author: WICKERSHAM, Judge:

text:
    453 A.2d 1031
    John A. LAVIN and Joanne Lavin, his wife, Appellants, v. Philip MYLECRAINE and Pearl Mylecraine, his wife, and MTD Products, Inc.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 22, 1982.
    Filed Dec. 17, 1982.

      Frank N. Gallagher, Doylestown, for appellants.
    Frederick E. Smith, Doylestown, for appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and WIEAND, JJ.
   WICKERSHAM, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order and judgment of the lower court which denied a petition to add damages for delay to a verdict pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 238. The pertinent facts are as follows.

On May 21,1977, appellant John A. Lavin was driving his automobile on Route 202, opposite the premises of Howard’s Antiques in Buckingham Township, Bucks County, when he was struck in the left eye by an object propelled by a lawnmower being operated by Philip Mylecraine as he mowed the lawn at the antique store. John A. Lavin lost the use of his left eye as a result of the accident. The Lavins filed a complaint in trespass against Philip Mylecraine; Pearl Mylecraine, the owner of Howard’s Antiques; and also against MTD Products, Inc., the manufacturers of the mower, on May 14, 1979.

On July 14, 1981, the Mylecraines offered $30,000 to the Lavins in exchange for a joint tortfeasor’s release, which offer was accepted. MTD made an oral offer of settlement of $15,000, which the Lavins rejected. A trial was held before Judge William H. Rufe, III, and a jury; a verdict of $37,000 was returned in favor of the Lavins on July 16,1981. Comparative negligence was apportioned at ninety percent (90%) on MTD and ten percent (10%) on the Mylecraines.

The Lavins then filed a petition for damages for delay alleging, inter alia, that MTD had made no written offer of settlement prior to the verdict and was, therefore, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 238, liable for an additional $7,831.79 in delay damages. The trial court issued an order denying the delay damages claim because the $37,000 jury verdict did not exceed one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the $30,-000 previously accepted by the Lavins in settlement of their claims against the Mylecraines. The Lavins filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying damages for delay, which was denied by the lower court. Judgment was subsequently entered.

The Lavins frame the first question involved as follows:

A. When a plaintiff recovers a verdict against joint tortfeasors A and B after having settled with A, is he entitled to delay damages under Rule 238 from B who made no written offer prior to verdict?

Brief for Appellants at 2.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 238 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), in an action seeking monetary relief for bodily injury, death or property damage, or any combination thereof, the court ... shall
(1) add to the amount of compensatory damages in the award of the arbitrators, in the verdict of a jury, or in the court’s decision in a nonjury trial, damages for delay at ten (10) percent per annum, not compounded, which shall become part of the award, verdict or decision;
(2) compute the damages for delay from the date the plaintiff filed the initial complaint in the action or from a date one year after the accrual of the cause of action, whichever is later, up to the date of the award, verdict or decision.
(e) If a defendant at any time prior to trial makes a written offer of settlement in a specified sum with prompt cash payment to the plaintiff, and continues that offer in effect until commencement of trial, but the offer is not accepted and the plaintiff does not recover by award, verdict or decision, exclusive of damages for delay, more than 125 percent of the offer, the court or the arbitrators shall not award damages for delay for the period after the date the offer was made.

The release agreed to by the Lavins and the Mylecraines, by its terms, exonerated the Mylecraines from any liability for delay damages. Even if, hypothetically, the Mylecraines’ offer of $30,000 in settlement of the Lavins’ claim had been rejected by the Lavins, the Mylecraines would have been exonerated from any more damages for delay attributable to the period after the offer was made as long as the offer was kept open until the commencement of trial since the offer was written, provided for prompt cash payment in a specified sum and the Lavins did not recover more than 125% of the offer in the jury award: the Mylecraines would still, however, owe damages for delay attributable to the time period before the offer was made. MTD made no offer in conformance with Rule 238(e) but, nevertheless, seeks to take advantage of the Mylecraines’ conforming offer and avoid the payment of delay damages attributable to the period after the date of the Mylecraines’ offer.

In Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that Pa.R.C.P. No. 238 “clearly reflects a primary desire to encourage pre-trial settlement .... Undeniably, this rule serves to compensate the plaintiff for the inability to utilize funds rightfully due him, but the basic aim of the rule is to alleviate delay in the disposition of cases, thereby lessening congestion in the courts.” Id., 496 Pa. at 59, 436 A.2d at 151.

The effort to encourage pre-trial settlement and reduce congestion in the courts would be discouraged if we were to toll the running of delay damages against MTD as of the date of the Mylecraines’ offer. If we were to interpret Rule 238 as MTD suggests, once an offer in conformance with the Rule was made by any defendant the remaining defendants would lose the incentive to settle provided by the accrual of more delay damages beyond the date of the offer.

MTD cites Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956), which interprets the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Act of July 19, 1951, P.L. 1130, 12 P.S. § 2082 et seq., for the proposition that a non-settling defendant, who proceeds to trial and suffers an adverse verdict, is to be granted the benefit of an overly generous settlement paid by a co-defendant before trial. Daugherty concerns the liabilities of defendants with respect to a jury verdict, however, not the accrual of delay damages. Both Daugherty and the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act are inapplicable to our present case as neither considers the concern for alleviating court congestion held so central to Rule 238 in Laudenberger.

The Mylecraines’ offer does not toll the accrual of delay damages against MTD.

The second question presented by the Lavins relates to the date from which delay damages begin to accrue.

Section (a) of Rule 238 provides that delay damages shall be added to the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the verdict of a jury in an action for bodily injury, death or property damage. While section (e) of Rule 238 provides that a conforming settlement offer will toll the accrual of delay damages beyond the date of the offer, the offer does not eliminate such delay damages as have accrued to that point.

In order to determine the date from which delay damages begin to accrue we look to section (f) of Rule 238 which states:

If an action is pending on the effective date of this rule, or if an action is brought after the effective date on a cause of action which accrued prior to the effective date, damages for delay shall be computed from the date plaintiff files the initial complaint or from a date one year after the accrual of the cause of action, or from a date six (6) months after the effective date of this rule, whichever date is later.

The effective date of Rule 238 was April 15, 1979. The Lavins’ cause of action accrued on, or soon after, the date of the accident, May 21, 1977. Their complaint was filed on May 14, 1979. As October 15, 1979, the date six months after the effective date of the Rule, is the latest of the possible alternatives under section (f), it is the applicable date for determining the starting point for delay damages in this case.

In summary, the Lavins are entitled to delay damages from MTD. The Mylecraines offer of settlement did not toll the accrual of delay damages against MTD.

That portion of the judgment and the order which deny delay damages are reversed. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WIEAND, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    453 A.2d 1033
    In re In the Matter of Arthur Henry JAMES. Appeal of Arthur Henry JAMES.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 21, 1982.
    Filed Dec. 17, 1982.

      Athena Mary Dooley, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Dianne L. Anderson, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, participating party.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and WIEAND, JJ.
   WIEAND, Judge:

Arthur Henry James, an attorney, overslept and arrived late on the seventh day of a criminal trial, causing delivery of the court’s jury instructions to be delayed for almost an hour. Counsel was summarily held in contempt and fined $200. On appeal, he contends that the “wrongful intent” essential to a finding of contempt was absent. We agree and reverse.

“Courts unquestionably have inherent power to punish willful misconduct which obstructs a fair and orderly trial. [Citations omitted] This includes the authority to impose summary criminal contempt.” Commonwealth v. Garrison, 478 Pa. 356, 365, 386 A.2d 971, 975 (1978). However, in Pennsylvania, the power to impose summary punishment for contempt has been limited by statute. Thus, the Judicial Code, at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4131, provides as follows:

The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue attachments and to inflict summary punishments for contempts of court shall be restricted to the following cases:
(1) The official misconduct of the officers of such courts respectively.
(2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses of or to the lawful process of the court.
(3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice.

Subsection 3 of the statute, being the provision under which appellant was adjudged guilty of contempt, “grants the court power to ensure that lawsuits will be heard in a manner conducive to the just and orderly resolution of the issues presented.... To prove criminal contempt of court which may be acted upon under authority.of [this subsection], the Commonwealth must prove an improper intent, an action and an obstruction of the administration of justice.” In re Johnson, 467 Pa. 552, 557, 359 A.2d 739, 741-42 (1976). See also: In re Galloway, 480 Pa. 1, 4-5, 389 A.2d 55, 57 (1978); Tenenbaum v. Caplan, 454 Pa. 1, 4, 309 A.2d 428, 430 (1973). In Commonwealth v. Washington, 466 Pa. 506, 508, 353 A.2d 806, 807 (1976), the Supreme Court said: “ ‘[TJhere is no contempt unless there is some sort of wrongful intent.’ Offutt v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 232 F.2d 69, 72 (1956), cert. den. 351 U.S. 988, 76 S.Ct. 1049, 100 L.Ed. 1501 (1956). \ .. [A] degree of intentional wrongdoing is an ingredient of the offense of criminal contempt.’ In Re Brown, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 454 F.2d 999, 1006 (1971). ‘Willfulness is, of course, an element of criminal contempt and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ United States v. Greyhound Corporation, 508 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir.1974). In United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 368 (7th Cir.1972), the Court thoroughly discussed the necessity for proof of the element of intent, and concluded that the minimum intent required is ‘a volitional act done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.’ ”

Instantly, an improper intent was lacking. The record discloses nothing more than a late appearance caused by oversleeping. Upon awakening, appellant immediately presented himself to the trial judge and, the transcript discloses, apologetically explained his tardiness. Under these circumstances there was no evidence of an intentional disobedience or an intentional neglect.

In Commonwealth v. Washington, supra, the appellant, a defendant in a criminal proceeding, failed to appear in court at the appointed time. A detective sent by the trial court to find him, found him asleep at home. Appellant apologized to the court and explained that he had gone to a party the night before and thought he had set his alarm. Nonetheless, the trial court held him in contempt and imposed a $50 fine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that intent had not been established under such circumstances. Thus, contempt had not been proved.

We are not insensitive to the delay and inconvenience which appellant’s tardiness caused to the court and to the judicial proceedings then in progress. Neither are we unaware of the great need for courteous courtroom decorum which insures fair and orderly trials. However, “appellate courts have consistently overturned convictions of attorneys held in contempt for lateness when there was no showing of intent.” Commonwealth v. Washington, supra 466 Pa. at 508, 353 A.2d at 807. Compare: Medve v. Walakovits, 305 Pa. Super. 75, 78, 451 A.2d 249, 250 (1982).

Order reversed.

      . This is a substantial re-enactment of the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 23, 17 P.S. § 2041.


text:
    453 A.2d 1035
    William B. KLINE and Renee Kline, Appellants, v. ARDEN H. VERNER COMPANY, Arden H. Verner, Arden H. Verner Company, Inc. and Arden H. Verner t/a Painters, Inc. and t/a Painters, Inc.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted Oct. 13, 1982.
    Piled Dec. 17, 1982.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted March 9, 1983.

      Thomas Kovalchick, Arnold, for appellants.
    Fred C. Trenor, II, Pittsburgh, for appellees.
    Before WIEAND, BECK and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   WIEAND, Judge:

William B. Kline, employed as a painter, was injured in a work related fall from a ladder. He was unable to work for approximately a month and received workmen’s compensation benefits for that period. He sustained injuries to the pelvic region characterized as “priap[i]sm secondary to perineal trauma” which resulted in loss of the functional use of his penis. Because this is not among the enumerated specific losses compensable under Section 306 of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, Kline commenced an action in trespass against the employer, Arden H. Verner Company, alleging permanent injury caused by the negligence of a fellow employee. The trial court entered summary judgment for the employer, and this appeal followed. We affirm.

Section 303 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended and re-enacted by the Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, No. 263, § 6(a), 77 P.S. § 481(a), provides:

The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employes, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined in section 301(c)(1) and (2) or occupational disease as defined in section 108. (Footnotes omitted.)

Appellant has been compensated under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. He has been paid by his employer the full benefits to which he is entitled. His contention that he should be permitted to maintain an action at law because the permanent impairment which he has sustained is not otherwise specifically compensable is untenable. When an employee sustains injuries which bring him within the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the amount he is to be compensated depends upon the provisions of the Act. That compensation is his exclusive remedy. Its exclusivity is not destroyed and the employee does not acquire additional remedies merely because the provisions of the Act fail to provide what he deems to be adequate or full compensation for injuries sustained.

In Scott v. C.E. Powell Coal Co., 402 Pa. 73, 166 A.2d 31 (1960), an employee sustained a compensable injury which left him with a permanent loss of the senses of taste and smell. He sought to maintain an action in trespass to recover for the permanent loss of these senses but made no claim for medical expenses or loss of earnings. He contended that because the loss of the senses of taste and smell was not among the enumerated specific losses compensable by a fixed amount irrespective of actual disability, he could recover damages therefor in an action of trespass. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and refused to allow the action, noting the anomaly that would result from a contrary holding:

If we were to adopt the appellant’s argument it would be necessary to establish two standards for those employees, all parties to the same workmen’s compensation agreement, who lose their senses of taste and smell as a result of accidental injuries. The injured worker whose salary was diminished as a result of the loss of his senses of taste and smell would be limited to recovery under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, whereas the injured employee, whose loss of the senses of taste and smell in no way impairs his earning capacity, would be permitted to bring an action for trespass against his negligent employer. We do not intend to create such an anomalous situation by allowing a suit in trespass in this case.

Id., 402 Pa. at 77, 166 A.2d at 34.

A similar result was reached in Hartwell v. Allied Chemical Corp., 457 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir.1972), where appellant had brought an action at law to recover damages for disfiguring but not disabling scars resulting from a compensable, work-related accident.

Appellant argues that these decisions have reached an unfair result and urges that we overrule them and allow his action to proceed. This we cannot do. If there is inequity in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the remedy lies with the legislature. Kelly v. The Carborundum Co., 307 Pa.Super. 361, 367-68, 453 A.2d 624, 627, 628 (Wieand, J. 1982); Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 293 Pa.Super. 474, 482, 439 A.2d 674, 678 (1981).

To demonstrate unfairness, appellant relies upon decisions interpreting the Occupational Disease Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 566, No. 284, § 101 et seq., as amended, 77 P.S. § 1201 et seq., as permitting common law actions for diseases not specifically listed in the Act. See: Greer v. United States Steel Corp., 475 Pa. 448, 380 A.2d 1221 (1977); Boniecke v. McGraw-Edison Co., 252 Pa.Super. 467, 381 A.2d 1301 (1977), aff’d, 485 Pa. 163, 401 A.2d 345 (1979). The Occupational Disease Act, however, is not analogous. It has application only to those diseases identified therein and was not intended to bar trespass actions brought upon diseases not covered by the Act. See: Perez v. Blumenthal Brothers Chocolate Co., 428 Pa. 225, 237 A.2d 227 (1968); Boniecke v. McGraw Edison-Co., supra, 252 Pa.Super. at 471, 381 A.2d at 1303. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, however, provides benefits for and is applicable to “all injuries.” See: Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, No. 263, 77 P.S. § 1.

Appellant contends finally that to interpret the Workmen’s Compensation Act so as to bar the instant action is to place thereon an interpretation violative of Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This section provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law . .. . ” It has been said, however, that there is nothing in this section which prevents the legislature from extinguishing a cause of action. Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 400, 346 A.2d 897, 903 (1975) (Opinion of Jones, C.J.). Moreover and in any event, the enactment of a Workmen’s Compensation Act is authorized by Article III, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which specifically includes the right to “limit the amount to be recovered for injuries....” Cf. Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 412 A.2d 1094 (1980), aff’g, 262 Pa.Super. 417, 396 A.2d 1241 (1978); Eisel v. U.S. Slicing Machine Co., Inc., 488 Pa. 192, 412 A.2d 138 (1980), aff'g, 267 Pa.Super. 528, 407 A.2d 36 (1979); Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 123 A.2d 837 (1956).

The order entering summary judgment is affirmed.

      . Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, No. 263, § 10, 77 P.S. § 513.


text:
    November 5, 1982.
    452 A.2d 1073
    Autenreith v. Slowik. Appeal of Thomas J. Kratzenberg.
    Argued June 15, 1982.
    M. Lawrence Shields, III, for appellant;
    Robert R. Graff, submitted a brief on behalf of appellees.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1073
    Bouch, Appellant v. Murdick.
    Argued June 15, 1982.
    David M. Moran, for appellant;
    Joseph N. Mack, for appellees.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    453 A.2d 1060
    Commonwealth v. Downing, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 11, 1983.
    Argued November 16, 1981.
    Michael J. Downing, appellant, in propria persona;
    Garold Tennis, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., McEwen and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge Charles L. Durham is affirmed.

CERCONE, P.J., and HOFFMAN, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    452 A.2d 1074
    Commonwealth v. Harrison, Appellant.
    Submitted May 4, 1982.
    David Samuel Dessen, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1074
    Commonwealth v. Hutchins, Appellant.
    Submitted February 18, 1982.
    Patricia M. Dugan, for appellant;
    Steven J. Cooperstein, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1074
    Commonwealth v. Jenco, Appellant.
    Argued November 11,1980.
    Michael J. Murphy, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1074
    Commonwealth v. Mackie, Appellant.
    Submitted May 11,1982.
    Patrick J. Kronenwetter, for appellant;
    John D. Gresimer, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1075
    Commonwealth v. Nilsson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 3, 1983.

      Submitted June 16, 1982.
    Nils H. Ljungman, Jr., for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1075
    Commonwealth v. Patrick, Appellant.
    Argued June 8, 1982.
    Gary R. Egoville, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Joseph Hylan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1075
    Commonwealth v. Rowkosky, Appellant.
    Submitted June 15,1982.
    John A. Halley, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Affirmed.

JOHNSON, J., filed a memorandum concurring statement.


text:
    452 A.2d 1076
    Commonwealth v. Waddell, Appellant.
    Submitted April 7,1982.
    Andrew G. Gay, for appellant;
    Joseph A. Smyth, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1076
    Commonwealth v. Wilson, Appellant.
    Submitted June 9, 1982.
    Bernard V. O’Hare, III, for appellant;
    Christopher T. Spadoni, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1076
    Commonwealth ex rel. Tropiano v. Tropiano, Appellant.
    Argued June 11, 1980.
    Henry A. Stein, for appellant;
    John F. McAllister, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

WICKERSHAM, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    452 A.2d 1076
    In the Matter of Steven Ruggles, a minor.
    Argued April 28, 1982.
    Carmella Presogna, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Dana S. Jones, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, participating party.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Appeal dismissed as moot.


text:
    452 A.2d 1077
    Kane, Appellant v. Fazio.
    Argued December 7, 1981.
    Robert A. Naragon, for appellant;
    Ward F. Clark, submitted a brief on behalf of appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   The order of the learned Bucks County Common Pleas Court Judge Kenneth G. Biehn is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1077
    Knox v. Millstine, Appellant.
    Argued November 10,1980.
    Harry J. Gruener, for appellant;
    John L. Bailey, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, CAVANAUGH and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1077
    Mitek, Appellant v. Ste-mel Signs, Inc.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 11, 1983.

      Submitted December 5, 1980.
    Julius E. Fioravanti, for appellant;
    Abraham L. Hodes, for appellee.
    Before CERCONÉ, P.J., HESTER and WIEAND, JJ.
   The order and judgment nunc pro tunc of the lower court are affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1077
    Pa Manufacturers, Appellant v. Liberty Mutual Insur.
    Argued May 19, 1982.
    Robert B. Truel, for appellant;
    Gerald J. Hutton, for appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1078
    Salkowski, Sr., et al., Appellants v. Bearoff, etc.
    Argued October 6, 1981.
    Thomas B. Rutter, for appellants;
    George H. Knoell, III, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ.
   The judgment of the learned Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Judge Frederick Smillie is affirmed.


text:
    454 A.2d 147
    Cedar Valley Civ. Ass’n v. Schnabel et ux., Appellants.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 26, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 19, 1983.
    Argued June 21, 1982.
    James D. Crawford, for appellants;
    Albert McBride, Jr., submitted a brief on behalf of appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The final decree and order is affirmed.


text:
    November 12, 1982.
    452 A.2d 1078
    Commercial Leasing, Appellant v. Good Scents Prod. Inc., et al.
    Submitted June 21, 1982.
    Irvin D. Ellis, for appellant;
    William T. Adis, for appellees.

      Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

LIPEZ, J., filed a memorandum dissenting opinion.


text:
    452 A.2d 1078
    Commonwealth v. Bell, Appellant.
    Submitted March 8, 1982.
    Owen W. Nash, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1078
    Commonwealth v. Iommie, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 7, 1983.
    Argued September 8,1982.
    Rochelle Newman, for appellant;
    Mark Stuart Gurevitz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before BROSKY, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1079
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 29, 1983.
    Submitted June 27,1978.
    Ronald W. Morrison, for appellant;
    Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., MONTGOMERY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1079
    Commonwealth v. Joynes, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 14, 1983.
    Argued January 20, 1982.
    Joel S. Moldusky, for appellant;
    Michele G. Lehr, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1079
    Commonwealth v. Pollino, Jr., Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted March 3, 1983.
    Submitted January 18, 1982.
    John P. Campana, for appellant;
    Gailey C. Keller, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1080
    Commonwealth v. Ramirez, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 16, 1983.
    Argued May 12, 1982.
    Donald Louis Van Gilder, for appellant;
    Jerry A. Snyder, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CIRILLO, MONTEMURO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1080
    Commonwealth v. Snead, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 14, 1983.
    Argued December 8,1981.
    Daniel J. DiGiacomo, for appellant;
    Mark Gurevitz, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1080
    Commonwealth v. Wertz, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 12, 1983.
    Argued May 4,1982.
    Stephen S. Pennington, for appellant;
    Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1080
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted March 10, 1982.
    John J. Gallagher, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1081
    Kraft t/d/b/a Allied Realty, Appellant v. Humford, Equ.
    Argued November 6, 1981.
    Joseph G. Albert, for appellant;
    Arthur Silverblatt, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1081
    Matrese, Appellant v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., et al.

      Argued June 22, 1982.
    Gordon Morton, for appellant;
    Anthony J. Ciotola, for appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1081
    Toren, Appellant v. Toren.
    Argued November 5, 1981.
    Boyd A. England, for appellant;
    Robert A. Naragon, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1081
    Woodall, Appellant v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
    Argued December 7,1981.
    John E. Kusturiss, Jr., for appellant;
    Ira P. Tiger, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    November 15, 1982.
    452 A.2d 1082
    Commonwealth v. Brosier, Appellant.
    Submitted October 14, 1981.
    John Halley, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1082
    Commonwealth v. Grassmyer, Appellant.
    Submitted October 15, 1981.
    Michael B. Magee, for appellant;
    Oliver E. Mattas, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1082
    Commonwealth v. Noyer, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 16, 1983.
    Argued January 12,1982.
    Bruce H. Hoffman, for appellant;
    Frank J. Hartye, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, BECK and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1083
    Hughes et al., Appellants v. Swistock etc. et al.
    Argued May 20, 1981.
    Gary Horner, for appellants;
    John W. Taylor, for appellee.
    Before MONTGOMERY, HOFFMAN and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1083
    McFetridge, Appellant v. Air Products & Chemicals Co.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 18, 1983.
    Argued June 16, 1982.
    Daniel J. Weis, for appellant;
    Av-rum Levicoff, for Air Products, appellee;
    Daniel F. Cusick, for Westinghouse, appellee;
    Charles Kirshner, for Welding & Steel, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.


text:
    November 19, 1982.
    452 A.2d 1083
    Alexander et al., Appellants v. Tower Associates.
    Argued December 5,1979.
    Lenard L. Wolffe, for appellants;
    Edward O’Malley, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, MONTGOMERY and O’KICKI, JJ.

       President Judge Joseph F. O’Kicki of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.

   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1083
    Bastin et ux., Appellants v. McConnell et al.
    Argued November 12, 1980.
    Martin Singer, for appellants;
    William C. Robinson, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1084
    Carter v. Mored, Inc., Appellant.
    Argued September 8,1982.
    David M. Kozloff, for appellant;
    Jay N. Abramowitch, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, ROWLEY and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1084
    Clark, Appellant v. Clark.

      Argued June 17, 1982.
    Donald J. McCue, for appellant;
    Robert P. Boyer, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1084
    Commonwealth v. Abner, Appellant.
    Submitted June 7, 1982.
    Robert F. Pappano, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1084
    Commonwealth v. Alicea, Appellant.
    Submitted September 16,1981.
    David A. Binder, for appellant;
    George Yatron, District Attorney, for Com-
    monwealth, appellee.

      Before CAVANAUGH, WATKINS and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    452 A.2d 1085
    Commonwealth v. Alston, Appellant.
    Submitted May 20, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before ROWLEY, MONTEMURO and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1085
    Commonwealth v. Auve, Appellant.
    Submitted September 20, 1982.
    John D. Flinchbaugh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Sheryl Ann Dorney, Assistant District Attorney for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1085
    Commonwealth v. Barnes, Appellant.
    Submitted March 24, 1982.
    James Lee Goldsmith, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1086
    Commonwealth v. Barnett, Appellant.
    Submitted March 24, 1982.
    William C. Cramer, for appellant;
    John F. Nelson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1086
    Commonwealth v. Collins, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 18, 1983.
    Submitted March 9,1982.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1086
    Commonwealth v. Conjalko, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 18, 1983.
    Submitted June 23, 1981.
    Kenneth Lee Rotz, for appellant;
    Gary E. Hartman, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., PRICE and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed denying the petition to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and this case is remanded for appropriate proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.


text:
    452 A.2d 1086
    Commonwealth v. Curtis, Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 1981.
    James W. Harris, for appellant;
    Harry M. Ness, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., WIEAND and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1087
    Commonwealth v. Davis, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 22, 1983.
    Submitted September 20, 1982.
    Louis Andrew Yuhn, for appellant;
    Sheryl Ann Dorney, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1087
    Commonwealth v. Fornwalt, Appellant.
    Submitted June 22, 1981.
    P. Richard Wagner, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1087
    Commonwealth v. Friel, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 28, 1983.
    Submitted June 9, 1982.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald Thomas Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1088
    Commonwealth v. Fulton, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 8, 1983.
    Argued April 7, 1982.
    Mark L. Mazzanti, for appellant;
    Ronald Eisenberg, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgments of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1088
    Commonwealth v. Green, Appellant.
    Submitted January 18, 1982.
    Marilyn J. Gelb, for appellant;
    Gaele M. Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1088
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Submitted September 20, 1982.
    Jeffery M. Cook, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1088
    Commonwealth v. Lockey, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 28, 1983.
    Argued February 22,1982.
    Joseph W. Bullen, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Helen T. Kane, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BROSKY and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.

SPAETH, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    452 A.2d 1089
    Commonwealth v. Malott, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 18, 1983.
    Submitted March 6,1980.
    Bruce C. Bankenstein, for appellant;
    Sheryl Ann Dorney, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1089
    Commonwealth v. Mancini, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 30,1983.
    Submitted February 17, 1982.
    Lawrence A. Ruth, for appellant;
    Ronald Thomas Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The Post Conviction Hearing Act Order dated April 8, 1981, is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1089
    Commonwealth v. Mays, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 23, 1983.
    Submitted June 22, 1982.
    Vincent P. DiFabio, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1090
    Commonwealth v. Miller, Appellant.
    Argued March 23, 1982.
    Allen H. Smith, for appellant;
    Harry M. Ness, Assistant District Attorney, submitted a brief on behalf of Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1090
    Commonwealth v. Nelson, Appellant.
    Argued May 10, 1982.
    Leon Wilbert Tucker, for appellant;
    Ronald Eisenberg, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1090
    Commonwealth v. Nuttall, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 28, 1983.
    Submitted June 8, 1982.
    Richard J. Jacobs, for appellant;
    Christopher T. Spadoni, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1090
    Commonwealth v. Papay, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 24, 1983.
    Submitted October 13, 1981.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1091
    Commonwealth v. Ralph, Appellant.
    Submitted September 21,1982.
    Anthony Stefanon, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1091
    Commonwealth v. Raven, Appellant.
    Submitted February 18, 1982.
    Douglas M. Johnson, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Ronald Thomas Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence dated June 19, 1981 is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1091
    Commonwealth v. Rhone, Appellant.
    Submitted September 21, 1982.
    Blake E. Martin, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Frederic G. Antoun, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1092
    Commonwealth v. Ross, Appellant.
    Submitted June 21, 1982.
    Gary Phillip Heslin, for appellant;
    Jane Culter Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1092
    Commonwealth v. Swanger, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 22, 1983.
    Submitted December 2, 1981.
    Frederick S. Wolf, for appellant;
    Robert W. Feeman, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1092
    Commonwealth v. Uhlig, Appellant.
    Submitted October 28, 1981.
    Dante G. Bertani, Public Defender, for appellant;
    Albert M. Nichols, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, HESTER and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1092
    Commonwealth v. West, Appellant.
    Submitted April 22, 1982.
    Richard P. Haaz, for appellant;
    Jane Culter Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is relinquished. The lower court is directed to enforce its sentence.

BROSKY, J., filed a memorandum dissenting opinion.


text:
    452 A.2d 1093
    Commonwealth v. White, Appellant.
    Submitted March 6, 1980.
    Bruce D. Foreman, for appellant;
    Marion E. MacIntyre, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1093
    Commonwealth v. Woodson, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 23, 1983.
    Submitted January 18, 1982.
    Dennis J. Cogan, for appellant;
    Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1093
    Commonwealth ex rel. Mackerchar v. Mackerchar. Appeal of Pearl I. Mackerchar.
    Argued April 7, 1982.
    Neil H. Stein, for appellant;
    John R. Howland, for appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1094
    Damiano v. Andre, M.D. Appeal of James Damiano.
    Argued December 7,1981.
    Michael J. Pepe, Jr., for appellant;
    Scott A. Bennett, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Orders affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1094
    Dickinson, etc. v. McLaughlin, Appellant.

      Argued April 13, 1982.
    Claude V. Falkenhan, Jr., for appellant;
    Charles F. Haley, for appellees.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    454 A.2d 148
    Dohner etc., Appellant v. Spishock, etc.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 31, 1983.
    Argued November 12, 1980.
    Bruce T. Rosen, for appellant;
    John W. English, Jr., for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1094
    Ferry v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., et al., Appellants.
    Argued November 13,1980.
    John P. Papuga, for appellant;
    Neil R. Rosen, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1094
    Henry et al., Appellants v. Richie et al.
    Argued February 17, 1982.
    George T. McKinley, for appellants;
    George I. Puhak, for appellees.
    Before JOHNSON, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The order dated June 25, 1981 is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1095
    Heyman v. Heyman, Appellant.
    Argued June 21, 1982.
    Lee Bruce Hoffman, for appellant;
    Robert F. Ruehl, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1095
    Hutchinson, Appellants v. Canada Life Assurance Co. et al.

      Argued November 12,1980.
    Samuel J. Goldstein, for appellants;
    Samuel Avins, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1095
    Igo, et ux., Appellants v. Republic Steel Corp.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 24, 1983.
    Argued June 16,1982.
    Lawrence R. Chaban, for appellants;
    Thomas A. Matis, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1095
    Mitchell v. Mitchell, Sr., Appellant.
    Argued June 17,1982.
    Zeno Fritz, for appellant;
    Rosalia G. Parker, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1096
    Murlatt v. Murlatt, Appellant.
    Argued September 14, 1982.
    Samuel Leach Andes, for appellant;
    Floyd M. Baturin, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

MONTEMURO, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    452 A.2d 1096
    Tobin, Appellant v. Fred Astaire Dance Studio.
    Argued November 4, 1981.
    Robert S. Robbins, for appellant;
    Rochelle Z. Hirsh, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, BECK and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1096
    Ventresca v. Sherin, Appellant.

      Argued June 22,1982.
    Thomas M. Goldsmith, for appellant;
    Robert A. Korn, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    453 A.2d 1061
    Walker, Appellant v. Smullen.
    Reargument Denied Jan. 6, 1983.
    Argued November 5, 1981.
    Arthur L. Jenkins, Jr., for appellant;
    Michael S. Silberman, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1096
    Yeneskie etc., Appellants v. Selected Risks Insurance Co.
    Argued December 16, 1981.
    Paul R. Sacks, for appellant;
    Hugh J. Hutchinson, for appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

WICKERSHAM, J., filed a memorandum concurring statement.


text:
    November 30, 1982.
    452 A.2d 1097
    Baus, Appellant v. Salerno et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 21, 1983.
    Argued December 2, 1980.
    Robert J. Murphy, for appellant;
    William E. Rapp, for appellees.
    Before PRICE, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1097
    Commonwealth v. Beck, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 5, 1983.
    Submitted September 21, 1982.
    Jeffery M. Cook, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1097
    Commonwealth v. Bosley, Appellant.
    Submitted April 12, 1982.
    John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1097
    Commonwealth, Appellant v. Cole.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 6, 1983.
    Argued December 14, 1981.
    David M. McGlaughlin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant;
    Francis M. Walsh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

      Before McEWEN, JOHNSON and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    455 A.2d 727
    Commonwealth v. Colomy, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Feb. 11, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 18, 1983.
    Argued May 26, 1982.
    Stanton M. Lacks, for appellant;
    John Philips Luneau, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WIEAND and BECK, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1098
    Commonwealth v. Costelli, Appellant.
    Argued February 4, 1981.
    Rolfe C. Marsh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

      Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1098
    Commonwealth v. Cottman, Appellant.
    Submitted October 20, 1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1098
    Commonwealth v. Devereaux, Appellant.
    Submitted April 21, 1981.
    Daniel McGee, Public Defender, for appellant;
    David E. Grine, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1099
    Commonwealth v. Dill, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied June 8, 1983.
    Submitted September 15, 1982.
    Elkin A. Tolliver, Jr., for appellant;
    Jane Culter Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1099
    Commonwealth v. Dunscomb, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Feb. 25, 1983.
    Submitted June 17, 1982.
    John A. Halley, for appellant;
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, JOHNSON and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1099
    Commonwealth v. Gumby, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 16, 1983.
    Submitted June 23, 1982.
    Gary Spohn Fronheiser, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    George C. Yatron, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed. The jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is relinquished. The lower court is directed to enforce its sentence.


text:
    452 A.2d 1099
    Commonwealth v. Guthrie, Appellant.
    Submitted December 14,1981.
    George E. Lepley, Jr., for appellant;
    Kenneth Osokow, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, JOHNSON and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1100
    Commonwealth v. Hardy, Appellant.
    Argued February 3,1981.
    Carol E. Haltrecht, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Lee Ruslander, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1100
    Commonwealth v. Hoffman, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 28, 1983.
    Submitted May 11, 1982.
    Donald P. Russo, for appellant;
    Donald B. Corriere, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Affirmed with directives.


text:
    452 A.2d 1100
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, Appellant.
    Argued April 28,1982.
    Carmela R.M. Presogna, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Timothy Lucas, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CERCONE, P.J., BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   The order and judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1101
    Commonwealth v. Kline, Appellant.
    Submitted September 16,1981.
    Anthony J. Rosini, for appellant;
    James J. Rosini, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WATKINS and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., filed a memorandum concurring and dissenting statement.


text:
    452 A.2d 1101
    Commonwealth v. La Duna, Appellant.
    Submitted December 7, 1981.
    Charles A. Cunningham, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1101
    Commonwealth v. Land, Appellant.
    Submitted February 22, 1982.
    Gary Kleitman, for appellant;
    Joseph A. Smyth, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed on the able opinion of the distinguished Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Judge William T. Nicholas.


text:
    452 A.2d 1101
    Commonwealth v. Lee, Appellant.
    Submitted September 20, 1982.
    George Shultz, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William A. Behe, Deputy District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1102
    Commonwealth v. Mack, Appellant.
    Submitted June 2, 1982.
    John Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Gaele M. Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1102
    Commonwealth v. Maxwell, Appellant.
    Submitted June 7,1982.
    Robert F. Pappano, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Vram Nedurian, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and WATKINS, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1102
    Commonwealth v. Mobley, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 17, 1983.
    Submitted February 16, 1982.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane Culter Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before JOHNSON, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence dated March 26, 1980, is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1103
    Commonwealth v. Prillerman, Appellant.
    Submitted September 10, 1981.
    Larry D. Yogel, for appellant;
    Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, McEWEN and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1103
    Commonwealth v. Pusateri, Appellant.
    Submitted April 21, 1981.
    Joseph F. Sklarosky, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Chester B. Muroski, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.

MONTEMURO, J., concurred in the result.


text:
    452 A.2d 1103
    Commonwealth v. Reviello, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 1, 1983.
    Submitted February 23, 1982.
    James Richard Moyles, for appellant;
    Elviria C. La-Barre, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The judgment of sentence of the learned Northampton County Common Pleas Court, Judge Robert A. Freedberg, is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1104
    Commonwealth v. Savoy, Appellant.
    Submitted October 19,1981.
    Elaine DeMasse, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1104
    Commonwealth v. Scadden, Appellant.
    Submitted June 22, 1981.
    Douglas W. Herman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    John R. Walker, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    455 A.2d 727
    Commonwealth v. Shatley, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Feb. 11, 1983.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 18, 1983.
    Submitted September 11,1980.
    Janet W. Mason, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    William H. Lamb, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    457 A.2d 578
    Commonwealth v. Smith, Gerald, Appellant.
    Reargument Denied Feb. 11, 1983.
    Argued October 21, 1981.
    Robert C. Fogelnest, for appellant;
    Kevin A. Hess, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1104
    Commonwealth v. Staples, Appellant.
    Submitted May 4, 1982.
    Richard B. Moore, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1104
    Commonwealth v. Velasquez, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied April 5, 1983.
    Submitted April 5, 1982.
    Dennis J. Cogan, for appellant;
    Robert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence below is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1105
    Commonwealth v. Waters, Appellant.
    Submitted October 20,1981.
    Barry H. Denker, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BECK, WATKINS and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1105
    Commonwealth v. Williams, Appellant.
    Submitted April 21, 1982.
    John Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and WIEAND, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1105
    Commonwealth v. Wise, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 4, 1983.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Eric B. Henson, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1106
    Commonwealth v. Wood a/k/a Carter, Appellant.
    Submitted June 24, 1981.
    Marilyn C. Zilli, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;
    Marion E. MacIntyre, First Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before PRICE, BECK and JOHNSON, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1106
    Commonwealth v. Woolfolk, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied May 10, 1983.
    Submitted September 14,1981.
    Alan M. Tabas, for appellant;
    Jane C. Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, WATKINS and VAN der VOORT, JJ.
   Judgment of sentence affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1106
    First Valley Bank v. Fiddler’s Elbow, Inc., Appellant. Sentry Savings & Loan v. Fiddler’s Elbow, Inc., Appellant.
    Submitted February 22, 1982.
    Mark S. Refowich, for appellant;
    Earl T. Stamm, for appellees.
    Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ.
   The orders of the learned Northampton County Common Pleas Court Judge Franklin S. Van Antwerpen are affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1107
    Graham, Sr. et al., Appellants v. Today’s Spirit et al.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Feb. 2, 1983.
    Argued April 22, 1981.
    Robert D. Culp, appellants, in propria persona;
    Robert S. Staats, for appellee.
    Before WICKERSHAM, MONTEMURO and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1107
    Hassel v. Pacor, Inc., et al. Appeal of Pacor, Inc.
    Submitted May 3, 1982.
    Gerard J. Jackson, for appellant;
    Robert E. Paul, for Hassel, appellees; Ralph P. Bocchino, for Johns-Manville, appellee.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   The order of the court is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1107
    Kaucher et al. v. Metz & Jarvis Inc., Appellant.
    Argued June 21, 1982.
    John Michael Burns, for appellant;
    Robert J. Kupits, for appellees.
    Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and LIPEZ, JJ.
   The order of the learned Bucks County Common Pleas Court Judge Kenneth G. Biehn is affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1107
    Krawietz et al. v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance, Appellant.
    Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 4, 1983.

      Argued December 15, 1981.
    Joseph J. Musto, for appellant;
    Anthony J. Lupas, for appellees.
    Before McEWEN, JOHNSON and WATKINS, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1108
    Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. C & F Steel Inc., et al., Appellants.
    Submitted September 11, 1980.
    Nino V. Tinari, for appellants;
    Thomas McLaughlin, for appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1108
    Life & Health Insurance Co. of America, Appellant v. Kern et al.
    Argued September 15, 1982.
    Ronald Harvey Surkin, for appellant;
    William R. Balaban, for appellee.
    Before CAVANAUGH, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1108
    Markovitz v. Servicemaster, Appellant v. Gibson.
    Argued April 13, 1982.
    Lee Price, for appellant;
    C. Gates, Jr., for appellees.
    Before HESTER, JOHNSON and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Judgment and order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1108
    Morgan, Appellant v. Zsamba.
    Argued April 26, 1982.
    Edwin Wayne Robey, for appellant;
    Francis C. Sichko, for appellee.
    Before BECK, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1109
    Nicarry v. Hull. Appeal of Flora Hull and Gertrude M. Gordon.

      Argued September 22, 1981.
    Lawrenee C. Zeger, for appellants;
    Edward I. Steckel, for appellees.
    Before BROSKY, McEWEN and BECK, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1109
    Pully, Appellants v. Cramer.
    Submitted September 20, 1982.
    Kenneth Lee Rotz, for appellants;
    Walton Vail Davis, for appellee.
    Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and POPOVICH, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1109
    Samples, Appellants v. Lancaster County et al.
    Argued September 9, 1980.
    C. Richard Morton, for appellants;
    Thomas C. S. Goodman, for Lancaster County, appellee;
    Christopher S. Underhill, for Huth, appellee; William W. Boyd, for Mesa, appellee.
    Before BROSKY, WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
   Decree affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1109
    Solt, Appellant v. Solt.
    Submitted May 3, 1982.
    Jack I. Kaufman, for appellant;
    Jeffrey P. Solt, appellee, in propria persona.
    Before SPAETH, ROWLEY and CIRILLO, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


text:
    452 A.2d 1110
    Winters, Appellant v. Harvey.
    Argued January 18, 1982.
    Robert J. Sarno, for appellant;
    Gailey C. Keller, for appellees.
    Before JOHNSON, WATKINS and LIPEZ, JJ.
   Order affirmed.


author: CIRILLO, Judge: SPAETH, Judge,

text:
    453 A.2d 1038
    John D. MOTT, v. Katherine M. MOTT, Appellant.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Sept. 28, 1982.
    Filed Dec. 17, 1982.

      David H. Kupert, Philadelphia, for appellant.
    Malcolm. W. Berkowitz, Philadelphia, for appellee.
    Before SPAETH, WICKERSHAM and CIRILLO, JJ.
   CIRILLO, Judge:

This is an appeal from the final Decree of Divorce granted on September 24, 1979. In October of 1977, appellee filed a Complaint in Divorce, A.V.M., alleging a cause of action based upon grounds of both desertion and indignities. The Master held hearings on May 22, 1978 and May 30, 1978. The Master’s Report, filed on July 28, 1979, recommended that a Decree be entered in favor of the appellee, John D. Mott, and against appellant, Katherine M. Mott, on the ground of desertion. Exceptions to the Master’s Report were timely filed and dismissed by the lower court, which reviewed the record de novo and entered a final Decree in Divorce. This appeal followed.

The appellant-wife and the appellee-husband were married on June 3, 1972, both for the second time. Three months later, on September 2, 1972, the husband returned home from a trip to the shore with his two daughters to find that his wife had left and had removed her clothes from the house. The wife never again returned to reside with her husband.

In a divorce case, it is the responsibility of this court to make a de novo evaluation of the record of the proceedings and decide independently of the Master and the lower court whether the legal cause of action exists. Valerio v. Valerio, 298 Pa.Super. 262, 444 A.2d 1166 (1982); Dukmen v. Dukmen, 278 Pa.Super. 530, 420 A.2d 667 (1980); Keller v. Keller, 275 Pa.Super. 573, 419 A.2d 49 (1980). However, in determining issues of credibility, the Master’s findings must be given the greatest weight because it is he who heard and observed the witnesses. Jaconski v. Jaconski, 259 Pa.Super. 140, 393 A.2d 756 (1978); Valerio, supra; Dukmen, supra; Keller, supra.

Our review of the record shows that there is no question that the husband established that he and his wife were separated for the requisite statutory period of time. Once this has been demonstrated, the burden then shifts to the wife to prove consent or some reasonable cause for her withdrawal. Dougherty v. Dougherty, 166 Pa.Super. 219, 70 A.2d 411 (1950). The wife offered testimony that she left because she desired to seek employment, in contravention of her husband’s wishes, and because he beat her. In support of her assertions of physical abuse, her daughter, by á prior marriage, corroborated her testimony. The husband testified that he never beat his wife and his testimony was corroborated by his sister, who had lived with the couple for a month after their marriage, and his daughter, who also had resided with him during the entire three months the husband and wife had lived together.

The record shows that the Master specifically found the testimony of the husband and his daughter to be straightforward and credible. Where the wife’s wilful and malicious desertion of the husband is established by clear and satisfactory evidence and the wife fails to sustain the burden of showing that the desertion was justified by the husband’s conduct, the husband is entitled to a divorce on the ground of desertion. Charlton v. Charlton, 159 Pa.Super. 607, 49 A.2d 526 (1946). Additionally, a divorce may be granted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of the husband, unless that testimony is not only “contradicted” but “shaken” by the countervailing testimony of the other side. Hargrove v. Hargrove, 252 Pa.Super. 120, 381 A.2d 143 (1977). See also, Regan v. Regan, 227 Pa.Super. 552, 322 A.2d 711 (1974).

We have independently reviewed the record, and it is our conclusion that the wife failed to meet her burden of proof that she had consent or cause to withdraw from her husband’s residence.

Decree affirmed.

SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion.

SPAETH, Judge,

dissenting:

The majority acknowledges that a spouse in a divorce action can rebut the presumption of desertion that arises from the separation of the parties for the statutory period by showing that the other spouse consented to the separation. Slip op. at 2. See Gureghian v. Gureghian, 206 Pa.Super. 411, 213 A.2d 218 (1965); Burt v. Burt, 194 Pa.Super. 34, 166 A.2d 85 (1960). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant deserted her husband because I believe that appellant succeeded in establishing that her husband consented to her departure from their home.

Appellant testified without contradiction that her husband had threatened to oust her from their home if she began to work: “He started yelling at me and hollering he didn’t want me to work. And I told him I was going back to work____ So he told me that if I went back to work that I could get the f„__ out of the house.” N.T. 98-99. Appellant further testified that appellee had reiterated that threat: “I left because he told me that Saturday morning that if I was going back to work Monday that if I didn’t pack my things and get out then when I came home from work Monday that my personal belongings would be on the porch, that he would personally put them outside.” N.T. 104.

In determining whether separation is consensual, we examine the conduct of the parties. Gureghian v. Gureghian, supra. In presenting appellant with the ultimatum that she must choose between returning to work and remaining in their home, appellee expressed his consent to appellant’s departure should she choose to return to work. Since appellant did return to work, I conclude that—far from deserting her husband against his will—she left in complianee with appellee’s wishes. The lower court’s finding that appellant had deserted appellee was therefore error.

The decree granting a divorce should be reversed.

      . This action was brought under Act of May 2, 1919, P.L. 1237, 23 P.S. § 10(d) and is governed by that Act.

      . The Master recommended that the ground of indignities be dismissed.

      . 23 P.S. § 10(d) defines the ground of desertion as, "wilful and malicious desertion and absence from the habitation of the injured and innocent spouse without a reasonable cause, for and during the term and space of two years.”


author: BECK, Judge:

text:
    453 A.2d 1040
    Stephen GDOVIC, Appellant v. CATHOLIC KNIGHTS OF ST. GEORGE.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued April 28, 1982.
    Filed Dec. 17, 1982.

      Steven H. Wyckoff, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
    John F. Becker, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
    Before CERCONE, President Judge, and BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.
   BECK, Judge:

Appellant, Stephen Gdovic, applied for disability insurance with appellee, Catholic Knights of St. George, on March 16, 1976. That application included a check for payment in full of the first year’s premium. Appellant received in return a receipt for the premium payment. On March 31, 1976, appellant’s application was approved by the insurance company, and on that same date appellant was involved in an automobile accident in which he was injured. Despite the uncontroverted fact that the application was approved on March 31, 1976, the policy was issued bearing April 1, 1976 as its effective date. Appellant filed a claim for benefits which was denied by appellee because the policy was not in effect at the time of the disabling injury.

Appellant initially filed a complaint in the Arbitration Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. After an arbitration hearing, relief was granted to appellant in the amount of $4800.00. Appellee appealed that award and a non-jury trial was held. The trial judge entered a verdict in favor of appellee and dismissed appellant’s timely exceptions. An appeal to this Court followed. That appeal was quashed, 292 Pa.Super. 320, 437 A.2d 65, as the order denying exceptions had not been reduced to judgment and entered on the docket. Pa.R.A.P. 301(c). That order was later reduced to judgment and docketed and is now appealable.

Appellant argues, inter alia, that he was covered under the policy for his disabling injury because of his reasonable expectation that coverage had commenced “either as of the date of the payment of the first year’s premium or, at the very latest, as of the date of the application which he submitted.” (Appellant’s brief at 14.) He cites Collister v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 479 Pa. 579, 594, 388 A.2d 1346, 1353 (1978), cert. den., 439 U.S. 1089, 99 S.Ct. 871, 59 L.Ed.2d 55 (1978) in support of that proposition:

The reasonable expectation of the insured is the focal point of the insurance transaction involved here. E.g., Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 117-18, 225 A.2d 532, 537 (1967). Courts should be concerned with assuring that the insurance purchasing public’s reasonable expectations are fulfilled. Thus, regardless of the ambiguity, or lack thereof, inherent in a given set of insurance documents (whether they be applications, conditional receipts, riders, policies, or whatever), the public has a right to expect that they will receive something of comparable value in return for the premium paid.

We agree and find that ample evidence was adduced at trial to substantiate a reasonable expectation by appellant that he was covered at the time of his injury.

Appellant testified on direct examination that Carl Krupski (“agent”) “told me that it would only take a few days to approve the policy and my coverage would go to the date of issuance of the check, which I was assuming that was the day that I was covered.” Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”) at 17. Appellant, in response to cross-examination, reiterated that he believed the policy covered him from the date of his check. When asked by appellee’s attorney what he understood to be the meaning of the receipt, appellant responded: “I understood that as soon as the policy was approved, that my policy was approved from the date of the check; I was covered from the date that I had issued the check.” N.T. at 22.

The insurance agent testified that he could not remember whether he discussed the receipt with appellant: “I can’t say, I can’t say yes or no. Normally I do, ‘This is your receipt for your payment.’ Normally I say that you are not covered until the policy is issued.” N.T. at 58. The agent acknowledged that the foregoing explanation which he allegedly “normally” provided was in conflict with the wording of the receipt which stated: “No liability assumed by Catholic Knights of St. George, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, unless the application is accepted.” Id.

While it is not clear that the insurer intended to provide interim insurance, it is clear that it accepted payment in full for the first year’s premium at the time of application. In that situation, “it is then up to the insurer to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the consumer had no reasonable basis for believing that he or she was purchasing immediate insurance coverage.” Collister, 479 Pa. at 594, 388 A.2d at 1353. We find that appellee failed to sustain its burden. The only evidence offered to refute appellant’s testimony that he believed he would be covered as of the date the check was issued was that of the agent who could not remember whether or not he even discussed the receipt with appellant.

Accordingly, we find that appellant was covered under the policy from the date of the check that he issued. We find the language of the Collister court to be instructive in apprising insurance companies of their disclosure responsibilities if they wish to avoid such interim liability:

If insurers wish to protect themselves from liability during the interim period between the taking of the application and approval (or between the application and successful completion of a required médical examination), all that need be done is to delay acceptance of the applicant’s money until that time. If, on the other hand, the insurer wishes to enjoy the substantial benefits it receives by securing the customer’s cash at the time of the taking of the application, it must return what the customer can reasonably expect that the insurer is selling: i.e., immediate coverage. Alternatively, the insurer could inform the prospective applicant, before any money changes hands, that it does not intend to give the customer anything in return for advance payment, and that the customer is actually paying money now for nothing because no insurance will take effect until approval. Such notification would have to be given before the consumer paid the initial premium in order to avoid placing that consumer at the psychological disadvantage of having to ask for a return of the premium if he or she is dissatisfied with such terms. Furthermore, any such notice must be made in a manner calculated to bring the facts of the transaction—that the customer is paying money now, but getting nothing until later—to the customer’s attention in no uncertain terms. As such, the notice could not be printed on a receipt.
Only after such an unequivocal showing that the consumer is to be given no immediate benefits in return for his or her cash payment can a court say that the insurer has sustained its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the consumer could not reasonably have expected to receive immediate coverage in return for the payment of the required premium. The insurer has failed to show this here[.]

Id., 479 Pa. at 599-98, 388 A.2d at 1355 (emphasis in original).

We reverse the order of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter an order consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

      . Appellee maintained at trial and on this appeal that it only issued insurance policies on the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month.

      . The lower court found that Mr. Krupski had no authority to represent the insurance company. We expressly disagree with that finding and note that Krupski's agency is not controverted by appellee.

      . We note that the agent himself apparently was confused as to whether appellant’s claim would be covered. That agent helped appellant apply for benefits even though he knew the date of the accident was March 31st, the day before the date represented on the policy to be its effective date.


author: JOHNSON, Judge:

text:
    453 A.2d 1043
    Jerome H. GERBER, Charles W. Johnston, Jr., Elliott A. Strokoff and James L. Cowden, v. Ira H. WEINSTOCK, Appellant. Ira H. WEINSTOCK, v. Jerome H. GERBER, Charles W. Johnston, Jr., Elliott A. Strokoff and James L. Cowden, Appellants.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued June 22, 1981.
    Filed Dec. 17, 1982.

      Heath L. Allen, Harrisburg, for Weinstock, appellant (at No. 147) and appellee (at No. 148).
    Ronald M. Katzman, Harrisburg, for Gerber et al., appellants (at No. 148) and appellees (at No. 147).
    Before PRICE, JOHNSON and SHERTZ, JJ.
   JOHNSON, Judge:

On December 27, 1978, an Application for Winding Up Affairs of a Partnership was filed by four attorneys who, at one time, had been engaged principally in the practice of labor law in Harrisburg. The application sought an accounting and the appointment of a receiver in accordance with the Uniform Partnership Act of 1975. A fifth attorney, the named defendant, answered with new matter and a counterclaim.

A receiver was appointed to wind up the affairs of the partnership and to submit an advisory opinion to the chancellor relative to the disposition of the counterclaim. On April 9, 1980, the receiver filed his Report with the equity court, which contained certain conclusions of law with respect to the relationship between the parties, determined that no damages were due the defendant on his counterclaim, and found that a sixth attorney, a former partner of one of the plaintiffs and the defendant, inter alios, was a creditor of the partnership subject to dissolution and entitled to payment as such in an amount determined by his contract with the partnership.

So far as the record and the Receiver’s Report would reveal, there has been no formal accounting filed with the equity court, nor does the Receiver’s Report contain any specificity with respect to the assets and proceeds of the partnership, the monies collected by the receiver, or a schedule of debts and liabilities found to be due by the receiver.

Exceptions to the Receiver’s Report were filed by both the plaintiffs and the defendant. On July 1, 1980, the chancellor filed his opinion, upholding the bulk of the receiver’s findings and conclusions. The chancellor, however, concluded that the name of the sixth attorney was an asset of the successor partnership, that the value of the asset had not been clearly established, but that the defendant was, in fact, entitled to relief on his counterclaim. The Order of the chancellor, filed the same day, set forth in its entirety:

ORDER

AND NOW, July 1, 1980, the above captioned case is remanded to the receiver for the purpose of effecting distribution and termination consistent with this opinion. It is from this order that both sides have brought their respective appeals. Because we find that the order remanding the proceedings to the receiver for the purpose of taking additional testimony is not a final and appealable order, these cross-appeals must be quashed.

We note that Rule 1530 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that any pleading demanding relief may include a demand for an accounting and that the within plaintiffs included such a prayer in their original Application. The chancellor, in his order of May 2, 1979 appointing the receiver, expressly directed that the receiver obtain an accounting, collect all monies which may be due the partnership, pay the debts and liabilities and settle the accounts among the partners. The chancellor acknowledged in the trial court opinion that the receiver had filed a report “dealing with the issues raised in the pleadings.” We, however, do not view the findings of fact, discussion, and conclusions of law contained in the Receiver’s Report as fulfilling the receiver’s duties as contained in the chancellor’s order appointing the receiver.

Both Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 1530 and 1533 contemplate the filing of a formal account to which exceptions may be filed. After the disposition of the exceptions, it is the equity court which enters a decree granting judgment in the amounts shown to be due. And it is from such a final decree of the equity court that an appeal would properly lie to this court.

Neither silence nor agreement of the parties will confer jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist. Tunstall v. Penn Federal Savings and Loan Association, 287 Pa.Super. 511, 430 A.2d 1007 (1981); Mitchell v. Center City Cadillac, 287 Pa.Super. 350, 430 A.2d 321 (1981).

This court has jurisdiction over “all appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas.” Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, 42 Pa.C.S. § 742 (effective June 27, 1978) (emphasis added). “In determining what constitutes a final order we ... look to ‘a practical rather than technical construction’ of an order.” Tunstall v. Penn Federal Savings and Loan Association, 287 Pa.Super. at 514, 430 A.2d at 1009, quoting Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 73, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978) (citation omitted). A final order is an order which either ends the litigation or disposes of the entire case. Piltzer v. Independence Federal Savings and Loan Association, 456 Pa. 402, 319 A.2d 677 (1974); Tunstall v. Penn Federal Savings and Loan Association, supra; Mitchell v. Center City Cadillac, supra.

In the instant case, the chancellor did not have before him a proper account to which exceptions could be taken and upon which a final decree could be entered. That the receiver had not completed his tasks is clear from the fact that the chancellor remanded the matter to permit the receiver to take additional testimony, if necessary, and to place a proper valuation upon the name of the sixth attorney. While the conclusions of law advanced by the receiver in his Report may be a necessary prerequisite to the preparation of an account setting forth the respective assets, liabilities, and partnership interests, those conclusions do not constitute an acceptable substitute for the formal accounting contemplated by Subchapter F of the Uniform Partnership Act (59 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 351-365). Moreover, without a formal account being filed in the equity court by the receiver, the proper foundation for confirmation and a final decree of the chancellor does not exist.

We note that the law partnership here under review had been formed in 1972, and that over a period of six years, the partners had changed and various associates had been brought into the firm. We further note that, as of the filing of the Receiver’s Report on April 9, 1980, the partnership had not filed a Partnership Return of Income (IRS Form 1065) for the taxable year ending December 31, 1978. This does not detract, however, from the receiver’s responsibility and authority to secure an accounting of the assets and proceeds of the partnership as of the date of dissolution and to file with the chancellor a full account setting forth the assets, debts, liabilities, and interests of all the parties as of the dissolution date.

We need not rest our conclusion on the technical effect of the chancellor’s decree ordering remand, since our examination of the ramifications of the adjudication, the failure of the equity court to actually rule upon the specific interests of the parties and the lack of an account subject to review, exceptions and confirmation are all factors compelling a conclusion that we do not, at this stage, have before us a final, reviewable order.

The record on this appeal leads to the inescapable conclusion that the order remanding the proceedings to the receiver does not constitute a final order, and would not end the litigation nor dispose of the entire case. Therefore, the appeal is interlocutory.

Accordingly, the cross-appeals at Nos. 147 and 148 Harrisburg 1980 from the order date July 1, 1980 are quashed.

SHERTZ, J., did not participate in the decision or consideration of this case.

      . Act of December 19, 1975, P.L. 524, No. 155, § 1, 59 Pa.C.S.A. § 301 et seq., see 59 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 351-365.


author: WATKINS, Judge:

text:
    453 A.2d 1045
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William R. EISEMANN, Donald V. Frederick, Diann H. Stuempfle, Alfred E. Hoberman, Glenn R. Tweed. Appeal of George MILLER. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Horace F. HANNA, Jr. and R. Bruce McCormick. Appeal of George MILLER.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued Dec. 15, 1981.
    Filed Dec. 17, 1982.
    See also, 276 Pa.Super. 543, 419 A.2d 591.

      George Miller, in pro. per.
    Frederick D. Lingle, District Attorney, Lock Haven, for Commonwealth, appellee.
    Before McEWEN, JOHNSON and WATKINS, JJ.
   WATKINS, Judge:

These cases come to us on appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County, Criminal Division, and involve appellant’s appeals from orders of the court entered December 31, 1980 and April 30, 1981, by which the court below refused to approve the appellant’s request to charge the appellees with various criminal offenses. The appellant is a private prosecutor who wants to charge the mayor and four council members of the City of Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, with violations of Section 5301 of the Crimes Code of Pennsylvania (Official Oppression). Appellant is Chairman of a group called the “Citizen’s in Action Committee”. After attempting and failing to get the District Attorney to approve the charges, the appellant filed his criminal complaints with the court below which also refused to approve them. Appellant now appeals the orders of the court below which refused to approve his private prosecution to our Court.

The instant appeals arise from a meeting of the Lock Haven City Council which took place on April 3, 1978. At this public meeting the appellant appeared and asked to address the City Manager. He then proceeded to question the City Manager with respect to the hiring and resignation of a former city code enforcement officer. A heated discussion between appellant and various members of council then ensued. The Council subsequently voted not to discuss the matter any further and refused to answer any more of appellant’s questions regarding the former code enforcement officer. Appellant then prepared criminal complaints against the mayor and several council members seeking to charge them with “Official Oppression”. Apparently appellant believes that he has some sort of constitutional right to speak at council meetings and that any attempt to limit his speeches to the council constitutes the criminal offense of “Official Oppression”.

Of course, neither the District Attorney nor the court below would entertain appellant’s spurious criminal complaints. The defendant then appealed the court’s refusal to approve the charges to our Court. In Commonwealth v. Eiseman, 276 Pa.Superior Ct. 543, 419 A.2d 591 (1980) we held that: (1) Pennsylvania Rule Criminal Procedure 133(B)(1) mandates that a person who is not a police officer desiring to file misdemeanor or felony charges against another which charges do not involve a clear and present danger to the community or to any person, must obtain the approval of such charges from the appropriate district attorney; (2) that the district- attorney enjoys prosecutorial discretion as to whether to approve or disapprove a private criminal complaint, and that courts should not interfere with that discretion unless there has been a gross abuse thereof; (3) that the said Rule permits a person to appeal a district attorney’s decision refusing to approve such charges to the Court of Common Pleas; (4) that the provision in the Rule allowing an appeal of the district attorney’s disapproval of such charges to the court constitutes sufficient checks and balances upon the district attorney’s actions so as to comply with constitutional due process requirements; (5) in the instant case the district attorney and the court below found that the appellant would not be able to sustain a conviction on the charges proposed by the appellant. We agreed with their decisions as each had a responsibility to prevent the misuse of judicial and prosecutorial personnel in pursuit of futile convictions; and (6) that the issue as to whether a private criminal complainant has the right to file an appellate court appeal in such a case is reserved for future consideration.

Because the appellant had failed to demonstrate a gross abuse of discretion by the district attorney we affirmed the decision of the court below. Appellant did not appeal our previous decision, but, instead, attempted to refile the criminal complaints. This time he also named two additional members of the city council as defendants. Again, the court below affirmed the district attorney’s refusal to approve the criminal complaints. We will again affirm the court below and adopt our holding and reasoning set forth in Commonwealth v. Eisemann, supra, as applicable to the instant case.

We also point out that in order to constitute the offense of “Official Oppression”, the person acting in the “official capacity” must knowingly and illegally deny or impede another in the exercise of some “right”, “power” or “immunity”, or must knowingly and illegally subject another to “arrest, detention, search, seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or other infringement of personal or property rights”. [Emphasis—ours.] We hold that the word “knowing” means that the accused must have been acting in “bad faith” when he subjected the other to the proscribed activities. Obviously, if one acting in an official capacity mistakingly places a “lien” on the property of another he does not commit the crime of “Official Oppression”. The use of the word “knowing” in defining the offense obviously is intended to include as an element of the crime that the actor be guilty of “bad faith” in order to be guilty thereof. There is no evidence that any of the defendants acted in “bad faith” in our case. Contrary to appellant’s belief an individual has no “right” to speak at public municipal meetings, any more than he has the right to address the state legislature or Congress while they are in session. According to custom and practice most local governments afford individuals the opportunity to address the local governmental bodies but such practice is not required and local governments surely have the right to establish and enforce rules and regulations governing individuals’ conduct at public municipal meetings. Furthermore, there is no requirement that any individual attending a public meeting be given unlimited time to address the body on real or imagined evils or on any other matter. To rule otherwise would be to permit any person to destroy the effectiveness of a local government by monopolizing its time at public meetings where its business must be conducted. See 65 P.S. 261, et seq. (Open meetings, law). In the instant case the appellant was permitted to address the city-manager and council members at a public meeting. However, when his address to council disintegrated into a belabored “shouting match” the city council voted to end discussion of the topic. As stated above, a local governmental body is under no duty to grant anyone unlimited time at a public meeting. Appellant, therefore, was not deprived of any “right” when council ended the discussion and sought to move on to other business. Thus, it is clear that Appellant’s attempt to bring criminal charges of “Official Oppression” against appellees had no reasonable possibility of succeeding and would constitute a waste of judicial resources. A district attorney has a duty to achieve justice. This duty includes the obligation to prevent the misuse of judicial and prosecutorial personnel in the pursuit of futile convictions. See Commonwealth v. Eisemann, supra. It also includes the duty to prevent the misuse of the criminal justice system for “harassment” purposes. We find that in the instant case the district attorney did not abuse his discretion in disapproving appellant’s private, criminal complaints.

Orders affirmed.

      . “OFFICIAL OPPRESSION
      A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advantage of such actual or purported capacity commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, knowing that his conduct is illegal, he:
      (1) subjects another to arrest, detention, search, seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or other infringement of personal or property rights; or
      (2) denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power or immunity.”