author: CERCONE, Judge:

text:
    530 A.2d 1334
    Gilda MECCA, Administratrix of the Estate of Elizabeth Hope Mecca, Deceased v. Frank LUKASIK and Antoinette Lukasik, his wife, Administrators of the Estate of Anthony Lukasik, Deceased, Appellants. Joseph HAFICH and Charlotte Hafich, his wife, Administrators of the Estate of Jody Hafich, deceased v. Frank LUKASIK and Antoinette Lukasik, his wife, Administrators of the Estate of Anthony Lukasik, deceased, Appellants. Rodney CIZIK and Joan Cizik, his wife, Administrators of the Estate of Michelle Cizik, Deceased v. Frank LUKASIK and Antoinette Lukasik, his wife, Administrators of the Estate of Anthony Lukasik, Deceased, Appellants. Arthur J. THOMAS, Sr., and Hannah Thomas, Administrators of Estate of David J. Thomas, Deceased v. Frank LUKASIK and Antoinette Lukasik, his wife, Administrators of the Estate of Anthony Lukasik, Deceased, Appellants. Lloyd CHERESKO and Annette Cheresko, his wife, Administrators of the Estate of Michael Cheresko, deceased, and Lloyd Cheresko and Annette Cheresko, his wife, individually v. Frank LUKASIK and Antoinette Lukasik, his wife, Administrators of the Estate of Anthony Lukasik, Deceased, Appellants.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Feb. 25, 1987.
    Filed July 6, 1987.
    Reargument Denied Aug. 28, 1987.

      James A. Doherty, Scranton, for appellants.
    Robert W. Munley, Scranton, for appellees.
    Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and TAMILIA and CERCONE, JJ.
   CERCONE, Judge:

This is an appeal from judgment entered on behalf of the estates of five deceased teenagers who were killed when the car in which they were passengers plummeted from a roadway and landed some 200 feet below. Plaintiffs are the parent-administrators of their children’s estates. Defendant-appellants are the parent-administrators of the estate of Anthony Lukasik, also a teenager who the jury found was the driver of the car, and who died the night of the accident.

After a jury trial, verdicts were returned in an average amount of $3.5 million for each of the plaintiffs. Following the denial of timely post-trial motions, this appeal followed. Appellants raise numerous allegations of error which we have carefully considered.

The evidence presented by the plaintiffs at trial established that on the evening of March 6, 1981, Anthony Lukasik borrowed his sister’s car, a 1976 Chrysler Cordoba with a vinyl roof. He drove to Idle Hour Lanes, a bowling alley, in Dickson City, Lackawanna County. From there he drove seven other teenagers to a bonfire party. Around 11 p.m., those present began to arrange themselves in cars in order to go home. Jill Mecca, whose younger sister, Lisa Mecca, died that night, had originally been in the Lukasik vehicle, when, at the last minute, Lisa approached the car and asked Jill to trade places with her. Lisa’s boyfriend was already in the ill-fated vehicle. Jill testified that Anthony Lukasik was in the driver’s seat during this exchange. Eight teenagers were in the Lukasik vehicle and all died when, minutes later, traveling at a high rate of speed, it veered from side to side on a rural road and plunged through the guard rail into the chasm below. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident and details as to speed and measurement were presented in plaintiffs’ case by an accident reconstruction expert and by various law enforcement personnel who investigated the scene. Those who arrived first at the scene of the accident either were not able to determine or did not take note of who was behind the wheel. That Anthony Lukasik was the driver at the time of the accident was decided by the jury based on the aforementioned testimony by Jill Mecca, and by that of Edward Smith and James Greavy, who stated that when the Lukasik car left the party, Anthony was the driver.

The first allegation of error which defendant-appellants argued vigorously and relentlessly during the trial and now on appeal concerns a statement which Jill Mecca made during a grand jury investigation. Appellants contend that this remark, which Jill attributed to Michelle Cizik, Anthony Lukasik’s girlfriend and, one of the deceased teenagers, should have been allowed into evidence. During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Jill Mecca, he asked her, “Now, when you got out of that car, did you hear Michelle Cizik ask Tony Lukasik if she could drive the car?” Counsel for the plaintiffs objected and a sidebar discussion ensued.

The appellants sought to enter the Michelle Cizik remark into evidence as establishing, not that Michelle was the driver, but only that Jill overheard Michelle’s remark. However, appellants claim that the identity of the driver of the vehicle was the key issue in the case, highlighting the meaning which they hoped the jury would give to the offered statement. Appellant then offered other rationales in an attempt to extirpate the statement from its hearsay nature. The trial court was not persuaded and refused to admit the statement as inadmissible hearsay.

On appeal, appellants assert that the remark was a statement against a party interest or an admission, which would render it as an exception to the hearsay rule. However, the offered statement had neither minimal indicia of reliability, since as Jill related it, it was said in jest, nor was it capable of cross-examination, since the declarant was deceased. As the court explained in a case cited by appellants as authority, DeFrancesco v. Western Pennsylvania Water Co., 329 Pa. Superior Ct. 508, 522-3, 478 A.2d 1295, 1302 (1984),

Hearsay exceptions have historically been justified under two divergent theories. The first and most common justification for the admission of hearsay statements is that such statements exhibit a high degree of reliability, so that the denial of the right to cross-examination is minimized. Thus, a jumble of hearsay exceptions have sprung up on the basis that the circumstances surrounding the statement guarantee the requisite measure of reliability.
There exists, however, a very narrow second category of hearsay exception which does not deal with reliability at all. Instead, out-of-court statements may be admitted regardless of trustworthiness where the right to cross-examination is preserved. This category originates with the case of party admissions. The reason for the admission of a party’s statement is not that it is especially reliable, but rather, because the right to cross-examination is not lost; i.e., the party is present to take the stand and explain his statement. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 262 (2d ed. 1972); 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1048 (Chadbourne rev. 1972). Thus, the hearsay rule is not a ground for objection when a party’s extrajudicial opinions are offered against him, although it remains a ground for objection when a party attempts to offer his extrajudicial assertions in his own behalf. See 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra. The probative value of such statements derives, therefore, from satisfaction of the hearsay rule via retention of the right to cross-examination, rather than from any independent indicia of reliability.

The proffered statement was hearsay which did not fall within any exception. It was not a statement against interest or an admission as in Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 Pa. 642, 23 A.2d 445 (1942), in which plaintiffs properly testified as to defendant’s statement that the accident in question was his fault. Absent any substantiating behavior, Michelle Cizik’s joking comment reveals nothing about her conjectured offer to drive the Lukasik car, as appellants attempt to portray it. Therefore, appellants are not entitled to a judgment n.o.v., nor to a new trial because of the trial court’s refusal to permit the Michelle Cizik remark into evidence.

The next issue concerns two newspaper articles which appeared during the trial in local papers. Defense counsel requested a mistrial or at least a polling of the jury to determine whether they had read the articles which reported Anthony Lukasik as the driver of the vehicle in the accident. Insurance coverage of the vehicle involved was mentioned in one of the articles. The defendant, Mr. Frank Lukasik, administrator, related however, to the court and all counsel, in chambers, that he heard three jurors referring to one of the articles and the fact that, once they recognized it as pertaining to the trial, they closed the paper. Nevertheless, appellants maintain that these jurors could have been influenced by mention of insurance companies in the articles in light of the large verdicts which they rendered. Appellants contend that the jury would not have awarded such generous verdicts if they had thought the Lukasiks were going to have to pay them. The action, if any, to be taken in such a situation rests in the discretion of the trial court. Nicholson v. Garris, 418 Pa. 146, 210 A.2d 164 (1965). In denying the defense motion at trial, the court emphasized its instructions to the jury after it had been sworn that they must consider only the evidence presented at trial. Before the jury retired, the court instructed the jurors to consider only the evidence in making its decision and nothing extraneous to the evidence. And, as the court stated in its opinion, Mr. Lukasik’s report of the overheard conversation supported the court’s conclusion that the jurors were aware of their role and were taking it seriously in closing the newspaper upon seeing reference to the trial. There was no evidence that the jurors had read about the insurance in the article but merely that as soon as they read that the article dealt with the case they closed the paper.

Appellants rely on cases in which the fact of insurance was brought to the attention of the jury at trial. At most, what was involved in the instant case was reference in one newspaper article as to the insurance policy limits involved but no evidence the jurors read that portion of the article dealing with insurance. This situation does not violate the well-recognized rule that evidence in a personal injury action which informs the jury that the defendant is insured against liability is inadmissible and an improper subject of cross-examination. See Price v. Yellow Cab Co., 443 Pa. 56, 63, 278 A.2d 161, 166 (1971) and cases cited therein. And, while the reason behind the rule is “the assumption that a knowledge of the fact of insurance against liability will motivate the jury to be reckless in awarding damages to be paid, not by the defendant, but by a supposedly well-pursed and heartless insurance company that has already been paid for taking the risk”, II Wigmore on Evidence § 282a, at 133-34 (3d ed. 1940), it does not necessarily follow that under the facts of this case the large verdicts resulted from one of the articles that appeared during the trial. The trial court, in weighing all factors on balance in determining the least prejudicial path in light of the information before it, was correct in its ruling refusing a mistrial.

Appellants’ next allegation of error involved the testimony of Dr. George Reavy as to the loss of earning power of the deceased adolescents. Dr. Reavy was presented as an economist and he projected certain dollar amount lost earnings based on the planned careers of the minors to which the respective parents testified. He included in his computations the children’s life expectancies, minus a maintenance figure plus fringe benefits figures. Appellants argue that this testimony of the economist was speculative, citing Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa. Superior Ct. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982), in which our Court in the context of the calculation of an injured employee’s wage loss from the date of the accident until the time of trial, repeated the well-established principle that the law requires not merely conjecture, but rather sufficient data from which damages can be assessed with reasonable certainty.

In all survival actions, damages are to be properly measured for loss of earning power less personal maintenance expenses from the time of death through a decedent’s estimated working life span. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 299, 282 A.2d 206, 229 (1971). And, while expert testimony is not required to show loss of earning capacity, either party in a negligence action is entitled to introduce expert or other evidence to establish or refute actual expected future earning capacity of a particular plaintiff. Fish v. Gosnell, 316 Pa. Superior Ct. 565, 463 A.2d 1042 (1983). For example, in McClinton v. White, 497 Pa. 610, 444 A.2d 85 (1982), in which the issue concerned the amount to be deducted from an award of damages as personal maintenance, the Supreme Court related the procedure employed by the plaintiffs in presenting their case on future lost earnings damages to the jury. The expert, who was a professor of economics, calculated the earning potential of the two decedents, who were ages 16 and 18 at the time of their death in an automobile accident, both as college graduates and as high school graduates. He based these calculations on testimony of the decedent’s interests, talents and ambitions. Thus, as in this case, experts are commonly used by plaintiffs to present their case regarding the future lost earnings.

Dr. Reavy, relying partly on figures from the United States Bureau of the Census calculations for earnings data, discussed each of the plaintiff’s possible earning capacities in light of the testimony already of record regarding each of the plaintiffs. As for Michelle Cizik and Jodi Hafich, Dr. Reavy testified that future wage loss of all high school and college graduates fall in the range of $533,023 and $664,358 respectively. Both girls had expected to attend college, according to their mothers. Regarding Elizabeth Mecca, who planned to become a doctor, Dr. Reavy presented future wage loss of high school ($529,920) college ($671,572) and medical school graduates ($5,197,444). David Thomas was described by his mother as wanting to go to the Air Force or to learn air conditioning repair work. Dr. Reavy offered future wage loss of high school graduates in the amount of $836,766, and for all white males in the amount of $1,020,538. With regard to Michael Cheresko, his father testified that Michael wanted to be a mechanic like his father. Future wage loss of a mechanic was presented in Dr. Reavy’s analysis for Michael Cheresko in the amount of $972,000.

Appellants contend that there was not a sufficient basis to justify such calculations to infer that the deceased teenagers would attend college, or in Elizabeth Mecca’s case, become a physician. We disagree.

As the Supreme Court has explained,

[a]ll that the law requires is that

“(a) claim for damages must be supported by a reasonable basis for calculation; mere guess or speculation is not enough.” Stevenson v. Economy Bank of Ambridge, 413 Pa. 442, 453-54, 197 A.2d 721, 727 (1964). See also Small v. Flock, 407 Pa. 148, 180 A.2d 59 (1962); Getz v. Freed, 377 Pa. 480, 105 A.2d 102 (1954). “If the facts afford a reasonably fair basis for calculating how much plaintiff’s entitled to, such evidence cannot be regarded as legally insufficient to support a claim for compensation.” Western Show Co., Inc. v. Mix, 308 Pa. 215, 162 A. 667 (1932). Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 567, 421 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1980).

It is particularly difficult to project future wage loss of a deceased child, as in this case, but this item of damages had not been denied by any court because of the problems of the youth involved. Prince v. Adams, 229 Pa. Superior Ct. 150, 324 A.2d 358 (1974). The testimony on which Dr. Reavy based his projections was more than the dreams of each teenager as supported by his or her parents at trial. Testimony was also given by the parents concerning their own stations in life and that of the respective siblings. Slavin v. Gardner, 274 Pa. Superior Ct. 192, 418 A.2d 361 (1979). In the case of Lisa Mecca, whose projections included medical school as a possibility, one sister was already in medical school and one was in pharmacy school. As for her, a proper foundation was laid. For Jodi Hafich, although her academic performance as a high school freshman was not good, nevertheless, her sister had attended college, and Mrs. Hafich testified that Jodi wanted the same for herself. Michelle Cizik was described by her mother as wanting to become a geologist. An older brother of Michelle’s attended college. The two male decedents, David Thomas and Michael Cheresko, were portrayed as wanting to enter air conditioning repair work or the Air Force and to become a mechanic, respectively. These foundations for Dr. Reavy’s projections on the potential earning capacities of David Thomas and Michael Ch.eresko respectively, cannot be said to be unreasonable given David’s two sisters who had attended, although not completed, college, and considering that Michael’s father was a mechanic.

The jury had a range of future wage loss amounts from which to choose based on their own findings from the background testimony which they heard at trial. The amounts which the jury chose to award were based on credible evidence which is properly within their fact-finding domain. Richardson v. LaBuz, 81 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 436, 474 A.2d 1181 (1984). Relying on the inquiry of case law as to the reasonableness of the bases for the calculations involved, Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, supra, we find that the testimony of Dr. Reavy constituted proper evidence for the jury’s consideration.

Appellants allege that the verdicts rendered by the jury in this case were so excessive as to shock the Court’s sense of justice and were clearly based on prejudice, passion and the aforementioned alleged knowledge that any verdict would be paid by an insurance company.

The grant or refusal of a new trial because of the excessiveness of the verdict is within the discretion of the trial court. Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961). This court will not find a verdict excessive unless it is so grossly excessive as to shock our sense of justice. Kravinsky v. Glover, 263 Pa. Superior Ct. 8, 396 A.2d 1349 (1979). We begin with the premise that large verdicts are not necessarily excessive verdicts. Each case is unique and dependent on its own special circumstances and a court should apply only those factors which it finds to be relevant in determining whether or not the verdict is excessive. Mineo v. Tancini, 349 Pa. Superior Ct. 115, 502 A.2d 1300 (1986). A court may consider the following factors, inter alia:

(1) the severity of the injury; (2) whether the plaintiffs injury is manifested by objective physical evidence or whether it is only revealed by the subjective testimony of the plaintiff (and, herein, the court pointed out that where the injury is manifested by broken bones, disfigurement,, loss of consciousness, or other objective evidence, the courts have counted this in favor of sustaining a verdict); (3) whether the injury will affect the plaintiff permanently; (4) whether the plaintiff can continue with his or her employment; (5) the size of the plaintiffs out-of-pocket expenses; and (6) the amount plaintiff demanded in the original complaint.
Kemp v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 239 Pa.Superior Ct. 379, 361 A.2d 362 (1976).

Of course, the first four factors are answered in the instant case with death as the ultimate injury. Appellants argue that the excessiveness of the verdict is apparent in that plaintiffs’ decedents were high school students who were killed instantly, had no work record, no medical care, and whose administrators had evaluated their cases at a much lower amount than determined by the verdict. It is one thing to reduce a large verdict of a verdict winner for his failure to require medical care or wage loss when the plaintiff is employable and survives an injury; it is quite different when the reason a deceased has no medical expenses or work record is that he or she has been killed and was too young to earn a wage of any significance before death. Thus, the factor pertaining to out-of-pocket expenses is not relevant. As for appellant’s argument that we consider plaintiffs’ willingness to settle pre-trial for a much less sum is not proper in our review of a verdict for excessiveness. This Court, in an opinion by the Honorable Justin M. Johnson, Ammon v. Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 361 Pa. Superior Ct. 409, 522 A.2d 647 (1987), recently held that settlement discussion amounts were an improper consideration in a court’s determination of whether a verdict is excessive since to do so would discourage the settlement of disputes. “Plaintiffs will be dissuaded from making conservative settlement demands if they know that such demands will be used against them at a later stage in the proceedings.” Id., 361 Pa.Superior Ct. at 415, 522 A.2d at 650.

The question here is on what basis can we hold that damages in any amount for a teenager killed by another’s negligence is excessive? If a jury determines that a certain amount is, in its judgment, justifiable, on what basis can this kind of verdict be overturned when there is no evidence of passion, prejudice or recklessness displayed on the part of the jury. We find no basis to do so. Damages for wrongful death are the loss of decedent’s life and the loss to his or her family. Slaseman v. Myers, 309 Pa. Superior Ct. 537, 455 A.2d 1213 (1983). The measure of damages in survival actions is the decedent’s pain and suffering and loss of gross earning power from the date of injury until death, and loss of earning power, from time of death through his estimated working life-span. Krock v. Chroust, 330 Pa. Superior Ct. 108, 478 A.2d 1376 (1984). The jury arrived at the within verdicts based on testimony which they heard pertaining to those various items of damages. We cannot say in law or fact that our sense of justice is shocked by the within verdicts.

Appellants complain that Dr. David Schorr, who was plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert, was erroneously allowed to testify at trial since a report which was provided to appellants and dated April 23, 1982, was incomplete and did not contain any calculations or measurements. Dr. Schorr’s report estimated that the Lukasik vehicle had attained an estimated speed of 75-85 mph at the time it left the roadway and that this was a reasonable approximation of the vehicle’s speed considering the nature of the impact. Appellants had access to Mr. Schorr for questioning prior to trial and cannot now complain as to the inadequacy of the initial report when they chose not to depose him. They were provided with a supplemental report with the same estimated calculations, and with a police report including the measurements of the investigating officers. This is clearly not a violation of the discovery rules, Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5 since appellants cannot claim they were surprised by Dr. Schorr’s testimony. See Mapp v. Dube, 330 Pa. Superior Ct. 284, 479 A.2d 553 (1984).

Appellants claim that delay damages pursuant to Pa.R. C.P. 238 were erroneously granted in this case. Contrary to appellees’ assertion that appellants waived this issue for failure to file their objection timely, we find that the objection was properly preserved by the exception that “there was no basis to make any offer over and above the insurance limits of $35,000.00.” Appellants’ argument on appeal is that delay damages should not have been assessed against them where the insurance policy limits of $35,000 had been offered two and one-half years prior to trial and there were no collectible assets of the defendant’s estate.

The purpose of Rule 238 is to facilitate early settlements in cases involving bodily injury, death or property damage. Thus, if a defendant at any time prior to trial makes a written offer of settlement, but the offer is not accepted by plaintiffs ($35,000 was offered, but not accepted in this case), and plaintiffs do not recover more than 125% of the offer, delay damages will not be awarded. (In this case, plaintiffs recovered many times over and above the offered amount.) Therefore, following the Rule in blind fashion, delay damages would be automatically awarded.

However, recent refinements of Rule 238 lead us to conclude that a hearing is required in the court below to determine the Rule’s applicability here. In Berry v. Anderson, 348 Pa. Superior Ct. 618, 502 A.2d 717 (1986) this Court, sitting en banc, considered the applicability of Rule 238 damages in a case where • a defendant was clearly incapable of offering an amount in settlement which could stay the operation of the Rule. Rule 238 penalizes defendants who make no offer at all and those who make inadequate offers, with inadequacy measured by comparison of the offered amount with the actual verdict. The amount which defendant Anderson would have had to offer in the Berry case supra, to avoid delay damages was $1,600,000. The amount of the offer was $100,000, which appellant. Anderson asserted was the full amount of her resources. In Berry, this court, questioned how the purpose of Rule 238 to encourage settlement was served by penalizing a defendant who could not possibly pay the amount she was required to offer. The Court, therefore, remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the defendant’s ability to make an offer that would have been sufficient to stay the operation of Rule 238. This must also be done in this case.

The trial court states summarily in its opinion that Berry is factually distinguishable from this case. Appellees claim that funds in the Estate of Anthony Lukasik were available, but not offered, thus removing this case from the ambit of Berry. It is necessary that the trial court make specific findings to determine whether, following the Berry principle, appellees are, in fact, entitled to delay damages. We cannot rely on unsupported allegations in parties’ briefs and an evidentiary hearing is ordered.

One of defendant’s claims in this case is that the lower court erred in not allowing evidence of the character of their son, Anthony, who the jury found drove the death car. The lower court was correct in this ruling since the parents, the defendants here and administrators of their son’s estate were making no claims for damages.

Appellants allege error on the part of the trial judge in precluding defense inquiry of Dr. Disilvio the pathologist that all plaintiffs and defendant had died of identical injuries. This allegation is frivolous in that, although appellants’ attorney was not permitted to pursue the inquiry at the point in trial cited in appellants’ brief, earlier in the testimony of Mr. Sweeny, the coroner, the identical question was asked and answered. Thus:

Q. (by Mr. Doherty): Mr. Sweeny, so I’m correct in stating then, that all eight high school students died from the same type of injury?
A. (By Mr. Sweeny): Well, some had various different fractures; however, the immediate cause on all eight was directly skull and internal injuries, on all eight victims.

Thus, although Dr. Disilvio, the pathologist, was unable and unwilling to answer the same question affirmatively, owing to his superficial review of the cases, the facts which counsel sought to elicit were earlier presented to the jury through Mr.. Sweeny. The court committed no error in precluding counsel’s inquiry of Dr. Disilvo.

Appellants objected to Edward Smith’s description of the Lukasik vehicle as “tearing out” of the party when it departed. Appellants requested that a mistrial be declared because there was no competent evidence of the speed of the Lukasik vehicle as it left the party. The court, instead, gave a cautionary instruction to the jury that they should disregard the witness’s statement as non-responsive. This instruction was sufficient to cure any prejudice to appellants.

We now turn our attention to appellants’ ten remaining averments of trial court error in its instructions to the jury prior to deliberations. We will first consider appellants’ contentions as to erroneous instructions that were delivered over appellants’ objections. It is settled that

[i]n reviewing a trial judge’s charge, the proper test is not whether certain portions taken out of context appear erroneous. We look to the charge in its entirety, against the background of the evidence in the particular case, to determine whether or not error was committed and whether that error was prejudicial to the complaining party, (citations omitted.) Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 507 Pa. 204, 231, 489 A.2d 1291, 1305 (1985).

Appellants claim that there was insufficient testimony to warrant instructions from the court that the jury could infer that Anthony Lukasik was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Appellants also assert error in the court’s instructions that the jury could find that the driver was negligent where no eyewitness testimony justified such a charge. The challenged portion of the charge reads as follows.

You cannot surmise or guess as to whether the Defendant/Decedent, Anthony Lukasik, was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident, or whether he was negligent in the operation of the vehicle. You must decide whether or not Anthony Lukasik was the driver from the credible evidence that has been presented in this case, and from the fact that Mr. Lukasik was seen to enter the car and take the driver’s seat a short time before the accident, you may infer that he was the driver.
Now, Members of the Jury, the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code regulates the way and manner in which automobiles are driven on our highways and roads. Now, under the law in Pennsylvania, if anyone violates the Motor Vehicle Code, that person is considered to be negligent, as a matter of law. And I want to cite to you a portion of the Motor Vehicle Code. And if you, in your determination, find from the evidence that the Decedent/Defendant, Anthony Lukasik, violated the Motor Vehicle Code, then, Mr. Lukasik is deemed to have been negligent.
I must caution you, before you answer the question of the Plaintiffs’ right to recover, if you have found negligence by the Defendant/Decedent, Mr. Lukasik, you must also determine whether the negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the Plaintiffs’ harm.
Now, the Motor Vehicle Code provides that no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, and having a regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing. Nor, shall it be driven at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured. clear distance ahead.
Now, consistent with what I have just read, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill, a crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when any special hazards exist, with respect to pedestrians or other traffic, by reason of weather or other highway conditions.
I have mentioned assured clear distance ahead. Now, that rule, as applied in darkness, requires a driver to operate his vehicle so that he can always stop his automobile within the range of his headlights. As far as his headlights shine, he must be able to stop his car within the distance. Now, the unexplained violation of the statute, which results in injury to a person or property, constitutes negligence, as a matter of law. And the driver has the burden of proving that an alleged violation was excusable or justified under the circumstances.
When the driver’s vehicle leaves a highway, and causes injury and damage, Members of the Jury, you can infer that the driver was negligent, and that the driver then has the burden of exculpating himself, by an acceptable explanation, that the accident occurred through no fault of his own. Now, in the ordinary course of the events, an automobile does not depart from the highway and then crash if the driver is using proper care; that is, the driver is called upon to show how, consistent with due care, how his car crashed.

Our review of the charge in its entirety against the background of the evidence presented convinces us that it was properly given as to these two objections. Sufficient testimony was presented by several witnesses as to Anthony Lukasik driving his sister’s car at all times during the evening, including the time of the car’s departure from the party just prior to the accident. The jury was properly instructed that it could, but not must, infer that Anthony Lukasik was driving at the time of the accident itself. As for the instruction as to his negligence in driving, the jury could properly infer that on a country road, on a clear, dry night, that the driver of a car estimated to have left a roadway at a speed in excess of 72 miles per hour, did so negligently.

Appellants next assert that the court erroneously charged the jury that it could award damages for pain and suffering.

The charge states:

[t]he plaintiff would also be entitled to be awarded such an amount as you believe, again in your considered discretion, that will fairly and adequately compensate for the mental and physical pain and suffering and inconvenience that a decedent endured from the moment of the accident until the moment of death.

Appellants claim that Dr. Schorr’s testimony indicated that the decedents lost consciousness upon striking their heads on the roof of the car as it left the roadway. In all likelihood, appellants maintain, the decedents suffered no pain as a result of the accident. There is no support for such a conclusion in the record. As reviewed by appellees, the evidence showed that the Lukasik vehicle first struck 36 feet of the easterly guardrail, crossed the roadway diagonally, a distance of 146 feet before striking the westerly guardrail, became airborne and traveled 2.1 seconds in the air for 211 feet, before impacting with the ground. While there can be no recovery for pain and suffering in a survival action where a decedent is killed instantaneously, in this case death was something less then instantaneous. And absent support in the record for appellants’ claim that the occupants of the car were unconscious as it left the roadway, the court correctly charged on pain and suffering. In re Consolidation Coal Co., 296 F.Supp. 837 (W.D.Pa. 1969).

Seven of appellants’ requested instructions were refused by the trial court, which refusal is now claimed as error by appellants. These requested points included:

1. Mere happening of an accident does not establish negligence;
2. Negligence against a defendant could not be shown by circumstances merely consistent with its existence;
3. Circumstantial evidence requires substantial proof as to what happened at the moment of the accident;
4. Mere happening of an accident does not establish negligence, and at such times accidents are unavoidable;
5. Damages could not be awarded absent sufficient basis in law and fact, and that Mr. Reavy’s testimony was not sufficient;
6. Sufficient testimony concerning calculations and measurements on all aspects of the accident is necessary prior to jury’s consideration of testimony of speed;
7. Decedent was entitled to presumption of having operated and exercised due care for his safety and others while driving the vehicle.

These points for charge were properly denied by the trial court and because we concur in its reasons for doing so as they appear in its opinion, we add nothing further.

The following of appellants’ contentions have been waived. Appellants claim that the court instructed the jury erroneously on the damages recoverable under the Wrongful Death Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8301, insofar as the pecuniary value of a decedent’s services, society and comfort to his or her family, had he or she lived, are concerned. Contrary to appellants’ contention, they did hot object at trial to this section of the charge. We may not consider it at this time. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974). Appellants also assert that certain of plaintiffs’ opening remarks to the jury were intended to convey the fact of insurance to them. Appellants’ objection came too late when they waited until the plaintiffs’ attorney completed his opening argument. Fretts v. Pavetti, 282 Pa.Superior Ct. 166, 422 A.2d 881 (1980). For the same reason, appellants must be deemed to have waived their contention regarding plaintiffs’ counsel’s urging the jury to send a message to the community. Appellants failed to object until opposing counsel’s closing was completed.

Judgment reversed and case remanded for an evidentiary hearing on delay damages. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      . Two other teens were in the car and met the same fate, but they are not represented as parties to this lawsuit.

      . Defense counsel related that he sought this information to disclose what Jill Mecca testified before a grand jury regarding a comment she heard Michelle Cizik make before the Lukasik car took off on its fatal journey, to-wit: I heard Michelle joking around, she goes, ‘Oh, I’ll drive.’" During a later sidebar conference with the trial court concerning appellants’ repeated offer of this testimony, one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys expanded the context of this statement.
      Your Honor, from the same transcript, where Mr. Doherty, [counsel for defendants] left off, Your Honor, the next question was, she was told to speak up. She said, “I heard Michelle joking around; she said, oh, I’ll drive. She was just joking around though. [Question, by a grand juror:] “How do you know she was just joking around.” Answer, ‘‘Because she started laughing.” Then one of the jurors asked about a license. The witness Mecca said, “No. That’s why I knew it was just a joke.”

      . The related contention of appellants as to the court’s instructions to the jury concerning Dr. Reavy’s testimony is without merit.

      . Each plaintiff was awarded damages of $1,000,000 under the Survival Act, and approximately $2,500,000 plus an amount representing funeral and related expenses under the Wrongful Death Act.

      . Appellants assert a violation of the discovery rules in the that measurements taken by Officer Anthony Merenich were not provided to appellants. They allege error in his testifying to those measurements at trial. Corporal Mcrenich's measurements were the same as those timely provided to appellants in the police report and because the Corporal was not presented as an expert witness, but merely in his capacity as one of the first investigating officers at the scene of the accident. As such, Rule 4003.5 governing discovery of expert witnesses is inapplicable. We find no error also in Officer Neal Furiosi’s testifying to measurements of the accident scene which he himself did not take. They were taken under his direct supervision and control and coincided with his familiarity with the scene.
      Nor did the failure of appellants’ to receive interrogatories in Michael Cheresko’s case render testimony inadmissible as to Cheresko. The court did not err in refusing appellants’ request. Even if one of these contentions could be considered as error, an erroneous trial ruling must also be harmful to the complaining party before reversal is required. Williams v. McClain, 513 Pa. 300, 520 A.2d 1374 (1987). This is not the situation herein.

      . Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suspended the operation of the mandatory provisions of Rule 238 and directed a post-trial procedure to determine fault for delay. Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center, 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986). However, this new hearing procedure is to be applied prospectively in cases in which appellants assert that Rule 238 offends due process by failing to provide a forum to assess fault for delay. Morgan v. Monessen Southwestern Railway Co., 513 Pa. 86, 98, 518 A.2d 1171, 1177 (1986); Bolus v. United Penn Bank, 363 Pa.Superior Ct. 247, 525 A.2d 1215 (1987). Appellants have not asserted their attack on Rule 238 in this manner.

      . Wrongful Death Act. — Delay damages were awarded, thus, from February 28, 1983 to June 13, 1985. Mecca — $568,647.57 for total verdict of $3,054,352.57; Ciziks — $582,680.37 for total verdict of $3,070,146.37; Thomas — $568,563.38 for a total verdict of $3,053,-920.38; Cheresko — $565,875.70 for total verdict of.S3,051,370.70; Hafich — $582,414.74 for total verdict of $3,068,746.74.
      Survival Act — Delay damages were awarded as follows: Mecca— $227,623.28 for total verdict of $1,222,623.28; Cizik — $233,075.33 for total verdict of $1,228,075.33; Thomas — $227,623.28 for total verdict of $1,222,623.28; Cheresko — $226,532.87 for total verdict of $1,221,532.87; Hafich — $233,075.33 for a total verdict of $1,228,-075.33.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MONTEMURO, Judge: WIEAND, Judge,

license: Public Domain

text:
    530 A.2d 1345
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Stephen M. LYONS, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 18, 1986.
    Filed July 8, 1987.
    Reargument Denied Sept. 18, 1987.

      Walter A. Steinbacher, Assistant Public Defender, Williamsport, for appellant.
    Brett O. Feese, District Attorney and Kenneth A. Osokow, Assistant District Attorney, Williamsport, for Com., appellee.
    Before WIEAND, MONTEMURO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   MONTEMURO, Judge:

Appellant Stephen M. Lyons challenges the judgment of sentence entered against him by the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas. The question before us is whether the court, in sentencing appellant on a misdemeanor conviction, transgressed the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 et seq., by using appellant’s juvenile record to justify a term of imprisonment within the “aggravated minimum range.” Because we find that the sentencing court acted improperly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

Appellant pled guilty on December 5, 1985, to charges of theft by unlawful taking and theft by receiving stolen property. The Commonwealth graded both offenses as misdemeanors of the third degree, pursuant to Section 3903(b)(2) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3903(b)(2). After reviewing a presentence investigation report, the court sentenced appellant to serve a term of imprisonment of not less than six nor more than twelve months. The court determined at the sentencing hearing that each ■ charge bore an offense gravity score of one and that appellant had a prior record score of zero. Although the sentencing guidelines would have allowed the court to impose a term of probation, see 204 Pa. Code § 303.9(b), the court observed that this case is not appellant’s first contact with the criminal justice system. Appellant, according to the court, was “adjudicated delinquent on at least nine burglaries” between 1981 and 1983. Because of this “aggravating circumstance,” the court felt that a sentence in the “aggravated minimum range” under the guidelines, see 204 Pa. Code § 303.3, was appropriate. The sentence imposed was the maximum permitted by the Crimes Code for a misdemeanor of the third degree, see 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 1104(3). The court denied appellant’s motion to modify sentence, and this timely appeal followed.

Appellant contends that Section 6354(b) of the Juvenile Act prohibits the court from considering prior juvenile adjudications when it imposes sentence for conviction of a misdemeanor in adult criminal proceedings. Section 6354 provides as follows:

(a) General rule. — An order of disposition or other adjudication in a proceeding under this chapter is not a conviction of crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction or operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment.
(b) Effect in subsequent judicial matters. — The disposition of a child under this chapter may not be used against him in any proceeding in any court other than at a subsequent juvenile hearing, whether before or after reaching majority, except:
(1) in dispositional proceedings after conviction of a felony for the purposes of a presentence investigation and report; or
(2) if relevant, where he has put his reputation or character in issue in a civil matter.

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6354. This provision protects the juvenile from most of the civil and criminal consequences of his or her contact with the juvenile court system. The General Assembly apparently believed that this sort of protection was warranted given the fundamental differences, in terms of both process and purpose, between a juvenile court proceeding and a full-fledged criminal trial. In terms of process, the juvenile defendant in Pennsylvania cannot elect a jury trial, see 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6336(a); In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970), aff'd sub. nom, Terry v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); the juvenile cannot take advantage of the panoply of procedural safeguards afforded by our rules of criminal procedure, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 1(a); and, moreover, juvenile proceedings are closed to the public, see 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6336(c). In terms of purpose, juvenile court systems exist primarily “to facilitate the identification and treatment of children in need of protective or therapeutic services,” while criminal processes exist more to assess “responsibility and blameworthiness.” McCarthy, Preadjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U.PittL.Rev. 457, 457 (1981). See also In the Interest of Leonardo, 291 Pa.Super. 644, 436 A.2d 685 (1985). The use of prior juvenile adjudications to enhance an adult criminal penalty appears therefore to violate the spirit as well as the letter of the Juvenile Act. Of course, the General Assembly did establish exceptions to the general prohibition in Section 6354(b). In “dispositional proceedings after conviction of a felony,” for example, the need for an accurate profile of the individual offender outweighs the need to protect the juvenile record from misuse. This case, however, concerns only dispositional proceedings after conviction of a misdemeanor. It falls within neither of the two narrow exceptions established by the Assembly.

On the other hand, the Commonwealth identifies several provisions of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9701 et seq., that appear to require the adult sentencing court to consider prior juvenile adjudications even in misdemeanor cases. In particular, Section 9722(7) of the Code requires the court to weigh the defendant’s lack of “prior delinquency” as a factor, among others, “in favor of an order of probation.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9722(7). Section 9732 provides that the presentence report “shall include” the defendant’s “history of delinquency.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9732. Although the sentencing judge need not order a presentence report in every misdemeanor case, our rules of procedure certainly allow the judge to do so. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1403 A. A complete biography of the defendant will usually better enable the sentencing court to fashion a penalty that is “consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense ... and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant,” see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The Sentencing Code makes clear that the court must consider the defendant’s “prior delinquency” at least to determine the appropriateness of an order of probation. To this extent, the Code conflicts with the Juvenile Act.

Appellant asks us to enforce the plain language of the Juvenile Act while the Commonwealth asks us not to slight the equally plain language of the Sentence Code. We must attempt to resolve this legislatively-created conflict without depriving either provision of its effect. A panel of this court recently addressed the same conflict in Commonwealth v. Torres, 362 Pa.Super. 617, 525 A.2d 391 (1987). The reasoning in Torres guides the result here:

‘Statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible as one statute.’ 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(b). Additionally, such statutes should be construed as far as possible to be consistent with each other. See Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 472 Pa. 530, 539, 372 A.2d 815, 819 (1977). Section 6354 of the Juvenile Act and § 9722(7) of the Sentencing Code are in pari materia because they both relate to the consideration of an adjudication of delinquency in a subsequent sentencing proceeding. Section 6354 prohibits the consideration of adjudications of delinquency in subsequent proceedings except in sentencing for a felony and § 9722 obliges a court to give weight to the absence of prior adjudications of delinquency when considering a sentence of probation in any case. In order to construe these two statutes in a manner that would give me.aning to each, we conclude that § 9722(7) should be read as an exception to § 6354. Thus, when sentencing for a misdemeanor, only in the instance when a sentencing court is considering imposing an order of probation shall the court consider the absence or presence of a juvenile record.

Torres, supra, 362 Pa.Superior Ct. at 620, 525 A.2d at 393 (emphasis added).

The sentencing court in Torres considered the defendant’s juvenile record solely to determine the appropriateness of probation. Because it did not otherwise use the record as a factor in its decision, we affirmed the judgment of sentence. In the present case, the sentencing court relied upon appellant’s juvenile record as a reason for sentencing in the aggravated range. This use of juvenile adjudications to enhance the sentence on a misdemeanor conviction transgressed the clear prohibition of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C. S.A. § 6354(b), and was not required by the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9722(7). The Juvenile Act flatly forbids the court from using prior adjudications of delinquency against the defendant in adult proceedings, except in narrowly-defined circumstances that do not apply here. The Sentencing Code, on the other hand, allows the court to consider the absence of prior adjudications as a factor “in favor of an order of probation.” Thus, while the court can weigh the lack of juvenile record in favor of the defendant, it cannot weigh the presence of a juvenile record against the defendant. We recognize, of course, that by allowing the court to consider the lack of juvenile record, the Sentencing Code necessarily allows the court to use prior adjudications against the defendant. The presence of prior adjudications certainly renders less likely the possibility of probation. Nevertheless, we need not conclude, as the Commonwealth does, that the Sentencing Code necessarily allows the court to use the defendant’s juvenile record affirmatively to enhance sentence. Nothing in the Code requires us to find that once a sentencing court has rejected probation as a proper disposition it then can weigh the juvenile record as an “aggravating circumstance” in support of a longer term of imprisonment. The only purpose for which the Code mandates consideration of juvenile adjudications is to determine the appropriateness of probation. If we are to give any force to the Juvenile Act, we should restrict the use of juvenile adjudications to this purpose.

Our fidelity to the plain language of the Juvenile Act will necessarily frustrate the policy favoring individualized sentencing. We agree with the Commonwealth that the Sentencing Code in general encourages full presentence disclosure of all relevant data on the history and character of the individual defendant. This data helps the court to fashion a sentence that meets the particular needs of both the defendant and the community, as Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code requires. The General Assembly has determined, however, that juveniles require special protection from the consequences of their encounters with the juvenile court system. Even if we disagree with that determination, we lack the authority to alter it.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

WIEAND, J., files a dissenting opinion.

WIEAND, Judge,

dissenting:

The majority holds that a court which imposes a sentence for a misdemeanor theft offense may not consider that the defendant, as a juvenile, was adjudicated guilty of at least nine burglaries. I dissent. I would hold that a defendant’s juvenile record is relevant and may be considered as evidence of his character and to assist the sentencing court in determining his rehabilitative needs.

Stephen M. Lyons entered pleas of guilty to charges of theft by unlawful taking and theft by receiving stolen property. Both offenses were graded as misdemeanors of the third degree. A presentence investigation was made, and, on March 3, 1986, Lyons was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than twelve months.' At the sentencing hearing, the court determined that the offenses were Lyons’ first adult offenses and that, therefore, he had a prior record score of zero (0). The court also determined that the offense gravity score for each offense was one (1). The court stated that if this had been Lyons’ first contact with the criminal justice system, the court would have been inclined to sentence him to a term of probation. The court observed, however, that from 1981 to 1983, Lyons had been adjudicated delinquent on account of at least nine burglaries which he had committed. Based upon these prior juvenile adjudications, the court concluded that aggravating circumstances were present which called for a sentence of imprisonment. The sentence imposed was the maximum permitted by law for a misdemeanor, of the third degree. See: 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104. Lyons’ request for reconsideration of sentence was denied, and this appeal followed.

Appellant contends that the trial court committed error when it considered his prior juvenile adjudications. His argument is based on Section 6354 of the Juvenile Act, which provides as follows:

(a) General rule. — An order of disposition or other adjudication in a proceeding under this chapter is not a conviction of crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction or operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment.
(b) Effect in subsequent judicial matters. — The disposition of a child under this chapter may not be used against him in any proceeding in any court other than at a subsequent juvenile hearing, whether before or after reaching majority, except:
(1) in dispositional proceedings after conviction of a felony for the purposes of a presentence investigation and report; or
(2) if relevant, where he has put his reputation or character in issue in a civil matter.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6354.

This statute, when read in isolation, seems to support appellant’s argument; it seems to prohibit a sentencing court from considering prior juvenile adjudications for any purpose except when sentencing an offender following conviction for a felony. However, when it is read together with other relevant statutes, it becomes apparent that such a result was not intended by the legislature.

Section 9732 of the Sentencing Code provides that a presentence report shall include, inter alia, “the history of delinquency ... of the defendant____” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9732. Although the sentencing court is not required to order a presentence report in cases involving misdemeanor offenses, it clearly may do so. See: Pa.R.Crim.P. 1403 A(l) (sentencing judge may order a presentence report in any case). In most cases, in fact, a presentence report will be essential to enable a sentencing court to comply with the mandate of the Sentencing Code to impose a sentence which is consistent with the gravity of the offense, the need to protect the public, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. In this respect, the Sentencing Code requires a sentencing court to consider favorably the absence of prior adjudications of delinquency when determining whether a sentence of probation is appropriate. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9722(7). The converse, then, must also be true. This is confirmed by the legislature’s direction that if a defendant’s history and character are such that there is undue risk that he will commit another crime upon imposition of a sentence of probation or partial confinement, the court must impose a sentence of total confinement. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9725. A defendant’s lengthy juvenile record or the absence of any juvenile record would, in either event, be a significant factor in making such a determination. To suggest that the absence of a juvenile record may be considered for sentencing purposes but not the existence of prior juvenile adjudications is to create in practice a distinction impossible to follow.

It seems clear, therefore, that the legislature did contemplate the need for a sentencing court to consider the presence or absence of prior adjudications of delinquency in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon a defendant. A sentencing court does not, and should not, operate in a vacuum. The presence or absence of prior adjudications of delinquency is an important factor for a sentencing court to consider in complying with the statutory mandate to impose an appropriate, individualized sentence. “To deprive the [cjourts of the right to be informed of and to consider the history and background of the person subject to sentence may result in sentences which are unjust and unfair to both society and defendants.” Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 231, 144 A.2d 367, 371 (1958).

The legislature has directed that “[wjhenever a general provision in a .statute shall be in conflict with a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933. See: Appeal of Yerger, 460 Pa. 537, 333 A.2d 902 (1975). The provisions of the Juvenile Code and the Sentencing Code can be made to operate in harmony if 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354 is interpreted to provide that, with the exception of subsequent felony convictions, an adjudication of delinquency shall not be considered as a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing. Thus, it cannot be considered in determining a defendant’s prior record score for purposes of applying the Sentencing Guidelines. See: Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 366 Pa.Super. 328, 531 A.2d 441 (1987). However, the provisions of the Juvenile Code and the Sentencing Code, when construed together, do not prevent a sentencing court from considering prior juvenile adjudications for the purpose of determining the sentence best calculated to fit a defendant’s character and rehabilitative needs and the public’s interest in protection against crime.

Such an interpretation of the applicable statutes will not only permit a court to impose a meaningful and personalized sentence, as intended by the Sentencing Code, but it will also serve the purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354. The Juvenile Act was not intended to obliterate an offender’s past history, especially where he or she continues to engage in unlawful behavior after reaching the age of majority. See: Commonwealth v. Smith, 333 Pa.Super. 179, 182, 481 A.2d 1365, 1366 (1984). The statutory purpose was merely to ensure that young adults who had previously been adjudicated delinquent would not begin their adult lives with the stigma and adverse consequences which generally follow criminal convictions.

I would hold, therefore, that the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354 do not prohibit a sentencing court from being' made aware of and giving consideration to an offender’s prior juvenile record for purposes of imposing an appropriate sentence following conviction of a criminal offense, whether the offense be a felony or a misdemeanor.

      . 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3921(a).

      . Id. at § 3925(a).

      . The court concluded that the conviction for theft by receiving stolen property merged with the conviction for theft by unlawful taking for sentencing purposes.

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).

      . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903.

      . The conviction for theft by receiving stolen property was held to merge in the conviction for theft by unlawful taking, and no separate sentence therefor was imposed.


author: KELLY, Judge:

text:
    530 A.2d 1351
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John Theodore BONAPARTE, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Dee. 15, 1986.
    Filed Sept. 3, 1987.

      John T. Bonaparte, in propria persona.
    John S. Kennedy, York, for Com., appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and KELLY, JJ.
   KELLY, Judge:

Appellant, John Theodore Bonaparte, appeals from an order denying his motion for bail pending disposition of various petitions filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. Although we find that disposition of such motions is governed by Pa.R. Crim.P. 1506(2) rather than Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010, which was relied upon by the trial court, we nonetheless affirm.

On October 29, 1984, appellant was arrested and charged with: two counts of corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125; two counts of prostitution and related offenses, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5902; one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, 35 P.S. § 78-113(30); and one count of possession of marijuana, 35 P.S. § 78-113(31). On June 28, 1985, appellant entered an open plea to two counts of prostitution and related offenses and one count of possession of marijuana pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain. The remaining charges were nol prossed. On August 23, 1985, appellant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of three to six years on the prostitution and related offenses convictions and a concurrent term of twelve months probation on the possession of marijuana conviction. No timely motion to modify sentence or timely notice of appeal was filed. However, beginning August 29, 1985, appellant filed a series of counselled and pro se motions and petitions. The instant appeal involves only the court’s July 15, 1986 denial of appellant’s June 18, 1986 pro se petition for bail during the pendency of proceedings on his various PCHA petitions.

Review of appellant’s inarticulate pro se brief reveals the following contentions: the court erred in denying the petition for bail; appellant was denied a fair hearing on his petition for bail; the court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent appellant at a bail hearing; appellant was denied due process; and the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself.

The trial court rejected appellant’s contentions and filed a memorandum opinion which includes the following statement:

The defendant has filed an appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania from our Order of July 15, 1986, refusing to grant him bail pending the various proceedings against him. This Memorandum Opinion is filed to comply with Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a).
As we indicated in our said Order of July 15, 1986, we are governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010(b)(2)....

Trial Court Opinion at 1-2.

I.

While we agree that this appeal lacks merit and that the order denying appellant’s petition for bail should be affirmed, we cannot agree with the trial court’s reasoning in reaching this result. The provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010 referred to by the trial court do not apply to the instant case; rather, motions for bail pending disposition of PCHA petitions or other collateral post-conviction proceedings are governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1506 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9550.

However, because the standard set by the- applicable rule and statute is clearly more restrictive of the court’s authority to release, appellant on bail than the standard set by Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010, which the trial court applied in denying the motion, we may affirm notwithstanding the trial court’s citation of the wrong rule in support of its order. “A ruling or decision of a lower court will be affirmed if it can be supported on any basis despite the lower court’s assignment of a wrong reason.” Commonwealth v. Terry, 513 Pa. 381, 404, 521 A.2d 398, 409 (1987).

A.

Prior to conviction, in a non-capital case in Pennsylvania, an accused has a constitutional right to bail which is conditioned only upon the giving of adequate assurances that he or she will appear for trial. Pa.Const., Art. 1, sec. 14. Absent evidence that the accused will flee, the importance of the presumption of innocence, the principle that punishment should not be imposed prior to conviction, and the need to provide an accused an unhampered opportunity to prepare a defense, dictate that bail should be granted prior to trial. See Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 335-36 & n. 13, 296 A.2d 829, 834-35 & n. 13 (1972).

Following a verdict of guilt, however, a defendant has no state or federal constitutional right to bail. See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 451 Pa. 505, 304 A.2d 124 (1973); Commonwealth v. Caye, 447 Pa. 213, 290 A.2d 244 (1972); Commonwealth v. Keller, 433 Pa. 20, 248 A.2d 855 (1969). After conviction, and pending final disposition of all direct appeal proceedings, allowance of bail in non-capital cases is left to the discretion of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Keller, supra, 248 A.2d at 856; Commonwealth v. Meyers, 137 Pa. 407, 409, 21 A. 246, 247 (1891). The provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010 set forth the procedural rules governing the exercise of this discretion. See Commonwealth v. Fowler, supra, 304 A.2d at 127 & n. 6.

At first glance, it would appear that Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010 was intended to govern all post-conviction motions for bail. However, upon close examination, it is apparent that its application is clearly limited to pre-sentence and direct appeal situations; Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010(B)(3) provides:

When bail is set after sentencing, the judge shall condition bail upon defendant’s perfecting an appeal within the time permitted by law.

Further, the official comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 4011 (which governs the validity of bond entered to secure bail granted under Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010) provides:

The intent of this rule is to continue the validity of the bond through all avenues of direct appeal, but to exclude state post-conviction proceedings or federal post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings or any other collateral attack.

Application of either Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010 or Pa.R.Crim.P. 4011 to motions for bail pending disposition of PCHA petitions would yield curious results — bail granted would be subject to revocation due to the failure to perfect an appeal, which is an express condition mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010(B)(3), and the bond securing bail would be invalid from the date of its entry. Although this issue has not previously been decided in Pennsylvania’s appellate courts, we find that these rules were clearly not intended to apply to motions for bail pending disposition of PCHA petitions. See Commonwealth v. Wetzel, 88 Dauph. 250, 251-52 (Pa. Com.Pl.1967); accord Avery v. State, 17 Md.App. 686, 304 A.2d 856 (1973); State v. Rose, 88 NJ.Super. 86, 210 A.2d 793 (1965).

B.

Proceedings upon PCHA petitions are governed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 et seq. and Pa.R.Crim.P. 1501 et seq. With regard to the authority to release a PCHA petitioner on bail, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9550(a) provides:

If the trial court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall order appropriate relief and issue any supplementary orders as to reassignment, retrial, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other matters which are necessary and proper.

(Emphasis added). This statute appears to restrict a trial court’s authority to grant bail to cases where the PCHA petition is found to have merit.

However, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1506 provides in pertinent part: When the court grants a post-conviction hearing, it shall:
(2) Enter such interim order as may be necessary in the interests of justice;
(6) Enter an order granting or denying relief; and
(7) Issue any supplementary orders appropriate to the proper disposition of the case.

(Emphasis' added). We find that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9550(a) and Pa.R.Crim.P. 1506(2) are inconsistent to the extent that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9550(a) could be construed to restrict the trial court’s authority under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1506(2) to release a petitioner on bail pending the disposition of his PCHA petition when the interest of justice so required. By rule of court, the Post Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 et seq., is suspended “insofar as it is inconsistent with the Rules.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 1507. Thus, the apparently restrictive language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9550(a) notwithstanding, a PCHA petitioner may be admitted to bail pending disposition of the petition when such an order would be “necessary in the interests of justice.”

It is important to note that Pa.R.Crim.P. 1506(2) did not create a new substantive right. Pa.Const. Art. V, sec. 10; Commonwealth v. Fowler, supra, 304 A.2d at 127-28. The vast majority of federal and state courts have concluded that courts have inherent power to release a petitioner on bail pending disposition of a habeas corpus petition as a consequence of the conferral of jurisdiction in such cases. See Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528, 530-31 (3rd Cir.1955) (citing cases); State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1264-65 (R.I. 1980); Shamblin v. Hey, 163 W.Va. 396, 256 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1979); see also Annotation, Court’s Power and Duty, Pending Determination of Habeas Corpus Proceedings on the Merits, to Admit Petitioner to Bail, 56 A.L.R.2d 668 (1957); 56-61 A.L.R.2d Supp. 55 (1984 & 1986 supp.). We agree and find that the same is true of PCHA proceedings which have replaced post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings. We note that we recognize a power vested in the court and not a right vested in petitioners.

C.

We have found that a court may release a petitioner on bail pending the disposition of a PCHA petition when such an order would be necessary “in the interests of justice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 1506(2). Upon review of the well-reasoned opinions of our sister states, we conclude that such motions should only be granted in exceptional cases for compelling reasons. In Shamblin v. Hey, supra, the West Virginia Supreme Court explained:

There are, however, egregious factual situations in which it may become so obvious to the trial court that the petitioner will ultimately prevail on the merits of his habeas corpus proceeding that it would be manifestly unjust for him to continue to serve one more day of incarceration as the result of a conviction which made a mockery of justice. While the mechanics of a formal hearing may be such that an orderly disposition of the case cannot occur in less than several weeks or even several months, where it is obvious to the trial court that an injustice has probably been done, there is no impediment to releasing the petitioner [on bail] pending final formal disposition of his petition. In light, however, of the pervasive and exhaustive use of post conviction habeas corpus to litigate and relitigate issues which have already been determined, this Court would adamantly point out that bail pending the outcome of a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that under ordinary circumstances that discretion is well informed to deny bail in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.

256 S.E.2d at 437-38. In State v. Avery, supra, the Maryland court echoed the West Virginia court’s concerns regarding the abuse of post-conviction proceedings:

It requires little imagination to visualize a situation in which a determined and resourceful individual could continuously present claims of newly discovered evidence and thus postpone indefinitely the time at which he would have to serve a criminal sentence. We, who have had occasion to observe closely the ingenuity displayed by persons convicted of crimes in presenting claims on post conviction [review], can readily attest to the fact that attributing such ingenuity to our hypothetical convicted person is not an exercise in fantasy.

304 A.2d at 858. Pennsylvania courts are not immune from such abuses of post-conviction proceedings. Thus, while it may be appropriate to exercise the power to admit a petitioner to bail pending final formal disposition of PCHA petitions in exceptional cases, it is important that this power be exercised in a way which does not provide an inducement to ingenious convicts to redouble their pursuance of merit-less petitions.

In the instant case, the trial court stated that it was of the opinion that the sentence was fair and that bail should be denied. It is readily apparent that had the more restrictive standard for admitting a PCHA petitioner to bail pending disposition of the PCHA petition (announced herein) been applied, bail would have been denied; there is not the slightest indication in the instant case of exceptional circumstances that would justify releasing the appellant on bail “in the interests of justice.” Hence, the denial of bail was proper and should be affirmed.

II.

Appellant also contends that he was denied a fair hearing on his bail petition and that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent him at the bail hearing. We find no authority for appellant’s contention that he was entitled to a hearing prior to disposition of his bail petition; it is clear that neither 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9550 nor Pa.R.Crim.P. 1506 require such a hearing. Nor do we find any authority for the contention that the court was required to appoint counsel to present and argue the PCHA bail petition. We note, however, that it was appellant who elected to file the motion pro se rather than to present the motion to the court through counsel appointed by the court to represent appellant in the PCHA proceedings. Hence, we find no merit in these contentions.

III.

Appellant further contends that he has been denied due process. Appellant fails however to state the basis for this claim, although it appears that he is distressed by the fact that murderers are granted bail pending direct appeal of their convictions of violent crimes while he is denied bail pending disposition of his PCHA petitions and motions to withdraw his guilty plea. As noted supra, a motion for bail pending disposition of PCHA petitions stands upon entirely separate grounds from motions for bail pending direct appeals. The difference in the treatment of direct appeal and PCHA bail petitions does not offend either due process or equal protection provisions of the federal constitution. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Finley, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). We find no denial of due process or violation of the equal protection clause implicated by appellant’s vague, conclusory and unsupported allegations.

IV.

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to recuse himself. Appellant argues:

During the PCHA and Recusal hearings, Judge Buckingham assured everyone that he was impartial and fair despite the fact that he had been pictured in publications of The Shadow and was a member of the Prison Board, an organization which had been sued by the Appellant. (T.T. at 6-7). The Shadow is a scandal newspaper printed by the Appellant. While Judge Buckingham may not have been prejudiced, the law clearly states that the test is whether a reasonable inferrence [sic] can be made that prejudice existed. Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. 15, 459 A.2d 727 (1983).
Thus, even though Judge Buckingham acted with complete integrity in sentencing Appellant and in hearing the PCHA petitions, the fact is irrelevant. Since it reasonably can be inferred from the facts of this case that prejudice and bias could exist, Judge Buckingham should [have] recused himself from sentencing and hearing the PCHA petitions and the bail petition.

(Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at 8). We cannot agree. Neither appellant’s publication of articles concerning the judge in a prison scandal newspaper nor the mere institution of a lawsuit against a Prison Board upon which the judge served raise a reasonable inference of potential for prejudice or bias. We find that absent some indication that the articles or the lawsuit were likely to have had a negative effect on the judge, the recusal motion was properly subject to summary rejection. See Municipal Publications v. Common Pleas Court, 507 Pa. 194, 489 A.2d 1286 (1985).

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the order denying appellant’s motion for bail pending the disposition of his PCHA petitions is affirmed.

CAVANAUGH and MONTEMURO, JJ., concur in result.

      . Review of an order denying bail prior to sentence or pending direct appeal is governed by Pa.R.A.P. 1762, Pa.R.A.P. 1502, Pa.R.A.P. 1503, and Pa.R.Crim.P. 4001-17. See Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 489 Pa. 142, 142 n. 2, 413 A.2d 1054, 1555 n. 2 (1980); Commonwealth v. Heiser, 330 Pa.Super. 70, 71 n. 1, 478 A.2d 1355, 1356 n. 1 (1984). The instant case, however, involves an appeal from an order denying bail pending determination of the merits of a PCHA petition which does not fall within the ambit of the above rules.
      Nonetheless, we find that the order is an appealable interlocutory order under the three prong Cohen test which has been adopted in this Commonwealth. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 94, 501 A.2d 211, 214 (1985); Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 73, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978); Fidelity Bank v. Duden, 361 Pa.Super. 124, 127, 521 A.2d 958, 960 (1987) (en banc). A request for bail pending disposition of a PCHA petition is separate from and collateral to the determination of the merits of the petition; the right to bail in such cases is too important a right to be denied review; and the right would clearly be irreparably lost if appeal were postponed until disposition of the PCHA petition. We note that our Supreme Court has granted review on the merits of an appeal from an order denying bail pending determination of the merits of a PCHA petition without discussing the appealability of the order. Commonwealth v. Keller, 433 Pa. 20, 248 A.2d 855 (1969). We note further that the trial court retains jurisdiction to dispose of the PCHA petition while an appeal from an order denying bail is pending unless a specific order directing otherwise is entered by the trial or appellate court. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(c & d).

      . We note that the habeas corpus statute which the Post Conviction Hearing Act replaced provided:

        In ordering the writ to issue, or in awarding a rule to show cause, the judge shall fix a date for hearing, which shall be held as promptly as may be, and may or may not order the relator to be produced at the hearing, as the circumstances may warrant, and except when the relator is charged with a non-bailable offense or has been convicted and sentenced, the judge may in his discretion, fix bail, in such amount as he deems appropriate for the appearance of the relator at the time and place of the hearing and may order his discharge meanwhile.
      12 P.S. § 1905 (repealed in part, 19 P.S. §§ 1181 et seq., repealed in toto, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 20002(a) (1274)). (Emphasis added).

      . The common law regarding the power of a court to admit a petitioner to bail pending determination of the merits of a habeas corpus petition was stated in Barth v. Clise, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 400, 402, 20 L.Ed. 393 (1871) as follows:
      By the common law, upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus and the production of the body of the party suing it out, the authority under which the original commitment took place is superceded. After that time, and until the case is finally disposed of, the safe keeping of the prisoner is entirely under the control and direction of the court to which return is made. The prisoner is detained, not under the original commitment, but under the authority of the writ of habeas corpus. Pending the hearing he may be bailed de die in diem, or be remanded to the jail from whence he came, or be committed to any other suitable place of confinement under the control of court. He may be brought before the court from time to time by its order until it is determined whether he shall be discharged or absolutely remanded.

        See also In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 133, 14 L.Ed. 345 (1852) (Nelson, J. dissenting; Taney, CJ. and Daniel, J., concurring).

      . We note that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Pennsylvania v. Finley, — U.S.-, 107 SCt. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) indicates that there is no federal constitutional requirement that counsel be appointed in collateral post-conviction proceedings and that when counsel is afforded under state law that the extension of the right to counsel need not carry with it all of the federally mandated procedural safeguards attendant to the right to counsel on direct appeal. Specifically, the Court held that even though Pennsylvania extended to a PCHA petitioner the right to counsel, the procedures for withdrawal of representation on direct appeal set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) were not mandated by the federal constitution in PCHA proceedings. What effect Pennsylvania v. Finley, supra, may have on Pennsylvania PCHA petitioners’ rights to counsel in general, we need not decide in this case.