author: TATE, Justice. SANDERS, Chief Justice SUMMERS, Justice SUMMERS, Justice. DENNIS, Justice

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Respondent, v. Morris W. COX and Rose Ann Garrett, Relators.
    No. 56098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 3, 1975.
    Dissenting Opinion Nov. 14, 1975.
    Dissenting Opinion Nov. 18, 1975.
    On Rehearing March 29, 1976.
    Anthony J. Bruscato, Bruscato & Loom-is, Monroe, for defendants-relators.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson, Dist. Atty., Brian E. Crawford, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent.
   TATE, Justice.

The defendants Morris Cox and Rose Garrett were convicted of possession of marijuana, La.R.S. 40:966, and sentenced respectively to ninety and thirty days in the parish jail in addition to fines of $300. We granted certiorari to review substantial contentions of trial error, 312 So.2d 872 (1975), and we now reverse and remand for a new trial.

Trial was had on an information charging four defendants with possession of marijuana on November 23, 1974: two girls, Miss Garrett and Miss Almond; and two young men, Cox and Anderson. At the present trial, Cox and Miss Garrett were found guilty and Anderson acquitted. At a later trial, Miss Almond was convicted.

The Issues

Certain marijuana was seized by the officers as a result of a search of Miss Garrett’s apartment authorized by a search warrant. She attacks the validity of the search, as illegally based (a) on an affidavit insufficient on its face to justify it and (b) on false information misrepresented by the affiant who secured the warrant.

Certain other marijuana was seized from Cox’s automobile, parked outside the Garrett apartment, as a result of a warrantless search. Cox attacks this warrantless search as illegal.

1.

The incidents giving rise to this charge occurred as follows:

Based on an affidavit by Officer Kelly, a search warrant was issued to search a described apartment in which Miss Garrett and Miss Almond lived. The affidavit was issued on the basis of information allegedly given to Kelly by a confidential informant (described as reliable on the basis of past information found proven as true by other independent sources and as a result of prior searches made on the basis of warrants secured based on information from the informant proven as reliable by the searches).

According to the affidavit, the informant supplied the information to Officer Kelly as based on his own personal knowledge: “Within the last 48 hours your affiant [Officer Kelly] has been contacted by a reliable confidential informant. The informant stated the following: Within the last 48 hours the informant has been on the premises of a residence [particularly described], . . . While on said premises the reliable confidential informant observed a quantity of marijuana being at least several ounces in open view and in the possession of one white female known to the reliable confidential informant as Rose Ann Garrett, in the possession of one white male known to the reliable confidential informant as Morris Cox, and in the possession of another white female known to the reliable confidential informant as Pat Almond.”

2.

The Defendant Garrett’s Contentions

We reject Miss Garrett’s attack on the facial insufficiency of the affidavit of probable cause upon the search warrant was based. We believe the affidavit adequately sets forth facts which afforded the issuing magistrate a factual basis both to find the informant credible and the information given by him credible. State v. Humble, 309 So.2d 138 (La.1975); State v. Paciera, 290 So.2d 681 (La.1975).

However, we believe her conviction must be set aside and a new trial granted because the trial court, under the circumstances shown, incorrectly prevented her from attacking the credibility of the af-fiant, Officer Kelly. Her assignment of error in this regard is well-founded.

She filed a motion to suppress the product of the search, alleging, inter alia, “that the information was not furnished to Detective Pat Kelly by any informer and that Detective Kelly either intentionally or unintentionally misrepresented the facts in executing the oath in support of the search warrant.” In support of this allegation, she produced evidence from the defendants that the only persons in the apartment during the 48 hours described by the confidential informer were the four defendants, with the only outsider present at any time during that interval being a Stephen Fury. Fury denied that he was the informer.

Officer Kelly was then recalled to the stand. He admitted that Fury was not his informant. The trial court denied further questioning on the issue of the truthfulness of Kelly’s statement that he had been furnished the information sworn to by a confidential informer. The trial court held that Miss Garrett had made an insufficient affirmative showing that there was a genuine issue that Officer Kelly had sworn untruthfully that he had been furnished the information set forth as obtained from a confidential informer.

This ruling was erroneous.

The credibility of the affiant’s informant or the correctness of the information furnished by the informer may not be attacked on a motion to suppress. State v. George, 273 So.2d 34 (La.1973); State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 256 So.2d 98 (1971), as interpreted by State v. Giordano, 284 So.2d 880 (La.1973) and State v. Melson, 284 So.2d 873 (La.1973).

However, as Giordano and Melson held, upon proper allegations and showing of a genuine issue of the falseness of the affidavit, allegations made therein by the af-fiant may be traversed as untruthful on the affiant’s part. These decisions point out the constitutional and statutory reasons which cannot permit untrue ex parte allegations made by an affiant to be exempt from judicial inquiry. Misrepresentation by an affiant cannot justify the invasion of an individual’s home or his privacy when there is in fact no true probable cause for the invasion, as required by our state and federal constitutions.

The testimony produced by Miss Garrett made a prima facie showing, under appropriate allegations of her motion, that the affiant had sworn falsely that an informer had been present in the apartment and had seen the marijuana illegally possessed. Testimony introduced on her behalf negatived the presence and possibly the existence of such an informer.

Her contention that her home was invaded on the basis only of suspicion, in violation of the state and federal constitutions, was shown to have at least prima facie validity. She should not have been barred from further development of the facts surrounding the seeming untruthfulness of the affiant’s affidavit and the consequent illegality of a warrant secured by untruthful allegations. Further, if the affiant-witness had been permitted to answer the questions indicated, perhaps a truthful basis for the information of his affidavit might have been disclosed and justified as constitutional the search based upon the warrant thereby secured.

The conviction of Miss Garrett must be reversed, and her case remanded for a new trial.

3.

The Defendant Cox’s Contention

Marijuana was seized from the defendant Cox’s motor vehicle without a warrant under the following circumstances:

The search warrant was secured between three and four o’clock in the afternoon. At 12:40 a.m. in the morning, Kelly and four other police officers drove up to search the apartment of the two girls. No one was home. The officers saw a Ford van parked in the yard outside the apartment house.

The van was owned by the defendant Cox. The officers knew the van belonged to Cox, a former state policeman. The windows of the van were up.

The officers approached the van, saw Cox and Anderson inside, and told them to get outside. The officers frankly admitted that they intended to detain Cox and Anderson until the girls showed up, as Cox testified, so as to prevent them from going away and possibly informing the girls not to come. The officers admitted that, at this time, they had no basis for arresting Cox and Anderson, and that they had no arrest warrant for Cox or search warrant for his van.

Cox testified that Officer Breaux told him he would have to search the van and that, if Cox had anything in the van, it would make it a lot easier if he just gave it to Breaux. Cox then took a bag of marijuana from under the carpet and gave it to the officer.

Three of the officers testified that Breaux first told Cox he did not have to permit a search, and that Cox then consented to it, reaching in and handing Breaux the bag. Nevertheless, we do notice that Officer Breaux admitted that he had told Cox, “Do you have anything in there you are wanting to declare to keep us from having to, you know, make much of a mess?” Breaux testified, however, that he made this observation after Cox had already consented to the search (i.e., not before, as Cox testified).

The state does not cite any authority by which the officers had a right to arrest Cox, without a warrant, simply because he was parked in his own automobile outside his girlfriend’s house. Although the search warrant gave them a right to search the girl’s apartment, it did not justify a search of the van parked outside, State v. Massey, 310 So.2d 557 (La.1975), nor did they have any probable cause to do so or to search or arrest Cox himself, State v. Saia, 302 So.2d 869 (La.1974).

Whatever right the police had for temporary questioning of Cox in a public place, La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, it did not extend to the right to detain him until the girls arrived; and, further, no basis for reasonable suspicion is shown (or even claimed) that he had or was about to commit any crime, as required by the statute even for such temporary questioning. Neither is any probable cause shown or even claimed to arrest without a warrant for the unverified misdemeanor allegedly reported by the unidentified informer. La.C.Cr.P. art. 213.

The arrest (detaining) of Cox without a warrant is clearly illegal and unauthorized by the law of Louisiana and of the United States. The “consent” to search was the fruit of this illegal arrest and cannot justify the admission into evidence the product of such a coerced search. The Fourth Amendment’s protection of Americans in the security of their persons and property against unlawful action by state officers prevents admission into evidence of the product of an illegal arrest, as the United States Supreme Court recently held unanimously in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed. 2d 416 (1975). See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Similar provisions in our state constitutions provide like guarantees, with like effects for arbitrary violations of the rights of individuals by officials of government. La.Const. of 1921, Art. I, Section 7; La.Const. of 1974, Art. I, Section 5.

The motion to suppress filed by the defendant Cox should have been sustained. His conviction on the basis of evidence thus illegally obtained must be reversed.

Decree

For the reasons assigned, the convictions of the defendants for the misdemeanor charged must be reversed, and their cases remanded for new trials.

Reversed and remanded for new trials.

SANDERS, C. J., dissents and will assign written reasons.

SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign written reasons.

MARCUS, J., dissents.

SANDERS, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

The majority has upset the conviction of both defendants, but on different grounds. The conviction of Rose Ann Garrett is reversed because of a conclusion that the trial judge unduly restricted the attack upon - the credibility of the police officer who made the affidavit for the search warrant. The conviction of Morris W. Cox is set aside on the ground that the marijuana was obtained in an unconstitutional search of his automobile. I disagree with these holdings, being of the opinion that the factual findings of the trial judge are correct and that, based on these findings, the convictions should be sustained.

The law relating to the Garrett conviction is clear. The correctness of information furnished by an informer to a police officer and included in a search warrant affidavit may not be attacked in a motion to suppress. State v. George, La., 273 So. 2d 34 (1973); State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 256 So.2d 98 (1971).

Perjury of the affiant police officer can be used in an attack upon a search warrant, but only after the defendant has demonstrated “a genuine issue.” State v. Giordano, La., 284 So.2d 880 (1973).

In his well-written Per Curiam, the trial judge 'correctly applies the law to the circumstances of the present case, as follows:

“The motion to suppress merely alleged that the 'information furnished by the affiant in obtaining the search warrant was false, but there were no facts alleged upon which this conclusion was based. The first witness called by the defense on the trial of the motion was that, affiant. Defense counsel sought to illicit [sic] from him the identity of the informant, but was not allowed to do so. Then, it was explained that only one person other than the four arrested were present at the searched apartment during the 48 hours prior to issuance of the warrant (the affidavit stated the informant was there within that period). Counsel stated that he intended to show that the one other person did not give the affiant information.
“At that point, the Court held that the mere conclusion of falsity as alleged was not sufficient to permit the defendants to attack the credibility of the affiant by examining him directly — that there must first be a factual foundation to establish some reason to attack his veracity and that such foundation must be established independently of the affiant.
“There was then presented the testimony of three of the four defendants arrested during the search (one defendant being absent and having been called on her bond), and of Stephen Fury. The three defendants all testified that Fury was the only ‘outsider’ in the apartment during the critical 48-hour period; and Fury and the three defendants all denied that they had given the affiant'any information. It is to be noted, however, that when Rose Ann Garrett (one of the defendants) was cross-examined by the state, she admitted that all four defendants had been present at several times during the 48-hour period and that marijuana was also openly displayed during that period,
“The defense recalled Officer Kelly (the affiant) who admitted that Fury was not his informant. He was never directly asked if the absent defendant were his informant, and the Court would not allow generalized questions seeking merely to explore the officer’s mind, procedures and contacts. At that point in the trial, the defense evidence had not only failed to raise a genuine issue as to the truthfulness of affiant’s sworn statement but there had actually been an admission by the tenant of the apartment of facts reported by the informant to the affiant.
“For these reasons, the Court not only refused to permit further interrogation of the affiant but also denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized in execution of the warrant.”

The circumstances leading to the seizure of marijuana from the Cox automobile are these. The police officers received a valid search warrant to search an apartment located at 1403 Jackson Street in Monroe. The affidavit supporting the search warrant read in part as follows:

“Within the last 48 hours the informant has been on the premises of a residence being one of the apartments located in a white frame house on Jackson Street, Monroe, Louisiana said apartment being located at 1403 Jackson Street, Monroe, Louisiana and more particularly described as being the only apartment with an entrance facing Jackson Street. While on said premises the reliable confidential informant observed a quantity of marijuana being at least several ounces in open view and in the possession of one white female known to the reliable confidential informant as Ro-seanne Garrett, in the possession of one white male known to the reliable confidential informant as Morris Cox

They undertook to execute the warrant on November 23, 1974, arriving at the apartment about 12:30 a. m. Upon leaving their vehicle, the officers saw and recognized Morris Cox, a former law enforcement officer and one of the persons named in the search warrant affidavit as a possessor of marijuana on the premises. Cox and a companion were seated in Cox’s automobile van in the yard of the apartment to be searched. What followed is best described by the trial judge in connection with his findings of fact:

“Since the officers were present to execute the warrant and the occupants of the vehicle were waiting outside, it was obvious to the Court that it was imperative they be removed from the vehicle and ‘detained’ and ‘patted down’ to avoid their tipping off the occupants of the apartment or posing a threat to the activity or to the officers’ safety. Since Cox was a former police officer who was named by the informant as having been in possession of marijuana earlier, there was probable cause to suspect either that he was involved with the occupants of the apartment or independently in such illegal activity.

“Thus, Sergeant Breaux requested permission to search his car, which was granted. He even went so far as to offer Cox the opportunity to remove or declare anything in the vehicle so as to avoid disturbance during the search. At that point, Cox voluntarily removed a package of marijuana from under the floor covering beside the driver’s seat and handed it to an officer. The consent search led to the discovery of a second package in the same general hiding place.”

After the search, the officers informed Cox that he was under arrest for the possession of marijuana.

I know of no adequate reason to reject the finding of the trial judge that consent for the search was freely and voluntarily given. His finding, always entitled to great weight, is reinforced by the circumstance that the vehicle owner who gave consent was a former law enforcement officer, fully acquainted with his constitutional rights. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed.2d 854 (1973).

The majority apparently makes the validity of the consent, though freely given, depend upon the legality of the action of the officers in requesting the defendant and his companion to leave the vehicle. It is true that some restraint of the person occurred prior to the consent-search. Every restraint of the person without an arrest warrant, however, is not a violation of constitutional safeguards. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits only unreasonable seizures of the person. See Hentry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused: Pre-Trial Rights, § 5, p. 28 (1972).

As noted by the trial judge, the restraint imposed by the officers upon defendant represented a minimal invasion of his freedom of action. It was designed to protect the safety of the officers and to avoid the frustration of their search by warning or otherwise. It could easily, in my opinion, be classified as an investigatory stop. Such a stop is specifically authorized by Article 215.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure upon reasonable suspicion. See State v. Winesberry, 256 La. 523, 237 So.2d 364 (1970). The search warrant affidavit implicating Cox in possessing marijuana was more than adequate under the circumstances to provide a basis for reasonable suspicion.

In State v. Jefferson, La., 284 So.2d 882 (1973), this Court held:

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the people against ‘Unreasonable searches and seizures’. (Italics ours.) The United States Supreme Court has held that a warrantless investigatory detention, reasonably limited in scope by its merely investigatory purposes, does not offend this prohibition. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). This investigatory detention for purposes of interrogation extends to automobiles and their occupants. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), See also: State v. Williams, 262 La. 317, 263 So.2d 306 (1972) ; State v. Amphy, 259 La. 161, 249 So.2d 560 (1971); State v. Winesberry, 256 La. 523, 237 So.2d 364 (1970).”

The majority apparently recognizes the right of the police officers to make an investigatory stop, but expresses the view that “it did not extend to the right to detain him until the girls arrived.” As I view the record, the investigative action was taken and search made within minutes after the officers arrived. After the search, the defendant was placed under arrest for probable cause. Thus, the defendant was held in a valid arrest status until the occupants of the apartment arrived a few minutes later.

I am convinced that the detention of defendant was legal.

Assuming, however, that it was illegal to restrain the defendant during the short interval prior to the search, that restraint did not vitiate the consent clearly established by the record.

The state and federal jurisprudence supports the view that consent to search given after an illegal detention is nonetheless valid under circumstances showing no exploitation of the illegality. Phelper v. Decker (5th cir.) 401 F.2d 232 (1968); Bailey v. State, Fla.App., 295 So.2d 133 (1974); James v. State, Fla., 80 So.2d 699 (1955); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3rd 858, 887 at § 9.

At the time the officers requested defendant to get out of the automobile, they immediately advised him of his constitutional rights. There was no handcuffing, deceit, extended interrogation, or other coercive measures. There was no exploitation of the restraint. Defendant, himself, disclosed his possession of marijuana and delivered the first package to thé law enforcement officers.

Under these circumstances, I would hold that the consent was not tainted by the action of the officers.

For the reasons assigned, I respectfully dissent.

SUMMERS, Justice

(dissenting).

I dissent for the reasons assigned by the Chief Justice.

ON REHEARING

SUMMERS, Justice.

Defendants applied to this Court for cer-tiorari to review their convictions and sentences for possession of marijuana, arguing three assignments of error: 1) the search warrant and the affidavit in support thereof were facially insufficient to render a search warrant valid as a matter of law; 2) the trial judge erred in denying the right to traverse during hearing the factual allegations of the affiant in an affidavit to support a search warrant when the factual allegations of the affidavit had been put at issue by the motion to suppress evidence obtained upon the authority of the search warrant; and 3) the trial court erred in finding the police officers had the right to detain a person in a vehicle found adjacent to a residence, which residence is to be searched pursuant to a search warrant, subsequently search the vehicle which that person is occupying, and then arrest that person as a result of the search of his vehicle.

Based upon these assignments of error and the unilateral representation of the applicants we granted certiorari. Upon receipt of the record and after a hearing we rejected the first assignment of error. However, by a divided Court, the second and third assignments were found to be meritorious. Rehearing was granted to reconsider the Court’s decision on these last two assignments of error, principally for the cogent reasons and analysis of these issues by the 'Chief Justice in his dissenting opinion. After reconsideration, the Court’s original opinion is reversed and set aside and the convictions and sentences of the defendants are affirmed.

Based on an affidavit signed by Detective Pat Kelly of Ouachita and Morehouse Parishes’ Strike Force on November 22, 1974, the district judge in Ouachita Parish signed a search warrant authorizing a search of an apartment occupied by Rose Ann Garrett at 1403 Jackson Street, Monroe, Louisiana for controlled dangerous substances, particularly marijuana.

Among other facts, Detective Kelly’s affidavit recites that a reliable confidential informant advised him within the last 48 hours that he had been at the apartment at 1403 Jackson Street and observed a quantity of marijuana in open view in the possession of Rose Ann Garrett, Morris Cox and Pat Almond.

With the authorization the search warrant provided, Detective Kelly and other officers some time thereafter proceeded to 1403 Jackson Street to execute the search. Upon arrival at 12:40 a. m. they observed a Ford Van parked in the front yard at 1403 Jackson, occupied by its owner Morris Cox and one David Anderson. Morris Cox was a former police officer known to Detective Kelly and known to be the owner of the van. Cox’s name was also mentioned in Kelly’s affidavit.

Upon request of the officers, Cox and Anderson got out of the vehicle and were advised of their constitutional rights, after which Cox voluntarily consented to a search of his van. He was then asked if he would “declare” any contraband items prior to the search, whereupon he reached into the vehicle, removed a plastic bag of marijuana from under the floor mat and handed it to the officers. Thereafter, while searching the interior of the van, officers found another bag of marijuana under the front floor mats and a marijuana smoking pipe between the seats. Cox and Anderson were then placed under arrest for possession of marijuana.

At approximately 12:50 a. m. Rose Ann Garrett and Patsy Almond arrived at the Jackson Street apartment. Both were brought inside and advised of their constitutional rights and the reason for the search. The search was then conducted by the officers and resulted in the seizure of a marijuana smoking pipe containing marijuana found in plain view on the mantel in the living room. A cosmetic kit belonging to Rose Ann Garrett containing marijuana and a “roach clip” were also found. Garrett and Almond were then arrested for possession of marijuana.

Cox and Garrett were tried and found guilty of the charge on February 12, 1975. Anderson was found not guilty and Patsy Almond was absent, called on bond, and at a later date found guilty of possession of marijuana on the same facts.

I.

Prior to trial both Garrett and Almond filed motions to suppress based upon allegations that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant because the affidavit supporting its issuance was defective in that it contained misrepresentations. Thus, according to the motion, any evidence obtained as a result of the execution of the search warrant was illegally obtained.

The trial judge denied the motion and the second assignment of error urged in the application for certiorari was reserved.

As the trial judge set forth in his per curiam to this assignment, the motion to suppress merely alleged that the information furnished by affiant in support of the issuance of the warrant was false. However, no facts were alleged to support these conclusions. When Detective Kelly was called as a witness by the defense, defense counsel sought to elicit from him the identity of the informer, but was not allowed to do so. The defense then sought to establish by the testimony of the defendants and Anderson that only one person other than the four mentioned in the affidavit was present in the apartment during the 48 hour period mentioned :in the affidavit and that this person was one Stephen Fury.

When Rose Ann Garrett was cross-examined by the state she admitted that all four defendants had been present at several times during the 48 hour period and that marijuana was openly displayed during that period.

Although defense counsel obtained an admission from Detective Kelly that Fury was not his informant, he did not ask if the absent defendant Patsy Almond was his informant. Generalized questions seeking merely to explore the officer’s mind, procedure and contacts were not allowed thereafter by the trial judge. A fishing expedition by defense counsel was not permitted. The trial judge concluded, therefore, that the defense had failed to raise a genuine issue as to the truthfulness of Officer Kelly’s sworn statement. Moreover, he found to be relevant the fact that there had actually been an admission by Rose Ann Garrett that marijuana was in open display while the four arrested parties were in the apartment during the 48 hour period mentioned in Detective Kelly’s affidavit. The motion to suppress was denied.

There is nothing in the record which would persuade this Court to reject the fact finding prerogative of the trial judge, which is the principal basis for his denying the motion.

Defendant cannot avail himself of the right to controvert the truthfulness of an affiant in a sworn affidavit in support of a search warrant without demonstrating a genuine issue on the affiant’s veracity supported by convincing allegations of fact which, if proven, would establish the falsity of the affidavit. State v. Giordano, 284 So.2d 880 (La.1973). The paramount public interest recognizes the need to protect and promote a reliable informer system. If the issuance of search warrants based upon information supplied by informers is to continue the state must not be compelled to produce its informer to refute unsupported allegations of falsification by affiants in support of search warrants at every hearing on a motion to suppress. State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 256 So.2d 98 (1972).

There is no merit to this assignment.

II.

Defendant Cox filed a motion to suppress alleging that there was no probable cause for the search of his van, no search warrant had been issued to authorize the search and that the search was not incident to a lawful arrest. Therefore, any evidence obtained as a result of said search was illegally obtained and should be suppressed. The motion was denied.

The trial judge found as a fact that the officers executing the search of Cox’s van requested permission to search and Cox granted permission. Moreover, Cox voluntarily handed over a package of marijuana .from under the floor covering in the van. The consent to search led to the discovery of a second package in the van.

It is not necessary, therefore, to inquire into the validity of the detention of Cox prior to the consent he voluntarily gave to the search. Consent to search given after an illegal detention is nonetheless valid under circumstances showing no exploitation of the illegality. Phelper v. Decker, 401 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1968); Bailey v. State, 295 So.2d 133 (Fla.App. 1974); James v. State, 80 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1955); 9 A.L.R. 3rd 858, 857 at § 9.

As a former police officer Cox was knowledgeable in matters of this nature and at the very outset of the detention he was 'advised of his constitutional rights. It could hardly be said that the officers exploited the detention, if it could be considered illegal, by asking Cox, after he had consented to the search, “Do you have anything in there you are wanting to declare to keep from having to, you know, make much of a mess ?”

This assignment of error has no merit.

For the reasons assigned, the original opinion rendered herein is reversed and set aside and the convictions and sentences are affirmed.

TATE, J., dissents for the reasons assigned on original hearing.

DIXON, J., dissents.

DENNIS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

CALOGERO, J., dissents, being of the opinion that the opinion on original hearing was correct in all respects.

DENNIS, Justice

(concurring).

As I view the record, the detention of the defendant Cox was not unlawful. Therefore, I find it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether a consent to search following an illegal detention can be considered valid.

I respectfully concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jewel HORNSBY v. Edward RAY et al.
    No. 57817.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Mrs. Jewel Hornsby and Wallace Hornsby, applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of St. Landry, 327 So.2d 146.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.

TATE, and DIXON, JJ., dissent, agreeing with the dissent in the Court of Appeal.


author: SUMMERS, J., DIXON, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilbur Joseph LELEUX, Jr.
    No. 57822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 9, 1976.
    Risley C. Triche, Triche & Sternfels, Napoleonville, James A. McPherson, New Orleans, Emile Carmouche, Crowley, for defendant-relator, Wilbur Joseph Leleux, Jr-
    Frank T. Salter, Jr., Dist. Atty., Lake Charles, for respondent, State of Louisiana.
   In re: Wilbur Joseph Leleux, Jr. applying for Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Stay Order

Writ denied in part and granted in part:

Applicant’s assignment relative to the trial court’s denial of motion to suppress presents a serious issue under Aguil-lar v. Texas and decisions of this Court concerning the admissibility of evidence seized under search warrant. Nevertheless, the Court does not ordinarily interfere with the orderly processes of trial where there is an adequate remedy by appeal in the event of conviction. Writ is therefore denied as to this assignment.

Applicant’s assignment of error relative to denial of motion for subpoena ad testificandum directed to the State of Louisiana to produce or see to the production of the witness, John A. Jensen, Jr. at the bail hearing is meritorious. Applicant is entitled under Art. 731 of the La.C.Cr.P. to compel the attendance of witnesses in order to discharge his burden of proof under La.C.Cr.P. art. 313(2). The State of Louisiana and the district attorney of Calcasieu Parish are therefore ordered to produce at the hearing of defendant’s application for bail the witness, John A. Jensen, Jr. or take such steps, and do and perform all such acts as are necessary and proper to secure the attendance of the witness at the hearing on the application for bail.

SUMMERS, J.,

is of the opinion the writ should be denied on all issues. The gratuitous statements in the majority per curiam relating to the denial of the motion to suppress are not supported by the application or the law. There is no proper showing to set aside the trial judge’s ruling on the question of issuance of subpoenaes. No opportunity has been accorded the trial judge to respond to the application in support of his ruling on this issue.

DIXON, J.,

concurs in ordering the production of the witness at the bail hearing, but dissents from the refusal to grant on the motion to suppress, being of the opinion that the search warrant clearly violated “Aguillar” requirements in the failure to disclose reliability of information that defendant participated in the crime.


text:
    Herbert Ray JACK v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK.
    No. 57808.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, applying for Certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Evangeline, 326 So.2d 584.

Writ denied. We cannot say that the result is incorrect.

SANDERS, C. J., is of the opinion that a writ should be granted.

SUMMERS, J., is of the opinion the writ should be granted.


author: SUMMERS, Justice. TATE, Justice PER CURIAM:

text:
    Buster Joseph CHIVOLETTO v. JOHNS-MANVILLE PRODUCTS CORPORATION.
    No. 56998.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 29, 1976.
    On Application for Rehearing May 14, 1976.

      David Gertler and Joseph M. Singerman, The Law Offices of Steven R. Plotkin, New Orleans, for plaintiff-applicant.
    Bruce A. North, Baldwin, Haspel, Mo-lony, Rainold & Meyer, New Orleans, for defendant-respondent.
   SUMMERS, Justice.

Certiorari was granted on plaintiff’s application to resolve three issues presented in this workmen’s compensation suit: 1) Was plaintiff totally and permanently disabled? 2) Was defendant’s action in refusing to pay compensation arbitrary and capricious? 3) Had the plaintiff’s action prescribed ?

I.

This case involves facts which are not disputed. The Court of Appeal accepted the findings of fact of the trial judge, and plaintiff relies upon these findings to support his claim that he is entitled to total and permanent disability under the Workman’s Compensation Act. The issue, then, is whether, from the facts of record, plaintiff is, as he contends, totally and permanently disabled.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Section 1031.1 of Title 23 of the Revised Statutes, which is the occupational disease section of Louisiana’s Workmen’s Compensation Act. He alleges that he was employed by Johns-Manville Products Corporation from 1948 through 1970 in various capacities as a common laborer in its New Orleans plant. The facts show that asbestos was employed there in the manufacture of pipe and other products. Plaintiff was in time a lathe operator, fashioning asbestos pipe and was engaged in that employment at the time of his termination. His discharge from employment was due to the shutdown of the plant.

While in the employ of Johns-Manville during March 1970 plaintiff participated in a pulmonary (lung) function study of 900 workers from Johns-Manville and National Gypsum Company.

After his separation on October 1, 1970 from Johns-Manville, plaintiff was employed by Hunt-Wesson Foods in Gretna as a laborer performing odd jobs. His work there was satisfactory. This employment was interrupted by a lay-off for five months. During this interval plaintiff obtained employment with Hydril, Inc., a company engaged in the business of threading oil field tubular goods. Here plaintiff’s job involved handling pipes before and after threading, storage of pipe, loading trucks, hydrostatic testing and similar work. At the end of five months, plaintiff returned to work with Hunt-Wesson Foods where the pay was better. His duties required only mild exertion, commensurate with the exertion required to perform his duties as lathe operator with Johns-Manville.

Then, on March 1, 1972, plaintiff obtained employment with the Parish of Jefferson as Sewerage Treatment Plant Operator working in the lab, repairing motors, turning valves, occasionally loading trucks, raking sewerage disposal areas, and other duties as assigned. Again his work was satisfactory and during the course of this employment he received merit raises in pay. While thus employed he experienced an episode of difficulty in breathing on February 25, 1973 and sought medical attention. After X rays and examination by Dr. Morton Brown he was advised on March 3, 1973 that he had asbestosis, a condition involving interstitial fibrosis of the lungs.

Plaintiff instituted this suit on May 15, 1973, alleging that he contracted asbestosis while in the employ of Johns-Manville, claiming total and permanent disability under the terms of the occupational disease statute, La.R.S. 23:1031.1. At the time of the trial on March 12, 1974, he was still in the employ of Jefferson Parish as a Sewerage Treatment Plant Operator earning $585 per month, more than he earned in the employ of Johns-Manville.

From the 1970 study and from X rays and examinations performed by three doctors after March 3, 1973 and the other evidence, the trial judge, in a lengthy and thorough opinion, drew these conclusions:

The plaintiff ceased work with Johns-Manville because he, along with several hundred other workers, was laid off. This lay-off had nothing to do with plaintiff’s health and was solely for business or economic reasons as determined by Johns-Manville. At the time of his lay-off in 1970, plaintiff was actually able to perform his duties as a lathe operator; he is neither legally nor factually disabled from performing his duties as a sewerage plant operator for his present employer, the Parish of Jefferson, and he is presently satisfactorily performing the duties of his new occupation without undue pain or discomfort and without danger to himself or to others. Plaintiff could not now work at any occupation in an environment which necessitated his exposure to asbestos or silica particles in the atmosphere without severely endangering his health.

Finding that plaintiff had asbestosis, the trial judge reasoned that although plaintiff was not disabled, his lung condition and shortness of breath would entitle him to an award under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Accordingly, he found that the usefulness of a physical function (his lungs) was seriously and permanently impaired, allowing compensation under Section 1221 (4) (p) of the Act for 100 weeks at $49 per week, plus past and future necessary medical expenses. This award was affirmed in the Court of Appeal.

According to the 1970 study which included X rays, physical examination and tests of each participant, there was not then any indication of plaintiff’s subsequently diagnosed asbestosis. Defendant’s expert medical witness, a medical doctor of reknown in the field, who gave his opinion of the findings, stated the lung volumes were all within normal limits. Vital capacity, residual volume and total capacity all exceeded the predicted normals. He did testify, however, that plaintiff exhibited evidence of emphysema which can produce airway obstruction and that there was no correlation between emphysema and asbestosis. In addition, he found that plaintiff was a heavy smoker and suffered from bronchitis, stating that there was a definite correlation between bronchitis and smoking.

In response to a question from the Court as to the condition of plaintiff’s lungs in 1970, defendant’s medical expert stated that plaintiff had “slight” obstruction to airflow and “minimal” reduction in diffusion capacity. He further stated that the level of impairment was not likely to be clinically significant, that is, it would not be expected to be associated with significant exercise or tolerance and not likely to cause significant shortness of breath.

In support of these expert opinions the record makes clear that plaintiff worked steadily after leaving Johns-Manville’s employ and, aside from his own uncorroborated statement that he sometimes had trouble breathing, he was apparently not limited in the physical activity which his employment required.

Later lung function studies made on plaintiff in March 1973 revealed normal lung volumes and a normal index of pulmonary mixing. Evidence did exist, however, of mild obstructive change which was compatible with asbestosis, smoking, emphysema and bronchitis, all of which were present at times in plaintiff’s medical history. It was the opinion of defendant’s experts that plaintiff’s subjective complaints (shortness of breath) were disproportionate to the objective findings and that plaintiff was capable of working.

In addition to the functional studies, plaintiff underwent extensive radiological examination. It is undisputed that the X rays indicated the presence of some interstitial fibrosis. Defendant’s medical expert had the benefit of X rays taken in connection with his examination of 1970 and X rays taken in 1973. He testified that the fibrosis apparent in the 1970 X rays was minimal or mild in extent, and that there was no difference in the extent of fibrosis demonstrated between 1970 and 1973. This is an important factor since asbestosis is considered to be progressive, even in the-absence of continued exposure to asbestos dust.

Plaintiff’s medical expert, to some extent, based his opinion on the results of tests performed by defendant’s experts, because the hospital where he practiced was not equipped to perform those tests. He agreed that plaintiff’s lung function studies were within normal limits with the exception of a low P.C.0.2 factor indicative of hypertension. He nevertheless testified that plaintiff could not return to his work as a lathe operator. But this opinion seems to be based not so much upon plaintiffs physical condition, but upon the doctor’s belief that plaintiff should not be further exposed to asbestos dust.

In view of the findings of the trial judge, which were undoubtedly based to some extent upon the credibility of the witnesses, especially plaintiffs subjective complaints, and the complete acceptance of those findings by the Court of Appeal, together with our own study of the record, we are unable to conclude that plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled as he contends. However, in view of the progressive nature of asbestosis, plaintiff is reserved the right to file another compensation claim if and when he becomes disabled as a result of the occupational disease he has contracted. LaCoste v. J. Ray Mc-Dermott & Co., 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779 (1967). Prescription on this claim has been interrupted by the filing of this suit within four months of the date the disease first manifested itself. In the event plaintiff does become disabled and entitled to compensation for that reason, defendant shall receive credit for payments made as a result of the instant suit.

Defendant argues that, in the absence of a showing of disability as a result of an occupational disease, no recovery is available to plaintiff, for by the express terms of the statute on the subject, and this Court’s decision in LaCoste v. J. Ray McDermott Company, 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779 (1967), disability is a prerequisite to the entitlement to compensation under the occupational disease statute. The relevant portion of the occupational disease statute provides:

“Every employee who is disabled because of the contraction of an occupational disease as herein defined (asbestosis being defined as an occupational disease) . . . shall be entitled to the compensation provided in the Chapter the same as if said employee received personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.” (parentheses added). La.R.S. 23:1031.-1A.

While this question was answered in the LaCoste Case, the question of entitlement to compensation “where the usefulness of a physical function is seriously permanently impaired” as provided for in Section 1221 (4) (p) (see footnote 1) was not considered. Regardless of the merits or demerits of defendant’s contention, this Court will not amend the judgment rendered in the Court of Appeal in defendant’s favor because defendant has not applied for writs seeking its amendment. As a result defendant is limited to opposing the relief sought by plaintiff, which, on this issue, is a claim for an award of compensation based upon a finding of total and permanent disability. Since we deny plaintiff’s claim for total permanent disability the judgment in plaintiff’s favor awarding compensation for impairment of a physical function remains in full force and effect.

II.

Although the trial court denied plaintiff’s claim for penalties and attorney’s fees under Section 1201.2 of Title 23 and Section 658 of Title 22 of the Revised Statutes, this phase of the case assumed a different posture when plaintiff’s award for 100 weeks compensation at $49 per week was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and defendant did not timely apply for writs to review that judgment. Thus plaintiff’s judgment became final insofar as that award was concerned. Proof of plaintiff’s loss to the extent of that judgment was then established to a legal certainty. The continuing demand represented by plaintiff’s application for writs, and the expiration of sixty days, completed the law’s requirements. Withholding payment of compensation thereafter became arbitrary and capricious, entitling plaintiff to penalties and attorney’s fees as prescribed by the act.

Considering the time and effort expended by plaintiff’s attorneys in the prosecution of this claim in the trial court, the Court of Appeal and in this Court, a fee of $1,000, in addition to the fee agreed upon by plaintiff and his counsel under the limitations provided in Section 1141 of Title 23 of the Revised Statutes, is considered reasonable.

III.

Insofar as defendant’s plea of prescription is concerned, that issue is also finally determined adversely to defendant.

Defendant filed the plea of prescription in the trial court and the plea was denied. The Court of Appeal affirmed, saying the facts of the case would not support defendant’s plea of prescription. No application for review of that adverse ruling has been filed by defendant in this Court and no relief from its effect can be granted to defendant.

This Court has consistently held that it will not amend a judgment to the prejudice of the party at whose instance the writ issued where the opposing party has failed to make application seeking such amendment. Gulotta v. Cutshaw, 283 So.2d 482 (La.1973); Francis v, Lake Charles American Press, 262 La. 875, 265 So.2d 206 (1972); Pennington v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 242 La. 1, 134 So.2d 53 (1961); Foley v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., 183 La. 49, 162 So. 798 (1935); Black v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 161 La. 889, 109 So. 538 (1926). A judgment should not be amended to benefit parties who have failed to apply for review. Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 245 So.2d 151 (1971). Although the Court may in its discretion permit the filing of a plea of prescription in this Court, it will not do so when the plea has been previously asserted at a lower level. Gullota v. Cutshaw, supra; Succession of Douglass, 225 La. 65, 72 So.2d 262 (1954). Notwithstanding these obstacles to defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s claim has prescribed, as already noted, the facts recited support a finding that plaintiff filed his claim within four months after the asbestosis manifested itself.

For the reasons assigned, plaintiff is awarded penalties as provided by law and attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,000, in addition to the fee agreed upon by plaintiff and his counsel under the limitations provided in Section 1141 of Title 23 of the Revised Statutes. In all other respects the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.

TATE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., dissent for reasons assigned by TATE, J.

TATE, Justice

(dissenting).

The plaintiff is entitled to benefits for permanent and total disability. He is a skilled or semi-skilled lathe-operator disabled by his work-disease from performing the duties of the employment in which the disease was incurred.

Under the occupational disease statute, his disability caused by his work-disease is compensable “the same as if said employee received personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.” La.R.S. 23:1031.1A. As stated in LaCoste v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779, 782 (1967), applying the same test for disability resulting from an occupational disease as that resulting from an occupational accident: “In fine, in Louisiana ‘disability’ has always been interpreted and understood to mean inability to perform the same or similar work the employee was doing when injured.” (Italics mine.)

As a result of the employment-caused disease, the plaintiff employee can never return to work in the asbestos field. It was in this employment of some twenty-two years that the plaintiff incurred his present disabling disease.

This disability is compensable under our jurisprudence, as being a disability which prevents his return to this field of skilled or semi-skilled employment. The resulting physical incapacity thus narrows his field of employment opportunity and his ability to earn a living. Under well-settled principles, this loss of earning capacity is com-pensable, despite the plaintiff’s present ability to earn a living in other fields of labor, such as at the sewerage plant at which he presently works as a common laborer.

I also have reservations about the imposition of penalties upon the defendant.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM:

Considering the stipulation of counsel that, although not part of the record, the judgment of the district court rendered on May 31, 1974, together with costs, was in fact satisfied by defendant, within a reasonable time after rendition, in accordance with the facts set forth in a stipulation filed herein, we now modify and amend the judgment and decree rendered herein to strike therefrom the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,000.

The parties hereto are granted the right to apply for a rehearing on the issue adjudicated in this per curiam opinion.

      . La.Rev.Stat. 23 :1221 (4) (p) provides:
      “In the following cases the compensation shall be as follows
      “(p) In cases not falling within any of the provisions already made, where the employee is seriously permanently disfigured about the face or head, or where the usefulness of a physical function is seriously permanently impaired, the court may allow such compensation as is reasonable and as in proportion to the compensation hereinabove specifically provided in cases of specific disability, not to exceed sixty-five per centum of wages during one hundred weeks.”


text:
    RIVERS HALL v. KAISER ALUMINUM COMPANY.
    No. 57820.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Rivers Hall, applying for Certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of St. Bernard.

Writ denied. On the facts found, we find no error in the result.

DIXON, J., dissents from the denial and would grant the writ.


author: DENNIS, Justice. DIXON, Justice

text:
    ECONOMY CARPETS MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU OF BATON ROUGE AREA, INC.
    No. 57146.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 29, 1976.

      Bart Eaton, D. Bert Garraway, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-relator.
    Donald T. W. Phelps, Seale, Smith & Phelps, Baton Rouge, for defendant-respondent.
    Calvin E. Hardin, Jr., Ashton L. Stewart, A. Leon Hebert, P. Raymond Lamoni-ca, Baton Rouge, for amicus curiae.
   DENNIS, Justice.

We granted certiorari to consider the ambit of constitutional protection to be afforded a person when the publication of his views out of court is alleged to be in conflict with the fair administration of justice in the courts. The petitioner, a litigant in a civil jury case before the East Baton Rouge Parish district court, contends that the trial judge, in prohibiting it from expressing opinions concerning the parties, the judge and other persons involved in the lawsuit, has abridged its liberty of free speech as protected by the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 7 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.

On May 9, 1975, Economy Carpets Manufacturers and Distributors, Inc. instituted suit against the Better Business Bureau of Baton Rouge Area, Inc., claiming treble damages and attorney’s fees for conspiratorial acts in restraint of trade and commerce under La.R.S. 51:122. Subsequently, plaintiff successfully moved the district court for an order allowing a trial by jury in these proceedings. During a hearing on a contested discovery motion the trial judge was orally informed by counsel that the parties had published comments about the litigation on a sign board and in a bulletin mailed within the Baton Rouge area. Without an evidentiary hearing, the court issued an order prohibiting the parties from using any public advertisements, news media, private publication or other means whatsoever to draw attention to the litigation, and further ordered that all signs were to be removed within twenty-four hours. On certiorari to this Court, the order of the trial court was set aside as having been improperly issued without affording the parties a hearing or an opportunity to present evidence. 319 So.2d 783 (La.1975).

After remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on its own motion and issued an order commanding the plaintiff to cease and desist from using signs or any public advertisements to call attention to this litigation and prohibiting defendant from calling attention to this litigation by means of any public advertisements or private publications. We again granted writs to review the significant constitutional issues raised by this decision.

The facts are not in dispute. On May 6, 1975, Jesse James Jarreau, executive officer of Economy Carpets, stationed a portable electric sign at its place of business on Greenwell Springs Road in Baton Rouge, which read:

“CHARLIE TAPP OF CONSUMER PROTECTION IS A LIAR WHO SUCKS UP WITH THE B.B.B.”

On May 15, 1975, the defendant BBB distributed to its membership a bulletin in which it discussed the background of this litigation. This included referral of complaints against Economy Carpets by the BBB to Mr. Charles Tapp, Director of the Governor’s Office of Consumer Protection; an investigation of"Economy by Mr. Tapp which resulted from the complaints; and various verbal attacks upon the BBB and Mr. Tapp made by Jesse James Jar-reau of Economy Carpets.

On May 29 or 30, 1975, Mr. Jarreau placed a portable electric sign across the street from the BBB office at 200 Laurel Street in Baton Rouge, which stated:

“THE BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU SHAFTS YOU & THE SMALL BUSINESSMAN TOO! ”

On June 9, 1975, Mr. Jarreau changed the wording of the sign across from the BBB office to read:

“DALE RAMIREZ OF THE BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU MUST .. RESIGN PENDING INVESTIGATION.”

Between June 17 and June 30,. 1975, Mr. Jarreau was quoted in a local weekly newspaper as having said:

“We have asked for a jury trial, so I am not scared of Melvin Shortess. We might even put up a sign about him.”

On June 25, 1975, Mr. Jarreau changed the lettering on the sign across from the BBB office to state:

“BILLY GUSTE DOESN’T HAVE THE BALLS TO INVESTIGATE HIS DARLINGS, CHARLIE TAPP & THE BBB.”

However, on June 27, 1975, he changed the word "balls” to “guts.” Then on or about July 16, 1975, this sign was changed by Mr. Jarreau to say that congressional records prove that BBBs are phonies run by big shots, or words to that effect. On November 17 through 22, 1975, the sign erected across from the BBB office stated:

“THE BBB IS THE WORST BUNKO OPERATION OF THEM ALL ECONOMY CARPETS JESSE JAREAU.”

From November 22, 1975 through January 9, 1976, it said:

“A VOTE FOR JUDGE SHORTESS IS A VOTE AGAINST FREEDOM OF SPEECH ECONOMY CARPETS JESSE JARREAU.”

At one point the sign was worded to read:

“NEWS FLASH JIM KOLTER QUITS BBB RUNNING SCARED MOVING OUT OF TOWN.”

Mr. Jarreau testified that he thought he had a right to erect the signs and that he contemplated putting up similar ones in the future.

The evidence does not show the proximity of the signs to the parish courthouse, nor is there any indication that either sign could be seen by persons entering or leaving the court building.

In its written reasons for judgment the trial court concluded that:

“ * * * It is imperative that strong protective measures be taken in order to assure that the trier of fact will not be influenced by anything other than an objective presentation of the evidence. * * * ”

and cited as authority for its issuance of the protective order La.C.C.P. art. 1631 which, in pertinent part, provides:

“The court has the power to require that the proceeding shall be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner, and to control the proceedings at the trial, so that justice is done.”

This article is a partial restatement of the courts’ inherent judicial authority and power of supervision. La.Constitution of 1974, Art. II; Art. V, §§ 1, 2; La.C.C.P. art. 1631, Official Revision Comment (a). Unquestionably, this power and authority would furnish ground for the issuance of a protective order to assure the fair administration of justice under proper circumstances. See Economy Carpets v. BBB, 319 So.2d 783 (La.1975). However, the judicial authority, as all powers of government, is not without limit, and where it is asserted an individual’s right of free speech has been abridged by the exercise of that power, the burden is upon us to define its limitations.

Since any order issued under La.C.C.P. art. 1631 restricting an individual’s freedom of expression would depend ultimately for its enforcement upon the court’s contempt power, we find that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining the limitations upon that power to be controlling, insofar as petitioner’s assertion of its First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and very pertinent to our inquiry into a court’s authority to hinder freedom of expression under the Louisiana Constitution. In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962), the United States Supreme Court, in reviewing the principles evolved from the exercise of this judicial power in the context of the First Amendment protections, stated:

“We start with the premise that the right of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled way lies at the foundation of our system of government and that courts necessarily must possess the means of punishing for contempt when conduct tends directly to prevent the discharge of their functions. While courts have continuously had the authority and power to maintain order in their courtrooms and to assure litigants a fair trial, the exercise of that bare contempt power is not what is questioned in this esse. Here it is asserted Jhat the exercise of the contempt power, to commit a person to jail for an utterance out of the presence of the court, has abridged the accused’s liberty of free expression. In this situation the burden upon this Court is to define the limitations upon the contempt power according to the terms of the Federal Constitution.
“In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, [159 A. L.R. 1346], this Court for the first time had occasion to review a State’s exercise of the contempt power utilized to punish the publisher of an out-of-court statement. The accused contended that the exercise abridged his right of free speech guaranteed against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment. To determine the scope of this constitutional protection, the Court reviewed the history of the contempt power, both in England and in this country. It held that ‘the only conclusion supported by [that] history is that the unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to give to liberty of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society.’ Id. [314 U.S.] at 265, 62 S.Ct. [190] at 194, 195. Thus clarifying the exercise of this judicial power in the context of the protections assured by the First Amendment, the Court held that out-of-court publications were to be governed by the clear and present danger standard, described as ‘a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.’ Id. [314 U.S.] at 263, 62 S.Ct. [190] at 194. Subsequently, in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295, after noting that ‘[f]ree discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principle of Americanism — a principle which all are zealous to preserve’ (id., [328 U.S.] at 346, 66 S.Ct. [1029] at 1037), the Court reaffirmed its belief that the ‘essential right of the courts to be free of intimidation and coercion . . . [is] consonant with a recognition that freedom of the press must be allowed in the broadest scope compatible with the supremacy of order.’ Id. [328 U.S.] at 334, 66 S.Ct. [1029] at 1031. The Court’s last occasion to consider the application of the clear and present danger principle to a case of the type under review was in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546. There the Court held that to warrant a sanction ‘[t]he fires which [the expression] kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.’ Id. [331 U.S.] at 376, 67 S.Ct. [1249] at 1255.” (Footnotes omitted.) 370 U.S. at 383, 82 S.Ct. at 1369, 8 L. Ed.2d at 576, 577.

Defendants contend that there is a significant distinction between these authorities and the instant case because the former do not involve a jury trial with its correlative considerations. We agree that the potential effect upon jurors is a valid factor in determining whether there is a clear and present danger that the fair administration of justice will be obstructed by the exercise of free speech in a particular situation. However, even in a jury case, a clear showing must be made that the exercise of free speech rights will interfere with the rights of the parties to a fair trial in order to justify prior restraint upon the freedom of expression. See Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) ; In re Oliver,-452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Recommendations of Committee on Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 45 F. R.D. 391, 404-407 (1969).

Defendant further argues that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press are inapplicable to “public advertisements” such as those proscribed by the trial court’s order. However, the publications here were not commercial advertisements doing no more than proposing a business transaction. Instead, they “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, [and] protested claimed abuses.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, .376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Compare the New York Times case and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973) with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court cases have clearly established that speech is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in the

form of commercial advertising. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975).

We recognize the principles set forth in Wood v. Georgia, supra, as the proper criteria for determining both the federal and the Louisiana constitutional questions raised herein by plaintiff. Accordingly, we are required to examine the statements of the parties to see whether or not they carry a threat of clear and present danger to the orderly and fair administration of justice in our courts or whether they are of the character which the principles of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 protect.

Although the trial judge concluded the parties’ statements created a serious evil he did not in any manner indicate how the publications threatened interference with the administration of justice. In contrast with the cases holding that suppression was appropriate, see, e. g. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 38 S.Ct. 560, 62 L.Ed. 1186 (1917), the record here does not contain elaborate factual findings.

Our review of the evidence reveals no danger of any kind to the administration of justice, much less a situation in which a substantial threat of evil is “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.” Bridges v. California, supra, 314 U.S. at 263, 62 S.Ct. at 194. None of the utterances here even recommends how the litigation should be decided or constitutes a threat of consequences that will follow a contrary decision by the trier of facts. Compare Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941) and Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1946), wherein publications obviously designed to influence judicial decisions nevertheless were held entitled to protection as free speech because the expressions did not pose a clear and present danger of accomplishing their purpose. In the present litigation, except for the sign referring to the judge, who is not the trier of facts in this civil jury case, it would be difficult for the uninitiated to determine that plaintiff’s signs had any relation to a court proceeding. Even if we assume the utterances tended to coerce prospective jurors exposed to them, the statements could not have had a great impact within the thickly populated parish of East Baton Rouge. The publications were limited to two small sign boards and one mailing of an organizational bulletin, and the dispute did not receive any attention from television stations, daily newspapers, or other media. Without probative evidence that the publicity threatened to affect the answers of jurors on voir dire examination or testimony of witnesses at the trial, or to in some way create prejudice in the public mind or undue influence for a party so that a fair and impartial trial could not be obtained in the parish, we think it unreasonable to conclude that such would be the case. See La. C.C.P. art. 122 and La.C.Cr.P. art. 622, which describe these as circumstances that could prevent a fair and impartial trial.

The words of Mr. Justice Holmes, spoken in reference to very different facts, seem entirely applicable here:

“ * * * I confess that I cannot find in all this or in the evidence in the case anything that would have affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still less can I find there anything that obstructed the administration of justice in any sense that I possibly can give to those words.” Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. at 425, 38 S.Ct. at 566, 62 L.Ed. at 1195.

Our examination of the statements and the circumstances under which they were published leads us to conclude that they did not present a danger to the administration of justice that should vitiate either party’s freedom to express its opinion in the manner chosen.

The protective order of the trial court of November 17, 1975 is annulled and set aside, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

SUMMERS, J., concurs.

DIXON, J., concurs with reasons.

DIXON, Justice

(concurring).

Although I fully subscribe to the majority opinion, I would note that it must not be considered authority for attorneys to resort to extra-judicial publicity for pending litigation. Canon 7, Ethical Consideration 7-33, Code of Professional Responsibility.

      . This sign was erected after the issuance of the cease and desist order by the trial judge. However, the parties stipulated that this fact be made a part of the record for consideration by us in deciding the case.


text:
    John C. ROURKE, M. D., et al. v. Victor E. COURSEY, Jr.
    No. 57328.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1976.
   In re: Victor E. Coursey, Jr. applying for Supervisory Writ of Certiorari and Mandamus. 329 So.2d 481.

Writ and stay order denied. This court will not interfere with the orderly proceedings in the trial court in the absence of a showing of irreparable injury. There is no showing of such injury as in our opinion warrants our staying the Sheriff’s sale scheduled for Jan. 7. Relator has a remedy by appeal from the trial court’s granting plaintiff’s judgment of dismissal without prejudice. Nor shall this writ denial in any way prejudice defendant-relator’s properly asserted defenses to the initial and/or subsequent petitions for deficiency judgment if any such defenses exist.


text:
    LOUISIANA RESOURCES COMPANY v. Roger EDWARDS et al.
    No. 57561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 19, 1976.
   In re: Louisiana Resources Co., applying for writs of Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition. 329 So.2d 477.

Writ refused. The showing made is insufficient to support the conclusion that the Court of Appeal erred.

SUMMERS, J., takes no part.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles A. J. WEEDON and Tommy Ronish.
    No. 57748.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Charles A. J. Weedon and Tommy Ronish applying for Writs of Certiora-ri, Review, Prohibition, Mandamus and Stay Order.

Writ denied. Applicants have an adequate remedy by appeal in the event of conviction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. William J. GUSTE, Jr., Attorney General v. ESTATE of Numa Paul HIMBERT et al.
    No. 57755.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Steven Wayne Ard, Ronald Stanley Ard and Phillip F. Ard, in his capacity as natural tutor of the minor child, Melanie Mae Ard, applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of E. Baton Rouge. 327 So.2d 698.

Writ denied. The judgment is not final.


text:
    Herbert R. STOREY v. STATE FARM MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
    No. 57756.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Herbert R. Storey, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 327 So.2d 687.

Writ denied. Under the facts found by the Court of Appeal, we cannot say the result is incorrect.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Howard JONES.
    No. 57759.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: James Howard Jones applying for Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Stay Order.

Writ denied. There is no merit in the application.


text:
    Kathryn Eileen ROBINSON v. Carolyn May SMITH.
    No. 57762.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Carolyn May Smith applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 327 So.2d 707.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the court of appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.


text:
    Earl E. REEVES v. GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY.
    No. 57769.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Gulf States Utilities Co., Robert J. Tassin and Royal Indemnity Co. applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 327 So.2d 671.

Writ denied. The judgment of the court of appeal is correct.


text:
    Doris E. Delecerda PARENT v. Charles Jean PARENT.
    No. 57771.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Doris E. Delecerda Parent applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 327 So.2d 576.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the court of appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Henry Lee FRIERSON v. C. Paul PHELPS, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 57777.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Henry Lee Frierson applying for Writs of Habeas Corpus, Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

Writ denied. The record of this case on appeal (see La., 302 So.2d 605) shows that applicant’s contentions are without merit.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Irvin WILLIAMS v. C. Paul PHELPS, Acting Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary and Hon. 24th Judicial District Court In and For the Parish of Jefferson Gretna, Louisiana.
    No. 57778.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Irvin Williams, applying for writ of certiorari and habeas corpus.

Writ denied. Under the assignments of error, relator has not made a showing to warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.


text:
    In re Stephen BERGER v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY.
    No. 57782.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Stephen Berger applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 327 So.2d 705.

Writ refused. No error of law.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. William J. GUSTE, Jr., Attorney General v. The ESTATE of Numa Paul HUMBERT et al.
    No. 57785.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Adelheid S. Himbert, and Janet Nehrbass, applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of E. Baton Rouge. 327 So.2d 698.

Writ denied. The judgment is not final.


text:
    Earl E. REEVES v. GULF STATES UTILITIES CO et al.
    No. 57786.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Earl E. Reeves applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit Parish of East Baton Rouge. 327 So.2d 671.

Writ denied. The judgment of the court of appeal is correct.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Donald BRIGGS v. C. Paul PHELPS, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 57787.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Donald Briggs applying for Writs of Habeas Corpus, Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

Writ denied. Relator’s contention was disposed of in his appeal. See 292 So.2d 238 (La.).


text:
    Robert L. ROLAND v. David R. POYNTER and E. L. Henry
    No. 57851.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: David R. Poynter and E. L. Henry applying for Supervisory Writs of Review.

Writ denied. There is no error in the judgment complained of.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilbur Joseph LELEUX, Jr.
    No. 57859.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 1976.
   In re: Wilbur Joseph LeLeux, Jr. applying for Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Stay Order.

Writ denied. There is not a sufficient showing to warrant the interference with the orderly proceedings in the trial court; defendant has an adequate remedy by appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Inez BRADY.
    No. 57908.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 22, 1976.
   In re: Inez Brady applying for Writs of Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari.

Writ denied. Applicant was granted full transactional immunity effective in both state and federal courts under authority of Murphy v. Waterfront Com. of N. Y., 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) and Kastigar v. U. S., 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Consequently applicant was not justified in refusing to testify and there is no error in the ruling below.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edwin MOORE.
    No. 57913.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 22, 1976.
   In re: Edwin Moore applying for Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Stay Order.

Writ refused. The showing made is insufficient to warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.


text:
    Tommie Joe SEATON v. Conrad E. KELLY et al.
    No. 57773.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Avoyelles, 327 So.2d 512.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.


text:
    PIONEER PRODUCTION CORPORATION et al. v. Elizabeth Barnhill SEGRAVES et al.
    No. 57783.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: City of Jennings, La., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 326 So.2d 516.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.


text:
    Mrs. Eric Linda PARKS v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA et al.
    No. 57797.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Mrs. Eric (Linda) Parks, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Avoyelles, 326 So.2d 535.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.


text:
    Aljane Domingue BROUSSARD v. Dudley BROUSSARD.
    No. 57807.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Aljane Domingue Broussard, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Acadia, 326 So.2d 572.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue ; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.


text:
    Aljane Domingue BROUSSARD v. Dudley L. BROUSSARD.
    No. 57811.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Dudley L. Broussard, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Acadia, 326 So.2d 572.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.


text:
    Eugene C. FONTENOT v. Mr. & Mrs. John Allen GUILLORY et al.
    No. 57707.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Eugene C. Fontenot applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Evangeline. 327 So.2d 578.

Application denied. There is no error of law in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.


text:
    Garland Wayne WHITE v. Elayn HUNT, Director of Louisiana, Department of Corrections, et al,
    No. 57753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Garland Wayne White applying for Writ of Certiorari. '

Writ denied. The judgment is correct.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David JOHNSON.
    No. 57750.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: State of Lousiana, through John M. Mamoulides, District Attorney applying for Writ of Certiorari.

Application denied; We will not review the granting or denial of motion for new trial except for error of law. C.Cr.P. 858.


text:
    Bobby GAUTHIER v. Jim SCOTT.
    No. 57767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Jim Scott, applying for Certiora-ri, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge, 327 So.2d 702.

Application denied. No error of law.


text:
    J. E. SUMRALL & SONS, INC. v. WATSON & COXE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., et al.
    No. 57774.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: J. E. Sumrall & Sons, Inc. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 327 So.2d 694.

Application denied. No error of law.


text:
    Jack BOOTHE and Billie G. Boothe v. AMERICAN ASSURANCE CO. et al.
    No. 57784.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Bob Wickes and American Assurance Co., applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of Livingston. 327 So.2d 477.

Writ denied. Under the facts found by the Court of Appeal, no error of law.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. Alberie DEGUEYTERRE.
    No. 57789.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Alberie Degueyterre applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of St. Martin. 326 So.2d 627.

Writ denied. No demonstrated error in the result.


text:
    Roma and Joseph QUARTANA v. David W. JENKS et al.
    No. 57790.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: David W. Jenks, Mrs. Romayne Jenks, Mrs. Pat Farley and Progressive Arts, Inc., applying for writ of prohibition, mandamus or review.

Writ denied. The judgment is correct.


text:
    In re LIQUIDATION OF DELTA SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
    No. 57794.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Charles V. Nichols, applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Con-cordia.

Writ refused. On the facts found, the result is correct.


text:
    James GRAVES v. KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORP.
    No. 57806.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: James Graves, applying for Cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of St. Bernard. 327 So.2d 611.

Writ denied. On the facts found, the result is correct.


text:
    Gloria Ann GUILOTT v. Clyde E. GUILOTT.
    No. 57798.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Gloria Ann Guilott applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Calca-sieu. 326 So.2d 551.

Writ refused. Judgment is not final. The rights of all parties on all issues in this litigation are reserved.


text:
    DANCE CITY OF BATON ROUGE, INC. v. Larry Paul BROUSSARD.
    No. 57795.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Dance City of Baton, Rouge Inc. applying for supervisory and remedial writs and Stay Order.

Writ denied. Insufficient showing of irreparable injury to justify exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.


text:
    In re LIQUIDATION OF DELTA SECURITY BANK AND TRUST CO., and Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
    No. 57812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: John F. Anders, Frank L. Vogt, A. B. Strozier, D. A. Williams and Don A. Baxter applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Concordia.

Application denied. The result is correct.


text:
    Robert WILLIAMS v. Marie WHITMEYER.
    No. 57895.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1976.
   In re: Marie Whitmeyer, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Cad-do. 327 So.2d 541.

Not considered. Not timely filed. The application was not received timely and carried a post-mark of April 15, 1976.


text:
    B. J. LUCAS v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA et al.
    No. 57814.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: B. J. Lucas, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of LaSalle, 326 So.2d 525.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.


text:
    Mrs. Yvonne HONEYCUTT et al. v. TOWN OF BOYCE, La., et al.
    No. 57816.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Yvonne Honeycutt et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Rapides, 327 So.2d 1541

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robert C. COLLINS v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 57826.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Robert C. Collins, applying for writ of habeas corpus.

Granted. An evidentiary hearing is ordered on the issue of effective counsel, otherwise the application is denied.


text:
    George W. PRATHER v. John VALIEN.
    No. 57813.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: John Valien, applying for Certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of St. Landry. 327 So.2d 130.

Writ denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in the judgment complained of.


text:
    FRONTIER, INC. v. Clayton C. CURTIS
    No. 57809.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Clayton C. Curtis, applying for Certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Natch-itoches. 326 So.2d 639.

Writ denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, the judgment is correct.


text:
    Henry ARNOLD and John F. Robbert v. The BOARD OF LEVEE COMMISSIONERS OF the ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT et al.
    No. 57821.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: The Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District and the F. Edward Hebert Foundation, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 327 So.2d 495.

Application denied. The judgment is not final.


text:
    Mrs. Jewel HORNSBY v. Edward RAY et al.
    No. 57819.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Edward Ray, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of St. Landry. 327 So.2d 146.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Isaac WINDER v. C. Paul PHELPS, Acting Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 57678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Isaac Winder applying for Writs of Certiorari, Mandamus and Habeas Corpus.

Writ denied. The application is moot. The trial court has ruled, denying applicant’s petition for habeas corpus; furthermore, with respect to applicant’s request for evidentiary hearing in this writ application, the trial judge advises that on an earlier identical application, an evidentiary hearing was held and the habeas application denied with reasons.


text:
    Carrie Young, wife of/and Eugene RICHARDSON v. WINN-DIXIE LOUISIANA, INC. and the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York.
    No. 57823.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. and the Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 327 So.2d 613.

Writ denied. On the facts found, the result is correct.


text:
    Robert T. BAGBY v. Donald A. CLARK.
    No. 57917.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Robert T. Bagby applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Jefferson. 327 So.2d 633.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    L. M. BAGGETT v. MID-STATE SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, INC.
    No. 57810.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: L. M. Baggett applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Allen.

Writ denied. No error of law.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lenzy FELTON.
    No. 57926.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Lenzy Felton, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writ denied. No abuse of discretion.


text:
    Villere REGGIO et al. v. LOUISIANA GAS SERVICE COMPANY et al.
    No. 57828.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 27, 1976.
   In re: Louisiana Gas Service Co., et al. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Jefferson.

Application denied. The court of appeal judgment is correct.