source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
MARCUS, Justice.
     DIXON, Chief Justice CALOGERO, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James WILLIAMS.
    No. 65199.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 19, 1980.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Brian G. Meissner, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-relator.
    Dwight M. Doskey, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-respondent.
   MARCUS, Justice.

James Williams, a deaf mute, was indicted for the June 14,1975 aggravated rape of a seventy-four year old woman. Because defendant was unable to communicate, he entered a plea of not guilty “through his mother and sister.”

Thereafter, examinations and evaluations were made of and treatment rendered to defendant through the joint efforts of the prosecution and defense. In December 1977, defendant moved to dismiss the proceeding or have defendant committed “civilly.” After a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion. Upon defendant’s application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of this ruling. On October 9, 1978, this court handed down a decision in which we remanded the case to the trial court for additional inquiry into defendant’s mental condition and the possibility of treatment to improve his ability to communicate provided it could be accomplished without delay. “Otherwise,” we stated, “the State must release Williams.” State v. Williams, 363 So.2d 441 (La.1978).

On remand, the trial court ordered a mental examination for defendant and received a report from Dr. William C. Super, a psychiatrist, that he was unable to communicate with defendant and that some degree of mental retardation was involved. The court then ordered the district attorney to comply with the remainder of this court’s order, i. e., either move to civilly commit defendant or dismiss charges by May 4, 1979. The district attorney filed a petition for civil commitment under the provision of La.R.S. 28:54 which provides in pertinent part:

A. Any person of legal age may file with the court a petition which asserts his belief that a person is mentally ill or is suffering from substance abuse and that the person is a danger to himself or others or is gravely disabled and may thereby request a hearing. The petition may be filed in the judicial district in which the respondent is confined, or if not confined, in the judicial district where he resides or may be found. The hearing shall not be transferred to another district except for good cause shown. A petitioner who is unable to afford an attorney may seek the assistance of any Legal Aid Society or similar agency if available.
D. As soon as practical after the filing of the petition, the court shall review the petition and supporting documents, and determine whether there exists probable cause that the respondent is mentally ill or suffering from substance abuse and that he is a danger to himself or others or is gravely disabled. If the court determines that probable cause exists, the court may appoint the respondent’s treating physician if available, or if none, then another physician, preferably a psychiatrist, to examine respondent and make a written report to the court and respondent’s attorney on the form provided by the office of mental health of the Department of Health and Human Resources. This report shall set forth specifically the objective factors leading to the conclusion that the person has a mental illness or suffers from substance abuse, the actions or statements by the person leading to the conclusion that the person is dangerous to himself or others or is gravely disabled and in need of immediate treatment as a result of such illness or abuse and why involuntary confinement and treatment are indicated. The following criteria should be considered by the physician:
(1) The respondent is suffering from serious mental illness or substance abuse.
(2) The respondent’s condition is likely to deteriorate needlessly unless the respondent is provided appropriate medical treatment.
(3) The respondent’s condition is likely to improve if he is provided appropriate medical treatment.

On July 5, 1979, a hearing in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans was held to determine if defendant should be civilly committed under the standard provided in La.R.S. 28:55:

E. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is dangerous to self or others or is gravely disabled, as a result of substance abuse or mental illness, it shall render a judgment for his commitment to a designated treatment facility which is medically suitable and least restrictive of his liberty. .. .

Dr. Super testified at the civil commitment hearing. In response to the court’s inquiry as to whether defendant had any medical disability or disability related to substance abuse, Dr. Super responded:

I found no evidence that he’s suffering from any major mental disorder, that is, psychosis for example or severe organic brain syndrome which would severely impair his ability to function. . . . His disability can be characterized primarily as a learning disability when it’s a hearing and speech impediment and because of related to that there are no indications of mental deficiency, but the exact level of his intelligence is, of course, very difficult to arrive at, however, he’s disabled through his hearing and speech difficulties.

On the basis of this testimony, the court maintained defendant’s exception of no cause of action because the defendant had not been shown to have been “mentally ill” under the statute.

On July 16, 1979, the trial court ordered the state to release defendant. Upon the state’s application, we granted certiorari to review this ruling.

The record reveals ample evidence of defendant’s incompetency to stand trial and his inability to effectively assist counsel in his defense. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), the United States Supreme Court was also faced with a deaf mute who could not communicate with others. The Court stated:

We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal. 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858.

In Jackson, the Court noted that defendant’s commitment under Indiana law was not founded upon any requirement of dangerousness.

Thus, because defendant is unfit to stand trial, the state had the option of either confining him for a reasonable length of time to teach him to assist in his own defense or institute civil commitment proceedings. To be involuntarily committed under La.R.S. 28:54, one must be judicially determined to be “a person [who] is mentally ill or is suffering from substance abuse and ... is a danger to himself or others or is gravely disabled ....” (Emphasis added.) La.R.S. 28:2(3) defines “dangerous to others”:

“Dangerous to others” means the condition of a person whose behavior or significant threats support a reasonable expectation that there is a substantial risk that he will inflict physical harm upon another person in the near future.

If there is ample evidence that defendant committed the aggravated rape upon the seventy-four year old woman, there would be sufficient evidence that he is dangerous to others; in addition, to be civilly committed, defendant must be adjudged to be “mentally ill.” It is this requirement that the civil district court found lacking.

Before the mental health law was completely revised in 1977, the judicial commitment statute (La.R.S. 28:53) required a different finding: “that the patient is suffering from a mental illness which causes him to be dangerous to himself or others ....” (Emphasis added.) The new statute does not require a finding of a mental illness causing a dangerous condition; it simply requires that a person be “mentally ill” and “dangerous.” “Mentally ill” is a broad term encompassing many types of disorders. La.R.S. 28:2(14) broadly defines a “mentally ill person” as:

... any person with a psychiatric disorder which has substantial adverse effects on his ability to function and who requires care and treatment. It does not refer to a person suffering solely from mental retardation, epilepsy, alcoholism, or drug abuse.

If a person is found unfit to stand trial because of an inability to effectively communicate, he should be considered “mentally ill” under La.R.S. 28:54 unless his unfitness is due solely to a physical condition. If that person also meets the dangerousness requirement of the statute, he should be considered subjectable to involuntary civil commitment. By a requirement of finding a defendant both mentally ill (because he is unfit to stand trial) and dangerous to himself or others, the possibility of committing an individual to a mental facility solely because he has been found unfit to stand trial is avoided.

This approach is identical to that used by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Lang, 76 Ill.2d 311, 29 Ill.Dec. 87, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979). As stated in Lang.

[This] interpretation . . . complies with the dictates of Jackson v. Indiana. Under this construction Lang, if found to be dangerous, would not be held indefinitely as a person unfit to stand trial. His unfitness casts him into the class defined as mentally ill by the [statute], and if he also meets the dangerousness test, he would be committed in the same manner as one is involuntarily civilly committed. 29 Ill.Dec. at 93-94, 391 N.E.2d at 356.

The court civilly committed the defendant, a deaf mute charged with murder.

The Louisiana provisions provide numerous due process protections, including judicial review of any judicial commitment every one hundred and eighty days after commitment; reports from the director of the treatment facility provides the basis for this review and the reports must justify continued confinement. In addition, each patient must have his case reviewed at a hearing at least annually, though more frequent review is available. Finally, the director of treatment may convert the patient to “voluntary commitment” status or discharge him completely at his own discretion. La. R.S. 28:56(C). Rights of review and habeas corpus are also available.

We find the civil district court erred in finding defendant did not meet the “mentally ill” requirement under the civil commitment statute. The trial court erred in ordering defendant released based upon this erroneous finding. Accordingly, we must remand the case to the trial court with instructions to order the district attorney to reinstitute civil commitment proceedings in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans in order to determine whether or not defendant is dangerous to himself or others. If he is found to be dangerous, he should be civilly committed.

DECREE

The order of the trial court dated July 16, 1979, ordering the state to release defendant is reversed and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DIXON, C. J., dissents with reasons.

CALOGERO, J., dissents with reasons.

DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons.

DIXON, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

The defendant in this case has been found not to be psychotic or suffering from any major medical disorder or severe organic brain syndrome. His learning disability is caused by his hearing and speech impairment. There are no indications of mental deficiency except, perhaps, a slight retardation.

The brief and rather cursory effort made by the state to teach the defendant to communicate was terminated prematurely. Nevertheless, there was an immediate indication that he was able to learn.

The record is rather convincing that the state could have, but has not, taught the defendant to communicate. The record does not contain any evidence that the defendant cannot be taught to communicate.

Por this court once more to remand the case to the criminal district court and once more order the district attorney to institute “civil commitment proceedings” in the civil district court is wholly ineffective. The civil district judge, in the earlier civil commitment proceedings, sustained an exception because the defendant had not been shown to have been mentally ill, a prerequisite under R.S. 28:55.

The majority now strains a new definition of “mentally ill” from the defendant’s inability to communicate because of his speech and hearing impairment. This is in spite of the existence of an adequate, though seldom used, statutory provision for the care of persons like the defendant who, because of an infirmity, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their estates.

Article 422 of the Civil Code provides that: “Not only lunatics and idiots are liable to be interdicted, but likewise all persons who, owing to any infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons and administering their estates.” The jurisprudence of this state has recognized that, since mental infirmities vary greatly in nature and degree, each interdiction must depend on its particular facts. But in each case three prerequisites are necessary to the pronouncement of a judgment of interdiction: (1) incapacity to administer one’s estate; (2) inability to care for one’s person; and (3) an actual necessity for the interdiction. In the Matter of the Interdiction of Fabre, 371 So.2d 1322 (La.1979); In re Interdiction of Adams, 209 So.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1968); Doll v. Doll, 156 So.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1963); In re Corbin, 187 La. 968, 175 So. 636 (1937); Landry v. Landry, 171 La. 280, 130 So. 866 (1930).

In the case of Succession of Lanata, 205 La. 915, 18 So.2d 500 (1944), it was determined that the language in C.C. 422 is traceable no further back than to the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, wherein it was provided, under article 29, that: “Not only lunatics and idiots are liable to be interdicted; but likewise all persons, who, owing to certain infirmities, are incapable of administering their persons and their estates, as is the case with those who are deaf and dumb.” The court in Lanata noted that although the last clause was merely illustrative, it indicated that under the former law of this state “certain infirmities” would encompass physical disabilities.

Therefore, if the three prerequisites for interdiction are met then this is a proper case for interdiction under C.C. 422. Defendant cannot communicate through any form of communication with the exception of primitive gestures and grunts. He cannot speak or hear, read or write, use sign language or read lips. In Dr. Super’s letter to Judge Shea, following his attempt at examining the defendant, he stated that the defendant is totally unable to communicate, and that this fact led him to believe that some degree of mental retardation is involved. Because the defendant cannot communicate with others in any way, it is clear that he lacks the capacity to administer his estate. For the same reason, the defendant might not have the ability to care for his person. In determining whether a person is capable of taking care of his person, this court has held that:

“.. . An adult woman whose capacity is limited to the mere dressing and undressing of herself, to making up beds and sweeping floors, is not, in legal intendment, such a person as may be held capable of caring for her person. That the inmates of insane asylums perform acts of that character daily is of such common knowledge that the court may take judicial notice of the fact.” Landry v. Landry, 171 La. 280, 284, 130 So. 866, 867.

There is also an actual necessity for interdiction in this case. Custodial care might be the only way his condition can be improved, and removal from a prison environment might speed the process.

Civil Code article 417 provides for the custody of an interdict:

“According to the symptoms of the disease, under which the person interdicted labors, and according to the amount of his estate, the judge may order that the interdicted person be attended in his own house, or that he be placed in a bettering house, or indeed if he be so deranged as to be dangerous, he may order him to be confined in safe custody.”

Therefore, the only alternative to the release of the defendant, which was properly ordered by the district judge, under the circumstances, is interdiction in the civil district court.

CALOGERO, Justice,

dissenting.

I dissent. The state failed to prove that defendant was suffering from a “mental illness.” R.S. 28:55 E. At most the state made out a case that defendant should be interdicted pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 422.

      The Honorable Edward A. de la Houssaye III participated in this decision as an Associate Justice Ad Hoc.

      . Such commitment would also comply with O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), which held that a finding of mental illness alone is not sufficient for involuntary commitment; additional findings of dangerousness to self or others or incapacity for survival outside an institution are essential.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bertell VEALS.
    No. 80-KA-2121.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 4, 1981.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Kay Kirkpatrick, Glen Peterson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee:
    Bonnie P. Jackson, M. Michele Fournet, Asst. Public Defenders, for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

On July 6, 1979, defendant Bertell Veals was charged by bill of information with improper telephone communications, in violation of La.R.S. 14:285. A six-member jury subsequently found the defendant guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in the parish prison, the maximum term of incarceration allowable under the statute. On appeal, defendant urged two assignments of error.

We have reviewed the defendant’s arguments relating to alleged trial errors and found them to lack merit. However, the remaining assignment, concerning the ex-cessiveness of the two year sentence and the trial judge’s failure to comply with La. C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1, warrants a remand for resentencing.

In imposing sentence herein, the trial court made no attempt to comply with the provisions of La.C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1 (1977). The article sets forth three factors which justify a sentence imposing imprisonment, and eleven other factors which tend to indicate suspension of sentence or probation as appropriate. The statute provides that the latter, “while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight” by the trial court in its sentencing decision. The enactment concludes that the trial court “shall state for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence.” (emphasis supplied).

We have repeatedly stated that, even without formal objection at the time, where the trial judge imposes a sentence without adequate compliance with the mandatory requirement of La.C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1 that he state the considerations and the factual basis for his sentence, this Court may vacate a sentence and remand for re-sentencing, when the reasons for an apparently severe sentence in relation to the particular offender and the actual offense committed do not appear in the record. State v. Jackson, 360 So.2d 842 (La.1978); State v. Scarborough, 359 So.2d 982 (La.1978); State v. Sepulvado, 359 So.2d 137 (La.1978). See also, State v. Gibson, 362 So.2d 769 (La.1978). See also, State v. Gist, 369 So.2d 1339 (La.1979).

In the present case, the trial court reasons do not reflect that it adequately followed the sentencing guidelines that should be considered before imposing a sentence of incarceration as provided by La.C. Cr.P. Art. 894.1. Absent such compliance, we lack appropriate criteria by which to measure whether this sentence is excessive under our state constitution. La.Const. 1974, Art. 1, Section 20. See, State v. Sepulvado, supra.

Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction but vacate the sentence imposed and remand the case for re-sentencing in accordance with law.


author: DIXON, C. J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Charles F. WALGAMOTTE v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-K-1488.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 1981.
   In Re: Charles F. Walgamotte applying for Writ of Certiorari, Parish of St. John the Baptist, Number 29,284.

Writ denied. By this application relator seeks to have his guilty plea to and the resultant conviction for second degree murder vacated. The application is denied because the request is moot. Information supplied this Court indicates that on April 14, 1975, the trial judge ordered the guilty plea withdrawn and relator remanded to parish prison to await trial for first degree murder. The stay order granted applicant by this Court on June 17, 1975, in connection with an earlier application by this relator coincident with our ordering the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding relator’s guilty plea, is no longer in effect.

DIXON, C. J.,

concurs. It appears that relator is in Angola under a sentence that was vacated six years ago, and that there are no other charges against him.


author: CALOGERO, J., DENNIS, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. David Dene MARTIN v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary. STATE of Louisiana v. David Dene MARTIN.
    Nos. 81-K-0361 to 81-K-0365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 10, 1981.
   In re David Dene Martin, Applying for Stay of Execution and for Oral Argument, and Applying for Post-Conviction Relief, Nos. 80074, 80075, 80076, 80077. Parish of Lafourche.

CALOGERO, J.,

would grant a stay of execution and order an evidentiary hearing on this relator’s first post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus. Relator should be permitted to present evidence in court in support of his contentions including (1) that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not presenting expert evidence or testimony relative to defendant’s mental state at time of the offense or of the effect of the drugs he was taking at the time upon his mental capacity to commit these crimes, (2) that the district attorney furnished the jurors with a crawfish dinner and was seen entering and leaving the room where the jurors were sequestered (which allegations I read to mean, by implication, that the jury was improperly influenced in its deliberations). These contentions may or may not be true, or provable with hard evidence. But before this Court permits relator’s execution relator should be given an opportunity to prove it and if so to have considered what effect these occurrences should have upon court approval of his execution.

DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons.

DENNIS, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I would stay defendant’s execution and order an evidentia-ry hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and violations of jury sequestration. Before he is put to death, defendant should be given an opportunity to show that his sentence is based on those defects in his trial and sentencing proceeding.

Furthermore, I continue to believe that the death penalty has been erroneously and inappropriately imposed in this case for the reasons expressed in Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion on petition for certiorari, my own dissenting opinion, and petitioner’s claims V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XII, XIII, and XVII.


author: DIXON, C. J., DENNIS, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Leon ROBERTSON v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-K-1518.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 1981.
   In Re: Leon Robertson applying for Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Habeas Corpus, Parish of Bossier, No. 55,783.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J.,

concurs in the denial. The specific intent necessary for 2nd degree murder may be the intent to do great bodily harm. Relator admitted hitting the victim with his rifle, which “went off”.

DENNIS, J.,

would grant an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the relator’s plea of guilty was voluntary as to the specific intent element of second degree murder. See, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William S. LIGHT.
    No. 66919.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 1980.
   ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, William S. Light, was charged by grand jury indictment with first degree murder. This indictment was amended by the district attorney to charge second degree murder in violation of R.S. 14:30.1.

Defendant was in Charlie’s Lounge in Shreveport when the victim and three friends, all off-duty police officers, entered. The policemen were celebrating the forthcoming marriage of one of the group. A conversation began between the policeman and the defendant. The five left the lounge followed by two other customers with whom defendant had been speaking earlier in the evening; one of these men took a pool cue with him. Outside the lounge a fight developed between the two groups. One witness testified that defendant bumped into the victim who then took a swing at defendant. There was a short scuffle and then the victim and two of his friends entered their car to leave the premises with the victim in the back seat of the car. The man with the pool cue prevented the driver of the car from entering it. A shot was fired and defendant was seen standing by the rear window of the car with smoke coming up in front of him. The driver was allowed to enter the car and the group left for the hospital. The victim was dead on arrival at the hospital.

Following the procedure established by this Court, defendant’s case was screened and assigned to the summary docket. For a discussion of this full screening and summary docket procedure see State v. Duhon, 340 So.2d 151 (La.1976, on rehearing). The case was set for oral argument on June 30, 1980, but was submitted on briefs. The Court rendered a unanimous per curiam affirmance of defendant’s conviction, 386 So.2d 364 (La.).

Defendant applies for a rehearing and reurges all of the original assignments of error, fourteen in number, and especially directs the attention of this Court to assignments of error numbers five and ten regarding the allegedly inflammatory nature of the state’s closing and rebuttal arguments.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 774 provides that the argument shall be confined to the evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. In the instant case the prosecutor, in response to the defense attorney’s vindication of his client’s motorcycle attire, referred sarcastically to clothing worn by the victim as a full dress combat uniform with an M-16; and said that he would be willing to bring into the courtroom the blood soaked clothing of the victim. After the defense objection to this reference as being outside the evidence was sustained, the prosecutor responded that it was reasonable to assume that the clothing of someone who had been shot through the head would be soaked with blood. On several occasions, the prosecutor skirted the edge of contempt by interrupting when defense counsel was making an objection and by being impertinent with the judge after a ruling. The prosecutor also addressed several personal remarks to the defense attorney. Thus, the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal arguments were in several instances clearly improper. Closing argument is not the time to vent personal feelings or express animosity toward the defendant, the defense attorney or the court. Counsel clearly flirted with reversible error.

Nevertheless, it is well settled that, before a verdict will be overturned on the basis of improper argument, this Court must be thoroughly convinced that the jury was influenced by the remarks and that they contributed to the verdict. State v. Carthan, 377 So.2d 308 (La.1979); State v. Lee, 364 So.2d 1024 (La.1978); State v. Berain, 360 So.2d 822 (La.1978); State v. Crumholt, 357 So.2d 526 (La.1978). We deny the rehearing in the instant case because we are not convinced that the remarks so inflamed the jury that it was incapable of making an unaffected and independent determination of defendant’s guilt. The defendant’s own testimony established his guilt.

REHEARING DENIED.

DENNIS, J., would grant a rehearing.


author: DIXON, Chief Justice. WATSON, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patricia Jane KNOWLES.
    No. 80-K-1540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 1980.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 1981.

      Diehlmann C. Bernhardt and Steven A. Jefferson, Monroe, for defendant-relator.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parker-son, Dist. Atty., John R. Harrison, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent.
   DIXON, Chief Justice.

The defendant was indicted for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, violations of R.S. 14:3o and R.S. 14:26. A jury acquitted her of the murder charge, and the state has now attempted to prosecute her for the alleged conspiracy. Defendant filed two motions to quash the indictment, based upon pleas of former jeopardy, autrefois acquit, res judi-cata and collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the motions, and defendant seeks review.

The victim of the homicide was the husband of Sherry Littleton, who is defendant’s sister. Testimony at the trial on the murder charge indicated that defendant was in the company of Sherry Littleton from 5:00 p. m. until about midnight, when the shooting occurred. Winfred Chappel, a witness for the prosecution, also accompanied the two sisters during part of that time. The three visited various bars in the City of Monroe, drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana, and taking capsules of amphetamine. The evidence indicates that Chappel and Littleton were romantically involved at the time, and that Mrs. Littleton asked Chappel to kill her husband. Defendant testified that Chappel refused the request, and that she believed that the matter was at an end. Chappel testified that the murder was discussed two or three times later in the night.

By late evening, defendant stated that she was staggering, and could barely drive her sister’s car. The three then went to a convenience store. Reportedly at her own request, Mrs. Littleton was struck several times in the face by Chappel, as part of a plan to make it seem that she had been beaten by her husband. Defendant then drove Littleton to her trailer home; she testified that she waited in the car for several minutes after Littleton entered the trailer. When defendant made her entrance, she found her sister sitting on a bed with a loaded 16 gauge shotgun. As the victim approached, defendant stated that she grabbed the barrel of the gun, which discharged. The police were called, and Littleton told them that she had shot her husband after he had beaten her.

Pursuant to negotiations with the district attorney, Mrs. Littleton pleaded guilty to negligent homicide in connection with the fatal shooting of her husband. Defendant moved to Kansas. Some time later an undercover investigator with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation contacted the Ouachi-ta Parish sheriff’s office reporting that defendant had admitted shooting her brother-in-law. Defendant was arrested in Kansas and gave a recorded statement; she was then brought back to Louisiana, where the grand jury indictments were returned.

No person can twice be put in jeopardy for the “same offense.” Amendment V, U.S.Const.; Art. 1, § 15, La.Const. (1974); C.Cr.P. 591. Whether two offenses are the same for purposes of double jeopardy is determined by the test established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932):

“... The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. . . . ”

It is clear that this rule is constitutionally required of the states. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).

The Louisiana rule is embodied in C.Cr.P. 596:

“Double jeopardy exists in a second trial only when the charge in that trial is:
(1) Identical with or a different grade of the same offense for which the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial, whether or not a responsive verdict could have been rendered in the first trial as to the charge in the second trial; or
(2) Based on a part of a continuous offense for which offense the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial.”

This court has employed both the “Block-burger” test, see, for example, State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175 (La.1980), and State v. Doughty, 379 So.2d 1088 (La.1980), and the “same evidence” test. State v. Solomon, 379 So.2d 1078 (La.1980); State v. Smith, 323 So.2d 797 (La.1975); State v. Didier, 262 La. 364, 263 So.2d 322 (1972); State v. Bonfanti, 262 La. 153, 262 So.2d 504 (1972).

The “same evidence” test depends upon the proof required to convict, not the evidence actually introduced at trial. State v. Doughty, supra. Thus, if the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient to support the former indictment, double jeopardy prohibits the second prosecution. State v. Richardson, 220 La. 338, 56 So.2d 568 (1951); State v. Foster, 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255 (1924); State v. Roberts, 152 La. 283, 93 So. 95 (1922).

In this regard, it is significant to note that the jury present at the murder trial was instructed as to the law of principals contained in R.S. 14:24, which states:

“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.”

At the trial on the murder charge, defendant could have been convicted if the jury was convinced that she aided and abetted her sister in intentionally killing the victim, or if the jury found that defendant counseled her sister in the commission of the crime.

Criminal conspiracy, the crime with which defendant is charged in the present prosecution, is defined by R.S. 14:26 as:

“.. . the agreement or combination of two or more persons for the specific purpose of committing any crime; provided that an agreement or combination to commit a crime shall not amount to a criminal conspiracy unless, in addition to such agreement or combination, one or more of such parties does an act in furtherance of the object of the agreement or combination.”

If the state has proof that defendant reached an agreement with her sister and/or Chappel for the specific purpose of murdering the victim, and that an act was done in furtherance of the agreement, such proof is not necessarily sufficient to convict the defendant as a principal to the crime. The one difference is that, in order to be convicted as a principal, there must be proof that the crime was committed; a conviction for conspiracy does not depend upon the actual commission of the crime, but only upon an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The evidence necessary for a conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder is therefore not sufficient to support a conviction for the murder itself.

Similarly, the proof required to convict an accused as a principal to a crime does not necessarily involve the same evidence that is needed for a conviction of conspiracy. The term “principal" is broadly defined to include the actual perpetrator of the crime as well as one who assists in the perpetration. The crime of conspiracy is formed when an agreement to commit a crime is reached between two or more persons and an act is done in furtherance of the agreement. It is at least conceivable that an accused may be proven to have assisted in a crime without introducing any evidence as to an agreement. See, e. g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954); Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949). In this sense, the two crimes do not involve the same evidence; they are not the “same offenses.” This is recognized in R.S. 14:26, which states:

“If the intended basic crime has been consummated, the conspirators may be tried for either the conspiracy or the completed offense, and a conviction for one shall not bar prosecution for the other.”

However, the case with which we are presented is not one in which the defendant has been convicted of the “intended basic crime.” In fact, it has never been proved that the homicide was the result of anything other than Mrs. Littleton’s criminal negligence. Because of this, the provision allowing prosecution for both the conspiracy and the underlying offense is not relevant. It is necessary, then, to determine whether the double jeopardy prohibition bars prosecution of the defendant for conspiracy to commit the crime of which she was acquitted, when the jury was specially instructed as to the law of principals. It is in this regard that we must consider defendant’s argument that the state should be barred from prosecuting the conspiracy charge on the basis of collateral estoppel.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel was explained in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 (1970):

“... It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future law-suit_”

The opinion makes it clear that the protection of this doctrine is anchored in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. In this state, the application of the doctrine has been limited “to those cases where it is required by Ashe v. Swenson .... ” State v. Doucet, 359 So.2d 1239, 1248 (La.1978). Compare State v. Cain, 324 So.2d 830 (La.1975).

In Ashe v. Swenson, the jury in the first trial determined that the defendant was not proved to have been one of the robbers involved in the alleged crime. Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, the state was not allowed to present “the same or different identification evidence in a second prosecution for the robbery.” 397 U.S. at 476, 90 S.Ct. at 1195-96; 25 L.Ed.2d at 477. In the present case, the basis of the jury’s determination is not so clear, and herein lies the difficulty in applying collateral estoppel. To employ the doctrine, the court must determine what issue of “ultimate fact” was resolved by the jury’s verdict:

“. .. Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to ‘examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’ ...” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d at 475-76.

Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 Harv.L. Rev. 1, 38-39 (1960).

In Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 68 S.Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948), the court decided a case which was almost the exact reverse of the present situation. The defendant was acquitted of conspiracy to defraud the United States. He was then prosecuted for the underlying substantive offense, publishing false invoices, on the theory that he aided and abetted the perpetrator in the commission of the offense. The court applied res judicata to bar the second prosecution on the basis that, under the circumstances, the defendant could not have aided and abetted the commission of the offense unless he had reached an agreement with the actual perpetrator. The verdict of acquittal on the conspiracy charge was said to reflect the jury’s determination that defendant never made such an agreement, even though defendant concededly was implicated with participation in the crime. In reaching its decision, the court looked to the facts adduced at trial and the instructions given to the jury, “set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.” 332 U.S. at 579, 68 S.Ct. at 240, 92 L.Ed. at 184.

In the present case, the jury’s verdict found the defendant not guilty of being a principal to an intentional killing. Two findings could have supported this conclusion: that defendant actually fired the fatal shot, but that she lacked the requisite intent because of her intoxication; or that defendant was not proved to have been concerned in the commission of the offense. As a corollary to this, the jury might have determined that the shooting was the result of an accident or negligence. From a reading of the entire record, it is evident that the state’s chief theory in prosecuting defendant for murder was that she was the one who fired the shotgun. In support of this theory, the state introduced defendant’s recorded statement, in which she purportedly admitted shooting her brother-in-law. The state also relied upon the testimony of an agent of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, who reported that defendant told him that she was the one who shot the victim. On the stand, defendant completely recanted her recorded statement, and testified that she never touched the trigger of the gun. In addition, the defendant stated that she had consumed such a quantity of alcohol and drugs that night that she was staggering and could not see straight.

The state’s evidence tending to show that defendant pulled the trigger was weak. The only eyewitness to the shooting, Mrs. Littleton, refused to testify, claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant’s recorded statement describing the events in question was vague and ambiguous as to her actual handling of the gun. Moreover, the agent of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation described defendant’s condition as “hysterical” when she allegedly admitted the shooting. Under these circumstances, we find that a rational jury could not have concluded that defendant was proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have fired the gun. Because of this, the jury did not need to reach the question of whether defendant’s, intoxication negated the requisite intent. R.S. 14:15.

However, it was also necessary for the jury to determine whether defendant aided, abetted or counseled her sister in the commission of the killing. Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of proving who actually pulled the trigger, the state introduced evidence tending to show that defendant and her sister had deliberately schemed to murder the victim; the state also requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that defendant could be convicted of the crime under the law of principals. The agent of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation reported that defendant told him that she, her sister and Winfred Chappel had talked about killing Mrs. Littleton’s husband. Chappel testified that defendant and her sister discussed the subject of murder two or three times during the night. However, he was not specific in describing the nature of the discussions; nor did he implicate defendant in the plan to make it seem that Mrs. Littleton had been beaten by her husband, other than to remark that she was present at the time. Defendant testified that she never heard the murder discussed after Chappel refused her sister’s request to do the shooting. She also stated that, when she came out of the convenience store that night, she sat alone in her sister’s car and that Chappel and her sister were in Chap-pel’s car. Chappel was said to have rolled down the window and to have told defendant to look the other way; defendant stated that she glanced into Chappel’s car and saw Chappel striking her sister in the face. Given this evidence, a rational jury must have concluded that, although a plan was formed for the murder of the victim, and an act done in execution of the plan, defendant was simply not involved in it; she did not aid, abet or counsel her sister in the commission of the alleged offense. A rational jury could not have concluded otherwise and have found defendant not guilty of first degree murder.

A finding that defendant was not a principal to the alleged offense is a finding of ultimate fact, and one which directly bears upon the conspiracy charge. The jurisprudence interpreting the definitions of “principals” (R.S. 14:24) and “criminal conspiracy” (R.S. 14:26) has implied that anyone who is proved to be a conspirator in a crime is also a principal to the offense. See, e. g., State v. Kimble, 375 So.2d 924 (La.1979); State v. Witherspoon, 292 So.2d 499 (La.1974). However, these cases involved crimes that were in fact consummated: because there was proof that the intended basic crime was completed, there was no logical difficulty in finding that the conspirators were also principals. The present conspiracy prosecution involves a distinctly different set of circumstances, in that the state has failed to prove that defendant is guilty of intentional homicide, either as a perpetrator or as a “principal.” In this context, it is plausible to theorize that defendant could be a conspirator without being a principal.

The theory may not be irrational in the abstract, but when it is matched against the facts adduced at the murder trial, it becomes apparent that the conspiracy prosecution is an attempt to relitigate the broad scope of facts found adversely to the government. Upon the facts of this case, it would be illogical to believe that even if defendant did not aid, abet or counsel her sister in killing the victim, she nevertheless specifically agreed with her sister to commit the crime. The jury’s verdict, exonerating defendant of any criminal involvement in the homicide, must be taken to preclude litigation of the issue of whether she conspired to commit the killing.

Although the definitions of principals and conspirators are not perfectly synonymous, the imposition of criminal liability upon one who aids and abets in a crime is founded upon the same principle that makes a conspirator culpable for the acts of a coconspirator. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Both of these inchoate offenses are directed at persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime. In the present case, the issue of defendant’s alleged criminal involvement has been resolved in her favor, and the state cannot be allowed to raise the issue under another name. It is simply not plausible to believe that defendant could have reached an agreement with her sister to kill the victim yet nevertheless have failed to “aid” or “counsel” her sister in the commission of the slaying. Any agreement made by defendant would necessarily constitute “aid” and “counsel.” Just as the facts in Sealfon v. United States, supra, logically dictated that the defendant could not have aided and abetted in the crime without reaching an agreement with the actual perpetrator, the facts in this case command the inference that, if defendant did not aid, abet or counsel the commission of the offense, she must never have reached an agreement with her sister for the specific purpose of murdering the victim. When the jury returned its verdict finding defendant not guilty of giving any form of assistance in the killing, it must necessarily have concluded that no criminal agreement was ever made. Under these circumstances, the finding that defendant was not a principal precludes a finding that she was a conspirator. Cf. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 71 S.Ct. 581, 95 L.Ed. 758 (1951) (Black, J. concurring); Krench v. United States, 42 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1930); Davis v. People, 22 Colo. 1, 43 P. 122 (1895); Annotation, Prosecuting both Conspiracy and Offense, 92 L.Ed. 185-209 (1948); 98 L.Ed. 448-54 (1954).

The gravamen of the charge of conspiracy was essentially included within the allegation that defendant acted with specific intent in aiding her sister to commit the offense. In this case, the jury’s verdict of not guilty can only be taken to mean that defendant was absolved of any complicity in the alleged crime. Defendant’s version of the shooting was accepted, not the state’s. Under such circumstances the second prosecution must be barred. State v. Smith, 323 So.2d 797 (La.1975); City of Baton Rouge v. Jackson, 310 So.2d 596 (La.1975); State ex rel. Wikberg v. Henderson, 292 So.2d 505 (La.1974).

We therefore conclude that, given the record in the murder trial, a rational jury must have concluded that defendant did not fire the fatal shot, did not aid or abet her sister in doing so, and, in short, was not criminally involved in planning or executing the homicide. Such a finding necessarily negatives the presence of an agreement for the specific purpose of accomplishing the crime, which is the precise issue which the state wishes to litigate in the second prosecution. Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel forbids the prosecution of defendant for a crime which arises from the very facts which have already been resolved in her favor.

The trial court judgment overruling the motion to quash the conspiracy indictment is reversed and set aside, the motion to quash the indictment is granted, and the defendant is discharged.

WATSON, Justice,

concurring.

Defendant was acquitted of first degree murder, and is now charged with conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The State is attempting to prosecute twice using the “same evidence”. The plea of double jeopardy should be sustained, but it is unnecessary to resort to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

I respectfully concur.

      . The homicide occurred in January, 1979. The version of R.S. 14:30 which was in effect at that time was enacted by Acts 1976, No. 657:
      “... the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.”


author: DIXON, Chief Justice.

text:
    LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY v. LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.
    No. 80-CA-1984.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 1980.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 1981.

      Andrew P. Carter, Eugene G. Taggert, J. Wayne Anderson, Monroe & Lemann, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
    Marshall B. Brinkley, Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellees.
    Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., Duval, Funder-burk, Sundbery & Lovell, Houma, for inter-venor-appellee.
   DIXON, Chief Justice.

This case involves a territorial dispute between Louisiana Power & Light Company and South Louisiana Electric Cooperative Association. At the request of the developer of a subdivision, SLECA built an electric distribution line to service that subdivision. LP&L filed a complaint with the Louisiana Public Service Commission alleging that SLECA’s action was unlawful, and requesting that SLECA be ordered to remove the line. The Commission dismissed LP&L’s complaint, and the district court affirmed the Commission’s order. LP&L now appeals to this court. La.Const. art. IV, § 21(E); R.S. 45:1192. We affirm.

The subdivision at issue, called the Medical Services Complex, is situated in Terre-bonne Parish, west of Louisiana Highway 57, south of Industrial Boulevard, and east of Denley Road. The subdivision consists of twenty-one unimproved lots, ten of which lie north of Picone Road (Block 1) and eleven of which lie south of Picone Road (Block 2). To service the subdivision, SLECA tapped from its existing line on Denley Road, ran an overhead distribution line down the rear lot line of Block 2, installed an underground cable across Picone Road, then ran an overhead line up the rear lot line of Block 1. This configuration was chosen to accommodate the developer.

LP&L’s argument is that it ought to have the exclusive right to service the subdivision, contending that SLECA’s extension of its own line into the subdivision was unlawful. The Commission disagreed, and held that the developer had the right to choose between the two utilities.

Specifically, LP&L contends that the Commission erred in failing to find SLE-CA’s actions to be illegal in three respects. LP&L alleges: first, that SLECA violated a general order of the Commission by “mak[ing] line extensions that duplicate, parallel and preempt existing LP&L facilities;” second, that SLECA violated that same order by “servfing] an area that could be served in a much more economical and justifiable manner from facilities of LP&L;” and, third, that SLECA “engaged] in a promotional practice that is specifically proscribed” by another general order.

Orders of the Public Service Commission are entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious or abusive of the Commission’s authority. When there is some evidence upon which the Commission could have reasonably based its determination, an order of the Public Service Commission will not be upset; the burden of demonstrating that an order is defective is on the party attacking it. See, e. g., Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 370 So.2d 497 (La.1979).

The Legal Background

Prior to March 12, 1974, the only way in which a utility could claim that it possessed the exclusive right to serve a customer was by invoking R.S. 45:123. That statute provides in part:

“No electric public utility shall construct or extend its facilities, or furnish, or offer to furnish electric service to any point of connection which at the time of the proposed construction, extension, or service is being served by, or which is not being served but is located within 300 feet of an electric line of another electric public utility, except with the consent in writing of such other electric public utility; provided, however, that nothing contained herein shall preclude (a) any electric public utility from extending service to an applicant for service at an unserved point of connection located within 300 feet of an existing electric line of such electric public utility, unless (i) such line was not in operation on April 1, 1970 and (ii) the point of connection is located within 300 feet of an existing electric line, of another electric public utility, which line was in operation on said date, or (b) any electric public utility from extending service to its own property, or to another electric public utility for resale; ...”

This version of the statute was enacted in 1970, and is much more restrictive in the grant of exclusive right to serve than was it predecessor. South Louisiana Electric Cooperative Assn. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 309 So.2d 287, 289 (La.1975). The general rule embodied in R.S. 45:123 is that no utility can furnish services to a point of connection that is within 300 feet of another company’s electric line. Thus, a utility has the exclusive right to service all points of connection located within 300 feet of its electric lines. The term “point of connection” was defined by this court as actual meter connection. South Louisiana Electric Cooperative Assn. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, supra. Thus, unless an actual meter connection is within 300 feet from a utility’s electric line, R.S. 45:123 does not confer upon that utility the exclusive right to serve.

The narrow scope of the exclusive right afforded to a utility by R.S. 45:123 can be seen from the facts of the ease cited above. To service a subdivision, SLECA extended an electric line approximately three miles. By contrast, LP&L had an existing line located 291.4 feet from the property line. This court upheld SLECA’s right to service the subdivision, since the actual meter connections would be located more than 300 feet from LP&L’s existing line. In order to halt such uneconomic and wasteful practices, the Public Service Commission promulgated its General Order of March 12, 1974, entitled “Duplication of Electric Service.” This order contains a broader proscription than that embodied in R.S. 45:123, but the order is not so broad as to vitiate customer choice in every instance.

Duplication of Electric Service

To serve this subdivision, a transmission line was to have been placed along the rear lot line of each block. Neither utility had such an existing line. The cost of installing these transmission lines would have been the same for each utility company. Similarly, the cost of tapping for Block 2’s transmission line would be the same for either utility. LP&L’s nearest existing line was located along Highway 57, a distance of 104 feet from the lot nearest to that line. By contrast, SLECA’s existing line along Denley Road is 84 feet from the lot nearest it. There is no duplication whatsoever, no difference in cost between the two utilities; LP&L was not entitled to the exclusive right to serve Block 2.

Block 1 presents a more difficult situation. As mentioned above, SLECA built an underground line traversing Picone Road in order to service Block 1. LP&L contends that, had it serviced the subdivision, there would been no need to construct the underground line since LP&L already had lines located between Block 1 and Industrial Boulevard from which it could have tapped for $1500.

LP&L further contends that the cost of constructing that underground line was $11000. This amount was a cost estimate by an LP&L employee who stated that this is what a comparable three phase underground line would have cost LP&L. An employee of SLECA testified that the line used was single phase, and not three phase, which is more expensive. The record before us does not show SLECA’s cost of constructing the extension. Therefore, we cannot find that the Public Service Commission arbitrarily rejected LP&L’s contention that it could have serviced the area more economically. The burden of proof was on LP&L to prove its contentions.

LP&L makes the further argument that SLECA duplicated LP&L’s existing facilities because LP&L could have served Block 1 without constructing the underground line. As mentioned above, the underground line was chosen to accommodate the developer. SLECA could have serviced the block by extending its line along Denley Road and crossing Denley as it had done for Block 2. It is doubtful that LP&L’s proposed method would have satisfied the developer. Therefore, we do not believe that the Public Service Commission erred because it failed to hold that SLECA’s lines were duplicative of LP&L’s existing facilities.

Promotional Practices

A SLECA employee testified that streetlight standards were installed in the subdivision at no cost to the developer. The cost to SLECA was $2365.45. That employee testified that SLECA has not charged any developers within its territory for streetlight standards since 1971, the inception of this general policy. LP&L contends that this practice constitutes a promotional practice proscribed by the General Order of March 12, 1974. That order prohibits a public utility from giving a preference or prize “for the purpose of enticing” someone to deal with that utility “in preference to the service of any other public utility.”

In Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, supra, this court was confronted with the issue of whether a utility violated this order by installing underground facilities, yet charging customers the price of less expensive overhead facilities. This court affirmed the Public Service Commission’s conclusion that no violation of the order occurred. The evidence in that case revealed that this was part of a comprehensive service policy, and that the policy was applied uniformly, even in areas where there was no competition for customers. We find the same type of policy to exist in the present case. Thus, the Public Service Commission did not err in failing to hold that SLECA violated the General Order.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Louisiana Public Service Commission and the district court are affirmed. Costs of this appeal are to be paid by the appellant.

      . Lot 10 of Block 1 and Lots 10 and 11 of Block 2 are not at issue in this litigation.

      . LP&L’s complaint was dismissed in Order No. 13803, dated May 1, 1979, which provides:
      “In this proceeding, Louisiana Power and Light Company (‘LP&L’) alleges that South Louisiana Electric Cooperative Association (‘SLECA’) has violated the provisions of LRS 45:123 and LPSC General Orders dated March 12, 1974, entitled ‘Promotional Practices’ and ‘Duplication of Electric Service’ by attempting to provide electric service to the Medical Services Complex Subdivision, Louisiana Highway 57 and Picone Road, Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana.
      This matter was tried by Hearing Examiner in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on September 11, 1978, and taken under advisement.
      Final consideration was given to this matter at Open Session of this Commission on October 16, 1978, which was held in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and the Commission finds after consideration of the evidence and exhibits in this case, including the exception to jurisdiction filed by SLECA, that both companies have electric lines within 300 feet of some portion of the subdivision, and that the customer has chosen SLECA to provide the service. It is the opinion of this Commission that this is a case of customer-choice which is allowed under LRS 45:123. It is, therefore,
      ORDERED that this matter be dismissed.”

      . This order is reproduced in Appendix 1 of Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 343 So.2d 1040, 1046 (La.1977).

      . LP&L contended to this court in oral argument that it had attempted to obtain SLECA’s actual cost figures via a subpoena duces tecum, but that SLECA did not bring the figures to the hearing. We note that the petition filed with the Public Service Commission by LP&L does not suggest that the construction of the underground line is conduct complained of by LP&L. Further, the record indicates that the subpoena requested that SLECA furnish “the cost of streetlight standards and facilities.” Because of the lack of notice in the petition and the ambiguity in the subpoena, it is understandable that SLECA did nor furnish LP&L with its cost figures for construction of the underground line.


text:
    Howard TULL v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE.
    No. 80-C-1559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Howard Tull applying for certiorari to the 1st Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 385 So.2d 343.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Richard D. PETERSON and Judy Lynn Peterson v. LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.
    No. 80-C-1575.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Louisiana Health Service and Indemnity Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Jackson. 384 So.2d 503.

Denied.


text:
    W. A. WHITE v. CITY OF WINNFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT et al.
    No. 80-C-1590.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re City of Winnfield Fire Department, et al. applying for certiorari, or writ of review of the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Winn. No. 22132.

Denied.

MARCUS and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Malroy O. MAYER and Mattie Lou Mayer v. McNAIR TRANSPORT, INC., Benjamin R. Martin and Excalibur Insurance Company
    No. 80-C-1600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re McNair Transport, Inc., Benjamin R. Martin and Excalibur Insurance Company applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Ouachita. No. 111-904.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    The HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY v. CENTRAL LOUISIANA ELECTRIC COMPANY et al.
    No. 80-C-1610.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Central Louisiana Electric Co., and Continental Casualty Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Beauregard. 384 So.2d 455.

Denied.


text:
    Lynn CHOATE v. LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
    No. 80-C-1601.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Lynn Choate applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Ouachita. No. 113-784.

Writ denied.


text:
    Maxine HUKILL et al. v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY et al.
    No. 80-C-1663.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Rapides. 386 So.2d 172.

Writ denied.


text:
    PATRICK PETROLEUM CORP. OF MICHIGAN et al. v. Thomas POCHE et al.
    No. 80-C-1654.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Ferdie A. Nobile, Myrdis N. Buckner, Myrle Lynn N. Vitrano, Aimee B. Faucheux, Florette F. Porche, A. L. Faucheux, Jr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of St. James. 384 So.2d 834.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Herbert JOSEPH v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-1643.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Herbert Joseph, applying for writs of certiorari, habeas corpus and mandamus. Parish of Lafayette. No. 36597.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Johnny R. COLLINS v. COURT REPORTER AND CLERK OF COURT 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF BOSSIER.
    No. 80-KH-1668.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Johnny R. Collins applying for remedial writ. Parish of Bossier. No. 54685.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Glen TAUZIER et al. a/k/a Wayne Tauzier v. Patrick J. CANULETTE, Sheriff, St. Tammany Parish et al.
    No. 80-KH-1669.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Glen Tauzier, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish St. Tammany. No. 73414.

Denied.


text:
    DAIGLE & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. Sylvia S. COLEMAN et al.
    No. 80-C-1555.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Bernard Watson, Jr., and Rowena Watson, applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 385 So.2d 349.

Writ granted.


text:
    DAIGLE & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. Sylvia S. COLEMAN et al.
    No. 80-C-1556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Robert E. Tillery, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 385 So.2d 349.

Writ granted.


text:
    Claude A. FONSECA v. MARLIN MARINE CORPORATION, Alfred Cenac, Jr., and the Home Indemnity Company.
    No. 80-C-1522.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Claude A. Fonseca, applying for certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Terrebonne. 385 So.2d 341.

Granted.


text:
    Odeal Martin BANKS v. ADMINISTRATOR OF the DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY of the State of Louisiana et al.
    No. 80-C-1588.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Odeal Martin Banks applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Franklin. No. 18698.

Granted.


text:
    Ashton P. GIRON v. The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF OPELOUSAS.
    No. 80-C-1681.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Ashton P. Giron applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of St. Landry. 385 So.2d 1224.

Granted.


text:
    Patrick A. COURVILLE, Sr., et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
    No. 80-C-1704.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Patrick A. Courville, Sr., et al. applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of St. Landry. 386 So.2d 176.

Granted.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of Russell J. GIANGROSSO, Lonnie Ray J. Gros and Scott N. Hood.
    No. 80-C-1793.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Russell J. Giangrosso, Lonnie Ray J. Gros and Scott N. Hood, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Ascension. 385 So.2d 471.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of Robin SAPIA.
    No. 80-C-1981.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources, Office of Human Development, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 387 So.2d 41.

Granted.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of Tod REDDICKS.
    No. 80-C-1985.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources, Office of Human Development applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 387 So.2d 689.

Granted.


text:
    Margaretta LeSage MEARES et al. v. PIONEER PRODUCTION CORPORATION et al.
    No. 67747.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Pioneer Production Corp., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Jefferson Davis. 382 So.2d 1009.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Margaretta LeSage MEARES et al. v. PIONEER PRODUCTION CORPORATION et al.
    No. 67748.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Union Oil Development Co., Ltd., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Jefferson Davis. 382 So.2d 1009.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Charles S. TAYLOR v. ZETZ 7-UP BOTTLING COMPANY and Continental Insurance Company.
    No. 80-C-1635.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Zetz 7-Up Bottling Company and Continental Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 384 So.2d 811.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Robert HARRISON, August Harris and Jacqueline Montana v. Robert HOWELL, Groendyke Transport, Inc., and Farmers Insurance Group (Truck Insurance Exchange).
    No. 80-C-1634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Jacqueline Montana applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 384 So.2d 464.

Writ denied.


text:
    James M. CANCIENNE v. Fay Ann Ziegler, Wife of James M. CANCIENNE.
    No. 80-C-1685.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Fay Ann Ziegler applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 384 So.2d 843.

Writ denied.


text:
    Robert THIBODEAUX v. KING-WILKINSON, INC.
    No. 80-C-1679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Robert Thibodeaux applying for writ of certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of St. Landry. 386 So.2d 189.

Denied.


text:
    Janis LANHAM et al. v. WOODWARD, WIGHT AND COMPANY et al.
    No. 80-C-1666.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re John Lanham applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Rapides. 386 So.2d 131.

Denied.

CALOGERO, DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Richard M. PRIMEAUX, d/b/a Acadian Engineering Company v. Merk GASPARD.
    No. 80-C-1665.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Richard Primeaux, d/b/a Acadian Engineering Company, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Avoyelles. 385 So.2d 1250.

Writ denied.


text:
    John DICKERSON v. Jimmy TAYLOR et al.
    No. 80-C-1711.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re John Dickerson applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Tangipahoa. 385 So.2d 467.

Denied. The result is correct.


text:
    Jack MORAN v. CANAL INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO. et al.
    No. 80-C-1554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Jack Moran applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Tangipahoa. No. 54326.

Denied.


text:
    W. Frank EMERSON v. EMPIRE FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
    No. 80-C-1558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re W. Frank Emerson applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Terrebonne. 387 So.2d 1238.

Granted.


text:
    Raymond E. HANKAMER et al. v. TEXACO, INC.
    No. 80-C-1531.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Raymond E. Hankamer et al. applying for writ of certiorari, or review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of St. Mary. 387 So.2d 1251.

Writ granted.


text:
    Alfred Henry SAMPAY v. MORTON SALT COMPANY and Continental Casualty Company.
    No. 80-C-1424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Alfred Henry Sampay applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of St. Mary. 388 So.2d 62.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Paul Edward WARE v. C. Paul PHELPS, Director of the Department of Corrections.
    No. 80-K-1592.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Paul Edward Ware applying for writ of habeas corpus, Parish of St. Landry. Nos. 30009, 68125-1, 59682 and 31244.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Willie JENKINS, Jr. v. Hayden J. DEES, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 80-KH-1604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Willie Jenkins, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari, Parish of Orleans. No. 263-763 Sect. B.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. George T. BENNETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-1530.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re George T. Bennett applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of St. Charles. No. 77-201.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Lee JACKSON.
    No. 80-K-1504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Robert Lee Jackson, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of DeSoto. No. 41195.

Denied. Adequate remedy by appeal in event of conviction.

l


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Henry ANDERSON v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary et al.
    No. 80-K-1459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Henry Anderson, applying for writ of forma pauperis. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court, Section C. No. 260-387.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronnie HALL.
    No. 80-K-1591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Ronnie Hall applying for remedial writs, 20th Judicial District Court, Parish of West Feliciana, Judge William F. Kline, Jr. No. 6870.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Billy James WILLIAMS.
    No. 80-K-1550.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Billy James Williams applying for writ of certiorari, Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 9-75-1945.

Denied.

WATSON, J., concurs but suggests application be made in proper court (20th Judicial District Court).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Jerry Ryan LAMMANACK v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-K-1446.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Jerry Ryan Lammanack applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, review and supervisory. Parish of Jefferson Davis. No. CR 978-78, C 199-80 and C 202-80.

Denied; plea bargain.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant evidentiary hearing.

WATSON, J., concurs but is of the opinion the waiver form should be revised.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Alton M. DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-K-1390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Alton M. Davis applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 215-412.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J.,

would grant the writ. The record does not show a Boykin examination at the December 8, 1971 plea and does not show that relator was represented by counsel.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Henry D. TAYLOR, Jr. v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-K-1362.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Henry D. Taylor, Jr., applying for writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and review. 31st Judicial District Court. Parish of Jefferson Davis. Nos. CR-771-78; C-233-80; C-234-80.

Denied; plea bargain.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant an evidentiary hearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bennie G. SMITH.
    No. 80-K-2076.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Bennie G. Smith, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, review, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Tangipahoa. Nos. 44458-44460.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ronald TAUZIER et al. v. Patrick J. CANULETTE, Sheriff, St. Tammany Parish et al.
    No. 80-KH-1670.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Ronald Tauzier, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of St. Tammany. No. 73474.

Denied.


text:
    Corinne H. McARDLE v. Gordon HACKMAN et al.
    No. 80-C-2130.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Gordon Hackman and Marion Hackman, applying for writs of certiorari. Parish of Orleans (Civil District Court). No. 80-5991.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Terry WALLS v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-KH-2017.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Terry Walls applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 24-76-401.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Terry Lee WALLS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-1924.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Terry Lee Walls applying for remedial writ. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 2-4-76-401, Sect. II.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sherry E. LITTLETON.
    No. 80-K-1852.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Sherry E. Littleton applying for writ of review. Parish of Ouachita. No. 39273.

Denied.

WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. David Eugene LEWIS v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-1823.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re David Eugene Lewis, applying for writs of certiorari, habeas corpus and mandamus. Parish of St. Tammany. No. 53163.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Melvin BUJOL v. Frank C. BLACKBURN.
    No. 80-KH-1820.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Melvin Bujol applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. No. 255-381.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Estella BROWN.
    No. 80-K-1799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Estella Brown, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 2-80-590.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. James Louis HUMPHREY v. Judge L. E. HAWSEY, Jr., 14th Judicial District Court.
    No. 80-KH-1761.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re James Louis Humphrey, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 5635-78.

Denied.


text:
    Mrs. Patricia PACKARD v. Robert Evan ADAMS.
    No. 80-C-1699.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Robert Evan Adams applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. No. 10932.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Douglas CLOUD v. WOODSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al.
    No. 80-C-1677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Douglas Cloud applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Rapides. No. 7652.

Writ denied.


text:
    Joy Howell THOMASEE v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
    No. 80-C-1696.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, et al. applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Natchitoches. 385 So.2d 1219.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Darryll TERRANCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-2105.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 1980.
   In re Darryll Terrance applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. No. 275-363, Sect. J.

Writ denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. James E. SMITH, Jr.
    No. 80-O-2214.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 1980.
   In re James E. Smith, Jr. applying to take the Louisiana State Bar Examination and be admitted to the practice of law.

Granted.

MARCUS, BLANCHE and WATSON, JJ., would deny the application.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Andre J. HAYNIE.
    No. 80-K-2098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 1980.
   In re Andre J. Haynie, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Grant. No. 34796.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Steve MARCANTEL and Delius Guillory v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-2179.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 1980.
   In re Delius J. Guillory, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Evangeline. No. 20732.

Granted. The trial court is ordered to fix bond forthwith. Remanded.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of Rhonda JARRELL.
    No. 80-K-2209.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 1980.
   In re Rhonda Jarrell, applying for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari. Parish of St. Tammany. No. 146 JJ, First Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 13965.

Granted. The court of appeal is ordered to recall its writ denial and grant the writ, treating the matter as an appeal, and to decide the merits.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Herbert WOMACK v. Frank BLACKBURN et al., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 67218.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Herbert Womack applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 78-6932.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. James Earl WILLIAMS v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 67625.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re James Earl Williams, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court, Section G. Nos. 235-114 and 236-105.

Granted. District Court is ordered to act on relator’s petition within 14 days.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. John SULLEN v. Frank A. MARULLO, Jr., Judge.
    No. 67831.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re John Sullen applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. No. 195-236.

Granted. The trial court is ordered to hold a hearing within 30 days. Remanded.


text:
    CITY OF MONROE v. Kenneth Ray WYRICK.
    No. 80-K-1737.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Kenneth Ray Wyrick applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, review and mandamus. Parish of Ouachita. No. 296.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patricia KNOWLES.
    No. 80-K-1766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Patricia Knowles applying for writs of certiorari, review and mandamus. Parish of Ouachita. No. 39274.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Amos BOUDREAUX.
    No. 80-K-2011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Amos Boudreaux, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Ouachita. No. 38451.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William F. ROSS.
    No. 80-K-2051.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re William F. Ross, applying for remedial writs and stay order. Parish of Jefferson. No. 80-1536.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clyde THOMPSON, Charles Hubbs and Colvin Wines.
    No. 80-K-2211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Clyde Thompson, Charles Hubbs and Colvin Wines, applying for supervisory writs. Orleans Parish. No. 277-981.

Granted. Defendants are entitled to waive their appearance at the preliminary examination and motion to suppress. Remanded.


text:
    Loulan PITRE v. TENNECO OIL COMPANY.
    No. 80-C-1738.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Tenneco Oil Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal First Circuit. Parish of Lafourche. 385 So.2d 840.

Writ denied.

BLANCHE and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Donald Ray LINKS v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 67846.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Donald Ray Links applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 12-72-2398.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Grandville TENNART v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-1617.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Grandville Tennart, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of Avoyelles.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant an eviden-tiary hearing on assignment of error No. 2.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. James C. JOHNSTON v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-1622.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re James C. Johnston, applying for writs of habeas corpus. Parish of Natchi-toches. No. 45854.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory T. FREY.
    No. 80-K-1687.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Gregory T. Frey, applying for writ of review. Parish of Caddo. No. 114,481.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Milton LAWRENCE v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-KH-1690.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Milton Lawrence applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 197-348, Sect. E.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Thomas CARDWELL v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-K-1716.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Thomas Cardwell applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Lafourche. No. 95818.

Writ denied.


text:
    CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. Odell MACK.
    No. 80-K-1680.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Odell Mack, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 12-79-165.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Leal MAGEE v. Patrick J. CANULETTE, Sheriff, St. Tammany Parish, et al.
    No. 80-KH-1671.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Leal Magee applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of St. Tammany. No. 73475.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Irving J. ROGERS v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-1674.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Irving J. Rogers, applying for remedial writs of certiorari and habeas corpus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 12-77-122.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Donald James FRANKLIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-1650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Donald James Franklin applying for remedial writ. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nos. 7-78-218 and 5-77-398.

Denied. Motion for new trial pending. Also must first be filed in the district court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Edward ADAMS a/k/a Edward Bledsoe v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-K-1414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Edward Adams a/k/a Edward Bledsoe applying for writs of certiorari, review and mandamus. Parish of East Feliciana. Nos. B-12071 and A15649.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. James C. JOHNSTON v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-KH-1582.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re James C. Johnston applying for writs of certiorari, habeas corpus and mandamus. Parish of Natchitoches. No. 45-854 I.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Alton M. DAVIS v. Harry CONNICK, District Attorney, Criminal District Court and James Parsons, Chief of Police, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 80-KH-1597.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Alton M. Davis applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 255-578.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Bruce MINOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-K-1371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Bruce Minor applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. No. 78-2679J.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Eddie LeBLANC v. ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 66621.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Eddie LeBlanc, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 261-167, 266-248 and 264-016.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Willie TAYLOR v. Judge Frank MARULLO, Orleans Criminal District Court.
    No. 66911.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Willie Taylor, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 266-860.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Derek ROBERTSON v. Judge Frank MARULLO, Orleans Criminal District Court.
    No. 66982.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Derek Robertson, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 269-882.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Roy Lee CHAMBERS v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT SECTION J, PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 67816.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Roy Lee Chambers applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans. No. 269-042.

Denied.


text:
    Marcy GERTLER et al. v. GONDOLA SKI SHOP, INC., et al.
    No. 80-C-1754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Marcy Gertler, Wife of/and M. H. Gertler applying for writ of certiorari, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 384 So.2d 856.

Writ denied.

WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Frank LISTER et al. v. TEXACO, INC., et al.
    No. 80-C-1790.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Frank Lister, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of St. Mary. 389 So.2d 726.

Denied.


text:
    Charles P. BILQUIST v. KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION and Robert Stockstill.
    No. 80-C-1741.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Charles P. Bilquist applying for writ of certiorari, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of St. James. 384 So.2d 818.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ. •


text:
    Rose Boe, Wife of Charles BONOMO, William J. Boe, Ruby Boe, wife of Henry J. Jastram and Joseph P. Boe v. LAKE FOREST, INC.
    No. 80-C-1742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Rose Boe et al., applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. No. 10943.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION of Mrs. Ora Nelms LOGAN, also known as Mrs. Ora Logan Shaffer.
    No. 80-C-1744.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Mrs. Olyn Soniat Saufley, et al., applying for certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 384 So.2d 830.

Writ denied.

CALOGERO and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Florestine JENKINS et al. v. JEFFERSON PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE.
    No. 80-C-1794.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Florestine Jenkins, Herbert Jenkins, individually and on behalf of his minor child, David Jenkins, Glenda Jenkins and Brenda Jenkins, Pauline Jenkins and Glenn Jenkins, Vincent Jenkins, Paul Coleman, Darryl Turner and Linda Pierre individually and on behalf of minor daughter Keylan-da Pierre, applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 385 So.2d 578.

Granted.


text:
    Belinda LEGE v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
    No. 80-C-1697.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Belinda Lege applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Vermilion. 386 So.2d 123.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J., to grant as to Assignment No. 5.


text:
    Patrick LAFLEUR et al. v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK et al.
    No. 80-C-1705.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Patrick Lafleur et al., applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Evangeline. 385 So.2d 1241.

Denied.

CALOGERO, DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of Donald Ray ROCK.
    No. 80-K-2086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Donald Ray Rock, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Caddo. Juvenile Court. No. 26223-C.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J„ and CALOGERO, and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Percy Lee ELZEY.
    No. 80-K-2257.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Percy Lee Elzey, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of Tangipahoa.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Louis FOSS v. Criminal District Court Judge Oliver SCHULINGKAMP, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 67248.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Louis Foss applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 259-716.

Granted. Relator is entitled to credit for good time per 15:571.3 as amended by Act 727 of 1975.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joseph JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-1908.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Joseph Johnson, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 269-738 and 269-739.

Denied. Appeal pending.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. George McCORMICK v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS, SECTION G.
    No. 80-KH-2042.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re George McCormick, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 273-765.

Denied; appeal pending.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward Lee GIOVANNI, Jr.
    No. 80-K-2061.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Edward Lee Giovanni, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 5724-80.

Denied.


text:
    Emma Lee ROGERS v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH et al.
    No. 80-C-1776.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Emma Lee Rogers, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 13294.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mrs. Marie BROWN v. Emile E. SOUPENNE et al.
    No. 80-C-1771.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re J. W. Stroughter, individually and d/b/a J. W. Stroughter Realty, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Parish of Orleans. No. 77-1443.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Richard James BOURQUE.
    No. 80-K-1764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Richard James Bourque, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Acadia. No. 33557.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilburt HUDSON and Patricia Torres.
    No. 80-K-1755.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana, through the District Attorney, John M. Mamoulides, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. Nos. 173878 and 175600.

Denied. As long as article taken has any value, the precise value is irrelevant in a prosecution for the lowest grade of theft.


text:
    Daniel F. EGAN, Jr. v. DRAVO CORPORATION and Employers National Insurance Company.
    No. 80-C-1743.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Dravo Corp. and Employers National Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. No.10869.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James L. JACKSON.
    No. 80-K-1758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re James L. Jackson, applying for writs of review, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 6-79-285.

Denied. Adequate remedy by appeal in event of conviction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward Lee GIOVANNI, Jr.
    No. 80-K-2062.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Edward Lee Giovanni, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 5724-80.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth J. SHARP, Jr.
    No. 80-K-2116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Kenneth J. Sharp, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and stay order. Parish of Jefferson. No. 80566.

Denied. Adequate remedy by review in event of conviction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Willie JONES, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-2108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Willie Jones, Jr. applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. No. 274-688. Sect. G.

Denied. Relator must first file in the district court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Donald James FRANKLIN v. The 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE.
    No. 80-KH-1822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Donald James Franklin, applying for remedial writs. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nos. 7-78-218 and 5-77-398.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Raymond TUCKER v. CLERK OF COURT, ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, SECTION G.
    No. 80-KH-2041.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 6, 1980.
   In re Raymond Tucker, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 257-MO.

Denied. Transcript has been completed or completion of appeal record is imminent.