author:
CALOGERO, Justice.
      MARCUS, Justice

text:
    BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF LOUISIANA MUNICIPAL POWER COMMISSION (LAMPCO) v. ALL TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS, AND CITIZENS of the State of Louisiana (including particularly the Citizens of the Municipalities of Franklin, Morgan City, Natchitoches and Opelousas, the Creators of the Louisiana Municipal Power Commission) and Non-Residents Owning Property or Subject to Taxation therein, and all other Persons Interested in or Affected in any way by the Issuance of Electric Revenue Bonds of the Louisiana Municipal Power Commission.
    Nos. 61586, 61622.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 19, 1978.
    Rehearings Denied July 26, 1978.

      Daniel T. Murchison, Watson, Murchison, Crews, Arthur & Corkern, Natchitoches, Salvador L. Diesi, Richard B. Millspaugh, Opelousas, Harold B. Judell, William H. Beck, Jr., Foley, Judell, Beck, Bewley & Martin, John W. Cox, Cox, Osborne & Mi-chaelis, Michael R. Fontham, Paul L. Zim-mering, Ewell P. Walther, Jr., Stone, Pig-man, Walther, Wittmann & Hutchinson, New Orleans, Harmon F. Roy, Mouton, Roy, Carmouche, Bivins & Hill, Lafayette, for plaintiff-applicant.
    Alfred S. Lippman, Nicholas F. Larocca, Jr., Lippman, Mahfouz & Martin, Morgan City, Jack C. Caldwell, James R. McClel-land, Aycock, Horne, Caldwell, Coleman & Duncan, Franklin, for defendants-respondents.
    Harmon F. Roy, Mouton, Roy, Car-mouche, Bivins & Hill, Lafayette, for amici curiae for City of Lafayette.
    Kermit M. Simmons, Simmons & Derr, Winnfield, C. Jack Pearce, Wallace E. Brand, Pearce & Brand, Washington, D.C., for amici curiae for Cities of Winnfield, Vidalia and Jonesboro.
    Eddie N. Pullaro, Pullaro & Daigle, Hou-ma, Hale M. Walker, Walker, Holstead & Smith, Ruston, for amici curiae City of Ru-sten and the Bd. of Commissioners of Electric Power Systems Authority.
   CALOGERO, Justice.

We granted writs in this case upon application of plaintiff, Board of Commissioners of Louisiana Municipal Power Commission [hereinafter referred to simply as LAMP-CO].

LAMPCO, a joint commission and agency/instrumentality of four Louisiana cities is a corporate political subdivision of the State of Louisiana created by virtue of an intergovernmental agreement among the governing bodies of Morgan City, Franklin, Opelousas and Natchitoches, and under the authority of R.S. 33:1321-1337, sometimes known as the local services law. LAMPCO proposes to raise $90,000,000 by issuing revenue bonds under R.S. 33:1321-1337, the proceeds to be used to construct a type of electric generating plant referred to as a “115 MW synthesis-gas combined cycle” power plant. LAMPCO brought this action under R.S. 13:5121-5130 to obtain judicial validation of the bonds and certain power sales contracts. The power sales contracts entered by LAMPCO and each of the four cities are a primary source of security for the bonds.

The district court declared, favorably to petitioner LAMPCO, that the bonds were valid and would be legally binding obligations of LAMPCO, and that the power sales contracts were valid and binding obligations of LAMPCO and the four cities. Reversing the district court, the Court of Appeal dismissed plaintiff’s petition holding that the power sales contracts and the proposed bonds were null and void because not authorized by the statute upon which plaintiff and the cities were relying and because violative of the Louisiana Constitution. 355 So.2d 578 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1978). We granted LAMPCO’s application for writ of review to examine the correctness of these holdings. 356 So.2d 1002 (La.1978).

Each of the four member cities engages in the generation of electricity. The power plants are part of the respective utility systems operated by each of the cities. Natural gas or oil is the energy source for each of the generating plants. Because these fuels are subject to critical supply problems including diminishing reserves, the cities’ electric utilities were threatened with curtailment of available supply and significant price escalations. A foreseen solution was the construction of a new type of generating plant which employs an alternate fuel. Feasibility studies confirmed that the new type of electric generating plant, the 115 MW synthesis-gas combined cycle power plant, would be a practical and workable solution to the problems of these cities and their respective electric utilities. Cost factors dictated a “joint action power program” such as that here undertaken.

The legal facility for this joint action power program was the 1975 statutory addition and amendments to R.S. 33:1321-1337 which was apparently specifically passed to authorize just such a program. Under these statutes municipalities (or parishes) concluding an agreement under its provisions may by resolutions of their respective governing bodies create a joint commission as an agency and instrumentality of the municipal governing bodies. R.S. 33:1332. The commission so created is by law “a body corporate” (R.S. 33:1332) and a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana (R.S. 33:1334(D)) with, among other rights, powers and authority, the power to issue revenue bonds to finance the cost of the construction, acquisition or improvement of public projects, “including electric utility services.” R.S. 33:1334(A).

These revenue bonds are payable, “solely from the revenues derived from the operation of the public project constructed or acquired with the proceeds of such revenue bonds.” R.S. 33:1334(A). Revised Statute 33:1334(C) provides that a municipality or parish “shall not in any event be liable for the payment of the principal or interest on any revenue bonds of the commission except as provided” in the statute. [R.S. 33:1334(A) authorizes the municipality to be an obligor on the bonds, with the bonds payable, as earlier mentioned, solely from revenues derived from operation of this public project.] Revised Statute 33:1334(C) goes on to provide that “in addition, the municipalities or the parishes may contract for services furnished by any joint facility constructed by the commission and the municipalities and parishes may obligate themselves to make payments for such term not exceeding forty years, and in such manner as may be provided in such contracts. . . ” Revised Statute 33:1334(C) concludes: “None of the bonds of the commission shall be construed to constitute an indebtedness of the municipality or parish for debt limit or other purposes within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory provisions whatsoever.” R.S. 33:1334(C). These revenue bonds “may be issued without the necessity of securing the approval of the electorate at a referendum.” R.S. 33:1336.

Finally, for our present discussion in any event, R.S. 33:1337 provides that “these provisions shall be liberally construed, to the end that, through the use of arrangements and agreements provided for herein between one or more municipalities and/or joint commissions and/or one or more electric public utility companies greater economy and efficiency in the providing of electrical and energy services to the citizens may be achieved; and further to this end, the governing authority of the municipality and/or joint commission . . . shall be empowered to adopt such other ordinances and resolutions, take such other actions and charge and collect such fees as may be contemplated or necessary by the said Contract . . . R.S. 33:1337.

Constitutional provisions bearing on the case include Article 6, section 37(A) of the Louisiana Constitution by which the legislature is allowed to “authorize political subdivisions to issue bonds or other debt obligations to construct, acquire, extend or improve any revenue producing public utility or work of public improvement.” That section goes on to provide that “bonds or other debt obligations may be secured by mortgage on the lands, buildings, machinery and equipment or by the pledge of the income and revenues of the public utility or work of public improvement.” However, the section announces that “[t]hey shall hot be a charge upon the other income and revenues of the political subdivision.” [emphasis provided]

Peripherally pertinent to the issues in this case is Article 6, section 33 of Louisiana Constitution which provides that “general obligation bonds may be issued only after authorization by a majority of the electors voting on the proposition at an election in the political subdivision issuing the bonds.”

Construing the pertinent statutory provisions in conjunction with the applicable constitutional articles we believe that it is evident that Revised Statute 33:1321-37 is constitutional. Under the statute the authorized revenue bonds are not a charge upon other income and revenues of the political subdivisions. In fact they are “payable . . solely from the revenues derived from the operation of the public project.” Article 6, section 37(A) is thus not offended. Similarly, the provision of the statute which says that the bonds may be issued without the necessity of securing the approval of the electorate at a referendum does not offend Article 6, section 33’s requirement that general obligation bonds be issued only after authorization by a majority of the electors, for the reason that the revenue bonds are not general obligation bonds.

It was apparently for these reasons that the Court of Appeal did not find unconstitutional any of the provisions of R.S. 33:1321-37. Rather, the Court of Appeal found the power sales contracts and the proposed bonds null and void as 1) not authorized by the statute purportedly authorizing them (R.S. 33:1321-37), and 2) in violation of Louisiana Constitution, Article 6, section 37(A) because the bonds purportedly represent a charge upon other income and revenues of the four cities.

Before considering the propriety of these resolutions of the legal issues by the Court of Appeal we choose to restate some of the specifics concerning LAMPCO’s proposed bond issue and the provisions of the power sales contracts here under attack.

In essence the agent/instrumentality of the four cities, namely LAMPCO, is committed to build a $90,000,000 electric generating plant for the benefit and advantage of the four member cities and their respective electric utility systems. When the plant is completed and producing energy, each of the cities will have a proportionate call on energy produced, that is, each city will be entitled to purchase a percentage of the project’s capability. Each city will be entitled to purchase power and also will be compelled to do so under a “take or pay” contract, although it is contemplated that unneeded capacity will be sold to outsiders or adjusted between the cities. Additionally, the Court of Appeal described the arrangement in the following way, with reference to plaintiff’s exhibits:

The intergovernmental agreement provides that the cities’ percentages of energy can be adjusted, if one city needs less and another desires more. (P-1). Each city will continue to operate its own electric utility system, which will later be coordinated with LAMPCO’s system. It is “expected” that the energy generated by LAMPCO during its first years of operation will be in excess of the four cities’ needs, and LAMPCO is to sell any surplus. (P-7, pg. 14). The payments by the cities are termed “monthly power costs” (P-7, pg. 10). These can include maintenance, renewal or replacement of the facility, debt service, all costs of production and any uninsured liability for damages. In addition to the monthly power costs, each city is to pay a ten per cent surcharge. (P-6, pg. 26). LAMPCO will submit a monthly statement to each of the cities, and is to prepare an annual budget of the estimated monthly power costs. The budget is to be reviewed at the end of each quarter and revised if necessary. The four identical contracts each state:
“The obligations of the City to make the payments required . . . payable as an operating expense of its combined municipal utility system, payable solely from the revenues and receipts of such combined municipal utility system . . . shall be made whether or not the project has been completed, is then operable or is operating, and . . . shall not be conditioned upon the performance or nonperformance by LAMPCO. . . (P-7, pg. 11).
and
“. . . non-delivery of Project power and energy on account of Uncontrollable Forces or for any reason shall not relieve the City from its obligation to make its payment required. . . .” (P-7, pg. 13). 355 So.2d at 580.

The Court of Appeal determined that, to the extent LAMPCO revenues securing the bonds will include receipts from the power sales contracts, such revenues will not be derived solely from the operation of the public project. Instead, the bonds will in effect be paid with income from the utility systems of the respective cities. It was for this reason that the Court of Appeal found the arrangement at issue here to violate that part of R.S. 33:1334(A) which provides that bonds are “payable . . . solely from the revenues derived from the operation of the public project constructed.”

We believe that this construction of the language of R.S. 33:1334(A) is much too narrow in light of the overall import of the statute and the specific provision of R.S. 33:1337. That section requires that the act’s provisions be “liberally construed, to the end that, through the use of arrangements and agreements provided for herein between one or more municipalities and/or joint commissions, and/or one or more electric public utility companies, greater economy and efficiency in the providing of electric and energy services to the citizens may be achieved.” Further, the same section empowers the cities and the joint commission “to adopt such other ordinances and resolutions, take such other actions and charge and collect such fees as may be contemplated or necessary by the said Contract, all for the purpose intended.”

In light of R.S. 33:1337 and other provisions of the statute, we conclude that “revenues derived from the operation of the public project” (R.S. 33:1334(A)) is intended to mean all LAMPCO revenues, including those to be derived from the power sales contracts between LAMPCO and the four cities, contracts which are authorized by R.S. 33:1334(C). Contrary to defendants’ position we believe that the specific power sales contracts and the provisions thereof obliging payment irrespective of completion of the project or ultimate delivery of project power are authorized by R.S. 33:1334(C). Construing that subsection with R.S. 33:1337’s provision as to liberal construction and the purposes of the statute, it is evident that the contract for service contemplated by R.S. 33:1334(C) includes one under the terms of which LAMPCO, the agent/instrumentality of the four member cities, obliges itself to construct a $90,000,000 plant and, assuming successful completion thereof, to furnish electric power in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

We likewise find erroneous the Court of Appeal’s finding that the power sales contracts and the proposed bonds violate Article 6, section 37(A) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. That constitutional provision says in effect that bonds issued in connection with revenue producing utilities “shall not be a charge upon the other income and revenues of the political subdivisions.” This provision quite obviously means that the bonds shall not be a charge upon the income and revenues of the political subdivision other than utility revenues, inasmuch as that section in its preceding sentence specifically provides that the bonds may be secured by “the income and revenues of the public utility.”

The Court of Appeal was no doubt influenced by its concern for the overall effect upon the cities’ general revenue picture by virtue of committing for bond payments all utility revenues when, historically, net utility revenues have been transferred to the general funds of the cities. That concern may indeed be legitimate. Nonetheless as an appropriate policy determination it is properly the concern of the governing bodies of the cities, rather than the courts.

The Court of Appeal found, erroneously in our view, that the power sales contracts “constitute a debt which can be enforced by a judgment against a member city’s entire revenues and assets,” and that the cities have an unconditional obligation to pay the monthly power costs and surcharges provided in the power sales contracts. This is simply not so. While there is an obligation to pay whether or not the project has been completed and project power and energy furnished, that obligation or debt is payable only from the revenues and receipts of the respective combined municipal utility systems of the four cities. See Arata v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, 254 La. 579, 225 So.2d 362 (1969); McCann v. Mayor of Morgan City, 173 La. 1063, 139 So. 481 (1932). It is not payable from the member cities’ entire revenues and assets, although conceivably customers of the utility may be exposed to increased charges, in the event the project fares worse than the feasibility studies suggest. Nonetheless, the general or “other income and revenues of the political subdivision” (La.Const. art. 6, § 37(A)) can in no way be charged or burdened with payment of the revenue bonds at issue. Similarly, possible loss to the cities’ general funds of net utility revenues, while perhaps affecting solvency (or indirectly requiring generation of additional general income or revenues), does not convert a charge against utility revenues to a charge against other income and revenues. The power sales contracts and the proposed bonds do not violate Article 6, § 37(A) of Louisiana Constitution of 1974.

We thus conclude that the power sales contracts and the proposed bonds are authorized by R.S. 33:1321-1337, in particular 33:1334(A) and (C), and do not violate Article 6, § 37(A) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.

Decree

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed; the judgment of the district court declaring the bonds and power sales contracts valid and legally binding is ordered reinstated. All costs of these proceedings are to be assessed against Louisiana Municipal Power Commission.

COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT REVERSED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

APPENDIX

La.Const. art. VI, § 33, Political Subdivisions; General Obligation Bonds

Section 33. (A) Authorization. Subject to approval by the State Bond Commission or its successor, general obligation bonds may be issued only after authorization by a majority of the electors voting on the proposition at an election in the political subdivision issuing the bonds. Bonds to refund outstanding indebtedness at the same or at a lower effective rate of interest, even though payable solely from ad valorem taxes, need not be authorized at an election if the indebtedness refunded is paid or cancelled at the time of the delivery of the refunding bonds, or if money, or securities made eligible for such purpose by law, are deposited in escrow in an adequate amount, with interest, to be utilized solely to retire the refunded indebtedness or bonds and to pay interest thereon and redemption premiums, if any, to the time of retirement, [emphasis provided here and elsewhere]

La.Const. art. VI, § 37: Revenue-Producing Property

Section 37. (A) Authorization. The legislature by law may authorize political subdivisions to issue bonds or other debt obligations to construct, acquire, extend, or improve any revenue-producing public utility or work of public improvement. The bonds or other debt obligations may be secured by mortgage on the lands, buildings, machinery, and equipment or by the pledge of the income and revenues of the public utility or work of public improvement. They shall not be a charge upon the other income and revenues of the political subdivision.

R.S. 33:1324: Grant of authority to parishes, municipalities, police juries, harbor districts and terminal districts to act jointly

Any parish, municipality or political subdivision of the state, or any combination thereof, may make agreements between or among themselves to engage jointly in the construction, acquisition or improvement of any public project or improvement, the promotion and maintenance of any undertaking or the exercise of any power, provided that at least one of the participants to the agreement is authorized under a provision of general or special law to perform such activity or exercise such power as may be necessary for completion of the undertaking. Such arrangements may provide for the joint use of funds, facilities, personnel or property or any combination thereof necessary to accomplish the purposes of the agreement, and such agreements may include but are not limited to activities concerning:
* * * * * *
(2) Public utility services, such as water, electricity, gas, roads, bridges, causeways, tunnels, ferries and other highway facilities, and public transportation.

R.S. 33:1331: Financing agreements

Agreements concluded under R.S. 33:1324 and all written agreements concluded under R.S. 33:1325 shall include a statement of the financial obligations of each of the parties to the agreement. Any parish or municipality may appropriate such sums, issue its bonds, as defined in R.S. 33:1321, or levy any special taxes, except income taxes, in the manner provided by law, for any public project or improvement, as defined in R.S. 33:1324(4), to raise such sums as are necessary to fulfill its obligations under the terms of any agreements authorized by this part, including its obligations incurred in connection with the issuance of its bonds or other obligations issued under the authority of this part, and may charge and collect such fees, fares and tolls as are contemplated in said agreements. In furtherance hereof, each such municipality, parish or political subdivision may levy and collect such special taxes, except income taxes, as are not prohibited by the constitution of the state in effect at the time of such tax levy, including, but not limited to, ad valorem, license or excise taxes. Such taxes shall be for the sole purpose of enabling the municipality, parish or political subdivision to meet its financial obligations under the agreements entered into pursuant to Section 1325. No tax authorized herein shall be levied or increased until authorized by a majority of the electors of each municipality or parish affected thereby who vote thereon in an election held for that purpose.

R.S. 33:1332: Administration of agreements; joint commission

Any parishes or municipalities concluding an agreement under the provisions of this Part may create by resolutions duly adopted by the governing bodies thereof a joint commission as an agency and instrumentality of such parishes or municipalities to administer the terms of such agreement. The members of such commission shall be appointed by the respective participating parishes or municipalities, and shall receive such compensation for services performed by virtue of such appointment as shall be provided in such agreement, but any member of such commission who is also an officer or employee of a parish or municipality concluding such agreement shall also receive the compensation to which he is otherwise entitled as such officer or employee. Each such commission shall be a body corporate under such corporate name and style as shall be provided in such agreement, shall have power to sue and be sued and shall continue in existence until all bonds, including refunding bonds, issued by such commission or any of such parishes or municipalities pursuant to such agreements have been finally paid and discharged. Each such commission shall have such powers relative to the construction, acquisition, improvement, operation and management of any public project or improvement, as shall be provided in such agreement, and shall have power, if provided in such agreement to issue in its corporate name, but for and on behalf of such parishes or municipalities, any bonds to finance the cost of the construction or acquisition or improvement of such public projects or improvements, which bonds may be the joint obligation, several obligations, or joint and several obligations of such parishes or municipalities. No such agreement shall have the effect of providing for a donation, in whole or in part, of the public funds or services of one parish or municipality for the benefit of another.

R.S. 33:1334: Issuance of revenue bonds by commissions; prescriptive period

A. Any joint commission created by any parishes or municipalities as an agency and instrumentality of such parishes and municipalities under the provisions of this Part shall have the power, if provided in the agreement entered into between such parishes and municipalities, to issue in its corporate name, any revenue bonds of such commission to finance the cost of the construction or acquisition or improvement of such public projects or improvements, including but not limited to, the public purposes described in R.S. 33:1324, which bonds may be the joint obligation, several obligations, or joint and several obligations of such parishes and municipalities, payable, however, solely from the revenues derived from the operation of the public project constructed or acquired with the proceeds of such revenue bonds. Title to such project shall vest in the parties to said agreement in the proportion or manner set forth in such agreement. Notwithstanding any other provision of Louisiana law relative to the right of partition available to owners of property or portions of property, the right of partition shall not be available to any party with respect to any property acquired or held subject to the terms of said agreement; however, the agreement may provide for the sale, lease, or other disposition of such property on such terms and conditions as may be set forth in the agreement.
B. Said bonds may be issued by the commission substantially in compliance with the procedures established by Subpart C, Part 1, Chapter 10, Title 33 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 but without the necessity of securing the approval of the electorate at a referendum. Any contracts for construction or for acquisition of materials and supplies payable from the proceeds of such bonds shall be subject to the public contract law of the state of Louisiana (R.S. 38:2211, et seq.).
C. The municipality or the parish shall not in any event be liable for the payment of the principal or interest on any revenue bonds of the commission except as provided in Subsection A of this Section and, in addition, the municipalities or the parishes may contract for services furnished by any joint facility constructed by the commission and the municipalities and parishes may obligate .themselves to make payments for such term, not exceeding forty years, and in such manner as may be provided in such contracts. None of the bonds of the commission shall be construed to constitute an indebtedness of the municipality or parish for debt limit or other purposes within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory provisions whatsoever.
D. The commission is hereby declared to be performing a public function and to be a body politic and political subdivision of the state of Louisiana as defined in Article VI, Section 44 of the Louisiana Constitution, with all rights, powers, and authority granted to political subdivisions of the state under the constitution and general laws of the state, including, without limitation, the provisions of R.S. 31:149. Accordingly, the commission and all properties at any time owned by it and the income therefrom and all bonds issued by it and the income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation in the state of Louisiana. Also, for purposes of R.S. 51:704(2), and any amendment thereto or substitution therefor, bonds issued by the commission shall be determined to be securities issued by a political subdivision of the state of Louisiana, provided, however, that nothing in Subsection D shall be construed as altering jurisprudentially established rules governing the responsibilities of a municipal corporation when engaged in the operation of a public utility-
E. Every ordinance or resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds or other debt obligation by the commission shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation published within the area of the municipalities or parishes creating the commission or, if there is none, in a newspaper having general circulation therein. For thirty days after the date of publication, any person in interest may contest the legality of the ordinance or resolution and of any provision therein made for the security and payment of the bonds. After that time, no one shall have any cause of action to test the regularity, formality, legality, or effectiveness of the ordinance or resolution, and provisions thereof, including security, for any cause whatever. Thereafter, it shall be conclusively presumed that every legal requirement for the issuance of the bonds or other debt obligation has been complied with. No court shall have authority to inquire into any of these matters after said thirty days.
F. Nothing in this Chapter shall grant to any joint commission the right to expropriate transmission or distribution facilities of any existing public utility; provided, however, that this shall in no way alter, affect or restrict the rights of expropriation or eminent domain of any individual parish or municipality which participates in the creation of any such commission.
G. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to grant an immunity to or on behalf of any public instrumentality created under this Act from any antitrust laws of the state or of the United States.
H. The books, records and proceedings of joint commissions shall be subject to the Public Records Act, provided, however, that a joint commission may agree that its records, writings, contracts or memoranda relating to new industrial or technological processes, developments, inventions or discoveries for which patents or copyrights have been applied or obtained either by itself or by others in connection with a project of such commission shall remain confidential and not be subject to the public disclosure.

R.S. 33:1335: Energy Resource Contracts

Any municipality and/or joint commission created under this Part is hereby authorized to engage with one or more electric public utility companies as defined in R.S. 45:121, in the financing, construction, maintenance, and operation of joint electric power generation and transmission facilities as owners or otherwise. All arrangements and agreements made under the authority of this Section shall be reduced to writing, shall include, among other provisions, the proportionate share of the cost to be borne by the municipality and/or joint commission, and the proportionate share or quantity of the electric power to be acquired by the municipality and/or joint commission. Contracts authorized under this Section are hereinafter referred to as “Energy Resource Contracts” or “Contract” and are authorized for the object and purpose of providing for the efficient and economical operation of electric power services. Title to facilities acquired under a Contract shall vest in the parties to the Energy Resource Contract in the proportion or manner set forth in such Contract. Facilities or interest in facilities acquired by municipality and/or joint commission under the provisions of an Energy Resource Contract shall be acquired in strict compliance with the public contract law of the state of Louisiana (R.S. 38:2211, et seq.). Energy Resource Contracts shall be subject to the approval of the State Bond Commission, and shall have a term not exceeding forty (40) years, except as approved by the State Bond Commission. Energy Resource Contracts entered into under the authority of this Section are declared to be for a public purpose for the economic production and conservation of electric power and energy in the protection of the public health, welfare and safety. Notwithstanding any other provisions of Louisiana law relative to the right of partition available to owners of property or portions of property, the right of partition shall not be available to any party with respect to any property acquired or held subject to the terms of an Energy Resource Contract: however, an Energy Resource Contract may provide for the sale, lease, or other disposition of property subject thereto on such terms and conditions as may be set forth in the Contract. None of the property or facilities jointly owned, acquired or held, or property and facilities of a participant covered by a Contract shall be subject to expropriation by another party to any Energy Resource Contract entered into hereunder. A municipality and/or a joint commission may become parties to an Energy Resource Contract hereunder by the authority of an ordinance adopted by the governing body of the municipality and/or joint commission in the same manner as are other proceedings of such governing body or bodies. Notice of intention to adopt said ordinance shall be given by the governing body of the municipality and/or joint commission, and shall be published one time in the official journal of the municipality and/or joint commission at least seven days prior to the adoption of the ordinance or resolution.

R.S. 33:1336: Financing agreements

Any municipality and/or joint commission entering into a Contract pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 33:1335 may appropriate such sums as are necessary to fulfill its obligations under the terms of such Contract, and may incur debt and issue revenue bonds for the purpose of providing the municipality and/or joint commission’s share of the cost of the construction and acquisition of the joint electric power generation and transmission facilities authorized under the provisions of R.S. 33:1335. Said bonds may be issued by any municipality and/or joint commission substantially in compliance with the procedures established by Subpart C, Part 1, Chapter 10, Title 33 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, but as to a joint commission created and acting pursuant to the authority of R.S. 33:1334, such bonds may be issued without the necessity of securing the approval of the electorate at a referendum. All properties or interest in properties at any time owned by a municipality and/or joint commission, and all bonds issued by a municipality and/or joint commission under the authority of this Section and the income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation in the state of Louisiana. Also, for the purpose of R.S. 51:702(2) and any amendment thereto or substitution therefor, bonds issued by a municipality and/or joint commission hereunder shall be determined to be securities issued by a public instrumentality of a political subdivision of the state of Louisiana. The provisions of R.S. 33:1334(E) shall be applicable to bonds issued under this Section.

R.S. 33:1337: Liberal construction

These provisions shall be liberally construed, to the end that, through the use of arrangements and agreements provided for herein between one or more municipalities and/or joint commissions, and/or one or more electric public utility companies, greater economy and efficiency in the providing of electrical and energy services to the citizens may be achieved-, and further to this end, the governing authority of the municipality and/or joint commission entering into an Energy Resource Contract as authorized by R.S. 33:1335 shall be empowered to adopt such other ordinances and resolutions, take such other actions and charge and collect such fees as may be contemplated or necessary by the said Contract, all for the purpose intended and in accordance with the authority of Article VII, Section 14(C) of the Constitution of 1974.

MARCUS, Justice

(dissenting).

Under the terms of the power sales contracts entered into by LAMPCO and each of the four member cities, “[t]he obligations of the [c]ity to make the payments required . payable as an operating expense of its combined municipal utility system, payable solely from the revenues and receipts of such combined municipal utility system . . . shall be made whether or not the project has been completed, is then operable or is operating, and shall not be conditioned upon the performance or nonperformance by LAMPCO . . ” and “. . . non-delivery of Project power and energy on account of Uncontrollable Forces or for any other reason shall not relieve the [cjity from its obligation to make its payments required. . . . ”

The issue presented is whether the power sales contracts and the proposed bonds are authorized by law.

La.R.S. 33:1334 A provides in pertinent part:

Any joint commission created by any parishes or municipalities as an agency and instrumentality of such parishes and municipalities under the provisions of this Part shall have the power, if provided in the agreement entered into between such parishes and municipalities, to issue in its corporate name, any revenue bonds of such commission to finance the cost of the construction or acquisition or improvement of such public projects or improvements, including but not limited to, the public purposes described in R.S. 33:1324, which bonds may be the joint obligation, several obligations, or joint and several obligations of such parishes and municipalities, payable, however, solely from the revenues derived from the operation of the public project constructed or acquired with the proceeds of such revenue bonds. . . . (Emphasis added.)

Clearly, the bonds issued by LAMPCO for the construction of a 115 MW synthesis-gas combined cycle power plant (type of electric generating plant) are not payable solely from the “revenues derived from the operation of the public project constructed or acquired with the proceeds of such revenue bonds.” Rather, they are payable from the combined municipal utility system of each member city and must be paid regardless of whether the proposed project is completed and operable and whether or not power is delivered. Hence, I do not consider that the power sales contracts and the proposed bonds are authorized by La.R.S. 33:1334 A.

Moreover, La.Const. art. VI, § 37(A) provides that the legislature by law may authorize political subdivisions to issue bonds to construct, acquire, extend or improve any revenue-producing public utility which bonds may be secured, inter alia, “by the pledge of the income and revenues of the public utility” and which “shall not be a charge upon the other income and revenues of the political subdivision.” Since the proposed bonds issued by LAMPCO are payable from the revenues and receipts of each city’s combined municipal utility system and are not payable solely from the income and revenues of the electric public utility, they constitute a charge upon the other income and revenues of the municipalities in contravention of La.Const. art. VI,. § 37(A).

Hence, I do not consider that the power sales contracts and the proposed bonds are authorized by law. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

      . In this Court LAMPCO has both timely sought writs (No. 61,586) and appealed (No. 61,622). Revised Statute 13:5128 which is found in the statute authorizing, and setting forth the procedure for, lawsuits to determine the validity of governmental bonds (R.S. 13:5121-5130) purports to grant a review by this Court by appeal. That statute would seem to be in conflict with Article 5, section 5(D) of the Louisiana Constitution which, setting forth the appellate jurisdiction of the Louisiana Supreme Court, provides that “. . a case shall be appealable to the Supreme Court if (1) a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional; (2) the defendant has been convicted of a felony or a fine exceeding $500 or imprisonment exceeding six months actually has been imposed.” Article 5, section 5(D) does not apply to the present case because the Court of Appeal has not held any law or ordinance unconstitutional. Thus, we must dismiss the appeal in this case while realizing that identical contentions are now before us in the timely-filed application for writ of review.

      . The portions of R.S. 33:1321-1337 and those sections of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution referred to herein are set out more fully in an appendix attached to this opinion.

      . As we understand the situation, until such time as the plant is operative and surplus energy is being sold by LAMPCO to entities other than the four cities, there is no “LAMPCO revenue” or prospective revenue other than that which will be derived from the power sales contracts of the four cities.

      . We deem it worth noting that, as structured, payment on the outstanding bonds does not begin until after the project’s scheduled completion and the onset of energy production.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory ENGLAND.
    No. 61278.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 28, 1978.
    Rehearing Denied July 26, 1978.

      A. J. Boudreaux, Staff Appeals Counsel, 24th Judicial Dist., Indigent Defender Board, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mam-oulides, Dist. Atty., Jacob Amato, Asst. Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, Research and Appeals Division, Gretna, for' plaintiff-ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

TATE, J., dissents and would grant a rehearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald SHIELDS.
    No. 61569.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 28, 1978.
    Rehearing Denied July 26, 1978.

    Ronald J. Rakosky, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

       SUMMERS and DENNIS, JJ., voted to deny the rehearing.

   PER CURIAM.

Because trial counsel acquiesced in the ruling complained of, we have determined that there is no merit to defendant’s assignment of error.

Accordingly, defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

On Application for Rehearing

In his application for rehearing, appellant’s counsel forcefully argues that we were in error in finding that appellant’s trial counsel acquiesced in the ruling complained of.

Although counsel had requested the police record of both the defendant (to which he was entitled) and to that of state witnesses, in his argument he insisted only upon that of the witnesses. See P. 2. Although counsel did object to the ruling in favor of the state (P. 3), later, in reference to the ruling, he stated “ * * * actually in this particular case it’s probably moot because the only thing was witnesses, and I suspect the witnesses are police officers.” See P. 4.

Since the only prejudice sustained was from the failure of the state to supply his trial counsel his criminal record, we think the colloquy shows that defense counsel at trial urged only his right to receive the record of the witnesses and acquiesced in the trial court’s'failure to furnish him the police record both of the accused and that of the witnesses.

Accordingly, the application for rehearing is denied.

REHEARING DENIED.

SUMMERS and DENNIS, JJ., vote to deny the rehearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George PRESTON.
    No. 62344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: George Preston applying for writ of certiorari and review. Parish of Lafayette.

Writ Granted: Probation revocation rescinded, and case remanded for trial court to hear further evidence offered as to the excessiveness of the amount fixed for restitution by the ex parte order and to take into consideration whether applicant had violated a condition of his probation, when the amount of restitution was not determined as a condition of probation at the time of sentence, La.C.Cr.P. art. 895, but only subsequently fixed by ex parte order (so far as the record shows) fixing amount alleged to be excessive and providing for monthly installments alleged to be beyond the relator’s financial ability to pay.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Donald WILSON v. CRIMINAL DIST. COURT, Hon. Judge Frank J. Shea, Section “G”.
    No. 61559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Donald Wilson, applying for writ of mandamus.

Mandamus granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ronald WIKBERG v. 16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. MARY.
    No. 62205.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Ronald Wikberg applying for remedial writs. Parish of St. Mary.

Writ granted. Because of the information received from the Sheriff’s office, the detainers are vacated.


text:
    Olivia Dupar DRUMMER v. CENTRAL PECAN SHELLING CO. and Travelers Ins. Co.
    No. 62402.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Olivia Dupar Drummer applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Avoyelles.

Writ granted.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Alvin MALLERY, Jr. v. Frank BLACKBURN, in his Capacity as Warden, etc.
    No. 62542.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Alvin Mallery, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari and for supervisory and/or remedial writs. Parish of Orleans.

Writ granted.

The petition of the relator — in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered,

It is ordered that a Writ of Certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable Alvin V. Oser, Judge of the Criminal District, Court for the Parish of Orleans, to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or before the 17th day of July, 1978, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through counsel shall show .cause, in this court, on a date to be fixed by this court, at 10 o’clock A.M., why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator should not be granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles M. DIXON.
    No. 61711.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Charles M. Dixon, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied. Mandamus is moot since appeal has been lodged in this court. In all other respects the application is denied without merit. Relator’s showing does not indicate that he sought bond pending appeal in the trial court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin DUMAS.
    No. 61955.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Calvin Dumas, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Morehouse.

Writ denied.

DIXON, CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant writ and order a hearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Malcolm J. FALGOUST.
    No. 61957.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Malcolm J. Falgoust, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. St. John the Baptist Parish.

Writ denied.

TATE, DIXON, and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leon RICHARD.
    No. 62242.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Leon Richard applying for supervisory writs. East Baton Rouge Parish.

Denied.

TATE, DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rudolph Lamar SHAW, Jr.
    No. 62250.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Rudolph Lamar Shaw, Jr., applying for supervisory writs and/or writs of certiorari and review.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Douglas R. LEVERETT v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN and the District Attorney of the 16th Judicial District, State of Louisiana.
    No. 62265.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Douglas R. Leverett applying for writ of mandamus. St. Mary Parish.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Norris J. FANGUY, Jr.
    No. 62281.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Norris J. Fanguy, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Lafourche.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Floyd L. BYRD.
    No. 62295.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Floyd L. Byrd, applying for certio-rari and review. Parish of Caddo.

Writ denied.

DIXON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James JURGENSMIER.
    No. 62316.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: James Jurgensmier, applying for writs of certiorari, review and mandamus. Parish of Caddo.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. John R. JONES v. Hon. Wallace A. EDWARDS.
    No. 62318.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: John R. Jones applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of St. Tammany.

Writ denied. An out-of-time appeal has been granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Garland Wayne WHITE v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al.
    No. 62322.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Garland Wayne White applying for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Parish of Oua-chita.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lester HACKMAN, Jr.
    No. 62325.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Lester Hackman, Jr. applying for writ of certiorari. Lafourche Parish.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph E. BISCHOFF.
    No. 62426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Joseph E. Bischoff applying for writs of review, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Orleans Parish.

Writ denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    John E. JONES and Ora Cripps Youngblood v. Wayne D. JOINER.
    No. 62457.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Wayne D. Joiner, Sr., (In Proper Person), applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Grant.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. John ELMORE, Jr. v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana.
    No. 62465.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: John Elmore, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari, Review and Mandamus. Parish of Ouachita.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Tyrone Glenn JEFFERSON v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, SECTION “B”, PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 62480.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Tyrone Glenn Jefferson, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans.

Denied. The writ is an application for mandamus.ordering the trial court to rule on a writ of habeas corpus. A return from the district court indicates that the writ was denied in that court on June 28, 1978. The present application is therefore moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David Scott DARBY.
    No. 62501.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: State of Louisiana through the District Attorney, J. Carl Parkerson, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Ouachita.

Writ denied.

SANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS and DIXON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas M. STRAMIELLO.
    No. 62521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Thomas M. Stramiello applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and for a stay order. Parish of Rapides.

Writ denied. No abuse of discretion.

DIXON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roger S. BOURGEOIS.
    No. 62531.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Roger S. Bourgeois applying for writs of certiorari and review. Parish of Jefferson.

Denied. Applicant has an adequate remedy by appeal in the event of conviction.

DIXON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Janice LIVAS.
    No. 62532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Janice Livas applying for writs of certiorari, review, prohibition, mandamus and for a stay order. Parish of Orleans # 263-539.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mary V. GREENE and Cathy Ann Melton.
    No. 62533.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Mary V. Greene and Cathy Ann Melton, applying for writ of certiorari or review.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald ROBINSON and Wilbert Prescott, Jr.
    No. 62538.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Donald Robinson applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Caddo.

Denied.

DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Elmore B. NICHOLAS v. H. B. ZACHARY COMPANY.
    No. 62545.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Elmore B. Nicholas, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of St. Charles.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Louis DABON.
    No. 62546.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 1978.
   In re: Louis Dabon applying for writ of certiorari and for supervisory and/or remedial writs. Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clyde ROBINSON.
    No. 62579.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 5, 1978.
   In re: Clyde Robinson applying for supervisory and remedial writs. Parish of East Carroll.

Writ granted. The bail of $50,000.00 previously fixed by the trial judge is reinstated.

Bail fixed in a capital case as a result of a pre-indictment hearing under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 313 is not invalidated, ipso iacto, by a subsequent Grand Jury indictment.


author: DENNIS and TATE, JJ.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Janice LIVAS.
    No. 62586.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 7, 1978.
   In re: Janice Livas, applying for writs of certiorari review, prohibition, mandamus and for a stay order. Parish of Orleans.

Writ granted. Since it does not appear that an evidentiary hearing has been held on defendant’s motion for reduction of bail, it is ordered that such hearing be held.

DENNIS and TATE, JJ.,

concur and are of the opinion that an evidentiary hearing should have been conducted on State’s motion before increase of bail.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael BAZLEY.
    No. 62591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 7, 1978.
   In re: Michael Bazley applying for writs of certiorari, review, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Orleans.

Writ granted. Since it does not appear that an evidentiary hearing has been held on defendant’s motion for reduction of bail, it is ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held.

DENNIS and TATE, JJ.,

concur and are of the opinion that an evidentiary hearing should have been held on the State’s motion to increase bail in order to provide a basis for the finding of “good cause” to increase bail.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Billy T. LAMBERT.
    No. 62568.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 7, 1978.
   In re: Billy T. Lambert applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and for a stay order. Parish of Caddo.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Richard E. MOLINA.
    No. 62593.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 7, 1978.
   In re: Richard E. Molina applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and stay order. Parish of Orleans.

Denied. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ira JONES et al.
    No. 62558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 7, 1978.
   In re: Ira Jones, et al, applying for writs of certiorari, review, prohibition, mandamus and for a stay order. Parish of Orleans.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. June BLOOMFIELD et al.
    No. 62592.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 7, 1978.
   In re: State of Louisiana, through the District Attorney, Harry F. Connick, applying for an extension of time within which to file an out-of-time writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Orleans.

Application for extension to file application in this Court denied.


author: CALOGERO, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry D. MAYSHACK.
    No. 62689.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 18, 1978.
   In re: Larry D. Mayshack, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Caddo.

Writ denied.

CALOGERO, J.,

concurs in this writ denial for the reason that a majority of this Court has consistently refused to grant the character of relief here sought.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Paula DYAN.
    No. 62691.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 18, 1978.
   In re: Paula Dyan applying for stay order and writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied. Adequate remedy by review in event of conviction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy George BALDWIN.
    No. 62706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 21, 1978.
   In re: Timothy George Baldwin applying for writs of review and stay order. Parish of Ouachita.

Writ denied. The showing made does not warrant interfering with the orderly proceedings in the trial court. Applicant has an adequate remedy by appeal in the event of conviction.


author: SANDERS, C. J. and MARCUS, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alvin McBRIDE.
    No. 62740.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 26, 1978.
   In re: State of Louisiana through Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Orleans.

Writ granted. Upon the showing that the witnesses did not have available advice of counsel at the time, the order of the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, Section D, holding Police Officer Rhett Magnon and Police Officer Donald Curóle in contempt of court, is set aside, without prejudice to the trial court’s right to conduct an in camera hearing at which the police officers could be required, after advice by counsel, to respond. In lieu thereof, the trial judge may order the prosecutor to divulge in camera the name of the confidential informant described in the application for the search warrant, or he may sustain the motion to suppress the evidence upon the prosecutor’s failure to do so. Under the present circumstances, the state may acquiesce in suppression of the evidence rather than divulge the name of the informant.

SANDERS, C. J. and MARCUS, J.,

would grant the writ and place the case on the docket for argument. In the present case, there appear to be no exceptional circumstances requiring the disclosure of the name of the confidential informant.


author: MARCUS, J.,

text:
    Walter Charles PARLANGE, Jr., et al. v. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., Noble Drilling Corporation, et al.
    No. 62720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 26, 1978.
   In re: Chevron USA Inc. applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to stay and review a pre-trial discovery order. Parish of Pointe Coupee.

Writ denied.

MARCUS, J.,

is of the opinion that the writ should be granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roy J. DORMAN, Jr.
    No. 62741.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 26, 1978.
   In re: Roy J. Dorman, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and for a stay order. Parish of Caddo.

Writ denied. No abuse of discretion.


author: STOULIG, Judge. LEMMON, Judge,

text:
    Howard GRUENBERG and Mrs. Lorraine Gruenberg Goldenberg et al. v. GOLDMINE PLANTATION, INC., et al.
    No. 8826.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    March 14, 1978.
    Concurring Opinion May 12, 1978.

      Milling, Benson, Woodward, Hillyer & Pierson, Charles A. Snyder, W. Richard House, Jr., New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants and for intervenors-appellants.
    Goldman & Levin, Stanley H. Levin, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.
    Before LEMMON, STOULIG and GAR-SAUD, JJ.
   STOULIG, Judge.

Appellants, the minority shareholders controlling an aggregate 40% of the outstanding 360 shares of Goldmine Plantation, Inc. (Goldmine), have appealed a judgment dismissing their suit to dissolve the corporation under R.S. 12:143(A)(2) or (3) or (7), alleging in essence the majority shareholders have mismanaged the corporate assets to their detriment. The controlling shareholders, members of a voting trust, are S. J. Rodrigue, Ada Rodrigue, Marie Cognevich and Michael Tassin.

Goldmine’s principal asset is a 900-acre tract of land fronting on the right descending bank of the Mississippi River in St. John the Baptist Parish. Acquired in 1941 for $65,000, the property was appraised at $3,000 per acre in 1975, giving it a value then of $2,700,000. Since its acquisition the land has been planted in sugar cane and the mineral rights have been leased.

Between 1966 and the present, various industrial interests have expressed a desire to buy this land, the latest proposed price being $3,600 per acre net to vendor. While none of the attempts to purchase have taken the form of a written and binding offer, the evidence suggests that the prospective buyers were substantial and a contract to sell could have materialized had the Goldmine board of directors expressed any interest.

Without investigating the merit of these offers, the directors voted to reject them. It is evident from their testimony they lacked the information to intelligently weigh the proposals in the light of the best interest of the shareholders because they are holding the land for speculation. The minutes of the corporation reflect board member Ada Rodrigue, a certified public accountant, voted against the $3,600-per-acre net offer received in 1973 because the land might be worth $7,000 or $10,000 per acre.

A subsequent appraisal by Omer Kuebel, plaintiffs’ witness, the only real estate expert to testify, fixed the value of the property at $3,000 per acre, which is $4,000 per acre less than the minimum price suggested by Ada Rodrigue. The highest price for industrial property realized in this area was $4,837 per acre for land to which Kuebel assigned a higher value. It is apparent Ms. Rodrigue’s vote was based on uninformed speculation. Prom the testimony of the other controlling directors, it is evident they too did nothing further than make a few offhand inquiries with respect to neighboring land values, but they were vague in recalling the specifics of their efforts in this direction.

Meanwhile, back at the farm, the sugar cane crop was yielding dismal dividends which, over the past 10 years, averaged a net profit of less than one-half of 1% and the only reason the operation did not result in a loss for most of these years was that no charge for the use of the land was included in the operating expenses.

The only shareholder who realized anything substantial from the operation in relation to the value of his investment was S. J. Rodrigue, owner of one share, who was employed as farm manager for $12,000 per year plus 20% of the profits in excess of $25,000 on all operations except mineral leases. In 1975, sugar prices skyrocketed and growers, including Goldmine, reaped a substantial profit increase, which also dramatically improved Rodrigue’s salary. In 1973, he drew $12,000 in salary and bonus, while in 1975 he was paid $162,128. For the same years the shareholders were paid total dividends of $5,400 ($15 per share) and $72,-000 ($200 per share). These were the returns from assets with a fair market value in excess of $2,700,000.

From the minority standpoint, approximately $1,080,000 of their collective funds are tied up in a farming operation that has no future and from which they realize sparse returns. Aware of the tax consequences of liquidating, they nonetheless reason that 50% plus of something they can use is better than 100% of a paper asset beyond their reach.

In the light of this situation, we consider whether plaintiffs and intervenors have sustained the proof to support their demands for involuntary dissolution under R.S. 12:143(A)(2) or (3) or (7), which we quote:

“A. The court, may entertain a proceeding for involuntary dissolution under its supervision when it is made to appear that:
* * * * * *
(2) The objects of the corporation have wholly failed, or are entirely abandoned, or their accomplishment is impracticable; or
(3) It is beneficial to the interests of the shareholders that the corporation should be liquidated and dissolved; or
* * * * * *
(7) The corporation has been guilty of gross and persistent ultra vires acts * * *

First we hold the evidence does not support our concluding the objects of incorporation have “wholly failed” or “been abandoned” or that “their accomplishment is impracticable.” Sugar cane has been grown continuously on this property since 1941; therefore the first two enumerated causes for dissolution in subsection (2) are inapplicable. Although the future of sugar cane farming on plantations the size of Goldmine is at best speculative and the record leaves no doubt that the highest and best use of this land at present is for industrial purposes, we cannot conclude that the accomplishment of sugar farming is impracticable.

Low profits per se do not render the accomplishments of the objects of the corporation impracticable. In 1973 it is doubtful that any Goldmine shareholder would have anticipated the yield the corporation derived from sugar farming in 1975. To us “impracticability” connotes an element of obsolescence as well as a low return operation. Therefore relief is not available under (A)(2).

We next consider whether the record supports the view that dissolution would be more beneficial to the shareholders. It can be urged validly in this case that the low returns of the past have been more than offset by the appreciation of the corporate assets. With the completion of the river bridge at Luling within the next few years, the land value, according to Kue-bel, should increase tremendously. Thus the proof required by (A)(3) is lacking.

Finally, we consider the contention that the majority shareholders and the board have been guilty of gross and persistent ultra vires acts. While we question the wisdom of the board’s approach in reaching a decision not to sell the real estate, we conclude the action taken is within the scope of the board’s authority and therefore legal. In 58 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations 5821, this language appears that we think applies to the situation before us. We quote:

“Unless it clearly appears that the act is an abuse of discretion, intra vires, legal and good faith acts of the board of directors, other corporate officers, or the majority stockholders, i.e., acts pertaining to the internal management, of the corporation, where they are not fraudulent or unfair to minority stockholders, will not be interfered with or remedied at the instance of minority stockholders, regardless of whether such acts are wise or expedient. In other words, to warrant the interposition of a court in favor of the minority shareholders in a corporation, as against the contemplated action of the majority, where such action is within the corporate powers, a case must be made out which plainly shows that such action is so far opposed to the true interests of the corporation itself as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests, but that he must have acted with an intent to subserve some outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the company and in a manner inconsistent with its interests. This is the unavoidable result of the fundamental principle that the majority can regulate and control the lawful exercise of the powers conferred upon a corporation by its charter. * * * The wisdom of the action taken or threatened will not be considered. It is only when the corporate acts are so unjust as to be evidence of fraud and intentional wrong that the internal management will be interfered with. Courts cannot compel corporate officers to act wisely but they can compel them to act honestly.”

We appreciate the frustrations of the minority who are locked into a financial situation in which they have a substantial interest but no control. Appellants suggest the shareholders be equated to partners and be permitted to disengage from the corporation as they could were Goldmine operated as a partnership. Our substantive law provides for involuntary dissolution but offers no remedy for the minority shareholder with substantial holdings who is out of control and trapped in a closed corporation. We will not arrogate the legislative function to provide relief.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

LEMMON, Judge,

concurs and assigns reasons.

Because the land has substantial river frontage, its value for industrial use in recent years has increased dramatically, so that no reasonable purchaser would buy the land today for the purpose of growing sugar cane. However, the ever increasing trend in market values for riverfront acreage bears heavily on the critical question in this case: When is it in the best interest of the shareholders to liquidate the corporation and sell the land, now or later?

The overall testimony of the directors is that they were not trying to promote the sale of the property, but were willing to and did consider any and every offer. Consistent with this position they gave no listings and made no counteroffers, so as to avoid fixing a ceiling in the face of constantly increasing values. Yet they never told any prospective purchaser they were not interested in selling, and the thrust of the record is that the sale of the property is only a matter of time.

One cannot say the evidence preponderates that it is more beneficial to the interest of the shareholders to dissolve the corporation and sell the land at the present time rather than in the future, in view of ever increasing values and a further surge expected upon completion of the new bridge.

      . Plaintiffs are Howard Gruenberg, Mrs. Lorraine Gruenberg Goldenberg, Mrs. Joel Gross-man Myers and Rene Grossman, who collectively own 20% of the stock. Intervenors, who adopt plaintiffs’ position and evidence, are Louis Frederic, Vernon Frederic, Kermit X. Frederic, Madeline Frederic Futrelle, Evelyn Frederic England and Gerard Frederic.

      . The acreage is variously described as 893 or 917. We use 900 acres for convenience.


author: DOMENGEAUX, Judge. CUTRER, Judge,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Burnis N. McINNIS et ux., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 6458.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    May 24, 1978.
    Rehearings Denied July 5, 1978.

      William W. Irwin, Jr., Johnie E. Branch, Jr., and Bryan Miller, by Bryan Miller, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant.
    Thomas & Dunahoe, Gerard F. Thomas, Jr., Natchitoches, for defendants-appellees.
    Before CULPEPPER, DOMENGEAUX, WATSON, FORET and CUTRER, JJ.
   DOMENGEAUX, Judge.

The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways, expropriated for highway purposes a portion of a tract of land owned by the defendants. Pursuant to the -requirements of La.-R.S. 48:441, et seq., the Department of Highways deposited the sum of $45,198.00 as just compensation for the property taken. The defendants answered claiming compensation of $71,953.75 for the property taken. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants awarding a total of $69,326.50 subject to a credit for the funds previously deposited. This award consisted of $24,-721.00 for the land taken, $34,300.00 for the improvements taken, $9,124.00 for severance damages, and $1,180.50 as an expert witness fee for defendants’ appraiser. Plaintiff appealed.

Four issues are presented by this appeal: (1) the value of the land taken, (2) the value of the improvements taken, (3) the amount of severance damages, and (4) the amount of the expert fee.

We note that, at the outset, plaintiff urges that the trial judge’s factual conclusions should not carry the usual weight of the manifest error rule. Trial on the merits was held in March, 1976, before Judge Stuart S. Kay, who died before rendering a decision. His successor, Judge Ted R. Broyles, ordered the preparation of a written transcript and rendered a decision from the record on September 6,1977. The cases of Allstate Insurance Company v. Shemwell, 142 So.2d 866 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1962), and Moore v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 352 So.2d 270 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1977), flatly hold that, in such a situation, the well established rule of according great weight to the factual conclusions of the trial judge is not applicable. This Court in Smith v. West Calcasieu-Cameron Hospital, 251 So.2d 810 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1971) recognized that it was free to assign less weight than usual to the trial court’s finding of fact concerning the credibility of witnesses in a similar situation. We have doubts that these appellate court decisions are correct because of the languagé of the Louisiana Supreme Court in the case of Gradney v. Vancouver Plywood Co., Inc., 299 So.2d 347 (La.1974). Although the Gradney case had to do with depositions, the rationale therein may very well apply to a situation such as we have here. In Gradney, a workmen’s compensation case, a pertinent question involved whether or not the plaintiff’s disability was causally connected with the accident. There was conflicting medical testimony in that regard, and the Supreme Court stated that on the question of causation, the finding of the trial judge must be given great weight. They further said that this was true despite the circumstance that the testimony of all physicians except one was received by deposition. A reasonable analogy exists between deposition testimony, wherein the trial judge has no opportunity to hear or observe the witnesses and the circumstances of the instant case, wherein the judge who decided the case was not the judge who heard the case.

Be that as it may, we feel that it is not necessary to specifically apply the rationale of the Gradney case herein, inasmuch as our review of the record, as hereinafter shown, leads us to agree with the results reached by the district judge who decided the case, except in one particular, specifically, the value allocated to the improvements.

Two qualified appraisers testified in the trial of this case. Mr. Perry E. Futrell, Jr., was called by the Department, and Mr. T. J. Stephens testified on behalf of the owners.

VALUE OF LAND TAKEN

The property was expropriated November 18, 1974, as part of an improvement program for the widening of La. 171 near the City of Leesville. Before the taking, the tract of land consisted of 1.912 acres fronting on La. 171 approximately one-half mile north of the city limits of the City of Leesville in the Parish of Vernon. Situated on the land was a two-story masonry and frame building used partially as a residence. It had two apartments on the upper floor and five garages and an office on the bottom floor. The area was enclosed by a four foot chain link fénee. Other improvements on the property were a barn south of the building, a dog house and yard, chicken coop, birdhouse, blacktop parking areas, and a gravel driveway.

The area taken contained 1.060 acres fronting 411.11 feet along Highway 171, with a south depth of 117.44 feet, rear width of 415.23 feet, and north depth of 128.03 feet.

There was a wide disparity between the two appraisers as to the value of the land taken. Mr. Stephens set the value at $24,-721.00, and Mr. Futrell’s value was $7,560.00. Both appraisers used the market data approach to establish value. The difference in their values arises from the fact that Mr. Stephens classified the property as commercial and Mr. Futrell classified it as residential.

Mr. Stephens placed emphasis on the fact that along Highway 171 in the City of Leesville and to the south of Leesville, the property along the highway was commerr cial. He further felt that the property north of the city along the highway also should be classified as commercial, pointing out that in the vicinity of the subject property are located the State Police Headquarters, Chamber of Commerce building, and a cemetery. Close by is a municipal golf course, and a little distance away there is a sawmill-lumber company. He also stated that property for sale along the highway north of the City of Leesville was difficult to find because the owners did not wish to sell. Based on a commercial trend inside the City of Leesville and extending southward toward Fort Polk, he concluded that the subject property north of the City of Leesville must also be classified as commercial.

The comparables principally relied upon by Mr. Stephens were located near the center and south of the City of Leesville. These he adjusted accordingly. These properties reflected a commercial depth of 150 feet and after adjustments he concluded that the subject property had a value of $80.00 per front foot by a depth of 150 feet. Through this process, Mr. Stephens concluded that the 1.06 acres taken was valued at $24,721.00.

Mr. Futrell testified that he considered the highest and best use of the property to be residential, notwithstanding the fact that, in the immediate area on the same highway, there was situated a police headquarters, Chamber of Commerce building, and a cemetery.

Although we find that the area involved is just north of the city limits of Leesville and that there are several residences in the area, nevertheless, we feel that there is justification in classifying the property taken as commercial. Considering the general area we feel that Mr. Stephens’ conclusions are applicable. We conclude that the preponderance indicates that the highest and best use of the property expropriated is commercial. Therefore we affirm the trial court award of $24,721.00 for the land taken.

VALUE OF IMPROVEMENTS

The next assignment of error concerns the award of $34,300.00 for the improvements taken.

It appears that the main building on the property taken is neither fully residential nor fully commercial, but rather a little of both. One apartment is being rented and brings in revenue, and the defendant uses a portion of the building as an office for his business. We feel that the building is such that it is not error to assess it with a compensable value. We must consider, as was stated in State, Department of Highways v. Goldberg, 223 So.2d 174 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1969), the extent that the improvements enhance the value of the subject property. We feel that the main building herein is an enhancement to the value of the property for some types of commercial purposes. In Goldberg, supra, the trial court awarded $8,850.00 for two houses which were situated on and taken with the land. The Goldberg court reduced that award and arrived at a valuation for the improvements of approximately 72% of the replacement value.

We feel, as was felt in Goldberg, that the record does not substantiate a holding that the building in this case is worth its full replacement value. Mr. Futrell estimated the value of the improvements taken at $34,300.00, and Mr. Stephens estimated the improvements at $34,940.00. We have reviewed the analysis of both appraisers concerning the improvements and conclude that the $34,300.00 value is proper. Based generally on the formula expressed in Goldberg, supra, we fix the value of the improvements at $24,696.00.

SEVERANCE DAMAGES

The appellant disputes the amount of severance damages awarded by the trial court as the third assignment of error. The remaining tract of land after the taking constituted 0.852 acres based on the survey plat introduced by plaintiff into evidence. The tract had 415.23 feet of frontage on Highway 171. The remaining tract will be triangular in shape with a north depth of 17.41 feet, a south depth of 195.19 feet, and a rear width of 363.31 feet. Due to the size and shape of the remainder, both experts were of the opinion that the land had been damaged. Mr. Stephens valued the severance damages at $9,124.00. Mr. Futrell indicated severance damages in the amount of $6,354.00. The major difference in the amount of damages results from the difference in the values given the property before the taking.

Having reached the conclusion that Mr. Stephens’ valuation of the subject property was more proper than Mr. Futrell’s we adopt the former’s assessment of the severance damages and affirm that award in the amount of $9,124.00.

EXPERT FEES

Plaintiff’s last assignment of error urges that the trial court erred in fixing the fee of the defendants’ expert at $1,181.50, the exact amount reflected in his statement of services. Plaintiff argues that the trial judge used the bill for services as the major, if not the sole, criterion for setting the expert fee. We do not agree. The trial judge in his written reasons felt that the amount reflected in Stephens’ statement was fair considering the time required in inspecting the premises, researching comparable sales, as well as the skill and training required.

In expropriation proceedings, the condemning authority is taxed with the reasonable costs of the testifying expert witnesses retained by the landowner to help him obtain his just compensation. State, Department of Highways v. William T. Burton Industries, Inc., 219 So.2d 837 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1969), writ refused 254 La. 14, 222 So.2d 67 (1969).

The record reveals that Mr. Stephens prepared a written appraisal detailing his valuations and comparable sales used in reaching these valuations. He also submitted an addendum to his original report containing three more comparable sales. Mr. Stephens testified at the trial of this matter. His statement also reflects considerable time spent in preparing his written appraisal. We affirm the award for the expert fee since the fee is reasonable and in line with awards made by this court in similar cases. E. g., State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Highways v. Gormley, 357 So.2d 859 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1978).

For the above reasons, the judgment of the District Court is amended so as to reduce the award to defendants from $69,-326.50 to $59,722.50, and as amended, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellate costs are assessed one-fourth to defendants-appellees and three-fourths to plaintiff-appellant. The costs assessed to the plaintiff-appellant are to be limited as provided for in La.R.S. 13:4521.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED.

WATSON, J., concurs and is of the opinion that the manifest error rule is applicable.

CUTRER, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

CULPEPPER, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by CUTRER, J.

CUTRER, Judge,

dissenting.

MANIFEST ERROR RULE

The Honorable Ted R. Broyles decided this case from the record which was prepared following the death of the Honorable Stuart S. Kay who tried the case. Under these circumstances the rule of according great weight to the findings of the trial judge would not apply since the successor judge who rendered the decision had no opportunity to hear or observe any witnesses. Smith v. West Calcasieu-Cameron Hospital, 251 So.2d 810 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1971); Moore v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 352 So.2d 270 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1977); Allstate Insurance Company v. Shemwell, 142 So.2d 866 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1962). The majority opinion discusses the case of Gradney v. Vancouver Plywood Company, Inc., 299 So.2d 347 (La.1974). The majority opinion states that Gradney seems to indicate that the manifest error rule would apply to this case, but does not decide the point as they generally agree with the conclusions of the trial judge. The circumstances of the case at hand can be distinguished from that presented in Gradney v. Vancouver Plywood Co., Inc., supra. In Gradney the trial court heard the lay testimony plus one physician, the remainder of the medical being by the depositions of three doctors. The Supreme Court stated that the finding of the trial judge in that case must be given great weight. In the case at hand, the trial judge had no opportunity to hear any of the testimony, and I feel the factual conclusions of the trial judge should not carry the usual weight of the manifest error rule.

VALUE OF THE LAND TAKEN

The majority reaches the conclusion that this is commercial property and values the 1.06 acres of land at $24,721.00. They accepted the testimony of Mr. T. J. Stephens who testified on behalf of the owner. Em-pbasis was placed upon the fact that situated in the area along Highway 171 was the State Police Headquarters, a Chamber of Commerce building, and a cemetery. These buildings should not be classified as commercial within the usual sense of that word in that they are not used in a profit-making venture. These were improvements that served a special purpose.

The better reasoning in this case is reflected by the testimony of Mr. Perry E. Futrell, Jr., who testified on behalf of the State. Mr. Futrell testified that he considered the highest and best use of the property to be residential with some commercial potentiality. He pointed out that the City of Leesville has developed commercially and residentially to the south, toward New Llano, Fort Polk, and along Highway 8 toward Texas. He felt that the Fort Polk location had influenced this pattern of development. This pattern of highway commercial development had not extended north of the City of Leesville at the time of the taking. He felt the police headquarters and Chamber of Commerce building located in the area were for special purposes and could not be classified as commercial in the ordinary sense of the word. He also explained that the residential growth north of the city had been slow. To have business establishments in an area, there must exist support for same. He stated that the lack of residential growth north of the city would explain the lack of commercial interest in the area of the subject property. This explanation by Mr. Futrell is buttressed by the fact that one of the principal comparables used by him is a sale of property a few hundred feet north of the subject property. This sale was made in September, 1971, three years before the taking, by Boise Southern Company to Leesville Lumber Co., Inc., for a price of $2,500.00 an acre. This property had a frontage of 1300 feet along Highway 171. Shortly after the purchase, a brick home was constructed upon the property. This sale was consummated by two business establishments and used for residential purposes. Mr. Futrell utilized other comparables in the area of the subject property, but not along Highway 171, which reflected a range of values from $2,000 per acre to $4,386 per acre. Through adjustment, Mr. Futrell concluded that the indicated market value of the subject property was $6,000 per acre or $6,360 for the 1.06 acres taken. To this figure he added $1,200.00 as a contributory value due to the superior landscaping, reaching a total value of the land taken to be $7,560.00.

In the case of State, Through Department of Highways v. Kennedy, 193 So.2d 848 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused 250 La. 273, 195 So.2d 149 (La.1967), the law of expropriation was set out as follows:

“. . . Furthermore, when property is expropriated for highway purposes the owner who claims the value thereof exceeds the estimate of its value made by the Department of Highways and deposited in the registry of the court upon institution of the expropriation proceeding, bears the burden of proving his claim and must establish by convincing evidence that its value is greater than the appraisal of the expropriating agency. LSA-R.S. 48:453. State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Highways v. Kemp, et al., La.App., 141 So.2d 487.
“As established by the jurisprudence of this state concerning expropriation proceedings, the testimony of each qualified expert in the determination of market value of expropriated property is to be given effect if and when it appears well grounded from the standpoint of sincerity and good reasoning. But where the expert's opinion is not predicated upon sound reasoning, such as, the consideration of comparables which are not in fact similar or located in the vicinity of the expropriated property, or the consideration of a land use speculative and conjectural in nature, or the failure to take other factors and circumstances into consideration, the general rule above stated does not apply and effect will be given only to the opinions of those experts whose testimony is grounded on the best reasoning. Greater Baton Rouge Consolidated Sewer District v. Nelson, La.App., 144 So.2d 186.” (Emphasis supplied)

As I examine the reasoning and explanations of the experts and the facts and circumstances surrounding the property in question, I conclude that the property in question must be classified as residential for appraisal purposes. I do not feel that this highway frontage north of Leesville has developed into a commercial classification as of the time of the taking. As point-ed out by Mr. Futrell, there is some potentiality in the direction of commercial, but there is not a basis upon which it can be reasonably classified as commercial as of the time of the taking in 1974. I say this especially in view of the Boise Southern Company to Leesville Lumber Co., Inc. comparable previously discussed. Furthermore, whether we classify this as commercial or residential, the record does not justify the valuation of $24,721.00 for this 1.06 acres of highway frontage. Mr. Stephens, the expert called by the owner, admitted on cross-examination that he was unable to find any sales north of the City of Leesville in the area of the subject property that would exceed $5,000 per acre. There were no comparables cited by either expert in the immediate area that would justify the conclusion reached by the majority. I would accept Mr. Futrell’s appraisal of $7,560.00 for the value of the property taken.

VALUE OF IMPROVEMENTS

Mr. Futrell, having concluded that the property was classified as residential, estimated the replacement value of the improvements at $34,300.00. Mr. Stephens estimated the replacement value of the improvements at $34,940.00.

After concluding that the property should be classified as commercial, the majority then accepted the replacement value placed upon the property by Mr. Futrell of $34,-300.00 less 28%, fixing a value of the improvements at $24,696.00.

Mr. Futrell testified that if the property was classified as commercial it would have no contributory value since the residence could not be utilized for a commercial venture. Mr. Stephens, when questioned about the contributory value of the property, testified as follows:

“Q. With respect to your appraisal of the improvements, most particularly the home located there on Mr. Mclnnis’ property, you have given a highest and best use of commercial to the land. What does the house contribute to that property as a commercial entity?
“A. Well, there are several ways to look at it. There’s possibility the house could be utilized as some commercial venture. Don’t know. But the house was there. He had spent his money for it. It had a value because it had cost somebody to build the house and, therefore, you had to consider it — its actual value.”
“Q. But the point I’m making is that you have given the land a high value as commercial property and you have treated the residence as a residential piece of property, and it sits on top of the land. You don’t find that inconsistent in any fashion whatsoever?
“A. I find that there was certain improvements on there, regardless of what it was being used for, it was still improvements that somebody paid for.”

Mr. Stephens did not place a contributory value on the property which he classified as commercial. He, in substance, stated that in his expert opinion the owner would be entitled to a value of $34,940.00 for the improvements because the owner paid for them and should be reimbursed. This is replacement value and not contributory value. In the case of State, Department of Highways v. Goldberg, 223 So.2d 174 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1969), cited by the majority, the court held:

“. . . Consideration of the value of such buildings and improvements is limited to the extent only that they enhance the value of the land.”

Without the necessary expert testimony as to the actual contributory value of the improvements, I cannot agree with the majority valuation of improvements as being a contributory value.

In conclusion, I would classify this property as residential and would reduce the award for the value of the land taken from $24,721.00 to $7,560.00, affirm the award of $34,300.00 for replacement value of improvements, and reduce the severance damage award from $9,124.00 to $6,354.00.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

      . This suit sought expropriation of property owned by the community of acquets existing between Burnis N. Mclnnis and Eleanor Martin Mclnnis. Mrs. Mclnnis died during the pend-ency of this matter. Her husband, as surviving spouse in the community, and a major child were substituted as parties-defendant in this case.