author: CIRILLO, Judge:

text:
    614 A.2d 775
    Robert CAPUZZI, Administrator of the Estate of Eleanor Capuzzi, Deceased, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Nicholas Capuzzi, a Minor, and Amanda Capuzzi, a Minor and in His Own Right, Appellant, v. Richard HELLER, Joseph Becker, Theresa Becker Benfield, Anthony Grandinetti, Van’s Auto Tags, Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Institute, Centennial School District and William Tennent School District.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued July 16, 1992.
    Filed Oct. 9, 1992.

      See also 125 Pa.Comwlth. 678, 558 A.2d 596.

      Roy T.J. Stegena, Media, for appellant.
    . Edward M. Wild, Doylestown, for Van’s Auto Tags, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, TAMILIA and POPOVICH, JJ.
   CIRILLO, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Van’s Auto Tags (VAT) and against appellant Robert Capuzzi (Capuzzi), administrator of the estate of Eleanor Capuzzi. We affirm.

On September 8, 1986, Richard Heller’s (Heller) vehicle collided with Eleanor Capuzzi’s vehicle, killing Eleanor Capuzzi and seriously injuring her two young children. Earlier that year, on July 14, 1986, VAT had issued Heller a temporary vehicle registration signed by the owner of VAT. The owner of VAT admitted to signing hundreds of such applications in advance, for “expediency” sake. Heller knowingly and falsely represented to VAT that he had proper insurance; moreover, Heller told the VAT employee that he had a policy with “Metropolitan” and that his policy number was the same as his social security number. On the date of the accident, however, Heller was, in fact, uninsured.

On appeal, Capuzzi presents one issue for our consideration: Whether the court below erred in holding that Capuzzi was not entitled to recover damages from VAT which provided temporary vehicle registration to an uninsured driver in violation of Pennsylvania regulations, on the grounds that, since Capuzzi collected uninsured motorist coverage under his own automobile insurance policy, he was not also entitled to recover from VAT at least the minimum liability limit that the uninsured tortfeasor (Heller) should have had under Pennsylvania law?

We will uphold a grant of summary judgment only in those cases in which the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b); Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corporation, 399 Pa.Super. 226, 228-29, 582 A.2d 27, 28-29 (1990). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party’s pleadings and give the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Lookenbill v. Garrett, 340 Pa.Super. 435, 490 A.2d 857 (1985).

VAT is an authorized issuing agent of temporary automobile registration cards and plates. See 67 Pa.Code § 43.4. VAT, like most automobile dealers, is permitted to issue temporary cards and plates to new car buyers as well as to individuals who are renewing their vehicle registration. The duties of an issuing agent are defined by section 43.5 of the Motor Vehicle Code which provides in pertinent part:

Issuance of temporary registration cards.
(d) Duty to examine documents. The duty to examine documents shall include the following:
(1) Before issuing a temporary registration card, the issuing agent shall examine all documents necessary to the transaction;
(2) A temporary registration card may not be issued unless the following items are found to be in order:
(i) Insurance information.
(A) Except as provided in clause (B) or (C), check to determine that the vehicle is insured by examining one of the following documents ...
(I) An identification card as required in 31 Pa. Code Chapter 67, Subchapter B (relating to evidence of financial responsibility).
(II) The declaration page of an insurance policy.
(III) A valid binder of insurance.
(IV) A copy of an application to the Pennsylvania Automobile Insurance Plan.
(B) If none of the documents in clause (A) is available, verification that the vehicle is properly insured may be obtained by contacting the applicant’s insurance agent.

67 Pa.Code § 43.5.

In his complaint, Capuzzi avers that VAT had breached its statutory duty by failing to request or review the requisite documents and by failing to confirm with Metropolitan that Heller was indeed a policyholder. Moreover, Capuzzi asserts that Heller did not indicate to VAT that he had reliable financial arrangements, deposits, or resources to demonstrate that he was adequately self-insured as required by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq., nor was Heller requested to produce documents indicating that he was self-insured. Capuzzi contends, therefore, that but for VAT’s breach of its statutory duty to verify the proof of insurance, Capuzzi would be entitled to receive at least the minimum automobile liability insurance Heller was required to carry.

The statutory duty set forth in section 43.5 of the Pennsylvania Code defines the standard of care to which an issuing agent such as VAT will be held. The rationale for this requirement is the protection of all motorists — ensuring that they will have recourse to comprehensive expeditious and equitable no-fault insurance coverage.

In Lyngarkos v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 57 Pa.Commw. 121, 125, 426 A.2d 1195, 1198 (1981), the court held that an automobile dealer [issuing agent] which issues a temporary registration card and plate to a purchaser without first securing proof of no-fault insurance is answerable in trespass to one injured by the dealer’s neglect. Id., 57 Pa.Commw. at 124, 426 A.2d at 1198 (emphasis added). The trespass action is based upon the statutory duty imposed upon the issuer, as an agent of the Department of Transportation, to inspect all documents necessary for proper registration of a motor vehicle. The legislature’s purpose for imposing this duty of inspection was to further the policy of the No-Fault Act, that is, to establish “a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims....” 40 P.S. § 1009.102(b) (repealed). Id. (emphasis added).

With this policy in mind, in Lieberman v. Abat’s Auto Tag Service, 344 Pa.Super. 350, 496 A.2d 831 (1985), our court determined that the scope of the issuer’s duty is limited. The Lieberman court explained that “injury” was “not the physical harm from the accident but rather the inability to recover medical expenses under the No-fault Act.” Id., 344 Pa.Superi- or Ct. at 352, 496 A.2d at 832.

In Lieberman, Abat’s Auto Tag Service had issued a temporary registration and license plate to Nolan Brown, allegedly without proof of insurance coverage. Lieberman was struck and injured by Brown. Lieberman filed suit against Abat’s, contending that his injuries were a direct result of Abat’s negligence. This court held that although the tag service cannot be held responsible for the physical injuries to the plaintiff under a negligence theory, the plaintiff’s inability to recover insurance benefits as a result of the issuing agent’s breach of its statutory duty is actionable. Id., 344 Pa.Superior Ct. at 353, 496 A.2d at 832-33. This court, however, affirmed the dismissal of Lieberman’s action because Lieberman had failed to claim that he was "unable to recover through recourse to the No-fault Act.” Id., 344 Pa.Superior Ct. at 353, 496 A.2d at 832-33. Lieberman’s sole remedy was under the No-fault Act. Id., 344 Pa.Superior Ct. at 352, 496 A.2d at 832.

The concurring opinion authored by the Honorable Edmund J. Spaeth, Jr., President Judge, instructs us farther:

[AJppellant suffered no injury within the scope of the duty owed to him by appellee. Appellee was an authorized issuing agent of temporary automobile registration cards and plates. As such, his duty was defined by statute and implementing regulations.... Here, even if one assumes that appellee breached its duty as an issuing agent by negligently issuing temporary cards and plates to the uninsured motorist who in turn insured appellant, still, appellant suffered no damage from the breach. This is true because, through the Assigned Claims Plan, the legislature has provided an alternative means by which an uninsured victim of an uninsured motorist has access to basic loss benefits. ... Appellee’s negligence, therefore, if it was such, was injuria abseque damno, “a wrong done, but from which no loss or damage results, and which, therefore will not sustain an action.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 924 (4th ed. rev. 1968).

Id., 344 Pa.Superior Ct. at 356-57, 496 A.2d at 834-35 (Spaeth, P.J., concurring).

Today we adopt this rationale. An issuer’s liability does not extend beyond the responsibility to ensure that the injured party has “a source available to compensate him for vehicle-caused injuries up to the levels provided for basic loss benefits under the No-Fault Act. See 40 P.S. § 1009.202 [repealed].” Id. The statutory regulations imposed upon the issuing agents have as their purpose the protection of the public; an issuing agent’s violation of these duties are punishable by sanction. See 67 Pa.Code § 43.11. We refuse to impose a further duty upon the issuing agent to pick up where the first party benefits leave off, and become in effect a provider of liability insurance.

Here, Capuzzi admitted in interrogatories that he had received all “benefits for medical expenses, income loss, accidental death, or funeral benefits” that he was entitled to under his own uninsured motorists coverage. When asked what “personal injury protection” benefits Capuzzi believed he would have been entitled to receive had Heller been insured, Capuzzi answered “none.” Capuzzi concedes that he has collected first party benefits and uninsured motorist coverage under his own policy in the amount of $100,000.00. 'Unlike the “uninsured victim of an uninsured motorist,” Capuzzi had a source available to compensate him for injury up to the levels provided for under the MVFRL pertaining to first party benefits. Lieberman, 344 Pa.Super. at 358, 496 A.2d at 835. See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1702, 1712. Accordingly, we hold that the duty owed by an issuer of a temporary registration to one who has been injured by the issuer’s neglect is limited to the extent that the injured party is unable to recover first party benefits as provided in the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701 et seq. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee VAT is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurs in the result.

      . We note that the Lyngarkos, supra, and Lieberman, infra, cases were decided when the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (the No-Fault Act) governed automobile insurance. 40 P.S. §§ 1009.101-1009.701. Repealed. Feb. 12, 1984, P.L. 26, No. 11, § 8(a), effective Oct. 1, 1984. The accident in the instant case occurred in 1986, and is therefore governed by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq. Despite the repeal of the No-Fault Act and the subsequent enactment of the MVFRL, the purpose of the regulations and the policy underlying insurance law remains the same. Moreover, "[w]hen a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4).

      . Section 1702 of the MVFRL defines "benefits” or “first party benefits” as follows: "Medical benefits, income loss benefits, accidental death benefits and funeral benefits.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: OLSZEWSKI, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    614 A.2d 1146
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joyce D. LITTLE, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted April 9, 1992.
    Filed July 31, 1992.

      Harold Ciampoli, Asst. Dist. Atty., Montoursville, for Comm., appellee.
    Before OLSZEWSKI, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   OLSZEWSKI, Judge:

This is an appeal from judgment of sentence rendered by the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County on December 19, 1990. Following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of two counts of simple assault by physical menace. Appellant’s post-trial motions were denied, and she was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than three months nor more than eighteen months. This appeal followed. Appellant proceeded pro se at trial and continues pro se on this appeal.

Appellant presents three issues for our consideration: first, whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish simple assault by physical menace; second, whether she was improperly denied her constitutional right to assistance of counsel; and third, whether she was denied the right to a fair and impartial trial. We affirm.

We adopt the facts of this case as summarized in the trial court opinion:

On [October 11, 1989], deputy sheriffs Debra Reed and Donald J. Turner were directed by the Lycoming County Sheriffs Office to perform a writ of execution for mortgage foreclosure on the property of Charles 0. and Joyce D. Little,- at R.D. # 1, Hughesville, and to serve the owners with a notice of sale.
During the trial, held on 22 August 1990 and 23 August 1990, both deputies testified that they arrived at the Little residence, in a marked sheriffs car with official insignia on both sides of the vehicle. They were also both wearing their official uniform — blazers and trousers — with an insignia patch on the left front pocket of the blazer.
Upon reaching the Little residence, Deputy Reed set about completing the levy sheet by filling in a description of the property. At this time, Deputy Turner, who was in the driver’s, seat, glanced up and saw Mrs. Little coming out of the front door holding a shotgun. He immediately radioed for state police back-up unit assistance. Next, he rolled down his window and tried to speak to the defendant, whom he knew to be Mrs. Little from a previous encounter. He identified himself as a deputy sheriff from the Lycoming County Sheriffs Office, showed her his badge, and attempted to enter into a rational discussion with her. Defendant responded to Deputy Turner’s sensible and courteous gestures toward her by firmly ordering the deputy sheriffs to get off her property. She then retreated back into to her house, only to make several more surprise entrances onto the porch with gun in hand. During one of these brief appearances, Mrs. Little yelled to the deputies that she knew théy had radioed for back-up police, because she had her scanner on. She also told them that she had called various news media and that at least one TV crew was on its way.
Because of what he perceived to be a potentially volatile situation, Deputy Turner decided that he would not attempt to personally hand Mrs. Little the papers, but would at least try to post the levy sheets on the house during one of her trips inside. He asked Deputy Reed to “cover him” while he walked to the house to post the papers. Deputy Reed exited the vehicle and drew her weapon to protect Deputy Turner as he walked up to the house with the levy sheets and staple gun. When he reached the residence, Deputy Turner discovered that the staple gun was empty. He also noticed that Mrs. Little had again appeared, still toting the shotgun. This time, she left the porch and began advancing toward Deputy Turner, reportedly coming within three to six feet of him. Deputy Turner, frightened and flustered dropped the levy sheets on a sign in the yard, returned to the vehicle and made a hasty departure.
The testimony of the deputies indicates that throughout the incident Mrs. Little behaved in a belligerent and hostile manner, shouting obscenities and refusing to enter into any dialogue with them.
At trial, the defendant asserted that on the eventful date of 11 October 1989, while doing her laundry, she was interrupted by a man’s voice yelling at her to come out of her house. She peeked out of her front door and saw only the back end of a white car. Because of previous bad experiences in which her life was threatened by the driver of a white car, and because she was alone at the time, she was frightened, and picked up her shotgun to defend herself. Mrs. Little continually asserted that the deputies were not in uniform and that they never identified themselves to her; thus, it was not until after they left that she understood who the deputies were and why they had come.

Trial court opinion, June 18, 1991, at 2-4 (references to notes of testimony omitted).

Appellant first maintains that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove simple assault by physical menace. Our review of challenges to sufficiency of the evidence is measured by a well-established standard:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must decide whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deductible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to establish all the elements of the offense(s) beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Rollins, 525 Pa. 335, 339, 580 A.2d 744, 746 (1990). The Crimes Code defines simple assault by physical menace as:

§ 2701. Simple assault
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of assault if he:
(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3). In his opinion, the Honorable Clinton W. Smith has provided a well-reasoned 10-page analysis of appellant’s challenge to sufficiency of the evidence. In summary, we find that there was sufficient evidence to establish the elements of simple assault by physical menace since appellant erratically emerged from her home carrying a shotgun, shouting and advancing from her porch. In fear of imminent serious bodily injury, the deputies radioed for state police back-up. Ultimately, they abandoned their attempt to post the levy sheets and instead opted to perform a “drop service” by dropping the papers on a post in appellant’s yard. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we find that the evidence abbreviated here and more fully explained in the trial court opinion, is sufficient to prove the crime of simple assault by physical menace beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we adopt that portion of the trial court’s opinion (pages 4-14) and find that appellant’s claim is without merit.

Next, appellant asserts that she was denied her constitutional right to counsel since the trial court permitted her privately-retained counsel to withdraw. We must first determine whether the trial court properly allowed appellant’s trial counsel to withdraw. Pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct, there are certain situations where an attorney may be permitted to withdraw from representing a client. Specifically, Rule 1.16(b) provides:

Rule 1.16. Declining or Terminating Representation
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client, or if:
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;

Rules Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(4), 42 Pa.C.S.A. (Purdon’s Supp. 1992). With regard to withdrawal of counsel, this Court has held that:

There are no prophylactic rules which exist when determining whether a denial or withdrawal amounts to an abuse of discretion. Each case must be decided by balancing the competing interest giving due regard to the facts presented.

Commonwealth v. Scheps, 361 Pa.Super. 566, 576, 523 A.2d 363, 368 (1987), allocatur denied, 516 Pa. 633, 533 A.2d 91; Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 368 Pa.Super. 33, 47-48, 533 A.2d 473, 481 (1987).

The record indicates that Michael Rudinski, Esq., represented appellant at her preliminary hearing and arraignment. Mr. Rudinski received a retainer fee for these services. Thereafter, Mr. Rudinski recommended that appellant enter into the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition Program (ARD). Appellant refused Mr. Rudinski’s advice. Appellant then wrote Mr. Rudinski on February 1, 1990, refusing to pay $1,500 for the handling of her trial. (Official Record, Defendant’s Motion to find in Contempt, Exhibit 1.) Rather, appellant proposed that Mr. Rudinski represent her at trial based on a contingency arrangement. Id. Appellant wrote,

While I am well aware most attorneys in this area require Jé of any award as their fee, I believe this to be excessive; I am prepared to be generous but have no desire to “pad” anyone’s bank account or pay for their European vacation. I am prepáred to offer a fee in the 15-20 percent range, being fully aware that 15% is quite generous and the most ethical might consider 20% a bonus.

Id. In her letter, appellant continued by asking Mr. Rudinski to begin preparation of an action against the Lycoming County Sheriffs department seeking compensatory damages for the mental anguish she has suffered at their hands. Id. Appellant’s confusion is apparent. She not only wanted Mr. Rudinski to represent her at trial but also in relation to a civil matter. For this service, she was willing to pay Mr. Rudinski a 15-20 percent contingent fee. Based on her proposal, it is evident that appellant was unable to comprehend the separateness of the criminal and civil matters.

Mr. Rudinski next appeared in court on April 20, 1990, to request withdrawal. In his application, Mr. Rudinski petitioned for withdrawal because appellant refused to pay the requested trial fee and was acting in an uncooperative manner. At hearing on this matter, Mr. Rudinski stated that he told appellant from the beginning that he would not get involved in any civil matters, and that $1,500 would cover trial and sentencing. (N.T. 4/23/90 at 8.) By order of April 23, 1990, the Honorable Kenneth D. Brown denied Mr. Rudinski’s petition for withdrawal since it was possible that appellant’s case would be reached for trial in the current trial term. Judge Brown added, however, that in the event appellant’s case was not reached within the current trial term, Mr. Rudinski could then request reconsideration of the order.

After Mr. Rudinski’s petition to withdraw was denied, he contacted appellant by letter dated April 27, 1990, and included a contract again offering to perform trial and sentencing services for a flat fee of $1,500. (Official Record, Defendant’s Motion to find in Contempt, Exhibit 2.) Appellant responded by letter of April 30, 1990, wherein she stated that Mr. Rudinski’s offer was totally unacceptable and that she stood by her previous offer of a 20% contingency arrangement.

Appellant’s case did not come to trial in the April term, and, citing the same reasons stated in his initial petition, appellant’s counsel again requested withdrawal on May 16,1990. On May 29, 1990, Judge Brown held a hearing on Mr. Rudinski’s second motion to withdraw. At this hearing, appellant maintained that Mr. Rudinski’s contract was unacceptable. (N.T. 5/29/90 at 3.) Since the parties could not resolve their differences, Judge Brown granted Mr. Rudinski’s request for withdrawal and continued appellant’s case until the July term in order to give her additional opportunity to obtain new counsel.

The posture of the instant case reveals that appellant refused to obtain counsel at trial by declining to acquire the services of Mr. Rudinski. Mr. Rudinski was willing to represent appellant and provided a contract which demanded a flat fee of $1,500. The price would include services incident to trial and sentencing. Appellant refused to accept this arrangement and instead proposed a contingency arrangement. The record reveals that appellant was well aware of her financial obligation and deliberately refused to pay for the services which she sought. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing appellant’s counsel to withdraw.

In addition, we find that appellant was not denied her constitutional right to counsel since she waived this right before trial. Appellant’s case was rescheduled for the July trial term in order to provide time to secure substitute counsel. At a pre-trial conference on July 10, 1990, appellant appeared without counsel claiming that she was unable to obtain alternative counsel. Judge Smith, who was now presiding over the case, strongly advised appellant to obtain counsel and also advised her of a proposed trial date. At call of the list on July 23, 1990, appellant again appeared without counsel claiming that the Lord God Almighty was her attorney and that her son would assist her at the counsel table. (N.T. 7/23/91 at 1.) Since appellant considered the Lord God Almighty to be her counsel, she did not waive her right to counsel, but indicated that she did waive her right to a licensed attorney. (N.T. 7/23/91 at 3.) Before trial on August 22, 1990, the trial judge delivered an extensive colloquy regarding appellant’s waiver of counsel. At this stage, the trial court was required to ascertain whether appellant was fully aware of the dangers of proceeding pro se. Commonwealth v. Monica, 528 Pa. 266, 272, 597 A.2d 600, 603 (1991). Rule 318(c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure addresses waiver of counsel and provides:

Rule 318. Waiver of Counsel
* % % * *
(c) Proceedings Before a Judge. When the defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel after the preliminary hearing, the judge shall ascertain from the defendant, on the record, whether this is a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel.

Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 318(c), 42 Pa.C.S.A. In the case at bar, appellant was specifically advised of the right to counsel, the nature and elements of the charges against her, the range of permissible sentencing, the applicability of procedural rules, and the existence of possible defenses and rights which must be timely asserted. (N.T. 8/22/90, “Transcript of Waiver of Counsel Hearing,” at 1-22.) In addition, Judge Smith inquired whether appellant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol; whether she had ever been institutionalized for a mental disorder; and whether she was waiving her right to counsel in response to any outside threats or promises. Id. Thereafter, appellant executed a written waiver of counsel and has proceeded pro se up until this appeal. A thorough review of the trial judge’s colloquy indicates that appellant was made fully aware of all necessary information and knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to counsel.

Lastly, appellant contends that she did not receive a fair and impartial trial because the trial judge was prejudiced against her and the prosecution made inflammatory remarks. Appellant’s argument on this issue is primarily unfocused. We find that her claims of trial judge bias are vague and unsubstantiated. With regard to her contentions of prosecutorial misconduct, we glean from appellant’s argument that the prosecution allegedly made inflammatory statements about appellant’s mortgage foreclosure. We note that a prosecutor must limit his statements to the facts introduced at trial and legitimate inferences therefrom. Commonwealth v. Turner, 390 Pa.Super. 216, 222-24, 568 A.2d 622, 625 (1989), allocatur denied, 527 Pa. 645, 593 A.2d 418. In addition, statements are only improper where they connote unavoidable prejudice, forming in the minds of the jurors a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not weigh the evidence and render a true verdict. Id. Our review of the record indicates that the prosecutor’s remarks were limited to the facts as they related to this incident and did not rise to the prejudicial level of prosecutorial misconduct.

Judgment of sentence is affirmed.

BECK, J., concurs in the result.

APPENDIX

[TRIAL COURT OPINION pp. 4-14]

three to six feet of him. N.T. 8/22/90 p. 22. Deputy Turner, frightened and flustered, dropped the levy sheets on a sign in the yard, returned to the vehicle, and made a hasty departure.

The testimony of the deputies indicates that throughout the incident Mrs. Little behaved in a belligerent and hostile manner, shouting obscenities and refusing to enter into any dialogue with them.

At trial, the defendant asserted that on the eventful date of 11 October 1989, while doing her laundry, she was interrupted by a man’s voice yelling at her to come out of the house. She peeked out her front door and saw only the back end of a white car. Because of previous bad experiences in which her life was threatened by the driver of a white car, and because she was alone at the time, she was frightened, and picked up her shotgun to defend herself. Mrs. Little continually asserted that the deputies were not in uniform and that they never identified themselves to her; thus, it was not until after they left that she understood who the deputies were and why they had come.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Since this court must view Mrs. Little’s appeal as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, all the facts and all the permissible inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Commonwealth v. Morris, 522 Pa. 533, 564 A.2d 1226 (1989). Thus, the testimony of the deputy sheriffs is considered to be credible, and this court finds that the evidence presented at trial supports the jury’s guilty verdict.

In order to prove the crime of simple assault by physical menace, the Commonwealth must establish the following elements: (1) that the defendant attempted to put the deputies in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, and took a substantial step toward that end, (2) that the defendant used physical menace to do this, and (3) that it was the defendant’s conscious object or purpose to cause fear of serious bodily injury. See Pennsylvania Crimes Code Annotated, Section 2701(a)(3). In the remainder of this opinion, this court will address each of these elements in turn and discuss how the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to prove all the elements of the crime.

I. Fear of Imminent Serious Bodily Injury

“Serious bodily injury” is defined in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code Annotated, Section 2301 as an “impairment of physical condition which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Clearly, Mrs. Little’s shotgun was capable of causing such harm, and by brandishing the weapon, she obviously intended to cause fear of serious bodily injury.

As indicated in the Facts section, several of Mrs. Little’s actions could constitute the required “substantial step” toward putting the deputies in fear of serious bodily injury. Most obvious is her brandishing the shotgun while shouting obscenities and exhibiting hostile behavior toward them. She also took a literal as well as a figurative “substantial step” when she walked off the porch and advanced within 3-6 feet of Deputy Turner, with the ever-present weapon still in hand.

The embattled deputies’ actions unquestionably show that Mrs. Little succeeded in her attempt to cause fear of serious bodily injury. The first step they took after being confronted by the armed defendant was to radio for back-up police to come to their aid. Secondly, before Deputy Turner attempted to post the house, he asked Deputy Reed to “cover him” with her weapon — a clear indication that he feared Mrs. Little might fire her gun at him. Thirdly, when Mrs. Little walked off the porch and advanced toward him, Deputy Turner quickly (and wisely) aborted his attempt to properly post the levy sheets and opted to drop them on a post in her yard and return to the car instead. Lastly, both deputies decided to leave the premises rather than wait for the back-up police to come to their aid. All these actions indicate that both deputies seriously feared for their safety.

The testimony at trial regarding their feelings during the encounter with the weapon-wielding defendant clearly bears this out. Both deputies stated several times that they were frightened by Mrs. Little’s behavior. As Deputy Reed explained:

She kept going in and out of the house, which was very frightening because we didn’t know where she was going to come back out from ... every time she went in the house, we — I constantly had to scan the perimeter because I didn’t know if she would be coming back out from the rear of the house, from the front, the side, we didn’t know if there was anyone in the garage — we just constantly had to keep scanning.

N.T. 8/22/90 p. 23. Deputy Turner testified that he too was frightened by Mrs. Little’s behavior: “She was holding a shotgun, and I had — I was scared ... I had no idea what she would do.” N.T. 8/22/89 p. 38. In fact, he even abandoned his attempt to post the levy sheets, and decided instead to perform a “drop service” by leaving the papers on the premises, rather than handing them to Mrs. Little directly. When questioned about the circumstances under which a drop service would be used, Deputy Turner answered “when it’s extreme hazard that we may be in fear of bodily injury or that we are in fear of our life ...” N.T. 8/22/90 p. 48.

The court recognizes that whether the deputies were actually fearful is, in and of itself, irrelevant, and that the issue is what Mrs. Little attempted. However, we find that all of the above stated facts are indeed relevant to show what Mrs. Little attempted, because she continued to brandish the shotgun after being fully aware of the fear it was creating — she saw the deputies’ reactions and heard them radio for help. Thus, the only rational conclusion is that the defendant did indeed attempt to put the deputies in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

II. Menacing or Frightening Activity

The primary issue in this case, as the court views it, is whether Mrs. Little’s actions constituted physical menace. It is well settled in Pennsylvania case law that pointing a gun at someone constitutes simple assault by physical menace. In the instant case, however, the Commonwealth does not assert that Mrs. Little ever pointed her shotgun at the deputies. Because this court could find no case law addressing the issue of whether merely brandishing a weapon constitutes physical menace, we must look to the totality of the circumstances and evaluate the defendant’s behavior throughout the incident to determine whether or not Mrs. Little used physical menace.

As described in the Facts section of this opinion, Mrs. Little not only carried the shotgun, but she repeatedly ordered the deputies off her property and shouted obscenities at them. Moreover, with her sudden and erratic appearances and disappearances on and off of the porch — with shotgun in hand — she clearly attempted to frightened both deputies. Although she never actually threatened to shoot them, the mere act of toting a shotgun while exhibiting such combative, antagonistic, and hostile behavior clearly constitutes an implied threat — “Get off my property ... or else!” — which came through loud and clear.

Perhaps Deputy Turner described it best when, during cross-examination, Mrs. Little asked him what she had done to threaten him. He replied, “You told me to get off your property, it was private property and we were trespassing while you were brandishing a shotgun. I perceive that as a threat against my person. In fact, I see that as an extreme threat against my person.” N.T. 8/22/90 p. 54.

In addition to holding the gun “in the cradle” during each of her brief appearances, Mrs. Little also walked off the porch at one point and advanced toward Deputy Turner, coming within 3-6 feet of him — another concrete use of physical menace.

Pennsylvania case law clearly supports the court’s finding that Mrs. Little’s used physical menace. A look at some of the physical menace cases reveals that a person may indeed commit simple assault by physical menace without verbally threatening the victim. Neither must the defendant actually point a weapon or hold the weapon in a striking position. In Commonwealth v. Diamond, 268 Pa.Super 326, 329, 408 A2d 488 (1979), appellant was one of two men running in the street in the direction of a car driven by victim Hinds. Mr. Hinds swerved to avoid hitting them. Shortly afterwards, he stopped at a red light, and appellant ran up to the passenger door of the car and put his hand on the door handle. The Diamond court found that:

“by approaching Hinds’ car at 4:00 a.m. and gripping the door handle, appellant ‘attempted] by physical menace to put [Hinds] in fear ... A reasonable person, accosted in his car at 4:00 a.m. on the street, will quite likely fear that such an injury is imminent.”

In Commonwealth v. Hudgens, 400 Pa.Super. 79, 87-89, 582 A.2d 1352, 1357 (1990), we can examine another circumstance where a deadly weapon was brandished. In this case, during a heated argument, appellant informed victim Swope that he would “get him.” Hudgens removed a sword which was concealed in his trousers, held it within five to six inches of Swope’s body, and touched Swope’s hand with the sword. Appellant averred that Swope was not placed in fear of serious bodily injury because the victim testified that appellant never attempted to strike Swope, and never even held the sword in a striking position. Yet the court still ruled that there was “ample evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction for simple assault.”

A similar situation is found in Commonwealth v. Dicenzo, 260 Pa.Super. 12, 393 A.2d 988 (1978). In this case, appellant and his companion were arrested after “prowling.” While the officer physically restrained the companion, appellant “moved up the driveway a short distance to pick up a stone. He yelled to the officer that he [appellant] would ‘bash my [the policeman’s] brains in’ if he came closer. Appellant fled but later gave himself up at the magistrate’s office.” Dicenzo’s actions, although accompanied by a verbal threat, appear to this court far less menacing than the actions of Mrs. Little, who, although she made no specific verbal threat, certainly communicated a serious implied threat, and held in her hand a shotgun, as opposed to a stone.

After consideration of the above cases, this court finds that Mrs. Little’s behavior during the incident in question is every bit as menacing as any of the cases discussed above, and therefore that the evidence clearly supports the second element of the crime — that Mrs. Little’s behavior constituted a use of physical menace.

III. Conscious Object or Purpose

The final criteria for the charge simple assault by physical menace is that the defendant’s conduct must be intentional — it must have been her conscious object or purpose to cause fear of serious bodily injury. In 18 Pa.C.S. 302(b), intent is defined as follows:

(1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result

In the case of Commonwealth v. Gregory, 267 Pa.Super 103, 108, 406 A.2d 539, 542 (1979), the court addresses the issue of intent, and states the following:

As intent is a subjective frame of mind, it is of necessity difficult of direct proof ... we must look to all the evidence to establish intent, including, but not limited to, appellant’s conduct as it appeared to his eyes.

Other appellate courts have issued similar statements on the proving of intent. In Commonwealth v. Russell, 313 Pa.Super. 534, 543, 460 A.2d 316, 321 (1983), the court ruled: “Intent can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the attendant circumstances.” See also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 465 Pa. 442, 447, 350 A.2d 847, 849-50 (1976), where the court found that “[a] finder of fact is not bound by an actor’s stated intention but may find that he intended the natural and probable consequences of his act.” See also In Interests of J.L., 327 Pa.Super. 175, 475 A.2d 156, 157 (1984) and Commonwealth v. Alexander, 477 Pa. 190, 383 A.2d 887 (1978).

In the instant case, this court finds that the surrounding circumstances clearly indicate that Mrs. Little fully intended to put the deputies in fear of serious bodily injury, and that this intention may be inferred from her actions. Indeed, the only other explanation for her exploits would be that she was unaware of the deputies’ identity and purpose in coming on her premises. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, as we must do, this court will accept the testimony of the deputies as true, as stated in the Facts section, and finds that: (1) the deputies arrived at the Little residence in a sheriffs vehicle, marked with the official insignia, (2) the deputies were wearing their official uniforms, (3) Deputy Turner repeatedly told Mrs. Little who they were and why they had come, (4) Deputy Turner produced his badge of authority and showed it to Mrs. Little, (5) Mrs. Little yelled to the deputies that she had her scanner on, and that she knew who they were and that they had called for back-up police assistance, (6) Mrs. Little never telephoned the police to help her, as one would expect any frightened person to do, and (7) Mrs. Little did, however, telephone the media, urging them to come and film the scene.

In light of the above findings of fact, this court finds that Mrs. Little was fully aware of the identity of the deputies, and it was her conscious object and purpose to frighten them into leaving with the implied threat that she would fire her shotgun at them if they did not. The evidence presented at trial indicates that her actions effectively got this point across.

CONCLUSION

Although Mrs. Little never pointed her shotgun directly at the deputies or verbally threatened to shoot them, this court finds that her actions certainly constituted an implied threat, which was every bit as menacing and frightening to the deputies. In evaluating the circumstances surrounding the case, this court finds that the defendant deliberately and intentionally put Deputy Turner and Deputy Reed in fear of serious bodily injury. We further find that she did this through the use of physical menace, which consisted of brandishing a shotgun while engaging in hostile and threatening behavior that included the following actions: ordering the deputies to leave, shouting obscenities at them, refusing to listen to them or enter into dialogue with them, repeatedly entering and exiting the house in an erratic and unpredictable manner, and advancing off the porch to within 3-6 feet of Deputy Turner. Any reasonable person would fear for his or her safety when confronted with a pugnacious, shotgun-toting individual behaving in a combative and hostile manner. Thus, this court finds that the evidence clearly supports the jury’s verdict that the defendant is guilty of two counts of simple assault by physical menace.

      . 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3).

      . At trial the Commonwealth and appellant stipulated that during the incident appellant was holding the gun "in the cradle,” or in one arm, visible to onlookers. Although appellant never pointed the gun at the deputies, we find that her overall demeanor and actions were designed to, and did in fact, put the deputies in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

      . Appellant was denied public defender assistance because she did not meet the financial qualifications.

      . We note, however, that these cases were decided based on the application of former Disciplinary Rule 2-110 “Withdrawal from Employment,” Code of Prof. Resp. DR 2-110, 42 Pa.C.S.A. (superceded by the Rules of Professional Conduct, April 1, 1988). Our research has disclosed no case law commenting on the application of Rule 1.16 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra, which is currently in force.

      . We note that attorney's are prohibited from entering contingent arrangements when representing a defendant in a criminal case. Rules Prof. Conduct 1.5(d)(2), 42 Pa.C.S.A. (Purdons Supp.1992).

      . See Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 355 Pa.Super. 575, 513 A.2d 1382 (1986), Alloc. dism., 524 Pa. 53, 569 A.2d 328; Commonwealth v. Bryant, 282 Pa.Super. 600, 423 A.2d 407 (1980); Commonwealth v. Savage, 275 Pa.Super. 96, 418 A.2d 629 (1980).

      . See Commonwealth v. Diamond, 268 Pa.Super. 326, 408 A.2d 488 (1979), where the court ruled that a person is held responsible for the forseeable consequences of his behavior, and that the surrounding circumstances known to a person may be taken into account when considering and evaluating these actions.

      . Mrs. Little represented herself at trial.

      . The Assistant D.A. and Mrs. Little stipulated that during the incident Mrs. Little was holding the gun "in the cradle,” or held in one arm, visible to onlookers. N.T. 8/23/90 p. 3.

      . In her testimony, Mrs. Little stated that she did not call the police because the nearest headquarters was located some distance from her home, and she did not believe they would arrive in time to provide her with the emergency assistance she needed. However, the court notes that the newspaper and television stations which she did call are located in Williamsport, some 15-20 miles away.


author: ROWLEY, President Judge:

text:
    614 A.2d 1155
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Steven A. BESCH, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Feb. 3, 1992.
    Filed Aug. 13, 1992.
    Reargument Denied Oct. 23, 1992.

      Michael S. Gingerich, Lewistown, for appellant.
    Mary B. Seiverling, Deputy Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for Com., appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, President Judge, and FORD ELLIOTT and BROSKY, JJ.
   ROWLEY, President Judge:

In this appeal from the judgment of sentence entered September 12, 1990, in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County, appellant Steven A. Besch raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erroneously expanded the definition of the term “enterprise” as used in the Corrupt Organizations Act by applying it beyond the scope of legitimate business; (2) whether separate sentences on the corrupt organizations offenses and the underlying drug offenses violates the double jeopardy clause; (3) whether convictions on two conspiracy charges violates 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(c) as well as the double jeopardy clause because there was only one conspiracy with multiple objectives; (4) whether the trial court used an incorrect offense gravity score when determining the sentences for the four counts of delivery of a controlled substance and the count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance; (5) whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing disproportionately lenient sentences on appellant’s codefendants; and (6) whether the trial court relied on erroneous information when determining the amount of fines to impose. After considering the parties’ arguments, we affirm the judgment of sentence except for the portions imposing fines. We vacate the imposition of fines and remand for a hearing on appellant’s ability to pay the fines imposed upon him, and either resentencing or reinstatement of the original fines imposed.

Appellant was arrested after an investigation revealed his involvement in extensive drug-related activities. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the following: Count 1 — violation of the Corrupt Organizations Act; Count 2 — conspiracy to violate the Corrupt Organizations Act; Count 3 — conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine); Counts 4-7 — delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine); Count 8 — possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine); and Count 9— possession of a controlled substance (LSD). Appellant filed timely post-trial motions on May 28,1990. On September 11, 1990, the trial court imposed the following sentence:

Count 1 — $10,000 fine plus costs and imprisonment of 3-20 years.
Count 2 — $10,000 fine and imprisonment of 1 56-3 years, consecutive to Count 1.
Count 3 — $10,000 fine and imprisonment of 3 56-10 years, consecutive to Count 2.
Count 4 — $10,000 fine and imprisonment of 2 56-10 years, concurrent to Counts 1-3.
Count 5 — $10,000 fine and imprisonment of 2 56-10 years, consecutive to Count 4, concurrent to Counts 1-3.
Count 6 — $10,000 fine and imprisonment of 2 56-10 years consecutive to Count 5, concurrent to Counts 1-3.
Count 7 — $10,000 fine and imprisonment of 2 56-10 years, concurrent to Counts 1-6.
Count 8 — $10,000 fine and imprisonment of 2 56-10 years, concurrent to Counts 1-7.
Count 9 — $5,000 fine.

After sentence was imposed, appellant filed a motion to modify, which was denied. Appellant then filed this timely appeal.

Before reaching the merits of appellant’s issues, we must determine whether he has waived those issues by failing to comply with the trial court’s directive that he file a statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) provides: “A failure to comply with such direction may be considered by the appellate court as a waiver of all objections to the order, ruling or other matter complained of.” Appellant and the Commonwealth both agree that this provision is discretionary. As the Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Silver, 499 Pa. 228, 452 A.2d 1328 (1982):

The statement provided for therein is intended to aid the trial court in the preparation of an opinion where the basis of an appeal is unclear after post-verdict motions have been disposed of. The waiver provision of the Rule is properly invoked only where failure to file a statement or omission from a statement of issues raised on appeal defeats effective appellate review.

Id., 499 Pa. at 238, 452 A.2d at 1333. Because of the nature of the issues appellant raises in this appeal, we conclude that our ability to effectively review this case has not been compromised. We will therefore address the merits of appellant’s issues.

Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he violated the Corrupt Organizations Act in that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was engaged in an “enterprise”! within the meaning of the statute. He argues that the purpose of the statute in question is to protect legitimate business from infiltration by criminal elements. Appellant concedes that his position was rejected by this Court in Commonwealth v. Yacoubian, 339 Pa.Super. 413, 489 A.2d 228 (1985). Nonetheless, he argues that Yacoubian was wrongly decided.

In Yacoubian, this Court held “that the term ‘enterprise’ is unrestricted and sufficiently broad to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises____Neither the preamble nor the express language of the statute prevents its proscription from reaching enterprises organized and existing for illegal purposes.” Id., 339 Pa.Superior Ct. at 420, 489 A.2d at 231. On the basis of this controlling precedent, we conclude that appellant was properly convicted under the corrupt organizations statute.

In his next issue, appellant contends that separate sentences for both the corrupt organizations offenses and for the predicate acts underlying the corrupt organizations offenses constitutes a double jeopardy violation. Appellant argues that he engaged in only one offense because “[e]ach element of the Drug offense must be proved both for the Drug Act offense itself and for the ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ element of the Corrupt Organizations offenses.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. This type of Blockhurger analysis is not helpful where, as here, the legislature has enacted a criminal statute which imposes liability for engaging in a pattern of specified criminal acts.

Appellant was convicted for violating the corrupt organizations statute, which provides in relevant part that “it shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(3). A pattern of racketeering activity is defined as “a course of conduct requiring two or more acts of racketeering activity one of which occurred after the effective date of this section.” Id. § 911(h)(4). Acts of racketeering activity for purposes of this statute are enumerated in section 911(h)(1). In the present ease, the Commonwealth set forth the following predicate acts in the complaint filed against appellant: conspiracy to commit violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Count 3), multiple acts of delivery of a controlled substance (Counts 4-7), possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (Count 8), possession of a controlled substance (Count 9), conspiracy to commit theft and to receive stolen property, and receiving stolen property. Appellant was not charged with the last two predicate acts. He was, however, charged with and convicted of the other predicate acts. He was also sentenced on all counts, as noted above. Appellant now contends that sentencing on both the drug charges and the corrupt organizations charges violates double jeopardy.

Appellant’s argument implicates the multiple punishment aspect of the double jeopardy clause. In this context,

[t]he double jeopardy clause serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors — it does not restrain the legislature in its role in defining crimes and fixing penalties. The intent of the double jeopardy provisions is to prevent courts from imposing, and prosecutors from seeking, more than one punishment under a particular legislative enactment, and, where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single trial, to prevent the court from exceeding its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. ... [T]he Blockburger test is merely a tool of statutory construction whereby the courts can determine whether, in the absence of legislative expression to the contrary, the legislature intended to prescribe multiple punishments under two separate statutory provisions for what might arguably be considered the ‘same offense.’

Commonwealth v. Bostic, 500 Pa. 345, 350-51, 456 A.2d 1320, 1323 (1983) (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Under the circumstances of the present case, we conclude that separate sentencing does not violate the double jeopardy clause.

First, appellant was not twice punished for the same offense. On the drug charges, he was sentenced for engaging in activity which violates the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. On the corrupt organizations charges, he was sentenced for engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity. It is true that the pattern of racketeering activity included the drug offenses. However, it also included non-drug-related offenses, namely, receiving stolen property and conspiracy to commit theft and to receive stolen property. Furthermore, appellant was not sentenced for the drug-related offenses when he was sentenced for corrupt organizations. Rather, he was sentenced for engaging in a pattern of criminal activity as evidenced by those drug-related offenses. The pattern of racketeering activity for which appellant was sentenced is simply not the same offense as the individual instances of drug-related activity.

Moreover, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended to preclude sentencing on the predicate acts when it enacted the corrupt organizations statute. In enacting the statute, the legislature determined that “in order to successfully resist and eliminate [the infiltration and corruption of legitimate business by organized crime, and the resulting danger to the economic and general welfare of the Commonwealth], it is necessary to provide new remedies and procedures.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(a). In setting forth these new remedies and procedures, it would be unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended that offenders would be immune from punishment for the numerous predicate acts upon which a conviction of corrupt organizations can be based. See id. § 911(h). For example, one of the acts which can form a pattern of racketeering activity is “any act which is indictable under ... Chapter 25 (relating to criminal homicide).” Id. § 911(h)(l)(i). Accordingly, if a person who is employed by or associated with any enterprise, conducts or participates in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, including first-degree murder and one other predicate act, that person can be charged with a violation of the corrupt organizations statute. However, if by prosecuting that person for corrupt organizations, the Commonwealth would lose the opportunity to seek a conviction for the first-degree murder offense, there would be no incentive for the Commonwealth to charge under the corrupt organizations statute. As a result, the corrupt organizations statute would have no deterrent effect in this situation.

Similarly, if a defendant could not be sentenced for violating both the corrupt organizations statute and the predicate acts, a defendant who is convicted of violating the corrupt organizations statute on the basis of predicate acts involving first-degree murder would be sentenced the same as a similarly-situated defendant whose predicate acts involve gambling. Our legislature could not have intended such a result. For these reasons, we conclude that appellant was properly sentenced on the drug charges and the corrupt organizations charges.

Next, appellant raises two issues with respect to his convictions for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and conspiracy to violate the corrupt organizations statute. For the reasons just discussed, we reject appellant’s assertion that sentencing on both counts violates the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments.

In a similar argument, appellant contends that pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(c), he may only be convicted on one conspiracy charge because his activities constituted one continuous conspiratorial relationship with multiple objectives. Section 903(c) provides: “If a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship.” We conclude that this section does not bar multiple conspiracy violations under the circumstances of the present case. Appellant was not convicted of two counts of conspiracy under section 903. Rather, he was convicted of one count of conspiracy under section 903 and one count of conspiracy under the corrupt organizations statute, specifically, section 911(b)(4). If the legislature had intended that conspiracy under section 911(b)(4) would be identical to conspiracy under section 903, there would have been no need to enact section 911(b)(4). Accordingly, we conclude that section 903(c) does not apply to the present case.

In his appeal, appellant also raises three sentencing issues. First, he argues that the trial court used an incorrect offense gravity score in determining his sentences for delivery of a controlled substance. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court should have used the' offense gravity score of “F,” which is applied when the amount of cocaine is less than two grams, rather than “E,” which is applied when the amount of cocaine is two to 100 grams. He also argues that the trial court used an erroneous offense gravity score with respect to the conspiracy count because the jury could have found that he conspired with only one of the co-conspirators and “it must be assumed for purposes of sentencing that there was a finding of conspiracy with only one [co-conspirator]----” Appellant’s Brief at 18.

Appellant was convicted of four counts of delivery of a controlled substance. Each count alleged deliveries to one of four different persons. Each of those four persons testified about receiving drugs from appellant. Appellant argues that “[t]he way the Information was drawn, a finding of guilt as to only one of the multiple deliveries alleged to the named individual was sufficient for a finding of guilt.” Id. at 17. Accordingly, he asserts, he should have been sentenced for only the “minimum single deliveries” to which each witness testified.

We have reviewed the record and conclude that all of the counts charged are supported by adequate testimony from which the trial court could find that amounts greater than two grams had been distributed by appellant to each witness. For example, Charles Miller testified that “a couple hundred” times, he bought “anywhere from grams to eight balls” of cocaine from appellant. Although no specific aggregate amount was testified to, each witness clearly testified to receiving amounts greater than two grams from appellant. We will not speculate that the jury only found sufficient evidence of one delivery for each count, nor will we speculate that the jury found sufficient evidence of a conspiracy with only one co-conspirator. Accordingly, appellant is not entitled to relief as to this issue.

Appellant also argues that he received a disproportionately harsh sentence as compared to his codefendants. It is true that when a trial court imposes disproportionate sentences on codefendants, the court should explain its reasons for doing so on the record. Commonwealth v. Sinwell, 311 Pa.Super. 419, 457 A.2d 957 (1983). In the present case, however, appellant’s argument is meritless.

Appellant contends that his sentence was unduly disproportionate to Douglas G. Woodward, Kenneth Z. Norton, and Jeffrey L. Holland. These three men were participants in the criminal activities for which appellant was convicted. Although appellant characterizes these men as his codefendants, the record is clear that they were not. Rather, Norton and Woodward cooperated with the government and testified against appellant. In addition, Woodward pled guilty to one count of delivery of a controlled substance and one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, while Norton pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. As to Holland, he did not testify against appellant and the record reveals no information concerning him. However, appellant contends that Holland pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. Appellant, on the other hand, was convicted on nine counts of criminal charges. The differences in the sentences is easily explained by the differences in the number and seriousness of the crimes of which each was convicted.

Furthermore, as appellant recognizes, it would be unrealistic to expect the trial judge to explain his reasons for sentencing appellant more harshly where the other three men were sentenced approximately a year after appellant was sentenced. Nonetheless, appellant requests that we vacate his sentences because they are unduly disproportionate to those received by other participants in the criminal activities at issue. Under these circumstances, we have no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court imposed a disproportionately harsh sentence on appellant.

Appellant’s final sentencing issue involves the basis for the fines imposed upon him. Appellant argues that the trial judge relied on erroneous information that appellant is receiving $900 a month in social security benefits. As evidenced by a letter from the Social Security Administration, which was attached to appellant’s motion to modify sentence, those payments have been stopped due to appellant’s conviction and imprisonment. The Commonwealth agrees that a remand is appropriate so that the trial judge can determine whether appellant is able to pay the fines imposed upon him. However, the Commonwealth notes, and we agree, that the trial court only relied on erroneous information because that was the information supplied to him at the sentencing hearing. The transcript reveals that the trial judge asked appellant’s counsel if he had read the pre-sentence report, which listed appellant’s social security payments as assets. Appellant’s counsel stated that he and appellant had reviewed the report and that it was accurate. Subsequently, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Alright. We, of course, have read the presentence report and we’ve considered such. We note in the final section that Mr. Beseh was getting $900.00 (Nine Hundred Dollars) a month social security. Still getting that?
DEFENDANT BESCH: No.
THE COURT: Where is it? Where is it going? DEFENDANT BESCH: I shut it off.
THE COURT: You shut it off.
DEFENDANT BESCH: Yeah.
THE COURT: You better turn it back on.

Sentencing Transcript, 9/11/90, at 5. The trial judge then imposed a fine in an amount sufficient to exhaust the social security payments which he thought appellant would be receiving during his term of imprisonment.

After reviewing the sentencing transcript, we cannot say that the trial court erroneously relied on the fact that appellant was receiving social security payments as this was the information before him. Furthermore, contrary to his assertion, appellant did not try to explain to the judge that he did not stop his payments, but rather, that they were stopped by the Social Security Administration. Nonetheless, because appellant raised the issue in his motion to modify sentence, and the trial court could have corrected the sentence at that time, we will vacate the judgment of sentence as to the fines imposed and remand so that the trial judge can determine appellant’s ability to pay those fines. After the hearing, the trial judge can resentence appellant or reinstate the original fines imposed.

For the above reasons, we affirm appellant’s convictions and sentences with the exception that we must vacate that portion of the sentences that impose a fine and remand for a hearing to determine appellant’s ability to pay the fines imposed upon him.

The judgment of sentence is affirmed except for the portions imposing fines. The imposition of fines is vacated and the case is remanded for a hearing and either resentencing as to fines or reinstatement of the original fines imposed. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 911.

      . It appears from the record that the trial court did not dispose of appellant’s post-trial motions.

      . Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

      . We note that appellant has complied with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) by providing a statement of reasons for allowance of appeal regarding the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Because his assertions raise a substantial question that the sentence imposed is inappropriate, we will address the merits of his assertions.

      . An “eight ball” is one-eighth of an" ounce of cocaine.