author: DENNIS, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Lee DOUGHTY.
    No. 65337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.

      James C. Dixon, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Ralph Tyson, Kay Kirkpatrick, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
   DENNIS, Justice.

The question raised by this criminal appeal is whether the double jeopardy prohibitions bar multiple conviction and punishment at a single trial for the crimes of forgery and theft which occurred when defendant knowingly obtained cash and merchandise with a check bearing a false signature. Defendant’s conviction and sentence for theft must be reversed. Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. In the present case, the evidence required to support a conviction of theft would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction of forgery, without the proof of any additional facts. Where multiple punishment has been erroneously imposed the proper appellate procedure is to eliminate the effect of the less severely punishable offense.

In a two-count bill of information filed on April 7, 1978, defendant Robert L. Doughty was charged with forgery and felony theft, in violation of La. R.S. 14:72 and 14:67. Following trial before a judge, defendant was found guilty as charged on each count. On April 20, 1979 the trial judge sentenced defendant to eighteen (18) months’ imprisonment on each count, sentences to run concurrently. From this conviction and sentence defendant has appealed, urging a single contention of error based on double jeopardy violations.

On November 19, 1977, at approximately 4:00 p. m., defendant Robert Doughty and his wife entered Butler’s Check and Save Grocery on Foster Drive in Baton Rouge. After shopping awhile, defendant asked the check-out clerk to cash his payroll check. When she agreed, defendant endorsed the check with the name “Roy Fruge.” The check was drawn on the account of Charles Ellis Construction Company and made payable to Roy Fruge in the amount of one hundred sixty-nine dollars. After the clerk cashed the check the defendant used some of the money to pay for approximately twenty dollars worth of groceries.

Shortly after the transaction, Mrs. Robert Butler, an owner of the store, inspected the check and became suspicious. She phoned Charles Ellis Construction Company to verify the check. When she was told that the check was forged Mrs. Butler called the police, who came and arrested defendant and his wife sitting in an automobile in front of the store.

Defendant Doughty was charged with the offenses of forgery, La. R.S. 14:72, and theft, La. R.S. 14:67. Defendant’s motion to arrest judgment on double jeopardy grounds was denied. Defendant appealed, contending that his prosecution for forgery placed him in double jeopardy because it arose from the same conduct as the theft.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth, provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offenses to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Article 1, § 15 of 1974 Louisiana Constitution contains a similar guarantee. It has long been understood that separate statutory crimes need not be identical — either in constituent elements or in actual proof — in order to be the same within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); 1 J. Bishop, New Criminal Law, § 1051 (8th ed. 1892); Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 268-269 (1965).

Because it was designed originally to embody the protection of the common-law pleas of former jeopardy, see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-340, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1019-1020, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975), the double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecution ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 166, 97 S.Ct. at 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d at 193-194.

The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and it protects against multiple punishment for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (footnotes omitted).

In determining whether two offenses are the same for purposes of barring multiple punishments at a single trial, the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Ohio, supra, 432 U.S. at 167, 97 S.Ct. at 2220, made clear that the test which had been formulated in the federal system is constitutionally required of the states:

“The established test for determining whether two offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative punishment was stated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932);
“ ‘The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not . . .’
This test emphasizes the elements of the two crimes. ‘If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes ..’ Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1294, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975).
“Unless ‘each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not,’ Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871), the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecutions as well as cumulative punishment.” 432 U.S. at 166, 97 S.Ct. at 2225-26, 53 L.Ed.2d at 194-195. See also Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 31 S.Ct. 421, 55 L.Ed. 489 (1911).

Sometimes called the “distinct fact” test, the Blockburger test depends on the evidence required to convict, not the evidence introduced at trial. See Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 271-273 (1965). The test is equivalent to the rule announced by Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. (12 Browne) 433 (1871), the first case to apply the “same evidence” test in this country. As formulated by Morey, offenses are the same when “the evidence required to support a conviction upon one [indictment] would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other.” [emphasis supplied] Id. 434.

Applying the distinct fact test, we conclude that there is only one offense in this case because the evidence required to support a conviction on the theft charge would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction on the forgery charge. Theft is defined as the misappropriation or taking of anything of value of another either without his consent or by means of fraudulent conduct. La. R.S. 14:67. In the present case, since the cash and merchandise obtained by the defendant were given over with consent, the evidence that the goods were transferred for a forged instrument was crucial to proof of theft by means of fraudulent conduct. Furthermore, no additional fact, beyond that necessary to prove the theft charge, was required to warrant a conviction on the forgery charge. Forgery is the false making or altering, with intent to defraud, of any signature to, or any part of, any writing purporting to have legal efficacy; or issuing or transferring, with intent to defraud, a forged writing known by the offender to be a forged writing. La. R.S. 14:72. Since it was necessary to prove that the check was forged and that defendant knew it was forged in order to prove the essential fraudulent element of the theft crime, proof of no additional fact was required in order to convict defendant of forgery.

Since the sentences in the present case were made to run concurrently, it may be argued that the concurrent sentences are presumed to be no greater punishment than a single sentence of equal length. See Claasen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 12 S.Ct. 169, 35 L.Ed. 966 (1891); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 306, 81 S.Ct. 653, 656, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961); Note, 107 U.Pa.L.Rev. 726 n. 4 (1959). However, “[t]he validity of this presumption is questionable . . . [i]t does not take into account the stigma which attaches for an accused from the conviction of two or more crimes, rather than one, or the practical effect on a prisoner, now that the parole system is so widely applied.” United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1958). Concurrent sentences are more prejudicial than a single sentence because “it is well understood that a multiplicity of sentences impairs a prisoner’s opportunities for pardon or parole.” Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 1953); see Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 300 (1965).

Because of the prejudicial effect of concurrent sentences where, as in the present case, the convictions are found to be in violation of the state and federal provisions which proscribe double jeopardy, one of the sentences must be vacated. Where multiple punishment has been erroneously imposed, the appropriate procedure at the appellate level is to eliminate the effect of the judgment as to the less severely punishable offense. State v. Ballez, 102 Ariz. 174, 427 P.2d 125 (1967); State v. Hopper, 25 Ariz.App. 65, 540 P.2d 1284 (1975). This action consists of eliminating both conviction and sentence. Id. Cf. In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 56 Cal.Rptr. 110, 422 P.2d 998 (1967); People v. Laster, 18 Cal.App.3d 381, 96 Cal.Rptr. 108 (1971).

In the present case forgery, La. R.S. 14:72, is punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten (10) years or both. The crime of theft, La. R.S. 14:67, provides for a penalty of imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years when the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value of one hundred dollars or more. Accordingly, defendant’s conviction and sentence for theft must be vacated.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence for theft are vacated. The conviction and sentence for forgery are affirmed.

VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DENNIS, Justice. MARCUS, Justice SUMMERS, Chief Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie MARTIN.
    No. 65381.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
    Concurring Opinion Feb. 28, 1980.
    Robert Barnard, New Orleans, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, for defendant-appellant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Thomas Chester, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
   DENNIS, Justice.

Martin was convicted of one count of armed robbery following a trial by jury. He was then sentenced to serve one hundred and ninety-eight years at hard labor as a multiple offender, having been convicted of simple burglary on November 3, 1971, and simple robbery on June 11, 1974. He asserts three assignments of error: (1) there are errors patent on the face of the record; (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress identifications made out of court; (3) the trial judge improperly used the two prior convictions to enhance the sentence because their underlying guilty pleas were involuntary.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

We find no error patent on the face of the record.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

The defendant argues that eyewitness identifications of the defendant should have been suppressed and excluded from the trial, because the out-of-court identifications were prejudicial and tainted the in-court identifications.

This armed robbery occurred at a church in the presence of five witnesses, M. Yolanda Domingue, Ms. Mercedes Barthe, and three priests. At a photographic line-up taken shortly after the robbery, Ms. Do-mingue selected the photo of the defendant, but noted that the hair style was different. The police permitted her to cover the hair and she identified the defendant. Later, Ms. Domingue identified the defendant at a line-up at police headquarters. At trial, Ms. Domingue again identified the defendant with no hesitation. Likewise, Ms. Barthe identified the defendant at the trial positively although she showed some tentativeness in her identification at the police lineup.

Even if we assume that the photographic and physical line-ups were improperly suggestive, we do not find that the in-court identification was tainted. The witnesses were present at the commission of the crime and had considerable exposure to the defendant. The defendant met Ms. Do-mingue in the church when he entered, pointing a gun at her. He walked her up the stairs and made her stand nearby while he had the church deacon open the safe. Ms. Domingue testified that she had learned to remain calm during robberies and to pay attention to the identification of robbers when she was trained as a bank teller at Pelican Homestead. She asserted that she employed this calmness in the face of this robbery. Ms. Barthe also had enough time with the defendant to make an adequate identification of him at the trial. She encountered the defendant in a bedroom in the church building and was taken by him to the safe, where she stood while he removed the money. Added to the foregoing factors, we find that the lighting in the church during the robbery was good.

We conclude that the in-court identification, because of the extent and quality of the exposure that the witnesses had of the defendant, was independent of the out-of-court identifications. Since there was an independent and reliable basis for the in-court identification, we find that the evidence was admissible. State v. Siegel, 354 So.2d 525 (La.1978); State v. Taylor, 347 So.2d 172 (La.1977).

This assignment is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

The defendant complains of the use of his two prior convictions to enhance his sentence. We find that the court properly considered the November 3,1971 conviction, but improperly used the 1974 conviction.

Under State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La.1979), a conviction by a guilty plea taken before December 8, 1971, is not governed by State v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1155 (La.1979) and State v. Jackson, 255 So.2d 85 (La.1971). The defendant’s conviction on November 3, 1971, therefore, falls within the category governed by this rule, according to Holden : the state need only show that the defendant entered his guilty plea while he was represented by counsel; following this, the burden shifts to the defendant to show the plea was taken without a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights. The minutes from the defendant’s 1971 conviction indicate that he was represented by counsel when the judge accepted his guilty plea. Since he did not show that the plea was involuntary or made without a waiver of his rights, we affirm the trial judge’s use of it in enhancing this sentence.

The prosecution failed, however, to establish a predicate for use of the defendant’s 1974 conviction to enhance his punishment, as it was required to do by defendant’s timely objection. Since the conviction and underlying guilty plea occurred after December 8, 1971, State v. Holden mandates that, upon objection by defendant to the predicate, the state must produce a contemporaneous record of defendant’s guilty plea affirmatively showing his waiver of his right to jury trial, his right to confront accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination. The guilty plea record introduced by the prosecution affirmatively shows that he waived his right to “a trial,” but does not show that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination.

Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction of the basic crime is affirmed, but his sentence and adjudication as an habitual offender are set aside; the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; HABITUAL OFFENDER DECREE AND SENTENCE REVERSED; REMANDED.

SUMMERS, C. J., dissents and will assign reasons.

DIXON, J., concurs.

MARCUS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.

BLANCHE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by MARCUS, J.

WATSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by MARCUS, J.

MARCUS, Justice

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur in defendant’s conviction but dissent from the setting aside of his sentence and adjudication as an habitual offender. I would overrule both State v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1155 (La.1979) and State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La.1979); however, if Lewis is not overruled outright, I would continue to concur in the limitation placed on it in Holden.

SUMMERS, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

I would overrule State v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1155 (La.1979). In view of this Court’s division on this case and the fact that it was partially overruled in State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La.1979), the case can no longer stand as sound authority. Moreover, Lewis goes far beyond the interpretation of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 288, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) which the Federal Courts have adopted, pointing out by their decision the error to which this Court has fallen in its reading of Boykin. See McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101 (1973); cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 901, 39 L.Ed.2d 102. See also my dissents in State v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1155 (La.1979) and in State v. Johnson, 260 La. 902, 257 So.2d 654 (1972).

I respectfully dissent.


author: WATSON, Justice. BLANCHE, Justice

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael W. CRAIN.
    No. 65960.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.

      W. Michael Stemmans, Nicholson & Stemmans, Baton Rouge, for defendant-relator.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Kay Kirkpatrick, Richard E. Chaffin, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-respondent.
   WATSON, Justice.

A writ was issued to review defendant’s complaint that, due to an inordinate lapse of time between the alleged offense and his arrest, he has been denied due process and a fair trial.

Defendant, Michael W. Crain, was arrested on March 26, 1979, pursuant to a warrant issued on March 22, 1979. The warrant referred to an offense alleged to have been committed on September 24, 1978, approximately six months prior to the issuance of the warrant. On May 14, 1979, a bill of information was lodged against defendant charging him with two counts of distribution of cocaine in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(A). The bill of information indicated that these offenses allegedly occurred on September 20, 1978, and October 12, 1978, different dates from the one stated on the arrest warrant, but likewise about six months prior to the arrest. Defendant was arraigned and entered pleas of “not guilty”.

Following a preliminary examination, in which the trial court found probable cause to hold defendant on both counts, defendant filed a motion to quash the charges, contending that the delay between the alleged commission of the offense and the issuance of an arrest warrant, together with the delays between arrest, filing of a bill of information and arraignment, hindered an adequate defense. Specifically, defendant alleged that the delays impaired his ability to preserve evidence and subpoena witnesses on his behalf, in violation of his rights to due process and speedy trial under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Defendant’s motion to quash was denied and this court granted writs to review that ruling.

In the trial court, the State showed no justification for the pre-arrest delay and defendant presented no evidence of prejudice to his due process right to a fair trial. Defendant did not testify nor did he produce any witnesses on his behalf. His contention now is simply that the long lapse of time between the alleged crimes and his arrest resulted in a loss of memory of his exact whereabouts on the days in question and a resulting inability to produce any witnesses. He argues that the police officer who testified at the preliminary hearing had to rely on his notes, but the record indicates only that the officer admitted frankly that he had reviewed his report prior to taking the stand.

Officer Barry Phares testified that he was the only law enforcement official that ever worked on the case. He was not known to Crain, the defendant, as a policeman, but there was no showing that an earlier arrest would have destroyed his cover for other investigation. Phares considered the investigation complete after October 13, 1978. There was no other official involvement until the issuance of the warrant and the arrest. Crain’s whereabouts were known to the police during the six months before his arrest; the delay did not result from the State’s inability to locate him. There is no showing that a prompt arrest would have jeopardized any ongoing undercover investigations and there is no evidence that the State had doubts as to the desirability of prosecuting the case.

The issue presented is whether a defendant who alleges that his due process right to a fair trial has been violated by virtue of the State’s delay of about six months in arresting him must show that actual prejudice resulted, when no justification for the delay has been shown by the State.

The United States Supreme Court and the courts of this state have consistently held that the constitutional guarantees to a speedy trial are not invoked until a citizen has become an accused, either by arrest or indictment. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); State v. Malvo, 357 So.2d 1084 (La. 1978).

Statutes of limitation are the primary protection against stale criminal charges. Article 572 of the Code of Criminal Procedure fixes these limitations for other than capital crimes:

“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for an offense not punishable by death unless the prosecution is instituted within the following periods of time after the offense has been committed:
“(1) Six years, for a felony necessarily punishable by imprisonment at hard labor;
“(2) Four years, for a felony not necessarily punishable by imprisonment at hard labor;
“(3) Two years, for a misdemeanor punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both; or
“(4) Six months, for a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine or forfeiture.”

In this case, it is manifest that the defendant was arrested and the prosecution instituted within the applicable statute of limitations. The applicable delay in this case is six years, (1) above, since the offense is necessarily punishable at hard labor.

Therefore, the question is not denial of speedy trial or violation of the statute of limitations, but is one of due process. United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment; Louisiana Constitution 1974, Article I, Section 2. The due process clause may provide a basis for dismissing an indictment if the defense can show that governmental delay has prejudiced the right to a fair trial. United States v. Marion, supra. What this court must determine is whether, absent a valid purpose for the delay by the State, the mere passage of time must be held to deny defendant a fair trial.

In State v. Malvo, supra, defendant complained of a six month delay between the alleged commission of the offense and the indictment. Expressly rejected was the notion that due process requires the dismissal of all prosecutions in which the defendant suffers prejudice as a result of a pre-indictment delay. The proper approach was held to be a measuring of the government’s justifications for the delay against the degree of prejudice suffered by the accused. In Malvo, the State’s justification for the delay was the protection of ongoing undercover operations, while defendant contended that he was prejudiced by the State’s actions because a material witness, one who “probably” could have helped determine what defendant was doing on the night of the alleged offense, died during the seven month delay. In light of the strong governmental interest in continuing a successful undercover operation and the minimal prejudice demonstrated, Malvo held that defendant was not denied due process by the delay.

In State v. Stetson, 317 So.2d 172 (La.1975) a period of several months elapsed between an alleged heroin sale and defendant’s arrest. Defendant’s due process argument was rejected on the specific ground that no proof or prejudice was offered. As in this case, defendant in Stetson did not take the stand and offered no witnesses to testify on his behalf. He asserted in brief, without other support from the record, that no one was called to testify for him because no one could accurately testify to his whereabouts seven months prior to his arrest. Thus, defendant asked that prejudice be presumed from the delay, just as in the present case. This court declined to presume prejudice, but referred to the explicit delays set out in the statute of limitations.

Crain has not shown even the minimal prejudice of Malvo; he like Stetson relies only on the passage of time. The passage of time here, six months, is brief when compared to the statutory limit, six years.

Since the prosecution against defendant, Crain, was instituted within the statutory period, and since there is no showing that defendant was prejudiced by the State’s delay, we cannot conclude that he has been deprived of his due process right to a fair trial. The ruling of the trial court denying the motion to quash was correct.

AFFIRMED.

BLANCHE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

BLANCHE, Justice

(concurring).

I concur in the majority opinion, agreeing that defendant has made no showing that the delay in. arresting defendant after the alleged commission of the crime in any way deprived defendant of due process of law.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Louis F. HICKS.
    No. 65501.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 1980.
    Rehearing Denied March 3, 1980.
    Robert P. McLeod, Barbara G. Danos, Law Offices of Robert P. McLeod, Monroe, for defendant-appellant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parker-son, Dist. Atty., John R. Harrison, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

DENNIS, J., would remand for resen-tencing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leonard HEBERT.
    No. 65311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 1980.
    John Wilson Reed, Glass & Reed, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

DENNIS, J., would remand for tencing. resen-


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael JAMES.
    No. 66546.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana, through the District Attorney, John M. Mamoulides, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. No. 79-1872.

Writ denied.


text:
    Angeline G. ROSSIGNOL et al. v. William J. ROSE, Allstate Insurance Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 66294.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 1980.
   In re Angeline G. Rossignol, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 378 Sb.2d 196.

Writ denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    LAKE FOREST, INC., Pat’i Four and the Ground Pat’i, Inc. v. Edward R. DRURY and C. Reece Owen, a/k/a Clarence Reece Owen.
    No. 66381.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 1980.
   In re Ground Pat’i, Inc., applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 378 So.2d 1071.

Writ denied.


text:
    William D. O’REGAN III et al. v. Leroy LABAT.
    No. 66595.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 1980.
   In re William D. O’Regan III et al., applying for remedial writs. Parish of St. John the Baptist. No. 9923.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Marlin ZIELMAN and Michael Zielman.
    No. 66330.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 1980.
   In re Marlin Zielman and Michael Ziel-man, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of St. Tammany. 369 So.2d 462.

Writ granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Erwin J. JACKSON.
    No. 66540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 1980.
   In re Erwin J. Jackson, applying for supervisory and remedial writs. Orleans Parish. No. 273-617 — Magistrate.

Granted. At a preliminary examination the witnesses are subject to cross-examination (C.Cr.P. 294) which must not be unduly curtailed. Identification witnesses can be examined and cross-examined on the circumstances of the identification. The probable cause finding is set aside and the case is remanded for a new preliminary hearing in accordance herewith.

SUMMERS, C. J., and MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., dissent.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Norris L. VESSELL v. Honorable Matthew S. BRANIFF, Judge, et al.
    No. 66454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 1980.
   In re Norris L. Vessell, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 257-212.

Writ granted in part and denied in part. The trial judge is ordered to furnish relator with a transcript of the suppression hearing and the transcript of previous mistrials. The writ is otherwise denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., dissents from the order.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James W. MARSH.
    No. 66612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and stay order. Parish of St. Charles. Number unknown.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald BONNET.
    No. 66577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 1980.
   In re Ronald Bonnet, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Jefferson. No. 78-2383.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carlos POREE.
    No. 66318.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. Parish of Orleans. No. 262-953.

Granted. This matter is consolidated with the case of State v. Poree, No. 64,308, on application for rehearing.


text:
    The SUPERIOR OIL COMPANY v. Frank David VAN BREEMEN et al.
    No. 66399.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 18, 1980.
   In re David Van Breemen, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Acadia. 378 So.2d 444.

Writ denied.

WATSON, J., recused.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


author: SUMMERS, C. J., DENNIS, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Norris L. VESSELL v. Honorable Matthew S. BRANIFF, Judge, et al.
    No. 66454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana through the District Attorney, Harry F. Connick, applying for rehearing on writ of certiorari granted on January 17, 1980. Orleans Parish.

Previous writ recalled. The trial judge is ordered to permit relator to listen and copy from the tapes of all previous proceedings and furnish relator with copies of transcripts of any previous proceedings which have been transcribed and to grant a reasonable continuance to accomplish same if necessary.

SUMMERS, C. J.,

would recall our previous order and dissents otherwise from the Court’s order.

DENNIS, J.,

concurs but understands that this Court’s ruling will not prevent relator from renewing his request for transcription of portions of the previous records necessary for adequate representation at trial; also he understands that the prosecution should not be permitted to use any transcript not furnished relator in advance of trial.


text:
    Karen Townsend BROWN v. Donald R. BROWN.
    No. 66429.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Karen Townsend Brown, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Ouachita. 377 So.2d 438.

Granted.


text:
    Jennings Jack DOFFLEMYER v. Gary D. GILLEY et al.
    No. 66432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Jennings Jack Dofflemyer, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Calcasieu. 378 So.2d 440.

Writ granted.


text:
    Homer FONTENOT v. TOWN OF KINDER et al.
    No. 66342.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re The Allen Parish Police Jury and Zurich Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Allen. 377 So.2d 554.

Writ denied.


text:
    Michael McCAULEY v. DELTA DRILLING and Highland Insurance.
    No. 66362.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Michael McCauley, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Evangeline. 377 So.2d 577.

Writ denied.


text:
    Richard Joseph CORTEZ v. Julia Antoinette Virgadamo CORTEZ.
    No. 66385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Julia Antoinette Virgadamo Cortez, applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 376 So.2d 517.

Writ denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    W. O. WINZOR v. AUGENSTEIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
    No. 66415.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Augenstein Construction Company, Inc., applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Calcasieu. 378 So.2d 470.

Denied.

WATSON, J., recused.


text:
    CENTRAL LOUISIANA BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. Johnnie A. SELLERS et ux.
    No. 66421.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Lemoine and Son Lumber Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Avoyelles. 378 So.2d 469.

Denied.

DIXON, J., would grant the writ.

WATSON, J., recused.


text:
    Joseph POLOZOLA v. GARLOCK, INC., et al.
    No. 66469.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re National Maintenance Corporation applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 376 So.2d 1009.

Denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., and BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Joseph POLOZOLA v. GARLOCK, INC., et al.
    No. 66479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re H. E. Wiese, Inc. and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 376 So.2d 1009.

Denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., and BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Marjorie FONTENOT v. HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 66425.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Marjorie Fontenot, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Evangeline. 378 So.2d 461.

Writ granted.

WATSON, J., recused.


text:
    Robert W. HAACKER et al. v. Henry Douglas KEETH et al.
    No. 66434.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Henry Douglas Keeth et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Jefferson Davis. No. 6422.

Writ denied.

WATSON, J., recused.


text:
    Cecil D. MILLER, Sr., et al. v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the FIREMAN’S PENSION & RELIEF FUND OF the CITY OF LAKE CHARLES et al.
    No. 66435.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Cecil D. Miller, Sr., et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Calcasieu. 378 So.2d 973.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Joseph Alca OGEA v. Barbara Ann OGEA.
    No. 66428.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Joseph Alca Ogea, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Calcasieu. 378 So.2d 984.

Denied.

CALOGERO and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joseph BICKMAN et al. v. C. Paul PHELPS, Director, Department of Corrections.
    No. 66115.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Joseph Bickman et al., applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Number unknown.

Granted. Application transferred to district court for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joseph SALISBERRY v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 65209.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Joseph Salisberry, applying for remedial writ. Parish of West Feliciana. Number unknown.

Writ granted. Out of time appeal or-v dered. Counsel appointed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cody L. DENTON et al.
    No. 65468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re David Johnson and Jack Hutchinson, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Lafourche. No. 85,909.

Writ granted and consolidated with the appeal in No. 66,438, State v. Denton, et al.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gordon NOVEL.
    No. 66556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Gordon Novel, motion to remand. Parish of Orleans. No. 255,236.

Granted. The case is remanded for action on the motion for new trial.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Morris E. HARDY.
    No. 66414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Morris E. Hardy, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Ouachita Parish. No. 39,192.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert TRANUM.
    No. 66410.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana through the District Attorney, Harry F. Connick, applying for writ of certiorari. Orleans Parish. No. 272-571.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. George TEMPLE v. 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT and the Honorable Walter E. Kollin, Judge.
    No. 66018.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re George Temple, applying for writ of mandamus. Jefferson Parish. Number unknown.

Denied. Although the district court should have acted on the relator’s petition for habeas filed there in September, 1979, it would be vain for us to order action at this time; we have examined a copy of the habeas petition, and find that the search and seizure complained of was ruled on by the district court in a motion to suppress and subsequently reviewed by this Court on appeal. See State v. Temple, 343 So.2d 1024 (La.1977). The record discloses no merit to the other contentions.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. DeWayne F. HALL.
    No. 65619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re DeWayne F. Hall, applying for remedial writs. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 11-78-670.

Writ denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Grandville TENNART v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 65453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Grandville Tennart, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and manda- < mus and for supervisory writs. Avoyelles Parish. No. 38,574-V2.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Michael BICKHAM v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, and/or his successors, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 65419.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Michael Bickham, applying for writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, and other remedial writs. Orleans Parish. No. 231-133.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joe ROSENTHAL v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 66005.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Rudolph F. Becker, III, Judge, Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, Section “E”, applying for rehearing of granted writ on January 11, 1980. Orleans Parish. No. 258-944.

Denied.


text:
    FRANKLIN PRINTING COMPANY, INC. v. Richard H. COLLIN et al. COLORTRONICS, INC. v. Richard H. COLLIN, Michael Ledet and Two Plus Graphic Coordinators, Inc.
    No. 66523.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Richard H. Collin, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 376 So.2d 1323.

Writ Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Thomas J. GAUTHREAUX v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 65967.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Thomas J. Gauthreaux, applying for writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, and mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. No. 111,478.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry BERRY.
    No. 66567.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Jerry Berry, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Jefferson Parish. No. 79-473.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Barry Wayne BROWN v. Oliver P. SCHULINGKAMP, Judge, Criminal District Court.
    No. 66535.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re' Barry Wayne Brown, applying for remedial writs. Orleans Parish. Number unknown.

Denied as moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    Frank WARREN, Jr., and Alex Labry v. John B. REEVES, Jr., and the Millers Casualty Insurance Co. of Texas.
    No. 66441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re John B. Reeves, and the Millers Casualty Insurance Co. of Texas, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of St. Mary. No. 12764.

Writ denied.


text:
    Frank WARREN, Jr. and Alex Labry v. John B. REEVES, Jr. and the Millers Casualty Insurance Co. of Texas.
    No. 66440.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re John B. Reeves, Jr. applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of St. Mary. No. 12,764.

Writ denied.


text:
    Laura Jean STEWART, as Natural Tutrix of Clerice Yvett Wilson v. Don SCHMIEDER, d/b/a Schmieder Enterprises et al. Dorothy Franklin JEFFERSON v. Don SCHMIEDER, d/b/a Schmieder Enterprises et al. Roland DESHOTEL v. 12055 AIRLINE CORPORATION et al. Billie Jean McGOWAN, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of her minor child, Cheryl Sue McGowan, v. Don SCHMIEDER, d/b/a Schmieder Enterprises et al. Stanley L. STEVENS v. 12055 AIRLINE CORPORATION et al.
    No. 66486.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Dorothy Jefferson, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 376 So.2d 1046.

Denied.


text:
    Laura Jean STEWART, as Natural Tutrix of Clerice Yvett Wilson v. Don SCHMIEDER, d/b/a Schmieder Enterprises et al. Dorothy Franklin JEFFERSON v. Don SCHMIEDER, d/b/a Schmieder Enterprises et al. Roland DESHOTEL v. 12055 AIRLINE CORPORATION et al. Billie Jean McGOWAN, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of her minor child, Cheryl Sue McGowan v. Don SCHMIEDER, d/b/a Schmieder Enterprises et al. Stanley L. STEVENS v. 12055 AIRLINE CORPORATION et al.
    No. 66478.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Billie Jean McGowan et al. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 376 So.2d 1046.

Denied.


text:
    Laura Jean STEWART, as Natural Tutrix of Clerice Yvett Wilson v. Don SCHMIEDER, d/b/a Schmieder Enterprises et al. Dorothy Franklin JEFFERSON v. Don SCHMIEDER, d/b/a Schmieder Enterprises et al. Roland DESHOTEL v. 12055 AIRLINE CORPORATION et al. Billie Jean McGOWAN, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of her minor child, Cheryl Sue McGowan v. Don SCHMIEDER, d/b/a Schmieder Enterprises et al. Stanley L. STEVENS v. 12055 AIRLINE CORPORATION et al.
    No. 66437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re City of Baton Rouge, Parish of East Baton Rouge, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 376 So.2d 1046.

Granted.


text:
    State of Louisiana in the INTEREST of Myiea CLARK.
    No. 66436.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana, applying for writ of certiorari or review, Parish of Orleans. Family Court. No. 182-894.

Denied. •


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Michael Odell DAVIS v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 66431.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana ex rel. Michael Odell Davis v. Ross Maggio, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary. Parish of Lincoln. No. 23,363.

Writ denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant an eviden-tiary hearing.


text:
    Jesse (Jessie) SCOTT v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, State of Louisiana.
    No. 66426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Jesse (Jessie) Scott, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 12,787.

Denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., and BLANCHE and WATSON, would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilbert McCLAY, Jr.
    No. 66423.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Wilbert McClay, Jr. applying for remedial or supervisory writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Iberville Parish. Nos. 3181-79, 3182-79, 3183-79.

Denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles Roderick SHIPP.
    No. 66412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Charles Roderick Shipp, applying for writ of review and stay order. Parish of Ouachita. No. 42036.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Oliver F. BARBOUR et al.
    No. 66369.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Terrebonne. No. 74,209.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry WEST.
    No. 66368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana, through the District Attorney, Harry F. Connick, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Orleans Parish. No. 272 — 909.

Writ denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., and BLANCHE and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Douglas JOHNSON v. Warden Albert MOFFET.
    No. 66354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Douglas Johnspn, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of East Feliciana. No. 3-79-448.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Claude Elliot WOODS and Joseph Lee Woods v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 66036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Claude Elliot Woods and Joseph Lee Woods, applying for writ of habeas corpus and certiorari. Parish of West Baton Rouge. No. 39,945.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. John JOHNSON v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary et al.
    No. 66035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re John Johnson, applying for writ of habeas corpus, and/or certiorari. Orleans Parish. No. 258-083.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Maurice G. MORLAN, Jr. v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary; Honorable Lucien Bertrand, Judge, 15th Judicial District Court.
    No. 66017.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Maurice G. Morían, Jr., applying for writ of habeas corpus, mandamus and cer-tiorari. Parish of Vermillion. Number unknown.

Denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant and order an evidentiary hearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Jackie DAVIS v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, and Honorable Louis DeSonier, 24th Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson.
    No. 66014.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Jackie Davis, applying for remedial writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, and mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. Number unknown.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Thomas HAYNES v. H. Charles GAUDIN, Judge, Division “G”, 24th Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson.
    No. 65870.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Thomas Haynes, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. No. 77-1566.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lynda CYRUS.
    No. 65799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Lynda Cyrus, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. Number unknown.

Denied. Relator must first apply to the trial court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Paul Edward WARE v. C. Paul PHELPS, Director of the Department of Corrections.
    No. 65719.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Paul Edward Ware, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of St. Landry. No. 30,009.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Sylvester K. MAJOR v. STATE of Louisiana, CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 65686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Sylvester K. Major, applying for writ of mandamus. Orleans Parish. Number unknown.

Denied. Moot-.


author: MARCUS, J.,

text:
    Lincoln J. CARMOUCHE v. HAYNES LUMBER COMPANY, INC. et al.
    No. 66430.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Southern Casualty Insurance Co., and Haynes Lumber Co., Inc., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Avoyelles. 378 So.2d 466.

Writ denied. Result is correct.

MARCUS, J.,

would grant. Appeal court decision contrary to this Court's decision in Lushute v. Diesi, 354 So.2d 179 (La.1977).

BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.

WATSON, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Erwin J. JACKSON.
    No. 66540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 31, 1980.
   In re State of Louisiana through the District Attorney, Harry F. Connick, applying for rehearing on writ of certiorari granted on January 17, 1980. Parish of Orleans. No. 273-617.

Denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., and MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant a rehearing.


text:
    Richard ROUSSEL, Jr. v. Paul KELLER and Paul Hardy, Secretary of State, State of Louisiana.
    No. 66642.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 1, 1980.
   In re Richard Roussel, Jr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of St. James. 379 So.2d 81.

Writ denied. The result is correct.

DIXON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth E. JAYE.
    No. 66580.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 1, 1980.
   In re Kenneth E. Jaye applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 271— 005.

Writ granted. The trial judge is ordered to allow filing of the Motion to Vacate Guilty Plea and Sentence and to set a date for hearing the motion.


text:
    Jack LEBOEUF v. Betty Shipe DUPRE, Cavalier Insurance Corp., Aetna Life & Casualty and Maryland Casualty Company.
    No. 66289.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 5, 1980.
   In re Betty Shipe and Cavalier Insurance Corp., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Terrebonne. 378 So.2d 150.

Writ denied.

SUMMERS, C. J., and WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Joan OLIVER, wife of/and Donald Oliver v. Sam P. CAPITANO et al.
    No. 66760.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 1980.
   In re Joan Oliver, wife of/and Donald Oliver, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Parish of Jefferson. No. 209-770.

Writ granted. Court of appeal order vacated. Trial court ruling reinstated. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion.

DIXON, J., dissents and would affirm the Court of Appeal’s action.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leon and Annie Lee JOLLA.
    No. 66724.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 1980.
   In re Leon and Annie Lee Jolla, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 5-79-905.

Granted and consolidated with No. 66,638.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. H. M. “Mike” CANNON.
    No. 66219.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 1980.
   In re H. M. “Mike” Cannon, applying for stay of sentencing. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 7 — 78—451.

Stay of sentencing granted pending further orders of this Court.

BLANCHE and WATSON, JJ., dissent and would deny the order to stay.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Barry BROWN v. Honorable Oliver SCHULINGKAMP, Judge, Section “F”, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 65886.
    Supreme Court of Louisana.
    Jan. 28, 1980.
   In re Barry Brown, applying for writ of mandamus. Orleans Parish. No. 263-417.

Writ denied. The application is moot. The district court has acted.