author: WIEAND, Judge:

text:
    476 A.2d 419
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Guy J. DePASQUALE, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Nov. 3, 1983.
    Filed April 19, 1984.
    Reargument Denied June 25, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Oct. 1, 1984.

      Linus E. Fenicle, Harrisburg, for appellant.
    Theodore B. Smith, III, Assistant District Attorney, Car-lisle, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and CERCONE, JJ.
   WIEAND, Judge:

Guy J. DePasquale was cited for speeding after he had been clocked at 36 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. speed zone on Brentwater Road in East Pennsboro, Cumberland County. On appeal, after having been found guilty by the Court of Common Pleas, DePasquale contends that the Commonwealth’s evidence of speed should have been excluded because it was obtained by use of a Model TK 100 Excessive Speed Preventor (TK 100). This device, he argues, was an electronic device whose use, by statute, has beén limited to members of the Pennsylvania State Police. The trial court found that the TK 100 was an electrical device which could properly be used by municipal police and that a computation of DePasquale’s speed obtained by use thereof was admissible. Finding this computation of speed credible, the trial court determined that DePasquale was guilty of speeding and imposed an appropriate fine. We affirm.

It is provided by the Vehicle Code, at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(c), that:

(1) The rate of speed of any vehicle may be timed on any highway by a police officer using a mechanical or electrical speed timing device.
(2) Electronic devices such as radio-microwave devices (commonly referred to as electronic speed meters or radar) may be used only by members of the Pennsylvania State Police. No person may be convicted upon evidence obtained through the use of such devices unless the speed recorded is six or more miles per hour in excess of the legal speed limit.

We must decide, therefore, whether the TK 100 is an electronic device or an electrical device. If the former, it can be used only by members of the Pennsylvania State Police. If it is an electrical speed timing device, however, it can be used by any police officer.

The science of electronics pertains to the emission, behavior and effects of electrons in vacuums and gases. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1980). Radar has been characterized as an electronic device because it depends upon the emission of electrons as radio-microwaves. It gathers input data electronically by making use of the scientific principle known as the “Doppler effect.” This principle describes the resulting change in frequency of radio-microwaves caused by the interference of a moving object. See: Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 822, 830 (1973). A radio-microwave is transmitted by a radar unit and is received again by the unit after it has been reflected by or bounced from an interfering object. See: Commonwealth v. Bartley, 411 Pa. 286, 288, 191 A.2d 673, 674 (1963). Speed is determined by measuring the change in frequency caused by the interfering object. All computations are effected electronically. Radar contains inherent dangers of inaccuracy if not carefully used. It is subject to interference by objects in the environment or by power sources other than the moving vehicle being checked. See: Commonwealth v. Bartley, supra; Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d at 830 n. 15. Thus, the measurement of speed by radar can be and frequently is distorted by objects in the environment or by another moving vehicle. It is because of concerns for possible distortions that the legislature prohibited speeding convictions based on evidence obtained by radar unless the established limit was exceeded by at least six m.p.h.

The problem of inaccuracies caused by distortions does not exist in speed measuring devices which operate electrically. Electricity is a fundamental entity of nature consisting of positive and negative particles, electrons and protons or positrons, usually used in the form of electric currents in a closed circuit. See: Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1980).

The TK 100 is a speed recording device which is plugged into the cigarette lighter in a motor vehicle. It uses both electrical and electronic components. The measurement of a vehicle’s movement is achieved electrically; only the computation of speed is accomplished electronically. Two sensor tapes, which appear as insulated wires, are secured to the pavement at an intervening distance of six feet. When the wheels of a vehicle cross the sensors, two signals are electrically transmitted to a computing unit. The computer, which operates electronically, determines the amount of time which elapsed while the vehicle was travelling six feet between the sensors and computes the speed of the vehicle. The result is displayed on a digital read-out. An electronic component in the computer consists of a quartz crystal oscillator which establishes- the accuracy of the TK 100. Therefore, only a technician trained in electronics can make repairs to the unit. Because input signals are mechanically determined and electrically conveyed, however, the potential for inaccuracy inherent in electronic measuring devices is not present in the TK 100. Moreover, the identity of the vehicle whose speed is being measured is determined mechanically, so that there is no danger of measuring the speed of the wrong vehicle. The signals from the sensors are emitted and communicated electrically to the calculating unit. Such communication of data does not use radio-microwave emissions. Because the operation is entirely self-contained, the surrounding environment cannot affect the accuracy of the determination of speed.

With respect to the manner in which information is gathered and fed into the computer, therefore, the TK 100 does not function electronically. It relies, rather, on theories of electrical signals emitted when a vehicle’s wheels make contact with the sensors. It is this aspect which distinguishes it from electronic devices such as radar which measure speed by making use of radio-microwaves.

Because the TK 100 does not rely upon radio-microwave emissions, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) has determined that it is an electrical speed timing device. PennDOT has by regulation authorized its use generally and has not confined use thereof to members of the Pennsylvania State Police. PennDOT has been charged with administering the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 6102(a). Its construction of the statute, therefore, is entitled to great weight and will not be disregarded unless it is clear that its interpretation is incorrect. Dear v. Holly Jon Equipment Co., 283 Pa.Super. 74, 81, 423 A.2d 721, 725 (1980). The evidence presented in this case confirms that the TK 100 is an electrical device for measuring speed and does not measure speed electronically. Its use by police in East Pennsboro, therefore, was not proscribed by statute.

Use of the TK 100 to detect speeding violations is not contingent upon enactment of a local ordinance authorizing its use by municipal police. Use of electrical speed timing devices by municipal police officers has been authorized by 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(c)(1). Additional authorization by municipal ordinance is not required.

The provisions of the Vehicle Code, at 75 Pa.C.S. § 6109(a)(14), do not prevent local authorities from exercising their police powers by establishing minimum speed limits on streets and highways within their physical boundaries. The establishment of such minimum speed limits, however, must be by ordinance. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6109(b)(1). After such limits have been set by ordinance, there is no requirement that an additional ordinance be enacted to authorize the means for enforcing established limits. The Vehicle Code contains no such requirement, and it would be unreasonable, if not absurd, for this Court to legislate such a requirement. This is particularly so where, as here, the legislature has already enacted legislation specifically authorizing all police officers to use electrical speed timing devices.

The Vehicle Code provides that no traffic ordinance establishing minimum speed limits shall be effective unless notice is given by posting official traffic-control devices. 75 Pa. C.S. § 6109(c). In the instant case, the evidence showed that speed limit signs had been posted by the municipality. The Vehicle Code does not contain an additional requirement that warnings be posted to alert motorists to the use of the means being used to detect violators.

Appellant’s reliance upon Commonwealth v. Brose, 412 Pa. 276, 194 A.2d 322 (1963), is misplaced. The law as it then existed and as it was there interpreted by the Court contained a specific requirement that radar warning signs be posted. Neither the same nor a comparable provision is contained in the present Vehicle Code. Signs warning of the use of the TK 100, or even of the use of radar, are not required by 75 Pa.C.S. § 6109(c). The “official traffic-control devices” referred to therein are required only to give notice of traffic regulations or ordinances which regulate, warn or guide traffic, e.g., the maximum speed limit. See: 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 102, 6109(c). Official traffic-control devices are not required in order to notify motorists of the specific means being used at any particular moment to enforce a traffic regulation pertaining to speed. The legislature, as we have repeatedly observed, has authorized the use of electrical speed timing devices by police. No further notice of the use of such a device is required.

The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    April 19, 1984.
    474 A.2d 666
    Banks et vir., Appellants, v. C.C. Charlies Inc.
    Argued February 22, 1984.
    George M. Bobrin, for appellants;
    Pamela B. Gagne, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 666
    Baxter, etc., Appellant, v. Nationwide Ins. Co.
    Submitted February 14, 1984.
    Francis A. Ferrara, for appellant;
    Edward J. Carney, Jr. for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 666
    Bucci, et al., Appellants v. Paulick, Appellant
    (at No. 174),
    (at No. 64).
    Argued February 8, 1984.
    Robert L. Campbell for appellant;
    Dennis A. Watson for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order and judgment affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 666
    Commonwealth v. Abner, Appellant.

      Submitted January 20, 1984.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald T. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 667
    Commonwealth v. Benjamin, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 9, 1984.
    Submitted October 7, 1983.
    Harry C.J. Blair, for appellant;
    Domenic P. Sbrocchi, Assistant District Attorney for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, MONTGOMERY and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 667
    Commonwealth v. Bond, Appellant.

      Submitted December 9, 1983.
    John M. McAllister for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 667
    Commonwealth v. Brooks, Appellant.
    Submitted July 28, 1983.
    William P. Fedullo, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 667
    Commonwealth v. Burgos, Appellant.
    Submitted February 21, 1984.
    Abraham Leizerowski, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 668
    Commonwealth v. Burnett, Appellant.
    Submitted January 5, 1984.
    Cynthia Marie Weaver, for appellant;
    Douglas Maloney, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, OLSZEWSKI and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 668
    Commonwealth v. Byrd, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 3, 1984.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Robert F. Pappano, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ann Aschauer Osborne, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 668
    Commonwealth v. Carthon, Appellant.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Andrew G. Gay, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK, and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 669
    Commonwealth v. Chappell, Appellant.
    Argued January 26, 1984.
    Kenneth J. Yablonski, for appellant;
    Frank Carl Roney, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, TAMILIA and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 669
    Commonwealth v. Correa, Appellant.
    Submitted October 24, 1983.
    David M. McGlaughlin, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 669
    Commonwealth v. Cottman, Appellant.
    Argued January 12, 1984.
    Leonard Rubin, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 669
    Commonwealth v. Curry, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 14, 1984.

      Submitted November 28, 1983.
    Edward J. McMearty, for appellant;
    Dennis C. McAndrews, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment is hereby affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 670
    Commonwealth v. DeLong, Appellant.
    Argued December 7, 1983.
    Andrew F. Schneider, for appellant;
    William F. Merz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence for falsely impersonating persons privately employed vacated; judgment of sentence for criminal trespass affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 670
    Commonwealth v. Dooley, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 1, 1984.

      Submitted November 18, 1983.
    James S. Bruno, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, HESTER and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 670
    Commonwealth v. Dukeman, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 1, 1984.
    Submitted March 21, 1984.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Mary Louise Barton, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK and TAMI-LIA, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 671
    Commonwealth v. Forrest, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Aug. 30, 1984.

      Submitted December 15, 1983.
    Robert J. Leibowitz, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Remanded for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing within sixty days to ascertain whether or not appellant, through his trial counsel, made a choice, supported by a reasonable legal basis, not to challenge the police’s due diligence during the period of July 4, 1980 to April 1, 1981; and whether or not the Commonwealth complied with Pa.R. Crim.P. 1100 by using due diligence in seeking to secure the presence of the appellant during the period of July 4, 1980 to April 1, 1981. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

SPAETH, President Judge, concurred in the result.


text:
    474 A.2d 671
    Commonwealth v. Goolsby, Appellant.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 672
    Commonwealth v. Gorham, Appellant.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Mervin A. Heller, Jr., for appellant;
    Charles M. Guthrie, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 672
    Commonwealth v. Graff, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 30, 1984.
    Submitted February 3, 1984.
    Glenn D. Hains, for appellant;
    C. Theodore Fritsch, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order denying P.C.H.A. relief is affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 672
    Commonwealth v. Hammond, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 5, 1984.
    Submitted January 5, 1984.
    Joseph F. Sklarosky, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert J. Gillespie, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and WICKERSHAM and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 672
    Commonwealth v. Ivey, Appellant.
    Submitted November 18, 1983.
    Arlan Ryna Mintz, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, HESTER and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 673
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, Appellant.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Louis G. Retaceo, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 673
    Commonwealth v. John, Appellant.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Edward F. Browne, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    476 A.2d 983
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied June 29, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 7,1985.

      Submitted June 23, 1983.
    Mitchell S. Strutin, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   We affirm the order of December 10, 1981 from which appeal was taken at 45 Philadelphia 1982. The appeal at 168 Philadelphia 1982 is dismissed as appellant has not raised any issue relative to this appeal.

BROSKY, J., filed a dissenting memorandum.


text:
    474 A.2d 673
    Commonwealth v. Kennedy, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 1984.
    David S. Keller, for appellant;
    John M. Eakin, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and HESTER, JJ.
   The order denying leave to withdraw pleas of nolo contendere is affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 673
    Commonwealth v. Kirksey, Appellant.

      Submitted October 7,
    Brian S. Quinn, for appellant;
    Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, MONTGOMERY and CERCONE, JJ.
   Conviction as to conspiracy to commit robbery is reversed and judgment of sentence as to that conviction is vacated; all other judgments of sentence are affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 674
    Commonwealth v. Lantzy, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 20, 1984.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    Geoffrey L. Seacrist, for appellant;
    Gregory A. Olson, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 674
    Commonwealth v. Lehman, Appellant.

      Argued February 7, 1984.
    Carmela R.M. Presogna, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Frank J. Scutella, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

JOHNSON, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    474 A.2d 674
    Commonwealth v. Magwood, Appellant.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    Richard S. Levine, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Peter G. Nychis, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., recused himself from consideration and disposition of this case.


text:
    474 A.2d 675
    Commonwealth v. McGowan, Appellant.

      Submitted February 3, 1984.
    Robert T. Gownley, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ernest D. Preate, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 675
    Commonwealth v. Milyak a/k/a Kaufman, Appellant.
    Submitted October 14, 1983.
    Vincent R. Baginski, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 675
    Commonwealth v. Peek, Appellant.
    Submitted November 28, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 676
    Commonwealth v. Pittman, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Francis E. Gleeson, Jr., for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 676
    Commonwealth v. Rhome, Appellant.
    Argued February 7, 1984.
    William J. Wiker, for appellant;
    Margaret E. Picking, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 676
    Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, Appellant.
    Submitted January 3, 1984.
    Jack J. Bulkin, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and DEL SOLE and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SPAETH, President Judge, concurred in the result.


text:
    474 A.2d 676
    Commonwealth v. Scaine, Appellant.
    Argued February 9, 1984.
    Shelley Stark, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Dara A. DeCourcey, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   This case is remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Jurisdiction is retained by this court pending remand.


text:
    474 A.2d 677
    Commonwealth v. Schultz, Appellant.
    Submitted September 30, 1983.
    Henry F. Reints, for appellant;
    W. Malcolm, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    474 A.2d 677
    Commonwealth v. Seiders, Appellant.
    Argued November 3, 1983.
    Dennis A. Zeger, for appellant;
    Merrill W. Kerlin, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 677
    Commonwealth v. Severcool, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 14, 1984.
    Argued March 15, 1983.
    Robert G. Dean, for appellant;
    Laurence M. Kelly, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, and ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 678
    Commonwealth v. Strong, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted October 4, 1983.
    Alfred Hemmons, for appellant;
    James J. Narlesky, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 678
    Commonwealth v. Toth, III, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 21, 1984.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    Roseann B. Joseph, for appellant;
    Anthony S. Blasco, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 678
    Commonwealth v. Wackowski, Appellant.
    Submitted February 3, 1984.
    William R. Adams, Jr., for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 678
    Commonwealth v. Weber, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 1984.
    Paul S. Herzberg, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and HESTER, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 679
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 1984.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Edward F. Browne, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 679
    Commonwealth v. Wingate, Appellant.

      Submitted October 24, 1983.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.

BROSKY, J., filed a dissenting memorandum.


text:
    474 A.2d 679
    Cottom, Appellant, v. Cherry.
    Argued March 21, 1984.
    John J. Fomash, III, for appellant;
    William B. Brooks, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK and TAMI-LIA, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 680
    English v. DeMarco Family Roofing Corp., Appellant.
    Argued November 17, 1983.
    Joel W. Todd, for appellant;
    Saul Finestone, for appellee.

      Before SPAETH, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    474 A.2d 680
    Hostetter v. Detwiler, Appellant.
    Argued November 2, 1983.
    David A. Johnston, Jr., for appellant;
    Herbert A. Schaffner, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    476 A.2d 472
    In re Williams. Appeal of Donald K. Williams.
    Reargument Denied June 25, 1984.
    Argued April 21, 1983.
    David A. Scholl, for appellant;
    Philip Marsh Hof, for Domestic, participating party;
    Gregory R. Reed, for Dept, of Public, participating party.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 680
    LaRosse, et al. v. Brown, etc., Appellants, v. Miller.
    Submitted January 10, 1984.
    Arthur K. Dils, for appellants;
    Daniel W. Stern, for appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, DEL SOLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 680
    McShane, Appellants, v. Asia Carpet & Decorating Co.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 14, 1984.
    Argued January 24, 1984.
    William McShane, appellant, in propria persona;
    James G. Georgalas, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, TAMILIA and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 681
    Moran, et al. v. Khouri, etc., Appellants.

      Submitted January 3, 1984.
    Edgar Bayley, Jr., for appellants;
    Loudon L. Campbell, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and DEL SOLE and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.

SPAETH, President Judge, filed a concurring memorandum.


text:
    476 A.2d 55
    Parsons, Appellant v. Dorney.
    Reargument Denied June 18, 1984.
    Submitted February 3, 1984.
    Donald F. Spry, II, for appellant;
    James Lee Zulick, for appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    474 A.2d 681
    Sarver v. Northside Dep. Bk. v. Sarver, Appellant.

      Argued March 1, 1984.
    Linda C. Liechty, for appellant;
    Gary Milnes, for appellees.
    Before BROSKY, DEL SOLE and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 681
    Wiley, Appellant, v. Schuck.
    Argued February 8, 1984.
    David B. Washington, for appellant;
    Donna Schuck, appellee, in propria persona.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Appeal quashed.


text:
    April 25, 1984.
    474 A.2d 682
    Commonwealth v. Darush, Appellant.
    Submitted February 9, 1984.
    William A. Hebe, for appellant;
    Jeffrey E. Leber, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is vacated and remanded for sentencing.


text:
    474 A.2d 682
    Commonwealth v. Lepore, Appellant.
    Submitted February 8, 1984.
    Daniel Joseph Milliron, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    John Woodcock, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 682
    Commonwealth v. Monroe, Appellant.
    Argued February 7, 1984.
    Carmela R.M. Presogna, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Frank J. Seutella, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    April 26, 1984.
    474 A.2d 682
    Commonwealth v. Torres, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 28, 1984.
    Submitted February 22, 1984.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Edward F. Browne, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 683
    Commonwealth v. Vasquez, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 16, 1984.
    Submitted February 23, 1984.
    Thomas G. Klingensmith, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Michael H. Ranck, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 683
    Com. ex rel., Beck v. Beck, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted March 29, 1984.
    Michael P. Gregorowicz, for appellant;
    Cleveland Hummel, for Beck, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and McEWEN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 683
    Red Oak Company v. Kempton, Appellant.
    Argued March 21, 1984.
    John Peter Karoly, Jr. for appellant;
    Henry S. Perkin for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and BECK and TAMI-LIA, J.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    April 27, 1984.
    474 A.2d 684
    Bernardi Bros., Inc. v. Buxton, Appellant.
    Argued November 2, 1983.
    Lawrence John Neary, for appellant;
    Samuel Leach Andes, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND and CERCONE, JJ.
   The order of the lower court refusing to open the confession of judgment in ejectment is affirmed.

WICKERSHAM, J., filed a dissenting memorandum.


text:
    474 A.2d 684
    Birch v. Bethlehem Mines Corp. Appeal of Bethlehem Mines Corporation.
    Argued January 25, 1984.
    Lawrence A. Demase, for appellant;
    Steven R. Wolf, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, TAMILIA and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 684
    Cellars v. Haywood, Appellant.
    Argued March 1, 1984.
    Emilio Paul Fastuca, for appellant;
    Evalynn Welling, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, DEL SOLE and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 684
    Chappel, Appellant, v. Lowros, D/B/A Diamond Lunch, and Ray.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 30, 1984.
    Argued January 24, 1984.
    Robert B. Truel for appellant;
    Louis C. Long and Lisle A. Zehner, III, for appellees.
    Before WIEAND, TAMILIA and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.

Jurisdiction relinquished.


text:
    474 A.2d 685
    Chesson, Appellant, v. Keystone Insurance Company.
    Argued December 9, 1983.
    Allen L. Feingold, for appellant;
    Wendy Marie Johnston, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed and additional costs imposed.


text:
    474 A.2d 685
    Commonwealth v. Barr, Appellant.
    Submitted November 8, 1983.
    James J. Stucznski, for appellant;
    Paul J. Susko, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order and judgment affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 685
    Commonwealth v. Bonhurst, Appellant.

      Submitted January 4, 1984.
    Robert W. Suter, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William F. Merz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, TAMILIA and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The conviction is affirmed but judgment of sentence is vacated and the case remanded to permit the lower court to specify its reasons for dispensing with a presentence report as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1403 A(2).

Jurisdiction relinquished.


text:
    474 A.2d 686
    Commonwealth v. Boykin, Appellant.
    Submitted September 9, 1983.
    Mitchell S. Strutin, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed, except the judgment of sentence for recklessly endangering another person is vacated.


text:
    474 A.2d 686
    Commonwealth v. Brake, Appellant.

      Submitted February 27, 1984.
    William T. Krzton, for appellant;
    Robert F. Hawk, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 686
    Commonwealth v. Cregg, Appellant.
    Argued April 11, 1984.
    Charles F. Gilchrest, for appellant;
    Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 687
    Commonwealth v. Davis, Appellant.
    Submitted January 19, 1984.
    Michael F. Giampietro, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, HESTER and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed as to appellant’s burglary conviction; judgments of sentence for theft, receiving stolen property and criminal trespass are vacated.


text:
    474 A.2d 687
    Commonwealth v. Davis, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 1984.
    Ferris Peter Webby, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert J. Gillespie, Jr., District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and HESTER, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 687
    Commonwealth v. De Shields, Appellant.
    Submitted January 4, 1984.
    Peter V. Marks, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, TAMILIA and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence, 1108 May Term, 1980 affirmed.

Judgment of sentence, 1109 May Term, 1980 affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 688
    Commonwealth v. Dotson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 21, 1984.
    Submitted January 4, 1984.
    Penn Bradford Glazier, for appellant;
    John A. Kenneff, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, TAMILIA and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   This court affirms the judgment of sentence of the learned Lancaster County Common Pleas Court Judge Paul A. Mueller, Jr. on the basis of the Opinion of December 24, 1981 and the Memorandum Opinion and Order of June 16, 1982.


text:
    474 A.2d 688
    Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Elmo.
    Submitted December 7, 1983.
    Granbery Goodnow, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant;
    William R. Bernhart, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., filed a dissenting memorandum.


text:
    474 A.2d 688
    Commonwealth v. Gamble, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 3, 1984.
    Submitted October 14, 1983.
    Ronald P. Rusinak, for appellant;
    D. Long, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 688
    Commonwealth v. Furtick, Appellant.
    Argued January 18, 1984.
    Martin Glenn Rubenstein, for appellant;

      Denis P. Cohen, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, HESTER and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 689
    Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, Appellant.
    Argued March 8, 1984.
    Louis S. Konowal, for appellant;
    Stuart L. Haimowitz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
   Appeal dismissed without prejudice to the right of appellant to seek relief in accordance with the provisions of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.

Before ROWLEY, MONTEMURO and JOHNSON, JJ.


text:
    474 A.2d 689
    Commonwealth v. Hagler, Appellant.
    Argued December 7, 1983.
    James P. McEvilly, Jr., for appellant;
    William F. Merz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 689
    Commonwealth v. Haines, a/k/a Harris, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 25, 1984.
    Submitted November 8, 1983.
    Richard S. Levine, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 690
    Commonwealth v. Hill, Appellant.
    Submitted October 14, 1983.
    Sally A. Frick, for appellant;
    Kemal A. Mericli, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Assertions of error are deemed waived. Case is remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

McEWEN and BECK, JJ., filed concurring memoranda.


text:
    474 A.2d 690
    Commonwealth v. Hughey, Appellant.
    Submitted October 14, 1983.
    Alphonse P. Lepore, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 690
    Commonwealth v. Locust, Appellant.
    Submitted February 3, 1984.
    Robert J. Dixon, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 690
    Commonwealth v. Madden, Appellant.
    Submitted May 25, 1983.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Affirmed in part and reversed in part with judgment of sentence vacated and case remanded for an evidentiary hearing. If the lower court finds that counsel was ineffective, then it should grant appropriate relief. If appellant is unable to sustain his contentions that trial counsel was ineffective, then judgment of sentence should be reimposed.

Jurisdiction relinquished.


text:
    474 A.2d 691
    Commonwealth v. Miller, Appellant.
    Submitted March 5, 1984.
    Michael E. Moyer, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Emil W. Kantra, II, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and CERCONE, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 691
    Commonwealth v. O’Hara, Appellant.
    Submitted February. 27, 1984.
    Raymond Harry Bogaty, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 691
    Commonwealth v. Polzer, Appellant.
    Submitted October 21, 1983.
    Joseph F. Sklarosky, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Joseph Giebus, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, President Judge, and WIEAND and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 692
    Commonwealth v. Prather, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 1984.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and HESTER, JJ.
   This case is remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Jurisdiction is retained by this court pending remand.


text:
    474 A.2d 692
    Commonwealth v. Presley, Appellant.
    Submitted February 3, 1984.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 692
    Commonwealth v. Ramos, Appellant.
    Submitted March 5, 1984.
    William T. Cannon, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and CERCONE, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 693
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, Appellant.
    Submitted January 4, 1984.
    Daniel H. Greene, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, TAMILIA and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 693
    Commonwealth v. Schaefer, Appellant.

      Argued January 26, 1984.
    Kurt S. Rishor for appellant;
    Robert F. Hawk, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, TAMILIA and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 693
    Commonwealth v. Shuler, Jr., Appellant.
    Submitted November 4, 1983.
    David Scott Keller, for appellant;
    Kevin A. Hess, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is vacated and case remanded for a hearing on appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea without prejudice to either party’s future right of appeal.

Jurisdiction is not retained.


text:
    474 A.2d 693
    Commonwealth v. Sipes, Appellant.

      Argued December 8, 1983.
    George T. Guarnieri for appellant;
    Michael L. Turner, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 694
    Commonwealth v. Wilson, Appellant.
    Submitted January 4, 1984.
    Benjamin Lerner, Assistant Public Defender for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, TAMILIA and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 694
    Continental Bank v. Bedford, III, Appellant.
    Argued January 18, 1984.
    Edward Fackenthel, for appellant;
    James W. Hennessey, for appellee.

      Before ROWLEY, HESTER and ROBERTS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 694
    Crumley, Appellant, v. Weaber.
    Argued January 10, 1984.
    Howard O. Mammau, for appellant;
    Wiley P. Parker, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, DEL SOLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

MONTEMURO, J., filed a concurring memorandum.


text:
    474 A.2d 695
    Fernandes, Appellant, v. Warminster Municipal Authority.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 28, 1984.
    Argued December 7, 1983.
    Donald Fernandes, appellant, in propria persona;
    William H. Casey, for appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 695
    Ford v. Ford, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 20,1984.
    Argued March 8, 1984.
    Joseph P. Ford, appellant, in propria persona;
    Michael S. Bomstein, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, MONTEMURO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Order affirmed on the opinion of the Honorable Nicholas A. Cipriani.


text:
    474 A.2d 695
    Franklin, Appellant, v. Franklin.
    Argued January 25, 1984.
    David S. Pollock, for appellant;
    Michael R. Ford, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, TAMILIA and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order of the Court of Common Pleas affirmed.

Jurisdiction relinquished..


text:
    474 A.2d 695
    Lawson, Jr., Appellant, v. Bond.
    Argued May 26, 1983.
    John A. Metz, Jr., for appellant;
    Russell John J. Ober, Jr. for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 696
    Maravich, Appellant, v. Maravich, Jr.
    Argued February 29, 1984.
    Roberta C. Higley, for appellant;
    Layden C. Sadecky, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, DEL SOLE and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.


text:
    476 A.2d 983
    Martin, Appellant, v. PFA Members Service Corp.
    Reargument Denied June 29, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Oct. 29, 1984.

      Argued February 14, 1984.
    James L. Martin, appellant, in propria persona;
    James D. Flower, Jr. for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Appeal from judgment following order of June 22, 1982 affirmed. Appeal as to all other orders quashed.


text:
    474 A.2d 696
    Miller v. Miller, Appellant.
    Submitted December 8, 1983.
    Timothy Allen Shollenberger, for appellant;
    W. Williams, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order at No. 1157 affirmed.

Order at No. 1266 affirmed.


text:
    476 A.2d 983
    Oswald, Appellant, v. Pyron.
    Reargument Denied July 10, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 15, 1984.

      Argued February 9, 1984.
    Charles S. Morrow, for appellant;
    Melvin L. Moser, Jr., for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 696
    Port Authority of Allegh. County v. Adams.
    Argued April 10, 1984.
    David B. Washington, for appellant;
    Emil Robert Pecori, II, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 696
    Sapp Roofing Co., Inc. v. Thermoflo Equip. Co., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 23, 1984.
    Argued February 7, 1984.
    Philip B. Hart, Jr. for appellant;
    John Richard Orie, Jr. for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of March 24, 1982 affirmed.


text:
    April 30, 1984.
    474 A.2d 697
    Commonwealth v. Kelly, Appellant.
    Submitted April 10, 1984.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Melinda G. Tell, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence as to restitution is vacated. In all other respects, the judgment of sentence is affirmed. Case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction is not retained.-


text:
    474 A.2d 697
    Commonwealth v. Lumley, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug. 9, 1984.
    Argued April 11, 1984.
    William F. Cercone, Jr., for appellant;
    Charles S. Hersh, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    474 A.2d 697
    Commonwealth v. Telthorster, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 20, 1984.
    Submitted April 12, 1984.
    Donald R. Marsh, for appellant;
    Gregory Allen Olson, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


author: BECK, Judge:

text:
    476 A.2d 422
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James BRYANT, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Feb. 22, 1982.
    Filed April 19, 1984.
    Reargument Denied June 25, 1984.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Jan. 17, 1985.

      John Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and BECK, JJ.
   BECK, Judge:

Appellant filed a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. He alleges, inter alia, that the trial judge improperly refused to recuse himself from consideration of appellant’s post-verdict motions and sentencing. We vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for rehearing of appellant’s post-verdict motion and sentencing.

The facts are undisputed in this appeal. In the middle of the night appellant forcibly entered a home and committed assault and indecent assault upon a woman who was eight and one-half months pregnant. Before departing, he stole thirty dollars in cash from the dresser in the victim’s bedroom.

After a jury trial appellant was found guilty of indecent assault, simple assault, burglary, and robbery. Appellant then filed post-verdict motions. The Trial Court empanelled a court en banc to hear argument on the post-verdict motions. The trial court opinion relates:

Shortly after the initial [post-verdict] motions were filed, the Trial Court requested that defense counsel prepare a brief and granted a continuance for that purpose. The points raised in post-verdict motions had to be briefed to be intelligently considered by the other members of the panel [i.e., those judges who had not participated in the conduct of the suppression hearing and trial].
About a year after the trial, a hearing was held on the motions. At that time, defense counsel submitted what he styled Supplemental Post-Verdict Motions. These supplemental motions were delivered only to the two members of the panel who had not presided at the trial. In the supplemental motions for the first time, [appellant] asked [that] the Trial Judge recuse himself from hearing argument on the motions. The Trial Judge was not aware of this defense request for recusal until argument before the panel. [The motion for recusal was denied.]

Trial Court Opinion at 1-2.

Appellant asserts that the trial judge acted improperly in participating in appellant’s post-verdict motions and sentencing instead of recusing himself as requested.

Appellant and the trial judge were engaged in an ongoing three-act drama, each act representing a separate criminal trial at which the trial judge presided and in which appellant was the defendant. The crimes were all similar. A subplot running through the entire drama and on which the appellant bases his current recusal argument is the judge’s alleged remarks relating to his upcoming election which, appellant claimed, showed prejudice against appellant.

As noted, the instant case is the third matter in which the defendant was tried before the same judge. On October 18, 1979, prior to the already scheduled sentencing hearings in the first two cases, the trial judge allegedly announced in camera, and in the presence of appellant’s trial counsel and others, (i) that in order to generate preelection publicity for himself, the date for the sentencing hearing in appellant’s first case would be changed from November 8 to November 5, the day immediately preceding the election in which the judge was a candidate and (ii) that he would award the maximum possible sentences to appellant in both cases. Record at 32-36, October 29, 1979.

The appellant does not claim in this appeal that the trial judge made any prejudicial remarks directly related to the present case. He asserts, however, that the judge’s reputed comments of October 18, 1979, concerning the two prior cases reveal the judge’s bias against him. Therefore, the appellant contends that the two earlier cases taken as a unit with the present case are all tainted by the judge’s alleged, prejudicial remarks.

For several reasons not germane to this opinion, hearings on post-verdict motions and sentencing in the instant case were not held until approximately one year after those in the two prior cases. But the trial in the instant case had been completed before October 18, 1979, the date on which the trial judge allegedly made biased in camera remarks. Consequently, the motions for recusal in the two earlier cases as well as the motion for recusal in the present case were filed (i) after the trial in each case was completed, (ii) after the trial judge reputedly made biased in camera comments on October 18, 1979, and (iii) before hearings were held on the appellant’s post-verdict motions and sentencing in each case. In all three cases, on the basis of his alleged in camera comments, the trial judge was asked to recuse himself from consideration of the appellant’s post-verdict motions and sentencing.

In the two earlier cases a recusal motion was initially addressed to the trial judge and subsequently to an en banc court empanelled by the trial judge. In both cases the trial judge did not participate in the en banc court’s determination of the appellant’s post-verdict motions and sentencing.

In the present case the appellant’s motion for recusal of the trial judge was presented to a newly formed en banc court which was empanelled by the trial judge and which included the trial judge among its three members. The appellant’s recusal motion was denied by the en banc court, and the trial judge continued to sit as a member of the en banc court which decided the appellant’s post-verdict motions and sentencing.

Recently, in Municipal Publications, Inc. v. Snyder, 322 Pa.Super.Ct. 464, 469 A.2d 1084 (1983), this Court clarified the two-step analysis utilized in reviewing a motion for recusal.

When a motion for recusal is filed, the challenged judge must first decide the sufficiency of the allegations of bias and prejudice. In making this decision, the judge must take the allegations as true. If on the basis of the allegations, taken as true, the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the judge must refer the recu-sal motion to another judge for hearing.

Id., 322 Pa.Superior Ct. at 494, 469 A.2d at 1099.

In the instant case the appellant’s motion for recusal was submitted as part of the appellant’s supplemental post-verdict motions. By direct reference counsel incorporated both the recusal motion filed by the appellant in the two previous cases and the notes of testimony from the hearing on the recusal motion in the earlier cases.

In paragraph nine of the recusal motion covering the two earlier cases, the appellant averred that

[o]n October 18, 1979, after the jury had returned a verdict, the trial judge asked to speak with defense counsel ... in chambers. During the course of the ensuing conversation, [the trial judge] stated to [defense counsel] that: (1) with regard to the [two] cases ..., the Court had already made up its mind to impose maximum, consecutive sentences on each and every information on which defendant had been convicted, and (2) the Court had fixed November 5 as the date for post verdict motions and sentencing on [the] two ... cases because [the trial judge] was running for reelection to the Bench in the election to be held on November 6, and the Court believed that he would receive favorable publicity from the sentencing proceedings on November 5, thus improving his prospects for reelection.

At the hearing on the appellant’s recusal motion in the two earlier cases only the appellant’s trial counsel and the trial judge’s judicial aide testified as witnesses. In his hearing testimony the appellant’s trial counsel reiterated the allegations appearing in the appellant’s written recusal motion, Record of October 29, 1979, at 32-36, and further contended:

My client has been severely prejudiced because the trier of facts [the trial judge], the person that is going to sentence him on November 5th, or whatever date, had made up his mind to give that person a specific sentence without having taken into account the presentence report [Section 9731 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9731], the psychiatric examination [Section 9736 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9736], any witnesses that I may present, the allocution of my client [Section 9752(a) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9752(a), and Pa.R.Crim.P. 1405(a) ]____

Record at 120, October 29, 1979.

The only testimony offered at the hearing to counter the trial counsel’s testimony was that of the trial judge’s aide. No direct testimony was offered to rebut the trial counsel’s testimony as to the prejudicial statements allegedly made by the trial judge. The only testimony contrary to the trial counsel’s was indirect and not on point. The aide stated that he was solely responsible for scheduling and rescheduling hearings before the trial judge. Record at 145-46, 156 & 162, October 29, 1979. At the recusal hearing no testimony was adduced to refute directly the allegations made concerning the trial judge’s in camera remarks.

Accordingly, in considering the recusal motion in the instant case, the en banc court was presented with allegations of prejudice which, if taken as true, provided a sufficient basis on which the trial judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Since the appellant’s allegations of prejudice were sufficient, the challenged trial judge could no longer participate in the ruling on the appellant’s recusal motion. That is, “once it appears that the allegations of bias and prejudice are sufficient, ... the challenged judge must refer the recusal motion to another judge for hearing” to ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations and the necessity for recusal. Municipal Publications, Inc., 322 Pa.Superior Ct. at 494, 469 A.2d at 1099.

The Commonwealth argues that the judge was not required to recuse himself because he was only one of three judges deciding appellant’s recusal motion. Thus, the Commonwealth asserts that the empanelling of an en banc court adequately safeguarded both the appellant’s right to an unbiased determination of his recusal motion and the public’s confidence in the impartiality of the judicial decision making process. We disagree.

We are not persuaded that the instant case is distinguishable from Municipal Publications Inc. simply because the present appellant’s recusal motion was not determined by the challenged judge sitting alone. The Municipal Publications Inc. rule mandates that once sufficiency is established the judge in question can no longer participate in the hearing on his own recusal. While a court en banc may attenuate the possibility of judicial prejudice, having the challenged judge as a member of the panel does not adequately preserve the integrity of the recusal hearing.

Additional support for the position that the trial judge should have recused himself is found in Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. 15, 459 A.2d 727 (1983). The appellant in Darush urged recusal of the sentencing judge on the grounds that the particular judge harbored ill-will toward the appellant because the “appellant had openly opposed election of the ... judge and had made derogatory remarks concerning the candidate to the judge’s campaign manager [, which remarks appellant] ... believed the candidate had overheard ----” Id., 501 Pa. at 23, 459 A.2d at 732. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Da-rush that it found “no evidence of bias [on the part of the sentencing judge] and [was] convinced that the judge acted in what he sincerely felt was a proper manner,” id., 501 Pa. at 19, 459 A.2d at 730, the court reasoned that “the largely unfettered sentencing discretion afforded a judge [was] better exercised by one without hint of animosity toward appellant.” Id., 501 Pa. at 24, 459 A.2d at 732. Therefore, the case was remanded to the court of common pleas for resentencing of appellant by a different judge.

The precept governing judicial conduct is the avoidance of not only actual impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety. Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498 Pa. 486, 447 A.2d 250 (1982); Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515, 364 A.2d 312 (1976); Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as amended. Because “ ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,’” Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 482 Pa. 76, 92, 393 A.2d 386, 394 (1978) (citation omitted), disqualification of a judge is mandated whenever “a significant minority of the lay community could reasonably question the court’s impartiality.” Darush, 501 Pa. at 24, 459 A.2d at 732; Boyle; Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In the instant case, the appellant bore the burden of showing bias. Since a review of the record reveals that the appellant adduced evidence of bias which was not refuted, we conclude that no further hearing on the question of recusal is necessary. We hold, therefore, that the trial judge should have recused himself from consideration of the appellant’s post-verdict motions and sentencing.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a rehearing of (1) the appellant’s post-verdict motion concerning the jury charge on reasonable doubt and (2) sentencing. The rehearings are to be conducted by a judge or judges other than the challenged trial judge. Jurisdiction is relinquished to the court of common pleas.

      . A judge is not automatically disqualified from hearing a case merely because he has presided over prior cases involving the same defendant. Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 273 Pa.Super.Ct. 600, 417 A.2d 1210 (1980), petition for allowance of appeal denied, September 9, 1980; Commonwealth v. Kane, 199 Pa.Super.Ct. 89, 184 A.2d 405 (1962). However, if circumstances exist showing a continuing or recurring bias against a particular defendant or a class of cases, the trial judge should be disqualified. Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 482 Pa. 76, 393 A.2d 386 (1978); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 452 Pa. 457, 308 A.2d 90 (1973); Snyder’s Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 A. 33 (1930); Kane.

      . The trial judge presided over the recusal hearing of October 29, 1979, and did not testify as a witness.

      . "The party who asserts that a trial judge must be disqualified bears the burden of producing evidence establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessitating recusal.” Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. 15, 21, 459 A.2d 727, 731 (1983); Commonwealth v. Council, 491 Pa. 434, 421 A.2d 623 (1980).

      . Both the instant appellant and the appellant in Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. 15, 459 A.2d 727 (1983), were "tried by a jury which was responsible to evaluate the testimony and arrive at a verdict.” Id., 501 Pa. at 23, 459 A.2d at 732. Reviewing the record in Darush, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that "[s]ince appellant [was] not able to point out any partial rulings or conduct by the trial court which might have improperly affected the jury, he [had] not shown that the integrity of the fact finding process was affected by any alleged predisposition held by the court.” Id., 501 Pa. at 23, 459 A.2d at 732. Consequently, the court did not award appellant a new trial. In the present case the appellant has not argued that the jury's functions were affected by the alleged bias of the trial judge.