text:
    Emanuel ORDON, Individually and as Tutor of his Minor Child, Ricky Ordon v. Helene Hill NASH and United States Automobile Association.
    No. 82-C-1145.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Emanuel Ordon, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 411 So.2d 1111.

Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Donald Mouton QUINN, III v. Judith Lynn Fletcher QUINN.
    No. 82-C-1146.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Judith Lynn Fletcher Quinn, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Morehouse. 412 So.2d 649.

Writ denied.


text:
    Willie DAVIS v. FRANKLIN PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al. F. B. Etheridge Reed and Sons Hardwood, Inc.
    No. 82-C-1147.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re F. B. Etheridge, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Franklin. 412 So.2d 1131.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Harold E. FUNCK v. LOUISIANA FIREMAN’S SUPPLEMENTAL PAY BOARD.
    No. 82-C-1148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Louisiana Fireman’s Supplemental Pay Board, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 411 So.2d 1222.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Nick J. GUZZARDO v. Gibbs ADAMS, et al.
    No. 82-C-1149.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Nick J. Guzzardo, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 411 So.2d 1148.

Denied.


text:
    BENEFICIAL FINANCE COMPANY OF LOUISIANA v. George E. HAVILAND & Mary Haviland.
    No. 82-C-1151.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Beneficial Finance Company of Louisiana, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 411 So.2d 1102.

Denied. The result is correct.


text:
    Leonard GORDON v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, Budget Rent-a-Car of New Orleans, Inc., Homer Brister, Snee Lumber Company, and the XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-1154.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re National Union Fire Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Civil District Court. Parish of Orleans. 411 So.2d 1094.

Denied.


text:
    Ernest W. HARTHCOCK et al. v. Filmore J. HURST and Elizabeth Ann New Hurst.
    No. 82-C-1155.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Filmore J. Hurst, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Pointee Coupee. 413 So.2d 636.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie MACKYEON.
    No. 82-K-1158.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Willie Mackyeon, applying for writs of certiorari, or review, habeas corpus and mandamus. Parish of Ascension. Nos. 43494, 43495 and 43496.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph H. HIRSTIUS v. LOUISIANA MATERIALS COMPANY, INC.
    No. 82-C-1160.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Louisiana Materials Company, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of St. Tammany. 413 So.2d 611.

Denied.


text:
    Jackie Ray KING and Cecile Ford King v. PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY, et al. Julius D. GILL v. Jackie Ray KING, et ux. PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY, et al. v. Julius D. GILL (Jackie Ray King, et ux., Intervenors).
    No. 82-C-1163.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Julius D. Gill, applying for certiora-ri, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Caddo. 412 So.2d 642.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Alfred PIZZECK v. EXECUTONE SYSTEMS COMPANY OF LOUISIANA, INC.
    No. 82-C-1171.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Executone Systems Company, Inc., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 411 So.2d 1202.

Denied.


text:
    Desi DRAUGHN v. BREAUX MART.
    No. 82-C-1172.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Desi Draughn, applying for writ of review, to the Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Jefferson. 411 So.2d 1188.

Writ denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Josephine N. NELMS v. Leonard H. NELMS.
    No. 82-C-1173.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Leonard H. Nelms, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Family Court of East Baton Rouge. 413 So.2d 1341.

Denied.


text:
    Vernon VILLARS, d/b/a Villars Construction and Remodeling Company v. Lawrence A. EDWARDS.
    No. 82-C-1175.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Vernon Villars, applying for certio-rari on writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 412 So.2d 122.

Denied. Result is correct.


text:
    Oscar ALLEMAN, et al. v. Steven JOFFRION, et al.
    No. 82-C-1177.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Oscar Alleman, et al. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Assumption. 411 So.2d 1142.

Denied.


text:
    Jerome WOOL, Sr. v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON.
    No. 82-C-1179.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Jerome Wool, Sr., applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 411 So.2d 1198.

Denied.

CALOGERO and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mervis THOMAS, Sr. v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 82-C-1181.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re State Farm Insurance Company, applying for writ of review. Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Evangeline. 413 So.2d 293.

Denied.


text:
    Donald Mouton QUINN III v. Judith Lynn Fletcher QUINN.
    No. 82-C-1182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Donald Mouton Quinn III, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Morehouse. 412 So.2d 649.

Writ denied.


text:
    Leonard GORDON v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, et al.
    No. 82-C-1210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Homer Brister, Snee Lumber Company and Employers Insurance of Wausau, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 411 So.2d 1094.

Denied.


text:
    Jerome WOOL, Sr. v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON.
    No. 82-C-1211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Parish of Jefferson, applying for writ of certiorari. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of Jefferson. 411 So.2d 1198.

Denied.

BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Freddie WILLIAMS.
    No. 82-KH-1331.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Freddie Williams, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 282-686.

Denied. Relator has not filed request for appeal bond in the district court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Roy A. VANDERHOFF, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-1251.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Roy A. VanderHoff, Sr. applying for remedial writ. Parish of St. Bernard. No. 49888.

Writ denied. Relator’s application has been filed and will be considered as rehearing application.


text:
    Antonio TIRANTE v. GULF STATE UTILITIES COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-1174.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re The White Budd VanNess Partnership, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 14494.

Denied.

BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Sebastian ROLLAND v. TODD SHIPYARDS CORPORATION and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company.
    No. 82-C-1373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 4, 1982.
   In re Todd Shipyards, Inc. and Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 81-14785.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jessie LEWIS.
    No. 82-K-1383.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 7, 1982.
    Reconsideration Denied June 11, 1982.
   In re Jessie Lewis, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 1805-82.

Writ denied. The matter is moot. Trial judge advises the case is to be tried this morning.


text:
    In re John DUNN.
    No. 82-K-1298.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 10, 1982.
   In re John Dunn, applying for supervisory writs and a stay order. Parish of Orleans. No. 288-991.

Stay order recalled and application denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reginald SMITH.
    No. 82-K-1193.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 10, 1982.
   In re Reginald Smith, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Jefferson Parish. No. 78-2600.

Granted. The trial judge is ordered to allow defendánt to call the trial attorney as a witness.


text:
    Clarence SEALS, Individually and for the minor, Bobby Ray Seals v. L. M. LEWIS OIL COMPANY and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, et al.
    No. 82-C-1335.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, applying for writs of prohibition, certiorari and or mandamus. Parish of Rapides. Ninth Judicial District Court. No. 113323.

Granted. The matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal to rule on the merits of the application, Herlitz Construction Co. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, et al 396 So.2d 878 (La.1981).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lorenza ARMONT.
    No. 82-K-0902.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Lorenza Armont, applying for writs of certiorari (review). St. John the Baptist Parish. No. 54-81.

Granted. Since the argument discloses that the object of the “robbery” was an infant and since people are not subject to ownership, the bill of information charging armed robbery is quashed.

MARCUS, J., dissents from the order and would deny the writ.


text:
    Karl J. PIZZALOTTO, M.D., Ltd. v. Dietrich WILSON.
    No. 82-C-1142.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Dietrich Wilson, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 411 So.2d 1150.

Granted.


text:
    Earl J. DESCANT v. RAPIDES PARISH POLICY JURY.
    No. 82-C-1207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Rapides Parish Police Jury, applying for writs of prohibition, certiorari and/or mandamus. Parish of Rapides. No. 118092.

Granted. Trial judge ordered to dismiss suit with prejudice on joint motion of all parties.


text:
    Phil John MARTIN v. H. B. ZACHRY COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-1221.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Phil John Martin, applying for cer-tiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of St. Charles. 411 So.2d 1123.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James A. MOORE.
    No. 82-K-1234.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re James A. Moore, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Ouachita. Fourth Judicial District Court. No. M47405.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ronald TAUZIER, Glen Tauzier v. Presiding Judge, Thomas W. TANNER Criminal District Court 22nd Judicial District Division “C” 510 East Boston Street, Covington, State of Louisiana.
    No. 81-KH-3118.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Ronald Tauzier and Glen Tauzier, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of St. Tammany. No. 73474.

Writ denied. Moot.


text:
    Glen D. McNEELY v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, PINECREST STATE SCHOOL.
    No. 82-C-1183.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Glen D. McNeely, applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Parish of Rapides. First Circuit Court of Appeal. 413 So.2d 594.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Frank M. LOPEZ v. SID ODEN AND COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-1186.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Sid Oden & Company and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Orleans Parish. 411 So.2d 1135.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Virginia Patterson, Wife of/and Sidney J. PATTERSON, Jean Mayhall, Wife of/and Lester Mayhall and Irma Pitre v. Charles A. GARIC, III d/b/a Orlandia Storage Warehouse and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-1188.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Virginia Patterson, et al., applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of St. Bernard. 411 So.2d 1091.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    George D. HAYNES, d/b/a Geo-Je’s Apparel and North River Insurance Company v. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY and Miller’s Mutual of Texas.
    No. 82-C-1191.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re George D. Haynes, d/b/a Geo-Je’s Apparel and North River Insurance Company, applying for writ of review or certiorari. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. East Baton Rouge Parish. 411 So.2d 1145.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J., and BLANCHE and LEM-MON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mrs. Joyce Melacon BACILE, Individually and as Natural Tutrix and Administratrix of Dodie Ann Melacon v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON and Bogalusa Iron Works, Inc.
    No. 82-C-1192.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Bogalusa Iron Works, Inc., applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 411 So.2d 1088.

Denied-

DIXON, C. J., and MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ivory HAYES.
    No. 82-K-1198.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Ivory Hayes, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Nos. 5-79-260, 261 and 262.

Denied.


text:
    Armond J. EITMANN v. M. G. WEST.
    No. 82-C-1203.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Armond J. Eitmann, applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of Orleans. 411 So.2d 1127.

Denied.


text:
    Stewart M. CARPENTER v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, David P. Johnson and the City of New Orleans.
    No. 82-C-1204.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Stewart M. Carpenter, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 411 So.2d 1206.

Denied. Result correct.


text:
    Pauline A. ROSEVALLY and Henry H. Arnold, III v. T. L. JAMES & COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-1208.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Pauline A. Rosevally and Henry H. Arnold, III, applying for writ of certiorari, review, prohibition and mandamus. Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Plaque-mines. 411 So.2d 1178.

Denied.


text:
    Susie Mae BRADLEY, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of her Minor Children; Theresa Diane Bradley, Lashanna Deniese Bradley, Linda Gail Bradley and John W. Bradley, III v. Aurila F. HUNTER, et al.
    No. 82-C-1209.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Susie Mae Bradley, applying for writs of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Natchi-toches. 413 So.2d 674.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph E. SCHIELDER v. SCHWEGMANN BROTHERS GIANT SUPERMARKETS, INC.
    No. 82-C-1212.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Joseph E. Schielder, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of St. Bernard. 411 So.2d 1220.

Denied.


text:
    Lori Jean ALPHONSO v. CHARITY HOSPITAL OF LOUISIANA AT NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 82-C-1213.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Lori Jean Alphonso, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 413 So.2d 982.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mrs. Louise Lagrange NOEL, Widow of Lawrence Thomas Noel, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of Donna Louise Noel, Michael Thomas Noel, Glenda Faye Noel and Linda Kaye Noel, Minors: Arlene Marie Noel; Mrs. Dorothy Lawrence Noel, Wife of Roger Arceneaux v. ESGARD, INC. and Continental Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-1214.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Mrs. Louise LaGrange Noel, Widow of Lawrence Thomas Noel, etc., et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. No. 12569. Plaquemines Parish.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerron W. PLATER.
    No. 82-K-1220.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Jerron W. Plater, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Caddo. No. 119855.

Denied. Adequate remedy by review in event of conviction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Wendell A. MARTIN v. Judge Jerome WINSBERG, Section “C” Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-1224.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Wendell A. Martin, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 263-888.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    Oscar JACOBSEN and Cecelia Jacobsen v. SOUTHEAST DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Erwin Vogel, Richard Vogel, Frank Knight and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-1235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Oscar Jacobsen, applying for writ of review or certiorari, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of Orleans. 413 So.2d 995.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Stan FEJTA d/b/a Fejta Construction Company v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC.
    No. 82-C-1241.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Werner Enterprises, Inc., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 412 So.2d 155.

Writ denied. The result is correct.


text:
    Dudley Joseph CAMPBELL v. Edmond MOUTON & Pete Reaux.
    No. 82-C-1288.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Edmond Mouton, applying for writs of certiorari and review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Vermillion. 412 So.2d 191.

Denied.


text:
    HIBERNIA NATIONAL BANK IN NEW ORLEANS v. Thomas BOLLETER a/k/a Thomas W. Bolleter and Wanda T. Bolleter.
    No. 82-C-1303.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Hibernia National Bank, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of St. Bernard. No. 12886.

Writ denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant this writ.

LEMMON, J., recused.


text:
    Lennie H. WALKER, et al. v. JAMES W. SALLEY, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-1325.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Lennie H. Walker and Albert Walker, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Rapides. 412 So.2d 159.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of Troy WRIGHT.
    No. 82-CK-1395.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Troy Wright, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and stay order. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 190-983 and 191-180.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stanley BLUNT.
    No. 82-K-1396.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Stanley Blunt, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 283-990.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Clarence CELESTINE v. CLERK OF COURT, 15TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LAFAYETTE.
    No. 82-KH-0373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Clarence Celestine, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Lafayette. Nos. 42654, 42590 and 43052.

Granted. It is ordered that relator be provided with a transcript of the “Boykin” examination.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Murray J. GARLAND.
    No. 82-K-1161.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Murray J. Garland, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of St. John the Baptist. No. 3840.

Granted. There was no evidence that defendant was operating the vehicle. Hence, his conviction and sentence are reversed and defendant is ordered discharged.


text:
    Armand J. DUVIO, Sr. v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-1227.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Armand J. Duvio, Sr., applying for supervisory writs and extension of time. Parish of Orleans. No. 77-7128.

Granted. The matter is remanded to the district court to reconsider the denial of the motion to separate the consolidated cases, because the consolidation of the compensation case with another case should neither cause an undue delay of the compensation case, nor the loss of the right to trial by jury in the other case.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Eugene ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana, PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 82-KH-1254.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Eugene Anderson, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans.

Writ granted. The trial court is ordered to rule on relator’s speedy trial motion forthwith.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas NATIONS.
    No. 82-K-1315.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Thomas Nations, applying for supervisory writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 12-80-1089.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald W. HEUMANN.
    No. 82-K-1365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Donald W. Heumann, applying for writ of certiorari and stay order. Orleans Parish. No. 287-649.

Granted. The state is ordered to answer the bill of particulars, numbers 1 through 8. The trial date is upset, and trial is stayed pending completion of discovery.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Clifford KEYS v. Warden Hayden DEES.
    No. 81-KH-2272.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Clifford Keys, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of St. Landry. Nos. 29666 and 29666-A.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Dennis W. LEGER v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 81-KH-2501.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Dennis W. Leger, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Lafayette. Nos. 32609, HC 81-9.

Writ denied.

DIXON, C. J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Sylvester WILLIAMS v. Edwin A. LOMBARD, in his Official Capacity as Clerk of the Criminal District Court.
    No. 81-KH-2578.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Sylvester Williams, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 273-942.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joseph FOUNTAIN, Jr. v. Frank C. BLACKBURN.
    No. 81-KH-2818.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Joseph Fountain, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 272-075.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Clarence HOLMES, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF ADULT SERVICES, et al.
    No. 82-KH-0053.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Clarence Holmes, Jr., applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 252-813.

Writ denied. Relator must first file in the district court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Rudolph JOHNSON v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 82-KH-0108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Rudolph Johnson, applying for writ of certiorari and habeas corpus. Parish of Webster. Twenty-sixth Judicial District Court. No. 44494.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. John W. ALLEN v. CLERK OF COURT, ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 82-KH-0364.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re John S. Allen, applying for writ of mandamus. Orleans Parish. No. 221-178.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Simon SMITH, Jr. v. John T. KING, Secretary, and Donald R. Guillory, Warden.
    No. 82-KH-0391.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Simon Smith, Jr., applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and other remedial writs. Parish of Concordia.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Bobby D. GLOVER, DOC# 80931 v. STATE of Louisiana CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS, NEW ORLEANS, Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-0665.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Bobby D. Glover, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 251-185.

Writ denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Charles RAMEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-0731.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Charles Ramee, applying for remedial writs, to the Criminal District Court. Parish of Orleans. No. 279-359.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anne H. DOWLEARN.
    No. 82-K[A]-0865.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Anne H. Dowlearn, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Terrebonne. Nos. 69661 and 71070.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Walter MARTIN v. Honorable Dennis J. WALDRON, Judge, Section “F”, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-0889.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Walter Martin, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus. Orleans Parish No. 272-043.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Willie SHERMAN v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 82-KH-0907.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Willie Sherman, applying for writ of mandamus. Orleans Parish. No. 280-370.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Hubern Ray DOXEY v. 38TH DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CAMERON, Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-0908.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Hubern Ray Doxey, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Cameron. Nos. 17731, 32, 33 and 34.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Wilson WILLIAMS v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-1010.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Wilson Williams, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 78-1066.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joy RHODES.
    No. 82-K-1195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Joy Rhodes, applying for writ of review. Parish of Terrebonne. Thirty-second Judicial District Court. No. 105779.

Writ denied.


text:
    Ruby B. WILLIAMS, et al. v. Ronald SCROGGINS, et al.
    No. 82-C-1197.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Ruby B. Williams and Herbert L. Williams, Sr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Rapides. No. 8767.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Carl OSMENT v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 82-KH-1199.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Carl Osment, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 80-1682.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Murray HOLMES.
    No. 82-K-1216.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Murray Holmes, applying for supervisory writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 8-81-219.

Writ denied.


text:
    Freddie CLARK, Individually and on behalf of his minor Daughter, Daphne Clark v. Michael WHALEN and Dixie Auto Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-1219.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Michael Whalen and Dixie Auto Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. No. 12996.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry Lynn PECK.
    No. 82-K-1239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Jerry Lynn Peck, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Ouachita. Fourth Judicial District Court. No. M47857.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jessie James PORTER.
    No. 82-K-1257.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Jessie James Porter, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of St. Helena. No. 4627.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Auggie TRUVIA, Sr. v. COURT REPORTER, SECTION “E”, CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 82-KH-1260.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Auggie Truvia, Sr., applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 278-472.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Hollis S. Margaret DUKES and Bernice D. Kibodeaux.
    No. 82-K-1281.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Bernice D. Kibodeaux, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Terrebonne. No. 115329.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Auggie TRUVIA, Sr.
    No. 82-KH-1294.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Auggie Truvia, Sr., applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court. No. 278-472.

Denied. Relator must first apply to the trial court.


text:
    Mrs. Shannon McDonald McCLENDON v. William F. KELLY, Elbilco, Inc. and National Homes Acceptance Corp. and William F. KELLY v. Clydia DAVENPORT and Glenn L. Morgan.
    No. 82-C-1299.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Clydia Davenport and Glenn L. Morgan, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Jefferson. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 208-417.

Denied. Relator must first apply to the Court of Appeals.

CALOGERO and LEMMON, JJ., would simply transfer this application to the Court of Appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Donald YOUNG v. Warden Roger AUCOIN.
    No. 82-KH-1304.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Donald Young, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of East Baton Rouge.

This application is transferred to the district court for immediate action.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Jesse POWELL v. CLERK OF COURT, 9TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF RAPIDES, and James S. Gravel, Attorney at Law.
    No. 82-KH-1334.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Jesse Powell applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Rapides. No. 176769.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Florence San Filippo, Widow of Harry J. SELIGMAN.
    No. 82-C-1337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Henry James Seligman, Richard John Seligman, Mary Anne Seligman, wife of Frank Ryan, applying for writs of certio-rari, prohibition and review. Parish of Jefferson. No. 263-546.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ray Anthony SMITH.
    No. 82-K-1400.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Ray Anthony Smith, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 12-81-002.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vernon SIMMS.
    No. 82-KH-1410.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 11, 1982.
   In re Vernon Simms, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 282-741.

Writ denied. Moot.


author: CUTRER, Judge.

text:
    Jessie LANDRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Joseph P. MARTINEZ, et al., Defendant-Appellees.
    No. 8857.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Jan. 29, 1982.
    Donald Richard, Opelousas, for plaintiff-appellant.
    Pugh & Boudreaux, Charles Boudreaux, Lafayette, for defendant-appellee.
    Before GUIDRY, FORET and CUTRER, JJ.
   CUTRER, Judge.

MOTION TO DISMISS

The defendant-appellees, Dr. Joseph P. Martinez et al, moves to dismiss the appeal of plaintiff-appellant, Jessie Landry, on the grounds that the judgment appealed from is an non-appealable interlocutory judgment.

This is a medical malpractice claim filed by Jessie Landry against Joseph P. Martinez, et al. Due to the fact defendants were qualified health care providers, the original petition was dismissed. As provided in LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(C), an attorney chairman was selected by both parties to aide in the selection of the medical review panel. In accordance with LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(C)(2), plaintiff named Dr. John V. Ferazzano, a physician practicing in Opelousas, Louisiana, and of the same specialty as defendants to serve on the medical review panel.

Thereafter, the defendant and his insurer filed a petition for an order and relief pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(CX8). This petition sought an order directing the plaintiff, Jessie Landry, to withdraw the name of Dr. John V. Ferazzano as a member of the medical review panel and to name and select in his place any other duly qualified physician. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s attorney consulted with Dr. John Kempf, an employee of Dr. John V. Feraz-zano, thereby requiring the preclusion of Dr. Ferazzano from the medical review panel. The district court concurred with this opinion and issued an order directing plaintiff to name and select any other duly qualified physician with whom they have had no contact. Plaintiff-appellant has appealed this order.

Defendant-appellee filed a motion to dismiss this appeal contending that the judgment rendered below is not a final judgment, but merely an interlocutory decree which is not appealable absent a showing of irreparable injury. We disagree.

The original petition for damages against Dr. Joseph P. Martinez, Jr., et al., was dismissed by judgment of the trial court as being premature.

The defendant and his insurer then filed a petition seeking relief pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(C)(8). The trial court, after a hearing, rendered judgment granting defendants the relief prayed for.

The only issue before the trial court was the composition of the review panel. This issue being reduced to judgment becomes a final judgment of the only litigation before the trial court. As such, this appeal is properly before this court as it emanates from a final judgment. LSA-C.C.P. Articles 1841 and 2083.

MOTION DENIED.


author: STOKER, Judge.

text:
    Jessie LANDRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Joseph P. MARTINEZ, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 8857.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    May 26, 1982.
    Donald J. Richard, Opelousas, for def-appellant.
    Pugh & Boudreaux, Charles Boudreaux, Sr., Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellee.
    Before GUIDRY, STOKER and LA-BORDE, JJ.
   STOKER, Judge.

This case involves a matter which is incidental to a medical malpractice claim. Alleging that such a claim had been asserted against them, defendant physicians and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company filed a petition seeking to have the malpractice claimant (Jessie Landry) withdraw the name of Dr. John V. Ferazzano as her selection for the medical review panel to be convened under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47. Dr. Ferazzano’s partner in the practice of medicine, Dr. John Kempf, had been consulted by Jessie Landry’s attorney concerning medical matters relative to the merits of the malpractice claim and apparently still acts as medical advisor to Jessie Landry and her counsel with respect to the malpractice claim.

After a hearing on a rule to show cause, the trial court directed that Dr. Ferazzano’s name be withdrawn as a member of the medical review panel. Jessie Landry has appealed.

The principal issue on appeal is: May a medical doctor sit as a medical review panelist where one of his partners in a medical practice has served as medical consultant to the medical malpractice claimant (and will probably continue to do so)?

In our opinion the answer to this question is no.

Our conclusion regarding this question is based on the fact that the statute requires that a medical review panelist “represent neither side”.

LSA-R.S. 40:1299.470(5) provides:

“(5) Before entering upon their duties, each voting panelist shall subscribe before a notary public the following oath:
T, (name) do solemnly swear/affirm that I will faithfully perform the duties of medical review panel member to the best of my ability and without partiality or favoritism of any kind. I acknowledge that I represent neither side and that it is my lawful duty to serve with complete impartiality and to render a decision in accordance with law and the evidence.’
The attorney panel member shall subscribe to the same oath except that in lieu of the last sentence thereof the attorney’s oath shall state:
T acknowledge that I represent neither side and that it is my lawful duty to advise the panel members concerning matters of law and procedure and to serve as chairman.’
The original of each oath shall be attached to the opinion rendered by the panel.”

Without reference to what Dr. Fer-azzano may know concerning Dr. Kempf’s knowledge of the facts of this particular case or any medical opinions Dr. Kempf may hold concerning the facts, we believe that the legislative intent requires that members of the same medical partnership not serve both as consultants and medical review panelists. We decide the question solely as a general proposition, giving effect to the legislative prescription, and also with an eye to the precedent value of our ruling for future cases which may arise. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment holding that Dr. Ferazzano may not serve.

On behalf of defendant-in-rule Jessie Landry it is argued that the trial court’s judgment should be reversed on the basis of the holding in Derouen v. Kolb, 397 So.2d 791 (La.1981). The facts of the case before us are not precisely the same as those present in the Derouen case and for that reason this case is distinguishable from Der-ouen.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment which is appealed from reads as follows:

“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Jessie Landry, through her attorney of record, Mr. Donald J. Richard, be and they are hereby directed to withdraw the name of Dr. John V. Ferazzano, Opelousas, Louisiana, as a member of the medical review panel to be constituted for the review of this case and that they name and select in his place any other duly qualified physician with whom they have had no contact and who has not been consulted by them regarding this case, said physician to serve as one of the members of said medical review panel;
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the delays set forth in LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47 with regard to the selection of panel members and the completion of the panel’s review have been suspended during the pendency of this proceeding and the attorney-chairman of the panel shall be provided with a certified copy of this Judgment as evidence thereof.”

Jessie Landry assigns as an additional error, and apparently in the alternative, that portion of the trial court judgment which ordered her to appoint any other physician with whom she or her attorney have had no contact and who has not been consulted by them. Appellant complains that the broadness of this order will make it impossible for her or her attorney to approach any other physicians to ascertain whether they would accept an appointment to serve on the panel. Under LSA-R.S. 40:1299.470(3) each party to a medical malpractice controversy has the right to select one physician to sit on the medical review panel.

In the brief filed on behalf of appellees, their counsel conceded that appellant’s assignment in this regard has merit. It is conceded by counsel for appellees that the judgment which he prepared is overly broad and he urges that there was no intention that Jessie Landry and her counsel be inhibited in their search for another physician panelist. Hence, we will reform the judgment in this respect.

Appellant has also assigned as error that portion of the trial court’s judgment which orders a suspension of the delays set forth in LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47 with regard to the selection of panel members and the completion of the panel’s review. On behalf of appellant it is argued that the court has no authority to order such a suspension.

In considering LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47 we note that various delays are provided.

Paragraph A provides for a suspension of the general prescription for the filing of suits of this nature (which must be filed under this statutory authority against health care providers qualified under the statute) “until ninety days following the issuance of the opinion by the medical review panel . .."

The filing of the request for review of a claim sets in motion certain procedural steps leading to the appointment of the four members of the medical review panel consisting of the attorney chairman and three physicians. Under LSA-R.S. 40:1299.470(3) the plaintiff in a malpractice claim must notify the attorney chairman of his choice of a physician member of the medical review panel within thirty days of the time that the commissioner of insurance notifies the attorney and all other members of the name of the attorney selected to be chairman. The defendant has 15 days after notification by the plaintiff of his choice of a physician to name his own. Certain time periods are then prescribed within which the two physicians selected by the parties shall select a third physician.

Paragraph G under LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47 provides:

“After reviewing all evidence and after any examination of the panel by counsel representing either party, the panel shall, within thirty days but in all events within one hundred eighty days after the selection of the last panel member, render one or more of the following expert opinions” [specified in subparagraphs one through four under Paragraph G].

Paragraph K provides:

“In the event the medical review panel after a good faith effort has been unable to carry out its duties by the end of the one hundred eighty day period, as provided in R.S. 40:1299.47(G), either party or the commissioner, after exhausting all remedies available to them under this Section, may petition the appropriate court of competent jurisdiction for an order to show cause why the panel should not be dissolved and the panelists relieved of their duties. The suspension of the running of prescription shall cease on the day the court order dissolving the medical review panel becomes final.”

After considering these various delays we are of the opinion that no prejudice results to the appellant as a result of the suspension order complained of. While there may be no specific statutory authority for the trial court to order such a suspension, we think the practical effect of the trial court’s order requiring the withdrawal of the name of Dr. Ferazzano will be to cause such a suspension. Under the portions of the statute discussed above, the plaintiff has a thirty-day period in which to indicate a choice of her physician member of the medical review panel. Inasmuch as the withdrawal of Dr. Ferazzano’s name will be made upon court authority and against the wishes of appellant, equity and fairness would require that she be given an additional thirty days (after the order in question becomes final) in which to make a choice of another physician. It will follow that all other delays will not begin to run until appellant has made her choice.

In our view the suspension contained in the last paragraph of the judgment was unnecessary. Under the circumstances, we think the appropriate action for this court in this appeal is to simply delete that portion of the order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we affirm that portion of the trial court’s judgment which ordered, adjudged and decreed that Jessie Landry through her attorney of record, Mr. Donald J. Richard, be directed to withdraw the name of Dr. John V. Ferazzano, Opelou-sas, Louisiana, as a member of the medical review panel to be constituted for the review of this case.

In all other respects the trial court’s judgment is amended to provide that it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that Jessie Landry, through her attorney of record, be permitted to select any other physician who is qualified by law to sit as a member of the medical review panel as contemplated by LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the portion of the trial court’s judgment which ordered a suspension of delays set forth in LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47 be set aside and deleted with reservation in favor of appellee to claim on equitable grounds further delays as may appear appropriate and justified.

The costs of this appeal shall be assessed equally between plaintiff and defendants.

AFFIRMED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART.

      . Paragraph B of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47 provides:
      “B. No action against a health care provider covered by this Part, or his insurer, may be commenced in any court of this state before the claimant’s proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel established pursuant to this Section and an opinion is rendered by the panel. By agreement of both parties, the use of the medical review panel may be waived.”

      . Counsel for appellee physicians suggests in appellees’ brief that this Court “can very readily remedy that situation by providing that the parties may select any duly qualified physician who has not treated the appellant or seen her as a patient, who has not been consulted by any party or any attorney to the proceedings for a review of the medical aspects of the case and an opinion thereon and who, therefore, has no prior knowledge of the matter to be considered by the panel.” We have confined ourselves to ruling on the narrow question of whether in proceedings under LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47 one member of a medical partnership may be selected by a party as a medical review panelist if another member of the partnership is serving as consultant, advisor or expert to the same party. Under the circumstances, we decline to specify any restrictions concerning the alternative selection to be made by or on behalf of appellant, Jessie Landry. It is implicit in our opinion, of course, that any selection be consistent with the views expressed herein.


author: MARVIN, Judge.

text:
    Mary Beth SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY and Ouachita Parish Police Jury, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14806.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    April 5, 1982.

      McKinley, O’Neal & Storms by Hodge O’Neal, Monroe, for plaintiffs-appellants.
    Rountree & Hicks by Gordon E. Roun-tree, Shreveport, for defendants-appellees.
    Before PRICE, MARVIN and SEXTON, JJ.
   MARVIN, Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal a summary judgment in an action for damages that were allegedly caused when a pickup truck struck one or more potholes in a parish road, went out of control and collided with a tree, causing the damages.

Defendants include the Ouachita Parish Police Jury and its liability insurer under two policies, Reliance Insurance Company.

The summary judgment which dismissed plaintiffs’ demands against the insurer, Reliance, is based on the finding that each of the Reliance policies excludes any liability coverage against damage caused by a street or a road.

Plaintiffs generally contend that a summary judgment is not appropriate because the policy language may be construed by reasonable minds as affording such coverage and because plaintiffs have alleged fault that is broader than the road hazard exclusion, as was recognized in Snell v. Stein, 261 La. 358, 259 So.2d 876 (1972). We affirm.

THE TWO POLICIES

The Police Jury leases gravel pit lands from a private entity on which the Jury maintains a sanitary land fill operation for the disposal of garbage. One Reliance policy, a Manufacturers and Contractors (M & C) liability policy, includes this operations hazard, but excludes “... streets, alleyways, and other ways from the hazard, except that if the declarations [of the policy] contain a classification describing operations [for] the construction, maintenance, or repair of any [street] . .. this exclusion shall not apply ... to such construction, maintenance or repair operations while actually being performed.”

Plaintiffs do not contend that the M & C policy covers the Jury’s liability for the accident complained of. Plaintiffs use the M & C policy language and structure to illustrate why the general liability policy should be held to afford liability coverage. The endorsement purporting to exclude road hazards from the general liability policy is identical to the exclusion, partially quoted above, that is in the M & C policy.

The general liability policy obligates Reliance “... to pay all sums for which the Jury shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies caused by an occurrence ...”

To the general liability policy is attached a form or endorsement entitled “General Liability Hazards”. This form describes certain premises such as office buildings and parks owned by the Jury. Also attached to the policy is the exclusionary endorsement above quoted, which begins, “The Policy does not apply to streets ... ”. This endorsement concludes:

“RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY
“Exclusionary endorsement
“OUACHITA PARISH POLICE JURY
“ACCEPTED BY: s/Billy F. Wilhite
“PRESIDENT
“OUACHITA PARISH
POLICE JURY

The statement at the top of the exclusionary endorsement, “It is agreed that these exclusions do not apply to description of hazards” does not negate the exclusion of streets from the general liability insuring clause of the policy. The road is not in a geographical premises (park or building) described on the General Liability Hazards form.

Plaintiffs contend that the form “General Liability Hazards” is inconsistent with the comprehensive liability coverage of the general policy, relying on the holding in Snell, supra. Snell recognized that allegations of a petition may be broader than the exclusion so as to preclude summary judgment. There the policy excluded road hazards, but the allegations were that the damage was caused by a malfunctioning traffic light.

Plaintiffs here contend that their allegations of negligence (failure to inspect, to warn, to provide adequate personnel and equipment) make the Snell doctrine applicable. We cannot agree. The alleged existence of the potholes in the parish road as the cause of the tragedy complained of is not broadened by plaintiffs’ other allegations as in Snell. By any other name, whether negligent maintenance or failure to warn, the existence of the pot hole(s) is the essential cause of the accident. See Labruzza v. Boston Insurance Company, 198 So.2d 436 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967).

It is not the act or omission of the Jury that is excluded by the endorsement, it is the thing under the control of the Jury as the cause of the damage (here potholes in a parish road), that is excluded from the liability coverage.

We find no uncertainty or ambiguity in the endorsement excluding coverage for damages caused by a “street” under the circumstances and allegations of this case. The contract, its endorsements, and applicable statutes constitute the law in this instance and shall be enforced.

At appellants’ cost, judgment is

AFFIRMED.


text:
    Wilson BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RILEY BUICK, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14,810.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    April 5, 1982.
    Rehearing Denied May 12, 1982.

      McKeithen, Wear & Burns by Russell A. Woodard, Columbia, for plaintiff-appellant.
    Oliver & Wilson by J. Michael Rhymes, Monroe, for Riley Buick, Inc.
    Hudson, Potts & Bernstein by Gordon L. James, Monroe, for General Motors Corp.
    Before PRICE, MARVIN and SEXTON, JJ.
   MARVIN, Judge.

In this redhibitory action arising out of the sale of a new automobile, plaintiff appeals a judgment which decreed a reduction in the purchase price. Plaintiff contends that the trial court should have rescinded the sale.

CC Art. 2543 expressly provides that in a redhibition action the judge may decree a reduction in price. Coco v. Mack Motor Truck Corp., 235 La. 1095, 106 So.2d 691 (1958). Where the defects do not render the thing sold useless, or its use so inconvenient to the degree that it is altogether unsuited to its purpose, the court may deny redhibition and grant a reduction in price. CC Arts. 2520, 2541, 2542. The degree and effect of a defect in the thing sold is a factual determination best made by the trial court under the circumstances of each case. Ark-La-Tex Builders & Realty, Inc. v. Hoge, 344 So.2d 90 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1977). The essential issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a reduction in the purchase price instead of rescinding the sale. We find no abuse and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff purchased the automobile, a 1979 four-door Buick Electra, on November 9, 1978, for $13,250. During the next seven months he drove the car 6,600 miles and returned it to the dealer five times with various complaints, each time complaining of a noise or knock in the engine, which was usually attributed to low octane gasoline. The other complaints concerned such things as door, glove box, and molding adjustments, cosmetic appearance which was apparently corrected by spot painting, and water leakage on the passenger side of the front seat of the car which was not detected by tests made by the dealer. Plaintiff returned the car on November 13, 1978, on January 9, 1979 (with 1,500 miles on it), on January 17, on March 12 (with 3,400 miles), and finally on June 14, 1979 (with 6,600 miles).

On November 2, 1979, plaintiff brought the redhibition action against the dealer, who in turn made the manufacturer (GM) a third party defendant on December 6, 1979. After June 14, 1979, plaintiff drove the car for an additional 4,400 miles until January 1980, when he ceased driving it because he felt it was unsafe when the noise from the engine became louder. When defendants examined the car in February 1980 it had been driven 11,000 miles.

In May 1980 the car was taken by defendant’s mechanic to a dealership in Alexandria where the engine was dismantled and examined by experts. One or more defective piston rods were discovered to be the cause of the engine knock or noise about which plaintiff had complained. The litigants agree that this was a latent manufacturing defect which existed at the time of the sale.

Plaintiff stated that his complaints to the dealer, other than about the engine noise, were “minor stuff” which he desired to have fixed so the car would look “real nice”. Plaintiff’s expert agreed that the engine could be repaired and the vehicle placed in an operable condition. This, the defendants offered to do, along with other preventive maintenance, such as replacing such things as windshield wipers and seals that might have hardened or deteriorated while the car was sitting idle for several months after January 1980.

Defendants obligated themselves or paid for telephone calls ($75) and a wrecker fee ($105) incurred in transporting the car to Alexandria for the inspection of the motor. In addition, defendants offered plaintiff $4,962.84 and later tendered plaintiff this amount by depositing it in the registry of the court before trial. This amount was reached by attempting to total the amount of the repair estimate ($2,142.84, less the $180 telephone and wrecker charges, or $1,962.84), plus the approximate amount of plaintiff’s car payments for one year ($2,070) and $1,000 attorney fees.

The trial court’s award, which totalled $5,162.84, included the repair estimate (which included the $180 telephone and wrecker charge) of $2,162.84, $1,500 reduction, and $1,500 attorney fees. The trial court’s award should be viewed in the proper legal perspective as $3,662.84 reduction in price, plus $1,500 attorney fees.

A graphic comparison of the tender and the awards reveals that defendants tendered at least $130 less than the total the trial court awarded. Under C.C. Art. 2545, attorney fees are a part of the “repayment of expenses” which a successful plaintiff in redhibition — quanti minoris is entitled to recover. See Borne v. Mike Persia Chevrolet Co. Inc., 396 So.2d 326 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ refused.

The total amount tendered ($4,962.84) is less than the total of the trial court’s award ($5,162.84), not more. Defendants assert in answer to the appeal that because they tendered more ($2,000 or $2,070) than the trial court awarded for the actual “reduction,” they should be relieved of costs. Defendants also suggest that $1,000 is more than adequate as attorney fees because that figure was suggested by the attorney for the plaintiffs during negotiations but before trial. Again we must make the comparison in the proper legal perspective. There is but one reduction in price, although that reduction may be based on several factors such as the factors used in this case.

Viewed in its totality and considering the circumstances that this automobile had a defective engine when sold, but was yet driven for 11,000 miles for more than a year, and that the engine could have been repaired to a new condition for approximately $2,000, the trial court judgment awarding a reduction of $3,662.84 and attorney fees of $1,500 is not an abuse of discretion and achieves substantial justice between the litigants.

Similarly, where the defendants tender a total, including attorney fees, of $4,962.84, and the trial court award totals $5,162.84, the trial court has not abused its discretion in assessing defendants with costs and with legal interest. Legal interest should run on the total amount of the award from the date of judicial demand until the date of the tender and on the $200 difference from the date of the judgment of the trial court until paid. C.C. Art. 1938. See Williams v. Hanover Insurance Co. of New York, 351 So.2d 858 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1977).

The judgment is ordered amended accordingly. In all other respects we do not disturb the judgment appealed. Costs of this appeal shall be assessed one-half to plaintiff and one-half to defendants.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED.

      . The following complaints and corrective steps taken were noted on the dealer’s repair orders on:
      (1) 11/13/78: (a) engine knock — timing adjusted; (b) wind noise, leak — doors adjusted; (c) molding tightened; (d) doors, trunk, deck lid painted; (e) rear bumper cushion ordered; (f) glove compartment aligned.
      (2) 1/9/79: (a) monitor lamp repaired; (b) left front door repaired; (c) rear bumper pad replaced; (d) doors realigned; (e) engine knock checked. (3) 1/17/79: (a) doors adjusted; (b) headlining repaired; (c) molding on rear glass repaired; (e) engine knock present.
      (4)3/12/79: (a) doors adjusted; (b) headlining on left side repaired; (c) repaint front fender; (d) water leak present; (e) engine knock continues.
      (5) 6/14/79: (a) paint on left door checked; (b) doors adjusted; (c) adjust glove compartment; (d) tape player and radio not working— removed for repair; (e) headlining repaired; (f) paint front door, grill and hood; (g) engine noise checked again.

      . Total Reduction Attorney Fee Total
      TENDER $4,032.84 $1,000 $5,032.84
      AWARD 3,662.84 1,500 5,162.84
      DIFFERENCE $ 370.00 ($ 500) ($ 130.00)
      The correspondence leading up to the tender and defendants’ pleadings in making the tender use the figures mentioned above which total $5,032.84. The actual tender, however, was $4,962.84 or $70.00 less than what the figures totalled.


author: GARRISON, Judge.

text:
    The BANK OF NEW ORLEANS AND TRUST COMPANY v. Norris T. PHILLIPS and Ruth Phillips.
    No. 11716.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    May 11, 1982.

      Matthews & Breeden, Patrick D. Bree-den, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.
    Newman & Drolla, Robert T. Wakefield and Joseph E. Fick, Jr., New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
    Before GARRISON, CHEHARDY and KLIEBERT, JJ.
   GARRISON, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the First City Court, granting to plaintiffs in reconvention, Norris and Ruth Phillips, the amount of $250.00, plus legal interest and costs, as well as attorney’s fees in the amount of $700.00. From that judgment, which we affirm, the Bank of New Orleans (hereinafter BNO) appeals.

The case arises out of a suit on an open account for the balance due and owing on a revolving VISA credit card account. BNO filed suit in First City Court in Orleans Parish. The Phillips were both domiciled in Plaquemines Parish. After service, the Phillips filed an exception of venue and answer and reconventional demand. The reconventional demand alleges that the filing of BNO’s petition in a parish other than where the Phillips are domiciled is an Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice, prohibited by R.S. 51:1401 et seq., in light of BNO’s knowledge of the Phillips’ true domicile. BNO filed an exception of no cause of action and an answer in response to the recon-ventional demand. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Phillips, granting their exception to venue, denying BNO’s exception of no cause of action, dismissing BNO’s original petition without prejudice, and granting damages and attorney’s fees to the Phillips on their reconventional demand.

On appeal, BNO argues that R.S. 51:1401 et seq. does not apply to banks, that the filing of suit in the wrong venue is not an unfair or deceptive act under R.S. 51:1401 et seq., and that the trial court erred in awarding damages and attorney’s fees.

BNO argues that it is not subject to the act due to the language of R.S. 51:1406 which provides as follows:

“The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to:
“(1) Actions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Public Service Commission or other public utility regulatory body, the state bank commissioner and the insurance commissioner, and any bank chartered by or under the authority of the United States acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices” (emphasis added)

BNO further argues that banks are regulated solely by R.S. 6:1 et seq. While banks are generally regulated by the State Banking Commissioner, this particular transaction is not. In the instant case, BNO is not acting as a bank, but rather as a commercial credit card company. This fact was recognized by the legislature in 1974. Prior to that time, R.S. 6:965-969, dealing with revolving loan plans and retail installment contracts, were placed in Chapter 6 of the Revised Statutes and placed under the jurisdiction of the State Banking Commissioner. Those provisions were repealed by Acts 1974, No. 466 § 3. Thus, bank credit card transactions are no longer within the jurisdiction of the State Banking Commissioner. Accordingly, the exception contained in R.S. 51:1406 does not apply and the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act does apply.

The second specification of error raised by BNO is that the trial judge erred in finding that the filing of suit in an improper venue is an unfair and deceptive trade practice. BNO argues that it is not unlawful or deceptive to file suit in an improper venue, citing Code of Civil Procedure Art. 44, because venue is waivable.

C.C.P. Art. 44 provides as follows:

“An objection to the venue may not be waived prior to the institution of the action.
“The venue provided in Articles 2006, 2811, 2812, 3941, 3991, 4031 through 4034, 4541, and 4542 may not be waived.
“Except as otherwise provided in this article or by other law, any objection to the venue, including one based on any article in this Chapter, is waived by the failure of the defendant to plead the declinatory exception timely as provided in Article 928.” (emphasis added)

Venue is waivable only after suit is filed; hence, the filing of suit in the wrong venue by plaintiff does not act as a waiver of defendant’s rights. After filing and service, the burden then shifts to defendant to assert those rights, but only after institution of proceedings. We find that C.C.P. Articles 44, 925 and 121, when read together, contemplate two different situations. The first situation occurs when the plaintiff does not have sufficient knowledge to ascertain the correct venue or acts upon incorrect knowledge and erroneously files suit in the wrong venue. In this instance, a transfer of venue under Art. 121 is proper. The second situation occurs where the plaintiff knowingly files suit in the wrong venue. In this instance, a dismissal under C.C.P. Art. 121 is proper. In both instances, a defendant may waive venue if he so chooses, but plaintiff cannot anticipate a waiver of defendant’s preexisting due process rights. We find that the intentional and knowledgeable filing of suit in the wrong venue is tantamount to an abuse of process. It acts as a harassment to the defendant and attempts to hinder him in his access to the courts. Accordingly, we find that the intentional, knowledgeable filing of suit in the wrong venue is an unfair trade practice within the contemplation of R.S. 51:1401 et seq.

The last specification of error is that the trial court erred in awarding damages and attorney’s fees. R.S. 51:1409 provides as follows:

“Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice declared unlawful by R.S. 51:1405, may bring an action individually but not in a representative capacity to recover actual damages. If the court finds the unfair or deceptive method, act or practice was knowingly used, after being put on notice by the director or attorney general, the court shall award three times the actual damages sustained. In the event that damages are awarded under this Section, the court shall award to the person bringing such action reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Upon a finding by the court that an action under this section was groundless and brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, the court may award to the defendant reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” (emphasis added)

The definition of “actual” provides as follows:

Defendant argues that “actual” damages does not include humiliation and mental anguish. We do not agree. Humiliation and mental anguish are “real”, “genuine”, “existing in fact”, a part of “reality” and “exist in the present”, as opposed to the future. Accordingly, we find that the trial judge acted properly in awarding damages to the plaintiffs. Likewise, the trial judge acted properly in awarding attorney’s fees and court costs. Once damages are awarded to a plaintiff, the trial judge is mandated to award fees and costs.

For the reasons discussed, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . BNO’s knowledge of plaintiffs’ Plaquemines Parish domicile is evidenced by the address that BNO gave for service of process on the Phillips.

      . Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (G. & C. Merriam Co., 1971).


author: WATKINS, Judge.

text:
    Edward BAHM and June Bahm v. SUCCESSION (Estate) OF Maude McMICHAEL.
    No. 14809.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 25, 1982.

      Henry Mentz, Jr., Hammond, for plaintiff.
    Roy Wood, Amite, for defendant.
    Before COVINGTON, COLE and WATKINS, JJ.
   WATKINS, Judge.

Edward Bahm and his wife, June Bahm, filed the present action for a money judgment against the Succession of Maude McMichael for services rendered Miss McMichael before her death on October 14, 1979, The action was filed July 31, 1980. The Succession through its administrator, John H. George, filed a peremptory exception of prescription. The trial court held that plaintiffs’ claim for all services rendered before July 31, 1979, was prescribed. Plaintiffs have appealed. We reverse and remand.

According to the deposition of Edward Bahm, Miss McMichael persuaded the Bahms to build a house about one hundred feet from Miss McMichael’s house with the express verbal agreement that Miss McMi-chael would leave the Bahms “her place in her will”. Also implicit in the agreement was the understanding that the Bahms would take care of the place and perform personal services for Miss McMichael until her death. Mr. Bahm contends he mowed the lawn, trimmed hedges, and generally maintained the grounds on Miss McMicha-el’s place from 1962 until her death, as well as hiring sitters for Miss McMichael after she had her first heart attack in 1979, and performing other personal services. Miss McMichael left an unsigned paper which the Bahms contend was in her handwriting which states in a third paragraph: “3. I will will my home to Edward Bahm with the understanding that he will take care of me until I die.” Mrs. Bahm was Miss McMichael’s cousin.

The succession representative contends the claim of the Bahms is one for payment of wages by a workman, laborer, or servant, which prescribes within one year after the work is performed under LSA-C.C. art. 3534.

It is well settled that one who renders services for a person under the promise he will be left certain property in that person’s will may recover that property from the person’s succession after death if the promise was not kept and those services were in fact performed. Succession of Oliver, 184 La. 26, 165 So. 318 (1936). Also under a line of jurisprudence beginning with Oliver, prescription on a claim for such services does not begin to run until decedent’s death, as until death, no right of action has accrued. White v. Succession of Candebat, 210 La. 995, 29 So.2d 39 (1946); Succession of Berthelot, 24 So.2d 185 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1945); Succession of Catalinotto, 144 So.2d 678 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1962). There is some suggestion in the cited cases that the claim must be filed within one year of death, and that the services must be continuous until the time of death.

In the present case, the Bahms’ claim is not prescribed as the claim is one for services for which they contend they were promised they would be compensated by will; they were not compensated; the claim was filed within a year of death, and the performance of services was continuous from 1962 until the time of death.

We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court, overrule the exception of prescription, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings, all costs of this appeal to be borne by the Succession of Maude McMichael, all other costs to await final disposition of this matter.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


author: CARTER, Judge:

text:
    Larry WOODS v. PETROLEUM HELICOPTERS, INC., et al.
    No. 14833.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 25, 1982.
    Lee W. Rand, Badeaux, Discon, Cumberland & Barbier, New Orleans, for appellant.
    J. Mark Graham, Henderson, Hanemann & Morris, Houma, for appellees.
    Before LEAR, CARTER and LANIER, JJ.
   CARTER, Judge:

This workmen’s compensation case is before us on appeal from a judgment of dismissal holding that the injured party had received all compensation due him. We affirm.

After a series of various jobs with various employers, on March 6, 1980, appellant Woods went to work for Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. as a laborer and general maintenance man. On June 2, 1980, Woods was injured in the course and scope of his employment. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. was insured by American Home Assurance Company who paid workmen’s compensation benefits to Woods for temporary disability through September 8, 1980. Woods filed suit on November 13,1980, alleging that he was permanently disabled and seeking weekly benefits, medical expenses, and penalties. It is the dismissal of this suit that he is appealing.

On the day of the accident, Woods and a co-employee were repairing a golf cart, the rear end of which was suspended from a chain hoist. As Woods was lifting the rear end, it became disconnected from the chain hoist, and most of the weight of the cart came down on him. Woods testified at trial that he felt a snap in his back at the time of the accident but did not experience any immediate pain and finished out the work day. He did experience some pain sitting in a car riding home from work. He testified that by the next morning, “I noticed it wasn’t there, ... ”. Nevertheless, when he reported the accident at work that morning, he stated that he felt he needed to see a doctor. After complaining several times to his immediate superior, Woods was allowed to fill out an accident report and was sent to Dr. Hector Ruiz. Dr. Ruiz prescribed medication and released Woods from work until Friday. On Friday evening, Dr. Ruiz admitted Woods to a hospital where he remained for six days.

Appellant’s low back pain worsened, and Dr. Ruiz called in Dr. Jeffrey Fitter, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Fitter began his examination and treatment of Woods on June 9, 1980. Woods stated to the doctor that the pain had lessened somewhat with hospital treatment, but he still had moderate discomfort in the right low back area. He further stated to Dr. Fitter that he had had transient pain in both of his legs immediately after his injury but had experienced no pain in his legs since then. Dr. Fitter felt that Woods had sustained an acute lumbar strain but could find no objective clinical findings of injury. Dr. Fitter advised Dr. Ruiz that Woods appeared to be improving with treatment in the hospital and did not recommend any changes in the program. He felt that Woods was getting over his problem at that time and could probably be discharged from the hospital in a short period of time. He further felt that Woods might require out-patient treatment for one to two weeks before returning to work.

The treatment prescribed for Woods while in the hospital was rest in an orthopedic bed, application of hot packs to the painful areas of his back, and medications for muscle relaxation and pain. Dr. Fitter re-examined Woods on June 19 and found that the tenderness of the lumbar muscle was gone. Although Dr. Hector Ruiz, in one of his reports, stated that he had found muscle spasms, Dr. Fitter stated that he had no record of Woods having any muscle spasms at any time. Dr. Fitter found no sign of herniated disc or other serious lesion; however, he instructed Woods to remain in bed for another two or three weeks. He prescribed a muscle relaxant and Darvo-eet N-10Q, a pain reliever, as needed. On July 3, Dr. Fitter again examined Woods, and Woods continued to complain about low back pain and pain in his right anterior thigh. Dr. Fitter testified that Woods was “somewhat dramatic in his voluntary restrictions of motion in the back.” He found a full range of motion in the lumbar spine. A straight leg raising test was positive with the patient in the supine position, but the same straight leg raising test was negative with Woods in the sitting position. Dr. Fitter testified that he performs the test both in the supine and sitting positions to determine if the patient is being sincere. He explained that if the straight leg raising sign is positive in the supine position, it will also necessarily be positive with the patient sitting.

Dr. Fitter again examined Woods on July 29, and despite Woods’s complaint of low back pain, Dr. Fitter found the results of the examination to be normal except for “voluntary guarding against passive range of motion in the lumbar spine and complaints of vague pain in that area.” He advised Woods that he could not find anything wrong with his back, and that he felt a second orthopedic opinion would be appropriate before releasing him from treatment. He referred Woods to Dr. Russell Grunsten, an orthopedic surgeon in New Orleans.

Dr. Grunsten performed an orthopedic examination on Woods on August 25, 1980. This examination was essentially negative and confirmed Dr. Fitter’s findings. Dr. Grunsten observed rigidity of musculature which he testified is an uncommon response for any injury of the back. He stated that standing rigid, as Woods did, will produce pain in a person who has a back injury. He found Woods’s range of motion restriction uniform in each direction. He testified that, invariably, when there is an injury to the back, that injury is one that mechanically interferes with one direction of motion, but not all four directions of motion. As did Dr. Fitter, he found that straight leg raising in the supine position brought complaints of pain from Woods but that there was no complaint of pain from the straight leg raising test in the sitting position. Woods further complained of pain in the back of the thigh when Dr. Grunsten slowly bent Woods’s knee. Dr. Grunsten testified that this is not physiologically explainable or possible. X-rays revealed no abnormalities and only a slight scoliosis of the lum-barsacral spine convexed to the left. Dr. Grunsten did not consider this scoliosis to be an abnormality because he was of the opinion that it was “obviously positioned.” Dr. Grunsten testified:

“Because of the history revealed, the physical examination, the x-rays studies that we had done, it was my opinion that this patient presented what I identified as a grossly contradictory straight leg raising response; as well as an overall range of motion of the low-back area. No objective evidence of mechanical interference could be identified, nor was any objective evidence of nerve root irritation.
It was my feeling that the current x-rays were within normal limits. With this consideration, I was unable to identify any objective evidence of injury residual referable to the low back and it was felt by me that this patient could be permitted to resume what for him would be a normal daily physical activity program.”

Dr. Grunsten further testified:

“Q. Doctor, the straight leg raising test you have noted and explained to us very well that they were completely contradictory, is that physiologically explainable, is there any explanation for such a contradiction?
A. It is physiologically not explainable. I would contemplate that this patient is magnifying his complaints. He is attempting to have me believe there is injury greater than there is or that there is injury where there is none.
Q. You also mentioned rigidity of the musculature and flexion being things inconsistent with a back injury.
A. That’s correct. These are not findings that are associated with true back injury pathology.”

Dr. Grunsten also testified that a “lumbar facet syndrome” is no longer a medically acceptable diagnosis and that use of the term stems from misinformation popular over twenty years ago. He further stated that Woods exhibited no problems ref erra-ble to the facets and had no mechanical problems in his back facet, disc, vertebrae, musculature, or otherwise. In short, after thorough examination, Dr. Grunsten could find no evidence of injury and was of the opinion that plaintiff could resume his normal activity without difficulty and that Woods greatly magnified his complaints in an apparent attempt to deceive the physician. After receiving Dr. Grunsten’s report, Dr. Fitter released Woods from treatment on September 12, 1980.

On September 4, 1980, Woods was referred to Dr. Kenneth Vogel, a neurosurgeon, by his attorney. Dr. Vogel found a moderate degree of motion in all directions and focal muscle spasms in the left multifi-dis triangle. He described the multifidis triangle as the very lowest part of the back where the sacrum and ilium join in a triangle. He also found mild scoliosis to the right. He performed a straight leg raising test and found it to be positive and further found hypalgelsia of the left foot. Considering the above findings, Dr. Vogel felt that Woods suffered a permeated disc and a lumbar facet syndrome secondary to an acute lumbosacral strain. He prescribed conservative care, medication, and physiotherapy. Dr. Vogel next saw Woods on October 30, and Woods complained of low back and bilateral leg pain. Examination revealed mild muscle spasms present bilat-eraly. Dr. Vogel recommended that Woods continue the conservative care he had initiated before. On December 2, 1980, Dr. Vo-gel again saw Woods and he was still complaining of severe low back pain and left leg pain, with mild muscle spasm on the right. At this time, Dr. Vogel recommended that Woods be hospitalized and a myelogram performed. Woods was scheduled to enter the hospital on January 4, 1981, but did not because he could not make financial arrangements. It was established during the trial that Woods made demand upon appellees to provide this medical service and was refused. Dr. Vogel next saw Woods on March 17, and Woods complained of low back pain and bilateral leg pain, in the left more than the right. Dr. Vogel found focal muscle spasm in the multifidis triangle again. In summary, Dr. Vogel felt that Woods either sustained a chronic lum-bosacral strain, lumbar facet syndrome, or hernia of the disc. He felt Mr. Woods would not be able to return to his former employment.

Appellant Woods testified that the golf cart was jacked up by two separate chains, one on each side. The chains were connected to the top of the building, and when the chain on the side that he was working on slipped he felt the pressure of the cart on him. His co-worker, Ray Lee, ran from the other side to give him some assistance, but Woods had “already felt it snap, you know.” He did not experience immediate pain. He continued to work from about 4:45 p. m. to about 5:30 pm. After that, he rode home with a co-worker and experienced some pain in his back sitting in the seat of the co-worker’s vehicle. The next morning he noticed that the pain wasn’t there. He testified to the various consultations, examinations, and treatments by the various physicians, including Dr. Hector Ruiz, who did not testify in this case. He testified that he continually experienced pain in the low back area. At trial, he pointed out the area to be to the right of the midline of the back or the midline on or above the belt line. He described the examination by Dr. Grunsten as very cursory and stated that Dr. Grunsten specifically told him he could not return to work — in direct contravention of the doctor’s testimony.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the testimony of Dr. Vogel, who counsel contends was the claimant’s treating physician. Appellant cites the case of Kinsey v. Travelers Ins. Co., Inc., 402 So.2d 226 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1981) to support his argument for the proposition that Woods had the right to select a physician of his choice as his treating physician. Kinsey is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. Certainly an injured employee is permitted to select the physician of his choice as his treating physician while he is in need of treatment and undergoing treatment. In Kinsey, it was not disputed that the claimant needed additional treatment. The dispute was whether the claimant had the right to choose his own doctor and compel the insurance company to pay for the treatment by a physician of his choice. This case is not authority for the proposition that the plaintiff in a workmen’s compensation case is entitled to select a physician upon whom the title “treating physician” is to be bestowed thereby making the “treating physician’s” testimony entitled to greater weight than that of an “examining physician”. It is highly possible and quite often the case than an individual will have two or more “treating physicians” and certainly the treating physicians’ testimony is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of an “examining physician”. See LaBorde v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Company, Inc., 316 So.2d 440 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1975), writ refused 320 So.2d 207 (La.1975); Launey v. Lawton Forest Products, 309 So.2d 901 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1975); Moulard v. Massman Construction Company, 209 So.2d 742 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1968); Martinez v. Equitable Equipment Company, 330 So.2d 634, 637 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1976). In the instant case, we find that Dr. Fitter was the original treating physician and Dr. Vogel was the treating physician after Woods had been discharged by Dr. Fitter. In very well prepared findings of fact and reasons for judgment, the trial court stated:

“Plaintiff’s testimony concerning his physical condition is completely contradicted by the great weight of medical testimony. It is apparent to the Court that plaintiff is exaggerating his complaints. The complaints which he does have do not fit any physiological pattern and, therefore, can only be concluded to be insincere.
He did indeed sustain an injury by accident in the course and scope of his employment but he has not borne the burden of proving that he was disabled beyond early September when he was released by Dr. Fitter as able to return to work. He has been paid compensation for that entire period.
Plaintiff's claim for penalties and attorney’s fees must likewise fail because the action of the insurer in terminating compensation was more than adequately supported by the medical evidence at that time. Plaintiff argues that subsequent medical evidence from Dr. Vogel so changed the picture that not only should penalties and attorney’s fees be awarded but compensation should have been reinstated and defendants should be required to pay for the diagnostic studies proposed by Dr. Vogal (sic). However, plaintiff’s argument overlooks the facts that the great weight of evidence is in opposition to the opinion of Dr. Vogal (sic) that plaintiff continues with legitimate complaints. Defendants actions were in no way arbitrary.
The basic issue in the case is plaintiff’s credibility and the Court has not been impressed by him favorably in this regard. His description of the examination given him by Dr. Grunston (sic) certainly does not compare favorably with Dr. Grunston’s (sic) testimony. Further, he stated that Dr. Grunston (sic) specifically told him that he could not return to work and this is in direct contravention of the doctor’s findings and his testimony. His testimony specifically contradicts that of Dr. Grunston (sic) as to the number and type of tests administered.”

The evidence is sufficient to maintain the trial court’s determination that the injury was not such as to render the claimant disabled beyond September 8, 1980. A trial court may accept or reject an opinion expressed by a medical expert, depending on what impression the qualifications, credibility, and testimony of the expert make on the court. In evaluating the testimony of medical experts, the trial judge must consider the opportunities each physician had for observation and examination of the patient and the expert’s familiarity with the patient and the patient’s history. In deciding whether an employee has proven his claimed disability, the totality of the evidence, medical and lay, must be considered. Tantillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 315 So.2d 743 (La.1975); Batiste v. Pointe Coupee Constructors, Inc., et al., 401 So.2d 1263 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1981).

It is the trial judge’s function to determine the weight which is to be accorded the medical and the lay testimony. In carrying out this function, the court below apparently gave greater weight to the medical testimony of Dr. Fitter and Dr. Grunsten than to that of Dr. Vogel. The trial judge discounted the lay testimony. The trial judge apparently concluded that the plaintiff was exaggerating his complaints and that his complaints did not fit any physiological pattern and were therefore insincere.

It is well established that on appellate review the trial court’s factual findings as to disability are entitled to great weight. They are not to be disturbed in the absence of manifest error. Batiste v. Pointe Coupee Constructors, Inc., supra; Cadiere v. West Gibson Products Co., Inc., 364 So.2d 998 (La.1978); LaBorde v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Company, Inc., 316 So.2d 440 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1975), writ denied, 320 So.2d 207 (La.1975).

We conclude that a reasonable evaluation of evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Mr. Woods was no longer disabled after September 8, 1980, and this finding will not be disturbed. Having arrived at the above conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider appellant’s contention that the trial judge erred in denying penalties and attorney fees. For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellant’s costs.

AFFIRMED.

      . Suit was filed against Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. and “American International Insurance Company”. In answer to this suit, Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. set forth “.. . there is no such entity as American International Insurance Company.” Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. set forth that it had workmen’s compensation insurance but did not set out the name of the company. Though the pleadings do not reflect the proper name of the insurer, it was developed in the trial of the case that American Home Assurance Company was the workmen’s compensation insurer. Except for their appellate briefs, various pleadings filed by both appellant and appellee continue to carry the erroneous caption. For this appeal we will consider Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. as the sole appellee.

      . The injury occurred on Tuesday.

      . Apparently, a stalemate existed between appellant and appellee. Defendant-appellee’s Exhibit # 3 indicates that appellee requested that Woods submit to another medical examination and that Woods refused to do so unless outstanding medical bills and overdue compensation benefits were paid, and unless hospitalization was authorized for a myelogram.