author: CALOGERO, Justice. SUMMERS, Justice PER CURIAM.

text:
    Thomas C. FARRELL, Jr., et al. v. HODGES STOCK YARDS, INC., et al.
    Nos. 58383, 58387.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 1977.
    Per Curiam on Rehearing March 3, 1977.
    Rehearing Denied April 7, 1977.

      Francis J. Mooney, Jr., Curtis, Foster, Hyde & Mooney, New Orleans, for Louisiana Southern Railway Co.
    Sidney W. Provensal, Jr., Provensal & Fitzmaurice, New Orleans, for Thomas C. Farrell, Jr.
    Henican, James & Cleveland, for Hodges Stockyards, Inc.
   CALOGERO, Justice.

Plaintiffs own certain industrial property in Arabi, Louisiana in the Parish of St. Bernard. Displeased with the presence of certain railroad tracks, switches, and spurs traversing their property, they brought this law suit against two railway companies, Louisiana Southern Railway Company and the New Orleans Terminal Company, as well as Hodges Stock Yards, Inc., a successor in title to an earlier company which had granted in 1891 and 1908, respectively, the rights of way which facilitated placing of the tracks. 'Plaintiffs’ suit seeks the removal of the tracks, and, alternatively, a judgment extinguishing the recorded railway right of way agreements, and, again alternatively, the relocation of the tracks.

Various exceptions were overruled by the trial judge and after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment cancelling and extinguishing the railway companies’ servitudes and rights of way, and further ordering relocation of the servitudes, should plaintiffs elect to relocate them, according to a plan presented in plaintiffs’ pleadings.

All three defendants appealed and the court of appeal affirmed the trial court judgment. 333 So.2d 745 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1976). We granted writs upon application of defendants Louisiana Southern Railway Company and Hodges Stock Yards, Inc., 337 So.2d 878 (La.1976).

The following title history of the property in question is important for an understanding of the case. On March 12, 1891 Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company, [hereinafter Crescent City Live Stock], owners of a large tract of ground on which was operated at the time a slaughter house and related businesses, granted to a predecessor of Louisiana Southern Railway Company, i.e., New Orleans and Gulf Railroad Company, a right of way over and across the land of the said grantor. In 1893 that original grantor, Crescent City Live Stock, sold the entire tract burdened by the railroad servitude (less certain lots previously sold) to Crescent City Stockyard and Slaughter House Company, Ltd. [hereinafter Crescent City Stockyard]. In April of 1921 that company sold a portion of the tract to Arabi Packing Co., Inc. [hereinafter Arabi] and in June of 1921 sold another portion of the tract to New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc. Thereafter, in 1960, New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc. sold a portion of its land to plaintiffs. Sometime after 1960, the corporate name was changed from New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc. to Hodges Stock Yards, Inc. [hereinafter Hodges]. Hodges today owns not only that portion of the original tract which in their earlier name, New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc., they had acquired in 1921, but also a portion of the property acquired by Arabi in 1921, which Arabi later sold to International Cold Storage, Inc., a corporation which subsequently merged with Hodges.

At least one part of the Arabi tract is today owned by Earl Doescher Company whose property is burdened by the railroad servitude and which enjoys rail service. Rail service is additionally being furnished several tenants of defendant Hodges, including Modern Woodcrafts and Ace Box Company. Additionally, Hodges has agreements with certain meat handlers who, it is asserted, also have the right to rail service.

In the 1891 servitude agreement, Crescent City Live Stock granted to the railroad a right of way running fully across its property. The entire instrument follows:

“The Crescent City Live Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Louisiana and domiciled in the Parish of St. Bernard, in said State, through its President, Louis Ruch, duly authorized by Resolution of the Board of Directors of said Company, hereto attached, declares:
That in view of the advantages and conveniences accruing to the shippers of cattle, and in consideration of the improvement and increased facilities thus offered to those engaged in the cattle trade on this market; and of the desire of the said Company to promote the interests of said trade, by the construction, operation and maintenance of a switch from the main line of the New Orleans & Gulf Railroad to a point at or near the Slaughter-House and cattle pens of the said Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, as now located upon or near the River Bank, below the City of New Orleans, in the Parish of St. Bernard, it does hereby grant, bargain, convey and deliver the right of way over and across the land of said Company, as follows:
A strip of land thirty feet in width, beginning at such a point on the line of said New Orleans & Gulf Railroad as may be selected by the General Manager of the said Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company and continuing through the lands of the said Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company to a point to be selected by said Slaughter House Company, at or or [sic] near their present buildings, to the New Orleans and Gulf Railroad Company, a corporation under the laws of the State of Louisiana, domiciled in the City of New Orleans, its successors and assigns, for the purpose of constructing and operating aforesaid switch.
The right of way which is hereby granted is thirty feet in width or fifteen feet on either side of the centre line of said switch, from the point at which the said switch shall enter the land of the Slaughter House Company to Royal Street, fifty feet in width at this point, thence decreasing gradually to thirty feet at the terminus of the switch, in line with the receiving pens of the said Slaughter House Company, the whole as may be finally located and constructed by the said New Orleans & Gulf Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, through the said before described strip of land; provided such line and location be agreed to by said Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company, and this grant of way shall be exclusively used for operating cattle-cars and such other rolling stock as may be required for the purposes of cattle yards and slaughter houses and attendant factories, and shall continue in full force as long as the said property of the said Crescent City Live Stock Landing & Slaughter House Company shall be used for the business for which it is now used or any other of like nature and no longer. The said Slaughter house Company reserving to itself the right to cancel and annul the right of way herein granted, whenever it shall select itself or be compelled to change the nature of the business now conducted on said property or that it shall cease to operate at that point cattle-yards or slaughterhouses; or desire to make a conveyance of said property; provided that the expenses incurred by the said New Orleans & Gulf Railroad in constructing and maintaining the said switch be refunded by said slaughterhouse Company, in the event of the right of way being thus cancelled and annulled prior to ten years from this date. The amount of such expenses to be determined by the actual payments made for said work by the New Orleans and Gulf Railroad Company and, in any dispute, by arbitration.
“The New Orleans & Gulf Railroad Company, in accepting the grant of a right of way, hereby agrees and promises to construct all necessary road-crossings and cattle-guards; to construct and maintain fences along both sides of the track, with openings properly guarded at the points designated by the General Manager of the Slaughter-House Company, and obligates itself not to impair the drainage of the lands of the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Company; and also agrees that said Crescent City Live Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Company, or their successors, may be permitted to occupy any lands embodied in this grant not needed by the New Orleans & Gulf Railroad Company for its purposes and should such permission be granted, it is to be used in such manner as not to interfere in any way whatever with the management of the said railroad or with the property of said railroad in the right of way herein and hereby conveyed, except as hereinabove provided. Itself (sic) to hold the Slaughterhouse Company harmless from any damages to person or persons, animals or property that may occur on that portion of land the use of which is hereby granted to said railroad Company, through the fault or negligence of its own, agents or employees.
“It is agreed that any violation of the foregoing contract shall be reported to the railroad Company or its General Manager and if after fifteen days’ notice the Railroad Company fail to comply with the terms of this contract, then the said Crescent City Slaughter House Company shall be entitled to annul and cancel the said contract, without the necessity of placing the said Railroad Company in default and empower the said Slaughter House Company to reenter into immediate possession of the herein granted right of way and to remove the material there belonging to said railway Company, at the cost and expense of said railway Company.” [emphasis added]

Plaintiffs argue that the 1891 instrument contained an automatic dissolving condition: namely, that “this grant of way . shall continue in full force as long as the said property . . . shall be used for the business for which it is now used or any other of like nature and no longer.” They argue that no cattle has rolled over Louisiana Southern Railway Company tracks since 1966 and that the property has not been used for cattle yards or slaughter houses since about 1963. Plaintiffs contend that there has thus occurred an automatic dissolution of the conventional servitude and that accordingly they are entitled to have the tracks removed from their property-

Plaintiffs’ position was upheld in the courts below, the Court of Appeal relying on Article 783 of the Louisiana Civil Code which provides in part that: “Servitudes are extinguished ... by the happening of the dissolving condition attached to the servitude.”

Our threshold consideration, therefore, is whether the 1891 contract as properly construed provides for an automatic dissolution of the servitude. When we examine the contract, we find that there is no express calendar term for the period during which the right of way is to continue. The purpose for which the right of way is to be used is said to be “exclusively” for operating cattle cars and such other rolling stock as may be required for the purpose of cattle yards and slaughter houses and attendant factories. There follows the language relied upon by the lower courts which is to the effect that the right of way shall continue in full force as long as the property shall be used for the business for which it is now used or any other of like nature and no longer. If construed to mean that at such time (when the property is no longer used for a “like” business) the right of way shall automatically dissolve, the provision conflicts, with the immediately succeeding sentence, actually grammatically a clause or continuation of the preceding sentence, which states: “The said Slaughter house Company reserving to itself the right to cancel and annul the right of way herein granted, whenever it shall select itself or be compelled to change the nature of the business” or shall cease to operate cattle yards or slaughter houses or desire to make a conveyance of the property. If the preceding sentence means that the right of way shall automatically dissolve when the property of the grantor is no longer used for the business for which then used, there would be no reason for the grantor’s reserving to itself the right to cancel and annul the right of way whenever grantor should elect or be compelled to change the nature of the business being conducted on the property, or cease to operate cattle yards or slaughterhouses, or sell the property.

If the right of way were intended to dissolve automatically if use of the property were to be substantially changed, then there would be no reason to give grantor “the right to cancel and annul” the servitude whenever it should voluntarily or involuntarily change the nature of the business or cease to operate cattle yards or slaughterhouses, or whenever it should sell the property.

Contracts are to be construed to give compatible meaning to all clauses. “All clauses of agreements are interpreted the one by the other, giving to each the sense that results from the entire act.” La. C.C. art. 1955. Furthermore, it seems evident from a reading of the entire agreement that it was prepared by the grantor; in any event the possibly ambiguous provisions should not be construed against the railroad.

Attempting to give meaning to both provisions and the balance of the instrument in a sensible and reasonable way, we believe that the words convey the following meaning:

The grant of this right of way is for an indefinite term. The railroad may insist on continuing the right of way in full force and effect, but only so long as and no longer than while the property of the grantor shall be used for the business for which now used or any other of like nature. On the other hand, grantor reserves unto itself the right to cancel and annul, or not to do so, in the event it chooses to or is compelled to change the nature of the business or ceases to operate cattle yards or slaughter houses or simply wants to convey the property.
If the right of way is cancelled by grantor within ten years for any of the foregoing reasons, the railroad is entitled to be reimbursed its expenses in constructing and maintaining the tracks. Even if the grantor may not cancel because none of the foregoing should come to. pass, i.e., voluntary or compelled change in the nature of the business, cessation of operation of cattle yards or slaughter houses or sale of the property, grantor may nonetheless cancel the right of way agreement in the event the railroad violates any provision of the agreement and fails to comply after having received fifteen days notice to do so.
The provisions of the contract which the railroad might violate are these: 1) use of the right of way other than for operating cattle cars and such other rolling stock as may be required for cattle yards and slaughter houses and attendant factory purposes; 2) failure to construct necessary road crossings and cattle guards; 3) failure to construct and maintain fences along both sides of the track with openings properly guarded at the point designated by the general manager of the grantor; and 4) impairment of drainage of the lands of the grantor.

When we examine the facts of this case in light of the interpreted contract provisions, what we find, first, is that the property is no longer being used for the slaughter house business. ' Moreover, since at least 1936 the railroad and its customers at this site have used the right of way, not exclusively for operating cattle cars and such other rolling stock, but for the carriage of other commodities as well. Since 1966 no cattle have been conveyed over the tracks.

Thus for many years the exclusive use provision of the right of way grant has been violated, and grantor’s property has not been used since 1963 for the business for which used at the time of the grant or any other of like nature. And until the institution of this lawsuit by successors in title to a portion of grantor’s original property, neither the grantor nor any successor has judicially or otherwise sought to exercise the right to cancel and annul the singular right of way granted in 1891. Rather, during this time, and right through the present, grantor, its successors (Crescent City Stockyard, New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc. and Hodges Stock Yards, Inc.), vendees (Arabi, International Cold Storage, Inc. and Earl Doescher Company), and tenants (including Modern Woodcrafts and Ace Box Company) have enjoyed, presently use, and wish to continue using the existing railroad servitude for their business advantage.

Plaintiffs convinced the court of appeal that the full import of the contract is to be gleaned in that sentence which sets the terms of the servitude as existing only for so long as grantor’s property is used for the business for which it was used in 1891. They successfully argued below that Civil Code Articles 783(6) and 821, which provide for the extinguishment • of a servitude of right.at the “happening of the dissolving condition,” govern the contract at issue.

In light of our finding that the proper interpretation of the contract and all its provisions is that there is not provided in this contract any automatic dissolution, but rather nullification at the option of the grantor when and if certain events should occur, we find it unnecessary specifically to consider whether discontinuance of the property’s use as a slaughter house was equivalent to Article 783(6)’s “happening of the dissolving condition,” and whether such discontinuance fixed the “certain time” which under Article 821 caused a servitude to become “extinguished of right.”

There was no automatic dissolution included within the contract. Furthermore, we know of no provisions of law or legal theory which strike with nullity a contract such as the present one where the grantor of a servitude reserves unto himself the authority to cancel and annul the agreement upon the occurrence of events so real, substantial, and foreseeable as change in the nature of the business conducted on the property, cessation of cattle yard or slaughterhouse operations, or conveyance of the property.

Finding that the contract did not automatically dissolve, but that its nullification must have been demanded in order to effect dissolution of the servitude, we turn now to the question of whether plaintiffs, one of several successors to grantor, and owners of only a portion of the original tract burdened with the servitude, may dissolve the servitude as it affects their property, with the attendant result that the servitude is effectively terminated as to the entire tract including property of their opposing neighbors who are also grantor’s successors. We find that plaintiffs may not.

There is no question but that plaintiffs purchased their property with full knowledge of the existence of the tracks and servitude on the property. Plaintiff Farrell testified at trial:

“We understood that these tracks on this property we were purchasing was burdened by this right-of-way. We understood that. We further understood, and in our discussions on drawing up the options in Jones, Walker’s office, that these rights of way were established by those certified documents.”

Farrell also testified that he was aware that the Act of Sale listed the railroad rights of way with which the property was burdened.

When plaintiffs acquired the property from New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc. (vendor’s name was later changed to Hodges Stock Yards, Inc.) the 1960 act recited that the transfer was made subject to certain leases and reservations including these:

“(a) The agreement of Switch privileges granted by Crescent City Stock Yard and Slaughter House Company, Limited, and New Orleans Terminal Company, dated August 12, 1908, registered in MOB 17, Folio 158. [This servitude was the one granted to New Orleans Terminal Company, the other railroad with tracks on the property.]
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“(d) Right-of-way, granted by the Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company, to the New Orleans Gulf and Railroad Company, of the right-of-way over and across the land of said Company, as more fully shown in Act of Deposit, executed before Gustave Legardeur, Jr., Notary Public, for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, dated March 17,1891. [This refers to the servitude granted to the predecessor of defendant Louisiana Southern Railway Company.]
“(e) Agreement entered into by, and between Louisiana Southern Railway Company, and the New Orleans Terminal Company, dated December 15, 1908, recorded in MOB 18, Folio 170. [This agreement is between the two railway companies; in it Louisiana Southern allowed New Orleans Terminal to use a portion of its tracks.]
“(f) The rights-of-way, servitudes and privileges established in the Act whereby the Crescent City Stock Yard and Slaughter House Company, Limited, conveyed other properties in the same location, as per act executed before Conrad G. Collins, Notary Public, dated April 30, 1921, registered in COB 28, Folio 80.” [This provision incorporates the servitude established in the 1921 sale to Arabi.]

If the servitude in question here (and we are now talking about the railroad’s servitude acquired originally in 1891) were a predial servitude, one which runs from one estate to another, then there would be no question but that plaintiffs alone could not cause removal of the tracks. Article 656 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that:

“The rights of servitudes, considered in themselves, are not susceptible of division, either real or imaginary. It is impossible that an estate should have upon another estate part of a right of way, or of view, or any other right of servitude, and also that an estate be charged with a part of a servitude.
“The use of a right of servitude may be limited to certain days or hours; but thus limited, it is an entire right, and not part of a right.
“From thence it follows that a servitude existing in favor of a piece of land, is due to the whole of it, and to all the parts of it, so that if the land be sold in parts, every purchaser of a part has the right of using the servitude in toto.”

Under this article, when a portion of a piece of property burdened by a servitude is sold, the buyer cannot have the servitude removed, because each of the property owners has the right of use of the entire servitude.

The servitude at issue here is one in favor of a public railroad. Thus, it is not a predial servitude but a limited personal servitude, governed by the rules of predial and personal servitudes, applied by analogy. A. N. Yiannopolous, Usufruct: General Principles, Louisiana and Comparative Law, 27 La.L.Rev. 369 (1967); III Yiannopolous, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Personal Ser-vitudes § 125 (1968); see 8 La.L.Rev. 553 (1948); see also Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. Gournay, 205 La. 164, 17 So.2d 21 (1944) in which this Court applied the codal principles of predial servitudes to a conventional servitude in favor of a railroad. When we apply Article 656 by analogy to the conventional servitude now before the Court, we find that the personal servitude created in favor of the railroad is indivisible because its advantage is not susceptible of division, C.C. art. 657, and because every purchaser of a part of the land “has the right of using the servitude in toto.” C.C. art. 656. No single owner can gain extinguishment of the servitude. Since only a single owner, plaintiffs herein, brought this action, they have no cause of action to extinguish the indivisible servitude running in favor of the railroad which is to the advantage of their neighbors.

We do not base our opinion that plaintiffs are without right to nullify the servitude simply upon the indivisibility of the personal servitude granted to the railroad in 1891. There is another reason why plaintiffs cannot succeed. In 1921 a predial servitude, a railway right of way, was established which burdens plaintiffs’ property.

In April of 1921, Crescent City Stockyard, plaintiffs’ predecessor in title, sold a parcel of its land to Arabi Packing Company. That act of sale recited that:

“This sale is made upon the further terms, conditions, stipulations and agreements, to-wit:
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“(11) The property hereby conveyed to the purchaser herein constitutes part of a larger area surveyed by E. L. Eustis, on Jan. 23rd, 1920, which said survey is made part hereof and paraphed for identification herewith, marked “B.” From said survey, it appears that there exist certain switch tracks, spurs, roads, crossings, rights of way, servitudes and privileges between that portion of the property hereby conveyed to the Arabi Packing Co. Inc., and that portion of the property retained by the vendor, Crescent City Stock Yard & Slaughter House Co. Ltd.
“It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto that there is hereby created for the use and benefit of the property retained by vendor and the successive owners thereof, rights, easements, servitudes, rights of way, in favor of said respective estates, perpetually, to the use of all the track, tracking privileges, roads, road ways, switching privileges, over the property of the Arabi Packing Co. Inc., as shown by the said blue print hereto attached and made part hereof, and as may presently exist.
“(12) On said blue print, marked “B,” hereinabove referred to and attached hereto, there appear certain tracks connecting with the New Orleans Terminal Railroad Company and the Louisiana Southern Railroad Company, running across Chartres and Royal Streets and the Block between said streets. And it is hereby agreed that the Arabi Packing Co. Inc., shall have the right to the joint use of said tracks, connecting with the aforesaid Terminal Railroad Company and the Louisiana Southern Railroad Company, insofar as the Crescent City Stock Yard & Slaughter House Co. Ltd., has the right or power to grant such joint use of them. The Arabi Packing Co. Inc. agrees jointly to maintain said tracks. The servitudes, rights and obligations above created shall attach to and follow ownership of the properties to which they relate.
“12-A-The vendor and purchaser, and their successors, shall have the right to change location of all switches, tracks and pipes and spurs, provided similar connections and service as presently exists, shall be maintained, and further provided, that the cost of making any change shall be borne by the party making same.” [emphasis added]
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In this agreement of 1921, Crescent City Stockyard granted a predial servitude to Arabi for a railroad right of way over the land it retained. Likewise, Arabi granted to Crescent City Stockyard a predial servitude for a railroad right of way over the -land it was purchasing. When Crescent City Stockyard sold to New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc. and when New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc. sold to plaintiffs, that predial servitude created in the 1921 agreement followed the land. It was this agreement, with its attendant predial servitude created upon the whole of the vendor’s property, including that portion later sold to plaintiffs, that was made a particular reservation in the act of sale by which plaintiffs acquired the land.in 1960. See section “f” of the “Reservations” in the 1960 act of sale hereinabove. That predial servitude affecting all of vendor’s property is indivisible. La.C.C. art. 656. A suit by an owner of a portion of the larger tract retained by vendor and burdened by the predial servitude created in 1921 may not succeed in removing the servitude from the property. In regard to this predial servitude, we note parenthetically, even were Hodges and plaintiffs joined in such effort, they could not extinguish this servitude to the prejudice of the 1921 vendee, Arabi, or Arabi’s successors.

For the reasons we have expressed herein, we conclude that there continues to exist over plaintiffs’ property the railway right of way granted initially in 1891 to the predecessor of Louisiana Southern Railway Company.

We turn now to the second alternative demand of plaintiffs: that the servitude in question be relocated to a strip bordering the properties which would be less burdensome on plaintiffs as they attempt to change the use of their property. This relocation was, of course, the central issue in plaintiffs’ previous suit. See footnote 1. In that opinion, this Court discussed the applicability of Civil Code Articles 703, 753, and 777 to the servitude in question. These articles set out the right of the owner of a servient estate to relocate a servitude across his property which has become more burdensome. Whatever the application of these articles to a conventional limited personal servitude, they are applicable only if the owner of the entire servient estate seeks to relocate the servitude. Just as the plaintiffs, owners of portion of the property which the 1891 grantor burdened with this servitude, could not successfully extinguish the entire indivisible servitude, as explained earlier herein, so too they cannot successfully effect the relocation of that entire indivisible servitude absent concurrence by each of grantor’s successors. Considering the record evidence of the opposition of other owners, including defendant Hodges, to the relocation, and considering as well the fact that some owners, successors to grantor, are not even parties to this litigation, we find that plaintiffs cannot in this lawsuit effect the relocation of the tracks to another place on their property.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, except insofar as it became final as to New Orleans Terminal Company, is reversed. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is otherwise dismissed, plaintiffs to bear all costs of this action.

MARCUS, J., dissents.

SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

SUMMERS, Justice

(dissenting).

I do not agree with the finding of the majority that the contract did not automatically dissolve, or that its nullification must have been demanded in order to effect dissolution of the rights acquired by the grantees, or, for that matter, that plaintiffs could not demand dissolution of those rights as they affect their property. Therefore, in my view, because the rights of the grantees of the rights of way were extinguished by failure to meet the conditions of the contract creating those rights, it is unnecessary to consider the other issues decided by the majority.

Only the rights of Louisiana Southern Railway Company and Hodges Stock Yards, Inc., are in question here, no application having been filed seeking review of the Court of Appeal judgment declaring the rights of New Orleans Terminal Company to be extinguished.

By the March 12, 1891 agreement Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company granted a “right of way over and across the land of said Company” to the New Orleans and Gulf Railroad, which, in turn, assigned to Louisiana Southern Railways Company the rights it now asserts.

The documents granting the rights of way in question specifically provided that the rights of way were to continue so long as the property of the grantors continued to be used as cattle yards and/or slaughter houses and attendant factories, and no longer.

The consideration supporting the agreement of March 12,1891 was stipulated to be “the advantages and conveniences accruing to the shippers of cattle, and in consideration of the improvement and increased facilities thus offered to those engaged in the cattle trade.”

The term or duration of the right of way was set forth as follows:

“. . . [A]nd this grant of way shall be exclusively used for operating cattle-cars and such other rolling stock as may be required for the purposes of cattle yards and slaughter houses and attendant factories, and shall continue in full force as long as the said property of the said Crescent City Live Stock Landing & Slaughter House Company shall be used for the business for which it is now used or any other of like nature and no longer.” (emphasis added).

The business of Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company is exemplified by its name. The demise of that particular mode of business appears from the testimony at the trial. A former salesman and operator of auction sales for New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc., later named Hodges Stock Yards, Inc., successor to parts of the property formerly owned by Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company, testified that Arabi Packing Company acquired part of the business of Crescent City Stock Yards and Slaughter House Company, and New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc., acquired another part of that business. He said Arabi Packing Company had holding pens, a slaughter house, coolers and trucks to deliver the meat it refrigerated. New Orleans Stock Yards, Inc., provided stock yard facilities to commission merchants, and a per head yardage fee was charged. According to this witness, who was 61 years old at the time of the trial and a lifelong resident of the neighborhood, in March of 1964 he made a public statement on behalf of Hodges Stock Yards, Inc., that livestock auctions of cattle were discontinued.

An official of that company conceded that Hodges Stock Yards, Inc., no longer “handle or slaughter live cattle.” He testified that “[t]he Hodges Stock Yards property is being used for warehouses, cold storage facilities, and that’s principally dry and cold storage facilities.” The rails service on the rights of way, he said, were needed to service his tenants, whom he listed as Modern Woodcrafts, Ace Box Company, and Mr. Doescher, none of whom were shown to be using their property for cattle yards or slaughter houses. Hodges had agreements with meat handlers who were using his cold storage facilities, but they used trucks, not rail service. Hodges objected to removal of the tracks because

“We also hope and feel that the biggest and best use of our property is the port development in St. Bernard, and we want to use these tracks. Saint Bernard has had trouble establishing its rights to use the property. The port authority in New Orleans has controlled the riverfront. This has been a problem in the development of the port facility down here. We feel that some day along the line we’ll get the port working and established, and we need the tracks to service the port industry that will come.”

An official of Louisiana Southern Railway Company testified that the very last time that any “livestock” was shipped over the tracks of New Orleans Terminal Company was in 1966 when three cars of sheep were brought in, fed, watered, and shipped out. They were not slaughtered. The tracks of Louisiana Southern Railway Company, he said, have not, to his knowledge, been used for livestock since 1960.

The contract here is one which may be denominated as a contractual grant of enjoyment of certain rights of the owner upon his land. As such, great latitude is granted to the owner of property to stipulate the terms and conditions by which the grantee may enjoy the rights thereby conferred. Just as the manner of enjoyment may be limited, the duration of the right may also be limited. It is the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract which governs. La.Civil Code arts. 2013, 2015.

From the record evidence the conclusion is inescapable that the property of Hodges Stock Yards, Inc., is not being used “for the purposes of cattle yards and slaughter houses” nor are the rights of way used for those purposes, as the grant requires. These properties were not being used for those purposes when this suit was filed in 1971.

Thus the conditions attached to the right of way agreement, upon which the life of that contract depends, are no longer being performed. Because these resolutory conditions are not being met the contract is annulled by its terms, and the rights of the parties which are dependent upon the fulfillment of those conditions are defeated. La.Civil Code arts. 2021, 2028.

I find no conflict between the quoted provision, which I feel brings about a dissolution or extinguishment of the rights of way under these circumstances, and the clause which states “the said Slaughter House Company reserving to itself the right to cancel and annul the right of way herein granted, whenever it shall select itself or be compelled to change the nature of the business.” This latter termination clause is another method by which the contract may be dissolved. The first is automatic and brings about the annulment and cancellation of the right of way upon the failure to maintain certain conditions. The second requires affirmative action on the part of the grantor to cancel and annul the right of way when “compelled” to change the nature of the business, which is to operate cattle yards and slaughter houses; or when it “desires to make a conveyance” of the property. The stipulations are not incompatible or inconsistent. Each is operative independently of the other, and I find no objection to the recognition of the first provision independently of the second. To hold otherwise is to rewrite the contract which is the law between the parties.

I respectfully dissent.

ON REHEARING APPLICATIONS

PER CURIAM.

Applications for rehearing in this case have been filed by plaintiffs-respondents Farrell, et al. and defendant-relator Hodges Stock Yards, Inc. We find no merit in the application of plaintiff Farrell.

The application of defendant Hodges suggests a possible ambiguity in the opinion at footnote two. Hodges points out that while the Court of Appeal opinion is indeed final as it relates to defendant New Orleans Terminal Company, a party which did not seek writs of this Court following an unfavorable decision in the Court of Appeal, it (the applicant) nonetheless retains rights as to that servitude (hereinafter referred to as the second servitude) which New Orleans Terminal Company was initially granted in 1908 by Hodges’ predecessor in title.

Hodges’ contention prompts us to issue this per curiam. Insofar as Hodges is concerned, the issue as to the continued existence of the second servitude was perpetuated by Hodges’ application for and procurement of a writ of review. Furthermore, our original opinion confirmed the validity of Hodges’ interest in both of the servi-tudes in question.

The pertinent language in the 1908 agreement by which Hodges’ predecessor in title granted the servitude to New Orleans Terminal Company is identical to the language in the 1891 servitude agreement which we examined in the original opinion. Our holdings there, that the language does not provide for an automatic dissolution of the servitude and that the railroad servitude is indivisible, apply here for the same reasons. Likewise, our holding that the 1921 sale to Arabi Packing Company created a predial servitude upon the vendor’s (and vendee’s) property applies equally in this instance.

The pending applications for rehearing on behalf of plaintiff Farrell and defendant Hodges are hereby denied, with the reservation to plaintiff Farrell of the right to apply for rehearing anew only on the issue discussed in this per curiam.

SUMMERS and MARCUS, JJ., dissent from the refusal to grant the application for rehearing of Thomas C. Farrell, Jr., et al., and, also, dissent from this per curiam.

      . Plaintiffs had made an earlier effort to remove and/or relocate the same tracks before the Louisiana Public Service Commission. Their application was denied, and that decision was upheld in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge and in this Court. Denegre v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 257 La. 503, 242 So.2d 832 (1970).

      . The third defendant, New Orleans Terminal Company, did not seek writs in this Court. Therefore, the judgment below is final as to that defendant, and our discussion will not deal with the demands of plaintiffs which related exclusively to that defendant, nor to the 1908 agreement by which its predecessor corporation acquired its right of way. It should be pointed out, however, that the two railroad defendants, Louisiana Southern Railway Company and New Orleans Terminal Company, had acquired two separate servitudes, with Louisiana Southern by independent agreement allowing New Orleans Terminal Company to use a portion of its tracks and right of way. Although both companies are now members of the Southern Railway System, they have always been separate corporations and their servitude grants are separate and distinct.

      . Moreover, we note that the grantor’s right to elect whether or not it will terminate the servitude is emphasized a second time in the same instrument, concededly in relation to certain acts or omissions on the part of the railroad, in these words:
      It is agreed that any violation of the foregoing contract shall be reported to the railroad Company or its General Manager and if after fifteen days’ notice the Railroad Company failed to comply with the terms of this contract, then the said Crescent City Slaughter House Company shall be entitled to annul and cancel the said contract, without the necessity of placing the said Railroad Company in default . . .

      . A slaughter house operated on a portion of the property closed in 1963. There is, however, at least one meat packing plant still on the property, and defendants contend that such business is closely related to the slaughter house business, such that the property is still being used for a business of “like nature.” We assume for purposes of this opinion that the meat packing plant does not constitute a business of “like nature” to a slaughter house.

      , George Denegre acted as agent for the purchasers Joseph Merrick Jones and Thomas E. Farrell. Although only Denegre’s name is on the act of sale, the actual purchasers were Jones and Farrell.

      . We note the recently-amended personal servitude section of the Civil Code which includes a new category for servitudes such as this one which is denominated a “personal servitude of right of use.” Rev.C.C. arts. 639-45. Revised Article 645, which follows, confirms our holding herein:
      “A right of use is regulated by application of the rules governing usufruct and predial ser-vitudes to the extent that their application is compatible with the rules governing a right of use servitude. (Revised by Acts 1976, No. 103, § 1.)”

      . We note In passing that our holding here, that a limited personal servitude running in favor of a railroad is indivisible in nature, coincides in part with the position of the concurring judge on the court of appeal. He took the position that because of that indivisibility the entire servitude was extinguished when the servitude automatically dissolved. Our finding it indivisible, after concluding the servitude was not automatically dissolved, serves to prevent plaintiffs from nullifying any part of the servitude.

      . It should be noted that it is not merely Hodges’ interest in the tracks which is at stake in the litigation, but the interest of Hodges’ grantees and tenants who use and wish to continue using the railroad tracks.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Alvin RELIFORD, Appellant.
    No. 58677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 10, 1977.
    Truly W. McDaniel, Shreveport, for appellant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John A. Richardson, Dist. Atty., Charles R. Lindsay, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, La.R.S. 40:966, and sentenced to life imprisonment. We find no merit to the four assignments of error presented by his appeal:

(1) The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to require the state to furnish the evidentiary detail requested by the defendant’s bill of particulars. State v. Thomas, 290 So.2d 317 (La.1974).

(2) We have previously rejected contentions similar to those now advanced of the unconstitutionality of provisions of the statute upon which the defendant was prosecuted and convicted. State v. Stetson, 317 So.2d 172 (La.1975); State v. Sliger, 261 La. 999, 261 So.2d 643 (1972).

(3) We find no error in the trial court’s overruling of objection to the testimony as to the customary manner in which an addict uses heroin, when elicited from a witness previously qualified as an expert in narcotics practice. Under similar circumstances, we have previously held that testimony similar to that here elicited was relevant to the issue of intent. State v. Marks, 337 So.2d 1177 (La.1976) (syllabus 17). The defendant relies upon State v. Sibley, 310 So.2d 100 (La.1975), but that decision is inapposite to the present issue; it concerned an inadmissible surmise by a non-expert as to the unidentified contents of a cellophane bag.

(4) The trial court was not required to give the special charge requested by the defendant. To be wholly correct, it required qualification, limitation, or explanation. The court therefore did not err in refusing to give the charge. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 807.

Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED.


author: CALOGERO, Justice. MARCUS, Justice, TATE, Justice,

text:
    In re REBAR STEEL ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION.
    No. 58883.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 1977.
    Rehearing Denied April 7, 1977.

      Lawrence K. Benson, Jr., M. Hampton Carver, Milling, Benson, Woodward, Hillyer & Pierson; Louis B. Merhige, Raymond J. Salassi, Jr., Charles W. Lane, III, G. Bruce Kuehne, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitev-ent, Carrere & Denegre; Virgil M. Wheeler, Jr., New Orleans, for applicants.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., John R. Flowers, Jr., James F. Willeford, Asst. At-tys. Gen., for respondents.
   CALOGERO, Justice.

A district court judge in the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans signed a document entitled “grant of Immunity under La.Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 439.1” along with the district attorney of Orleans Parish and the attorney general of the State of Louisiana, purporting to grant immunity, both transactional and use, from prosecution, to each of the four relators herein, Charles F. Jones, A. A. Boudousquie, Jr., Richard M. Johnson and John W. Bean “for testimony or information [to be] given” by them under oath in consolidated civil proceedings pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

From that grant of immunity, or order, and, inferentially at least, from a ruling of the trial court refusing to quash the proceedings in criminal district court which resulted in the order granting immunity, the four relators sought from this Court and were granted a writ of review.

The proceedings in the district court arose in the following manner. Three of the four relators (Boudousquie, Bean and Jones) along with the companies by whom the three were employed were indicted in federal court for violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The three individuals entered pleas of nolo contendere. Thereafter, the attorney general instituted on behalf of the State of Louisiana a civil class action against relators and their several employers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for treble damages allegedly due the state, its political subdivisions, public agencies, districts of the state and other consumers similarly situated because of violations of the antitrust laws. When the attorney general on behalf of the state issued subpoenas in conjunction with that federal civil action commanding the appearance of relators at the attorney general’s office for the purpose of having their depositions taken, counsel for relators advised the attorney general that relators intended to invoke their federal and state privileges against self-incrimination and would refuse to testify.

At that point the attorney general and the district attorney for Orleans Parish filed a pleading in Criminal District Court in Orleans Parish entitled “State’s Grant of Immunity and Motion under Article 439.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure” coupled with a “Motion of Attorney General for Subpoena of Witnesses Before the Attorney General.” The subpoenas sought the appearance of the four relators for questioning by the attorney general in the attorney general’s New Orleans office on the same date and at the same time designated in the earlier-filed deposition subpoenas in the federal civil action. Attached to the state’s initial pleading was an order which, as proposed, required that re-lators appear before the attorney general pursuant to the subpoena issued them under Article 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and answer questions regarding the Rebar Steel Antitrust Investigation, and recited that they “may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of their privilege against self-incrimination, but no testimony nor other information compelled under this order, or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information, may be used against the witnesses in any criminal case except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with said order.” That proposed order was not signed by the district judge. The judge did, however, sign an order attached to the motion for subpoenas, commanding the Clerk of Court to issue subpoenas directing the four relators to appear at the attorney general’s office at the same prescribed time for questioning by the attorney general or his assistants.

Thereafter a hearing took place at which counsel for the four relators moved to quash the application and moved to quash the state court subpoenas (both motions later reduced to writing). The former motion to quash urged that the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans was without jurisdiction because of the peculiar nature of the proceeding, and the latter motion complained that Article 66 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure was unavailable as authority for issuance of the subpoenas because there was no intent to have relators questioned by the attorney general or the district attorney concerning any offense under investigation by him.

At the hearing an assistant attorney general testified, and it was stipulated that the district attorney for the Parish of Orleans would have similarly testified if called, that at all times material to the proceeding neither of these agencies — the offices of the attorney general or of the district attorney for Orleans Parish — had a criminal investigation or action pending or contemplated, and that there was also no pending or contemplated grand jury proceeding with respect to the matter. Furthermore, except for the proceeding then being conducted before the trial judge, there were no proceedings pending in any court of this state, criminal or civil.

After argument, the trial judge granted the relators’ motion to quash the state subpoenas pursuant to Article 66; he refused, however, to quash the instant proceeding; and he signed, along with the attorney general and the district attorney, the document referred to in the first paragraph of this opinion, by which there was purportedly granted to the four relators transactional and use immunity from prosecution for testimony which they were later to give, under oath, in the consolidated civil proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Although the state did not seek writs complaining of the judge’s quash of the state subpoenas, making that action final, we granted rela-tors’ application for supervisory writs which asked that we inquire into the judge’s grants of immunity so as to ascertain their validity. The sole issue before us, then, is whether the attorney general of the state and a district attorney can take advantage of the provisions of Article 439.1 so as to have immunity granted to a person whose deposition they wish to take in a federal civil action although the district court pleading which they employ has no relation to any state court prosecution or other proceeding, pending or contemplated.

“The attorney general or district attorney, respectively, may determine who shall be present during the examination and may order all persons excluded, except counsel for the person subpoenaed.” (emphasis added)

The statutory provision upon which the attorney general and the district attorney relied in these district court proceedings is Article 439.1 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. That article provides in full as follows:

“A. In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a grand jury of the state, at any proceeding before a court of this state, or in response to any subpoena by the attorney general or district attorney, the judicial district court of the district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with Subsection B of this article, upon the request of the attorney general together with the district attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in Subsection C of this article.
“B. The attorney general together with the district attorney may request an order under Subsection A of this article when in his judgment
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self incrimination.
“C. The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self incrimination, but no testimony or other information compelled under the order, or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information, may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
“D. Whoever refuses to comply with an order as hereinabove provided shall be adjudged in contempt of court and punished as provided by law.” (emphasis added)

The state’s position before this Court is that the article may be utilized in the instant situation because the persons granted immunity were individuals who have “been or may be called to testify or provide other information ... in response to any subpoena by the attorney general or district attorney . . . .” The attorney general argues that “any subpoena” refers to any subpoena at all, in federal or state court, without any requirement that it be related to a-proceeding in a state grand jury or in state court.

It is important to reemphasize that the assistant attorney general testified and the attorney general and district attorney in effect stipulated, and in brief candidly admit, that there is no pending or contemplated state grand jury proceeding, that there is no proceeding before a court of this state other than the instant one (the purpose of which is not to procure testimony or other information at a proceeding before a court of this state), and that, as they concede, “the whole purpose of our seeking immunity for these people is to obtain their deposition for purposes of discovery only in connection with the ongoing civil suit.” Had either the attorney general’s or district attorney’s position been that he intended to question relators in conjunction with his investigation of criminal wrongdoing pursuant to his subpoena of them under Article 66 we would have a different legal issue. Since there was no review applied for from the quash of those subpoenas, however, that issue is not before us. And, in any case, the state’s admittedly exclusive reason for quizzing relators was to obtain answers for purposes of discovery in the federal civil action.

We turn now to an examination of Article 439.1, a 1972 addition to the Code of Criminal Procedure which has heretofore remained uninterpreted, and to our findings as to the validity of the attorney general’s reliance on it in this situation. We believe that the subpoena by the attorney general or district attorney contemplated by the article is not one issued in conformity with the laws, and/or under authority of a court, of a sovereign other than the State of Louisiana. Nor do we believe that under this article there exists, or was intended to exist, the right in the attorney general, district attorney and district court judge to grant immunity independent of state compulsion of the testimony or information, the perimeters of which dictate the extent of immunity which ensues. C.Cr.P. art. 439.-1(C).

Our conclusion in this regard is premised essentially upon a common sense appreciation of the statute and what we understand to be the statute’s intent. Our conclusion is fortified by the qualifying language in subsection A which, in describing the district court which shall issue the order requiring the testimony, refers to the “judicial district court of the district in which the proceeding is or may be held.” We believe that this clause qualifies the entire section and refers, not to a proceeding such as the present where the attorney general is seeking an immunity order unrelated to any pending state matter, but to proceedings ancillary to or a part of state court proceedings. The language of the article is this: “In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a grand jury of the state, at any proceeding before a court of this state, or in response to any subpoena by the attorney general or district attorney, the judicial district court of the district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue . .” We believe that the phrase “any subpoena” refers only to subpoenas issued in connection with a proceedings before “a grand jury of the state,” proceedings before “a court of this state,” or other proceedings of any nature which are related to a state criminal matter.

Thus we find the provision of Article 439.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure inapplicable and unavailable in this situation where the attorney general seeks an immunity order which he wants to employ in extracting deposition testimony in a pending federal court civil action.

Aside from basing his argument on Article 439.1, the attorney general argues that inherent in the district attorney’s broad powers in the enforcement of our criminal laws (for instance, he “has entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district and determines whom, when, and how he shall prosecute” C.Cr.P. art. 61) is the authority to decide who shall not be prosecuted, which he equates with a general power to grant immunity. Thus he, in effect, claims that apart from Article 439.1 he has the authority in this case to grant immunity to relators. In support of his position, he directs our attention to the following language in State v. Hingle, 242 La. 844, 139 So.2d 205, 210 (1962):

“Louisiana is in the category of those states that have no statutory or jurisprudential prohibition against the power of a district attorney to nolle prosequi a case or grant immunity to an accused completely independent of the court. On the contrary, under our specific statutory provisions, ‘The district attorney is the representative of the public and the legal adviser of the grand jury. * * * ’ and, ‘Subject to the supervision of the attorney-general * * * shall have entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in any parish wherein he is a district attorney, and shall determine whom, when, and how he shall prosecute * * (emphasis added)

While the majority on rehearing in Hin-gle did use the language quoted herein-above, the Court was there speaking of the right of the district attorney to bind himself not to prosecute given charges in return for an accused’s entering a plea to a lesser crime. The Court found prosecution of a defendant as a multiple offender barred by a prosecutor’s promise not to so prosecute in return for a plea of guilty to attempted possession of marijuana. The Court was not there concerned with a carte blanche grant, or promise of immunity from prosecution, or a grant of immunity in exchange for prospective testimony, but merely with the district attorney’s promise not to prosecute a particular charge as part of a plea bargain. In any event, the language in Hingle was obiter dicta and was soundly criticized by Justice (now Chief Justice) Sanders of this Court who in a concurring opinion stated:

“I am also unable to subscribe to the pronouncement, unnecessary for the holding in this case and conceded to be the minority rule, that in Louisiana a district attorney may grant immunity to an accused completely independent of the court. This conclusion is based primarily upon the circumstance that a district attorney in this state has the authority to enter a nolle prosequi without the consent of the court. This authority of nolle prosequi without the consent of the court is expressly conferred by statute. See LSA-R.S. 15:327-329. This authority is clear. However, contrary to the law of many of the other states, a nolle prosequi in this state does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. In legal effect it only discharges the particular indictment. LSA-R.S. 15:328. There is a vast difference between entering a nolle prosequi and granting full immunity for crime. The first is procedural, but the latter is a complete bar to prosecution. This being true, it does not follow that the district attorney alone has general authority to grant immunity to an accused for a crime.” [Footnote omitted] Hingle, supra, at 214.

We find the language in Hingle relied upon here by the attorney general neither persuasive nor controlling.

Additionally, however, the attorney general points to In re Greene, 260 La. 859, 257 So.2d 433 (1972) for the proposition that the district attorney has the authority to grant constitutional immunity in order to compel testimony. Indeed this Court in a per cu-riam to a writ denial in that case did acknowledge the right of the state to grant immunity, but it was from “prosecution arising out of responsive testimony material to the issue or question in controversy”, (testimony sought in a state grand jury proceeding) and it was in conjunction with a public bribery investigation. Article 19, section 13 of Louisiana Constitution of 1921 specifically provided at that time this special exception to the right of self-incrimination: “Any person may be compelled to testify in any lawful proceeding against any one who may be charged with having committed the offense of bribery . . .; but such testimony shall not afterwards be used against him in any judicial proceedings, except for perjury in giving such testimony.” Because the present investigation does not relate to public bribery and because there is here no state proceeding, we find In re Greene, supra, is likewise distinguishable from the present situation.

There is no provision of law in Louisiana which grants to the district attorney the discretionary power to grant immunity except in public bribery, bribery of voters and corrupt influencing cases. (R.S. 14:121). It is for this reason that the attorney general and district attorney attempted to rely upon and, in fact, must rely upon Article 439.1, not for the right to grant immunity, but for the procedure it affords him to compel testimony in certain limited circumstances, i. e., after a person has refused or is likely to refuse to testify in an appropriate state proceeding when the individual’s prospective testimony or information may be necessary to the public interest and the trial judge has issued, on joint application of the attorney general and the district attorney, an order compelling testimony. When the attorney general and the district attorney have made use of this procedure and the person has testified, then one result of that testimony is that “no testimony or other information compelled under the order, or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information, may be used against [him] in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or otherwise failing to comply with the order.” Action of the attorney general and the district attorney when they make use of the provisions of this article, then, can finally result in a person’s gaining transactional and use immunity, but that result is not the same as a right in the attorney general and/or the district attorney to grant immunity. We conclude, therefore, that, aside from the discretion afforded by R.S. 14:121 and the indirect grant under Article 439.1, there is no authority in attorney general or district attorney, statutory or inherent, to grant immunity from prosecution.

Because we find no constitutional or statutory authority for the proceedings which took place below and the order which rela-tors protest, we make the writ heretofore granted peremptory and render judgment herein in favor of relators Charles F. Jones, A. A. Boudousquie, Jr., Richard M. Johnson, and John W. Bean, reversing and vacating the order of the criminal district court which purported to grant immunity to petitioners from criminal prosecution.

MARCUS, Justice,

dissenting.

In my view, the attorney general together with the district attorney may request an order under subsection A of article 439.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure either in the case of an individual who has been or may be called to testify or in response to any subpoena by the attorney general or district attorney where the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

TATE, Justice,

dissenting.

The writer respectfully dissents.

As the majority states, the sole issue is whether a person may be granted immunity from criminal prosecution by the state under La.C.Cr.P. art. 439.1, when there is no state criminal prosecution pending or at the time contemplated?

(1)

The context in which this grant of immunity is sought must be noted. In federal civil proceedings, the relators have refused to testify, claiming that to do so subjects them to criminal prosecution under state statutes forbidding agreements to restrain trade. Except for this privilege against self-incrimination under state statutes, the relators would be required to testify truthfully as to facts within their knowledge.

The majority concludes that, because no criminal proceedings against these relators are actually (now) contemplated, the state may not grant them immunity and thus require them to testify truthfully. May I suggest, as a commonsense observation, that, when the state does not even intend to prosecute, there is even less reason to permit these relators to refuse to testify for reasons founded upon a non-existent possibility that they might by so doing incriminate themselves?

The majority’s error results, in my opinion, from an extremely technical analysis of the immunity statute’s wording, without construing such wording in the light of the statute’s purpose.

As the proper analysis to be set forth below shows, the majority’s analysis leads to the functionally absurd result that a witness may refuse to testify truthfully upon a claim of possible self-incrimination but cannot nevertheless be immunized to give testimony, simply because in offering immunity the state also volunteers that it does not intend to prosecute him whether or not he is immunized. To grant immunity, the majority apparently feels, the state must first pretend it intends to conduct a prosecution, from which it is now immunizing him in order to obtain his truthful testimony.

(2)

Similar to the federal constitution, our state constitution provides that “No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself”, Art. 1, Section 16, La. Constitution of 1974. In the context of this constitutional protection, the protection insures any person from being compelled to give evidence by which his guilt of a crime may be proved.

The constitutional provision does not encompass within the scope oí its protection any person being compelled to testify adverse to his own interest in civil proceedings, or concerning matters embarrassing to himself in any proceeding, so long as by being required to do so he does not subject himself to criminal prosecution or provide evidence of his guilt of a criminal offense. The majority opinion does not dispute these well-settled principles.

Thus, except when there is a possibility that a witness will thereby provide evidence for a criminal prosecution against himself, a witness is required (absent some other privilege not here claimed) to testify to the truth in civil or criminal proceedings, however embarrassing the truth may be or however hurtful it may be to his associates or however much it may implicate them in criminal activity. Again, the majority opinion does not dispute these equally well-settled principles.

The relators here claim, in the federal civil proceedings, that they subject themselves to state criminal prosecution if they testify. The federal court is required to honor this claim of privilege until the state grants immunity from such prosecution; nor may the federal authorities grant immunity to these witnesses in order to require them to testify to facts within their knowledge. State authorities alone may grant such immunity.

The mechanism by which state authorities may grant immunity is provided by La.C.Cr.P. art. 439.1, here sought to be invoked. Upon the joint request of the district attorney and the attorney general, full transactional and use immunity may be granted to the witness by the district court with jurisdiction over the offense with which the person may be charged or in which he may be called to testify as to any criminal charge of which the court has jurisdiction.

Upon its face, the statute does not require that criminal prosecution must be pending or that, before the immunity may be granted, the individual “shall ” be called to testify in a proceeding brought before a court of this state. Instead, it provides that this immunity may be sought if “any individual . . . may be called to testify . at any proceedings before a court of this state”. In simple English, this means to me that, if criminal prosecution may be brought in a particular judicial district as to an offense against state law, that district court has jurisdiction to grant immunity against prosecution to any individual “[who ] may be called to testify” in proceedings related to that prosecution, whether or not the prosecution is actually instituted or has been instituted.

Thus, the tenor of the statute is not to require intended prosecution before immunity is sought. It is rather to confer authority to grant immunity as to any individual “[who ] may be called to testify” in any prosecution that might possibly be brought in that district. The purpose of the provision is simply to delineate which district court may confer immunity, not to limit the jurisdiction of that district court to grant immunity depending upon for what purpose the compelled testimony (by reason of the immunity) is sought.

In my opinion, therefore, the majority errs in its overly-technical construction of the statute.

In addition, however, in my belief the majority overlooks that full and truthful testimony is the general objective sought for our civil and criminal proceedings. The exceptions by way of privilege, including that of self-incrimination, must be honored, for these involve constitutional and statutory principles to protect values of society deemed more important than the truth.

However, once (as here) these values of the self-incrimination privilege are preserved by a statute granting full use and transactional immunity for testimony sought to be educed, no reason exists to honor a claim that one cannot testify truthfully without exposing himself to criminal prosecution — for he cannot then be prosecuted on the basis of the evidence he gives or any leads resulting therefrom.

The majority has, in my opinion, beyond the statutory intent narrowed the state’s right to grant immunity. No statutory or functional purpose is served by this technical and narrowed construction of the statute.

Furthermore, the majority’s construction forces the state, in instances where the bar to the witness’s truthful testimony is sought to be removed, to pay at least lip-service to an intention to prosecute the witness or somebody else. By the very nature of the proceeding to grant immunity, the state has determined that a greater social value is served by obtaining the information from the witness rather than by prosecuting him.

I fear that the majority’s opinion has, contrary to the intention of the legislation, deprived the public and the state of an efficient means by which to free witnesses of the possibility of criminal prosecution, in return for which they are required to testify truthfully in any criminal or civil proceeding. The grant of immunity to accomplish this obviously worthwhile social purpose should not be hindered or ringed around with artificial technicalities.

The purpose and function of the statute would here be served by granting immunity: The only reason for the witness not testifying truthfully is thereby removed; and the legislative requirements to protect the public are here met, i. e., both the district attorney and the attorney general have joined in the request, and the district court (in which any prosecution involving that witness must be brought) has approved it.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

      . The titles of those proceedings are as follows: Louisiana v. Armco Steel Corporation, et al., civil action no. 75-317 and Wilson P. Abraham v. Armco Steel Corporation, et al., civil action no. 74-1899.

      . The complaint alleged that the defendants had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing among themselves to raise and stabilize the prices of rebar materials, to submit rigged and collusive bids for the sale of rebar materials, and to allocate the market in accordance with fixed percentage shares of each defendant. A similar class action in the same federal court was instituted by an individual plaintiff, Wilson P. Abraham. The stated action and the individual action, the exact titles of which appear in footnote one, were consolidated by the federal court.

      . Article 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides in full that:
      “Upon written motion of the attorney general or district attorney setting forth reasonable grounds therefor, the court may order the clerk to issue subpoenas directed to the persons named in the motion, ordering them to appear at a time and place designated in the order for questioning by the attorney general or district attorney respectively, concerning any offense under investigation by him. The court may also order the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.
      “The contumacious failure or refusal of the person subpoenaed to appear is punishable as a contempt of court.

      .Relator had also moved to quash the application for the asserted reason that applicants and the court had not complied with the court’s allotment procedures. We find it unnecessary to review the merits of this motion, denial of which is made the subject of one of relator’s assignments of error, because there is no record before us on this issue and we assume that it has been abandoned.

      . The assistant attorney general also testified, “It is not our intention to prosecute any named defendant or any named parties at the state level.” .

      . It might be well to point out that we do not have here a situation wherein persons who have been made immune from state prosecution are being prosecuted in federal court on the basis of their incriminating testimony, as was the situation in Murphy v. Waterfront Com’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964). Relators here have already entered pleas in their federal criminal prosecutions, and they have not yet given any testimony in the federal civil action either before or after the purported grant of immunity from state prosecution in the state criminal district court.

      . This provision has no counterpart provision in the 1974 Constitution, but an almost identical provision remains in our law, R.S. 15:468. See also R.S. 14:121.


author: TATE, J.,

text:
    James A. MOREAU v. Richard A. TONRY et al.
    No. 59477.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 1977.
   In re: Richard A. Tonry et al. applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writ denied. The trial judge was correct in ruling that the court has jurisdiction to try the action for nullity of the prior judgment. Further, the exception of no cause of action was properly overruled as to the action for nullity; we do not reach the exception as to other demands of plaintiff, and make no ruling thereon, since the exception must be overruled if the petition states a cause of action as to any demand.

TATE, J.,

concurs in the denial. The trial court properly overruled the exception of no cause of action to annul a judgment allegedly obtained fraudulently, for whatever consequential effect the judgment may have. Our denial of this application is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to urge defenses he may have in the basic election contest suit.

The primary defenses we do not pass upon are that the state court allegedly does not have jurisdiction to disturb the election of a member of Congress who has taken office, and that under state law the basic election contest suit is abated, since the nominee of the primary election was placed on the ballot of the general election. See La. R.S. 18:364, 1072, as of the date of the suit.

MARCUS, J., concurs in the denial of the writ in that the judgment is not final.

DENNIS and CALOGERO, JJ., are of the opinion this court should grant the writ and cause the issues raised to be expeditiously argued and decided.


author: CALOGERO, J., DENNIS, J.,

text:
    James A. MOREAU v. Richard A. TONRY et al.
    No. 59643.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Richard A. Tonry, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order.

Writ denied. In accordance with our previous decision, La., 343 So.2d 1386, the trial judge has jurisdiction to try this action of nullity of the judgment.

CALOGERO, J.,

a majority of this court has already ruled unfavorably to applicant on the legal issue presented in this application. For this reason I concur, while nonetheless agreeing with the sentiment expressed by my brother Dennis.

DENNIS, J.,

adheres to the view that this court should have granted a previous writ application in order to determine whether this civil litigation can have any actual legal effect on the parties so as to constitute a legitimate justiciable controversy. If it cannot, the evidence being gathered in this case should more properly be presented to a grand jury or a legislative committee.


author: MARCUS and DENNIS, JJ., TATE, J.,

text:
    In re John DOE.
    No. 59556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 1977.
   In re: John Doe applying for supervisory review from certain rulings of the Committee on Professional Responsibility & Stay Order

Application denied for the reason that the Committee has the power & duty to decide the admissibility of any tapes to be used in the hearing. This court would authorize contempt proceedings in aid of its jurisdiction. If the Committee possesses or determines that there are “originals” of the tapes involved, the Committee must comply with the previous order of this court in # 58,565.

MARCUS and DENNIS, JJ.,

are of the opinion that the writ should be granted and the proceedings stayed until it be determined that complainants have produced the original tapes and recorder in compliance with the subpoena duces tecum issued by the Committee and ordered by this court.

TATE, J.,

concurs in the denial: An inadequate showing has been made for the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction at this time. The tapes may not be introduced at the hearing without a foundation proving that they are the original and not a (possibly altered) reproduction of them. In my opinion, the respondent should not be required to present his defense until as authenticated original is presented.


author: DIXON, J., DENNIS, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Richard S. PIKE.
    No. 59361.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 1, 1977.
   In re: State of Louisiana applying for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition

Writ Granted. The ruling of the trial court is reversed. The attorney-client privilege does not extend to the fact of representation, including the identity of the client. State v. Hayes, 324 So.2d 421 (La.1975). This ruling is not to be construed as suggesting that the state may elicit from the attorney witness over further objection any further information, particularly as relates to the outcome of the previous trial. The case is remanded to the trial court.

DIXON, J.,

dissents from the grant. The majority apparently misunderstands the ruling of the trial court, because the majority states that defendant’s former attorney is prohibited from testifying as to defendant’s prior conviction. Further, this court should strongly discourage the interruption of prosecutions for the state to challenge in this court evidentiary rulings of the trial judge, particularly when not critical to the prosecution.

DENNIS, J.,

is of the view that the writ should be denied or granted for a full hearing. The court should not rule on this issue precipitously and without careful consideration after entertaining briefs and oral arguments from both parties.


text:
    Horace W. GETCHELL, Sr., Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of his Deceased son, Horace W. Getchell, Jr. v. Anthony GUARINO et al.
    No. 59521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 1, 1977.
   In re: Horace W. Getchell, Sr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, 343 So.2d 1109, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied. The result is correct.

DIXON, J., dissents.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ;


text:
    Clarence McCLOSKEY, Sr., et al. v. Anthony GUARINO et al.
    No. 59522.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 1, 1977.
   In re: Clarence McCloskey, Sr., et al. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, 343 So.2d 1101, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied. The result is correct.

DIXON, J., dissents.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


author: SUMMERS, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John T. LUCK, d/b/a Tommy’s News.
    No. 59619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 4, 1977.
   In re: John T. Luck, d/b/a Tommy’s News and Shreveport News Agency, Inc., applying for supervisory writs and stay order.

Stay order denied. The Club Magazine case relied on has been dismissed. The right of this relator to apply for supervisory relief is reserved.

SUMMERS, J.,

is of the opinion the stay order should be unqualifiedly denied.

DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ., dissented in dismissing the Club Magazine ease and would grant the stay order in this case.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert H. GILMORE, d/b/a Gilmore’s Newsstand.
    No. 59620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 4, 1977.
   In re: Robert H. Gilmore, d/b/a Gilmore’s Newsstand and Shreveport News Agency, Inc., applying for supervisory writs and stay order.

Stay order denied. The Club Magazine case relied on for a stay order has been dismissed. The right of relator to apply for supervisory relief is reserved.

SUMMERS, J.,

is of the opinion the stay order should be denied without qualification.

DIXON, J., dissented from dismissing the Club Magazine case and would grant the stay order.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roger Dale DOUCET.
    No. 59628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: State of Louisiana applying for writ of certiorari.

Not considered. Not timely filed.

TATE, J., concurs in denial. Unofficial postmark shows mailing date of March 31st, but application not received here until April 4th. Under such circumstances, unofficial postmark does not prove timely filing. See Rule 10, Section 5(b) (1976).


text:
    Horace THOMPSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 49604.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    April 6, 1977.
    Smith & McLemore, James G. McLemore, Jr., Carthage, for appellant.
    A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Wayne Snuggs, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
   Appeal from Circuit Court, Leake County; O. H. Barnett, Judge.

Before GILLESPIE, C. J., and SMITH and WALKER, JJ.

AFFIRMED.

PATTERSON and INZER, P. JJ., ROBERTSON, SUGG and BROOM, JJ., concur.

LEE, J., took no part.


text:
    Lindell TINEY v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 49713.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    April 6, 1977.
    John C. Webb, Greenville, for appellant.
    A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Pete J. Cajoleas, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
   Appeal from Circuit Court, Washington County; B. B. Wilkes Judge.

Before PATTERSON, P. J., and ROBERTSON and BROOM, JJ.

AFFIRMED.

GILLESPIE, C. J., INZER, P. J., and SMITH, SUGG, WALKER and LEE, JJ., concur.


text:
    KROEHLER MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al. v. Willie West HEIDELBERG.
    No. 49287.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    April 6, 1977.
    Snow, Covington, Temple & Watts, Kenneth Watts, Meridian, for appellant.
    Goldman & Goldman, Dennis Goldman, Meridian, for appellee.
   Appeal from Circuit Court, Lauderdale County; Lester F. Williamson, Judge.

Before GILLESPIE, C. J., and SMITH and WALKER, JJ.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

PATTERSON and INZER, P. JJ., ROBERTSON, SUGG, BROOM and LEE, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert H. GILMORE d/b/a Gilmore’s Newsstand.
    No. 59644.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 6, 1977.
   In re: Robert H. Gilmore d/b/a Gilmore’s Newsstand and Shreveport News Agency, Inc. applying for stay order.

Stay order denied at this time.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John T. LUCK d/b/a Tommy’s News.
    No. 59645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 6, 1977.
   In re: John T. Luck, etc., et al. applying for stay order.

Stay order denied at this time.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Albert CLARK v. Hon Frank A. MARULLO, Judge Criminal District Court Section "D” Parish of Orleans.
    No. 59452.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Albert Clark applying for writ of mandamus.

Writ denied. The matter is moot. No mandamus is in order.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terry JOHNSON.
    No. 59468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Terry Johnson applying for supervisory writs, writs of certiorari, and for stay order.

Writ denied. No merit in application.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tracy Lee HUDSON.
    No. 59612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: State of Louisiana applying for writs of certiorari and review.

Writ denied. The trial court’s grant of a new trial has not been shown to have been an abuse of discretion.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Milo HAYES v. C. Paul PHELPS, Director, Louisiana Department of Corrections.
    No. 59418.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Milo Hayes, applying for writ of certiorari.

Writ denied. On the showing made, relator not entitled to the relief sought.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. 1971 GREEN GMC VAN.
    No. 59461.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: State of Louisiana through District Attorney, Ossie Brown applying for supervisory writs.

Granted. The petition of the relator in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered,

It is ordered that a writ of certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable Elmo E. Lear, Judge of the 19th Judicial District, Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or before the 21st day of April, 1977, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through counsel shall show cause, in this court, on the 24th day of June, 1977, at 10 o’clock A.M., why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator should not be granted.


text:
    In re subpoena duces tecum Joseph Neves MARCAL, III.
    No. 59351.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Joseph Neves Marcal, III applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition and stay order.

Writ Granted. Upon the motions of the District Attorney and the defendant, the subpoena duces tecum is hereby canceled and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.


text:
    BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the CADDO LEVEE DISTRICT v. The S. D. HUNTER FOUNDATION et al.
    No. 59483.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Board of Commissioners of the Caddo Levee District applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caddo. 342 So. 2d 720.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.


text:
    Mrs. Sue Wilder SZMYD et al. v. Raymond WINGATE et al.
    No. 59557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Sue Wilder Szmyd applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Jackson. 341 So .2d 1271.

Writ application not considered. Untimely filed.


text:
    Mrs. Vera Mae ROBINSON et al. v. BEAUREGARD PARISH POLICE JURY.
    No. 59631.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Mrs. Vera Mae Robinson, et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Beauregard. 342 So.2d 696.

Application not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    Clarence O. DUPUY, Jr. v. Francis J. DEMAREST, Recorder of Mortgages and Milton E. Dupuy.
    No. 59499.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Milton E. Dupuy, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 342 So.2d 263.

Writ denied. No error in the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeal.


text:
    Charles LOYD v. ATLAS CONSTRUCTION CO. and Highlands Insurance Company.
    No. 59503.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Charles Loyd, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany. 341 So.2d 1245.

Writ denied. On the facts found by the courts below, the result is correct.


text:
    Leonard J. GREENE v. CATALYTIC, INC. and Elbert Fletcher.
    No. 59505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Leonard J. Greene applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 341 So.2d 1172.

Writ denied. On the facts found, the court of appeal judgment is correct.


text:
    Virginia HAMILTON v. LOUISIANA HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION et al.
    No. 59506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Virginia Hamilton, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. 341 So.2d 1190.

Writ refused. There is no error of law in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.


text:
    Dorothy LABOSTRIE v. Abe WHITAKER et al.
    No. 59510.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Dorothy Labostrie applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 342 So.2d 249.

Writ denied. Under the errors assigned, no error in the court of appeal result.


text:
    PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
    No. 59523.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 7, 1977.
   In re: Travelers Insurance Co. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 342 So.2d 226.

Application denied; on the facts found by the court of appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond T. WOODALL, Jr.
    No. 59675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 12, 1977.
   In re: Raymond T. Woodall, Jr., applying for stay order.

Writ denied. The showing made does not warrant issuing the stay order requested.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jory WALTON et al.
    No. 59648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 12, 1977.
   In re: Jory Walton, et al. applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

Writ denied. No abuse of discretion shown by the evidence thus far produced, without prejudice to the applicants’ right to have a further evidentiary hearing as to their entitlement to bail.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lawrence M. WEINBERG.
    No. 59662.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 12, 1977.
   In re: Lawrence M. Weinberg, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition and stay order.

Writ denied. The ruling of the trial judge is correct.