author: CIRILLO, Judge:

text:
    611 A.2d 1267
    In re V.E. and J.E.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted April 20, 1992.
    Filed June 30, 1992.

      Jay Stillman, Asst. Public Defender, Williamsport, for appellant.
    Charles F. Greevy, III, Williamsport, for VE, Natural Father, participating party.
    Ralph W. Thorne, Williamsport, for Lycoming County Child & Youth Services, participating party.
    Before CIRILLO, MONTEMURO and HESTER, JJ.
   CIRILLO, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County granting a petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the natural father. The appeal is also accompanied by a petition from counsel for the father requesting permission to withdraw representation on the grounds that the appeal is frivolous. We affirm the order and grant the petition.

Appellant Victor H. Edwards, who is currently serving a twelve year and two month to twenty-five year sentence in the State Correctional Institute at Frackville, is the natural father of two boys, V.E., bom August 2, 1982, and J.E., born October 7, 1983. On February 13, 1989, a Children and Youth Services (CYS) caseworker accompanied a Pennsylvania State Police officer to Edwards’s residence in response to a report that a woman and her infant were being held there against their will. The report was accurate; the woman had been padlocked inside and Edwards controlled the key. The woman stated that Edwards escaped through a window when he saw the police officer approaching. The woman and child were taken from the residence. The police also took emergency custody of Edwards’s two sons, V.E. and J.E., because the home was unsanitary, in deplorable condition, and the boys, ages six and seven, were left without supervision. Edwards telephoned CYS later that same day to inform the agency that he would be out of the state for six weeks. Edwards made no provision for the care of his sons; consequently, at the emergency hearing the children were placed with CYS. On February 28, 1989, the boys were adjudicated dependent and placed together in a foster home. On April 7, 1989, after the objectionable conditions which prompted their removal were remedied, V.E. and J.E. were returned to their father’s custody. They remained with him for three months.

On July 14, 1989, CYS again took emergency custody of the boys, based on a report that Edwards was teaching V.E. how to have sexual intercourse with the five year old daughter of Edwards’s live-in girlfriend. The report was determined to be “founded.” After a hearing, the boys were again adjudicated dependent and placed in foster care. Over the next few days Childline, the state-wide child abuse hot-line and registry, received several more reports of Edwards’s sexual abuse of his sons; each report was investigated and determined to be “indicated.” See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6368 & 6303. Finally, in September of 1989 the parties entered into an agreement which continued the boys’ dependency adjudication, approved a six month Family Service Plan, arranged for a psychological evaluation of Edwards to be performed at the prison where he was incarcerated, arranged for Edwards to have a supervised visit with his sons, and required Edwards to cooperate in any treatment prescribed by the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program.

The visit with the boys took place at the prison, but according to the caseworker present, was very strained. Edwards terminated the psychological evaluation, claiming an earache, at the first mention of his sons. The prison system had a psychological evaluation done on Edwards for its own use, but Edwards refused to consent to release of the report. Edwards never even scheduled the initial interview with the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program. The requisite disposition review hearings were held every six months; at each hearing the boys’ dependent status was reaffirmed and their placement in foster care was continued. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. Although Edwards was unable to attend the disposition review hearings due to his incarceration at Farview and various other correctional facilities, Edwards was granted the right to petition for a review hearing whenever he was able to attend. Edwards exercised that right in January of 1991, and a review hearing was scheduled for March 27, 1991.

On March 12, 1991, CYS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Edwards’s parental rights pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2) and (a)(5) of the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (a)(5). The trial court conducted extensive hearings on five days in March, April and May. Edwards testified and essentially denied either physically or sexually abusing his sons; he claimed all incidents of abuse were inflicted by his live-in girlfriend. He also claimed he provided a happy and stable home life for his sons. The judge interviewed V.E. and J.E. separately in his chambers, with all counsel present. V.E. stated he had been subject to both physical and sexual abuse and had been told to have sexual intercourse with a five year old girl. J.E. reported that he saw his brother have sexual contact with the five year old girl, and that he was beaten with a belt and tied to a chair. The psychologist who has been working with the boys weekly since September of 1989, their foster mother since March of 1990, an independent psychologist who evaluated the boys, a mental health caseworker, a sexual abuse caseworker, the CYS parent-partner, and the CYS caseworker all testified about their conversations and interaction with the children.

The trial court’s findings of fact, supported by competent evidence in the record, reveal the following: in addition to being subjected to various forms of sexual abuse, the boys had also witnessed their father having intercourse with, sodomizing and performing oral sex on the five year old daughter of his girlfriend, having inappropriate sexual contact with his girlfriend’s young son, and engaging in sexual intercourse with his girlfriend. The boys also witnessed the young girl being sexually molested by her two young brothers. Although J.E. was a victim of less sexual abuse, both boys had been excessively hit with a belt by Edwards and his girlfriend, and had often been tied to chairs when their father worked outside. Both boys are very much afraid of their father, express hatred toward him and never want to see him again. When removed from their father’s home, both boys were socially and educationally delayed; at ages six and seven, neither child even knew the alphabet.

On September 18, 1991, the trial court granted CYS’s petition to involuntarily terminate Edwards’s parental rights. Edwards filed Exceptions to the Decree Nisi, which were denied on December 2, 1991. This timely appeal followed. Edwards now asks us to consider “[wjhether termination of parental rights was in error.”

On appeal, our scope of review is limited to determining whether the decree of termination is supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of Michael J.C., 506 Pa. 517, 521, 486 A.2d 371, 373 (1984). Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law or insufficient evidentiary support for the findings of the trial court, we will not reverse the hearing court’s involuntary termination of parental rights. In re Quick, 384 Pa.Super. 412, 559 A.2d 42 (1989). The party seeking to terminate parental rights bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds for doing so. Matter of Adoption of C.A.E., 516 Pa. 419, 422, 532 A.2d 802, 803 (1987).

CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Edwards’s parental rights pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2) and (a)(5) of the Adoption Act, which provide:

(a)(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * * * * *
(a)(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2) and (a)(5).

Where, as here, the children have been removed from the parental home and placed in foster care, the parent has an affirmative duty to work towards the return of his children. In re Adoption of J.J., 511 Pa. 590, 602, 515 A.2d 883, 889 (1986). At a minimum, that “affirmative duty” requires that the parent show a willingness to cooperate with CYS to obtain the rehabilitative services necessary to enable the parent to meet the duties and obligations inherent in parenthood. Id. In a termination proceeding, the trial court must consider all the circumstances in determining whether a parent has fulfilled his obligations; the court must measure the parent’s performance in light of what would be expected of any individual under similar circumstances. Matter of M.L. W., 307 Pa.Super. 29, 33-34, 452 A.2d 1021, 1023-24 (1982) (citations omitted).

When a parent is separated from his children, he not only has a duty to love, protect and support them; he also has a duty to maintain communication and association with them. Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 216, 331 A.2d 652, 654 (1975); In re Adoption of M.J.H., 348 Pa.Super. 65, 72, 501 A.2d 648, 651 (1985). Our courts have repeatedly stated that being a parent is more than a passive state of mind; it requires constant affirmative demonstration of parental devotion. M.J.H., 348 Pa.Super. at 73, 501 A.2d at 652. “A parent must exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.” Id. Imprisonment is but one circumstance the trial court must consider in analyzing a parent’s performance, for parental responsibilities are not completely tolled during incarceration. McCray, 460 Pa. at 216-217, 331 A.2d at 655. Moreover, a parent is expected to utilize whatever resources are available to him while in prison in order to foster a continuing close relationship with his children. Id. “Where the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in ‘declining to yield to obstacles,’ his [parental] rights may be forfeited.” Id.

At the termination hearing on May 7, 1991, the following exchange occurred between Edwards and the attorney for CYS:

Q. Have you in any way communicated with your children in regards to sending them cards or letters or gifts or anything while you’ve been in prison?
A. It’s impossible to send cards and gifts because you’ve got to buy the cards and gifts and I’m in a strict unit that I can’t buy anything, there’s no address to send these to how would I send a gift to somebody unless you know where they’re living?
Q. You’ve been aware that they’ve been in the custody of [CYS], isn’t that so?
A. That’s right.
Q. And the visitations that you’ve talked about, you were aware that a psychological evaluation had to be done before you would be allowed any visitations, is not that true?
A. That’s right, a guy came to the jail and I had trouble with my ear____

When asked why he refused CYS’s request to release the report of the psychological evaluation performed by the prison system, Edwards responded:

To make it perfectly clear to the Court, I’m not involved with Children and Youth, I never will be and as far as I know I will not tell them my business, that is none of their business, my kids are well brought up, ...

In light of Edwards’s own testimony, it is clear that Edwards has neither “exerted himself to take and maintain a place of importance” in his childrens’ lives, M.J.H., supra, nor made any type of affirmative demonstration of his love or concern for his children. Id. Indeed, by refusing to cooperate with CYS in obtaining a psychological evaluation, the condition precedent to visits with his sons, Edwards has failed to meet even the minimum level of his affirmative duty. J.J., supra.

In M.J.H., supra, the incarcerated father sent cards and letters to his daughter, wrote weekly letters to his family inquiring about her welfare and asking them to purchase gifts for her, ánd arranged with his family to bring her to the prison on their twice-monthly visits. On his daughter’s visits the father would play with her, and they admittedly had a good relationship. Nonetheless, this court affirmed the termination of the father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) of the Adoption Act, which focuses on the needs of the child rather than the parent’s willingness or capacity to parent. According to the court, “[h]is life imprisonment makes him incapable of providing [his daughter] with what she needs on a day-to-day basis, and this incapacity will not be remedied.” M.J.H., 348 Pa.Super. at 80, 501 A.2d at 656.

Unlike the situation in M.J.H., supra, here Edwards has sent no cards, gifts or letters to his children. He does not know where his sons live and he has not even contacted CYS to obtain an address or telephone number. Edwards has not requested that the social workers or volunteers at the prison help him contact his children. The record clearly indicates that when V.E. and J.E. were living with their father, he repeatedly and continually abused them, physically, mentally, and sexually. His relationship with his sons is very poor; they fear him and never want to see him again. Edwards is now serving a twelve to twenty-five year term. In twelve years when he first becomes eligible for parole, V.E. will be twenty-one years old and J.E. will be nineteen years old. Applying the criteria of section 2511(a)(2) and considering all the circumstances, M.L.W., supra, we conclude that Edwards is incapable of providing his sons with what they need on a day-to-day basis, and Edwards’s incapacity will not and cannot be remedied before the children reach their majority. M.J.H., supra. We decline to “preserve in law a relationship which no longer exists in fact, with the result that the child[ren are] consigned indefinitely to the limbo of foster care or the impersonal care of institutions.” In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 349, 383 A.2d 1228, 1241 (1978). As we have decided this appeal on the basis of section 2511(a)(2), we need not address the same issue under section 2511(a)(5).

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law; the decree of termination is adequately supported by competent evidence. Quick, supra; Michael J.C., supra. CYS has met its burden and established by clear and convincing evidence every element of the grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) of the Adoption Act. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2); C.A.E., supra. We, therefore, affirm the decree terminating the parental rights of Victor H. Edwards to his sons V.E. and J.E.

We must now address the petition filed by Edwards’s attorney seeking our permission to withdraw representation on the grounds that Edwards’s appeal is frivolous, “in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).” In his “Anders Brief” counsel presents the following issue:

Whether an application to withdraw as counsel should be granted when counsel had diligently investigated the possible grounds of appeal and finds the appeal frivolous? Initially, we note that Anders v. California, supra, is the

seminal case in which the United States Supreme Court delineated the extent of court-appointed appellate counsel’s duty to prosecute a first appeal from a criminal conviction after that attorney has conscientiously reviewed the record and determined that there is no merit to the indigent’s appeal. Based as it was on the United States Constitution’s sixth amendment guarantee, made obligatory on the states through the fourteenth amendment, that “the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence,” the principles set forth in Anders are applicable only to criminal cases. Our supreme court adopted the Anders rule for Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 Pa. 209, 239 A.2d 201 (1968).

In Anders, the Supreme Court was distressed by the situation in which “the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself.” 386 U.S. at 741, 87 S.Ct. at 1398. (citation omitted). Commenting that an attorney’s role as an advocate for his client requires him to support an appeal to the best of his ability, the Supreme Court then stated:

Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request, however, must be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses: the court — not counsel — then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.

386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400 (emphasis added). Above all, the Supreme Court stressed, the brief was to be that of an advocate, not amicus curiae. Counsel was to present arguments in support of the appeal; counsel was not to argue that the appeal was wholly frivolous. Anders, supra.

After more than a decade of experience with the Anders procedure and several opinions addressing the inadequacies of the Anders briefs being submitted, see Commonwealth v. Collier, 489 Pa. 26, 413 A.2d 680 (1980); Commonwealth v. Perry, 464 Pa. 272, 346 A.2d 654 (1975); Commonwealth v. Greer, 455 Pa. 106, 314 A.2d 513 (1974), our supreme court reevaluated the requirements. In Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981), our supreme court determined:

[t]he role of an advocate, insisted upon in Anders, refers to the manner in which the record was examined in an effort to uncover grounds to support the appeal. Where counsel has in good faith satisfied that obligation and found the appeal to be wholly frivolous, he [or she] can do no more. We reject the view that his [or her] explanation of why there is no basis for an appeal should be interpreted as reflecting counsel’s lack of concern in the client’s cause.

Id., 495 Pa. at 473-474, 434 A.2d at 1188.

In In re Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973), our supreme court noted that, in criminal cases, it is well established that an individual is entitled to be represented by counsel at any proceeding that may lead to “the deprivation of substantial rights.” Id., 455 Pa. at 31, 312 A.2d at 602 (citations omitted). Stating that “the logic behind [the criminal cases] is equally applicable to a case involving an indigent parent faced with the loss of her child,” id., the court held that an indigent parent who is a respondent in a proceeding for the involuntary termination of parental rights is constitutionally entitled to be represented by an attorney. Id., 455 Pa. at 34-35, 312 A.2d at 603-04 (concurring opinion by Pomeroy, J.).

This court recently reiterated that constitutional rights in a termination proceeding are not derived from the sixth amendment; rather, they are derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In re Adoption of T.M.F., 392 Pa.Super. 598, 609-610, 573 A.2d 1035, 1040-41 (1990) (en banc), allocatur denied, 527 Pa. 634, 592 A.2d 1301 (1990); In Interest of Del Signore, 249 Pa.Super. 149, 155, 375 A.2d 803, 806 (1977). However, in Pennsylvania, the right to be represented by an attorney is also embodied in the Judicial Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 2501. In T.M.F., this court was presented with the issue of how and when the ineffectiveness of counsel at an involuntary termination proceeding can be raised. The court focused on the adversarial process and the liberty interest involved in criminal cases and contrasted it with the quasi-adversarial process inherent in the principle of parens patriae. In a plurality decision, the court reasoned that in light of the constitutional and procedural differences between criminal prosecutions and termination proceedings, “any attempts to superimpose the [sixth amendment right to counsel] and its accompanying procedures to non-criminal termination cases, while superficially appropriate, is misguided.” T.M.F., 392 Pa.Super. at 609, 573 A.2d at 1041. Since the procedures for raising ineffectiveness of counsel claims in criminal, civil, and paternity suits were all derived from the sixth amendment, the plurality determined that similar procedures could not be adapted to termination proceedings because no liberty interest or guaranteed right is at stake. We find that reasoning inapplicable to the issue at hand.

In William L., supra, our supreme court stated: Noting that the contours of the liberty interest guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment had never been exactly defined, the [United States Supreme] Court stated: “Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to ... marry, establish a home, and bring up children____” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).

477 Pa. at 335, 383 A.2d at 1234. While we agree that the Commonwealth has both the right and the duty to protect its weaker members who are unable to protect themselves, id., 477 Pa. at 338, 383 A.2d at 1236, parental rights must nevertheless be accorded significant protection. Id. (citations omitted). An indigent parent faced with the permanent loss of his or her child, like the indigent defendant described in Anders, is entitled to be represented by an advocate, an attorney who will support the appeal to the best of his or her ability. Anders, supra; Baker, supra.

We are aware of no case law, statute, or rule of court in the Commonwealth that authorizes the adoption of the Anders procedure for appointed counsel’s withdrawal of representation in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. Therefore, we now hold that counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her parental rights, may, after a conscientious and thorough review of the record, petition this court for leave to withdraw representation if he or she can find no issues of arguable merit on which to base the appeal. Given the less stringent standard of proof required and the quasi-adversarial nature of a termination proceeding in which a parent is not guaranteed the same procedural and evidentiary rights as a criminal defendant, we hold that appointed counsel seeking to withdraw representation must submit an advocate’s brief, as contemplated in Anders, supra; Baker, supra.

In a criminal case the Commonwealth’s evidence is vigorously tested in a true adversarial proceeding, with a demanding standard of proof, and often in front of a jury. Conversely, in an involuntary termination proceeding, the parent is never entitled to a jury and can be deprived of a substantial right — the permanent loss of a child — based on the imprecise concept of “needs and welfare of the child.” Moreover, the allegations against the parent and the evidence submitted in court is often based on information from an unidentified accuser who the parent has no legal right to confront. Because of the ambiguity inherent in the “needs and welfare” standard and the subjective nature of much of the evidence presented by CYS, zealous advocacy of the parent’s cause is of particular importance in an involuntary termination proceeding. As this court stated in Bartasavich v. Mitchell, 324 Pa.Super. 270, 471 A.2d 833 (1984):

“The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with'forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.”

Id., 324 Pa.Superior Ct. at 274-75, 471 A.2d at 835-836, quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). For this reason we hold that any motion to withdraw representation, submitted by appointed counsel, must be accompanied by an advocate’s brief, and not the amicus curiae brief delineated in McClendon, supra.

In the case at hand we find the brief submitted woefully inadequate under any standard. Counsel’s review of the record consisted of little more than a recitation of the standard of review. The sole case cited in reference to the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights did not even refer to either of the two provisions of section 2511(a) of the Adoption Act relied upon to terminate Edwards’s parental rights. However, our independent review of the record indicates that, in fact, Edwards has no issues of arguable merit on which he can base an appeal. Despite the inadequacy of counsel’s brief, denial of the attorney’s petition to withdraw, with an order that he resubmit a proper brief, would only waste scarce judicial resources and prolong the uncertain status of V.E. and J.E. Therefore, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw representation.

Order involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Victor Edwards affirmed; motion to withdraw representation granted.

MONTEMURO, J., concurs in the result.

      . We note that the natural mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to V.E. and J.E, and a final decree to that effect was entered on March 6, 1991. Although the natural mother was married to Edwards at the time the boys were born, she subsequently divorced him.

      . Two of the additional reports alleged that Edwards’ live-in girlfriend engaged in “full sexual intercourse” as well as oral sex with each of the boys, while two of the other reports alleged that Edwards and his girlfriend engaged in sexual intercourse in front of the boys. On July 21, 1989, using a collection of anatomically correct male, female, child, and adult dolls the boys acted out what they had been subjected to and what they had witnessed. The mental health caseworker testified that upon being shown the dolls,
      V.E. undressed the dolls immediately. As soon as their clothes were off he took an adult female doll and placed it on top of the male child doll. He inserted the penis into the vagina. [When asked] who the dolls were, he responded Georgeann [Edwards’s live-in girlfriend] and J.E. ... using the dolls he also depicted his father and Georgeann engaged in intercourse. He portrayed every conceivable position with the adult dolls ... He also demonstrated the different male and female children dolls engaged in sex acts. [When asked] he said the dolls were J.E. and [Georgeann’s 5 year old daughter].

      . We note that while the case law of the Commonwealth requires counsel in involuntary termination proceedings, Pennsylvania statutes do not. In re Adoption of T.M.F., 392 Pa.Super. 598, 607, 573 A.2d 1035, 1039 (1990).

      . Section 2501 provides:
      (a) Civil matters. In all civil matters before any tribunal every litigant shall have a right to be heard, by himself and his counsel, or by either of them.

        (b) Criminal matters. In all criminal prosecutions the accused has a right to be heard by himself and his counsel.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KELLY, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    611 A.2d 1276
    STROUDSBURG AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT and Stroudsburg Area School Authority, Appellants, v. R.K.R. ASSOCIATES/ARCHITECTS and R.K.R. Hess Associates, Appellees, v. VITA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Allentown Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., F & M Associates, Inc., H.H. Robertson & Company and United States Steel Corporation, Appellees, v. MUELLER ROOFING SERVICE, INC., Apache Foam Products, the Celotex Corp., John F. Stevens Associates and Reliance United Pacific Surety Manages, Appellees, v. UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued March 26, 1992.
    Filed July 1, 1992.
    Reargument Denied Sept. 8, 1992.

      James V. Fareri, Stroudsburg, for appellants.
    George W. Westervelt, Jr., Stroudsburg, for R.K.R. Associates, appellee.
    Joseph A. Holko, Allentown, for F & M Associates, appellee.
    David A. Luptak, Pittsburgh, for U.S. Steel Corp., appellee.
    James M. Scanlon, Scranton, for John F. Stevens Associates, appellee.
    Maureen A. Jordan, W.Va., for Apache Foam Products, appellee.

      Before McEWEN, KELLY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   KELLY, Judge:

In this opinion we are called upon to determine whether appellant, Stroudsburg Area School District (School District), may assert the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi to defeat the applicable statute of limitations in an action against various architects and general contractors (appellees) based upon their alleged failure to adequately design, supervise and provide specifications and safe and suitable materials for the construction of one of the exterior walls of one of the district's school buildings. We conclude that a school district may properly invoke the doctrine of nullum tempus to defeat the applicable statute of limitations and reverse the order of the trial court awarding summary judgment to appellees.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By agreement in November, 1968, the School District contracted with appellee, R.K.R. Associates, for appellee to design and supervise the construction of its Middle School. Shortly after the Middle School was constructed, several structural problems surfaced in the building. The two major concerns of the School District were leaks in the roof and rusting of the outside walls. The School District instituted the instant action by filing a complaint in July, 1985, alleging that appellee, R.K.R. Associates had breached their agreement by failing to adequately design, specify material for and supervise the construction of the Middle School. Several additional defendants were joined and motions for summary judgment were filed, alleging inter alia, that the School District’s claims were time barred.

Following discovery related to the summary judgment motions, the trial court concluded that the doctrine of nullum tempus was unavailable to the School District and that, therefore, the applicable statute of limitations had run and the School District’s claims were time-barred. This timely appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review of an appeal from an order granting summary judgment is well-established.

Ordinarily, summary judgment should only be entered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b). In passing upon a motion for summary judgment, a court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. It is not part of the court’s function to decide issues of fact but solely to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. Any doubt must be resolved against the moving party.

School District of the Borough of Aliquippa v. Maryland Casualty Company, 402 Pa.Super. 569, 574-75, 587 A.2d 765, 768 (1991), quoting Knecht v. Citizens & Northern Bank, 364 Pa.Super. 370, 373-74, 528 A.2d 203, 205 (1987). The determination of whether a statute of limitations has run is generally a question of law for the trial court. Id. At times, however, a factual determination by a jury is required. Id.

III. NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURRIT REGI

While the general purposes of any statute of limitations are to discourage delay, expedite litigation and thus prevent the presentation of stale claims, Insurance Company of North America v. Carnahan, 446 Pa. 48, 51, 284 A.2d 728, 729 (1971), an exception to these principles exists where the Commonwealth is the party seeking to recover damages for an injury suffered. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 497 Pa. 58, 63, 439 A.2d 101, 104 (1981). Accordingly, the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi (“time does not run against the king”) has long been accepted in this Commonwealth. J.W. Bishop, supra, 497 Pa. at 62, 439 A.2d at 103 (collecting case). When the Commonwealth invokes the doctrine of nullum tempus, it “seeks to vindicate public rights and protect public property.” Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Rockland Construction Co., 498 Pa. 531, 535, 448 A.2d 1047, 1049 (1982). As this Court recently observed,

[wjhenever the Commonwealth invokes the doctrine of nullum tempus, it is seeking as a plaintiff to vindicate public rights and protect public property. Thus, since its adoption in this country, the rationale for the doctrine of nullum tempus has been “the great public policy of preserving public rights, revenues and property from injury and loss.” United States v. Hoar, 26 Fed.Cas. 329, 330 (C.C.D.Mass.1821) (No. 15,373) (Story, J.). See [Commonwealth v.] Musser Forests [394 Pa. 205, 146 A.2d 714 (1958)], supra (nullum tempus “Matter of important public policy”). Moreover, the benefits and advantages of the doctrine of nullum tempus extend “to every citizen, including the defendant whose plea of ... limitations it precludes.” Guaranty Trust [Co. of New York v. United States], supra, 304 U.S. [126] at 132, 58 S.Ct. [785] at 789 [82 L.Ed. 1224 (1938)].

School District of Aliquippa, supra, 402 Pa.Super. at 581, 587 A.2d at 771. Thus, unless a statute of limitations expressly so provides, the statute is not applicable to actions instituted by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Rockland Construction, supra, 498 Pa. at 535, 448 A.2d at 1048.

In City of Philadelphia v. Holmes Protective Co., 335 Pa. 273, 6 A.2d 884 (1939), our Supreme Court held that,

[i]t is true that, unless otherwise provided, statutes of limitations cannot be pleaded against such political subdivisions when they are seeking to enforce strictly public rights, that is, when the cause of action accrues to them in their governmental capacity and the suit is brought to enforce an obligation imposed by law as distinguished from one arising out of an agreement voluntarily entered into by the defendant.

Id., 335 Pa. at 278, 6 A.2d at 887; see also Pocono Township v. Hall, 127 Pa.Cmwlth. 116, 121, 561 A.2d 53, 55 (1989) (same); Borough of West Fairview v. Hess, 130 Pa.Cmwlth. 385, 391-393, 568 A.2d 709, 713 (1989) (“unless a municipality is exercising a governmental function or there is an express provision to the contrary, a statute of limitation will apply to the government unit.”). Recently, in Mt. Lebanon School District v. W.R. Grace & Co., 414 Pa.Super. 455, 607 A.2d 756 (1992), this Court recognized the constitutional and statutory obligation of school districts, as agencies of the legislature, to provide safe and suitable facilities for the education of the schoolchildren of this Commonwealth. Id. (414 Pa.Super. at 465, 607 A.2d at 761). In doing so, the Court opined:

The Constitution of this Commonwealth provides:

The general assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system .of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.

Pa. Const. Art. 3, § 14. School districts have been created as agencies of the legislature to administer this constitutional duty. School District of Philadelphia v. Twer, 498 Pa. 429, 435, 447 A.2d 222, 224 (1982); Smith v. School District of Township of Darby, 388 Pa. 301, 130 A.2d 661 (1957). Moreover, the legislature has declared that it is the duty of the board of directors of each school district to

... provide the necessary grounds and suitable school buildings to accommodate all the children between the ages of 6 and 21 years, in said district, who attend school. Such buildings shall be constructed, furnished, equipped and maintained in a proper manner as herein provided. Suitable provisions shall be made for the heating (including the purchase of fuel), ventilating, adequate lighting, and sanitary conditions thereof, and for a safe supply of water, so that every pupil in any such building may have proper and healthful accommodations.

24 Pa.C.S.A. § 7-701. The Pennsylvania Code provides that, “[t]he school building, grounds, play are equipment and appurtences shall be constructed and maintained to minimize health and accident hazards.” 25 Pa.Admin.Code § 171.13.

Id. (414 Pa.Super. at 466, 607 A.2d at 761-62); see also Slippery Rock Area Joint School System v. Franklin Township School District, 389 Pa. 435, 442, 133 A.2d 848, 852 (1957) (“a school district is an agency of the state charged with the sovereign duty of building and maintaining the schools within its particular territory”); Community College of Allegheny County v. Seibert, 144 Pa.Cmwlth. 616, 622, 601 A.2d 1348, 1350-51 (1992) (concluding that a community college is a local agency for purposes of governmental immunity). Accordingly, because school districts, as agencies of the legislature, are “unquestionably compelled by law, both statutorily and constitutionally, to provide safe and suitable facilities for the schoolchildren of the Commonwealth,” the Mt. Lebanon Court concluded that the Mt. Lebanon School District, as a Commonwealth agency, could properly invoke the doctrine of nullum tempus to defeat the applicable statute of limitations in an action against the supplier of a product found to contain asbestos which was used in the construction of a school building. Id. (414 Pa.Super. at 465, 607 A.2d at 761-62).

Although the instant case does not involve a product. containing asbestos, we find the holding of Mt. Lebanon, supra, equally applicable to the facts herein. As our Supreme Court has cogently recognized in a previous nullum tempus case,

whatever inconvenience defendants may experience, that inconvenience is outweighed by the sound policy of vindicating public rights and protecting public property which underlies the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi.

J. W. Bishop, supra, 497 Pa. at 66, 439 A.2d at 104-105. As an agency of the legislature, a school district is unquestionably fulfilling an obligation imposed upon it by law when it is constructing new school buildings to house the schoolchildren of the Commonwealth. Accordingly, when a school district is seeking to recover damages for any alleged negligence or defects in any facet or component involved in the construction, design and/or maintenance of school buildings housing the schoolchildren of this Commonwealth, the School District is seeking to vindicate public rights and protect public property, i.e. ensuring that school buildings built and maintained with taxpayers’ dollars are both safe and suitable for schoolchildren. When such is the case, a school district, as an agency of the legislature, may properly invoke the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi to defeat the applicable statute of limitations.

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude, therefore, that the Stroudsburg Area School District can properly invoke the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi to defeat the applicable statute of limitations herein. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise and the order granting summary judgment to appellees is reversed.

Order reversed. Case remanded to the trial court. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

      . The court found that although a six-year statute of limitations was applicable, the School District’s cause of action arose sometime in 1977. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the School District’s failure to institute the instant action prior to or during 1983, resulted in the action being time-barred. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5525 and 5527 and Historical Notes.

      . In Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical, U.S.A., 389 Pa.Super. 11, 566 A.2d 591 (1989), affirmed Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 528 Pa. 502, 598 A.2d 1288 (1991) (per curiam ) (Papadakos, J., dissented and filed an opinion which Larsen, J. joined), this Court held that because the legislature did not create the community colleges, but merely autho

        rized their creation, the college could not properly invoke nullum tempus as it was not a Commonwealth party. Id. 389 Pa.Super. at 19-21, 566 A.2d at 595; but see Community College of Allegheny County v. Seibert, supra. The school district, however, has been created to fulfill the legislature’s constitutional mandate, Le. to provide an efficient system of public schools. See School District of Philadelphia v. Twer, supra and Smith v. School District of Township of Darby, supra. Given this distinction in classification, the holding in Northampton County College v. Dow Chemical, Co., supra, is inapplicable to the instant case.

      . We note that although authority from other jurisdictions is divided, we find persuasive those cases which have granted immunity from statutes of limitation to school districts when they are seeking to recover damages for injuries suffered in their role as legislature agencies carrying out a constitutionally or statutorily mandated directive to provide safe and suitable school facilities for those of school age in their respective states. See e.g. Laramie County School District

        Number One v. Muir, 808 P.2d 797 (Wyo.1991); Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A, C, and S, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 428, 137 Ill.Dec. 635, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989); Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 238 Va. 595, 385 S.E.2d 865 (1989); Oklahoma City Municipal Improvement Authority v. HTB, Inc., 769 P.2d 131 (Okl.1988); Rowan County Board of Education v. U.S. Gypsum, 87 N.C.App. 106, 359 S.E.2d 814, reh. denied, 321 N.C. 298, 362 S.E.2d 782 (1987); Bellevue School District No. 405 v. Brazier Construction Co., 103 Wash.2d 111, 691 P.2d 178 (1984); but see New Jersey Educational Facilities v. Gruzen, 125 N.J. 66, 592 A.2d 559 (1991); Board of Education v. Dow Chemical Co., 40 Conn.Super.Ct. 141, 482 A.2d 1226 (1984).


author: KELLY, Judge: BECK, Judge,

text:
    611 A.2d 1280
    Michael S. HUTCHISON, Jr., an Incompetent, by Mary J. HUTCHISON, Parent & Natural Guardian, and Mary J. Hutchison, and Michael Hutchison, Individually, v. Father Francis LUDDY, St. Therese’s Catholic Church, St. Therese’s Elementary School, Bishop James Hogan and Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown. Appeal of ST. THERESE’S CATHOLIC CHURCH, St. Therese’s Elementary School, Bishop James Hogan and Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 11, 1991.
    Filed July 2, 1992.

      Maria Zulick, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
    Richard M. Serbin, Altoona, for Hutchison, appellee.
    Scott E. Henderson, Pittsburgh, for Pittsburgh Press, intervenor.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BECK, and KELLY, JJ.
   KELLY, Judge:

In this opinion, we are called upon to determine whether a trial judge currently presiding in the same case could reconsider and reverse an order issued by a predecessor which imposed a seal upon the record. We are also called upon to determine whether the succeeding trial judge properly denied the appellants’, St. Therese’s Catholic Church’s, St. Therese’s Elementary School’s, Bishop James Hogan’s, and the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown’s, motion for the imposition of sanctions against the appellees, Michael S. Hutchison, Jr., Mary J. Hutchison, and Michael Hutchison, for violating the sealing order before its removal by the trial court. We affirm in part and reverse in part the portion of the trial court’s order removing the seal and quash the portion of the appellants’ appeal which pertains to the trial court’s order denying the appellants’ motion for the imposition of sanctions against the appellees.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On June 23, 1987, the appellees, Michael S. Hutchison, Jr., an incompetent, Mary J. Hutchison and Michael Hutchison, guardians and his parents, praeciped for the issuance of a writ of summons against the appellants. The writ of summons was duly served upon the named defendants by the sheriff of Blair County. On November 25, 1987, the appellees commenced discovery by serving upon the named parties a request for the production of documents and interrogatories upon all the defendants. The appellants filed a praecipe for a rule to file a complaint on December 14, 1987.

On December 23, 1987, the appellants filed a motion for an order of the court to seal the record. The motion was granted by Senior Judge William W. Lipsitt, who was specially presiding. The order entered by Judge Lipsitt decreed that all pleadings filed to date and any pretrial discovery was to be sealed and access to the record prohibited to anyone without further order of the court. The order further stated that the appellees must notify the appellants one day before filing their complaint in order to permit the appellants to seek a further order sealing the record.

On December 31, 1987, the Honorable R. Bruce Brumbaugh issued a rule to show cause why the seal should not be continued. A hearing date was set for January 4, 1988. Oral argument on the motion to continue the seal was heard by Judge Brumbaugh at which all parties to the lawsuit participated. As a result of the hearing, Judge Brumbaugh temporarily continued the stay and ordered the appellees to withhold filing their complaint for ten days while he took the motion for continuation of the seal under advisement. On January 13, 1988, Judge Brumbaugh issued an order extending the seal to all pretrial discovery and all pleadings or other documents, heretofore or hereafter, to be possessed by the parties and filed until either further order of the court or the actual commencement of trial, whichever should occur first.

The appellees subsequently filed their ten count complaint. The first three counts of the complaint assert that Father Luddy sexually abused Michael Hutchison, Jr. on numerous occasions, causing the child to suffer extreme mental anguish necessitating extensive psychiatric medical care for which Father Luddy should be held liable. The next four counts of the complaint assert the appellants were jointly and severally liable to Michael Hutchison, Jr. for his damages caused by Father Luddy’s alleged sexual abuse by failing to properly supervise the activities of their agent and/or employee, Father Luddy, and for placing Father Luddy in a position of responsibility over children when they allegedly knew of his purported sexual proclivity toward young male children. Finally, in counts eight through ten, the appellee-parents assert that Father Luddy and the appellants should be held liable for the medical expenses the appellee-parents have incurred and will continue to incur for their son’s treatment, the severe emotional distress the appellee-parents suffered as a result of Father Luddy’s alleged sexual abuse of their child, and finally, that Father Luddy and the appellants breached their fiduciary and contractual duty to the appellee-parents after accepting valuable consideration from the appellee-parents to provide their child the appropriate religious, moral, and educational training.

On January 25, 1988, the appellants filed preliminary objections to the appellees’ complaint. Father Luddy subsequently filed his own preliminary objections on February 11, 1988, which were followed by appellees’ preliminary objections to the appellants’ preliminary objections. All parties’ preliminary objections remain pending at this time.

On October 20, 1988, the Pittsburgh Press Company petitioned to intervene in order to open the proceedings. In the petition, the Pittsburgh Press Company requested an order from the court providing the press and the public with access to all pleadings and other matters of record and the opening of all proceedings to the public. The appellants filed an answer opposing the Pittsburgh Press Company’s petition to intervene and open proceedings. Father Luddy filed a petition to intervene in his capacity as a criminal defendant awaiting trial and joined the appellants’ answer opposing the intervention of the Pittsburgh Press Company. The appellees filed an answer in which they joined the Pittsburgh Press Company’s petition to intervene and open the proceedings and opposed Father Luddy’s petition to intervene in his capacity as a criminal defendant because his rights were already protected by virtue of being a party to the suit and through his representation by counsel.

On December 13,1988, a hearing on the Pittsburgh Press Company’s petition to intervene and to open the proceedings was held before Judge Brumbaugh. At the hearing, Judge Brumbaugh, before leaving judicial office on January 1, 1990, granted the Pittsburgh Press Company intervenor status; however, Judge Brumbaugh never rendered a decision on the portion of the petition which requested the opening of the proceedings and the unsealing of the record.

While the petition to open the proceedings remained pending before Judge Brumbaugh, discovery in the case continued. On November 18, 1988, the appellants filed a motion for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4019 contending the appellees’ counsel violated the Blair County seal by incorporating into the Samuel C. Hutchison’s Somerset County complaint against Father Luddy and the appellants’ excerpts from a 1975 letter written by Monsignor Thomas Madden to Bishop Hogan regarding instances of Father Luddy’s unpriestly behavior discovered in the Blair County lawsuit.

On May 7, 1990, the appellants filed for an order of the court preventing further disclosure and violation of sealing orders and for imposition of appropriate sanctions. In their motion, the appellants alleged that appellees’ counsel once again made use of matters discovered as a result of the deposition of Bishop Hogan in the Blair County lawsuit when counsel filed a supplemental affidavit in support of a motion for protection of discoverable documents from destruction in the unsealed Somerset County lawsuit. The appellants further alleged that appellee’s counsel’s violation of the Blair County sealing order resulted in the publishing of a newspaper article in the Pittsburgh Press on April 29, 1990, which portrayed the appellants unfavorably. The appellants requested that appellees’ counsel be required to pay the appellants’ attorney fees for the preparation of their motion to prevent further disclosure and violation of sealing orders and be precluded from utilizing any portion of Bishop Hogan’s deposition for any purposes in the Blair County lawsuit.

On May 29, 1990, the appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order of January 13, 1988, sealing the record. In their motion, the appellees contended that reconsideration of the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record was warranted due to changed circumstances not anticipated by Judge Brumbaugh when the order sealing the record was entered. The appellees argued that Judge Brumbaugh could not possibly have been aware at the time he issued the order sealing the record that a complaint would be filed in another county alleging that Father Luddy had also molested another member of the Hutchison family, and that the appellants were negligent for failing to know of his alleged propensity to sexually molest children. The appellees further argued that the sealing order was burdening the discovery process in the unsealed Somerset County lawsuit as it required the complete duplication of discovery to matters that were discovered in the sealed Blair County lawsuit which were also pertinent in the Somerset County lawsuit.

On June 13, 1990, the trial court held oral argument on the appellants’ motion for the imposition of sanctions and the appellees’ motion for reconsideration of the January 1, 1988 sealing order. Shortly thereafter, the appellees filed a motion for compliance and to dismiss objections of defendant Bishop Hogan to plaintiffs’ request for admissions. The appellants filed an answer; argument on the motion was then held before Judge Grine. Subsequently, on October 22, 1990, Judge Grine entered two orders. The first order entered removed the seal and denied the appellants’ motion for the imposition of sanctions. The second order entered granted the appellees’ motion for compliance for request of admissions. The appellants filed a petition for emergency relief with the President Judge of Blair County, Thomas Peoples, Jr., requesting a stay from the October 22, 1990 order unsealing the record. The appellants’ petition for emergency relief was assigned by President Judge Peoples to Judge Hiram A. Carpenter, III because Judge Grine was unavailable. On October 24,1990, Judge Carpenter entered an amended order which stayed both of the October 22, 1990 orders and directed that the record continue to be sealed. The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration of the October 24, 1990 amended order. Judge Carpenter then entered an order which canceled the stay on the Judge Grine’s October 22, 1990 order granting the appellees’ motion for compliance to the request for admissions, but continued the stay of Judge Grine’s October 22, 1990 order unsealing the record. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, the appellants raise two issues for our review:

1. DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY UNSEAL THE PRETRIAL RECORD, BECAUSE THE “RECONSIDERATION” MOTION THEREFOR [sic] WAS UNTIMELY AND COLLATERALLY ATTACKED THE SEAL ORDER, THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED OR OVERRULED AN ORDER OF A COORDINATE MEMBER OF THE COURT, THE RECONSIDERATION REQUEST CONSTITUTED “JUDGE SHOPPING,” AND THE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE AUTHORITY ON WHICH IT ERRONEOUSLY RELIED?
2. DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENY SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE SEAL ORDER, INTACT WHEN THE VIOLATION OCCURRED, WHERE THE VIOLATING PARTIES HAD TAKEN NO TIMELY, PROCEDURAL CHALLENGE TO THAT SEAL, THE COURT WHERE THE VIOLATION OCCURRED FOUND PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THEREOF, AND THE VIOLATION RISKED THE INJURY TO A FAIR, OPEN TRIAL, WHICH THE SEAL ORDER HAD PROTECTED?

(Appellants’ Brief at 2).

However,.before we may address the issues raised by the appellants in this appeal, we must first dispose of the appellees’ motion to quash this appeal. In their motion to quash this appeal, the appellees contend that our Supreme Court’s issuance of a per curiam order in Hutchison v. Luddy, 527 Pa. 525, 594 A.2d 307 (1991), which reversed this Court’s decision in Hutchison v. Luddy, 398 Pa.Super. 505, 581 A.2d 578 (1991), precludes our review of any order granting or denying a motion to seal the record. The appellees argue that because the order directing the removal of seal is not a final order, as it neither ends the litigation nor disposes of the entire case, we are prohibited under our Supreme Court's per curiam order from reviewing the order until a final judgment is rendered in the entire case. The appellees assert that because the order directing the removal of the seal is not appealable at this time, the appellants’ appeal must be quashed. We disagree.

We find the appellees’ reliance upon the Supreme Court’s per curiam order issued in Hutchison v. Luddy, supra, to be misplaced. We believe that the Supreme Court’s per curiam order’s reversal of this Court’s decision in the Somerset County lawsuit was because our decision permitted an appeal from an order denying the motion to seal the record before discovery in the case had actually commenced. Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court, through its issuance of a short per curiam order, agreed with the position taken by the trial judge in the Somerset County lawsuit, the Honorable Eugene E. Fike, II and the Honorable Phyllis W. Beck, in her concurring and dissenting opinion in Hutchison v. Luddy, supra, that as discovery had not actually begun, the trial court’s refusal to issue an order sealing the record with regard to discovery was not ripe for appellate review under the “collateral order” exception to final judgment rule because no party was aggrieved by the order at the time the appeal was taken. It is our belief that had the Supreme Court intended to preclude any appellate review of all collateral orders concerning seals it would have made a general pronouncement to that effect in its per curiam order reversing this Court’s decision in Hutchison v. Luddy, supra. Rather, the Supreme Court used language in its per curiam order which would seem to limit its per curiam order specifically to this Court’s decision in that particular case. See In Re Subpoena To Testify Before Grand Jury, 864 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir.1989) (collateral order doctrine gave Court of Appeals jurisdiction from closure order that restrained counsel and parties from disclosing content of pleadings and memoranda filed in connection with grand jury investigation); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Blain, 808 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.1987) (appeal permitted from trial court’s order directing the removal of a previously imposed seal); Bank of America Nat. Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d 339 (3rd Cir. 1986) (appeal permitted from the denial of the appellant’s motion to unseal record); Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir.1984) (appeal permitted under the “collateral order” exception to the final judgment rule from an order requiring disclosure of previously sealed documents). Compare H.L. Hayden Co. v. New York v. Siemens Medical, 797 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir.1986) (order denying modification of protective order was not a final order for purposes of appeal, nor within “collateral order” doctrine). Cf. Katz v. Katz, 356 Pa.Super. 461, 514 A.2d 1374 (1986), appeal denied, 515 Pa. 581, 527 A.2d 542 (1987). (This Court allows an appeal from a collateral order directing public hearings in an equitable distribution using Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra, analysis.)

However, we are presented here with an entirely different procedural posture than was presented to this Court and our Supreme Court in the Somerset County lawsuit. Here, the parties had been subject to the conditions of the January 13,1988 sealing order until its removal on October 22, 1990. Extensive discovery had already been conducted by the parties and filed pursuant to the seal. Therefore, unlike the appellants in the Somerset County lawsuit, it is possible for these appellants to be aggrieved by the trial court’s issuance of an order unsealing the record. Thus, we find that we are permitted under the circumstances of this case to apply the “collateral order” exception to the final judgment rule test set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) and adopted by our Supreme Court in Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975) to determine the appealability of the trial court’s order directing the removal of the seal.

Under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra, an order which is separable from and collateral to a cause of action may become appealable under certain circumstances. Katz v. Katz, supra. These circumstances, all of which must be present, are as follows: 1) the order appealed must be separable from, and collateral to the main cause of action; 2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; 3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until a final judgment is rendered in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1978); Kronz v. Kronz, 393 Pa.Super. 227, 574 A.2d 91 (1990); Beasley v. Beasley, 348 Pa.Super. 124, 501 A.2d 679 (1985).

Instantly, the order of the trial court removing the seal on the record is separable and collateral to the basic question of whether Father Luddy and the appellants are liable to the appellees for their damages. Thus, the first step has been met. Second, the rights which the appellants assert, i.e. their right to a fair and impartial civil trial, see P.G. Publishing Co. v. Commonwealth by District Attorney 389 Pa.Super. 86, 566 A.2d 857 (1989), and the prevention of the disclosure to the public of private pre-trial discovery materials, see Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Center, 382 Pa.Super. 75, 554 A.2d 954 (1989), are too important to be denied review. Finally, if review is postponed until after a final judgment rendered on the question of Father Luddy’s and the appellants’ liability to the appellees, the opportunity to provide the appellants with a fair trial and prevent the disclosure of private pre-trial discovery materials to the general public will have disappeared. Thus, we find that all three prongs of the Cohen test have been fulfilled. Therefore, this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, the appellee’s motion to quash this appeal is denied.

Next, we turn our attention to the procedural questions raised by the appellants in their first issue on appeal. In their first issue, the appellants contend that Judge Grine’s October 22, 1990 reversal of Judge Brumbaugh’s January 13, 1988 sealing order was improper. The appellants argue that the appellees’ motion for reconsideration of the January 13, 1988 sealing order was untimely pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 903, and 1701 because the petition for reconsideration was filed more than thirty day after the entry of the January 13, 1988 sealing order. The appellants further argue that Judge Grine erred in reversing Judge Brumbaugh’s January 13, 1988 sealing order under the well-recognized principle that one trial judge should not overrule an order issued by another trial judge in the same case. The appellants assert that because Judge Grine has cited no change in the law regarding the sealing of a record or changed circumstances warranting the removal of Judge Brumbaugh’s January 13, 1988 sealing order, the order could not be subsequently overruled by Judge Grine. We disagree.

A court has inherent power to reconsider its own rulings. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. J.J. White, 302 Pa.Super. 276, 448 A.2d 634 (1982). The statute limiting the time for reconsideration of orders to thirty days applies only to final, appealable orders. Daywalt v. Montgomery Hosp. 393 Pa.Super. 118, 573 A.2d 1116 (1990); Commonwealth v. McMillan, 376 Pa.Super. 25, 545 A.2d 301, (1988) order affirmed 523 Pa. 426, 567 A.2d 1043 (1990); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. Where an order does not effectively place the litigant out of court or end the lawsuit, it is within the trial court’s discretion to entertain a motion to reconsider the interlocutory order outside the thirty day time limit set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. See generally Golden v. Dion & Rosenau, 410 Pa.Super. 506, 509, 600 A.2d 568, 569 (1991).

Instantly, Judge Brumbaugh’s January 13, 1988 order sealing the record stated that the record was to remain sealed either “... until further order of court or the time of actual commencement of trial, whichever shall first occur.” Thus, the January 13, 1988 sealing order itself left the door wide open for the appellees to file a motion for reconsideration of the sealing order at a later date. Accordingly, we find that the appellants’ contention that the trial court lost its jurisdiction to reconsider the sealing order at the expiration of the thirty day time period set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 to be without merit.

Next, we will proceed to address the appellant’s argument that Judge Grine did not have the authority to overrule the order issued by his predecessor, Judge Brumbaugh, sealing the record. It is a well recognized principle that “... judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same court and in the same case should not overrule the decisions of each other.” Golden v. Dion & Rosenau, supra, 600 A.2d at 570 (1991) (quoting Okkerse v. Howe, 521 Pa. 509, 516, 556 A.2d 827, 831 (1989)). The purpose of this rule is to ensure a degree of pretrial finality “so that judicial economy and efficiency can be maintained.” Salerno v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 377 Pa.Super. 83, 87, 546 A.2d 1168, 1170 (1988) (quoting Commonwealth v. Eck, 272 Pa.Super. 406, 409, 416 A.2d 520, 522 (1979)). However, this rule is not absolute as there are times when a judge cannot avoid placing himself or herself in such a position due to the death, retirement, or expiration of the judicial commission of his or her predecessor. See Duffy v. Gerst, 286 Pa.Super. 523, 531, 429 A.2d 645, 650 (1981). Thus, where a successor judge is asked by a timely and proper motion to reconsider the legal conclusion of an unavailable predecessor, he or she is empowered to reconsider those issues to the same extent that his or her predecessor could have. US. Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros. Inc., 668 F.2d 172 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961, 102 S.Ct. 2038, 72 L.Ed.2d 485 (1981); Degregorio v. O’Bannon, 86 F.R.D. 109 (1980).

Such a situation has occurred instantly as Judge Brumbaugh was no longer available to hear the appellees’ motion for reconsideration of the sealing order due to his departure from judicial office. Thus, the appellees’ right to try to persuade the court that it erred when it issued the sealing order will not be denied simply because the trial judge who issued the order had departed from judicial office at the time the appellees requested reconsideration. See US. Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros. Inc., supra. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration was properly before Judge Grine, and the issue before this Court is not whether Judge Grine was precluded from reconsidering the sealing order, but rather whether upon reconsideration, Judge Grine properly ordered the seal removed.

Moreover, where new evidence is placed on the record in the interim between the first trial judge’s ruling and the second trial judge’s reassessment, it is not improper for the second trial judge to reach a result different than the result reached by his or her colleague where the later result is based upon new evidence. Gabovitz v. State Auto Ins. Assn., 362 Pa.Super. 17, 21 n. 2, 523 A.2d 403, 405 n. 2 (1987), appeal denied, 516 Pa. 634, 533 A.2d 92 (1987); Melendez by Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, 320 Pa.Super. 59, 62 n. 2, 466 A.2d 1060, 1062 n. 2 (1983).

Instantly, the record is replete with evidence of how circumstances had changed since Judge Brumbaugh’s issuance of the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record. At the time the order sealing the record was issued, there was no action pending in Somerset County which involved similar allegations by a member of the appellees’ family, who is also represented by the same counsel, against many of the same defendants that are also defendants in this lawsuit. Nor was Judge Brumbaugh cognizant at the time he issued the order sealing the record that it was going to impede the discovery process in both cases. Judge Brumbaugh could not have conceived at the time he issued the order sealing the record that a serious controversy would arise on the question of whether matters discovered in one lawsuit could be used in the other lawsuit or whether the discovery would have to be duplicated in order to be used in the other lawsuit. In fact, it was Judge Brumbaugh’s express intention when he issued the order sealing the record that the rights of the parties to full and complete discovery not be impeded. (See January 13, 1988 Order sealing the record). Accordingly, due to the changed circumstances and the existence of new evidence of how the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record was hampering the progress of discovery, Judge Grine was fully warranted in subsequently reconsidering Judge Brumbaugh’s January 13, 1988 order sealing the record.

Finally, we must determine whether Judge Grine properly held that the record should be opened. Article 1, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that “all Courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.” Generally speaking, the question of the openness of the proceedings has been raised in the context of criminal trials, and with respect thereto the courts have recognized both a common law and constitutional right of public access. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2829, 65 L.Ed.2d 973, 991-92 (1980); Commonwealth v. Contakos, 499 Pa. 340, 343-45, 453 A.2d 578, 579-80 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 426-27, 414 A.2d 318, 321 (1980); Commonwealth v. Murray 348 Pa.Super. 439, 443, 502 A.2d 624, 626 (1985). “The requirement of public civil trials, though not an enumerated or even a penumbral constitutional guarantee, is nevertheless as old as the guarantee in criminal proceedings.” Katz v. Katz, supra, 356 Pa.Super. at 467, 514 A.2d at 1377, (quoting All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public’s Right to View Judicial Proceedings and Records, 52 Temple L.Q. 311 (1979)).

The common law rule, which also confers a public right of access to court records, is that every person is entitled to access “provided he has an interest therein for some useful purposes and not for mere curiosity.” C. v. C., supra, [320 A.2d 717,] at 723; 23 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 341, a 410 (1983). This common law right of access, of course, is not absolute. In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C.Cir.1981). Every court has supervisory powers over civil proceedings in progress before it and may deny access where such access may become a vehicle for harmful or improper purposes. See: Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., supra, 435 U.S. [589,] at 598, 98 S.Ct. [1306,] at 1312, 55 L.Ed.2d [570,] at 580. Thus, the public may be “excluded, temporarily or permanently, from court proceedings or the records of court proceedings to protect private as well as public interests: to protect trade secrets, or the privacy and reputations [of innocent parties], as well as to guard against risks to national security interests, and to minimize the danger of an unfair trial by adverse publicity.” In re National Broadcasting Co., supra, at 613.

Id. at 467. See also Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 515 Pa. 501, 530 A.2d 414 (1987); P.G. Pub. v. Cmwlth. by District Attorney, supra.

However, private documents collected during discovery are not judicial records. In re Alexander Grant and Company, 820 F.2d [352,] at 355; Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1986); see also Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). For the reasons articulated in the constitutional section of this opinion, discovery is essentially a private process. As stated by the Supreme Court in Seattle Times, “pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial.” Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33, 104 S.Ct. at 2207. Thus, wrote the Court, “such proceedings were not open to the public at common law.” Id. Justice Burger wrote separately in another Supreme Court opinion that “it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly private to the litigants.” Gannett Company v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2914, 61 L.Ed.2d 608, 632 (1979).

Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Center, supra, 382 Pa.Super. at 89, 554 A.2d at 960-61.

Upon reconsideration of Judge Brumbaugh’s January 13, 1988 order sealing the record, Judge Grine determined that the appellants had not initially presented sufficient evidence to warrant the sealing of the record under the test set forth in Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (1984), which held that the sealing of the pleadings and trial proceedings may be warranted only when an important governmental interest is at stake and there is “no less restrictive way to serve that governmental interest.” Id. at 1070. Secondly, a sealing of the record may be warranted when the motioning party can show good cause which is established when the motioning party can show that a clearly defined and serious injury would have occurred to the motioning party if the record were not sealed. Id. at 1070, 1071. We need not address Judge Grine’s conclusion that the appellants had originally failed to carry their burden for the initial issuance of the order sealing the record until the commencement of trial, because we find that due to the changed circumstances in this case, Judge Grines’ order removing the seal as to the judicial records was proper. We reach this conclusion for the following reasons.

Judge Brumbaugh issued his January 13, 1988 order sealing the record at a time when no other lawsuit involving similar allegations against the appellants was in existence. The purpose of the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record was to protect the reputations and standing in the community of the appellants; however, the order explicitly stated that the sealing of the record was not intended in any way, shape, or form to impede the parties’ rights to full and complete discovery.

Instantly, the existence of the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record has impeded the progress of discovery in not only this action, but also given the appellants unfair advantage as to discovery in both this case and the action in Somerset County. A review of the record indicates that the appellants have in the Somerset County lawsuit utilized matters which were under seal in this action when it has suited their purposes and have cried foul when the appellees have attempted to do the same. See Appellees’ Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration R.R. 105A, 106A. See also R.R. 132A, 173A-174A, 182A. As the original purpose of Judge Brumbaugh’s January 13, 1988 order sealing the record was not to impede the progress of discovery or to give the appellants an unfair advantage over the appellees in the conduct of discovery, we find that Judge Grine was correct in ordering the record in this case unsealed. However, we note that while we affirm Judge Grine’s decision to open the record in this case, our decision extends only to the judicial records. Any aspect of Judge Grine’s decision that could be interpreted as opening up the pretrial depositions and interrogatories for public inspection is hereby reversed as the pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not judicial records. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, supra; Hutchison v. Luddy, supra, 398 Pa.Superior Ct. at 509-512, 581 A.2d at 581; Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Center, supra. Accordingly, the pretrial depositions and interrogatories are to continue to be filed under seal pursuant to the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record and the parties are not to make them available for public inspection before the commencement of trial. However, our continuation of the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record as to the depositions and interrogatories does not preclude the parties from utilizing them in the Somerset County lawsuit should the need arise.

The appellants’ second issue on appeal is that Judge Grine erred in failing to impose sanctions against the appellees for their failure to comply with the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record. The appellants argued that even though the order sealing the record was subsequently reversed, the appellees were not excused from following the dictates of the order before its reversal. Thus, the appellants assert that Judge Grine erred when he summarily denied their motion for the imposition of sanctions when he reversed Judge Brumbaugh’s January 13, 1988 order sealing the record.

An order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings. Philadelphia M.T. Assn. v. International Long Assn., 453 Pa. 43, 49-50, 308 A.2d 98, 102 (1973); Ewing v. Oliver Realty, 305 Pa.Super. 486, 493, 451 A.2d 751, 755 (1982). When a party or person fails to permit discovery, or fails to obey a court order respecting discovery, a court, on motion, may issue an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated, things or testimony. Pa.R.C.P. 4019(a)(l)(viii), 4019(c)(2); 6 Standard PA Practice 2d § 34:52. The imposition of specific sanctions for failure to obey a discovery order is largely within the discretion of the trial court. Feingold v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 313 Pa.Super. 579, 460 A.2d 339 (1983). Unless sanctions are imposed, an order declaring a party in contempt for failing to follow discovery orders is interlocutory and not ripe for appellate review. Hester v. Bagnato, 292 Pa.Super. 322, 323, 437 A.2d 66, 67 (1981). “As a general rule, this Court will not provide interim supervision of discovery proceedings conducted in connection with litigation pending in the several trial courts. In the absence of unusual circumstances, we will not review discovery or sanction orders prior to a final judgment in the main action.” Joyce & Associates v. Pivirotto, 358 Pa.Super. 50, 52, 516 A.2d 763, 764 (1986) (quoting McManus v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 342 Pa.Super. 405, 410, 493 A.2d 84, 87 (1985).

Instantly, the trial court denied the appellants’ motion for the imposition of sanctions against the appellees for their failure to follow the January 13,1988 order sealing the record. As no sanctions were imposed against the appellees, nor has the appellants’ ability to defend against the appellees’ claims been limited in any way by the trial court’s refusal to impose sanctions, we find that review of the trial court’s failure to impose sanctions against the appellees is not warranted at this time and the portion of the trial court’s order denying appellants’ motion to impose sanctions is interlocutory. See Joyce & Associates v. Pivirotto, supra; McManus v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, supra. Accordingly, we quash the portion of the appellants’ appeal which concerns the issue of the trial court’s failure to impose sanctions against the appellees for non-compliance of the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record and find that review of this issue will not be ripe until a final judgment is entered in the main action.

Based upon the foregoing, Judge Grine’s October 22,1990 order removing the seal as to all judicial records is affirmed; however any aspect of Judge Grine’s October 22, 1990 order which could be interpreted as opening up the pretrial depositions and interrogatories for public inspection is reversed, and all pretrial depositions and interrogatories are to remain under seal pursuant to the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record. Finally, the portion of this appeal pertaining to Judge Grine’s denial of the appellants’ motion for the imposition of sanctions is quashed.

Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; and Quashed in Part.

BECK, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

BECK, Judge,

dissenting:

I cannot accept the majority’s reasoning that, despite a per curiam supreme court order involving an appeal which I consider legally indistinguishable from the instant case, the appellees’ motion to quash this appeal should be denied. Hutchison v. Luddy, 527 Pa. 525, 594 A.2d 307 (1991), reversing Hutchison v. Luddy, 398 Pa.Super. 505, 581 A.2d 578 (1991). Instead I am constrained to conclude that the instant appeal is from an order which, according to the supreme court, was not final and, therefore, not appealable.

In the superior court opinion in Hutchison v. Luddy, supra, 398 Pa.Super. at 510-512, 581 A.2d at 580-581, this court reviewed, in relevant part, a trial court’s order in Somerset County which denied the Church Parties’ motion to seal all discovery records. The majority in Hutchison found, and I specifically agreed, that our court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the order denying the motion to seal the records fell within the “collateral order” exception to the final judgment rule. Our reasoning in that case regarding the applicability of the “collateral order” exception paralleled the majority’s reasoning here and cited Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) and Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1978), as does the majority here.

Nevertheless, despite agreeing that subject matter jurisdiction under Cohen and Pugar was proper, I wrote separately in Hutchison v. Luddy, 398 Pa.Super. at 516-518, 581 A.2d at 584-585, in order to state my view that no party was as yet arguably aggrieved by the trial court’s refusal to seal the record because discovery had not yet begun. In a separate opinion in Hutchison, supra, I articulated the view that the discovery issue was, therefore, not ripe for review. I concluded, therefore, that the trial court properly denied the parties’ motion to seal the discovery records because discovery had not yet commenced. This was not a Cohen analysis but a conclusion that there were as yet no discovery materials upon which the trial court could act.

The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion cited above, reversed this court’s order insofar as we reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to seal the record. Despite the instant majority’s assertion to the contrary, the supreme court did not base its action on the position expressed in my concurring and dissenting opinion. Instead, the supreme court specifically stated that the order “was not final and, therefore, not appealable”, and cited Pugar v. Greco, supra, and Cohen, supra. I can come to no other conclusion but that the supreme court specifically reversed our court’s conclusion that an order denying the sealing of a record is final under Cohen and therefore appealable. In the wisdom of the supreme court, such an order does not satisfy the prerequisites of Cohen, is not final and is not appealable. We are bound by that judgment.

Finally, I see no basis for distinguishing this case from the previous Hutchison appeal on the grounds that in Hutchison I we were dealing with an order denying a motion to seal and here we are reviewing an order removing a seal from a record. In fact, in a related matter, considering a prior motion to quash in the instant case, this court stated in a per curiam order that “an order removing a seal from a record is indistinguishable from an order denying the sealing of a record”, for purposes of appealability.

Therefore, despite my previously held view regarding the appealability of such orders pursuant to Cohen, I conclude that we are bound by the supreme court’s per curiam opinion and on that basis must grant appellees’ motion to quash.

      . Although Father Francis Luddy is a named party in the caption of this case, he has not joined the defendants’ appeal of the trial court’s order removing the seal and denying sanctions against the appellees.

      . The full text of the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record is as follows:

        ORDER

      AND NOW, this 13th day of January, 1988, upon careful consideration of a defense motion to continue a sealed record in the above-captioned matter, oral argument thereon of all record counsel presented to this judge in chambers on January 4, 1988, review of the briefs originally submitted to the Honorable William W. Lipsitt, Senior Judge, Specially Presiding relative to the original motion to seal granted by this December 23,1987 Order and our reading of the complaint, based upon the law which we believe applicable thereto it is ORDERED, DIRECTED AND DECREED that the prayer of said motion be and the same is hereby granted and accordingly:
      (1) the aforesaid Order of Judge Lipsitt is hereby confirmed and continued; and
      (2) all pretrial discovery and all pleadings or other documents, whether heretofore or hereafter to be had and filed, shall be and remain sealed of record, with access thereto or release in any form or manner of any of the content thereof by or to anyone strictly prohibited until further order of court or the time of actual commencement of trial, whichever shall first occur.
      It is neither the design nor the intent of this order either to impede the rights of the respective parties to full and complete discovery or to bar the public from trial of this case.

      . Eight days after the Pittsburgh Press Company filed its petition to intervene and open the proceedings, the alleged victim’s brother, Samuel C. Hutchison, filed a civil suit in Somerset County against Father Luddy alleging that he was also sexually abused by Father Luddy. The Somerset County lawsuit also named Bishop Hogan, and the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, as defendants, together with several other parties who were not named as defendants in the Blair County action brought by the appellees. The defendants in Somerset County, excluding Father Luddy, Cardinal John Krol, and the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, filed a motion to seal the record. In their motion for a seal, the movant-defendants claimed that without a seal, it would be impossible for them to obtain a fair and impartial jury and a fair and impartial trial. The movant-defendants further alleged in their motion to seal that failure to seal the record would result in irreparable prejudice and harm to the rights of the defendants, their good names, reputations, and standing in the community. The motion was opposed by the Pittsburgh Press Company who filed a petition to intervene asserting that on the basis of the first amendment to the United States Constitution, it possessed a right of access to all materials sought to be sealed. The trial court denied the movantdefendants’ motion to seal with certain limited exceptions regarding discovery material directed toward the criminal defendant, Father Luddy. This Court affirmed in part and reversed in part holding that the trial court properly permitted the Pittsburgh Press Company to intervene for the purposes of attempting to gain access to the pleadings and pretrial proceedings, but abused its discretion in allowing the Pittsburgh Press Company to intervene in order to oppose the Motion to Seal insofar as it related to discovery matters. Hutchison v. Luddy, 398 Pa.Super. 505, 518, 581 A.2d 578, 584 (1990) (Beck, J., concurring and dissenting). This Court’s decision was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court in a Per Curiam Order. See Hutchison v. Luddy, 527 Pa. 525, 594 A.2d 307 (1991).

      . Father Luddy is criminal defendant in Somerset County. The case has been transferred to Franklin County as a result of Father Luddy’s motion for change of venue.

      . The Pittsburgh Press Company, whom had previously been granted intervenor status by Judge Brumbaugh and whose petition to open the proceedings, which was joined by the appellees, was still pending before the trial court, was not notified of appellees’ motion to reconsider the January 13, 1988 order sealing the record and did not participate in the oral argument of this motion.

      . The full text of the Supreme Court’s per curiam issued in Hutchison v. Luddy, supra, is as follows:
      ORDER
      PER CURIAM.
      The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is granted. The Order of Superior Court entered on August 27, 1990 at No. 339 Pittsburgh 1989, 398 Pa.Super. 505, 581 A.2d 578 is REVERSED insofar as it reversed the trial court’s denial of Motion to Seal Record with respect to discovery. That Order was not final and, therefore, not appealable. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1978). See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).
      All other aspects of the Petition for Allowance of Appeal are hereby DENIED.
      (Emphasis added).

      . Superior Court may affirm the decision of the trial court for reasons other than those relied upon by the trial court as long as the result is correct. Schreffler v. Pa. Ins. Guar. Assn., 402 Pa.Super. 309, 586 A.2d 983 (1991).

      . We note that any discovery materials that must be utilized in any pleading or other materials filed of record in the Blair County lawsuit are subject to the seal until the commencement of trial.

      . The appellants are not precluded by our Supreme Court’s decision in Hutchison v. Luddy, supra, from applying in Somerset County for a protective order to seal the record regarding the depositions and interrogatories taken in the Somerset County lawsuit as well as the depositions and interrogatories filed in the Blair County lawsuit which are sought to be utilized in the Somerset County lawsuit.

      . We note that the appellants themselves routinely referred to matters that were under seal in this action when Samuel Hutchison made discovery requests in the Somerset County lawsuit and permitted persons who were not parties to this lawsuit to review discovery material obtained in this case to be used for defense purposes in the Somerset County lawsuit. Accordingly, where reasonable justification exists for a party’s questionable conduct, no sanction should be imposed. Berlin v. Brody, 4 D & C.2d 173 (1955); 10 Goodrich Amram § 4019(a):10; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schtesinger, 465 F.Supp. 913 (1979) (Doctrine of "unclean hands” precluded federal officials from claiming that information sought by discovery was privileged as pertaining to the decision-making process where the federal officials had offered the same or similar testimony in several other cases in which the testimony suited their purposes).

      . Appellees filed a motion to quash this appeal on May 8, 1991. In a per curiam order, part of which is quoted above, this court denied the motion to quash and found the instant order appealable on the basis of our decision in Hutchison v. Luddy, 398 Pa.Super. 505, 581 A.2d 578 (1991). Thereafter, in light of the supreme court’s reversal of this court’s order on appealability grounds, appellees filed a second motion to quash. We granted appellees leave to argue the second motion at oral argument in Pittsburgh.