author: CALOGERO, Justice. SUMMERS, Justice

text:
    Robert HOWELL v. WINN PARISH SCHOOL BOARD et al.
    No. 57178.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 1976.
    Rehearing Denied June 18, 1976.

      Bobby L. Culpepper, Baker, Culpepper & Brunson, Jonesboro, for plaintiff-applicant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Charles B. Bice, Dist. Atty., Kermit M. Simmons, Asst. Dist. Atty., for defendants-respondents.
   CALOGERO, Justice.

We granted writs in this case to consider the contention of Robert Howell that his dismissal as a tenured employee of the Winn Parish School Board violated the provisions of the Louisiana Teachers’ Tenure Law, La.R.S. 17:441 et seq.

After an administrative hearing on the question, the Winn Parish School Board •dismissed plaintiff as principal of the Atlanta High School in Atlanta, Louisiana, and as an employee of the Winn Parish School Board, finding him guilty of wilful neglect of duty. Pursuant to the provisions of La.R.S. 17:443 B., which authorize a tenured employee to petition court for a full hearing to review the action of the school board, plaintiff filed suit requesting that he.be reinstated and awarded a monetary judgment for back salary and attorney’s fees. The district court dismissed the suit and the Court of Appeal affirmed. Howell v. Winn Parish School Board, 321 So.2d 520 (La.App.2d Cir.1975)

Plaintiff had been employed by the Winn Parish School Board for a sufficient period of time to have qualified as a tenured employee under the provisions of La. R.S. 17:441-442, and had served as the principal of the Atlanta High School for several years prior to his dismissal on April 15, 1974. Proceedings to dismiss plaintiff were initiated by E. H. Farr, at that time the Superintendent of Winn Parish Schools. In a letter dated March 11, 1974, Mr. Farr recommended that plaintiff be dismissed for wilful neglect in the performance of his duties, charging that Mr. Howell had been absent from the Atlanta High School during the final week of the 1972-73 school year. He alleged that because of this absence “a student employed for Atlanta High School through the [Neighborhood Youth Corps] N.Y.C. program was left without assignment of duties and without supervision of work,” and that he had “to assume the duties of principal-ship, including the signing of checks, until such time as his substitute could be employed.” A 1967 resolution adopted by the Winn Parish School Board had “established the school year for principals as a ten month period beginning two weeks before the opening day of school and ending two weeks after the closing day of school.” Monday, June 11, 1973 to Friday, June 15, 1973, the period at issue in this case, was the second week following the closing of school.

The trial court held that there was substantial evidence to support the school board’s finding that plaintiff was absent for the week in question without permission and, on this basis, affirmed the decision of the board. After reviewing conflicting testimony with respect to whether plaintiff had permission to be absent, the Court of Appeal concluded that this was a factual issue involving credibility and that as the board’s finding was not manifestly erroneous it should not be disturbed. They then held that this conduct did constitute “wilful neglect of duty,” noting as follows:

“We have examined all cases cited by counsel in brief and do not find that any are sufficiently analogous factually to define what conduct constitutes ‘wilful neglect of duty.’
“Although the evidence does not show any real or serious harm was caused by plaintiff’s absence for the week in question and though his dismissal under the circumstances could be termed harsh, we nevertheless are of the opinion such a dereliction is sufficient to authorize the board to exercise its discretion to terminate the employment.”

La.R.S. 17:443 A provides, in relevant part, that “[a] permanent teacher shall not be removed from office except upon written and signed charges of wilful neglect of duty . . . and then only if found guilty after a hearing by the school board of the parish . . . As previously noted, an aggrieved employee may “petition a court of competent jurisdiction for a full hearing to review the action of the school board, and the courts shall have jurisdiction to affirm or reverse the action of the school board in the matter” (emphasis added) La.R.S. 17:443 B. While this clause by its terms provides for review by the courts and not a trial de novo, see Campo v. East Baton Rouge School Board, 231 So.2d 67, 71 (La.App.1st Cir.1970) and Granderson v. Orleans Parish School Board, 216 So.2d 643, 646 (La.App.4th Cir.1969), the requirement of a full hearing indicates that the legislature intended the courts to exercise a broad scope of judicial review, particularly at the district court level. See Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-73 Term, 34 La.L.Rev. 197, 306 (1974). Thus in Lewing v. De Soto Parish School Board, 238 La. 43, 113 So.2d 462 (1959), this Court noted that under the provisions requiring a full hearing at the district court level, a discharged employee of a school board could present additional evidence to that court.

Despite this provision for a full hearing before the district court, the standard of judicial review of a school board’s action is still whether there is a rational basis for the board’s determination supported by substantial evidence insofar as factually required. In such cases, the reviewing court must neither substitute its judgment for the judgment of the school board nor interfere with the board’s bona fide exercise of discretion. Lewing v. De Soto Parish School Board, supra; State ex rel. Rathe v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 206 La. 317, 19 So.2d 153 (1944); Simon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, 289 So.2d 511 (La.App.3d Cir.), writ denied, 293 So.2d 178 (La.1974); Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Board, 276 So.2d 386 (La.App.2d Cir.1973). Thus in the instant case, this Court will limit its inquiry to a determination of whether the action of the school board was (1) in accordance with the authority and formalities of the Louisiana Teachers Tenure Act, and (2) supported by substantial evidence, or conversely, an arbitrary decision and thus an abuse of discretion. Lewing v. De Soto Parish School Board, supra; Celestine v. Lafayette Parish School Board, 284 So.2d 650 (La.App.3d Cir.1973); Moffett v. Calcasieu Parish School Board, 179 So.2d 537 (La.App.3d Cir.1965).

The record of the hearing before the school board, and the transcript of the testimony and evidence presented to the district court reflect the following:

Plaintiff Robert Howell had requested and been granted a sabbatical leave for the 1973-74 school year. At the school board hearing and before the district court, Mr. Howell testified that he had received permission from Mr. E. H. Farr, the Superintendent of Winn Parish Schools, to be absent during the week of June 11, 1973 to June 15, 1973 in order to register for summer school. Ms. LaRue Waxley, an employee of the Winn Parish School Board at the time in question, testified that she overheard a conversation between plaintiff and Mr. Farr during which Mr. Farr told plaintiff it would be alright for him to be absent to register for school.

Plaintiff further testified that prior to the week in question he had completed all his final reports for the year and had turned them in to the Winn Parish School Board Office; that he had made arrangements with Mr. Prentis Ferguson, an agriculture teacher at the Atlanta High School, to act as principal during his absence, as was customary; and that on the Friday prior to the week in question, he took his school keys to the home of Mr. Collins, a school board member whose wife, Ms. Dorothy Collins, was plaintiff’s secretary. Mr. Ferguson verified that he had agreed to act as principal and Mr. Farr admitted that Mr. Ferguson generally acted in this capacity during Mr. Howell’s absences.

With respect to the lack of supervision of the student employed in the N.Y.C. program, a letter to the Winn Parish Police Jury, which sponsored the program, showed that Mr. Howell had appointed Ms. Ruby Hamlin, the librarian at the Atlanta High School, as supervisor of the student involved. The evidence indicated that it was the usual policy for a principal to appoint some one to supervise the participants of this program. Ms. Hamlin was apparently attending a workshop during the week in question, but Ms. Delois Roe, the N.Y.C. student, testified that she was adequately supervised by Mr. Ferguson.

Plaintiff Howell also testified that he went by the school from time to time during that week: early on Monday to verify that the building was secure, and again about 12:30 p. m., after he had been to Northwestern; on Wednesday when he talked to his secretary; and on Friday when, by the school board’s own admission, he signed two checks. Mr. Ferguson testified that he saw Mr. Howell on at least one day that week, although he could not remember exactly when. Ms. Collins, while not denying that plaintiff had come by the school, testified that she did not “remember” seeing Mr. Howell that week.

Mr. Farr, the school superintendent, denied giving plaintiff permission to be absent during the week in question, stating that Mr. Howell had only brought him a letter asking for sabbatical leave. He testified that on a routine visit to the Atlanta High School on Monday, June 11, 1973, he inquired of plaintiff’s whereabouts and was told by Ms. Collins, the school secretary, that Mr. Howell had already left for the summer to register for summer school; that Mr. Ferguson was at the school at the time acting as principal; that the N.Y.C. student was sitting in the principal’s office with nothing to do; and that as Mr. Ferguson did not have authority to sign checks, it was necessary for him to sign several checks to pay some outstanding bills. Everyone concerned testified that there was no immediate need for the checks to be signed at that time, other than Ms. Collins’ desire to finish her paperwork.

While we do not disagree with the findings of the school board and the district court that Mr. Farr did not specifically authorize plaintiff’s absence during the week in question, we note supplementally that Mr. Farr never expressly told Mr. Howell that he would not be permitted to be away from his school at that time. We are thus required to assess Mr. Howell’s conduct in relation to the week of Monday, June 11, 1973 to Friday, June 15, 1973 and to determine whether as a matter of law and fact it constitutes wilful neglect of duty.

Under the facts as developed by the school board and the district court, we conclude that there was no substantial evidence to establish that as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, Mr. Howell wil-fully neglected his duty as principal of the Atlanta High School during the week in question. Even accepting Mr. Farr’s statement that he did not give plaintiff express permission to be absent, the facts on the record indicate that Mr. Howell made adequate provisions to insure that his responsibilities were carried out. With respect to the specific charges leveled against plaintiff, the record reveals that Ms. Ruby Hamlin had been appointed by Mr. Howell to supervise the N.Y.C. student’s work; that arrangements had been made for Mr. Prentis Ferguson to act as principal; and that, with respect to the only function which Mr. Ferguson could not perform as principal, i. e., the signing of checks, Mr. Howell did return to the school during the week and signed several checks on Friday, June 15, 1973. As Mr. Farr himself stated when questioned about whether there was an established school board policy with respect to the hours a principal was to keep during the week in question, “on the two week period that school is out the principals are required to put in as many hours as is necessary to carry out their work.” Nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Howell did not carry out his work or that any adverse consequences ensued insofar as the school board was concerned. While there might have been reasons why a principal 'should be present on the school premises during the week in question, the record before us does not establish what these duties or responsibilities are. Rather the record indicates that a principal’s job during that period is of a supervisory nature and that a principal need not put in a prescribed work period, but only such time as is found necessary.

The law requires the charges against a tenured employee to be in writing. La.R.S. 17:443A. See Simon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, 289 So.2d 511, 515 (La.App.3d Cir.), writ denied, 293 So.2d 178 (La.1974); Johns v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, 154 So.2d 581, 584 (La.App.3d Cir. 1963). The charges against plaintiff were that he was absent from school without prior authorization, leaving a student worker unsupervised and some checks unsigned. On these limited grounds, and the facts shown, we find no substantial evidence of wilful neglect of duty by Mr. Howell.

The Louisiana Teacher Tenure Act is designed to protect the job security of teachers and the statute should, therefore, be liberally construed in favor of the class of person intended to be its primary beneficiaries, the tenured employees. See Palone v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 306 So.2d 679 (La.1975); Lewing v. De Soto Parish School Board, 238 La. 43, 113 So.2d 462 (1959); Lea v. Orleans Parish School Board, 228 La. 987, 84 So.2d 610 (1955). We feel that the foregoing principle dictates our result in the instant case, taking into consideration the minimal allegations contained in the written charges against plaintiff and the lack of any substantial evidence that he failed to discharge his responsibilities as principal of the Atlanta High School or that he otherwise wilfully neglected his duty.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in favor of the Winn Parish School Board et al and against Mr. Robert Howell is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and rendered.

SUMMERS, J., dissents for the reasons assigned.

DENNIS, J., is recused because he performed a judicial act in the case in another court. L.C.C.P. Art. 151(3).

SUMMERS, Justice

(dissenting).

I cannot agree that the decisions of the School Board, the trial judge in the district court and the Court of Appeal on this purely factual matter involving the credibility of witnesses should be reversed. I agree with the opinion of the Court of Appeal. See 321 So.2d 420.

      . La.R.S. 17:443B. provides in full as follows :
      “If a permanent teacher is found guilty by a school board, after due and legal hearing as provided herein, on charges of wilful neglect of duty, or of incompetency, or dishonesty, or of being a member of' or of contributing to any group, organization, movement or corporation that is by law or injunction prohibited from operating in the State of Louisiana, and ordered removed from office, or disciplined by the board, the teacher may, not more than one year from the date of the said finding, petition a court of competent jurisdiction for a full hewing to review the action of the school hoard, and the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm or reverse the action of the school hoard in .the matter. If the finding of the school board is reversed by the court and the teacher is ordered reinstated and restored to duty, the teacher shall be entitled to full pay for any loss of time or salary he or she may have sustained by reason of the action of the said school board.” (Emphasis added)

      . Plaintiff had also requested that the school board be enjoined from dismissing him. Prior to trial the parties entered into a stipulation that the matter was being tried and submitted to the court on the merits.

      . “Teacher” is defined as “any employee of any parish or city school board who holds a teacher’s certificate and whose legal employment requires such teacher’s certificate.” La.R.S. 17:441.

      . The Court also held that, unless a teacher chooses to introduce additional evidence, the school board is confined to the record on which it acted. This is so because the board “should not be allowed to prove its cases in the district court.” Lewing v. De Soto Parish School Board, 238 La. 43, 113 So.2d 462, 465 (1959).

      . Records from Northwestern State University in Natchitoches, Louisiana established that Mr. Howell did register for summer school on Tuesday, June 12, 1973. Mr. Howell testified that on Monday, June 11, 1973 he had gone to the university to discuss his program with Dr. Robert Dennis, that he registered the next day and that he had classes the rest of the week. Dr. Dennis verified the program discussion with plaintiff.

      . The evidence established that if Mr. Ferguson had not accepted this responsibility he would have been on vacation during the week in question. Mr. Ferguson was not paid by the school board for this accommodation of Mr. Howell.

      . While Mr. Farr denied ever discussing the absence with Mr. Howell, on cross-examination Mr. Farr indicated that at least some conversation on the question had taken place:
      “Q O.K., and you don’t remember any other conversations of this nature or along these lines with Mr. Howell?
      A I felt like of Mr. Howell had wanted permission to be off that week, we had a board meeting the week before, June something the early part of June .
      Q So you told him .
      A And he could have ask the Board.
      Q You told him, this?
      A That’s right.”

      . As previously noted, the testimony revealed that there was no particular reasons requiring the checks to be signed any earlier in the week.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DENNIS, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Rosalie SPAIN and Preston Broussard v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY and Interstate Fire and Casualty Company.
    No. 57170.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 17, 1976.
    Rehearing Denied June 18, 1976.

      Wood Brown, III, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown & Read, New Orleans, for defendants-applicants.
    Roger C. Edwards, Abbeville, for plaintiffs-respondents.
   DENNIS, Justice.

This is a suit by a legal secretary and her husband to recover for her personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of her employer. The secretary, Rosalie Spain, and her husband, Preston Broussard, sued Travelers Indemnity Company and Interstate Fire and Casualty Company, the primary and excess liability insurers, respectively, of the driver of the automobile in which Mrs. Broussard was riding. Both the trial and intermediate appellate courts rendered judgments for plaintiffs. We granted defendants’ applications for writs, and for the reasons hereinafter assigned we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The accident occurred about 3:30 p. m. on March 11, 1971 in Lafayette while Mrs. Broussard was riding as a passenger in the right front seat of an automobile which was owned and being driven by the attorney by whom she was employed. They were returning to his law office in Abbe-ville after having attended a conference in Lafayette with an internal revenue agent pertaining to a federal estate tax return which Mrs. Broussard was assisting her employer in preparing. After the accident the automobile was still operable and the attorney drove Mrs. Broussard back to his office in Abbeville. She completed her usual end of the day office chores and drove her own vehicle home.

Later she developed the symptoms which led to the discovery of the injuries giving rise to this lawsuit. However, the severity of the injuries, the amounts awarded below and the negligence of Mrs. Broussard’s employer in causing her injuries are not at issue in this appeal.

Instead, the issue presented for our decision is whether the insurers should be absolved from liability because of an exclusion contained in one of the policies. The basic policy issued by Travelers Indemnity Company with a limit of $5,000 liability for bodily injury to one person contained the following exclusion:

“This policy does not apply under Part I:
* * *
“(e) to bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of (1) domestic employment by the insured, if benefits therefor are in whole or in part either payable or required to be provided under any workmen’s compensation law, or (2) other employment by the insured;
"* * * t*

In the excess policy issued by it, Interstate Fire and Casualty Company agreed to indemnify Mrs. Broussard’s employer for the amount of loss in excess of the applicable limits of liability of the underlying insurance in the amount of $95,000 for bodily injury to one person.

However, the excess policy included the following provision:

“The provisions of the immediate underlying policy are incorporated as a part of this policy except for any obligation to investigate and defend and pay for costs and expenses incident to the same, the amount of the limits of liability, any ‘other insurance’ provision and any other provisions therein which are inconsistent with the provisions of this policy.”

Both insurers strenuously contend that because Mrs. Broussard’s injuries arose out of and in the course of employment by the insured that coverage was excluded under each policy.

The trial court rejected these defenses and held in favor of plaintiffs on the theory that the policy provision excluded all employees incurring injuries within the course and scope of their employment if they were not eligible for workmen’s compensation benefits, and that Mrs. Brous-sard was not so eligible because she was not engaged in a hazardous occupation.

The court of appeal reached the same result except that it did so by concluding the exclusion was invalid because it was ambiguous. The court reasoned that because the insurer had written the ambiguous exclusionary clause, that clause should be construed in the sense most favorable to the insured by rendering it inoperative as to Mrs. Broussard.

We cannot subscribe to the rationale employed by either court below. The exclusion is neither ambiguous as found by the court of appeal nor susceptible to the strained interpretation given it by the trial court. A reading of the exclusion, particularly in light of the numbering used to set off the clauses therein, leaves no doubt as to its meaning: all employees of an insured injured in the course and scope of their employment are excluded from coverage under the policy unless they are domestic employees who are not covered by workmen’s compensation.

In Manuel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 256 La. 480, 236 So.2d 807 (1970), we held that the test to be applied in determining whether an employee’s injuries were sustained in the course and scope of his employment within the terms of an exclusionary clause similar to the one involved here is the same test which is applied in determining whether the employee was injured in the course of his employment so as to entitle him to workmen’s compensation. In his dissent to the court of appeal opinion in the instant case, Judge Hood ably reviewed the applicable workmen’s compensation cases and correctly concluded that Mrs. Broussard was in the course of her employment at the time her injuries were sustained.

Therefore, we hold that the exclusion relieved Travelers of any liability to plaintiffs.

However, plaintiffs argue that because the exclusion was not physically attached to or written into the excess policy, Interstate cannot assert it as a defense. They rely primarily upon La.R.S. 22:628, which provides:

“No agreement in conflict with, modifying, or extending the coverage of any contract of insurance shall be valid unless in writing and made a part of the policy. This Section shall not apply to the contracts as provided in Part XV of this Chapter.”

The plain meaning of the statute seems to render invalid any agreement modifying the coverage of an insurance contract unless it is somehow physically made a part of the policy. This section of the Insurance Code appears to have the same purpose as many other sections which require that, in order to have effect, applications, by-laws, or other instruments must be made a part of the policy by attachment, endorsement or some other method.

La.R.S. 22:219 provides, in pertinent part:

“A. The falsity of any statement in the application for any policy covered by this Part shall not bar the right to recovery thereunder unless such false statement materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer. The insured shall not be bound by any statement unless made in a written application in the case of domestic industrial insurers, and in the case of other insurers, unless a copy of such application is attached to or endorsed on the policy as a part thereof. (Emphasis added.)
«* $ *

La.R.S. 22:618 provides, in pertinent part:

“A. No application for the issuance of any insurance policy or contract shall be admissible in evidence in any action relative to such policy or contract, unless a correct copy of the application was attached to or otherwise made a part of the policy, or contract, when issued and delivered. This provision shall not apply to policies or contracts of industrial insurance subject to R.S. 22:213A(1) and 22:259 (2). (Emphasis added.)
«* * *»

La.R.S. 22:624 provides, in pertinent part:

“A. The written instrument, in which a contract of insurance is set forth, is the policy.
“B. A policy shall specify :
* *
“(6) The conditions pertaining to the insurance. (Emphasis added.)
U * * *

La.R.S. 22:626 provides:

“No policy shall contain any provision purporting to make any portion of the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or other constituent document of the insurer a part of the contract unless such portion is set forth in full in the policy. Any policy provision in violation of this Section shall be invalid.” (Emphasis added.)

La.R.S. 22:654 provides:

“Every insurance contract shall be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy, and as amplified, extended, or modified by any rider, endorsement, or application attached to or made a part of the policy.”

Defendant Interstate, on the other hand, argues that by enacting La.R.S. 22:628, the legislature intended that contracts of insurance may consist of a policy and other instruments incorporated therein by reference. Defendant’s argument is based solely on the choice of words in several other sections of the Insurance Code. In essence, it contends that the use of the disjunctive “attached to or made a part of the policy” in Section 654, the words “attached to or otherwise made a part of the policy” in Section 618(A), and the phrase “attached to or endorsed on the policy as a part thereof” in Section 219(A) shows that documents may be made a part of an insurance policy without being physically attached thereto. Consequently, defendant Interstate concludes, these statutes demonstrate a legislative approval of the doctrine of incorporation by reference with regard to insurance policies.

We are unable to find such an intention in the language quoted by the defendant, but conclude that if the legislature had meant to allow the incorporation of applications, by-laws, statements, agreements or other instruments by reference it would have so stated. Instead, we believe it evinced a contrary intent when it insisted in each instance that such addenda must be attached to or made part of the policy in order to have any effect. By using disjunctive phrases in some instances, such as “attached to or otherwise made a part of the policy,” the legislature intended to allow for more than one means of making other instruments a part of an insurance policy. For example, an instrument may be attached by affixing a photocopy of it to the policy, or it may be imprinted upon the policy itself through typing, handwriting or other methods. In each case, however, it is clear that the essence of the instrument must physically become a part of the insurance policy in order to have any validity.

The legislative history of the Insurance Code, the jurisprudence of this State and the majority of decisions in other jurisdictions support this view.

The source provision of the Insurance Code sections regulating extraneous modification of insurance contracts was Act 227 of 1916, The Entire Contract Policy Statute, which, in pertinent part, provided:

“That every policy of insurance issued or delivered within the State by any life insurance corporation doing business within the State shall contain the entire contract between the parties and nothing shall be incorporated therein by reference to any constitution, by-laws, rules, application or other writings un less the same are endorsed upon or attached to the policy when issued; and all statements purporting to be made by the insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representations and not warranties, and no statement or statements not endorsed upon or attached to the policy when issued shall be used in defense of a claim under the policy unless a copy of such statement or statements be endorsed upon or attached to the policy when issued. Any waiver of the provisions of this section shall be void.” (Emphasis added.)

In Fisette v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 162 La. 620, 110 So. 880 (1926) we emphatically held that The Entire Contract Policy Statute must be construed literally so as to require actual physical attachment of the insured’s application to the policy when issued in order to avail the insurer of a defense thereon. The opinion lucidly explained the purpose of the statute:

“ * * * The language of the statute is plain and vigorous in its requirement that every life insurance policy shall contain the entire contract between the parties; that nothing shall be incorporated therein by reference to the application or any other document Unless the same is indorsed upon or attached to the policy; . The purpose of the law is that the insured shall have in his possession during his lifetime, and that the beneficiary shall have after the death of the insured, the entire evidence of the contract. It would not serve that purpose, but would violate the spirit, if not the very letter, of the law, if the statute should be so construed that a statement made by the insured in an application for ‘establishing’ or ‘placing in force’ a policy that was not theretofore placed in force by the payment of the first premium need not be indorsed upon, or attached to, the policy to form a part of the contract. * * *” 110 So. at 882. (Emphasis added.)

In Louisiana our courts have consistently followed the holding in Fisette calling for rigorous enforcement of The Entire Contract Policy Statute. Shuff v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 164 La. 741, 114 So. 637 (1927); Whitmeyer v. Liberty Industrial L. Ins. Co., 166 La. 328, 117 So. 268 (1928) (affirming 1927) 8 La.App. 126; Oglesby v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 12 La.App. 311, 124 So. 551 (1929); Williams v. Unity Industrial L. Ins. Co., 14 La.App. 680, 130 So. 561 (1930); Cherry v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 143 So. 121 (Orl.App.1932); McBride v. Acme Industrial L. Ins. Soc., 150 So. 110 (Orl.App.1933) (affirmed 1934), 179 La. 701, 154 So. 741); Jackson v. Unity Industrial L. Ins. Co., 142 So. 207 (Orl.App.1932); Lane v. The Life Insurance Company of Virginia, 176 So.2d 202 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1965). This view appears also to have been adopted by the vast majority of American states. See Annotations, 93 A.L.R. 374; 18 A.L.R.3rd 763.

Although originally restricted to policies issued by life insurance corporations, the concepts set forth in The Entire Contract Policy Statute were made applicable to most insurance policies, including automobile liability policies, with the adoption of the Insurance Code by the legislature in Act 195 of 1948. See La.R.S. 22:218; 219; 624; 626; 628; 654, supra. Consequently we have held that due to La.R.S. 22:628, which prohibits modification of the coverage of any contract of insurance, unless made in writing and as a part of the policy, the coverage under an automobile liability policy was not limited by a lease agreement which had not been annexed to the policy. Jones v. Breaux, 289 So.2d 110 (La.1974). More recently we decided that an application for health and accident insurance, which was not attached to the policy when issued, was inadmissible in evidence under La.R.S. 22:618(A) in any action relative to the policy. Smith v. North American Co. for Life Acc. and Health Ins., 306 So.2d 751 (La.1975). The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held in Tingle v. Globe Life Insurance Company, 290 So.2d 460 (La.App.2d Cir. 1974) that under La.R.S. 22:213 and La.R.S. 22:628 an insured could recover although he had signed a written agreement not to purchase or to accept any insurance coverage from the insurance company, because that instrument was not attached to or made a part of the insurance policy when issued.

The statutes of some states require only that the contract of insurance be plainly expressed in the policy, while in other jurisdictions, such as Louisiana, policies of insurance must contain the entire contract. A majority of states appear to have adopted the latter view. See Couch on Insurance 2d, § 3.19. In that treatise the author states:

§ 3.20. “It is within the power of the state to require that the policy state the contract or the entire contract, or to require that the application or by-laws be attached to or made part of the policy. Such statutes come within the police power, being regarded as in the interest of sound public policy, and as not impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving the insurer of property without due process of law.
“These conclusions naturally follow from the fact that statutes of this character are clearly intended to protect the policyholder by requiring the insurer to place in his hands written evidence of the entire contract, or, in other words, by requiring all the terms, conditions and representations, to be incorporated or embodied in the policy, and thereby largely eliminate the evils growing out of uncertainty and the imposition which might otherwise be practiced, by permitting the insured to know from his policy what his contract is. In fact, the laudable purpose is to furnish both parties the entire contract between them, and to enable them both to be informed of the exact terms of the policy.
“Such statutes also have the advantage of proclaiming uniform procedure.” (Footnotes omitted.)
§ 3.21. “Under statutes in the various forms noted in the preceding section, the policy, including documents properly incorporated therein so as to form a part of the contract, constitutes the sole contract, to the exclusion of all anterior or contemporaneous agreements not contained or expressed in the policy, including conditions in the application when not properly made a part of the contract, as well as premium notes which are not made a part of the contract, a receipt given for a note representing the first premium on a policy, or a conditional receipt issued by the insurer prior to the delivery of the policy and not incorporated therein. If the statute specifies that the entire contract shall be contained in the insurance policy itself bylaws not incorporated in the policy except by reference form no part of the contract. A statute requiring a life policy to state that it and the application shall constitute the entire contract invalidates a contract for reinstatement, consisting of the application therefor, the policy, and a note given for the premium. * * * ” (Footnotes omitted.)

Thus it seems clear that the legislative policy, as expressed in La.R.S. 22:628, and by similar statutes in other jurisdictions, prohibits the insurer from urging as a defense the breach of any condition which is not in some manner physically made a part of the policy. The object of the’ statute is to assure full notification to the insured of all relevant provisions of his insurance contract. Furthermore, the legislature has determined this object can be attained only by mandating the actual attachment of such modifying provisions to the insurance policy.

For these reasons we conclude that the exclusion in the Travelers policy, which was not attached to or otherwise physically made a part of the Interstate policy, afforded Interstate no defense against plaintiffs’ claims resulting from the injuries suffered by Mrs. Broussard in the accident.

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal in favor of the plaintiffs and against Interstate Fire and Casualty Company is affirmed, and the judgment in plaintiffs’ favor and against Travelers Insurance Company, is reversed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Interstate Fire and Casualty Company.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.