author: SCHOTT, Justice Ad Hoc.

text:
    STATE v. Steven E. BOUDREAUX.
    No. 80 KA 1996.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 6, 1981.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel C. Ca-shio, Dist. Atty., Houston C. Gascon, III, Jack Marionneaux, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    C. Jerome D’Aquila, New Roads, and John E. Bride, for defendant-appellant.
   SCHOTT, Justice Ad Hoc.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of theft of a motorbike worth over five hundred dollars in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:67 and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In this appeal he assigns error in the admission into evidence of the statement made by his alleged conspirator to the sheriff after they had been arrested. The issues are 1) whether the statement was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under R.S. 15:455 and 2) if not so admissible whether the statement’s use constituted only harmless error considering that the person who made the statement was called by defendant as his witness and was thereby afforded rights of confrontation and cross examination.

On November 20, 1979, Timothy Klien-peter reported to the police that his motorbike was stolen from his carport on New Erwin Drive. He had purchased it new for $1800 just a few weeks previous to the theft. On December 27 the police, acting on a tip, found parts of the dismantled bike buried behind the levee near Stoney (or Tony) Ourso’s house and about a quarter of a mile from Klienpeter’s. Further investigation led them to question defendant who consented to their conducting a search of his home. They found the battery from Klienpeter’s bike and charged defendant and Ourso with the theft. Now in custody, defendant made the following statement to the police:

“In the month of December myself and Tony Ourso was walking down New Erwin Drive and we passed a house with a motorbike under the carport and Tony said, ‘I want that bike’ and I said, ‘That’s your business’ and I went sit on top of the levee. So Tony then came and rolled the bike up the levee and then went down the levee and then brought the bike behind the levee. So three or four days later, Tony came to my house and we started talking about my bike and asked me what was wrong with my bike and I told him I needed a battery for it. And Tony said that he had a battery at his house. So he went get it for me.”

After the state presented evidence as to the foregoing, it called to the stand a detective who, over defendant’s objection, read a statement he took from Ourso after his arrest and detention in jail. This statement was as follows:

“I stole a motorbike from New Erwin Drive. I pushed it away from the house. Steve Boudreaux was with me. I brought it to back of the levee. We hid it and burned it.”

The statement was clearly inadmissible as hearsay under R.S. 15:434 and did not qualify as an exception under R.S. 15:455 since it was made after Ourso was arrested and the supposed conspiracy was at an end. State v. Dupree, 377 So.2d 328 (La.1979).

After introducing Ourso’s statement the State rested and defendant called Ourso as his witness. He again confessed to stealing the bike. He also admitted that he made the statement to the police but repudiated his implication of defendant in the statement saying that he was “mixed up” and that he “messed up” in that respect.

The state contends that any error involved in the introduction into evidence of Ourso’s statement to the police was rendered harmless when defendant placed him on the stand because defendant thereby gained an opportunity to confront and examine Ourso. The state relies on Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971) in support of this position.

In that case the court held that the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated by the introduction of his codefendant’s statement where the codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating defendant and proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant. The court distinguishes its previous ruling in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) on the point that the codefendant did not take the stand so that defendant had no opportunity to confront the witness. In the Nelson case the court observed:

“The constitution as construed in Bruton, in other words, is violated only where the out-of-court hearsay statement is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the trial for ‘full and effective’ cross examination.”

While there may be no conceptual distinction between the codefendant who decides to testify as in Nelson and the witness who can be compelled by defendant to testify since, in both cases, defendants had the same opportunity for full and effective cross-examination so that their federal constitutional rights are protected in either case, the principle is inapplicable to the instant case. The question here is not whether defendant’s federal constitutional rights were violated by the introduction of Ourso’s statement. That statement was clearly inadmissible as hearsay under R.S. 15:434 and could only be admitted if it fell within the exception provided by R.S. 15:455. Since it did not the statement was erroneously admitted into evidence and Nelson v. Jones cannot be construed to reduce that error to the status of harmless error.

Finally, the state contends that the introduction of Ourso’s statement was harmless error at worst because there was sufficient evidence otherwise to support the conviction. However, we are convinced that the other evidence was not sufficient so that the Ourso statement cannot be regarded as merely cumulative as in State v. Ford, 336 So.2d 817 (La.1976). The introduction of the statement constituted a substantial violation of defendant’s R.S. 15:434 statutory right warranting a reversal under C.Cr.P. Art. 921.

Accordingly, the conviction and sentence are reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL

GULOTTA, J. ad hoc, concurs.

       Judges James C. Gulotta, John C. Boutall and Patrick M. Schott of the Courts of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as associate justices ad hoc, joined by Chief Justice John A. Dixon, Jr., and Associate Justices Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., James L. Dennis and Jack Crozier Watson.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James N. SIGLER.
    No. 80 KA 2788.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 6, 1981.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Wiley Dial, Kay Kirkpatrick, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Sumpter B. Davis, III, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
   SCHOTT, Justice Ad Hoc.

This appeal is from a judgment of the district court declaring as unconstitutional LSA R.S. 14:98 C which provides as follows:

“C. On a second conviction, regardless of whether the second offense occurred before or after the first conviction, the offender shall be fined not less than one hundred twenty-five dollars nor more than five hundred dollars and shall be imprisoned for not less than one hundred twenty-five days nor more than six months.” (emphasis supplied)

Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated on October 10, 1979, and released on bail the following day. Prosecution was instituted by information on June 23,1980, for driving while intoxicated under R.S. 14:98. The information recited that defendant was previously convicted on October 29,1979, for driving while intoxicated on April 2, 1979, and that defendant should be sentenced, upon conviction, as a second offender pursuant to R.S. 14:98 C. On October 7, 1980, defendant was found guilty as charged with sentence deferred until November 5. Before sentence defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment pursuant to LSA C.Cr.P. Art. 859 on the ground that R.S. 14:98 C is unconstitutional. The district court treated the motion as a motion to quash under C.Cr.P. Arts. 532 and 535 and granted it so as to amend the information to a first offense of driving while intoxicated.

Act 682 of 1978 amended R.S. 14:98 C to add after the opening words “On a second conviction” the phrase “regardless of whether the second offense occurred before or after the first conviction.” In State v. Neal, 347 So.2d 1139 (La.1977) this court concluded that a defendant could not be convicted of driving while intoxicated, second offense, unless the crime was committed after conviction for the first offense. Thus, the 1978 act was a direct response by the legislature to this court’s decision in Neal.

The trial judge seemed to base his decision on the notion that the application of the statute to an offense committed after commission of the first offense but prior to conviction therefor would make the statute an ex post facto law in violation of the federal and state constitutions. In this court defendant takes up this argument and attempts to buttress it with language from Neal.

In the Neal case the court began its discussion of the interpretation of R.S. 14:98 as it then read with the following observation:

“The issue involves an interpretation of the statutory intent of La.R.S 14:98.”

And the discussion concludes with:

“In our opinion, our lawmakers did not intend that individuals be subjected to enhanced punishment, including to the penitentiary, when at the time the offense was committed, the offender was subject only to fine or minor imprisonment. Consonant with the general purpose of enhanced punishment status, the most reasonable legislative intent to ascribe to the more serious punishment accorded for a subsequent ‘conviction’ by La.R.S. 14:98 is that, if following conviction of the offense, the offender repeats the prohibited conduct, he is then subject to enhanced penalty — but not if after the first conviction has put him on notice of the possibility of more severe punishment, the offender takes heed and reforms.” (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, then, the court’s determination of the intent of the previous statute can furnish no support for defendant’s attack on the present statute which was designed to make crystal clear the intent to impose enhanced penalties on the second time offender irrespective of whether conviction for the first offense occurred before or after commission of the second offense.

An ex post facto law is one passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition. A statute which would impose increased penalties for a crime already committed is an example of an ex post facto law. But the statute in question simply provides for enhanced penalties on second conviction if the first conviction has already occurred. The statute’s repudiation of the notion that the first conviction must precede the commission of the second offense in order for enhanced penalties to be imposed does not make it an ex post facto law.

Although the foregoing seems dispositive of the case since defendant has suggested no other reasons why the statute is unconstitutional some additional comment is provoked by his reference to some of the language in Neal relative to criminal intent. There the court became preoccupied with the notion that a person charged under the old statute could not have the criminal intent to violate that law because an essential element of the offense was both commission of and conviction for the previous offense. This is precisely what has been changed. The person who has been accused of committing the first offense and is awaiting trial therefor and who commits the second offense during the interim has the criminal intent to commit a crime for which he is exposed to enhanced penalties if conviction on the first offense takes place in the meantime. When he commits that second offense he knows the risk and takes it. His position is vulnerable and altogether unlike the first offender. The legislature intended to add a deterrent to the crime and the offender knowingly disregards that added deterrent.

Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and the conviction of defendant under R.S. 14:98 is reinstated. The case is remanded to the district court where the defendant is to be sentenced as a second offender under R.S. 14:98.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

       Judges James C. Gulotta, John C. Boutall and Patrick M. Schott of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as associate justices ad hoc, joined by Chief Justice John A. Dixon, Jr., and Associate Justices Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., James L. Dennis and Jack Crozier Watson.


author: GARRISON, Justice Ad Hoc .

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert NORWOOD.
    No. 80-KA-2288.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 6, 1981.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Marvin Optowsky, Louise S. Korns, J. Kevin McNary, Asst. Dist. At-tys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Loyola Law School Clinic, William O’Hara, III, Linda B. Adams, Michael S. Gallagher, John M. Standridge, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   GARRISON, Justice Ad Hoc .

The principal issue in this case involves the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his request for a mistrial. It is contended that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the State’s failure to disclose its intention to use certain identification testimony. He had filed a formal motion for pre-trial discovery and a bill of particulars which specifically asked: “Was there a pre-trial lineup or other pre-trial identification of the defendant?” The State’s response to this question was: “None.”

Defense counsel argues that a spontaneous and impromptu identification of the defendant by some of the witnesses— caused, in fact, by the defendant’s own bizarre actions when being taken through the station — constituted a custodial line-up. He argues, and this is the thrust of his defense, that he would have moved to suppress evidence of identification had he known about this prior to trial. The short reply to this can be made, at the outset, that the evidence indicates that a custodial line-up at the station in fact simply never occurred.

The defendant was charged by bill of information with four counts of armed robbery and one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. On June 10th, 1980, he was tried on the four armed robbery counts by a jury of twelve persons and found guilty on all charges. He was sentenced to serve seventy-five years at hard labor on each count, to run concurrently.

I.

The facts of this case are relatively simple. On February 15th, 1980, at approximately 3:00 a. m., the office of the Amoco service station on the corner of Martin Luther King Drive and South Claiborne in New Orleans was entered by a man carrying a .357 Magnum revolver. He required all of the occupants to give him their money.

At the time of the robbery Robert Williams was fixing a tire on the tire rack outside of the service station office. Observing the hold-up occurring inside, he promptly went to a nearby liquor store and called the police. By the time he returned to the service station, the police already had arrested the defendant.

At the trial each of the victims testified that as they left the service station office they observed the man who had just robbed them in the process of being arrested by the police outside the station. At that time he was heard to say, “Ya’ll got me.”

The police at once apprehended and handcuffed the defendant. While they were walking him to the patrol car, the victims came running out, pointing to the defendant, saying in effect, “That’s him”. They subsequently were interviewed at the Sixth District Police Station.

What the defendant seeks to characterize as a “custodial line-up” then occurred at the district station. The defendant was being brought in to be booked while the witnesses were being interviewed. A police officer, separated from the victims in another area of the station, was taking the defendant to the bathroom. The defendant upon seeing the victims shouted to them in effect, “Let me take these handcuffs off and I’ll beat all of ya’ll up.” At this point, during the defendant’s explosive display, at least one of the witnesses, Charles Stevens, who was in the process of being interviewed by officer Yvonne Chaney, was asked by that officer whether the screaming, threatening man was the one who had robbed him. He replied affirmatively to this question. The record is imprecise regarding the exact occurrence during this commotion but it does appear that several other victims participated to the same extent, and to the same effect, in such a spontaneous colloquy. What is more significant, inasmuch as this incident plainly was not initiated by the police, is that at least two of the victims who were at the police station testified with considerable more precision that they were not asked to make any identification of the defendant there.

II.

The identification which occurred at the scene of the robbery in no sense constituted a custodial line-up. Nor does defendant attempt to so argue. Accordingly, we are concerned only with the fact that the foregoing “degree of identification did occur at the police station.

What the defendant seeks to describe as a custodial line-up — to the extent that it can be referred to as a “line-up”— was instituted not by the police but by the defendant himself. It was he who yelled threats to the victims and, in so doing, called their attention to him. Thus, it was he — and not the police — who virtually initiated such identification as did occur at the police station.

Taking the above testimony as a whole it is apparent that whatever occurred at the Sixth district, it certainly was not in any sense a custodial line-up. The state’s Bill of Particulars was satisfactory, therefore, in responding that no such line-up occurred.

The defendant points out that under La.C.Cr.P. Art. 729.5 the State has a continuing duty to disclose evidence requested by the defendant and under that Article, he contends, the failure to comply should have resulted in a mistrial pursuant to defendant’s request. However, this Article does not mandate a mistrial. It merely indicates that a mistrial is simply one of the options available to the court and within the court’s discretion. Inasmuch as the trial court had the discretion to deny the defendant’s request for a mistrial or admonition, a showing of prejudice by virtue of the court’s adverse ruling is required before a reversal of the conviction would be in order. See State v. Kimble, 375 So.2d 924 (La.1979); State v. Qualls, 353 So.2d 978 (La.1977).

Not only was the State’s Bill of Particulars entirely satisfactory in responding that no custodial line-up had occurred but, it should further be noted, nowhere in the record are there grounds for suppression of any of the numerous identifications made in this case. Counsel for defendant’s argument that he would have moved to suppress the non-existent “custodial line-up” is groundless and the defendant suffered no prejudice from any action of the State. The defendant’s appeal is without merit.

The conviction and sentence are affirmed.

LEMMON, J., concurs.

       Judges Garrison, Chehardy, and Barry of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as associate justices ad hoc, joined by Associate Justices Calogero, Marcus, Blanche, and Lemmon.

      . La.C.Cr.P. Art. 729.5 Failure to comply; sanctions.
      A. If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this Chapter or with an order issued pursuant to this Chapter, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, order a mistrial on motion of the defendant, prohibit the party from introducing into evidence the subject matter not disclosed, or enter such other order, other than dismissal as may be appropriate...


author: CHEHARDY, Justice ad hoc.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George UPTON.
    No. 80-KA-2065.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 6, 1981.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul Car-mouche, Dist. Atty., Sonia D. Peters, Jim McMichael, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Jack D. Barnett, Shreveport, for defendant-appellant.
   CHEHARDY, Justice ad hoc.

By Bill of Information dated February 21, 1978, defendant Upton was charged with receiving stolen goods valued in excess of five hundred dollars ($500.00) a violation of La.R.S. 14:69. The defendant entered a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of attempting to receive stolen goods, a misdemeanor and a violation of La.R.S. 14:27; 14:69. Following a pre-sentence investigation, the trial court sentenced defendant to one year in Parish Prison (the maximum term provided by the statute). The sentence was suspended, conditioned on defendant spending six months in jail and defendant was placed on active probation for three years. Defendant appealed that sentence to this Court, urging that the trial judge erred in relying on prejudicial misinformation contained in the pre-sentence report, and erred further in denying him an opportunity to offer evidence in rebuttal. This Court vacated defendant’s sentence, although on grounds other than those urged by counsel, and remanded for resentencing. See, State v. Upton, 382 So.2d 1388 (La.1980). Upon remand, a formal resentencing hearing was held on June 23, 1980, and defendant was then sentenced to 11 months and 29 days in the parish jail.

Defendant now urges that he was not sentenced according to the guidelines established in La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and that the sentence imposed was excessive. In application for writs, the defendant also urged that he was improperly denied access to the pre-sentence investigation report. Following this Court’s granting of supervisory writs, defendant seems to have abandoned this argument as it is not addressed in brief. In any event, the record reveals that defense counsel did review the PSI and was given ample opportunity to rebut any information considered erroneous, prejudicial or misleading.

La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:69 provided that the punishment for the crime of which defendant was convicted is a fine of not more than two hundred dollars or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. As noted above, on remand defendant was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days. Although this sentence is clearly within the statutorily defined limits, it is stiffer than the original sentence. As previously stated, defendant was originally sentenced to a one-year suspended sentence, conditioned on a six-month jail term and three years of probation. This Court found such a sentence illegal, as defendant may have been subject to more jail time than legislatively provided for the offense in question. See, State v. Upton, supra.

Although the defendant may serve a minimum of six months under the original sentence (though he was faced with the possibility of serving one and one-half years and three years of probation), he must serve 11 months and 29 days under the new sentence, which is certainly more severe.

This Court has noted that where a defendant receives a more severe sentence than that originally imposed, the reasons for the more severe sentence must appear in the record. State v. Franks, 391 So.2d 1133 (La.1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); State v. Rutledge, 259 La. 544, 250 So.2d 734 (1971).

The record reveals that at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing the district attorney and not the trial judge particularized reasons under La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 for defendant’s sentence. Following additional argument by both the state and defense counsel, the trial judge summarized the sequence of events leading up to the resentencing. He noted defendant’s challenge to information in the pre-sentence report and the fact that counsel for the defendant was given ample opportunity at the hearing to rebut the contents of the report. Upon imposition of the sentence, the judge stated:

“We are quite willing to have been able to afford Mr. Upton and his attorney this opportunity at this formal pre-sentence hearing since it gives us also the chance to look a little deeper into Mr. Upton’s background. Now, in order to avoid any complications arising out of a suspended or probated sentence, which the Court might have otherwise given for the reasons more specifically expressed in this Court’s sentence and reasoning of September 18, 1979, as well as the reasons just given and articulated by Ms. Peters, the district attorney, the Court therefore now sentences Mr. Upton to 11 months and 29 days in parish jail.
“He will be given credit for time served.”

The record does not disclose that the trial judge gave sufficient explanation for the increase in penalty. Though the trial judge referred to the prior sentencing hearing, and adopted the district attorney’s reasoning for imposition of a jail term under La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, he did not explain why the length of imprisonment was increased. The only reason given was to avoid complications with a suspended or probated sentence. The United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, stated:

“Whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.”

Defendant Upton’s effective jail term was doubled with little or no explanation. In light of the Pearce decision the trial judge’s failure to articulate reasons for a more severe sentence necessitates a remand for resentencing.

It should be noted that were the defendant’s sentence and remand not more severe, there would have been sufficient compliance with La.C.Cr.P. art 894.1. The PSI reveals that defendant is a 44-year-old white male with no prior record. Defendant was caught in possession of stolen property (i. e., various items of heavy equipment) valued at over $50,000.00. He was charged with receiving stolen goods valued in excess of $500.00, a ten-year felony offense, La.R.S. 14:69. He subsequently pleaded guilty to attempting to conceal stolen goods, a misdemeanor offense under all circumstances. The plea bargain was based on defendant’s cooperation with authorities in other investigations. At the second hearing, Detective Kitchens testified that defendant Upton had in fact provided information to authorities which lead to the arrests of other individuals. At the conclusion of the second sentencing hearing, the trial judge in effect adopted the reasons articulated in the original sentencing procedure, considerations which were equally applicable on resentencing.

“THE COURT: That was attempted felony of receiving stolen goods over $500 value, this is a misdemeanor for which you can receive up to twelve months maximum sentence. Your pre-sentence investigation shows that you have no pri- or criminal convictions. The crime to which you plead guilty was not a violent crime, such as one of brutality against persons, however, the crime did involve machinery and equipment valued in excess of $50,000. Therefore, the Court feels that you are in need of some correctional treatment, or a custodial environment, that can be provided most effectively by your commitment to an institution, and furthermore a lesser sentence than will be pronounced would deprecate the seriousness of the crime. Your sentence then we hope will act as a general deterrent for any further criminal activities; it will as well act for the protection of the public.”

Had this Court not determined that the second sentence is stiffer than the original illegal sentence, then it is clear that there was sufficient compliance with La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 guidelines. The reasons given would have clearly supported the sentence imposed. A sentence of 11 months and 29 days, though one day short of the maximum term provided by statute, would not have been excessive given the fact that defendant was actually caught with over $50,-000.00 in stolen merchandise and was allowed to plead to a misdemeanor offense. Thus, the sentence would not have been grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime, nor would it have been merely the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355 (La.1980).

However, since defendant Upton’s sentence was doubled without articulated reasons for the more severe sentence as required by North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, we must vacate the sentence in this case and remand to the trial court for re-sentencing consistent with the guidelines laid down by Pearce and State v. Franks, supra.

      . Judges Garrison, Chehardy, and Barry of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as associate justices ad hoc, joined by Associate Justices Calogero, Marcus, Blanche, and Lemmon.


author: COLE, Associate Justice ad hoc .

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Elena M. RODRIGUEZ.
    No. 80-K-2190.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 6, 1981.

      Craig J. Cimo, Gretna, for defendant-relator.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mam-oulides, Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, James Maxwell, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiffs-respondents.
   COLE, Associate Justice ad hoc .

Elena Rodriguez was arrested on April 14,1980 and charged by bills of information on May 7, 1980 with possession of cocaine and marijuana in violation of La.R.S. 40:967. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence which was heard by the trial court on August 15 and 18, 1980 and denied. This Court granted the defense application for supervisory writs to review that judgment below.

FACTS

On April 14, 1980, at approximately 9:15 p. m., Officer Herbert Doyle of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office received a telephone call from a confidential informant who told him a grey Mercury automobile with a particular license plate number would be in “Fat City” that night carrying two males and one female who were in possession of one ounce of cocaine. The conversation between Officer Doyle and the informant was brief and Officer Doyle could not recall when he testified four months later any additional information being furnished. Officer Doyle had received reliable information from the informant in the past which resulted in one or two arrests and convictions. Believing the informant to possess personal knowledge upon which the information was based, Officer Doyle immediately proceeded to search for the vehicle. He was accompanied by Officer Dexter Accardo who drove a separate police unit. A third officer remained behind to obtain a search warrant if the police activity revealed one was needed and could be utilized.

The officers, in their two unmarked police cars, patrolled the parking areas and streets of Fat City. They soon located a vehicle fitting the exact description furnished by the informant. The vehicle was stopped just before it entered Interstate 10, presumably before it could leave the jurisdiction of Jefferson Parish officers and enter into Orleans Parish. The occupants were requested to get out of their vehicle and as they did so, one arresting officer observed marijuana in two plastic bags on the floor of the car. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was observed throwing down a white envelope. This was retrieved, tested and found to be cocaine.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

By this assignment defense counsel contends the trial court erred in curtailing his cross-examination of the arresting officers concerning the reliability of the confidential informant. Following testimony that the informant had previously supplied narcotics related information which resulted in one or two arrests and convictions, defense counsel sought the name of those arrested or convicted as a result of the alleged previous contacts. The trial court would not permit counsel to elicit the names reasoning such specific information about the informant might disclose his identity and thereby endanger his life.

When the arresting officer has testified in open court as to why he had reason to believe the informant, it will not be assumed the officer has committed perjury. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 1063, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967). Officer Doyle’s testimony that the informant had provided accurate information in the past satisfies the need to establish reliability, at least in the absence of defense suggestion that he intentionally misrepresented his informant’s past performance.

In State v. Babbitt, 363 So.2d 690 (La.1978), we held:

“The informer privilege is the privilege of withholding the identity of an informant who supplies information to law enforcement officials concerning crime. It is founded upon public policy and seeks to advance the public interest in effective law enforcement. [Citation omitted.] This court has consistently held that a confidential informant’s identity will be divulged only under exceptional circumstances. [Citations omitted.] The general rule is that the burden is upon the defendant to demonstrate exceptional circumstances and much discretion is vested in the trial judge on the question of whether the circumstances warrant disclosure. [Citations omitted.]”

Also, in State v. Babbitt, supra, we held:

“It is well established that the credibility of the affiant’s informant or the correctness of the information furnished by the informant may not be attacked on a motion to suppress. [Citations omitted.]”

The hearing on the motion to suppress in this case was held on two separate days. On the first occasion, defense counsel named two persons and asked if either was the informant. The trial court sustained the state’s objection to this attempt to identify the informant. During the second day’s proceedings defense counsel pursued the names of those persons previously arrested or convicted upon information furnished by the informant. The trial judge felt this line of questioning tied in with the previous interrogation and would aid in identifying the informant himself. We agree. The specifics of prior experience with the informant would certainly tend to disclose his identity. What is directly prohibited will not be allowed through indirect means. See, State v. Babbitt, supra; State v. Diliberto, 362 So.2d 566 (La.1978); State v. Keys, 328 So.2d 154 (La.1976); State v. Thorson, 302 So.2d 578 (La.1974).

Aside from questions concerning the identity of the informant or the identity of persons previously arrested or convicted upon information supplied by the informant, defense counsel was allowed to interrogate the arresting officers as regards the credibility of the informant and the correctness of the information furnished. Considering this was permitted on a motion to suppress, defendant cannot seriously argue prejudice. State v. Babbitt, supra.

This assignment is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

By this assignment defendant contends the trial court erred in determining the information supplied by the informant was sufficient reasonable cause to justify an intrusion upon her liberty.

The evidence sought to be suppressed was seized pursuant to the stop of defendant’s vehicle. The state stipulated the arresting officers did not obtain a warrant. The officers admitted they did not observe the occupants of the vehicle commit any crime prior to stopping the vehicle, but rather, the stop of the vehicle was based upon their checking out the tip and finding everything to be as represented. Essentially, the informant gave Officer Doyle seven items of information. They were: (1) the make of the automobile, i. e., a Mercury, (2) the color of the automobile, i. e., grey, (3) the number of the license plate on the automobile, (4) the occupants of the automobile, i. e., two males and one female, (5) the location of the automobile, i. e., in “Fat City,” (6) the time when the automobile would be in “Fat City,” and, (7) possession by the occupants of one ounce of cocaine. It is undisputed the six supporting items of information were verified by the officers prior to the stop.

Initially, no arrest was made of the defendant nor was a search of the vehicle conducted. The evidence establishes after the vehicle was stopped, the marijuana was immediately discovered. This happened while the occupants were getting out of the vehicle. As of that time, the officers had no opportunity to demand of the occupants their names, addresses and an explanation of their actions. Upon finding the marijuana, the defendant was advised she was under arrest and, at about the same time, she attempted to throw away the envelope containing the cocaine.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1 states, in pertinent part:

“A. A law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or a misdemeanor and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.”

Reasonable cause for an article 215.1 investigatory stop is something less than probable cause; nevertheless, the officers must have articulable knowledge of particular facts which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, provide reasonable grounds to suspect the detainee of criminal activity. State v. Ault, 394 So.2d 1192 (La. 1981); State v. Edsall, 385 So.2d 207 (La. 1980); State v. Brown, 370 So.2d 547 (La. 1979).

Compliance with these standards is in the first instance a substantive determination to be made by the trial judge from the facts and circumstances of the case. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); State v. Marks, 337 So.2d 1177 (La.1976).

We hold the officers in this case conducted a valid investigatory stop. The reasonable suspicion required by article 215.1 is predicated upon the past reliability of the informant, verification by the officers of all specific items of supporting information, and the rational inferences to be drawn from information in such detail that only one with actual knowledge could provide it.

In State v. Robinson, 342 So.2d 183, 187 (La.1977), this court noted “it is recognized that an informant’s tip can provide a police officer with reasonable cause to detain and question a suspect.” We held an informant’s tip which may not have supplied the requisite probable cause to arrest, nevertheless, carried with it enough “indicia of reliability” to justify at the least an investigatory stop of the defendant. In Robinson, the informant had described the defendant’s clothing and given the defendant’s name and exact location to the police. There, as here, the officer had previously relied upon the informant and believed the informant to have first-hand knowledge. There, as here, specific details were given pinpointing time, place, color and make of automobile, criminal activity, and description of the suspect. The only discernable factual difference between Robinson and this case is that, in Robinson, the name of the suspect was given. However, the identity was not verified until after the stop was made. More than offsetting the lack of names in this case is the license plate number and the number and sex of the vehicle occupants.

The facts in this case are equally strong, if not more so, than those found in Robinson. Reasonable cause and exigent circumstances coincided in this instance. The suspicion which was the product of good police work ripened into almost certain facts justifying the stopping of the defendant vehicle. See also, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); State v. Guzman, 362 So.2d 744 (La.1978).

Having found the investigatory stop to be based upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the evidence need not be suppressed because it was seen in “plain view” before the defendant was actually arrested. In State v. Banks, 363 So.2d 491 (La.1978), the “plain view” exception to warrant requirements was explained:

“In sum, the conditions necessary for the applicability of the plain view doctrine are: (1) there must be a prior justification for an intrusion into a protected area, (2) in the course of which evidence is inadvertently discovered, and (3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection that the items are evidence or contraband. State v. Parker, 355 So.2d 900 (La.1978); State v. Fearn, supra [345 So.2d 468]. See also, State v. Meichel, 290 So.2d 878 (La.1974).”

The facts of this case clearly bring it within the exception. The officers were lawfully at the scene by virtue of the investigatory stop, the discovery of the marijuana was clearly inadvertent, and it was immediately apparent without close inspection the plastic bags contained marijuana.

This assignment is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to suppress is affirmed and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED.

DIXON, C. J., specially concurs.

       Judges Frederick S. Ellis, Luther F. Cole, and J. Louis Watkins, Jr. of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, participated in this decision as Associate Justices Ad Hoc, joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Associate Justices Marcus, Watson, and Lemmon.

      . Doyle testified, “Well, I’m quite sure he had to have knowledge, otherwise he wouldn’t have called me.”

      . Under cross-examination, Doyle explained they stopped the vehicle because the information obtained from the informant had been verified. He testified: “[T]he fact that the vehicle was, in fact, there and it did have that same license number on the vehicle, and it, in fact, had three people in it, this is the reason we stopped the vehicle.” Officer Accardo testified the information from the informant was: “Right down the line, the color of the vehicle, the specific license plate, the area it would be in and the occupants of the vehicle. Everything fell right in place right down the line.”

      .The trial judge expressly stated he believed the testimony of the officers relative to the inadvertency of their discovery of the marijuana and cocaine.


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Quentin J. REED.
    No. 80-KA-2050.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 6, 1981.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, and Cornelius Regan, Asst. Dist. Attys., counsel for plaintiff-appellee.
    Howard McCurdy, and Dwight Doskey, New Orleans, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, counsel for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM

Defendant Quentin J. Reed was charged by bill of information with purse snatching, in violation of R.S. 14:65.1. Following trial, the six member jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as charged. Defendant was sentenced to serve twenty years at hard labor. On appeal to this Court, defendant argues only that he received an excessive sentence.

In pertinent part, R.S. 14:65.1 states “Whoever commits the crime of purse snatching shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than two years and for not more than twenty years.” Defendant thus received the maximum sentence allowed for the crime. Previous decisions of this Court have held that a sentence, although within statutory limits, may be excessive when viewed within the context of the particular crime and the particular defendant involved. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979).

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1 delineates considerations which the trial judge must take into account in imposing a sentence of imprisonment as well as mitigating factors which are to be accorded weight in the determination of suspension of sentence or probation. The article also requires that the judge state for the record “the considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence.”

The crime of purse snatching carries a mandatory prison sentence as noted above. Consequently, our review of defendant’s sentence is limited to whether or not its length is excessive when viewed in light of this particular defendant and his background and considering the offense. In sentencing defendant, the trial judge referred to a pre-sentence investigation report which contained information regarding defendant’s extensive criminal activity as a juvenile. Several of these offenses involve crimes against the person. As a juvenile, defendant committed two simple robberies and two armed robberies. Additionally, defendant committed theft, two simple burglaries and possession of a controlled dangerous drug. Defendant also escaped once from Milne Boys Home and once from Louisiana Training Institute.

During sentencing, the judge also made reference to the “factual situation.” The victim of the purse snatching testified that defendant hit him on the head and grabbed him around the neck, choking him. The defendant testified that he was unmarried and lived with an aunt and grandmother. At the time of the crime defendant had been unemployed, working occasionally through Labor Pool, and receiving some spending money from his relatives. While the trial judge did not address each of the considerations set forth in Article 894.1, we find that he did articulate sufficient reasons for his having imposed the maximum sentence.

In defendant’s favor we note that the instant crime, committed at age twenty-three, is defendant’s first adult offense. We choose not to publish the pre-sentence investigation report nor allude to it extensively in this opinion. Nevertheless, we have reviewed that report which, along with defendant’s juvenile record, satisfies us that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in sentencing defendant to the twenty years at hard labor. Thus, the maximum sentence received by defendant does not violate his constitutional protection against an excessive sentence.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED.

       Judges James C. Gulotta, John C. Boutall, and Patrick M. Schott of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as Associate Justices ad hoc, joined by Chief Justice John A. Dixon, Jr. and Associate Justices Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., James L. Dennis, and Jack C. Watson.


author: MARCUS, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Luke A. PETROVICH, Albert J. Beshel, Lennard H. Mackenroth and Michael E. Kirby.
    No. 80-K-2491.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 6, 1981.
    Camille F. Gravel, Jr., David W. Robertson, and Susan M. Theisen, of Gravel, Robertson & Brady, Alexandria; Michael S. Fawer, and Matthew H. Greenbaum, of Fawer & Greenbaum, New Orleans, for defendants-relators.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leander Perez, Jr., Dist. Atty., Frank Klein, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gilbert V. Andry, III, Sp. Counsel to Dist. Attys., New Orleans, for plaintiff-respondent.
   MARCUS, Justice.

Luke A. Petrovich, Albert J. Beshel, Len-nard H. Mackenroth and Michael Edward Kirby, four of the five members of the Plaquemines Parish Commission Council, were charged by the grand jury in separate indictments with three counts of violating R.S. 42:263 pertaining to the employment of special legal counsel by the parish governing authority. Each defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment grounded on the claims that the employment of special counsel was authorized by the Plaque-mines Parish Local Self-Government Charter, that R.S. 42:263 and the penal provision, R.S. 42:264, were violative of the federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws, and that the indictments failed to allege the element of criminal intent required under R.S. 42:264. After a hearing, the trial judge denied defendants’ motions. On application of defendants, we granted writs under our supervisory jurisdiction to review the correctness of those rulings. Defendants assert five arguments in brief to this court in support of their position. Finding no merit in three of their arguments, we will address only the remaining two, concluding that the penal provision of R.S. 42:264 is unconstitutional.

Defendants argue that R.S. 42:263 and 264 deny them equal protection of the laws and that the entire statutory scheme of R.S. 42:261-264 is so vague and overbroad that the prosecution thereunder denies them due process of law.

R.S. 42:263 and 264 form part of the statutory scheme designed to provide legal counsel for various state and local governmental authorities. This scheme in pertinent part is as follows:

§ 261. Attorney General to be counsel for boards and commissions
A. Except as provided by Subsection C of this section or as otherwise provided by law, the attorney general for the parish of Orleans and the district attorneys of the several judicial districts other than the parish of Orleans, shall ex officio and without extra compensation, general or special, be the regular attorneys and counsel for the parish governing authorities, parish school boards, and city school boards within their respective districts and of every state board or commission domiciled therein, the members of which, in whole or in part, are elected by the people or appointed by the governor or other prescribed authority, except the state boards and commissions domiciled at the city of Baton Rouge, and all boards in charge or in control of state institutions.
B. Except as provided by Subsection C of this section or as otherwise provided by law, all legal services for parish governing authorities, parish school boards, city school boards and all state boards and commissions, including levee boards, hospital and asylum boards, educational boards and dock boards, the members of which, in whole or in part, are elected by the people or are appointed by the governor or other prescribed authority, in reference to the issuance of bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, whether in the original instance or for refunding purposes, shall be under the supervision, control and authority of the attorney general.
C. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections A and B of this section or of any other law, the governing authority of any parish listed in the 1970 decennial federal census as having a total population of between 70,000 and 80,000 may retain, select and/or employ, on a full or part time basis or on retainer, an attorney to serve as its regular or special attorney and in such case may fix and pay the salary or compensation of said attorney. The employment of an attorney under this authorization relieves the district attorney of responsibility.
D. Except as otherwise permitted by this Section it shall be unlawful for any parish governing authority, school board, or state board or commission to retain or employ, for any compensation whatever, any attorney or counsel to represent it generally, or, except as provided in R.S. 42:263, to retain or employ any special attorney or counsel, for any compensation whatever, to represent it in any special matter, or pay any compensation for any legal services whatever, provided that the board of commissioners of the port of New Orleans shall select its own attorney.
The provisions of this Subsection shall not apply to the board of assessors of the parish of Orleans, the salary of whose attorney is paid by the city of New Orleans, nor shall it apply to the Board of Liquidation of the City Debt created by Act 110 of 1890.
F. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or of any other laws to the contrary, and as a further exception to the general prohibition contained in this section, the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board is hereby authorized to select its own attorney to serve as general counsel of said board, the compensation of said attorney to be fixed and paid by the board solely from funds appropriated by the board for that purpose.
G. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section or any other law to the contrary, nothing shall prohibit either the governing authorities of the parishes of St. Charles, Ouachita, Morehouse, and Vermilion, or the school boards of the parishes of St. Charles, Ouachita, More-house, Acadia, DeSoto, St. Bernard, Red River, Lafayette, Pointe Coupee, West Carroll, and Vermilion, and the Monroe City School Board from each employing or retaining its own attorney to represent it generally; however, except in those specific instances where expressly allowed by law, no payment to such attorney so employed or retained shall be made on a contingent fee or other percentage basis. The employment of attorneys by either or both of said political subdivisions of the aforementioned parishes shall relieve the district attorneys of the judicial districts serving the parishes of St. Charles, Acadia, DeSoto, St. Bernard, Red River, Lafayette, West Carroll, and Vermilion from any further duty of representing said political subdivisions of said parishes.
H. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Section or any other law to the contrary, the Recreation and Park Commission for the parish of East Baton Rouge may retain and employ counsel as otherwise more specifically provided in R.S. 16:2.1 and the district attorney shall be relieved of his responsibility to serve as attorney for the commission only in such instances as provided therein.
§ 261.1 Certain parish and city school boards; employment of general attorney
A. All parish and city school boards in the state which have in their respective school systems an average daily membership in excess of twenty-five thousand pupils may select, employ, fix the salary of and pay their own general attorney, in which case the district attorney shall be relieved of responsibility.
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection A hereof, and irrespective of the average daily membership of pupils in the school system of any such parish, the school board of any parish listed in the 1970 decennial federal census as having a total population of between seventy thousand and eighty thousand may select, employ, fix the salary of and pay its own general attorney, in which case the district attorney shall be relieved of responsibility.
§ 261.2 Certain parish school boards in the twenty-first judicial district; employment of general attorney
All parish school boards in the twenty-first judicial district may select, employ, fix the salary of and pay their own general attorney.
§ 263. Resolution requesting special counsel
A. No parish governing authority, levee board except as provided in Subsection B hereof, parish school board, city school board, or other local or state board shall retain or employ any special attorney or counsel to represent it in any special matter or pay any compensation for any legal services whatever unless a real necessity exists, made to appear by a resolution thereof stating fully the reasons for the action and the compensation to be paid. The resolution then shall be subject to the approval of the attorney general and, if approved by him, shall be spread upon the minutes of the body and published in the official journal of the parish.
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection A of this Section or R.S. 42:264, the governing boards of the Cane River Levee and Drainage District, the Campti-Clarence Levee District, the Natchitoches Levee and Drainage District, the Red River Levee and Drainage District, the Fifth Louisiana Levee District, and the Nineteenth Louisiana Levee District may retain or employ special counsel as needed and without the approval of the attorney general.
§ 264. Penalties
The members of parish governing authorities, parish school boards, and state boards or commissions, who shall violate any of the provisions of R.S. 42:261 through 42:263 and any attorney or counselor who knowingly accepts prohibited employment or compensation shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than two hundred and fifty dollars and imprisoned for not less than ten days nor more than ninety days; and in addition shall be deemed guilty of malfeasance and gross misconduct and removed from office in the manner prescribed by law.

R.S. 42:261(A) generally provides that with the exception of the parish of Orleans and state boards and commissions domiciled at the city of Baton Rouge, the district attorneys of the various judicial districts shall serve as the regular attorneys and counsel for the parish governing authorities, parish and city school boards and every state board or commission domiciled within their respective districts. Subsection B provides that the issuance of bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness shall be under the supervision, control and authority of the attorney general. Notwithstanding these provisions, Subsection C permits the governing authority of any parish listed in the 1970 federal census as having a total population of between 70,000 and 80,000 to employ an attorney other than the district attorney to serve as its regular or special attorney. Subsection D makes it unlawful for any parish governing authority, school board, or state board or commission that has not been exempted by this section to employ counsel to represent it “generally,” or, “except as provided in R.S. 42:263,” to retain or employ any special attorney or counsel, “provided that the board of commissioners of the port of New Orleans shall select its own attorney”; this subsection also shall not apply to the board of assessors of the parish of Orleans nor to the Board of Liquidation of the City Debt. The remaining subsections of R.S. 42:261, as well as R.S. 42:261.1 and 42:261.2, single out certain other parish governing authorities, school boards and state boards and commissions and specifically accord them the right to employ general counsel other than the district attorney.

R.S. 42:263(A) prohibits a parish governing authority, levee board except as provided in Subsection B hereof, parish and city school board or other local or state board from employing special counsel to represent it in any special matter unless a “real necessity exists,” made to appear by a resolution thereof stating fully the reasons for the action and the compensation to be paid. The resolution then shall be subject to the approval of the attorney general and, if approved by him, shall be spread upon the minutes of the body and published in the official journal of the parish. Subsection B permits the governing boards of six levee districts to employ special counsel as needed and without the approval of the attorney general. R.S. 42:264 prescribes criminal penalties for members of the parish governing authorities, parish school boards, and state boards or commissions who shall violate any of the provisions of R.S. 42:261 through 42:263.

The thrust of defendants’ constitutional attack is threefold. First, they contend that only some of the entities subject to the procedures set forth in R.S. 42:263 are amenable to punishment under R.S. 42:264. Defendants have been charged under R.S. 42:263(A) which prohibits a “parish governing authority, levee hoard, ... parish school board, city school board, or other local or state board” from employing special counsel without following the procedures described therein [emphasis added]. However, the penal provisions of R.S. 42:264 apply to members of “parish governing authorities, parish school boards, and state boards or commissions” who violate the provisions of R.S. 42:261 through 42:263 [emphasis added]. Defendants contend that the omission of levee boards, city school boards and other local boards listed in R.S. 42:263(A) from the penal provisions of R.S. 42:264 results in a disparate and unequal treatment of entities similarly situated. Second, defendants urge that the exemption of the governing boards of six levee districts in R.S. 42:263(B) from the provisions of R.S. 42:263(A) results in discriminatory application of the statute. Last, defendants contend that the entire statutory scheme of R.S. 42:261-264, having been amended so often since it was enacted in 1912 to exempt various public bodies, is, as it currently reads, vague, obscure and internally inconsistent.

Both the federal and state constitutions mandate equal protection of the laws. U.S.Const. Amend. XIV; La.Const. Art. 1, § 3 (1974). Generally, the guarantee of equal protection requires that state laws affect alike all persons and interests similarly situated. Where, as here, there is no involvement of a “suspect classification” or “fundamental right,” traditional equal protection analysis sustains a classification if it is not arbitrary and bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage District No. 2 of the Parish of St. Charles, 366 So.2d 1381 (La.1978); Succession of Robins, 349 So.2d 276 (La.1977); State v. Everfield, 342 So.2d 648 (La.1977). The legislature has a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some classifications of persons differently from others and it is fundamental that a statutory enactment of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional. Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage District No. 2 of the Parish of St. Charles, supra; State v. Everfield, supra; State v. Newton, 328 So.2d 110 (La.1976). Nevertheless, where classifications are founded on no real distinctions and are clearly capricious, irrational, arbitrary or unnatural, they will be invalidated. Southland Corp. v. Collector of Revenue for the State of La., 321 So.2d 501 (La.1975). The burden is upon the party claiming the unconstitutionality to show that the classification inherent in the statute has no rational basis. State v. Everfield, supra; State v. Newton, supra; State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So.2d 192 (1965).

We conclude that defendants met the burden of proving that, due to the infirmities inherent in R.S. 42:263 and 42:264, the instant prosecution of defendants thereunder denies them their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. First, we agree with defendants’ contention that by omitting some public bodies enumerated in R.S. 42:263 from the penal statute of R.S. 42:264, the legislature created an unreasonable, arbitrary and irrational classification of similarly situated public entities. An examination of these statutes reveals no valid state purpose for singling out levee boards, city school boards and other local boards and placing them beyond the reach of the criminal sanctions set forth in R.S. 42:264. We further find that defendants have been denied equal protection of the laws insofar as the governing boards of the six levee districts listed in R.S. 42:263(B) have been legislatively exempted from complying with the procedures set forth in R.S. 42:263(A) without a rational basis for the exemption. Moreover, we note that the entire statutory scheme of R.S. 42:261-264 is wrought with internal inconsistencies created by legislative exemptions of many state and local public bodies from the statutes’ parameters. Hence, we conclude that R.S. 42:264 is unconstitutional in that it exposes those entities that have not been exempted from its penalties to unequal protection of the laws in violation of the federal and state constitutions. While finding it unnecessary to reach the constitutionality of R.S. 42:261-263, we suggest that the legislature re-examine these statutes with the view of removing any constitutional infirmities that may exist.

Since we find R.S. 42:264 unconstitutional, the indictments of defendants under R.S. 42:263 must be quashed.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the rulings of the trial judge denying defendants’ motions to quash are reversed and set aside. Defendants’ motions to quash the indictments are granted.

      . According to the state’s brief, the remaining member of the Commission Council, Chalin O. Perez, was subsequently indicted on similar charges.

      . R.S. 42:263 provides in pertinent part:
      No parish governing authority, levee board except as provided in Subsection B hereof, parish school board, city school board, or other local or state board shall retain or employ any special attorney or counsel to represent it in any special matter or pay any compensation for any legal services whatever unless a real necessity exists, made to appear by a resolution thereof stating fully the reasons for the action and the compensation to be paid. The resolution then shall be subject to the approval of the attorney general and, if approved by him, shall be spread upon the minutes of the body and published in the official journal of the parish.

      . R.S. 42:264 provides:
      The members of parish governing authorities, parish school boards, and state boards or commissions, who shall violate any of the provisions of R.S. 42:261 through 42:263 and any attorney or counselor who knowingly accepts prohibited employment or compensation shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than two hundred and fifty dollars and imprisoned for not less than ten days nor more than ninety days; and in addition shall be deemed guilty of malfeasance and gross misconduct and removed from office in the manner prescribed by law.

      . 394 So.2d 1235 (La.1980).

      . Defendants argued that the employment of special counsel by them was within the authority granted them under Article II, Section 10 of the Plaquemines Parish Charter entitled “Legal Services” and that this provision of their charter superseded R.S. 42:263 as a result of the “exalted status” accorded to the Plaquemines Parish Charter and other pre-1974 home rule charters by La.Const. Art. 6, § 4 (1974). They argued that this latter provision of the 1974 constitution recognized the authority of home rule charters adopted prior to that constitution “except as they were inconsistent with this constitution” and since no mention was made of the state’s general or statutory law, the provision of their home rule charter authorizing the hiring of legal counsel effectively superseded R.S. 42:263. Defendants also contended that since R.S. 42:264 makes a violator of R.S. 42:263 guilty of malfeasance in office (R.S. 14:134), the indictments were defective and should have been quashed because they failed to allege intent, an essential element of that crime (malfeasance).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald CRAFT.
    No. 81-K-0289.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 1981.
   In re Donald Craft, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans. No. 272-366.

Granted and remanded for reconsideration in light of State v. Gould, 395 So.2d 647 (La.1981).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Thomas J. PIERCE v. Warden Hayden J. DEES, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 80-KH-2487.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 1981.
   In re Thomas J. Pierce, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans. No. 263-653.

Granted. The conviction is reversed and the sentence vacated. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 99 S.Ct. 1623, 60 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 100 S.Ct. 2214, 65 L.Ed.2d 159 (1980). The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.


author: MARCUS, J.,

text:
    SUCCESSION of Salassi RICHARDSON.
    No. 81-C-0162.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 1981.
   In re Alma Francis Christy, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 392 So.2d 105.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.

MARCUS, J.,

would grant to overrule Succession of Brown, 388 So.2d 1151 (La. 1980).

LEMMON, J., would grant on the issue of sufficiency of proof of acknowledgement.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Daryl Wayne HAMPTON.
    No. 81-K-0235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 1981.
   In re Daryl Wayne Hampton, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Jefferson Parish. No. 80-1701.

Granted. Sentence set aside, and case remanded for resentencing see, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970); State v. Williams, 288 So.2d 319 (La.1974).


text:
    Validine F. GANEY et al. v. David H. BEATTY et al.
    No. 81-C-0245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Validine Ganey et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Concordia. 391 So.2d 545.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Francis J. NORMAN v. Solonge E. SORREL et al.
    No. 81-C-0273.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Francis J. Norman, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Iberia. 391 So.2d 496.

Denied.

DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Neva Lacour LEMOINE v. MARKSVILLE INDUSTRIES INC., and Insurance Co. of North America.
    No. 81-C-0299.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Marksville Industries Inc., and Industries Co. of North America, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Avoyelles. 391 So.2d 528.

Denied.


text:
    Vernon McCLINTON et al. v. Herbert W. REID et al.
    No. 81-C-0300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Herbert W. Reid, applying for writ of certiorari, from the Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Natchitoches. 391 So.2d 506.

Denied.


text:
    Dewey James HELVERSON v. RAPIDES PARISH POLICE JURY et al.
    No. 81-C-0307.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Rapides Parish Police Jury, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. Parish of Rapides. 391 So.2d 516.

Denied.


text:
    Vernon McCLINTON et al. v. Herbert W. REID et al.
    No. 81-C-0332.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Casco Manufacturing Co., a Division of Sun Chemical Co., Inc., applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Natchi-toches. 391 So.2d 506.

Denied.


text:
    Fannie GODWIN v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD et al.
    No. 81-C-0441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Fannie Godwin, applying for supervisory writs and stay order. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 242-956.

Granted and transferred to the court of appeal for expedited treatment. First amendment issues deserve prompt attention.


text:
    J. WEINGARTEN, INC. v. NORTHGATE MALL, INC. and Pickens Bond Construction Company.
    No. 80-C-2991.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Northgate Mall, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Third Circuit, Court of Appeals. Parish of Lafayette. 390 So.2d 527,

Writ granted.


text:
    Dorothy Lozano HUBBS et al. v. Carlo CANOVA et al.
    No. 81-C-0014.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Carlo Canova, et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Iberville. 392 So.2d 486.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. CITY OF PINEVILLE.
    No. 81-C-0017.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re City of Pineville, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Rapides. 390 So.2d 228.

Granted.


text:
    Walter Dale TUCKER v. Mr. and Mrs. Earl LIRETTE, Jr. and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 81-C-0144.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Walter Dale Tucker, applying for writs of certiorari and review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Terre-bonne. 393 So.2d 293.

Granted.


text:
    Ernest MORGAN et al. v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY et al.
    No. 81-C-0204.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Ernest Morgan, et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Natchi-toches. 391 So.2d 499.

Granted.


text:
    Arthur Gerald ROGERS et al. v. PAYNE AND KELLER OF LOUISIANA, INC., et al.
    No. 81-C-012O.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Arthur Gerald Rogers, et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 392 So.2d 109.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ on the “statutory employer” issue.


text:
    George WERNER v. SOUTHERN FOREST PRODUCTS ASSOC., Daniel Harigan and Commercial Union Assur. Comp.
    No. 81-C-0164.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re George Werner, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson. 391 So.2d 63.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Allen J. ST. PIERRE v. Leonard A. WASHOFSHY, Individually and as a Partner in the Law Firm of Jackson & Hess and its Successors in Interest, Hess & Washofshy and his Legal Malpractice Insurer, The XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 81-C-0179.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Allen J. St. Pierre, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 391 So.2d 78.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., dissents, believing that summary judgment is inappropriate.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Lionel PERKINS v. Charles WARD, Judge, Criminal District Court.
    No. 66563.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Lionel Perkins, applying for writ of mandamus. Orleans Parish. No. 246-138.

Granted. Trial court is ordered to grant out of time appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robert GRIFFIN v. Honorable Matthew BRANIFF, Judge, Criminal District Court, Orleans Parish.
    No. 80-KH-2871.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Robert Griffin, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 269-740.

Granted. Petitioner is to be furnished a Boykin transcript.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Albert J. SOUBLET v. Judge Frank J. SHEA, Section G, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 80-KH-2970.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Albert J. Soublet, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 268-481.

Granted. Both motions transferred to district court for disposition.


text:
    Mildred Badie, Wife of Nolan A. MARSHALL v. Nolan A. MARSHALL.
    No. 81-C-0168.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Nolan A. Marshall, applying for writs of certiorari, or review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 390 So.2d 1365.

Granted. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal to consider the plea of prescription filed and received by this Court and to consider any other relief appropriate.

Opinion after remand, 399 So.2d 1253.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Daryl Michael SYLVESTER v. Judge John A. PATIN, 14th Judicial District Court.
    No. 81-K-0372.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Daryl Michael Sylvester, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 4330-80.

Granted. Defendants entitled to some relief. Trial court is ordered to fashion appropriate order.


text:
    Honorable Charles A. IMBORNONE v. Honorable Thomas A. EARLY, Jr., et al.
    No. 81-CA-0388.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Honorable Thomas A. Early, Jr., et al., motion to set aside suspensive appeal. Parish of Orleans.

The motion to set aside the suspensive appeal is denied, for the reasons that the temporary restraining order previously issued is no longer in effect.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Tommy PORTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 66591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Tommy Porter, applying for reconsideration of denied writ, January 9, 1981. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 272-231 and 272-443.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ronnie Tyronne WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-2448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Ronnie T. Williams, applying for reconsideration of denied writ of October 24, 1980. Orleans Parish. No. 260 — 94'7.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. O’Dowl WATSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-1999.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re O’Dowl Watson, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 258-216, Sect. G.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joseph CORNER v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2425.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Villery J. Corner, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Avoyelles. Nos. 28,281, 28,284, 28,286 and 28,287.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Emmitt JONES v. COURT REPORTER, DIVISION A, 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON.
    No. 80-KH-2447.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Emmitt Jones, applying for writs of certiorari and mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. No. 79-234.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Phillip O. ABRAHMS (aka) Phillip O. Hudgins v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2509.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Phillip 0. Abrahms (aka) Phillip 0. Hudgins, applying for writs of mandamus, habeas corpus, certiorari and prohibition, or other remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 183-542 — G, 183-541 — B, and 183-545 —A.

Writ denied. This Court has been informed that petitioner has not applied for credit in no. 183-546 or reapplied in no. 183-545.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. McKinley PETERSON v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re McKinley Peterson, applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. No. 77-1823.

Writ denied.

DIXON, C. J., would grant an evidentiary hearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Danny Boy GRIFFITH v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2567.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Danny Boy Griffith, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Terre-bonne. Nos. 46113 and 45972.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Glenn Dale NEWMAN v. Warden Hayden J. DEES, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 80-KH-2584.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Glenn Dale Newman, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Bossier. No. 56575.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Jerry Louis CHAPMAN v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2597.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Jerry Louis Chapman, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 275-486.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Douglas GREMILLION v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2598.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Douglas Gremillion, applying for remedial writ. Parish of Rapides. No. 170975.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Randy J. LESTER v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2599.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Randy Lester, applying for writ of habeas. Parish of Jefferson. No. 78-1874.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joseph R. SIEGEL v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2602.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Joseph Siegel, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Tensas. No. 14521.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. James R. THOMAS v. Roger AUCOIN, Warden.
    No. 80-KH-2620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re James R. Thomas, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nos. 1-78-701 and 1-79-379.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. CHAPMAN DODGE CENTER, INC., John L. Swindle and Donald Barrett.
    No. 81-K-0407.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Chapman Dodge Center, Inc., John L. Swindle and Donald Barrett, applying for writs of certiorari and stay order. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nos. 11-80-45 and 11-80 — 46.

Granted; ruling of the trial judge vacated and set aside. The trial judge is ordered to comply with C.Cr.P. Art. 738.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Thomas PHILIPS v. Honorable Frank SHEA, Judge.
    No. 81-KH-0208.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Thomas Philips, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 268-481 Sec. G.

Granted. Trial court is ordered to fix a new return date in this matter ninety (90) days from the date of this order. In this regard the transcript shall be furnished at least fifteen days prior to the return date. See C.Cr.P. art. 919 as amended by Acts 1980, # 537.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robert H. MURRAY v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2622.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Robert H. Murray, applying for writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 220-082 and 220-134.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joe Lee COLLINS v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2642.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Joe Lee Collins, applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, and prohibitive injunction relief. Parish of St. Tammany. Nos. 57721 and 60692.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Sidney FRANKS, Jr. v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2643.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Sidney Franks, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari and review. Parish of Beauregard. Nos. C-636-80 and 11243.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. David STEVENSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-2655.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re David Stevenson, Jr., applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Caddo. Nos. 102613 and 115149 H.C.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Billy HENDERSON and Frank Matthews v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Billy Henderson and Frank Matthews, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, or habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 251-487.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Michael SALISBURY v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-K-2935.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Michael Salisbury, applying for writs of certiorari, review, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of St. Bernard. No. 36494.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Michael WAGNER v. 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON.
    No. 81-KH-0015.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Michael Wagner, applying for remedial writ. Parish of Jefferson. No. 70-768.

Denied.


text:
    Vernice C. WRIGHT v. HOWARD BROS. DISCOUNT STORES, INC.
    No. 81-C-0098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Vernice C. Wright, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Sabine. No. 31684.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robert JOHNSON v. Warden Frank C. BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 81-KH-0101.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Robert Johnson, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Feliciana. No. 1-75-58.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Timothy Lee HARDESTY v. CLERK OF COURT, SECTION E, ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 81-KH-0113.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Timothy Lee Hardesty, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 260-834.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Timothy Lee HARDESTY v. CLERK OF COURT, 14TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CAMERON.
    No. 81-KH-0114.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Timothy Lee Hardesty, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Cameron. No. 8199.

Denied. Application is moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Warren LAWSON v. Judge Jerome WINSBERG, Criminal District Court, Section C, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 81-KH-0117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981
   In re Warren Lawson, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 268-123.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Andrew P. BROWN v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT (SECTION A), ORLEANS PARISH.
    No. 81-KH-0148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Andrew P. Brown, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 268-493.

Denied.


text:
    Harold LYON et al. v. Henry COBENA.
    No. 81-C-0165.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Brown’s Velvet Dairy Products, Inc., applying for writs of certiorari, or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of St. Charles. No. 10534.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Felix A. PRICE v. Charles FOTI, Criminal Sheriff, Parish of Orleans, and Frank C. Blackburn, Warden, Louisiana Slate Penitentiary.
    No. 81-K-0182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Felix Price, applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. No. 269-823.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Oscar HERRERA.
    No. 81-K-0194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re State of Louisiana through District Attorney John Mamoulides and Assistant District Attorney Abbott J. Reeves, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. No. 80-2316.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Bradley FUSELIER.
    No. 81-K-0210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re John Bradley Fuselier, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of St. Landry. City Court, No. L-24-420.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charlie JONES.
    No. 81-K-0230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Charlie Jones, applying for writ of review. Parish of St. Charles. No. 37-363.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lennon Ray JOHNSON.
    No. 81-K-0232.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Lennon Ray Johnson, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Ouachita. No. M44727.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dewayne Donnell WILLIAMS.
    No. 81-K-0246.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Dewayne Donnell Williams, applying for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Vernon. No. 32831.

Denied.


text:
    CHRYSLER CREDIT CORPORATION v. Albert D. LEE.
    No. 81-C-0263.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Lena D. Lee, wife of/and Albert D. Lee, applying for writ of certiorari. St. John the Baptist Parish. No. 11591.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lloyd R. LACHNEY and Lowell W. Connella a/k/a Sonny.
    No. 81-K-0302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Lowell W. Connella a/k/a “Sonny”, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Rapides. No. 199581.

Writ denied. Defendant has an adequate remedy by appeal in event of conviction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Victor THOMPSON v. ORLEANS INDIGENT DEFENDER PROGRAM.
    No. 81-KH-0316.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Victor Thompson, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 276-708 and 276-497.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Dominick J. VILLAFRANCO v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF JEFFERSON PARISH and Clerk of the 24th Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, et al.
    No. 81-KH-0324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Dominick J. Villafranco, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Jefferson.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles SHEARS.
    No. 81-K-0368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Charles Shears, applying for writs of certiorari, or review, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Madison. No. 33299.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clyde GOSEY. STATE of Louisiana v. Jimmie Lee WOODLEY.
    No. 81-K-0352.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1981.
   In re Clyde Gosey and Jimmie Lee Wood-ley, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of DeSoto. Nos. 42828 through 42835.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnny FULLER.
    No. 81-K-0580.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1981.
   In re Johnny Fuller, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and stay order. Parish of Livingston.

Granted; relator is entitled to reasonable bond, C.Cr.P. 899. Bail is fixed at $1,000.00.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. B. W. BRISTER.
    No. 81-K-0348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re B. W. Brister, applying for writs of certiorari, review, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Jefferson. No. 411-922.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest Lee BREAUX, Jr.
    No. 81-K-0351.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Ernest Lee Breaux, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and stay order. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 3374-80.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Craig E. WHITT v. Sheriff Charles C. FOTI, Jr., Criminal Sheriffs Office, Orleans Parish.
    No. 81-KH-0356.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Craig E. Whitt, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Howard L. GOODS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 81-KH-0357.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Howard L. Goods, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Catahoula. Nos. 80-148 and 80-168.

Denied. Relator’s appeal No. 80-KA-2946 filed December 22, 1980 is pending in this Court.


text:
    Rhondda PARKS v. Jule William PARKS, III.
    No. 81-C-0376.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Jule William Parks, III, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. No. 14367, Parish of Ouachita.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Glen A. HEBERT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 81-KH-0381.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Glen A. Hebert, applying for writ of certiorari and mandamus. Parish of Acadia. Nos. 31240 and 32102.

Denied; moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Albert D. LITTLETON and Marion R. Littleton.
    No. 81-K-0393.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Albert and Marion Littleton, applying for writs of certiorari, review, and stay order. Parish of Concordia. Nos. 80-2049, 80-2067 and 80-2064.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robin Brett POLK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 81-KH-0481.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Robin Brett Polk, applying for remedial writs. Parish of St. Tammany. No. 70156.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clyde MOORE.
    No. 81-K-0488.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Clyde Moore, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Caddo. No. 113521.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Leslie SMITH v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2708.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Leslie Smith, applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 244-. 210.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Terry Janies PIERRE v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-KH-2725.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Terry James Pierre, applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 233-385, Sect. E.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Robert WILKERSON v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-KH-2726.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Robert Wilkerson, applying for motion to proceed in forma pauperis and writ of habeas corpus. Parish of W. Feliciana. No. 7511.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Alfred LABOSTRIE v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-KH-2727.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Alfred Labostrie, applying for writ of habeas corpus and motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Parish of Orleans. No. 243-886, Sect. J.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., James Earl WILLIAMS v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 80-KH-2750.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re James Earl Williams, applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 235-114, Sect. G.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Alex COLLINS v. Hayden J. DEES, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute and C. Paul Phelps, Secretary, Louisiana Dept. of Corrections et al.
    No. 80-KH-2751.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Alex Collins, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 252-432.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Lawrence STERLING v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2760.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Lawrence Sterling, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 260-160.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Willie FRANK v. Warden Frank C. BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2761.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Willie Frank, applying for remedial writs and memorandum of authorities with exhibits. Parish of Orleans. No. 253-187.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., John T. JOHNSON v. FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF OUACHITA, MONROE, Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-2812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re John T. Johnson, applying for remedial writs and memorandum of authorities. Parish of Ouachita. No. 27433.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Elbert JACKSON v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2833.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Elbert Jackson, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Caddo. No. 76851.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Reginald AMBROSE v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2834.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Reginald Ambrose, applying for writs of certiorari, habeas corpus, and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 257-866.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., E. J. WARREN, Jr. v. Sheila MYERS, Esq, Asst. District Attorney; Paul Katz, Esq., O. I. D. P.; Criminal District Court of Orleans Parish, State of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-2856.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re E. J. Warren, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari, habeas corpus, and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 268-298.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Baron SMITH v. Warden Frank C. BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary et al.
    No. 80-KH-2896.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Baron Smith, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 234-392.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Warren WALKER v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 80-KH-2899.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Warren Walker, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus. Orleans Parish. Nos. 269-776 and 269-777.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry F. DAVIS.
    No. 81-K-0175.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Henry F. Davis, applying for writs of certiorari, or review. Parish of Orleans. No. 275-339.

Denied; adequate remedy by review in the event of conviction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reginald SMITH.
    No. 81-K-0329.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Reginald Smith, applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Parish of Orleans. No. 270-246.

Writ denied.


text:
    Jeannine Elizabeth Tobin HAMITER v. James Jewell HAMITER.
    No. 81-C-0335.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re James Jewell Hamiter, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Caddo. No. 269-151.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Hillary CARRERE v. Peter CASTANO, Respondent-Contestee, and Edwin Lombard, Clerk of Criminal District Court.
    No. 81-C-0468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Hillary Carrere, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 395 So.2d 949.

Granted and remanded to the Court of Appeal to decide en banc pursuant to R.S. 18:1409(H).

LEMMON, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., John David HOBBS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 80-KH-2857.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re John David Hobbs, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 251-128.

Granted. Evidentiary hearing ordered on sentence to which relator was exposed based on statement by trial judge.

WATSON, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., James E. EZELL v. 4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF OUACHITA.
    No. 80-KH-2835.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re James E. Ezell, applying for writ of certiorari and mandamus. Parish of Oua-chita. No. 39341.

Writ granted to order that relator must be furnished a transcript of his Boykinization; otherwise, the writ is denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Arnold Ray HUSKEY v. STATE of Louisiana, Parish of Assumption.
    No. 80-KH-2898.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 1981.
   In re Arnold Ray Huskey, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Assumption. No. 14499.

Granted. It is ordered that relator be granted an evidentiary hearing.

Remanded.