.2d at 488.

THE AGREEMENT IN SUIT

In the instant case, it cannot be said that the terms of Paragraph 5 of the agreement are so clear and unambiguous as to obviate the necessity for construction. Although the first segment of Paragraph 5 speaks of a “first option and privilege to renew,” it is unquestioned and undisputed that it was never in the contemplation of any party to the agreement that Paragraph 5 conferred a privilege to renew the terms of that agreement. Similarly, the language of the second segment stating “the terms and conditions of this agreement shall be extended” cannot be taken to mean that either the Association or WPVI-TV was bound to extend the terms of the 1977 agreement. An ambiguity further arises as to what the notice duty of the Association is which is described as being to give WPVI-TV notice “of all details of any other bona fide offer.” Reference to “any other . . . offer” could be read to mean that the provision only came into play once WPVI-TV had made an offer. Does “bonafide offer” mean every genuine offer, every offer which is not a sham offer, which is received by Association, or only such offers as interest the Association? Would the notice by WPVI-TV of an intention to meet or exceed the terms of any such offer of which it had notice terminate all further negotiations, or would a new offer followed by new notice create new rights and obligations. Finally, and we believe most importantly, during what period of time was the Association under a duty to give such notice and during what period of time did WPVI-TV have the right to exercise a right of first refusal?

Applying settled principles of contract construction to the language of this agreement will yield a reasonable interpretation capable of performance with regard to each of the ambiguities except for the lack of termination date. Thus, construing the language strictly against appellant whose attorney prepared the agreement, it may reasonably be interpreted as setting forth a right of first refusal which prevents the Association from accepting any offer by a third party without first offering the opportunity to appellant WPVI-TV to meet the terms of the third party’s offer and giving WPVI-TV two months in which to decide whether to accept the offer to contract on those terms or waive its right of first refusal.

In Gateway Trading Company, Inc. v. Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh, 438 Pa. 329, 265 A.2d 115 (1970) in construing what purported to be an option to purchase land contained in a lease, but which option contained language similar to the agreement herein, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the language created a right of first refusal, “described by Professor Corbin” as creating the following result:

If a third party should make an offer, the owner was privileged not to accept it, and also not to make any offer to the promisee. But the owner was bound by duty not to accept the offer of the third party without first giving an option to the promisee.

The court therefore held that:

The clear import of the instant rider provision was that the lessor was obliged to give Gateway written notice of the terms of any bona fide offer which it deemed acceptable and to allow Gateway to purchase the property on those terms before any sale to a third party was effected. .. .

While the cases on a right of first refusal are not many, a review of such cases together with standard provisions of contract law, establishes the following:

A right of first refusal constitutes a promise to offer the res of the right to the promisee for such consideration as the promisor determines to accept on the basis of an offer from a third party before accepting the offer of the third party. A right of first refusal does not require the promisor to offer the res at all. The right of first refusal merely requires that before the promisor accepts an offer of a third party, he must offer the res to the promisee of the right for the consideration he is willing to accept from the third party. Ross v. Shawmut Development Corp., 460 Pa. 328, 333 A.2d 751 (1975); Warden v. Taylor, 460 Pa. 577, 333 A.2d 922 (1975); DeVries v. Westgren, 446 Pa. 205, 287 A.2d 437 (1972); Gateway Trading Co., Inc. v. Children’s Hospital, supra, Sun Oil Co. v. Bellone, 292 Pa.Super. 341, 437 A.2d 415 (1981); Steuart v. McChesney, supra, Bobali Corporation v. Tamapa Company, supra.

Construing the instant right of first refusal in accordance with the principles thus adopted in this Commonwealth, the provisions of Paragraph 5 carry the clear import that the Association was obliged, during the life of the right of first refusal, to offer the televising rights to WPVI-TV on the terms of any bona fide offer from a third party which it had determined to accept. WPYI-TV then had two months in which to accept that offer, thus exercising its right of first refusal, or to reject that offer, thus waiving its right of first refusal.

On this basis, we agree with the lower court that the letter of June 3, 1980 from the Association to WPVI-TV, notifying it of negotiations with WCAU-TV and inviting it to make a “new proposal” can not be interpreted as inviting appellant to exercise its right of first refusal. The letter established that there was no pending offer which it was determined to accept, but on the contrary indicated that it wished all offers to be placed before it for full study and a determination on June 19. Similarly, appellant’s letter of June 16 can only fairly be read as a bid and did not constitute an acceptance of any offer made by the Association. The fact that appellant also made an attempt to bind appellee Association by using self-serving language does not alter the overall import of the letter as an attempt to outbid WCAU-TV and finalize negotiations. As stated in the opinion by Judge Stanley Greenberg in the lower court, “Their argument that the increased payment offered was an act of generosity not required under the circumstances and for which they should not be penalized, is not only a little far fetched, but is certainly not consistent with their previous dealings with the Mummers... . ” There was therefore no offer made by appellee Association to appellant WPVITV to exercise its right of first refusal, and no acceptance by WPVI-TV in the exchange of letters June 3 to June 16.

We cannot agree with the court below, however, that notice in accordance with the agreement was served upon appellant. The only offer which appellee Association determined to accept was the WCAU-TV offer of June 19 which it voted to accept. Appellant received no notice from appellee Association that it had received that offer. Appellant received no notice from anyone that appellee was offering appellant the televising rights on those terms or any terms. On the contrary, appellant received notice, first by the June 23 letter from WCAU-TV and then by service of complaints, that appellee Association had accepted the WCAU-TV offer and that both appellees repudiated the right of first refusal as being unenforceable. Under these circumstances, appellant could not be expected to respond as though it had received normal notice of an offer, requiring acceptance or rejection. Therefore, if Paragraph 5 of the agreement of October 5, 1977 was valid and enforceable and had not earlier terminated, appellant has not received the notice required by the agreement.

However, this court is of the opinion that the issue of the validity of a perpetual right of first refusal is not immaterial as held by the court below, but rather is at the center of this controversy.

TERMINATION DATE OF THE AGREEMENT

The issue of the termination date of the agreement was not argued or briefed by the parties as a result of the lower court’s ruling on other issues. However, this court will consider the issue since it must consider all grounds for possible affirmance appearing from the opinion and record before it. Appellees did argue in the court below, and in fact grounded their complaints on the claim, that the lack of a termination date for the right of first refusal rendered it invalid.

Appellant WPYI-TV claimed at trial, and offered testimony and exhibits tending to support, that it drafted Paragraph 5 in accordance with other agreements in the industry containing such rights of first refusal. However, each similar agreement presented by appellant as evidence contained a fixed term of the agreement and contained reasonably clear language establishing that the right of first refusal was to be exercised within the term of the agreement. Moreover, each was negotiated with a corporate distributor in the television industry, thus resulting in a common industry understanding of the language used. In the case of the agreement in suit, appellant WPVI-TV, who drafted the agreement, neglected to insert any designation whatsoever of the term of the agreement. With regard to the primary performance of the agreement, this creates no problem, for the central portion of the agreement relates to specific payments to be made for specific performances to be held on the three specific dates, January 1, 1978, .January 1, 1979 and January 1, 1980. Some vagueness does arise with regard to the dates for “other programs” mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the agreement, resulting in a lack of clarity as to whether any portion of the agreement is expected to survive beyond January 1, 1980. We are here faced with language so vague, as it relates to dates in which performance of duties under the contract is required, that any attempt to construe the contract may be seen as actually rewriting the contract for the parties.

To the extent any construction is possible, the contract must be construed most strongly against the claims of appellant in light of the combination of the factors of appellant’s greater sophistication in the television industry and the fact that appellant drafted the agreement and must therefore accept the burden of the uncertainty created by its omission of the “Term of the Agreement” paragraph normal to the industry.

While Paragraph 5 does use language relating to a right “to renew this agreement beyond the termination date,” thus must be read to mean “to enter into a new agreement for the period beyond the termination date” when it is construed with the rest of the agreement and in light of its purpose. Similarly, the language indicating that such new agreement shall be based upon an offer “received by Association beyond the termination date” cannot possibly be read to mean that appellant has the right to meet all offers in the future, but clearly must be read to mean that the appellant had the right to meet such an offer received by the Association during the term of the agreement, for performance beyond the termination date. In short, while the parties had the right and ability to draft and enter into an agreement which could have required the performance by some party of an obligation during some specifically limited period of time after the termination date of the agreement, they did not do so. At the very most, by reference to the period of time granted appellant WPVI-TV for response to notice, the agreement may be read to extend its right for the specific two-month period after the termination date.

There remains the question of whether we can ascertain a termination date and make a determination of the specific period of time during which performance was required of the parties.

Since the latest date mentioned in the agreement is January 1, 1980, we are forced to conclude that that date is intended as the termination date of the agreement. This construction is' supported by the testimony of the Vice President and General Manager of appellant WPVI-TV that the prior agreement dated November 5, 1974 had expired on January 1,1977. Although representatives of appellant did refer to the prior contract as a “three year contract” both the above testimony and the conduct of the parties in entering into a new agreement prior to November 5, 1977 demonstrate that it was viewed as a tri-annual agreement, the three annual parades covered in the agreement setting the actual contract dates.

From all of the foregoing, we must conclude either that any obligation under the agreement imposed upon appellee Association to give notice of a bona fide offer which it was determined to accept expired at midnight on January 1, 1980, or the agreement is so vague as to termination date as to require that we hold that it was null and void for want of a term central to the agreement. In either event, we hold that no right of first refusal existed in appellant WPVI-TV on June 19, Í980 when appellee Association received the bona fide offer which it was determined to accept. Appellee Association was therefore free at all relevant times to contract with whomever it pleased.

CONCLUSION

The Declaratory Judgment should have stated:

1. Paragraph 5 of the agreement entered into between Capital Cities Communications, Inc. (WPVI-TV) and Philadelphia New Year Shooters and Mummers Association, Inc. (Association) dated October 5, 1977 is construed to require that, during the term of the agreement, Association was required to give notice to WPVI-TV of any bona fide offer from a third party which Association had determined to accept, and before accepting any offer from a third party was required to offer to contract with WPVI-TV on the same terms as those offered by the third party. Upon receipt of such an offer from Association, WPVI-TV was given two months within which to accept such offer.

2. Paragraph 5 of the said agreement is either so vague with regard to the termination date that it is void for want of - a term central to the agreement, or must be construed to have terminated no later than March 1980.

3. Appellant WPVI-TV had no existing right of first refusal at any time relevant to this litigation, such right having terminated no later than March 1980.

The .Declaratory Judgment appealed from is modified as above set forth and, as so modified, is affirmed. Judgment for both appellees in these consolidated appeals is affirmed.

      . Appellee WCAU-TV sought a further declaration that appellee Association might lawfully contract with it in described terms. Appellee Association sought a further declaration that the agreement of October 5, 1977 was voidable in its entirety for fraud, and sought an accounting.

      . A Petition to intervene as parties plaintiff was filed below by the Philadelphia Mummers Brigade Association and certain string bands alleging that appellee Association represented only approximately half of the string bands participating in the Mummers’ Parade. This petition was denied on the grounds that intervenors’ position with regard to relief sought against appellant WPVI-TV was identical with that sought by the plaintiff in suit. Denial of the petition was without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners to seek other legal remedies as to their claims against the parties. The issue of the power of appellee Association to grant “exclusive” rights is therefore not before this court.

      . Deposition of Lawrence J. Pollack, Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”) at 81a.

      . N.T. at 416a.

      . Paragraph 16, Amended Answer to the Complaint, N.T. at 579a.

      . N.T. at 507a-509a.

      . N.T. at 510a-512a.

      . N.T. at 513a-515a.

      . N.T. at 516a-517a.

      . N.T. at 519a.

      . N.T. at 520a-522a.

      . N.T. at 523a.

      . N.T. at 524a-526a.

      . N.T. at 527a.

      . Lawrence J. Pollock testified that he had described the impact of the right of first refusal to Association President Calandra on June 16, 1980 as resulting in a situation “where you are contractually bound to notify us of another offer you are going to accept____” 294a. There was no other testimony as to the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of “bona fide offer” of which notice was to be given. .

      . In re Breyer’s Estate, 475 Pa. 108, 379 A.2d 1305 (1977); Egyptian Sands Real Estate, Inc. v. Polony, 222 Pa.Super. 315, 294 A.2d 799 (1972). The rationale for this rule is directly applicable to the facts of this case:
      Since one who speaks or writes can by exactness of expression more easily prevent mistakes in meaning than one with whom he is dealing, doubts arising from ambiguity of language are resolved in favor of the latter....
      4 Williston on Contracts, Third Edition Section 621 at 760-761.

      . See e.g., Grier Estate, 403 Pa. 517, 170 A.2d 545 (1961) and cf. Greenwood v. Kadoich, 239 Pa.Super. 372, 357 A.2d 604 (1976).

      . LeDonne v. Kessler, 256 Pa.Super. 280, 389 A.2d 1123 (1978); Book Metals Corp. v. Sitkin Smelting & Refining, Inc., 254 Pa.Super. 21, 385 A.2d 504 (1978).

      . The lower court relied upon expert testimony that the term “bona fide offer” is so interpreted in the television industry. We find that the lower court reached the right result under the law of Pennsylvania and all of the circumstances. However, the expert testimony was not relevant to the issue. As previously discussed, it is the intent of the parties which this court must ascertain. Had both parties been members of the same industry and equally cognizant of the usages in the industry, expert testimony as to custom in the industry would be relevant to ascertain intent. However, here appellee Association is wholly unfamiliar with the television industry. Mr. Calandra with whom the negotiation of the agreement primarily took place is a retired shipping clerk (456a) and may in no way be held to knowledge of television industry terms of art. Custom of the trade can only be relevant to show the understanding of the party who is a member of the trade.

      . The agreement states that “Association agrees to give station notice.... ” and it was appellee Association which was to give such notice. Appellant WPVI-TV could not consider either rumor via the news media nor communications from third parties as notice entitling it to exercise a right of first refusal. C.f. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Roth, 118 Pa. 329, 12 A. 283 (1888): Notice from a stranger to the agreement is not adequate notice.

      . The filing of a complaint seeking to hold a transaction invalid does constitute notice of rejection: Yates v. Clifford Motors, Inc., 283 Pa.Super. 293, 423 A.2d 1262, 1271 (1980). Such a complaint is clearly inconsistent with an affirmance of the agreement. Thus, the complaints filed herein cannot be interpreted as notice of an offer to contract in accordance with the right of first refusal.

      . See E. J. McAleer & Co., Inc. v. Iceland Products, Inc., 475 Pa. 610, 381 A.2d 441, 443 note 4:
      We may, of course, affirm the decision of the trial court if the result is correct on any ground without regard to the grounds which the trial court itself relied upon. See Mazer v. Williams Bros. Co., 461 Pa. 587, 594 n.6, 337 A.2d 559, 562 n.6 (1975); Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 604 n.5, 327 A.2d 94, 96 n.5 (1974); Prynn Estate, 455 Pa. 192, 197 n.9, 315 A.2d 265, 267 n.9 (1973).

      . N.T. at 534a-545a.

      . N.T. at 81a-82a.

      . The lower court entered one order setting forth its Declaratory Judgment in the two cases consolidated for trial. Judgment was entered thereon in each of the two cases, and the two appeals filed from the judgments and order of Declaratory Judgment are here consolidated.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JOHNSON, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    448 A.2d 59
    In re Interest of C. M. E., a minor. Appeal of R. J. B.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued March 15, 1982.
    Filed July 9, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 12, 1982.

      David M. Axinn, Franklin, for appellant.
    Joseph E. Alternare, Tionesta, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   JOHNSON, Judge:

Appellant R. J. B., the natural mother of C. M. E., appeals from the order terminating her parental rights in her child C. M. E. following a consolidated hearing on the petition for involuntary termination filed by Forest County Department of Youth and Children’s Services (FCCS) and Appellant’s Habeas Corpus petition. Because of our determination that follows, we reverse the termination of Appellant’s parental rights.

C. M. E. was born in April of 1974 and resided with Appellant in Venango County until April of 1980, at which time their residence was changed to Forest County. Between April of 1976 and February of 1980, C. M. E. was admitted to the hospital on nineteen occasions for sundry illnesses and injuries, as well as for scabies, .bums, animal bites and ingestion of, inter alia, Librium.

While residing in Forest County, Appellant arranged for a babysitter to care for C. M. E. overnight on May 1, 1980 while she and her companion took an automobile to be inspected in a different county. Appellant told the sitter that she would return the following evening. On May 5, 1980, the sitter contacted FCCS, as Appellant had not returned home, nor provided her with sufficient food or clothing for the child. FCCS caseworkers took food to the babysitter and found the child to be without proper clothing and in poor health. Upon the discovery of the child's need for additional clothing, the caseworkers entered Appellant’s apartment. There they found an eviction notice and the apartment unlocked. The babysitter informed the caseworkers that the landlord had left the apartment open to allow Appellant’s dogs to have access to the outside. Large amounts of dog feces were present in the apartment and on the steps leading to the apartment. The caseworkers determined that the apartment was so unsanitary as to pose a health hazard to the child.

The caseworkers contacted the Sheriff’s Department and took custody of C. M. E. Upon Appellant’s return, she stated that the car had needed unforeseen repairs and that she did not have access to a telephone to contact the sitter concerning her delay. A shelter hearing was held on May .7, and on, May 8 Appellant signed a. consent decree giving FCCS custody of C. M. E. He was then, placed in a foster home in Forest County and given immediate medical treatment for scabies.

FCCS then drafted a parenting plan on May 19, 1980 which Appellant was to follow in order to remedy the problems encountered by the caseworkers, for the. return of the child. This six month plan included locating .adequate and safe housing, nutrition counseling, and parenting education. Appellant attended regularly all of the various classes, including mental health counseling for both Appellant and her husband. However, counseling was determined to be unproductive, because Appellant failed to communicate verbally in many cases and failed to actively participate in the programs, despite her attendance. The parenting classes ended after five months, as the counselor felt no progress was being made.

In the meantime, Appellant and her present husband moved to Venango County in July of 1980. Their new residence was again determined to be substandard and the parties moved, again, to a substandard dwelling. Upon the next move, Appellant’s current address, the dwelling was determined to be satisfactory if certain improvements were made.

Appellant was allowed visitation with C. M. E. during this period after his placement in the foster home and Appellant took advantage of this visitation, often taking gifts to the child. Also, Appellant did request the return of C. M. E. on numerous occasions.

After Appellant’s relocation to Venango County, a problem arose concerning the providing of services. The Venango County agencies believed that they could not provide support services to Appellant, as set out by FCCS in May of 1980, because the child involved was not residing in Venango County. However, Appellant did attend certain mental health classes and two home evaluations were made by agencies in Venango County after Appellant’s relocation. Appellant had been told by a FCCS caseworker that Appellant would be responsible for contacting the Venango County agencies for continued supportive services after July of 1980.

Appellant was psychologically evaluated in the fall of 1980 and a finding made of borderline intellectual functioning, with minimal verbalization ability. She was found to be functioning in the normal range in non-verbal skills and had no neurological impairment. Appellant has completed ten grades of special education.

C. M. E. was psychologically evaluated in February of 1981 as mildly retarded, being one to one and one-half years behind the school ability of his age group with similar measured intelligence. He also was found to be suffering from hyperactivity.

It was determined by the lower court that both are in need of continued on-going educational and supportive services through public health visits, educational programs and medical attention. Also, it was determined by the testifying psychologist, Christopher F. Groff, that an intensive educational program for a period of two to two and one-half years would be necessary to equip Appellant with the parenting skills necessary to advance the child’s development if Appellant and child were reunited, and that intervention was necessary to either maintain or improve C. M. E.’s level of development.

A joint conference, including FCCS and the Venango County agencies, and involving a review of the six month plan, was held in November of 1980, upon the expiration of the time schedule. Upon a review of the information, it was determined that little, if any, progress had been made in improving Appellant’s parenting skills.

It is undisputed that both Appellant and her husband are unemployed and receiving welfare.

Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus on February 17, 1981 and FCCS filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights on March 5, 1981. The grounds alleged by FCCS involved 23 P.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (a)(5) which state:

§ 2511. Grounds for Involuntary Termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

After a hearing on May 6,1981 and the filing and dismissing of exceptions following the court’s order terminating Appellant’s parental rights, this appeal was filed.

Appellant alleges that termination was not justified under either 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) or (a)(5), and that continued foster placement is not necessary, nor in the best interests of the child.

The opinion of the lower court makes several determinations concerning the issues involved, after making thirty-six findings of fact. The lower court determined that (1) Appellant failed to successfully complete the parenting program to the degree where the child’s welfare would not be placed in jeopardy if he was returned to Appellant without on-going supportive services, (2) the medical observations, as discussed supra, support the finding that Appellant cannot perform proper parental duties and care without institutional support, (3) that although there is no evidence indicating that Appellant is unable to care for herself, continuous agency and institutional support on an intense basis is necessary for Appellant to meet the child’s on-going demands, and (4) that the statute does not require providing such daily and intensive services to Appellant, as opposed to the termination of her parental rights. The lower court determined that the mere possibility of rehabilitating Appellant’s parenting skills within a maximum period of two and one-half years did not preclude the termination of parental rights on these facts. The court then stated that:

Our last analysis of the entire record and determining in our decision is “the services of assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.”1 In our view Petitioner would virtually be compelled to live with Respondent to protect this child over an extended period of time without any confidence the mother would be able to correct her own shortcomings and rise to the level of a competent parent. The Act does not require this of Petitioner. [Footnote omitted.]

On July 9, 1981, an order was issued denying Appellant’s writ of habeas corpus, terminating Appellant’s parental rights, and placing' the child in custody of FCCS for adoption. A final decree was made on July 15, 1981.

Our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the orphans' court’s decree terminating parental rights is supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of B. D. S., 494 Pa. 171, 431 A.2d 203 (1981); In re D. K. W., 490 Pa. 134, 415 A.2d 69 (1980). However, the lower court’s inferences, deductions and conclusions are subject to review. In re Adoption of J. A. B., 487 Pa. 79, 408 A.2d 1363 (1979).

Because of the importance placed on the family, the Commonwealth may disrupt the parent-child relationship only upon a clear showing of necessity; moreover, even if removal is necessary to protect the child, every effort should be made to reunite the family. In re Adoption of R. I., 468 Pa. 287, 361 A.2d 294 (1976), appeal dismissed, U.S. cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1032, 97 S.Ct. 722, 50 L.Ed.2d 743 (1977).

All circumstances must be considered when analyzing a parent’s performance of parental obligations in a proceeding for termination of parental rights; the parent’s performance must be measured in light of what would be expected of an individual in circumstances which the parent under examination finds herself. In re Adoption of B. D. S., supra.

It is clear that termination of parental rights cannot be justified merely by demonstrating that the home is “submarginal” and likely to result in “cultural deprivation”. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228 (1978), U.S. cert. denied sub nom., Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services, et al., 439 U.S. 880, 99 S.Ct. 216, 58 L.Ed.2d 192 (1978).

Three things must be proven before a natural parent’s rights in a child will be terminated under section 2511(a)(2): (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975).

The record contains sufficient evidence of the repeated and continued incapacity of Appellant in terms of her parenting skills. The testimony of the caseworkers and the psychologists, supra, indicates her deficiencies in caring for the child. The evidence also reveals that Appellant’s incapacity has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control and subsistence, for the child has been voluntarily placed in a foster home. However, we disagree with the lower court concerning the third requirement, namely, that the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.

A parent, whose child has been placed in foster care, has an affirmative duty to work towards the return of the child, but even if there has been a long separation occasioned by parental neglect or incapacity, termination of parental rights cannot be ordered if there is a reasonable possibility that the causes and conditions which have led to the separation can be remedied and the family restored. In re William L., supra.

The lower court concluded, inter alia, that the possibility of rehabilitation of Appellant in a maximum period of two to two and one-half years was not a reasonable amount of time. We disagree. We refuse to punish a parent for her lack of parenting skills which is based, at least in part, on her limited intellectual abilities, especially when the evidence leads to the conclusion that she may be able to reach a satisfactory level of parenting skill with the aid of programs available to her. See In re D. L. R., 495 Pa. 55, 57, 432 A.2d 196, 197 (1981) (NIX, J., dissenting).

It must be kept in mind that a parent’s IQ score is only one factor among many to be considered in determining whether she has the capacity to meet the essential needs of her children. In re William L., supra.

In the instant case, only one half-hearted attempt was made to remedy Appellant’s parenting deficiencies. The six month plan lasted only five months, due in part to the difficulties in dealing with Appellant’s non-verbal character, but also because of Appellant’s change of residence from Forest to Venango Counties. The demand on Appellant to seek assistance in Venango County by herself is insufficient proof, in this case, that Appellant’s incapacity cannot or will not be remedied. We will not terminate the interests of a parent in her child where efforts by the parent to secure support services may have been thwarted'by the complexities of the jurisdiction of the state welfare agencies. Without an opportunity to receive the full benefit of the plan devised for the education and possible return of the child to Appellant, her parental rights must take precedence. This is not to say that termination of parental rights may never be permitted in this or any other similar factual situation, but where programs do exist for the education of parents, and these programs present a viable alternative with a reasonable chance of success, termination of parental rights should be permitted only in the most drastic of situations. The language of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2): “cannot or will not,” requires more proof than has been offered here.

Because we find the evidence lacking as to section 2511(a)(2), then it must also follow that section 2511(a)(5) has also failed, for it contains, in part, the same language:

(5) ... the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time. . . . ”

We have determined previously in this opinion that two to two and one-half years is, in fact, a reasonable period of time under the instant facts. Therefore, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) has not been proved.

Three alternatives were available to the lower court in the instant case: (1) return the child to Appellant, i.e., grant the habeas corpus petition and deny the involuntary termination petition; (2) retain the status quo, i.e., deny both petitions; or (3) terminate Appellant’s parental rights, as the lower court has done.

We do not believe that the instant facts warrant a return of the child to Appellant. However, we do not find the evidence to have been sufficient to terminate Appellant’s parental rights. Therefore, we believe that the second alternative is the proper one.

The Order of the lower court terminating Appellant’s parental rights is reversed; the Order, as it relates to Appellant’s habeas corpus petition and custody of C. M. E. is affirmed.

HOFFMAN, J., dissents.

      . The rights of C. M. E.’s natural father, M. E., who is no longer married to Appellant, were terminated at the same hearing and are not a part of this appeal.

      . We note.that despite the number of hospital admissions, neither doctor who testified would conclude that the number or nature of the admissions indicated anything out of the ordinary. However, we do note that one of the doctors did contact Children’s Services with regard to C. M. E.

      . A later order terminated the parental rights of C. M. E.’s natural father, M. E.

      , We are mindful of the recent U. S. Supreme Court opinion in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) holding that termination of parental rights requires, at a minimum, clear and convincing evidence. However, because of our determination in the instant case, we need not discuss the applicability of the holding in Santosky at this time.

      . We need not decide which county should provide its services to Appellant.


text:
    December 18, 1981.
    447 A.2d 636
    Stahl, Appellant v. Stahl.
    Reargument Denied July 2, 1982.
    Argued November 10, 1980.
    Leonard E. Stahl appellant, in propria persona; Myron J. Markovitz, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    June 4, 1982.
    447 A.2d 636
    Commonwealth v. Best, Appellant.
    Submitted February 24, 1982.
    James Robert Protasio, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Kenneth D. Brown, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    448 A.2d 645
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 19, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 29, 1982.
    Argued March 10, 1982.
    Joel Harvey Slomsky, for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ. .
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 637
    Commonwealth v. Burke, Appellant.
    Argued March 29, 1982.
    Nicholas Mancini, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; William F. Merz, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 637
    Commonwealth v. Candelori, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 30, 1982.
    Argued December 5, 1980.
    Lawrence S. Rosenwald, for appellant; Nancy D. Wasser, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 637
    Commonwealth v. Cashmere, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Lewis J. Bott, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 637
    Commonwealth v. Grosso, Appellant.
    Submitted April 6, 1982.
    Robert W. Suter, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael J. Kane, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence of the court below affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 638
    Commonwealth ex rel. Harner v. Harner. Appeal of Sandra Harner.
    Submitted January 26, 1981.
    Lester Krasno, for appellant; John T. Pfeiffer, III, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 638
    Commonwealth v. Harris, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted November 6, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 638
    Commonwealth v. Heavner, Appellant.

      Submitted April 1, 1981.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 639
    Commonwealth v. Hill, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 8, 1982.
    Submitted April 12, 1982.
    John A. Halley, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 639
    Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, Appellant.

      Submitted May 22, 1981.
    David G. Metinko, for appellant; David S. Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 639
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, Appellant.
    Submitted June 1, 1981.
    Kenneth L. Mirsky, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, McEWEN and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 639
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Keasley.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Nov. 3, 1982.
    Argued March 31, 1981.
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; Athena M. Dooley, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 640
    Commonwealth v. Klinger, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 1, 1982.
    Submitted March 10, 1981.
    Harold S. Irwin, III, for appellant; Edgar B. Bayley, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 640
    Commonwealth v. Koehler, Appellant.
    Submitted April 14, 1982.
    James M. Skorupa, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 640
    Commonwealth v. Lenhart, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Dec. 6, 1982.
    Submitted May 22, 1981.
    Randy Ross Lenhart, appellant, in propria persona; David J. Flower, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 641
    Commonwealth v. Maines, Appellant.
    Submitted April 14, 1980.
    Benjamin S. Blakley, III, for appellant; Laurance B. Seaman, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 641
    Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 30, 1982.
    Submitted November 6, 1981.
    Barry W. Miller, for appellant; Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, jj:
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 641
    Commonwealth v. Merrifield, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 1, 1982.
    Argued November 16, 1981.
    Merritt E. McKnight, for appellant; Frederick D. Lingle, District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 641
    Commonwealth v. Miceli, Appellant.
    Argued February 18, 1982.
    Norman M. Abraihs, for appellant; Steven J. Cooperstein, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    449 A.2d 759
    Commonwealth v. Milliken, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 30, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 5, 1982.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    Peter M. Suwak, for appellant; Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., and WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.

WIEAND, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    447 A.2d 642
    Commonwealth v. Montgomery, Appellant.
    Submitted April 13, 1982.
    Paul Bogdon, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 642
    Commonwealth v. Novak, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 28, 1982.
    Submitted June 3, 1981.
    John J. Thomas, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, McEWEN and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The judgments of sentence entered by the distinguished Luzerne County Common Pleas Court Judge Robert J. Hourigan are affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 642
    Commonwealth v. Peoples, Appellant.
    Argued March 8, 1982.
    John Joseph Szajna, submitted a brief on behalf of appellant; Lee Ruslander, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 643
    Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, Appellant.
    Submitted February 2, 1982.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Public Defender, for appellant; Joseph A. Smyth, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and McEWEN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 643
    Commonwealth v. Schwartz, Appellant.

      Submitted March 10, 1981.
    Lee Mandell, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 643
    Commonwealth v. Shields, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 27, 1982.
    Submitted May 22, 1981.
    Frank R. Riddle, for appellant; William G. Martin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 644
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Slingluff.
    Submitted May 22, 1981.
    John M. Dawson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant; David P. Truax, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 644
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
    Submitted May 6, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, CAVANAUGH and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 644
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Dec. 22, 1982.
    Submitted June 2, 1981.
    Carol K. McGinley, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael Moyer, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before ROWLEY, McEWEN and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The order of the learned Lehigh County Common Pleas Court Judge Maxwell E. Davison is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 644
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 13, 1982.
    Submitted May 22, 1981.
    Paulette J. Balogh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 645
    Commonwealth v. Wilson, Appellant.
    Argued February 19, 1981.
    William P. James, for appellant; Michelle Goldfarb, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth,, appellee.

      Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 645
    Estate of Rebecca Fleet. Appeal of Jerome Fleet Cowden.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 27, 1982.
    Argued December 16, 1981.
    Jerome Fleet Cowden, in propria persona, appellant; Robert W. Costigan, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.

BECK, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    447 A.2d 645
    Freisleben, Appellants v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins., Co.
    Argued December 2, 1980.
    Raymond J. Falzone, Jr., for appellants; Edward S. Lawhorne, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order and judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 646
    Goins et vir., Appellant v. Sears Roebuck and Co.
    Argued September 29, 1981.
    Matthew R. Wimer, for appellants; Arnold V. Plum, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 646
    Hagy v. Thomas, Appellants.
    Argued June 2, 1981.
    Ken Sandoe, for appellants; Christopher Patterson, for appellees.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    447 A.2d 646
    Heritage Bank etc., Appellant v. Jerene Enterprises.

      Argued October 14, 1981.
    Mark E. Mioduszewski, for appellant; E. James Lucht, for appellees.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    June 11, 1982.
    447 A.2d 646
    Commonwealth v. Berger, Appellant.
    Submitted September 22, 1981.
    H. Stanley Rebert, Public Defender, for appellant; Sheryl Ann Dorney, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence of the learned York County Common Pleas Court Judge Emanual A. Cassimatis affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 647
    Commonwealth v. Gray, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Robert Pappano, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 647
    Commonwealth v. Harris, Appellant.
    Submitted May 20, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order denying the petition for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 647
    Commonwealth v. McCormick, Appellant.
    Argued March 1, 1982.
    D. Webster Keogh, for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WIEAND, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 648
    Commonwealth v. McIntyre, Appellant.
    Argued October 20, 1981.
    Joseph A. Balsama, for appellant; Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 648
    Commonwealth v. Roggio, Appellant.
    Argued April 22, 1982.
    Michael J. Rutenberg, for appellant; A. Sheldon Kovach, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and WIEAND, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 648
    Commonwealth v. Shaw, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 12, 1982.
    Submitted October 19, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

BECK, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    447 A.2d 648
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted January 7, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 649
    Commonwealth v. Yannone, Appellant.
    Submitted September 22, 1981.
    Richard L. Guida, for appellant; Marion E. MacIntyre, First Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of March 26, 1980 of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, Criminal Division, at No. 1355 C.D. 1979 is affirmed.

McEWEN, J., filed a memorandum concurring opinion.


text:
    447 A.2d 649
    Commonwealth v. Zook, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted October 6, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., filed a memorandum dissenting opinion.


text:
    447 A.2d 649
    D’Amico, et ux. v. Harper, et al., Appellants.
    Argued November 11, 1980.
    Louis R. Salamon, for appellants; Carmine V. Molinaro, Jr., for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment and final decree affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 650
    Enock, et al., Appellants v. Reifer, et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 17, 1982.
    Argued March 17, 1982.
    Stanley W. Greenfield, for appellants; William C. Walker, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of the court is affirmed.

HOFFMAN, J., filed a memorandum dissenting opinion.


text:
    448 A.2d 645
    McTighe, et al., Appellants v. Burke, et al.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 20, 1982.

      Argued February 22, 1982.
    Desmond J. McTighe, for appellants; Marc H. Jaffe, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 650
    Pennsylvania Engineering Corporation, etc. v. McGraw-Edison Co. Appeal of Pennsylvania Engineering Corporation.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Dec. 14, 1982.
    Argued March 16, 1981.
    Gilbert Helwig, for appellant; C. Arthur Wilson, Jr., for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., PRICE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is affirmed on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Grigsby.


text:
    447 A.2d 650
    Roberts, Appellant v. Pilcavage, et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 7, 1983.
    Argued February 19, 1981.
    James L. Heidecker, for appellant; Edward McCardle, for appellees.

      Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 651
    Thomas, et ux. v. Jos. Infante, et al. Appeal of Richard J. Thomas.
    Argued September 9, 1981.
    Steven D. Gitman, for appellant; Hugh J. Hutchison, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, McEWEN and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The order denying the motions by plaintiffs for a judgment N.O.V. or for a new trial is affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    June 18, 1982.
    447 A.2d 651
    Benjamin, Inc. v. Nance, et al., Appellants.
    Argued March 10, 1982.
    Michael Borish, for appellants; John Martin Matrullo, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 651
    In re Estate of: Allene G. Cleary. Appeal of: Rinehart J. Cleary.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 30, 1982.
    Argued September 2, 1981.
    Zeno Fritz, for appellant; Gail L. Gratton, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   The order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, docketed at No. 3303, 1978 is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 651
    Commonwealth v. Althouse, Appellant.
    Submitted September 10, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, McEWEN and CIRILLO, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Lancaster County Common Pleas Court Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 652
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Dec. 29, 1982.
    Submitted May 22, 1981.
    John P. Liekar, for appellant; Herman Bigi, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order denying post conviction relief is hereby affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 652
    Commonwealth v. Diener, Appellant.
    Submitted February 10, 1982.
    Francis C. Sichko, for appellant; Herman J. Bigi, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 652
    Commonwealth v. Gibbs, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 31, 1982.
    Argued March 31, 1982
    George B. Ditter, for appellant; Ronald Thomas Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 653
    Commonwealth v. Green, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 8, 1982.
    Submitted May 3, 1982.
    Benjamin Lemer, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Garold Edward Tennis, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 653
    Commonwealth v. Holliday, Jr., etc., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Dec. 6, 1982.
    Argued November 10, 1980.
    John P. Joyce, for appellant; George B. Kaufman, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 653
    Commonwealth v. Hullihan, Appellant.
    Submitted February 22, 1982.
    Jeffrey P. Bowe, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Richard B. Russell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 653
    Commonwealth v. Jones, Appellant.
    Submitted February 19, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 654
    Commonwealth v. Lanigan, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 8, 1982.
    Argued November 13, 1979.
    John W. Murtaugh, for appellant; Howard C. Klebe, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 654
    Commonwealth v. Lark, Appellant.
    Submitted October 5, 1981.
    Daniel P. McElhatton, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for. Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Angelo A. Guarino is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 654
    Commonwealth v. Mack, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, JJ.

       At the time this case was submitted, Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania is sitting by designation.

   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

CIRILLO, J., filed a memorandum concurring opinion.


text:
    447 A.2d 655
    Commonwealth v. Milliard, Appellant.
    Submitted February 24, 1982.
    George Nejm Daghir, for appellant; James A. Meyer, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order and judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 655
    Commonwealth v. Ondic, Appellant.
    Argued February 9, 1982.
    Richard A. Peterson, for appellant; Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 655
    Commonwealth v. Pierce, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 8, 1982.
    Submitted April 13, 1982.
    Vincent J. Roskovensky, II, for appellant; Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order and judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 656
    Commonwealth v. Reaves, Appellant.
    Argued December 2, 1980.
    Karl Baker, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Ellen Mattleman, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 656
    Commonwealth v. Richardson, Appellant.
    Submitted May 22, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 656
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.
    Submitted August 31, 1981.
    David S. Shrager, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    448 A.2d 1143
    Commonwealth v. Stevenson, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 24, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 29, 1982.
    Argued May 3, 1982.
    Robert Joseph Magee, for appellant; Donald B. Corriere, District Attorney, did not file a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 656
    Commonwealth v. Sunbury, Appellant.
    Submitted November 17, 1981.
    Charles P. Buchanio, for appellant; David J. Brightbill, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 657
    Commonwealth v. Upshur, Appellant.
    Submitted February 8, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 657
    Commonwealth v. Vulto, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 17, 1982.
    Submitted March 9, 1982.
    Robert Longo, for appellant; Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 657
    Commonwealth v. Ward, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 8, 1982.

      Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Joel M. Scheer, for appellant; John Gallagher, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 658
    Corbett, et al. v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co., Appellant.
    Argued February 4, 1981.
    David W. Saba and Elihu A. Greenhouse, for appellant; Albert J. Flora, for appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

WICKERSHAM, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    447 A.2d 658
    Foam Fabricators, Pennsylvania, Inc., Appellant v. Magee Carpet Co.

      Argued November 16, 1981.
    Ronald M. Katzman, for appellant; Otis W. Erisman, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 658
    Kaye v. Kaye, Appellant.
    Argued April 7, 1981.
    Thomas A. Ditioe, for appellant; David Wagenseller, III, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 658
    McClintock v. Alkota Manu, Inc., et al. Appeal of Alkota Manufacturing, Inc.
    Argued February 4, 1981.
    Sol H. Weiss, for appellant; Avram G. Adler, for McClintock, appellee; Robert Radano, for Silver, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    June 25, 1982.
    447 A.2d 659
    Ashekian, etc., Appellants v. Haverford Twnshp. Sch. Dist.
    Argued December 7, 1981.
    Charles W. Proctor, III, for appellants; Edgar N. Persons, III, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of the court is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 659
    Burmylo, et ux., Appellants v. Sunset Memorial Park Co.
    Argued March 8, 1982.
    Mary Scheuhing, for appellants; Andrew L. Braunfeld, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and CIRILLO, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 659
    Commonwealth v. Allen a/k/a Hutchinson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 15, 1982.

      Submitted November 4, 1981.
    Thomas L. McGill, Jr., for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 659
    Commonwealth v. Bastogne, Appellant.
    Submitted March 8, 1982.
    Robert Marc Silverman, for appellant; Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 660
    Commonwealth v. Black, Appellant.

      Submitted December 9, 1981.
    William E. Averona, for appellant; Debbie Fox, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 660
    Commonwealth v. Brabham, Appellant.
    Submitted September 21, 1981.
    James W. Harris, for appellant; John C. Uhler, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence of the learned York County Common Pleas Court Judge Emanuel A. Cassimatis affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 660
    Commonwealth v. Burton, Appellant.
    Argued March 10, 1982.
    Stanley P. Stern, for appellant; David DaCosta, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 661
    Commonwealth v. Cole, Appellant.
    Submitted September 21, 1981.
    Robert Bruce Evanick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Floyd P. Jones, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned York County Common Pleas Court Judge James E. Buckingham is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 661
    Commonwealth v. Dukes, Appellant.
    Submitted September 21, 1981.
    Robert N. Tarman, Public Defender, for appellant; William Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Judge William W. Caldwell is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 661
    Commonwealth v. Ewan, Appellant.
    Submitted September 9, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 662
    Commonwealth v. Fucci, Appellant.
    Submitted April 14, 1982.
    Jay Stuart Nedell, for appellant; Michael J. Veshecco, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 662
    Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 1, 1982.
    Submitted December 8, 1981.
    Stephen P. Patrizio, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 662
    Commonwealth v. Gray, Appellant.
    Submitted November 6, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 662
    Commonwealth v. Hartman, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 23, 1983.
    Submitted December 1, 1981.
    Scott Lee Kelley, for appellant; John C. Uhler, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 663
    Commonwealth v. Henderson, Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1981.
    Roy A. Keefer, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Dauphin County Common Pleas Court Judge John C. Dowling is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 663
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted April 26, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant; Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 663
    Commonwealth v. McCoy, Appellant.
    Argued March 22, 1982.
    Barry J. Peffley, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 664
    Commonwealth v. Michaels, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 12, 1982.

      Submitted March 24, 1982.
    Robert Niels Tarman, Public Defender, for appellant; Gary Steven Reinhardt, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM,. ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 664
    Commonwealth v. Monroe, Appellant.
    Submitted November 4, 1981.
    Harry Aaron Rubin, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 664
    Commonwealth v. Rice, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 3, 1982.

      Argued September 28, 1981.
    John P. Fonzo, for appellant; William G. Martin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 664
    Commonwealth v. Roque, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 12, 1982.
    Argued March 23, 1982.
    Lawrence A. Kalikow, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant; William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 665
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Appellant.

      Submitted March 16, 1981.
    Anthony V. DeCello, for appellant; Paul W. Johnson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., BROSKY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 665
    Commonwealth, v. Svirbley, Appellant.
    Argued October 15, 1981.
    Robert G. Kochems, for appellant; Charles Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 665
    Commonwealth v. Turner, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 3, 1982.
    Submitted December 9, 1981.

      Richard P. Haaz, for appellant; Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 666
    Commonwealth v. Waring, Appellant.
    Submitted October 5, 1981.
    A. Charles Peruto, Jr., for appellant; Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Armand Della Porta is affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    447 A.2d 666
    Hartshorn, Appellants v. DeCarlo.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 12, 1982.

      Argued January 19, 1982.
    Robert J. Kerns, for appellants; David C. Huganir, for appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of June 18, 1981, is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 666
    Leppek, Appellant v. Vochko & Palmer.
    Submitted April 12, 1982.
    June S. Schulberg, for appellant; John Alan Conte, for Vochko, appellee; Albert J. Dudash, Jr., for Palmer, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    450 A.2d 1031
    Mundis v. Enck, et al., Appellants.
    Reargument Denied Oct. 14, 1982.
    Argued March 22, 1982.
    Bruce E. Cooper, for appellants; Peter Foster, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 666
    Precision Offset Prtg. Co. v. Photo Motion. Appeal of: Multicom Corp., Intervenor.
    Argued October 6, 1981.
    Richard F. Stern, for appellant; Parke Ulrich, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 667
    Rainbow Int’l Inc. v. Select Publish Corp. Appeal of Arnold Select Publish Corp., A New Jersey Corp.
    Argued February 1, 1982.
    Charles K. Plotnick, for appellant; Steven T. Stern, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and McEWEN, JJ.
   The order of the learned Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Judge Louis E. Stefan is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 667
    Schenk v. Kuo Sin Chen, Appellant.
    Argued December 9, 1981.
    Joseph I. Papalini, for appellant; Barry Adelman, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of the court is affirmed.


text:
    449 A.2d 759
    Seitz v. Lang, Jr., Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Sept. 17, 1982.
    Argued October 26, 1981.
    Alan Berman, for appellant; Eugene J. Reinbold, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    447 A.2d 667
    Southeast National Bank v. Geary, et al. Appeal of Paul A. Geary and Joseph E. Geary and D’Antonio.

      Argued December 7, 1981.
    Robert E. Surrency, for appellant; Steven H. Palmer, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of the court is affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 668
    Stine, Appellant v. Cross. Stine, Appellant v. Township of Swatara, et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 8, 1982.
    Argued December 1, 1981.
    David J. Foster, for appellant; Dianne Anderson, for Cross, appellee (at No. 146); John Stephen Feinour, for Township of Swatara, appellee (at No. 147).
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.


text:
    447 A.2d 668
    University of Pittsburgh v. Singer, Appellant.
    Argued February 10, 1982.
    Howard R. Singer, for appellant; Eric Andrew Schaffer, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.