author: ROWLEY, President Judge: CAVANAUGH, Judge, concurring:

text:
    647 A.2d 247
    Warren B. GOODMAN, Sr. and Joan Goodman v. Jerome B. KOTZEN, C.P.A., Daniel J. Paci, Esquire, and Friedlander, Dunn & Company, Appellants, v. SPECTOR GADON & ROSEN, P.C., and Paul R. Rosen, Esquire.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Argued June 22, 1994.
    Filed Sept. 12, 1994.

      Kelley A. Grady, Philadelphia, for appellants.
    Robert L. Grundlock, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellees.
    Before ROWLEY, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH and TAMILIA, JJ.
   ROWLEY, President Judge:

In this appeal filed by original defendants Jerome B. Kotzen, C.P.A., Daniel J. Paci, Esquire, and Friedlander, Dunn & Company (hereinafter “appellants”), we consider whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of additional defendants Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C. and Paul R. Rosen, Esquire (hereinafter “appellees”). After considering the parties’ arguments in light of the appropriate standard of review, see American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 427 Pa.Super. 170, 180-81, 628 A.2d 880, 885-86 (1993), and after reviewing the record and the applicable case law, we affirm the judgment in favor of appellees.

The action underlying this appeal was commenced on January 22, 1991, when Warren B. Goodman and Joan Goodman (hereinafter “the Goodmans”) filed a complaint against appellants. The Goodmans set forth eight separate counts in their complaint, alleging professional malpractice and negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and conflict of interest, bad faith breach of the duty of fair dealing and good faith, fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. The complaint alleges that appellants’ actions caused Warren to lose control of Metallurgical Products Company, Inc. (hereinafter “Metallurgical”) by forcing him to sell the company to his son Michael under unfavorable circumstances. The complaint alleges that the Goodmans suffered economically because of the loss of control of the company. The Goodmans also allege that appellants’ actions divided their family by enabling Michael to seize Metallurgical for his own benefit and to the detriment of Warren, Joan, and their son Buddy.

In support of their claims, the Goodmans averred the following. Warren Goodman formerly owned and served as President of Metallurgical. In 1982, he owned all the stock in Metallurgical and operated it as a profitable business. Daniel J. Paci, Esquire, is an attorney admitted to practice law in Pennsylvania and practices law as a part of the accounting firm, Friedlander, Dunn & Company (hereinafter “Friedlander”). Jerome B. Kotzen, C.P.A., is a certified public accountant and a partner in Friedlander. Kotzen served as an accountant for Metallurgical and the Goodmans.

Warren sought and received advice from Kotzen and Fried-lander regarding his estate plan. Specifically, Warren wanted to provide equally for Michael and Buddy. He effectuated Kotzen’s advice in that regard by giving Michael fifty percent of the company’s class A voting stock, requiring Metallurgical to purchase his shares upon his death, and providing an option for Buddy to purchase fifty percent of the class A stock held by Michael.

Subsequently, Paci became involved in tax planning for Metallurgical, the Goodmans, and Michael. Paci devised a plan (hereinafter “Estate Freeze Plan”) to limit estate taxes on Michael’s share of Metallurgical. Because Paci and the other appellants assured Warren that their plan would have no effect on his estate plan, he effectuated the Estate Freeze Plan. That plan gave Michael an option to purchase fifty percent of Metallurgical’s class B non-voting stock, thus giving him a fifty percent ownership interest in Metallurgical’s equity and assets. That plan, however, did not provide Buddy with an opportunity to acquire an equal share in class B stock upon Warren’s death and would have disrupted Warren’s estate plan. When Warren learned of the impact of the Estate Freeze Plan, he sought to have Michael execute an agreement to sell fifty percent of his class B stock to Buddy upon Warren’s death. Michael refused to do so. Therefore, Warren was left with no choice but to negotiate the sale of Metallurgical. He entered into negotiations with Michael and Buddy in an effort to have Michael and Buddy purchase his interest in Metallurgical. Michael, however, wanted a controlling interest in the company.

During this time period, appellants advised and assisted Michael in his attempt to seize control of Metallurgical. Pursuant to appellants’ advice, Michael executed, on Metallurgical’s behalf, a Subchapter S election for federal and state taxes, which had a profoundly disproportionate impact on the tax liabilities of Warren and Michael. However, Warren, Michael, and appellants decided that Metallurgical would make a sufficient distribution so that Warren could pay his share of the taxes.

On February 21, 1990, Warren, Michael, and Kotzen met at Kotzen’s office to discuss the payment of Metallurgical’s taxes. When Michael threatened to prevent Metallurgical from making the distribution necessary for Warren to pay the taxes, Warren agreed to sell the company to him. The agreement was contingent upon Buddy agreeing to give up his interest in the class A stock. Buddy’s refusal to do so rendered the agreement ineffective. Michael subsequently initiated a lawsuit, which he settled favorably. He now has 100% control and ownership of Metallurgical.

Appellants filed an answer and new matter to the foregoing allegations, denying liability and denying that the Goodmans had sustained damages. They also alleged that if the Good-mans did sustain damages, those damages were caused by appellees, who were Warren’s attorneys with regard to the settlement with Michael. Appellants subsequently filed a joinder complaint against appellees, alleging that the Good-mans’ damages were caused solely by the negligence, misfeasance, and malfeasance of appellees. Appellees filed preliminary objections, which the trial court denied. Appellees then filed an answer and new matter, as well as a subsequent motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, bifurcation. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, and appellants filed this timely appeal.

In this appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erroneously relied upon Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, 526 Pa. 541, 587 A.2d 1346 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 867, 112 S.Ct. 196, 116 L.Ed.2d 156 (1991), in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who agrees to settle a case, but subsequently becomes dissatisfied with that settlement, cannot file a malpractice action against his or her attorney, absent fraudulent inducement on the part of the attorney. In support of its decision, the Court stated,

The primary reason we decide today to disallow negligence or breach of contract suits against lawyers after a settlement has been negotiated by the attorneys and accepted by the clients is that to allow them will create chaos in our civil litigation system. Lawyers would be reluctant to settle a case for fear some enterprising attorney representing a disgruntled client will find a way to sue them for something that ‘could have been done, but was not.’ We refuse to endorse a rule that will discourage settlements and increase substantially the number of legal malpractice cases. A long-standing principle of our courts has been to encourage settlements; we will not now act so as to discourage them. Id. at 548, 587 A.2d at 1349. The Court also opined that “[t]o permit [such suits] results in unfairness to the attorneys who relied on their client’s assent and unfairness to the litigants whose cases have not yet been tried. Additionally, it places an unnecessarily arduous burden on an overly taxed court system.” Id. at 552, 587 A.2d at 1351. The Court further stated that “litigation concerning litigation” cases would henceforth be viewed with a jaundiced eye. Id. at 550, 587 A.2d at 1350.

We agree with the trial court that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Muhammad precludes appellants from joining appellees as additional defendants in this case. The concerns discussed by the Supreme Court in that case are implicated whether a disgruntled client files a claim against his attorney or whether a third party, in effect, files a claim against the client’s attorney on the client’s behalf. The Supreme Court’s objective of encouraging settlements would be thwarted if we were to permit a party to circumvent Muhammad in this way.

Appellants contend that extending Muhammad to restrict the rights of parties who were not participants in the underlying settlement is a denial of due process. We disagree. Our decision does not preclude appellants from defending against the Goodmans’ claims by arguing that their wrongful conduct did not in fact cause the Goodmans’ injuries. We merely hold that appellees cannot be held liable to the Goodmans for their injuries on the basis that those injuries were caused by appellees’ negligence in handling the settlement. That is so whether the Goodmans themselves attempt to place liability upon appellees or whether, as here, a third party attempts to place liability upon appellees.

We also note that this is not the only situation in which a defendant’s ability to state a viable claim against an additional defendant is dependent upon the plaintiffs ability, or lack thereof, to do so. Notably, a defendant cannot file a complaint against an additional defendant alleging sole liability on the part of the additional defendant after the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs cause of action has run. See Wnek v. Boyle, 374 Pa. 27, 96 A.2d 857 (1953); Dickson v. Lewandowski, 228 Pa.Super. 57, 323 A.2d 169 (1974). For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Muhammad.

Furthermore, joinder of appellees under the circumstances of this case is not permitted under Pa.R.C.P. 2252. That rule provides in relevant part the following:

Except as provided by Rule 1706.1, any defendant or additional defendant may join as an additional defendant any person, whether or not á party to the action, who may be

(1) solely liable on the plaintiffs cause of action, or

(2) liable over to the joining party on the plaintiffs cause of action, or

(3) jointly or severally liable with the joining party on the plaintiffs cause of action, or

(4) liable to the joining party on any cause of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences upon which the plaintiffs cause of action is based.

Pa.R.C.P. 2252(a). That rule is broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of avoiding multiple lawsuits by settling, in one action, all claims arising from transactions or occurrences which gave rise to the plaintiffs complaint. Olson v. Grutza, 428 Pa.Super. 378, 389, 631 A.2d 191, 196-97 (1993).

Appellants contend that the Goodmans’ damages were “caused entirely and completely by the negligence, misfeasance and malfeasance of [appellees] in advising and representing Warren and in negotiating for him the terms of the settlement and sale.” Complaint Against Additional Defendants, para. 6. Because appellants are alleging that appellees are solely liable to the Goodmans, the cause of action raised in appellants’ complaint must be the same cause of action set forth by the Goodmans. “Cause of action,” for purposes of Rule 2252, has been broadly construed to mean that the “additional defendant’s liability [be] related to the original claim which plaintiff asserts against the original defendant.” Olson, supra at 387, 631 A.2d at 195 (1993) (quoting Somers v. Gross, 393 Pa.Super. 509, 514, 574 A.2d 1056, 1058 (1990)). Joinder is not permitted where the allegations contained in the original complaint and the allegations contained in the joinder complaint “relate to different harms to be proven with different evidence as to different occurrences happening at different times.” Id. at 387, 631 A.2d at 195-96 (quoting Somers, 393 Pa.Super. at 518, 574 A.2d at 1060-61).

Appellants argue that the causes of action in the original complaint and in the joinder complaint are the same because they both involve the settlement between Warren and his son. Appellants contend that they are being wrongfully blamed for Warren’s unfavorable settlement with his son, and that appellees are the responsible parties because they counseled Warren with regard to the settlement. The Goodmans, however, do not allege negligence or wrongdoing on appellants’ part in connection with the settlement. Rather, they allege negligence and wrongdoing on appellants’ part with regard to their actions prior to the settlement. The fact that appellants’ wrongdoing created a situation in which settlement was allegedly Warren’s only option does not transform the Goodmans’ claim into one based upon dissatisfaction with a settlement. Contrary to appellants’ assertion, the settlement did not give rise to the Goodmans’ damages. Rather, the settlement merely provides proof of, as well as a measure of, damages allegedly sustained by the Goodmans.

Appellants further contend that the outcome of this case is controlled by this Court’s opinion in Somers v. Gross, 393 Pa.Super. 509, 574 A.2d 1056 (1990). Appellants assert that Somers “uncannily mirrors” this case. We disagree. In Somers, both the original defendants, the plaintiffs’ accountants, and the additional defendants, the plaintiffs’ attorneys, advised the plaintiffs with regard to their tax filing for the year 1984. In filing their joinder complaint, the accountants argued that the plaintiffs had not relied upon their advice, but rather, had relied upon the advice of their attorneys. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the attorneys, and this Court reversed. In so doing, the Court determined that there was one central common question in that case, that is, who was responsible for giving the plaintiffs improper tax advice and providing related services. In addition, the Court concluded that “[tjhere was one course of events leading to plaintiffs’ alleged harm.” Id. at 514, 574 A.2d at 1058.

In the present case, on the other hand, there is not one central common question. Appellants’ improper conduct prior to the settlement is not negated even if, as appellants allege, appellees negligently negotiated and' counseled the settlement. Moreover, there was not only one course of events in this case. Rather, appellants’ wrongful conduct allegedly gave rise to, and exacerbated, a dispute between Warren and his son. Appellees were not involved in those events. Subsequently, Warren entered into a settlement agreement with his son which, he contends, was his only option in light of the state of events which was allegedly caused by appellants’ wrongdoing. The Goodmans have no disagreement with appellees’ handling of the. settlement matters. Rather, they blame appellants for the fact that they had to enter into the settlement in the first place.

This case is also distinguishable from Gordon v. Sokolow, 434 Pa.Super. 208, 642 A.2d 1096 (1994). In Gordon, the plaintiffs filed a legal malpractice action against the attorneys who represented them in a real estate transaction. The attorneys attempted to join the proposed buyer and its agent, alleging fraud and intentional and/or negligent misrepresentation. Although the claims raised in the joinder complaint were separate from the cause of action raised in the plaintiffs’ complaint, this Court determined that joinder was proper pursuant to Rule 2252(a)(4). The Court stated:

Attorneys Sokolow and Salamon are arguing that the fraudulent conduct of Empire and Nolan affected their ability to properly advise their clients. Sokolow and Salamon have attempted to plead facts that would sustain a fraud or intentional and/or negligent misrepresentation action against additional defendants, Empire and Nolan. Joinder would be permitted on this independent cause of action under Rule 2252(a)(4) because that section allows joinder of a party who may be liable to the original defendant on any cause of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence upon which the plaintiffs action is based.

Id. at 217, 642 A.2d at 1101. In the present case, appellants did not allege an independent cause of action against appellees. Appellants only allege that appellees are solely liable to the Goodmans. Therefore, appellants cannot rely on Gordon in support of their claim that joinder was proper.

We agree with appellees that the situation presently before us is more analogous to that considered in Austin J. Richards, Inc. v. McClafferty, 371 Pa.Super. 269, 538 A.2d 11 (1988), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 570, 576, 549 A.2d 131, 136 (1988). In that case, the plaintiff filed an action against the original defendant in which she alleged interference with contract and slander of title. Those allegations were based on the filing of a lis pendens notice on property the plaintiff was attempting to sell to a third party. The original defendant claimed that the plaintiff had agreed to sell the property to a corporation of which he was the sole shareholder. After the plaintiff filed her complaint against the original defendant, he filed a joinder complaint against the plaintiffs attorneys, alleging that the attorneys negligently advised the plaintiff to reject settlement offers with regard to the real estate transaction. This Court held that summary judgment in favor of the additional defendants was proper. The Court stated,

To attempt to interject a legal malpractice claim and compel the plaintiff to seek recovery against her attorneys because of alleged negligent advice regarding settlement was clearly improper and outside the joinder permitted by Pa.R.C.P. 2252(a). The plaintiff did not assert a claim for malpractice against her attorneys, and the defendant will not be allowed to force her to do so in her action against the defendant. Id. at 278, 538 A.2d at 16. Simply stated, a claim based on interference with contract and slander'of title is not the same as a claim based on legal malpractice. Therefore, joinder of the attorneys was not proper in Austin.

The Goodmans’ complaint includes eight counts, none of which relate to the settlement. The causes of action set forth in the complaint relate to appellants’ actions with regard to their handling of Warren’s estate plan and Metallurgical’s corporate affairs and their assisting Michael in his acquisition of the company. The cause of action set forth in the joinder complaint relate to appellees’ actions with regard to the handling of the settlement. Those causes of action are not one and the same. Although both the Goodmans and appellants allege professional malpractice, those claims have different factual bases. Therefore, the allegations relate to different harms to be proven with different evidence as to different transactions and occurrences happening at different times. See Olson, supra. Under these circumstances, joinder is not proper.

Judgment affirmed.

CAVANAUGH, J., files a Concurring Opinion.

CAVANAUGH, Judge, concurring:

Given the broad reach of Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, 526 Pa. 541, 587 A.2d 1346 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 867, 112 S.Ct. 196, 116 L.Ed.2d 156 (1991), I join the majority. I do so because I believe that the Supreme Court opinion in Muhammad has provided lawyers with a defense to malpractice claims which is well nigh absolute. Since, happily, the great majority of civil actions are terminated by settlement and, also happily, it is extremely rare for cases to occur where attorneys induce settlements by fraudulent activity, the immunity provided by Muhammad may, as a result of the wide doctrinal sweep of that decision, provide attorneys with an unmerited shield from otherwise valid claims by Pennsylvania litigants and clients. See Miller v. Berschler, 423 Pa.Super. 405, 621 A.2d 595 (1993).

      . We note that the trial court did not specifically rely on Rule 2252 in support of its decision. However, the court did cite Austin J. Richards, Inc. v. McClafferty, 371 Pa.Super. 269, 538 A.2d 11 (1988), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 570, 576, 549 A.2d 131, 136 (1988), a case which involves the application of that rule. In addition, although the parties do not rely substantially on Rule 2252, they cite cases in which the Court applied that rule.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KELLY, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    647 A.2d 253
    In the Interest of C.F., A Minor. Appeal of C.F.
    Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    Submitted April 6, 1994.
    Decided Sept. 7, 1994.

      Thomas L. Kearney, York, for appellant.
    George H. Kain, III, York, for York County Children & Youth Services, participating party.
    J. Christian Ness, York, for Adoptive Parents, participating parties.
    Before ROWLEY, P.J., and KELLY and POPOVICH, JJ.
   KELLY, Judge:

In this opinion, we are called upon to determine whether the trial court may compel parents to produce their minor daughter for visitation with their child’s minor sibling who has been adjudicated a dependent child, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 et seq., in the absence of a showing by the minor sibling that visitation would be in the best interests and permanent welfare of their minor daughter. The appellant, C.F., appeals from the order of September 15,1993 entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Juvenile Division, which denied the petition filed on behalf of the appellant requesting supervised visitation with his sister, R.F. We conclude that no statutory basis exists in Pennsylvania which would mandate the interference of the court with the parents’ right to undisturbed custody of their daughter or would require the parents to produce their daughter for visitation with their child’s minor sibling. Accordingly, we affirm the order which denied the petition filed on behalf of the appellant requesting supervised visitation with his sister.

The relevant facts and procedural background are as follows. C.F., born January 26, 1981, and R.F., natural brother and sister, were adopted by Mr. and Mrs. F. in 1983. Following an incident where C.F. allegedly threatened R.F. with a knife, Mr. and Mrs. F. abandoned C.F. at Allentown State Hospital on November 29,1990. On December 4,1991, following a dependency hearing, Judge Sheryl Ann Dorney found that the parties had reached an agreement which called for adjudication of C.F. as a dependent child. Judge Dorney determined that further evaluations of C.F. were necessary, prior to C.F.’s prospective discharge from Allentown State Hospital and placement in another home through the Host Home program. Judge Dorney adjudicated C.F. a dependent child pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 et seq., and directed that temporary legal and physical custody of C.F. be awarded to York County Children and Youth Services.

Disposition pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351 was continued to March 9, 1992, at which time Judge Penny L. Blackwell determined that the goal with respect to disposition of C.F. was to be changed from one of returning home to that of long-term placement. Judge Blackwell directed that C.F. be removed from Allentown State Hospital to a Host Home within the West York area, a move necessitated by the fact that Allentown State Hospital was closing its doors permanently. In addition, Judge Blackwell ordered York County Children and Youth Services and the Host Home program to place Mr. and Mrs. F. on their list of individuals to be contacted if C.F. should be absent from the placement home for a period of one hour, especially if C.F.’s whereabouts were unknown. Judge Blackwell also directed that C.F. be forbidden entry into the Eastern School District, where his sister was attending school, absent an agreement of all of the parties involved in the case or without prior approval of the court; C.F. might travel through the school district but he was forbidden to enter or have any contact with the Eastern school system. Moreover, if the adoptive parents, Mr. and Mrs. F., moved outside the Eastern School District, they were directed to notify York County Children and Youth Services and the Host Home program so that the order could be amended to reflect the school system to which they moved. Judge Blackwell ordered that C.F. be placed in a “specialized foster care home” (N.T. March 9, 1992 at 2) through the Host Home program, and formally awarded legal and physical custody of C.F. to York County Children and Youth Services.

On May 27, 1992, a review hearing was held before a Juvenile Master, Jeffrey T. Bitzer, Esquire. Although Mr. and Mrs. F. were notified of the proceeding, they did not attend nor did their attorney, who had recently been the victim of an auto/pedestrian accident. The Master found that C.F., having been discharged from Allentown State Hospital into the Host Home program thence to the foster home of Mr. and Mrs. G., was making “good and steady adjustment.” The Master recommended that the travel restrictions contained in the March 9, 1992 order be lifted and that C.F. be permitted to travel to locations within the Eastern School District. However, the Master also recommended that the prohibition on contact between C.F. and Mr. and Mrs. F. be continued. The Master declared the continuing goal to be long-term foster care. Judge Blackwell approved the findings and recommendations of the Master and confirmed them as the order of the trial court.

On November 17, 1992, another review hearing was held before the same Juvenile Master, Jeffrey T. Bitzer, Esquire. The Master found that C.F. continued to reside with Mr. and Mrs. G., his foster parents, where C.F. was “making slow but steady progress, and learning to control his negative behaviors .... Although he no longer displays physical aggression, that he still can become defiant to authority figures.” The Master recalled that at the last review hearing, the travel restrictions had been lifted and that the adoptive parents had not taken issue with that recommendation through a petition for modification. The Master noted also that neither the adoptive parents nor their attorney were in attendance at the May 27, 1992 hearing or at the present hearing. The Master then approved the recommendations, submitted by both York County Children and Youth Services and C.F.’s social worker, that C.F. have contact with his biological sister, R.F., citing C.F.’s sense of loss and separation caused by the prohibition against any contact between the siblings. The Master noted that Mr. and Mrs. F. had not taken issue with his recommendation of the May 27, 1992 hearing that C.F. be permitted to travel through and to a location in the Eastern School District by filing a petition for modification. He further noted that if Mr. and Mrs. F. had any objection to contact between C.F. and R.F., they should contact York County Children and Youth Services within fourteen days of the hearing. Apparently, C.F. had also expressed an interest in arranged visitation with his maternal adoptive grandmother and the Master conjectured that perhaps the grandmother might prove to be an appropriate resource to either supervise or provide a setting for visitation between C.F. and R.F. Once again, Judge Blackwell confirmed the findings and recommendations of the Master as the findings and order of the court.

On April 27, 1993, another review hearing was scheduled to have taken place before Jeffrey T. Bitzer, Esquire, but was rescheduled for a later date. On May 10, 1993, Judge Blackwell presided over a judicial review of the request by York County Children and Youth Services that C.F. be permitted contact with his biological sister, R.F. Judge Blackwell found that, based upon the indications in an April 29, 1993 letter addressed to the trial court from a York County Children and Youth Services caseworker and her supervisor, C.F.’s “placement continues to be necessary and appropriate.” The letter also included the following information:

[C.F.] continues to reside in the foster home of A.G. and L.G., where he is well-cared-for and thriving____ However, his negative behaviors continue to be of much concern....
[C.F.] still has difficulty taking directions from persons in authority, especially females, and he is not always truthful when confronted about his wrong doings....
[C.F.] is still in the sixth grade SED at Spring Grove Intermediate School. His teacher reports that he is capable academically but is becoming increasingly more defiant in the classroom, refusing to do his work. On March 23rd, he was suspended from school for threatening to kill his teacher and break her nose. [C.F.] has been caught stealing candy from the teacher’s desk. On March 25th, [C.F.j’s behavior became out of control and violent to the point where he had to be physically restrained. [C.F.] was kicking, punching others, and said he was going to bring a knife to school. Crisis Intervention was called and [C.F.] was subsequently admitted to the Meadowlands of York Hospital for a psychiatric. evaluation.
[C.F.] remained in the hospital for seven days. During that time, it was reported by staff that he became the “model patient.” It was felt that he used his reported negative behaviors as a means for seeking attention.... Of significant note though, [C.F.] has been referred to Dr. Bryan Stevens, a psychiatrist, to evaluate for possibility of schizophrenia or manic-depression....
The adoptive parents remain uninvolved. [C.F.] still grieves over the abandonment and has a difficult time understanding their position. [C.F.] still desires to see his biological sister. The maternal adoptive grandmother was contacted in January of 1993 regarding visitation, but said, “Because of the particular situation, there is no way I can deal with [C.F.] at this time.”
At the last Judicial Review a recommendation was made that the agency arrange for contact between [C.F.] and his sister at the earliest possible date.... [S]ince that time, a letter was forwarded to you objecting to this matter on the grounds that visits between the siblings could prove detrimental to the sister’s mental well-being.
The agency is once again requesting that supervised visitation be allowed....

(Letter from York County Children and Youth Services to Judge Blackwell, dated April 29, 1993). Judge Blackwell then continued the hearing, due to the absence of C.F.’s attorney, and ordered that all parties submit briefs on the matter of visitation between C.F. and R.F. On September 16, 1993, by opinion and order, the trial court, finding that Mr. and Mrs. F. were vehemently opposed to the occurrence of supervised visitation between C.F. and R.F. and that it had no jurisdiction to interfere where “[tjhere has been no allegation or adjudication of dependency concerning R.F.” (Trial Court Opinion, dated September 16, 1993 at 3), denied the appellant’s request for supervised visits with his sister. This timely appeal followed.

The sole question which the appellant raises on appeal is: WHETHER ADOPTIVE PARENTS WHO ABANDON THEIR CHILD, CAUSING HIM TO BECOME DEPENDENT, MAY BE COMPELLED TO PRODUCE THE CHILD’S NATURAL SIBLING, WHO IS STILL IN THEIR CUSTODY FOR VISITATION?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Whether the matter concerns custody or visitation, the ultimate consideration of the court is a determination of what is in the best interests and permanent welfare of the child. Wiskoski v. Wiskoski, 427 Pa.Super. 531, 534-35, 629 A.2d 996, 998 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 646, 639 A.2d 33 (1994); Bucci v. Bucci 351 Pa.Super. 457, 460, 506 A.2d 438, 439 (1986). See Nonnenman v. Elshimy, 419 Pa.Super. 597, 615 A.2d 799 (1992), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 637, 631 A.2d 1008 (1993) (“In custody and visitation cases, the paramount concern is the best interests of the child.”). This determination is made on a case-by-case basis and must be premised upon a weighing of “all factors which legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being.” Wiskoski v. Wiskoski supra (quoting Lee v. Fontine, 406 Pa.Super. 487, 488, 594 A.2d 724, 725 (1991), citing Zummo v. Zummo, 394 Pa.Super. 30, 574 A.2d 1130 (1990)).

When reviewing visitation orders, appellate courts are not bound by the trial court’s deductions, inferences and interpretations of evidence. Bucci v. Bucci, supra at 460, 506 A.2d at 440. See also McMillen v. McMillen, 529 Pa. 198, 602 A.2d 845 (1992) (when reviewing child custody orders, appellate court is empowered to determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not interfere with trial court’s conclusions unless they are unreasonable in view of trial court’s factual findings, thus representing gross abuse of discretion). Despite our broad scope of review, we are mindful that matters of credibility are solely within the trial court’s discretion; only the trial judge can observe demeanor and assess trustworthiness. Bucci v. Bucci, supra at 461, 506 A.2d at 440. See generally Altus-Baumhor v. Baumhor, 407 Pa.Super. 276, 278, 595 A.2d 1147, 1148 (1991) (quoting Mumma v. Mumma, 380 Pa.Super. 18, 21, 550 A.2d 1341, 1343 (1988)).

In addition, we are mindful that, as this Court stated in Weber v. Weber, 362 Pa.Super. 262, 524 A.2d 498 (1987), appeal dismissed, 517 Pa. 458, 538 A.2d 494 (1988):

The right to raise one’s children has long been recognized as one of our basic civil rights. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); In Re Rinker, 180 Pa.Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955). Freedom of personal choice in matters of family life, and the concomitant freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion, is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). For these reasons, governmental intrusion into the family is warranted only in exceptional circumstances. The statutory basis for court interference with the parents’ right to custody are limited and specific, reflecting that philosophy. See, 11 P.S. § 2208 (taking an abused child into protective custody); 23 Pa.C.S. § 5311-5313 (grandparents visitation); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351, 6352 (disposition of dependent and delinquent children).

Id. 362 Pa.Super. at 264, 524 A.2d at 499.

In Weber v. Weber, supra, this Court was faced with a situation which was factually somewhat similar to the instant matter. In that case, the parents of an adult daughter would not permit their minor daughter to visit with the adult daughter in her residence or at places outside the parents’ home, because the parents did not approve of their adult daughter’s living arrangements. The adult daughter filed a complaint seeking partial custody of her sister. The parents filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the adult daughter had not stated a cause of action. The trial court granted, the motion, dismissing the adult daughter’s complaint. An appeal followed.

On appeal, this Court agreed with the trial court that the adult daughter did not have standing to bring an action for partial custody of a minor child over the objections of the minor child’s parents. The Court reasoned that the issue was not simply whether the sisters should be permitted to visit with one another, but rather encompassed the broader question of whether and to what extent the courts may interfere in a decision made by the parents of a minor child, concerning with whom that child may associate. The Court acknowledged that, given the specific facts of the case, there was no statutory basis for court interference with the parents’ right to custody. Thus, this Court concluded that it would not “intervene in this family matter in which no legal rights are at issue.” Id. at 265, 524 A.2d at 499 (quoting Herron v. Seizak, 321 Pa.Super. 466, 470, 468 A.2d 803, 805 (1983)). The Superi- or Court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the parents and dismissing the adult daughter’s petition.

Instantly, after extensive research, we conclude that no statutory basis exists in Pennsylvania which would mandate court interference with Mr. and Mrs. F.’s right to undisturbed custody of their daughter, R.F., or would require Mr. and Mrs. F. to produce their daughter for visitation with their child’s minor sibling. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301 et seq. In addition, the appellant offered no showing that visitation with his sister would be in the best interests and permanent welfare of R.F. See Wiskoski v. Wiskoski, supra; Bucci v. Bucci, supra. See also Norris v. Tearney, 422 Pa.Super. 246, 619 A.2d 339 (1993) (in grandparent visitation case, grandparent has burden to prove that visitation is in best interests of child); Nonnenman v. Elshimy, supra (rights of guardian of incompetent adult existed solely for ward’s benefit and were subordinate to best interest of ward’s child with respect to child’s visitation with ward); Commonwealth ex rel. Zaffarano v. Genaro, 286 Pa.Super. 436, 429 A.2d 17 (1981), rev. on other grounds, 500 Pa. 256, 455 A.2d 1180 (1983) (although true that third parties in general have no inherent legal right of either visitation or partial custody of a child, test to be applied in situation in which third party seeks visitation or partial custody is whether it is in the child’s best interest to give some time to third party); Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Miller, 254 Pa.Super. 227, 385 A.2d 992 (1977) (when seeking visitation, third party must show reasons to overcome parent’s prima facie right to uninterrupted custody; reasons need not be so convincing as in a custody case; in visitation case, third party need only convince court that it is in the child’s best interest to give some time to third party). Moreover, pursuant to our holding in Weber v. Weber, supra, we refuse to “intervene in this family matter in which no legal rights are at issue.” Id. 362 Pa.Super. at 265, 524 A.2d at 499. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the order which denied the petition filed on behalf of the appellant, requesting supervised visitation with his sister.

Order affirmed.

      . Counsel for Mr. and Mrs. F. attended the hearing, but Mr. and Mrs. F. were not present.

      . Other findings of the Master included: The G.s, C.F.’s foster parents, reported no particular psychotic episodes.' C.F. was continuing to address his problems with profanity. He was described by his fifth grade teacher as "on target except in the area of math,” and reportedly had good peer relations in the classroom. C.F. was participating in therapy with social worker Thomas Murray twice per month, where he addressed issues of allowing others personal space, social skills, and handling his anger. C.F. was also exploring issues surrounding his rejection by his adoptive parents. C.F. was participating in weekly therapy to address speech issues, specifically, stuttering. His medication had been continued but recently was reduced in dosage.

      . The Master also found the following: C.F. was enrolled in a special program at Spring Grove Intermediate School, where he was classified as a sixth grade student. He was continuing his twice monthly therapy with social worker Thomas Murray where he was addressing separation issues, relationships with females, and issues of self-esteem. However, C.F.’s foster parents and his caseworker reported that C.F. had begun to tell lies on a daily basis. Thomas Murray, C.F.’s social worker, described C.F.’s adjustment to the foster home as moderately positive and confirmed that the problem of C.F.’s lying was being addressed in therapy sessions.

      . Mr. and Mrs. F. were present, along with their attorney.

      . She was unmarried and resided with an unmarried man in a residence separate from her parents and her sister.