author: LEMMON, Justice.

text:
    In re Judge John B. WHITAKER, Judge, Tenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Natchitoches.
    No. 84-0-2035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 1985.
    Rehearings Denied April 11,1985.

      Eugene J. Murret, John H. Ryan, New Orleans, for applicant.
    Charles Whitehead, Natchitoches, Guy E. Humphries, Jr., Alexandria, for respondent.
   LEMMON, Justice.

This is a disciplinary proceeding against a Louisiana judge. The proceeding was commenced by a complaint to the Judiciary Commission, a constitutional commission composed of three judges, three attorneys and three citizens who are not attorneys or elected officials. La. Const. Art. V § 25(A) (1974). After conducting a preliminary investigation to determine whether a hearing should be held on the question of discipline pursuant to La.S.Ct. Rule XXIII § 3(a), the Commission issued a written notice to respondent specifying the charges against him. Eventually, the Commission ordered a formal hearing concerning specified charges. The charges, which the Commission after the hearing found had been proved by clear and convincing evidence and which form the basis of the proceeding in this court, are:

CHARGE I
“A. That since becoming Judge, 10th Judicial District Court, and/or while campaigning for your judicial office, you engaged in the following activities:
“(1) You smoked marijuana in the presence of Diane Michels and/or Pat Bridges at the time you were campaigning for your judicial office;
“(2) You obtained marijuana from Diane Michels at the time you were campaigning for your judicial office;
“(7) You smoked marijuana in the presence of Diane Michels and/or Pat Bridges while you were a Judge;
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“(14) You have fraternized with users of illegal drugs and prostitutes while you were a Judge.
“B. By reason of the foregoing Paragraph A, (1) you have violated the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Article Y, Section 24, which prohibits the practice of law by a District Judge of this State; (2) you have engaged in willful misconduct relating to your official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute; (3) you have violated Canon 1, Canon 2A & B, Canon 5C(4) and Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana effective January 1, 1976; and (4) you have engaged in conduct while in office which would constitute a felony.
“CHARGE II
“A. That since becoming Judge, 10th Judicial District, you have engaged in a crime against nature in violation of La. R.S. 14:89, with Paul Grappe and Jeanie Adams.
“B. By reason of the foregoing Paragraph A, (1) you have engaged in willful misconduct relating to your official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, (2) you have violated Canon 1 and Canon 2A & B, and (3) and [sic] you have engaged in activity while a Judge which constitutes a felony.
“CHARGE III
“A. You1 have shown favoritism in connection with your handling of the case of State of Louisiana v. John Bynog, in that you did the following:
“1. You dismissed the case prematurely without legal grounds for said dismissal; and
“2. You socialized with defendant By-nog while his felony theft charges were pending against him in your Court.
“B. By reason of the foregoing Paragraph A, (1) you have engaged in willful misconduct relating to your official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute; (2) you have violated Canon 1, Canon 2A & B, and Canon 3A(1), (2) & (4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
“CHARGE IV
“A. In an effort to obstruct the investigation of the Louisiana Judiciary Commission, you have intimidated certain witnesses and potential witnesses against you, as follows:
“1. You have threatened Natchitoch-es Parish Sheriffs Deputy Albert L. Lester.
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“B. By reason of the foregoing Paragraph A, (1) you have engaged in willful conduct relating to your official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute; (2) you have violated Canon 1, Canon 2A & B, and Canon 3A(2) & (3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and (3) you have engaged in conduct while in office which would constitute a felony in violation of La.R.S. 14:122 and La.R.S. 14:129.1 relative to, respectively, public intimidation and witness intimidation.”

After the three-day hearing, the Commission issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. On the basis of its findings, the Commission recommended to this court that respondent be removed from office. La. Const. Art. V § 25(C) (1974).

This court immediately set the matter on the docket for oral argument. Based on the Commission’s recommendation, this court also disqualified respondent from exercising any judicial function, without loss of salary, during the pendency of the proceeding. La. Const. Art. V § 25(C) (1974). After reviewing the record complied in the hearing before the Commission, we conclude that some of the charges were not supported by clear and convincing credible evidence and that the supported charges warrant respondent’s suspension from office, rather than removal.

JURISDICTION

Respondent objected to the Commission’s jurisdiction on the basis that the Commission had no authority relating to conduct which occurred prior to October 1, 1980, the date that he first became a judge. In a related argument, respondent objected at the hearing to any evidence of conduct which occurred prior to the critical date. Because the contentions are interrelated, we treat them together, although the first objection was intended to defeat the entire proceeding and the second objection was simply intended to exclude evidence.

The objection to the Commission’s jurisdiction was essentially an objection that the charges relating to-conduct prior to October 1, 1980 did not state a cause of action for discipline of a judge. To that extent, we agree with respondent’s contention that conduct of a judge prior to his assuming office generally cannot form the sole basis for disciplinary proceedings before the Commission. Most of the charges in the present case, however, are alleged to have occurred while respondent was in office.

Furthermore, evidence of a judge’s conduct prior to his induction into office may be relevant and therefore admissible as evidence for two purposes. First, evidence of conduct prior to induction into office may be relevant and probative as to the probability that such conduct continued after the judge was inducted into office. Because judges are human beings, and because human beings generally continue habitual conduct without abrupt termination, such evidence, depending upon the degree and quality of the proof, may be relevant to the resolution of a credibility dispute when the judge testifies that the conduct halted abruptly upon his assuming office and other witnesses testify that the conduct continued after the judge assumed office. Second, evidence of conduct prior to induction into office may be relevant to the question of the extent of disciplinary sanction to be imposed. For example, one isolated occurrence of misconduct, representing the first time that such conduct had occurred, might call for a lesser sanction than a pattern of similar misconduct which occurred before and after the judge assumed office. To the extent that evidence of conduct prior to induction into office shows a pattern of misconduct, such evidence is relevant and probative on the issue of appropriate sanction.

Because the suspension which we order in the present case is based on conduct which occurred after October 1, 1980, the exception to the Commission’s jurisdiction is without merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Respondent contends that the investigation and the investigatory hearing conducted by the Commission violated his constitutional right to due process. His three primary arguments are (1) that the Commission held a hearing on April 7, 1983 and received the testimony of four witnesses without notifying him or affording him the right to cross-examine the witnesses, (2) that the Commission failed to provide him timely with the required notice of the investigation and of the nature of the charges, and (3) that he was not given sufficient notice of out-of-state depositions.

The procedure for the Commission’s investigation and hearing into charges against a judge is established by La.S.Ct. Rule XXIII, which provides that the Commission, upon receiving a complaint which is not obviously frivolous or unfounded, shall make a preliminary investigation to determine whether a hearing should be held. See Section 3(a). The Commission may also initiate a preliminary investigation on its own motion. Section 3(b) requires that the judge be notified of the investigation, of nature of the charge, and of the name of the person making the complaint or of the fact that the investigation is on the Commission’s own motion. The judge must also be afforded reasonable opportunity in the course of the preliminary investigation to present relevant and material matters as he may choose. Section 4 provides that if the Commission concludes after the preliminary investigation that a hearing should be instituted, the judge must be informed of the charges. Prior to the hearing, the judge and the Commission are entitled to discovery to the extent available in civil proceedings. Section 9 provides that the judge shall have the right and the reasonable opportunity to subpoena witnesses and documents and defend against the charges by introduction of evidence, representation by counsel, and cross-examination of witnesses. Section 21 authorizes the Commission to establish rules of procedure for the hearing so as to provide a “full and fair hearing”.

Pursuant to this authorization, the Commission has adopted the Rules of the Judiciary Commission which provide that complaints of misconduct or disability of a judge must be in writing, must specify the misconduct or disability, and must be signed by the complainant. Rule III allows the Commission to consider any alleged misconduct or disability from whatever source and on its own motion. Rule VI allows the Commission to make a preliminary investigation “in any manner proper” to determine whether a hearing should be held. The Commission, which is not bound by the technical rules of evidence, is authorized to administer oaths and to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence.

Nevertheless, preliminary investigation and subsequent hearing into charges against a judge, like a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney, is not a criminal prosecution, but is in the nature of a civil action. In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So.2d 469 (1970). Further, because the Judiciary Commission is not a court, and because its only power is to investigate disciplinary cases within the judiciary and to recommend disciplinary action, it need not afford the full due process rights required in a criminal prosecution. In re Haggerty, above. The Judiciary Commission need only provide the minimum standards of due process contained in the Supreme Court Rules and its own rules for a “full and fair hearing”.

In this case, the Commission began its investigation of respondent after receiving a complaint from Charles Michels. The Chairman of the Commission notified respondent of the nature of Michels’ complaint by letter dated February 1, 1983. During its preliminary investigation, the Commission discovered other information which led to further investigation.

On October 13, 1983, the Commission requested respondent to appear at an informal hearing to discuss Michels’ complaint, as well as his conduct in a criminal case involving John Bynog. The Commission also notified him of ten other areas of inquiry. After this hearing, the Commission notified respondent that it had concluded that he had mishandled the Bynog matter, but that it had decided to close all matters listed in the October 13 letter.

On March 16, 1984, however, the Commission notified respondent that it had initiated an investigation on its own motion into the charges which form the basis of the present proceeding. He was requested to appear at an April 7 meeting of the Commission. When his counsel could not attend that meeting, the Commission granted him a continuance as to his appearance until May 19. However, the Commission at its regularly scheduled meeting date on April 7 heard the testimony of four witnesses, three of whom later testified at the formal hearing. Respondent contends that the Commission’s taking this testimony without his presence was a violation of due process.

The Commission, being only an investigatory and accusatory body, may take testimony within the course of a preliminary investigation without the presence of the respondent. Although La.S.Ct. Rule XXIII § 3(b) provides that a judge is to be given “reasonable opportunity in the course of the preliminary investigation to present such relevant and/or material matters as he may choose”, there is no requirement that he be allowed to cross-examine witnesses who appear before the Commission during the preliminary investigation.

Counsel for respondent relies on In re E.L. “Bubba” Henry, 448 So.2d 143 (La. App. 1st Cir.1984), to argue that the taking of the testimony of the four witnesses violated his right to due process. In that case, the Ethics Commission heard testimony of witnesses, including Henry, but would not allow him to cross-examine the witnesses or provide him with a transcript of the proceedings. The First Circuit held that the proceeding, although classified as an investigation, was really a private hearing at which Henry was entitled to cross-examine witnesses and to present his own witnesses and evidence under the Commission’s procedural rules, which had been enacted by the Legislature.

In this case, there were not procedural rules which required the Judiciary Commission to afford the right to cross-examine witness during the investigatory proceedings. Moreover, the Ethics Commission, unlike the Judiciary Commission, is an adjudicatory body. While we might agree that the testimony of witnesses before an adjudicatory body without the protection of cross-examination could have substantially prejudiced respondent, the Judiciary Commission does not make binding findings. The Judiciary Commission is authorized only to investigate, to hold hearings and to make recommendations to this court, which is the court of original jurisdiction in these matters. Respondent was not denied due process because he was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses at that particular point in the investigation.

Respondent’s second due process argument is that the Commission failed to inform him properly of the investigation, the nature of the charges, and the name of the person making the complaint, as required by Rule XXIII § 3(b).

In this case, the only complaint was made by Charles Michel, and respondent was fully informed of the charges and supplied with a copy of Michels’ complaint on February 1, 1983. During the investigation of these charges, other matters came to the Commission’s attention. By letter dated September 2, 1983, respondent was informed that the Commission was investigating this additional information on its own motion to determine whether it was frivolous or unfounded. In a letter dated October 13, 1983, the Commission requested respondent’s appearance at a December 3 meeting and outlined the eleven areas to be discussed.

Although the Commission closed that investigation after the hearing, it decided to begin another investigation on its own motion and informed respondent on March 16, 1984. That letter, which contained the charges that form the basis for this disciplinary hearing, indicated that the investigation was initiated on the Commission’s own motion. Thus, the Commission substantially complied with the requirements of Rule XXIII § 3(b).

After the rescheduled informal hearing was held on May 19, 1984, formal charges were filed on June 5, 1984 and the formal hearing was scheduled for July 27, 1984. As of July 3, respondent’s counsel was furnished with copies of all statements of witnesses in the Commission’s possession. Respondent was permitted discovery prior to the formal hearing, and he was permitted at the hearing to subpoena documents and witnesses, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. Rule XXIII § 9.

Respondent finally contends that he was not afforded sufficient notice of the depositions of Paul Grappe in San Francisco and Jeanie Adams in Kansas City. These depositions were taken on videotape for the purpose of introduction into evidence at the formal hearing. The letter notifying respondent’s counsel of the out-of-town depositions on July 12 and 13 was dated July 2, 1984. There were conversations in late June relative to the scheduling of these depositions, but the parties disagreed as to the outcome of the conversations. In fact, the Commission’s refusal to pay respondent’s counsel’s expenses was a serious area of contention.

Nevertheless, while the fact that the testimony of Jeanie Adams, a critical witness, was taken without respondent’s cross-examination is disturbing, this court has rejected her testimony as not credible, as will be discussed later. Furthermore, the testimony of Paul Grappe was virtually neutral. Respondent has therefore suffered no prejudice from his counsel’s failure to attend and participate in the depositions.

MERITS

The Commission, after the hearing, determined that parts of Charge I and Charge IV should be dismissed for lack of evidence. Because a determination of the merits of Charges II and III and the remaining parts of Charge I and IV depends upon resolution of conflicting testimony, we first discuss the weight, if any, to be assigned to the factual findings of the Commission.

This court is the court of original jurisdiction in judicial disciplinary proceedings. The factfinding function of the judicial process is vested in the court of original jurisdiction. Inasmuch as this court is not equipped to receive evidence, the evidence in judicial disciplinary proceedings is received at the hearing before the Commission, and factual determinations are made by this court on the basis of the record of the hearing.

La.S.Ct. Rule XXIII § 11 requires the Commission to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the issues of fact and law. Nevertheless, the Commission is not an adjudicatory body, and the primary purpose of the requirement of written factual findings is to explain the basis of the Commission’s recommendation. Thus, while the factual findings of the Commission are helpful, this court is in no way bound by the findings, and the court may give the findings whatever weight the court chooses.

Charges IA(7) and (8)

The Commission found that the allegations of Subparagraphs IA(7) and (8) had been proved by clear and convincing evidence. These charges alleged that respondent, while serving as a judge, had smoked marijuana in the presence of Diane Michels and Pat Bridges and that he had procured marijuana from Diane Michels. Evidence on the allegations was provided by Michels, Bridges and respondent.

Diane Michels testified that respondent visited her at her office one afternoon while Pat Bridges was there and that the three of them went for drinks to her apartment in Cane Plaza, where she and respondent shared a marijuana cigarette. She estimated the time of the event as late June, 1982, shortly after she had leased the apartment on June 10, 1982. She recalled that it was after she and Bridges had completed an automobile accident settlement on March 3, 1982, and after she and her husband had separated in May, 1982. She also recalled that Bridges, who then lived in Shreveport, was in town on banking business.

Michels also testified that she had smoked marijuana in the Cane Plaza apartment with several people in respondent’s presence, but did not remember if respondent had participated in the drug use. She further testified that she and respondent had smoked marijuana again in Pat Bridges’ presence at her (Michels’) residence in Point Place after she had moved there in August, 1982.

Michels admitted that she had dealt drugs in substantial quantities since about 1978. She stated that she had known respondent since about 1977, that she had smoked marijuana with him at his apartment in about 1978, while he was separated from his first wife, and that she had furnished him with marijuana and quaaludes at his law office and with quaaludes at his apartment.

Michels’ husband was the person who filed the initial complaint against respondent after respondent signed a warrant for his arrest in August or September, 1982. Charles Michels had physically threatened his estranged wife with bodily harm at the Holiday Inn and had taken the car that she had received in a property settlement. After his arrest, Michels coerced his wife into taping a telephone conversation with respondent. At the outset of the conversation, Michels stated that she had just finished “smoking some fantastic stuff”, to which respondent replied, “You dirty rat.” When she offered to get him “a couple joints”, he replied, “I believe I’d better pass.” Respondent then asked her if she was working that afternoon and told her he would drop by her office. They then talked about her recent divorce, and respondent told her that her former husband had filed a complaint with the Judiciary Commission arising out of the arrest incident. In her testimony before the Commission, Michels stated that respondent went to her office that afternoon and that she gave him two marijuana cigarettes, which he put in his pocket.

Pat Bridges, a former resident of Natchi-toches who had lived in Shreveport since 1981, testified that she was at Diane Mi-chels office while visiting Natchitoches to attend to banking business some time after the March 2, 1982 accident settlement, that respondent stopped by and asked Michels if she had anything to smoke, and that respondent and Michels shared a marijuana cigarette later in Michels’ Cane Plaza Apartment. Bridges further testified that she saw respondent again while she was visiting Michels later in the summer at Michels’ residence at Point Place. When Michels and respondent talked about marijuana, Michels said, “Pat doesn’t partake”, and respondent replied, “To each his own.” She did not remember any marijuana smoking on that occasion.

Pat Bridges had no other relationship with respondent and no apparent motive for testifying against him. Even respondent’s attorneys admitted that she was a credible witness, but took the position that she was confused as to dates.

For his part, respondent admitted that he has smoked marijuana with Diane Michels on three occasions, all before he became a judge. The first time was at his apartment around 1978, the second time was at Mi-chels’ house at Point Place (she had lived there during a previous marriage and moved there again after leaving her Cane Plaza apartment) in mid-1980, and the third time was in Pat Bridges’ presence at Mi-chels’ house in August, 1980 while he was campaigning door-to-door. He stated, however, that Pat Bridges had smoked marijuana with him and Michels. He also denied ever being at Michels’ apartment in Cane Plaza.

Respondent further testified that he had severed his relationship with many people, including Diane Michels, after he became a judge and that he never smoked marijuana thereafter. He denied ever using other drugs. He admitted that either Michels or Judy Gay had given him quaaludes at his apartment while he was representing Gay in domestic litigation, but he stated that he had flushed them down the toilet. He also admitted going to Michels’ office on the afternoon of the taped telephone conversation, but insisted it was the only time he had seen her after his induction into office and that she had not given him any marijuana.

We conclude that respondent’s smoking of marijuana with Diane Michels in the presence of Pat Bridges, after October 1, 1980, has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. The credible testimony of Pat Bridges supported the not-so-credible testimony of Diane Michels as to dates and places of the events. However, we conclude that the procuring of marijuana by respondent from Diane Michels was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. Only her uncorroborated testimony supported the allegation that she delivered marijuana to respondent on the date of the taped telephone conversation, and respondent’s refusal of her offer of “a couple joints” during the taped accusation militates against a conclusion that he accepted marijuana from her several hours later. Moreover, Michels admitted that she was threatened by her husband and offered financial assistance by her husband and another man in exchange for her testimony against respondent, and the value of her uncorroborated testimony was somewhat undermined.

Charge IA (U)

The allegations of Subparagraph IA (14) related to respondent’s fraternizing with sellers and users of illegal drugs and with prostitutes.

The evidence previously discussed in connection with Charge IA (7) also relates to this charge. Diane Michels admittedly dealt drugs, and respondent shared some of the drugs with her, both before and after he assumed office. He visited her at her residence and office after his induction. The head of the City’s narcotics task force testified that Diane Michels was known to “run in the drug crowd”. Respondent met her through her association with Judy Gay, respondent’s client who eventually went to jail on drug charges.

Respondent also chose to associate, at least at the time immediately preceding his induction, with Jeanie “Cinnamon” Adams, a long-time drug addict and dealer, and with Johnette Davidson, whom Adams introduced to narcotics and prostitution. The narcotics chief testified that he knew Davidson as a drug dealer and prostitute for over three years preceding the 1984 hearing. A narcotics investigator and an assistant district attorney verified Adams’ notorious reputation as a drug dealer, as well as the fact that “track marks” were clearly visible on both of her arms. The narcotics chief testified that he found considerable drug paraphernalia lying around Adams’ apartment in plain view when he executed a search warrant there. Relator met Adams through Billy Maggio, respondent’s lifelong friend and his golfing companion at the times pertinent to this proceeding. The narcotics chief also verified Maggio’s reputation as a cocaine user and seller.

We conclude that the evidence established, by clear and convincing proof, that respondent associated with people who were generally known to be drug users and dealers and with prostitutes prior to his taking office and that this conduct continued to some extent after he assumed office.

Charge II

This charge alleges that respondent had engaged in a crime against nature with Paul Grappe and Jeanie Adams, in violation of La.R.S. 14:89.

Adams, a 39-year old longtime drug addict and dealer discussed in connection with Charge IA(14), testified that she met respondent during his campaign for the judgeship, while she was working as a legal secretary. She admitted that she sold drugs in very large quantities and that she procured prostitutes as a means of additional income. She further testified that in early 1981 respondent began coming by her apartment in Cane Plaza two or three times per week; that a homosexual named Paul Grappe spent several days in her apartment; that at respondent’s urging she arranged an evening of sex involving Grappe, respondent and herself that included fellatio and anal intercourse; that respondent several weeks later engaged in sex with Johnette Davidson at her apartment; and that many drug transactions occurred while respondent was present in her apartment.

Johnette Davidson, a 21-year old who had been convicted of drug violations and was on probation at the time of the hearing, knew respondent when he played golf with her husband. She testified that she saw respondent twice at Adams’ apartment. On the first occasion, she bought drugs and then injected them in the bathroom, while respondent, Burl Lee and Harold Hale were in the living room. On the second occasion, she was alone and high on drugs, and she and respondent wound up having sexual intercourse. She also asserted that Grappe told her one day at Adams’ apartment about a planned sex encounter with respondent that night.

Paul Grappe testified that he met Adams while visiting Natchitoches in 1981 and that respondent visited Adams’ apartment for about 45 minutes on the one occasion that he was there. He denied having sexual relations with either respondent or Adams at any time. He also denied knowing Joh-nette Davidson or observing any drug or prostitution activity in Adams’ apartment.

Respondent testified that he went to Adams’ apartment at Cane Plaza twice, both times before October 1, 1980 and both times while looking for Billy Maggio. He admitted having sexual relations with Adams on the second occasion. However, he denied ever seeing Johnette Davidson at Adams’ apartment or ever being alone with her and further denied ever seeing drug paraphernalia in the apartment. He also denied ever meeting Paul Grappe or having sexual relations with him.

Burl Lee, the City’s Chief of Police, and Harold Hale, a retired university administrator and former high school principal, who were supposedly in Adams’ apartment with respondent when Davidson bought drugs there, denied that they had ever been in Adams’ apartment, contradicting Davidson’s testimony that they were there with respondent when Davidson bought drugs there.

Contrary to the findings of the Commission, we conclude that the testimony of Adams and Davidson was not credible. Davidson was a drug abuser and convicted felon. Her testimony concerning respondent’s first occasion in Adams’ apartment was refuted by Lee, Hale and respondent. As to the second occasion (when the sexual encounter allegedly occurred), she admitted that she “was really messed up on drugs”. Law enforcement officers, including her former probation officer and the district judge who placed her on probation, testified that she was not worthy of belief. Although she testified that she acted twice as a confidential informer, one officer stated that he refused to use her because she was unreliable. Another officer testified that she voluntarily named many drug users in order to curry favor with the police, but she never mentioned respondent.

Adams’ testimony was presented to the Commission and to this court by means of a videotape deposition taken in Kansas, where she was undergoing drug rehabilitation treatment. She began by listing a string of college degrees, some of which she couldn’t remember and all but one of which were denied by her mother. Although she admitted being a drug addict for 18 years and taking 18 to 20 injections per day of various drugs at the time of these alleged occurrences, she testified in great detail concerning respondent’s close association with her and his visits to her apartment, particularly the one at which he engaged in the criminal conduct alleged in Count II. When she was asked at the conclusion of her lengthy deposition why she was providing information against respondent, she replied that she had been “used” by respondent and was “too drugged” to know that he was using her.

Grappe and respondent, the other two people allegedly involved in the sex crime, both denied its occurrence. Adams’ mother testified that “I know that she is ill and I just can’t believe anything she says”.

We conclude that Charge II was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Charges 111(1) and (2)

This charge alleges that respondent showed favoritism in his handling of a criminal case against John Bynog by dismissing the case prematurely without legal grounds and by socializing with Bynog while felony charges against Bynog were pending in his division of court.

Bynog and respondent were lifelong friends. In September, 1982, Bynog was arrested for felony theft. Respondent had declined to sign the arrest warrant and advised the deputy to take the matter before the grand jury. On December 3, 1982, Bynog was arraigned in respondent’s court and pleaded not guilty. The following month, Bynog took respondent rabbit hunting two or three times. Respondent presided over the bench trial held on March 25, 1983. When an experienced deputy sheriff during the trial blurted out unsolicited information regarding the contents of a statement which had just been excluded from evidence, respondent declared a mistrial and dismissed the case. Following the dismissal, the prosecutor pointed out to respondent that he lacked authority to dismiss the charges, whereupon relator admitted his mistake and recalled the dismissal. He then recused himself from the case.

As to the dismissal, respondent immediately admitted and rectified his mistake. Double jeopardy problems, if any, were created by the declaring of the mistrial and not by the dismissal of the case.

The far more serious matter was respondent’s presiding over the trial at all and his continued social activity with Bynog while the matter was pending. At the hearing before the commission, respondent admitted the impropriety of this conduct, characterizing it as poor judgment. He explained that Bynog had invited him hunting during a chance meeting at a supermarket and that they each took a child with them.

We conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent socialized with John Bynog while felony charges against Bynog were pending in his court, but that the charge of favoritism based on dismissal of the charges was not proved.

Charge IV

This charge alleged that respondent intimidated two witnesses who had testified before the Commission during the investigation. No evidence was introduced as to one witness. The second witness was Albert Lester, a deputy sheriff who had provided information about respondent to the Commission. In early December, 1983, the Commission informed respondent that its investigation would not be pursued further. Later that month, the sheriff ordered Lester to meet with respondent after the sheriff had several times informally requested Lester to do so. Lester then met with, respondent and recorded the conversation.

At the outset of the meeting, respondent “came on strong”. He accused Lester of lying to the Commission, but said that it was all over and that they should “clear the air”. He pointed out that he could sue Lester civilly or have him arrested for the malicious statements, but that he would not do so. He said the matter was “water under the bridge” and that “the best thing that could happen would be for me and you to get along”.

Respondent referred during the taped conversation to an incident, apparently involving a boundary dispute, in which Lester “pulled a shotgun” on some people. Respondent told Lester that he sometimes didn’t handle confrontations too well, but that an officer’s actions in the heat of an arrest should not be subjected to close scrutiny. The conversation ended when the two apologized to each other for past differences. However, Lester told the Commission he had felt threatened during the conversation.

We conclude that respondent “overstepped his bounds as a judge”, as found by the Commission, by requiring Lester to come to his office under orders from the sheriff and by using the apparent power of his office to enhance the threats at the outset of the conversation. Nevertheless, the Commission found that the evidence did not establish that respondent’s threatening of the witness was done in an effort to obstruct the investigation, since respondent apparently believed the investigation was over when the incident occurred. Thus, the Commission, in effect, dismissed both parts of Charge IV, and we shall not consider them in relation to the determination of the appropriateness and extent of discipline.

Disciplinary Action

La. Const. Art. V § 25(C) authorizes this court, upon the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission, to censure, to suspend, or to remove a judge from office for several grounds. The only grounds for discipline pertinent to the allegations proved by clear and convincing evidence are for “persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute” and “for willful misconduct relating to his official duty”. The next issue is whether respondent’s conduct, which was proved by clear and convincing evidence, falls within the standards for imposition of disciplinary sanctions.

The evidence proved that respondent smoked marijuana with Diane Michels on two occasions after he became a judge. Possession of marijuana is a crime in violation of La.R.S. 40:966D, and the maximum criminal penalty for a first offender is six months imprisonment without hard labor and a $500 fine. This is a serious matter which warrants sanctions. One who holds a judicial office must adhere to the highest standards of personal conduct. A criminal act for which any citizen may be punished by imprisonment is much more serious when the conduct is that of a judge. Such conduct is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice and brings the judicial office into disrepute.

A mitigating factor is that the marijuana did not belong to respondent, but was supplied by Diane Michels who shared the cigarette with respondent. The conduct was also relatively private, as is most criminal conduct, but there was a non-participant present. Moreover, the overall evidence suggested that respondent’s use of marijuana occurred over a period of time and that the proved events were not merely isolated incidents.

The association with users and sellers of illegal drugs and with prostitutes is more nebulous conduct. Respondent, while an attorney, could not choose only lawabiding citizens as his clients, but when he became a judge, he was required to avoid any personal association with persons known for criminal activities. His intentional association with Diane Michels, Jeanie Adams, Johnette Davidson and possibly Billy Mag-gio was prejudicial to the administration of justice and brought discredit to the judicial office.

Charge III, pertaining to partiality in the Bynog case, is the only charge involving respondent’s official duties. We have determined that the dismissal of the case was not grounds for disciplinary action. The evidence established, however, that respondent accepted Bynog’s offer to take him rabbit hunting on three occasions while Bynog’s criminal case was pending in respondent’s division. The strong appearance of impropriety and the obvious undermining of public perception of judicial impartiality, whatever respondent’s subjective feelings, were prejudicial to the judicial system, brought disrepute to the office of judge, and seriously reflected on respondent’s ability to perform his official duties impartially.

On the other hand, many witnesses testified that respondent was a courteous, efficient and hard-working judge. Other evidence established that respondent raised three children after his first wife abandoned them and that he was a good parent to his second wife’s three children.

The most severe discipline should be reserved for judges who use their office improperly for personal gain; judges who are consistently abusive and insensitive to parties, witnesses, jurors and attorneys; judges who because of laziness or indifference fail to perform their judicial duties to the best of their ability; and judges who engage in felonious criminal conduct. Respondent’s proved conduct can hardly be viewed objectively as falling into any of these categories. Nevertheless, he did engage in some criminal conduct and in other conduct which lowered public esteem for the office that he held, an office which demands the most in public confidence and trust.

On the basis of the overall record, we conclude that respondent should be suspended from office, without salary, for a period of one year.

Accordingly, it is ordered that Judge John A. Whitaker of the Tenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Natchitoch-es be, and he hereby is, suspended from office for a period of one year, effective December 1, 1984. That part of the suspension from the date of finality of this judgment shall be without salary.

      . There was actually more than one investigation. A more complete chronological recital is included in the discussion of Constitutional and Procedural Issues.

      . Actually, the Commission found that Charge IV had not been proved as written, but apparently considered the charged conduct which was proved in determining its recommendation.

      . Because of our factual findings, it is not essential that we decide in this case whether a judge’s conduct, prior to the time he assumed office but during the time he was campaigning for the judgeship, can form the sole basis for disciplinary proceedings.

      . This court, in fact, does reject completely the Commission’s evaluation of the credibility of Johnette Davidson and partially that of Diane Michels, two of the witnesses who testified before the Commission on April 7, 1984. A third witness, Judith Gay, did not testify at the formal hearing.

      . In an ordinary civil action, the trial court is the trier of fact, and its findings may not be disturbed on appeal unless they are manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. See Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973), in which this court stated:
      "When there is evidence before the trier of fact which, upon its reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnishes a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's finding, on review the appellate court should not disturb this factual finding in the absence of manifest error. Stated another way, the reviewing court must give great weight to factual conclusions of the trier of fact; where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. The reason for this well-settled principle of review is based not only upon the trial court’s better capacity to evaluate live witnesses (as compared with the appellate court's access only to a cold record), but also upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts.” 283 So.2d at 724 (Emphasis supplied.)

      . The allegations of Subparagraphs IA(1) and (2) pertained to similar conduct while respondent was campaigning for the judgeship. See the foregoing discussion under the Jurisdiction section of the opinion.

      . Respondent insisted that he had not seen Adams or Davidson since October 1, 1980. The testimony with respect to these relationships will be discussed in connection with Charge II.

      . The other judge in the district testified that Lester had caused problems by overreacting with threats and weapons during the course of arrests.

      . Section 25(C) provides in pertinent part:
      “On recommendation of the judiciary commission, the supreme court may censure, suspend with or without salary, remove from office, or retire involuntarily a judge for willful misconduct relating to his official duty, willful and persistent failure to perform his duty, persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, conduct while in office which would constitute a felony, or conviction of a felony.”

      . We have determined that the allegations of the crime against nature, which would be conduct that would constitute a felony, were not proved by clear and convincing evidence.

      . The second offense is a felony.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LEMMON, Justice. CALOGERO, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur TURNER v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KD-1283.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 1985.
    Rehearing Denied March 21,1985.

      Katherine Wheeler, Baton Rouge, for respondent.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald Martin, Dist. Atty., Ronald E. Corkern, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for relator.
   LEMMON, Justice.

This is the latest in a series of cases involving a postconviction application in which a prisoner, who had entered a guilty plea and been sentenced to life imprisonment prior to the repeal of La.R.S. 15:571.7, claims that his plea was not “intelligently” entered because subsequent statutory and departmental policy changes have had the effect of making parole for “lifers” more difficult to obtain. In this case relator claimed that he was induced to plead guilty by “promises” that he would be considered for parole after he had served ten years and six months with good prison conduct and that the state’s failure to keep the bargain entitles him to release or to withdrawal of the plea. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted postcon-viction relief and ordered that the plea be set aside. We then granted the district attorney’s application for certiorari. 457 So.2d 6.

On February 6, 1973, relator participated in a brutal murder during the armed robbery of a liquor store. After he and two others were arrested for armed robbery and murder, relator signed a written confession. At his arraignment on March 2, 1973, relator entered a guilty plea against the advice of his court-appointed lawyers. That plea was subsequently withdrawn, and the case was set for trial.

As a result of plea negotiations between defense counsel and the district attorney, relator on October 15, 1973 (only one day before the case was scheduled to be tried) again entered a guilty plea. The prosecutor accepted a plea of “guilty without capital punishment” and agreed to forego prosecuting relator for armed robbery. At the guilty plea, the trial judge conscientiously canvassed on the record the rights being given up by relator and assured himself that relator understood the elements of the offense to which he was pleading and the mandatory life sentence which was to be imposed. The judge also determined on the record that relator had discussed his rights and the consequences of his plea with his two court-appointed lawyers, who were both present in court.

At the time of relator’s plea, life sentence prisoners who conducted themselves as exemplary inmates were routinely recommended by the superintendent of the prison for commutation of sentence (and parole eligibility) after serving ten years and six months. The procedure was actually a two-step process. In the first step, the prisoner could apply for commutation of his sentence with the approval of the superintendent of the prison, and the governor, upon recommendation of certain officials, could cummute the sentence to a fixed term of years, but the period of incarceration could not be reduced below ten years and six months. Once the governor commuted a sentence, the prisoner could become eligible to apply for parole, which was the second step in the procedure. These so-called “10-6 lifers” were, as a result of the statutory scheme and the prison policy existing at the time, frequently freed on parole.

“Whenever a prisoner who has been convicted of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment for life, so conducts himself as to merit the approval of the superintendent of the state penitentiary he may apply for a commutation of his sentence and the application, upon approval of the superintendent, shall be forwarded to the governor. The governor may commute the sentence upon the recommendation in writing of the lieutenant governor, attorney general, and presiding judge of the court before which the conviction was had or any two of them. No commutation under this Section shall reduce the period of incarceration to less than ten years and six months.”

In 1974, Louisiana adopted a new constitution with a restructured Board of Pardons. La. Const. Art. IV § 5E (1974). In 1973 and again in 1976, Louisiana adopted new capital sentencing provisions which statutorily eliminated the possibility of parole for newly-convicted murderers sentenced to life. See Acts 1973, Nos. 109 and 111; Acts 1976, Nos. 694 and 657. In 1979, La.R.S. 15:571.7 was repealed. See Acts 1979, No. 490. Coincidental with the changes in the statutory scheme was a change in the attitude and in the policy of the officials who reviewed applications for commutations and parole.

On August 8, 1983, nearly ten years after his plea, relator filed an application for postconviction relief, contending that his plea had been induced by “promises” of consideration for parole eligibility after ten years and six months of imprisonment with good behavior. The evidence in the post-conviction hearing conducted by the successor of the original trial judge established that relator’s lawyers advised him of the then-existing practice regarding life sentences. He was therefore fully aware of the possibility of parole release after serving ten years and six months. Relator and his two experienced defense attorneys had . also thoroughly discussed the available options. The strength of the state’s case (including the confession) and the stark facts of the brutal murder obviously convinced them that there was little to gain by going to trial (even though Furman had effectively eliminated the possibility of a death sentence). On the other hand, relator’s attorneys advised him that the proposed plea bargain offered the possibility of avoiding an additional conviction for armed robbery, with a sentence that had to be imposed without benefit of parole and that could be imposed consecutively for as long as 99 years of imprisonment. See La.R.S. 14:64; La.C.Cr.P. Art. 883. Of course, a nonparolable sentence for a significant term would have adversely affected relator’s chances for possible commutation and parole of a life sentence for murder.

Relator and his lawyers apparently weighed all of these considerations when relator reached his decision to plead guilty. However, he now contends that his plea was based almost solely on representations by his lawyers that he would be considered for parole on his life sentence after ten years and six months of prison with good behavior and that this “promise” was the controlling factor in his decision to plead guilty.

We initially observe that relator had no vested interest in the continuation of the “10-6 policy” which existed at the time of his plea. Likewise, he had no vested interest in the structure of the pardon board or in the statutory scheme which permitted the superintendent to recommend commutation (or, actually, to approve prisoner’s applications to the governor, which was tantamount to a recommendation). These statutory rules and practices did not create substantive rights, but were merely matters of procedure. The subsequent statutory and policy changes did not offend the principle that ex post facto changes in the substance of a criminal penalty for an offense cannot work to the disadvantage of the accused. See State v. Dunn, 408 So.2d 1319 (La.1982). Compare State v. Curtis, 363 So.2d 1375 (La.1978).

Moreover, there was no automatic commutation or eligibility for parole under the former La.R.S. 15:571.7. Relator may still apply to the Board of Pardons for a reduction of his sentence under the present La. R.S. 15:572. Indeed, the former statute’s requirement for a minimum period of confinement before eligibility for commutation no longer exists, and the present statutes governing a life-sentence prisoner’s right to seek commutation and parole are actually more favorable. It is the policy of those reviewing the applications that has changed and has significantly decreased the possibility of commutation and parole.

Second, relator’s expectations arising from the professional assessment of then-existing policy expressed by defense counsel cannot be equated to a “promise” which induced a plea and which therefore must be kept under penalty of invalidity of the plea. A guilty plea agreement, by its very nature, represents for a defendant a choice between unpleasant alternatives. When the choice is between going to trial against overwhelming evidence and pleading guilty to a serious offense, neither affords the prospect of a “pleasant journey”. Viewed from the perspective of the criminal offender, the plea frequently represents, as in this case, the lesser of two evils.

Various safeguards have been designed to assure that a guilty plea represents an accurate acknowledgement of guilt and is entered into with as full and complete an awareness of the risks, options, consequences, and possible benefits as is feasible. These rules and procedures also serve to assure finality for guilty pleas, which, after all, are convictions. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). Thus, the accused is entitled to have a lawyer represent him and advise him competently, as well as to have the judge determine on the record that the accused understands the basic constitutional rights he is giving up and the possible sentence to be imposed. The accused is also entitled to enforce any promises which served as substantial inducements to his entering the plea (or to be permitted to withdraw his plea). Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971).

In the present case, the record does not .establish that relator was substantially induced to plead guilty by unkept promises or by misrepresentations on the part of the district attorney or his attorneys. The district attorney’s inducement to relator was to agree not to pursue armed robbery charges which very likely could have been successfully prosecuted. This promise eliminated relator’s exposure to an additional nonparolable sentence of as much as 99 years. Because relator was obviously convinced that he could not successfully contest his guilt to either murder or armed robbery, and because he was hoping for a sentence which would give him the best possibility of gaining release on parole as early as possible, the promise to dismiss of the armed robbery charges significantly enhanced his chances for parole. That promise, therefore, was not at all insignificant.

As to any “promise” by relator’s attorneys, although the record clearly established that relator’s attorneys informed him of the practice under which life sentences were frequently commuted and parole granted after “10-6”, he was never promised by his attorneys that he would be released. His lawyers testified at the hearing that they made no promises or guarantees to relator and reached no understanding with him that his release on parole was automatic. Relator was certainly motivated by the hope for an early release on parole, and he actually had a reasonable expectation of that possibility based on the lawyers’ competent assessment of the situation as it existed at the time of his plea. Nevertheless, his lawyers made no representation which would justify relator’s belief that he was pleading guilty in exchange for a promise or guarantee (other than dismissal of the armed robbery charge).

The essence of the advice by relator’s attorneys was that the best possibility for gaining release from custody was to plead guilty, accept a life sentence, behave in an exemplary fashion, and hope to be released on parole. Relator understood and accepted this competent advice, which canvassed the full range of possibilities. His guilty plea was therefore clearly the result of an informed decision that this was his best course of action under the existing circumstances. The fact that commutation and parole were not immediately forthcoming at the end of ten years and six months does not vitiate the voluntariness of his plea. This was an acceptable risk of which relator was aware on the basis of the advice given to him by his lawyers. The fact that things did not work out as he had hoped does not render his plea involuntary and certainly does not reflect a “breach” of any “bargain” made by the state.

We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in holding that the relator’s “expectation” was enforceable so that the guilty plea must be set aside (at great prejudice to the state since the offense was so old that evidence presumably would be difficult to reassemble). To set aside a clearly voluntary guilty plea because unforeseen changes in the attitude and policy of the executive branch toward commutation and parole have substantially lessened the possibility of release would unnecessarily undermine the finality of such pleas.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, the postconviction application is denied, and relator is remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

CALOGERO, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

CALOGERO, Justice,

concurring.

The matter disposed of in the majority opinion has been properly treated and resolved. However, there may be other problems with defendant’s October 15, 1973 guilty plea which the Court does not see fit, and properly so, to examine as a possible error patent.

It is difficult to ascertain from the record alone whether Turner knew the specific crime to which he pleaded. At various times during the proceeding, the trial judge relied upon a statute which went into effect after the commission of the crime.

Furthermore Boykin requires that a defendant pleading guilty must be told of certain rights, among them the right to confront witnesses against him. The trial judge’s explanation of this right may not be sufficiently clear. See State v. Cressy, 440 So.2d 141 (La.1983); State v. Age, 417 So.2d 1183 (La.1981); State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 260 La. 90, 255 So.2d 85 (1971).

      . See State v. Dunn, 408 So.2d 1319 (La.1982); Dunn v. Maggio, 712 F.2d 998 (5th Cir.1984); Hall v. Maggio, 697 F.2d 641 (5th Cir.1983); Garrett v. Maggio, 685 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.1982); Hayes v. Maggio, 699 F.2d 198 (5th Cir.1983).

      . The trial court initially granted relief without an evidentiary hearing on the basis of the petition and the record and ordered the Department of Corrections to release relator on parole if he was eligible under the rules and regulations concerning parole release for prisoners with good behavior. This court reversed and ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant’s case differed from State v. Dunn, 408 So.2d 1319 (La.1982), a case in which we reversed the granting of relief based on a similar allegation. 441 So.2d 206.
      After the hearing, the trial court again ordered that relator be released on parole if eligible on the basis of his conduct. No findings were made with respect to differences between this case and Dunn. This court again reversed and remanded for reconsideration, with instructions that the trial court had no authority to order the parole board to release relator. We noted that the trial court could order that the plea be set aside if such action were warranted. 450 So.2d 643.
      After a second •hearing, the trial court again granted relief, this time ordering that the plea be set aside. That ruling is now before us for review.

      .Former La.C.Cr.P. Art. 557 provided for the plea of "guilty without capital punishment” which resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment, rather than death. For a history of this statutory scheme, see State v. Jett, 419 So.2d 844 (La.1982). The “guilty without" plea was eliminated by Acts 1973, No. 134.

      . The trial judge erroneously referred to the name of the offense to which relator was pleading as "second degree murder”. Relator’s offense predated the 1973 amendments which created first and second degree murder. Prior to those amendments, the crime of murder included both specifically intended killings and "felony murder” (unintended killings during certain enumerated felonies). See Acts 1942, No. 43; Acts 1973, Nos. 109 and 111 (effective July 2, 1973). Nevertheless, the trial judge properly enumerated the elements of the offense of "murder" to which relator was pleading. Relator suffered no prejudice from the error in the "name” of the offense.

      . Various documents and articles in the record demonstrate the policy under which life-sentence prisoners were generally released on parole after ten years and six months in prison with good behavior. A letter from the district attorney, written to one of the defense lawyers, reinforces relator’s assertion that this policy was in effect prior to and at the time of his plea. Furthermore, in State v. Dunn, above, we found that the practice was established by the evidence presented at the hearing. See also Garrett v. Maggio, above.

      . Former La.R.S. 15:571.7 provided:

      . See also La.R.S. 15:572 et seq., which establish the procedures to be followed by the Board of Pardons. A review of those statutes reveals that a prisoner still has essentially the same statutory right to apply to the proper reviewing authority for executive clemency. As will be further discussed, he has no right to have a "receptive attitude” on the part of the pardon authority.

      . In a thought-provoking article entitled "The Forgotten Men”, The Angolite, May-June, 1980, pp. 23-56, which was introduced into evidence at the hearing, the author traces what he perceives to be the history of the practice of granting parole release after ten years and six months to "lifers” who had behaved well. The author speculates, possibly correctly, that the change of attitude toward the parole release of "lifers" came in the wake of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and other cases which freed significant numbers of inmates from death sentences and, in effect, required reimposition of sentences to life imprisonment.

        Understandably, society wanted more assurance of continued incarceration of certain dangerous criminals who had been spared from capital punishment. Possibly as a result of this attitude, the Legislature specifically eliminated the possibility of parole in the statutes which provided life sentences for first or second degree murder, aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping — all of which were crimes for which the death penalty could formerly be imposed. See La.R.S. 14:30, 30.1, 42, 44. This legislative policy, which perhaps reflected the "tough” attitude of the electorate, may also have been paralleled by a "tough” attitude adopted by the pardon board and the governor.

      . Compare Hayes v. Maggio, above, in which the unrebutted evidence in the record established that relator received a distinct promise from the prosecutor that his sentence would be automatically commuted after he had served ten years and six months.

      . Thus, we reject relator’s contention that his case differs from Dunn, in which the accused arguably pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty, a threat not present in this case. Relator's argument that he had nothing to lose by going to trial (or nothing to gain by pleading guilty) ignores the substantial benefit flowing from the dismissal of the armed robbery charge.

      . Under Strickland v. Washington, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), an attorney’s performance in representing and advising an accused in connection with his guilty plea must be evaluated on the basis of a standard of "reasonably effective assistance”. The first stage of such analysis is the determination of whether counsel’s performance was "deficient”; that is, whether “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed an accused by the Sixth Amendment”. 104 S.Ct. at 2064. As noted, the performance of counsel in giving advice here was not at all deficient. The attorneys provided competent advice based on their best estimate of the situation under the existing scheme, and the advice was sound despite the fact that the recommended course of action did not produce the desired result.

      . The only matter before us now concerns whether defendant’s plea was involuntary because it allegedly was induced by defendant’s belief that he would become eligible for parole after ten and one-half years.


text:
    LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. Herman Neil YOUNG, Respondent.
    No. 85 B 0205.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 7, 1985.
   ORDER

Based upon the Court’s concurrence with the opinion of the Committee on Professional Responsibility that the crimes of which Herman Neil Young has been convicted constitute serious crimes, the necessary elements of which reflects upon said attorney’s moral fitness to practice law:

IT IS ORDERED BY THE COURT, that Herman Neil Young be and is hereby suspended.

It is further ordered that the Committee institute the necessary disciplinary proceedings against Herman Neil Young, seeking his disbarment or other remedy deemed appropriate, all in keeping with Article XV of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association.


text:
    ANGELO PAVONE ENTERPRISES, INC., Angelo J. Pavone, Jr. and Barbara Pavone (Plaintiffs-Relators), v. SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY and American Telephone and Telegraph (Defendants-Respondents).
    No. 84 C 2106.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 11, 1985.
    Warren M. Schultz, Jr., Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, New Orleans, for defendants-respondents, South Cent. Bell Telephone Co. and American Tel. and Tel.
    Raymond C. Burkart, Jr., New Orleans, for plaintiffs-relators, Angelo Pavone Enterprises, Inc., Angelo J. Pavone, Jr., and Barbara Pavone.
   RELATORS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Angelo Pavone Enterprises, Inc., Angelo J. Pavone, Jr., and Barbara Pavone, rela-tors in the above entitled and numbered action, move for a dismissal pursuant to Rule V, Section 4, Louisiana Supreme Court Rules, on the following grounds:

I.

Relators desire to abandon this action, 462 So.2d 646, which is a proceeding on certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. 459 So.2d 1223.

II.

No answer or other formal action to amend or modify the judgment has been filed or applied for by any opponent.

III.

As evidenced by the signature of undersigned counsel for respondents, South Central Bell Telephone Company and American Telephone and Telegraph, $aid respondents have no objection to the entry of an order of dismissal pursuant to this motion.

WHEREFORE, relators pray for the entry of an order dismissing this action, with each party to bear its own costs.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Considering the foregoing Relators’ Motion to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. that the above entitled and numbered action be, and it hereby is, dismissed, with each party to bear its own costs.


text:
    ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS and Wilhemina Armour v. Hon. James H. BROWN, Secretary of State, State of Louisiana; St. John The Baptist Parish School Board et al.
    No. 85-C-0099.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 17, 1985.
   In re Brown, James H. Secy./St. et al., Louisiana State of, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, stay, prohibition, mandamus, rule nisi, supervisory writ; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 84-CA-679; Parish of St. John the Baptist, 40th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 17396.

Prior report: 462 So.2d 1269.

Writ granted. Election is stayed. Case set for oral argument in this Court on Monday, January 28, 1985, at 10 A.M.


text:
    Gwendolyn GROS, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, Darryle R. Gros, Damion A. Gros and Francois Gros v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION and/or Hooker Chemical and Plastic Company Dr. Armand Hammer, A. Robert Abboud, George P. Haas, A.J. Vedros, Bobby Mayaux, James Pittman, Curtis Cullen, Wilbert Fremin, Robert L. Hall and General Electric Corporation.
    No. 85-CC-0106.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 1985.
   In re Gros, Gwendolyn etc. et al., applying for supervisory writs; Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 25395; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 84-C-511.

Prior report: 463 So.2d 3.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerard E. GAUDIN.
    No. 85-KH-0282.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 1985.
   In re Gaudin, Gerard F.; applying for supervisory writ; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “M”, No. 84-2800.

Granted and transferred to the Court of Appeal, 5th Circuit, for consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Alfred JOHNSON v. 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, State of Louisiana.
    No. 85-KH-0209.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 14, 1985.
   In re Johnson, Alfred; applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on the motion for disposition of warrants submitted for filing in November, 1984.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dennis S. LENNON v. State of Louisiana, Criminal District Court “J”, Judge Alvin OSER, Orleans Parish, Louisiana.
    No. 85-KH-0212.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Lennon, Dennis S.; applying for supervisory writs; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “J”, No. 271-079.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on relator’s post conviction petition submitted for filing on November 9, 1984, if that petition has been filed.


text:
    Katherine R. KRAMPE v. Edward J. KRAMPE.
    No. 85-CC-0292.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Edward J. Krampe; applying for writs of review, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and stay order, to the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette, No. 80-4209-J; Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 85-60.

Stay order denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald L. FARMER.
    No. 85-KD-0299.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Farmer, Donald L.; applying for supervisory and/or remedial writs; Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 37005.

Denied.


text:
    Nolan GRIFFIN v. Carl LECOMPTE, Jr. and General Agents Insurance Company of America.
    No. 85-C-0016.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Griffin, Nolan; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-1044; Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court, Div. “ ”, No. 8126.

Prior report: 459 So.2d 207.

Granted.


text:
    Myron DUCOTE v. J.A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Company.
    No. 85-C-0073.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Ducote, Myron; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-965; Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 83-3896.

Prior report: 459 So.2d 191.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry ADAMS v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KH-1027.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Larry Adams; applying for supervisory writs to the Ninth Judicial District Court, No. 149364, Parish of Rapides.

Granted. Sentence vacated. The case is remanded for resentencing under the law applicable to the case at the time of original sentencing, which permitted the sentencing judge to consider a suspended sentence.

WATSON, J., dissents from the order.


text:
    Jeannie R. BLOODWORTH, et al. v. Donald B. CARROLL, et al.
    No. 84-C-1780.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Carroll, Donald Buford; Rushing, Charlette; Phoenix Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16374-CA; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “H”, No. 286386.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1197.

Granted. Judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Snider v. Kemper, 461 So.2d 1051, decided January 14, 1985.

DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., dissent, being of the opinion that the Court of Appeal’s decision is correct.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., James PORTER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-2141.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Porter, James Jr.; applying for remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 278-168.

Granted. The trial judge is ordered to comply, forthwith, with this Court’s order of 11/9/84, 459 So.2d 528, or to show cause in writing in this Court on or before 30 days from this day why he has not done so.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wilfred SMITH v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 84-KH-2149.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Smith, Wilfred; applying for remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 269-397.

Granted. The trial court is ordered to order the court reporter to furnish the transcript ordered by this Court on September 20, 1984 and November 9, 1984 under penalty of contempt and to notify this Court of compliance.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry BROWN v. Honorable Dennis J. WALDRON, Judge, Section “F”, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
    No. 85-KH-0115.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Brown, Larry; applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, No. 262-434.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on the transcripts motion relator submitted for filing on December 10, 1984.


text:
    Cheryl FARRIA v. LABONNE TERREBONNE OF HOUMA, INC. et al.
    No. 85-C-0143.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Farria, Cheryl; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 84-CA-1311; Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 69-378.

Prior report: 462 So.2d 301.

Granted. Relator’s appeal is reinstated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal. See Reed v. Superior Motors, 415 So.2d 219 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1982.)


text:
    STATE ex rel. James BAKER v. Shirley WIMBERLY, Judge, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, Section “I”.
    No. 85-KH-0208.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Baker, James; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-3120; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “I”, No. 292-930.

Granted. Trial court is ordered to grant an out of time appeal to the Court of Appeal.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard CRESSY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 85-KH-0259.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Cressy, Leonard; applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 263820.

Granted. The trial judge is ordered to resentence relator in accordance with our previous order — 440 So.2d 141 (1983). Appointment of attorney to represent defendant will be made in a subsequent order.


text:
    STATE ex rel., Harold BROOMFIELD v. STATE of Louisiana Through Frank BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 84-KH-1820.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Broomfield, Harold; applying for supervisory writ, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “D”, No. 251455.

Granted. Application transferred to the district court for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bobby JENNINGS.
    No. 85-KK-0150.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Jennings, Bobby; applying for motion and order for out of time appeal; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 4-83-576; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. KW 0057.

Out of time appeal to the Court of Appeal granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Steve WHATLEY v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ORLEANS, State of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-1584.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Whatley, Steve; applying for writ of mandamus, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Victor MATTHEWS v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KH-1960.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Matthews, Victor; applying for remedial writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 70988.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Calvin WILLIAMS v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, LSP.
    No. 84-KH-1061.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Calvin Williams, applying for remedial writs to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rodney E. CARLISLE, Jr.
    No. 84-K-2169.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Carlise, Rodney E. Jr.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16-407-KA; Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 60576.

Prior report: 458 So.2d 1347.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Helen LAMB and Cezanne Ingram.
    No. 84-K-2176.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Lamb, Helen; Ingram, Cezanne, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CR-83-826; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, Nos. 47500, 47500.10.

Prior report: 458 So.2d 551.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles R. KENNEY.
    No. 84-K-2186.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Kenney, Charles R. a/k/a, Kenny, Charles R.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16596-KA; Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 41484.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 103.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Archie WILLIAMS.
    No. 84-K-2189.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Williams, Archie; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 84-KA-0109; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 1-83-234. Prior report: 458 So.2d 1315.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roger James EASON.
    No. 84-K-2197.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Eason, Roger James; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16648-KA; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “H”, No. 123156.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 1139.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony LEVEIGE.
    No. 84-KK-2201.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Leveige, Anthony; applying for supervisory writ of review; Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. T-84-161-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. K-84-1026.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Haskel V. BOYD.
    No. 85-KK-0077.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re State of Louisiana, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. K84-872; Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 38726.

Denied.

MARCUS, BLANCHE and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    William Gary BLACK v. Shirley Jean Parker BLACK.
    No. 85-C-0081.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Black, William Gary; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16704-CA; Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 19060.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 1175.

Denied.

WATSON and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    HIBERNIA NATIONAL BANK v. James A. McPHERSON.
    No. 85-CC-0105.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re McPherson, James A., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “D”, No. 83-18133; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. C-3164.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Ray Anthony JACKSON v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden.
    No. 85-KH-0118.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Jackson, Ray Anthony; applying for remedial writ; Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 111950.

Denied.


text:
    John K. FIORITA v. ELECTRIC COAL COMPANY, The Vessell ABC & The XYZ Company.
    No. 85-C-0125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Fiorita, John K., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1841; Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 22-112.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 4.

Denied.


text:
    CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. Ronny CAUSEY, Lloyd J. Patterson, Sr., James Beach, Curtis Anderson Ekker. STATE of Louisiana v. Louis PATRY.
    No. 85-KK-0126.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Causey, Ronny; Patterson, Lloyd J. Sr.; Beach, James; Ekker, Curtis Anderson; Patry, Louis; applying for supervisory writs; Parish of East Baton Rouge, City Court of Baton Rouge, Div. “C”, Nos. 98629, 102710, 106283, 101713; 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “J”, Nos. 11-84-181, 10-84-998, 1-84-871; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. KW-84-1503.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Betty W. EDWARDS v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN.
    No. 85-C-0136.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Corrections, Dept, of L.C.I.W., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, stay; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-1175; State Civil Service Commission, Div. “ ”, No. 2997.

Prior report: 461 So.2d 678.

Denied. Result is correct.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Holyne NEWMAN v. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.
    No. 85-C-0137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Newman, Holyne, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA 84-1302; Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 54794.

Prior report: 462 So.2d 299.

Denied.


text:
    NEW ORLEANS FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION LOCAL 632; Clarence J. Perez; William Sanchez, Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Employees of the Fire Department of the City of New Orleans v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; Marcel Garsaud, Jr.; Wood Brown III; Janice M. Foster; Leon J. Reymond, Jr.; City of New Orleans; Errol G. Williams; Reynard J. Rochon.
    No. 85-C-0145.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re New Orleans Fire-fighters et al., Perez, Clarence J., Sanchez, William J., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-2075; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “H”, No. 79-11130.

Prior report: 459 So.2d 1204.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


author: DENNIS, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lue E. SULLIVAN.
    No. 85-KP-0148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Sullivan, Lue E., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, prohibition and mandamus; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 73-966.

Denied on showing.

DENNIS, J.,

dissents and would supplement the record as to the proceedings in the trial court before taking final action upon this application.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT v. Lawrence J. JACOB, et ux.
    No. 85-CC-0157.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Jacob, Lawrence J. et ux, Jacob, Olite Preiean; Jacob, William; Jacob, Glenn; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, and emergency; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 84-2934; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 85-79.

Denied. Relators may reassert their arguments on appeal.


text:
    N.G. CARTWRIGHT v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE & TAXATION.
    No. 85-C-0159.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Revenue & Taxation Dept, of, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0098; Civil Service Commission, Div. “ ”, No. 2823.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 1066.

Denied. Result correct.


text:
    Joseph BURRELL, Jr. v. TASSIN PILE-DRIVING CO., INC., Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company and Globe Construction Co. Inc.
    No. 85-C-0174.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Schlesinger, Lillie; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1478; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “D”, No. 81-10578.

Prior Report: 459 So.2d 1195.

Denied.


text:
    Johnny McCLAIN v. C.E. HOLMES, Ken Netterville and Cavelle Bradley.
    No. 85-C-0180.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Netterville, Ken; applying for supervisory writ; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA 83-1284; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “I”, No. 229478.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 681.

Denied.


text:
    Florence Price BONVILLAIN, H. Minor Pipes, Jr., and George Rickey Murphy, Executors of the Estate of Carroll J. Matherne v. TERREBONNE PARISH POLICE JURY.
    No. 85-C-0181.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Bonvillain, Florence Price; Pipes, H. Minor Jr.; Murphy, George Rickey; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA-84-0306; Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd

Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 71252.

Prior report: 462 So.2d 274.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Donald WOLFE v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, SECTION “I”.
    No. 85-KH-0191.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Wolfe, Donald; applying for mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “I”.

Denied.


text:
    Florence Price BONVILLAIN, H. Minor Pipes, Jr., and George Rickey Murphy, Executors of the Estate of Carroll J. Matherne v. TERREBONNE PARISH POLICE JURY.
    No. 85-C-0192.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Terrebonne Par. Pol. Jury, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA-84-0306; Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. .71252.

Prior report: 462 So.2d 274.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    NEW ORLEANS FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION LOCAL 632; Clarence J. Perez; William Sanchez, Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Employees of the Fire Department of the City of New Orleans v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; Marcel Garsaud, Jr.; Wood Brown III; Janice M. Foster; Leon J. Reymond, Jr.; City of New Orleans; Errol G. Williams; Reynard J. Rochon.
    No. 85-C-0201.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re New Orleans, City of; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-2075; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “G”, No. 79-11130.

Prior report: 459 So.2d 1204.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dalton JOSEPH v. CLERK OF COURT, 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON.
    No. 85-KH-0216.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Joseph, Dalton; applying for supervisory writs; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 80-719.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin WISE.
    No. 85-KH-0217.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Wise, Kevin; applying for remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 298-819.

Denied on showing.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tommy Lee GRANISON v. Burrell J. CARTER, Judge 21st JDC, Parish of Tangipahoa.
    No. 85-KH-0022.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1985.
   In re Granison, Tommy Lee, applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court, Div. “D”.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on the motion to quash submitted in October, 1984, and the supplement thereto submitted in December, 1984, if the motion and supplement have been filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Troy Murphy OATSVALL v. Lucy Reid RAUSCH, Clerk of Court and A. Clayton James, Judge.
    No. 85-KH-0280.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1985.
   In re Oatsvall, Troy Murphy; applying for mandamus, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court, Div. “E”.

Granted. The district court is ordered to issue the Subpoena Duces Tecum prayed for by relator.


text:
    Sylvester J. LOPICCOLO v. Rita Miller, wife of Sylvester J. LOPICCOLO.
    No. 85-CC-0302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1985.
   In re Miller, Rita Lopiccolo; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, supervisory, prohibition and mandamus; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “I”, No. 227-751; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 85-C-101.

Granted. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal, for argument and opinion.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin HOLLINGSWORTH.
    No. 85-KD-0309.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 1985.
   In re Hollingsworth, Kevin; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, No. 300-609.

Granted and transferred to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    Arthur J. DAIGLE v. AMERICAN WELL SERVICE AND DRILLING, INC., Zurich-American Insurance Companies.
    No. 85-CC-0355.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 22, 1985.
   In re Daigle, Arthur J.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, stay; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 85-62; Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court, Div. “ ”, No. C-397-84.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant as to the place of the examination.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dennis PETERS v. Hon. Hillary CRAIN, Judge, Division “A” and Clerk of Court et al.
    No. 85-KH-0257.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 22, 1985.
   In re Peters, Dennis; applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 30929.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on the post conviction petition submitted for filing on December 7, 1984.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lindy Emanuel Tillett ROLAND v. Hon. CLERK OF COURT, CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, SECTION “A”, PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 85-KH-0305.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 22, 1985.
   In re Roland, Lindy Emanuel Tillett; applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “A”, No. 235-023.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on relator’s motion for Boykinization transcript submitted for filing about September 25, 1984.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clarence FOURNIER.
    No. 85-KH-0278.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 22, 1985.
   In re Fournier, Clarence; applying for supervisory writs; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 84-KA-0768; Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 1886-83.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lindy Emanuel Tillett ROLAND v. CLERK OF COURT, CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, SECTION “I”, PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 85-KH-0304.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 1985.
   In re Roland, Lindy Emanuel Tillett; applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “I”, No. 247-236.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on the motion for Boykinization transcript submitted for filing about September 25, 1984.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Johnny BURNS, Jr. v. Hon. Miriam WALTZER, Judge, Section “A”, Criminal District Court.
    No. 85-KH-0222.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 1985.
   In re Burns, Johnny Jr.; applying for mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “A”.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on the post conviction petition submitted by relator on December 7, 1984, if that petition has been filed.


text:
    Ronald HOWARD v. DePAUL HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTER.
    No. 85-CC-0372.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 1985.
   In re HCA Health Services of Louisiana, d/b/a DePaul Hospital, applying for supervisory writs and stay order, to the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 83-9618, Div. C; Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. C-3441.

Denied.


text:
    In the Matter of C. Alvin TYLER v. Jennifer LUSE, Judge, The Family Court, Division A, East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana.
    No. 85-CC-0371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 1985.
   C. Alvin Tyler, applying for remedial writs of certiorari and/or review to The Family Court, No. C-68400; First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CW-85-0219.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lonnie J. SHROPSHIRE, Jr.
    No. 85-KK-0312.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1985.
   In re Shropshire, Lonnie J. Jr.; applying for stay, supervisory or remedial writs; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-3349; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “I”, No. 302-591.

Writ granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry Peter WHITE.
    No. 85-K-0395.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 1985.
   In re White, Henry Peter; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, stay; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16683-KA; Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 41641.

Writ denied.