author: PER CURIAM. ENGLAND, Justice, SUNDBERG, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Larry LEE, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Illanos G. JULIO, Appellee.
    Nos. 52076 and 52190.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 23, 1978.

      Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Jack 0. Johnson, Public Defender and James A. Cornelius, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for Larry Lee.
    Catherine L. Dickson and Ed L. Harvey, Asst. Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for lí-tenos G. Julio.
    Robert Berner Lester, III, Tallahassee, for Bill Gunter, Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer, amicus curiae.
    Marion R. Shepard and Vincent J. Rio, III of Mathews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Go-belman & Cobb, Jacksonville, for John E. Mathews, Jr., amicus curiae.
    D. Stephen Kahn and Paul W. Lambert, Tallahassee, for Legislators Brantley, Barron, Forbes, Gallen, Glisson, MacKay, McClain, Poston, J. Thomas, P. Thomas, Ware and Zinkil, amici curiae.
    Paul B. Steinberg and Bruce M. Singer of Steinberg & Sorota, Miami Beach, for Insurance Underwriters Unlimited, Inc., a Florida Corporation, amicus curiae.
    Louis de la Parte, Jr., Tampa, for AAA Motor Clubs of Florida, amici curiae.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review consolidated appeals from orders of the county courts of Polk and Gadsden Counties, holding Section 42 of the Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, Chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, unconstitutional. On September 7, 1977, we rendered a decision in this cause affirming the judgments of the trial courts and holding Section 42 unconstitutional. We retained jurisdiction to fully articulate the reasons for its unconstitutionality and invited the parties and amicus curiae to submit briefs on the question of whether the unconstitutionality of Section 42 required a holding that the entire Act was unconstitutional.

We now hold that Section 42 is unconstitutional on the grounds that (i) it improperly uses the police power to take private property from one group of individuals solely for the benefit of another limited class of individuals; and (ii) it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions in that it constitutes an irrational classification. We reject the contention that the entire Act is unconstitutional because it violates Article III, Section 6, of the Constitution which mandates that a tew must embrace one subject matter. We further find that Section 42 is properly severable from the other provisions of the Act.

We first must articulate the reasoning behind our holding Section 42 unconstitutional. Section 42 provides for the establishment of a “Good Drivers’ Incentive Fund” with the stated legislative purposes of encouraging safe driving and discouraging the abuse of driving privileges. Under this section, additional civil penalties are assessed for certain traffic violations. These additional penalties are collected by county clerks and remitted to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for deposit into the fund. The fund then operates in the following manner:

Section 42. Good Drivers’ Incentive Fund.—
sf; * ¡fc * * s}s
(5) Beginning July 1, 1978,. and at the beginning of each fiscal year thereafter, all money in the fund after deduction of the costs of administration of the fund shall be distributed to persons who have:
(a) Been licensed to drive in Florida;
(b) Received no convictions as specified in subsection (4) or convictions arising out of a motor vehicle accident during the preceding 12 months; and
(c) 1. Purchased and maintained continuously for 12 months on a voluntary basis bodily injury liability insurance of at least $10,000 because of bodily injury to, or death of, one person in any one accident, and, subject to said limits for one person, in the amount of $20,000 because of bodily injury, or death of, two or more persons in any one accident; or
2. Established voluntarily with the department financial responsibility by one of the alternative methods set forth in s. 324.031(2), (3), or (4). [The three alternative methods are (1) posting a surety bond with the Department of Insurance; (2)furnishing a certificate from the Department of Insurance showing a cash deposit of $25,000, or a deposit of securities of like market value; or (3) furnishing a certificate of self insurance issued by the Department of Insurance.] Chapter 77-468, Section 42(5), Laws of Florida.

Unquestionably, the legislature, through the exercise of the state’s police powers, has the right to establish fines or penalties to be paid by those individuals who violate the state’s traffic laws. The state’s police powers, however, are not absolute and any legislation resting on the police power, to be valid, must serve the public welfare as distinguished from the welfare of a particular group or class. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So.2d 560 (Fla.1976); Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corporation, 40 So.2d 371 (Fla.1949).

Appellant contends that Section 42 serves the public welfare by providing an incentive for those persons operating motor vehicles in this state to utilize the privilege in a safe and financially responsible manner, and, at the same time, by providing a disincentive to those who would abuse such privilege. Appellant argues that this public purpose protects Section 42 from a successful constitutional attack. We disagree.

Our analysis of Section 42 reflects that, no matter how beneficial the public purpose behind its enactment, the distribution of a portion of the fines to a limited group of private persons makes it an improper use of the police power of the state. Section 42 has potential benefit for only a very limited class of private individuals. The class of persons who are entitled to receive a distribution from the fund does not even include all “good” drivers within the state, but includes only those operators of motor vehicles who meet the restrictive qualifications of Section 42(5).

We recognize that legislation is not always invalid because it benefits a limited group. We further recognize that the state does have the power to levy fines against those who violate the state’s traffic laws to the extent necessary to protect the public welfare. Section 42, however, does not fall within the category of valid legislation benefiting a limited group, and it is not saved by any public purpose which may have prompted its enactment. The state’s police power cannot be invoked to distribute collected funds arbitrarily and discriminatorily to a special limited class of private individuals. For the reasons expressed, Section 42 is in itself unconstitutional.

Somewhat akin to the foregoing impediment in the law is its deficiency under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitutions of Florida and the United States. The classic criterion for assessing the validity of a statutory classification is whether that classification rests upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 50 S.Ct. 310, 74 L.Ed. 775 (1929). Stated another way “in order for a statutory classification not to deny equal protection, it must rest on some difference that bears a just and reasonable relation to the statute in respect to which the classification is proposed.” Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So.2d 261, 264 (Fla.1976). Accord, Rollins v. State, 354 So.2d 61 (Fla.1978). The question, then, is whether the classification made by the legislature in Section 42 is reasonable. We conclude that it is not.

The purpose of the legislature in enacting Section 42 is easily determined for it is stated concisely within the body of the law. Its purpose is to provide “an incentive for those persons operating motor vehicles in this state to utilize the privilege of operating such motor vehicles in a safe and financially responsible fashion and at the same time to provide a disincentive to those who would abuse such privilege.” To accomplish this purpose, the legislature elected to amend Chapter 316, Florida Statutes, which sets forth the fines and penalties prescribed for violation of the state’s traffic code, by increasing the amount of the fines and penalties, and to create a “Good Drivers’ Incentive Fund” to reward safe drivers.

An examination of Section 42 will reveal that the legislature has divided the licensed drivers of automobiles in Florida into two classes. One class consists of licensed drivers who have received no convictions for moving traffic violations and who maintain bodily injury liability insurance or an acceptable substitute. These drivers are the “good drivers” and receive benefits from the “Fund.” The second class is comprised of licensed drivers who have received as few as one single conviction for a moving traffic violation but who have also maintained bodily injury liability insurance or an acceptable substitute. These drivers are the “bad drivers” and they are prohibited from receiving the benefits to be dispensed from the “Fund.” Are those classified as “bad drivers,” in fact, unsafe drivers simply because they have violated one of the enumerated sections of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes? If so, then to separate them into a class apart from “good drivers” and to deny them the benefits of the “Good Drivers’ Incentive Fund” would reasonably relate to the purpose of Section 42 to encourage the operation of motor vehicles in a safe fashion and to provide a disincentive to those who would abuse their driving privilege. Accordingly, is a single violation by a licensed driver of one of the many sections of the traffic code listed in Section 42 a reasonable basis for showing that such driver has abused his privilege to drive? We think not. Furthermore, virtually all of the traffic violations set out in Section 42 are minor violations which have been decriminalized by the enactment of Chapter 318, Florida Statutes, and many of the violations are not reasonably related to safe driving.

Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the verb “abuse” is:

To make excessive or improper use of a thing; to make an extravagant or excessive use, as to abuse one’s authority.

This Court has held that to “abuse power” is to use it in an extravagant manner, to employ it contrary to the law of its use, or to use it improperly and to excess. Swenson v. Cahoon, 111 Fla. 788, 152 So. 203 (1933). By definition, it is apparent that a single conviction for a minor traffic violation which has been decriminalized cannot constitute an abuse of the privilege to drive an automobile by an otherwise responsible driver.

More importantly, many of the moving traffic violations catalogued in Section 42, conviction of which prohibits a driver from enjoying the benefits of the “Fund,” are in no way related to the driver’s efforts to drive his automobile safely. For example:

Section 316.056, Florida Statutes, — “It is unlawful to tear down or deface any detour sign . . ..” (Prohibition here is not unsafe driving, but actions of a pedestrian defacing state property.)
Section 316.061, Florida Statutes,— “The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident . . . and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of § 316.062.” (Obviously, this violation does not relate to the driver’s ability to drive safely, but rather to his responsibilities after an accident has occurred, even when he is absolutely without fault in causing.the accident.)
Section 316.095, Florida Statutes, — “No driver of any vehicle other than an authorized emergency vehicle on official business shall follow any fire apparatus traveling in response to a fire alarm closer than 500 feet or drive into or park such vehicle within the block where fire apparatus has stopped in answer to a fire alarm.” (The prohibition here is to prevent the frustration of fire fighting activities, not unsafe driving.)
Section 316.096, Florida Statutes, — “No vehicle shall be driven over any unprotected hose of a fire department when laid down on any street or highway, or private road or driveway, to be used at any fire or alarm of fire, without the consent of the fire department official in command.” (This violation also relates to the hindrance of firefighters in their activities rather than safe driving.)
Section 316.102, Florida Statutes, — “It is unlawful to operate upon any hard surfaced road in this state any log cart, tractor, or well machine; any steel tired vehicle other than the ordinary farm wagon or buggy; or any other vehicle or machine that is likely to damage a hard surfaced road except to cause ordinary wear and tear on the same.” (Obviously the intent of this section is to prohibit physical damage to highways not to define unsafe driving practices.)
Section 316.104(2), Florida Statutes, — “It is unlawful to allow any vehicle or contrivance or any part of same, or any load or portion of a load carried on the same, to drag upon any street or highway.” (Again the intent is to prohibit physical damage to highways.)
Section 316.104(4), Florida Statutes, — “It is unlawful for any vehicle to be equipped with any solid tires or any airless type tire on any motor-driven vehicle when operated upon a highway.” (The intent of this section is similar to that of the preceding section.)

The arbitrary classification of drivers based on their conviction of one of the traffic violations set out above or a similar violation bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of Section 42.

Furthermore, under the provisions of Section 42 it is possible for a person to be placed in the “bad driver” class even though he was not driving his automobile at the time of the violation. The provisions of Section 316.206, Florida Statutes, require that an owner of a vehicle who permits his vehicle to be driven in violation of the section is also guilty of violating the section. Thus, a moving traffic violation as defined by Section 42 may be vicariously imputed to a motor vehicle owner who was not physically present at the time or place of the moving violation.

We cannot distinguish the classification imposed by Section 42 from others which have been held by this Court to be unreasonable and discriminatory. For example, in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001 (1908), this Court held invalid a statute which imposed the legal duty on the operators of railroads to pay for goods lost or injured in transportation, but exempted all other common carriers from such duty. It was held that a statute making such a regulation applicable only to railroads created an unreasonable classification which denied railroad companies equal protection of the laws. In State v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d 19 (Fla.1958), a statute forbidding the display of signs advertising the price of gasoline by gas station operators within 15 feet of the right-of-way of any public street was held to be constitutionally invalid. It was ruled that dealers in gasoline could not be singled out for regulation while dealers in other products attractive to motorists were not prohibited from so advertising their products. The Court determined that the purpose of the statute was to eliminate the danger to the public of distracting the attention of the driver. Justice Thomas observed that:

The lack of substantial reason to impose the conditions on the one class of retailers specified and on but one type of sign maintained by that class renders the pertinent part of the law invalid. 104 So.2d at 21.

A similar conclusion was reached in Gammon v. Cobb and Rollins v. State, supra. The former decision dealt with an unreasonable classification for illegitimate children and the latter related to operators of billiard parlors. The reasoning iterated in each of the foregoing decisions of this Court is equally applicable to Section 42 and, consequently, the same result must obtain.

The next constitutional issue that must be addressed concerns the contention that the entire Act is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the constitutional directive that a law “shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith.” Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution.

Appellee Julio contends that Chapter 77-468 is a statute which contains at least two separate subjects, insurance and tort reform, in addition to other matters which are not properly connected to either subject. Although Chapter 77-468 is a broad and comprehensive legislative enactment, we must disagree with appellees’ contentions.

The purpose of the constitutional prohibition against a plurality of subjects in a single legislative act is to prevent a single enactment from becoming a “cloak” for dissimilar legislation having no necessary or appropriate connection with the subject matter. E. g., Colonial Inv. Co. v. Nolan, 100 Fla. 1349, 131 So. 178 (1930). This constitutional provision, however, is not designed to deter or impede legislation by requiring laws to be unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation. See State ex rel. X-Cel Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 122 Fla. 685, 166 So. 568 (1936). This Court has consistently held that wide latitude must be accorded the legislature in the enactment of laws, and this Court will strike down a statute only when there is a plain violation of the constitutional requirement that each enactment be limited to a single subject which is briefly expressed in the title. Farabee v. Board of Trustees, 254 So.2d 1 (Fla.1971); Rouleau v. Avrach, 233 So.2d 1 (Fla.1969).

The subject of a law is that which is expressed in the title, Rouleau, supra, at 4; Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786 (1906), and it may be as broad as the legislature chooses provided the matters included in the law have a natural and logical connection. Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So.2d 693 (Fla.1969).

Applying the above-stated principles, we conclude that the Act before us deals with only one subject. Chapter 77-468 is an attempt by the legislature to deal comprehensively with tort claims and particularly with the problem of a substantial increase in automobile insurance rates and related insurance problems. Sections 38-41 of Chapter 77-468 concern certain aspects of tort litigation, but these sections relate primarily to tort litigation arising from automobile negligence. Given the profound effect of tort litigation on all phases of the automobile insurance industry, we cannot say that tort law and automobile insurance have no logical connection.

The legislature, in enacting Chapter 77-468, has dealt comprehensively with a broad subject, but we cannot say that appellees have demonstrated a plain violation of Article III, Section 6, of the Constitution. Prior comprehensive enactments by the legislature demonstrate that widely divergent rights and requirements can be included without challenge in statutes covering a single subject matter. For example, the recently enacted Probate Code encompasses a wide range of rights, penalties, and forfeitures in a single legislative enactment. Chapter 75-220, Laws of Florida. With the presumption of validity that Chapter 77-468 carries with it, we must give the legislature the benefit of the doubt.

The appellees make at least seven other constitutional assaults on Section 42. In view of our finding, we need not address those contentions.

The final issue concerns the question of whether Section 42 is properly severable from the remaining portions of Chapter 77-468. In resolving the issue of severability, this Court has consistently applied the tests set forth in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 137 So.2d 828 (Fla.1962):

When a part of a statute is declared unconstitutional the remainder of the act will be permitted to stand provided: (1) the unconstitutional provisions can be separated from the remaining valid provisions, (2) the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those which are void, (3) the good and the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other and, (4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are stricken. . . . 137 So.2d at 830.

Chapter 77-468 was designed to accomplish several objects. Section 42 was intended principally to lower the frequency of traffic violations. The remaining sections of the Act relate to reforms in insurance rates and coverage as well as reforms in certain aspects of tort litigation. The legislative purposes behind the enactment of the remaining portions of the Act, although related, can be accomplished independently of Section 42. The remaining sections are not inseparately connected with or contingent on Section 42.

Further, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the legislature would not have passed the other provisions had it known that Section 42 would fall. In fact, the evidence of legislative intent points to the contrary. Section 44 of Chapter 77-468 declares that the legislature intended each section to be severable from the remaining portions of the Act.

We hold that Section 42 is properly severable from the remaining sections of Chapter 77-468. In so doing, however, we express no opinion as to the constitutionality of each of the remaining sections of Chapter 77-468.

The judgments of the trial courts holding that Section 42 is unconstitutional are affirmed. That portion of the judgment of the County Court of Gadsden County which held the entire Chapter 77-468 unconstitutional, however, is reversed. The funds collected pursuant to Section 42 should be refunded to the extent possible without cost to the original payor.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., and MASON, Circuit Judge (Retired), concur.

ENGLAND, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, with which SUNDBERG, J., concurs.

SUNDBERG, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, with which ENGLAND and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.

ENGLAND, Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

While I support the Court’s invalidation of Section 42, I cannot agree with my colleagues’ determination that Section 42 is severable from the other provisions of this 1977 statute.

Following the entry of our September 7 order declaring Section 42 invalid, we invited interested parties to brief for us the question of whether Section 42 is severable from other provisions of Chapter 77-468. In response to our request we received helpful briefs on both sides of the issue. A point of common agreement among those responding is that the so-called “severability clause” which appears as Section 44 of the Act does not control our determination, but simply assists the Court in ascertaining the legislative intent. See Small v. Sun Oil Co., 222 So.2d 196, 199-200 (Fla.1969).

The tests for severability have been variously cast as whether the statute would have been enacted without the invalid provision, whether the unaffected portions of the statute would produce a result never contemplated by the Legislature, whether the unaffected portions are complete, sensible and wholly independent of the invalid provision, and whether the invalid provision was an inducement to the enactment of the other provisions. The touchstone for severability under each of these formulations, however, is the “intent” of the Legislature with respect to the enactment as a whole.

In the present case I am persuaded that the Legislature enacted the Good Driver’s Incentive Fund as an inducement to another key provision of the statute — the elimination of mandatory insurance coverage for Florida motorists (other than $5,000 of personal injury protection). Viewed in a different light, I am convinced that the resulting legislation would not have been enacted without some “trade-off” like Section 42 to induce motorists to secure financial responsibility for motor vehicle mishaps. Put another way, the consequence of allowing the legislation to stand without Section 42 would be a result the Legislature never intended.

The interdependence of Section 42, diminished financial responsibility, and the statutory adjustments to the fault system of litigating motor vehicle torts is readily apparent from a mere reading of this comprehensive statute. It is also easily illustrated from the legislative history of the Act. Chapter 77-468 began as Senate Bills 792, 925, and 1181. The initial bills were modest and innocuous, in no way resembling the final enactment. They followed this path through the 1977 regular session of the Florida Legislature:

1. On April 19, SB 792 was introduced and referred to the Judiciary-Civil Committee and to the Commerce Committee. SB 925 was introduced and referred to the Commerce Committee on April 22, and SB 1181 was introduced and referred to the Commerce Committee on April 28.

2. On April 29, SB 792 was recommended for passage by the Judiciary-Civil Committee.

3. On May 17, a Committee Substitute for the three bills was recommended for passage by the Commerce Committee. This comprehensive statute marked the first appearance of a “good driver’s fund”.

4. On May 18, CS for SBs 1181, 925 and 792 was passed by the Senate and sent to the House, as amended to change the use of the good driver fund from premium reductions to direct distribution to certain policy holders. An amendment to strike the fund provision of the bill failed.

5. On May 24, CS for SBs 1181, 925 and 792 was introduced in the House and referred to the Commerce Committee.

6. On May 31, CS for SBs 1181, 925 and 792 was recommended for passage by the House Commerce Committee, with amendments, and passed by the House as amended. The good driver’s fund, although altered in certain details, remained essentially intact.

7. On June 1, the Senate refused to concur in the House amendments and requested a conference committee; the House refused to recede from its amendments and House conferees were appointed.

8. On June 2, Senate conferees were appointed. On the following day, the conferees’ report on the bill was adopted by both the Senate and the House, and the bill as amended as enacted by both bodies.

Relevant to our concern from this history is the fact that all versions of the proposed legislation considered by the reviewing committees, by the full Senate and by the full House, contained as part of this complex insurance and tort package both a provision for diminished mandatory insurance coverage and a provision for some form of incentive rebate or refund designed to induce voluntary insurance purchases.

One can argue hypothetically that the object of this 1977 legislation was simply to reduce automobile insurance premiums. It can nowhere be demonstrated, however, that the Legislature would have been willing to undertake that responsibility without also providing that persons injured in automobile accidents would be afforded a substitute form of protection. The Good Driver’s Incentive Fund provided the incentive for policyholders to purchase insurance protection in addition to that required by law. I am convinced that the removal of that incentive, without a concomitant removal of premium reduction provisions, would yield a result which was never contemplated by the Legislature.

SUNDBERG, J., concurs.

SUNDBERG, Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

While I concur in the Court’s conclusion that Section 42 of Chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, is unconstitutional for the reasons stated in the majority opinion, I must respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion which finds Section 42 severable and upholds the balance of the Act. I have concurred with Justice England’s observations concerning the non-severability of Section 42. However, I perceive a more basic infirmity in the entire Act which makes unnecessary any inquiry into the sev-erability of Section 42.

The County Court of Gadsden County, Florida, in the case brought against Ulanos G. Julio found Chapter 77-468 to be unconstitutional for the reasons, inter alia, that:

CS/SB 1181, 925 and 792 [Ch. 77-468, Laws of Florida] as a whole violates Article III, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution by embracing more than one subject. The Act on its face, relates to insurance and tort reform while also regulating increased fines and/or penalties for certain traffic offenses. The matter of civil penalties and/or fines for certain traffic offenses is not fairly and naturally germane to the subject of insurance and tort reform, nor are such penalties necessarily incident to, or tend to make effective or promote the objects and purposes of the legislation included in the subject of the Act.

I agree with the county judge that the Act fails to comply with the mandate of Article III, Section 6 of our Constitution.

Chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, was not enacted as a general revision or revisor’s bill. Cf. Jones v. Christina, 184 So.2d 181 (Fla.1966). It adds to or creates at least 18 sections of the Florida Statutes: repeals three sections; and directly amends 24 sections, several of these amendments being substantial revisions. Not counting two unnumbered new statutory sections, on its face it changes nine different chapters of the Florida Statutes (Chapters 11, 120, 320, 324, 325, 624, 626, 627, 768), ranging from “Legislative Organization, Procedures, and Staffing” to that portion of “Negligence” known as the “Florida Wrongful Death Act.”

Among other things, the Act: changes duties of the Joint Legislative Management Committee (Section 2); amends the Administrative Procedure Act (Section 3); requires proof of personal injury protection insurance when motor vehicles are registered, and creates a new crime concerning such proof (Section 4); redefines the purpose of the Financial Responsibility Law and the definition of “motor vehicle” used in that law, while changing supervision of that law from the Department of Insurance to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Sections 5 and 6); changes agencies responsible for filing certain accident reports and the circumstances in which licenses and registrations will be suspended (Section 7); revises accident security deposit procedures (Section 8); revises license and registration reinstatement procedures, and triples the reinstatement fee (Section 9); abolishes equitable apportionment among insurers and the requirement that proof of insurance be provided at vehicle inspections (Section 12); adds to requirements for departmental examination of insurers (Section 14); changes several aspects of insurance certification, reporting, regulation and rate-making (Sections 15 through 28); provides that a motor vehicle lessor’s insurance shall ordinarily be primary (Section 29); changes uninsured motorist’s coverage and eliminates pain and suffering damages unless the no-fault threshold is met (Section 30); generally eliminates compulsory liability insurance for motor vehicles (Section 31); revises personal injury protection coverage (Sections 33, 37); changes the “collateral source” rule regarding motor vehicle accident suits (Section 34); prohibits punitive damages in actions against automobile liability insurers for damages exceeding policy limits (Section 35); substantially revises the civil and criminal law concerning fraudulent insurance claims and soliciting of motor vehicle tort claims by attorneys and others (Section 36); generally requires mandatory joinder of all personal injury claims and actions brought under Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975) (Section 38); generally precludes joinder of liability insurers in suits against insureds (Section 39); changes the definition of “minor children” in the Wrongful Death Act (Section 40); provides for mandatory trial court remittitur or additur in motor vehicle personal injury or wrongful death actions (Section 41); creates a “Good Driver’s Incentive Fund” (Section 42); generally freezes rates for private passenger motor vehicle insurance effective June 4, 1977, until January 1, 1978 (Section 43); and establishes multiple effective dates (Section 45).

Stated another way the Act relates to at least three distinct and separate subjects, which may be categorized: (i) insurance and matters related thereto; (ii) tort law; and (iii) enhanced penalties for moving traffic violations. By the first line of the title it is acknowledged that Chapter 77-468 is “[a]n act relating to insurance and tort reform.” CS/SB 1181, 925 and 792. The very scope of the Act with its effect on myriad aspects of our law is almost intimidating to judicial scrutiny. So pervasive is the reach of the legislation into so many subjects that one is reluctant to examine closely any part for fear that its invalidation will cause a domino effect upon programs and provisions which touch upon all sorts of subject matter within our statutes. Nevertheless, the consequences of a holding that this legislation violates Article III, Section 6, cannot be a consideration in exercising our judicial responsibilities.

But the uneasiness evoked in the judiciary in reviewing such multifaceted legislation is merely a symptom of the cause for which Article III, Section 6, was placed in our Constitution. A legislator in initially considering a bill should not be put to the choice of accepting provisions affecting a subject matter totally alien to provisions affecting a subject matter with which he is sympathetic. For example, it is clear that a subject such as abortion should not be combined with revision of the Uniform Commercial Code. The factors relevant to one are totally different to the considerations, moral and philosophical, bearing upon the other. An apt phrase has been applied to this constitutionally unacceptable practice —logrolling. See Lee v. Bigby Electric Co., 136 Fla. 305, 307, 186 So. 505 (1939). The rationale for such provisions as Article III, Section 6, is clearly expressed in Colonial Inv. Co. v. Nolan, 100 Fla. 1349, 131 So. 178, 179 (1930):

The object of this constitutional provision, which in substance has been placed in practically all of the constitutions of the several states, was to prevent hodgepodge, logrolling, and omnibus legislation. It had become quite common for legislative bodies to embrace in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other, or to the subject specified in the title, by which means measures were often adopted without attracting attention. And frequently such distinct subjects, affecting diverse interests, were combined in order to unite the members who favored either in support of all. And the failure to indicate in the title the object of a bill often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved. And not only were members thus misled, but the public also; and legislative provisions were sometimes pushed through which would have been made odious by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably demonstrated by the title of the bill. Thus it was long since decided that these evils should be corrected by constitutional provisions preventing such aggregations of incongruous measures by confining each act to one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject should be briefly expressed in the title. Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 3.

Accord, State v. Sullivan, 99 Fla. 1070, 128 So. 478 (1930).

Needless to say, there are degrees of ger-manity. It is the function of this Court to measure legislation against the constitutional mandate, when objection is raised, and assess whether the Act so abuses the organic provision as to be constitutionally impermissible. We have earlier cases of this Court to assist us in this task. My review of those authorities convinces me that Chapter 77-468 plainly exceeds the tolerable limits of propriety imposed by Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution. While it is true that each ease tends to go off on its own peculiar facts, nonetheless certain guiding principles can be discerned from these earlier authorities.

The first of these is that Article III, Section 6, relates to the subject of legislation. Though some constitutional subject-title requirements command a unity of object, the Florida Constitution requires that each law shall embrace one subject. By definition “[t]he subject is the matter to which an act relates; the object, the purpose to be accomplished.” Wright v. Board of Public Instruction, 48 So.2d 912, 915 (Fla.1950). Accord, Nichols v. Yandre, 151 Fla. 87, 9 So.2d 157 (1942); Spencer v. Hunt, 109 Fla. 248, 147 So. 282 (1933).

In defense of the Act the attorney general maintains that the legislation has a single general subject matter-automobile insurance coverage. But it must be readily apparent that, at best, this topic could only be construed as an object of the legislation and that multiple subjects are dealt with and recited in the title, i. e., insurance, torts, and traffic law. Ordinarily the word “subject” is a broader term than the word “object,” as one subject may contain many objects. Spencer v. Hunt, supra. However, the reverse appears to be true here. The legislature may deal with the subject of insurance, or torts, or traffic regulation, independently, to accomplish any number of remedial purposes, including automobile insurance coverage. It may not, though, conglomerate these diverse subject matters in a single act under the auspices of dealing with automobile insurance coverage. The subjects which might be affected by the object of regulating automobile insurance coverage are so limitless and diverse that to accept the State’s argument and convert this purpose to a single subject of legislation would be to completely emasculate Article III, Section 6 of our Constitution. For example, if the appellant’s position were accepted, the fields of automobile manufacturing safety standards, automobile repair, traffic control devices, highway construction, delivery of medical services, hospital care and drug prices, to name a few, could all be dealt with in one act because they bear upon automobile insurance rates and coverage. The Act before us, in fact, intrudes into the areas of court practice and procedure as well as lawyer discipline and is justified, allegedly, by the fact that those matters affect insurance coverage and rates. In fine, pursuant to the constitutional mandate of Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution, the question presented sub ju-dice is not the germanity of the matters included in the measure, but whether multiplicity in subject matter is present. If but one subject were embraced in the title to Chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, it would be appropriate to examine the body of the Act to determine if the provisions thereof are “matter[s] properly connected therewith (germane).” However, if distinct, unrelated and incongruous subjects are embodied in the title itself, it matters little that provisions in the body of the Act are germane to one or more of the stated subjects in the title. Cf. McConville v. Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Co., 101 Fla. 727, 135 So. 392 (1931). The title should express only one subject. Colonial Inv. Co. v. Nolan, supra. The constitutional provision is mandatory. Boyer v. Black, 154 Fla. 723, 18 So.2d 886 (1944).

Although courts are naturally reluctant to invalidate a statute for defects in the title and will not do so except in clear cases free from every reasonable doubt, nevertheless I am satisfied that the Act under review clearly fails to comply with the mandate of Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution. If this legislation does not fall within the proscription of that section of our organic law, I cannot conceive of one that would. Obedience to the Constitution requires that this Act fall. As suggested by Justice Brown in Colonial Inv. Co. v. Nolan, supra, if an Act embraces two or more subjects, and two or more are expressed in the title, the whole Act is void. 131 So. at 180. This Court is not at liberty to choose between the several subjects and hold the Act valid as to one and void as to the others. See Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d ed. 1904) Section 144.

Accordingly, I would affirm the action of the trial court in ruling, inter alia, that Chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, is invalid in its entirety for transcending the requirements of Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution.

ENGLAND and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.

      . For the purposes of Section 42, the term “moving traffic violations” means an infraction of the following Florida Statutes:
      §§ 316.029, 316.030, 316.040, 316.053, 316.-054, 316.055, 316.056, 316.0565, 316.057(9), 316.061, 316.081, 316.082, 316.083, 316.084, 316.085, 316.086, 316.087, 316.088, 316.089, 316.090, 316.091, 316.092, 316.094, 316.095, 316.096, 316.098, 316.100(1), 316.102, 316.-104(2) or (4), 316.107, 316.108, 316.109, 316.-110, 316.1105, 316.113, 316.121, 316.122, 316.-123, 316.125, 316.126(1) or (3), 316.133, 316.-134, 316.138, 316.139, 316.151, 316.152, 316.-153, 316.154, 316.155, 316.157, 316.158, 316.-159, 316.162, 316.181, 316.182, 316.183, 316.-184, 316.185, 316.186, 316.196, 316.197, 316.-198, 316.205, 316.206, 316.217, 316.236, 316.-238, 316.2431, or 339.30(l)(a), (b), (c), (d), (g), or (h).
      All of the above sections have been decriminalized by the provisions of Chapter 318, Florida Statutes, except for the following: 316.029, 316.061, 316.028.

      . In support of severability are the Attorney General, on behalf of the state, John E. Mathews, Jr., and state legislators Brantley, Barron, Forbes, Gallen, Glisson, MacKay, McClain, Po-ston, J. Thomas, P. Thomas, Ware and Zinkil, as friends of the Court. Urging invalidation of the entire statute are appellees and both Insurance Underwriters Unlimited, Inc., and AAA Motor Clubs of Florida, as friends of the Court.

      . “Section 44. If any provision of this act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application. To this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

      . It has been suggested that severability clauses have become so commonplace that their significance should be considered minimal. See Kapaun v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 64 S.D. 635, 269 N.W. 564 (1936). While not “routine” in Florida, the use of such clauses has been fairly regular. In the 1975 regular session, the Legislature put a severability clause in 26 of its statutes. In 1976 a like clause was contained in 20 statutes, and in 1977 a like clause was contained in 30 statutes.

      . Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Florida v. Wood, 297 So.2d 556, 559 (Fla.1974); State ex rel. Limpus v. Newell, 85 So.2d 124, 128 (Fla.1956); State v. Calhoun County, 127 Fla. 304, 311-13, 170 So. 883, 886 (1936).

      . State ex rel. James v. Gerrell, 137 Fla. 324, 330, 188 So. 812, 815 (1939) (on rehearing); Hayes v. Walker, 54 Fla. 163, 168, 44 So. 747, 749 (1907).

      . Kass v. Lewin, 104 So.2d 572, 577 (Fla.1958); Greenblatt v. Goldin, 94 So.2d 355, 359 (Fla.1957).

      . State ex rel. West v. Hilburn, 70 Fla. 55, 61-62, 69 So. 784, 786 (1915); Dade County v. Keyes, 141 So.2d 819, 821-22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962), cert. discharged, 152 So.2d 171 (Fla.1963).

      . For example, Section 4 of the Act (adding a new subsection 320.02(3), Fla.Stat.) requires car owners to furnish proof of personal injury protection insurance at the time of vehicle registration, and it prescribes “uniform proof of purchase" cards for that purpose. Paragraph 320.02(3)(a) of this provision, states these cards must also indicate the existence of any bodily injury liability insurance voluntarily purchased “as an aid in implementing Section 42.”

      . A “Statement of Substantial Changes Contained in Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1181, 925, 792” was prepared for the Senate by the staff director of the Commerce Committee. The statement identifies substantial changes in the committee bill from the original bills, among other things, “in the reporting requirements currently used by motor vehicle insurance companies”, in the abolition of “compulsory liability insurance, unless required under financial responsibility laws”, “in tort law”, in the establishment of “a good driver fund”, and in rates (“A rate freeze would be imposed until 1/1/78.”). As originally conceived, moneys in the fund would have been “distributed to insurers writing motor vehicle liability insurance in this state to reduce premiums charged to policyholders .

      . S.Jour. 438, 1977 Reg.Sess.Fla.Leg., amend. 16. The fund provision appeared as section 27 of the bill as enacted by the Senate.

      . S.Jour. 444, 1977 Reg.Sess.Fla.Leg., amend. 42.

      . S.Jour. 871 and H.R.Jour. 1243, 1977 Reg. Sess.Fla.Leg.

      . Of course, the legislation had that effect. See § 324.011, Fla.Stat. (1977), as amended by Ch. 77-468, § 5, Laws of Fla.

      . The Act expressly states the Legislature’s intent to protect persons and property from motor vehicle mishaps. See § 5, amending § 324.011, Fla.Stat.

      . By ensuring protection through voluntary insurance purchases, however, legislators could accurately represent that they had reduced the high insurance premiums required by law.

      . Art. Ill, § 6, Fla.Const., provides in pertinent part:
      “Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title. . ."

      . See Parker, Constitutional Law — The Legislative Subject Title Requirement, 9 M.L.Q. 431, (Summer 1955).

      . E. g„ La.Const., Art. Ill, § 16. For a case interpretative of the origin and application of this section, see Conley v. City of Shreveport, 216 La. 78, 43 So.2d 223 (1949).

      . See State ex rel. Shevin v. Metz Construction Co., Inc., 285 So.2d 598 (Fla.1973); State ex rel. Flink v. Canova, 94 So.2d 181 (Fla.1957); McConville v. Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Co., supra.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KARL, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    FLETCHER PROPERTIES, INC., etc., Petitioner, v. FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
    No. 52157.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 23, 1978.

      Kenneth F. Hoffman of Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones & Gay, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
    Leon F. Olmstead and Raymond E. Ves-terby of the Florida Public Service Commission, Tallahassee, for respondent.
   KARL, Justice.

We have for review by petition for writ of certiorari a declaratory statement by the Public Service Commission.

Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory statement with the Florida Public Service Commission to determine the applicability of Chapter 367, Florida Statutes (1975), and Chapter 25-10, Florida Administrative Code, rules of the Public Service Commission, to petitioner and, more specifically, to determine whether petitioner constitutes a public utility. In its petition for declaratory statement, petitioner alleged:

“Fletcher Properties is managing agent for Baymeadows, a private residential community located in Southside Jacksonville, and is part owner of Baymeadows, as tenant in common, along with Centennial Equities Corporation and Baymea-dows, Inc. This community is provided sewer and water service by Jacksonville Suburban Utility Corporation. (The community presently includes approximately 242 occupied condominiums, 826 rental apartments, and recreational facilities).
“By agreement with Jacksonville Suburban Utility Corporation water provided to Baymeadows is master metered, and Baymeadows (the owners) retain [sic] ownership of the lines and lift stations and perform maintenance.
“Billing for services has been by Jacksonville Suburban Utilities Corporation. In the past Baymeadows has recouped these costs from the various apartment complexes and condominium associations on an equal share basis.
“Baymeadows is also planning to begin a single family home subdivision. Jacksonville Suburban Utilities Corporation has approved service of this addition, but will not bill these customers direct, since it does not own the lines and the meters will be individually installed at each residence.
“It is possible that Baymeadows could read the meters but pay on a master meter basis to Suburban Utilities, and then recover the costs from the individuals.
“In any event, since Jacksonville Sur-burban [sic] Utilities is in fact a public utility providing the water and sewer services, with Baymeadows’ pipes merely acting as conduits, and since payment for services is made to Jacksonville Suburban Utilities, with Baymeadows acting as a money collector, it would appear that Bay-meadows is not a utility as defined at Section 367.021, Florida Statutes.”

Additional information was requested by the Public Service Commission regarding how Fletcher Properties recoups the cost of water and sewer utility service from the various apartment complexes and condominium associations on an equal share basis, how Jacksonville Suburban Utilities bills for services it provides and how charges for water and/or sewer service to the future single-family home subdivision will be handled. Petitioner responded that Fletcher Properties recoups the cost of water and sewer utilities service from various apartment complexes and condominium associations on an equal share basis per occupied unit after an allocation of a flat $200.00 to the Tennis Club served by Fletcher; that Jacksonville Suburban Utilities bills Fletcher directly every three months for total consumption through a master meter located at the entrance to Baymeadows at their approved tariff rates from multiple dwellings; that as to the proposed single-family subdivision, Fletcher proposes to install individual residential meters on each home, although water will go through the master meter; and that if Jacksonville Suburban Utilities does not service the homes, Fletcher will have to read the meters itself and allocate usage to each homeowner at the same rate that Jacksonville Suburban bills Fletcher.

The Public Service Commission issued its declaratory statement on June 2,1977, finding that the operations of petitioner in providing water and sewer utility service are within the definitions of a utility in Section 367.021, Florida Statutes (1975), and are not exempt under Section 367.022, Florida Statutes (1975). The Commission reasoned as follows:

“Chapter 367, Florida Statutes, is the ‘Water and Sewer System Regulatory Law’ (Section 367.011(1), F.S.). A ‘utility’ thereunder, ‘means water or sewer utility and, except as provided in Section 367.022, includes every person, lessee, trustee or receiver owning, operating, managing, or controlling a system, or proposing construction of a system, who is providing, or proposes to provide, water or sewer service to the public for compensation.’ (Section 367.021(3)).
“Exempt from regulation, insofar as herein relevant, are ‘(5) Landlords providing service to their tenants without specific compensation for the service; (6) Systems designed to serve or serving one hundred persons or less; and (7) Nonprofit corporations, associations, or cooperatives providing service solely to members who own and control such nonprofit corporations, associations or cooperatives.’ (Section 367.022, F.S.)
“Fletcher Properties is manager and part owner of a development containing approximately 242 occupied condominiums, 826 rental apartments, and recreational facilities. By agreement with Jacksonville Suburban Utilities Corp., water service from Jacksonville Suburban Utilities Corp. (Jacksonville Suburban) is master-metered at the entrance to the Fletcher development. Sewage service is provided on the same basis.
“Fletcher is planning construction of some single-family homes and proposes to individually meter them, the meters to be read, although all water will go through the master-meter. Charges to the single family units will be on the same rate Jacksonville Suburban bills Fletcher.
“It is apparent from the above facts, that the Fletcher operations relating to water and sewer service do not fall within the above listed exemptions from Public Service Commission regulation. This, then, leaves only the question whether or not the ‘utility’ and ‘public’ parts of the definition are applicable.
“It is clear that Fletcher is ‘providing water and sewer utility service’, [sic] and is obtaining compensation therefor.
“The application of the term ‘public’ has been considered previously. (See Order No. 7415, Docket No. 73359-W). The service must be available to the indefinite public (not tenants). Order No. 4874, Docket No. 69319-EU, 85 PUR 3rd, 107; service must be available to all indivudu-als [sic] in general without discrimination, within a given area, including sub-vendees, tenants and others, with whom Fletcher had no contractual relations. (Village of Virginia Gardens v. City of Miami Springs, 171 So.2d 199 (1965) Fla. [App.]; Lorch v. Read Investment Company, and cases cited therein, 96 PUR-NS 120, 122, Wisconsin (1952).)
“From the facts cited above, it is apparent that the operations of Fletcher Properties, Inc., in providing water and sewer utility service, are within the definitions of a utility in Section 367.021, Florida Statutes, and are not exempt under Section 367.022, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, it must comply with Chapter 367, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 25-10, Florida Administrative Code. This is particularly so as to the condominium units and others not tenants of Fletcher.”

We agree with the determination by the Public Service Commission that petitioner is a water and sewer utility within the provisions of Chapter 367, Florida Statutes (1975), and Chapter 25-10, Florida Administrative Code, for the reasons stated in the declaratory statement of the Commission.

Petitioner’s assertion that respondent, by its statement, is establishing policy concerning the definition of water and sewer utility and that such determination may only be made by rule is without merit since respondent did not make its decision based on uncodified policy. “Utility” is defined by statute and decisional law, and compensation is not a term of art. We have examined the remainder of the issues raised by petitioner, in light of the record and briefs before us, and find them to be likewise without merit.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of cer-tiorari is denied.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.

ADKINS and HATCHETT, JJ., dissent.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Robert B. HORNER, Respondent.
    No. 52773.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 23, 1978.
    John R. Saalfield, Bar Counsel, Jacksonville and David G. McGunegle, Asst. Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, for complainant.
   PER CURIAM.

This is a disciplinary proceeding brought by The Florida Bar against Robert B. Hor-ner, a member of The Florida Bar. Our jurisdiction is authorized by Article V, Section 15, of the Constitution of the State of Florida.

The Report of Referee sufficiently summarizes the charges and evidence in this case by stating in pertinent part:

1. That the Respondent, Robert B. Horner, is and was at all times hereinafter mentioned a member of the Florida Bar, subject to the jurisdiction and disciplinary rules of the Supreme Court of Florida. Respondent having been admitted to the practice of law in 1937 in the State of Illinois, and was licensed to practice law in the State of Florida in 1951. Referee further finds that during all periods in question, the Respondent has suffered no other disciplinary proceeding or record complaint concerning his professional conduct.
2. That Respondent, in 1969, commenced a relationship with one Pleasant Gay, now deceased, involving both an attorney-client relationship and a social relationship, which exceeded the attorney-client relationship and which continued until the death of Mr. Gay.
3. That from late 1973 until March 1975, the Respondent acted as an attorney on behalf of Mr. Gay, including the collection of rents on certain property, handling the purchase and sale of certain property and handling through judgment a law suit involving approximately $3,000.00 for non-payment of rent.
4. This referee further finds that Respondent deposited the rents collected in the approximate sum of $1,800.00 and the monies received from judgment in the approximate sum of $3,000.00 in Respondent’s Trust Account. That Respondent apparently made numerous efforts to effect a settlement and disposition of these funds with his client, Mr. Gay, including the settlement of the fees due Respondent for the legal work involved. Said efforts being without success.
5. Referee further finds that Respondent advised his client, Mr. Gay, that he desired to effect settlement and receive his fee for services rendered, but was advised by the client that Respondent should use whatever funds were necessary out of the Trust Account and that a settlement could be reached at a later date.
6. That thereafter, Respondent did use the client’s funds deposited in the Trust Account, but that said use was with the client’s knowledge and consent.
7. That upon the death of the client, Mr. Gay, the decedent’s widow made demand for an accounting and for payment in full of all sums collected. That the Respondent, instead of effecting an accounting or making re-payment, attempted to settle the sums due him with decedent’s widow and as a result decedent’s widow brought disciplinary proceedings.
8. That prior to hearing in this cause, a full accounting was rendered to decedent’s widow and all funds collected have been paid over to decedent’s widow.
9. Based on the foregoing facts, the undersigned finds that the Respondent did comingle and use the client’s funds; however, testimony clearly indicates that such action occurred with the consent and knowledge of the Respondent’s client, Mr. Gay, and while such acts are a technical violation of the Rule, the undersigned fails to find any wilful intention to defraud or improperly use the client’s monies.

We find the evidence to be clear and convincing that the respondent did commit the acts charged in Count I of the Bar’s complaint. We also accept the recommendation of the Referee and find the respondent guilty of a violation of Disciplinary Rules 9-102(A) and 9-102(B)(3) and (4). For this misconduct, the respondent, Robert B. Horner, is publicly reprimanded by the publishing of this opinion in the Southern Reporter. He shall pay costs in this case in the sum of $340.50.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., dissents.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. In the Interest of R. L. J., a child, Respondent.
    No. 50253.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 2, 1978.
    Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
    Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, Tallahassee, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We issued a writ of certiorari in this cause. Upon hearing argument and upon further consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion that certiorari should not be granted.

The writ is hereby discharged.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, ENGLAND, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur.

OVERTON, C. J., and SUNDBERG, J., dissent.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Harold WALLS and Stanley Gerstenfeld, Appellee.
    No. 50822.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 2, 1978.
    Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Marsha G. Madorsky, Asst. Atty. Gen., David H. Blud-worth, State’s Atty., and John Scarola, Asst. State’s Atty., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    J. Brian Brennan of Brennan, Brown & Avery, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   KARL, Justice.

We have for review on petition for writ of certiorari granted an interlocutory order of the trial court upholding the constitutional validity of Sections 934.02(2), 934.03 and 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.

Without respondents’, defendants below, prior consent to the electronic interception, Francis Antel, the alleged victim of extor-tionary threats, electronically recorded a conversation which occurred in his home on February 19,1975, between himself and the respondents. The interception was not made by a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer. Antel alleged and would testify that the conversation included extortionary threats and would personally testify to the nature of those threats at trial.

The defendants are charged by information with the crime of extortion. The State seeks to introduce as evidence at trial the electronic recording of the alleged extor-tioning threats to corroborate the victim’s testimony. The defendants seek to suppress the electronic recording under the provisions of Chapter 934, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 74-249, Laws of Florida.

In his amended order on rehearing, the trial judge concluded that an extortionary threat delivered personally to the victim in the victim’s home is an “oral communication” as defined in Section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes, that this electronic recording without consent of all the parties to the communication was an illegal interception prohibited by Section 943.03, Florida Statutes, and that use of the electronic recording as evidence is prohibited by Section 934.06, Florida Statutes. Granting the motion to suppress, the trial judge expressly ruled Sections 934.02(2), 934.03 and 934.06 constitutional.

Section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (1975), provides:

“ ‘Oral communication’ means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting.”

Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975), provides in part:

“Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who:
“(a) Willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire or oral communication;
“(b) Willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication[s] when:
“1. Such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or
“2. Such device transmits communications by radio or interferes with the transmission of such communication;
“(c) Willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection; or
“(d) Willfully uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection;
“shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.-082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
“(2)(d) It is lawful under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire or oral communication when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception.”

Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), provides:

“Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the state, or a political subdivision thereof, if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.”

We agree with the trial court that an extortionary threat delivered personally to the victim in the victim’s home is an “oral communication” within the definition of Section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (1975); that pursuant to Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975), the electronic recording of such “oral communication” without the consent of all parties to the communication was prohibited; and that Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), expressly prohibits the use of such electronic recording as evidence. The subject electronic recording did not fall within any of the situations permitting interception delineated in Section 934.-03(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Section 934.-06, Florida Statutes (1975), contains no exception to the prohibition against use of the illegally intercepted wire or oral communication as evidence.

Appellant argues that such electronic recording may not constitutionally be suppressed from evidence and that Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to this cause. Appellant in effect requests this Court to create an exception to Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), and Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975).

The language of the statutes in question is clear and unambiguous, and no exception for the situation we have before us is provided. This Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature and create an exception which would encompass the instant circumstances. State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973); State ex rel. Green v. City of Pensacola, 126 So.2d 566 (Fla.1961). Cf. Wagner v. Botts, 88 So.2d 611 (Fla.1956). The function of this Court is to interpret the law and is neither to legislate nor determine the wisdom of the policy of the Legislature. Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla.1970). Recently, upholding the constitutional validity of Section 934.-03(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1975), this Court, in Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corporation, 351 So.2d 723 (Fla.1977), opined:

“This was a policy decision by the Florida legislature to allow each party to a conversation to have an expectation of privacy from interception by another party to the conversation.”

The Supreme Court of the United States, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), opined:

“But the protection of a person’s general right to privacy — his right to be let alone by other people — is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.”

In Markham v. Markham, 272 So.2d 813 (Fla.1973), this Court adopted the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, Markham v. Markham, 265 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972), which had been certified as presenting a question of great public interest. The District Court, therein, determined that the contents of an intercepted wire communication should have been suppressed and quoted from Commonwealth v. McCoy, 442 Pa. 234, 275 A.2d 28 (1971), wherein the court had sustained the suppression of an intercepted telephone conversation, as follows:

“. . . Hence the Legislature has determined as a matter of state public policy that the right of any caller to the privacy of his conversation is of greater societal value than the interest served by permitting eavesdropping or wiretapping.”

Chapter 934 was designed to effectively protect the privacy of oral and wire communications and to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings. By Chapter 934, the Legislature delineated the circumstances and conditions under which oral and wire communications could be authorized. The Legislature chose to prohibit unauthorized interception and use of the contents of such interception in evidence in courts and administrative proceedings. We observe that the exception contended for by appellant is not workable. Had Antel suspected that an extortionary threat would be made, he could have taken the appropriate action designated by Chapter 934 for authorization of the interception.

Sub judice, no harm derives from the suppression of the tape recording since the victim is free to testify as to the alleged extortionary threats.

We find the statutes in question are constitutional as applied to this cause, and accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court suppressing the subject electronic recording.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Elbert Bryan GRIFFIS, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 51011.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 2, 1978.
    Kenneth C. Howell of Thompson, Wads-worth, Messer, Turner & Rhodes, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Patti Englander, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
   KARL, Justice.

We have for review on direct appeal a final judgment ordering forfeiture to the State of a seized motor vehicle. The final judgment, entered by the Circuit Court in and for Suwannee County, expressly upheld the constitutionality of Sections 943.41 through 943.44, Florida Statutes (1975), known as the “Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act,” thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

The appellant and his wife were traveling from Tallahassee to Stuart, Florida, in the appellant’s 1973 Dodge pick-up truck when an inspector with the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services pulled the truck over. The inspector told the appellant’s wife, who was driving at that time, that she had failed to stop at the Agricultural Inspection Station and would have to return to the Station. The appellant, his wife and the truck were accompanied back to the Agricultural Inspection Station where a search of both the appellant and his truck took place. During the search, a quantity of controlled substances were found on the appellant and in his truck. As a direct result of the search, charges were brought against the appellant for possession of marijuana and cocaine. The appellant pled nolo contendere to possession of marijuana and received a sentence of one year’s probation. The cocaine charge was dismissed by the State.

Subsequently, pursuant to Sections 943.44 and 893.12, Florida Statutes (1975), the State instituted proceedings for forfeiture of appellant’s truck, alleging that the vehicle had been used by the appellant for the purpose of transporting cannabis and cocaine in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1975). The trial judge entered a show cause order directed to appellant to show why his truck should not be forfeited. In his response, the appellant alleged that his truck had not been used as a part of an illegal drug “operation,” that he had not been convicted of a crime which would give rise to seizure of his vehicle as contemplated by Section 943.41, et seq., Florida Statutes (1975), and that Section 943.41, et seq., Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional facially and as applied to the appellant.

In his judgment of forfeiture, the trial judge found that the appellant had been duly convicted of possession of marijuana; that the appellant’s conviction was irrelevant as the instant proceeding was civil; that the legality of the seizure was irrelevant since the appellant had pled nolo con-tendere, not reserving for appeal any question as to the legality of the search; that there was no indication that the appellant’s vehicle was being used as part of an illegal drug operation; and that Section 943.41, et seq., Florida Statutes (1975), is constitutional on its face and as applied to the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argues that forfeiture pursuant to the “Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act” requires a showing that the seized vehicle is involved in an ongoing drug trafficking operation and that any interpretation that would allow a forfeiture without evidence of trafficking would render the statutes void as violative of the due process, equal protection and double jeopardy provisions of the Florida and the United States Constitutions. As an additional ground, the appellant argues that the forfeiture is invalid because it is based entirely on illegally seized evidence.

It is axiomatic that this Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case may be effectively disposed of on any other grounds. Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551 (Fla.1975). Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So.2d 260 (Fla.1973). Thus, if a particular matter in litigation can be determined by statutory construction, this Court will avoid considering the constitutional questions raised. Green v. State ex rel. Phipps, 166 So.2d 585 (Fla.1964). A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate legislative intent. McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48 (Fla.1974).

Sub judice, a determination of the constitutionality vel non of the questioned statutory provisions is not required in view of legislative intent and the appropriate construction to be given them. Because we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues posed, this does not divest us of jurisdiction to determine the appeal. DeJong v. Pallotto, 239 So.2d 252 (Fla.1970). P. C. Lissenden Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 116 So.2d 632 (Fla.1960).

In construing a statute, this Court is committed to the proposition that a statute should be construed and applied so as to give effect to the evident legislative intent, regardless of whether such construction varies from the statute’s literal meaning. Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake Howell Water and Reclamation District, 274 So.2d 522 (Fla.1973). Deltona Corp. v. Florida Public Service Commission, 220 So.2d 905 (Fla.1969). In Beebe et ux. v. Richardson, 156 Fla. 559, 23 So.2d 718, 719 (1945), this Court explained:

“. . . [W]here the context of a statute taken literally conflicts with a plain legislative intent clearly discernible, the context must yield to the legislative purpose, for otherwise the intent of the lawmakers would be defeated. State v. Beardsley, 84 Fla. 109, 94 So. 660; City of West Palm Beach v. Amos, 100 Fla. 891, 130 So. 710; State v. City of Miami, 101 Fla. 292, 134 So. 608.”

Although a literal reading of the language contained in Section 943.42, Florida Statutes (1975), would support the trial court’s finding that the statute does not require that a vehicle be used in an illegal drug “operation,” this literal reading must give way to the legislative intent in enacting the statute which is plainly to the contrary. To effect the legislative intent, we must construe Sections 943.41, et seq., Florida Statutes (1975), as requiring a showing by the State that the seized vehicle is involved in a drug trafficking operation before forfeiture can be ordered, and the facts before us in the instant cause do not support such a finding. In fact, the trial judge’s order ordering forfeiture expressly states that there is no indication that the vehicle in question was being used in an illegal drug “operation.”

The language of Sections 943.41 through 943.44, Florida Statutes (1975), was originally contained in Section 893.12, Florida Statutes (1973), enacted by the Legislature as part of Chapter 73-331, Laws of Florida. Chapter 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, was entitled the “Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act” and was a substantial adoption of the major provisions of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in 1970. In 1974, the Legislature enacted Chapter 74-385, § 1, Laws of Florida, excising from Section 893.12, Florida Statutes (1973), those provisions which now constitute Sections 943.41 through 943.44, Florida Statutes (1975), and denominating the excised portions as the “Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act.” The legislative intent in enacting Chapter 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, contained in the introductory language to the act, was inter alia, to achieve “uniformity between the laws of Florida and the laws of the United States” which was “necessary and desirable for effective drug abuse prevention and control.” The introductory language also expressed the Legislature’s intent “that the State of Florida exercise more authority over manufacture and distribution of dangerous drugs.” The express intent of the Legislature was that the Florida forfeiture statute be in uniformity with its federal counterpart.

49 U.S.C. § 781, § 782, are the current federal forfeiture counterparts to the “Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act.” The “Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act” is substantially identical to 49 U.S.C. § 781, § 782. 49 U.S.C. § 781, § 782, were also the federal forfeiture provisions in effect at the time Chapter 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, was enacted, having been enacted by Congress in 1939 and subsequently amended in 1950. The intent of Congress in their 1950 amendment of 49 U.S.C. § 781, § 782, was to authorize forfeiture only when the vehicle was engaged in drug trafficking. The congressional committee report that accompanied the amendment leaves no doubt that the congressional intent was not to permit forfeiture for mere possession of a controlled substance but to authorize forfeiture of those vehicles used in trafficking drugs in violation of the Internal Revenue laws. In its report, the committee stated:

“In recent years there has been an increase in the number of narcotics thefts, robberies, and burglaries from drug stores, physicians’ offices, and other places from which narcotic drugs are dispensed. The perpetrators of these crimes rely to a large extent on the use of high-powered automobiles to make their escape from the jurisdiction in which the crime took place. When captured, the narcotic drugs thus stolen often are found to bear the required internal-revenue stamps, and consequently seizure and forfeiture of the vehicles used is difficult to obtain, particularly when the drugs have not been sold by the thieves subsequent to the theft. The proposed legislation would attack this problem by permitting the seizure of vessels, vehicles, and aircraft used in connection with the traffic in stolen drugs, when such drugs are carried or transported in interstate commerce, or within any Territory, possession, or the District of Columbia.
“Enforcement officers of the Government have found that one of the best ways to strike at commercialized crime is through the pocketbooks of the criminals who engage in it. Vessels, vehicles, and aircraft may be termed the operating tools of dope peddlers, and often represent major capital investments to criminals whose liquid assets, if any, are frequently not accessible to the Government. Seizure and forfeiture of these means of transportation provide an effective brake on the traffic in narcotic drugs. The proposed legislation is intended to provide additional means of combating this nefarious activity.” 1950 U.S.Code Congressional Service, pp. 2953-54.

In reviewing the Congressional intent behind the 1950 amendment of 49 U.S.C. § 782, the Federal District Court, in United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F.Supp. 1200 at page 1205 (D.C.N.H.1974), stated:

. [T]he legislative history surrounding the 1950 Amendments to 49 U.S.C. § 782 makes clear that a primary goal of this forfeiture statute is to cripple illegal drug trafficking and narcotics activity. Before the Amendments, vehicles used in trafficking narcotics were not subject to forfeiture unless it could be shown that the narcotic drug was possessed with intent to sell, that it was offered for sale, or that it was actually sold in violation of the tax laws (i. e., without the proper Internal Revenue stamps). 53 Stat. 1291 (1939). This statutory scheme made forfeiture of vehicles regularly used in the operation of illegal narcotics activity impossible in cases involving stolen narcotics, which normally bore proper stamps, and marijuana, the sale of which required the transferee to pay the appropriate tax and affix the proper revenue stamps. The 1950 Amendments broadened the definition of contraband to include stolen narcotics and to allow forfeiture based solely on illegal acquisition or possession, without requiring proof of sale or intent to sell.
“. . . The legislative history surrounding these Amendments clearly shows that a purpose of vehicle forfeiture in the enforcement of the narcotics laws is to prevent the flow of narcotics by depriving narcotics peddlers of the ‘operating tools’ of their trade, thereby financially incapacitating the illegal narcotics activity. The purpose will not be greatly furthered by forfeiture in this case. The Government has not alleged that claimant uses the Datsun as part of the modus operandi of an ongoing criminal narcotics enterprise, nor has it alleged that the Datsun has been specifically adapted for illicit narcotics activity. Absent such allegations, it is not clear that forfeiture of the vehicle will help to prevent the illegal sale of narcotics any more than forfeiture of any number of claimant’s personal effects which facilitate his ability to deal with such commonplace and everyday problems as transportation.”

The Legislature having enacted the “Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act” with forfeiture provisions identical to those contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 781, 782, and at the same time declaring that its purpose in doing such was to achieve “uniformity between the laws of Florida and the laws of the United States,” we must conclude that the Legislature’s purpose in enacting Ch. 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, was directed at preventing the transportation of a controlled substance for distribution by authorizing forfeiture of vehicles engaged in such activity. We must also conclude that it was not the legislative intent in enacting Ch. 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, to authorize vehicle forfeiture as an instrument to punish citizens for mere possession of controlled substances in a vehicle. Although this construction may conflict with a literal reading of Sections 943.-41 through 943.44, Florida Statutes (1975), an interpretation allowing forfeiture for mere possession of a controlled substance while in a vehicle does violence to the expressed intent of the Legislature.

We also base our conclusions on the expressed intent of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in proposing the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the act after which Ch. 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, was modeled. In their prefatory notes to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the Commissioners stated:

“This Uniform Act was drafted to achieve uniformity between the laws of the several States and those of the Federal government. It has been designed to complement the new Federal narcotic and dangerous drug legislation and provide an interlocking trellis of Federal and State law to enable government at all levels to control more effectively the drug abuse problem.
“The exploding drug abuse problem in the past ten years has reached epidemic proportions. No longer is the problem confined to a few major cities or to a particular economic group. Today it encompasses almost every nationality, race, and economic level. It has moved from the major urban areas into the suburban and even rural communities, and has manifested itself in every State in the Union.
“Much of this major increase in drug use and abuse is attributable to the increased mobility of our citizens and their affluence. As modern American society becomes increasingly mobile, drugs clandestinely manufactured or illegally diverted from legitimate channels in one part of a State are easily transported for sale to another part of that State or even to another State. Nowhere is this mobility manifested with greater impact than in the legitimate pharmaceutical industry. The lines of distribution of the products of this major national industry cross in and out of a State innumerable times during the manufacturing or distribution processes. To assure the continued free movement of controlled substances between States, while at the same time securing such States against drug diversion from legitimate sources, it becomes critical to approach not only the control of illicit and legitimate traffic in these substances at the national and international levels,, but also to approach this problem at the State and local level on a uniform basis.” 9 U.L.A., Prefatory Note, p. 146.

Although the Uniform Act’s forfeiture sections were reworded when adopted by Ch. 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, the Florida forfeiture statutes proscribe substantially the same conduct as § 505 of the Uniform Act. The purpose of the Uniform Act’s forfeiture provisions is set out in the Commissioners’ notes following § 505:

“. . . Effective law enforcement demands that there be a means of confiscating the vehicles and instrumentalities used by drug traffickers in committing violations under this Act. The reasoning is to prevent their use in the commission of subsequent offenses involving transportation or concealment of controlled substances and to deprive the drug trafficker of needed mobility.” 9 Uniform Laws Annotated, § 505, p. 338.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in the case of State v. One 1972 Pontiac Grand Prix, Two-Door Hardtop, VIN 2K57T2A161214, 242 N.W.2d 660 (S.D.1976), was asked to decide whether a mere showing of controlled substances in a vehicle at the time it was stopped was sufficient to permit forfeiture of the vehicle pursuant to the South Dakota forfeiture statute. The South Dakota forfeiture statute is worded similarly to Section 943.42, Florida Statutes (1975), and like its Florida counterpart, it is modeled after § 505 of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The Court, in One 1972 Pontiac Grand Prix, supra, at page 663, stated:

“. . . [W]e hold that the Act requires something more than a mere showing that controlled substances were contained in the vehicle at the time it was stopped. SDCL 39-17-129(4) subjects to forfeiture conveyances ‘used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment’ of controlled substances. The instant case involves only possession of marijuana in the defendant automobile. There is nothing in the affidavits to indicate that the movements of the automobile on April 26, 1975, were directly related to the possession of marijuana. The automobile was not used to ‘facilitate’ the possession of marijuana, but was merely incidental to its possession. As the Supreme Court of Utah stated in construing the identical language in State v. One Porsche 2-Dr. I.D. No. 911211026, T. PP10026F, etc., 1974, Utah, 526 P.2d 917, 919, ‘The statute is transportation to accomplish possession, not simply transportation “with” possession.’ (emphasis theirs) Here, there is no evidence in the affidavits of a conscious design to transport, sell, receive, possess or conceal a controlled substance in the defendant automobile.”

We agree with the Supreme Court of South Dakota and hold that the legislative history of the Uniform Contraband Substances Act and 49 U.S.C., §§ 781, 782, indicates that the target of vehicle forfeitures is the “narcotics peddler” and “drug trafficker.” It is obvious that the legislative intent in enacting Ch. 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, was directed at the transportation of controlled substances for distribution and not for personal possession and consumption.

The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in In re Forfeiture of 1972 Porsche, 307 So.2d 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and In re Forfeiture of 1969 Chevrolet Camaro, 334 So.2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. den. 342 So.2d 1103 (Fla.1976), held that the forfeiture statutes in question are intended to apply to those persons “significantly included in a criminal enterprise” and that forfeiture is a drastic remedy “in the absence of a nexus between the illegal drugs found in the car and the furtherance of an illegal drug ‘operation.’ ” We find that the Third District’s decisions in In re Forfeiture of 1972 Porsche, supra, and In re Forfeiture of 1969 Chevrolet Camaro, supra, comport with the legislative intent in enacting the forfeiture provisions of the “Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act.”

Accordingly, we hold that vehicle forfeiture pursuant to Sections 943.41 through 943.44, Florida Statutes (1975), is permitted only upon a showing of “a nexus between the illegal drugs found in the car and the furtherance of an illegal drug ‘operation.’ ” The trial court’s judgment of forfeiture which found that “there is no requirement in the statute that the vehicle be used in an illegal drug operation” is hereby reversed.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., dissents.

      . This Court, in Lissenden, supra, opined at pages 635 to 636:
      “The Court has reached the conclusion that the language of the Constitution confers upon a litigant in the trial courts of this state the right to appeal to the Supreme Court an adverse final judgment or decree such as that here involved which on its face passes upon the validity of a state statute, and that when that right is exercised by the litigant then this Court, under the cited provision of the Constitution, has jurisdiction of and should determine the appeal even though in its consideration of the case it is decided that the action of the trial court, in passing upon or expressing an opinion upon the jurisdictional issue of statutory validity, was unnecessary to the disposition of the cause. . . . ”


text:
    In the Matter of THE FLORIDA BAR, Petitioner.
    No. 52904.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 2, 1978.
    Russell Troutman, President, Winter Park, Robert L. Floyd, President-elect, Miami, Joel H. Sharp, Jr., Chairman, Integration Rule and Bylaws Committee, Orlando, Leonard H. Gilbert, Chairman, Budget Committee, Tampa, and William B. Wiley, Asst. Legislative Counsel, Tallahassee, for The Florida Bar, petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on petition of The Florida Bar requesting amendment of Article VIII of the Integration Rule and the Bylaws under Article VIII, Integration Rule, relating to dues. We hereby approve the following proposed amendments. Underscoring indicates new material, and strike-throughs indicate deletions.

OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur.

ADKINS, J., dissents.

Article VIII DUES

1.On January 1, 1976, members of The Florida Bar shall pay six mouths dues in the amount of $37^50 as dues for the period January 1,1976, through June 307-1976. On or before July 1,1976, and on or before July 1 of each year thereafter, every active member of The Florida Bar shall pay annual dues to The Florida Bar in such an amount as shall be set at an annual meeting, and shall also file with the executive director a statement setting forth his business and residential addresses and any other information that may be required by the Board of Governors, provided that at no annual meeting shall the dues be fixed at more than $75.00 per annum.

2. When any member is in arrears in the payment of annual dues for 45 days, the executive director shall send written notice by registered or certified mail to such member at his last business address. Within 30 days after the posting of the notice, such member may pay his dues in full, together with a delinquency charge of $25.00. Upon failure to make these payments within the 30 day period, he shall become a delinquent member, entitled to none of the privileges of membership in The Florida Bar, and shall not practice law in this state. He may thereafter reinstate this membership upon petition to and approval by the Board of Governors and the payment of all fees and charges owing by him, including a reinstatement fee of $50.00.

3. Dues shall not be payable until the dues payment date next following date of admission to The Florida Bar. Provided however, persons admitted to The Florida Bar subsequent to July 1 and prior to January 1 of any fiscal year shall nay six months dues in the amount of one-half the annual dues, for the period January 1 through June 30 of the fiscal year of admission.

4. The executive director shall furnish the county judges and the clerks of all courts of record in each county a list of all active members in good standing in their respective counties and shall furnish corrections and additions to such list as occasion may require. A list of all active members in good standing in the state, and corrections and additions, shall likewise be filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court.

5. The annual dues of The Florida Bar shall not include the dues of local or regional voluntary bar associations, and shall not be shared with such associations. The Florida Bar may, however, as it sees fit, cooperate with and encourage local or regional voluntary bar associations.

6. Dues tendered to The Florida Bar shall not be accepted from any member who is delinquent in the payment of costs imposed against him in a disciplinary proceeding. Costs shall be deemed delinquent unless paid within 30 days after the disciplinary decision becomes final unless such time is extended by the Board of Governors for good cause.

Article VIII DUES

Section 1. ANNUAL DUES. The annual dues provided for in Article VIII of the Integration Rule as amended shall be paid at the headquarters office on or before July 1st each year. Such annual dues shall be paid by every person admitted to practice law in Florida, except retired members, former members under disciplinary conviction and sentence, members adjudged insane or mentally incompetent, and members who have resigned pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 of Article II of the Integration Rule as amended. No person failing to make payment of his annual dues in compliance with Article VIII of the Integration Rule as amended shall engage in the practice of law, or be entitled to receive any of the privileges and benefits accorded to active members of The Florida Bar. Failure to receive notice or demand or payment of dues shall not relieve any person of the duty to comply with the requirements of the Integration Rule. The executive director shall issue to each member making payment of his annual dues an official membership card certifying that such member has paid annual dues for the current year, which membership card shall be evidence that the person named therein is an active member of The Florida Bar in good standing.

Section 2. SIX MONTHS DUES. The six months dues provided for in paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the Integration Rule as amended shall be due and payable on January 1. The executive director shall issue to each member making payment of such dues an official membership card which shall be evidence that the person named therein is an active member of The Florida Bar in good standing. Failure to pay such dues shall result in such amount being added to the next annual dues statement and the combined six months dues and annual dues shall be paid on or before July 1. The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article VIII of the Integration Rule as amended shall apply to members who fail to tender proper payment of such six months dues in conjunction with the annual dues billing as provided herein.

Section 2 3. DELINQUENT MEMBERS. Upon expiration of the time fixed by Article VIII of the Integration Rule as amended, the executive director shall compile a list of all persons who have become delinquent members, as defined by Section 3 of Article II of these bylaws, and shall file such list of delinquent members in accordance with Section 4 of Article VIII of the Integration Rule. Copies of such list shall be furnished to the Board of Governors for appropriate action.