author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    THE FLORIDA BAR. In re AMENDMENT TO INTEGRATION RULE (Certification Plan).
    No. 54081-A.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 28, 1982.
    Supplemental Opinion May 20, 1982.
    Samuel S. Smith, President of The Florida Bar, Miami Beach, and Peter W. Zinober, Chairman, Court/Bar Committee on Specialization Regulation, Tampa, for The Florida Bar Bd. of Governors.
   PER CURIAM.

In 1979, the Florida Bar Board of Governors petitioned this Court to approve a plan which would allow bar members to become “board certified” as having special competence in specific areas of law, as determined by the board of governors. In the original opinion in this matter, we rejected the bar’s initial plan, but approved lawyer certification in concept and suggested that the bar resubmit a pilot plan. The bar thereafter submitted for approval a permanent certification plan in the areas of taxation and civil trial advocacy. We again approved the matter in substance, but again remanded the plan to the bar for redrafting, finding the plan’s administrative structure and procedure cumbersome and not properly interrelated with lawyer advertising and designation.

The board of governors has now submitted a redrafted plan for Court approval. We find the present plan properly harmonizes lawyer advertising, designation, and certification through the advent of a “Board of Certification, Designation, and Advertising,” which controls the policy decisions of all three areas, subject, of course, to ultimate responsibility in the board of governors and, in turn, this Court.

We approve with slight structural modification the proposed plan, as appended to this opinion, including amendment to or adoption of the following: (1) Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, article XXI (Florida Specialization Regulation); (2) Bylaws under the Integration Rule, article XIX (Florida Certification Plan; including standards for certification of board certified civil trial lawyer and standards for certification of board certified tax lawyer); (3) Bylaws under the Integration Rule, article XX (Florida Designation Plan; this section repeals article XVII); (4) Integration Rule, article XI (Rules of Discipline relating to rule 11.13(8), Ethics and Unauthorized Practice of Law Opinions); and (5) Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-105 (Limitation of Practice; allowing lawyer publication of any certification specialty).

The bar is.directed to publish the plan in the Florida Bar News by February 15,1982, so that interested parties may have the opportunity to respond on or before March 10, 1982. Barring further amendment or modification as a result of the responses received, the total plan shall become effective on July 1, 1982, at 12:01 a. m.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

Contents

Amendment to Integration Rule, Article XXI (Florida Specialization Regulation) . 491

Adopted Bylaws Under Integration Rule, Article XIX (Florida Certification Plan) . 491

Standards for Certification of a Board Certified Civil Trial Lawyer . 496

Standards for Certification of a Board Certified Tax Lawyer . 497

Adopted Bylaws Under the Integration Rule, Article XX (Florida Designation Plan). ®00

Amendment to Integration Rule, Article XI (Rules of Discipline; Rule 11.13(8), Additional Rules of Procedure) . 504

Amendment to Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-305 (Limitation of Practice). ®®4

The Integration Rule of The Florida Bar is amended to provide that Article XXI is hereby repealed and replaced with the following:

ARTICLE XXI

FLORIDA SPECIALIZATION REGULATION

PREAMBLE

It is recognized that the Code of Professional Responsibility presently governs the ethical conduct of lawyers. It is further recognized that the Florida programs for specialization regulation must be carefully related and coordinated to assure the public is advised of the significance of participation or nonparticipation in such programs. It is the responsibility of the Supreme Court of Florida and The Florida Bar to assist the public in selecting a lawyer of their choice to perform necessary services. To honor that responsibility, the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar shall establish the Board of Certification, Designation and Advertising to function as a central administrative board to oversee specialization regulation and lawyer advertising in Florida.

1.The Board of Certification, Designation and Advertising shall be composed of 13 members of The Florida Bar appointed by the president of The Florida Bar, with the advice and consent of the Board of Governors. Twelve of the members shall hold office for three years and until their successors are appointed. These 12 members shall be appointed to staggered terms of office, and the initial appointees shall serve as follows: four members shall serve until the June 30 next following their appointment; four members shall serve until the second June 30 following their appointment; and four members shall serve until the third June 30 following their appointment. One of the 12 members shall be designated by the president as chairman. The 13th member shall be the chairman of the Continuing Legal Education Committee of The Florida Bar. Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner provided for original appointments.

2. There is established the Florida Certification Plan which allows members of The Florida Bar to inform the public concerning areas of law practice in which such members have become certified as having special knowledge, skills and proficiency. The bylaws governing the plan are set out in Article XIX. Any future amendments to or additional areas under the plan will become effective when approved by the court.

3. There is established the Florida Designation Plan which allows members of The Florida Bar to inform the public concerning areas of law practice in which such members have substantial experience or education. The bylaws governing the plan are set out in Article XX. Any future amendments to the plan will become effective when approved by the court.

4. The Board of Governors may require those who wish to participate in these plans to pay reasonable fees to The Florida Bar to be approved by the court. The funds derived from such fees shall be used exclusively for purposes related to the plans.

5. The Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility governs the ethical conduct of lawyers with respect to advertising and other aspects of the practice of law. Establishment of this Board of Certification, Designation and Advertising with responsibility for advertising is not meant to amend or alter the Code without following the normal procedure of petitioning the Supreme Court of Florida. This board will participate in the issuance of advisory opinions on lawyer advertising or solicitation in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Board of Governors pursuant to Article XI, Rule 11.-13(8) of the integration Rule of The Florida Bar.

The Bylaws Under the Integration Rule are Amended to Create:

ARTICLE XIX

FLORIDA CERTIFICATION PLAN

Section 1. ADMINISTRATION.

The Board of Certification, Designation and Advertising (the “Board”) shall have the authority and responsibility to administer the program for regulation of certification including:

(a) Recommend to the Board of Governors areas in which certificates may be granted and provide procedures by which such areas may be determined, redefined or eliminated.

(b) Recommend to the Board of Governors minimum, reasonable and nondiscriminatory standards concerning education, experience, proficiency and other relevant matters for granting certificates in areas of certification.

(c) Provide procedures for the investigation and testing of the qualifications of applicants and certificate holders and to award certificates.

(d) Encourage law schools, the Continuing Legal Education Committee of The Florida Bar, local bar associations and other continuing legal education entities to develop and maintain a program of continuing legal education to meet the standards described by the plan.

(e) Cooperate with other agencies of The Florida Bar in establishing and enforcing standards of professional conduct necessary for the recognition and regulation of certification.

(f) Cooperate with the Standing Committee on Specialization of the American Bar Association and with the agencies in other states engaged in the regulation of legal specialization.

(g) Report as required, but at least annually, to the Board of Governors on the status and conditions of the plan.

(h) Determine standards, rules and regulations to implement this authority, in accordance with the limitations of power of the Board of Governors and the minimum standards prescribed by the Supreme Court of Florida.

(i) Delegate to The Florida Bar staff any of the administrative responsibilities of the Board, providing the Board retains responsibility for staff decisions.

Section 2. CERTIFICATION COMMITTEES.

For each certification area approved by the Supreme Court of Florida, a seven-member committee, bearing the name of the area, shall be appointed by the president of The Florida Bar, with the advice and consent of the Board of Governors. Members of each committee shall be members in good standing of The Florida Bar, shall have been admitted to The Florida Bar no less than 10 years and must meet such other requirements as may in the future be promulgated by the Board. The committee members shall hold office for three years and until their successors are appointed. The committee members shall be appointed to staggered terms of office, and the initial appointees shall serve as follows: two members shall serve until June 30 next following their appointment; two members shall serve until the second June 30 following their appointment; and three members shall serve until the third June 30 following their appointment. Initial committee appointees shall be eminent attorneys in such field and shall be granted certificates by reason of such appointment. Subsequent appointees must have received a certificate in the area prior to appointment.

Section 3. JURISDICTION OF CERTIFICATION COMMITTEES.

Each certification committee shall be responsible for:

(a) Proposing criteria for the issuance or renewal of a certificate, which may include:

(1) Experience;

(2) References;

(3) Continuing legal education;

(4) Examination, either oral or written or both; and

(5) Whether certificates may be issued without examination and on what basis.

(b) Reviewing applications for certificates.

(c) Reviewing and establishing testing procedures as may be deemed necessary for certification or recertification.

(d)Recommending to the Board certificates be issued to those individuals meeting both the minimum standards imposed by this plan and the particular standards for the area for which certification is sought.

Section 4. LIMITATIONS ON THE POWERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, THE BOARD OF CERTIFICATION, DESIGNATION AND ADVERTISING, AND THE CERTIFICATION COMMITTEES.

The following limitations are established:

(a) No standard shall be approved which shall, in any way, limit the right of a certificate holder to practice law in all areas. Subject to Canon 6, any lawyer, alone or in association with any other lawyer, shall have the right to practice in all areas of law, even though he is certified in a particular area.

(b) No lawyer shall be required to be certified before he can practice law in any particular area. Subject to Canon 6, any lawyer, alone or in association with any other lawyer, shall have the right to practice in all areas of law, even though he is not certified in any particular area.

(c) All requirements for and all benefits to be derived from certification are individual and may not be fulfilled by or attributed to a law firm of which the certified lawyer may be a member.

(d) Participation in the plan shall be on a voluntary basis.

(e) The limit on the number of areas in which a lawyer may be certified shall be determined by such practical limits as are imposed by the requirements of “substantial involvement” and such other standards as may be established by the Board.

(f) No rules or standards shall be adopted in contravention of the Integration Rule, the Bylaws Under the Integration Rule, or the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 5. STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION.

(a)The minimum standards for certification are prescribed below. Each area of certification established under this article may contain higher or additional standards if approved by the Supreme Court of Florida.

(b) A member in good standing of The Florida Bar who meets the requirements may be granted a certificate in an area of certification. The certificate shall be issued by the Board and state that the lawyer is a “Board Certified (area of certification) Lawyer.”

(c) Minimum requirements for qualifying for certification by examination are:

(1) A minimum of five years in the practice of law on a full-time basis. The “practice of law” means full-time legal work performed primarily for purposes of rendering legal advice or representation. Service as a judge of any court of record shall be deemed to constitute the practice of law. Employment by the government of the United States, any state (including subdivisions of the state such as counties or municipalities) or the District of Columbia, and employment by a public or private corporation or other business shall be deemed to constitute the practice of law if the individual was required as a condition of employment, to be a member of the Bar of any state or the District of Columbia.
(2) A satisfactory showing of substantial involvement in the particular area for which certification is sought during three of the last five years preceding the application for certification.
(3) A satisfactory showing of such continuing legal education in a particular field of law for which certification is sought as set by that area’s standards, but in no event less than the minimum required under the Florida Designation Plan.
(4) Passing a written and/or oral examination applied uniformly to all applicants to demonstrate sufficient knowledge, skills and proficiency in the area for which certification is sought and in the various areas relating to such field. The award of an LL.M. degree from an approved law school in the area for which certification is sought within eight years of application may substitute as the written examination required in this subsection.
(5) Current certification by an approved organization in the area for which certification is sought within five years of filing an application may, at the option of the certification committee, substitute as partial equivalent credit, including the written examination required in subsection (c)(4). Approval will be by the certification committee with an appeal from denial to the Board.

(d) When certification without examination is available in an area, the minimum requirements for such certification are:

(1) A minimum of twenty years in the practice of law on a full-time basis.
(2) A satisfactory showing of competence and substantial involvement in the particular area for which certification is sought during five of the last ten years, including the year immediately preceding the application for certification. Substantial involvement in the practice of law for the one year immediately preceding the application may be waived for good cause shown.
(3) A satisfactory showing of such continuing legal education in a particular field of law for which certification is sought as set by that area’s standards, but in no event less than the minimum required under the Florida Designation Plan.
(4) Certification without examination may be granted only to individuals who apply within two years after the date on which the particular area is approved by the Supreme Court of Florida.

(e) Payment of any fees required by the plan.

Section 6. RECERTIFICATION.

(a) No certificate shall last for a period longer than five years.

(b) The minimum standards for recertifi-cation are prescribed below. Each area of certification established under this article shall contain requirements and safeguards for the continued proficiency of any certificate holder. The following standards shall apply:

(1) A satisfactory showing of substantial involvement during the period of certification in the particular area for which certification was granted.
(2) A satisfactory showing of such continuing legal education in the area for which certification is granted, but in no event less than the minimum required under the Florida Designation Plan.
(3) The payment of any fees prescribed by the plan.

(c)Any applicant for recertification who has either failed to meet the standards for recertification or has allowed the certificate to lapse, must meet all the requirements for initial certification as set out in Section 5.

Section 7. REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATION.

(a) A certificate may be revoked by the Board if the program for certification in that area is terminated or it is determined after hearing on appropriate notice that:

(1) The certificate was issued to a lawyer who was not eligible to receive a certificate or who made any false representation or misstatement of material fact to the certification committee or the Board;
(2) The certificate holder failed to abide by all rules and regulations governing the program promulgated by the Board of Governors or the Board as amended from time to time, including any requirement or safeguard for continued proficiency;
(3) The certificate holder failed to pay any fee established by the plan;
(4) The certificate holder no longer meets the qualifications established by the plan or the Board.

(b) A certificate may be revoked by the Board of Governors by reason of disciplinary action taken pursuant to the Integration Rule, Bylaws under the Integration Rule, or the Code of Professional Responsibility of The Florida Bar.

Section 8. MANNER OF CERTIFICATION.

(a) A member having received a certificate in an area may list the area on his letterhead, business cards, office door, in the yellow pages of the telephone directory, in approved law lists and by such other means permitted by the Code of Professional Responsibility. The listing shall be made by stating “Board Certified (area of certification) Lawyer.”

(b) No law firm may list an area of certification for the firm, but membership in the firm does not impair an individual’s eligibility to list areas of certification in accordance with this article. Except for the firm listing in the telephone directory, a law firm may show next to the name of any firm members their certification area(s).

Section 9. RIGHT OF APPEAL.

A lawyer who is refused certification, recertification, or whose certificate is revoked by the Board, or any person who is aggrieved by a ruling or determination of the Board shall have the right to appeal the ruling to the Board of Governors under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe. Exhaustion of this right of appeal shall be a condition precedent to judicial review by the Supreme Court of Florida.

Section 10. FEES.

The fees for the operation of this plan are:

(a) Filing fee. This is for the filing and $150 review of an individual’s certification application. This fee is not refundable regardless of the disposition of the individual’s application.
(b) Examination/Certification fee. This $150 fee must be paid before the taking of the examination for certification or before an applicant who otherwise qualifies receives his certificate. This fee is not refundable regardless of the results of the applicant’s test.
(c) Annual fee. This fee is assessed $ 50 against each plan participant at the time that participant files a list of the approved continuing legal education accumulated during the preceding year.
(d) Course approval fee. This fee is $125 assessed against sponsors who want their
course approved under the Plan.
(e)Individual credit approval. This fee $ 5 is assessed against applicants or Plan participants to cover administrative costs of processing a credit request where a sponsor refuses to cooperate with approval under the Plan.

Section 11. PUBLIC NOTICE.

(a) The Florida Bar may cause a public notice to be promulgated where and when it deems necessary, including for example, telephone directories, in substantially the following form:

NOTICE

FOR THE GENERAL INFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC

ATTORNEYS MAY LIST THEIR AREAS OF PRACTICE IN THE YELLOW PAGES WITHOUT MEETING ANY SPECIFIC CRITERIA. “DESIGNATED ATTORNEYS” HAVE MET MINIMUM EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FLORIDA DESIGNATION PLAN. ATTORNEYS INDICATING THEY ARE “BOARD CERTIFIED” HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE FLORIDA BAR AS HAVING MET RIGOROUS REQUIREMENTS OF EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION IN THOSE AREAS.

ALL PERSONS ARE URGED TO MAKE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION AND EVALUATION OF ANY ATTORNEY BEING CONSIDERED.

This notice published by The Florida Bar, telephone A.C. 904/222-5286, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8226.

(b) The Florida Bar shall assume no liability to any persons whomsoever by reason of the adoption and implementation of the plan.

Section 12. CONFIDENTIALITY.

All matters including but not limited to applications, references, tests and test scores, files, reports, investigations, hearings, findings, and recommendations shall be confidential so far as consistent with the effective administration of this plan, fairness to the applicant, and due process of law.

APPENDIX I

STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION OF A BOARD CERTIFIED CIVIL TRIAL LAWYER

Lawyers who are members in good standing of The Florida Bar and who meet the standards prescribed below may be issued an appropriate certificate identifying the lawyer as a Board Certified Civil Trial Lawyer. The purpose of the standards is to identify those lawyers who practice civil trial law and have the special knowledge, skills, and proficiency to be properly identified to the public as certified civil trial lawyers.

Section 1. DEFINITIONS.

(a) “Civil trial law” is the practice of law dealing with litigation of civil controversies in all areas of substantive law before state courts, federal courts, administrative agencies and arbitrators. In addition to actual pretrial and trial process, “civil trial law” includes evaluating, handling, and resolving civil controversies prior to the initiation of suit.

(b) The “practice of law” for this area is defined as set out at Section 5(c)(1) of Article XIX of the Integration Rule Bylaws governing the Florida Certification Plan. Practice of law which otherwise satisfies these requirements but which is on a part-time basis will satisfy the requirement if the balance of the applicant’s activity is work such as law teaching or legal editorial duty which is legal in nature although not the practice of law.

Section 2. MINIMUM STANDARDS.

(a) Substantial Involvement. To become certified as a civil trial lawyer, a lawyer must demonstrate substantial involvement in civil trial law. Substantial involvement shall include:

(1)At least five years of actual practice of law of which at least thirty percent has been spent in active participation in civil trial law. At least three years of this practice shall be immediately preceding application or, during those three years, the applicant may have served as a judge of a court of general civil jurisdiction adjudicating civil trial matters or as a teacher of civil trial subjects in an accredited law school.
(2) The trial of a minimum of fifteen contested civil cases in courts of general jurisdiction during his practice. Of these fifteen cases several shall have been jury cases, several shall have been conducted by the applicant as lead counsel and several shall have been submitted to the trier of fact. On good cause shown, for satisfaction in part of the requirement of the fifteen contested civil cases the Civil Trial Certification Committee may consider involvement in protracted litigation.
(3) Within three years immediately preceding application the applicant shall have substantial involvement in contested civil matters sufficient to demonstrate special competence as a civil trial lawyer. Substantial involvement includes investigation, evaluation, pleading, discovery, taking of testimony, presentation of evidence and argument of a jury or nonjury case.

(b) References. The applicant shall select and submit names and addresses of six lawyers, not associates or partners, as references to attest to the applicant’s involvement in civil trial practice. Such lawyers themselves shall be substantially involved in civil trial law and shall be familiar with the applicant’s practice. No less than one shall be a judge of a court of general jurisdiction in the State of Florida before whom the applicant has appeared as an advocate in the two years immediately preceding the application. In addition, the Civil Trial Certification Committee may, at its option, send reference forms to other attorneys and judges. For good cause shown, one of these references listed may be waived by the Civil Trial Certification Committee, but in no event more than one.

(c) Education. The applicant shall make a satisfactory showing that within the five years immediately preceding application he has minimum approved postgraduate educational experience in the broad field of civil trial law. Such experience shall be at programs approved by The Florida Bar and may include such activity as:

(1) Teaching a course in civil trial law;
(2) Completion of a course in civil trial law;
(3) Participation as a panelist or speaker in a symposium or similar program in civil trial law;
(4) Attendance at a lecture series or similar program concerning civil trial law, sponsored by a qualified educational institution or Bar group;
(5) Authorship of a book or article on civil trial law, published in a professional publication or journal;
(6) Such other educational experience as the Civil Trial Certification Committee shall approve.

PROVIDED HOWEVER, for applications filed in the years 1981 and 1982 there shall be a minimum of 30 hours. For applications filed in the year 1983 there shall be a minimum of 40 hours. For applications filed in the year 1984 and thereafter there shall be a minimum of 50 hours.

(d) Examination. The applicant must pass a written examination applied uniformly to all applicants, to demonstrate sufficient knowledge, proficiency and experience in civil trial law to justify the representation of special competence to the legal profession and to the public.

Section 3. RECERTIFICATION.

Recertification shall be under the following standards:

(1) The applicant must show that during the certification period he has met the substantial involvement criteria set forth in Section 2(a)(1) and (2).

(2) The applicant must submit references for knowledge and experience in accordance with Section 2(b).

(3) For each year of certification the applicant must show a minimum of 10 hours of approved educational experience. This requirement shall be satisfied in accordance with the provisions of Section 2(c).

(4)On special application, for good cause shown, the Civil Trial Certification Committee may waive compliance with the substantial involvement criteria provided all other requirements of Section 2 have been complied with.

APPENDIX II

STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION OF A BOARD CERTIFIED TAX LAWYER

Lawyers who are members in good standing of The Florida Bar and who meet the standards prescribed below may be issued an appropriate certificate identifying the lawyer as a Board Certified Tax Lawyer. The purpose of the standards is to identify those lawyers who practice in the area of taxation and have the special knowledge, skills, and proficiency to be properly identified to the public as certified tax lawyers.

Section 1. DEFINITIONS.

(a) “Tax law” means legal issues involving federal, state or local income, estate, gift, ad valorem, excise or other taxes.

(b) The “practice of law” for this area is defined as set out at Section 5(c)(1) of Article XIX of the Integration Rule Bylaws governing the Florida Certification Plan. Notwithstanding anything in the definition to the contrary, legal work done primarily for the purpose other than legal advice or representation (including, but not limited to, work related to the sale of insurance or retirement plan or work in connection with the practice of a profession other than the law) shall not be treated as the practice of law. However, time devoted to obtaining an LL.M. in taxation from an approved law school shall be considered as the practice of law.

Section 2. MINIMUM STANDARDS.

(a) Minimum Period of Practice. Every applicant shall have been engaged in the practice of law in the United States, or engaged in the practice of the United States law while in a foreign country, and shall have been a member in good standing of the Bar of any state of the United States or the District of Columbia for a period of five years as of the date of application.

(1) The years of practice of law need not be consecutive.

(2) Receipt of an LL.M. degree in taxation (or such other related fields approved by the Board and the Tax Certification Committee) from an approved law school may substitute for one year of experience to meet the five year practice requirement under this section.

(b) Substantial Involvement. Every applicant must demonstrate substantial involvement in the practice of tax law during the three years immediately preceding the date of application. Upon an applicant’s request and the recommendation of the Tax Certification Committee, the Board may waive the requirement that the three years be “immediately preceding” the date of application if the Board determines the waiver is warranted by special and compelling circumstances. Substantial involvement means the applicant has devoted forty percent or more of his practice to matters in which issues of tax law are significant factors and in which he had substantial and direct participation in those tax issues. An applicant must furnish information concerning the frequency of his work and the nature of the issues involved. For the purposes of this section the “practice of law” shall be as defined in Section 1(b) except that it shall also include time devoted to lecturing and/or authoring books or articles on tax law if the applicant was engaged in the practice of law during such period. Demonstration of compliance with this requirement shall be made initially through a form of questionnaire approved by the Tax Certification Committee but written or oral supplementation may be required.

(c) References for Knowledge and Experience. Every applicant shall submit the names and addresses of five other attorneys who are familiar with his practice, not including attorneys who currently practice in the applicant’s law firm, who can attest to the applicant’s reputation for involvement in the field of tax law. The Board and the Tax Certification Committee may authorize references from persons other than attorneys in such cases as they deem appropriate. The Board and the Tax Certification Committee may also make such additional inquiries as they deem appropriate.

(d)Education. Every applicant must demonstrate that during the three-year period immediately preceding the date of his application, he has met the continuing legal education requirements in tax law as follows. During the first three years after the plan’s implementation, the required number of hours of continuing legal education shall be sixty hours which shall have been attained during the three-year period preceding the date of application. Thereafter, the required number of hours shall be established by the Board but shall in no event be less than ninety hours. Credit for attendance at continuing legal education seminars shall only be given for programs which are directly related to tax law. However, during the first three years of the plan any courses approved for credit in taxation or estate planning and administration (but only to the extent of the tax aspects of estate planning and administration) under The Florida Designation Plan shall be given equal credit for the purposes of the education requirement under this section. The education requirement may be satisfied by one or more of the following:

(1) Attendance at continuing legal education seminars meeting the requirements set forth above;

(2) Lecturing at, and/or serving on the steering committee of, such continuing legal education seminars;

(3) Authoring articles or books published in professional periodicals or other professional publications;

(4) Teaching courses in “tax law” at an approved law school or other graduate level program presented by a recognized professional education association;

(5) Completing such home study programs as may be approved by the Board and the Tax Certification Committee, subject to the limitation that no more than fifty percent of the required number of hours of education may be satisfied through home study programs; and

(6) Such other methods as may be approved by the Board and the Tax Certification Committee.

The Board and the Tax Certification Committee shall, by rule or regulation, establish standards applicable to (1) through (6) above, including, but not limited to, the method of establishment of the number of hours allocable to any of the above-listed categories. Such rules or regulations shall provide that hours shall be allocable to each separate but substantially different lecture, article or other activity described in subsections (2), (3) and (4) above.

(e) Examination. Every applicant must pass a written examination designed to demonstrate special knowledge, skills and proficiency in the field of tax law. Any applicant who has received a LL.M. in taxation or other approved field from an approved law school within eight years of the date of application shall be exempt from the written examination requirement under this section.

Section 3. SPECIAL CERTIFICATION.

As a substitute for meeting the certification requirements set forth in Section 2, an attorney may be certified in tax law if, within eighteen months after the plan is officially implemented, he files an application and meets the following requirements:

(1) A minimum of twenty years of the practice of law.

(2) A satisfactory showing, as determined by the Board and the Tax Certification Committee, of substantial involvement in the field of tax law for seven of the ten years preceding the date of application and for the twelve-month period immediately preceding such date. The Board and the Tax Certification Committee may waive the twelve-month requirement upon request of an applicant if they determine that a waiver is warranted by special and compelling circumstances. An applicant must demonstrate substantial involvement in accordance with the criteria set forth in Section 2(b).

(3) Demonstration that the applicant has had not less than sixty hours of continuing legal education, determined in accordance with the standards established under Section 2(d), during the three years immediately preceding the date of application.

(4)Submittal to the Board of the names and addresses of five other attorneys who are familiar with his practice, not including attorneys who currently practice in the applicant’s law firm, who can attest to the applicant’s reputation for involvement in the field of tax law. The Board and the Tax Certification Committee may authorize references from persons other than attorneys in such cases as they deem appropriate. The Board and the Tax Certification Committee may also make such additional inquiries as they deem appropriate.

Section 4. RECERTIFICATION.

To be eligible for recertification, an applicant must meet the following requirements:

(1) A satisfactory showing, as determined by the Board and the Tax Certification Committee, of continuous and substantial involvement in the field of tax law throughout the period since the last date of certification. The demonstration of substantial involvement shall be made in accordance with the standards set forth in Section 2(b), except that the Board and the Tax Certification Committee may accept an affidavit from the applicant attesting to his compliance with the substantial involvement requirement.

(2) Demonstration that he has completed at least 150 hours of continuing legal education since the last date of certification (or recertification). The continuing legal education must logically be expected to enhance the proficiency of attorneys who are Board Certified Tax Lawyers. If the applicant has not attained 150 hours of continuing legal education, but has attained more than sixty hours during such period, successful passage of the written examination given by the Board to new applicants shall satisfy the continuing legal education requirements.

(3) Completion of the reference requirements set forth in Section 2(c).

(4)If, after reviewing the material submitted by an applicant for recertification, the Board and the Tax Certification Committee determine that the applicant may not meet the standards in tax law established under this article, the Board and the Tax Certification Committee may require, as a condition of recertification, that the applicant pass the written examination given by the Board to new applicants.

Article XX of the Bylaws under the Integration Rule is established as follows. Article XVII of the Bylaws is hereby repealed. The use of struck-through type indicates deletions. Underscoring indicates new language.

Article XVII

Article XX

FLORIDA DESIGNATION PLAN Section 1. ADMINISTRATION.

(a) The Board may delegate to a committee of Certification. Designation and Advertising (the “Board”') or to the staff personnel of Tho Florida Bar any or all of its shall have the administrative responsibilities arising under this article*, but Any member affected by an adverse decision from persons to whom-such duties are delegated of the Board may appeal to the Board; of Governors pursuant to Section 13 of this article.

(b) Responsibilities which have been delegated to the staff of The Florida Bar are listed on Schedule B.

(c) The president of- The — Florida- -Bar, with the approval of the Board, shall appoint a standing committee to be known as the Designation Coordinating Committee, which shall be composed of twelve members-, one of whom shall be the chairman-of the GLE Committee of The Florida Bar and not -more- -than-two ■ of.whom-shall-be - appointed from the roster of vice chairmen of the CLE Committee--of The Florida-Bar-; The president shall name one member of the Designation -Coordinating Gommittee-as the chairman. — The Designation Coordinating Committee Board shall cooperate with and answer inquiries from the staff personnel pertaining to the Plan and shall investigate and make recommendations to the Board of Governors concerning all questions relating to the Plan, including the following:

(1) Approved education courses,
(2) Alternative education methods,
(3) Number of hours credit to be allowed for educational efforts,
(4) Educational standards for satisfactory completion of approved courses,
(5) Possible need for cooperation with colleges and universities,
(6) Additional areas of practice to be approved for designation,
(7) Possible modification or expansion of the plan,
(8) Adoption of additional standards pertaining to the plan,
(9) Amount of the application and renewal fees,
(10) General administration of the plan.

(d)Application and renewal fees paid by members will bo deposited in a segregated account of Tho Florida Bar and used exclusively — for—purposes related to operations under this article.

(d)(e) The Florida Bar shall maintain a list of all members who have filed applications for permission or applications for renewal, showing the date and disposition of each application acted upon.

(e)(f) At least six months before the date on which a member’s permission to designate areas of practice expires, The Florida Bar shall give the member notice by regular mail advising the member of the date on which permission expires, the required qualifications for renewal of eligibility, and the procedure for renewal.

Section 2. DESIGNATION OF AREAS OF PRACTICE. A member may receive permission from The Florida Bar to publicly designate the areas in which he practices law if he has accumulated the experience and educational requirements set out in this article.

Section 3. SCOPE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT. The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar intends to study and monitor the plan and- the operations thereunder to determine if modification and expansion. is required in the interests of the public and the Bar. Standards of education and experience will be periodically reviewed and upgraded where necessary.

Section 4. AREAS OF PERMITTED DESIGNATION.

(a) A member in good standing of The Florida Bar may not designate an area of practice unless the area has been approved by the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors may approve a particular area of practice on its own motion or upon the request of any member if it finds that the area:

(1) Has not already been approved under a different description;
(2) Is a generally accepted area of practice;
(3) Is described in dignified and ethically appropriate terms.

(b) The areas of practice which have already been approved are listed on Schedule A. Schedule A may be amended as frequently as necessary to add or delete areas approved by the Board of Governors.

(c) If a member wishes to designate an area which has not been approved by the Board of Governors, he shall include in his application for permission a request that the area of practice be approved. The Board shall consider the request before it takes action on the member’s application for permission.

Section 5. ELIGIBILITY FOR PERMISSION TO DESIGNATE AREAS OF PRACTICE.

(a)Except as provided in subsections (b), (c) and (d), a member in good standing of The Florida Bar may be eligible for permission to designate areas of practice if at the time he files his application: (1) he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least three years and during the three years preceding his application for permission he has had substantial experience in each area of practice listed in the application; and (2) he has accumulated at least the.minimum amount thirty hours of approved continuing legal education set-out below in each area sought to be designated^

—Ten hours if-the application is filed on or before December 31, 1979.
b-. — Twenty hours if the application is filod-on or after January 1; 198Qrbut not later than Docomber- 31, 1980.
e= — Thirty hours — if- the application is

filed on or after January 1, 1981.

(b) If the Board finds that a member who has not engaged in the practice of law in an area for three years preceding his application but has had post-graduate education or concentrated experience in a particular area of practice and the experience is equal to or greater than the experience he would have gained in that area from three years of practice, and he has accumulated the minimum amount of approved continuing legal education required under Section 5(a)(2), the Board may waive the requirement of Section 5(a)(1) and permit him to designate that area.

(c) If the Board finds that a member has had at least three years substantial experience or postgraduate education in an area of practice and the experience or education is not unreasonably remote, but that due to extenuating circumstances the member has not had substantial experience in the area during the three years preceding his application, and the member has- accumulated the minimum amount of approved continuing legal education required under Section 5(a)(2), the Board may waive the requirement of Section 5(a)(1) and permit him to designate that area.

(d) A member applying for permission to designate General Practice who has not been a member in good standing of The Florida Bar for the three years preceding his application but who has accumulated the minimum amount of approved continuing legal education required under Section 5(a)(2), may designate General Practice.

(e) A member shall not be eligible to designate more than three areas of practice at any one time.

Section 6. APPLICATION FOR DESIGNATION OF AREAS OF PRACTICE.

(a) A member who wishes to designate one or more areas of practice shall file with the Board an application for permission on a form to be specified by the Board. The application shall:

(1) List the area or areas the member wishes to designate;
(2) State facts sufficient to establish that the member is eligible to designate the areas listed;
(31 Require the applicant to list the continuing legal education the member has accumulated during the previous three years:
(41 Require the applicant to submit certificates of reference from other lawyers who can attest to the applicant’s substantial experience in each area sought to be designated:
(5K31 Contain a statement that to enhance his proficiency the member will continue his legal education in the areas he wishes to designate through private study or continuing legal education programs approved by the Board or by this court and other appropriate means approved by the court.

(b) When the application is filed, the member shall pay an application fee in an amount to be established by the Board of Governors not exceeding $50 per area sought to be designated.

Section 7. ACTION ON APPLICATIONS TO DESIGNATE AREAS OF PRACTICE.

The Board shall promptly consider and act upon all applications for permission to designate areas of practice. If it finds that an applicant is eligible under Section 5 to designate one or more areas of practice, it shall issue a letter of permission authorizing the applicant to designate those areas. If it finds that an applicant is not eligible it shall notify the applicant of its finding and reasons for it.

Section 8. MANNER OF DESIGNATION.

(a) A member having permission to designate areas of practice may do so by listing the areas in the manner and locations permitted under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Designations shall be made by naming the permitted areas of practice. (For example, a permitted designation might be “John J. Jones, Admiralty and Trial Practice — General.”) Only the following description is permitted: “Qualified in _ under the Florida Designation Plan.”

(b) No law firm may designate an area of practice for the firm, but membership in a firm does not impair an individual member’s eligibility to designate areas of practice in accordance with this article.

Section 9. EFFECT OF DESIGNATION RULE. Nothing in this article precludes any member from practicing in any area of practice regardless of whether he has designated it or any other area under this article.

Section 10. DURATION AND RENEWAL.

(a) A member’s rights to designate one or more areas of. practice shall continue for a term of three years from the date of the letter of permission issued under Section 7 or subsection (d) of this section.

(b) A member shall be eligible to renew his right to designate an area of practice only if during the preceding three-year period he has had substantial experience during the three years preceding the renewal application and he has devoted at least 30 hours, of which only a maximum of 20 hours may be accumulated for credit in any one of the preceding three years, to approved continuing legal education in each area for which renewal is sought. For good cause shown, the Board may waive all or any part of such requirement.

(c) A member who wishes to renew his right to designate areas of practice shall file an application for renewal with the Board at least 30 days before the permission expires. The application shall be on a form specified by the Board and shall state sufficient facts to establish that the member is eligible to renew. When the application is filed, the member shall pay a renewal fee in an amount to be established by the Board of Governors not exceeding $50 per area sought to be designated. The 30-day notice period may be waived by the Board for good cause shown.

(d) The Board shall promptly consider and act upon all applications for renewal in the same manner as provided in Section 7.

Section 11. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION.

(a) Continuing legal education courses which are designed to enhance the proficiency of a designated attorney in a particular area of practice shall qualify as approved courses hereunder. The Board shall determine the number of hours credit to be given for each such course and the designated area entitled to credit for each course. The Board of Governors may assess a fee to review and approve courses under this plan.

(b) On the application of any interested person, the Board shall make a determination of the qualification of, and credit to be allowed for, alternative courses or methods of legal education.

(c) From time to time the Board shall publish current lists of approved educational alternatives.

Section 12. PUBLIC NOTICE.

(a) The Florida Bar may cause a public notice to be promulgated where and when it deems necessary, including, for example, telephone directory yellow pages, in substantially the following form:

NOTICE

FOR THE GENERAL INFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC

ATTORNEYS MAY LIST THEIR AREAS OF PRACTICE IN THE YELLOW PAGES WITHOUT MEETING ANY SPECIFIC CRITERIA. “DESIGNATED ATTORNEYS” USING (A SYMBOL) AF-TER-THEIR NAME OR AREAS OF PRACTICE HAVE MET MINIMUM EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FLORIDA DESIGNATION PLAN. HOWEVER. NO ATTOENEW-HAS- BEEN CERTIFIED BY-THE-FLORIDA- BAR AS HAVING ANY MORE COMPETENCE IN THESE AREAS THAN ANY OTHER ATTORNEY. ATTORNEYS INDICATING THEY ARE “BOARD CERTIFIED” HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE FLORIDA BAR AS HAVING MET RIGOROUS REQUIREMENTS OF EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION IN THOSE AREAS.

ALL PERSONS ARE URGED TO MAKE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION AND EVALUATION OF ANY ATTORNEY BEING CONSIDERED.

This notice published by The Florida Bar, Telephone A.C. 904/222-5286, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8226.

(b) The Florida Bar shall assume no liability to any persons whomsoever by reason of the adoption and implementation of the plan.

Section 13. RIGHT OF REVIEW.

Any member adversely affected by an administrative ruling concerning this plan may petition the Board of Governors for relief. Any denial of relief by the Board of Governors can be reviewed by the court on the member’s petition within 30 days of notice of the Boards of Governors action.

SCHEDULE A

Administrative and Governmental Law Admiralty

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Appellate Practice

Aviation Law

Bankruptcy

Civil Rights

Collections

Corporation and Business Law

Criminal Law

Environmental Law

General Practice

Immigration and Naturalization

International Law

Juvenile Law

Labor Law

Marital and Family Law

Patent, Trademark and Copyright

Real Property Law

Securities

Taxation

Trial Practice — General

Trial Practice — Commercial

Trial Practice — Personal Injury and Wrongful Death

Wills, Estates and Estate Planning

Workers’ Compensation

SCHEDULE B

1. Action under Section 7 on applications for permission filed by individual members provided the applications do not involve requests for waivers under Section 5(b) or (c).

2. Action under Section 10(c) on applications for renewal filed by individual members.

3. Issuance of letters of permission under Section 7 and Section 10(c).

4. Timely issuance and publication of all notices required under this article.

5. Maintenance of list of members required by section lfeUcT).

6. Maintenance and publication of lists of educational courses approved by the Board.

The Integration Rule of The Florida Bar is amended as follows. The use of struck-through type indicates deletions. Underscoring indicates additions.

Article XI

RULES OF DISCIPLINE

Rule 11.13: ADDITIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE

(8) Ethics and Unauthorized Practice of Law Opinions.

The Professional Ethics Committee, Staff Counsel and assistants, and the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law of The Florida Bar shall issue Advisory Opinions in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court of Florida. Such Advisory Opinions shall be written by the foregoing committees and staff counsel acting as adjuncts of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar serving as an arm of the Supreme Court of Florida in the exercise of its jurisdiction to control, supervise and regulate the standards of professional conduct to be observed by members of The Florida Bar and in the exercise of its jurisdiction to prohibit the Unauthorized Practice of Law. Such opinions shall be subject to review by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar in accordance with procedures promulgated by the Board. Informal and other staff counsel opinions, including but not limited to ethics opinions and Unauthorized Practice of Law opinions, shall be subject to review by the Professional Ethics Committee, or the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law of The Florida Bar in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Board of Governors. All opinions of the Professional Ethics Committee and the Standing Committee on Unauthorized-Praetice of Law of The Florida-Bar involving an interpretation of Canon 2 as it relates to lawyer advertising or solicitation shall be subject to review by the Board of Certification. Designation and Advertising and the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar or such appeals committee as they the Board of Governors may designate. All opinions of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law shall be subject to review bv the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar or such appeals committee as the Board of Governors may designate.

The Code of Professional Responsibility is Revised to Provide:

DR 2-105. LIMITATION OF PRACTICE.

A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist or as limiting his practice, except as permitted under DR 2-102(A)(6) or as follows:

('ll A lawyer who complies with the Florida Certification Plan as set forth in Article XXI of the Integration Rule and Article XIX of the Bylaws of The Florida Bar, may inform the public and other lawyers of his certified areas of legal practice.

(21134 A lawyer who complies with the Florida Designation Plan as set forth in Article XXI of the Integration Rule and Article XVH XX of the Bylaws of The Florida Bar, may to the extent permitted therein inform the public and other lawyers of his designated areas of his legal practice.

(31(21 A lawyer may permit his name to be listed in lawyer referral offices according to the fields of law in which he will accept referrals.

(4K31 A lawyer available to act as a consultant to or an associate of other lawyers in a particular branch of law or legal service may distribute to other lawyers and publish in local legal journals a dignified announcement of such availability, but the announcement shall not contain a representation of special competence or experience, except as permitted under DR 2-105(1) or (2) above. The announcement shall not be distributed to lawyers more frequently than once in a calendar year, but it may be published periodically in local legal journals.

(4) A lawyer who is cortified-as a specialist in a particular-field of law-or law practice by the- authority having jurisdiction under- state law over the subject of speciali ■ zation by lawyers may hold himself out as such specialist but only in accordance with the rules prescribcd-by that authority.

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION

PER CURIAM.

By our opinion in this matter dated January 28, 1982, we approved the bar’s new proposed plan for lawyer certification, designation, and advertising. We directed the bar to publish the plan in The Florida Bar News so that interested parties could have the opportunity to respond on or before March 10, 1982. In response we have received a number of comments, one of which we find merits our attention.

Section 5(c)(4) of the certification plan provides that “[t]he award of an LL.M. degree from an approved law school in the area for which certification is sought within eight years of application may substitute as the written examination required in this subsection.” In our January 28 opinion, we directed that the plan should become effective on July 1, 1982, so that it would coincide with the beginning of The Florida Bar’s fiscal year. That date effectively requires those lawyers receiving an LL.M. degree in May or June of 1974 to take a written examination under the plan, but those receiving an LL.M. degree in July of 1974 may, under section 5(e)(4), be excluded from a written examination.

We deem this inequitable and grant to the Board of Certification, Designation, and Advertising the authority to include within section 5(c)(4) May and June, 1974, LL.M. graduates. We find that insertion of additional language into section 5(c)(4) to achieve this purpose unnecessary. As stated in our previous opinion, the total plan shall become effective on July 1, 1982, at 12:01 a. m.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: OVERTON, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    James NELSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 60944.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 1, 1982.
    Rehearing Denied June 21, 1982.

      Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Robert L. Bogen, Asst Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
   OVERTON, Justice.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in its decision reported at 399 So.2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), certified direct conflict with the decision in Ferrell v. State, 385 So.2d 120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution (1980). The issue is whether a trial court, after receiving a mandate from a district court directing a new trial in a criminal case, has the authority to extend speedy trial time under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 when the state seeks review in the Supreme Court of the district court’s decision. The Nelson decision holds that the trial court has such authority under rule 3.191, while the Ferrell court holds that only the district court or the Supreme Court may suspend operation of the speedy trial requirement by issuing a stay of mandate under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(a). For the following reasons, we approve the Nelson decision and disapprove the contrary holding in Ferrell.

In the instant case, the district court of appeal reversed petitioner’s 1977 conviction for second-degree murder and remanded the cause for a new trial. After the mandate was filed in the trial court, the state filed a petition for certiorari to this Court and, five days later, moved the trial court to extend the speedy trial time pursuant to rule 3.191(a). The trial court granted an extension of 90 days from the issuance of the Supreme Court’s mandate. The petition for certiorari to this Court was subsequently denied and the trial court set the trial for a date falling within the extension period. On the day set for trial, petitioner moved for discharge, alleging that the speedy trial period had run because the trial court’s extension was improper. After the trial court denied the motion, the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charge of manslaughter, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion for discharge.

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the motion, finding that the trial court could properly extend the time under the speedy trial rule when a petition for certiorari or review has been taken to the Supreme Court. The district court concluded that the filing of such a petition is an appropriate exceptional circumstance within the meaning of rule 3.191(d)(2) and (f). Conversely, the Third District Court of Appeal in Ferrell held that, when review is sought in the Supreme Court, the running of the speedy trial time may be suspended only by a stay of mandate issued by a district court or the Supreme "Court pursuant to appellate rule 9.310(a) and that the trial court has no authority to extend the speedy trial period under criminal rule 3.191. In so holding, that court clearly implies that a stay of mandate and an order extending speedy trial time are the same. We reject that view.

In State v. Jenkins, 389 So.2d 971 (Fla.1980), we distinguished between a stay ana an extension of the right to a speedy trial, stating that “[tjhey each concern different matters.” We emphasize the difference between the tolling of the speedy trial time by the trial court under the speedy trial rule and the entry of a stay of mandate by an appellate court. An extension of the speedy trial period affects only the date of trial, and all other proceedings, such as discovery and the filing and disposition of motions, may continue. However, if a stay is entered, all proceedings in the cause are effectively terminated. The action by the trial court in extending the speedy trial time under criminal rule 3.191 does not affect the power of either the district court or the Supreme Court to enter a stay of the entire proceedings if either court determines that action is appropriate under appellate rule 9.310(a).

The Ferrell decision also seems to imply that the trial judge is not the proper person to determine if an extension should be granted when review is sought in the Supreme Court because the trial judge might improperly grant an extension. In the Jenkins opinion, we noted that all motions for extensions of speedy trial time are to be made in the trial court:

The manner of suspending the running of the speedy trial time during a state appeal is a question for the trial court. Our present rule recognizes that the trial judge has the sole responsibility for determining whether a defendant has been guaranteed his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The trial judge is in the best position to make certain under the individual facts of the case that an extension of time will not deprive the defendant of this constitutional right to a speedy trial. We note that the purpose of our procedural speedy trial rule is to ensure (1) the effective implementation of a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, and (2) the effective and expeditious prosecution of criminal offenses.

389 So.2d at 974. See also Tucker v. State, 357 So.2d 719, 720 n.6 (Fla.1978), and Carroll v. State, 251 So.2d 866 (Fla.1971). We reaffirm our holding that the trial judge has the responsibility to rule on speedy trial extensions, taking into account the individual facts of each case in making the determination of whether the extension would deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, as set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

We interpret the term “for appeals by the State,” under criminal rule 3.191(d)(2), to include all appellate applications made by the state, and we find that such an application may constitute an “exceptional circumstance” under rule 3.191(f), depending on the facts and legal issues involved in a particular case. The fact that the state has sought review in this Court of a district court decision does not, however, automatically entitle the state to an extension of the speedy trial period. The defendant must be afforded an opportunity to present evidence and argument at a hearing to demonstrate that he would be prejudiced by an extension. This is the same standard we set forth in Jenkins. In the instant case, we find nothing in the record to show that petitioner was prejudiced or deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

We approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Nelson v. State, and disapprove the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Ferrell v. State.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, ALDERMAN, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, J., dissent.


text:
    THE FLORIDA BAR In re PETITION TO AMEND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (MERIT RETENTION ELECTION).
    No. 61507.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 29, 1982.
    Samuel S. Smith, President of The Florida Bar, Miami Beach, James C. Rinaman, President-elect of The Florida Bar, Jacksonville; Drake M. Batchelder, Chairman, Judicial Merit Retention Study Commission, Fort Lauderdale, Eurich Z. Griffin, Chairman, Judicial Administration Selection and Tenure Committee, Tampa; John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Anita F. Dahlquist, UPL Counsel, of The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
    John Paul Parks, Ormond Beach, interested person.
   PER CURIAM.

The Florida Bar has petitioned the Court to amend Canon 7B(3) and the commentary to 7B of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Florida Bar News has published the proposal and the Court has received no adverse comments from interested parties. The proposed amendment to the Code of Judicial Conduct is as follows:

Canon 7B(3)
Code of Judicial Conduct
(3) An incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention in office or re-election to office without a competing candidate, and whoso candidacy-has drawn active opposition may.campaign in response thereto and may obtain publicly stated support and campaign funds in the ■manner provided in subsection B(-2)r may conduct only limited campaign activities until such time as the judge certifies that his candidacy has drawn active opposition. Limited campaign activities shall include only the conduct authorized bv subsection B(21. interviews with reporters and editors of the print, audio and visual media, and appearances and speaking engagements before public gatherings and organizations other than political parties. Upon mailing a certificate in writing to the Secretary of State. Division of Elections. with a cony to the Judicial Qualifications Commission, that his candidacy has drawn active opposition, and specifying the nature thereof, a judge mav thereafter campaign in any manner authorized bv law, subject to the restrictions of subsection Bill
Canon 7B
Code of Judicial Conduct
Commentary
Active opposition is difficult to define but is intended to include any form of organized public opposition or an unfavorable vote on a bar poll. Any political activity engaged in by members of a judge’s family should be conducted in the name of the individual family member, entirely independent of the judge and without reference to the judge or to his office.

This proposed amendment is the work product of a special commission established by the Florida Bar at the request of the Chief Justice to resolve the practical problems in our merit retention election system for appellate judges as well as for the election process of trial judges who have no known opposition. The commission was composed not only of lawyers and judges but representatives of the media and the League of Women Voters.

The existing canon placed an absolute ban on campaign activity of a judicial officer in the absence of any organized opposition. This had the effect of prohibiting any type of travel or appearances before media boards or other groups or entities who would endorse or oppose judicial candidates. It resulted in restricting the public knowledge concerning the merit retention candidates and the judicial election process.

The new proposed canon eliminates the absolute ban on campaign activities and establishes a two-tier system. It allows an incumbent judge with no known opposition to engage in limited campaign activities such as interviews with the media and appearances and speaking engagements before public gatherings and organizations other than political parties. If the judge’s candidacy draws active opposition, he or she then may engage in a full range of campaign activities in the manner presently prescribed by the canons.

We agree with the proposed change and believe it improves and fine-tunes our judicial retention and election process. Canon 7B(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby amended in accordance with the proposal submitted, effective immediately.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.


author: ADKINS, Justice.

text:
    Sherry Nathaniel WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 58704.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    May 13, 1982.

      Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender and Charles M. Johnston, Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for petitioner.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
   ADKINS, Justice.

This case tests the constitutionality of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). It also asks us to decide whether trial counsel properly raised and preserved his objections for appeal.

Williams pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and the trial judge sentenced him to prison for ninety-nine years. Pursuant to section 947.16(3), the judge retained jurisdiction to review any parole release order issued during the first thirty-three years of petitioner’s confinement. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the statute at the sentencing hearing, but the First District Court of Appeal refused to consider the issue, ruling that the absence of a specific objection precluded its review. Williams v. State, 378 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

Petitioner first maintains that section 947.16(3) is an ex post facto law as applied to him. The offense for which he was charged occurred on March 29, 1978. The statute did not become effective until June 19, 1978. We recently settled this issue in State v. Williams, 397 So.2d 663 (Fla.1981). In Williams, we held that the retention of jurisdiction by a trial judge and denial of release through gain time constituted an ex post facto application of the law when the crime was committed prior to the statute’s effective date. Under this authority, we agree with petitioner’s contention.

Petitioner’s procedural question focuses on whether his counsel preserved his objections to the invocation of section 947.16(3) by properly presenting them to the trial judge. We hold that he did.

At the sentencing hearing, petitioner’s attorney objected several times to the order retaining jurisdiction. In the first objection, he stated:

I would like the opportunity to be heard at some greater length on another occasion relating to this motion, I suppose it is, before the Court relating to the retaining of jurisdiction. We’re here for the purpose of imposing sentence at this time, and I certainly believe there are serious Constitutional questions relating to the statute, and I think there are serious questions relating to the applicability in this instance. I think moreover there is a question as to whether or not that statute was in effect at such time that it can be applied in this case.

(T. 33 emphasis supplied). The court, in response, announced its intention to invoke section 947.16(3) while recognizing counsel’s objections.

The Court will invoke the provisions of Chapter 783.18, Laws of Florida, which has been codified in the Florida Statutes as Section 947.16 as amended, Subsection 2, subject to, of course, or with the understanding that counsel for the defendant has already interposed an objection to such invocation of that provision. Of course, there are procedures that can be invoked in order to raise those objections, and the Court intends to invoke that provision.

(T. 38-39).

After petitioner’s sentence was announced, his attorney once again called attention to the constitutional questions he initially raised.

As far as the invocation of the Florida Statute, apparently recently passed, with the Court retaining jurisdiction, counsel for the State advised me of this approximately ten minutes before we came in before the Court, and as such I was certainly not in the position to explore the factual basis for it; however, I would object to the Court making findings for the invocation therefor without a full evi-dentiary hearing and the opportunity to present both sides of the question of whether or not it is appropriate in this ease to invoke that particular section of the statute. I would couple it with the previous objections to the Constitutional grounds, both generally and as applied in this instance.

(T. 41-42). The court disagreed with counsel’s argument, but “duly noted” his objections. It then concluded the proceeding by informing petitioner of his right to appeal.

We begin by considering a few long-standing propositions. In general, an appellate court may review only those questions properly presented to the trial court. Mariani v. Schleman, 94 So.2d 829 (Fla.1957). Proper presentation requires a contemporaneous objection. Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla.1978). Under the test established in Castor, an objection must be specific enough “to apprise the trial judge of the putative error and to preserve the issue for intelligent review on appeal.” Id. at 703.

The record in this case shows that the Castor test was met. Granted, the general references to the constitutional invalidity of the statute were insufficient by themselves to preserve this point on appeal. But notice of a challenge against the retroactive application of the statute was clearly given. Trial counsel did not specifically cite to the prohibition against ex post facto laws as the basis for his legal argument. But magic words are not needed to make a proper objection. His articulated concern with whether the effective date of section 947.16(3) permitted the statute’s application to petitioner’s case was sufficiently specific to inform the trial judge of the alleged error. The trial judge, noting the objection and having the opportunity to cure any error, ruled against petitioner by issuing the order retaining jurisdiction. Under the facts of this case, we find the purported error was properly raised in the trial court. Accordingly, we quash the opinion of the district court and remand the cause with instructions to quash the “Order Retaining Jurisdiction Pursuant To Chapter 78-318, Laws of Florida” entered by the trial court.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ„ concur.

      . Section 947.16(3) reads:
      “[p]ersons who have become eligible for parole and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall be placed on parole in accordance with the provisions of this law; except that in any case of a person convicted of murder ..., at the time of sentencing the judge may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a commission release order. This jurisdiction of the trial court judge is limited to the first third of the maximum sentence imposed.”


author: McDONALD, Judge. ALDERMAN, Judge,

text:
    Samuel Lamar WILSON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 59017, 59018.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    May 13, 1982.
    Margaret Good and Melanie Hines Alford, Asst. Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Doris E. Jenkins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for ap-pellee.
   McDONALD, Judge.

This cause is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County. Wilson pled guilty to charges in two separate informations. At sentencing, the trial court retained jurisdiction for one-third of the sentences pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). While so doing, the court expressly upheld the constitutionality of section 947.16(3). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972).

The facts are undisputed. On December 4, 1979 the state filed an amended information (Circuit Court Case No. 79-7387-CF) charging Wilson in count I with attempted armed burglary with a firearm, in count II with aggravated battery with a firearm, and in count III with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Allegedly, these offenses occurred on October 25, 1979. On January 10, 1980 another information was filed (Circuit Court Case No. 80-192) charging Wilson in count I with burglary with an assault and in count II with second-degree murder. These offenses allegedly occurred on June 18, 1976. Wilson entered pleas of guilty to all counts.

The court adjudged Wilson guilty and sentenced him in Case No. 80-192 to 99 years imprisonment for second-degree murder with a consecutive sentence of fifty years imprisonment for burglary. In Case No. 79-7387-CF, the court sentenced Wilson to fifteen years imprisonment for attempted armed burglary, to a consecutive fifteen years imprisonment for aggravated battery, and to a third consecutive term of fifteen years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court entered a written order retaining jurisdiction over Wilson for review of any release order of the Parole and Probation Commission during the first forty-five years of the total sentence.

Wilson’s first issue raises the impropriety of applying section 947.16(3) to a crime committed in 1976. He contends that such is an ex post .factor application of the law. Our recent decision in State v. Williams, 397 So.2d 663 (Fla.1981), is controlling on this issue, and we agree that retention of jurisdiction over an offense committed in 1976 is an ex post facto application of the statute. Wilson next asserts that the imposition of a fifteen-year sentence for attempted armed burglary is an illegal sentence. The state agrees on this point. The maximum sentence allowed under section 777.04(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), for this crime is five years. Finally, Wilson contends that section 947.16(3) is unconstitutional. We find no merit in his arguments and uphold the constitutionality of the statute based on our recent decision in Borden v. State, 402 So.2d 1176 (Fla.1981).

The circuit court’s application of section 947.16(3) to the 1976 offenses is reversed. Jurisdiction may be retained as to the 1979 offenses prosecuted under Case No. 79-7387-CF. The fifteen-year sentence for attempted burglary under Case No. 79-7387-CF is vacated to the extent it exceeds five years. We remand for the trial court to enter an order in accordance with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and OVERTON, JJ., concur.

ALDERMAN, J., concurs specially with an opinion.

ALDERMAN, Judge,

concurring specialty-

Although I concur with the majority opinion, I take issue with the propriety and the meaning of the footnote contained in the opinion. This footnote is not only unessential to the decision of this Court but also meaningless in its content. It amounts to a gratuitous statement by this Court which serves no purpose. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), provides in part:

[Ejxcept that, in any case of a person convicted of murder, robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping, sexual battery or attempted sexual battery, incest or attempted incest, an unnatural and lascivious act or an attempted unnatural and lascivious act, lewd and lascivious behavior, assault or aggravated assault when a sexual act is completed or attempted, battery or aggravated battery when a sexual act is completed or attempted, arson, or any felony involving the use of a firearm or other deadly weapon or the use of intentional violence, at the time of sentencing the judge may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a commission release order. This jurisdiction of the trial court judge is limited to the first third of the maximum sentence imposed. When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and concurrent sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein shall apply to the first third of the maximum sentence imposed for the highest felony charged and proven. When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and consecutive sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein shall apply to one-third of the total consecutive sentences imposed.

If the requirements of this statute are met, the trial judge has the broad discretion to retain jurisdiction over the offender for review of a Parole and Probation Commission release order for the first third of the maximum sentence imposed. The statute does not require that he employ this authority “sparingly and carefully.” To impose such a requirement amounts to a limitation of the legislature’s language which we are not at liberty to do.

Furthermore, even though section 947.-16(3)(a) requires that the trial judge, in retaining jurisdiction, state his justification with individual particularity and make this justification a part of the court record, I also object to the second sentence in the footnote which provides: “For retention to be valid, the trial judge is required to state the justification with individual particularity.” In the present case, the trial judge stated his justification with particularity as required by this statute. The issue of whether a retention of jurisdiction where he has failed to do so is invalid is not before us, and I would therefore not make this gratuitous statement on an issue not properly before us for review.

      Although we uphold the constitutionality of § 947.16(3), this section should be used sparingly and carefully. For retention to be valid, the trial judge is required to state the justification with individual particularity.


text:
    THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Fred C. BARKSDALE, Respondent.
    No. 60591.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    May 13, 1982.
    John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Stanley A. Spring, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, and Roberta J. Fox, Bar Counsel and Ann L. Kerr, Chairman, Tampa, of The Florida Bar, for complainant.

      Robert H. Carlton, Tampa, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary proceeding by The Florida Bar against Fred C. Barksdale, a member of The Florida Bar, is presently before us on complaint of The Florida Bar and report of referee. Pursuant to article XI, Rule 11.06(9)(b) of the Integration Rule of The Florida Bar, the referee’s report and record were duly filed with this Court. No petition for review pursuant to Integration Rule of The Florida Bar 11.09(1) has been filed.

Having considered the pleadings and evidence, the referee found as follows:

COUNT I
1. Respondent is, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a member of The Florida Bar, subject to the jurisdiction and disciplinary rules of the Supreme Court of Florida.
2. During the period of January 1, 1979, through June 30, 1980, Respondent maintained a checking account at the Peoples Bank of Tampa (# 010 434 3201) labeled Fred C. Barksdale, Trust Account (hereinafter referred to as Respondent’s Trust Account).
3. On or about July 30 and 31, 1980, The Florida Bar caused an audit to be performed on Respondent’s Trust Account pursuant to The Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.-02(4)(b) and (c).
4. Respondent placed funds received from clients into Respondent’s Trust Account and subsequently paid costs related to the same clients from those funds.
5. Respondent’s personal funds were deposited in Respondent’s Trust Account.
6. Respondent caused payments to be made from Respondent’s Trust Account to fulfill personal obligations.
7. By reason of the foregoing, Respondent violated The Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility D.R. 9-102(A).
COUNT II
8. Complainant realleges the matters set forth in paragraphs 1-5.
9. From the period of January 1,1979, through June 1, 1980, the bank statements from Respondent’s Trust Account reflected twenty-six negative balances.
10. During the period of January 1, 1979, through June 1, 1980, eleven checks which were written on Respondent’s Trust Account were returned by the bank due to insufficient funds.
11. By reason of the foregoing, Respondent violated The Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility D.R. 9-102(A) and The Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.02(4).
COUNT III
12. Complainant realleges the matters set forth in paragraphs 1-5.
13. During the period of January 1, 1979, through June 1, 1980, no reconciliations were made of Respondent’s Trust Account balance.
14. During the period of January 1, 1979, through June 1, 1980, no file or ledger containing an accounting for each person from whom or for whom trust money had been received had been kept for Respondent’s Trust Account.
15. By reason of the foregoing, Respondent violated The Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.02(4)(b) and (c); Section 11.02(4)(c) 4.a. and 2.d. of The Florida Bar Integration Rule Bylaws; and Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility D.R. 9-102(B)(3).

The referee recommends that respondent be found guilty of violating the following: D.R. 9-102(A) and (B)(3); The Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.02(4) and Rule 11.02(4)(b) and (c). The referee also recommends that respondent be publicly reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and said suspension should run concurrently with the suspension for felony conviction imposed in case number 59,856.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we approve the findings and recommendations of the referee.

Accordingly, respondent, Fred C. Barks-dale, is hereby publicly reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. This suspension shall run concurrently with the suspension for felony conviction imposed on January 19, 1981, in case number 59,586. Under The Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.07(4) this suspension remains in effect for three years and thereafter until the respondent’s civil rights are restored and he is reinstated.

Costs in the amount of $1,705.27 are hereby taxed against respondent.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, A. C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.


author: OVERTON, Judge.

text:
    Marcus Ray DESIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 61358.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    May 13, 1982.

      James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Thomas R. Mott, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for petitioner.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for respondent.
   OVERTON, Judge.

This is a petition to review the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, reported as Desin v. State, 404 So.2d 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), in which the district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:

Does section 810.06, Florida Statutes (1979), encompass: (a) only those trespasses included within said chapter 810; or (b) any statutory trespass; or (c) any statutory or common-law trespass, when it proscribes the possession of any tool, machine or implement with intent to use or permit such to be used to commit “any burglary or trespass.”

We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.Const. In answer to the question, we find that “trespass,” as used in section 810.-06, Florida Statutes (1979), includes only those types of unlawful interference with property which are designated by statute as crimes. Petitioner’s conviction is approved, but we cannot fully agree with the reasoning in the district court’s opinion.

The facts in the instant case are as follows. Petitioner and a codefendant were arrested when the police discovered them tampering with a newspaper vending machine. The codefendant had in his possession a coin-box which he had removed from the vending machine, and petitioner had in his possession a pair of bolt cutters which he admitted were used to sever the coin-box from the machine. Petitioner was charged with a second degree misdemeanor for molestation of a vending machine, section 877.-08(3), Florida Statutes (1979), and with a third degree felony for possession of tools with which to commit a burglary or trespass, section 810.06. The first charge was dismissed because the state failed to bring petitioner to trial within the time required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1). Petitioner was found guilty of possessing burglary tools.

The district court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that, even though breaking into the vending machine would not constitute a burglary, petitioner had committed a common-law trespass which fell within the ambit of section 810.06. In reaching this result, the district court relied upon two findings. The court first determined that, in using the phrase “any ... trespass” in section 810.06, the legislature intended to include all trespass, both statutory and common-law. The court then accepted the common-law definition of “trespass” as the “unlawful interference with one’s person, property or rights.” 404 So.2d at 182.

At common law, a simple trespass upon land or personal property was not a crime; rather, it was a private wrong which was remedied by a civil action to recover damages. 3 W. Burdick, The Law of Crime § 720, at 71 (1946); see generally 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *209-14; W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §§ 13-14, at 63-79 (4th ed. 1971). Although simple trespass was an element in certain common-law crimes, such as larceny, the attachment of criminal penalties to the act of simple trespass is done exclusively by statute. Burdick, supra, § 720, at 72. In Florida, the legislature has enacted numerous statutes providing criminal penalties for the most significant acts of unlawful interference with another person’s property. Some of these statutes expressly designate as “trespass” the prohibited act, while others prohibit unlawful interference with property without attaching the “trespass” label. Any act of “trespass” not made criminal by statute constitutes a private wrong under the common law which may, be remedied only by an action for damages.

Petitioner contends that the burglary tool statute applies only to those trespasses enumerated in chapter 810. We reject this argument. The construction of section 810.06 urged by petitioner is too narrow because it imputes to the legislature the intent to ignore the numerous criminal statutes outside of chapter 810 which punish both “trespass” and the unlawful interference with property. We conclude that the legislature intended the language “any ... trespass,” as used in section 810.06, to encompass any act of unlawful interference with property which is defined by statute as a criminal offense, regardless of whether or not the interference is designated a “trespass.” We do not believe, however, that the legislature intended to impose criminal sanctions for the possession of tools with which to commit a “common-law trespass,” especially since that act, if completed, would be redressable only by a civil action for damages.

We find that tampering with a coin-operated vending machine, as prohibited by section 877.08, constitutes a criminal trespass. The petitioner, under the facts of this case, clearly participated in committing this unlawful act. We, therefore, approve the district court’s affirmance of the conviction for possession of burglary tools in violation of section 810.06, but we must disapprove that portion of the opinion which construes section 810.06 as applying to common-law trespass.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, A. C. J., and ALDERMAN, MCDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.

      . W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 85, at 622-30 (1972).

      . See, e.g., § 812.14, Fla.Stat. (1981) (trespass and larceny with relation to utility or cable television fixtures); § 228.091, Fla.Stat. (1981) (trespass upon grounds or facilities of public schools); § 616.266 Fla.Stat. (1981) (trespass on the grounds of an authorized fair or exposition); § 581.122, Fla.Stat. (1981) (trespass on nursery stock); § 810.08, Fla.Stat. (1981) (trespass in a structure or conveyance); § 810.09, Fla.Stat. (1981) (trespass on property other than structure or conveyance in defiance of posted notice against entry).

      . See, e.g., § 806.13, Fla.Stat. (1981) (criminal mischief, the willful and malicious injury to any real or personal property of another); § 812.-014, Fla.Stat. (1981) (theft, obtaining or using the property of another with intent to deprive the other of the property); § 877.08, Fla.Stat. (1981) (tampering with a coin-operated vending machine).

      . Section 810.08 defines and prescribes the punishment for trespass in a structure or conveyance, section 810.09 relates to trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, and section 810.13 deals with cave vandalism and related offenses.