author: DIXON, Chief Justice. MARCUS, Justice WATSON, Justice, LEMMON, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Don M. JORDAN.
    No. 81-KA-1771.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 7, 1982.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 1982.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Lance Africk, Fred Harper, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Jasper Pharr, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   DIXON, Chief Justice.

Defendant Don M. Jordan was convicted of first degree murder, a violation of R.S. 14:30. Following a sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death. It is from this conviction and sentence that defendant appeals, urging seventeen assignments of error.

On Sunday, April 8, 1979 defendant, Dianna Schwall and Gary Haisch went to Mel Downey’s house for the purpose of buying drugs. Downey was unable to make a connection at first, but the group was subsequently able to purchase drugs in Chal-mette and on St. Claude Street. They injected the drugs at Haisch’s brother’s house. Deciding they needed money for additional drugs, they went to Jordan’s mother’s house for ski masks, then to Dianna Schwall’s house for two guns (a .357 magnum and a .38 caliber revolver) and a long-sleeved shirt for Mel Downey (Downey had identifying tattoos on his arms). As they drove toward the lakefront area in New Orleans, they stopped, intending to rob a grocery store but abandoned that plan and continued to ride around the lakefront area looking for potential robbery victims. Defendant had Schwall stop the car at Wren and Marconi Drive, near the Fraering residence. Gary Haisch knocked on the front door of the Fraering residence while defendant and Downey hid. When Mr. Fraering came to the door, Haisch asked to use the telephone to report that his girl friend had been involved in a ear wreck. Mr. Fraering told Haisch he would let him use the telephone in the garage. As Mr. Fraering left the house he closed and locked the front door behind him. At that moment, defendant and Downey, masked and armed, jumped from their hiding place and demanded entrance into the residence. Mr. Fraering refused to open the door and threw the keys on the ground. An argument ensued between defendant and Mr. Fraering. Defendant Jordan then shot Mr. Fraering twice, fatally wounding him. Immediately following the shooting, defendant, Downey and Haisch went their separate ways. Subsequently, Downey was stopped and questioned by police officers; this questioning led to the arrest of defendant Jordan and the others.

Assignments of Error Nos. 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10

By these assignments defendant contends that the trial court erred in excusing prospective jurors who expressed conscientious scruples against the imposition of the death penalty.

Defendant asserts that it was not unmistakably clear that the prospective jurors would automatically have voted against the death penalty without regard to the evidence or that their scruples would have prevented them from making an impartial decision as to defendant’s guilt.

C.Cr.P. 798 provides in pertinent part: “It is good cause for challenge on the part of the state, but not on the part of the defendant, that:
(2) The juror tendered in a capital case who has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment and makes it unmistakably clear (a) that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before him, or (b) that his attitude toward the death penalty would prevent him from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt ...”

This court has repeatedly held that the statute is constitutional and does not conflict with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). See State v. Monroe, 397 So.2d 1258 (La.1981); State v. Williams, 392 So.2d 619 (La.1980); State v. Miller, 391 So.2d 1159 (La.1980).

In the instant case, four of the five jurors in question indicated that they were opposed to the death penalty under any circumstances. The fifth juror, Mr. Alfortish, stated that he could vote for the death penalty only if he had witnessed the crime. Thus, it is unmistakably clear that none of these prospective jurors would have considered the imposition of the death penalty in this particular case, no matter what the evidence proved. Therefore, their removal for cause was proper.

These assignments lack merit.

Assignments of Error Nos. 3, 6 and 11

By these assignments defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s motion for an individual voir dire of prospective jurors and a sequestration of prospective jury members.

Defense counsel stated that the purpose of the motion was to insulate the jurors and prospective jurors from prejudicial remarks and responses of other prospective jurors under examination. Defense counsel cites one such statement made by a prospective juror during voir dire concerning the guilt of defendant. The juror under examination stated that he had heard about the case on television, and that from the information given on ■ television he definitely felt that defendant was guilty. He stated that he would feel that way until the evidence proved otherwise, and he assumed the defendant was guilty until proved innocent. In responding to a question by the prosecutor, the juror stated: “I’m with you already. In other words, I think he’s guilty. That’s what you think; that’s why you’re trying the case. In other words he’s the guy that is going to have to prove it’s the other way.”

Although the trial judge excused this prospective juror for cause, he did not admonish the remaining jurors. Defendant urges that this event should have justified the sequestration of the other prospective jurors.

There is no provision in our law which either prohibits or requires the sequestration of prospective jurors for an individual voir dire. It is well settled, however, that a trial court has the discretion to permit individual voir dire if a defendant can demonstrate that special circumstances are present. State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466 (La.1981). Defense counsel did not demonstrate that such special circumstances existed. In fact, defense counsel was permitted to address the remaining jurors to ascertain whether they had been prejudiced by the comment; the jurors indicated that they could still give the defendant a fair and impartial trial.

These assignments lack merit.

Assignment of Error No. 4

By this assignment defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his “motion to strike” the jury panel because of the overrepresentation of Orleans Parish School Board personnel and hospital employees.

Earl Duplantier, Director of the Orleans Parish Jury Commission, testified that a board composed of jury commissioners meets once each month and randomly selects sixteen to seventeen hundred names from the parish voters’ registration roll; volunteers are also placed in this group. From this group, three to four hundred names are randomly selected to make up the central jury pool list, from which the jury is ultimately selected. Mr. Duplantier further testified that often employees of the Orleans Parish school system are excused upon request due to the seasonal nature of their work, and their names are removed from that pool and divided as equally as possible and placed into a jury pool during the months of July, August, January or December, when the schools are not in term. He pointed out, however, that not all school system employees are excused, as some choose to serve during the school term. Mr. Duplantier could not explain the unusually large number of hospital employees on the list since their work is not seasonal and they are excused only in very few instances.

On cross-examination by defense counsel, Mr. Duplantier admitted that because this procedure had been followed, it was possible that as many as twenty-five of the three hundred seventy-five persons whose names appeared on the jury pool list for July could have been previously excused school system employees.

Defendant argues that the inclusion of the previously excused school employees in the July jury pool constituted a “stacking” of the jury pool with a certain class of people instead of a random drawing of names from a cross section of the community.

C.Cr.P. 409.1 authorizes the establishment of a central jury pool for the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans and provides that the pool is to be administered by the Orleans Parish Jury Commission. The jury commission is given the authority to select the number of jurors to serve in the central jury pool as determined by the criminal district court acting en banc and by the method prescribed by law. In effect, the statute allows the selection of jury panels in the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court from central jury pools rather than from a general venire.

C.Cr.P. 419 provides that a “general ve-nire, grand jury venire, or petit jury venire shall not be set aside for any reason unless fraud has been practiced or some' great wrong committed that would work irreparable injury to the defendant.” The Official Revision Comment under C.Cr.P. 419 suggests that the purpose of the statute is to prevent frivolous attacks upon venires resulting from good faith efforts by jury commissions to comply with the legal requirements for selecting juries. However, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides grounds for challenging the selection of a central jury pool.

C.Cr.P. 409.1 appears in Title XI, “QUALIFICATIONS AND SELECTION OF GRAND AND PETIT JURORS.” The legislature, following the enactment of C.Cr.P. 409.1 in 1972, did not amend C.Cr.P. 419 to include central jury pools. This appears to be an oversight, as it is. clear that C.Cr.P. 419 should apply to the various types of venires and juries from which grand or petit jurors are selected; challenges to the composition of a central jury pool are to be governed by C.Cr.P. 419.

In the instant case, defense counsel did not allege, argue or offer evidence to show that fraud was practiced or some great wrong was committed that worked an injury to the defendant. Under these circumstances, the trial judge properly overruled the motion.

This assignment lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 14

By this assignment defendant contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the state’s objection to a question propounded by defense counsel on cross-examination of Sergeant Frederick Williams.

Both Don Jordan and Mel Downey, in their respective statements, accused the other of shooting Mr. Fraering. Sergeant Williams testified that Don Jordan was his recently developed informant at the time of the murder. Upon cross-examination of Sergeant Williams by defense counsel, the following exchange occurred:

“Q. Have you ever had occasion to, through your duties, meet one Mel Dow-ney?
A. I am aware of Mr. Downey.
Q. You’re aware of him through your professional work — .
BY MR. AFRICK:
Your Honor, I’m going to object to that question.
BY MR. PHARR:
—as a police officer?
BY MR. AFRICK:
I think that’s an improper question. The question is is he aware of Mr. Downey through his professional work.
BY MR. PHARR:
Answer that question, then.
BY THE COURT:
Sustained. I don’t see the relevancy.”

Defense counsel objected to the court’s ruling, but did not defend his question or state reasons for his objection. On appeal, however, defense counsel states that he was attempting to expose the relationship between Sergeant Williams and Mel Downey to show Downey’s bias or interest. He asserts that the ruling prevented him from effectively cross-examining Sergeant Williams for impeachment purposes, which violated defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses against him.

As previously noted, defense counsel failed to make the trial court aware of what his intentions were when cross-examining Sergeant Williams about his relationship with Mel Downey. Furthermore, defense counsel did not question Mel Downey about the relationship although Downey admitted to having “struck a deal” with the prosecutor. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the objection to defense counsel’s question to Sergeant Williams on the ground that it was not relevant.

This assignment lacks merit.

Sentence Review

This court reviews every death sentence to determine if it is excessive. C.Cr.P. 905.-9. In evaluating whether the death penalty is excessive in a particular case, the court determines:

“(a) whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors, and
(b) whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and
(c) whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” Supreme Court Rule 28, § I-

Passion, Prejudice and Arbitrary Factors

During the sentencing hearing of this case, the prosecutor made the following remarks in the closing argument:

“Death or life without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence for the rest of his life. What about a pardon? Remember this: That man with all those' convictions — that man who has been paroled and violated his parole repeatedly, over and over and over again, that man who was actually out on probation at the time that he murdered Bill Fraering, can be pardoned from that life sentence that Mr. Pharr begged of you to give him. He can be pardoned, ladies and gentlemen, sent back out into the streets, released from the penitentiary! So, don’t be confused when they tell you that when you say life, that he is going to spend the rest of his life in the penitentiary. Woe is be to the person if he gets pardoned who meets Don Jordan in the street again. The Pardon Board can recommend to the Governor that he be pardoned and he can be pardoned. And if you don’t think it’s happened in the past — it has. I ask you to think back to just a few months ago—
BY THE COURT:
Don’t argue out of the record.
BY MR. HARPER:
He can get out. Life sentence does not necessarily mean life. It’s up to you to determine whether or not that man is going to have another opportunity to get back on the street and do what he has done his entire life, steal, burglarize, or try to pull an armed robbery!”

This argument is not dissimilar to the argument made by the prosecutor in State v. Willie, 410 So.2d 1019, 1032 (La.1982), where this court condemned the state’s interjection into the sentencing proceedings of an offender’s potential for future release. In Willie the prosecutor argued as follows:

“ ‘Mr. McElroy said that the rest of his life behind bars with no parole, no probation, no suspension of sentence would be enough for Mr. Willie in this case, but once again let’s look at things in a hard, cold light of reality and tell you the truth. He’s right. The statute does say no probation, no parole, no suspension of sentence, but have you ever heard of pardon, commutation? Those are two things that are given to the governor of the State of Louisiana in the Constitution of the State of Louisiana and it can’t be taken away by statute. As a result, the governor, whoever is the governor, eight, ten, twelve years from now, twenty years from now, can take it upon himself to let Robert Lee Willie back out onto the streets and back out into society, because that governor more than likely will not know the facts of this case. So don’t think that life really ever means life, because it doesn’t. * * *

In vacating Willie’s sentence, this court stated that in reviewing such a case it must be presumed that a death sentence was imposed under the influence of an arbitrary factor unless the record clearly indicates the jury was properly informed of its duty and admonished to disregard the improper remarks, and that the jury heeded the admonition. See also State v. Lindsey, supra, 404 So.2d at 483.

This court said in State v. Willie, supra, 410 So.2d at 1033:

“. .. this court has held that conditions under which a person sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of parole can be released at some time in the future are not a proper consideration for a capital sentencing jury and shall not be discussed in the jury’s presence. ...”

And at page 1034:

“. .. The interjection of pardon and commutation issues provokes questions that no human mind can answer and in substance transposes the task of the governor to the jury. In this latter respect it induces the jury to pass judgment upon the very issue entrusted only to the governor and could prevent him from deciding the issue at the proper time.”

The prosecutor’s argument to the jury in this case was explicit: “It’s up to you to determine whether or not that man is going back on the street ...” or be put to death. That is the jury’s choice. The prosecutor’s misleading and incorrect argument was not corrected (although the trial judge properly and commendably, without waiting for objections from defense counsel, admonished the jury to disregard other improper arguments).

The arbitrary factor (either the death penalty, or back on the street) had been given to the jury, and the record shows no effort to remove it. The sentence must be vacated and the case remanded.

Aggravating Circumstances

The jury found that one statutory aggravating circumstance was present: defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery or aggravated burglary at the time he killed the victim. This finding is clearly supported by the evidence, and was admitted by the defendant at the sentencing hearing.

Proportionality

Finally, this court must determine “whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” Supreme Court Rule 28, § 1(c).

Don Jordan and his accomplices went to the victim’s home for the specific purpose of committing a burglary or robbery. Jordan was armed with a .357 magnum and Dow-ney was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. Another participant in the crime, Gary Haisch, knocked at the victim’s door under the pretense of wanting to use the telephone. After the victim had come outside to let Haisch use the telephone in the garage, Jordan and Downey jumped from their hiding places and demanded entry into the house. When the victim refused, he and defendant Jordan began to argue and Jordan shot him twice, fatally wounding him.

At the time of the offense, defendant was thirty-one years old, divorced and had one child whom he did not support. He was unemployed and had never maintained steady employment for more than six months. The defendant had at least eight prior felony convictions. The jury found one aggravating circumstance — the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery and/or aggravated burglary. C.Cr.P. 905.-4(a).

Defense counsel assigns as a mitigating factor that defendant was mentally impaired at the time of the offense because of intoxication and drugs. C.Cr.P. 905.5. Defendant testified that he had been taking drugs and staying up twenty-four hours a day for approximately two weeks. Other participants in the crime testified that they injected drugs prior to cruising the lakefront to locate someone to rob so they could purchase additional drugs. The jury obviously did not agree that defendant’s self-induced drug intoxication so impaired “the capacity of the offender to appreciate the criminality of his conduct” that the punishment should be mitigated. The record supports such a finding.

Of the ninety-four first degree murder prosecutions in Orleans Parish since January 1, 1976, eight (including Don Jordan) have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. No sentence has been vacated because it was found to be disproportionate.

A comparison of the sentence in this case to sentences in other first degree murder prosecutions from Orleans Parish shows that it is not a disproportionate sentence. This defendant has a significant history of prior criminal activity. He is an admitted drug addict, and has been in and out of correctional institutions for sixteen of his thirty-one years as a result of prior convictions.

There are other cases from Orleans Parish where the death penalty was not imposed for crimes similar to the one under consideration. However, those defendants did not have such an extensive history of prior criminal activity as does Don Jordan. Decree

For these reasons, defendant’s conviction is affirmed; however, because of the interjection of an arbitrary factor in the sentencing hearing, the sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court for the empaneling of a new jury to determine only the issue of penalty in accordance with C.Cr.P. 905.1 et seq.

MARCUS and WATSON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part, and assign reasons.

LEMMON, J., dissents from reversal of the sentence and assigns reasons.

APPENDIX

Assignments Neither Briefed Nor Argued (Nos. 1, 2, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17)

In cases where the death sentence is imposed, abandoned assignments of error are reviewed as a matter of policy. State v. Lindsey, supra; State v. Monroe, supra; State v. Berry, supra; State v. Jones, 332 So.2d 466 (La.1976).

By Assignment No. 1 defendant contends that his Motion to Suppress the Confession and his Motion to Suppress the Evidence, as well as the testimony with respect to the obtaining of the evidence and confession, should have been sustained.

Defense counsel objected to the introduction of Mel Downey’s confession, which implicated defendant in the murder. However, Mel Downey testified that he gave the statement freely and voluntarily, and defense counsel introduced no evidence to the contrary.

Defendant objected to the introduction into evidence of two letters he had written to Dianna Schwall. The letters were mailed to Dianna Schwall while she was in custody at the Community Correctional Center. Defendant alleged that the letters were opened before they were given to Schwab, and that the correctional officers informed the district attorney of their contents. Notwithstanding, the record shows that Dianna Schwab voluntarily, and with the advice of her attorney, surrendered the letters to the district attorney.

Defendant objected to the introduction of a ski mask, knit hat and .38 caliber revolver found abandoned on a levee near the scene of the crime. The record shows that this evidence was properly admitted, as Mel Downey voluntarily led the police officers to the location along the levee where the items had been abandoned.

Defendant sought to suppress his written inculpatory statement which was made to Detective Pascal Saladino. Detective Saladino testified that defendant was fully informed of his rights and voluntarily signed the statement. He stated that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated when making or signing the statement. Defense counsel offered no evidence to show that defendant did not make the statement freely and voluntarily.

Defendant objected to the introduction of certain evidence seized from the vehicle used in the perpetration of the crime. The items seized included a short-sleeved shirt, a black ski mask with two holes cut in it, two pieces of brown knit material and a long-sleeved shirt. The record shows that the vehicle from which these items were seized was leased to the New Orleans Police Department by Star Chrysler, and loaned by Sergeant Williams to defendant, who was an informant. The vehicle was seized in St. Bernard Parish following the arrest of its occupants, Dianna Schwab and Sandra Ballon (defendant was not in the vehicle), and was subsequently taken to the New Orleans Police Department and locked up. The vehicle was searched and cleaned prior to being returned to Star Chrysler. During the cleanup the items in question were discovered and were properly admitted as evidence. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

There is no evidence that the inculpatory statements were not given freely and voluntarily and with full Miranda warnings. Further, the record shows that no evidence was seized without consent or without respect for constitutional safeguards. This assignment lacks merit.

By Assignment No. 2 defense counsel contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for continuance prior to the trial since counsel was not mentally or physically prepared to go forth with the trial. The case was originally set for trial on Tuesday, July 10, 1978 but was continued by the court to the following day. On Wednesday the trial was continued to Thursday because of a hurricane. On Thursday defense counsel requested a continuance, stating that he was not prepared mentally or physically because he felt the judge would not start a capital case on a Thursday. He also complained of a stomach virus.

The grant or refusal of a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge; his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion and a showing of specific prejudice caused by the denial. State v. Simpson, 403 So.2d 1214 (La.1981); State v. Haarala, 398 So.2d 1093 (La.1981). See C.Cr.P. 712.

In the present case, defense admitted that he was prepared for trial on Tuesday but not on Thursday, two days later. Defense counsel makes no claim of specific prejudice resulting from the denial. There was no abuse of discretion. This assignment lacks merit.

By Assignment No. 12 defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sustained the state’s objection to a question by defense counsel to S. William Provensal, III. Mr. Provensal had previously stated that he looked outside and saw a man wearing a ski mask over his head and holding a pistol in his hand. Defense counsel asked Mr. Provensal whether the person who knocked on the door when his father-in-law (the victim) answered it was the same masked person he later saw when he walked to the door to look out. The state objected on the ground that the question called for an opinion; the trial court sustained. Subsequently, Mr. Provensal testified that when his father-in-law answered the door he could not see the door or who was outside. No prejudice could have resulted from the denial since the witness subsequently answered the question. This assignment lacks merit.

By Assignment No. 13 defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Sandra Ballon to testify as to what Dianna Schwall said in the presence of defendant. The objectionable testimony is as follows:

“Q. Okay. From the time that you first saw them late that evening, would you relate to them the conversation that took place — anything that the defendant said to you regarding this murder.
A. Well, Don — they knocked on the door and they started to walk in and Diane said—
BY MR. PHARR:
Objection. Objection to what Diane said.
BY THE COURT:
Where was the defendant at that time? Where was Mr. Jordan at the time that Diana said something?
BY MS. BALLON:
Standing at my front door.
BY THE COURT:
Was he present when anything was said by Diana?
BY MS. BALLON:
Yes, sir.
BY THE COURT:
It’s overruled.
BY MR. PHARR:
Note our objection, Your Honor.
EXAMINATION BY MR. AFRICK:
Q. Go ahead. Tell them what happened.
A. Okay. Diane said, T think you should tell them.’ And I said, ‘Tell them what?’ And Don said, T shot a man.’
Q. Now, let me make sure I understand. Don said, T shot a man?’
A. Yes, sir.”

Ballon’s testimony as to Schwall’s out-of-court statement to defendant was not hearsay evidence, as the statement was not introduced for the truth of its contents, but only to show what was said to the defendant, and to show the circumstances of the defendant’s inculpatory statement. See State v. Nix, 327 So.2d 301 (La.1975), cert. denied Fulford v. Louisiana, 425 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1732, 48 L.Ed.2d 198 (1976). This assignment lacks merit.

By Assignment No. 15 defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the state to introduce certain evidence — Exhibits S-12 (the .357 magnum murder weapon), S-18 (a shirt belonging to Mel Downey), S-19 (the letters written by defendant to Dianna Schwall), S-31 (knit fabric from a cap mask), S-32 (a shirt recovered from the leased vehicle) and S-33 (pellets and casings used in the ballistics tests on the .357 magnum).

State Exhibits S-19, S-31 and S-32 were addressed in Assignment of Error No. 1; S-12 was seized as a result of a properly executed search warrant; S-33 consisted of items used by the police laboratory to perform ballistic tests and was properly admitted. Defendant did not object at trial to the introduction of S-18. This assignment lacks merit.

By Assignment No. 16 defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce into evidence at the sentencing hearing all the previous testimony, physical evidence and stipulations that were entered in the case-in-chief, the guilt phase of the proceedings. In State v. Kelly, 375 So.2d 1344, 1348 (La.1979), this court stated that C.Cr.P. 905.2 clearly permits the state to submit the matter at the sentencing hearing on the evidence of the trial on the issue of guilt. This assignment lacks merit.

By Assignment No. 17 defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to supply the jury with a third possible jury verdict which would have recommended life imprisonment if the jury could not agree. Pursuant to C.Cr.P. 905.7 the trial judge gave the jury two verdict forms: one unanimously recommending a sentence of death and the other unanimously recommending life imprisonment.

Although the trial judge must inform the jury that if it cannot unanimously agree on a verdict a sentence of life imprisonment must be imposed on defendant, this court has never held that the trial judge must supply the jury with a third verdict form to show that the jury could not agree. A verdict in either phase of a capital case must be unanimous. Defendant neither alleges nor argues that the trial court did not instruct the jury concerning the consequences of its failure to reach a unanimous verdict. This assignment lacks merit.

MARCUS, Justice

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur in the affirmance of defendant’s conviction but dissent from the reversal of his sentence. During closing argument, defense counsel made repeated references to the fact that defendant would be imprisoned for the rest of his natural life. Hence, I do not consider that the prosecutor exceeded the scope of rebuttal argument by informing the jury that defendant could receive a pardon from the governor. Accordingly, I would affirm the death sentence.

WATSON, Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in affirming the conviction of defendant, but I dissent from setting aside the sentence.

The prosecutor argued correctly to the jury that it is possible that the defendant could be pardoned in the future. There was no misleading or incorrect information in the argument. Therefore, the sentence should not be reversed.

LEMMON, Justice,

dissenting in part.

I dissent from setting aside the death penalty.

Defense counsel first raised the question of whether this murderer will ever be released if the jury decided to recommend life imprisonment. In pleading for mercy in closing argument, the defense counsel argued:

“Never see him on the street again. You will never see him on the street again, but make sure that he will be able to see him again.
“It only takes one. It only takes one of you to vote for life and he gets his life. The rest of his natural life behind bars. Maximum security. There is no escape from maximum security at Angola. He will be incarcerated all of his natural life. Don’t take his life.
******
“Do not take this young man’s life. Thirty-one years old. You incarcerate him for the rest of his natural life and it still wouldn’t justify what has been done. But, you do not take this young man’s life. You do not take his life.
******
“I’m not justifying it and I’m not saying that it’s good, but he’s sick. He’s sick. And once an addict, he can’t help himself. And drugs have controlled his mind. He has, really, no mind of his own. But, you do not take the life of a sick person on drugs. Incarcerate him, get him off the street for the rest of his natural life. But, do not take his life.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The prosecuting attorney rebutted defense counsel’s persistent and incorrect argument on the possibility of future release, as follows:

“Death or life without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence for the rest of his life. What about a pardon? Remember this: That man with all those convictions — that man who has been paroled and violated his parole repeatedly, over and over and over again, that man who was actually out on probation at the time that he murdered Bill Fraering, can be pardoned from that life sentence that Mr. Pharr begged of you to give him. He can be pardoned, ladies and gentlemen, sent back out into the streets, released from the penitentiary! So, don’t be confused when they tell you that when you say life, that he is going to spend the rest of his life in the penitentiary.
“Woe is be [sic] to the person if he gets pardoned who meets Don Jordan in the street again. The Pardon Board can recommend to the Governor that he be pardoned and he can be pardoned. And if you don’t think it’s happened in the past — it has. I ask you to think back to just a few months ago—
“BY THE COURT:
“Don’t argue out of the record.
“BY MR. HARPER:
“He can get out. Life sentence does not necessarily mean life. It’s up to you to determine whether or not that man is going to have another opportunity to get back on the street and do what he has done his entire life, steal, burglarize, or try to pull an armed robbery!
“BY MR. PHARR:
“Objection, Your Honor. On the armed robbery, he’s going outside the record. “BY MR. HARPER:
“I’m talking about this armed robbery right here.
“BY THE COURT:
“You’re talking about this armed robbery. The objection is overruled.
“BY MR. HARPER:
“Try to get dope. Try to pull an armed robbery. Steal cars. Burglarize homes. Burglarize pharmacies to get narcotics. And he want[s] to tell you that because this guy is on narcotics, that’s an excuse for murder? Because this guy had a tough life, because this guy had a tough family background, that’s an excuse to commit murder? That’s an excuse for which he should be spared?”

Thus, the prosecuting attorney simply corrected and rebutted the defense attorney’s argument and informed the jury accurately of the overall statutory scheme for handling the punishment of first degree murderers. He did not inject any arbitrary or prejudicial factors, except for a brief reference to happenings in the past, which the trial judge immediately halted and cautioned him to restrict his argument to the record.

When a defense attorney introduces the subject of the possibility of future release and argues inaccurately or misleadingly, the prosecuting attorney is entitled to correct the argument and to state accurately the overall statutory scheme for handling the punishment of first degree murderers.

I would affirm the sentence.

      . The Witherspoon decision holds that the death sentence cannot be constitutionally carried out if the jury that recommended it was chosen by excusing members of the venire for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Notwithstanding, the decision also recognizes that imposition of the death sentence would be proper if a prospective juror were excused because he made it unmistakably clear “.. . that [he] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case ...” 391 U.S. at 522 n.21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n.21, 20 L.Ed.2d at 785 n.21.

      . Defense counsel made his “motion to strike” before voir dire examination began. He did not raise the question of overrepresentation in the central jury pool by way of a written motion to quash. Nevertheless, the trial court entertained the motion on the merits, calling Earl Duplantier to testify with regard to the policies of the Orleans Parish Jury Commission. Therefore, the issue was presented to the trial court and preserved for appeal. See State v. Nelson, 357 So.2d 1100 (La.1978).
      Although defense counsel moved to strike the jury panel, his objection concerned the composition of the central jury pool, as the jury panel had not yet been selected.

      . In State v. Lindsey, supra, the jury interrupted its deliberation and asked the trial judge to give a definition of life imprisonment. Accordingly, the trial judge informed the jury of defendant’s right to apply for a pardon or commutation of sentence if given a life sentence. The jury subsequently recommended a sentence of death. In vacating the defendant’s sentence, this court voiced concern over the employment of the possibility of pardon and commutation as an issue in capital sentencing hearings, stating:
      “The problem with the interjection of such factors into the sentencing phase is that it diverts jurors from their primary responsibility, charges them with making decisions not properly within their duty as jurors, and creates a substantial likelihood that death sentences imposed in their presence are the product of arbitrary factors.” State v. Lindsey, supra, 404 So.2d at 485.

        State v. Lindsey, supra, was recently reaffirmed in State v. Brown, 414 So.2d 689, 700-01 (La. 1982). Quoting Lindsey in Brown, this court stated:
      “ ‘[C]onditions under which a person sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence can be released at some time in the future is not a proper consideration for a capital sentencing jury and shall not be discussed in the jury’s presence. Should a jury request information concerning the possibility of an offender’s release, it must be informed that it is duty bound to disregard how other governmental bodies may, in their wisdom and subject to other constraints, act but, instead, must concentrate upon whether it presently feels in light of the character of the offender and the nature of the offense, the offender should be sentenced to death or to spend the remainder of his life in prison. ...’”
      See also State v. Berry, 391 So.2d 406 (On Rehearing) (La.1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 1010, 101 S.ct. 2347, 68 L.Ed.2d 863 (1981).

      . The Orleans Parish Criminal District Court cases in which the death sentence was imposed are: State v. Jordan, (La.1982), No. 81-KA-1771; State v. Brown, supra; State v. Marshall, 414 So.2d 684 (La.1982); State v. Mattheson, 407 So.2d 1150 (La.1981); State v. Monroe, supra; State v. Culberth, 390 So.2d 847 (La. 1980) (sentence set aside for lack of statutory aggravating circumstances); State v. Parker, 372 So.2d 1037 (La.1979). A case not yet appealed to this court is State v. Williams, No. 280-790 “G” (Orleans Criminal District Court, June 29, 1981).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
WATSON, Justice. LEMMON, Justice,
      MARCUS, Justice BLANCHE, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    Charlotte Suire DAVIS v. Edson L. DAVIS.
    No. 82-C-0268.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 1982.

      Garland R. Rolling, Michael Baham, Me-tairie, for relator.
    Floyd J. Reed, Reed & Reed, New Orleans, for respondents.
   WATSON, Justice.

The community regime formerly existing between the parties was dissolved by a legal separation. LSA-C.C. art. 155. The issue is whether the plaintiff wife may maintain pre-separation injunctions or obtain a writ of sequestration to protect her undivided interest in the community property.

Plaintiff, Charlotte Suire Davis, obtained injunctive relief on November 17, 1981. Her husband, Edson L. Davis, the Whitney National Bank, E. F. Hutton & Company, Inc., and Hibernia National Bank were ordered to refrain:

“From disposing of, alienating or encumbering any of the property owned by the community of acquets and gains existing between plaintiff and defendant, or belonging to the minors; and further, from withdrawing, converting or disposing of any of the funds on deposit in certificates of deposit, money market funds, or contents of safety deposit boxes, (but not including checking accounts in the names of Davis Industries, Inc., or Davis Ready Mix Inc.) in the names of Charlotte S. Davis, Edson L. Davis, or of the minors Courtney Davis, Yvette Davis, Edson L. Davis, Jr., and Christopher Davis as well as the aforementioned businesses, namely; Davis Industries, Inc., Davis Ready Mix, Inc., Ultra-Mortar of Louisiana, Inc., Con-AGG Leasing Corporation and D & S Aggregate Transporters, Inc.”

The injunction issued to prevent the husband from abusing his control of the corporations which own the community assets, to-wit: Davis Industries, Inc.; Davis Ready Mix, Inc.; Con-AGG Equipment Leasings, Inc.; D & S Aggregate Transportation, Inc.; Ready Mix, Inc.; Ultra Mortar, Inc.; and, Ultra Mortar of Louisiana, Inc. Because these corporations were deemed alter egos of Mr. Davis, the trial court restrained alienation or encumbrance of the corporate assets except as allowed by court order. The preliminary injunctions did not prevent Davis and the corporations from engaging in the ordinary course of business.

On December 8,1981, a judgment of separation was rendered based on the mutual fault of the parties. The judgment allowed for alimony, child support and other incidental matters. Since the judgment of separation did not nullify the prior injunctions, Whitney National Bank refused to continue doing business with Mr. Davis without a court order. Mr. Davis moved to have the injunctions decreed null. Mrs. Davis petitioned for partition of the community asking that the property be sequestered without bond during the pendency of the suit.

The trial court declined to decree the injunctions null and also refused to issue a writ of sequestration. The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandamus and decreed that the judgment of separation automatically terminated the previous injunctions. Davis v. Davis, 410 So.2d 272 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1982). The Court of Appeal indicated in a footnote that the wife was not entitled to a sequestration of the assets of the former community. A writ was granted to consider whether the judgment of separation automatically terminated the injunctions against alienation of the community property and whether the wife is entitled to a writ of sequestration. 411 So.2d 47 (La., 1982).

At the pre-separation hearing on the injunction, Edson Davis testified that his children own stock in Davis Industries and he has a voting trust of the 6,882 shares held by his four children and 1,400 shares owned by him personally. The only other stock consists of 122 shares owned by his father. Davis is the sole director of this corporation and the president. Davis admitted that he has sole control. Davis Industries and Davis Ready Mix, Inc. are both in the ready mix concrete business but serve different areas. Edson Davis is the sole stockholder, sole director and president of Davis Ready Mix, Inc. Davis is also the sole stockholder, director and president of Con-AGG Equipment Leasing Corporation. The only assets of this corporation are three Mercedes automobiles. D & S Aggregate Transportation, Inc., Ultra Mortar of Louisiana and Ultra Mortar, Inc. are other companies where Davis is the sole stockholder and sole director. Ready Mix, Inc., is a new corporation formed to handle concrete business for the Louisiana Exposition or World’s Fair.

Although Davis draws a salary from Davis Industries, he testified frankly that furniture which he purchased for his apartment was paid for by D & S and the rent and utilities by Davis Industries. These monies were reflected on the corporate books as loans to Davis. There are various judgments against Davis personally, which are being paid by the corporations. According to his testimony, a $100,000 certificate of deposit in the names of his children, plus an additional $20,000 in interest, was transferred to Davis Industries’ general account. Davis testified that this was necessary because of slow payment of his receivables. The money for the C.D. had come from the children’s pay checks “and so forth”. (Tr. 53) Davis also purchased property in the name of Davis Industries for $67,000 and had an agreement to purchase a square of ground for Ready Mix, Inc., but was unable to close the agreement. To obtain the deposit for Ready Mix, Inc., Davis was “just taking all the funds that I could get; my payroll checks, my children’s payroll checks and these interest checks.” (Tr. 59-60) The funds were returned because the deposit was not made timely.

A certificate of deposit in the name of Courtney Davis at the Hibernia Bank was reinvested at E. F. Hutton in the names of Davis Industries and Davis Ready Mix. According to Davis, the initial investment at Hibernia had come from checks on those two companies.

Davis Industries has been profitable and had a profit of $130,000 in 1980. According to Davis, the concrete business requires personal owner attention and an injunction which would require a court order for each substantial decision would result in a situation where he might as well quit operating.

As the trial court stated, Davis is the biggest asset of the corporations but they function as his alter egos and he obviously believes they belong solely to him. To protect the wife, the trial court enjoined alienating or encumbering any of the assets of the corporations, except for that necessary in the normal and ordinary course of business.

During a suit for separation, a spouse may require an inventory and appraisal of the community property and an injunction restraining the disposition of the community property. LSA-C.C. art. 149 provides:

“During the suit for separation, a spouse may, for the preservation of his rights, require an inventory and appraisement to be made of the community property and obtain an injunction restraining the disposition of the whole of the community or of specified things of the community property.”

Neither Article 149 nor any other codal article or statute provides for the automatic termination of such an injunction. An inventory of the property belonging to this community has been ordered, but apparently not completed.

LSA-C.C.P. art. 3944 provides:

“Either party to an action for separation from bed and board or divorce may obtain injunctive relief without bond prohibiting the other party from disposing of or encumbering community property.”

No change of ownership in community property occurs with the entry of a separation judgment; prior to the judgment, the spouses own an undivided half interest; subsequent to the judgment, the spouses own an undivided half interest. Here, the judgment of separation made a de jure division of the community, but a de facto partition has yet to take place. Therefore, the necessity for injunctive protection contemplated by Article 149 remains the same.

A party to a divorce or separation is entitled to injunctive relief to protect his or her share of the community property until the property is inventoried and/or partitioned. See In Re F. H. Koretke Brass & Mfg. Co., 195 La. 415, 196 So. 917 (1940) where the suit for injunction was brought after the divorce was final. An injunction obtained by a party to a suit for separation or divorce continues until: (1) there is a court order; or (2) the necessity abates because the community property has been inventoried and/or partitioned. See Fuori v. Fuori, 334 So.2d 488 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1976).

Since the injunctions against alienation of the community property protect the wife’s undivided interest in the community, she is not entitled to a writ of sequestration. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3571.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as it ordered that the injunctions against alienation of the former community property automatically terminated with the judgment of separation. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed as to denial of a writ of sequestration.

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

CALOGERO, J., concurs.

LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

DENNIS, J., concurs for reasons assigned by LEMMON, J.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.

LEMMON, Justice,

concurring.

C.C. Art. 149 clearly contemplates the issuance of an injunction for the purpose of preserving community property rights when dissolution of the community is imminent. While the article also clearly provides the time at which the injunction may be issued or obtained (that is, during the suit for separation), it does not expressly provide the duration of the injunction or the time when the injunction terminates, and it is therefore up to the court to determine this issue.

In deciding this issue, the court is essentially faced with a policy decision. Considerations of logic and of accomplishment of purpose weigh heavily in favor of a decision that an Article 149 injunction does not terminate until its purpose has been accomplished or the need no longer exists.

Logically, the time when an injunction terminates should bear some relationship to the purpose for which the injunction was issued. Since an Article 149 injunction is a conservatory measure, it is reasonable to conclude that the injunction should terminate when the necessity for this protection no longer exists. Moreover, since Article 149 authorizes both the obtaining of an injunction and the requiring of an inventory and appraisal as steps in the preservation of community property rights, one might reason that the contemplated duration of the injunction is related more to the inventory and appraisal (and the ultimate partition or settlement) of the community property than to the judgment of separation.

In the present case, the wife at a full-day hearing made a showing that injunctive relief was necessary to protect her community property rights. The trial judge granted injunctive relief under the authority of C.C. Art. 149 (and dispensed with security under the authority of C.C.P. Art. 3944). When the judgment of separation was rendered three weeks later, there was no suggestion that injunctive relief was not still necessary to protect the wife’s community property rights (the purpose for which the injunction was originally issued). Significantly, the wife filed for a partition two days after the judgment, and that action was still pending (although the suit for separation had been completed) when the husband sought dissolution of the injunction.

The court of appeal reasoned that the injunction terminated automatically at the rendition of judgment because the spouses then became simple co-owners of the formerly community property. The court accordingly relegated the wife to seek relief under C.C.P. Art. 3601 and following, which requires the showing of irreparable injury and the furnishing of security. However, there is no clear-cut reason why an injunction, issued during the pendency of the separation suit because of the demonstrated need to protect community property rights, should terminate concurrently with the termination of community, if the proven need for the injunction still exists and the purpose of the injunction will be disserved by the automatic termination. Moreover, the mere fact that the former spouses are now simple co-owners of the formerly community property is not a compelling reason in favor of automatic termination. On the contrary, the fact that the settlement of the community property does not generally occur until some time after the judgment of separation suggests that the need for in-junctive relief usually continues beyond the date of the judgment.

Inasmuch as the purpose of the preliminary injunction in this case had not been accomplished when the judgment of separation was rendered, I agree with the holding in this case that the injunction did not automatically terminate with the judgment of separation.

MARCUS, Justice

(dissenting).

The community was dissolved by the legal separation. Article 149 of the Civil Code permits an injunction only “[djuring the suit for separation.” Article 3944 does not apply because the wife is no longer a party to an action for separation and she is not a party to an action for divorce. Hence, I consider that the pre-separation injunctions were terminated by the judgment of separation. I consider that the wife is relegated to the provisions on injunction in the Code of Civil Procedure, art. 3601, et seq. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

BLANCHE, Justice

(dissenting).

Injunction is an extraordinary remedy and as a general rule should only be granted where the party seeking it is threatened with irreparable injury and is without adequate remedy at law. Civil Code Article 149 and Code of Civil Procedure Article 3944 provide for injunctions between spouses, without bond, and without the necessity of alleging irreparable injury. These articles represent limited exceptions to the general injunction rule (La.C.C.P. Art. 3601) and as such should be interpreted narrowly.

The language of C.C. Article 149 and C.C.P. Article 3944 clearly indicates that the injunctive relief provided by these articles is not available after a suit for separation or divorce is terminated by a judgment awarding the requested relief. C.C. Art. 149 contemplates an injunction “During the suit for separation,” and C.C.P. Art. 3944 allows one for “Either party to an action for separation from bed and board or divorce.” This language is consonant with the underlying purpose of the C.C. Art. 149 injunction: to preserve the status quo during the pendency of the separation proceedings.

I agree with the concurring opinions statement that “considerations of logic and of accomplishment of purpose weigh heavily in favor of a decision that an Article 149 injunction does not terminate until its purpose has been accomplished or the need no longer exists.” However, I submit that the purpose of the C.C. Art. 149 injunction is accomplished upon rendition of a judgment of separation and that thereafter the necessity for such injunction no longer exists. The reason for the issuance of the C.C. Art. 149 injunction is simple. Prior to a judgment of separation from bed and board, either spouse, acting alone, may alienate or encumber community assets unless otherwise provided by law. La.C.C. Art. 2346. Upon rendition of the separation judgment, the community is dissolved retroactively and neither spouse can continue to alienate former community property with impunity as they are, as of that moment, co-owners. In the event that community rights are threatened, the spouses have adequate means of enforcing and preserving their respective property rights by invoking a judicial partition. That remedy is simply not available prior to a judicial separation (C.C. Art. 2336). The C.C. Art. 149 injunction specifically addresses the situation in which dissolution of the community is imminent, but not yet accomplished, and either spouse during the pendency of the separation proceedings could dispose of the community assets to the serious detriment of the other. Following the judgment of separation, the spouses become co-owners of the property and as such neither party can alienate or encumber the interest of the other. The demonstrated need for injunc-tive relief ceases with the rendition of the separation judgment. Following the separation judgment, there is neither necessity nor authority for continuing injunctive sanctions unless something more — the possibility of irreparable injury — can be shown.

This position is supported by the decisions in Leblanc v. Lyons, 401 So.2d 626 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1981) and Fuori v. Fuori, 334 So.2d 488 (La.App. 1st Cir., 1976) and represents the proper application of the injunction statutes.

Injunction sanctions are proper after a judgment of separation only upon a showing of irreparable injury pursuant to La. C.C.P. Art. 3601. The injunction obtained by Mrs. Davis under C.C. Art. 149 and C.C.P. Art. 3944 terminated by operation of law when the judgment of separation was granted.

I respectfully dissent.

      . C.C. Art. 149 does not expressly require a showing that irreparable injury may otherwise result, but does require a showing that an injunction is necessary for protection of the spouse’s community property rights (which arguably is a showing of irreparable injury). While most Article 149 injunctions are issued upon simple request (because the enjoined party does not oppose the request), necessity must be proved if the injunction is contested, as in this case. See also Fuori v. Fuori, 334 So.2d 488 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976), in which the court held that the evidence at the hearing supported the finding of irreparable injury and the issuance of an injunction under C.C.P. Art. 3601, even if C.C. Art. 149 did not authorize the continuance of the injunction after the judgment of separation.
      In the present case, the injunction was issued, not as a matter of form on simple request, but as a substantive determination after an extensive hearing.

      . Arguably, there is little difference in result between (1) a ruling by this court that the injunction issued pursuant to C.C. Art. 149 continues beyond the judgment of separation unless the enjoined spouse obtains a modification or dissolution by showing that the injunction is no longer necessary and (2) a ruling that the Article 149 injunction automatically terminates and the spouse must seek further injunctive relief by re-proving the need for the injunction pursuant to C.C.P. Art. 3601 (and by furnishing minimum security). The principal problem involves the determination of which party should be saddled with the burden of moving forward. Since need must be proved prior to the issuance of an injunction during the pendency of a separation action, and since the redactors of the Codes saw fit to dispense with security when a spouse has proved the need to protect community property rights, it is reasonable simply to construe C.C. Art. 149 and C.C.P. Art. 3944 as authorizing injunctive relief, without security, which continues in existence until the property is partitioned or until the enjoined party shows that the injunction is no longer needed or that a partition action is not pending and not contemplated.


text:
    LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. Robert D. EDWARDS, Respondent.
    No. 82-B-2240.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1982.
   ORDER

Based upon the Court’s concurrence with the opinion of the Committee on Professional Responsibility that the crimes of which Robert D. Edwards has been convicted constitute serious crimes, the necessary elements of which reflects upon said attorney’s moral fitness to practice law:

IT IS ORDERED BY THE COURT, that Robert D. Edwards, be and is hereby suspended from the practice of law and said attorney’s license to practice is hereby suspended.

It is further ordered that the Committee institute the necessary disciplinary proceedings against Robert D. Edwards, seeking his disbarment or other remedy deemed appropriate, all in keeping with Article XV of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association.

MARCUS and LEMMON, JJ., would not suspend pending appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alvin NETTERS.
    No. 82-K-2281.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 10, 1982.
   In re Alvin Netters, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 282-117.

Denied.


text:
    SOUTHERN AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY v. Ronald DOBSON. Consolidated With NORTHEASTERN FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PENNSYLVANIA v. Ronald DOBSON.
    No. 82-C-1583.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Ronald Dobson, applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Natchi-toches. 415 So.2d 641.

Granted.


text:
    E. R. ROSHTO v. Gary J. HEBERT and Joyce S. Hebert, d/b/a The Iberville South. Consolidated With Alfred ROSHTO v. Gary J. HEBERT and Joyce S. Hebert, d/b/a The Iberville South. Consolidated With Carlysle ROSHTO v. Gary J. HEBERT and Joyce S. Hebert, d/b/a The Iberville South.
    No. 82-C-1597.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Gary J. Hebert, Joyce S. Hebert and South Publishing Company, Inc., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Iberville. 413 So.2d 927.

Granted.


text:
    RTL CORPORATION v. MANUFACTURER’S ENTERPRISES, INC.
    No. 82-C-1624.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re RTL Corporation, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Iberville. 415 So.2d 412.

Granted.


text:
    Clarence SEALS, Individually and for the Minor, Bobby Ray Seals v. L. M. LEWIS OIL COMPANY and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, et al.
    No. 82-C-1679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, applying for writ of prohibition, certiorari and/or mandamus. Parish of Rapides. No. 113323.

Granted and remanded to court of appeal to decide merits of Hartford’s motion for summary judgment. Relator did not waive any rights by its second summary judgment motion.


text:
    Philip LaCAZE, et ux. v. L. R. COLLIER, M.D.
    No. 82-C-1714.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Philip LaCaze, et ux., applying for writ of certiorari, or review, Second Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Winn. 416 So.2d 619.

Granted.


text:
    Earl E. BEAN, Jr. (STATE ex rel.) v. Warden AUCOIN.
    No. 82-KH-2288.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Earl E. Bean, Jr., applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 3-82-903.

Granted, for the limited purpose of transferring to the court of appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Billy Ray BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-1837.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Billy Ray Brown, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 273-727.

Granted — Appeal reinstated.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Simon SMITH, Jr. v. Clyde R. WEBER, Clerk of Court, 7th Judicial District Court.
    No. 82-KH-1889.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Simon Smith, Jr., applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Concordia.

Granted and transferred to the district court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Phillip O. ABRAHMS a/k/a Phillip O. Hudgins v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 81-KH-1005.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Phillip O. Abrahms a/k/a Phillip 0. Hudgins, applying for writs of mandamus, habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition or other remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 66244.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Wendell A. MARTIN v. Judge Jerome M. WINSBERG, Section “C”, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-1350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Wendell A. Martin, applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari (or review), prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Orleans. No. 263-888.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Earl LEWIS, Jr.
    No. 82-KH-1387.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Earl Lewis, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari, and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 272-693.

Denied.


text:
    Tisa Mae CARTER v. Johnny LEONARD, III, John Doe, and the American Home & National Union Insurance Groups, d/b/a New Hampshire Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-1530.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Tisa Mae Carter, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Parish of Orleans. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. 413 So.2d 244.

Writ denied.


text:
    Cecelia MEYERS v. GULF INSURANCE COMPANY, et als.
    No. 82-C-1553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Cecelia Meyers, applying for writ of review, Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Orleans. 413 So.2d 538.

Denied. The result is correct.


text:
    Ansil BICKFORD v. RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES, et al.
    No. 82-C-1580.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Ansil Bickford, applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Parish of East Baton Rouge. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. 415 So.2d 405.

Denied.

CALOGERO and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mark J. LAMARTINIERE, et al. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., et al.
    No. 82-C-1593.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re State Fire Marshal and Emerson G. Wilkerson, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Tangipahoa. 415 So.2d 499.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF William E. GRIFFITH.
    No. 82-C-1622.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Edward C. Alker, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Jefferson. 411 So.2d 55.

Denied. Result is correct.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Jessie LANDRY v. Dr. Joseph P. MARTINEZ, et al.
    No. 82-C-1627.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Jessie Landry, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. St. Landry Parish. 415 So.2d 964 and 415 So.2d 965.

Denied.


text:
    W. E. GROVES v. ROSEMOUND IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-1628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re W. E. Groves, applying for writ of review or certiorari, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 413 So.2d 925.

Denied.

BLANCHE and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Iva O. MERRELL v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
    No. 82-C-1632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re State, Through the Department of Transportation and Development, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Parish of Natchitoches. Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. 415 So.2d 660.

Denied.


text:
    PAN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Terry Yamazaki HANCOCK, Administratrix of the Succession of Verna L. Coleman et al. Consolidated With The MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Terry Yamazaki HANCOCK, Administratrix of the Succession of Verna L. Coleman, et al. Consolidated With Terry Yamazaki HANCOCK, Administratrix of the Succession of Verna L. Coleman v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA.
    No. 82-C-1634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Terry Yamazaki Hancock, Adminis-tratrix of the Succession of Verna L. Coleman, applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 415 So.2d 422.

Denied.


text:
    Glynn BEARD v. ASSUMPTION PARISH POLICE JURY, et al.
    No. 82-C-1639.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Glynn Beard, applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Assumption Parish. 413 So.2d 923.

Denied.


text:
    Cathy Ann MOREAU v. John SANDERS, et al.
    No. 82-C-1640.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Cathy Ann Moreau, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Natchitoches Parish. 415 So.2d 562.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph T. NIGREVILLE v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY.
    No. 82-C-1647.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Joseph T. Nigreville, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Rapides. Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. 415 So.2d 600.

Denied.


text:
    J. Mark BARTLETT v. DOCTORS HOSPITAL OF TIOGA, INC.
    No. 82-C-1652.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Doctors Hospital of Tioga, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari or review, Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Rapides. 415 So.2d 635.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    LOUISIANA SAVINGS ASSOCIATION v. Gregory D. TRAHAN, et al.
    No. 82-C-1654.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Gregory D. Trahan, et al., applying for writ of certiorari, Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Calcasieu. 415 So.2d 592.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Albert LYONS.
    No. 82-K-1678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re State of Louisiana, through the Asst. District Attorney, Stephen Laiche, applying for writ of certiorari to review. Parish of Orleans. No. 287-774.

Denied.

WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frank C. FEEBACK, Irma Feeback and John Feeback.
    No. 82-K-1680.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Frank C. Feeback, Irma Feeback and John Feeback, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Ouachita, Fourth Judicial District Court. Nos. 40664, 40666 and 40665.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    HUVAL TRACTOR, INC. v. Gilbert JOURNET.
    No. 82-C-1691.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Huval Tractor, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of St. Martin. Third Circuit, Court of Appeal. 413 So.2d 978.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Ms. Janice RESTER v. T. L. JAMES CONSTRUCTION CO., et al.
    No. 82-C-1696.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re T. L. James Construction Company, Louisiana Paving Company, Inc., Clyde H. Richardson, and Highlands Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. St. Tammany Parish. 415 So.2d 272.

Denied.


text:
    Gerald TOMASICH v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-1701.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Gerald Tomasich, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Orleans Parish. 415 So.2d 1002.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Robert SIDNEY v. Aaron FROSCH, Albert Krafcheck, and Charlotte Tucker, Trustees of the James Ware Gardiner Trust.
    No. 82-C-1706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Robert Sidney, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Calcasieu. 413 So.2d 966.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Donald HAYNES v. Honorable Frank SHEA.
    No. 82-KH-2111.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Donald Haynes, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court. No. 262-981.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Albert Allen DOBBS v. Honorable C. Thomas BIENVENU, Judge, 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary.
    No. 82-KH-2161.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Albert Allen Dobbs, applying for writ of prohibition and mandamus. Parish of St. Mary, Sixteenth Judicial District Court. No. 105349.

Denied. We have been advised that the district court has ordered an evidentiary hearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alvin NETTERS.
    No. 82-K-2368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Alvin Netters, applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 282-117.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Earl SPIKES.
    No. 82-K-2370.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re James Earl Spikes, applying for certiorari or review and stay order. Parish of Washington, First Circuit. No. 82-KA— 0585.

Denied.


text:
    Ruby CROCKETT v. ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-1599.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance and Seventh Ward General Hospital, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Tangipahoa. 413 So.2d 949.

Denied.

CALOGERO, MARCUS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Viola BORDELON v. RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY and Colonial Nursing Home.
    No. 82-C-1606.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Ranger Insurance Company and Colonial Nursing Home, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Avoyelles Parish. 413 So.2d 962.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Lloyd John LANDRY v. ASCENSION PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 82-C-1607.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Ascension Parish School Board, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Ascension Parish. 415 So.2d 473.

Denied.


text:
    Armand J. DUVIO, Sr. v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, et al.
    No. 82-C-1609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Continental Casualty Company, et al., applying for supervisory writs. Orleans Parish. No. 77-7128, C/W 80-10538.

Denied.

CALOGERO and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Hughline DUFFY and Louis W. Duffy v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
    No. 82-C-1612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Hughline Duffy and Louis W. Duffy, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Livingston. 415 So.2d 375.

Denied. Result is correct.


text:
    In the Matter of the SUCCESSION OF Ernest L. CHANEY, Sr.
    No. 82-C-1614.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Ernest L. Chaney, Jr., applying for writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 413 So.2d 936.

Denied.


text:
    Mary McCASTLE, et al v. ROLLINS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES OF LOUISIANA, INC.
    No. 82-C-1617.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 1982.
   In re Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 415 So.2d 515.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Paulette THIBODEAUX.
    No. 82-KH-2433.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 1982.
   In re Paulette Thibodeaux, applying for bond reduction. Parish of Calcasieu.

Granted for the limited purpose of transferring to Court of Appeal, Third Circuit for consideration.


text:
    Doris VIDRINE, Individually, et al. v. STEWART & LANDRY, INC., and Fort Worth Steel & Machinery, Inc. et al.
    No. 82-C-1929.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Fred Kiesel, d/b/a Kiesel Electric, applying for writ of review or certiorari. Thirteenth Judicial District Court. Evangeline Parish. No. 35165. Third Circuit, Court of Appeal.' No. 82 — 292.

Granted. The ruling of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal to be briefed, argued and decided with an opinion. See Boyer v. Johnson, La., 360 So.2d 1164.


text:
    Doris VIDRINE, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of her Minor Son, Clifford Fulton v. STEWART & LANDRY, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-1877.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Long Manufacturing, Co., applying for writ of certiorari or review. Parish of Evangeline, Thirteenth Judicial District Court. No. 35165.

Granted. The ruling of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal to be briefed, argued and decided with an opinion. See Boyer v. Johnson, La., 360 So.2d 1164.


text:
    Doris VIDRINE, Individually and as natural tutrix of her minor son, Clifford Fulton v. STEWART & LANDRY, INC. and Fort Worth Steel & Machinery, et al.
    No. 82-C-1864.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Fort Worth Steel & Machinery, applying for writ of review or certiorari. Parish of Evangeline. Thirteenth Judicial District Court. No. 35165.

Granted. The ruling of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal to be briefed, argued and decided with an opinion. See Boyer v. Johnson, La., 360 So.2d 1164.


text:
    Anna Margaret Bodden, Wife of Richard ARSENAUX v. Richard ARSENAUX.
    No. 82-C-1713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Anna Margaret Bodden, wife of Richard Arsenaux, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 417 So.2d 856.

Granted.


text:
    Sallie Ann GUILLORY v. AVONDALE SHIPYARD, INC. and the Travelers Insurance Company. Consolidated With Merlin PONTIFF v. AVONDALE STEEL SALES, DIVISION OF AVONDALE SHIPYARDS, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-1758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Sallie Ann Guillory, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Terre-bonne. 414 So.2d 799.

Granted. Judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and case is remanded to the court of appeal to decide the case on the record.


text:
    Hamilton CARTER v. Isaac CARTER.
    No. 82-C-1760.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Hamilton Carter, applying for writ of review, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Tangipahoa. 415 So.2d 280.

Writ granted. The trial judge having specifically considered relator’s petition and memorandum allegations, and justice requiring that evidence in support of and in opposition to the contentions of fraud, misrepresentation and other irregularities be presented, the Court of Appeal and trial court judgments sustaining the exception of prescription are reversed and the case remanded to the district court for a new trial on the exception of prescription.

WATSON, J., dissents from order and would deny the writ.


text:
    William J. GUSTE, Jr., Attorney General, et al. v. Joseph H. BURRIS, Legislative Auditor.
    No. 82-C-1805.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General, ex rel. Pearl Johnson Courville, et ah, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. East Baton Rouge. 417 So.2d 445.

Writ granted.


text:
    Mrs. Minnie FISHER, Jr., Widow of Allen Charles Fisher, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Children Cheryl L. Fisher, Valarie D. Fisher, Angela Fisher, Sonja Renee Fisher, Allen Charles Fisher, III and Adrian J. Fisher v. Forest WALTERS, Richard Hadden, Sr., and Illinois Central Gulf Railroad.
    No. 82-C-1827.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Mrs. Minnie Fisher, Jr., et al., applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Parish of Madison. Second Circuit, Court of Appeal. 415 So.2d 348.

Granted.


text:
    Jerome S. GLAZER v. COMMISSION ON ETHICS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES.
    No. 82-C-1853.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Parish of East Baton Rouge. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. 417 So.2d 456.

Granted.


text:
    Marie BROWN v. WINN DIXIE LOUISIANA, INC., and XYZ Insurance Company, Inc.
    No. 82-C-1892.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Marie Brown, applying for writ of certiorari or review, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Terrebonne. 417 So.2d 44.

Granted.


text:
    Anna Margaret Bodden, Wife of Richard ARSENAUX v. Richard ARSENAUX.
    No. 82-C-2346.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Richard Arsenaux, applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Orleans Parish. 417 So.2d 856.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Douglas JOHNSON v. Warden AUCOIN.
    No. 82-KH-2324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Douglas Johnson, applying for writ of habeas corpus. East Baton Rouge Parish. No. 4-82-393.

Granted. Application transferred to the court of appeal for consideration and action.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Evans BROWN v. Honorable Bernard J. BAGERT.
    No. 82-KH-1201.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Evans Brown, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court. No. 253-368.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Preston George DEMOUCHET, Jr. v. NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE.
    No. 82-KH-1223.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Preston George Demouchet, Jr., applying for supervisory and remedial writs. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 246360.

Denied. Relator must direct his motion to the district court.


text:
    Hezzie and Lottie BAHAM, d/b/a H & L Furniture Company v. Carl SPEED, et al.
    No. 82-C-1600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re A & R Capital Corporation, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Tangipahoa Parish. 413 So.2d 934.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Danny J. BREAUX v. LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 82-C-1611.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Danny J. Breaux, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Lafourche. 413 So.2d 988.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Roger Paul CARLINE v. Robbie Faye CAMP.
    No. 82-C-1629.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Mr. and Mrs. Leonard Kohn, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Iberville Parish. 415 So.2d 216.

Denied.


text:
    Russell LEGER v. CARGILL, INC.
    No. 82-C-1636.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Russell Leger, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. St. Mary Parish. 415 So.2d 983.

Denied. On the facts found, the result is correct.

DIXON, C. J., DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Raymond LEMIEUX, Jr. v. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 82-C-1720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
    Writ Denied Oct. 18, 1982.
   In re Raymond Lemieux, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari, or review, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 416 So.2d 1347.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J., CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mrs. Sharon Riedlinger, Wife of/and Joseph M. GUTHRIE, Jr., v. RUDY BROWN BUILDERS, INC., Don Garland and Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Ragusa.
    No. 82-C-1738.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Sharon Riedlinger, wife of/and Joseph M. Guthrie, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari or review, Fifth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Jefferson. 416 So.2d 590.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J., and CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mrs. Sharon Riedlinger, Wife of/and Joseph M. GUTHRIE, Jr. v. RUDY BROWN BUILDERS, INC., Don Garland and Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Ragusa.
    No. 82-C-1739.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Ragusa, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, Fifth Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of Jefferson. 416 So.2d 590.

Denied.

DIXON, C. J., and CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    James PELLERIN v. TUDOR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Commercial Union Assurance Company, T. Clayton Price and Century Marble and Tile Corp.
    No. 82-C-1744.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re James Pellerin, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of St. Mary. 414 So.2d 403.

Writ denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Treiba McLEOD v. The PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE and the Department of Transportation and Development.
    No. 82-C-1749.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Treiba McLeod, applying for writ of certiorari or review, First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 414 So.2d 1341.

Denied.


text:
    Philip James MAGEE v. ENGINEERED MECHANICAL SERVICES, INC. et al.
    No. 82-C-1756.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Engineered Mechanical Services, Inc., et al., applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Parish of East Baton Rouge. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. 415 So.2d 277.

Denied.


text:
    Marie GRUNER, et al. v. CLAIBORNE PARISH POLICE JURY, et al.
    No. 82-C-1786.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Marie Gruner and Carmen Thornton, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Claiborne Parish. 417 So.2d 18.

Denied.


text:
    SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY v. Herbert SUMRALL, et al.
    No. 82-C-1799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re John E. Boe, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Parish of Orleans. Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. 414 So.2d 876.

Writ denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Adal D. JONES v. CHRYSLER CREDIT CORPORATION.
    No. 82-C-1800.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Adal D. Jones, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 417 So.2d 425.

Writ denied.


text:
    Kenneth W. HOLLIMAN d/b/a Holliman Ford Tractor Company v. E. H. GRIFFIS.
    No. 82-C-1806.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Kenneth W. Holliman, d/b/a Holliman Ford Tractor Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. West Carroll Parish. 415 So.2d 306.

Denied.


text:
    Arthur KLEINER and Richard A. Kleiner v. Laura Elizabeth RIST, wife of/and George Jules Ciko.
    No. 82-C-1852.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Laura Elizabeth Rist, wife of/and George Jules Ciko, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of St. Tammany. 417 So.2d 54.

Denied.

WATSON and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Posey BLOUNT, Widow of Johnnie Blount, Jr., Individually and For the Use and Benefit of Her Minor Child, Patricia Blount v. COOPER STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC., Interocean Stevedoring, Inc., and Employers National Insurance Company.
    No. 82-C-1861.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 416 So.2d 358.

Denied.


text:
    Julian CLARY v. NABORS SUN DRILLING & OPERATING COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 82-C-1865.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Julian Clary, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Sabine. 417 So.2d 119.

Writ denied.

WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Raymond ROCHON v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, 15TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ACADIA, State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-2211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Raymond Rochon, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Acadia. No. 10790.

Denied. Moot. Hearing date already set for November 8 at 1:30 P.M.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Elvis BROOKS v. Frank SHEA, Judge.
    No. 82-KH-2256.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1982.
   In re Elvis Brooks, applying for remedial writs. Orleans Parish. No. 261-032.

Denied. Moot.