source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BLANCHE, Justice. LEMMON, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Linda B. DODD v. NICOLON CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 82-C-0790.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 1982.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1982.

      Dennis R. Whalen, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-applicant.
    William J. Doran, Jr., William T. Kivett, Doran & Kivett, Baton Rouge, for defendant-respondent.
   BLANCHE, Justice.

The plaintiff, Linda Dodd, now married to Ollie Perry, suffered an injury to her knees as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Nicolon Corporation, a/k/a United States Textures Sales Corporation. Plaintiff brought this suit against Nicolon Corporation and its insurer, The Maryland Casualty Company, seeking workmen’s compensation benefits based on total permanent disability, or in the alternative, permanent partial disability. In addition, the plaintiff prayed for penalties and attorney’s fees for the defendants’ failure to pay compensation.

After a hearing on the merits, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit by finding that Perry’s continuing disability was attributed to her failure to engage in exercises prescribed by her doctor. The court of appeal affirmed in its original hearing. On rehearing, the appellate court again refused to grant the plaintiff any disability benefits, but did award her penalties in the amount of 12% of $1,805.00 together with $100.00 in attorney’s fees. Since neither party has complained to this court concerning the court of appeal’s award of penalties and attorney’s fees, we uphold this portion of the judgment. We believe, however, that the lower courts erred in failing to grant the plaintiff partial permanent disability benefits.

Linda Dodd Perry was employed by Nico-lon Corporation as office manager for a warehouse which stored large rolls of erosion control filter fabric. Part of Perry’s job included the act of climbing on the rolls in order to cut samples for customers. On May 16, 1977, as Mrs. Perry was climbing on the rolls of fabric, she slipped and fell, striking her knees on the concrete floor.

The day following the accident, the plaintiff visited the office of Dr. James Kilroy, an orthopedic surgeon. Perry complained of pain in her left knee. After an examination of the plaintiff revealed tenderness in the area of the knee, Dr. Kilroy placed her on one crutch with a splint and an ace wrap. Three days later, Mrs. Perry returned to Dr. Kilroy’s office. At this time, she was instructed to use two crutches.

On June 20, 1977, Dr. Kilroy diagnosed Perry’s condition as chondromalacia of both patellas. Chondromalacia, as explained by Dr. Kilroy, is a roughness in the back of the kneecap which causes a grinding sensation, in addition to pain and swelling. After several more visits with Mrs. Perry, Dr. Kilroy determined that surgical intervention was necessary to correct the condition. On April 26, 1978, surgery was performed on the plaintiff’s left knee to shave the rough areas under the knee. Similar surgery was performed on the right knee on September 5, 1978.

The plaintiff commenced physical therapy on October 18, 1978. Dr. Kilroy examined the plaintiffs knees on February 9, 1979 and found that she had full, unrestricted motion in her right knee. Perry was then referred to a physical therapist for a final evaluation. Upon receipt of the therapist’s report, Dr. Kilroy wrote a letter on February 14,1979 to the Maryland Casualty Company to inform it that he was of the opinion that the plaintiff could return to work as long as she did not do any excessive kneeling or climbing.

. On October 29, 1979, the plaintiff complained to Dr. Kilroy that she was experiencing pain and weakness in both knees. The doctor attributed this weakness to Mrs. Perry’s failure to perform her exercises, and he instructed her to continue her physical therapy. The plaintiff did undergo physical therapy for several weeks, but it was interrupted when she developed a neu-roma of her left knee. This neuroma was surgically removed on January 22, 1980. Subsequently, however the plaintiff contracted phlebitis and was placed on crutches for an extended period of time. When she recovered from phlebitis, Dr. Kilroy performed a plastic closure to reduce the size of the scars on Linda Perry’s legs. The plaintiff developed suture abscesses as a result of this operation.

By February 27, 1980, plaintiff was once again able to resume physical therapy. In August, 1980, however, Mrs. Perry returned to Dr. Kilroy and complained of weakness in her knees. Dr. Kilroy later testified that he believed that the plaintiff’s decreased strength was a result of her failure to do her exercises. He further testified that, with proper exercise, Mrs. Perry could perform any job, as long as it did not involve excessive kneeling or squatting.

EXTENT OF DISABILITY

Plaintiff concedes in brief that she is not permanently and totally disabled. This does not, however, preclude her from receiving any compensation award at all. Schouest v. J. Ray McDermott and Co., Inc., 411 So.2d 1042 (La.1982); Allor v. Belden Corp., 393 So.2d 1233 (La.1981). La.R.S. 23:1221(3) as amended provides that an employee is deemed partially disabled if he is unable “to perform the duties in which he was customarily engaged when injured or duties of the same or similar character, nature, or description for which he was fitted by education, training, and experience ...” We find that the preponderance of the evidence shows that Linda Perry is permanently and partially disabled.

The record reveals that Mrs. Perry underwent surgery on her knees on April 26,1978 and September 5, 1978. As a result of this surgery, Dr. Kilroy awarded the plaintiff a total, permanent physical impairment rating of fifteen percent for each knee. Since these surgical procedures involved the removal of cartilage which provides a cushion for the kneecap, Dr. Kilroy told Mrs. Perry that she should refrain from any excessive kneeling.

At the time of her accident, Linda Perry was employed by Nicolon Corporation as an office manager. Although her job was supervisory in nature, she was expected to perform the duty of cutting material for samples or for a sale. Mrs. Perry testified that this material was stored on large rolls and were stacked as many as twenty rolls high. In order to obtain a sample, the plaintiff would climb on the rolls, pull a roll out of the stack, and stretch it out on the floor of the warehouse. Then the material would be marked, and the plaintiff would get on her hands and knees to cut it with a pair of scissors or long shears. Mrs. Perry testified that she was expected to perform these acts almost on a daily basis.

Recently, in Naquin v. Uniroyal, Inc., 405 So.2d 525 (La.1981), this court found a claimant to be partially disabled when his work-related injury prevented him from performing significant physical tasks which were expected by his employer and important to the effective performance of his work, even though the physical tasks were incidental to his supervisory position. In the present case, Mrs. Perry was expected by her employers to cut material for samples or for sales. The physical task of cutting such material required excessive kneeling, and Dr. Kilroy specifically stated that, due to her knee surgery, the plaintiff should refrain from this type of activity. Mrs. Perry, therefore, could no longer perform the significant physical tasks (that of cutting material for samples and sales) which were expected by her employer and important to the performance of her job. These tasks were employment duties in which she was customarily engaged when injured. She was therefore permanently and partially disabled on April 26, 1978, the date of her first knee surgery.

The lower courts denied disability benefits to Mrs. Perry upon finding that she had failed to engage in the exercises that Dr. Kilroy prescribed and that such exercises could have remedied any continuing functional disability. The decisions of the courts below failed to consider the uncon-tradicted testimony of Dr. Kilroy who stated that even if Mrs. Perry performed her exercises and regained her full strength, she should refrain from spending long periods of time kneeling or squatting.

BENEFITS DUE

Since the plaintiff was injured on May 16, 1977, she is entitled to compensation benefits not to exceed 425 weeks with credit given the insurer for benefits previously paid and for those weeks in which actual wages are earned. La.R.S. 23:1221(3). The maximum weekly compensation to be paid is $95.00 per week. La.R.S. 23:1202(1).

We find that the plaintiff is entitled to receive partial permanent disability benefits commencing on April 26, 1978. It was on this date that the plaintiff underwent her first knee operation. Dr. Kilroy testified this surgical procedure involved the removal of the cushion from the kneecap and prevented Mrs. Perry from engaging in any excessive kneeling.

The record reveals that after her April 26, 1978 operation, the plaintiff did receive compensation in the amount of $95.00 per week for forty-three weeks extending over the period beginning May 2, 1978 and ending February 19, 1979. Disability benefits were also paid to Mrs. Perry following her surgery for the removal of her neuroma. These benefits were in the amount of $95.00 per week and were paid for nineteen weeks, from January 22, 1980 through June 2, 1980. Credit is to be given the insurer for benefits paid during these weeks.

In addition, the record shows that Mrs. Perry was employed with Cajun Contractors and Engineers, Inc. on April 26, 1978. She then terminated her employment with Cajun on May 16, 1978 and has not worked since that time. For the three week period of April 26, 1978 through May 16, 1978, the plaintiff is only entitled to 66%% of the difference between her wages at the time of her injury and any lesser wages which she actually earned with Cajun Contractors. La.R.S. 23:1221(3). At the time of her accident on May 16, 1977, Mrs. Perry was earning $1,000.00 per month or $230.77 per week. With Cajun Contractors, the plaintiff earned $173.10 per week. Therefore, we find that the plaintiff is entitled to 66% % of the difference of $230.77 and $173.10 which is a sum of $38.45 per week for the period of April 26, 1978 through May 16, 1978.

Although the plaintiff can seek reimbursement for medical expenses, the record indicates that the Maryland Casualty has paid all her outstanding medical bills through August 12, 1980.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as its failure to award the plaintiff benefits for partial disability. The decision of the Court of Appeal is affirmed as to the assessment of attorney’s fees and penalties. The plaintiff is entitled to partial permanent disability benefits pursuant to the provisions of La.R.S. 23:1221(3). Such benefits shall commence April 26, 1978, and shall be received during the period of disability, not to exceed 425 weeks. Said disability benefits are subject to a credit of $95.00 per week for forty-three weeks commencing May 2,1978 and subject to a credit of $95.00 per week for nineteen weeks commencing January 22, 1980, representing prior benefits paid. Legal interest shall accrue on all past due installments owed from date due until paid. Court costs are assessed to the defendants.

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART AND RENDERED.

LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

LEMMON, Justice,

concurring in part.

I concur in the decree awarding plaintiff benefits for partial disability. However, defendant has not sought employment since her marriage. In accordance with my concurring opinion in Schouest v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 411 So.2d 1042 (La.1982), I would allow benefits only for those weeks in which plaintiff did not earn wages because of the disability, either because the injury prevented her from working or because work was not available to a worker in plaintiff’s condition with her education and skills. Accordingly, I would allow the employer an opportunity to prove that plaintiff did not work only because she chose to collect compensation instead.

      . On cross-examination by Mr. Whalen, Dr. Kilroy testified:
      Q. And this 15% disfunction was the term you used was because you have actually had to go in and scrape cartilage from the underside of the kneecap and you have therefore reduced the amount of cartilage or the cushion that is there?
      A. Yes.
      Q. And it is the removal of that cushion from the kneecap that causes you to tell her she should not have excessive kneeling?
      A. Yes, sir.

      . Dr. Kilroy’s testimony during direct examination by Mr. Doran:
      Q. And once she had her strength back, would you have any limitations on what she could do as far as employment?
      A. No, Sir. The only thing, being very sensible about it, I tell them, you shouldn’t — you did have a disease process involving your kneecaps, so I wouldn’t intentionally go out and see how long I could kneel or how long I could squat. But I don’t put any limitations on them.

      . See n. 1.


author: DENNIS, Justice. DIXON, Chief Justice MARCUS, Justice

text:
    NEW ORLEANS FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, et al. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 82-C-0025.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 1982.
    Rehearings Denied Dec. 17, 1982.

      Ralph D. Dwyer, Jr., New Orleans, for applicant.
    Louis L. Robein, Jr., Barker, Boudreaux, Lamy, Gardner & Foley, New Orleans, Salvador Anzelmo, City Atty., Galen S. Brown, Deputy City Atty., for respondent.
   DENNIS, Justice.

We are confronted here with the problem of determining the allocation of constitutional power between the Legislature and the City Civil Service Commission to make rules of law establishing New Orleans firefighters’ minimum and overtime wages. This question, which is one of first impression under the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, arises because of a conflict between state statutes requiring inclusion of firefighters’ supplemental salaries in overtime wage computations and the New Orleans Civil Service Commission’s uniform pay plan, which excludes such salaries from the calculations.

The New Orleans Firefighters Association Local 632 AFL-CIO and several of its members filed this class action suit against the City of New Orleans and the City Civil Service Commission requesting a judgment declaring their rights to have supplemental salaries included in overtime wage computations and a mandamus of the defendants to enforce these rights. After a trial on the merits, the trial court found that the civil service rule for the calculation of overtime wages was ambiguous and not in conflict with an agreement entered into by the city with the firemen’s union to pay overtime wages based on supplemental salaries, and held that the agreement was enforceable. However, the instruments in question and the record indicate that the pay plan is unambiguous, that the agreement is in conflict with the pay plan, and that the agreement is therefore unenforceable unless it can be shown that the civil service commission rule is invalid. The court of appeal affirmed the result reached by the trial court, but reasoned that because the supplemental salary statute regulates minimum wages, a subject upon which the constitution has reserved to the legislature its plenary power to legislate, the statute takes precedence over the civil service commission’s pay plan. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeal’s interpretation and application of legal and constitutional precepts.

Specifically, we are called upon to answer two questions: (1) Does the Legislature’s plenary power to enact a law providing for “minimum wages” or “working conditions” for firemen yield to the Civil Service Commission’s power to adopt uniform pay scales? (2) Do the statutes setting a minimum wage schedule, overtime rules, and supplemental salaries constitute law providing for “minimum wages” or “working conditions” for firemen?

I

A

The 1974 Louisiana Constitution reserves to the Legislature its plenary power to enact law providing for the minimum wages and working conditions of firemen. This power is not diminished by, nor in conflict with, the power of the City Civil Service Commission to adopt a uniform pay plan affecting the salaries of New Orleans firefighters. Although the power of the City Civil Service Commission is exclusive within its sphere of authority, the setting of a statewide floor under wages and a standard for working conditions is solely within the prerogative of the legislature. Laws duly enacted by the legislature on these subjects must be accepted by the commission in formulating a uniform pay plan.

Article 6 § 14 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution provides:

No law requiring increased expenditures for wages, hours, working conditions, pension and retirement benefits, vacation, or sick leave benefits of political subdivisions employees, except a law providing for civil service, minimum wages, working conditions, and retirement benefits for firemen and municipal policemen, shall become effective until approved by ordinance enacted by the governing authority of the affected political subdivision or until the legislature appropriates funds for the purpose to the affected political subdivision and only to the extent and amount that such funds are provided. This Section shall not apply to a school board.

This section acts as a limitation upon the otherwise plenary lawmaking power of the Legislature recognized by Art. 3 § 1 of the Constitution. It provides that legislation increasing a political subdivision’s employee benefits shall not become effective until approved by its governing authority or until the legislature appropriates funds for the purpose.

The provision contains an exception, however, which reserves to the legislature its power to enact laws “providing for civil service, minimum wages, working conditions, and retirement benefits for firemen and municipal policemen.... ” Id. The language and logic of this provision, as well as the proceedings in the convention which drafted the constitution, indicate that the lawmaking power of the Legislature is not qualified, either conceptually or geographically, on these subjects.

The legislative power of the state is vested in the Legislature. La. Const. 1974, Art. 3 § 1. Except as expressly provided by the constitution, no other branch of government, nor any person holding office in one of them, may exercise the legislative power. Id. Art. II §§ 1 and 2. Furthermore, it is a general principle of judicial interpretation of a state constitution that, unlike the federal constitution, a state charter’s provisions are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through its legislature. In its exercise of the entire legislative power of the state, the legislature may enact any legislation that the state constitution does not prohibit. Thus, to hold legislation invalid under the state constitution, it is necessary to rely upon some particular constitutional provision that limits the power of the legislature to enact the statute appealed. State ex rel Guste v. Legislative Budget Committee, 347 So.2d 160 (La.1977); Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So.2d 577 (La.1975); In re Gulf Oxygen Welder’s Supply Profit Sharing Plan, 297 So.2d 663 (La.1974). See also, State v. Mallery, 364 So.2d 1283, 1284 (La.1978) (“Except as limited by the constitution its power is plenary”); Swift v. State, 342 So.2d 191, 194 (La.1977) (“Unlike Congress, our State Legislature has all powers of legislation not specifically denied it by the Louisiana constitution”).

There is nothing in the wording of Art. 6 § 14 that restricts the power of the legislature to enact minimum wage and working condition laws for firemen. On the contrary, this power is expressly reserved to the legislature as an exception to the provision’s restraint upon laws increasing the financial burden of political subdivisions.

The subject matter left by Art. 6 § 14 to the legislature’s prerogative, and the policy choices inherent in any action in that area, require that no limitations be placed upon the legislature’s power regarding firemen’s minimum wage and labor standards statutes. In order to set a floor under wages and eliminate substandard labor conditions in fire departments generally, it is necessary that the legislature be empowered to deal with such issues comprehensively. If the lawmaking branch were restricted either by geographical limitation or the policy of other agencies in considering socioeconomic data and formulating fair labor standards, it would be impossible for it to establish a minimum wage or a standard working condition pursuant to its own conception of state policy. Since the constitution plainly calls for the legislature to establish statewide rules for the measurement of firemen’s wages and working conditions, we conclude that its power in this regard is exclusive.

The record of the debates at the constitutional convention confirms our interpretation as being consistent with the understanding of delegates both for and against the provision. Although we do not find any ambiguity in the constitution on the question, proceedings in the convention which drafted the instrument are valuable aids, and should be given some weight, in determining the purpose, intent, and consequent meaning of provisions for those who find them doubtful. See, State ex rel Brewster v. City of New Orleans, 35 La.Ann 532 (1883). See, e.g. Hainkel v. Henry, supra. See generally, 16 Am.Jur.2d Const.Law § 129 at n. 95.

Article 6 § 14 was proposed by the Committee on Local and Parochial government, adopted by the constitutional convention without substantial change, and approved by the electorate. Most of the convention debate on this section focused on whether to delete or modify the language reserving the Legislature’s prerogative over minimum wages and labor standards for firemen and policemen. Opponents of the reservation of the legislative power introduced proposed amendments to either delete or defeat the provision. Delegate Lennox proposed an amendment to delete the legislative power clause which was defeated by a vote of 48 to 73. 7 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973; Convention Transcripts 1480, 1492. The failure of the Lennox proposal inspired Delegate Lowe to offer an amendment deleting the entire section, but it also was defeated by a vote of 36 to 78. 7 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcript 1496. Finally, and most significantly, Delegate Rachal proposed an exemption for the City of New Orleans and its civil service commission from the effect of state minimum wage and working condition laws for firemen and policemen. 7 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 1497. This crucial amendment, which epitomizes the controversy now before the court, failed by a 43 to 71 vote. Id. at 1498. During the debate, spokesmen for both sides expressed the view that the outcome of these amendments would be constitutionally decisive of the issue. Art. 6 § 14 was adopted by a vote of 85 to 30 with the reservation of legislative power over minimum wages and labor standards for firemen and municipal policemen intact. 7 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, 1500.

The record of the convention proceedings indicates that the legislature’s power to set minimum wage and labor standards prevailed because of the obviously compelling state interest in providing citizens with more effective police and fire protection. In expressing variants of this theme, several delegates deplored the failure of local governing authorities to give these needs a higher priority than other community programs , while others called attention to the risks of disparate levels of local fire and police protection resulting from lack of general legislative oversight of minimum standards. However, the driving force in retaining the legislative prerogative was a widely perceived need for state government to address vigorously the problems of rising crime, riots and other public disorders which had become prevalent in the 1960’s and early 1970’s.

We conclude that the fire and police minimum wage provision of Art. 6 § 14 is not only an exception to the home-rule financial autonomy created by the remainder of the section, but also is a positive reaffir-mance of the plenary power of the legislature to guarantee adequate fire and police protection for all citizens of Louisiana. We now turn to a consideration of appellant’s contention that this power is constrained by another provision of the state constitution.

B

The Legislature’s power to enact a minimum wage and working condition law for firemen is not limited by the New Orleans Civil Service Commission’s constitutional power to adopt a uniform pay plan. There is nothing in the language of the constitution, the debates of the delegates, or the purposes of the Civil Service which manifests an aim to exempt City of New Orleans’ firefighters from the plenary power of the legislature on this subject. The commission has the exclusive constitutional power to make rules for the administration and regulation of the merit system of classified civil service, including the power to adopt a uniform pay and classification plan. La.Const. art. 10 § 10(A)(1). Accordingly, the Legislature is not authorized to enact pay plans or amend the City Civil Service Commission’s pay plan. However, the plenary power of the Legislature to enact minimum wage and labor standards laws for firemen is reserved by the constitution. The City Civil Service Commission, therefore, must take into consideration any valid, minimum wage law affecting city firefighters in adopting a uniform pay and classification plan.

For the purpose of the administration and regulation of the merit system of civil service and to accomplish its objectives and purposes, Article 10 § 10(A) of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution vests the City Civil Service Commission with broad and general rule making powers, including the power to make regulations within several specific areas of typical civil service concerns. Consequently, the Commission is granted only that lawmaking power which is necessary to its effectuation of the objectives and purposes of the civil service. Although the language, history, and convention debates surrounding this provision suggest that it should be construed generously in favor of fulfilling the goals of civil service, there is no indication that it was the constitutional aim to vest any legislative powers in the commission except those required for this purpose. The debate accompanying the passage of the civil service provisions related mainly to whether to retain them in the constitution at all and to the reorganization of the commission. There was no attempt to reopen the dispute over the legislature’s power to set minimum wages for firemen and municipal policemen which had been settled by the adoption of Article 6 § 14. Therefore, we must look to the objectives and purposes of the merit system of civil service and classified service to determine the ambit of the Commission’s authority.

The fundamental purpose of civil service laws and rules is to establish a merit system for selecting non-policy forming public employees on the basis of merit and providing that they can be discharged only for insubordination, incompetency, or improper conduct, and not for religious or political reasons. 3 C.E. Dunbar, Jr., Projet of a Constitution for State of Louisiana 500 (1954). State ex rel Murtagh v. Dept. of City Civil Service, 215 La. 1007, 42 So.2d 65 (1949). Perkins v. Director of Personnel, 220 So.2d 253, 256 (La.App. 1st Cir.1969). Civil service is designed to abrogate the “spoils system” under which public employees are not selected for employment and promotion on the basis of merit or qualifications for the position but as rewards for faithful political activity and service, so that the job holders and their families become economic slaves of a particular political organization and have to vote and work for the candidates of their faction regardless of the character or qualifications of the candidates. Dunbar supra at 500. State ex rel. Boucher v. Heard, 228 La. 1978, 84 So.2d 827, 830 (1955). The routine operation of a civil service system by merit selection, compensation regulation, and tenure protection serves to promote efficiency by abolishing useless and unnecessary jobs, maximizing the resources invested in employees by long service, and determining salary and length of service on the basis of benefits rendered to the people rather than to the victorious party. Dunbar, supra, at 502. Vidrine v. State Parks and Recreation Commission, 169 So.2d 641, 645 (La.App. 1st Cir.1964).

Because of the peculiar history of civil service in Louisiana, the inclusion of detailed provisions on civil service in the constitution contrary to the principles of a brief charter has been deemed necessary by legal scholars. Dunbar, supra p. 499. A self-operative merit system established in the constitution so that it can be repealed or amended only by a vote of the people has been deemed essential to the protection of civil service against repeal or weakening amendments and sabotage by a temporary majority vote of a spoils-minded and partisan legislative faction. Dunbar, supra, at 501.

Historically, the state and city civil service commissions have no political policy-forming functions or powers. On the contrary, their primary function is quasi-judicial, and they must see to it that the rank and file of state and city employees are selected competitively on the basis of merit, free from political influence. They must also see that these employees are protected from dismissal or discriminatory treatment because of religious or political reasons. The state and city commissions are in substance courts of appeal, and their functions are to be impartially administered by commissioners who are absolutely free from any sort of political control or influence. Dunbar, supra, p. 504. Thus, the civil service commission is authorized to establish rules governing the administration of the system, is empowered in general to supervise the conduct and administration of the system, and is a quasi-judicial body for purposes of appeal.. Dunbar, supra, p. 506.

In order to accomplish these purposes and objectives it is not necessary that the Civil Service Commission’s quasi-judicial function include the power to override state minimum wage and working condition laws for firemen and municipal policemen enacted by the legislature pursuant to its conception of a compelling state interest. To safeguard merit selection and promotion, protect against discriminatory dismissal or treatment and free public employees from political influence or reprisal does not require that the City Civil Service Commission have the faculty to modify statewide minimum wage levels or labor standards. Nor does the Legislature’s setting of a statewide floor under wages and a ceiling over hours as a matter of state policy to promote efficient law enforcement and fire protection frustrate the function of the civil service. There is no inherent conflict between the power to establish a minimum wage level and the power to fix salaries above this floor because these powers operate on different planes to accomplish different purposes. Minimum wage laws guarantee workers at least a living wage. Uniform pay plans protect them from unfair wage discrimination. The setting of a basic floor under wages calls for a lawmaking body of statewide authority representing the broadest diversity of interests and viewpoints. Devising a pay plan is a task more appropriate for a quasi-judicial body such as the civil service commission which is capable of weighing the equities and considerations of fairness among different classifications of employees with respect to compensation and promotion. In the event of a disagreement between the civil service commission and the legislature as to what ought to be the minimum wage level of a fireman or municipal policeman, of course, the commission must yield because this policy question is outside the ambit of its quasi-judicial function. As a practical matter, however, the risk of such a dispute ever arising is very remote, as attested to by the low state minimum wage for firemen and the much higher salaries for New Orleans firefighters fixed by the City Civil Service Commission’s pay plan. Ultimately, the question of the least amount a fireman should be paid in the State of Louisiana to assure adequate protection in all communities is a matter of public policy within the legislative prerogative of the Legislature; and the question of what plan should be adopted setting actual salaries of public employees to insure selection, promotion, and treatment of employees on the basis of merit, free from political influence, is a quasi-judicial function within the prerogative of the City Civil Service Commission.

We conclude that the plenary legislative power to adopt laws providing for minimum wages and working conditions of municipal policemen and firemen does not yield to the Civil Service Commission’s power to adopt uniform pay plans. Having made this determination, it only remains for us to decide whether the legislature has exercised its power in this regard, and enacted legislation which provides for minimum wages or working conditions of New Orleans firemen by requiring that state supplemental salary payments be included in their base pay for the calculation of overtime wages.

II

The supplemental salary law in combination with the firemen’s minimum wage law provides a minimum standard of income and working conditions for firemen. These laws together establish the least amount which employees of local fire departments must be paid for regular work hours and overtime. This statutory scheme enacted by the Legislature is by all intents and purposes a law providing minimum wages and working conditions for firemen.

La.R.S. 33:1992 provides that each fireman in municipalities of 12,000 or more and paid firemen in parish and fire protection departments shall receive at least a salary of four hundred dollars per month. La.R.S. 33:2002 provides that, in addition to other compensation, a fireman regularly employed and paid by any municipality, parish or fire protection district, shall be paid extra compensation by the state at least in the amount of one hundred forty dollars per month at the completion of three months of service. Except in emergencies, a fireman may not be required to work more than sixty hours in any calendar week, and shall receive overtime wages at the rate of one and one-half times his usual salary. R.S. 33:1994.

To determine whether these statutes constitute minimum wage legislation we will compare them with the outstanding example of a minimum wage and working condition law, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. In essence, it provides that employees covered by the Act are guaranteed various minimum hourly rates of pay, 29 U.S.C. 206, and time and one half for any work in excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. 207. The congressional aim of the statute is to place a floor under wages and a ceiling over hours that can be worked at straight time pay to eliminate labor conditions detrimental to the health, efficiency, morale and well being of workers and to eliminate unfair competition based on these conditions. Id. § 202(a). Bay Ridge v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 68 S.Ct. 1186, 92 L.Ed. 1502 (1948), Overnight Transport Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682 (1942), U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941); Marshall v. Western Union, 621 F.2d 1246 (3rd Cir.1980); Marshall v. Hamburg, 577 F.2d 444 (8th Cir.1978) Brennan v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir.1973); BNA, The New Wage and Hour Law, Operations Manual (1967); Wests’ Federal Practice Manual § 1132. Both the minimum wage and maximum hours or overtime provisions are minimum wage requirements compelling the payment of a minimum standard wage with a prescribed increased wage for overtime. U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 125, 61 S.Ct. at 462, 85 L.Ed. at 623. In other words, it is a statutory “scheme to raise substandard wages first by a minimum wage and then by increased pay for overtime work.” Overnight Transport Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. at 577, 62 S.Ct. at 1219, 86 L.Ed. at 1687. The overtime or maximum hours requirement, however, also operates as a working condition regulation because it serves the purpose of encouraging employers to distribute work among a larger number of employees rather than imposing lengthy hours of labor at low wages. Bay Ridge v. Aaron, supra; Marshall v. Western U, supra; Marshall v. Homberg, supra. The provisions are remedial and humanitarian in purpose and must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner. Tenn. Coal, Iron, and RR Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949, (1944); Brennan v. Wilson Bldg. Inc., supra. The motive and purpose of the legislation are plainly to make effective the congressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows. U.S. v. Darby, supra, 312 U.S. at 115, 61 S.Ct. at 457, 85 L.Ed. at 617.

The principal elements of the Louisiana firemen’s minimum and supplemental wage laws, La.R.S. 33:1991 et seq. and La.R.S. 33:2001 et seq., closely resemble the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Together our statutes require that a fireman must be paid at least $540 per month and receive one and one-half times his usual pay for any time worked over sixty hours in a calendar week. Thus, they establish a floor under firemen’s wages and a ceiling over hours that can be worked without receiving premium pay, resulting in a single scheme to raise substandard wages first by a minimum wage, and then by increased pay for overtime. The Louisiana statutes affect a narrower class of employees, but there is no difference in principle between our statutes and the federal minimum wage and working condition laws. The motive and purpose of the legislature were plainly to make effective its conception of public policy that substandard labor conditions in city, parish and other local fire departments should be eliminated as being injurious to the safety and welfare of the public as well as detrimental to the health, efficiency and morale of firefighters. Accordingly, we conclude that these provisions constitute an exercise of the legislature’s plenary power to enact minimum wage and working condition laws for municipal firemen and policemen. They are remedial and humanitarian in purpose and must not be interpreted narrowly.

Consequently, a fair and ungrudging construction of the Louisiana firemen’s supplemental salary law demands that it be read in pari materia with the firemen’s minimum wage law. Supplemental pay must be considered as part of the floor under wages for purposes of determining overtime wages in order to avoid a strained interpretation and give full effect to the remedial and humanitarian purpose of the statutes. R.S. 33:1994 provides that overtime wages shall amount to one and one-half times a fireman’s usual salary. A fireman’s usual salary includes at least the total amount of compensation guaranteed to him by law under both minimum wage and supplemental salary statutes. This is confirmed by R.S. 33:2004(D) which provides that a fireman’s supplemental salary shall be included in the calculations and computation of total wages paid to the fireman in the determination of all employee benefits. The right to receive premium pay for overtime work is certainly a benefit to an employee. It is something which, if not required by law, would be subject to bargaining between him and his employer. We are unconvinced by appellant’s argument that premium overtime wages are not an “employee benefit” as contemplated by R.S. 33:2004(D). See Williams v. City of West Monroe, 403 So.2d 842 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1981). Furthermore, if an employer could circumvent the overtime requirement simply by labelling compensation as extra or supplemental pay, the public policy underlying the legislation would be defeated. Our courts have consistently held in a variety of contexts that state supplements are to be considered as part of the overall level of compensation due to employees. See e.g., Hebbler v. New Orleans Fire Department, 310 So.2d 113 (La.1975) (State supplements are part of “salaries and wages” in R.S. 49:113 requiring that salary must be restored by city for period of illegal separation from service); Latino v. City of Bogalusa, 295 So.2d 560 (La.App. 1st Cir.1974) (state supplement must be included in calculation of overtime wages under R.S. 33:2213); Maes v. City of New Orleans, 97 So.2d 856 (La.App.Orl.1957) (state supplement is part of “salary” subject to pension deduction under R.S. 33:2218.1 et seq.).

For these reasons, we conclude that the City Civil Service Commission is not free to ignore the legislative commandment to include state supplements in calculating overtime pay. This commandment is embodied in the scheme of minimum wages for firefighters and is a valid use of legislative power pursuant to Article 6 § 14 of our constitution.

Ill

The previous opinions of this court in Louisiana Civil Service League v. Forbes, 258 La. 390, 246 So.2d 800 (1971) and Barnette v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129 (La.1974) do not govern this case. The obstacles to the legislation found in those decisions under the 1921 Louisiana Constitution, as amended, have been removed by the adoption of the 1974 Constitution.

In Forbes, this court adopted in substantial part the written opinion of a trial court judge declaring unconstitutional an act of the legislature. According to the opinion, as approved by this court, the essential purpose of the statute was “to give the Louisiana State Troopers a well-deserved pay raise .... ” 258 La. at 401, 246 So.2d 800. The statute was struck down “[b]ecause the Constitution renders the Legislature powerless to effect a change in the compensation of classified employees, the constitution concludes that [the statute] which makes such an attempt, is null and void, being in contravention of the Civil Service Amendment to the Louisiana State Constitution.” 258 La. At 412, 246 So.2d 800. The principles governing Forbes are inapplicable in the present case. First, although the statute at issue appears to have been intended by the legislature as a minimum wage law, the court carefully characterized the act as a “pay-raise” or “change of salary” law. Thus, the court’s holding really does not resolve the question of whether the Legislature’s plenary power to establish minimum wage laws setting a floor under wages, as opposed to the power to actually set each employee’s salary, had been ceded to the Civil Service Commission. Forbes holds merely that because the State Civil Service Commission had the power to adopt a uniform pay plan for the state police, the legislature could not amend the pay plan or grant pay raises to the troopers. Secondly, the 1921 Constitution’s Civil Service Provisions forming the basis for Forbes have been replaced by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, and article 6 § 14 of the new constitution expressly reserves to the Legislature the plenary power to enact minimum wage and working condition standards for firemen and municipal policemen.

In Barnette this court declared unconstitutional “as applied to the City of New Orleans,” 289 So.2d at 133, the firemen’s minimum wage law, the effect of which it viewed as “fixpng] the salaries and annual vacation time of firemen in cities of 12,000 or more population.” Id. As in Forbes, this court’s opinion dealt with the 1921 constitution which did not contain the express reservation of the legislature’s power to enact minimum wage laws provided by article 6 § 14 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. Also, as in Forbes, this court failed to recognize the difference between the power to establish minimum wage standards and the power to fix salaries and uniform pay plans. In essence, Barnette decided a different issue under a different constitution from those at issue in the present case. Since the issue in this case is res nova under the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, neither of our former decisions in Forbes or Barnette can serve as a precedent in this case.

This court’s holding in .Barnette that the firemen’s minimum wage law is unconstitutional as applied to the City of New Orleans did not mean that the statute could not be applied elsewhere within the state. We have accepted the principle that language broad enough to be applied both validly and invalidly may be restricted to those applications within the legislative authority, when such a result conforms to what the legislature intended and does not destroy the fundamental purpose of the act. State v. Johnson, 343 So.2d 705 (La.1977); Roy v. Edwards, 294 So.2d 507 (La.1974); Mims v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 315 So.2d 349 (La.App. 1st Cir.1975); 2 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 44.17; (4th ed. 1973). The aim of the firemen’s minimum wage law is to set a floor under wages and a ceiling over hours for all firemen in cities of 12,000 or more and all paid firemen in other departments. Therefore, the removal of the City of New Orleans from the ambit of the statute by judicial interpretation did not destroy the statute’s fundamental purpose or utility.

Consequently, this is not a case of a law, or a distinct and separable part of a law, enacted in the unauthorized exercise of a power completely denied to the Legislature, Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867 (1912), but of a law which it was competent for the lawmakers to pass, but which could not operate within the City of New Orleans during the existence of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution’s civil service provisions. The 1974 Louisiana Constitution, which modified these provisions and expressly reserved the legislature’s plenary power on the subject matter in question, removed the obstacle. Additionally, upon careful reflection, we do not view the firemen’s minimum wage law as an attempt by the legislature to fix salaries or to amend a civil service pay plan but as a good faith effort to set a floor under wages and a ceiling over hours pursuant to a consistent statewide public policy. We perceive, therefore, no adequate grounds for adjudging that a reenactment of the statute was required before it could have the effect within the city which it had always had throughout the state. Cf., Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 11 S.Ct. 865, 35 L.Ed. 572 (1890).

Decree

In adopting a uniform pay plan, the City Civil Service Commission is obliged to comply with and take into consideration the firemen’s minimum wage law, R.S. 33:1991, et seq., and the firemen’s supplemental wage law, R.S. 33:2001, et seq. Accordingly, the commission is ordered to revise its uniform pay plan in accordance with these laws. Since there appear to be various ways in which the commission could comply with this decree, we limit our mandamus to the foregoing out of respect for the discretion vested in the commission by the constitution. The declaration of law and facts in this opinion shall have the force and effect of a final declaratory judgment. The judgments of the trial and appeals courts are amended to conform with this judgment.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED.

DIXON, C.J., dissents with reasons.

MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

BLANCHE, J., dissents for reasons assigned by DIXON, C.J.

DIXON, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. The issue here is whether New Orleans firemen should have their state supplemental pay added to their base pay for the computation of overtime pay. The rules of the city civil service do not permit it, defining “Base Pay” as weekly pay “... determined in accordance with the pay plan in effect ... regardless of any provisions or appropriation for any different salary rate or mode of payment for any position.... ” Rule IV, § 1.3 of the City Civil Service Rules.

The state supplemental pay for firemen (R.S. 33:2002(A)) cannot reasonably be equated to “minimum wages” referred to in Art. 6, § 14 of the Const, of 1974. On the other hand, this “extra compensation” is exactly that; or, as it is called in the title of Sub-Part B.l of Part II of Chapter 4 of Title 33 of the Revised Statutes, a part of the legislative plan for “Supplemental Salaries.” The Constitution of 1974 permits, in Art. 10, § 10, legislative supplementing of state police and wildlife officers’ pay plans (prompted by the Louisiana Civil Service League v. Forbes, 258 La. 390, 246 So.2d 800 (1971), which held unconstitutional supplemental pay by the state for state police) but not supplementary pay plans for firemen. Supplemental state pay for both state police and New Orleans firemen was prohibited by the same provisions of the 1921 Constitution, Art. 14, § 15. See New Orleans Firefighters Assn. Local 632 v. City of New Orleans, 263 La. 649, 269 So.2d 194 (1972).

Since the state supplement involved is unconstitutional, and is excluded by the civil service definition of “Base Pay,” it should not be included in the computation of overtime pay.

MARCUS, Justice

(dissenting).

La.Const. art. 6, § 14 provides that: “No law requiring increased expenditures for wages [or] working conditions ... except a law providing for ... minimum wages [or] working conditions for firemen ... shall become effective ... until the legislature appropriates funds for the purpose to the affected political subdivision and only to the extent and amount such funds are provided.” (Emphasis added.) By virtue of this provision, the legislature may constitutionally provide firemen with supplemental pay as provided by La.R.S. 33:2002, but only insofar as the legislature appropriates the funds for that purpose. This constitutional provision does not allow the legislature to impose upon the City of New Orleans the increased expenditure which the calculation of overtime predicated on the state supplemental pay and the base pay of the firemen will incur.

Article 6, § 14 also permits the state to establish minimum wages for firemen without appropriating the funds to the City of New Orleans and the legislature has chosen to do so. La.R.S. 33:1992. The state may also establish a standard with regard to the maximum number of hours that a fireman may work and may require that the City of New Orleáns pay overtime for any hours that its firemen work in excess of those hours. The state has also chosen to impose this standard. La.R.S. 33:1994. In each instance, however, the pay plan established by the Civil Service Commission of New Orleans is far in excess of these minimum requirements that have been established by the state. See Rule IV, §§ 1.3 & 10.2 of the City Civil Service Rules. There is no constitutional authority for the state to impose additional burdens upon the City of New Orleans other than those exceptions enumerated in La.Const. art. 6, § 14 unless the legislature choses to appropriate the funds.

By requiring the City to include state supplemental pay to the basis for computing overtime pay, the majority as a practical matter has imposed an increased expenditure on the City of New Orleans. I consider this to be in violation of La.Const. art. 6, § 14 because the state has not appropriated funds to cover this expenditure nor is it a permissible constitutional exception.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

      . This was the second suit filed in connection with the calculation of New Orleans firemen’s overtime wages. The first was filed by the Civil Service Commission against the city’s chief operating officer to enjoin him from including state salary supplements in his calculation of the firemen’s weekly overtime pay. In that suit, the court of appeal held that the city had no authority on its own to alter the manner specified by the Civil Service Commission for the calculation of overtime wages. Civil Service Commission v. Rochon, 374 So.2d 164 (4th Cir.1979). The court suggested that the proper manner for the city and firemen to raise the issue would be for them to file suit against the commission to compel alteration of the pay plan. 374 So.2d at 167. As a result of that statement, no review was requested over the decision, and the present suit was filed.

      . Rule IV, § 10.2(C) of the City Civil Service Rules provides:
      “Non-exempt uniformed fire personnel who work a 48-hour work week shall receive overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half the employee’s regular hourly base rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 12 consecutive hours on a shift or 48 hours in a week. (Amended April 27, 1977 and effective February 26, 1979.)”
      Rule IV, § 1.3 provides, further:
      “The pay of all positions in the classified service shall be determined in accordance with the pay plan in effect and in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Law regardless of any provisions or appropriation for any different salary rate or mode of payment for any position. The Base Pay of those employees paid on a bi-weekly basis shall be computed by multiplying the appropriate monthly salary step in the salary range by twelve and then dividing this product by twenty-six. The Base Pay of those employees paid on a weekly basis shall be computed by multiplying the appropriate monthly salary step in the salary range by twelve and then dividing this product by fifty-two. (Amended April 27, 1977).”

      .Unlike the trial judge, we do not find that the pay plan’s provisions are ambiguous in their treatment of the state salary supplement. The clear import of these rules, combined with the City Civil Service Commission’s consistent action, is that the state supplement is not to be included in the “base rate of pay.” Thus, we are unable to rest our inquiry upon a simple application of the constitutional provision that the city may enter into any contract it wishes with labor organizations so long as it does not conflict with a valid Civil Service Commission Rule. La.Const. Art. 10 § 10(A)(1). For this reason, we are called upon to make an adjudication that reaches the complex questions of the balance of constitutional power.

      . In discussion of the Lennox Amendment, Delegate Dennery and Delegate Segura engaged in the following colloquy:
      Mr. Dennery: Are you aware, sir that this provision also excludes firemen and policemen from general civil service provision?
      Mr. Segura: I don’t really understand what you mean.
      Mr. Dennery: As I read the committee proposal, it excludes a law providing for civil service for firemen and policemen. In other words, if there is a civil service law, as there presently is by constitution in the city of New Orleans which covers firemen and policemen, this provision would apparently exclude firemen and policemen from the civil service system in the city of New Orleans....

        7 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 1482 [hereinafter referred to as Records],
      Discussion of the Rachal Amendment, which would have exempted cities with comprehensive civil service plans from the legislature’s plenary power, produced the following dialogue:
      Mr. Rachal: The effect of my amendment then, is to permit those municipalities with what I call comprehensive Civil Service programs not to be placed under the mandate of the section 16 as it is now required ....
      Mr. Duval: Mr. Rachal, to make sure I understand your amendment, let me ask you, in the event a city’s firemen and policemen were under a comprehensive civil service plan, under your amendment does that mean that the legislature would not be able to pass laws affecting the salaries or the compensation of these people?
      Mr. Rachal: That’s right, it would exist the same as the legislature does not now pass laws affecting state of civil service employees .... My amendment is concerned only with municipalities with comprehensive civil service programs, which include fire and police, of which there is only one.
      Mr. Stovall: Mr. Rachal, might not we better deal with this issue under the civil service provision which will be presented later to this convention. Could not we deal with it in a more comprehensive and objective way at that time?
      Mr. Rachal: Well, Im’ afraid, Mr. Stovall, if we wait until that time we may have gotten ourselves locked into something under this section in this article and my ... I’m not certain what will remain by the time we finish it.
      It could well be that this amendment would have no effect, but I don’t see that the ... I, and those who support my concept, can wait until that time if we be ... if what I am trying to get done is precluded by this section. I think we need to establish the protection at this point....
      Records, p. 1497.

      . Examples of this may be found in the Statement of Delegate Stinson at page 1483 of the Records, where he stated that “It’s a statewide protection and security that the citizens of Louisiana are entitled to,” and at page 1485, where Delegate DeBlieux echoed that sentiment:
      I think that when it comes to firemen and policemen, there’s a little more involved than just local government; that’s when human rights, human lives and human property is involved. I don’t know of any fireman or any policeman who has ever refused to go outside of his area to answer a call. I just want you to take that into consideration. I think the lives of the whole state, the property of the whole state is involved in this issue, and I think as a result of that, the legislature ought to have something to say about how they operate so that we can be sure that the lives and property of all of our citizens are protected as much as possible.
      Delegate Roy agreed on page 1489: “When you deal with something on a statewide basis like for fire and police protection, all citizens of this state, all over that state are entitled to the protection....”

      . Delegate Rayburn commented that “that’s the only reason that you ... the legislature has helped the firemen and policemen as much as they have. They couldn’t get help locally; they had no recourse; they had no other place to go but the legislature.”

      . Delegate Stinson expressed this concern: “Suppose your car caught on fire and the firemen said, You’re from Bossier Parish. I’m not going to put your fire out. Coming down here I pass through twenty-five or thirty towns and cities. I’m an outsider. I’m a visitor, but I’m entitled to the protection. It’s a statewide protection and security that the citizens of Louisiana are entitled to.”

      . Delegate Stinson commented: You know you’ve got to have some assurance of security. It’s worse now than ever before.... That is security which now is needed more than ever, and it is going to get worse. Records at 1484. And, Delegate Ullo was concerned about our “day and age of crime in the streets.” Records at 1489.

      . These include the “power to adopt rules for regulating employment, promotion, demotion, suspension, reduction in pay, removal, certification, qualifications, political activities, employment conditions, compensation and disbursements to employees, and other personnel matters and transactions; to adopt a uniform pay and classification plan; to require an appointing authority to institute an employee training and safety program .... ” La.Const. art. 10 § 10(A)(1).

      .Our conclusion is further strengthened by an examination of the discussion surrounding the “state police” amendment proposed by Delegates Flory and Hernandez to Article 10 § 10. This amendment added the language that was to become the last sentence of Article 10 § 10(A)(1): “Nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from enacting laws supplementing these uniform pay plans for sworn, commissioned law enforcement officers of the Division of State Police, Department of Public Safety and regularly commissioned officers of the Enforcement Division of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.”
      The discussion of this proposal was centered almost exclusively on what was considered by the delegates as its “remedial” nature. The chief impetus for its enactment was to “bring this constitutional provision in line” with what had already been done. Although no specific references by name were made to the previously adopted provisions, the delegates were cognizant that they had already provided the legislature with power to assure adequate salaries for local law enforcement officers via minimum wage legislation. Thus, the amendment reserving the legislature’s power to provide supplemental salaries for state policemen was needed to afford them similar protection.. 9 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts p. 2712-15. See in particular, the statement of Delegate Kelly at p. 2713.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lenard FORD.
    No. 82-KA-0142.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 1982.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Marion B. Farmer, Dist. Atty., Walter P. Reed, Margaret A. Coon and Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    William J. Faustermann, Jr., Slidell, for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Because the defendant was not conscious when the trial judge announced his sentencing considerations and thus did not have a chance in the trial court to dispute the accuracy thereof, the sentence is sfet aside.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.


text:
    Barry L. NETTLES v. Earl E. BOWLIN, et al.
    No. 82-C-2374.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 29, 1982.
   Re: Gulf States Utilities, applying for Writ of Certiorari, or Review, First Circuit Court of Appeal, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 14582.

Denied.

MARCUS, BLANCHE and WATSON, JJ., would grant, reverse the judgment of the court of appeal and remand the case to the court of appeal to decide the case on the record. 417 So.2d 1192. Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation, 320 So.2d 163 (La.1975).


text:
    Barry L. NETTLES v. Earl E. BOWLIN, et al.
    No. 82-C-2417.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 29, 1982.
   Re: South Central Bell Telephone Company, applying for Writ of Certiorari, or Review, First Circuit Court of Appeal, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 14582.

Denied.

MARCUS, BLANCHE and WATSON, JJ., would grant, reverse the judgment of the court of appeal and remand the case to the court of appeal to decide the case on the record. 417 So.2d 1192. Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation, 320 So.2d 163 (La.1975).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Francisco D. CAVAZOS.
    No. 82-KA-0536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 1, 1982.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leonard K. Knapp, Dist. Atty., Evelyn Oubre, Asst, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Conviction affirmed. Defendant’s sentence is vacated, however, and this case is remanded for resentencing. Defendant remains eligible for parole on his conviction for attempted second-degree murder. La. R.S. 14:27; 14:30; of., State v. Green, 391 So.2d 833 (La.1980); State v. Welch, 368 So.2d 965 (La.1979) (on rehearing).


author: PER CURIAM. DENNIS, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Glynn BRIDGES.
    No. 82-KA-0882.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 1, 1982.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Morgan J. Gou-deau, Jr., Dist. Atty., Robert Brinkman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
    W. Simmons Sandoz, Sandoz, Sandoz & Schiff, Opelousas, for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

DENNIS, J., concurs with reasons.

DENNIS, Justice,

concurring. I respectfully concur but think that this case deserves a full written opinion by the court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Claude WALKER, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-1833.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 1982.
   In re Claude Walker, Sr., applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans.

Granted. Transferred to the district court to act.


text:
    Jimmie L. CLOUD v. HUFFMAN MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-2125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 1982.
   In re Jimmie L. Cloud, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Rapides. No. 8802.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Edward LEWIS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Prison.
    No. 82-KH-2590.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Edward Lewis, Jr., applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Lionel HALPHEN v. ORLEANS INDIGENT DEFENDER PROGRAM COURT REPORTER.
    No. 81-KH-2211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Lionel Halphen, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 273-072.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Johnny WINFIELD, Jr. COURT REPORTER, 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE.
    No. 81-KH-2137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Johnny Winfield, Jr., applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Granted. Relator is ordered furnished a Boykin transcript. Otherwise, the application is denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Winfred Wayne WRIGHT v. J.D. MIDDLEBROOKS.
    No. 81-KH-1867.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 1982.
   In re Winfred Wayne Wright, applying for remedial writ. Parish of LaFourche. No. 98365.

Denied.


text:
    Christopher B. KILLEEN v. COLISEUM HOUSE, et al.
    No. 82-C-2717.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 1982.
   In re Dr. Albert DeVillier, applying for writs of certiorari and review, to the Civil District Court. Orleans Parish. No. 80-4445; Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. C-0159.

Writ denied.

DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Emile L. TURNER, Jr. v. Helen Ruth Gubbels TURNER.
    No. 82-C-2751.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 17, 1982.
   In re Emile L. Turner, Jr., applying for supervisory writs, Civil District Court. Parish of Orleans. No. 79-4277; Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal, No. C-0310.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Irby J. “Duke” DUCOTE.
    No. 82-K-2725.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1982.
   In re Irby J. “Duke” Ducote, applying for writs of certiorari and review. Parish of Avoyelles. No. 50414.

Granted. A continuance of not less than 90 days is ordered; trial court to fix a new trial date.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Steven J. ARMAND.
    No. 82-K-2654.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1982.
   In re Steven J. Armand, applying for writs of certiorari and review, to the Twelfth Judicial District Court. Parish of Avoyelles. No. 50407.

Granted. A continuance is granted the defense counsel until a date to be fixed by the trial court allowing a reasonable time for trial preparation.


text:
    James R. SUTTERFIELD v. Sara Cargill Jackson, Wife of James R. SUTTERFIELD.
    No. 82-C-2535.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re James R. Sutterfield, applying for writs of certiorari or review, or alternative writs of mandamus or prohibition, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. C-0059. Parish of Orleans. Civil District Court, No. 823440.

Writ denied.


text:
    Hubert LINCECUM v. ADSERVE INC., and State of Louisiana Through the Division of Administration.
    No. 82-C-2375.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Hubert Lincecum, applying for writ of certiorari and review, First Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 417 So.2d 1247.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dr. Houston David HUGHES, and Dr. Wilmer H. “Jack” Jackson.
    No. 82-KK-2694.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Dr. Houston David Hughes, and Dr. Wilmer H. “Jack” Jackson, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and stay order, to First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 82-KW-0782 from Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 2-82-407, Division “5”.

Granted.

All proceedings stayed pending further orders of this Court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roy Edward ATES.
    No. 81-KA-2698.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Roy Edward Ates applying for motion to remand to District Court and motion for procedural clarification — Appeal from No. 39950 on the Criminal Docket of the Fourth Judicial District Court. Ouachita Parish.

Motion Granted and remanded to district court for filing [of] and action on second motion for new trial; otherwise denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Rubin TACKNO and Milton Armstead v. Honorable Frank J. SHEA, Judge, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-2047.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Rubin Tackno and Milton Armstead, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court, No. 249-185.

Granted. The trial court is ordered to act on this application within 14 days.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Soloman POLLARD v. STATE of Louisiana, ORLEANS JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 82-KH-2317.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Soloman Pollard, applying for writ of mandamus. Orleans Parish. No. 267-925.

Granted. The trial judge is ordered to act on relator’s writ application within 14 days.


text:
    Vernon L. LEWIS v. EXXON CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 82-C-2367.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Vernon L. Lewis, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. East Baton Rouge Parish. 417 So.2d 1292.

Granted.


text:
    In the Matter of the SUCCESSION OF Tracy E. BAKER.
    No. 82-C-2404.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Tracy E. Baker, applying for writ of certiorari, and writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 417 So.2d 1260.

Granted.


text:
    Derry L. BEARDEN, et al. v. Joseph RUCKER, et al.
    No. 82-C-2506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Derry L. Bearden, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. 418 So.2d 713.

Writ granted.


text:
    Henry TAUZIN, d/b/a Mo’s Buster Brown Shoes, et al. v. R.G. CLAITOR, et al. Robert G. CLAITOR v. Ray A. JUBAN.
    No. 82-C-1895.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Robert G. Claitor, et al., applying for writ of certiorari or review. Parish of East Baton Rouge. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. 409 So.2d 374.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Rosemary CASTLE, Individually and on Behalf of her Minor Children Dwayne Castle, Age 12, Joseph Castle, Age 11, and Tosha Castle, Age 3 v. PRUDHOMME TANK TRUCK LINE, INC. and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.
    No. 82-C-2379.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Rosemary Castle et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Terre-bonne. 417 So.2d 1205.

Writ denied.

DIXON, C.J., DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Floyd W. EDWARDS v. SUPERIOR COACH SALES, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-2410.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Floyd W. Edwards, applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Parish of East Baton Rouge. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. 417 So.2d 1289.

Writ denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Henry TAUZIN, d/b/a Mo’s Buster Brown Shoes, et al. v. R.G. CLAITOR, et al.
    No. 82-C-2416.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Henry Tauzier, d/b/a Mo’s Buster Brown Shoes et al., applying for writs of certiorari and review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 417 So.2d 1304.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.

BLANCHE, J., Recused.


text:
    Ray PITTS and Rena Keown Pitts v. Raymond MASON.
    No. 82-C-2431.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Raymond Mason, applying for writs of certiorari and review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Catahoula. 418 So.2d 27.

Denied.


text:
    F.A. NOBILE v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC.
    No. 82-C-2510.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re F.A. Nobile, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. Honorable S. Sanford Levy, Civil District Court. Parish of Orleans. 419 So.2d 35.

Denied.


text:
    CREDIT ALLIANCE CORPORATION v. James M. RABB.
    No. 82-C-2513.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re James M. Rabb, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Parish of Ouachita. Second Circuit, Court of Appeal. 419 So.2d 123.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lomax J. ROUBION.
    No. 82-KH-2521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Lomax J. Roubion, applying for a writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 268-142.

Denied.


text:
    Cora Beatrice DEVILLE v. PORT PIPE TERMINAL OF LOUISIANA INC. and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company.
    No. 82-C-2524.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Cora Beatrice Deville, applying for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 82-30. Parish of Calca-sieu. Fourteenth Judicial District Court. 419 So.2d 16.

Denied.


text:
    J.W. DEAN v. GEORGIA CASUALTY & SURETY CO. et al.
    No. 82-C-2536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re J.W. Dean, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Beauregard. No. 82-9; Thirty Sixth Judicial District Court. 418 So.2d 704.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY v. Katherine Wedge MUNSON, et al. GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY v. Robert H. PEAIRS, et al.
    No. 82-C-2537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Katherine Wedge Munson, and Robert H. Peairs, applying for remedial writs to Twentieth Judicial District Court. Parish of East Feliciana. No. A-17292 and No. A-17293, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. No. 82-CW-0794.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Curtis J. BROWN.
    No. 82-K-2541.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Curtis J. Brown, applying for writs of certiorari and review. Parish of Plaque-mines. No. 67339.

Denied.


text:
    Drs. BROWN, CARTER & SAULS v. Dr. J. Lane SAULS, et ux.
    No. 82-C-2543.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Dr. J. Lane Sauls and Joyce D. Sauls, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Beauregard Parish. Thirty Sixth Judicial District Court. 418 So.2d 706.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant as to rent and interest.

BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Phillip M. FAULK.
    No. 82-KH-2546.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Phillip M. Faulk, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Ouachita. No. 39108. Denied.


text:
    F.A. NOBILE v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC.
    No. 82-C-2553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re New Orleans Public Service, Inc., applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Civil District Court. Orleans Parish. 419 So.2d 35.

Denied.


text:
    Bobby R. ADAMS, Sr., et al. v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.; Royal Globe Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-2561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re J. Weingarten, Inc., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Caddo. First Judicial District Court. 420 So.2d 507.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Johnny Lee SULLIVAN v. STATE of Louisiana, Attorney, Joseph Meyers.
    No. 82-KH-2587.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Johnny Lee Sullivan, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 276-394.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Danny H. GRAFFAGNINO v. John T. KING, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Corrections; J.D. Middlebrooks, Warden of the Louisiana Correctional and Industrial School in De Quincy, Louisiana, and the State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-0556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Danny H. Graffagnino, applying for supervisory and remedial writs. Parish of St. Landry. No. 34140.

Out of time appeal granted, Writ Granted. To be consolidated.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Rickey TRUVIA v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-0885.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Rickey Truvia, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 257-168.

Granted. An evidentiary hearing is ordered on relator’s claims.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Emerson ANDRISHOK.
    No. 82-K-1059.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Emerson Andrishok, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Orleans Parish. No. 282-362.

Granted. To be consolidated with appeal in # 82-KA-2683.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eeves J. PHIPPS.
    No. 82-AW-2516.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Eeves J. Phipps, applying for a remedial writ. Parish of Jefferson. No. 82-0797.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Aaron TERRELL v. Honorable Douglas MOREAU, 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-2617.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Aaron Terrell, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 12-80-430.

Granted. Boykin transcript ordered furnished relator.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Donald BISSANT v. CLERK OF COURT, Criminal District Court, Section “E”, Orleans Parish, State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-0652.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Donald Bissant, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 185-701.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring to the district court for action.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Avery Joseph ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-0484.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Avery Joseph Robinson, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of St. Landry. No. 35654.

Motion to withdraw application granted, with relator given leave to reapply.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Raymond RICNER v. Honorable Andrew J. BUCARO, Judge, Criminal District Court, Section “H”.
    No. 82-KH-2557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Raymond Ricner, applying for writs of prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 283-947.

Motion to withdraw granted, upon assertion that the matter is moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ruchell C. MaGEE v. Sheriff Robert LYONS, et al.
    No. 81-KH-0359.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Ruchell C. MaGee, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Washington.

Denied. Civil matter.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Tyronne BARROW v. Frank A. MARULLO, Jr., Judge, Section “D”, Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, State of Louisiana.
    No. 81-KH-2244.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Tyronne Barrow, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans.

Denied. Moot.

2


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Steven Paul MATHESON v. John T. KING, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Corrections; J.D. Middlebrooks, Warden of the Louisiana Correctional and Industrial School in De Quincy, Louisiana; and, the State of Louisiana.
    No. 81-KH-2983.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Steven Paul Matheson, applying for supervisory and remedial writs. Parish of Avoyelles. No. 37920.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Charles Ray SMITH v. J.D. MIDDLEBROOKS, in his Official Capacity as the Warden of the Louisiana Correctional and Industrial School, at De Quincy, La.
    No. 82-KH-0613.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Charles Ray Smith, applying for supervisory and remedial writs. Parish of Caddo. No. 119415-HC.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joseph Paul BERTRAND v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-0642.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Joseph Paul Bertrand, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 1551-77.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Kenneth RIDEAUX v. Honorable Miriam WALTZER, Judge, Criminal District Court.
    No. 82-KH-0657.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Kenneth Rideaux, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 282-856.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Terry M. PIERCE v. Judge Rudolph F. BECKER, III Section “E” Criminal District Court Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-0706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Terry M. Pierce, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 278-616.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Eric BLUE v. Honorable Matthew S. BRANIFF, Judge Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-0743.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Eric Blue, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 276-946.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robert L. BROWN v. Burl CAIN/Warden Dixon Corr. Institute.
    No. 82-KH-0786.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Robert L. Brown, applying for writs of certiorari. Parish of Allen. No. 65479.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Louis Anthony STROTHER v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-0831.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Louis Anthony Strother, applying for remedial writs. Evangeline Parish. No. 18342.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Art PALMER v. Municipal Court Judge Eddie L. SAPIR and Charles C. Foti, Jr. Criminal Sheriff.
    No. 82-KH-0892.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Art Palmer, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 261167A.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. John D. FLOYD v. Judge Jerome WINSBERG, Criminal District Court Section “C”.
    No. 82-KH-1989.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re John D. Floyd, applying for writ of review. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 280-729.

Denied. Appeal pending.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robert PAIGE v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT SECTION “I”.
    No. 82-KH-2189.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Robert Paige, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of ^Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 284-031.

Denied. Appeal pending.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Eduardo ROBINSON v. Larry Preston WILLIAMS, Esq., State of Louisiana, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-2361.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Eduardo Robinson, applying for a writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 279-499, 279-500.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Samuel LEWIS v. Commissioner, Honorable Norbert C. RAYFORD 19th Judicial District Court.
    No. 82-KH-2393.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Samuel Lewis, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 243395.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Leroy RICHARDSON v. Honorable Frank SHEA, Judge Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-2459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Leroy Richardson, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 195-904.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Glenn A. BORDELON, v. HONORABLE JUDGE DIVISION “H” 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON and Clerk of Court, et al.
    No. 82-KH-2570.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Glenn A. Bordelon, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. No. 77-1921.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Randolph BESSARD v. Honorable Edward A. DE LA HOUSSAYE, III, Presiding Judge, Clerk of Court Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin, et al.
    No. 82-KH-2581.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Randolph Bessard, applying for writs of mandamus. Parish of St. Martin. No. 56536.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Albert GRAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-2605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Albert Gray, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 281-298.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frank JARMON.
    No. 82-KH-2650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re Frank Jarmon, applying for remedial writs. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court.

Denied.


text:
    George HUMENIUK v. UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION.
    No. 82-C-2116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 1982.
   In re George Humeniuk, applying for writ of certiorari and review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. St. Charles Parish. No. 12445.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., CALOGERO and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    ASSUMPTION BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. Raymond B. GAUTREAU and Beatrice H. Gautreau.
    No. 82-C-2774.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 22, 1982.
   In re Raymond B. Gautreau and Beatrice H. Gautreau, applying for writs of review, to the Twenty-third Judicial District Court. Parish of Ascension. No. 30,403; Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 82 CW 0970 and 82 CW 0993.

Denied.