author: CALOGERO, Justice. LEMMON, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clarence SIMMONS and Sammy Bernard.
    No. 81-KA-2990.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1982.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul Car-mouche, Dist. Atty., Catherine M. Estopinal, Dale G. Cox, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    John Ford McWilliams, Jeanette Garrett, Shreveport, for defendant-appellant.
   CALOGERO, Justice.

The convictions of these defendants, Clarence Simmons and Sammy Bernard, for attempted simple burglary of the Medic Pharmacy in Shreveport, Louisiana on December 9, 1978, is before us on this appeal for the second time. Originally charged with the completed offense and convicted of attempt, defendants on their first appeal succeeded in having their convictions reversed in this Court and new trials ordered.

We found reversible error in the trial court’s failure to sustain defendant’s challenges for cause of a prospective juror who was employed as a deputy sheriff. State v. Simmons and Bernard, 390 So.2d 1317 (La.1980).

On remand the bill of information was amended to charge attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy and defendants were again convicted of that crime by a twelve person jury.

Following the convictions Bernard was adjudged a third felony offender and sentenced to “a period of nine years ... as the law requires.” Simmons was adjudged a fourth felony offender and sentenced “to be confined at hard labor for a period of natural life ... subject to the conditions provided by law.”

In this joint appeal we find that only Simmons’ assignments of error numbers 39 and 44 concerning his adjudication as a fourth felony offender and sentence to life imprisonment have merit. Therefore defendant Bernard’s conviction and sentence will be affirmed. Simmons’ conviction will be affirmed, but his sentence is set aside.

In this opinion we will treat defendants’ common assignments relative to the trial court’s refusal to give requested jury charges and relative to an asserted restriction of defense counsel’s voir dire examination of prospective jurors; we will also treat Simmons’ meritorious assignment attacking his adjudication as a fourth felony offender and concomitant illegal sentence to life imprisonment.

We find that none of the remaining assignments of error present reversible error, nor do any involve legal issues not governed by clearly established principles of law. They will be treated in an appendix which will not be published but which will comprise part of the record in this case.

SIMMONS’ ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 32

BERNARD’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 51

Defendants contend that the lower court erred in refusing to give two requested jury charges. The trial judge instructed the jury that the only possible verdicts were “guilty of attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy” and “not guilty.” The defense requested jury charge No. 1, which the trial judge refused to give, read, “In order to find the defendants guilty as charged you must find that an attempted unauthorized entry was made solely for the purpose of obtaining controlled dangerous substances as defined by law.”

La.C.Cr.P. art. 802 requires that the judge charge the jury as to the law applicable in the case. State v. Clement, 368 So.2d 1037 (La.1979); State v. Marse, 365 So.2d 1319 (La.1978). Special requested charges are governed by La.C.Cr.P. art. 807 which provides, in part, that a special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation or explanation, and if it is wholly pertinent and correct. State v. Green, 418 So.2d 609 (La.1982). This charge, however, must be supported by the evidence. State v. Telford, 384 So.2d 347 (La.1980). This is a corollary of the trial judge’s basic obligation to charge the jury as to the law applicable to the case, under which he is required to cover every phase of the case supported by the evidence whether or not accepted by him as true. La.C.Cr.P. art. 802; State v. Miller, 338 So.2d 678 (La.1976).

Nevertheless, it is well-settled that requested charges which are already substantially given and covered by the trial court’s general charge are properly refused. C.Cr.P. art. 807; State v. Matthews, 380 So.2d 43 (La.1980); State v. Mead, 377 So.2d 79 (La.1979); State v. Badon, 338 So.2d 665 (La.1976); State v. White, 254 La. 389, 223 So.2d 843 (1969).

The trial court’s given charge defined simple burglary of a pharmacy according to the statute. It included the fact that an essential element of pharmaceutical burglary under La.R.S. 14:62.1 is the intended theft of substances enumerated under La.R.S. 40:961(7). The judge was therefore not required to give the defendants’ requested charge which was essentially to the same effect.

Defense requested jury charge No. 2, which the trial judge refused to give, told the jury that criminal trespass, [R.S.-14:63.-10] a misdemeanor which proscribes “[t]he unauthorized and intentional entry upon any [bjuilding is a lesser included offense for the charged crime, attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy, and a responsive verdict which the jury was at liberty to bring in.

The trial judge was apparently willing to charge the jury that both criminal trespass and attempted simple burglary were responsive to the charged attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy. Because counsel for the defendants opposed the judge’s giving the latter instruction, the judge deter- ’ mined that he would give neither.

The charged offense (attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy) is not one of those crimes listed at La.C.Cr.P. art. 814 as to which there are statutorily listed responsive verdicts. Criminal trespass does nonetheless appear to be a responsive verdict to simple burglary of a pharmacy under La.C. Cr.P. art. 815 since it is a lesser and included grade of the offense, even though just a misdemeanor, the greater- offense facially including as it does all the elements of the lesser offense. La.R.S. 14:5; State v. Dauzat, 392 So.2d 393 (La.1980); State v. Booker, 385 So.2d 1186 (La.1980) on rehearing; State v. Turnbull, 377 So.2d 72 (La.1979); State v. McCoy, 337 So.2d 192 (La.1976); State v. Roberts, 213 La. 559, 35 So.2d 216 (1948). Criminal trespass includes the unauthorized and intentional entry upon any building, dwelling, etc., whereas simple burglary of a pharmacy entails the unauthorized entry of any building, warehouse, etc., used for the storage and/or dispensing of controlled dangerous substances with the intent to commit theft of those controlled dangerous substances.

However, criminal trespass is not clearly a lesser and included offense of attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy, the charge for which these defendants were prosecuted. In the oft-quoted clarifying definition of lesser and included offense in State v. Poe, this Court stated:

In reaching the conclusion in the instant case that a verdict of simple assault is responsive to the charge of attempted simple kidnapping, it was reasoned that ‘ * * * all that is required is that the greater offense must include all the elements of the lesser offense in order to make a verdict of the lesser offense responsive.’ We now find that this statement is not entirely accurate for, as we observed in the Roberts case, the test is whether the definition of the greater offense necessarily includes all the elements of the lesser. Stated in another way for practical application, this merely means that, if any reasonable state of facts can be imagined wherein the greater offense is committed without perpetration of the lesser offense, a verdict for the lesser cannot be responsive. 214 La. 606, 38 So.2d 359, 363 (1948), on rehearing.

There are circumstances which can be reasonably imagined in which a defendant could be convicted of the attempted crime of burglary or burglary of a pharmacy without the unauthorized and intentional entry required by the trespass statute.

Attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy could conceivably be accomplished by a person who does not actually go upon the premises. Under the Louisiana attempt statute, R.S. 14:27, mere preparation is not sufficient; however, an attempt conviction is possible if one, having the necessary specific intent, “does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending toward the accomplishing of his object ... and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” Thus it is possible that a person, approaching an entrance or standing next to a window armed with burglary tools, coupled perhaps, with other evidence concerning his purpose, could be convicted under the attempt statute. Since the greater offense of attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy could possibly be committed without the perpetration of the lesser offense of criminal trespass, criminal trespass according to the jurisprudential definition is not truly a lesser and included offense of attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy. The judge would therefore not be required to charge the jury on criminal trespass under La.C.Cr.P. art. 803.

Furthermore defendant insisted that criminal trespass be charged, but he objected to the court’s charging the jury on the more obvious lesser included offense of attempted simple burglary. Even were defendant correct, that criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy, his requested charge containing criminal trespass but excluding attempted simple burglary was not wholly correct and pertinent. La.C.Cr.P. art. 807. Under these circumstances, the trial judge’s not giving the charge that criminal trespass is a lesser included offense did not constitute reversible error.

SIMMONS’ ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6

BERNARD’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 23

RESTRICTION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL’S VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

By these assignments attorneys for the defense contend that the trial court erred in curtailing the defense voir dire examination. The improper restriction denied the defendants a fair trial, they contend.

Defense counsel Mr. Minor attempted to explore the jurors’ attitudes toward a defendant who should remain silent at trial. After he had successfully questioned at least two prospective jurors in this area, the following exchange occurred:

Q. Mr. O’Neal, do you think that you would want to hear from either person because of—
MR. INDERBITZIN: Your Honor, I would object to the form of that question. Mr. Minor is saying would you want to hear, not can you render an impartial verdict. The juror is trapped in a situation where if they say don’t, they indicate they don’t care what the men have to say. If they do want to hear from them, they can’t respect their Fifth Amendment rights. I think the question is somewhat phrased as a catch twenty-two type of thing. I object to the form of the question.
THE COURT: You might have to either rephrase the question or go into it further with the jurors.

Counsel began to explore another area of questioning, but returned to the issue of defendants’ silence at trial:

Q. Mrs. Smith, do you think that you would want to hear some explanation of why you should find the defendant not guilty here? Some explanation from them before you could vote not guilty?
A. Yes.

The state again objected; the court replied:

THE COURT: I will have to hear the next question to see if he goes into it further.

EXAMINATION BY MR. MINOR:

Q. Do I understand your answer to be that you would want to?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand the law says that you cannot require to hear something from the defendant?
A. Yes.
Q. Or that you cannot take the fact that he chooses not to testify to affect your judgment. You are not to infer guilt on a defendant’s decision not to testify.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand that?-
A. Yes.
Q. So, again, do you think that even though the law says, do you think you would want to hear?
MR. INDERBITZEN: Your Honor, the same objection again as phrased. I understand what counsel is getting at. I don’t object to that. I just have trouble with the phrasing because the question is yes or no. Either way the juror answers it appears either she is disregarding a constitutional right on one hand or not caring what he says. I don’t think the question is phrased properly.
THE COURT: Objection will be sustained. You may go into the area as long as you follow up with the question as to whether the juror would follow the law.

Defense counsel then continued questioning concerning the right to remain silent.

EXAMINATION BY MR. MINOR:

Q. Mrs. Smith, you say that you want— you think that you would want to hear from the defendants; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You say you think you understand that the law does not require that they testify?
A. No. I don’t guess so.
Q. You say you understand that?
A. Yeah, understand that.

The state argues that the defense' was allowed to continue questioning as to the role of silence on the part of the defendants at trial; counsel was only asked to rephrase or further pursue the jurors’ acceptance of the law. Even after the state’s objection had been sustained, the judge permitted further discussion in the area. Defendants contend that the issue of whether the prospective jurors would infer guilt by the defendants’ decision not to testify was crucial since both defendants remained silent at trial. The state, however, objected only to the phrasing of the defense question, not to its substance.

Defendants contend that the defendant must be given wide latitude in examining prospective jurors in order to secure information for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges or challenges for cause. This is a well-settled principle constitutionally and jurisprudentially. La. Const., 1921, art. I, § 10; La.Const. art. I, § 17; State v. Hawkins, 376 So.2d 943 (La.1979); State v. Holmes, 347 So.2d 221 (La.1977); State v. Monroe, 329 So.2d 193 (La.1975). From a review of the entire voir dire it can be readily seen that the defense attorneys were not unreasonably restricted in the questioning of prospective jurors.

Additionally the defense in no way objected to the court’s ruling in this matter; therefore, the error cannot be urged for the first time on appeal. La.C.Cr.P. art. 841. After the court’s ruling, defense counsel continued to question jurors on the defendants’ right to remain silent pursuant to the court’s admonitions. These assignments therefore lack merit.

SIMMONS’ ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 39 AND 44

FOURTH FELONY ADJUDICATION AND EXCESSIVE SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT

By Assignment of Error No. 39 counsel for defendant Simmons contends that the trial court erred in adjudging Simmons a fourth felony .offender; by Assignment of Error No. 44 he argues that the resultant sentence of life imprisonment was excessive and illegal. According to testimony and documents introduced at the habitual offender hearing, the state asserted that Simmons had three convictions which could be used for enhancement, excluding the instant offense:

(1) February 12, 1954, guilty plea for manslaughter committed on October 31, 1953;
(2) February 14, 1966, guilty plea for attempted simple burglary committed on August 8, 1965;
(3) July 1, 1966, guilty plea in federal court for bank robbery, committed on February 11, 1966.

The scheme of R.S. 15:529.1 B which governs determination of the offender’s multiple status (second, third or fourth offender) entails enhancing the status for the commission of a given felony if the commission follows the conviction of an earlier felony which caused him to be an offender of a lesser status. For example, to become a second felony offender he must commit the felony after having been convicted for the commission of his first felony offense, and so forth.

This Court in State ex rel Jackson v. Henderson, 283 So.2d 210, 212 (La.1973), stated:

The plain meaning of the statute as it now stands requires that in order for one to be considered a second offender, the second offense must have been committed after the first conviction. To be a third offender the third offense must have been committed after the conviction which caused him to be a second offender, and the fourth offender is one who commits a felony after the conviction which caused him to be a third offender. Bennett [Criminal Law and Procedure, 17 La. L.Rev. 60-61 (1956)]. The severity of the
Habitual Offender Law requires that it be strictly construed. State v. Duncan, 219 La. 1030, 55 So.2d 234 (1951); State v. Bailey, 165 La. 341, 115 So. 613 (1928); State v. Kierson, 140 La. 31, 72 So. 799 (1916).

We also stated in State v. Taylor, 347 So.2d 172, 184 (La.1977):

Under our holding in Schamburge, both theft offenses must be treated as one offense in applying the multiple offender statute because the defendant had not been convicted of the first theft prior to the commission of the second. LSA R.S. 15:529.1 B; State ex rel Jackson v. Henderson, La., 283 So.2d 210 (1973).

See also State v. Schamburge, 344 So.2d 997 (La.1977); State v. Chapman, 367 So.2d 808 (La.1979).

In State v. Wimberly, 414 So.2d 666, 673 (La.1982) Justice Dennis, writing for the Court, stated:

The consistent application of our multiple offender statute and our repeated offense statutes over the years has been that prior convictions, in order to be available for imposition of a greater punishment as a subsequent offender, must precede the commission of the principal offense, that is, the latest prosecution in point of time.
* * * * * *
In fact, the multiple offender statute was amended in 1956 to avoid a contrary interpretation by this court. See State v. Williams, 226 La. 862, 77 So.2d 515 (1955); Act No. 312 of 1956. The multiple offender statute has ever since provided ‘that the offender shall be deemed a second offender only if the crime resulting in the second conviction shall have been committed after his first conviction.’ La.R.S. 15:529.1(B).
The only deviation from the general rule seems to be our DWI statute which was amended in 1978 to provide that ‘[o]n a second conviction, regardless of whether the second offense occurred before or after the first conviction, the offender shall be’ given enhanced punishment. La.R.S. 14:98. The exception proves the general rule that, unless otherwise expressly provided, the offender shall be deemed a second offender only if the crime resulting in the second conviction shall have been committed after his first conviction.

Since defendant’s third listed felony above (bank robbery) was committed on February 11,1966, three days before he was convicted on February 14, 1966, for the second listed felony (attempted simple burglary), that third crime, bank robbery, does not make defendant eligible to be charged as a fourth felony offender for the commission in 1978 of the present crime.

A contrary interpretation of the statute is not impossible. The statutory language “which in fact caused him to be a third offender” perhaps could be interpreted to mean the crime which caused him to be the perpetrator of three felonies. However, that interpretation is neither logical nor consistent with the scheme of the Habitual Offender Law. The language should be interpreted as it was obviously intended, i.e., “which caused him to be a third offender” in the legal sense, and as set forth in the statute. The obvious intent of La.R.S. 15:529.1 is to set up a sequential requirement; the third felony must be committed after the conviction responsible for the second offender status. This construction is consistent with the jurisprudence of Louisiana and the case law of other states.

The A.L.R. Annotation on Habitual Criminal Statutes, 24 A.L.R.2d 1248-80 (1952), and its Later Case Service cites a number of Louisiana cases in its placing Louisiana with the majority of states which requires “that the prior conviction or convictions precede the commission of the principal offense in order to enhance the punishment under habitual criminal statutes.” 24 A.L. R.2d at 1249. The Annotation lists several of the cases already cited in this opinion as well as State v. Neal, 347 So.2d 1139 (La. 1977), a decision citing the Annotation, which involves La.R.S. 14:98 before its clarifying amendment in 1978. Justice Tate for the majority in State v. Neal utilizes La. R.S. 15:529.1 by analogy, traces the history of enhanced penalty statutes, and concludes:

Consonant with the general purpose of enhanced punishment statutes, the most reasonable legislative intent to ascribe to the more serious punishment accorded for a subsequent ‘conviction’ by La.R.S. 14:98 is that, if following conviction of the offense, the offender repeats the prohibited conduct, he is then subject to enhanced penalty — but not if, after the first conviction has put him on notice of the possibility of more severe punishment, the offender takes heed and reforms. 347 So.2d at 1142.

Even more supportive of this interpretation in Louisiana is the dissent by Justice Summers in Neal. Justice Summers did not agree with Justice Tate’s analogy. However he clearly enunciated the obvious requirements of the Habitual Offender Law:

The defense contention that Article 98 should be considered in the light of the Habitual Offender Law because they are statutes in pari materia is also untenable. If this argument were adopted, the second offense under Article 98 would also have to occur after conviction of the first as the Habitual Offender Law requires.
If the legislature had intended that the second offender statute should be based upon offenses and convictions which occurred in chronological sequence as relator contends, such a limitation would have been stated as it was in the Habitual Offender Statute. 347 So.2d at 1144-45.

The defendant Simmons thus could only have properly been convicted of being a third felony offender.

The state agrees with the foregoing, but contends that as a third felony offender Simmons should still receive a mandatory life sentence under La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(b), which states:

(b) If the third felony and each of the two prior felonies involved a violation of R.S. 14:34 [aggravated battery], R.S. 14:62.1 [simple burglary of a pharmacy], R.S. 14:65 [simple robbery], R.S. 14:110(B) [aggravated escape], or any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be impris-
oned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

The state argues that attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy “involved a violation of ... R.S. 14:62.1” (simple burglary of a pharmacy), for the facts clearly showed that the actual burglary, rather than simply an attempt, had been committed. The argument is not meritorious. The language of the Habitual Offender Law must be strictly construed. State ex rel Jackson v. Henderson, 283 So.2d 210 (La.1973); State v. Duncan, 219 La. 1030, 55 So.2d 234 (1951). When the statute speaks of a felony which “involved” a violation of La.R.S. 14:62.1, it means that the conviction must be that of simple burglary of a pharmacy, not the lesser crime of attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy.

Thus as a third felony offender the defendant is punishable not under 15:529.1 A(2)(b) but rather under 15:529.1 A(2)(a).

He should therefore not receive more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction of attempted simple burglary of a pharmacy. Applying 15:529.1 A(2)(a) (not more than twice) in conjunction' with La.R.S. 14:62.1 (nine years maximum) and R.S. 14:27 D(3), (one-half for attempt, 4.5 in this case), the maximum possible sentence would then have been nine years (2 X 4.5). The defendant’s sentence to life imprisonment is therefore in excess of that provided by law. The case will be remanded for the sentencing of defendant Simmons as a third felony offender.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons the conviction and sentence of defendant Bernard is affirmed. The conviction of defendant Simmons is affirmed, but his sentence to life imprisonment is set aside, and his case remanded to the district court for resentenc-ing in accordance with law.

DEFENDANT BERNARD’S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED; DEFENDANT SIMMONS’ CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

LEMMON, J., dissents from reversal to the sentence and assigns reasons.

LEMMON, Justice,

dissenting from reversal of sentence.

Defendant’s third felony (the one for which defendant was tried and convicted in the proceeding now on appeal) clearly “involved a violation of ... R.S. 14:62.2 [simple burglary of a pharmacy]”.

Significantly, the Legislature in drafting R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(b) used the broad term “involved a violation of” rather than the narrower term “were convictions of”. The use of the broader term indicates a legislative intent for the subsection to be applicable not only to convictions of the completed offenses, but also to convictions of an attempt to commit the enumerated offenses.

Moreover, the obvious purpose of R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(b) is to provide stern punishment when the convicted criminal’s third felony involved serious criminal conduct relating to the enumerated serious felonies. The incident which brought about defendant’s third felony conviction in the present case clearly involved conduct relating to one of the enumerated felonies for which the Legislature prescribed severe punishment. Since it was the conduct of a repeat offender (rather than the success of the attempt) that the Legislature intended to deter by specifying harsh penalties for such conduct by repeat offenders, it is of no great moment whether defendant’s conduct in attempting a pharmacy burglary resulted in a successful burglary.

The majority’s narrow interpretation of R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(b), simply because the law is harsh, frustrates the Legislature’s efforts to deal harshly with two-time losers who attempt (successfully or unsuccessfully) to commit a pharmacy burglary. The result is that one of the exact criminals for whom harsh multiple offender laws were designed will now receive a relatively short sentence, instead of the life sentence the Legislature intended.

      . La.R.S. 14:63.10 as it appeared in 1978 stated in pertinent part:
      A. Criminal trespass in the parish of Caddo is:
      (1) The unauthorized and intentional taking possession of any tract of land or structure thereon without the consent of the owner thereof; or
      (2) The unauthorized and intentional entry upon any:
      (c) Building, dwelling structure, watercraft or movable, whether or not the same is posted or enclosed;
      The pertinent section of the currently applicable statute, R.S. 14:63, defines criminal trespass throughout the state as follows:
      A. No person shall without authorization intentionally enter any structure, watercraft, or movable.
      B. No person shall intentionally enter immovable property owned by another:
      (1) when he knows his entry is unauthorized, or
      (2) under circumstances where he reasonably should know his entry is unauthorized ....

      . ' The pertinent section of La.R.S. 14:62.1 states:
      A. Simple burglary of a pharmacy is the unauthorized entry of any building, warehouse, physician’s office, hospital, pharmaceutical house, or other structure used in whole or in part for the sale, storage and/or dispensing of controlled dangerous substances, as defined in R.S. 40:961(7), with the intent to commit the theft of any drug which is defined as a controlled dangerous substance in R.S. 40:961(7) other than set forth in R.S. 14:60.

      . La.R.S. 15:529.1(B) states that:
      It is hereby declared to be the intent of this Section that an offender need not have been adjudged to be a second offender in a previous prosecution in order to be charged as, and adjudged to be, a third offender, or that an offender have been adjudged in a prior prosecution to be a third offender in order to be convicted as a fourth offender in a prosecution for a subsequent crime. Provided, however, that the offender shall be deemed a second offender only if the crime resulting in the second conviction shall have been committed after his first conviction; that one shall be deemed a third offender under this Section only if the crime resulting in the third conviction shall have been committed after his conviction for a crime which in fact caused him to be a second offender, whether or not he was adjudged to be a second offender in the prior instance; and that one shall be deemed to be a fourth offender under this Section only if the crime resulting in the fourth conviction shall have been committed after his conviction for a crime which in fact caused him to be a third offender, whether or not he was adjudged to be a third offender in the prior instance.

      . That does not mean of course that a person who has committed four crimes in sequence, each of them following the conviction of the earlier one but never before sentenced as a multiple offender, may not be charged as a fourth felony offender. See La.R.S. 15:529.1 B.

      . La.R.S. 15:529.1(B). See footnote 3 supra, for the entire text of the statute.

      . The Later Case Service for Annot., 24 A.L. R.2d 1248-1280 (1952) at 548-50, cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions that so interpret the habitual offender laws of other states: Winstead v. State, 91 So.2d 809 (Fla.1957); Cooper v. State, 259 Ind. 107, 284 N.E.2d 799 (1972); House v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.2d 949 (Ky.App.1971); State v. Johnson, 109 N.J. Super. 69, 262 A.2d 238 (1970); State v. Valenzuela, 94 N.M. 285, 609 P.2d 1241 (1979), affmd, 94 N.M. 340, 610 P.2d 744 (1980); People v. Gillman, 49 A.D.2d 951, 374 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1975); Haines v. States, 391 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Cortez v. State, 314 S.W.2d 589 (Tex.Cr.App.1958); Ex parte Daniels, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 2, 252 S.W.2d 586 (1952).

      . La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(2)(a) states:
      A. Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows:
      (2) If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then,
      (a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for any term not less than one-half the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. ...

      . La.R.S. 14:27 D(3) states:
      D. Whoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished as follows:

      (3) In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.

      . Inasmuch as an attempt requires the specific intent to commit the pertinent crime, defendant’s attempt literally and logically “involved a violation of” the statute defining the crime.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    John & Frances BURKE v. OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
    No. 82-C-2000.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 1982.
   In re Occidental Life Insurance Co. of California, applying for rehearing/reconsideration of writ granted with Order on October 8, 1982. Parish of Orleans. Court of Appeal, 4th Circuit, Civil District Court No. 79-18064. 420 So.2d 978.

Rehearing Granted. Prior order of this Court vacated, Rehearing to be regularly docketed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carl S. AINSWORTH.
    No. 82-K-1398.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 1982.
   In re Carl S. Ainsworth, applying for reconsideration of denied writ of October 8, 1982. Parish of LaSalle. 420 So.2d 973.

Denied.


text:
    The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, Honorable Ernest N. Morial, Mayor of the City of New Orleans and Gail Broussard, Jerome S. Glazer, Dr. Robert Azar, Stephen Manshel and Peter Coleman, All Commissioners of the Audubon Park Commission and Intervenors, Mitch Ledet, Joe Knecht, Brendolyn McKenna, Phil Baptiste, George Ethel Warren, Edgar Poree, Alice Mayer Katz, and Felicia Kahn v. Honorable David C. TREEN, Governor of the State of Louisiana and Mrs. Lawrence H. Fox, Secretary of Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism and Intervenors, Friends of the Zoo, Inc., Mrs. Brooke H. Duncan, Mrs. James K. Wadick, III, Mr. Julian B. Feibelman, Jr., Mr. Harry B. Kelleher, Jr., Mrs. Lane T. Debardeleben, Mr. Louis F. Bradley, Mr. J. Freyhan Odenheimer and Mrs. Hughes P. Walmsley.
    No. 82-C-2527.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 1982.
   In re City of New Orleans, Hon. Ernest N. Morial, Mayor of the City of New Orleans, et al., applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Civil District Court. Parish of Orleans. 421 So.2d 282.

Granted. The stay order is continued in full force and effect.


text:
    The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, Honorable Ernest N. Morial, Mayor of the City of New Orleans and Gail Broussard, Jerome S. Glazer, Dr. Robert Azar, Stephen Manshel and Peter Coleman, All Commissioners of the Audubon Park Commission and Intervenors, Mitch Ledet, Joe Knecht, Brendolyn McKenna, Phil Baptiste, George Ethel Warren, Edgar Poree, Alice Mayer Katz, and Felicia Kahn v. Honorable David C. TREEN, Governor of the State of Louisiana and Mrs. Lawrence H. Fox, Secretary of Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism and Intervenors, Friends of the Zoo, Inc., Mrs. Brooke H. Duncan, Mrs. James K. Wadick, III, Mr. Julian B. Feibelman, Jr., Mr. Harry B. Kelleher, Jr., Mrs. Lane T. Debardeleben, Mr. Louis F. Bradley, Mr. J. Freyhan Odenheimer and Mrs. Hughes P. Walmsley.
    No. 82-C-2528.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 1982.
   In re City of New Orleans, Honorable Ernest N. Morial, Mayor of the City of New Orleans, et al., applying for writs of certio-rari or review, to the Civil District Court. Parish of Orleans. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 421 So.2d 282.

Granted.


text:
    Roger W. NORRIS v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, R.J. Marchand & John Slaughter dba Camelot Apartments.
    No. 82-C-2093.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., R.J. Marchand & John Slaughter dba Camelot Apartments, applying for writ of certio-rari, prohibition, and mandamus. Fifth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Jefferson Parish. 416 So.2d 321.

Not considered; not timely filed. Rule 10 § 4(b) and CCP 2166.


text:
    Arnold Leland STEWART v. John Hans GOEB, et ux.
    No. 82-C-1906.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Arnold Leland Stewart, applying for writs of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany. No. 14935,417 So.2d 59.

Granted.


text:
    KEM SEARCH, INC. v. David A. SHEFFIELD, d/b/a, J-L Petroleum Services.
    No. 82-C-2103.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re David Sheffield, d/b/a J-L Petroleum Services, applying for writ of certiorari or review, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Livingston. 416 So.2d 220.

Granted.


text:
    Mary A. BUTLER v. Ruth Daniels REDDICK a/k/a Ruth Daniels Riddick.
    No. 82-C-2108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Mary A. Butler, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 416 So.2d 332.

Granted.


text:
    PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. v. BEAN DREDGING CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 82-C-2201.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re PPG Industries, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Calcasieu. 419 So.2d 23.

Granted.


text:
    Mrs. Antoinette Ybos DAVILLA v. Lowell F. JONES.
    No. 82-C-2223.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Mrs. Antoinette Ybos Davilla, widow of Sidney T. Davilla, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Orleans Parish. 418 So.2d 724.

Granted.


text:
    Lawrence MOTT, Jr. v. RIVER PARISH MAINTENANCE, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-2347.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Lawrence Mott, Jr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Jefferson Parish. 417 So.2d 384.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Aubrey THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-1843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Aubrey Thompson, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of St. John the Baptist.

Granted and transferred to the district court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Joseph BAILEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-0419.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Joseph Bailey, applying for reconsideration of denied writs. Parish of Orleans. 420 So.2d 168.

Granted. Evidentiary hearing ordered.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Dale R. ALBERT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 81-KH-1604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Dale R. Albert, applying for remedial writ. Parish of Terrebonne. No. 93467.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robert GRIFFIN v. Edwin LOMBARD, Clerk, Orleans Criminal District Court.
    No. 82-KH-0272.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Robert Griffin, applying for remedial writ of mandamus and certiorari. Parish of Orleans. No. 269-704.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Marcus CLANTON, Jr. v. The COURT REPORTER/SECTION “G” CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 82-KH-0691.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Marcus Clanton, Jr., applying for writ of mandamus. Orleans Parish. No. 280-105.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie Lee JOHNSON.
    No. 82-KH-1520.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Eddie Lee Johnson, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 263-814.

Denied. Appeal pending.


text:
    James ROGERS v. Douglas BROWN, M.D. et al.
    No. 82-C-2071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re James Rogers, applying for writs of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Ouachita. 416 So.2d 624.

Denied.


text:
    TRINIDAD PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. PIONEER NATURAL GAS CO., et al.
    No. 82-C-2153.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Trinidad Petroleum Corp., applying for writs of certiorari and review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of LaSalle. No. 14023.

Denied.

DENNIS, WATSON and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    TRINIDAD PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. PIONEER NATURAL GAS COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-2154.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Trinidad Petroleum Corp., applying for remedial writs, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of LaSalle. 416 So.2d 290.

Denied.

DENNIS, WATSON and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Jim RATLIFF, et al. v. Charles BEARD, et al.
    No. 82-C-2155.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Charles Beard, applying for remedial writs. Parish of LaSalle. Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. 416 So.2d 307.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tab HEBERT.
    No. 82-K-2222.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Tab Hebert, applying for remedial writs. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 9-81-952.

Writ denied.


text:
    Walter B. CRAIGHEAD v. ADMINISTRATOR DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY OF the STATE OF LOUISIANA and Thornton Rental Company.
    No. 82-C-2237.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Administrator Department of Employment Security of the State of Louisiana, applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Parish of Caddo. Second Circuit, Court of Appeal. 420 So.2d 688.

Denied.

MARCUS and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Maureen T. CASEY v. Keith M. CASEY.
    No. 82-C-2238.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Keith M. Casey, applying for supervisory remedial writs. Parish of Jefferson. No. 164-784.

Writ denied.

CALOGERO, MARCUS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Arleen Newitt, Wife of/and Bruce NEWITT v. HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF LOUISIANA, d/b/a Lakeside Hospital for Women.
    No. 82-C-2274.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Arleen Newitt, wife of/and Bruce Newitt, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Jefferson Parish. 417 So.2d 391.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Horace Garland BYRD. and SUCCESSION OF Gira Avis Hays BYRD.
    No. 82-C-2286.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Donald Joe Byrd, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Claiborne. 419 So.2d 100.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mary G. SMITH v. MILLERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-2297.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Charles E. Mayfield, individually and as the Administrator of the estate of his minor son, James W. Mayfield, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Bossier Parish. 419 So.2d 59.

Denied.


text:
    Wendell P. HARRIS, Jr., and Freddie D. Harris v. Alvin G. BAHAM, Albaro Martinez and Bruce A. North, in his capacity as Testamentary Executor of the Succession of William Bruce North, Jr.
    No. 82-C-2320.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Alvin G. Baham and Bruce A. North, in his capacity as Testamentary Executor of the Succession of William Bruce North, Jr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 417 So.2d 1216.

Writ denied.


text:
    Mary Ann BERNARDI v. Lionel A. BERNARDI, Jr.
    No. 82-C-2321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Lionel A. Bernardi, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 417 So.2d 382.

Denied.


text:
    Helen GRIGSBY v. SCHWEGMANN BROS. GIANT SUPERMARKETS, INC.
    No. 82-C-2327.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 417 So.2d 388.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James WILLIAMS.
    No. 82-K-2332.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re James Williams, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 281-095.

Denied.


text:
    Wendell H. GAUTHIER v. ALLRIGHT NEW ORLEANS, INC. d/b/a Allright Auto Parks.
    No. 82-C-2334.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Wendell H. Gauthier, applying for writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 417 So.2d 375.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Allen HUNTER.
    No. 82-K-2336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re State of Louisiana, through the District Attorney, John M. Mamoulides, applying for supervisory writs of review. Parish of Jefferson. No. 82-1353.

Denied. This is an interlocutory ruling; the defendant is on substantial bond conditioned on treatment; defendant can be tried at any time.

MARCUS and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Gloria Marie ADAMS v. Wilbert J. POURCIAU and Allstate Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-2339.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Wilbert J. Pourciau, applying for writ of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Orleans. 417 So.2d 860.

Denied.


text:
    Shirley McNAMARA, Secretary, Department of Revenue and Taxation, State of Louisiana v. OILFIELD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
    No. 82-C-2343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Oilfield Construction Company, Inc., applying for writs, of certiorari, review and/or supervisory writs, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of St. Landry. 417 So.2d 1311.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Chetta Tuminello FERLITO v. Russell E. CECOLA.
    No. 82-C-2344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Chetta Tuminello Ferlito, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Cad-do. 419 So.2d 102.

Denied. The result is correct.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Chester Ray ELLIS v. MFA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-2350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Countryside Casualty Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Franklin Parish. 419 So.2d 92.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Cora M. Spearing DEMAREST.
    No. 82-C-2353.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Sam K. Payne, Sr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Orleans Parish. 418 So.2d 1368.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Albert DAMOND v. Honorable Frank SHEA, Judge Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-2439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Albert Damond, applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 237-115.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky J. JONES.
    No. 82-OK-2540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Ricky J. Jones, applying for writ of review and -stay order to the Second Circuit, Court of Appeal. Twenty Sixth Judicial District Court. Bossier Parish. No. 57348.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Norris VESSELL.
    No. 82-KH-2549.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Norris Vessell, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 257-212.

Denied. Appeal has been lodged.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Oscar E. MYLES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 81-KH-0484.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Oscar E. Myles, applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. No. 274-765.

Granted, for the purpose of transferring to the district court.


text:
    Prince LEWIS v. EAST FELICIANA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 82-C-2303.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Prince Lewis, applying for remedial writ. Parish of East Feliciana. No. A-13306.

Denied.

BLANCHE, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Michael JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 81-KH-1036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Michael Johnson, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 66-544.

Denied.


text:
    Emile K. VENTRE v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY.
    No. 82-C-2214.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
   In re Emile K. Ventre, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. St. Landry Parish. 419 So.2d 969.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George ALLEN.
    No. 82-K-2669.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1982.
   In re George Allen, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Parish of Orleans. No. 271-794.

Granted. The ruling of the trial judge is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court to establish the truth of the allegations. If the statement of facts in the application is found to be correct, the trial judge is directed to commit relator pursuant to C.Cr.P. 648.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Edward KLING.
    No. 82-K-2660.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1982.
   In re James Edward Kling, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and for a stay order. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. East Baton Rouge Parish. No. 8-81-362.

Granted. Execution of sentence stayed, pending disposition of appeal.


text:
    Willie WILLIAMS v. PUBLIC GRAIN ELEVATOR OF NEW ORLEANS, INC. and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-2386.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Public Grain Elevator of New Orleans, Inc., et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 417 So.2d 398.

Not considered. Not timely.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Donald HUMBLE v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-0687.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Donald Humble, applying for remedial writs. Plaquemines Parish. Nos. 16066, 16067 and 34535.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Ethel R. SKYE, Mary E. Maycock v. William E. SKYE, et al.
    No. 82-C-2468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re William E. Skye, et al., applying for certiorari, writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Ninth Judicial District Court. 417 So.2d 1221.

Not considered. Not timely. See Supreme Court Rule 10, Section 4(b).


text:
    Geneva Albin HUNNICUTT v. William R. KENT, et al.
    No. 82-C-2448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re William R. Kent, et al., applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and review, to the Twenty Fourth Judicial District Court. Parish of Jefferson. No. 241-376; Fifth Circuit, Court of Appeal. No. 5-403.

Not considered. Untimely. See Rule 10 § 5(b).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Lee SATCHER.
    No. 82-K-2166.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Robert Lee Satcher, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and for a stay order. Parish of Sabine. No. 29886.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    REPUBLIC OF TEXAS SAVINGS ASSOCIATION v. FIRST REPUBLIC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 82-C-2331.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re First Republic Life Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari, of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 417 So.2d 1251.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Joseph WOODS v. Honorable Matthew S. BRANIFF, Judge, Criminal District Court, Section “B” Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-2359.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Joseph Woods, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 269-488 and 269-497.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    Daniel G. CHAMPAGNE v. FOREST PRODUCT TRANSPORT, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-2377.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Daniel G. Champagne, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Washington. 418 So.2d 18.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Margie Gladden BROADWAY v. James L. BROADWAY.
    No. 82-C-2382.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re James L. Broadway, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 417 So.2d 1272.

Denied. Result is correct.

BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


author: LEMMON, J.,

text:
    Geneva BRUMFIELD, et al. v. Edward DYSON, et al.
    No. 82-C-2383.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Geneva Brumfield, et al., applying for writ of certiorari, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Tangipahoa. 418 So.2d 21.

Denied. The result is correct.

LEMMON, J.,

concurs. The judgment is correct on the alternative holding, but is incorrect on the “law of the case” theory.


text:
    Ross CAMPESI v. MARGARET PLANTATION, a Partnership, et al.
    No. 82-C-2385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Margaret Plantation, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. 417 So.2d 1265. Parish of West Baton Rouge. No. 12127.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    SANDERS’ CAMPER VILLAGE, INC. v. COLEMAN OLDSMOBILE, INC.
    No. 82-C-2399.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Robert T. Sanders, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 418 So.2d 679.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Harold P. STINE v. Hayward CREEL, Wayne Creel, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, John Doe, George Dow and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-2400.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Harold P. Stine, applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Parish of Washington. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. 417 So.2d 1243.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Deborah H. SMITH v. G.H. FLUID CO., et al.
    No. 82-C-2405.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Deborah H. Smith, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Assumption. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. 418 So.2d 6.

Denied.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY v. Shelia A. CAGE.
    No. 82-C-2411.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
    Reconsideration Denied Dec. 10,1982.
   In re Shelia A. Cage, applying for writ of certiorari, review, mandamus, supervisory and remedial, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. State Civil Service Commission. 418 So.2d 3.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CO. v. Durwood R. DUCK.
    No. 82-C-2415.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Durwood R. Duck, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Vermilion. 418 So.2d 38.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Charles R. WHITE v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.
    No. 82-C-2418.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. East Baton Rouge Parish. 419 So.2d 1279.

Denied.


text:
    Hilton James VERRETT v. CAMERON TELEPHONE COMPANY.
    No. 82-C-2430.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Cameron Telephone Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Cameron. 417 So.2d 1319.

Writ denied.

LEMMON, J.,

concurs. The reasonableness of the risks is more appropriately determined at a trial on the merits.


text:
    Joanlyn McElroy, Widow of Charles McELROY, Individually and for the Benefit of her Minor Children Charles J. McElroy, III, David J. McElroy, Tammy L. McElroy and Brian P. McElroy v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-2447.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Joanlyn McElroy, et al., applying for writ of certiorari, or review, Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of St. Bernard. 420 So.2d 214.

Denied.


text:
    Vernell MERRICK v. Patricia WHEELER, et al. Gertrude EDWARDS v. Esther FALLEN and New Orleans Public Service Incorporated. Jean MATHEWS v. Patricia WHEELER, New Orleans Public Service Incorporated and Esther Fallen.
    No. 82-C-2449.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re New Orleans Public Service Inc., applying for writ of review or certiorari, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. Civil District Court. 419 So.2d 555.

Denied.


text:
    Lawles J. BOURQUE, M.D. v. Ethel Aileen Dubois SCHROEDER, Testamentary Executrix of the Estate of Pauline Marie Bonnet Dubois.
    No. 82-C-2464.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In ré Lawles J. Dourque, M.D., applying for certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Lafayette. Fifteenth Judicial District Court. 418 So.2d 25.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Ethel R. SKYE, Mary S. Maycock v. William E. SKYE, et al.
    No. 82-C-2469.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Mary S. Maycock, applying for cer-tiorari, writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Ninth Judicial District Court. Rapides Parish. 417 So.2d 1221.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Vera BUCKBEE, Individually and as the Administratrix of the Succession of William Buckbee, and on Behalf of the Minor, Larry Dean Buckbee v. AWECO, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-2487.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Jerry R. Watt Co., et al., applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Calcasieu. Fourteenth Judicial District Court. 418 So.2d 698.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Katie Hodges WING v. Francis W. WING.
    No. 82-C-2497.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Francis W. Wing, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. 418 So.2d 720.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Freddie CLEMENTS, Jr.
    No. 82-KH-2539.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Freddie Clements, Jr., applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 272-959.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry B. PITTMAN.
    No. 82-K-2686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Jerry B. Pittman, applying for a writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and review to the First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Eighteenth Judicial District Court. Parish of Iberville. No. 2665-82.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. George REED v. CLERK, 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 82-KH-2293.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re George Reed, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 8-80-78.

Granted. ' Boykin transcript ordered furnished relator.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Eugene LAW v. FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT CLERK OF COURT.
    No. 82-KH-2479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Eugene Law, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Caddo. No. 101037.

Granted. Trial court is ordered to furnish relator another Boykin transcript.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Herman BOWIE v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-2520.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Herman Bowie, applying for writ of mandamus and habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 261-883.

Granted. The trial court is ordered to act on relator’s application forthwith.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Roland P. DENLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-2628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Roland P. Denley, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans.

Granted for the limited purpose of transferring relator’s application to the Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal for disposition.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Daniel UDOKA a/k/a William Murdock.
    No. 82-KH-2671.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Daniel Udoka a/k/a William Mur-dock, applying for remedial writs. Parishes of Avoyelles, Calcasieu and Terrebonne.

Granted and transferred. This application is granted for the limited purpose of transfer to the courts of appeal for consideration. The bond reduction matter relative to the charge in Terrebonne Parish is transferred to the First Circuit, Court of Appeal. The bond reduction matters relative to charges in Avoyelles Parish and Cal-casieu Parish are transferred to the Third Circuit, Court of Appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brent LUDWIG.
    No. 82-K-2652.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Brent Ludwig, applying for a supervisory writ and stay order. Orleans Parish. Criminal District Court. No. 290102.

Stay order denied. Inasmuch as the bill of information has been quashed, no proceedings in the trial court appear to be forthcoming.

Relator’s application for writs will be considered in this Court after the State’s appeal is lodged here.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Willis Wilbert JONES, Jr. v. Judge H. Garland PAYY, 27th Judicial District Court, St. Landry Parish.
    No. 81-KH-0483.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Willis Wilbert Jones, Jr., applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of St. Landry. No. 31820.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Frederick BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-1386.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Frederick Brown, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 266-709.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    DELTA SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. Lee T. BARNES.
    No. 82-C-1645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Delta Security Bank & Trust Company, applying for writ of certiorari or review, Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Concordia. No. 8812.

Denied.

BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Jesse BONVILLAIN v. HONORABLE CLERK OF COURT, 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON.
    No. 82-KH-1670.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Jesse Bonvillain, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Jefferson.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. J.P. PLESSALA, Jr.
    No. 82-KH-1754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re J.P. Plessala, Jr., applying for remedial writs. Parish of St. Mary. No. 110885.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willis Grant GARNER.
    No. 82-K-2136.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Willis Grant Garner, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Sabine. Twenty-ninth Judicial District Court. No. 30059.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Jerry Paul PLESSALA, Jr. v. Paul Kennze Linwood LOVELL.
    No. 82-KH-2210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Jerry Paul Plessala, Jr., applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of St. Mary. No. 110885.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Walter BURNETTE v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-K-2239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Walter Burnette, applying for supervisory writs of certiorari and mandamus. Parish of St. Tammany. No. 44098 “A”.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James BEARB. STATE of Louisiana v. Leonard L. JONES.
    No. 82-K-2245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re James Bearb & Leonard L. Jones, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of East Feliciana. Nos. 3-82-232 and 3-82-233.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Joseph WHITE v. COURT REPORTER, SECTION “F”, ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-2302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Joseph White, applying for supervisory writs. Orleans Parish. No. 274 — 908.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., James Edward MOORE v. CLERK, 16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 82-KH-2328.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re James Edward Moore, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Iberia. No. 29473.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel., Tommy Roy BOOK v. Bill C. DOWNEY, Clerk, 4th Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-2356.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Tommy Roy Book, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Ouachita. Nos. 37505 and 37506.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    Melinda Crowley HEFFKER v. Stephen Henry HEFFKER.
    No. 82-C-2381.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Melinda Crowley Heffker, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Terre-bonne. No. 82-CW-0637.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Janet Lee BRACY v. Honorable Ted R. BROYLES, Judge, 30th Judicial District Court, Parish of Vernon, 300 Courthouse St., Leesville, La.
    No. 82-KH-2394.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Janet Lee Bracy, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Vernon. Nos. 35725, 35725-A.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel., Harvey WILLIAMS v. 4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 82-KH-2395.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Harvey Williams, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Ouachita.

Denied.


text:
    Armond KIRT v. J. RAY McDERMOTT & COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-2401.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Armond Kirt, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 81-7043.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leo J. MEAUX, et al.
    No. 82-K-2406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Leo J. Meaux, et al., applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. No. 57830. Parish of St. Martin.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    In the Matter of the SUCCESSION OF Jimmy LEE. Minnie Lee SABEAN v. Charlie LEE.
    No. 82-C-2422.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Mrs. Frances Rae Saurage and Mrs. Ida Deloris Roberts, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Tangipahoa. Nos. 56877 and 8931.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Harvey WILLIAMS.
    No. 82-KH-2426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Harvey Williams, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 40-522.

Denied.


text:
    Daniel DAIGELE, et al. v. Richard H. FRIEDBERG, et al. DOTTLEY’S SPICE MART, INC. v. OMNI FOODS, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-2428.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Richard H. Friedberg and Michael Stern, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Nos. 248982 and 253297.

Denied.


text:
    Daniel C. CRADDOCK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-C-2432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Daniel Craddock, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, review and other appropriate relief. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 256790.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Louis V. TRAHAN v. Honorable Jerome WINSBERG, Judge, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-2437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Louis Trahan, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 282-613.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alfred CARTER.
    No. 82-K-2440.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Alfred Carter, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 259-200.

Denied.


text:
    In the Interest of Vicky SCHULTZ.
    No. 82-CK-2441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Vicky Schultz, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. Orleans Juvenile Court. No. 197-124E.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    Huey Henry BREAUX v. Benjamin Ray CHAMPAGNE, et al.
    No. 82-C-2446.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Benjamin Ray Champagne, et al., applying for writ of certiorari or review, Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. No. 82-338; Fifteenth Judicial District Court. Parish of Lafayette. No. 782929.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Melvin PAYNE v. CLERK OF COURT, 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 82-KH-2465.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Melvin Payne, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 77389.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Jerry W. EWINS v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 82-KH-2484.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Jerry W. Ewins, applying for a writ of mandamus. Parish of St. Mary. No. 98044.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerald YOUNG.
    No. 82-K-2489.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Gerald Young, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 265-530.

Denied.

CALOGERO, DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Ronnie WILLIAMS v. Honorable Leon FORD, III, Judge, 21st Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa and Clerk of Court, et al.
    No. 82-KH-2508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Ronnie Williams, applying for a 'writ of mandamus. Parish of Tangipahoa. No. 41248.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., William CLAY v. Honorable Carl A. GUIDRY, Judge, 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, Section V.
    No. 82-KH-2555.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re William Clay, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 9-80-239.

■ Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Charles ALLEN v. CLERK OF COURT, CRIMINAL DISTRICT, 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF WEBSTER.
    No. 82-KH-2563.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Charles Allen, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Webster.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Larry REDMOND v. CLERK OF COURT, 14TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 82-KH-2556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Larry Redmond, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 11288-80.

Denied.


author: PONDER, Judge.

text:
    Daniel D. BROUILLETTE, et al. v. CONSOLIDATED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF FLORIDA, INC., et al.
    No. 15027.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 16,1982.
    Allen R. Boudreaux, Patrick F. McGrew, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellee Daniel D. Brouillette, David F. Sehnebel and Fast Foods of Baton Rouge # 2.
    Walton J. Barnes, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant Consolidated Const. Co. of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Consolidated Const, and Engineering, Inc.
    Ray Dawson, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
    Before ELLIS, PONDER and SAVOIE, JJ.
   PONDER, Judge.

Defendants, Consolidated Construction Company of Florida, Inc. and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, appealed from a judgment holding them liable for damages incurred as a result of breaches of three construction contracts. Plaintiffs, Daniel Brouillette and David Schnebelen, appealed that portion of the judgment which failed to recognize the effects of compensation.

We amend and affirm.

The issues before the court are: 1) right of action; 2) estoppel; 3) quantum; and 4) compensation.

On January 12, 1978, plaintiffs entered into a contract with Consolidated Construction for the construction of a Hardee’s Restaurant on Sherwood Forest Boulevard. A notice of acceptance of the contract was filed on August 30, 1978.

During construction of the Sherwood Forest restaurant, plaintiffs and Consolidated Construction entered into an agreement to build a second Hardee’s Restaurant on Airline Highway. A site contract was executed by the parties on August 28,1978, and the building contract was signed on September 20,1978. A letter of acceptance was signed by Daniel Brouillette on January 16, 1979.

On September 13, 1978, Billy Suggs, a Hardee’s Restaurant representative, prepared a punch-list for the Sherwood Forest restaurant. Architect Steven Thweatt completed a punch-list for the Airline Highway restaurant on February 28, 1979. The Sherwood Forest Hardee’s was inspected for a second punch-list in late April or early May of 1979 by civil engineer, R.L. Bennett. By the time the list was submitted on June 26, 1979, the parties were at odds over balances due and made no further attempts to correct the defects.

Plaintiffs sued Consolidated Construction and its surety, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, for damages resulting from nonperformance of the contracts. Consolidated Construction reconvened for the balances due on the Airline Highway project. Auto-Owners Insurance Company filed a third-party demand against Consolidated Construction for any sums it may be liable for under its performance bonds. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $20,574.68, but limited Auto-Owners Insurance Company’s liability to $16,624.68. Judgment was also rendered in favor of Consolidated Construction on its reconventional demand in the sum of $6,586.00 as the balance due on the construction contracts. Judgment was further rendered on the third-party demand for any amount paid the owners, not to exceed $16,-624.68.

Defendants allege that the trial court erred in dismissing their peremptory exception of no right of action as to plaintiffs. Defendants contend that because plaintiffs are members of a partnership, Hardee’s of Baton Rouge, the partnership is the proper plaintiff in this lawsuit.

The peremptory exception of no right of action raises the issue of whether the plaintiff belongs to that particular class of persons to which the law grants a remedy. Bamber Contractors, Inc. v. Henderson Brothers, Inc., 345 So.2d 1212 (La.App. 1st Cir.1977).

Plaintiffs individually entered into construction contracts with Consolidated Construction. The damages are claimed to be the result to plaintiffs of the breached contracts. The trial judge was not in error in finding that plaintiffs were the proper parties.

Defendants next contend that because plaintiffs unqualifiedly accepted all work by Consolidated Construction, they have waived their right to object to the manner of performance of the contracts and are estopped from claiming damages.

The acceptance of a work without objection, protest or complaint respecting the manner of performance, estops the owner from recovery of damages resulting from defective work. However, acceptance with the understanding that certain defects will be remedied does not bar recovery for the cost of remedying such defects. Hemenway Company, Inc. v. Bartek, Inc. of Texas, 373 So.2d 1356 (La.App. 1st Cir.1979) writ denied 376 So.2d 1272 (La.1979); Charles C. Cloy, General Contractors, Inc. v. DiVincenti Brothers, Inc., 308 So.2d 495 (La.App. 1st Cir.1975), writ denied 311 So.2d 262 (La.1975).

There was an understanding or agreement that the defects complained of and included in the punch-lists would be corrected regardless of the signing of the acceptances. All parties were aware of plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with certain aspects of construction. Plaintiffs believed that the contractor was responsible for delays in construction and they were in a hurry to occupy the premises. Brouillette testified that he was told the letter of acceptance of the Airline Highway job represented substantial completion and had to be signed in order to occupy the building. He said everyone understood that there was an outstanding punch-list.

Joe Bradford, an employee of Consolidated Construction, testified that he had several conversations with Daniel Brouillette regarding the punch-list items for the Airline Hardee’s subsequent to occupancy and acceptance, and that punch-lists were a matter of “follow-up.” The continued conversations and efforts on the part of the contractor to correct items on the punch-lists after the acceptances, further indicates a qualified acceptance.

Furthermore, the construction contracts themselves warrant the work of the contractor and provide a period of one year for correction of defects. The trial court did not err in finding that plaintiffs’ acceptances did not bar their claim for damages.

Defendants argue that the trial judge’s estimates for costs of repair were too high.

A contractor’s liability for failure to perform a building contract is found in Louisiana Civil Code Art. 2769. An owner seeking to recover from the contractor has the burden of proving both the existence and nature of defects due to faulty materials or workmanship and the cost of repairing the defects. Neel v. O’Quinn, 313 So.2d 286 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1975), writ denied 319 So.2d 440 (La.1975).

Billy Suggs testified for plaintiffs regarding his inspection of the Sherwood Forest restaurant and punch-list. R.L. Bennett, an expert in the field of civil engineering, testified as to his own inspection and punch-list at Sherwood. Architect Steven Thweatt gave testimony concerning the Airline Highway Hardee’s and punch-list. The trial judge visited both restaurants after the trial on the merits, to observe and inspect the items in dispute. He rejected those items he found not defective, not included on the punch lists or already corrected by the contractor.

In computing the costs of repair, the trial judge relied on the estimates prepared by plaintiffs’ expert, Ronald J. Pennington. Where the owners themselves corrected the defects, the court awarded the actual costs of repair. No other estimates were introduced into evidence.

We find that there is sufficient proof to support the amounts awarded to plaintiffs in all but one instance.' As to that item, the trial court awarded $150.00 for replacement tile, but the only estimate in evidence indicated that the cost would be $75.00. This court amends the judgment and awards $75.00 for this item. We find no manifest error as to the other costs of repair.

Plaintiffs’ contention that set-off or compensation of judgments should apply as a matter of law because both plaintiffs and defendants are indebted to each other has merit.

Article 2207 of the Civil Code defines compensation as follows:

“When two persons are indebted to each other, there takes place between them a compensation that extinguishes both the debts, ...”

Every compensation implies two payments and is used to avoid the circuitry which would happen if each of two persons had to first pay what he owes and then receive back again what is due himself. Standard Roofing Company, Inc. v. Ragusa Brothers, Inc., 338 So.2d 119 (La.App. 1st Cir.1976); Tolbird v. Cooper, 243 La. 306, 143 So.2d 80 (1962).

In this case, plaintiffs owe Consolidated Construction $6586.00 on the contract price and defendants owe $20,499.68 in damages. Offsetting these mutual debts results in judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $13,913.68. Auto-Owners Insurance Company’s liability is limited to $9,963.68.

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is amended to award plaintiffs $13,913.68 with Auto-Owners Insurance Company’s liability limited to $9,963.68. Plaintiffs’ debt is extinguished and the judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Costs are to be cast against defendants.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED.

      . Plaintiff, Fast Foods of Baton Rouge # 2 is no longer a part of this proceeding.

      . Paragraph 4.5.1 of the construction and site • contracts provides:
      The Contractor warrants to the Owner and the Architect that all materials and equipment furnished under this contract will be new unless otherwise specified, and that all work will be of good quality, free from faults and defects and in conformance with the Contract Documents. All work not conforming to these requirements, including substitutions not properly approved and authorized, may be considered defective. If required by the Architect, the Contractor shall furnish satisfactory evidence as to the kind and quality of materials and equipment. This warranty is not limited by the provisions of Paragraph 13.2.
      Paragraph 13.2 of those three contracts provides:
      13.2.2 If, within one year after the Date of Substantial completion of the work or designated portion thereof or within one year after acceptance by the Owner of designated equipment or within such longer period of time as may be prescribed by law or by the terms of any applicable special warranty required by the contract documents, any of the work is found to be defective or not in accordance with the contract documents, the Contractor shall correct it promptly after receipt of a written notice from the owner to do so unless the Owner has previously given the Contractor a written acceptance of such condition. This obligation shall survive the termination of the contract. The Owner shall give such notice promptly after discovery of the condition.

      . La.C.C. Art. 2769:
      “If an undertaker fails to do the work he has contracted to do, or if he does not execute it in the manner and at the time he has agreed to do it, he should be liable in damages for the losses that may ensue from his noncompliance with his contract.”

      . Auto-Owners Insurance Company, as surety on the two construction contracts is not liable for the $3,950.00 awarded to the plaintiffs under the site contract for the Airline Highway Hardee’s.