author: BOYD, Justice. SUNDBERG, Chief Justice,

text:
    FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant, v. ATWOOD VACUUM MACHINE COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 56238.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 8, 1981.

      Monroe E. McDonald of Sanders, Mc-Ewan, Mims & McDonald, Orlando, for appellant.
    Elmo R. Hoffman and Stephen C. Saw-icki of Hoffman, Hendry, Stoner, Sims & Sawicki, Orlando, for appellee.
   BOYD, Justice.

This cause is before the Court on appeal from a circuit court order granting Atwood Vacuum Machine Company’s motion to dismiss Ford Motor Company’s third party complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Because the original plaintiffs reached a settlement with Ford Motor Company after the filing of the third party complaint, the order of dismissal terminated the litigation below and had the effect of a final judgment. In dismissing the Atwood company from the product liability action, the trial court held a portion of the Florida “long arm” jurisdiction statute unconstitutional as sought to be applied. Ford Motor Company, defendant and third party plaintiff below, appeals. We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, as it existed prior to the 1980 amendment. We reverse.

Elizabeth L. Westerling and her husband brought an action for damages against Ford Motor Company and Holiday Ford, Inc., a Volusia County automobile dealer, alleging that she was injured by the faulty operation of the rear door hinge of a new Ford station wagon. It was alleged that while Mrs. Westerling was unloading the station wagon at the rear door, a detention spring in the hinge broke, causing the door to swing shut and strike the plaintiff on her back. The plaintiff alleged that the faulty operation was the result of defective manufacture of the car.

Ford Motor Company filed a third party complaint against Atwood Vacuum Machine Company, a foreign corporation headquartered at Rockford, Illinois. Ford alleged that Atwood had manufactured the door hinge assembly; that the incident alleged by the plaintiffs, if it occurred as alleged, was caused by a defect in the manufacture or material of the door hinge assembly; that Atwood had warranted the product to be free of defects; and that Atwood supplied door hinge assemblies to Ford knowing that they were to be incorporated into automobiles manufactured by Ford and knew that some of these automobiles would be shipped to Florida and sold.

The Atwood company moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that section 48.193, Florida Statutes-(1977), which enumerates the acts subjecting persons to the jurisdiction of Florida courts, does not provide for jurisdiction in a situation such as the one alleged in the third party complaint. The motion to dismiss did not dispute the factual allegations or otherwise attempt to demonstrate the inapplicability of the “long arm” statute.

The trial court did not explicitly rule on Atwood’s contention that the statute was not intended to apply to the facts alleged. Implicit in the trial court’s order, however, is a holding that the statute is intended to apply, because the court proceeded to rule on the question — not presented by the motion to dismiss — of the statute’s constitutionality. The court held section 48.-193(l)(f)2., Florida Statutes (1977), “unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case,” citing Harlo Products Corp. v. J. I. Case Co., 360 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Thus, there are two issues in this case: first, whether the statute was intended to apply; second, whether it may be applied consistently with due process.

Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides for jurisdiction of Florida courts over persons, including nonresidents, who perform certain enumerated acts:

(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state'for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following:
(a) Operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in this state or has an office or agency in this state.
(b) Commits a tortious act within this state.
(c) Owns,, uses, or possesses any real property within this state.
(d) Contracts to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting.
(e) With respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for filing an action for dissolution of marriage.
(f) Causes injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission outside of this state by the defendant, provided that at the time of the injury either:
1. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state which resulted in such injury; or
2. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use, and the use or consumption resulted in the injury.
(g) Breaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.

The third party complaint asserted that jurisdiction could be exercised over Atwood pursuant to paragraph (f), subpara-graph 2. In support of this assertion, Ford alleged, as discussed above, that Atwood manufactured spring latch assemblies and sold them to Ford to be incorporated into automobiles and that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by one of these components incorporated into an automobile and shipped to Florida where it was purchased by the plaintiff. These allegations placed Atwood within the reach of the statute on the ground that the defendant’s act or omission outside the state caused injury within the state; and that the defendant manufactured products outside the state that were used within the state “in the ordinary course of commerce.” Thus, the undisputed allegations were sufficient to invoke the statute. We hold that it was intended to be applied to such a situation. See Electro Engineering Products Co. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla.1977).

The second issue we must decide is whether the courts of Florida have jurisdiction to adjudicate Ford Motor Company’s claim against the Atwood company. This issue arises because the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution imposes limits on the jurisdiction of state courts to adjudicate the rights, interests, and obligations of defendants not resident in the forum state. E. g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877).

The principle underlying the limitations imposed by the due process clause was once seen as a strict concept of territoriality, based on the states’ physical power as independent sovereigns over persons and property within their borders. In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court said:

The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse. D’Arcy v. Ketchum et al., 52 U.S. 165, 11 How., 165, 13 L.Ed. 648.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720. See also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91, 37 S.Ct. 343, 344, 61 L.Ed. 608 (1917) (“The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.... ”). Pennoyer did not completely close the door to extraterritorial exertion of personal jurisdiction by state courts, however. The opinion contained a dictum to the effect that foreign corporations could be required to appoint agents for service of process as a condition of the privilege of doing business in the state. The opening in the door thus left ajar provided a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over absent persons. While the permissibility of such extraterritorial exercises of power was often discussed in terms of legal fictions such as constructive presence, implied consent, and the like, the justification in retrospect can be found, in most cases, in the relations or ties between the defendant and the forum state, which rendered the exercise of power just and reasonable. See, e. g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940) (domicile, citizenship); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S.Ct. 553, 79 L.Ed. 1097 (1935) (implied consent, doing business); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927) (implied consent, use of automobile).

The Pennoyer system dealt with the problem of the extraterritorial power of state courts by considering the states of the Union as analogous to independent nations. Economic relations among citizens of the several states, however, do not stop at the state boundaries, and the existence of the full faith and credit clause indicates that the framers of the constitution never expected them to do so.

The jurisdictional problem in the United States is distinctive because, while the country is socially and economically essentially a unitary state, legally and politically it is in many respects a federation of distinct polities. It is this conjunction of circumstances that is peculiar. Our citizens have a legal right to move from state to state and cultural homogeneity makes it easy and inviting to do so. It is notorious that we are a mobile population, and we have been such since the beginning, as the lives of Franklin, Lincoln, and Stephen Field himself illustrate. Our citizens also have a legal right to project themselves commercially into all parts of the nation, not only to trade but to invest in business, to draw out profits, to buy property, and to become economically domesticated. The vastness and richness of the land has made wide-ranging economic adventure attractive. And this, too, has been true since the beginning of our history. Without these social and economic conditions, the federation could have remained an aggregation of social islands whose transactions inter sese, and whose conflicts and jurisdictional problems, would have remained the ancient and essentially simple ones of the merchant traders. (This, together with certain fairly standard problems of domestic relations, is what international conflict of laws was mostly about until the last two decades.)
At the same time, the legal and political pluralism of the American federation is also significant. If this were legally a unitary state, the problems of notice and of territorial jurisdiction would descend to those of venue. In fact, however, the states are autonomous in precisely the respects that are relevant to the problems of judicial jurisdiction. The states are chiefly responsible in our federal union for the promulgation and enforcement of legal rules governing private relations and for the maintenance and operation of civil courts. Autonomy in respect to private law requires rules for choice of law, which in turn can be devised at least in part in terms of choice of forum. In any event, the existence of coordinate tribunals of presumptively equal competence requires rules for choice of forum, and there seems nothing artificial in conceiving of them as rules of jurisdiction and in a real sense territorial.
The peculiar features of the jurisdictional problem in the United States, then, is that our national economic and social unity is conducive to the full panoply of substantive transactions found internally in a unitary state but our political plurality requires a choice of law and jurisdictional rules as among separate sovereigns. The combination would be unendurable as a practical matter but for two facts. First, there are powerful historical and cultural forces that conduce to similarity and reciprocity of state law. Second, the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause embody judicially enforceable limitations on state-court authority. However interpreted from time to time, they make state-court jurisdiction a matter of American municipal law and not a species of demi-interna-tional law.

Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.Ct.Rev. 241, 246-247 (citations omitted). The “unitary” nature of the Union economically and socially gave rise not only to a need for extraterritorial recognition of state court decrees but also to a need for limitations on the recognized extent of state court power. This points up one feature of the Pennoyer decision that retains its vitality: a state court decision that may rightfully be refused recognition by a sister state is also void in the state where rendered.

In the United States, the jurisdiction of a state court is controlled concurrently by state legislatures acting in accordance with state constitutions and by the United States Supreme Court as final interpreter of the federal constitution and laws. On the one hand, a state court may lack jurisdiction altogether, even if it is fully authorized by the laws of the state in which its sits, because of federal limitations on state adjudicative powers; on the other, in the great majority of cases the judgment of a state court having jurisdiction must be recognized by other states under the full-faith-and-credit clause. This federal control affords an opportunity — unavailable at the international level — for a rational allocation of actions among the several states, designed to minimize the expense and inconvenience to the parties and to secure to each state the ability to adjudicate effectively with respect to matters of its legitimate concern.

Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 912 (1960). The problem of state court jurisdiction has thus come to be seen not in terms of the mutually exclusive territorial power of independent sovereigns, but rather as a question of the “rational allocation” of judicial business based on an analysis that focuses on consideration of fairness to the defendant in light of the forum state’s legitimate concerns. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

The shift in emphasis from the territorial view to a view emphasizing reasonableness in the context of relations among interdependent states as members of a federated union was made explicit in International Shoe Co. v. Washington:

Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733, [24 L.Ed. 565]. But now that the capias ad responden-dum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278.

326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. The inquiry into whether there are “minimum contacts” between the forum state and a nonresident business enterprise must look at the nature of the defendant’s activities in the state. Continuous and systematic activities provide a reasonable basis for the assertion of jurisdiction. Single, isolated acts are viewed differently.

Whether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. The clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.

Id. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 159.

The United States Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the subject of state court jurisdiction in personam came in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). In that case the plaintiffs purchased an automobile in New York and were injured in an accident in Oklahoma. They brought a product liability action in Oklahoma, naming as defendants the car’s manufacturer, the importer, a regional distributor and the seller, a retail dealer. The regional distributor and the retail dealer entered special appearances, contesting the Oklahoma court’s jurisdiction over them. The trial court held that it had jurisdiction and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. The majority opinion emphasized the protective function of the due process clause:

The concept of minimum contracts ... can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.

Id. at 291-92, 100 S.Ct. at 564.

In support of its conclusion that there was no jurisdiction because the defendants had no contacts, ties, or relations with the State of Oklahoma, the Court majority made the following observation:

Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma.

444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 566 (emphasis added). Thus the record in Woodson did not establish facts such as those which have been alleged (without being refuted) in this case. The Court, in deciding Woodson, did not deal with the issue in the case at bar: whether a manufacturer who by continuous and systematic activity indirectly through others serves or seeks to serve a state’s market is subject to the jurisdiction of that state’s courts. The majority’s opinion contains dicta, however, suggesting that jurisdiction may properly be asserted in such a case:

When a corporation “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S., at 253 [78 S.Ct., at 1239], it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State. Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State. Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).

Id. 444 U.S. at 297-98, 100 S.Ct. at 567. The Court’s citation of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., as a distinguishable case is significant in that it indicates how the Court might be expected to rule in a case such as ours here.

In Gray the plaintiff alleged that she had been injured by the explosion of a water heater caused by the negligent manufacture of a safety valve. From the allegations of the complaint and the statements in the valve manufacturer’s affidavit in support of its motion to quash service of process, it appeared that the safety valve was manufactured in Ohio by a company headquartered there; that in the course of its business the manufacturer sold the valve to the water heater manufacturer, which incorporated the valve, in Pennsylvania, into a water heater; that in the ordinary course of commerce the water heater was sold to a consumer in Illinois; and that the valve manufacturer had no agent and conducted no business in Illinois. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the claim against the valve manufacturer, saying:

In the case at bar defendant does not claim that the present use of its product in Illinois is an isolated instance. While the record does not disclose the volume of Titan’s business or the territory in which appliances incorporating its valves are marketed, it is a reasonable inference that its commercial transactions, like those of other manufacturers, result in substantial use and consumption in this State. To the extent that its business may be directly affected by transactions occurring here it enjoys benefits from the laws of this State, and it has undoubtedly benefited, to a degree, from the protection which our law has given to the marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves. Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the manufacture of products presumably sold in contemplation of use here, it should not matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into this State.
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other States. The fact that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one, however, does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of his business; and it is not unreasonable, where a cause of action arises from alleged defects in his product, to say that the use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with this State to justify a requirement that he defend here.

Id., 22 Ill.2d at 441-42, 176 N.E.2d at 766.

A number of courts have cited the Gray case as authority for the proposition that a manufacturer engaged in interstate commerce, which expects its products to be used in other states, can reasonably expect to be held subject to the jurisdiction of those other states’ courts. Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970); Mann v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 361 So.2d 1021 (Ala.1978); Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of America, 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969); Andersen v. National Presto Industries, Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965); Ehlers v. U.S. Heating and Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963); Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966); see State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo.1970).

If a manufacturer is responding to the opportunities created by the existence of an interstate or nationwide market, then the reasonableness of requiring it to defend an action, arising out of its business activity, in another state, is a question not entirely divorced from the substantive question of the manufacturer’s liability for the consequences of defects. The manufacturer is the person in the best position to insure against such consequences, and it is less burdensome to require the manufacturer to defend in the state of the injured consumer’s residence than to require the plaintiff to travel to the state of the manufacturer’s domicile. In Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966), the only relation of the defendant to the forum state that could be established was the presence of its defective product there. The defendant argued that there had not been shown any conduct constituting a purposeful availment of the privilege of having its products sold in the forum state. The court responded:

Upon reflection, we think it would be a rare situation where a manufacturer could not foresee the presence of his product anywhere within the continental United States. That possibility should motivate him to seek appropriate insurance. Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws — Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under “Foreseeable and Insurable Laws”: II, 69 Yale L.J. 794; Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process — The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 554.
We do not think foreseeability itself is a necessary prerequisite to fairness. Cf. Note, Products Liability and the Choice of Law, 78 Harv.L.R. 1452. Ordinarily, a manufacturer is primarily interested in the consumption of his product, not where it is consumed. If his product is defective he may be held liable for the damage caused thereby whether suit is brought in his state or plaintiff’s state. The manufacturer should not necessarily be allowed to divorce himself from liability for a defective product solely because he cannot foresee where it will be consumed.

Id. at 259-60, 413 P.2d at 737-38. Other cases have held that the occurrence of a single injury in the state is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the nonresident manufacturer’s product got there through normal commercial channels, thus justifying the conclusion that sufficient contacts existed. E.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Atwood & Morrill Co., 265 F.Supp. 692 (D.Mont.1967); Duignan v. A.H. Robins Co., 98 Idaho 134, 559 P.2d 750 (1977).

As Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. indicates, the fact that a nonresident manufactures a component part outside the state and takes no part in the sale, distribution, or marketing of the finished product in the state is no basis for a limitation on jurisdiction. See, e. g., Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of America; Fisher v. Albany Machine & Supply Co., 261 La. 747, 260 So.2d 691 (1972); State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell; Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court; Hodge v. Sands Mfg. Co., 151 W.Va. 133, 150 S.E.2d 793 (1966); Hasley v. Black, Sivales & Bryson, Inc., 70 Wis.2d 562, 235 N.W.2d 446 (1975). The Atwood company benefits from the protection Florida law provides Ford Motor Company in the marketing of its automobiles in Florida.

We conclude that the Atwood Vacuum Machine Company’s lack of direct presence and activity within the borders of Florida is no bar to our holding that the minimum contacts test of International Shoe is met. Furthermore, even though the injured Florida plaintiffs are out of the lawsuit, the remaining dispute being between Ford and Atwood, we hold that Florida as the place of injury has a sufficient interest in the litigation to assert jurisdiction over the nonresident part manufacturer.

The circuit court erred in holding section 48.193(l)(f)2 unconstitutional under the facts of this case. The order of dismissal is reversed and the case is remanded with directions that the complaint be reinstated.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.

SUNDBERG, C. J., dissents with an opinion with which ENGLAND, J., concurs.

SUNDBERG, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

I do not believe that utilization of Florida’s “long arm” statute, section 48.-193(l)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1977), to assert jurisdiction over the Atwood company, a foreign car components manufacturer, meets with due process requirements as delineated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). The necessary predicate for exercise of this state’s jurisdiction is lacking because Atwood carries on no discernable activity in this state. Atwood closes no sales and performs no services in Florida. Its only connections with this state are that it is foreseeable that some of Atwood’s components might end up in cars sold by Ford in Florida, and the indirect economic benefit derived from such sales.

The United States Supreme Court has repudiated foreseeability as a sufficient contact to satisfy due process requirements for the jurisdictional predicate: “ ‘[Foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 566. Atwood has simply failed to “purposefully [avail] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). See also Harlo Products Corp. v. J.I. Case Co., 360 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). To accept that foreseeability of product use in this state is the sole requirement for establishing a sufficient jurisdictional nexus between a component manufacturer and this state, is to accept the following:

[ A] local California tire retailer could be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there; a Wisconsin seller of a defective automobile jack could be haled before a distant court for damage caused in New Jersey, or a Florida soft drink concessionaire could be summoned to Alaska to account for injuries happening there. Every seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel.

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296, 100 S.Ct. at 567 (citations omitted). Likewise, the supplier of raw materials would be subject to litigation anywhere in the states. The United States Supreme Court could not accept this, nor can I.

The only manner in which foreseeability is relevant is in terms of a party’s reasonable expectation that he may be subject to a state’s jurisdiction:

[ T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.

Id. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567. I cannot fathom how this Court can reasonably expect Atwood to anticipate litigation in every jurisdiction throughout this country.

The second part of the asserted connection with this state, the indirect economic benefits derived by Atwood from Ford car sales in Florida, has also been rejected by the Supreme Court:

[Financial benefits accruing to the defendant from a collateral relation to the forum State will not support jurisdiction if they do not stem from a constitutionally cognizable contact with that State. In our view, whatever marginal revenues petitioners may receive by virtue of the fact that their products are capable of use in Oklahoma is far too attenuated a contact to justify that State’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction over them.

Id. at 299, 100 S.Ct. at 568 (citation omitted). Indirect economic benefit, therefore, is too tenuous a connection to establish sufficient contact between a foreign components manufacturer and Florida, since Atwood is only economically present in this state due to Ford’s marketing of the finished product.

Extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction cannot here be justified on public policy grounds of providing to Florida resident consumers a remedy against foreign component manufacturers. Florida consumers will invariably be able to reach a pecunious manufacturer-distributor of the finished product because of significant business contacts that a manufacturer-distributor necessarily incurs through his commercial efforts.

Ford would also have this Court cast it in the role of the original consumer plaintiff. But Ford is not a Florida consumer. It seeks indemnity against Atwood based mainly on claims of breach of warranty that occurred in other states. This indemnity action will concern design, manufacture, sale, transportation, control, custody, and installation of the product, all of which took place in either Illinois or Michigan. The relationship between Atwood and Ford, the heart of the instant controversy, is centered in Illinois and Michigan, and it is much more rational for a Florida court to allocate this litigation to those states. This would be fairer to Atwood and no less so to Ford, whose only relationship with Atwood is in those states.

Today’s decision does not really increase protection for the Florida consumer. Rather, it allocates the burden of litigating in a foreign forum against components manufacturers, and gives unfair advantage to a national manufacturing and distributing company such as Ford, which is well established in all states and which can litigate with equal facility in any state. Shaffer v. Heitner teaches us that we must look at the foreign defendant’s contacts with out state to determine whether the contacts meet due process standards for asserting jurisdiction, and not at the resident plaintiff’s contacts. Because the defendant Atwood carries on no activity in this state and its presence is not materially manifest, the majority has failed to heed the lesson of Shaffer v. Heitner.

I would affirm the order of the trial court.

ENGLAND, J., concurs.

       Foreseeability as a test for constitutional minimum contacts becomes all the more meaningless when one recognizes that the majority admits most manufacturers of components are always presumed to foresee the use of their products throughout the country. See Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966) (cited by the majority).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    James A. MORGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 53418.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 15, 1981.
    Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Craig S. Barnard, Chief Asst. Public Defender and Jerry L. Schwarz and Jack A. Goldberger, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

      Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Paul H. Zacks and Russell S. Bohn, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant, James A. Morgan, age sixteen, was convicted of first-degree murder. The trial judge imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury’s advisory sentence recommendation. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const.

The appellant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. He was convicted and sentenced under a bifurcated trial procedure adopted by the 1977 legislature and prescribed in section 918.017(1), Florida Statutes (1977). One phase of the procedure determined appellant’s guilt and the second determined that appellant was sane at the time of the offense. Subsequent to trial and while this matter was pending on appeal, we declared section 918.-017(l)’s bifurcated trial procedure unconstitutional because it denied a defendant his right of due process of law. State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So.2d 789 (Fla.1978). In so holding, we stated:

The basis of an insanity defense is that a person is unable to form the requisite intent. Since intent is an element of most crimes, lack of intent precludes criminal responsibility. Under the bifurcated system established by our Legislature, no evidence of insanity is admissible during that phase of the trial in which guilt or innocence is determined. Sanity is, in effect, presumed, giving rise to' an irrebuttable presumption of the existence of the requisite intent. Thus, the State is relieved of its burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant is precluded from offering evidence to negate the presumption of intent.

Id. at 792-93. We concluded that because this bifurcated proceeding raised an irre-buttable presumption of intent, it was contrary to due process.

The state contends that appellant’s failure to object to the validity of the bifurcated insanity procedure at trial prevents him from asserting that issue before this Court. We reject this contention and find that, under the circumstances of this case, our decision must be determined by the law as it exists at the time of this appeal. Wheeler v. State, 344 So.2d 244 (Fla.1977); cf. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Rouse, 194 So.2d 260 (Fla.1967). Consequently, our holding in State ex rel. Boyd that section 918.017(1) was unconstitutional as violative of due process must be applied to this case which was pending on appeal at the time of our State ex rel. Boyd decision. We also conclude that this bifurcated insanity procedure’s due process violation as established in State ex rel. Boyd concerns the element of intent to commit a crime and, therefore, adversely affects the truth-finding function. Given the circumstances of this cause, prejudice is apparent and fairness dictates that the defendant be afforded a new trial.

With this holding, it is unnecessary that we address appellant’s other issues. We do, however, direct the trial court’s attention to our recent decision in Lane v. State, 388 So.2d 1022 (Fla.1980), concerning competency to stand trial.

Accordingly, we vacate both the judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial subject to the trial court’s finding appellant competent to stand trial.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J„ and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.


author: McDonald, justice.

text:
    Roger THOMPSON, Vicki Thompson, and Dorothy Thompson, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 54057.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 15, 1981.
    Joseph L. Cardozo of Jones & Cardozo, Sarasota, for appellants.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Michael A. Palecki and Richard G. Pippinger, Asst. At-tys. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
   McDonald, justice.

This is a direct appeal from the Charlotte County Court which held constitutional section 823.01(2), Florida Statutes (1975). This Court has jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972). We reverse.

The court order closed Mothers, a business owned and operated by Roger, Vicki, and Dorothy Thompson. This order followed a finding by a panel of twelve householders, summoned and acting pursuant to section 823.01(2), that the nightclub was a nuisance. Section 823.01(2) reads as follows:

Any nuisance which tends to the immediate annoyance of the citizens in general, or is manifestly injurious to the public health and safety, or tends greatly to corrupt the manners and morals or the people, may be removed and suppressed by the order of the county court judge of the county, founded upon the verdict of 12 householders of the same, who shall be summoned, sworn, and impaneled for that purpose, which order shall be directed to and executed by any sheriff of the county; and an indictment or information shall lie for the same.

Section 823.01(2), initially enacted in 1832, provides for the abatement of a nuisance which annoys citizens in general or which injures the public, while it also provides that the verdict in the proceeding shall be by a panel of twelve householders. Not all citizens and members of the public are householders. The panel, therefore, made up of a special segment of the general citizenry, has been empowered to determine for the general citizenry what is or is not a nuisance. The use of “special interest juries” has long been looked upon with disfavor, Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946), and has been declared a violation of due process of law, Allen v. State, 110 Ga.App. 56, 63-66, 137 S.E.2d 711, 715-17 (1964). Whatever valid reason may have existed in 1832 for restricting the jury to householders does not remain valid today, and a jury, if required, should be chosen according to the specifications and qualifications of chapter 40, Florida Statutes (1979). We hold that section 823.01(2) violates article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution.

Appellant also contends that chapter 823 is too broad and the determination of what is a nuisance too vague for any of the provisions to be constitutional. We rejected a similar attack in Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So.2d 881 (Fla.1972), when we said:

A public nuisance violates public rights, subverts public order, decency or morals, or causes inconvenience or damage to the public generally. The Legislature has broad discretion to designate a particular activity to be a public nuisance. In the exercise of its police power the State has authority to prevent or abate nuisances, for police power is the sovereign right of the State to enact laws for the protection of lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare.

Id. at 884 (citations omitted).

When the trial judge considers the granting of an injunction of a business he should, of course, enjoin only those acts which he finds to be a nuisance. Federal Amusement Co. v. State ex rel. Tuppen, 159 Fla. 495, 32 So.2d 1 (1947).

The judgment of the trial court is vacated without prejudice to the state to institute an appropriate action in accordance with sections 823.05, 60.05, and 60.06, Florida Statutes (1979).

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.

ADKINS, J., dissents.


author: PER CURIAM. ALDERMAN, Justice,

text:
    THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Andrew BARON, Respondent.
    Nos. 57041, 58273, 58051 and 58228.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 15, 1981.

      David G. McGunegle, Branch Staff Counsel and John B. Root, Jr., Asst. Staff Counsel, Orlando and John A. Boggs, Asst. Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, for complainant.
    Andrew Baron, in pro. per., for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

These proceedings are before us by virtue of the Court’s jurisdiction to regulate the discipline of lawyers. Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. Two of the cases, numbers 58,051 and 58,228, which we have already consolidated, are here on The Florida Bar’s petitions for review of the referees’ reports. Case number 58,273 is before us on the respondent’s petition for review of the referee’s report. In case number 57,041, Florida Bar staff counsel has filed the report of the referee with the Court, and neither party has sought review. We now consolidate all four for purposes of disposing of them in one opinion.

Case No. 57041

This case, based on a complaint in two counts, arises out of respondent’s representation of two clients in separate marriage dissolution proceedings. The referee found that in both cases respondent collected a fee and filed the complaint for dissolution, but thereafter neglected the matter entirely. After the filing of grievances, respondent refunded the fees. The referee found that in both instances respondent violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), 6-101(A)(3), and 7-101(A)(2). Taking into consideration the respondent’s past disciplinary record, The Florida Bar v. Baron, 342 So.2d 505 (Fla.1977), the referee recommended a public reprimand.

Case No. 58273

The referee found that in October, 1975, respondent undertook representation of Norma G. Andrade, who had a dissolution proceeding pending and whose house had just been severely damaged and rendered uninhabitable by fire, for purposes of securing a dissolution and fire insurance recovery. Mrs. Andrade had seven children, five of them living with her, and was referred to respondent by the bar referral service after the Legal Aid Society declared her ineligible for its services. Respondent entered into an oral fee agreement with her, providing him with a twenty-five per cent share of the proceeds of a sale of the house, or a fire insurance recovery.

Respondent appeared with Mrs. Andrade at the final hearing on dissolution. From the testimony it became apparent that Mrs. Andrade wanted the home repaired so that she and the children could continue living there, while her husband wanted to sell the home. He had allowed the mortgage payments to become in arrears, and apparently thought the insurance proceeds inadequate to properly restore the house. The court, in granting judgment of dissolution, retained jurisdiction to determine the disposition of the marital home.

The former husband subsequently moved for permission to sell the home, and a hearing date was set. Mrs. Andrade received the motion and notice of hearing, but went on vacation without leaving her vacation address with respondent because she did not think her presence would be necessary. At the hearing, respondent joined in the petition to allow the sale of the property. There is a conflict in the testimony, the referee reports, as to whether Mrs. Andrade had authorized respondent’s action. The referee concludes that she wanted to keep the house, but that respondent acted in her better interest when he approved the sale.

The court awarded respondent a fee of $1000 for his services to Mrs. Andrade. Yet he filed a claim of lien for, and received from the proceeds of the sale of the house, $1500.

The referee recommended that respondent be found guilty of joining in the approval of the sale of Mrs. Andrade’s house without her consent and without notifying her and thereby violated his oath as an attorney and the integration rule, and Disciplinary Rules 7-101(A)(l), 7-101(A)(2) and 7-101(A)(3). The referee found that in claiming an unauthorized fee respondent violated his oath, the integration rule, and Disciplinary Rules 7-101(A)(l), 7-101(A)(2) and 7-101(A)(3). The referee recommended a private reprimand and probation for not less than six months nor more than three years. The referee gave consideration to the fact that respondent has previously been disciplined by the Court and that he supports five children and a retarded brother.

The burden is on the respondent to demonstrate that the referee’s report is erroneous. Fla.Bar Integr.Rule 11.09(3)(e). The referee’s findings of fact are presumed correct and will not be disregarded unless clearly erroneous or lacking support in evidence. The Florida Bar v. McCain, 361 So.2d 700 (Fla.1978); The Florida Bar v. Hirsch, 359 So.2d 856 (Fla.1978). Applying this standard, we conclude that the referee’s findings of fact must be upheld.

Case No. 58051

The referee found that respondent, in June, 1975, undertook representation of a client who had a claim against an insurance company, and accepted a $100 partial fee in advance. Respondent engaged in some negotiations and then, in April, 1976, advised the client that suit would have to be filed. One year later, respondent informed the client that he would require an additional fee payment of $500 before filing suit. The client sent a check, and respondent cashed it. Respondent still did not initiate the lawsuit, however, and after the client complained to The Florida Bar, respondent refunded $500.

The referee recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating his oath, the integration rule, and Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3). We uphold the findings of fact.

The referee recommended a public reprimand, six months of probation, and periodic case load status reports. The Florida Bar seeks review of this recommendation and asks, in this case as consolidated with case number 58,228, that respondent be suspended for one year with assessment of costs, and with reinstatement conditioned upon proof of rehabilitation.

Case No. 58228

The referee found that a client whom respondent had represented in a marriage dissolution proceeding returned for representation when her former husband sought a reduction of his child support obligation. Depositions of both the client and the former husband were scheduled to be taken the same day, but because the client’s deposition took longer than expected, the husband’s deposition was not taken. While respondent indicated he would take the former husband’s deposition, he never did. The client filed a grievance when she was unable to get in touch with respondent for several months. She subsequently entered into a stipulation with her former husband admitting a change in her circumstances due to her having begun gainful employment. When the respondent received a copy of the stipulation, he assumed that a child support reduction was a foregone conclusion and that he was discharged, and did not attend the final hearing.

The referee found that respondent did not properly represent his client in the matter in violation of his oath, the integration rule, and Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4), 6-101(A)(3), and 7 101(A)(2). We uphold the referee’s findings of fact. The referee recommended a private reprimand and six months to three years of probation. The Florida Bar seeks review of the recommended discipline, and recommends as discipline in this case as consolidated with case number 58,051 a one year suspension with proof of rehabilitation and taxation of costs.

In supervising the discipline of lawyers, this Court deals more severely with cumulative misconduct than with isolated instances of misconduct. The Florida Bar v. Vernell, 374 So.2d 473 (Fla.1979). In view of the fact that we deal here with four separate bar discipline cases, we agree with the Bar that a more severe punishment is warranted than was recommended in any of the individual proceedings.

There was no evidence of a corrupt motive. Respondent’s problems have been those of neglect and failure to communicate. In those instances in which respondent neglected a legal matter, he refunded the fees paid. The respondent is supporting five children and a mentally retarded brother.

It is our responsibility to impose the appropriate discipline. We suspend the respondent from the practice of law for sixty days, the suspension to commence on the fifteenth day from the date of this order. Reinstatement shall be automatic. Upon reinstatement, respondent is to be placed on probation for three years, during which period he will report on the status of all his cases bimonthly to the Clerk of this Court and provide a copy of these reports to Florida Bar staff counsel as they are filed. We assess against respondent the costs of these proceedings, as found in the referee’s reports, in the amount of $1147.69.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON and McDONALD, JJ., concur.

ALDERMAN, J., dissents with an opinion.

ALDERMAN, Justice,

dissenting.

In view of the respondent’s cumulative misconduct, including that set out in The Florida Bar v. Baron, 342 So.2d 505 (Fla.1977), I would suspend him for one year.


author: BOYD, Justice. ENGLAND, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. DeCarr D. COVINGTON and Arthur Rodriguez, Appellees.
    No. 57889.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 15, 1981.

      Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and James S. Pur-dy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
    Ronald K. Cacciatore, Tampa, Charles D. Waller, Dade City, and Paul B. Johnson of Gregory, Cours, Paniello, Johnson, Hayes & Hoft, Tampa, for appellees.
   BOYD, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pasco County. We have jurisdiction because the trial court declared a state law invalid. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972).

Appellees Covington and Rodriguez were members of the governing board of the Lake Padgett Estates East Road and Bridge District, a special taxing district in Pasco County. In a one hundred and three (103) count information, the state charged them with numerous offenses arising out of their performance of their duties as district board members. Two counts of the information charged violations of section 517.-301(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), an anti-fraud provision in the Sale of Securities Law.

The defendants moved to dismiss the information, arguing numerous grounds. With regard to the two counts charging violation of section 517.301(l)(c), the grounds of the motion included the contention that the information failed to charge the crime with sufficient specificity.

The court granted the motions to dismiss. The state appeals the order of dismissal, but only as to the two counts of violating the securities law. The dismissal of the one hundred and one other counts of alleged wrongdoing has not been appealed and is not before us. The court dismissed the two securities counts — counts 99 and 100 — on the ground that section 517.301(l)(c) is unconstitutionally vague.

The state contends that the court erred in holding the statute to be vague and cites numerous state and federal authorities for the proposition that it is constitutional.

It is a “settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.” Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975); Mounier v. State, 178 So.2d 714 (Fla.1965). Even though we may decline to reach the constitutional question upon which the trial court’s ruling was based, we can still affirm the order under review on other grounds. See, e. g., Cohen v. Mohawk, Inc., 137 So.2d 222 (Fla.1962); City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., Inc., 77 So.2d 428 (Fla.1954); Colcord v. Conroy, 40 Fla. 97, 23 So. 561 (1898).

Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides:

It is unlawful, and a violation of the provisions of this part, for any person:
(1) In the sale or purchase of any security in this state, including any security exempted under the provisions of s. 517.-05, and including any securities sold in any transaction exempted under the provisions of s. 517.06, directly or indirectly:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(b) To obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;
(c) To engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140 contains the following provisions:

(b) Nature of Indictment or Information. The indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.
(d) The Charge.
(1) Allegation of Facts; Citation of Law Violated. Each count of an indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried shall allege the essential facts constituting the offense charged. In addition, each count shall recite the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in or omission of the citation shall not be ground for dismissing the count or for a reversal of a conviction based thereon if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.
(3) Time and Place. Each count of an indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried shall contain allegations stating as definitely as possible the time and place of the commission of the offense charged in the act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together, provided the court in which the indictment or information is filed has jurisdiction to try all of the offenses charged.

Count ninety-nine of the information charged that the appellees, during the period from September, 1972 to January, 1979,

did directly or indirectly engage in transactions, practice or course of business with regard to the sale of the bonds of Lake Padgett Estates East Road and Bridge District, Extension No. 3, Pasco County, Florida, which operated as a fraud or deceit upon the said bondholders in connection with their purchase of the said bonds . . . contrary to Chapter 517.-301(l)(c). .. .

Count 100 was worded exactly the same way except that it referred to extension no. 1 of the district. The information followed closely the statutory language.

When an indictment or information charges a crime substantially as defined in the statute denouncing it, it is generally sufficient, where the statutory language and the descriptive details state the nature and the cause of the accusation without misleading the accused in concerting his defense. Finch v. State, 116 Fla. 437, 156 So. 489 (1934). As a necessary corollary to this rule, this Court has held that when the charging document substantially follows the statute, if the information as a whole is still vague, indefinite, inconsistent, or calculated to mislead the defendant in the preparation of his defense, or expose him to the danger of a second prosecution, it is not sufficient. State v. Russee, 68 So.2d 897 (Fla.1953). To remedy such insufficiency, the information must be supplemented by other factual allegations which set out the acts alleged to constitute the offense with precision and particularity. State ex rel. Swanboro v. Mayo, 155 Fla. 330, 19 So.2d 883 (1944). This may be necessary when the statute defines the offense in general terms and the accusation using the statutory language does not clearly and specifically apprise the accused of what he must defend against. See, e. g., Rosin v. Anderson, 155 Fla. 673, 21 So.2d 143 (1945); Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 51 So. 278 (1910); State v. Barnett, 344 So.2d 863 (Fla.2d DCA 1977).

In the instant case, the information merely tracked the statute. The offense is there defined in broad, general terms. There was no supplemental description of the alleged misconduct. Without more particular factual allegations, the information failed to convey notice of the accusations with sufficient precision and clarity.

The question of the sufficiency of the information was before the trial court, having been raised by the appellees in their motions to dismiss. We believe the court should have granted the motions on this ground. We disapprove of the court’s ruling that section 517.301(l)(c) is unconstitutional.

We affirm, therefore, the order dismissing the information as to counts 99 and 100. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, OVER-TON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.

ENGLAND, J., dissents with an opinion.

ENGLAND, Justice,

dissenting.

I would decide the constitutional issue presented in this case on which the trial court expressly ruled. The sufficiency of the informations was neither raised on this appeal nor briefed and argued here by any of the parties.


text:
    Frank JACKSON, Jr., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 58957.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 15, 1981.
    Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, and Margaret Good and Melanie Hines Alford, Asst. Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Gregory C. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dayto-na Beach, and Doris E. Jenkins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District of Florida, reported at Jackson v. State, 382 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.


text:
    THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. T. David BURNS, Respondent.
    No. 59049.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 15, 1981.
    Stanley A. Spring, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, Donald A. Smith, Jr., Bar Counsel, Tampa and Donald R. Hall, Chairman, Sixth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee, Clearwater, for complainant.
    T. David Burns, in pro per, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary proceeding by The Florida Bar against T. David Burns, a member of The Florida Bar, is presently before us on complaint of The Florida Bar and Report of Referee. Pursuant to Rule 11.06(9)(b) of the Integration Rule of The Florida Bar, the referee’s report and record were duly filed with this Court.

Having considered the pleadings and evidence, the referee found as follows:

After having heard all of the testimony presented and having considered the exhibits filed in evidence, there appear to be certain inescapable facts bearing upon the charges made against the Respondent. First, it is obvious that on March 26th, 1979, the day before he appeared in the courtroom on a stretcher, the Respondent had been able to go by private automobile from his home in Pasco County to the Veterans Administration Hospital in Tampa dressed in normal attire, and that he had been able to walk into and out of the hospital without any visible distress of any magnitude. Second, although the Respondent stated that he was not aware on March 26th, 1979 that the trial was to be conducted the following day by Judge Patterson, he apparently made no effort to obtain that information. It is apparent that under those circumstances the Respondent made no effort to contact the Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit either for the purpose of determining which judge would conduct the trial or of advising the Chief Judge of his physical complaints. Thirdly, the Respondent was aware, on both March 26th and March 27th, 1979, that the press had an interest in the trial of his client, Mr. Cook, and, as an attorney who had been engaged in the practice of law for approximately twenty-seven years at that time, it is reasonable to assume that the Respondent should have anticipated that publicity would be given to his appearance in a courtroom on a stretcher attired in bedclothes. Fourthly, an attorney who had been engaged in the practice of law as long as the Respondent had been at that time should have reasonably anticipated that his action is [sic] appearing in the courtroom on a stretcher would have created an immediate problem for the judge before whom the trial was set, particularly in view of the uncertainty of the Respondent as to whether or not he could proceed with the trial at that time. Fifthly, the Respondent should have realized that by such conduct, he would place the trial judge in a position where the latter would be forced either to grant a further continuance of the trial (the record in this case indicating that the case had been set for trial on more than one occasion prior to the occurrence in question), or of forcing an attorney, who claimed to be ill, to proceed with the trial despite the illness. Sixthly, even if the Respondent believed that it was imperative that he be present for the trial, it is obvious that he could have requested his wife, who had accompanied him, or an ambulance attendant, to advise the judge of his condition before he was carried into the courtroom on a stretcher.
It is obvious that the Respondent may very well have been confused as a result of the instructions or advice given him by the doctors at the Veterans Administration Hospital. In the certificates furnished by the two doctors they stated that the Respondent should have complete bedrest for a period of three weeks following March 26th, 1979, but from their testimony given before Judge Patterson it appears that what they really meant was that would be the best course to follow and that the Respondent could do whatever he felt able to do. It is clear that on March 26th, 1979 the Respondent felt that he was able to dress and to walk in and out of the hospital.
In summary it is the conclusion of the undersigned that whether or not the Respondent deliberately intended by his action in going into the courtroom on a stretcher and dressed in bedclothing to embarrass the trial judge or to bring criticism upon the court, he should have realized, by reason of the length of time that he had then been engaged in the practice of law, that such a result would follow.
Based upon the evidence in this proceeding and upon the conclusions herein-before set forth, it is the finding of the ... Referee that the Respondent is guilty of a violation of the provisions of Disciplinary Rules 1 102(A)(5) and 1 -102(A)(6) in that his conduct in appearing in the courtroom on a stretcher and dressed in bedclothing constituting [sic] his engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice, and engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

The referee recommends that respondent be found guilty of the above disciplinary rules and recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of thirty (30) days and also receive a public reprimand.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we approve the findings and recommendations of the referee.

Accordingly, respondent, T. David Burns, is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of thirty (30) days, effective February 16, 1981, thereby giving respondent thirty (30) days to close out his practice and take the necessary steps to protect his clients. The publication of this order and judgment shall constitute a public reprimand, and it is further

ORDERED that The Florida Bar’s Motion to Strike Respondent’s Petition for Review is granted and the Petition for Review is hereby stricken.

Costs in the amount of $479.95 are hereby taxed against the respondent.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J„ and ADKINS, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.


author: ALDERMAN, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Joseph DALEY, Roque Cavazos, and Jeromy Augsten, Respondents.
    No. 59343.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 15, 1981.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Max Rud-mann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
    Robert A. Huth, Jr., Fort Lauderdale and Barry E. Witlin and James W. Reilley, Chicago, Ill., for respondents.
   ALDERMAN, Justice.

The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has certified the following question:

Does a defendant have automatic standing to challenge the legality of a search or seizure if he is charged with an offense that includes, as an element of that offense, possession of the seized material at the time of the contested search and seizure?

Daley v. State, 387 So.2d 971 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980).

Relying upon Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), and United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir. 1979), holding that the automatic standing rule announced in Jones was still the law, the district court held that the defendants in this case had automatic standing to challenge the legality of the searches and seizures, and it reversed the trial court’s findings in this regard.

Because the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in United States v. Salvucci, the district court certified this question to us. Subsequent to certification, however, the Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Salvucci and overruled the automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States. United States v. Salvucci, U.S. , 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).

In view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Salvucci, we remand this cause to the district court for reconsideration. See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).

It it is so ordered.

OVERTON, ENGLAND and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

ADKINS, J., Acting C. J., dissents.


author: PER CURIAM. BOYD, Justice,

text:
    Joseph Green BROWN et al., Petitioners, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Respondent.
    No. 59732.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 15, 1981.

      Samuel S. Jacobson and Albert J. Datz of Datz, Jacobson & Lembcke, Jacksonville, Marvin E. Frankel, New York City, Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Craig S. Barnard, Chief Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioners.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Carolyn M. Snurkowski and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Joseph Green Brown petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from an allegedly unconstitutional sentence of death. Brown was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, following which his conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court. Brown v. State, 381 So.2d 690 (Fla.1980). An application for certiorari is now pending in the United States Supreme Court. Brown v. Florida, No. 80 5708 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980).

Alleging common issues of law and fact, Brown has joined with one hundred and twenty-two other persons who seek relief from allegedly unconstitutional sentences of death. The dominant theme in the multiple requests for relief is the alleged impropriety of this Court’s having considered, in the course of reviewing sentences of death, documents which were not made available to the defendants’ counsel. For most of the petitioners, the alleged impropriety was the Court’s consideration of undisclosed documents not related to the proceedings in which their sentences were imposed or upheld, but seen in the course of reviewing death sentences approved or considered for other criminal defendants.

Before reaching the merits of the petitions, we first consider the procedural basis on which the Court has been asked to entertain habeas corpus petitions on a consolidated basis.

I

The writ of habeas corpus — the common law remedy used primarily to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined — has long been recognized as an essential vehicle by which fundamental individual liberties are shielded from illegal governmental action. Traditionally, habe-as corpus has been characterized by its utility in cutting through the “procedural morass” of institutional red tape so as to secure the release of persons unlawfully detained. It has been recognized, however, that no prisoner has an interest in the illegal restraint of another, since a sentence of imprisonment operates on each individually. A joinder of habeas corpus petitions, therefore, being unique, requires close scrutiny and a compelling justification.

The joinder of criminal defendants in trial proceedings is commonplace. The reasons which support joinder in those situations — considerations of judicial economy flowing from the presentation of common issues of law and fact, weighed against the potential prejudice to the defendants sought to be joined — provide a useful perspective from which to examine the desirability of deciding jointly the claims presented here.

In multiple habeas corpus petitions, such as those before us, prejudice to the petitioners is obviously of no concern. For one thing, these proceedings do not involve adjudications of guilt, but only the legality of petitioners’ confinement as related to this Court’s sentence review. For another, petitioners themselves, rather than the prosecuting authority, have sought consolidated consideration.

Considerations of judicial economy, then, are alone relevant here. As to these, economies become attenuated, and the potential benefits less attractive, as the disparity between legal and factual issues increases. Multiple party joinder is a function of the facts and circumstances of each case, with the determination in each necessarily resting within the sound discretion of the court. In the final analysis, a balancing test is employed to take into account the relative advantages and disadvantages attendant to joint consideration of the common and any noncommon claims presented.

Brown and the other petitioners in this proceeding — the one hundred and twenty-three inmates on “death row” — premise their joint filing for habeas corpus relief on alleged judicial economies which will flow from our considering in one proceeding allegedly common issues of law and fact. Those economies are not readily apparent in considering the several petitions, as the facts relevant to each vary significantly. Petitioners’ appendices, and their request for a special master to develop facts further, bear this out. Petitioners’ cases are even in different stages of the appellate process. Joined together are persons whose appeals from sentences of death are pending in this Court and persons whose sentences have already been affirmed by this Court — some more than once. The first category of petitioners have filed requests which are obviously premature.

The economies petitioners assert only become manifest if we rule precisely in the manner petitioners have urged — a presumptuous view of the merits of the cause. The fact of the matter is that to consider Brown’s claim along with each of the others would plainly prove more unwieldly than economical. Unlike In re Baker, 267 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1972), this case does not involve the routine application of a previously adjudicated constitutional issue to numerous persons who are, in reality, similarly situated. The claims for relief in these petitions present for our analysis new and unresolved constitutional issues, some applicable to one group of petitioners and some applicable to others.

The joinder here is manifestly designed, at best, to curtail all executions in Florida on legal grounds not yet adjudicated or, at least, to suspend the imposition of any lawful sentence until new legal issues are resolved. The latter objective, of course, has already been achieved. To allow a joinder under these circumstances in future cases would distort habeas corpus beyond recognition and create a pernicious precedent in capital cases. We decline to approve this precedent. There is no justification for joinder in situations such as this.

To avoid absurd technicalities, however, we decline to treat each petition as if it were separately filed and enter a separate order or opinion on each. Rather, our disposition of Brown’s petition effectively disposes of all claims for relief of those petitioners who have joined with Brown. In the future, attempts to create a class action habeas corpus proceeding in situations such as this will be rejected summarily-

ii

Turning to the legal issues presented, we perceive that petitioners’ several constitutional claims all emanate from their assertion that we have “engaged in the continuing practice of requesting and receiving information concerning capital appellants which was not presented at trial and not a part of the trial record or record on appeal.” This information allegedly includes pre-sen-tence investigations, psychiatric evaluations or contact notes made in the corrections system after conviction, and psychological screening reports made after conviction by corrections personnel. The receipt of this information, petitioners assert generally, has led to a rash of constitutional violations ranging from a denial of due process in individual cases where information was received, on the one hand, to a pervasive violation of Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), in all capital cases reviewed and affirmed by the Court, on the other hand. In short, petitioners contend that our alleged misconduct requires our invalidation of all death sentences imposed or approved in Florida, and by necessary implication, that we declare Florida’s death penalty statute invalid and unconstitutional in its operation.

Despite strident characterizations of our receipt of these materials, and notwithstanding the vigor and pith of the hypotheses on which petitioners depend, the doctrines of constitutional law here argued are singularly unpersuasive. Even if petitioners’ most serious charges were accepted as true, as a matter of law our view of the non-record information petitioners have identified is totally irrelevant either to our appellate function in capital cases as it bears on the operation of the statute, or to the validity of any individual death sentence.

Florida’s death penalty statute, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1979), directs that a jury and judge, not this Court, must weigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances delineated in the statute to determine whether death is an appropriate sentence. The jury performs that function only to recommend a sentence to the trial judge. It then becomes the responsibility of the trial judge to weigh evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in order to arrive at a reasoned judgment as to the appropriate sentence to impose.

This Court’s role after a death sentence has been imposed is “review,” a process qualitatively different from sentence “imposition.” It consists of two discrete functions. First, we determine if the jury and judge acted with procedural rectitude in applying section 921.141 and our case law. This type of review is illustrated in Elledge v. State, 346 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1977), where we remanded for resentencing because the procedure was flawed — in that case a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance was considered. See also Brown v. State, 381 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1980); Kampff v. State, 371 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 1979).

The second aspect of our review process is to ensure relative proportionality among death sentences which have been approved statewide. After we have concluded that the judge and jury have acted with procedural regularity, we compare the case under review with all past capital cases to determine whether or not the punishment is too great. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). In those cases where we found death to be comparatively inappropriate, we have reduced the sentence to life imprisonment. See Malloy v. State, 382 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 1979); Burch v. State, 343 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1977); Jones v. State, 332 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1976).

Neither of our sentence review functions, it will be noted, involves weighing or reevaluating the evidence adduced to establish aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Our sole concern on evidentia-ry matters is to determine whether there was sufficient competent evidence in the record from which the judge and jury could properly find the presence of appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances. If the findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances are so supported, if the jury’s recommendation was not unreasonably rejected, and if the death sentence is not disproportionate to others properly sustainable under the statute, the trial court’s sentence must be sustained even though, had we been triers and weighers of fact, we might have reached a different result in an independent evaluation.

It is not the function of this court to cull through what has been listed as aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the trial court’s order, determine which are proper for consideration and which are not, and then impose the proper sentence. In accordance with the statute, the culling process must be done by the trial court.

Mikenas v. State, 367 So.2d 606, 610 (Fla.1978). Accord, Hargrave v. State, 366 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 239, 62 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979).

The record of each proceeding, and precedent, necessarily frame our determinations in sentence review. Our opinions, of course, then expound our analysis. Factors or information outside the record play no part in our sentence review role. Indeed, our role is neither more nor less, but precisely the same as that employed by the United States Supreme Court in its review of capital punishment cases. Illustrative of the Court’s exercise of the review function is Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980).

Petitioners’ contentions in this proceeding are essentially grounded on Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). Gardner stands for the proposition that a sentence of death may not be imposed (note the word “imposed”) to any extent on non-record, unchallengeable information. Id. at 362, 97 S.Ct. at 1206. Since we do not “impose” sentences in capital cases, Gardner presents no impediment to the advertent or inadvertent receipt of some non-record information. The Kentucky Supreme Court explained the distinction which has eluded petitioners in Ex Parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1978), responding to the very assertion that is made here concerning the review of “non-record” materials in capital cases:

Every opinion from a case book, every text or treatise, every law review article, every philosophical, historical or religious document a judge might see fit to read and consider, including the Holy Bible, is a tangible source of information from which he may pick and choose in arriving at a judgment.
* * * *
There are obviously differences between' individualized information pertaining to the defendant personally, which is to be considered by a trial judge in fixing a sentence, and the impersonal data that may be used by an appellate court in determining whether the judgment of a trial court is or is not in line with what has been done in comparable cases.
* # * *
It seems to us that the difference is quite fundamental. If a judge or jury deciding one’s fate is. going to consider reports of what other people say about him, certainly he should be entitled to see them. “The risk that some of the information accepted in confidence may be erroneous, or may be misinterpreted, by the investigator or by the sentencing judge, is manifest.” Gardner v. Florida, supra, at 430 U.S. 359, 97 S.Ct. 1205. But we are not the sentencing court. In any given case before us we intend to comply with the statutory request to include in our decision a reference to those similar cases that have been taken into consideration. Presumably, however, the petitioners want to know not only what will be taken into consideration, but what will not, and to know it in advance, so that they can urge upon us what to choose and what to avoid.
* # * *
We do not find it possible to believe that in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), the Supreme Court of the United States meant to lay down a principle so pervasive as to require an appellate court to lay out for inspection by the appellant, even in a capital case, all of the information in its hands from which it may seek perspective and guidance in reviewing the propriety of his sentence. We therefore hold that Gardner does not apply.

Id. at 625-27 (footnote omitted).

It is evident, once our dual roles in the capital punishment scheme are fully appreciated, that non-record information we may have seen, even though never presented to or considered by the judge, the jury, or counsel, plays no role in capital sentence “review.” That fact is obviously appreciated by the United States Supreme Court, for it very carefully differentiated the sentence “review” process of appellate courts from the sentence “imposition” function of trial judges in Proffitt and in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).

A remaining question is whether the reading of non-record documents would so affect members of this Court that they could not properly perform their assigned appellate functions. Plainly, it would not. Just as trial judges are aware of matters they do not consider in sentencing, Alford v. State, 355 So.2d 108 (Fla.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 935, 98 S.Ct. 2835, 56 L.Ed.2d 778 (1978), so appellate judges are cognizant of information that they disregard in the performance of their judicial tasks.

The upshot of this is that petitioners’ claims are untenable.

Ill

We cannot pass this opportunity to put this case in a more rational perspective than it has been accorded by counsel and the media. This case emerges from society’s continuing wrangling over the moral and social justification for capital punishment. Regrettably, the thunderous emanations of this great debate, and the manner in which this joint petition was presented to the Court, have cast a pall on the integrity of the painful process by which this Court attempts to deal with the responsibility it has been assigned. It seems to us both unwarranted and unseemly to villify those who endeavor to follow the constitution; we are, after all, the messengers, and not the message.

Florida’s death penalty statute has been held constitutional time and time again. We are obliged to apply it so long as the citizens of this state deem it an appropriate punishment for select acts of criminality, and so long as the United States Supreme Court tolerates its use. Views on the subject can always be addressed to the Florida legislature or to the people of Florida, but attempts to pervert judicial processes, or to castigate the judiciary, benefit no one in the resolution of this societal debate.

The petitions of Brown and the others for writs of habeas corpus and for other extraordinary relief are denied. The motion for appointment of a special master and sundry other relief is denied. The stays of execution for Carl Ray Songer and Lenson Har-grave are dissolved.

No petitions for rehearing will be entertained.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, OVER-TON, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

BOYD, Justice,

concurs in result with an opinion.

I am convinced that no member of this court was influenced by any extraneous materials.

Although I don’t agree with all the language in the majority opinion, I concur in the result.

      . Porter v. Porter, 60 Fla. 407, 53 So. 546 (1910).

      . For a short overview of the history of the writ of habeas corpus, see State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207 (1933).

      . Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 269, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1052, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948).

      . See State ex rel. Williams v. Purdy, 242 So.2d 498 (3d DCA), appeal dismissed, 248 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1971), citing In re Kosopud, 272 F. 330 (N.D. Ohio 1920) and Riley v. City and County of Denver, 137 Colo. 312, 324 P.2d 790 (1958).

      . See Abbott v. State, 334 So.2d 642 (3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1977), and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968, 97 S.Ct. 2926, 53 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1977); Tifford v. State, 334 So.2d 91 (Fla.3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 344 So.2d 327 (1977).

      . See Note, Multiparty Federal Habeas Corpus, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 1482, 1483 (1968).

      . See id. at 1488.

      . See Menendez v. State, 368 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 1979); Stripling v. State, 349 So.2d 187 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1220 (1978).

      . State ex rel. Williams v. Purdy, 242 So.2d 498 (3d DCA), appeal dismissed, 248 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1971) (class action not an appropriate remedy in habeas corpus proceeding). We note that the applicability to habeas corpus of the rules concerning joinder and class actions has engendered much controversy in the federal courts. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 n.5, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1088 n.5, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969); United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921, 95 S.Ct. 1587, 43 L.Ed.2d 789 (1975); Adderly v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389, 400 (M.D.Fla. 1972). See generally Note, Multiparty Federal Habeas Corpus, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 1482 (1968).

      . In Baker, this Court, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s mandate in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), imposed life sentences on the class of persons previously sentenced to death who had not been resentenced as of that date.

      . The disparities are highlighted by the state’s motion to dismiss those of the petitions which allege no direct “taint” in our review of prisoners’ sentences.

      . Petitioners also assert that we have seen and were prejudicially affected (1) by one reference in a letter to the Court that one convict refused to submit to a psychiatric report, (2) by the mention in letters to the Court that there exist probation and parole violation reports for two convicts, and (3) by the mention in another letter to the Court that there exists a prison classification and admission summary for one convict.

      .At oral argument, counsel for petitioners charitably described our receipt of these materials as “an understandable effort to be fully informed.”

      .The relationship of the judge’s responsibility to the jury’s, about which much has been said in our opinions, is not germane here.

        . Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975).

      . At oral argument on the joint petitions, counsel clarified petitioners’ “proportionality taint” argument. He conceded that appellate judges receive and review all types of non-record information in the course of their duties, and that there is no impropriety in that occurring. He stated, moreover, that one constitutionally infirm decision by this Court would not itself skew the entire process by which we guarantee proportionality review in capital cases, so as to invalidate all other death sentences or the operation of the statute. He asserted, rather, that a systematic pattern of constitutionally defective review would be required for the relief requested, and he claimed to have found that pattern in the Court’s having received in several cases, by request or otherwise, the “tainted” materials which were never displayed to counsel. As we view the case, of course, appellate review can never be compromised, in the constitutional sense required by Proffitt, by the receipt of any quantity of non-record information. Cf. Goodman v. Olsen, No. 45,356 (Fla. July 30, 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945, 97 S.Ct. 1579, 51 L.Ed.2d 792 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court denied review of an order of this Court which had rejected a request to invalidate a decision of this Court allegedly made on the basis of improper, non-record information.

      . We cannot help but observe that the operation of capital punishment laws has been dependent upon a changing set of procedural principles, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), which have imposed shifting, supervisory standards on state high courts. The “tainted” information we are charged with reviewing was, as counsel concedes, in every instance obtained to deal with newly-articulated procedural standards. It would be ironic indeed if petitioners were successful in their assertion that our statute operates unconstitutionally because this Court has acted promptly from time to time to respond to new directives from the Supreme Court as to what procedures are required to make the statute operate in a constitutional manner.