author: COVINGTON, Judge:

text:
    F. G. SULLIVAN, Jr., d/b/a F. G. Sullivan, Jr., Contractor v. The CITY OF BATON ROUGE et al.
    No. 10788.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    July 21, 1976.

      Victor A. Sachse, Jr., and Victor A. Sachse, III, of Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, Baton Rouge, for intervenor-appellant Barber Bros. Contracting Co.
    Bobby L. Forrest, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellee F. G. Sullivan.
    R. Gordon Kean, Jr., Baton Rouge, for intervenors-appellees E. Baton Rouge Assn., et al.
    Joseph F. Keogh, Parish Atty., for City of Baton Rouge.
    Before LANDRY, COVINGTON and PONDER, JJ.
   COVINGTON, Judge:

This is a suit for mandamus brought by F. G. Sullivan, Jr., d/b/a F. G. Sullivan, Jr., Contractor, against the City of Baton Rouge, the Parish of East Baton Rouge, the Mayor-President and the City-Parish Council of East Baton Rouge seeking to compel the defendants to award a contract on a certain road construction project, designated as City-Parish Project No. 74 — PR-CI— 0401, State Project Nos. 742-00-88 and 742-00-87, and Federal Aid Project Nos. M — 8063(001) and M-6056(001), Bluebonnet Boulevard, Perkins Road to I — 10, to the petitioner as the alleged lowest responsible bidder on the public works project. Petitions of intervention were filed by Barber Brothers Contracting Company, Inc., the contractor to whom the defendants proposed to award the road construction contract, and EBR Associates, as abutting property owners interested in the project being completed, averring that petitioner’s bid was properly rejected, because Sullivan had not filed the required bond with his bid in that the amount of Sullivan’s bid was not expressed “in dollars and cents” in accordance with the bidding requirements and conditions, and the remedy of mandamus did not lie under the facts and circumstances presented in the instant case.

The facts show that the City-Parish desired to construct that portion of Bluebonnet Boulevard which would link Perkins Road to Interstate-10. The construction was to be funded with moneys made available by the abutting property owners and the Federal Highway Administration. In accordance with certain plans and specifications, the project was advertised and bids, including petitioner’s and the intervenor contractor’s, were received by the City-Parish.

The bid proposal, containing the plans and specifications for the project, as well as the various rules and regulations governing the project, was made available to all interested persons.

The original proposal contained several forms and provisions which were subsequently amended by two addenda. The first addendum voided the “Bid or Proposal Bond” form contained in the original proposal, and substituted an alternate form. The alternate form substituted “Parish of East Baton Rouge” for “Department of Highways, State of Louisiana.” The second addendum provided, in pertinent part, an amendment to Subsection 102.08, relative to guaranty requirements.

Bids were submitted to and opened by the City-Parish. At first it was determined that Sullivan had submitted the lowest bid; however, subsequently it was determined by a representative of the Department of Highways that Sullivan’s bond was “irregular” and failed to comply with the bid bond requirements. Instead of filling out the bid bond in “dollars and cents,” Sullivan had put “five per cent of the amount of the bid.”

It was thereafter determined, and Sullivan was so informed, that his bid was rejected because of this irregularity. Petitioner has filed this mandamus proceeding to question this rejection of his apparent low bid and to compel the defendants to award him the road construction contract as the lowest responsible bidder.

The petitioner contends that the subject construction is a parish road project, as evidenced by the procedures followed in issuing the notice to contractors, advertising for bids, receiving and opening bids; and that the amendments to the original proposal placed the bidding procedures, including the requirements for bid bonds, under the exclusive control of the City-Parish. The petitioner also challenges the right of the Department of Highways to question his bid because the subject project is not a state project, the state appearing only as administrator of the Federal Aid Project funds. The petitioner claims that his bid bond was regular, that he was the lowest responsible bidder, and that the contract must be awarded to him.

On the other hand, the defendants and the intervenor contend that State Highway regulations and specifications are controlling in the instant case and that Sullivan failed to comply with the State Highway regulations in that his bond did not contain a “dollars and cents” designation, so that his bid must be rejected. Intervenor claims to be the lowest responsible bidder. In addition, intervenor urges that mandamus does not lie under the facts and circumstances of the instant case.

Mandamus is defined in LSA-C.C.P. art. 3861 as follows:

“Mandamus is a writ directing a public officer or a corporation or an officer thereof to perform any of the duties set forth in Articles 3863 and 3864.”

As directed to public officers, LSA-C.C.P. art. 3863 provides in pertinent part:

“A writ of mandamus may be directed to a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law

Both the state legislature and the City-Parish Council have prescribed the form of bid bonds for public works contracts:

LSA-R.S. 48:253 states that:

“Every bid submitted shall be accompanied by a certified check, certified by a cashier of a national or state bank located in this state or by a bid bond guaranteed by a surety company qualified to do business in this state. The certified check or bid bond submitted shall be for an amount fixed by the department and shall be approximately five per cent (5%) of the department’s engineer’s cost estimate of the contract. The certified check or bid bond shall be forfeited to the department and credited to its general fund if the bidder fails to make the required bond and sign the contract within ten days after having received notice of the award from the department. Checks or bid bonds of unsuccessful bidders shall be returned to them not less than fifteen days after receipt of bids.”

Title 1, Section 706 of the parish ordinances reads as follows:

“The purchasing agent in all cases where bids are advertised may require the bidder to attach a certified check, cashier’s check, or bid bond, for not more than five per cent (5%) of the estimated price of the supplies or materials, or the contract price of the work to be done, as evidence of good faith on the part of the bidder. Where no bid bond, cashier’s check, or certified check, as required by this section, accompanies a bid, the purchasing agent shall reject said bid, and if circumstances justify, may recommend that all bids be rejected and re-advertised, provided, however, that if only one bid is received which is deemed otherwise proper and sufficient, the purchasing agent may accept same.”

The Court has reviewed the plans and specifications comprising the Bluebonnet Boulevard project, including the addendums thereto. The “Special Provisions” found at page seven of the proposal state, in pertinent part:

“STATE PROJECT NOS. 742-00-88 & 742-00-87
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
The Louisiana Standard Specifications for Roads and Bridges, dated October 1971, together with these special provisions consisting of page numbers 1 thru 46, A1 thru A13, MO thru M52 and El thru E32 and the following attachments, are a part hereof and shall become a part of the contract on this project. In the Louisiana Specifications for Roads and Bridges, the Parish of East Baton Rouge shall be substituted for the Department of Highways wherever pertinent or required to designate the Parish as the responsible contracting party to any contract.”

Subsection 102.08 of the Louisiana Highway Department Supplemental Specifications dealing with bidding requirements and conditions provides, with respect to proposal guaranties, the following (the first paragraph having been amended by Addendum No. 2):

“Each bid must be accompanied by a proposal guaranty in an amount of not less than five (5) percent of the amount of the contractor’s bid. The proposal guaranty shall be either a check certified by the cashier of a National or State Bank located in the State of Louisiana or a bid bond guaranteed by a surety company qualified to do business in the State of Louisiana. The certified check or bid bond shall be made payable to the Parish of East Baton Rouge. A cashier’s check, money order or currency will not be accepted.
“If the proposal guaranty submitted by a bidder is in the form of bid bond, this bond must be similar in all respects to the form of the ‘Bid or Proposal Bond’ sheet included in this proposal. The Bid bond must be filled out in dollars and cents; must be signed by the president, owner or partner of the bidding firm, or each firm representing a joint venture; and must be signed by the surety’s agent or attorney-in-fact. If the surety’s signer is not an authorized licensed resident agent in accordance with existing State laws, the bond shall be countersigned by a licensed resident agent authorized by the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance to sign on behalf of the surety. The bond shall be accompanied by a notarized document granting general power of attorney to the surety’s signer.
“Any deviation from these requirements will be considered cause for rejection of the bid.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the primary issue presented to us is whether Sullivan’s bid bond was an acceptable bid bond. The trial court was of the opinion that it was, since it met the requirements of a statutory bond. The trial court found, as stated in his written reasons for judgment:

“Thus, a valid statutory bond is all that is required of plaintiff in this case. The sole issue presented is whether or not plaintiff’s bond meets the requirements of the statutory bond provided for. This Court is of the opinion that it does. Neither the Council nor the Legislature saw fit to spell out, as did the drafters of Subsection 102.08 of the Louisiana Highway Specifications, that the bond must contain a ‘dollar and cents’ designation. “This Court finds that the requirements of both R.S. 48:253 and Section 706 of the parish ordinances are met by the bid bond of plaintiff which specifies that the bond is in the amount of 5% of the bid. Any other interpretation would be so highly technical as to be unreasonable. The sole purpose of the public bidding statutes is to insure that contractors are selected on the basis of the lowest responsible bid and that their performance is guaranteed by means of a valid, enforceable bond. It would be unthinkable to suppose that the bonding company in this ease could refuse to honor its bond because of the supposed ‘irregularity’ at issue here. Neither the sanctity of the bid nor the public trust are in any way jeopardized by filling in a percentage of the bid for the amount of the bond.”

The trial court, therefore, concluded that the petitioner was entitled to a writ of mandamus “directing defendants to accept the bid bond of plaintiff as a legal statutory bid bond.” We agree.

The law is settled that it is only where there is “a substantial variance between a bid specification and a bid,” that the bid must be rejected. Tide Equipment Co. v. Point Coupee Parish Police Jury, 312 So.2d 154, 158 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1975), writ refused 315 So.2d 38; Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Company v. City of New Orleans, 264 So.2d 768, 772 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1972), writ refused 263 La. 102, 267 So.2d 210. There is no substantial variance between the bid specification and the bid or bid bond in the instant case. The bid bond clearly set out that it was in the amount of 5% of the bid. We believe the sum of money in dollars and cents can easily be figured, even applying the “new math” of today’s generation. We will not impose a hypertechnical construction on bid specifications. Bid specifications must be designed and interpreted to encourage bids, not to discourage them. Arbitrary requirements in bid specifications will no more be permitted than the arbitrary selection of the low bidder. See St. Landry Lumber Co. v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of Town of Bunkie, 155 La. 892, 99 So. 687, 689 (1924).

However, insofar as the petitioner has asked for relief “broader than the issue presented”, as found by the trial court, in seeking “to mandamus the defendants to award the contract to plaintiff,” he is not entitled to such relief, because “other factors may bar the execution of the contract. For instance, defendants have a right to reject any and all bids if the budget allocation is deficient or if the bid or bidder is determined not to be responsible for reasons beyond the bid bond.” W. R. Aldrich & Company v. Gravity Drainage District No. 1, 238 La. 190, 114 So.2d 860, 864 (1959); T. L. James & Co. v. Jefferson Parish Council, 161 So.2d 597, 600 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1964).

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellant’s costs.

AFFIRMED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHIASSON, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS of the State of Louisiana v. Joseph T. SPINOSA dba Royal Angus Restaurant.
    No. 11070.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Jan. 19, 1977.
    Johnie E. Branch, Jr., Robert H. Marve, Baton Rouge, of counsel, for plaintiff-appel-lee.
    Joseph P. Brantley, IV, Baton Rouge, of counsel, for defendant-appellant.
    Before ELLIS, CHIASSON and PONDER, JJ.
   CHIASSON, Judge.

This appeal was fixed for argument on November 9, 1976, and alb attorneys of record were notified. At the time scheduled for argument, the appellant was not present or represented, nor had any brief been filed on behalf of appellant, nor had any motion been filed for continuance.

On authority of Rule VII, Section 5(b), this Court, ex proprio motu, considers said appeal as abandoned; therefore, it is ordered that this appeal be dismissed with prejudice.

APPEAL DISMISSED.


author: STOULIG, Judge. LEMMON, Judge, BEER, Judge,

text:
    Joseph MURRAY et al. v. Charles T. KUHN et al.
    No. 7843.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    March 15, 1977.

      Edmond R. Eberle, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants.
    Steven F. Griffith, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.
    Before SAMUEL, LEMMON, STOULIG, BOUTALL and BEER, JJ.
   STOULIG, Judge.

Plaintiffs, Joseph Murray and Katie Murray, have appealed that portion of a judgment dismissing their respective claims for property damage and personal injury allegedly caused by the negligence of defendant Charles T. Kuhn in losing control of his vehicle and ramming the Murray automobile as it was parked on or partially on the paved shoulder lane of U. S. Highway 61. The trial judge found that the accident occurred through the concurrent negligence of Kuhn in losing control of his car and of Katie Murray in parking where she did.

It is uncontradicted that Katie Murray and her two-year-old daughter Mabylee sat in the parked car on the highway shoulder of the eastbound traffic lane of the Airline Highway near New Sarpy, Louisiana, while two other companions, M. V. Smith and Fernando Murray, fished in a pond alongside the highway. A light drizzle or mist was falling at the time. Without warning to its occupants, the Murray car was struck violently from the rear by the Kuhn automobile and was knocked from the eastbound shoulder across four traffic lanes, the dividing median, and the westbound shoulder before hitting a tree and stopping. Both Katie Murray and her child were thrown from the car as it careened across the highway.

The trial court’s conclusion that Kuhn’s negligence in losing control of his vehicle was a proximate cause of the accident is amply supported by the evidence. His improbable and contradictory testimony tendered in support of his exculpatory defense of sudden emergency is unimpressive.

As he relates it, he was driving eastward on a rain-soaked highway when two ears traveling ahead of him and abreast of each other suddenly slowed from 65 to 60 miles per hour when they were confronted with a water puddle standing on the highway. He first estimated he was 400 feet behind them when they applied their brakes (presumably simultaneously) and he then braked, slid to the emergency lane where he struck the Murray vehicle. Defendant’s wife gave a conflicting version. Then, when Mr. Kuhn was recalled, he testified he was only two car lengths behind the braking vehicles in front of him when their drivers first applied the brakes and created the alleged emergency. It is apparent from the record the accident would not have occurred had Kuhn been observing appropriate cautionary measures under admittedly hazardous circumstances.

We next consider the finding that Katie Murray’s parking on the paved highway shoulder was a contributing proximate cause of the accident. The written reasons assigned by the trial court state this predicate for his conclusion:

“Plaintiff driver Katie Murray was negligent. Along the whole stretch of U.S. 61 in this Parish, where the emergency lane exists, numerous signs erected by the Highway Department inform motorists that driving on the emergency lanes is prohibited. R.S. 32:56(B) makes it an offense to refuse or fail to comply with instructions of traffic control devices, and R.S. 32:143[A](14) prohibits the parking of vehicles at any place where official signs prohibit such. When Katie Murray disregarded the signs and not only drove onto the emergency lane, but parked there, she assumed the risk of having the vehicle and herself injured while parked in the prohibited area. This negligence is imputed to Joseph Murray, the owner of the vehicle.”

There is no evidence in the record to indicate “no parking” signs were posted at the accident site. The trial judge incorporated as a determining factor something within his stated knowledge; how.ever, it is error to go beyond the evidence in reaching factual conclusions. Nor may the trial judge supply a defense of assumption of risk at the conclusion of the trial if it has not been pleaded. Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded. C.C.P. art. 1005.

Even though it is inappropriate to weigh the trial court’s observation about posted signs as part of the evidence, it is appropriate for us to consider whether Katie Murray’s parking on the shoulder was a contributing proximate cause of the accident because she must be free from negligence to obtain a reversal on her personal injury claim.

The defense pleadings state Katie Murray was negligent in “parking his [sic] vehicle illegally on the shoulder of U. S. Highway 61.” If violation of any statute enacted for the safety of life or limb is a legal cause of the accident, then the violat- or is guilty of negligence per se even if other causes intervene. Miller Car Washes, Inc. v. Crowe, 245 So.2d 485 (La.App.2d Cir. 1971).

The statutory violations referred to in the reasons for judgment cannot be considered because one applies to traffic controlled by signs (R.S. 32:143, subd. A(14)) and the other to “traffic control devices” (R.S. 32:56(B)). R.S. 32:141(A) prohibits parking in the “main traveled part” of the roadway. Mrs. Murray was either on or partially off the paved shoulder that had at least the same width as the traffic lanes. Her action was not a violation per se of the aforecited statutes. Our attention has not been directed to any statutory declaration that paved highway shoulder lanes are restricted to emergency use. Therefore, the burden devolved upon the defendant to prove that there were posted traffic signs designating this paved lane for emergency use only and that by parking thereon Katie Murray violated R.S. 32:143, subd. A(14). The record is devoid of any evidence bearing upon posted traffic signs in the area.

Nor is there any clear evidence that the Murray vehicle could have been parked farther off the road. The pictorial evidence indicates the roadbed sloped sharply downward at the edge of the shoulder. Were we to conclude plaintiff was negligent per se in parking the vehicle in this area without proof there is an express statutory prohibition of this act, we would, in effect, hold that theories of remote and proximate cause and/or intervening negligence are no longer elements in determining liability.

Turning to quantum, we note Katie Murray incurred neck and back injuries according to Dr. Francis Nicolle. His report, offered in evidence in lieu of his testimony, estimated she would feel discomfort for at least six weeks after the accident. He examined her 12 days after the occurrence and reported objective findings to substantiate her complaints. The medical evidence is uneontradicted. Under the circumstances appellant’s request for $1,500 in damages is reasonable.

By agreement of counsel the medical reports, hospital records, x-ray reports and medical expenses were stipulated into evidence. The following statements were rendered in connection with medical treatment of the minor Mabylee: Charity Hospital, $26.60; Drs. Schneider and Heard, $40 (x ray); and Dr. Nicolle, $36. For services rendered in connection with the treatment of Katie Murray, the following charges were incurred: Charity Hospital, $26.60; Drs. Schneider and Heard, $35; and Dr. Nicolle, $36. Plaintiff Katie Murray is entitled to judgment in the sum of $200.20 covering the costs of medical service rendered to her and on behalf of her minor child.

The property damage claim of Joseph Murray is $500, the stipulated book value of his totally demolished car. Charles T. Kuhn in his testimony concedes this value. Joseph Murray’s recovery is not contingent on absolving Katie Murray from negligence. He is the owner of the vehicle and there is no evidence his sister was acting as his agent or on a joint venture with him at the time she parked the car. See Washington Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Jones, 128 So.2d 687 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1961).

For the reasons assigned the judgment is amended in part; reversed in part; affirmed in part and recast as follows: It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff Joseph Murray and against the defendant Charles T. Kuhn in the sum of $500 and in favor of plaintiff Katie Murray and against the defendant Charles T. Kuhn in the sum of $1,700.20. The judgment in favor of plaintiff Katie Murray for and on behalf of her natural child Mabylee Murray and against Charles T. Kuhn in the amount of $300 is affirmed. All awards are to bear interest from the date of judicial demand until paid and all costs of these proceedings are to be borne by the defendant Charles T. Kuhn.

AMENDED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.

LEMMON, Judge,

dissenting and assigning reasons.

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Katie Murray’s parking on the paved shoulder of the high speed highway for an hour, while her brother and friend were fishing in the adjacent canal, was not a concurrent legal cause of this accident.

Tort liability is founded on existence of a duty and a breach of that duty which results in damages. The determination of duty and of civil liability depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Criminal statutes prohibiting certain acts (such as driving on the wrong side of the road or parking on the highway) may be considered in determining duty and may be applied by analogy in imposing civil liability. But civil liability for a motorist’s conduct certainly does not depend exclusively upon whether or not a criminal statute specifically prohibits that conduct. Imposition of civil liability ultimately depends upon a determination of the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct under the circumstances of the particular case.

In the present case there has been no statute or ordinance cited which prohibits parking on the paved shoulder. In order to determine liability we must therefore examine the reasonableness of plaintiff’s parking on the paved shoulder in a non-emergency situation.

One purpose of the paved shoulder of modern highways is to provide a wider and more convenient place for emergency parking, thereby enabling and encouraging motorists in disabled vehicles to pull completely off that part of the highway designed for travel. Paved shoulders also provide additional room for maneuvering in the event of a traffic emergency. On the other hand, it can hardly be argued that paved shoulders on high speed highways were provided as a parking place for persons desiring to fish in adjacent canals. Thus, the conduct of a motorist who stops a disabled vehicle on the shoulder must be viewed differently from that of a motorist who stops on the shoulder to fish nearby in determining whether the act of stopping under the facts of the particular case renders the motorist liable (or concurrently liable) for an ensuing collision when another car leaves the highway.

In my opinion it was completely unreasonable for Miss Murray to park as close as she did to the 70-mile per hour traffic traveling on the highway, unless there was a dire reason for doing so. Most importantly, photographs in the record show that there was ample parking area off the paved shoulder and far away from the moving vehicles.

In my opinion she had a duty under the circumstances to park as far off the highway as necessary to reasonably insure safety. Furthermore, in the examination of the duty-risk relationship, there is an ease of association between the risk (that a motorist will veer inattentively from the lane of travel or swerve onto the shoulder in an emergency situation) and the rule of law which would impose a duty to park as far off the highway as possible, according to circumstances, so as to reasonably insure safety.

I would therefore hold that it was encum-bent on Miss Murray under the circumstances of this case to park a safe distance off the main traveled portion of the highway and that her failure to do so was a legal cause of the accident. Her recovery of damages should thus be precluded.

BEER, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent for the reasons assigned by Lemmon, J.

      . Katie Murray testified that the car was parked with its left wheels on the paved portion of the shoulder and its right wheels on the bank of the pond. Defendant maintains that the Murray automobile was parked entirely on the paved shoulder lane. It is of little significance for the purpose of this opinion as to which version we accept.

      . Defendant testified his speed varied between 60 and 70 miles per hour between one-half mile from the accident site and the point of impact.

      . Mrs. Kuhn testified that the stream of water was between their car and the two vehicles proceeding in front of them and that when the Kuhn vehicle hit the stream of water her husband lost control of their car.

      . Plaintiff witnesses testified the left wheels of the car were on the paved shoulder and the right wheels off of it. The defendant driver estimates the Murray car was parked at least 12 inches from the right travel lane, and he first saw it when he was 25 feet from it.

      . A defendant’s violation of a statute is not negligence per se. Weber v. Phoenix Assur. Co. of N.Y., 273 So.2d 30 (La.1973). Furthermore, a statutory violation, depending on the circumstances, does not necessarily result in civil liability. See, for example, Laird v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So.2d 714 (1972). On the other hand, civil liability is often imposed because the defendant’s conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances, even if no statutory violation was involved.

      . R.S. 32:141(A)’s prohibition against stopping or parking “upon the paved or main traveled part of the highway when it is practicable to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off such part of said highway” must be considered in historical context as referring on modem highways to lanes designated for travel. (Emphasis supplied)

      . Miss Murray’s parking in that position was clearly a cause in fact of the accident. Had she parked further from the highway, the accident would not have occurred.

      . If her car was completely on the paved shoulder, as indicated by some testimony, she was within 14 inches to two feet of the high speed traffic. And if she was partially on the unpaved area adjoining the shoulder, she was only that much further away.