text:
    463 A.2d 1179
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Matthew GRAY, Jr., Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted March 29, 1983.
    Filed July 29, 1983.

      Carmela R.M. Presogna, Assistant Public Defender, Erie, for appellant.
    Frank J. Scutella, Assistant District Attorney, Erie, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ,
   PER CURIAM:

Appellant Matthew Gray appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant apparently entered a plea of guilty to the charge of robbery at No. 114 of 1973 on September 14, 1973. Sentencing was deferred and he was released on bond. He failed to report for the scheduled sentencing and was not sentenced until three years later, at which time he also pled guilty to robbery and other charges at No. 66, 67, 68 and 69 of 1976. Appellant did not file either an appeal or a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On February 4, 1981, he filed the instant P.C.H.A. petition pro $e. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed. Two continuances were granted while the court administrator attempted to locate the transcript of the September 14, 1973 plea colloquy. The transcript was never located. The trial court then dismissed appellant’s petition without a hearing as being frivolous and waived.

On this appeal, appellant argues that his petition should not have been dismissed without a hearing, especially in view of the lack of a transcript from the original plea colloquy. We agree. Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the court may dismiss- a petition without a hearing if the petitioner’s claims are patently frivolous and without a trace of support in the record. 19 P.S. § 1180-9. Unless a court is absolutely certain of the patent frivolousness of an issue in a post-conviction petition, it must grant a hearing. Commonwealth v. Laboy, 460 Pa. 466, 333 A.2d 868 (1975). In borderline cases, the petitioner should be given “every conceivable legitimate benefit” in favor of the grant of a hearing. Commonwealth v. Reider, 267 Pa.Super. 359, 406 A.2d 1081 (1979). If, on review, we are unable to tell from the state of the record whether appellant’s claims are frivolous and without support, we must remand for an evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Swift, 299 Pa.Super. 77, 445 A.2d 156 (1982).

In this case, appellant alleges, inter alia, that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Even in cases where we have had a record of the plea colloquy, we have recognized the petitioner’s right to present additional evidence where that record did not clearly refute his claim. Commonwealth v. Rusinko, 303 Pa.Super. 216, 449 A.2d 656 (1982). In the instant case, we have no record at all of the original plea proceeding. The determination of whether the plea was indeed knowing and voluntary is necessarily a factual matter to be resolved by the trial court, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 460 Pa. 303, 333 A.2d 739 (1975). We must, therefore, remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s claims.

Orders vacated and case remanded for an evidentiary hearing. We do not retain jurisdiction.

      . Two orders, dated June 1, 1981, and June 17, 1981, were entered by the lower court. Both orders denied post-conviction relief without a hearing. Appellant’s two appeals from these orders were consolidated and this opinion relates to both orders.

      . The Commonwealth contends, in addition, that appellant has waived these claims. Appellant alleges, however, trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in this regard. Since this is the first proceeding at which appellant has been represented by counsel other than trial counsel and since we do not have the benefit of a trial court’s factual findings on this issue, we cannot, at this stage of the proceedings, agree. See, Commonwealth v. Paige, 287 Pa.Super. 133, 429 A.2d 1135 (1981).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM:

license: Public Domain

text:
    463 A.2d 1180
    Lowell P. METZGER v. Mary A. METZGER, Appellant.
    . Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued March 10, 1983.
    Filed July 29, 1983.
    Order Vacated and Appeal Reinstated Nov. 7, 1983.

      Steven J. Schiffman, Harrisburg, for appellant.
    James Richard Ronca, Harrisburg, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a Divorce Order and Decree of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. We have concluded that we should not address the merits but instead should quash the appeal.

The present action was commenced on July 18, 1979 by appellee Lowell P. Metzger. He filed a complaint seeking a divorce on the ground of indignities. On September 25, 1980, he filed an amended complaint pursuant to the Divorce Code of 1980, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 101 et seq., and requested equitable distribution of the marital property. On December 2, 1980, appellant, Mary A. Metzger, filed an answer with new matter and counterclaim, seeking a divorce on the ground of indignities, and requesting alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, costs, and equitable distribution.

A hearing was held before a Special Master on June 30, 1981. The Master filed his report on October 28, 1981. The Master’s report recommended that the parties be granted a divorce pursuant to Section 201(c) of the Divorce Code, and also contained recommendations with respect to attorney’s fees, costs, division of marital property, and alimony pendente lite.

The docket indicates that timely exceptions to the Master’s report, were filed by appellant on November 9, 1981.

The trial court affirmed the report of the Master by order dated February 10, 1982.

On March 12, 1982, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the order of February 10, 1982, which affirmed the recommendations of the Master.

Subsequent to appellant’s filing of the appeal, the trial court entered an order denying and dismissing appellant’s exceptions on April 15, 1982.

It is well settled that an appeal will lie only from a final order unless otherwise permitted by statute. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1978); T.C.R. Realty v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372 A.2d 721 (1977); Gasper v. Gasper, 288 Pa.Super. 478, 432 A.2d 613 (1981); See also Pa.R.A.P. 341(a).

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55, which is among those governing Divorce or Annulment Actions, states in relevant part:

(a) Within ten days after notice of the filing of the master’s report has been mailed, exceptions may be filed by any party to the report or any part thereof
(c) If exceptions are filed, the court shall hear argument on the exceptions and enter an appropriate final decree. No exceptions may be filed to the final decree.

We have already stated that timely exceptions to the Master’s report were filed on November 9, 1980. The order of February 10, 1982 merely affirms the recommendations of the Master; there is no mention of the exceptions. Following entry of the February 10, 1982 order, the exceptions remained to be disposed of. Consequently, we rule that the order of February 10, 1982 is interlocutory.

Although not essential to our disposition here, we note that appellant’s filing of an appeal on March 12, 1982 divested the trial court of jurisdiction. Its order of April 15, 1982, denying and dismissing appellant’s exceptions is therefore a nullity. Yeager v. Long, 284 Pa.Super. 76, 425 A.2d 426 (1980) Pa.R.A.P. 1701.

Appeal quashed.


author: CAVANAUGH, Judge:

text:
    463 A.2d 1182
    COMMONWEALTH ex rel. Joela M. DONLEY v. Robert E. DONLEY, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Sept. 15, 1982.
    Filed Aug. 5, 1983.

      Allen H. Smith, York, for appellant.
    Lawrence V. Young, Assistant District Attorney, York, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   CAVANAUGH, Judge:

The instant appeal was taken from an order directing appellant to pay $130.00 per week for the support of his wife. His only claim on appeal is that the order of the court below is “excessive in light of [appellee’s] refusal to employ a joint marital asset in satisfaction of joint debts claimed as expenses on her part.” We find no merit to this claim and therefore affirm the order of the lower court.

At a hearing held before the lower court, testimony was presented regarding the income, earning capacity and expenses of both parties. At the conclusion of the hearing, the lower court determined that appellant should pay $130.00 per week for appellee’s support but it refused to order appellant to provide any support for the parties’ three college-age children, as appellee had requested. Our review of the record convinces us that the order entered by the lower court is eminently reasonable.

It was disclosed at the hearing that the parties are joint owners of a certificate of deposit valued at approximately $18,000.00. The certificate has been frozen and cannot be liquidated without the consent of both parties. Monthly mortgage payments on a home owned by the parties jointly, in which appellee resides, and monthly payments on a home improvement loan represent a large portion of appellee’s claimed, expenses. Appellant contends that he would like to liquidate the certificate of deposit and use the proceeds to pay off the mortgage and the home improvement loan, thus substantially reducing appellee’s expenses, and, presumably, the amount of support she would require from appellant. Appellee has, so far, refused to agree to liquidate the certificate. She claims that the parties had previously agreed that the certificate would be held in escrow for the parties’ children, to pay all their debts after they graduated from college. '

It is the appellant’s position that the lower court should have ordered appellee to liquidate the certificate of deposit and use the funds to pay off all of the joint obligations for which she sought support. The court refused to order any disposition of the certificate bn the ground that it had no authority to do so, noting that questions of ownership of jointly held marital property may not be considered by a support court. The court was entirely correct in so holding. It is not the prerogative of a court in a support action to order the division or distribution of property held by the parties. Commonwealth ex rel. Weinfurter v. Weinfurter, 276 Pa.Super. 199, 419 A.2d 165 (1980); Commonwealth v. Turner, 258 Pa.Super. 388, 392 A.2d 848 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Roviello v. Roviello, 229 Pa.Super. 428, 323 A.2d 766 (1974). Appellant’s remedy is to bring an action requesting partition of the property in question. Commonwealth ex rel. Weinfurter v. Weinfurter, supra.

Order affirmed.

      . If the parties weré proceeding under the Divorce Code of 1980, 23 P.S. § 101 et seq., the court’s power to direct partition of the property would be qualified by its duty to divide marital property in an equitable way. Platek v. Platek, 309 Pa.Super. 16, 454 A.2d 1059 (1982).


author: WICKERSHAM, Judge: SPAETH, Judge,

text:
    463 A.2d 1183
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. George Charles REICHERTER, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Sept. 28, 1982.
    Filed Aug. 5, 1983.

      Richard R. Fink, Levittown, for appellant.
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and CIRILLO, JJ.
   WICKERSHAM, Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on convictions of carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia and firearms not to be carried without a license (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6108, 6106). We affirm. .The pertinent facts are as follows.

On December 18, 1979, appellant George Reicherter was detained by Philadelphia police officers as he was riding, in a friend’s truck, away from his residence immediately before a search of the residence by federal and city authorities was to begin. Reicherter was frisked at that time by a Philadelphia detective and a Colt pistol .was found on his person. Reicherter was charged with firearms violations; he subsequently moved to suppress the pistol,- which motion was denied. Reicherter was tried in Municipal Court and found guilty of carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia and of firearms not to be carried without a license and fined $200 plus $50 costs. An appeal and trial de novo in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas followed with the same verdicts and sentence. Post-verdict motions were filed and denied. This appeal followed.

Appellant Reicherter frames the first two issues involved as follows:

Did the Commonwealth fail to articulate a justification for the stopping and frisking of the appellant for weapons which led to the discovery of the Colt revolver?
Did the Commonwealth’s possession of a search warrant for the appellant’s residence justify his arrest and the search incident to that arrest which yielded the Colt revolver?

Brief for Appellant at 2.

Reicherter argues that the police had no probable cause to stop and search him and that the seized weapon must, therefore, be suppressed.

The Supreme Court recently held in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), that when police officers executing a valid search warrant encountered the’ owner of the premises to be searched descending the front steps outside the premises, they were justified in requiring him to re-enter the house for the duration of the search. As the Supreme Court stated: “Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded oh probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to •detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2595 (footnotes omitted).

The Supreme Court reasoned as follows:

Of prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent’s house for contraband. A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there. The detention of one of the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself. Indeed, we may safely assume that most citizens—unless they intend flight to avoid arrest—would elect to remain in order to observe the search of their possessions. Furthermore, the type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek normally will be obtained through the search and not through the detention.
Moreover, because the detention in this case was in respondent’s own residence, it could add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itself and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station.

452 U.S. 701-02, 101 S.Ct. at 2593-94 (footnotes omitted).

Reicherter’s situation does not differ significantly from the situation discussed by the Supreme Court above. Although Reicherter was initially stopped by the police while several blocks from his apartment while the defendant in Michigan v. Summers, supra, was stopped on the front steps of his residence, this is not a difference such as would require a different result: in both cases some transportation of relatively short duration was required to return the defendant to the residence to be searched.

The frisk of Reicherter’s person, in the course of which the handgun that led to the instantly considered charges was discovered, was also properly conducted. Detective Chishlsom, the officer who frisked Reicherter, was aware that Reicherter’s residence was to be searched for narcotics and had previously observed Reicherter in possession of a shotgun. The Supreme Court held in Michigan v. Summers, supra, “the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence____ The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers exercise unquestioned command of the situation.” 452 U.S. at 702-03. Based on the circumstances present here, the police had a reasonable belief that Reicherter was armed and their frisk of him was fully justified. In any event, as Reicherter was arrested at the time he was placed in the police car for return to his residence (Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 450 A.2d 975 (1982)), and as the arrest was proper, the search is justified as incident to lawful arrest. Commonwealth v. Long, 489 Pa. 369, 414 A.2d 113 (1980).

Appellant Reicherter phrases his next question involved as follows:

Did the court err in allowing, over objection, the Commonwealth to prove the contents of the search warrant by the testimony of a witness, rather than by the document itself?

Brief for Appellant at 2.

During the suppression hearing, the lower court allowed Detective Chishlsom to testify that the search warrant for Reicherter’s home permitted a search for narcotics and weapons. Reicherter objects that the best evidence rule is applicable here and that the warrant itself, and not mere testimony about it, should be the exclusive evidence of its contents.

Detective Chishlsom, however, referred to the existence of the search warrant only to detail his justification for frisking Reicherter. “Probable cause for a warrantless arrest must be determined on the basis of the knowledge of the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Commonwealth v. Riley, 284 Pa.Super. 280, 286, 425 A.2d 813, 816 (1981). The actual contents of the warrant are not the key issue here; instead it is Detective Chishlsom’s knowledge at the time of arrest that is important. We note that “the evidentiary ruling of the trial court allowing ‘secondary evidence’ should not be reversed except for a grave abuse of discretion” (Ledford v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad, 236 Pa.Super. 65, 75, 345 A.2d 218, 224 (1975)). We find no such grave abuse here.

Reicherter states his final issue as:

Did the municipal court err in failing to grant the defendant’s petition for a de novo suppression hearing?

Brief for Appellant at 2.

Reicherter argues that he should have been granted a second suppression hearing because he had not been provided with a copy of the search warrant before the hearing and was unable to point out that, contrary to Detective Chishlsom’s belief, the warrant did not mention any weapons to be searched for at Reicherter’s residence. Reicherter maintains that this fact would “have shown that the search warrant did not provide any justification for the arrest and frisk of the appellant.” Brief for Appellant at 17.

We find more than enough justification for the frisk of Reicherter quite apart from the police officer’s mistaken belief that the search warrant described weapons to be seized and, therefore, reject this argument.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SPAETH, J., files a concurring opinion.

SPAETH, Judge,

concurring:

The majority extends the principle of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), to hold that the police may transport someone several blocks to his home and require him to remain there while they execute a warrant to search the home for contraband. Slip op. at 1184 -1185. I think this extension both unwarranted and unnecessary. It is sufficient for our decision to apply the principle that the police may arrest someone without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that he has committed a felony.

In Summers, the police obtained a valid warrant to search the defendant’s home for contraband. When the police arrived, the defendant came out of the house and began to descend the front steps, but the police detained him and continued to detain him, along with seven other occupants, while they conducted the search. The Supreme Court assumed that the detention was not supported by probable cause to arrest the defendant but held that it was nonetheless justified under the fourth amendment because: (1) it minimized the risk of harm to the officers; (2) it provided a safeguard against concealment or destruction of the contraband; (3) it facilitated an orderly completion of the search; (4) against the background of the search of his home, it represented a minimal additional intrusion on the defendant’s personal liberty; and (5) the search warrant provided an objective basis for concluding that someone in the home, although not necessarily any particular occupant, had committed a crime. None of these factors justifies the deprivation of an occupant’s liberty when he is several blocks away from his home. It is obvious that an absent occupant is far less likely to engage in sudden violence or to conceal evidence during a search than an occupant who is on the premises while they are being searched, for the absent occupant may not return to the premises during the course of the search. Moreover, the degree of intrusion involved in detaining an occupant and transporting him back to his home is considerably greater than that involved in detaining an occupant who is already on the premises to be searched. See Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 450 A.2d 975 (1982), cert. denied sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Lovette, 459 U.S. 1178, 103 S.Ct. 830, 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983). I therefore do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the police were justified in stopping appellant under Summers.

Apparently as an alternative to its extension of Summers, the majority holds that “the police had a reasonable belief that [appellant] was armed and their frisk of him was fully justified.” Slip op. at 260. I do not agree with this conclusion either. It is true that a police officer may stop and frisk a person if he reasonably suspects “that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person[ ] with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous____” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See generally Commonwealth v. Wasiuta, 280 Pa.Super. 256, 421 A.2d 710 (1980) (collecting cases). But the record here does not suggest that the officers were aware of any unusual circumstances from which they could have inferred that criminal activity was “afoot.”

I nonetheless concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of sentence. A police officer who has probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a felony may arrest the suspect without a warrant. Commonwealth v. Westerfer, 294 Pa.Super. 459, 440 A.2d 556 (1982); Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 233 Pa.Super. 396, 336 A.2d 632 (1975), cert. denied sub nom. Donnelly v. Pennsylvania, 424 U.S. 974, 96 S.Ct. 1477, 47 L.Ed.2d 744 (1976). Probable cause to make a warrantless arrest may be predicated upon the tip of an anonymous informant if the arresting officer “know[s] the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that the suspect participated in the crime and ha[s] some reasonable basis for concluding that the informant is reliable,” Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 288 Pa.Super. 232, 237, 431 A.2d 1023, 1025 (1981) (citing Commonwealth v. Stokes, 480 Pa. 38, 389 A.2d 74 (1978); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 266 Pa.Super. 167, 403 A.2d 596 (1979)). Here, the affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant was based on the tips of three anonymous informants, as well as on the observations of local and federal drug enforcement authorities and the owner of Quaker City Chemical Co. I am satisfied that the police could reasonably conclude that the informants were reliable, and, further, that the information provided by the informants gave the police probable cause to arrest appellant without a warrant.

In determining whether the tip of an anonymous informant is reliable, we must look to four factors: “(1) Did the informant give prior reliable information? (2) Was the informant’s story corroborated by any other source? (3) Were the informant’s statements a declaration against interest? (4) Does the defendant’s reputation support the informant’s tip?” Commonwealth v. Ambers, 225 Pa.Super. 381, 386, 310 A.2d 347, 350 (1973) (citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Mazzochetti, 299 Pa.Super. 447, 455, 445 A.2d 1214, 1218 (1982). Here, the reliability of the anonymous informants was established in part by the fact that they had previously provided the police with reliable information about criminal activity: The first informant had arranged for drug enforcement authorities to make two purchases of methamphetamine during the preceding six months; the second had arranged for the authorities to make one purchase of methamphetamine during the preceding month; the third had given information to the police that had led to four arrests and convictions for burglary. In addition, the information provided by the informants was corroborated, both by each other’s stories and by the observations of local and federal police. Finally, the information provided by the third informant was a declaration against his penal interest.

The reliability of thé informants upon whose tips the warrant was predicated was therefore amply demonstrated, and the question becomes whether the information they provided gave the police probable cause to arrest appellant.

The affidavit is replete with details about the underlying circumstances from which the informants and local and federal police concluded that appellant was engaging in the manufacture and delivery of methamphetamine. The first informant had frequently observed appellant distributing methamphetamine between January and August, 1979. During the summer of 1979, the informant had observed “test tubes, bottles, bunsen burners, hot plates, bottles of chemicals, a micro-wave oven with a gray substance in it and an infra-red light with a gray substance under its beam” in appellant’s residence, “all of which he believed to be the components of a methamphetamine laboratory.” Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant at 1-2. The second informant knew appellant personally and said that appellant had been making gray and purple “speed” for several years and selling it in exchange for cash and stolen goods. The second informant also said that he had observed methamphetamine drying at appellant’s residence and that, on December 6, 1979, he purchased an ounce of methamphetamine at appellant’s home, where he smelled a strong odor that he associated with methamphetamine. Drug enforcement agents witnessed the purchase. The third informant said that appellant had been receiving stolen property during October 1979 at his residence. From October 25, 1979, through December 18, 1979, Philadelphia police officers observed people whom they believed to be burglars delivering packages to appellant and his wife. The third informant also said that he had bought methamphetamine from appellant on four occasions in exchange for stolen goods. On November 2, 1979, the police observed appellant purchase a 55 gallon drum of isopropal alcohol, which the affiant asserted was used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, from Quaker City Chemical Co., where he identified himself as “Jose Pratty,” and return with it to his home. The owner of Quaker City Chemical Co. said that on eleven previous occasions, “Josep Pratty” had purchased chemicals from his store, including “hydrochloric acid, reagent, acetone and methyl alcohol methanol.” Drug enforcement officials said that these chemicals are used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. On November 8, November 30, December 7, and December 15, 1979, Philadelphia police found filter papers in appellant’s trash. The papers were analyzed in a laboratory and found to contain methamphetamine residue.

On the basis of these facts the police had probable cause to believe that appellant was engaged in the manufacture and delivery of methamphetamine. Since the manufacture, delivery, and possession with intent to manufacture or deliver methamphetamine is a felony, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) & (f)(l.l) (1977), the police could arrest appellant without a warrant, Commonwealth v. Westerfer, supra; Commonwealth v. Donnelley, supra, and search him incident to that arrest. Commonwealth v. Long, 489 Pa. 369, 414 A.2d 113 (1980).

      . Both local and federal police were involved in arresting and searching appellant. N.T. at 15 (Suppression Hearing)

      . Because the affidavit does not set forth the basis for the officers’ belief that the people who delivered packages to appellant and his wife were burglars, I do not view the assertion that these people were known burglars as adding any weight to the allegations set forth in the affidavit.

      . Of course, this does not mean that every valid search warrant to search a home for narcotics is predicated upon probable cause to believe that every occupant of the home is engaged in illegal drug activities. See Michigan v. Summers, supra (Although search warrant was based on probable cause to believe that someone who occupied residence had violated narcotics laws, Court would not infer that police had probable cause to believe that defendant, who was one of eight occupants found on the premises, had violated such laws). Id. 452 U.S. at 693, n. 1, 696, 703, 101 S.Ct. at 2589, n. 1, 2590, 2594.


author: CIRILLO, Judge:

text:
    463 A.2d 1188
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Cora Lee FLEMISTER, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted March 23, 1983.
    Filed Aug. 5, 1983.

      George Shultz, Assistant Public Defender, Harrisburg, for appellant.
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, and CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   CIRILLO, Judge:

This is an appeal from the judgments of sentence, entered on December 31, 1981, by the Honorable William W. Caldwell of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County.

The appellant, Cora Lee Flemister, was charged with the offenses of welfare fraud and theft by deception. These charges stemmed from allegations that the appellant, while receiving public assistance, concealed receipt of social security benefits and income earned by her dependent son. As a consequence, the appellant obtained overpayments from the Department of Public Assistance, totalling $18,818.00. A motion to quash the information was filed and subsequently denied. Then, on September 22, 1981, the appellant was found guilty of both charges in a bench trial before Judge Caldwell. Post-trial motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed and denied. The appellant was later sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 months nor more than 12 months for welfare fraud and a concurrent sentence of not less than 5 months nor more than 23 months for theft by deception. She was also ordered to make restitution in the amount of $18,818.00 to the Department of Public Assistance. This appeal followed.

The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss the charge of theft by deception.

The crime of theft by deception is defined at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922 as follows:

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains or witholds property of another by deception. A person deceives if he intentionally:
(1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind; but deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise;
(2) prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of a transaction; or
(3) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.

The provision of the Public Welfare Code which the appellant was found guilty of violating is found at 62 P.S. § 481(a). This section provides:

§ 481. False statements; penalty
(a) Any person who, either prior to, or at the time of, or subsequent to the application for assistance, by means of a wilfully false statement of misrepresentation, or by impersonation or other fraudulent means, secures, or attempts to secure, or aids or abets any person in securing assistance, or Federal food stamps, under this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or to undergo imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, and also shall be sentenced to make restitution of any moneys he has received by reason of any such false statement, misrepresentation, impersonation, or fraudulent means.

The Commonwealth maintains that the lower court did not err in finding the appellant guilty of both charges. The violation of the public assistance law, it is alleged, was complete with the misrepresentation to the welfare officials, while the charge of theft by deception relates to the assistance actually received to which the appellant was not entitled. We do not agree.

This specific issue was recently addressed by this Court in Commonwealth v. Soltis, 311 Pa.Super. 195, 457 A.2d 562 (1983), and Commonwealth v. Warner, 309 Pa.Super. 386, 455 A.2d 663 (1982). Both cases recognized that there exists in Pennsylvania a strong policy which precludes prosecutions under general provisions of a penal code when special penal provisions are applicable. Citing, Commonwealth v. Vukovich, 301 Pa.Super. 111, 447 A.2d 267 (1982). And, as Judge Wieand expressed for the majority in Commonwealth v. Warner, supra:

This general policy, of course, should not be applied rigidly and mechanically where there is a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. However, the fact that the legislature has enacted a specific statute covering substantially the same misconduct as a general law is a strong indication that the legislature intended prosecutions to be for violating the specific provision only. In most instances, an overlap of provisions will be determinative of the legislative intent.
In the present case, there is no basis for finding a contrary legislative intent. The Public Welfare Code is a comprehensive enactment. It mandates complete and truthful applicant disclosure and provides specific penalties for violations. There is no suggestion to be found in the statute that prosecution for giving false information may also proceed under general provisions of the Crimes Code. Therefore, we are constrained to apply the decisive rule that a specific statute precludes prosecution under a general statute.

309 Pa.Super. at 389, 392, 455 A.2d at 665, 666.

In accordance with our analyses and decisions in Commonwealth v. Soltis, supra and Commonwealth v. Warner, supra, we hold that the appellant’s prosecution pursuant to the specific statutory provisions of Section 481(a) of the Welfare Code precludes prosecution under the more general statutory provision in the Crimes Code dealing with theft by deception. We therefore vacate the appellant’s sentence for the crime of theft by deception. The judgment of sentence for welfare fraud is affirmed.

Vacated in part and Affirmed in part.

      . As amended by the Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 993, No. 202, Sec. 8, 62 P.S. § 481.

      . Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, Sec. 1, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922.


text:
    463 A.2d 1190
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Vincent COURTS, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted March 24, 1983.
    Filed Aug. 5, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 4, 1983.
    See also, 468 Pa. 613, 364 A.2d 684.

      John Francis Lyons, Harrisburg, for appellant.
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., and CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   CIRILLO, Judge:

Presently before this Court is an appeal from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, dated February 9, 1982, denying appellant’s post-trial motions filed nunc pro tunc.

On June 12, 1975, appellant was brought before the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County and sentenced on two prior convictions. Following the imposition of sentence, while the appellant was being transported from the courtroom back to the court house detention area, the appellant attempted to flee from official custody. The deputy sheriffs escorting appellant ordered him to halt, but appellant continued to run down the stairwell and outside the court house. After firing a warning shot, a deputy sheriff shot the appellant. His wound notwithstanding, the appellant fought police efforts to subdue him but was finally taken into custody and brought to a hospital.

Based on these facts, on August 5, 1975, the appellant was indicted by the Dauphin County Grand Jury on a charge of escape, and on October 30, 1975, the appellant was convicted by a jury of this charge. No post-trial motions were filed. On November 26, 1975, the appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than three and one-half nor more than seven years. No direct appeal was taken following sentencing.

On or about February 2, 1981, appellant filed a petition for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. The PCHA Court appointed new counsel, and on April 21, 1981, the appellant filed a supplemental petition for relief under the Act alleging inter alia that his trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to file post-trial motions. Pursuant to this allegation, on October 16, 1981, the PCHA Court ordered that the appellant be granted the right to file post-trial motions nunc pro tunc and on October 28, 1981, appointed new counsel to represent the appellant in this matter. These motions were filed and subsequently denied on February 9, 1982. It is from the denial of these post-trial motions that the present appeal is taken.

Appellant raises several issues regarding the use of a rubber-stamp facsimile signature of the district attorney on the indictment which charged him with escape. First, the appellant contends that the application of a rubber-stamp facsimile signature rendered the indictment null and void. We find this contention to be without merit.

Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 213(a) provides that “[a]n indictment shall be signed by the attorney for the Commonwealth ____” Whether a rubber-stamp facsimile constitutes a “signature” under Rule 213(a) has not been specifically addressed by the courts of this Commonwealth. Appellant strongly urges this Court to apply to indictments the rule which requires a manual signature of the district attorney to be placed on bills of information. However, the appellant fails to distinguish the inherent difference between an indictment and an information.

The policy behind the requirement of a manual signature on an information is well established. Recently, in Commonwealth v. Veneri, 306 Pa.Super. 396, 452 A.2d 784 (1982), this Court, sitting en banc, stated its reasons for this requirement.

Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(a) the attorney for the Commonwealth has the discretionary power to either proceed with charges by information or move to nolle prosequi the charges. The district attorney or his designee is also mandated to inquire into and make full examination of all the facts and circumstances connected with each case to determine if the filing of an information is warranted 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8931(d). Thus the act of approving the information is one fraught with grave consequences not the least of which may be the career, reputation and very freedom of the defendant. It would demean the significance, of this fateful document if we were to interpret the words “shall be signed” to permit affixing a rubber stamp facsimile to the information. We would thus reduce the required attestation to a mere clerical mechanism no different or more deliberative, for example, than assigning the information a file number .for office convenience. It would be simpler and just as meaningful to have the name of the attorney for the Commonwealth preprinted on the information form. It is, therefore, our belief that only a written indication by the district attorney or his designee, that the charges contained in an information have been considered and approved satisfy the “signature” requirement of Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b). While the prosecution may find the personal signature requirement of Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b) to be burdensome, any inconvenience is far outweighed by the need for a deterrent against frivolous charging of an accused.

306 Pa.Super. at 402-03, 452 A.2d at 787. (Emphasis added).

The final presentment of a bill of indictment by a grand jury is the culmination of a strictly mandated procedural process. At least fifteen jurors must review the charges in the bill of indictment presented to them by the district attorney. Each juror as well as the foreman must be administered an oath prior to consideration of the indictment. Each witness heard by the grand jury must be sworn in and his name placed on the bill of indictment. The bill of indictment may be approved only “if it receives the affirmative vote of at least twelve grand jurors.” The foreman of the grand jury is directed to personally sign the bill. If, after due consideration by the requisite number of jurors, -the bill is dismissed, the Court is directed to either dismiss the defendant or reduce his bail if proper under the circumstances.

In recognition of the many safeguards inherent in the grand jury process, not present in the process of filing a bill of information, our Court has stated,

A bill of indictment presented by a grand jury has indicia of reliability not found in a bill of information. The grand jury has made an independent determination of the sufficiency of the evidence which need merely be ratified by the district attorney. In the case of a bill of information, however, it is the prosecutor alone who must decide whether to bring the defendant to trial. When the vehicle for initiating a criminal trial (i.e., the information) is unsigned, it is not at all apparent that a reasoned evaluation of the advisability of instituting a criminal trial has been made. The signature on the information is, therefore, a vital ingredient which guarantees the authenticity and reliability of the document.

Commonwealth v. Belcher, 258 Pa.Super. 153, 155-156, 392 A.2d 730, 731 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Veneri, 306 Pa.Super. 396, 452 A.2d 784 (1982).

In line with this reasoning, the grand jury, when faced with a bill of indictment, decides whether to bring the defendant to trial. The signature of the foreman, not the district attorney, is the necessary indication that “a reasoned evaluation of the advisability of instituting a criminal trial has been made.” Commonwealth v. Belcher, supra, 258 Pa.Super. at 156-157, 392 A.2d at 731. It. is therefore the signature of the foreman not the district attorney, which guarantees the reliability and authenticity of the bill of indictment and acts as a deterrent against the frivolous charging of an accused. The foreman’s signature appears on the bill of indictment charging the appellant in the instant case.

We therefore hold that a rubber-stamp facsimile signature of the district attorney on a bill of indictment is adequate to fulfill its purpose of ratifying the determination of the grand jury and thereby constitutes a proper signing for the purpose of Rule 213(a). The need for a manual signature by the district attorney is far less in the case of a bill of indictment than in the case of a bill of information, as the duties of the district attorney in reviewing a bill of information are superceded by the grand jury’s finding of probable cause, in passing on a bill of indictment. The rubber-stamp facsimile of the district attorney’s signature on the indictment charging the appellant in the instant case does not render such indictment null and void and the present charge may not be dismissed on this ground.

We find appellant’s second contention, that the failure of appellant’s trial attorney to object to the use of the rubber-stamp facsimile signature on appellant’s indictment constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, to be without merit. It is a well established principle in this Commonwealth that counsel will not be deemed to have been ineffective for failing to assert a baseless or frivolous claim. Commonwealth v. Davis, 279 Pa.Super. 218, 420 A.2d 1111 (1980); Commonwealth v. Rainey, 282 Pa.Super. 15, 422 A.2d 652 (1980). It is only when the claim which has been forgone was of arguable merit that inquiry must be made into the basis for counsel’s decision not to pursue the matter. Commonwealth v. Weathers El, 485 Pa. 28, 400 A.2d 1295 (1979); Commonwealth v. Davis, supra.

Our holding herein that a rubber-stamp facsimile signature of the district attorney does not render a bill of indictment invalid, negates any basis upon which such claim could have been predicated. Further inquiry into the attorney’s reasons for failing to assert this claim need not be undertaken and appellant’s trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise it.

Appellant’s third contention is that the trial court’s charge to the jury was impermissably prejudicial and suggestive of the appellant’s guilt thereby denying the appellant a fair trial. More specifically, appellant draws attention to one comment by the Court: “It is a simple case and I have no question whatsoever that you will be able to arrive at an appropriate decision unanimously.”

A court’s charge to the jury must be reviewed in light of the mandate that,

The jury depends on the trial court for guidance and it will give great weight to any expressions of the court’s personal opinion. To preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial, the trial court must be careful to remain absolutely impartial, and not to invade the province of the jury.

. Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 474 Pa. 27, 34-35, 376 A.2d 617, 621 (1977). (Citations omitted).

With this standard in mind, we have reviewed the trial court’s charge in its entirety and have found the appellant’s allegation to be without merit. Since only three witnesses took the stand, with testimony concluding within a two-hour span, the Court’s comment regarding the simplicity of the case was indeed accurate. The contention that the appellant was prejudiced by the Court’s mention of arriving at an appropriate decision unanimously requires the taking of this statement completely out of context. The transcript clearly shows that the statement in question follows a lengthy dissertation regarding the necessity of a unanimous criminal verdict and was only added to emphasize this point.

We conclude, therefore, that when viewed in its entirety, the Court’s charge was a clear attempt to explain and emphasize to the jury that they were the finders of fact and the sole determiners of the appellant’s guilt or innocence. Nowhere in the charge does the Judge attempt to invade the province of the jury by stating his own opinion or by suggesting the proper decision. To afford the appellant a new trial predicated on this contention would be an affront to the trial judge and to the jurors in this case.

The final contentions raised by the appellant are focused upon the conduct of his trial counsel during the process of jury selection. Appellant contends, in particular, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct voir dire examination, concentrating on the lack of inquiry into possible racial prejudice or bias of prospective jurors, and for failing to exercise peremptory challenges.

The test for ascertaining whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is well established. “... [C]ounsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests.” Common wealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967). Moreover, in order to be entitled to relief under a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel, it must appear that counsel’s action or inaction was prejudicial to the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 254 Pa.Super. 267, 385 A.2d 1013 (1978).

As to the appellant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to exercise any peremptory challenges, our Court has held that “[t]he mere fact that no jurors were challenged without more cannot be determinative of one’s efficacy as trial counsel.” Commonwealth v. Kittrell, 285 Pa.Super. 464, 469, 427 A.2d 1380, 1382 (1981). Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not exercising these challenges just for the sake of exercising them.

The other two issues raised by the appellant concern voir dire examination. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, a review of the record reveals that counsel did engage in voir dire examination of prospective jurors. While the examination was brief and did not delve into the area of racial prejudice or bias, voir dire did occur.

Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Christian, 480 Pa. 131, 389 A.2d 545 (1978) and Commonwealth v. Brown, 464 Pa. 625, 347 A.2d 716 (1975) in support for his contention that voir dire examination into racial prejudice is necessary to avoid a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. These cases, however, involved racially sensitive issues and are therefore easily distinguished from the instant case. In Brown, the defendant had been convicted of the rape of a white minor. Christian involved a black defendant who had been convicted of the rape of an elderly white woman. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that voir dire inquiry into possible racial prejudice of prospective jurors in these cases was necessary and the absence of such inquiry denied the defendants due process of law. In Christian, the Court emphasized that its determination was predicated on the specific facts of the case and stated,

In the present case, it is clear that circumstances were present which would make it necessary to inquire into racial sensitivity of potential jurors. The crime—the rape and other sexual molestation of an elderly woman—was itself shocking. The fact that the victim was white and the accused a black man cannot be ignored____ The case was thus racially sensitive, and one in which there was need on voir dire for inquiry into the possible racial prejudices of potential jurors.

480 Pa. at 137, 389 A.2d at 547-548. (Footnote omitted).

The facts in the instant case do not involve racially sensitive issues. The appellant escaped from the custody of the Dauphin County Sheriffs Department after being sentenced for murder. Frankly, it is difficult to conceive of any reason why counsel would raise the issue of racial prejudice. If we were to uphold appellant’s contention here, we, in effect, would be requiring voir dire examination into racial prejudice of prospective jurors in any case involving a black defendant. The interests of justice would not be better served by this requirement. Furthermore, the appellant fails to allege that he suffered any specific prejudice because of the lack of questions regarding racial bias. The appellant makes no attempt to show racial prejudice in the composition of the jury panel or any systematic exclusion of blacks from the panel. This is clearly an insufficient basis upon'which counsel could be held to be ineffective.

Accordingly, we affirm the Order of the Court below.

      . Appellant was convicted of attempted murder and first degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Courts, 468 Pa. 613, 364 A.2d 684 (1976) for a complete discussion of the relevant facts of this case.

      . Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1; 18 C.P.S.A. § 5121.

      . Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, § 1, 19 P.S. §§ 1180-1 et seq.

      . 42 Pa.C.S.A.

      . See Commonwealth v. Belcher, 258 Pa.Super. 153, 392 A.2d 730 (1981); Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 285 Pa.Super. 594, 428 A.2d 204 (1981); Commonwealth v. Veneri, 306 Pa.Super. 396, 452 A.2d 784 (1982) .

      . See generally Pa.R.Crim.P., Rules 200-211, 42 Pa.C.S.A.

      . Id.; Rule 201(a). This rule provides,
      (a) The grand jury shall consist of not less than fifteen nor more than twenty-three legally qualified persons.

      . Id.; Rule 206.

      . Id.; Rule 207.

      . Id.; Rule 210(b).

      . Id.; Rule 210(a).

      . Id.; Rule 210(d).

      . Appellant also contends that the decision in Commonwealth v. Emanuel, supra, that a rubber-stamp facsimile signature on a bill of information does not satisfy the signature requirement of Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b), be applied retroactively to the instant case which was decided some six years before Emanuel. In light of our holding that a rubber-stamp facsimile signature constitutes a proper signing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 213(a), we do not find it necessary to herein address this issue.

      . In Commonwealth v. Davis, 267 Pa.Super. 370, 406 A.2d 1087 (1979), this Court dismissed appellant's contention that he was denied a fair trial because of the absence of blacks on the jury panel. The Court stated,
      [A]ppellant has failed to show that the panel from which his jury was selected did not represent a cross section of the community ... [T]he defendant has the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination, then the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to rebut the evidence.... Appellant has made no attempt to show racial prejudice in the composition of the jury panel or any systematic exclusion of blacks from this panel.
      267 Pa.Super. at 375-76, 406 A.2d at 1089. Appellant in the instant case has clearly not demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination when viewed in light of this reasoning.


author: HOFFMAN, Judge:

text:
    463 A.2d 1196
    Lee J. KLEINFELTER, Appellant, v. Mary M. KLEINFELTER.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted March 24, 1983.
    Filed Aug. 5, 1983.

      Arthur K. Dils, Harrisburg, for appellant.
    Horace M. Ehrgood, York, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, and CIRILLO, and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   HOFFMAN, Judge:

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in its distribution- of marital property. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Appellant and appellee, his former wife, were married on October 23, 1971. A 1979 divorce action, amended to meet the no-fault requirements, was granted on grounds that the marriage was .irretrievably broken. On April 21, 1981, a Master heard evidence and made recommendations on the parties’ request for equitable distribution of property and alimony. After appellee excepted to the Master’s recommendations, the lower court entered a decree of divorce fixing alimony and dividing property. This appeal followed.

Appellant challenges only the amount of money awarded appellee in the distribution of their marital property. The lower court may exercise its discretion in the equitable distribution of marital property, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Gee v. Gee, 314 Pa.Superior Ct. 31, 460 A.2d 358 (1983). See 23 P.S. § 401(d); Bacchetta v. Bacchetta, 498 Pa. 227, 445 A.3d 1194 (1982). Accord, Remick v. Remick, 310 Pa.Superior Ct. 23, 456 A.2d 163 (1983): A Master’s report in a divorce action, while entitled to great consideration, is advisory only. Herwig v. Herwig, 279 Pa.Superior Ct. 65, 420 A.2d 746 (1980). The reviewing court “is not bound by [the report] and it does not come to the court with any authority which must be overcome.” Arcure v. Arcure, 219 Pa.Superior Ct. 415, 416, 281 A.2d 694, 695 (1971).

Here, the master recommended that appellee receive $9,000, a hutch and a breakfast set, while appellant retain the jointly owned property, a car, a boat, household goods and an IRS tax refund. The lower court increased the monetary award to $9,500. We cannot say that the lower court ignored the Master’s recommendation or abused its discretion in making its determination. In fact, the final distribution indicates the strength of the lower court’s reliance on the Master’s report.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the lower court.

Affirmed.

       Appellant incorrectly states that the Master recommended he pay appellee $6,100. The Master presumably felt that was the amount owed to appellee for the joint property, but increased the award to $9,000 to reflect the distribution of other property, specifically the car and the IRS refund. Appellant, with regard to those items, alleges that he gave appellee the car and that he failed to benefit from the IRS refund because it was returned. Therefore, he claims he should pay only $6,100.
      The record indicates that the appellant was still in possession of the car in question and had received the IRS refund in full. (N.T. April 21, 1981 at 24, 29). We have no evidence before us other than appellant’s allegation to contradict the record. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s including the value of these items in its distribution of the marital property.


text:
    463 A.2d 1197
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Richard OLEXA, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Christopher McDONALD, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 28, 1983.
    Filed Aug. 12, 1983.

      Blane A. Black, Monongahela, for appellants.
    Frank Carl Roney, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

The records certified to this Court do not contain the required opinion of the trial judge. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921, 1925(a). Therefore, we remand for the filing of an opinion. See Commonwealth v. Clutter, 305 Pa.Super. 544, 451 A.2d 781 (1982).

The matter is remanded, with instructions. Jurisdiction is retained.


author: MONTGOMERY, Judge:

text:
    464 A.2d 323
    Anthony A. BARBER, et al., v. PITTSBURGH CORNING CORPORATION, et al., v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania and American Flint Glass Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Appeal of CHARTER CONSOLIDATED LTD., Central Mining Finance, Ltd., and Charter Consolidated Investments Ltd.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Jan. 13, 1983.
    Filed July 1, 1983.
    Reargument Denied Sept. 13, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Dec. 27, 1983.

      Werner Polak, Pittsburgh, for appellants and William M. Wycoff, Pittsburgh, submitted a brief, for appellants.
    Stanley W. Greenfield, Pittsburgh, submitted a brief, and George Cohen, Pittsburgh, for Barber et al., appellees.
    George Edward McGrann, Pittsburgh, for PPG, appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, MONTGOMERY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   MONTGOMERY, Judge:

The instant appeal arises from the lower court’s denial of preliminary objections which challenged the in personam jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts over a foreign corporation named as a defendant in the action. After denying the preliminary objections, the trial court certified, pursuant to Rule 311(b)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, that a substantial issue of jurisdiction was presented, and the matter is therefore properly before us for resolution at this time. The issues involved have been the subject of thorough briefs, and oral argument was expertly presented before us by counsel for the respective parties.

The instant case was commenced in August, 1979, by the filing of a Complaint in trespass and assumpsit in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The plaintiffs comprise current and former employees of the Pittsburgh Corning Corporation (hereinafter “Pittsburgh Corning”) and spouses of such employees. The spouses’ claims are for loss of consortion. The substance of the plaintiffs’ action is a claim that the plaintiff employees contracted asbestosis, a serious respiratory disease, as a result of their exposure to asbestos dust and fibers in the course of their employment at Pittsburgh Coming’s Port Allegheny Pennsylvania plant. The plaintiffs sought recovery from two general classes of defendants. The first class includes Pittsburgh Corning, Pittsburgh Plate Glass (hereinafter “PPG”) and Corning Glass Works, Inc. (hereinafter “CG”), the latter two defendants being joint owners of Pittsburgh Corning. It was generally alleged by plaintiffs that this first class of defendants was either directly or indirectly responsible for the conditions of the employment in which the employee plaintiffs suffered their alleged exposures to asbestos. The second broad class of defendants included Charter Consolidated, Ltd. (hereinafter “Charter”), the Appellant on this appeal, and various corporate entities which the parties referred to as the Cape Industries Group or Cape Industries, Ltd. We shall hereinafter refer to these defendants collectively as “Cape”, unless a more specific designation of a particular Cape constituent party becomes particularly relevant and requires separate identification. This second general group of defendants was alleged to have been directly or indirectly involved in the mining and sale of asbestos to Pittsburgh Corning. The members of the first class of defendants have each appeared in the lawsuit to defend against the merits of the claims asserted by plaintiffs. As to the second class of defendants, the record shows no appearance in the case by Cape. Charter entered an appearance in the case and then filed its preliminary objections to the Complaint, seeking to have the action dismissed for lack of in personam jurisdiction as to Charter.

The lower court postponed a decision on Charter’s preliminary objections and allowed the parties discovery with respect to the jurisdictional question presented. Following the termination of discovery, the lower court held a hearing and accepted briefs from the parties. Finally, the lower court overruled Charter’s preliminary objections, and the instant appeal was filed.. The basic question presented by this appeal is whether Charter, a foreign corporation, is subject to in personam jurisdiction in the courts of our Commonwealth.

In our analysis of this appeal, we will of course be concerned with the factual basis underlying the lower court’s assertion of jurisdiction over Charter in this case. However, it is initially appropriate that we review the law which governs the questions of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which are presented by this appeal.

The first reference to authority requires that attention be directed to the statutory provisions which provide for the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Courts over a foreign corporation. The so-called “long-arm” jurisdictional statutes were amended by our legislature in 1972, and such amendments were clearly intended to liberalize a somewhat restrictive Pennsylvania jurisdictional view which existed prior to that time. Garfield v. Homowack Lodge, Inc., 249 Pa.Super. 392, 378 A.2d 351 (1977). In reviewing the history of Pennsylvania practice under long-arm rules in 1974, our Court recognized that the 1972 amendments to the long-arm statute were designed to “... remove all Pennsylvania statutory and, therefore, decisional impediments to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations.” See Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lum ber Company, 228 Pa.Super. 12, 17, 323 A.2d 11, 14 (1974). The Court, in the same case, noted that: “The statute reinforced through express language the judicially stated public policy of Pennsylvania to extend in personam jurisdiction ‘to the full measure consistent with due process standards’.” (citations omitted) 228 Pa.Super. at 17, 323 A.2d at 14.

The Act of November 15, 1972, as amended, is now set forth, in parts pertinent to the issues presented in this appeal, in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5301 and 5322. These provisions establish jurisdiction over foreign corporations along two separate approaches. Section 5301 provides for jurisdiction over such an entity that conducts “a continuous and systematic part of its general business within [the] Commonwealth”, whether or not the particular cause of action asserted arises “from [the] acts” bn which jurisdiction is based. Section 5322, especially in subsection (b), establishes jurisdiction over foreign corporations based upon acts from which the claims of the plaintiff arise. This statutory provision specifically asserts that the jurisdiction of our courts “to the fullest extent allowable under the Constitution ... [may be] ... based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution.”

With respect to the subject of in personam jurisdiction over unregistered foreign corporations, we have recognized that the change in policy represented by the 1972 legislative amendments to our “long-arm” statute was merely coexistent with the evolution of substantive jurisdictional due process expressed by the United- States Supreme Court. Certainly the landmark modern decision of that Court in this area was the famous case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), where the Court stated:

“due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.”

This “minimum contracts” analysis is one our courts have followed since the issuance of the International Shoe decision. However, we cannot ignore subsequent explanations of minimum constitutional requirements for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction, such as the Court’s declaration in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1298 (1958): “[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Also, we cannot forget the requirement that the plaintiff’s cause of action must arise from activities within the forum state by the proposed defendant. See Garfield v. Homowack Lodge, Inc., supra.

In summarizing all of these concepts, our Court has established a two step test for determining whether the exercise of this state’s jurisdiction over a particular defendant was constitutional. It was restated not long ago in Koenig v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 284 Pa.Super. 558, 568, 426 A.2d 635, 640 (1980):

“First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within the forum state thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws ... Secondly, the cause of action must arise from defendant’s activities within the forum state ... Lastly, the acts of the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it reasonable...
If it appears that this test is not satisfied, the second step is to decide whether the non-resident defendant’s activities in Pennsylvania unrelated to the cause of action were ‘continuous and substantial.’ ” (citations omitted).

With these legal concepts in mind, it is next appropriate that we review the record for facts germaine to the jurisdictional issue presented. The record established that Charter is an English corporation engaged generally in a variety of commercial transactions primarily in the fields of mining, manufacturing and finance. Its mining operations involve mostly minerals from Africa. Its manufacturing, through various subsidiaries to be more particularly discussed below, includes asbestos insulation and building products, mining equipment and railroad track fasteners. Its financial operations include investments in other commercial entities, such as mining companies. Charter also often acts as a business agent for other companies in various fields.

Charter may best be described, in general, as a holding company, which conducts virtually all of its business through wholly owned or majority owned subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are within Charter’s four main divisions, which are Mining, Industrial, Finance and Administration and Servicés. Thus, for instance, Charter’s headquarters staff, including executives, are formally employed and paid by a wholly owned subsidiary.

Charter’s Industrial Division is not a department of the type one might envision in a more typical business entity, but actually consists of a collection of subsidiaries, including two groups of companies which are significant in the instant case because of their involvement in business transactions in Pennsylvania. These are Cape and the Pandrol Group. The record shows clearly that Charter conducts the affairs of its Industrial Division by exercising control over the operations of its industrial subsidiaries.

As noted, the transactions of Cape are highly significant in the resolution of the jurisdictional issue presented by this appeal. While Charter sought to divorce itself from Cape and to depict it as an almost unrelated entity, the record clearly refutes such a position. It shows that Cape is a principal operating subsidiary of Charter which has provided 16.9% of Charter’s income, according to answers to interrogatories. This income was derived from Cape’s involvement as the owner of asbestos mines in South Africa. Of greatest import in this case has been the business involved in Cape’s sales, between 1964 and 1972, of thousands of tons of asbestos to Pittsburgh Corning for use at the Port Allegheny Pennsylvania facility where the Plaintiffs have been employed.. The lower court in this case noted in its opinion that the parties stipulated to the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts over Cape, which is clear under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322.

Charter maintains that its relationship with Cape is not such that Cape’s business transactions in Pennsylvania should be significant in supporting the in personam jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts over Charter. However, although Cape may technically appear to be an independent business entity, the record shows clearly the extent to which it comprises an operating arm of Charter. As mentioned earlier, it has produced over one-sixth of Charter’s income. Charter in fact is the owner of over two-thirds of the common stock of Cape and has acquired all of its preferred shares. In the course of its purchase of such firm control of Cape over several years, Cape announced the following in a prospectus accompanying its offer to buy fifty percent of all then outstanding shares:

“It is Charter’s purpose to make use of the wide experience of Cape’s management so that Cape can become the main channel for the expansion of Charter’s industrial activities of this type; this could not be satisfactorily achieved unless Charter acquired a considerably larger holding such as would give Charter control of Cape.”

The record makes it clear that since it acquired such a substantial ownership of Cape, Charter has been well represented by its own executives placed on Cape’s Board of Directors, and has thereby participated in Cape’s important business decisions. This total involvement by Charter in Cape’s affairs was clearly significant to the lower court in its finding that through Cape, Charter has engaged in business affairs in Pennsylvania to a degree sufficient to assert in personam jurisdiction over Charter.

Also significant to the same conclusion was Charter’s relationship to the Pandrol Group, and the Pennsylvania business transactions of Pandrol. There is no question that the Pandrol Group has engaged steadily in business affairs in our Commonwealth. Pandrol International, Ltd., which is wholly owned by Charter, and Pandrol, Inc., wholly owned by Pandrol International, Ltd., have manufactured and sold various types of railroad track equipment. For many years prior to the filing of the instant suit, they have sold this equipment themselves or through an entity known as United Rail Anchor, located in Pittsburgh. Pandrol International, Ltd. was not only registered to do business in Pennsylvania from 1975 through 1978, but paid taxes and even maintained a bank account in our State.

There appears to be no dispute of the conclusion that the Pandrol Group has been actively engaged in business in Pennsylvania to the extent that it is subject to the in personam jurisdiction of our courts. Although Charter again seeks to segregate itself from Pandrol in the face of this jurisdictional problem, the facts simply do not support Charter’s position. It is clear that Pandrol is not an independent entity, even if set up as a separate business corporation under the law. Rather, it is clearly a business division of its corporate owner, which controls all of its operations. Charter does this not only through its total ownership of Pandrol but also through placement of its executives on Pandrol’s Board of Directors. Charter dictates Pandrol’s policies just as another business entity would control the activities and directions of one of its operating divisions. It simply cannot be realistically maintained that Charter and Pandrol are, in substance, independent entities.

In addition to the evidence in the record as to the activities of Cape and Pandrol, the record also contains evidence of direct participation in Pennsylvania business transactions by Charter representatives and employees. In the course of discovery in this case. Charter refused to supply information about such contacts with our Commonwealth occurring more than one year prior to the filing of this suit. Nevertheless, while so limiting its responses, Charter still disclosed several significant individual business forays into our Commonwealth by its employees. Some of these contacts were of extended duration, and involved meetings, sales, technical consultations, business planning and even a securities transaction.

More specifically, the record shows that during an eight month period in 1979, Charter sold columbite to a customer in Boyertown, Pennsylvania. These sales were made on behalf of one of Charter’s clients from Nigeria. In connection with that transaction, Charter’s manager of metals sales in its Mining Division met in June, 1979, in Pennsylvania, with representatives of the customer. In another case, a different Charter representative, from its Mining Division, met in Pittsburgh in April, 1979, with Pennsylvania customers to discuss orders for acid plant compressors. The supplier in that case was a Charter client situated in Zaire. Similarly, during the same month, a third Charter representative met in Pittsburgh with representatives of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, to discuss remote control devices manufactured by another Charter client. In still another transaction, a different Charter employee, Dr. Sage, met in Pittsburgh in November, 1978 and again in March, 1979 with representatives of U.S. Steel and some from Foote Minerals Company, for the purposes of discussing transactions involving business and research projects. During 1979, Charter’s Finance Division purchased 3000 shares of stock through a Philadelphia stock brokerage. Such activities by Charter agents, during the limited period covered by Charter’s responses in discovery, were also considered by the lower court to lend weight to the conclusion that Charter should be subjected to the in personam jurisdiction of our Courts, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301.

After thorough consideration of the record as a whole, we conclude that the lower court was correct in its determination on the in personam jurisdiction issue presented in this case. We find that Charter’s involvements in Pennsylvania satisfy the tests set forth in Koenig v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, supra., and other cases so that an assertion of Pennsylvania court jurisdiction over Charter is clearly constitutional. More particularly, we first find it evident that Charter has purposely availed itself of the privilege of acting within Pennsylvania and thus invoked the benefits and protections of our laws. Charter did this constantly and repeatedly over the years preceding the filing of this suit in its conduct of recurring business affairs through its Cape and Pandrol operations as well as the individual acts of various representatives. The second requirement, that the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities within the forum state, is clearly satisfied. In light of the allegations of the Plaintiffs’. Complaint, this occurred in its sale of .asbestos to their employer. The third requirement is that the acts of Charter must have been substantial enough with regard to Pennsylvania so that our courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over Charter is reasonable. Again, there is no question that the activities of Charter, through Cape, Pandrol and various individual representatives, has been both continuous and substantial in Pennsylvania. The extent of these commercial transactions makes the assumption of jurisdiction completely reasonable and proper in this case.

Some mention of the contentions raised by Charter is appropriate. Charter contends that under the holdings of Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 45 S.Ct. 250, 69 L.Ed. 634 (1925) and Botwinick v. Credit Exchange, Inc., 419 Pa. 65, 213 A.2d 349 (1965), it cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts because Cape and Pandrol comprise independent corporations, not subject to Charter’s direction and control. We find that Charter’s reliance upon these precedents is misplaced in light of the facts produced before the lower court in this case. • Moreover, we find that the modern trend in decisional law lends further weight to the conclusion that jurisdiction was properly asserted over Charter in this case. In Cannon, the Supreme Court held that a Maine corporation could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of North Carolina despite its ownership of all of the capital stock of another corporation which was engaged in business affairs in North Carolina. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brandéis, refused to ignore the separate formal corporate existence of each company. While the Supreme Court respected the separate incorporation of the subsidiary, it is noteworthy that it specifically declared that its ruling should not be taken as.having uniform application: “(S)uch use of a subsidiary does not necessarily subject the parent corporation to the jurisdiction” of North Carolina, (emphasis supplied) 267 U.S. at 337, 45 S.Ct. at 251. In Botwinick, our Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying in part upon Cannon, held that a New York corporation was not “doing business” within Pennsylvania even though it had a subsidiary which was a Pennsylvania corporation. The Court found that the subsidiary, which had a separate corporate existence, was not a mere instrumentality of the New York corporation. While reaching that conclusion upon the facts presented in that case, the Court in Botwinick nevertheless acknowledged that a subsidiary’s activities might well cause its parent to become subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in a state where the subsidiary was engaged in business activities:

“There is a well recognized exception to these general rules if the record demonstrates that the subsidiary is the “alter ego” of the parent to the extent that domination and control by the parent corporation renders the subsidiary a mere instrumentality of the parent; under such extreme circumstances the parent corporation may be held to be doing business within the state under the facade of the subsidiary.”

The lower court in the instant case determined, under the standards of Botwinick, and the facts of record, that Charter’s control over both Pandrol and Cape was of a sufficient degree to consider each but an instrumentality of Charter. We agree with such conclusions. It cannot be forgotten that Charter is itself only a holding company which has chosen to perform all its business functions through operational arms that happen to be set up legally as separate corporations. Despite such separate incorporation, Charter’s total control over Cape and Pandrol is so clear, that to reach any other conclusion in this case would be to blindly exhault form over substance. Charter itself has made these separate corporations constituent parts of its various operating divisions. As explained at length by the lower court, Charter has retained and exercised full control over these subsidiaries through their Boards of Directors. We agree that the degree of control, of both Cape and Pandrol, is sufficient for the proper assertion of Pennsylvania jurisdiction over Charter, even based upon the pronouncements ■ of the Botwinick court.

Charter’s arguments as to a lack of an alter ego relationship, and reliance upon Botwinick, ignore other factors in the case. These involve the activities of Charter’s own employees, for various commercial purposes, in our Commonwealth in the year prior to the filing of this suit. It is clear that the lower court was justified in finding that these activities constituted “a continuous and systematic part of its general business” of sufficient magnitude to make it fair and reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over Charter under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301. We do not have any particular mechanical rule which we follow in these cases, but must determine on an ad hoc case by case basis whether the “minimum contacts” of a foreign corporation have been sufficient to justify the assumption of jurisdiction over it by our courts. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Company, supra. The analysis of the substantiality of the business transactions conducted cannot depend on any comparative dollar volume test involving the defendant’s total sales volume, as such a ratio test would invariably favor the multimillion dollar corporations over those with smaller sales volumes. Hendrickson v. Reg O Co., 657 F.2d 9, 12-13 (3rd Cir.1981). It has been stated that the proper inquiry is whether the defendant’s “conduct and connection with [the state] are such that [it could] reasonably anticipate being haled into court” there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). We find that Charter’s own business contacts in our Commonwealth justify the assertion of jurisdiction over it, even without regard to the evidence of domination and control of its subsidiaries which are clearly engaged in business in our State.

This conclusion is mandated by the record, which demonstrates that even within the limited period of time for which it submitted responses in discovery, Charter’s own business contacts with our State were quite diverse in nature, and broad in scope. The record shows that in a single twelve month period, several different Charter representatives, from at least three of its separate operating divisions, visited our Commonwealth for business transactions. These direct business involvements by Charter were not limited to a single customer or business project, but included five separate Pennsylvania based customers or concerns, and dealt with matters as diverse as sales of minerals, acide plant compressors, and remote control devices, and other business projects and research endeavors. Further, during the same limited time period about which it made disclosures, Charter was not only a seller, but also purchaser, obtaining 3000 shares of stock in a transaction through a Philadelphia broker. Based upon these transactions, all within the year prior to the filing of this suit, we find no merit in Charter’s claim that it had not itself engaged in business in our Commonwealth sufficient to justify the assertion of jurisdiction by our courts.

Earlier, we had noted that the modern trend in judicial thought would favor the assertion of jurisdiction over Charter in this case. The modern cases, of course, rely upon the International Shoe Co. v. Washington “minimum contacts” type of analysis. The lower court cited the case of Energy Reserves Group v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F.Supp. 483 (D.C.Kan.1978) as an instructive case on the question of whether a parent corporation may be subjected to the jurisdiction of a state’s courts solely because of the activities of its subsidiaries within that state. We find the reasoning of the Court in Energy Reserves to be logical and helpful, and direct the reader to that case, especially including its criticism of the holding in the Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co. case, supra. In Energy Reserves the Court found the assertion of jurisdiction in Kansas to be proper over a foreign corporation, based solely upon the business activities within the State of Kansas by a subsidiary that was a separate corporation. The Court explained the less stringent modern constitutional analysis in such cases mandated under the International Shoe decision. We believe the “minimum contacts” analysis, and a recognition of the commercial reality of Charter’s domination and control of Cape and Pandrol, make it clear that Charter is subject to the jurisdiction of our Pennsylvania courts.

Finally, we. note that it is well-established as a rule that when preliminary objections, if sustained, would result in the dismissal of an action, such objections should be sustained only in cases which are clear and free from doubt. Botwinick v. Credit Exchange, Inc., supra. Moreover, when deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lieb v. American Pacific International, Inc., 489 F.Supp. 690, 694 (E.D.Pa. 1980). With these concepts in mind, it is clear that no basis exists in the instant case to disturb the findings of the lower court on the question of jurisdiction presented.

The order of the lower court denying preliminary objections is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not retained.

      . Charter Consolidated Investments, Ltd. and Central Mining Finance, Ltd. which are both subsidiaries of Charter, also filed preliminary objections in the lower court, on jurisdictional grounds, and both have appeared before our Court as co-appellants with Charter in the instant appeal. The record shows that both of the subsidiaries were administrative tools used by Charter to hold the stock of Cape. No separate arguments are offered on this appeal on behalf of either of the subsidiaries. Accordingly, all of the discussion in this Opinion as to Charter should be understood to refer to Charter Consolidated Investments, Ltd. and Central Mining Finance, Ltd. as well.

      . Section 5301 provides, in pertinent part:
      (a) General rule.—The existence of any of the following relationships between a person and this Commonwealth shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of this Commonwealth to exercise general personal jurisdiction over such person, or his personal representative in the case of an individual, and to enable such tribunals to render personal orders against such person or representative:
      (2) Corporations.—
      (i) Incorporation under or qualification as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth.
      (ii) Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent.
      (iii) The carrying on of a continuous and systematic part of its general business within this Commonwealth.
      (b) Scope of jurisdiction.—When jurisdiction over a person is based upon this section any cause of action may be asserted against him, whether or not arising from acts enumerated, in this section. Discontinuance of the acts enumerated in subsection (a)(2)(i) and (iii) and (a)(3)(i) and (iii) shall not affect jurisdiction or omission occurring during the period such status existed.

      . Section 5322, provides more fully, in pertinent part:
      (a) General rule.—A tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person (or the personal representative of a deceased individual who would be subject to jurisdiction under this subsection if not deceased) who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or other matter arising from such person:
      (1) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. Without excluding other acts which may constitute transacting business in this Commonwealth, any of the following shall constitute transacting business for the purpose of this paragraph:
      (i) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object.
      (ii) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object with the intention of initiating a series of such acts.
      (iii) The shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this Commonwealth.
      (3) Causing harm or tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth.
      (4) Causing harm or tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth.
      (b) Exercise of full constitutional power over nonresidents.—In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend to all persons who are not within the scope of section 5301 (relating to persons) to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States.
      (c) Scope of jurisdiction.—When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action or other matter arising from acts enumerated in subsection (a), or from acts forming the basis of jurisdiction under subsection (b), may be asserted against him.

      . It has been recognized that the current Pennsylvania long-arm legislation, discussed above, "... tracks the two jurisdictional theories defined by the Court in International Shoe." See Strick Corp. v. A.J.F. Warehouse Distributors, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 951, 955 (E.D.Pa.1982).

      . 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301 clearly applies as to Pandrol.