author: ROWLEY, Judge:

text:
    444 A.2d 1297
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Craig TANN.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Feb. 3, 1982.
    Filed April 30, 1982.

      Sarah B. Vandenbraak, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellant.
    Mary Willmann, Assistant Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and McEWEN, JJ.
   ROWLEY, Judge:

The Commonwealth appeals from an order denying its Petition to Extend the time for trial under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 and discharging appellee.

A complaint was filed against appellee on October 15, 1980. Therefore, the period for trial under Rule 1100 was due to expire on April 13,1981, one hundred and eighty days later. Trial was scheduled for April 7, 1981. The night before the trial, the prosecutor called the home of the sixteen-year-old victim, who had been subpoenaed, to remind him of his obligation to be present in court the next day. At that time, the prosecutor was advised by the victim’s mother that he would not attend court the next day because of a high school mid-term examination. The victim later testified that he believed he would jeopardize his high school graduation if he missed this examination. On April 10,1981, the Commonwealth filed a timely petition to extend the time for trial under Rule 1100. An evidentiary hearing was held on June 9, 1981, before the Honorable Matthew W. Bullock, Jr., who found that the Commonwealth had failed to exercise the due diligence required by Rule 1100. The Commonwealth’s Petition to Extend was denied and appellee’s Motion to Dismiss was granted.

We have concluded that the Commonwealth’s Petition to Extend was necessitated by the unavoidable unavailability of the victim even though the Commonwealth made diligent efforts to secure the victim’s presence at trial. Therefore, we reverse the orders of the lower court.

In Commonwealth v. Sharp, 287 Pa.Superior Ct. 314, 430 A.2d 302 (1981), the Court held that the Commonwealth was entitled to a Rule 1100 extension where its reasonable efforts to secure a witness’s presence at trial were thwarted by the witness’s decision not to appear for wholly personal reasons. See also Commonwealth v. Sinor, 264 Pa.Superior Ct. 178, 184 n. 5, 399 A.2d 724, 727 n. 5. In this case, the victim was properly subpoenaed. His decision not to appear was totally beyond the control of the Commonwealth.

The lower court concluded that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence on the ground that it should have negotiated with the victim’s family and school to make alternative arrangements for the examination. In determining whether due diligence has been exercised in trying to secure the presence of a witness, the court should not second-guess the methods used by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Long, 288 Pa.Superior Ct. 414, 432 A.2d 228 (1981). As long as the Commonwealth has acted reasonably in light of the circumstances at the time, it has acted with due diligence “even if it appears in hindsight that there were other, possibly more desirable or efficacious methods that might have been tried.” Id., 288 Pa.Superior Ct. 419, 432 A.2d at 231. Here, the Commonwealth did not discover that its witness would not appear until the night before the trial date, only three days before the period for trial under Rule 1100 would expire. Under these circumstances, the Commonwealth acted reasonably in requesting an extension. To require the Commonwealth to negotiate with the victim’s family and school officials, even if it were possible to do so on such short notice, would be unrealistic in view of the Commonwealth’s limited prosecutorial resources.

Appellee argues that the victim had already failed to appear twice before the trial date; once for a preliminary hearing listing and once for a lineup. It is true that the victim failed to appear for a preliminary hearing listing on October 27, 1980. However, while a witness’s previous failure to appear for scheduled trial dates may be relevant in determining, the reasonableness of the Commonwealth’s efforts to secure his presence for trial, the Commonwealth does not have to prove due diligence in trying to secure the witness’s appearance on a prior date for which it did not seek a Rule 1100 extension. Commonwealth v. Sharp, 287 Pa.Superior Ct. at 318 n. *, 430 A.2d at 304 n. *. As to the victim’s failure to appear for a lineup on November 5, 1980, the Commonwealth contends that the order received by the victim directed him to appear on November 9, 1980. A review of the record shows that the date on the order in question is not clearly written and could easily be interpreted as a “9” rather than a “5”. Therefore, the victim’s failure to appear for this lineup was excusable. Furthermore, the victim appeared for all other court dates prior to April 7, 1981; specifically, (1) the preliminary hearing listed on November 18, 1980, (2) the lineup on December 10, 1980, (3) the preliminary hearing listed on December 15, 1980, (4) the lineup on December 21, 1980, and (5) the preliminary hearing on January 12, 1981.

The Orders denying the Commonwealth’s Petitions, granting appellee’s Petition and discharging appellee are reversed and case remanded for trial.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MONTEMURO, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    444 A.2d 1299
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Mary Ann GORTO v. Andrew GORTO and Stella Gorto, Appellants.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Feb. 17, 1982.
    Filed April 30, 1982.

      Frank Townend, Wilkes-Barre, for appellants.
    Janet A. Conser, Wilkes-Barre, for appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   MONTEMURO, Judge:

The instant matter presents a custody contention in which the mother of a child has sought to regain her daughter from the parents of her second husband, former stepfather to this child.

The child was the offspring of an early first marriage which was annulled prior to the child’s birth. When the mother remarried, she left the child with her own mother for about three months, after which the child joined the mother and stepfather and step-grandparents in a single household.

The new husband became increasingly violent, at one point threatening to kill his wife and stepchild with a shotgun. After about eighteen months, the older couple requested that the younger couple move out to their own apartment, which they did. The child remained with her step-grandparents, which was certainly a safer place for her in view of the violent abuse of the wife that ensued. Within months, the wife separated from her second husband.

The mother was unwelcome at her in-law’s house unless she pretended to be trying to reconcile with their son. She was told that she no longer had legal custody of her child, but she persisted in visiting and calling and sending gifts. Eventually she went to the Luzerne County United Services Agency to find out how to regain her child. She was referred to Legal Services and thereafter filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

The step-grandparents appealed the decision to return this child to her natural mother on the following grounds: (1) that the best interests of the child lay in her custody with them; (2) the mother is mentally, morally, and psychologically unfit for custody; (3) the record is imperfect because psychiatric records submitted to the court were afterwards “blanked-out.”

Upon review, we find the opinion of the court below to be thorough and well-reasoned, and we affirm.

The parties are correct that the best interests of the child must be paramount. We find that the lower court correctly applied that measure to the facts of the instant case, stating that “although the question to be decided is what is in the child’s best interest, the parties do not start out even because the parents have a prima facie right to custody.” The lower court then cited In Re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa.Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977), to the following effect:

Thus, even before the proceedings start, the evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the parents’ side. What the judge must do, therefore, is first, hear all evidence relevant to the child’s best interest, and then, decide whether the evidence on behalf of the third party is weighty enough to bring the scale up to even, and down on the third party’s side. Id., 249 Pa.Superior Ct. at 286, 376 A.2d at 654.

The step-grandparents therefore had a heavy burden of proof to obtain custody, and they did not meet that burden. They have indeed provided a loving home for the child, who is a friendly, attractive little girl. However, no abandonment of this child by her natural parent was proved. The son of the step-grandparents, the then-husband of the mother, was a dangerously violent man. The decision to leave the child in the safer atmosphere of the home where the step-grandparents resided was a reasonable one at the time the young couple moved out. Despite discouragement by the step-grandparents, the mother persisted in maintaining loving contact with her child and she eventually found legal assistance. She never abandoned her child.

The claim that the mother is unfit for custody rests on three grounds: she participated in a theft with her husband, their son; she has another daughter born out of wedlock; she has a past history of psychiatric problems.

As to the theft charge, the mother has successfully completed her probation, has no other record, and is no longer associating with her co-defendant—former husband. We note that he is frequently living in his parents’ home and remains a violent person.

As to the presence of the half-sister, the liaison that produced the infant was long-term and apparently not traumatic to the older child, who obviously loves the baby. The fact that the mother is successfully raising a happy, healthy infant speaks for her competence in child-raising at this period in her life. A surprise visit by a social worker shortly before trial date found her two-bedroom apartment clean and neat and nicely furnished, located near an elementary school. We agree with the lower court that the surroundings in the maternal home are adequate and that the non-marital birth of the younger sister is not a detriment to the older child’s development.

The most serious problem the lower court faced was the psychiatric history of the mother, who has been institutionalized occasionally and has had ongoing outpatient treatment in recent years. She was examined in connection with this case at the request of the court below in November of 1979.

This latest report states that her emotional state is now “stabilized” and her previous impulsiveness is generally well-controlled. She has taken no psychotropic medication for eight years. She was cooperative at her interview, and coherent and logical, although overtalkative. Because of her past history of psychiatric disturbances, the report found prognosis for the future “guarded.”

It is obvious from this court-ordered report as well as from testimony of other witnesses that the mother’s adolescent and early adult years were subject to stresses which were in large part not within her control. At present she has organized her own life, established her own pleasant apartment independent of her troubled girlhood home and her violent former spouse. She has persisted against discouraging odds in her determination to regain custody of her child. She has continued her monthly psychiatric check-up visits, which now amount to discussing anything upsetting to her, mostly her anxiety about this action. She babysits regularly for a neighbor, who enthusiastically endorses her nurturing abilities.

The child herself was interviewed by the court and showed real attachment to her mother and baby sister. She loved her step-grandparents too, but her fears in leaving their home amounted to being concerned about losing her neighborhood friends.

The primary concern in custody matters lies not with the past but with the present and future. Hooks v. Ellerbe, 257 Pa.Super. 219, 390 A.2d 791 (1978), reversed on other grounds 490 Pa. 363, 416 A.2d 512 (1980). Facts as of time of hearing are the foundation for determination of the court. Augustine v. Augustine, 228 Pa.Super. 312, 324 A.2d 477 (1974). Past conduct is not relevant unless it will produce an ongoing negative effect on the child’s welfare. In Re Leskovich, 253 Pa.Super. 349, 385 A.2d 373 (1978).

The mother in this case had some difficult periods in her life but has never abandoned her child. The step-grandparents have provided a loving home during some stressful times, but that could not give them custody by default. The mother can now provide a stable environment; she has sought and continues to rely upon community-offered help, both medical and legal, for her problems; she is successfully keeping a clean and comfortable home and raising a healthy, happy younger child. The lower court was well within its discretion in awarding custody to the mother.

The final question concerns the possibility that some of the medical records of the mother were “blanked out” between one hearing and another. Whether the records were in fact tampered with is not clear on the present record. However, the case of In Re B., 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978) makes the production of any such records moot, and we will not remand the case for augmentation of a record with material which violates the mother’s constitutional right to privacy.

In In Re B., supra, the lower court had demanded revelation of the psychiatric records of the mother of a delinquent child to help determine proper custody.

The Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to privacy forbade wholesale exposure of private records of the custodial mother. As the court pointed out, persons seeking psychiatric help are expected to “lay bare” their “entire self” to the therapist and may admit to embarrassing or shameful thoughts to obtain healing results. Such revelations deserve confidentiality. The practical application made by that court seems relevant to the instant facts as well:

The record in the instant case reveals that the patient’s hospital records were subpoenaed so that they could be evaluated by the juvenile court judge, the court’s staff psychologist, staff psychiatrist, and staff social workers, so that they might assist the court in determining who should have custody over the patient’s delinquent son. More specifically, according to the record of the hearing held pursuant to the subpoena of the hospital records regarding Mrs. B, these records were sought so that the juvenile court could decide whether or not to allow Mrs. “B’s” delinquent son to return home to live with her. The court, based on the recommendation of its staff psychologist, felt that much of the juvenile’s psychiatric history could be explained by the mother’s history. We applaud the court’s concern about proper placement for a juvenile; the court’s efforts to place the child with one of his parents are commendable.
We recognize that our holding may, in some cases, make it more difficult for the court to obtain all the information it might desire regarding members of the juvenile’s family, or about the juvenile’s friends, neighbors, and associates. The individual’s right of privacy, however, must prevail in this situation. Moreover, much, if not all, of the information sought by the juvenile court might have been obtained without ordering disclosure of materials revealed within the private confines of the mother’s constitutionally protected doctor-patient relationship. The mother might have voluntarily submitted to psychiatric examination by a court-appointed psychiatric expert who could evaluate her ability to provide a proper home for her child, or who could, based on the findings of such examination, recommend appropriate alternative placement. Neither the doctor-patient privilege created by statute, nor the constitutionally protected zone of privacy would bar such an evaluation because the mother would not be relying detrimentally on either the doctor-patient privilege or upon her right of privacy if she chose to submit to such an evaluation. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). In this way, the juvenile court could accommodate its legitimate interest in assuring proper placement of the juvenile while at the same time preserving other important social interests. Id. 394 A.2d at 426.

In the instant case we note that the court did order an updated psychiatric examination of the mother, with which she willingly complied, and the trial judge gave greater weight to the results of that recent evaluation than to any of the reports from a prior period, a proper disposition of the matter. The mother’s readiness to seek help should not be used to her prejudice, and we are in accord with the decision in In Re B that delving into the private records of a custodial parent’s psychiatric history is an impermissible invasion of privacy. Thus, the lack of certain pages of record, if true, is immaterial to the outcome of this case, and affords no reason for remand.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the court below.


author: HESTER, Judge:

text:
    445 A.2d 108
    RED OAK COMPANY v. Lucy KEMPTON, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Jan. 21, 1981.
    Filed Feb. 19, 1982.
    Reargument Denied May 20, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 19, 1982.

      John P. Karoly, Jr., Allentown, for appellant.
    Henry Perkin, Allentown, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   HESTER, Judge:

For the purposes of our disposition of this appeal, a brief summary of the procedural history of this matter will suffice. Appellee filed an action to Quiet Title on February 20, 1979 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. The case was tried before the Honorable Maxwell E. Davison, sitting without a jury, on September 13, 14 and October 16, 1979. Judge Davison heard oral argument on December 12, 1979. The respective parties also submitted briefs for the Judge’s consideration.

On March 4, 1980, Judge Davison filed an Opinion with an accompanying Order, which granted the relief requested in the appellee’s action to Quiet Title against appellant. Copies of said Order were mailed to the parties on March 4, 1980.

Appellant failed to file exceptions to the Order of March 4, 1980, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1067 and 1038, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Instead, on April 2, 1980, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. On April 24, 1980, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal. On July 17, 1980, this Court dismissed the appeal. On July 31, 1980, appellant filed an Application for Reconsideration. On November 3, 1980, this Court granted appellant’s Application for Reconsideration, and the appeal was reinstated.

After reviewing the respective briefs of the parties concerning whether the appellant has properly preserved the substantive issues for appeal, it is our decision that this appeal must be dismissed.

This Court has repeatedly held that, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1038(d), a party , who objects to the lower court’s decision must file exceptions, “[wjithin ten (10) days after notice of the filing of the decision, . . . Matters not covered by exceptions are deemed waived . . . ”. The failure of a party to file exceptions pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1038(d) will preclude any further challenge of the lower court’s decision. In Re Custody of Frank, 283 Pa.Super. 229, 423 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1980); Matczak v. Matczak, 275 Pa.Super. 164, 418 A.2d 663 (1980); Gibson v. Miller, 265 Pa.Super. 597, 402 A.2d 1033 (1979); Canada Dry Bottling Company v. Mertz, 264 Pa.Super. 480, 400 A.2d 186 (1979); Blake v. Mayo Nursing Homes, 245 Pa.Super. 274, 369 A.2d 400 (1976).

Pa.R.C.P. 1061(a) states “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the procedure in the action to quiet title from the commencement to the entry of judgment shall be in accordance with Rules relating to the action of assumpsit.”

Furthermore, Pa.R.C.P. 1067 states, “The trial of actions to Quiet Title by a judge sitting without a jury shall be in accordance with Assumpsit Rule 1038.” Therefore, Rule 1038(d) is specifically applicable to an action to Quiet Title by virtue of Rule 1067. Under these circumstances and based upon our prior decisions, the instant appeal must be dismissed.

The appellant argues that the filing of exceptions in the instant case would be unnecessary since the legal issues involved were briefed and argued before the lower court prior to its decision on March 4, 1980. Appellant further contends that the filing of exceptions would be inconsistent with Pa.R.C.P. 1066, which specifies the form of judgment or order in a Quiet Title action.

We find these arguments unpersuasive due to the fact that Rule 1038 specifically applies to an action to Quiet Title, as clearly stated by Rule 1067. Rule 1066 only relates to the form of the judgment or order and does not, in any way, affect the requirement to file exceptions pursuant to Rule 1038(d) in order to preserve any issues for appeal.

We also note that, pursuant to Rule 1038(b), the issuance of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law with appropriate discussion is within the discretion of the trial judge and does not affect the requirement of filing of exceptions.

Appeal dismissed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or review of this case.


author: CERCONE, President Judge:

text:
    445 A.2d 109
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Nicholas CASCARIO, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Dec. 5, 1980.
    Filed April 23, 1982.

      Ronold J. Karasek, Bangor, for appellant.
    Donald Corriere, District Attorney, Bangor, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, and HESTER and WIEAND, JJ.
   CERCONE, President Judge:

Appellant, Nicholas Cascario, takes this appeal from his conviction by the Court of Common Pleas for the summary offense of speeding. Appellant raises several issues on appeal, however, we are unable to reach the merits of this case because there is no indication in the record that appellant filed post-verdict motions in accordance with Pa.R. Crim.P. 1123. Commonwealth v. Koch, 288 Pa.Superior Ct. 290, 431 A.2d 1052 (1981). However, neither does the record indicate that the court advised appellant, after verdict, of his right to file post-verdict motions and the consequences of failure to so file. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(c). Our sua sponte review of the record in the instant case for purposes of determining whether the lower court complied with Rule 1123(c) is in keeping with our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Williams, 290 Pa.Superior Ct. 158, 434 A.2d 179 (1981). See also Commonwealth v. Picker, 293 Pa.Superior Ct. 381, 439 A.2d 162 (1981), Commonwealth v. Johnston, 292 Pa.Superior Ct. 224, 437 A.2d 16 (1981), Commonwealth v. Koch, supra. Based upon the authority of Williams and Koch, we accordingly conclude that appellant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to file post-verdict motions and we therefore vacate judgment of sentence and remand this case to the lower court for the filing of post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc.

Judgment of sentence vacated and case remanded for the filing of post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc.

      . Appellant was initially tried and convicted by a magistrate, but appellant appealed to the Court of Common Pleas and received a trial de novo. However, appellant was again convicted after his trial de novo.


author: BECK, Judge: SPAETH, Judge,

text:
    445 A.2d 110
    Marlene C. MORRISON and George Morrison h/w Appellants, v. David J. SPEARS, The Borough of Lansdale and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 4, 1981.
    Filed April 23, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 10,1982.

      James E. Beasley, Philadelphia, for appellants.
    John M. McNally, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and LIPEZ, JJ.
   BECK, Judge:

This appeal arises from an action in trespass to recover for personal injuries suffered by Marlene Morrison when a car carrying her husband, George Morrison, and herself collided with that of David Spears at an intersection in Lansdale, Pennsylvania on July 12, 1979. Plaintiffs, Marlene and George Morrison, allege negligent design of the intersection and defective traffic signals as contributing causes. Plaintiffs brought suit in Philadelphia County against Spears, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, and the Borough of Lansdale. The Borough filed preliminary objections, moving to dismiss for improper venue. The lower court thereafter transferred the case to Montgomery County. Plaintiffs appealed from the order of transfer and filed a Petition for Reconsideration which was denied.

Appellants argue that the trial should take place in Philadelphia County. We note that the accident occurred in Montgomery County, the Morrisons and Mr. Spears live in Montgomery County, and the Borough of Lansdale is situated in Montgomery County. We add parenthetically that this case has but one tenuous link to Philadelphia County: the Department of Transportation has an office in Philadelphia. The lower court noted that this defendant also maintains offices in Montgomery County.

It appears that venue in this case was properly transferred pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2103(b) and 1006(c). The former states:

Except when the Commonwealth is the plaintiff or when otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly, an action against a political subdivision may be brought only in the county in which the political subdivision is located. Appellants assert that where there are multiple defend-

ants, Pa.R.C.P. 1006(c) controls. That rule states:

An action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more defendants, except actions in which the Commonwealth is a party defendant, may be brought against all defendants in any county in which the venue may be laid against any one of the defendants under the general rules of Subdivisions (a) or (b).

(Emphasis added.)

Appellants cite Peaceman v. Cades, 272 Pa.Super. 568, 416 A.2d 1042 (1979), for the proposition that where there are multiple defendants “a political subdivision may be sued in a county other than where it is located.” Id., 272 Pa.Super. at 572, 416 A.2d at 1044. That case, however, did not involve the Commonwealth as a party. The Peaceman court correctly concluded that when the Commonwealth is not a party and there are two or more defendants, the action may be brought in any county in which any one of them may be served. But it is apparent that when the Commonwealth is a party, as in the instant case, venue in an action against a political subdivision is governed by Rule 2103(b). Therefore, venue was transferred properly to Montgomery County wherein the political subdivision of Lansdale is located.

Order of the lower court is affirmed.

SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion.

SPAETH, Judge,

dissenting:

Rule 2103 provides (-with exceptions not here relevant) that “an action against a political subdivision may be brought only in the county in which the political subdivision is located.” From this it would seem that the Borough of Lansdale could only be sued in Montgomery County. But Rule 1006(b) makes Rule 2103 subordinate to Rule 1006(c); and Rule 1006(c) provides that all defendants may be sued where any defendant may be, so that the Borough of Lansdale could be sued in Philadelphia County “except [when] the Commonwealth is a party defendant.” Here, of course, the Commonwealth is a party defendant. But on the facts here, that doesn’t matter. The Commonwealth could already be sued in Philadelphia, since the Department of Transportation had an office there. It seems to me that the “except” clause in Rule 1006(c) is intended to protect the Commonwealth from suit only in a county-in which it could not, but for Rule 1006(c), be sued. See United States Cold Storage v. Philadelphia, 427 Pa. 624, 235 A.2d 422, after remand, 431 Pa. 411, 246 A.2d 386 (1968) (Philadelphia and several other defendants could be sued in Dauphin County because General State Authority was a defendant and could only be sued there).

If the Borough of Lansdale had pleaded forum non conveniens, the case would be different. But it did not.

I should reverse.


author: PER CURIAM:

text:
    445 A.2d 112
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joseph M. GREY, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Feb. 3, 1982.
    Filed April 23, 1982.

      Joseph Grey, appellant, in pro. per.
    Nancy Wasser, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and McEWEN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM:

The appellant was adjudged guilty by the Philadelphia Traffic Court of a violation of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 101 et seq. and sentenced to pay a fine of twenty-five dollars plus fifteen dollars cost. At the conclusion of a de novo hearing held on June 10,1981, the distinguished Common Pleas Judge Charles Durham found the defendant guilty at which time the proceeding was terminated. On July 6, 1981, appellant filed notice of appeal to this Court.

Our study of the record in this case leads us to conclude that there is no merit to any of the contentions of the appellant. We would, therefore, affirm the decision of the Common Pleas Court. However, we must instead quash the appeal and remand to the Common Pleas Court since there was no final appealable order entered in the court below. Pa.R.A.P. 301, 341.

The hearing judge, at the conclusion of the de novo hearing upon the summary violation, did find the appellant guilty of the motor vehicle violation with which he was charged but the record does not reflect that the further required procedures were accomplished. First, the hearing judge must inform the defendant of his rights under Pa.R. Crim.P. 1123 and then, if the motions referred to in Rule 1123 are denied or are not made, the hearing judge must proceed to impose sentence and provide for the entry of the judgment of sentence upon the docket. Commonwealth v. Nugent, 291 Pa.Super. 421, 425, 435 A.2d 1298, 1300 (1981).

We regret we are compelled to this action since we share the view expressed by President Judge William F. Cercone in Commonwealth v. Koch, 288 Pa.Super. 290, 296, 431 A.2d 1052, 1055 (1981), that “the filing of post-verdict motions can further burden the already overworked judges of the Courts of Common Pleas who handle such ‘statutory appeals’ in terms of judicial time and energy.” Whatever that burden, however, the recent clarification by our Supreme Court of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123 makes clear we are bound to strictly enforce the Rule.

The appeal is quashed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      . Our Supreme Court, in its Revised Comment of April 24, 1981 upon Rule 1123, effective July 1, 1981, declared: “This rule is intended to require post-verdict motions in the Court of Common Pleas at a de novo trial in a summary case.” 11 Pa.Bull. 1643, 1645 (1981). See Commonwealth v. Nugent, supra, 291 Pa.Superior Ct. at 425 n. 7, 435 A.2d at 1300 n. 7. As the eminent Judge Abraham H. Lipez observed in a footnote to his careful and thorough opinion in Nugent, supra, “[s]ince no amendment to the text of the rule was made when the comment was amended, the apparent purpose of amending the comment was to make it clear that the Rule 1123 procedure had always been intended to apply to de novo trial[s] of summary cases in the Courts of Common Pleas.” Id.


author: CERCONE, President Judge:.

text:
    445 A.2d 113
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Carl A. COMBS. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Stanley JENKINS.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 10, 1980.
    Filed April 30, 1982.

      Victor M. Fortuno, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellant.
    Neil F. Jodelson, Philadelphia, for Combs, appellee.
    John W. Packel, Chief Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, Philadelphia, for Jenkins, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, WICKERSHAM and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   CERCONE, President Judge:.

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, takes this appeal from the order of the trial court granting defendantappellees’, Carl Angelo Combs and Stanley Jenkins, motions in arrest of judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the lower court erred in arresting judgment and we hereby reverse that order and remand for sentencing.

On February 17, 1978, the lower court judge, sitting without a jury, 'convicted both defendant-appellees on charges of simple assault, criminal conspiracy, unlawful restraint, and rape. Following the trial, as indicated, appellees filed motions in arrest of judgment which were granted by the court. In granting these post-verdict motions, the court said, “In the within matter, the Court found totally incredible the testimony of Debbie Carter, the only prosecution witness, and therefore, the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the necessary elements of each of the crimes charged.”

The scope of review of the appellate courts when reviewing the issue of sufficiency of the evidence is to examine all of the evidence and all the reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict winner; the effect of a motion in arrest of judgment is to admit all the facts which the prosecution’s evidence tends to prove. Commonwealth v. Davis, 477 Pa. 197, 383 A.2d 891 (1978); Commonwealth v. Meadows, 471 Pa. 201, 369 A.2d 1266 (1977); Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108 (1970). As the Supreme Court has said:

“In order for a trial court to properly grant a criminal defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment on the ground of insufficient evidence, ‘it must be determined that accepting all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which it believed [the verdict could properly have been based], it would be nonetheless insufficient in law to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the [defendant] is guilty of the crime charged.’ ”

Commonwealth v. Meadows, 471 Pa. at 205-206, 369 A.2d at 1268, quoting from Commonwealth v. Blevins, 453 Pa. 481, 483, 309 A.2d 421, 422 (1973).

This Court has reviewed the entire record in the instant case and, after applying the above-cited rules, we find that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts rendered. At the trial, only two witnesses testified—the complainant, Debbie Carter, and appellee, Carl Combs. The complainant, who was fifteen years old at the time of the incident, testified that she had known the appellees “for years” and that on November 14, 1977, at approximately 6:30 p. m., she was at her girlfriend’s house when she saw appellee Jenkins walking down the street. She spoke to Jenkins for a while and he invited Debbie to accompany him to the local bar. At the bar, they met appellee Combs, who was twenty-two years old at the time. The three of them remained at the bar for about half an hour, during which time appellees drank some beer. Debbie had nothing to drink. Jenkins then asked Debbie if she would accompany appellees to a nearby discotheque, and Debbie agreed to do so. As before, Debbie had nothing to drink. The three of them remained at the discotheque for approximately half an hour, after which time they walked to the neighborhood playground, at the suggestion of appellee Jenkins.

• On the premises of the playground was a building; appellee Jenkins had the keys to the building and opened the door. According to Debbie’s testimony, she had been in this building during the summer to play ping-pong and similar games, so she was familiar with the place. On the evening in question, however, Debbie and the two appellees went inside the building to a large room containing a desk, a couch and a chair. Once inside, Debbie sat in the chair, Combs, on the desk, and Jenkins chose the couch. The three of them sat there for a time, talking, while at the same time Debbie doodled with a crayon on a piece of paper. Debbie admitted at trial that her mother had told Debbie to stay away from Jenkins, but Debbie liked to talk to Jenkins (and with Combs), which is why she went with Jenkins despite her mother’s orders. Debbie further testified that when she arrived at the playground, she called her mother and told her mother that she was still at her girlfriend’s house and that she would be home soon. Debbie then said that after talking with appellees for a while appellee Jenkins told Debbie that “he always wanted [Debbie].” A short time after Jenkins made his remark, Debbie said that she was ready to leave but Jenkins told her that the door was locked, and he pushed the couch in front of the door. Jenkins then grabbed Debbie and pinned her arms behind her in a “full Nelson.” Debbie testified that she attempted to break Jenkins’ grip but she could not and that while Jenkins held her, Combs stripped Debbie of her slacks and underpants. Jenkins then forced Debbie to the couch and raped her; after Jenkins stood up, Combs raped Debbie.

After the rapes, Debbie, who was crying, went into the bathroom to wash her hands and to get dressed. When she came out, the sofa was moved back into its place and Debbie tried to open the door but it was locked. Jenkins opened the door and Debbie was allowed to leave. Debbie testified that when she returned home she did not tell her mother about the rapes, but, rather, told her mother that she was crying because she had been smoking marijuana. Debbie said that she did not tell her mother the truth because she was afraid that her mother might stab one of the men, instead of going to the police to report the incident. About three days after the attack, Debbie told her girlfriend’s mother of the incident, and this woman called Debbie’s mother and told her.

At trial, appellees did not deny that they had intercourse with Debbie on the night in question but appellees claimed that Debbie consented and that no rape occurred. Obviously, credibility was a key factor here and the trial judge, sitting without a jury, in handing down the verdict credited Debbie Carter’s testimony over that of Carl Combs, saying when he handed down the verdict:

THE COURT: Mr. Combs and Mr. Jenkins, this Court has carefully considered the type and quality of the evidence presented in this case.
This jury [sic] has brought to the jury box all of its experience in human life, so that when it heard the testimony presented, it applied those experiences in order to resolve issues of inconsistencies.
This jury [sic], having completed that process, concludes that the Commonwealth has established the necessary elements of the crimes for which each of you are charged, and accordingly find you, Carl Combs, and you, Stanley Jenkins, guilty of the charges lodged.

Three months after handing down his verdicts in this case, the trial judge reassessed the credibility question and reversed his position, now finding the testimony of Debbie Carter to lack credibility because she admitted lying to her mother about where she was going on the evening in question and because she admitted that she willingly accompanied the appellees throughout the evening. Now finding the testimony of the Commonwealth’s sole witness to lack credibility, the trial judge sustained the motion in arrest of judgment ostensibly on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. This was error.

In Commonwealth v. Meadows, 471 Pa. at 205 n.5, 369 A.2d at 1268, n.5, the Supreme Court citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 1102(a), wrote, “[T]he trial judge’s authority over the verdict [in a non-jury case] ... is no greater than the authority of a trial judge over a jury verdict.” (Emphasis added.) In Meadows, as in the case sub judice, the trial judge, sitting without a jury, found the accused guilty as charged. Subsequently, however, upon reviewing the accused’s motion in arrest of judgment the trial court re-evaluated the credibility of the Commonwealth’s chief witness and of the weight to be assigned thereto. The Supreme Court held that this re-evaluation of credibility was not in keeping with the standards articulated for considering a motion in arrest of judgment, and for this reason the Court found the trial court to be in error for arresting judgment as it did. The Supreme Court was faced with the same issue in Commonwealth v. Davis, supra, and once again the Court held that the trial court erred in granting a motion in arrest of judgment where the trial court’s ruling on this motion meant a re-evaluation of the credibility of a key witness for the Commonwealth.

In this Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 245 Pa.Superior Ct. 33, 369 A.2d 279 (1976), affirmed, 476 Pa. 269, 382 A.2d 715 (1977) (remanded on other grounds), Judge Spaeth in his concurring opinion set forth the problem quite clearly, saying:

“Anyone who has been a trial judge will recognize what happened here. The judge had a difficult decision to make. He made it—he found appellant guilty—but then he started to worry that perhaps he had made a mistake. “We have all experienced such worry. It can be very painful. It does not, however, justify a change of mind. Had the judge been sitting with a jury, and had one of the jurors come to him after the trial and expressed the wish to change his verdict, the judge would have told him that he could not. Here, the judge was the jury. He should have said to himself what he would have said to the juror. “It is important to note a distinction in the cases. If a judge sitting without a jury indicates by something he says on the record that when he found the defendant guilty, he had a reasonable doubt, we will—must—reverse. Commonwealth v. Oglesby, 438 Pa. 91, 94, 263 A.2d 419, 420-421 (1970), Commonwealth v. Molina, 236 Pa.Super. 598, 601, 346 A.2d 351, 353 (1975) (Dissenting Opinion by Spaeth, J. in which Hoffman and Cercone, JJ., joined). The reason is that the record discloses error of law; the case is the same, in substance, as though the judge had been sitting with a jury and had failed to instruct the jury that it could not find the defendant guilty unless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not such a case. There is nothing on the record to support the conclusion that when the judge found appellant guilty, he had a reasonable doubt. It only appears that the judge had some doubt later. Thus, no error of law appears. In these circumstances both the trial judge and we are without power to change the verdict.” 245 Pa.Superior Ct. at 38-39, 369 A.2d 279.

The judge in the instant case made no bones about the fact that he was reassessing the credibility of the Commonwealth’s witness when the judge ruled upon defendant-appellees’ motion in arrest of judgment. We find the trial • judge to be in error and we hereby reverse his decision arresting judgment and reinstate the guilty verdicts.

Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

      . Where the question is purely one of law, the Commonwealth may appeal from an adverse ruling in a criminal case; thus, the Commonwealth may appeal from the decisión of a trial court arresting judgment after verdict in a criminal case. Commonwealth v. Glendening, 262 Pa.Superior Ct. 357, 396 A.2d 793 (1979).

      . Pa.R.Crim.P. 1102(a) provides: “When a defendant waives a jury trial, the trial judge shall determine all questions of law and fact and render a verdict which shall have the same force and effect as a verdict of a jury.”


text:
    December 1, 1980.
    445 A.2d 194
    Rogovitz et al. v. Guiras Ind. et al. Appeal of Potomac Insurance Company.
    Reargument Denied Feb. 23,1981.
    Argued September 10, 1979.
    Charles W. Craven, for appellants at No. 2947 and for appellees at No. 5;
    Jerome M. Dubyn, for appellees at No. 2947 and for appellants at No. 5.

      Before CERCONE, P.J., and WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment and order affirmed.


text:
    February 19, 1982.
    442 A.2d 348
    Bailey, Appellant v. Bailey.
    Argued June 22, 1981.
    Gary M. Light-man, for appellant;
    Joshua D. Lock, submitted a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before PRICE, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The order of Court of June 25, 1980, is affirmed on the opinion of the Judge Lipsitt. Having made an independent, study of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the court below properly denied a decree in divorce in this case.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 349
    Cohen, Appellant v. Forbes Hospital System et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 10, 1982.

      Argued April 13, 1981.
    Kenneth W. Behrend, for appellant;
    Charles H. Alpern, for Forbes, etc., appellee (at No. 1058);
    Robert B. Smith, for City of Pittsburgh, etc., appellee (at No. 1059).
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment dated October 1, 1980 is affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 349
    Commonwealth v. Blagman, Appellant.
    Argued February 18, 1981.
    H. Weston Tomlinson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    David E. Fritchey, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 349
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.

      Argued December 1, 1980.
    Richard B. Moore, for appellant;
    Maureen A. Brennan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and HOFFMAN, J.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    442 A.2d 350
    Commonwealth v. Freeman, Appellant.
    Submitted October 5,1981.
    Robert J. Breslin, Jr., for appellant;
    Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 350
    Commonwealth v. Henderson, Appellant.

      Submitted May 26, 1981.
    Ronald J. Harper, for appellant;
    Mark Gurevitz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 350
    Commonwealth v. LeFevre, Appellant.
    Argued June 23, 1981.
    Peter J. O’Donnell, for appellant;
    William A. Helm, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 351
    Commonwealth v. Miller, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 16, 1982.

      Submitted October 5, 1981.
    Peter A. Levin, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 351
    Commonwealth v. Pilkington, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 3, 1982.
    Submitted May 12, 1981.
    Nino V. Tinari, for appellant;
    Joseph Frontino, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 351
    Commonwealth v. Ragin, Appellant.
    Argued December 14, 1981.
    Nathaniel C. Nichols, for appellant;
    Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 351
    Commonwealth v. Ream, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 2, 1982.
    Submitted March 11, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 352
    Commonwealth v. Reeder, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 1, 1982.
    Submitted January 21, 1981.
    John P. Campana, for appellant;
    Kenneth D. Brown, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before HESTER, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 352
    Commonwealth v. Roman, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Argued January 20, 1981.
    William F. Fox, Jr., for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 352
    Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, Appellant.
    Submitted June 3, 1981.
    John F. Pyfer, Jr., for appellant;
    Charles B. Grove, Jr., for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 353
    Commonwealth v. White, Appellant.
    Submitted November 10, 1981.
    Paulette J. Balogh, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 353
    Commonwealth v. Widmyer, Appellant.
    Argued April 29, 1981.
    Stephen J. Mirizio, for appellant;
    William Madden, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 705, this case is hereby transferred to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania for consideration and decision.


text:
    442 A.2d 353
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.

      Submitted November 5,1981.
    Robert S. Gownley, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ernest D. Preate, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 353
    Courier Building Company, etc. v. Florence PTG, etc., Appellant.
    Argued May 20, 1981.
    Nicholas F. Lorenzo, Jr., for appellant;
    Ervin S. Fennell, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 354
    Ford, Appellant v. Ford.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 16, 1982.

      Argued January 26, 1981.
    Joseph P. Ford, appellant, in propria persona;
    Richard H. Knox, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 354
    Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trenge et al. Appeal of Franklin G. Trenge, t/a Farmington Realty and Farmington Building Corp.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 30, 1982.
    Submitted June 3, 1981.
    Charles E. Sieger, Jr., for appellant;
    Richard F. Stevens, for Harleysville, appellee;
    Armin Feldman, for Borger, Admin., participating party;
    F. Paul Laubner, for Beck, Admin., participating party;
    Jeffrey B. Matzkin, for Kochenash, participating party;
    Jack Feinberg, for Edgar, Mika, Boyer, Robert and Wayne German and Roberts, participating parties;
    Richard W. Hopkins, for Lehigh Ins. and Houpt, participating parties.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 354
    Estate of Niessen. Appeal of Geesey, et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 11, 1982.
    Argued December 2, 1981.
    William H. Poole, for appellant;
    Sharon E. Myers, for participating parties.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 355
    Lear, a minor, etc. v. Neshaminy School Dist., Appellant.
    Argued September 10, 1981.
    William T. Renz, for appellant;
    Thomas J. Corrigan, Jr., for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 355
    McCully v. Dic Corp. of Pa. et al. Appeal of Frankel-Wolgin, E. J. Frankel Construction Co., Inc., and 1845 Walnut Street Corporation a/k/a 1845 Walnut Street Associates and E. J. Frankel Enterprises.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.

      Argued September 9, 1981.
    James J. McEldrew, for appellants;
    Carl M. Mazzacone, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, McEWEN and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., concurred in the result.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    442 A.2d 355
    McCully v. Dic Corp. of Pa. et al. Appeal of The Dic Concrete Corp. of Pennsylvania.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Argued September 9, 1981.
    David Richman, for Die Concrete Corp., appellant;
    Carl M. Mazzocone, for McCully, appellee;
    James J. McEldrew, for Frankel-Wolgin, et al., appellees.
    Before HESTER, McEWEN and SHERTZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., concurred in the result.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    442 A.2d 356
    Munn v. Sult, Appellants.
    Argued January 21, 1981.
    Daniel G. Flannery, submitted a brief on behalf of appellants;
    Elliot B. Edley, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 356
    Riley, a minor, etc. v. Byun, Appellant.
    Argued January 20, 1981.
    Gilbert P. High, Jr., for appellant;
    Theodore Q. Thompson, submitted a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 356
    Rizzuto, Appellant v. City of York, et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 20, 1982.
    Argued June 24, 1981.
    Samuel K. Gates, for appellant;
    Joseph W. Moyer, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The order dated April 8, 1980 is affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., concurred in the result.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Decision was rendered prior to SHERTZ, J., leaving the bench of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


text:
    442 A.2d 357
    Rogoz, et al., Appellants v. Brennan et al.
    Argued May 21, 1981.
    Lee C. McCandless, for appellants;
    Gene E. Arnold, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    February 26, 1982.
    442 A.2d 357
    Brantner v. Bedford Improved TV Inc., et al., Appellants.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 16, 1982.
    Argued December 2, 1980.
    David P. Andrews, for appellants;
    Alan Krier, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 357
    Commercial Banking Corp. v. Butikus, Appellants.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 24, 1982.
    Argued April 1, 1981.
    Joseph Michael Smith, for appellant;
    Andrew N. Schwartz, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CERCONE, P. J., dissented.


text:
    442 A.2d 357
    Commonwealth v. Atkins, Appellant.
    Submitted April 13, 1981.
    Donald R. Calaiaro, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Harper.


text:
    442 A.2d 358
    Commonwealth v. Chapman, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 358
    Commonwealth v. Fant, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 13, 1982.
    Submitted May 22, 1981.
    John Halley, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 358
    Commonwealth v. Figueroa, Appellant.
    Submitted February 25, 1981.
    Charles J. Fonzone, for appellant;
    William Ford, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 359
    Commonwealth v. Floyd, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 30, 1982.
    Submitted March 9, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

HESTER, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    442 A.2d 359
    Commonwealth v. Galbraith, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 28, 1982.
    Submitted May 20, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 359
    Commonwealth v. Kozminski, Appellant.
    Submitted March 17, 1980.
    Michael Yanoff, for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 359
    Commonwealth v. Leymeister, Appellant.
    Submitted February 18, 1981.
    Frank R. Cori, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Richard B. Russell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 360
    Commonwealth v. Lucas, Appellant.
    Submitted April 14, 1981.
    Joseph P. Martone, for appellant;
    Frank J. Scutella, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence dated May 18, 1978 is affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 360
    Commonwealth v. Mateo, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Marilyn J. Gelb, for appellant;
    Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 360
    Commonwealth v. McFadden, Appellant.

      Submitted June 13, 1980.
    David Zwanetz, for appellant;
    Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 361
    Commonwealth v. Nauss, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 19, 1982.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    James M. Pierce, for appellant;
    Frank Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 361
    Commonwealth v. Palmer, Appellant.

      Submitted March 11,1981.
    Abraham Leizerowski, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 361
    Commonwealth v. Pippet, Appellant.
    Submitted September 10, 1981.
    Parke H. Ulrich, for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 361
    Commonwealth v. Pompey, Appellant.
    Argued February 17, 1981.
    Louis Podel, for appellant;
    Cynthia H. Severinsen, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 362
    Commonwealth v. Wise, Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    446 A.2d 666
    Glasgow, Inc. v. O'Hara, Appellant. Glasgow, Inc., Appellant v. O'Hara et al.
    Reargument Denied July 1, 1982.
    Argued September 10, 1980.
    Daniel Quinlan, for O’Hara, appellant (at No. 87) and appellee (at No. 94);
    John G. Kaufman, for Glasgow, appellant (at No. 94) and appellee (at No. 87).

      Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 362
    Glockner, Appellant v. Redevelopment Authority.
    Argued February 18, 1981.
    Samuel Rappaport, for appellant;
    Carl S. Primavera, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 362
    Hankin, et al., Appellants v. Hankin, et al.
    Argued March 19, 1980.
    Franklin Poul, for appellants;
    Thomas A. Allen, for Moe, Sabina, Gertrude and Perch Hankin and Benjamin and Pauline Shanken, appellees;
    Mark J. Sonnenfield, for Samuel and Harriet Hankin, appellees;
    John Chesney, for Pan American, appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Affirmed.

PRICE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    442 A.2d 363
    Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa. v. Wheeler, et al., Appellants.
    Argued November 6, 1981.
    Paul F. X. Gallagher, for appellants;
    Susan C. Waltman, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    442 A.2d 363
    Jakobowski, Appellant v. Jakobowski.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 30, 1982.
    Argued May 6, 1981.
    Joseph T. Murphy, Jr., for appellant;
    Medford Brown, III, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, CAVANAUGH and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    March. 5, 1982.
    443 A.2d 368
    Auth v. Auth, Appellant.

      Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Frank J. Marcone, for appellant;
    Patrick C. O’Donnell, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order of the lower court affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 368
    Coleman, Appellant v. Katz, et al.
    Argued January 20, 1982.
    Allen L. Feingold, for appellant;
    Charles W. Craven, for Katz, appellees;
    John Thomas Quinn, for Canning, appellees.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order dated May 14, 1981 is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 369
    Commonwealth v. Adair, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted September 23, 1981.
    James L. Goldsmith, for appellant;
    Marion E. MacIntyre, First Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 369.
    Commonwealth v. Anderson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 23, 1982.
    Argued December 14, 1981.
    Michael A. Klimpl, for appellant;
    Michael S. Goodwin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 369
    Commonwealth v. Bryant, Appellant.
    Submitted February 11, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., BROSKY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 370
    Commonwealth v. Curry, Appellant.
    Argued March 25, 1981.
    Larry A. Kalikow, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Rolf W. Bienk, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 370
    Commonwealth v. Farris, Appellant.
    Submitted November 30, 1981.
    William C. Cramer, for appellant;
    John R. Walker, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 370
    Commonwealth v. Fedalen, Appellant.

      Submitted February 24, 1981.
    John Mercuri, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ernest D. Preate, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence imposed on June 12, 1980, and the denial on July 1, 1980, of the petition to withdraw the guilty plea, are affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 370
    Commonwealth v. Feflie, Appellant.
    Submitted June 3, 1981.
    Herbert V. Giobbi, for appellant;
    Michael Vedomsky, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed on the opinion of the Honorable Robert A. Freedberg, Court of Common Pleas, Northampton County.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    443 A.2d 371
    Commonwealth v. Gerrick, Appellant.
    Submitted February 17, 1981.
    Franklin D. Green, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 371
    Commonwealth v. Gill, Jr., Appellant.
    Argued November 16, 1981.
    Merritt E. McKnight, for appellant;
    Frederick Lingle, District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 371
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Gould.

      Argued December 14, 1981.
    Michael S. Goodwin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant;
    Charles J. Conturso,- for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Appeal dismissed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 372
    Commonwealth v. Gudat, Appellant.
    Argued June 24, 1981.
    Victor Dell ’Alba, for appellant;
    Floyd P. Jones, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The. judgment of sentence is affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    443 A.2d 372
    Commonwealth v. Hipszer, Appellant.

      Submitted March 21, 1980.
    Arthur J. King, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald R. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 372
    Commonwealth v. Hoff, Jr., Appellant.
    Argued December 5, 1980.
    Henry V. Klein, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Thomas E. Boop, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 373
    Commonwealth v. Husovsky, Appellant.

      Argued February 18, 1981.
    George A. Heitczman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Richard H. Pepper, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 1195
    Commonwealth v. McGinley, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 16, 1982.
    Submitted November 30, 1981.
    Robert B. Lieberman, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 373
    Commonwealth v. Moore, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 25, 1982.

      Submitted February 17, 1981.
    George F. Schoener, Jr., for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 373
    Commonwealth v. Oliver, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 13, 1982.
    Submitted January 20, 1981.
    Joseph Jude Oliver, appellant, in propria persona;
    George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 373
    Commonwealth v. Owens, Appellant.

      Submitted November 9, 1981.
    Peter E. Horney, for appellant;
    Donald E. Williams, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 374
    Commonwealth v. Owens, Appellant.
    Argued September 10,1980.
    L. Carter Anderson, for appellant;
    Kenneth Gallant, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 374
    Commonwealth v. Pittman, Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 1981.
    Bruce D. Foreman, for appellant;
    Marion E. MacIntyre, First Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 374
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, Appellant.
    Argued February 19, 1981.
    John Rogers Carroll, for appellant;
    Nancy D. Wasser, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    443 A.2d 374
    Commonwealth v. Ryan, Appellant.
    Argued December 15, 1981.
    Paul M. Yatron, for appellant;
    George Yatron, District Attorney, did not file a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 375
    Commonwealth v. Washington, Appellant.
    Argued November 5, 1981.
    George Gershenfeld, for appellant;
    Gail Thackery, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 375
    Commonwealth v. Watson, Appellant.
    Argued December 14, 1981.
    Edward A. Savastio, for appellant;
    David E. Fritchey, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order of court affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 375
    Commonwealth v. Wright, Appellant.

      Argued November 11, 1980.
    Vincent R. Baginski, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 376
    1st Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Stohon. Appeal of: George A. Stohon, Sr.
    Argued November 11, 1980. Anthony J. Seneca, for appellant;
    William M. Baily, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 376
    Jones v. American Motors Corp., et al.
    Argued June 12, 1980.
    Edwin F. McCoy, for appellants;
    George Young, for appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.

LIPEZ, J., dissented.


text:
    443 A.2d 376
    Kimmel, Appellant v. Penn Central Trans. Co.
    Submitted February 19, 1981.
    Keith S. Erbstein, for appellant;
    Theodore Kerrine, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 376
    Matero, Appellant v. Keystone Insurance Company.
    Submitted December 16, 1981.
    Sidney I. Leabman, for appellant;
    Mark R. Bosinak, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

BECK, J., concurred in the result.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 377
    Moody, Appellant v. The Carlton House, et al.
    Submitted April 15, 1981.
    John M. Silvestri, for appellant;
    John M. Kish, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The order entered September 5,1980 granting the Petition to Strike Judgment against Defendant Carlton House is affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    443 A.2d 377
    Queer et ux. v. Sharp v. Erie Insurance Group, Appellant.
    Argued November 13, 1980.
    Dennis B. Rafferty, for appellant;
    John W. Pollins, for appellees.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 377
    Twin Tex Sales Co. v. Zoltan Toth Co., Inc., Appellant.
    Submitted June 13, 1980.
    Thomas F. Traud, for appellant;
    Jackson Sigmon, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    March 12, 1982.
    443 A.2d 378
    Biles, Appellant v. Campisi.
    Argued December 16, 1981.
    S. Regen Ginsburg, for appellant;
    Nathaniel P. D’Amico, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

BECK, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 378
    Commonwealth v. Arabia, Appellant.

      Submitted January 13, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion by Judge John W. O’Brien of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.


text:
    443 A.2d 378
    Commonwealth v. Bolar, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Submitted November 4, 1981.
    Nino V. Tinari, for appellant;
    Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 378
    Commonwealth v. Brazzle, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 23, 1982.

      Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Timothy H. Knauer, for appellant;
    Alan Jarvis, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Marrone.


text:
    443 A.2d 379
    Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 11, 1982.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

MONTGOMERY, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 379
    Commonwealth v. Caldwell, Sr., Appellant.

      Submitted April 1, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 379
    Commonwealth v. Francy, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 2, 1982.
    Submitted January 14, 1981.
    Thomas P. Ruane, Jr., for appellant;
    Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 380
    Commonwealth v. Godfrey, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 11, 1982.

      Argued September 1,1981.
    Raymond Bogarty, for appellant;
    Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    443 A.2d 380
    Commonwealth v. Graham, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 1, 1982.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Nino V. Tinari, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Ordér affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 380
    Commonwealth v. Hargrove, Jr., Appellant.

      Submitted May 12, 1981.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 380
    Commonwealth v. Harrison, Appellant.
    Argued January 21, 1981.
    Malcolm W. Berkowitz, for appellant;
    Mark S. Gurevitz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    443 A.2d 381
    Commonwealth v. Hollis, Appellant.
    Submitted February 2, 1981.
    James J. Phelan, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 381
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Argued September 11, 1980.
    David P. Trulli, for appellant;
    Eliot Present, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 381
    Commonwealth v. Kash, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 18, 1982.
    Submitted May 20, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 382
    Commonwealth v. Kirkland, Appellant.
    Submitted February 23, 1981.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence dated May 28, 1980 is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 382
    Commonwealth v. Kodash, Appellant.
    Argued December 15,1981.
    Michael F. Flannery, for appellant;
    George Yatron, District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 382
    Commonwealth v. Lamb, Appellant.
    Submitted February 23,1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 383
    Commonwealth v. McKahan, Appellant.

      Submitted May 22, 1981.
    Steve P. Leskinen, for appellant;
    Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 383
    Commonwealth v. Millner, Appellant.
    Submitted December 2, 1981.
    John M. Glace, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 383
    Commonwealth v. Mosley, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 20, 1982.

      Argued December 9, 1981.
    William T. Cannon, for appellant;
    Gary Tennis, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 383
    Commonwealth v. Murray, Appellant.
    Submitted June 22, 1981.
    H. Stanley Rebert, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Thompson J. McCullough, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 384
    Commonwealth v. Nelson, Appellant.
    Submitted May 22, 1981.
    Wayne S. Lipecky, for appellant;
    Edward H. Tocci, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 384
    Commonwealth v. Nonnemacher, Appellant.
    Submitted February 2, 1981.
    Edward C. McCardle, for appellant;
    William H. Platt, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Backenstoe of the court below.


text:
    443 A.2d 384
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, Appellant.
    Submitted June 2, 1981.
    Gary P. Heslin, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before ROWLEY, McEWEN and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 385
    Commonwealth v. Smyre, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Argued December 16, 1981.
    Dennis J. Cogan, for appellant;
    Deborah Fox, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   We affirm the judgment of sentence on the comprehensive and able opinion of James D. McCrudden, J.


text:
    443 A.2d 385
    Commonwealth v. Struble, Appellant.
    Argued November 10, 1980.
    Robert G. Kochems, for appellant;
    David B. Douds, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 385
    Commonwealth v. Survis, Appellant.
    Argued February 3, 1981.
    John M. Wajert, for appellant;
    Joseph J. Devanney, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 385
    Commonwealth v. Thoma, Appellant.
    Argued April 14, 1981.
    Patricia McCommon, for appellant;
    Stella L. Smetanka, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The order of August 22, 1980 is affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., concurred in the result.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    443 A.2d 386
    Commonwealth v. Wagner, Appellant.
    Submitted June 23,1981.
    Steven V. Manbeck, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael Johnston, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee..
    Before PRICE, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 386
    Commonwealth v. Walker, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied July 9, 1982.
    Argued March 25, 1981.
    James H. Rowland, Jr., for appellant;
    Rolf W. Bienk, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 386
    Commonwealth v. Wareham, Appellant.
    Submitted March 9,1981.
    Edward F. Kane, for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 387
    Commonwealth v. Vinks, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 28, 1982.
    Submitted February 25, 1981.
    Nino V. Tinari, for appellant;
    David Fritchey, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 387
    Feiertag, Appellant v. Rockwood Insurance, Co., et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Argued May 13, 1981.
    John E. Roberts, for appellant;
    Conrad G. Lipsin, for Rockwood, appellee;
    Frank A. Baker, III, for Daily Express, appellee;
    Thomas I. Vanaskie, for Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 387
    Forte, Appellant v. DiBenedetto and Tuono.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 16, 1982.
    Argued September 10, 1980.
    Joseph P. Briglia, for appellant;
    Joseph R. Livesey, for appellee.
    Before BROSRY, WATRINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Takiff.


text:
    443 A.2d 387
    Heatley v. Heatley, Appellant.
    Argued March 30, 1981.
    Joseph L. Rosenfeld, for appellant;
    Wallace H. Webster, Jr., for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 388
    In the Estate of: Carrie E. Baum, Dec'd. Appeal of: Charles F. Rose, The Exceptant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 16, 1982.
    Argued November 6, 1981.
    Dennis L. Plank, for appellant;
    Harris C. Arnold, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the basis of lower court opinion.


text:
    443 A.2d 388
    National Fleet Leasing Corp., Appellant v. K & S Cafe.

      Bernard S. Rubb, for appellant;
    John A. Metz, Jr., for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 388
    Rumpf, et ux. v. Rutledge Construction, Co., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Submitted January 12, 1981.
    Robert W. Goehring, for appellant;
    Herbert J. Zeh, Jr., for Rumpf, appellees;
    Anthony J. Martin, for Nam, Inc., appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order and judgment affirmed.


text:
    March 19, 1982.
    443 A.2d 388
    Arthur Moser Associates v. Jacobson et ux., Appellants.
    Argued October 14, 1981.
    John M. Silvestri, submitted a brief on behalf of appellants;
    S. Asher Winicoff, for appellee.

      Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The order is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 389
    Atwood Home Builders v. Zanakis, etc. Appeal of: Irene Straka. Appeal of: Mamie Zanakis.
    Argued April 14, 1981.
    Damon J. Faldowski, for Straka, appellant (at No. 698) and appellee (at No. 795);
    Anthony J. Seneca, for Zanakis, appellant (at No. 795) and appellee (at No. 698);
    W. Thomas Laffey, Jr., for Atwood, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   The order granting summary judgment against the appellants is affirmed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    443 A.2d 389
    Boyle v. Boyle, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Marc Reuben, for appellant;
    Walter B. Dunsmore, for appellee.

      Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and WIEAND, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 389
    Clark, Appellant v. Philadelphia Housing Authority.
    Argued January 26, 1982.
    Joyce Sessoms Wilkerson, for appellant;
    James Maurice Deleon, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 390
    Commonwealth v. Baldwin, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Charles W. Smith, for appellant;
    Mary M. Killinger, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and WIEAND, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 390
    Commonwealth v. Blair, Appellant.
    Submitted December 14, 1981.
    Gregory V. Smith, for appellant;
    Frederick D. Lingle, did not file a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 390
    Commonwealth v. Brooks, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Submitted June 24, 1981.
    Marilyn C. Zilli, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Marion E. MacIntyre, First Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 390
    Commonwealth v. Cobbs, Appellant.
    Submitted November 14, 1980.
    David G. Metinko, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 391
    Commonwealth v. Dowling, Appellant.
    Submitted February 3,1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Bart-hold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 391
    Commonwealth v. Good, Appellant.

      Submitted November 10, 1980.
    M. Scot Curran, for appellant;
    Francis C. Sichko, Assistant District Attorney, or Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 391
    Commonwealth v. Herndon, Appellant.
    Submitted February 10, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., BROSKY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 392
    Commonwealth v. Huggins, Appellant.

      Submitted June 23, 1981.
    John D. Flinchbaugh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Harry M. Ness, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 392
    Commonwealth v. Ilgin, Appellant.
    Argued March 24, 1981.
    Steven V. Manbeck, for appellant;
    Michael Johnston, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 392
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted February 25, 1981.
    Arthur J. King, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before SPAETH, WIEAND and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence dated August 4, 1980 is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 392
    Commonwealth v. Lewis, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 8,1982.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Daniel M. Preminger, for appellant;
    Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 393
    Commonwealth v. Lowe, Appellant.
    Submitted January 25, 1982.
    Stephen A. Seidel, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 393
    Commonwealth v. Lucas, Appellant.
    Argued September 1, 1981.
    Joseph Martone, for appellant;
    Shad Connelly, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 393
    Commonwealth v. Madison, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 9,1982.
    Argued September 14, 1981.
    Ronald J. Sharper, for appellant;
    Mark Gurevitz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, DiSALLE and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    443 A.2d 394
    Commonwealth v. Mills, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Submitted June 23, 1981.
    Jonathan Blum, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and DiSALLE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DiSALLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    443 A.2d 394
    Commonwealth v. Myers, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 15,1982.
    Argued September 10, 1981.
    Charles R. Rosamilia, Jr., for appellant;
    Richard Saxton, Special Prosecutor, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 394
    Commonwealth v. Norton, Appellant.
    Submitted March 9, 1981.
    Barry H. Denker, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 394
    Commonwealth v. Padworny, Appellant.
    Submitted February 19, 1981.
    Arthur J. King, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 395
    Commonwealth v. Phillips, Appellant.
    Argued September 9, 1980.
    John B. Talierco, for appellant;
    Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

BROSKY, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    443 A.2d 395
    Commonwealth v. Terrell, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 16, 1982.
    Submitted January 28, 1981.
    Lee Mandell, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, JOHNSON and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 395
    Commonwealth v. Tulanowski, Appellant.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Patrick J. Flannery, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 396
    Commonwealth v. Yukovich, Appellant.
    Argued May 20, 1981.
    Raymond Bogaty, for appellant;
    Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before MONTGOMERY, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence, as modified, affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 396
    Commonwealth v. Washington, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Argued December 1, 1980.
    Mark E. Kogan, for appellant;
    Andrew B. Cohn, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 396
    Commonwealth v. Wible, Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    Jay H. Gingrich, for appellant;
    John F. Nelson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order of lower court affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 396
    Commonwealth v. Williams a/k/a Duffy, Appellant.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Timothy A. Crawford, Jr., for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and WIEAND, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 397
    Commonwealth v. Wright, Appellant.
    Argued January 26, 1982.
    Edward J. McMearty, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Rex Rohland Gary, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 397
    Commonwealth ex rel. Hedmeck v. Hedmeck. Appeal of: Hedmeck.

      Submitted January 27, 1982.
    Alfred P. Antonelli, for appellant;
    Thomas P. Stitt, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 397
    D’Anna et ux., Appellants v. Moody.
    Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Frank M. Jakobowski, for appellants;
    Michael Dissette, did not file a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and WIEAND, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 398
    Dyer, Appellant v. Lower Bucks County Hospital.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 10, 1982.
    Argued January 25, 1982.
    John P. Koopman, for appellant;
    Allan H. Starr, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 398
    General Motors v. Allstate Indemnity Co. et al. Appeal of: Allstate Indemnity Co.
    Argued April 1, 1981.
    Joseph P. Selfridge, for appellant;
    Margaret Mary King, for General Motors, appellee. Daniel S. Lossing, for Continental Bank, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P. J., HESTER and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The order dated December 7, 1979 is affirmed on the comprehensive opinion of Judge Latrone.


text:
    443 A.2d 398
    Green, Appellant v. Fritz.
    Submitted April 6, 1981.
    Roger T. Margolis, for appellant;
    Gordon J. Daghir, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 398
    In re: Adoption of S. M. G. Barry and Judith G., Participating Parties. Appeal of: D. G.

      Argued January 27, 1982.
    Judith L. Jones, for appellant;
    Robert M. Davison, for participating party.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 399
    In The Matter Of: J. A. H., K. R. H. and J. T. H. Appeal of: P. H.
    Submitted May 21, 1981.
    William Taggart, for appellant;
    William Dopierala, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 399
    Lankenau Hospital v. Smith, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 30, 1982.
    Argued January 25,1982.
    James L. Womer, for appellant;
    Michael Borish, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order of the court below is affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 399
    Niemeyer v. Niemeyer, Appellant.
    Argued January 26, 1982.
    Arthur L. Jenkins, for appellant;
    Richard A. Mitchell, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 399
    Sanzo v. Sanzo, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 1981.
    John Alden, for appellant;
    Nelson Romisher, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 400
    Thomas v. Cooper, Appellant.
    Argued January 11, 1982.
    Leo C. Harper, Jr., for appellant;
    Patricia G. Miller, for appellee.

      Before HESTER, BECK and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    443 A.2d 400
    Tomchik v. Dawson, et al. Appeal of: Philip MARINO and The Pittsburgh Press, Co.
    Argued September 29, 1981.
    Dennis St. J. Mulvihill, for appellants;
    Frank E. Little, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., concurred in the result.