author: BECK, Judge:

text:
    596 A.2d 1132
    Lulu Mae NIX, Appellant, v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION and Peter J. Liacouras, President and Barbara L. Brownstein and William R. Tash and Margaret C. Wang and Richard M. Englert.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued May 23, 1991.
    Filed Sept. 6, 1991.

      Victor M. Raymond, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Brenda Fraser, Philadelphia, for appellees.
    Before WIEAND, BECK and HUDOCK, JJ.
   BECK, Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant challenges the trial court’s grant of defendants-appellees’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to each and every count of her complaint. Counts I, II and III of appellant’s complaint state claims of breach of contract and wrongful discharge against the employer-appellee. Counts IV, V, VI and VII state claims of interference with contract and civil conspiracy against the individual appellees, and Court VIII requests punitive damages. The trial court granted appellees’ preliminary objections to each of appellant’s claims because her complaint failed to adequately allege facts showing a) that an employment contract was formed between her and her employer, b) that the alleged interference was unprivileged, and c) that the individuals were not acting on behalf of their employer. The trial court also found that appellant’s request for punitive damages failed to constitute a cause of action in and of itself. Appellant argues the trial court erred in making each of the above determinations. After completely reviewing the record evidence and the relevant law, we agree that appellant’s claims each fail to state a cause of action and therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint.

Our review of a trial court’s decision regarding preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is undertaken favoring the party opposing the preliminary objections. That is, we must accept as true all well pled facts included in the complaint that are material to the claims. Ward v. Serfas, 387 Pa.Super. 425, 564 A.2d 251 (1989); Leach v. Hough, 352 Pa.Super. 213, 507 A.2d 848 (1986). We must also accept as true all inferences that are reasonably deducible from the facts included in the complaint. Id; Creeger Brick v. Mid-State Bank, 385 Pa.Super. 30, 560 A.2d 151 (1989). However, we will not accept unreasonable inferences of fact, nor will we necessarily accept plaintiffs conclusions of law derived from the complaint. Frankel v. Northeast Land Co., 391 Pa.Super. 226, 570 A.2d 1065 (1990); Leach, supra. Moreover, where any doubt exists- regarding the propriety of the preliminary objections, such doubt should be resolved by overruling the demurrer. Leach, supra.

With this scope of review as a background, we consider the relevant facts of the instant matter. In or about 1982, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the independently run National Institute for Adolescent Pregnancy and Family Services (the “Institute”) became part of the appellee, Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education (“Temple”). Pursuant to a Letter of Agreement between Temple and the Institute, Temple agreed to employ appellant, Lulu Mae Nix, who was currently an employee of the Institute, as Executive Director of the Institute with the right to “set criteria, interview, [and] accept or reject [personnel] as the [new] Institute's] needs require ...” Accordingly, Temple offered appellant the position and she accepted. Appellant readily admits that she did not have an employment agreement, expressed or implied, with Temple.

During her employment, appellant initiated and prepared Temple’s application for a federal operational grant for the Institute. In preparing the application appellant requested that she be named its “principal investigator.” The proposed budget accompanying the grant application allegedly included a portion of appellant’s salary.

At all times during appellant’s employment, individual appellee Peter J. Liacouras was Temple’s president, whose duty did not include supervising appellant. The other four individual appellees, Barbara L. Brownstein, William R. Tash, Margaret C. Wang, and Richard M. Englert, were Temple administrators whose respective duties included oversight of the Institute and its projects. Specifically, the Institute and its personnel were housed in a department of Temple under the supervision of Wang and Englert. Wang and Englert reported to Tash, who in turn, reported to Brownstein. Appellant was required to seek authorization from Tash, Wang, and Englert with respect to her activities on behalf of Temple. Additionally, appellant reported to Tash directly regarding the grant application.

Around May of 1989, disagreement arose between appellant and her supervisors, the individual appellees named above, as to numerous aspects of the grant application and specifically, in regard to the supervision and administration of the project for which the grant was sought. After a September meeting on the matter, appellant was removed from working on the grant application and Wang then took charge of it herself. On or about October 1, 1989, appellant submitted additional information for the grant application to the federal government without consulting with any of her supervisors and without Wang’s permission. Thereafter, appellant’s name was removed from the project, the application was re-submitted, and was subsequently rejected. Shortly thereafter, in a letter dated November 30,1989, Englert advised appellant that effective December 15, 1989, Temple was discontinuing the Institute and, as such, her employment would also end on that date.

Appellant then filed suit against Temple, its President and four of its administrators who supervised her alleging breach of contract, civil conspiracy, intentional interference with contract, and wrongful discharge. Thereafter the appellees filed preliminary objections to the complaint alleging that appellant was an at-will employee subject to discharge for any or no reason and that the other claims in the complaint failed to state a cause of action against them, and thereby demurring. After substantial briefing and oral argument from both sides, the trial court concluded that each count in appellant’s complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which she could recover. The trial court then dismissed the complaint and entered judgment against appellant. This appeal followed.

On appeal, appellant alleges that the trial court committed an error of law when it sustained the preliminary objections of the appellees. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to each count of her complaint, alleging breach of express and implied contract, wrongful discharge, civil conspiracy, and intentional interference with contract, on the basis that each failed to state a cause of action.

Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in sustaining demurrers to Counts I and II of her complaint alleging breach of express and implied contract. We disagree.

In making our decision to uphold the trial court’s conclusion, we begin with the understanding that in Pennsylvania an at-will employment environment is the norm, absent a contract to the contrary, and thus, an employee can be terminated for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. Hershberger v. Jersey Shore Steel Co., 394 Pa.Super. 363, 575 A.2d 944 (1990); See also Darlington v. General Electric, 350 Pa.Super. 183, 504 A.2d 306 (1986); Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85, 515 A.2d 571 (1986); Banos v. Matthews International Corp., 348 Pa.Super. 464, 502 A.2d 637 (1985). As such, in the absence of a recognized exception, we will not review an employer’s decision to discharge an employee. Robertson v. Atlantic Richfield Petroleum Products Co., 371 Pa.Super. 49, 537 A.2d 814 (1987); Veno v. Meredith, supra.

The clearest exception to the rule of employment-at-will is where the employer and employee have entered into a valid contract which expresses an intention to overcome the presumption. Veno v. Meredith, supra; Banas v. Matthews International Corp., supra. This court has explained that a contract overcoming the presumption of at-will employment must be clear and definite. Veno v. Meredith, supra; Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354 Pa.Super. 199, 511 A.2d 830 (1986). Where the language is ambiguous or where there is not a definite contractual agreement, such language and agreements will be “strictly reviewed because of the pervasive presumption that the employment is at-will.” Id.

It is important to recognize that the at-will rule is a presumption, and as such, the burden of proving that he or she is not employed-at-will rests squarely on the employee. Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., 368 Pa. 448, 84 A.2d 323, 325 (1951); Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 363 Pa.Super. 534, 526 A.2d 1192 (1987); Banas v. Matthews International Corp., supra.

In the instant case, appellant merely asserts in her complaint that Temple offered her the position of executive director of its Institute for Adolescent Pregnancy and Family Services at a certain salary, that she accepted this offer, and Temple employed her in such position for seven years. However, appellant does not allege in her complaint that her employment was pursuant to a clear and definite contract providing that her term of employment was for a definite period of time. In addition, none of the words or course of conduct that appellant attributes to her former employer even approach a clear impression of intent to contract away the at-will rule. Even where we take all of appellant’s allegations as fact, along with any reasonable inferences from those facts, we still cannot conclude that appellant has met her burden of overcoming the presumption that she was hired by appellees in an at-will status. In light of the long-standing presumption that, unless established to the contrary, all employment is at the will of both the employer and employee, and that a contract overcoming this presumption must be clear and definite, we find that the trial court correctly concluded appellant failed to show that her employment with Temple was other than at-will and thereby, did not adequately plead a breach of employment contract claim. As such, the trial court acted properly when it granted the demurrer to the counts in appellant’s complaint which alleged a breach of contract.

Appellant’s second contention is that the trial court erred in sustaining demurrers to Count III of her complaint which alleged that she was wrongfully discharged from her employment by Temple. In support of this contention, appellant claims that the facts in her complaint, if taken as true, established that her discharge violated public policy. We disagree.

In Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), our Supreme Court recognized the principle that even an employee-at-will may have a legitimate cause of action against her employer if her discharge threatens clearly mandated public policy. However, in Cisco v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 328 Pa.Super. 300, 476 A.2d 1340 (1984), a two-part test was established to determine whether the discharged employee could recover damages against an employer for wrongful discharge: First, we must decide whether any public policy is threatened. Second, even if an important public policy is involved, a discharge of an employee is lawful if the employer has separate, plausible and legitimate reasons for so doing. Id.; See also Darlington v. General Electric, supra.

Thus, we must first ask whether any clearly mandated public policy is involved in the instant case. In appellant’s complaint, she avers that the termination of her employment was a violation of public policy because she refused to approve acts proposed by appellee Tash which she believed would be unlawful, i.e., the misappropriation of federal funds. However, we have held that merely alleging an illegality or an attempt to avoid it is not a violation of a clearly defined mandate of public policy. See McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 383 Pa.Super. 223, 556 A.2d 878 (1989) (when the acts to be performed turns upon a question of judgment as to its legality or ethical nature, the employer should not be precluded from conducting its business where the professional’s opinion is open to question). Moreover, a review of appellant’s complaint reveals a separate, plausible, and legitimate reason for her discharge, namely, appellant’s position as executive director of the Institute was discontinued as a result of the Institute’s closing. As such, we find that appellant has not alleged sufficient facts which would support her claim that she was wrongfully discharged in violation of a clearly mandated public policy. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly granted appellees’ demurrer to Count III of appellant’s complaint alleging wrongful discharge.

Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that her complaint failed to state causes of action against the individual appellees for interference with contract. We disagree.

Appellant’s allegations of interference with contract appear in Counts IV, V, and VI of her complaint. Specifically, in Count IV of appellant’s complaint, she alleged that the individual defendants, Liacouras, Brownstein, Tash, Wang, and Englert, conspired to interfere with her employment contract with Temple. In Count V, she alleged that such interference was intentional and, in Count VI, appellant alleged that such interference induced Temple not to continue its perspective employment relationship with her. After careful review, we find that the above claims are deficient for the common reason that each claim fails to sufficiently make the requisite averments that the appellant had a contract or prospective contract with a third party or that the individuals’ alleged interference was unprivileged.

The tort of interference with contract is defined in terms of unprivileged interference with a contract with a third party. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 766; Daniel Adams Assoc. v. Rimbach Pub. Inc., 860 Pa.Super. 72, 519 A.2d 997 (1987). Essential to the right of recovery on this theory is the existence of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and a party other than the defendant. Id. It is well settled that a corporation cannot tortuously interfere with a contract to which it is a party. Menefee v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 458 Pa. 46, 329 A.2d 216 (1974). Because a corporation acts only through its agents and officers, such agents or officers cannot be regarded as third parties when they are acting in their official capacities. Id.

In the instant case, the alleged employment contract with which Liacouras, Brownstein, Tash, Wang, and Englert allegedly interfered was between appellant and Temple. All of the above named individuals were, at all relevant times, administrative officers of Temple who were acting on behalf of Temple when appellant was discharged. Although appellant’s complaint alleged that the individual defendants were “third persons” because they acted in their individual capacities at the time, it failed to allege any factual basis to sustain such an allegation. Accordingly, appellant has failed to show that a contract existed with a “third person.”

Additionally, appellant has failed to assert how the alleged interference was unprivileged. Corporate officers, as well as managerial employees, by virtue of the responsibilities of their offices, are permitted to take action which would have the effect of interfering with a contractual relationship between the corporation and an employee. See DuSesoi v. United Refining Cory., 540 F.Supp. 1260 (W.D.Pa.1982); See also Wells v. Thomas, 569 F.Supp. 426 (D.C.Pa.1983) (employee’s interference with contract claim against his supervisors failed to state a valid cause of action as supervisors were privileged, as a matter of law, to take action that allegedly resulted in the termination of the employee’s employment). As such, appellant’s complaint failed to sufficiently allege that her supervisors and the president of Temple were not privileged to take the actions which allegedly resulted in termination of her employment contract with Temple. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly granted appellees’ demurrer to Counts IV, V, and VI of appellant’s complaint.

We also affirm the dismissal of the count for civil conspiracy, Count VII of appellant’s complaint. “Absent a civil cause of action for a particular act, there can be no cause of action for civil conspiracy.” Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa.Super. 422, 432, 536 A.2d 1337, 1342 (1987).

Finally, we affirm the dismissal of appellant’s final count for punitive damages, Count VIII of her complaint. A request for punitive damages does not constitute a cause of action in an of itself. Rather, a request for punitive damages is merely incidental to a cause of action. Feingold v. SEPTA, 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270 (1986). The trial court properly dismissed Count VIII of appellant’s complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.

Order affirmed.

      . Appellant cites to 18 U.S.C. § 666 as the law which would be violated. Section 666 prohibits the theft or misapplication of federal property valued at $5,000 or more, or the giving or receipt of an inducement involving anything of $5,000 value or more by an agent of an organization which receives more than $10,000 in federal funds for a one year period. Appellant claims that the above statute would be violated if Temple paid her salary from federal funds Temple may receive for a project on which she was not working.

      . The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 766, which was adopted by Pennsylvania in Glenn v. Point Park College, 441 Pa. 474, 272 A.2d 895 (1971), provides in pertinent part:
      ... One who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposefully causes a third person not to
      a) perform a contract with another, or
      b) enter into or continue a business relation with another is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby.

      . Appellant’s claim must also fail for the additional reason that a corporation cannot conspire with itself. See Daniel Adams Assoc. v. Rimbach Pub., Inc., 360 Pa.Super. 72, 519 A.2d 997 (1987). Generally, the acts of the agents of a corporation are the acts of the corporation. Id. In the instant case, appellant’s complaint alleging a conspiracy among Temple’s agents, the individual appellees, is, in effect, an allegation that Temple conspired with itself. Thus, in the absence of sufficient allegations for which the law permits recovery, the count in appellant’s complaint for civil conspiracy was properly dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: POPOVICH, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    596 A.2d 1138
    Kenneth R. CUMMINGS, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Appellee.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued June 18, 1991.
    Filed Sept. 25, 1991.
    John W. Murtagh, Jr., Wexford, for appellant.
    John C. Donaher, III, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
    Before POPOVICH, JOHNSON and FORD ELLIOTT, JJ.
   POPOVICH, Judge:

This is an appeal from the order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas which granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. We affirm.

The record reveals the following facts, as set forth in appellee’s motion for summary judgment, which are not in dispute. On September 26,1990, while operating his vehicle which was insured by appellee, appellant backed his car into an unoccupied, parked vehicle. After the impact, appellant exited his vehicle in order to ascertain what, if any, damage had occurred and to locate the owner of the vehicle. Immediately after stepping out of his car, appellant was attacked and beaten by the owner of the parked car. Appellant admits his injuries were caused by the attack and not by the impact of his vehicle with the parked car. Based on those facts, the lower court granted appellee’s motion, stating, “The Pennsylvania Appellate Courts have rejected Plaintiff’s argument that motor vehicle insurance coverage reaches injuries intentionally inflicted by third persons as a result of the manner in which a vehicle was operated. See Erie Insurance Group v. Eisenhurth, [Eisenhuth] [305 Pa.Super. 571] 451 A.2d 1024 (Pa.Super.1982). See also Day v. State Farm, [261 Pa.Super. 216] 396 A.2d 3 (Pa.Super.1978).”

Herein, appellant, Kenneth Cummings, questions whether, under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701 et seq., the injuries he sustained arose out of the “maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.” Appellant contends that the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3745, specifically required him to stop his vehicle and locate the owner of the car he hit. Therefore, he maintains that since his action of exiting the vehicle was mandatory under the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, his injuries clearly arose from the “use of his vehicle.” We disagree.

The standard for reviewing an order granting summary judgment was set forth in Vargo v. Hunt, 398 Pa.Super. 600, 601, 581 A.2d 625, 626 (1990), as follows:

A determination of whether the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is to be upheld requires an appellate court to decide whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admission and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Overly v. Kass, 382 Pa.Super. 108, 554 A.2d 970, 971 (1989); see also Chiricos v. Forest Lake Council Boy Scouts of America, 391 Pa.Super. 491, 571 A.2d 474, 475 (1990). In making such a finding, we must accept as true all properly pleaded facts, as well as all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom. Furthermore, we shall not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless there has been an error of law or a manifest abuse of discretion. Overly v. Kass, supra.

See also, Pa.R.C.P. 1035; Dorohovich v. West American Ins. Co., 403 Pa.Super. 412, 419-21, 589 A.2d 252, 256 (1991); Bodnik v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa.Cmwlth. 453, 454-455, 580 A.2d 1187, 1187 (1990).

Presently, we are guided by the language of Huber v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 402 Pa.Super. 443, 446-447, 587 A.2d 333, 334-335 (1991) wherein, we stated:

It is beyond cavil that first party benefits are not paid simply because an injury occurs in or around a motor vehicle. We must keep in mind that the MVFRL, like the No-fault Act before it, is not a general liability insurance intended to cover all injuries, no matter how remotely connected with the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle, but is intended to cover motor vehicle accidents. Camacho v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 314 Pa.Super. 21, 460 A.2d 353 (1983), aff'd 504 Pa. 351, 473 A.2d 1017 (1984). Automobile insurance is designed to compensate for vehicle-caused injuries. Smith v. United Services Automobile Association, 392 Pa.Super. 248, 572 A.2d 785 (1990). There must be some causal connection between the motor vehicle and the injury before the motor vehicle insurer is required to pay first party benefits. Roach v. Port Authority of Allegheny Co., 380 Pa.Super. 28, 550 A.2d 1346 (1988). In Roach, for example, the plaintiff was riding on a bus and was injured as the result of a fight between two other passengers. Since there was no causal link between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle, this court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. Similarly, in Alvarino v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 Pa.Super. 563, 537 A.2d 18 (1988), the lack of a causal connection precluded recovery where a child was bitten by a dog while riding in a motor vehicle. See also, Smith v. United Services Automobile Association, supra (where a passenger on haywagon threw hay at plaintiff causing him to collide with a tree, first party benefits not available); McKelvey v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 392 Pa.Super. 216, 572 A.2d 769 (1990) (insured who injured his shoulder when he glanced off door frame while rushing to his children after house was struck by automobile not covered under MVFRL).

See also Camacho v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 314 Pa.Super. 21, 460 A.2d 353 (1983), aff’d, 504 Pa. 351, 473 A.2d 1017 (1984) (injuries sustained by driver sitting in car from exploding bottle thrown into car did not arise out of use of motor vehicle); Erie Ins. Exchange v. Eisenhuth, 305 Pa.Super. 571, 451 A.2d 1024 (1982) (injuries sustained by passenger sitting in car when shot by policeman during his pursuit of driver did not arise out of use of automobile).

Applying the aforementioned standards to the case at bar, it is readily apparent that appellant’s injuries did not arise out of the “maintenance of use” of his motor vehicle and, therefore, are not covered by his insurance policy. Even appellant admits his injuries were not “vehicle-caused injuries.” Huber, 402 Pa.Superior Ct. at 446, 587 A.2d at 334; Smith, supra. There was no causal link between appellant's injuries and his use of the motor vehicle. Rather, his injuries were the result of the physical attack which occurred after appellant has ceased operation of the motor vehicle and exited the vehicle. The present case is factually similar to the case of Day v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 261 Pa.Super. 216, 219-220, 396 A.2d 3, 4-5 (1978), wherein stated:

The real issue in this case involves the instrumentality used to cause the injury, not whether it was intentionally or accidentally inflicted. Automobile insurance, including uninsured motorist provisions, are designed to compensate victims for vehicle-caused injuries. There must be some connection between the harm done and the insured vehicle. See Wheeler et al. v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 292 Pa. 156, 140 A. 855 (1928), Ferry v. Protective Indemnity Company of New York, 155 Pa.Super. 266, 38 A.2d 493 (1944), Presbyterian University of Pennsylvania Medical Center v. Keystone Insurance Co. and Willie Bass, 251 Pa.Super. 71, 380 A.2d 381 (1977). The vehicle itself is covered by the automobile policy, and an individual is covered only by nature of his function as the driver of that vehicle. The intent of the driver becomes relevant only after a determination is made that the injury complained of was caused by the vehicle. This is, in fact, the meaning of the language “arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured motor vehicle,” contained in the State Farm policy.
In the instant case, Day’s broken ankle was caused by Williams knocking him down with his fists, not with his truck. In point of fact, no injury was caused by the collision of the two vehicles in question. Williams was clearly not behaving as a motorist at the time of his assault on Day.
Day could not have recovered from Williams’ automobile carrier for the type of injury he received in the fight, and he is also precluded from recovering from his own carrier, State Farm, under the terms of the Uninsured Motorist provision of his policy. The injury sustained was simply not within the scope and terms of that policy.

Although Day, supra, was decided under the Uninsured Motorists Act, 40 Pa.S.A. § 2000 et seq., we agree with our conclusion therein that injuries which are sustained as a result of a physical altercation between drivers after an accident, and not as a result of the accident itself, do not arise out of the “maintenance or use” of a motor vehicle. Therefore, just as those injuries are not covered under the Uninsured Motorist Act, those injuries are not covered by an automobile insurance policy issued pursuant to the MVFRL, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1711, 1712. Since the lower court did not commit an error of law and no material issues of fact remain, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

      . In Huber, supra, we ruled that an insured was not entitled to first-party benefits under his automobile policy for injuries he sustained when he was loading materials into his vehicle, absent a showing of a causal connection between injuries and the vehicle, i.e., loading was not a transaction essential to the "maintenance or use of the vehicle”.

      . We note that appellant has not even cited Day, supra, much less attempted to distinguish this case, despite the fact that the trial court’s decision expressly rested upon Day, supra.

      . In reaching our decision, we looked to numerous cases previously decided under the now repealed No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 40 Pa.S.A. § 1009.101 et seq., for assistance in interpreting the MVFRL and, in particular, the phrase "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." This same practice has been employed previously by this court on numerous occasions. See Dorohovich, 403 Pa.Superior Ct. at 422-423, 589 A.2d at 257; Huber, 402 Pa.Superior Ct. at 446-447, 587 A.2d at 335; Omodio v. Aetna Life and Casualty, 384 Pa.Super. 544, 559 A.2d 570 (1989).


author: MONTEMURO, Judge:

text:
    596 A.2d 1141
    In re ADOPTION of C.R.V., Formerly C.R.S., Formerly C.R.N. Appeal of J.R.M.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 11, 1991.
    Filed Sept. 30, 1991.

      Jay Y. Rubin, Indiana, for appellant.
    Before OLSZEWSKI, MONTEMURO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   MONTEMURO, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order denying appellant, J.R.M.’s motion for involuntary termination of parental rights of appellee, R.C.N. Rather than reach the merits of this appeal, we vacate the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County, Orphans’ Court division for failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In September of 1990, appellant filed a petition seeking the involuntary termination of the parental rights of Appel.lee with respect to her daughter, C.R.V. The petition alleged that in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), appellee’s parental rights should be terminated because by his conduct, since about January 1982, he had evidenced the settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to his child. After a hearing on November 27, 1990, the court filed an order denying the motion for involuntary termination of parental rights. Thereafter, on December 14, 1990, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this court from the November 27 order. In a subsequent opinion in support of its order, filed after Appellant filed this appeal, the court apparently affirmed its November 27 order stating, inter alia, that the evidence showed a pattern of obstructive behavior by Appellant aimed at preventing Appellee from maintaining a parental relationship with the child, and that the evidence did not show that Appellee had evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim.

Under the Orphans’ Court Rules, the practice and procedure to be followed in the orphans’ court is generally the same as in the local court of common pleas. Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Rule 3.1 provides:

Except where otherwise provided by a rule adopted by the Supreme Court, or by an Act of Assembly, or by general rule or special order of the local Orphans’ Court, and except for the Notice to Defend required by Rule of Civil Procedure 1018.1, which form of notice shall be required only if directed by general rule or special order of the local Orphans’ Court, the pleading and practice shall conform to the pleading and practice in equity in the local Court of Common Pleas.

Thus, in hearing this case the court of common pleas should have followed the procedure used in equity cases.

Rule 1517 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in equity actions the court must make an adjudication which should include a statement of the issues, findings of fact, a discussion of the question of the law involved, the court’s conclusion of law, and a decree nisi. The rule further provides that the adjudication may be made orally in open court if it is later transcribed and filed, or if it is subsequently made in writing and filed. Pa.R.C.P. § 1517. Thereafter, a party may, within ten days of the filing of the adjudication or decree nisi, file a motion for post trial relief. Pa.R.C.P. § 227.1. The filing of the motion for post trial relief after the entry of the adjudication or decree nisi allows the court an opportunity to correct any errors it may have made prior to the entry of the final decree. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights to B.M.D., 487 Pa. 387, 409 A.2d. 404 (1979). The filing of the post trial motion also helps provide an adequate record on appeal.

In this case the necessary steps were not taken by either the court or the appellant. Pa.R.C.P. 1517 and 227.1 were totally disregarded. Instead of entering a decree nisi after hearing the testimony of the case, the court entered what appeared to be a final order on November 27, 1990. Thereafter, since no decree nisi was entered, the appellant, instead of filing a motion for post trial relief, filed an appeal directly to this court. As no motion for post trial relief was filed, the trial court had no opportunity to address the specific arguments of appellant. Instead the court filed a subsequent opinion and order which affirmed its November 27, 1990 order. Again, however, this opinion and order failed to outline the court’s findings and conclusions on all important issues.

In In re Adoption of Hamilton, 362 Pa.Super.Ct. 249, 523 A.2d 1176 (1987), this court vacated a decree involuntarily terminating parental rights because no decree nisi was entered and no post trial motions were filed. The court reasoned that since the decree was incomplete, “appellate review of [the] important decision will be more meaningful if the Orphans’ Court first enters an adjudication which makes explicit the court’s factual findings and conclusions before making the decree final.” 362 Pa.Super.Ct. 249, 255, 523 A.2d 1176, 1179. In the Hamilton case, as in this case, instead of issuing a decree nisi, the court entered what appeared to be a final order. The parent was then denied the opportunity to file exceptions so that the court could correct any errors prior to entry of the final decree.

In reaching its decision in Hamilton, this court followed the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights to B.M.D., 487 Pa. 387, 409 A.2d 404 (1979). In B.M.D., again, instead of entering a decree nisi, the court entered final decrees terminating parental rights. The appellant then filed a direct appeál. Consequently, as in Hamilton, the record was compromised, and a meaningful review of the court order was impossible. As such, the supreme court ordered that the decree be vacated and the record remanded so that the court could prepare an adjudication in compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.

There is, however, a contrary line of cases which, instead of remanding, excuses the failure to file exceptions to the decree, and determines the case on the merits. See Storti v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., 331 Pa.Super.Ct. 26, 479 A.2d 1061 (1984). (The court held that where an order neither comports with the requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 1517 nor contains a suggestion that exceptions must be filed in order to preserve a right of appeal the failure to file exceptions will be excused.) In Hamilton, however, we distinguished between those decisions which vacated the decree and remanded the case and those cases which were decided on their merits. In most of the latter cases “the court was responding to the contention that the appellant had waived the issues on appeal by failing to file exceptions.” 362 Pa.Super.Ct. 249, 253, 523 A.2d 1176, 1178. The remand cases, on the other hand, are more concerned about the completeness of the decree and the possibility of meaningful appellate review. Id., 362 Pa.Superior Ct. at 253, 523 A.2d 1178. Since this case is both factually and legally similar to both B.M.D. and Hamilton, we are required to follow those decisions and vacate the decrees. As a result, the trial court will have an opportunity to address appellant’s specific arguments and correct its decision if necessary.

The decrees denying the petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of R.C.N. are vacated and the record is remanded with instructions to prepare an adjudication in compliance with Pa.R.C.P. § 1517 so that the parties have an opportunity to file post trial motions under Pa. R.C.P. § 227.1.

Decree vacated and case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.


text:
    596 A.2d 1143
    In re ESTATE OF William A. DEX, Deceased. Appeal of Irene S. MILLER, Respondent Herein and Legatee Under the Will and Codicil of William A. Dex, Deceased.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 17, 1991.
    Filed Oct. 1, 1991.

      John B. McNally, Jenkintown, for appellant.
    Elwood M. Malos, Easton, for appellee.
    Before MONTEMURO, BECK and TAMILIA, JJ.
   BECK, Judge:

The issue in this case is whether, in the absence of contrary testamentary intent, the beneficiary of a specific bequest of personal property takes the property subject to a security interest. We hold that in the absence of a contrary intent the personal property passes to the beneficiary subject to the security interest.

Appellant Irene Miller challenges the trial court’s decree that the bequest of a Lincoln Continental automobile passed to her subject to a $9500 lien against the car. The trial court held that the will and codicil in question were clear and unambiguous, and that the disposition of this case was controlled by 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2514 (12.1) (1976). We agree. We note that this statutory section has not been previously interpreted by the appellate courts in Pennsylvania.

Appellant raises five issues asserting various trial court errors. Specifically appellant contends the trial court (1) erred in not considering the intent of the testator as primary; (2) erred in holding that the bequest to appellant required the personal property to pass subject to the security interest; (3) erred in relying on the statutory rules of interpretation where no ambiguity exists in the testator’s will and codicil; (4) erred in invoking a procedural rule to dispose of a substantive right; and (5) erred in refusing to consider parol evidence allegedly explaining the testator’s intent regarding the bequest of the Lincoln Continental. After a complete review of the relevant law and the record, we find appellant’s challenges to be without merit and we affirm the trial court.

Our standard of review in a will contest is limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by sufficient evidence, and whether the court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Jakiella, 353 Pa.Super. 581, 583, 510 A.2d 815, 816 (1986).

The relevant factual background is as follows. William Dex died testate in May 1990, leaving both a valid will and codicil. The codicil was executed approximately one month prior to Mr. Dex’s death because he knew he was dying of cancer, and because he wanted to alleviate what he viewed as family in-fighting over his personal property.

In the third paragraph of the codicil the testator provided:

I give and bequeath to my friend, Irene Miller, my oriental carpet and my Lincoln Continental motor vehicle.

(Reproduced Record, at 6a). On the date that Mr. Dex died, the Lincoln Continental was subject to a bank lien of approximately $9500. Appellees, the executrices of the testator’s estate, filed a rule to show cause why the bequest of the Lincoln Continental to appellant should not pass subject to the outstanding lien. The trial court held a brief evidentiary hearing and decided that section 2514(12.1) of Pennsylvania’s Probate Code controlled the disposition of this matter. Specifically, the court found that paragraph three of the codicil was clear and unambiguous. The court pointed out that appellant failed to show that the testator had a contrary intent, and therefore, the testator is deemed to have made the bequest subject to the security interest.

It is axiomatic that in interpreting a will, the court must effectuate the testator’s intent. Hamilton Estate, 454 Pa. 495, 496, 312 A.2d 373, 374 (1973); Bloom v. Selfon, 366 Pa.Super. 283, 287, 531 A.2d 12, 14 (1987), aff'd, 520 Pa. 519, 555 A.2d 75 (1989); Estate of Sellers, 344 Pa.Super. 538, 540, 496 A.2d 1237, 1238 (1985). The primary means for determining a testator’s intent is “by carefully reviewing all of the language contained in the will.” Bloom, 366 Pa.Super. at 288, 531 A.2d at 14. Initially, the court must focus exclusively on the “four corners of his will.” In re Estate of Jacobson, 460 Pa. 118, 122, 331 A.2d 447, 449 (1975); In re Estate of MacFarlane, 313 Pa.Super. 397, 401, 459 A.2d 1289, 1291 (1983).

The court is also guided by the principle that the words used must be given their common legal effect. In re Estate of MacFarlane, 313 Pa.Super. at 401, 459 A.2d at 1291. Courts are not permitted to determine what they think the testator might or would have desired under the existing circumstances, or even what they think the testator meant to say. In re Estate of Baker, 495 Pa. 522, 523, 434 A.2d 1213, 1214 (1981) (citation omitted). Instead, the determination of intent focuses on the meaning of the language in the will. Id.

In order to amplify and clarify the interpretation of testamentary documents the legislature has enacted “Rules of Interpretation.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2514 (Purdon 1972, and Supp.1991). Of direct significance to the instant matter, and as relied on by the trial court, is section 2514 which provides:

In the absence of a contrary intent appearing therein, wills shall be construed as to real and personal estate in accordance with the following rules.

Subsection (12.1) titled “Property subject to a security interest” provides:

A specific ... bequest of ... personal property passes that property subject to any security interest therein existing at the date of the testator’s death, without any right of exoneration____

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2514(12.1) (1976).

In analyzing the case before us we point out the codicil in question is silent as to whether the specific bequest passes subject to or free of the security interest. Appellant interprets this silence, and the scheme of the will as a whole, as evidence that the testator intended that the Lincoln Continental pass to her free and clear of the security interest.

Using the language of the will itself to support her position, appellant points out that in paragraph six of the will, she was to be given the testator’s dog and in order to cover “care and maintenance” of the dog, she was also to be given $5000. Additionally, appellant argues that paragraph five of the codicil shows that the testator recognized and accounted for the potential liabilities of his beneficiaries. In paragraph five the testator provided that the inter vivos $5000 loan from the testator to his brother should be subtracted from any inheritance otherwise due his brother. Finally appellant strenuously asserts that the use of the word “gift” to describe the bequest of the car to appellant shows the car was to pass free of any encumbrance. According to appellant, these testamentary clauses establish that the testator intended the bequest to be free and clear. We disagree.

If anything, appellant’s arguments weigh against her. For example, the testator originally intended to leave appellant his dog, and knowing that the care of a pet often involves a financial liability, the testator provided $5000 to cover expenses. In contrast, the testator bequeathed his Lincoln Continental to appellant knowing full well that the car had a significant encumbrance and yet made no mention of the encumbrance. He made no provision to cover or dispense with the lien on the car. Moreover, we find the fact that the testator expressly acknowledged the $5000 loan to his brother, and made no mention of the car loan in the bequest to appellant, to be neither supporting nor contradicting of appellant’s contention. Also, appellant’s use of the word gift as applied to the car does not connote the testator’s intention as to the encumbrance.

In resolving questions under section 2514(12.1) the trial court must first examine the language of the will. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2514 (stating “In the absence of a contrary intent appearing therein, wills shall be construed----”); Estate of Sellers, 344 Pa.Super. at 543, 496 A.2d at 1238. Where the will is unambiguous, the trial court cannot admit parol evidence but may hear argument relating to the testator’s intent. See, e.g., Baker, 495 Pa. at 525, 434 A.2d at 1215; Sellers, 344 Pa.Super. at 543, 496 A.2d at 1239. It is here that appellant has the burden of showing that the testator intended to pass the bequest free of any encumbrance. If appellant does not satisfy this burden, then section 2514(12.1) instructs that the encumbrance passes with the gift. The statutory language provides that “in the absence of contrary intent ... a specific bequest of ... personal property passes that property subject to any security interest therein____” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2514(12.1). In the instant case we conclude that the trial court was correct in finding that appellant has not satisfied her burden of showing contrary intent.

Directly addressing the claims raised by appellant, we find that contrary to the assertion in issue (1), the trial court did consider the testator’s intent to be of primary importance. Relying on the language of the will and section 2514(12.1) the trial court correctly determined the testator’s intent. Based on this rationale we conclude appellant’s issues (1) and (2) are meritless.

In appellant’s third argument she asserts the trial court erred in applying section 2514(12.1) when there was no ambiguity in the testamentary language. She misconstrues the application of section 2514, which is titled “Rules of Interpretation.” Section 2514 instructs that it shall be applied unless a contrary intent is shown within the testamentary document. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2514. By enacting section 2514 the General Assembly has provided for certain statutory presumptions regarding the interpretation of wills. Such presumptions must be applied when construing testamentary language unless the testator expresses contrary intent within the will. Section 2514 is not a common law guideline that a court refers to when construing an ambiguous word in a will. It is an aid in construing the language in a will. The trial court correctly relied on section 2514. We find issue (3) to be without merit.

Appellant argues in issue (4) that since section 2514 is “in essence a procedural rule,” it is not applicable to this matter. We find no support, and appellant refers us to none, holding that section 2514 is a procedural rule. Significantly, we note that the cases cited by appellant, see, e.g., Sellers, 344 Pa.Super. 538, 496 A.2d 1237; Estate of Kehler, 488 Pa. 165, 411 A.2d 748 (1980); Corbett Estate, 430 Pa. 54, 241 A.2d 524 (1968), all hold that section 2514 is applicable in matters similiar to the one before this court.

In appellant’s final issue, she argues alternatively that if the reviewing court finds ambiguity then the case must be remanded for the trial court to consider parol evidence to determine the testator’s intent. Having found no ambiguity, we need not address appellant’s argument made on this issue.

In light of our foregoing analysis we conclude the trial court did not err in holding that the bequest of the Lincoln Continental to appellant passes subject to the security interest.

Trial court order is affirmed.

      . Section 2514(12.1) provides that
      [i]n the absence of a contrary intent appearing therein, wills shall be construed as to real and personal estate in accordance with the following rules:
      [a] specific devise or bequest of real or personal property passes that property subject to any security interest therein existing at the date of the testator’s death, without any right of exoneration out of any other estate of the testator regardless whether the security interest was created by the testator or by a previous owner and any general directive in the will to pay debts.
      20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2514(12.1) (1976). Section 2514(12.1) is the statutory paragraph that replaced and expanded the original paragraph (12), which was first enacted within the Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2514, Official Comment — 1976 (Purdon Supp.1991). As originally enacted, paragraph (12) applied solely to the testamentary transfer of real • property subject to a mortgage. As noted in the Official Comment to section 2514(12.1), this section is derived from section 2-609 of the Uniform Probate Code. Id. (We note that § 2-609 of the Code has been renumbered as § 2-607 in the current publication of the Uniform Probate Code).

      . The testator’s dog predeceased the testator, which was in part the reason the testator executed the codicil in question.

      . In one respect, we do agree with appellant. That is, that the instant testamentary language is clear and unambiguous. However, unlike appellant, we find that the testamentary language unambiguously establishes no intent contrary to that provided in section 2514(12.1).


author: OPINION PER CURIAM:

text:
    597 A.2d 93
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Alonzo VALENZUELA, Appellee.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued May 23, 1991.
    Filed Aug. 23, 1991.

      Douglas J. Wright, Asst. Dist. Atty., Erie, for Com., appellant.
    H. John Drayer, Clarion, for appellee.
    Before TAMILIA, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   OPINION PER CURIAM:

This is a Commonwealth appeal from an order suppressing both the physical evidence found during a search of appellee’s automobile and the alleged statements appellee made to the police officers. Finding no error, we affirm.

On this appeal, the Commonwealth contends: (1) that the trial court erred when it found that the Commonwealth failed to prove probable cause and that exigent circumstances are required to justify a warrantless search of an automobile; (2) that the court erred when it determined that the “white-line” stop of appellee’s automobile was invalid; and (3) that the court erred when it considered misconduct of the law enforcement officers when appellee did not plead such misconduct nor did appellee articulate any prejudice.

On March 11, 1990, Pennsylvania State Troopers McCauley and Hudson stopped appellee’s vehicle which was traveling on Interstate 80 in Clarion County. The troopers asked appellee for his registration and license, removed appellee from the vehicle and began to search the vehicle. Trooper McCauley found a small plastic bag containing marijuana in the front seat of the car. At some point, Trooper Hudson left the scene and the search ceased until Corporal Patterson arrived. Corporal Patterson continued the search by entering the car and removing the inside panels. He found thirty pounds of marijuana on the right side and thirty pounds of marijuana on the left side between the doors and the wheel wells. Corporal Patterson also interrogated appellee. During the search, other police officers, as well as a search dog, arrived. After the marijuana was found, appellee signed a form consenting to the search. Appellee was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.

After a preliminary hearing on March 15, 1990, appellee was held for court. Appellee then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing. A hearing on that petition was held on April 19, 1990. At that time, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to hold the case for court. Appellee then filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking suppression of both the physical evidence and the statements. At the hearing on the suppression motion, it was stipulated that the testimony of the April 19 hearing would be considered part of the entire testimony on the issues of suppression.

The transcripts from the two hearings present widely divergent testimony from the police officers involved. At the habeas corpus hearing, Trooper McCauley testified that he stopped appellee because he timed appellee with radar at 61 miles per hour and because the vehicle and driver fit the profile of a drug courier in accordance with his “white line” training. He testified that the car had either Texas or Oklahoma plates, that the driver looked straight ahead and did not look at the two marked police cars, that the driver gripped the wheel tightly and looked nervous, and that the driver appeared to be Italian. Trooper McCauley stated several times that the sole reason he stopped the vehicle was because it was going 61 miles per hour. He admitted, however, that the radar was done through glass which was against regulations, and he did not issue even a warning for speeding. Trooper McCauley also testified that appellee verbally consented to the search. Patrick J. McCarthy, a narcotic agent for the office of the Attorney General, also testified at the habeas corpus hearing. His testimony was that he met appellee at the Shippenville State Police barracks and filed the formal charges against him. He testified to the results of the laboratory examination of the physical evidence. He also stated that the only basis for the intent to deliver charge was the quantity of marijuana found.

At the suppression hearing, Trooper McCauley testified that he received a call directing him and Trooper Hudson to go out past Exit 10 on Interstate 80 and look for a mid-70’s brown Chevy heading eastbound, with Oklahoma plates, driven by a Hispanic male. They were instructed to do a “white line” stop. Further testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that the state police were involved in an investigation which included a wiretap. Trooper Wagner, one of the officers involved in the wiretap investigation, testified that an informant had told him that a Mexican individual named Alonzo would be bringing a load of drugs to the person who was the target of the wiretap. The informant also told him Alonzo was driving a brown, older Chevy with Oklahoma plates on it. He also testified to certain intercepted conversations between the wiretap target and a Mexican individual. In one call, the night before, the caller advised the target that Alonzo was eight hours away. There was another call the next day to the effect that “I’m between Exits 3 and 4” and the target replied “I’ll be right up.” Corporal Patterson testified that Trooper Wagner had relayed this information to him. Agent McCarthy, called by defense counsel, testified that he was aware of the evidence gathered from the wiretap and the informant at the time of the habeas corpus hearing but did not disclose it to the court and, in fact, had not disclosed it to the district attorney at that time.

On review of a suppression ruling, this court is, of course, bound by the factual findings of the suppression court as long as those findings are supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 469 A.2d 137 (1983). We may reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn from the facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529, 491 A.2d 111 (1985). Furthermore, credibility determinations are within the province of the trial court and may not be disturbed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 512 A.2d 1152 (1986).

Because it directly impacts on the suppression court’s findings of fact, we will discuss appellant’s third issue first. The Commonwealth here contends that the court erred in considering the police officers’ misconduct because the same was not pleaded by appellee prior to or during the suppression hearing. What the Commonwealth politely refers to as “misconduct,” was characterized by the trial court as follows:

(during Trooper McCauley’s testimony)
“I have been offended enough by this. I have to tell you that I have been offended enough by this. This is the worst testimony and the worst case I have ever heard of. There’s no question that this testimony was false and meant to deceive this Court in April____ When you take an oath in this Court it says the whole truth and a child would know this is not the whole truth. It’s more than deceptive, it’s false. And I sit in here and I hear defendants testify falsely, as any Judge does, we expect it, but when I sit here and a member of the Pennsylvania State
Police testifies falsely I’m offended____
It totally contradicts what this man told me in April ... This is a falsehood. You don’t have to bring in your entire case at a preliminary hearing but you don’t deceive a Court.”
Tr. 8/21/90 pp. 37-40.

In its Findings of Fact, the suppression court specifically found that Trooper McCauley and Agent McCarthy intentionally testified falsely about facts which were material to the issues before the court and that, therefore, these two witnesses were not credible. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 15. The Commonwealth now apparently argues that the court should not have considered the prior false testimony of these two witnesses. We do not agree.

It has long been the law that prior false, contradictory or conflicting statements of a witness are admissible for the purpose of impeaching a witness’s credibility. Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa. 599, 198 A.2d 534 (1964). The Commonwealth seeks to exclude these prior statements by arguing (1) that the prior testimony was not actually perjury or false swearing and (2) that the officers believed that they were prohibited by the wiretap statute from disclosing the contents of the wiretap. We know of no rule of law, nor has the Commonwealth cited any case, which requires that prior inconsistent statements rise to the level of perjury or false swearing before they are admissible to impeach a witness’s credibility. As to the latter argument, the Commonwealth concedes that an officer is permitted to testify in court without criminal liability, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5717(b), and further concedes that the officers could at least have informed the district attorney of the existence of the wiretap. Appellant’s Brief, pp. 26, 27. Instead, the officers chose to fabricate their testimony in an attempt to deceive both the prosecuting attorney and the court into believing that the only reason why appellee was stopped was because he was speeding and the only reason he was charged with possession with intent to deliver was because of the amount of marijuana found, when in fact neither of these statements were true.

The Commonwealth also contends that this “misconduct” is not in and of itself a basis for suppression. The Commonwealth misunderstands the suppression court’s findings and discussion. Nowhere does the trial court indicate that it is granting appellee’s suppression motion on this basis. Rather, the suppression court considered the prior false testimony in determining the credibility of Trooper McCauley and Agent McCarthy and in deciding that their testimony, as a whole, was not worthy of belief. Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider, 10/16/90, p. 5. This was proper as it is within the province of the fact finder to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 380 A.2d 362 (1977). The Commonwealth cannot, and indeed does not, argue that deliberately false prior testimony cannot be considered for this purpose.

The suppression court’s determination that Trooper McCauley’s testimony was not credible undermines the Commonwealth’s second argument, that the “white line” stop was valid. The Commonwealth bases its argument on Trooper McCauley’s testimony that appellee was traveling 61 miles per hour and McCauley therefore had a valid reason for stopping appellee. However, the trial court expressly disbelieved Trooper McCauley’s testimony that he checked the speed with radar and clocked appellee’s speed at 61 miles per hour. In a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a search or seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Williams, 380 Pa.Super. 227, 551 A.2d 313 (1988). Absent Trooper McCauley’s testimony, there is absolutely no evidence to support even a suspicion of a Motor Vehicle Code violation.

The Commonwealth alternatively contends that the stop was justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under Terry, an officer may make an investigatory stop where he observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot. Such an investigatory stop of an automobile must be based on objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the motorist is presently involved in criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Fassett, 496 Pa. 529, 437 A.2d 1166 (1981); Commonwealth v. Monaghan, 295 Pa.Super. 450, 441 A.2d 1318 (1982). The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant the intrusion. Id.

The suppression court found as a fact that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Trooper McCauley actually observed appellee gripping the wheel and looking nervous. Thus, the only “suspicious” conduct the Commonwealth can articulate is that appellee was driving an older model car with out-of-state plates and that the driver appeared to be Hispanic or Mediterranean. In Commonwealth v. Fassett, supra, police officers received a radio dispatch that three or four black males in a light-colored sedan were being sought in connection with a bank robbery. Approximately nine hours after the robbery, a police officer observed the defendant and another person riding in a white Oldsmobile sedan approximately eight miles from the robbery scene. The Commonwealth conceded that the sole factors motivating the stop were the light color of the vehicle and the race of its occupants. In holding that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, the Supreme Court stated that the factors relied upon were “so all-encompassing as to render it impossible to reasonably suspect” defendant’s or any other particular automobile. Id,., 496 Pa. at 534, 437 A.2d at 1169. Likewise in the instant case, we cannot conclude that an officer can reasonably suspect criminal activity from the mere fact that a Hispanic-looking person is driving a late model car with out-of-state license plates.

Even if the suppression court had credited Trooper McCauley’s other testimony, the only additional factors cited were that appellee was gripping the wheel and looking nervous and that he looked straight ahead when passing the marked police cars. In United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir.1986), a Florida state trooper stopped a car in reliance on a drug courier profile. The factors cited to justify the stop were that the two young men were traveling at 3:00 a.m. in an out-of-state car and that the driver did not look at the patrol car as he passed it. Finding that these factors, considered together or separately, did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, the court called the officer’s suspicion a “classic example of those ‘inarticulate hunches’ that are insufficient to justify a seizure under the fourth amendment.” Id. at 707. We cannot conclude that the factors set forth by Trooper McCauley are any more indicative of criminal activity than the factors set forth in Smith.

We now turn to the Commonwealth’s argument that there was probable cause for the stop and search. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to justify a person of reasonable caution to believe the suspect has committed a crime. Commonwealth v. Vinson, 361 Pa.Super. 526, 522 A.2d 1155 (1987). Clearly, Troopers McCauley and Hudson did not have probable cause because they did not have either personal knowledge or hearsay evidence of any facts and circumstances that would reasonably lead them to believe that appellee had committed a crime. If the arresting officer does not have sufficient knowledge to establish probable cause, the arrest may still be valid if the officer ordering the arrest possessed sufficient information to give rise to probable cause. Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa.Super. 100, 572 A.2d 711 (1990).

The knowledge which the Commonwealth claims establishes probable cause followed a rather convoluted trail. Trooper McCauley testified that Trooper Hudson took the call from the station and received the information from the Corporal. They were told only to go out past Exit 10 and look for a brown, mid-70’s Chevy heading eastbound with Oklahoma plates and a Hispanic driver. They were to do a “white line” investigation on the car. Trooper Wagner testified that he contacted the DuBois barracks and told Corporal Kirsch that there was a Mexican individual who would be driving an older model Chevy with Oklahoma tags on it and the vehicle would probably be loaded with contraband and to attempt to do a “white line” stop. Trooper Wagner testified that he did not give Corporal Kirsch any other information. Trooper Wagner testified that he gave Corporal Patterson this same information. Thus, not only did the arresting officers have insufficient knowledge to establish probable cause, they were never ordered to arrest appellee on this basis but rather were ordered to attempt to stop appellee on some other basis. Nevertheless, we will review the evidence which the Commonwealth contends establishes probable cause on the part of Trooper Wagner.

Trooper Wagner testified as to information received from a confidential informant:

Q What gave you cause to believe that this vehicle would be carrying contraband?
A Through information from a confidential informant we were furnished — we were furnished information that this individual here would make—
Q That would be Mr. Valenzuela?
A Yes. Would make a delivery in the Clarion County of marijuana on a seven to ten day rotation basis and usually it would be fifth or sixty pounds at a time. We also received information from the same informant that he would — was soon to arrive.
Sic * * * * #
Q Trooper Wagner, how specific was that information that you received as it was related to Mr. Valenzuela? A It was that it was a Mexican individual, it was on [sic] older model Chevy car, two door, and it had Ohio— Oklahoma registration on it. And that he usually came in from Oklahoma every five to seven days, delivered marijuana, and then would return to Oklahoma.
A No, we did not have the registration number of the vehicle, that I know of. That was not furnished to me by the informant. I think the vehicle was an older model Chevy, early seventies, brown in color, tan, just a Mexican driving it, male.

Tr. 8/21/90, pp. 59-61, 63.

Trooper Wagner also testified to the telephone conversations previously discussed. The Commonwealth contends that this evidence sufficiently establishes probable cause. The suppression court, however, found probable cause lacking because there was no testimony relating to the veracity or reliability of the confidential informant and no testimony as to how the informant became aware of the information he furnished to Trooper Wagner.

Whether probable cause exists to justify a warrantless arrest is to be determined by the “totality of circumstances” test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1985); Commonwealth v. Butler, 354 Pa.Super. 533, 512 A.2d 667 (1986). Under this test, when an informant's information is used to establish probable cause, the relevant considerations include the informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. Commonwealth v. York, 381 Pa.Super. 55, 552 A.2d 1092 (1989). Corroboration of the informant’s information, either by the police’s investigation or through other informants, may indeed establish the informant’s veracity and reliability. Id.

The Commonwealth contends that such corroboration is provided by two things: the intercepted telephone calls described above, and the numerous telephone calls detailed in the affidavit of probable cause submitted in support of the wiretap application. Although the affidavit of probable cause was admitted as an exhibit at the suppression hearing, it does not appear in the original record forwarded to this court. Nevertheless, we have reviewed the copy included in the Commonwealth’s reproduced record and find that it does not assist the Commonwealth’s argument. The calls all occurred approximately a month to six weeks before appellee was stopped and none of them refer either to appellee specifically or to a Hispanic or Mexican person from Oklahoma. They do not contain or corroborate any of the information relating to this appellee which was proffered by the confidential informant. We conclude, as did the trial court, that the Commonwealth has not established the informant’s veracity, reliability or basis of knowledge, and therefore the Commonwealth has failed to establish that probable cause existed for the stop.

We need not reach the Commonwealth’s argument regarding the necessity of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of appellee’s automobile because the Commonwealth concedes that probable cause is a necessary prerequisite in this case. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145, 541 A.2d 1381 (1988).

The Commonwealth concludes its argument by pointing out that sixty pounds of marijuana was found in appellee’s car. The Commonwealth contends that the “truth of this particular fact is unassailable, and any so-called allegation of prosecutorial misconduct does not affect the truth of this fact, nor should it affect the admissibility of this evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at p. 28. The admissibility of evidence is in fact affected by the conduct of the police; evidence which is obtained in violation of a person’s constitutional rights, whether the police act in good faith or bad, is inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991). We echo the trial court’s observation that the Commonwealth “must know that the suppression of evidence caused by a violation of the search and seizure clause of either the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution is totally unrelated to guilt.” Opinion at p. 39. As the Florida Supreme Court has so eloquently stated:

“Without doubt the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity presents difficult law enforcement problems. Roving patrols, random sweeps and arbitrary searches or seizures would go far to eliminate such crime in this state [and nation]. Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Communist Cuba have demonstrated all too tellingly the effectiveness of such methods. Yet we are not a state that subscribes to the notion that ends justify means. History demonstrates that the adoption of repressive measures, even to eliminate a clear evil, usually results only in repression more mindless and terrifying than the evil that prompted them. Means have a disturbing tendency to become the end result. And as Judge Glickstein noted in his dissent in Snider v. State, 501 So.2d 609, 610 (Fla.App.1986): ‘Occasionally the price we must pay to make innocent persons secure from unreasonable search and seizure of their persons or property is to let an offender go. Those who suffered harassment from King George Ill’s forces would say that is not a great price to pay. So would residents of the numerous totalitarian and authoritarian states of our day.’ ”

Bostick v. State of Florida, 554 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1989), quoted in United States v. Laymon, 730 F.Supp. 332, 342 (D.Colo.1990)

Order affirmed.

      . The term "white-line” refers to a program whereby police officers are trained to look for drug couriers based on a ¡general outline or profile of "what kind of car he drives, what he looks like and how he keeps things in the vehicle." Tr. 4/19/90, p. 21.


author: TAMILIA, Judge:

text:
    597 A.2d 101
    Rocco J. DeMASI, Appellant, v. Tanya J. DeMASI. Tanya J. DeMASI v. Rocco J. DeMASI, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued June 12, 1991.
    Filed Aug. 26, 1991.
    Reargument Denied Oct. 15, 1991.

      Andrew B. Brown, York, for appellant Rocco J. DeMasi.
    Nora Porter, York, for appellee Tanya J. DeMasi.
    Before CIRILLO, TAMILIA and HESTER, JJ.
   TAMILIA, Judge:

These are three consolidated appeals filed by former husband Rocco DeMasi from Orders entered October 16, 1989, and July 31, 1990. The October 16, 1989, Order found appellant/husband in willful contempt for failure to pay the alimony pendente lite (APL) Order of December 28, 1984, and denied his petition to terminate APL nunc pro tunc; the July 31,1990, Order held husband in contempt for failing to comply with the October 16, 1989, Order.

On September 29, 1982, husband filed a divorce action after which wife filed a related support action. On December 2, 1982, an Order was entered directing the husband to pay $264 per week for the support of two children and $130 per week as spousal support. No request for bifurcation was ever made by either party and a decree of divorce was entered on August 6, 1984. The divorce Master filed his report, which was adopted by the trial court, on September 5, 1985. On November 15, 1984, husband filed a petition to terminate APL on the basis a; decree of divorce had been entered. The trial court never acted upon this petition. On Décember 28, 1984, the trial court converted the Order of court relating to spousal support to APL pending the adjudication of the economic matters of the divorce. Husband appealed from the Order of July 9, 1985, which fixed child support at $264 per week and APL at $130 per week. Subsequently, the Order of September 5, 1985 was appealed by both parties because of their dissatisfaction with the award of equitable distribution. In August, 1987, we remanded the case for determinations on equitable distribution issues. DeMasi v. DeMasi, 366 Pa.Super. 19, 530 A.2d 871 (1987) (hereinafter DeMasi I). On August 18, 1988, wife filed a petition for contempt for husband’s failure to comply with the APL Order since May, 1984. On September 1, 1988, husband filed a second petition to terminate APL nunc pro tunc as of August 6, 1984. He argued the divorce action between the parties was a non-bifurcated divorce action and the continuance of APL was inappropriate under Dages v. Dages, 380 Pa.Super. 654, 547 A.2d 442 (1988) (unpublished memorandum). After hearings were held on both the APL termination nunc pro tunc and contempt issues, on October 16, 1989, the trial court denied husband’s petition and also found him in willful contempt for failure to pay the APL. The trial court found husband to be financially capable of paying the Order and found any argument husband might have had on the issue of termination of APL was waived by husband’s failure to raise the issue on appeal at the time of entry of the divorce decree. It is from the October 16, 1989, Order that husband is presently appealing.

Additionally, on April 18, 1990, wife filed a petition seeking enforcement of the October 16, 1989, contempt Order, where husband had been ordered to pay or suffer incarceration. After more hearings, on July 31, 1990, the trial court again held the husband in willful contempt for failure to comply with the October 16, 1989, Order. In making its contempt finding, the trial court chose to adopt the findings of fact regarding the husband’s expenses made earlier. The court directed husband to pay or suffer thirteen consecutive weekends in jail. Husband timely appealed from this Order. On August 9, 1990, husband filed for a stay of the July 31, 1990, Order, and the Superior Court granted his request on August 13, 1990.

Appellant argues the following two points: 1) the trial court, in its October 16, 1989, Order, erred as a matter of law in failing to find that the APL Order did not terminate as of the date of divorce in a non-bifurcated divorce proceeding; and 2) the trial court, in both the October 16, 1989 and July 31, 1990, Orders, erred in finding husband to be in contempt for non-payment of the APL Order and failed to provide reasonable conditions to purge said contempt.

Appellee contends: 1) the issue of bifurcation is res judicata as a result of our findings of fact and holdings in DeMasi I, supra; 2) even if the issue of bifurcation is not res judicata, there was a de facto bifurcation, and husband waived his right to challenge this by failing to raise the issue in his prior appeal to Superior Court; 3) the trial court’s Orders properly found husband to be in contempt and provided the proper conditions for purging himself of contempt; and 4) husband’s attempt to relitigate the issue of bifurcation is a frivolous appeal.

Both parties agree the October 16,1989, and July 31, 1990, Orders are final and appealable. We determine the appeal from the Order of October 16, 1989 is interlocutory as the finding of contempt did not, at that time, execute on sanctions which were imposed but to take place in the future. In line with our findings in Sonder v, Sonder, 378 Pa.Super. 474, 549 A.2d 155 (1988), since additional steps had to be taken and were taken, after the appeal was filed, to implement the sanctions by a jail sentence, the Order was, in fact, interlocutory. Since an appeal was taken from the second contempt finding which was followed by incarceration, we find it to be a final Order which will be disposed of in this review. The issue presented by the first appeal as to contempt merges with and will be disposed of by the second contempt appeal.

Whether or not the husband has been properly found in contempt can be resolved simply by determining whether he had a duty to pay APL in the first instance once the matter of equitable distribution had been reviewed and determined by this Court in DeMasi I. The trial court and counsel have confused several issues in this case which has resulted in a legal morass which we must cut through to arrive at a proper decision.

The statements of questions involved combine into basically two questions. The first is whether the holding in DeMasi I by this Court established a continuing basis for APL despite the fact there was no bifurcation by the trial court, the divorce had been entered and the wife was remarried. The second consolidated issue is whether the trial court may hold the appellant in contempt for failure to pay an Order of APL when the wife has remarried and the divorce is final.

Issues relating to whether or not bifurcation was or was not ordered by the trial court and whether or not DeMasi I is res judicata of the APL issue are peripheral and will be resolved when the two major issues or questions have been analyzed and determined. According to this Court’s finding in Levine v. Levine, 380 Pa.Super. 297, 520 A.2d 466 (1987), the trial court could properly convert a spousal support Order to APL in the process of the divorce proceeding which could effectively survive the divorce decree so long as matters of equitable distribution were still undecided. It may be argued that this is, in effect, a de facto bifurcation without following the procedure required by the Divorce Code in which the court orders bifurcation pursuant to a motion by a party to achieve that result. We do not rely on that theory, however, since, in this matter, APL will continue so long as the case is on appeal and the determination of the equitable matters in terms of property distribution has not finally been decided by the appellate court.

It is very important at this time to make the distinction between APL and alimony. While in Desch v. Desch, 329 Pa.Super. 22, 477 A.2d 883 (1984), this Court held that a conversion of a pre-existing Order of support into an Order of APL was merely a change in form and not substance with the underlying obligation remaining unaltered, this does not mean there is not a qualitative difference in terms of the effect of an APL Order and a support or permanent alimony Order. That distinction is traditional and goes back to a basic theory for permitting APL. APL is based on the need of one party to have equal financial resources to pursue a divorce proceeding when, in theory, the other party has major assets which are the financial sinews of domestic warfare. Thus, APL is not dependent on the status of the party as being a spouse or being remarried as would be the case of support or alimony. Under the Divorce Code, where a divorce decree has been entered, the court, as it deems reasonable, may allow alimony to either party only if it finds alimony is necessary. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a). Thus, alimony is not available until after the divorce decree has been entered. It is based on need and may be reduced or terminated upon remarriage or change in economic circumstances of the party receiving it. 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(e), 3706, and 3707. Pursuant to section 3702, Alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and expenses, APL is allowable to either spouse during the pendency of the action. The award of APL is not dependent upon the status of the parties but on the state of the litigation. This means, in theory, that the APL terminates at the time of divorce which usually concludes the litigation. However, a divorce is not final for purposes of APL until appeals have been exhausted and a final decree has been entered. Thus, while APL typically ends at the award of the divorce decree, which also should be the point at which equitable distribution has been determined, if an appeal is pending on matters of equitable distribution, despite the entry of the decree, APL will continue throughout the appeal process and any remand until a final Order has been entered. Appellant’s contention that the award of APL should be terminated as of August 6, 1984 is, therefore, without merit.

The element which has caused some confusion on the part of the appellant in this case is in relation to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3706, Bar to alimony, which provides: “[n]o petitioner is entitled to receive an award of alimony where the petitioner, subsequent to the divorce pursuant to which alimony is being sought, has entered into cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex who is not a member of the family of the petitioner within the degrees of consanguinity.” Id.

This provision does not apply to APL as APL has a purpose distinct from that of alimony. Admittedly, the appellee was married in October 1984, soon after the divorce decree was entered, and has since remained married. It is, therefore, without question that alimony is not available to her. However, APL, since its purpose is to provide her equal standing with the appellant throughout the divorce proceeding, does not come within the sanctions of section 3706. Appellant’s reliance on section 3706 is, therefore, not applicable to the facts presented by this case. A further distinction between alimony and APL is that a bar to alimony by virtue of section 3706 applies absolutely to cohabitation or remarriage and deals not at all with economic issues. It is possible for a woman who would be unable to maintain herself after the divorce to be married to a person who, likewise, cannot maintain her, but she nevertheless would not be permitted to retain alimony upon cohabitation or remarriage. APL focuses on the ability of the individual who receives the APL during the course of the litigation to defend her/himself, and the only issue is whether the amount is reasonable for that purpose, which turns on the economic resources available to the spouse. In Miller v. Miller, 352 Pa.Super. 432, 508 A.2d 550 (1986), this Court held that section 507 (now section 3706) does not apply to APL, relying on Prozzoly v. Prozzoly, 327 Pa.Super. 326, 475 A.2d 820 (1984), which stated reasons for the distinction between alimony and APL are based on enabling the dependent spouse to maintain or defend the action in divorce.

Our function as a reviewing court is limited to determining whether the court abused its discretion in allowing the claim for APL in compliance with 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3102(a)(6) and 3701(d). We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in implementing the APL Order, however, that does not resolve the ultimate issue in this case as to whether or not appellant has properly been found in contempt for failure to pay the APL down to the point where the contempt citation was issued.

To reach the focus of this appeal we must return to the decision entered by this Court in DeMasi I. In that Opinion we entered an Order which resolved virtually all of the outstanding issues presented by the divorce and award of equitable distribution. This Court did not, however, decide the matter of alimony continuing despite wife’s remarriage on October 12, 1985, as that argument was not properly before the Court. That is the issue which we have before us and which we have discussed and resolved earlier in our analysis. In DeMasi /, we instructed that without a termination petition upon which an Order was made the issue could not be resolved at that time. This was a correct ruling and places this Court in the position of now deciding the issue which previously could not have been raised. As stated above, remarriage alone is not a basis for terminating an APL Order. However, the termination of the litigation involving the divorce and equitable distribution matters does result in a termination of the APL Order, and if the court has not ordered such a termination, such an Order cannot be enforced by contempt proceedings when it is invalid as of the date when the final distribution determination was made.

For the purpose of this appeal, we are handicapped because no where in the record does there appear to be a resolution of the issue as to when, in fact, the Order of equitable distribution was finally entered. This Court remanded in DeMasi I for the purpose of resolving outstanding questions relating to three trust accounts which were established with insurance proceeds from an automobile accident involving one of the children. Secondly, this Court remanded for reconsideration of equitable distribution excluding good will from marital property and including the certificates of deposit as marital property, these considerations possibly requiring modification of the distribution of all other assets. Finally, this Court directed reconsideration of wife’s entitlement to alimony following the distribution of the marital property. That final remand instruction is actually moot as it has been determined the wife has remarried and, pursuant to section 3706, Bar to alimony, alimony is barred upon remarriage or cohabitation. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, the only issue remaining to be considered is when, in fact, the instructions of the DeMasi I Court were implemented. As of the date an Order was entered resolving the matters subject to remand, APL should have terminated. As stated before, since this record is not clear as to when those remand matters were effectively resolved, we are unable to determine at what specific point APL properly should have ended. Therefore, this case must be remanded for an evidentiary finding for the purpose of determining the date on which the remand matters were resolved. As of that date APL terminated and any arrearages must be adjusted to reflect that date. It necessarily follows that since the contempt Order was based on apparently unwarranted accumulations of arrearages on APL, and it was not factually determined what the true amount of the arrears would be that are due and owing, the contempt citations must be vacated pursuant to this remand.

Case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in compliance with this Opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

      . Although the parties were divorced in August, 1984, for the sake of simplicity we will refer to the parties as husband and wife.

      . One of the children moved in with the father on October 26, 1984, and the child support Order was reduced to $130 per week as of that date so that, at the time of the first appeal, this was the amount of child support which remained in contention. See DeMasi v. DeMasi, 366 Pa.Super. 19, 530 A.2d 871 (1987).

      . Reliance on Dages v. Dages, 380 Pa.Super. 654, 547 A.2d 442 (1988), is improper as memoranda have no precedential value.

      . After an appeal has been taken, the trial court may take action to "[e]nforce any Order entered in the matter, unless the effect of the Order has been superseded as prescribed in [Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(2) ].”

      . § 3102. Legislative findings and intent
      (a) Policy. — The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is the policy of the Commonwealth to:
      (6) Effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced or separated and grant or withhold alimony according to the actual need and ability to pay of the parties and insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their property rights.

      . § 3701. Alimony
      (d) Statement of reasons. — In an order made under this section, the court shall set forth the reason for its denial or award of alimony and the amount thereof.