text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James KENNEDY.
    No. 83-KA-0071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mam-oulides, Dist. Atty., William C. Credo, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., Jo Ellen McMillen, Kerry Hogan, Kenneth Lassus, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Charles L. Elloie, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Defendant and one Jerome Richardson were charged together by grand jury indictment with aggravated rape in violation of La.R.S. 14:42. After the trial court granted Richardson’s motion for a severance, defendant appeared alone before a jury on November 16, 1981. He was found guilty as charged. On December 8, 1981, the trial court sentenced him to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor. Defendant has now appealed his conviction and sentence to this Court urging four assignments of error filed below. On the present record, we find no reversible error in any of the assignments and conditionally affirm defendant’s conviction. However, we note that at the hearing conducted on defendant’s motion to suppress his confession the state failed to rebut his specific and detailed allegations of physical abuse by the arresting officers. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court for retrial of the motion. State v. Franklin, 381 So.2d 826 (La.1980); State v. Stevenson, 374 So.2d 1189 (La.1979); State v. Simmons, 328 So.2d 149 (La.1976).

Evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress showed the following. On the night of June 9, 1981, two young men sexually assaulted the victim in this case. One of the perpetrators also shot the victim’s boyfriend several times in the head with a small caliber pistol, although he did not kill him. Shortly thereafter, Detective Frank Murtagh acted on a report of the incident and stopped Jerome Richardson as he walked along the Jefferson Highway. Richardson ultimately agreed to take the detective to the Model Motel on Jefferson Highway where defendant and two friends had rented a room. According to Murtagh, when he arrived at the motel, he was joined by Deputy Sheriffs Hymel and Denoux outside defendant’s room. Together, the officers crashed through the door, held fast only by a “flimsy” lock, grabbed one occupant of the room each, and threw them up against the wall. The officers then separated defendant and his friends and began questioning them individually, after first advising them of their Miranda rights. It quickly became apparent from the other occupants of the room that defendant was the prime suspect, and when the officer led him outside, he was immediately identified by Richardson, who had remained behind in Murtagh’s car. After a brief trip back to the scene of the rape in a futile effort to recover the pistol used to shoot the victim’s boyfriend, the officers then took defendant to the Harahan lock-up and turned him over to Captain John Doyle and Lieutenant Odom Langford. Doyle read defendant his rights from a printed waiver form, obtained his signature on the waiver, and then began the interview that led to the confession.

Doyle and Langford denied using any threats, promises or coercion to obtain the statement. In addition, Langford testified that he had seen no marks on defendant’s face and had been looking for them “. .. because he had said that he had been hit about the face.” Murtagh and Hymel, who followed the detective to the stand at the hearing, also claimed that they used no more force than necessary to grab the occupants of the motel room as an initial matter and place them up against the wall. The officers specifically denied striking defendant or using their service revolvers to threaten him, and testified that they did not see anyone else beat him. However, defendant testified that six officers, not three, had taken part in the raid on the motel room. According to defendant, the officers separated him from his friends, led him outside, and began a beating that left him with sore ribs and a “busted lip.” In addition, one of the officers took out his revolver and shoved the barrel of the weapon into his mouth for “about thirty (30) seconds.” Defendant testified that while all six officers took part in the beating, one “in particular” had inflicted almost all of the damage. Asked by counsel whether he saw the officers in court, he replied “No.” Defendant did not claim that Doyle and Langford had inflicted any additional abuse but explained that he gave the statement because he got tired of the other officers “... beating on me and stuff....” The other two occupants of the motel room also testified that they had seen the officer strike defendant and then kick him out of the door. However, they did not estimate the size of the raiding party or identify Murtagh and Hymel specifically.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court found that while there may have been “some scuffling” in the motel, the amount of force used by the officers to subdue defendant initially was not sufficient to induce his later confession and render it involuntary. We are satisfied on this record that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that only three officers had taken part in the raid and that Murtagh and Hymel did not personally strike or threaten the defendant or see anyone else abuse him. However, the third officer concededly on the scene, Deputy De-noux, did not testify at the hearing or at trial, and the record contains no explanation for his absence. We have repeatedly cautioned that because of its heavy burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession, the state must rebut a defendant’s allegations of coercion specifically and “cannot simply rely on general testimony of officers not present that they witnessed no coercion, intimidation or other undue influence.” State v. Monroe, 305 So.2d 902, 912 (La.1972) (on rehearing). See also, State v. Franklin, supra; State v. Stevenson, supra. Hymel testified at the hearing that he was “watching my man....” in the motel room and Murtagh could state only that he kept track of defendant “... most of the time, intermittently....” The state therefore did not exclude the possibility that Deputy Denoux was the one officer “in particular” who took defendant outside, beat him, and shoved the barrel of his service revolver into his mouth. The last allegation by defendant was his gravest one. In State v. Jennings, 367 So.2d 357 (La.1979), we ordered suppressed a confession given by the defendant over 30 hours after a similar threat by a police officer. In this case, the time interval between arrest and interrogation was far shorter, and Denoux’s threat with the revolver, if it occurred, did not likely leave any marks for Doyle and Lang-ford to observe.

We therefore remand this case to the district court for another trial on the motion to suppress. Because retrial of the motion may eliminate the error here, we do not reverse defendant’s conviction at this time. If the trial court finds that the confession was inadmissible, it must grant defendant a new trial. Otherwise, we reserve to defendant the right to appeal once more any adverse ruling on the motion. In the absence of such an appeal, his conviction and sentence will be affirmed. State v. Stevenson, supra; State v. Simmons, supra.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE CONDITIONALLY AFFIRMED; CASE REMANDED FOR RETRIAL OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

MARCUS, WATSON and LEMMON, JJ., dissent from the remand. We would affirm the conviction and sentence.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eugene DEAN.
    No. 83-KA-0281.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., John Craft, Kendall Green, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Dwight Doskey, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Defendant was charged by bill of information with armed robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. After trial by jury on February 12, 1982, he was found guilty as charged. On April 28, 1982, the trial court then sentenced him to sixty-five (65) years’ imprisonment without benefit of suspension of sentence and probation or parole. Defendant has now appealed his conviction and sentences to this Court arguing the three assignments of error filed below.

We have reviewed defendant’s assignments challenging the trial court’s ruling on the voluntariness of his confession and find them without merit. Defendant’s conviction is therefore affirmed. However, we find merit in counsel’s argument that the trial court has imposed an excessive sentence in this ease. Defendant’s prior juvenile record, and the circumstances of his present offense, may have justified a finding that he warranted a substantial sentence of imprisonment. As we noted in State v. Douglas, 389 So.2d 1263, 1267 (La.1980) armed robbery is an offense “strongly condemned by our legislature” and punished accordingly. Nevertheless, we do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that at the age of 17, this first felony offender has “[no] chance of rehabilitation” and that the court had “no other alternative” than to impose a sentence close to the maximum. Defendant’s sentence appears disproportionately severe when compared to the penalties imposed in other armed robbery cases with more aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688 (La.1983); State v. Williams, 414 So.2d 371 (La.1982) and when compared to the 15 year sentence imposed by a different judge on defendant’s co-perpetrator for the same degree of culpability.

Accordingly, defendant’s conviction is affirmed but his sentence is vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for resen-tencing in accord with the law.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

BAILES, J., substitutes for MARCUS, J.

LEMMON, J., concurs.

WATSON, J., dissents from the remand for resentence.


author: DENNIS, J.,

text:
    Application of Dan Brian ZIMMERMAN.
    No. 83-OB-1529.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In Re: Dan Brian Zimmerman applying for Admission to the Louisiana State Bar Association.

The finding of the Committee that relator had not established his good character is overturned, and the finding of the Commissioner is approved. The relator shall be admitted to the practice of law upon meeting the other requirements.

DENNIS, J.,

concurs in the order admitting the applicant to the practice of law simply because he has met all of the requirements for admission. This matter is within the original jurisdiction of this Court. Although the recommendations of the Committee and Commissioner are entitled to respect and consideration, it is not necessary or appropriate that we “overturn” them.


author: DIXON, C.J., CALOGERO, J.,

text:
    In re E.L. “Bubba” HENRY.
    No. 83-CC-1994.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 30, 1983.
   In Re; Louisiana Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, applying for Writ of Certiorari and Review; Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CW-0831; Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, Docket Nos. 82-05 and 82-41 (Department of State Civil Service).

Granted. The ruling of the Court of Appeal is set aside, and the matter is remanded for argument and opinion.

DIXON, C.J.,

dissents from the action, and would grant this application and bring it up to decide, not only appropriate procedures in court of appeal writ considerations, but important constitutional issues involved in the Governmental Ethics Code.

CALOGERO, J.,

would simply grant the writ application.


author: CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas Mark GILBERT.
    No. 83-KK-1948.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 30, 1983.
   In Re: Thomas Mark Gilbert, applying for Writ of Certiorari, to the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia, Number 35,372; Third Circuit Court of Appeal, Number K 83-740

Stay order recalled. Writ denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ.,

would grant the writ. See dissent in State v. Sterling, 376 So.2d 103 (La.1979).


author: MARCUS, J., BLANCHE, J.,

text:
    Drs. Horace CHALSTROM, Ernst Lorch and Sidney Tiblier, Jr. v. Mr. and Mrs. Keith M. DESSELLES Individually and on the Behalf of their Minor Child, Brian Desselles.
    No. 83-C-1486.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 30, 1983.
   In Re: Drs. Chalstrom, Lorch and Tiblier, Jr. applying for Writ of Certiorari and Review to the Court of Appeal Fourth Circuit, Number CA-0577; from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Number 79-19156-82-4891, Division K. 433 So.2d 866.

Denied.

MARCUS, J.,

would grant the writ.

BLANCHE, J.,

would grant being of the opinion that the 3 year period provided for in R.S. 9:5628 is peremptive and does not except solidary obligors.


author: CALOGERO, J.,

text:
    Wayne Robert FELDE v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, At Angola, Louisiana.
    No. 83-KP-2059.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 30, 1983.
   In Re: Wayne Robert Felde, applying for Supervisory Writs and Writ of Habeas Corpus and Stay Order, Parish of Rapides.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J.,

would order that the evi-dentiary hearing requested by relator be held. If certain of the assertions contained in the affidavit of relator’s counsel can be proved, the defendant’s constitutional rights, to a fair trial and to reasonably effective assistance of counsel, have been violated, in instances which were not the subject of this Court’s review on appeal.


author: STOKER, Judge.

text:
    SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA GRAIN, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee, v. HOWARD A. DUNCAN, INC., et al., Defendant-Appellant-Appellee.
    No. 83-113.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Aug. 11, 1983.
    Rehearings Denied Sept. 29, 1983.
    Writs Denied Nov. 18,1983.

      Edwards, Stefanski & Barousse, Homer Ed Barousse, Jr., Crowley, for defendant-appellant.
    Everett & Everett, Glennon P. Everett, Crowley, for plaintiff-appellee-appellant.
    Marcantel & Marcantel, Bernard N- Mar-cantel, Jennings, Allen, Gooch & Bourgeois, William Parker and Arthur I. Robison, Voo-rhies & Labbe, W. Gerald Gaudet, Gary McGoffin, Hawley & Schexnayder, W. Paul Hawley, Onebane, Donahoe, Bernard, Tori-an, Diaz, McNamara & Abell, Robert Maho-ney, Lafayette, Guglielmo & Lopez, James C. Lopez, Opelousas, Aaron, Aaron & Chambers, Noble M. Chambers, Crowley, for defendant-appellee.
    Before STOKER, DOUCET and KNOLL, JJ.
   STOKER, Judge.

This is breach of contract claim. The petition alleges that the contract obligated defendant, Howard A. Duncan, Inc. (Duncan), to design and build a grain elevator and storage facility for the plaintiff, Southwest Louisiana Grain, Inc. (Southwest). After completion of construction, the foundation of the grain elevator and storage facility began to crack and silos on the foundation became unstable and began to lean.

ISSUE

The issue in this appeal is whether the primary and excess liability insurers of Duncan are liable for any structural failure of plaintiff’s property resulting from deficiencies or error in its design or construction.

The damages claimed are for property damage, loss of revenue because of failure to timely complete the work, and for further loss of revenue. Duncan’s liability insurers are defendants in this case and were dismissed from the suit on motion for summary judgment. This appeal concerns the correctness of the dismissals.

Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Company provided Duncan with primary liability coverage and Houston General Insurance Company provided excess and umbrella coverage. These two insurers are the appellees. The appellants are the insured contractor, Duncan, and the owner, Southwest.

From the allegations of the petition as amended and from the arguments presented in all the briefs it is clear that what is at issue in this appeal is whether completed operations coverage exists under the two policies. The damage occurred after the plaintiff’s facility was completed and apparently resulted when the facility was filled with grain. The original and supplemental and amending petitions are annexed to this opinion as Appendices I and II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CASE

In support of their motion for summary judgment the two appellee-insurers rely on well-settled principles of insurance law to the effect that liability policies are not intended to serve as performance bonds. Breaux v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 So.2d 204 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1977) and Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 179 So.2d 496 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1965), writ refused 248 La. 698, 181 So.2d 398 (1966), Vitenas v. Centanni, 381 So.2d 531 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980) and Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc., 304 So.2d 695 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1974), writ denied 309 So.2d 343 (La.1975). With the exception of the Vobill Homes case, these cases construed exclusions of coverage similar to certain exclusions contained in the policies involved here. The cases hold that liability policies containing such exclusions as were under consideration in those cases do not insure any obligation of the policy holder (contractor-builder or manufacturer) to repair or replace his own work or defective product.

The Vobill Homes case presented a different type of insurance policy exclusion from those involved here and in Breaux, Vitenas and Peltier. In Vobill Homes the policy excluded coverage for completed operations altogether. In contrast, the policies in the other cited cases, and those before us, do provide completed operations coverage but with certain exclusions. Therefore, the Vobill Homes case is not pertinent to our specific inquiry.

APPELLANTS’ POSITION

Although completed operations coverage is involved here, the position of appellants is that the policies in question, that of Bituminous at least, present for consideration policy exclusion language different from that considered in the line of cases represented by Breaux, Vitenas and Peltier. Appellants also urge that there are ambiguities in the policies.

PROVISIONS OF THE POLICIES

In order to address appellants’ arguments we first examine the policy provisions pertinent.

The general insuring agreement of the primary policy of Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Company (Bituminous) provides in part that:

“The company [Bituminous] will pay on behalf of the insured [Ducan] all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence .... ”

Immediately following the above quoted provisions the policy lists the exclusions, those situations to which the insurance does not apply. The policy contains amendments and supplemental endorsements.

The insuring agreement must be read together with applicable exclusions. This is perhaps best illustrated in Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, supra, written by Judge Albert Tate, while a member of this Court. That case, like the present case before us, dealt with a motion for summary judgment granted in favor of an insurer. Vobill Homes was sued in the principal demand by one Berge for defects in a house Vobill constructed for Berge. The defects, which included a defective or insufficient slab foundation, were alleged to have resulted from negligent acts or omission on the part of Vobill Homes. Vobill Homes sought through third party action to shift its liability to its manufacturer’s and contractors’ liability insurer, Hartford.

Judge Tate quoted the pertinent portion of Hartford’s insuring clause. Through Judge Tate this Court then held there was no coverage by reason of specific exclusion of completed operations coverage. This principle is also illustrated by the Breaux case, cited above, written by Justice Watson while he was a judge of this Court. Despite the holdings in the cases cited and relied upon by Bituminous and Houston, we are confronted with policy provisions not involved in those cases. Therefore, we must consider the effect of those provisions and the case may not be decided solely on the basis of the Breaux line of cases.

In the original briefs filed with this Court, all parties appeared to agree that the applicable policy exclusions in the two policies are as set forth below.

The exclusions in the primary liability policy of Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Company on which that company relies read as follows:

“Exclusions
This insurance does not apply:
* * * * * *
(m) to loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed resulting from
(1) a delay in or lack of performance by or on behalf of the named insured or any contract or agreement, or
(2) the failure of the named insured’s products or work performed by or on behalf of the named insured to meet the level of performance, quality, fitness or durability warranted or represented by the named insured;
but this exclusion does not apply to loss of use of other tangible property resulting from the sudden and accidental physical injury to or destruction of the named insured’s products or work performed by or on behalf of the named insured after such products or work have been put to use by any person or organization other than an insured;
(n) to property damage to the named insured’s products arising out of such products or any part of such products;
(o) to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts, or equipment furnished in connection therewith;
* * * >y

In supplemental provisions contained in Endorsement No. 8 to the policy the following exclusion appears:

“(z) with respect to the completed operations hazard, to property damage to work performed by the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith.”

(With respect to the Bituminous policy, Southwest urges in a supplemental brief that exclusion “o” was eliminated. Southwest contends that Endorsement No. 8, to be discussed later, replaced exclusion “o” with an exclusion designated “x” which in turn was replaced by exclusion “z” set forth above. Southwest further contends that this process of amendment and substitution had the effect of providing coverage to Duncan for property damage performed on behalf of Duncan as the named insured by subcontractors.)

The exclusions of the excess liability policy of Houston General Insurance Company on which that company relies read as follows:

“This policy does not apply:
* * * * * SfS
(d) to Property Damage to
(1) goods or products (including any container thereof) manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the named insured, or by others trading under his name, or premises alienated by the named insured, arising out of such goods, products or premises or any part of such goods, products or premises; or (2) work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith;
(e) to such part of any damages or expense which represents the cost of inspecting, repairing, replacing, removing, recovering, withdrawing from use or loss of use of, because of any known or suspected defect or deficiency therein, any
(1) goods or products or any part thereof (including any container) manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the named insured, or by others trading under his name; or
(2) work completed by or for the named insured; or other property of which such goods, products or work completed are a competent part or ingredient;
* * * »

APPELLANTS’ INITIAL ARGUMENTS

From the advance premiums noted in the Bituminous policy contract (Tr. 58-59), the policy covered comprehensive general liability insurance, independent contractors insurance, completed operations and products insurance. The appellants in their brief seem to suggest that there may be some question as to whether the policies do in fact provide completed operations insurance coverage. However, the insurers, Bituminous and Houston General, make no disclaimer in this regard. (Although the Bituminous policy is in some respects not clear on this point, we conclude that the policy does include coverage for completed operations hazard or products hazard. We make this conclusion despite the apparent exclusion of these coverages in Bituminous Endorsement No. 2 to the policy. This is because we conclude that Bituminous Endorsement No. 8 does provide completed operations coverage. In this connection we note that the Bituminous endorsements appear to have been written at the same time as the policy and date from the same date, October 1, 1979.)

Southwest contends that completed operations coverage is afforded only through Endorsement 8 and that there are no exclusions in the endorsement itself. Therefore, Southwest reasons that the exclusions listed above in the Bituminous policy, which appear in the basic policy, do not apply to Endorsement No. 8. We find these contentions of Southwest to be without merit for the following reasons.

The basic Bituminous policy was issued for the period October 1, 1979 to October 1, 1980. Endorsement 8 was made effective at the same time as the basic policy.

Endorsement No. 8 to the Bituminous policy bears the title heading SUPPLEMENTAL MISCELLANEOUS LIABILITY (Contractors Form). This endorsement provides broad form property damage coverage and is available either with or without completed operations coverage. If completed operations coverage is to be included, the election and agreement to include it must be specifically indicated by checking a box on the form indicating the selection of this option. The following provision is provided in Endorsement No. 8:

“This endorsement is effective from October 1, 1979, at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the named, insured’s address, and subject to all exclusions, conditions and other terms of the policy except as specifically amended herein, forms a part of policy No. GL 1 151 536 issued to (1) Howard A. Duncan, Inc. (See End. # 1)” (Emphasis supplied.)

By this language Endorsement No. 8 specifically incorporated all those exclusions set forth in the basic policy.

Endorsement No. 8 further states:

“In consideration of the payment of the premiums stated in the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance schedule as applicable to this endorsement, it is agreed that the insurance is amended to include the coverage amendments and additions described in the Coverage Section of this endorsement subject to the following provisions. * * * * ”

Endorsement No. 8 provides a number of types of insurance coverage. Broad form property damage (BFPD) coverage is only one of the types of insurance provided. As noted above BFPD coverage is available in two forms. (Tr 70). If BFPD coverage excluding completed operations coverage is selected, the following language (Tr. 72) relating to exclusion of coverage applies:

“1. The exclusions relating to property damage to (1) property owned, occupied or used by or rented to the insured or in the care, custody or control of the insured or as to which the insured is for any purpose exercising physical control and (2) work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith, are replaced by the following exclusions (w) and (x):
“(w) to property damage * * *
“(x) with respect to the completed operations hazard, to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith.”

As a result of this quoted language exclusion “o” in the basic (GCGL) policy is replaced by exclusion “x.” However, the two exclusions read the same; therefore no change is effected except for the letter designation of the exclusion. These exclusions are sometimes referred to as the “work product exclusion.” Breaux v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra and Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Pole Building, Inc., 478 F.2d 185 (9th Cir.1973).

The policy written by Bituminous in favor of Duncan included completed operations coverage by reason of the checking of the appropriate box indicating selection of that optional coverage, i.e., BROAD FORM PROPERTY DAMAGE COVERAGE (Including Completed Operations). See Tr. 70. Following the box containing the check, the following language is printed and applies to Duncan’s Bituminous policy:

“An ‘X’ in this box means that the Broad Form Property Damage coverage is amended as follows:

1. The title is amended as stated above.
2. Exclusion (x) is replaced by the following exclusion (z):
(z) with respect to the completed operations hazard, to property damage to work performed by the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith.
* * * »

Inasmuch as exclusion (x) replaced the original exclusion “o,” the latter forms no part of the Bituminous policy. However, exclusion “x” applies only to broad form property damage (BFPD) coverage which excludes completed operations. Selection of the option provision of BFPD coverage to include completed operations resulted in replacement of exclusion “x” with exclusion “z.”

Comparison of exclusion “x” and “z” discloses that exclusion “z” omits the words “or on behalf of” which appear in exclusion “x.” In a supplemental brief filed by Southwest with this Court on the day of oral argument, that appellant contends that the language difference between exclusion “x” and exclusion “z” resulted in including coverage for liability incurred through subcontractors. Southwest then suggests that the only work not subcontracted by Howard Duncan, Inc. was the pouring of the concrete slab and underlying pilings, and further that the engineering work and subsoil testing were subcontracted. Therefore, Southwest concludes that Duncan is liable for work done by subcontractors, and coverage is afforded for such liability by the Bituminous policy.

This position taken by Southwest is supported by writers and authorities in the field of insurance: See Jack P. Gibson, Broad Form Property Damage Coverage Analysis, Application and Alternatives, Second Edition, Dallas, Texas, International Risk Management Institute, Inc., 1981; The Fire Casualty & Surety Bulletins (FC & S Bulletins), Casualty Surety Volume, Subject: Public Liability, 1981, pages A-14, Bf 1 and Epb-Epba 1; David M. Sanborn, “Workmanship Exclusion,” Independent Agent, (February, 1979), 35-36; David M. Sanborn, “Workmanship Exclusions — 2,” Independent Agent (March, 1979) 29-35 and David M. Sanborn, “Workmanship Exclusion — 3,” Independent Agent, (April, 1979) 49-53.

Bituminous and Houston General have both chosen to answer the argument set forth by Southwest in its supplemental brief by assuming the correctness of Southwest’s postulate outlined above. Bituminous urges that the pertinent “work performed on behalf of the named insured” in this case consisted of engineering services and subsoil testing. Bituminous urges that since the engineering services and subsoil testing constituted the “work performed” on behalf of the insured, Duncan, we must then take into consideration that no damage was sustained by these engineering services or the subsoil testing. This work was in the nature of services and not susceptible of being damaged. Therefore, so Bituminous contends, “the work” performed by these subcontractors has not been damaged.

Houston General argues that the insurance in question does not insure the cause of the damage, only what was actually damaged. In this case, so Houston General urges, any damage sustained by the grain storage facility and its foundation when it was loaded with grain resulted from sinking caused by the failure of the soil underlying the slab of the structure to withstand the pressure when the facility was put to use. In its supplemental brief Houston states: “This argument is simply another way that the appellants are trying to demonstrate that the cause of the damage somehow renders ineffective the exclusion relative to work product. In short, the appellant [Southwest] is saying that perhaps the fault of a subcontractor caused the damage to the grain elevator, and thus the exclusion does not apply. This argument is obviously fallacious. As stated at oral argument and in previous briefs on behalf of Houston General, the policy does not address what caused the damage, but only what was actually damaged. Here there is no question but that the work product of Howard Duncan has been damaged. The subsoil contractor’s ‘work’ has not been damaged and is not sued upon in this case; the drawings or designs of any subcontractor architect have not been damaged in this matter, and are not actually the work which is being sued upon. Damage is to the grain elevator which was built by Howard Duncan; the fact that the Bituminous endorsement may leave out the language ‘or on behalf of the named insured’ is of no moment in determining what has been damaged, but only determining what caused the damage. This is not relevant to our inquiry.”

Houston General further points out that the supplemental brief of Southwest does not even mention the Houston General policy. Houston General urges that this is because its policy contains exclusion (d)(2) which states “This policy does not apply ... (d) to Property Damage to .. . (2) work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof .... ” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, Houston General urges that its policy covers neither damaged work of insured contractors nor their subcontractors.

Houston General sets forth other arguments based on its assertion that its policy is not merely an excess insurance policy, but is an umbrella policy as well, which contains applicable exclusions.

On its behalf Bituminous further urges that irrespective of the argument surrounding exclusion “x,” the other exclusions remaining should not be disregarded and should be given effect. Particularly, Bituminous refers to exclusion “n” which specifically excludes property damage to the named insured’s product. In the event that this should be found to be true, it would raise questions of ambiguity inasmuch as two provisions of the policy would be in conflict. There is an apparent conflict between the provisions of exclusion “n” and exclusion “z” if the term “product” in exclusion “n” applies to a building or any part of a building. One seems to exclude work performed by both the insured and subcontractors. The other appears to exclude only work performed by the insured, thus indicating coverage of subcontractors. Such an ambiguity would be construed in favor of the insured. Lee v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 387 So.2d 621 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980).

At this point we consider the argument on behalf of appellants that exclusions do not extend coverage. This argument might be pertinent if we were confronted solely with the effect of replacement of exclusions “o” and “x” by exclusion “z.” However, the extension of coverage is found in con-nexity between the basic CGL policy language insuring Duncan’s liability and Endorsement No. 8 which extends broad form property damage coverage. Clearly coverage was extended as modified by exclusion “z.” At this point in our resolution of the issue, exclusions “o” and “x” have passed out of the picture. They are significant only as a factor in the history of the change which has resulted in a less restrictive exclusion represented by “z.”

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

For the sake of clarity, we will recapitulate at this point the conclusions we have reached thus far.

1. The policy of Bituminous provided completed operations coverage and the policy of Houston General did also.

2. The Broad Form Property Damage coverage provided by Bituminous included completed operations coverage.

3. The completed operations coverage under the BFPD coverage was subject to all the exclusions stated in the basic comprehensive liability policy subject to the substitution of exclusion “z” in place of “o.”

4. Exclusion “z,” with respect to the completed operations hazard, does not exclude coverage for property damage to work performed on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work.

5. Exclusion “z” and exclusion “n” are in conflict if a building or its component parts are to be considered a “product” as that term is employed in exclusion “n.” Under the circumstances, exclusion “z” must prevail over exclusion “n.” If a building should not be deemed a “product” it would not apply here at all.

6. Based on the above, the Bituminous policy, at least provided completed operations coverage for property damage to work performed for the insured, Duncan, by subcontractors.

CONCLUSIONS WITH REFERENCE TO BITUMINOUS

At this point, we are concerned with the exclusion or non-exclusion of coverage for “property damage to work performed ... arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith.” Regardless of who may have performed the work, “the work” in the context of the exclusionary language in question must evidently be work of a tangible nature capable of being damaged. This conclusion is fortified by the addition of the words which follow the words “the work.” The provision applies not only to “the work,” but also to property damage arising out of “any portion thereof” and further “out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith.”

From the above we conclude that “work performed” affected by exclusion “z” of completed operations coverage must necessarily form part of the permanent, tangible, visible structure and exist in concrete form. Otherwise, any work which may be in question would not be susceptible of sustaining damage. For example, a surveyor might be engaged to locate a building on a given area of ground, to stake it out and to establish levels for the foundation and slab surface. If the surveyor mislocates the building or in misshapen form or sets the guides for levels incorrectly, the ultimate construction will contain errors and deficiencies. The contractor will be liable for these and will have to answer to the owner-contractor. While the surveyor’s work was essential to the construction, his work is a service which itself does not remain or persist in permanent, tangible or visible form, and the survey work is merely reflected in the work performed by the contractor or a subcontractor who follows the temporary stakes and guidelines set up by the surveyor. When the surveyor moves off the construction site, he leaves nothing which may be damaged.

We conclude that damage to some thing is essential to bring exclusion “z” into play.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that service consisting of soil testing or engineering advice and design would hardly qualify as “work performed” within the meaning of exclusion “z” of the Bituminous policy. The soil tester and engineer did not fabricate any part of the tangible work which sustained damage which is the measure of Duncan’s liability to Southwest. We now pass to subcontracted construction work.

What we have said has no effect on any liability the soil tester and engineer may owe to Duncan which relied on their services.

Ultimately, in construing the Bituminous policy we hold that there is no completed operations coverage for work performed by Duncan itself (the insured). This result is dictated by cases represented by Breaux, Vitenas and Peltier. These cases construed an all-embracing type exclusion such as “o” which is the same as “x.” Contrariwise, the damage to all portions of the work on the structure performed by subcontractors will be covered. This result obtains because exclusion “z” retains the exclusion for property damage to work performed by the insured arising out of the work but eliminates it as to damage to work performed on behalf of the insured. Such a result should obtain even if Duncan’s work (assuming it built the foundation) was performed in a workmanlike manner and failed only because of the condition of the subsoil. In summary, if subcontractor’s work sustained damage attributable to an unstable foundation, the subcontracted work should be covered because it is not excluded by exclusion “z.”

The petition of Southwest alleges that part of the construction to be performed was subcontracted. In Southwest’s supplemental brief it makes the following assertions:

“Although Howard Duncan, Inc. was the general contractor for the construction of the grain elevator for Southwest Louisiana Grain, the only work not subcontracted was the pouring of the concrete slab and underlying pilings. The engineering work and sub-soil testing was subcontracted and it is evident from all the discovery taken up to the present that the sub-soil is not sufficient to support the facility. At this point it appears that Duncan, Inc., is liable for work done by sub-contractors and coverage is afforded for such liability by the Bituminous policy.”

In addition to the assertion just quoted, plaintiff’s petition alleges that certain work was performed through subcontractors. As the appellee insurers were dismissed through motion for summary judgment, it is not established precisely what Duncan as the general contractor did and what any subcontractors may have done.

From the foregoing, it is clear that genuine issues of material fact exist as to what work Duncan may have performed and what subcontractors may have performed. Also, the monetary value or damages sustained by work performed by subcontractors is an issue of fact which must be established through trial. For these reasons, the summary judgment in favor of Bituminous must be reversed and the case remanded as to it.

Thus far we have not discussed exclusion “m” of the Bituminous policy, although Bituminous maintains in its original brief that it applies. However, beyond including this exclusion among the other exclusions quoted as relied upon, there is no discussion of the exclusion. We make no comment on this exclusion other than to point out that it relates “to loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed ...” (Emphasis supplied). Also, the exclusion contains its own exclusion. In view of the fact that none of the parties have attempted to relate this exclusion to any facts alleged in plaintiff’s petition as amended or any other items which may be considered on motion for summary judgment, we find nothing to consider involving this exclusion.

CONCLUSIONS WITH REFERENCE TO HOUSTON GENERAL

We conclude that the motion for summary judgment granted in favor of Houston General was proper. Unlike the Bituminous policy, the Houston General policy does not contain an exclusion of the type represented by exclusion “z.” Rather, Houston General’s exclusions include language of the type represented by exclusions “o” and “x.” Therefore, the completed operations coverage afforded by Houston General excludes any damages for defective work or product performed either by Duncan or any of its subcontractors. The language also excludes loss of use claims resulting from work performed by or on behalf of the named insured.

Houston General’s policy is a separate policy. It is in no way tied to the Bituminous policy except, as broadly provided, that it is excess over the limits of the Bituminous policy. Otherwise, Houston General’s contractual obligation is governed by its own terms. It does not in any way import into its contract terms any portion of the Bituminous policy. It contains its own insuring agreement, definitions, exclusions and other usual provisions. Therefore, Houston General’s own exclusions apply to Houston General’s obligation. None of the exclusions of the Bituminous policy apply to Houston General’s obligation.

Under the circumstances, Houston General is entitled to be dismissed from this case under Breaux v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra, Vitenas v. Centanni, supra; Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc., supra; Superior Steel, Inc. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 415 So.2d 354 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982) and Old River Terminal Co-op v. Davco Corporation of Tennessee, et al., 431 So.2d 1068 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).

For the reasons given above, the judgment of the trial court dismissing this action as to Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Company is reversed and set aside. The judgment dismissing Houston General Insurance Company is affirmed both as to the principal and incidental demands. The costs of this appeal are assessed to Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Company.

REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED, AFFIRMED IN PART.

DIX I

SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA GRAIN, INC. VS. NO. 47,895 HOWARD A. DUNCAN, INC. ETAL 15TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ACADIA STATE OF LOUISIANA

PETITION IN SUIT FOR DAMAGES

TO THE HONORABLE, THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF ACADIA, STATE OF LOUISIANA:

The petition of SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA GRAIN, INC., a domestic corporation domiciled in Acadia Parish, Louisiana, with respect represents:

1.

(a) HOWARD A. DUNCAN, INC., a domestic corporation domiciled in Acadia Parish, Louisiana, having as its registered «agent for the service of process Mr. Howard D. Duncan, 111 East Mill Street, Crowley, Louisiana;
(b) SOLLAY-BAKER FOUNDATIONS, INC., a domestic corporation domiciled in Jefferson Davis Parish, Louisiana, having as its agents for. the service of process Mr. Edwin K. Hunter and Mr. J.A. Delafield, 901 Lakeshore Drive, Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601;
(c) ROBERT A. CLEVELAND, a major resident of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, 336 Elizabeth Street, Lafayette, Louisiana 70501;
(d) MEMPHIS CONCRETE & SILO COMPANY, INC., a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Louisiana, having as its registered agent for the service of process Ben Miller, Jr., 401 North Boulevard, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821;
(e) GREEN’S HARDWARE & MACHINERY COMPANY, a domestic corporation domiciled in Acadia Parish, Louisiana, whose agents for the service of process are Murphy J. Green, 424 East First Street, Crowley, Louisiana, and Noble M. Chambers, Court Circle, Crowley, Louisiana;
(f) BITUMINOUS FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Louisiana, having as its agent for the service of process the Secretary of State of the State of Louisiana;
(g) MISSION INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation domiciled in California, doing business in the State of Louisiana, having as its agent for the service of process the Secretary of State of the State of Louisiana;
(h) HOUSTON GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Louisiana, having as its agent for the service of process the Secretary of State of the State of Louisiana.

2.

At all times pertinent hereto Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Mission Insurance Company and Houston General Insurance Company were insurers of Howard A. Duncan, Inc., for all losses incurred by petitioner.

3.

On April 18, 1978, petitioner and defendant Howard A. Duncan, Inc., entered into a standard form contract wherein it was agreed that Howard A. Duncan, Inc., would design and build a grain elevator and storage facility on the Mermentau River at Mermentau, Acadia Parish, Louisiana.

4.

Upon information and belief defendant Howard A. Duncan, Inc., sub-contracted with Sollay-Baker Foundations, Inc., to perform certain work on the foundation; defendant Robert A. Cleveland was the project engineer selected; defendant Memphis Concrete & Silo Company constructed the concrete silos; defendant Green’s Hardware & Machinery Company of Crowley provided the machinery.

5.

Through no fault of petitioner the facility was not completed until October, 1980, causing significant loss of revenue and other damages to petitioner which will be itemized below.

6.

Since completion, severe and serious problems with the foundation and with differential settlement of up to two feet have occurred with serious consequences. The following non-exclusive particulars have occurred:

(a) Four silos have become completely unusable and will need to be demolished and rebuilt;
(b) The structural integrity of the loading structures is zero and must be replaced;
(e) Unsafe conditions exist on the catwalk above the silos;
(d) All the silos are now out of plumb and all related equipment attached thereto has been rendered useless due to misalignment side effects; and
(e) All screw conveyors have been rendered inoperative.

7.

All problems above noted will continue to worsen until the foundation is stabilized and repairs affected, if this is possible. Upon information and belief, it is not, and demolition is inevitable.

8.

Including but not limited to the foundation, good grain elevator design and/or building practices were not followed during the course of engineering and construction of the entire facility.

9.

Defendants have breached their obligation to perform in a good workmanlike manner free from defects attributable to faulty materials and/or poor workmanship. They have not exercised skillful diligence and careful work practices in the following non-exclusive particulars:

(a) Insufficient soil testing was done to determine what construction was needed to ensure a solid, safe foundation;
(b) The foundation pilings were not constructed to the specifications noted in the contract;
(c) The foundation plans themselves were inadequate; and
(d) The construction of the foundation and underground pilings was not done in a workmanlike manner.

10.

Upon information and belief defendants Howard A. Duncan, Inc., and Green’s Hardware & Machinery Company have installed equipment of different types, sizes and quality than originally specified, including the grain cleaner system, the grain dryer system, the lower shipping conveyor and the barge loading system, which resulted in a facility incapable of operating at a capacity required and requested by petitioner, all in violation of their contract.

11.

Petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and expert witness fees in addition to the damages itemized below.

12.

As a result of the breach of contract and warranty of fitness, and under Civil Code Articles 2762, 2769 and others not enumerated, Howard A. Duncan, Inc., and its subcontractors, petitioner has suffered the following damages:

(a) Loss of income as a result of the late completion— $ 750,000.00
(b) Cost of attempted correction and repairs already expended— 120,000.00
(c) Cost of replacement machinery and equipment— 250,000.00
(d) Demolition cost— 750,000.00
(e) Replacement cost and cost of rebuilding and repair— 4,000,000.00
(f) Future loss of income— 3,500,000.00
(g) General damages— 2.000.000.00
TOTAL $11,370,000.00

13.

Petitioner is entitled to and does hereby request the matter be tried before a jury.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that after all legal delays and due proceedings had there be judgment herein in his favor and against the defendants, Howard A. Duncan, Inc., Sollay-Baker Foundations, Inc., Robert A. Cleveland, Memphis Concrete & Silo Company, Inc., Green’s Hardware & Machinery Company, Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Mission Insurance Company and Houston General Insurance Company, in the full sum of ELEVEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($11,370,000.00) DOLLARS, together with legal interest from date of judicial demand, until paid, and for all costs of these proceedings.

Petitioner further prays that this matter be heard before a jury.

By its attorneys,
EVERETT & EVERETT
BY: Glennon P. Everett
GLENNON P. EVERETT Post Office Box 44 Crowley, Louisiana 70526

ORDER

Considering the above, it is

ORDERED that plaintiff be granted a trial by jury and a bond for costs be set at $2000/00.

Signed this 21st day of April. 1981.

/s/G. Bradford Ware DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX II

SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA GRAIN, INC. VS. NO. 47,895 HOWARD A. DUNCAN, INC., ETAL 15TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OP ACADIA STATE OF LOUISIANA

AMENDED PETITION

TO THE HONORABLE, THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF ACADIA, STATE OF LOUISIANA:

The amended petition of SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA GRAIN, INC., through undersigned counsel, with respect represents:

1.

Petitioner wishes to amend its original petition to make Louisiana Testing & Inspection, Inc., a party defendant. Accordingly, the original petition is amended so as to add the following item to Paragraph 1:

“(i) LOUISIANA TESTING & INSPECTION, INC., a domestic corporation, having as its registered agent for the service of process Mr. Harry R. Smith, 1202 Oak Lawn, Lafayette, Louisiana 70501.”

2.

Petitioner wishes to amend the original petition so as to add an additional paragraph thereto, to read as follows:

“4 A.
Defendant, Louisiana Testing & Inspection, Inc., made a sub soil foundation investigation at the construction site at the request of Howard A. Duncan, Inc. Upon information and belief Robert A. Cleveland was employed by Louisiana Testing & Inspection, Inc., at this time and relied on Louisiana Testing’s findings in making his foundation recommendations.

3.

Petitioner wishes to amend Paragraph 5 of the original petition so as to make that paragraph read as follows:

“5.
Through no fault of petitioner the facility was not completed until November, 1979, causing significant loss of revenue and other damages to petitioner which will be itemized below.”

4.

Petitioner reiterates all of the allegations, as amended above, of its original petition.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that defendant Louisiana Testing & Inspection, Inc. be served with a copy of this petition as provided by law, and that after all legal delays and due proceedings had there be judgment in its favor as prayed for in the original petition.

By its attorneys,
EVERETT & EVERETT
BY: Glennon P. Everett
GLENNON P. EVERETT Post Office Box 44 Crowley, Louisiana 70526

CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the above and foregoing amended petition were this day mailed to all counsel of record in this cause, postage prepaid and properly addressed.

Crowley, Louisiana, this 27th day of May, 1981.

s/Glennon P. Everett GLENNON P. EVERETT


author: PRICE, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Joseph L. GRIFFIN, Appellant.
    No. 15455-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 15, 1983.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 29, 1983.
    Writ Denied Dec. 9,1983.

      Sanders & Sanders by Martin S. Sanders, Jr., Winnfield, for appellant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles B. Bice, Dist. Atty., Kermit M. Simmons, Asst. Dist. Atty., Winnfield, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, HALL and JASPER E. JONES, JJ.
   PRICE, Judge.

On March 8,1982, defendant was charged by a grand jury indictment with the offense of incest of his 14-year-old daughter, in violation of La.R.S. 14:78. He was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to serve nine (9) years at hard labor. It is from this conviction and sentence that defendant appeals alleging eight assignments of error. FACTS:

The facts of the case are essentially that defendant and his daughter, while hunting in the woods behind their home in Winn Parish in the fall of 1980, engaged in sexual intercourse.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 1

Defendant contends the trial court erred in not sustaining the challenge for cause of prospective juror Carl Womack after he made a prejudicial remark concerning the penalty for the crime charged. On voir dire Womack was asked certain questions concerning the crime of incest and the penalties involved. He expressed his opinion that the punishment “wasn’t rough enough.” When questioned further about his opinion he admitted he had no knowledge of the penalty for incest and further made the statement “just shoot him and be done with it.” Defendant’s challenge for cause was overruled by the court. Defendant used a peremptory challenge to excuse Womack and as his remaining 12 challenges were exhausted prior to completion of the panel, he may properly complain of the court’s ruling under La.C.Cr.P. Art. 800. See also State v. Sugar, 408 So.2d 1329 (La.1982).

Defendant contends that the statement made by the prospective juror was a ground for which a challenge for cause should have been sustained. The issue in this assignment is whether or not the statement “just shoot him and be done with it” in light of the entire questioning on voir dire was enough to be considered a challenge for cause such that failure to do so would constitute an abuse of the trial judge’s wide discretion. “The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and only where it appears, upon review of the voir dire examination as a whole, that the judge’s exercise of that discretion has been arbitrary or unreasonable, resulting in prejudice to the accused, will this Court reverse the ruling of the trial judge.” State v. Passman, 345 So.2d 874 (La.1977).

Before determining whether the challenge for cause should have been sustained, the voir dire examination of Womack must be considered as a whole. Womack made the prejudicial statement in regard to the penalty of one found guilty of the crime of incest. It did not directly relate to the prospective juror’s impression of guilt as to this particular defendant. In fact, when asked by the district attorney whether he could be a fit juror, he said he knew of no reasons why he could not.

Looking at the entire testimony on voir dire, it appears that the prospective juror’s prejudicial remark referring to the penalty was not prejudicial to the guilt of this defendant. He stated that he could be a fair juror and as such it was not error for the trial judge to overrule defendant’s challenge for cause. See also State v. Heard, 408 So.2d 1247 (La.1982). Defendant’s allegation of error therefore lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

Defendant contends in this assignment of error that it was improper for the trial judge to limit his examination of prospective juror, Donald Turner. On voir dire, the defense attorney asked Mr. Turner whether he would require testimony of the accomplice to be corroborated by other evidence. The prosecuting attorney objected to this question as being a misstatement of the law and misleading. The trial court sustained the objection.

The scope of the voir dire examination is within the discretion of the Court, as expressed by La.C.Cr.P. Art. 786:

The court, the state, and the defendant shall have the right to examine prospective jurors. The scope of the examination shall be within the discretion of the court. A prospective juror, before being examined, shall be sworn to answer truthfully questions asked him relative to his qualifications to serve as a juror in the case.

State v. Robinson, 404 So.2d 907 (La.1981), defines the discretion given a trial judge on voir dire examinations as follows:

Voir dire examination is designed to test the competency and impartiality of prospective jurors and may not serve to pry into their opinions concerning evidence to be offered at trial.
It is well-established that the scope of voir dire examination is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his rulings thereon will not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse of discretion.
Undoubtedly, the defense is entitled to wide latitude in examining prospective jurors. This right is, however, to be exercised within the discretion of the trial judge who determines the scope of the examination under the prevailing facts and circumstances. And when the question arises whether voir dire examination has been unduly restricted, the disallowance of a proper question is not automatically reversible. In evaluating the fairness of the ruling, the entire examination must be considered, (citations omitted) 404 So.2d 907 at pp. 911, 912.

As a prosecution for incest normally involves two persons only and they often have no other witnesses to corroborate the testimony of the two persons involved, there is no requirement that other testimony be adduced in order for guilt to be found. In the case at hand, the defendant’s daughter was the only witness to the crime. Defendant misstated the law in implying that the victim’s testimony be supplemented by other testimony. The trial court was correct in disallowing the question and as such no merit can be found in defendant’s second assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

Defendant contends that it was error for the trial court to allow the age of the victim to be introduced into evidence. He contends that it was error to introduce such evidence as it was prejudicial and irrelevant.

When a jury is told by a 16-year-old that at the age of 14 she was having sexual intercourse with her father, it may very well inflame the jurors. Yet, that alone would not make it error for the trial court to allow the victim’s age to be introduced at trial. In evaluating the testimony of witnesses, it is advantagéous to the jury to allow the age of a witness to be expressed. The witness’ credibility is at issue so the more the jury can learn about the witness’ personal history such as age, education, occupation, etc., the more easily the jury can establish what weight it will give to the witness’ testimony. In light of this rationale, it is apparent that defendant’s third assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4

The defendant contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the defense attorney to ask the witness, defendant’s daughter, whether it was true that on an occasion she ran off with a truck driver. When the question was asked, the prosecutor objected to the statement as being irrelevant, and the objection was sustained.

The following colloquy took place at trial:

Q ..., this ... do you have any idea as to the dates that you are trying to tell us that you had the relations with your father?
A It was about in ...
Q Well, let me ask you this. It ... it is true that you left school and run off from home and went up in Mississippi somewhere ...
BY MR. BRICE: We object.
Q ... with a truck driver, is it not?
BY MR. BRICE: That is not relevant and Mr. Sanders knows it.
BY MR. SANDERS, JR.: I am trying to find out when the date was.
BY THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

The question adduced by defense attorney is not relevant to the determination of the guilt or innocence of his client. If he asked the question to get a time frame as to when the crime occurred, he would have allowed the witness to answer the question the first time that he asked her to be specific as to the date, and he would not have interrupted her answer by asking about “running away with a truck driver.” There was no abuse of trial court discretion in sustaining the objection, therefore, defendant’s assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5

Defendant contends that it was error for the trial judge to allow testimony concerning other sexual relations between defendant and his daughter, as they were prejudicial and irrelevant. It is true that defendant was on trial for one specific, act of intercourse with his daughter only, so as a general rule evidence of other crimes is not allowed to be introduced. The exception to this is present in the case now before this court. The prosecutor was careful not to ask questions concerning other sexual activities'between defendant and his daughter. It was defendant’s counsel who first questioned the witness about other occasions concerning sexual activity.

After the defense first asked the witness if she had engaged in sex before and after the crime for which defendant was on trial, the prosecutor had a right to allow the witness an explanation of her answers to those questions. State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528 (La.1982).

The trial court is given discretion in controlling the redirect examination of witness and absent abuse the conviction will not be overturned on appeal. State v. Chapman, 410 So.2d 689 (La.1982). No abuse can be found in this instance. Defendant’s assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 6 and 7

Defendant asserts in these two assignments of error that the state failed to include in its answers to defendant’s bill of particulars that testimony would be adduced concerning references that defendant made to the Bible and also testimony of defendant’s non-response when questioned about the incest episode by members of his family.

Defendant in his bill of particulars, asked for the following information:

11. Has the defendant made any confession, admission or statement, or a written statement, inculpatory or exculpatory; if affirmative, oyer thereof, including a full statement of the substance, nature, and contents thereof.

The state’s response was as follows:

11. Yes; as stated to various family members, words to the effect that it is not all my fault; there is a Biblical precedent; I don’t want to hurt ... anymore; in other statements admitting commission of sexual intercourse with Kimberly, the victim, all of which were made at different times and places following his initial arrest but after his release from custody on bond.

Defendant contends that the admission of his commission of the offense as expressed by one of his daughters was not included in the answer and thus a surprise to the defense. He states that the state did not forewarn him that those statements would be used at trial. Such is not the case. In the above answer to the defendant’s request, the state gave the defendant ample information that a statement with Biblical reference would be utilized as well as other statements that defendant had made admitting his commission of the crime before family members. Although the prosecution did not give the statements to the defendant verbatim, it did give the general nature and as such the defendant was informed of their existence.

Furthermore, prior to trial and pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. Art. 769, the state gave notice to defendant that it would be introducing into evidence inculpatory statements that defendant made at his home, the home of Mr. and Mrs. Pinder, and at Ronnie Bruce’s home. The testimony that defendant objects to are statements that he made at his home and at Ronnie Bruce’s home. As he was given prior notice, no surprise can be found and defendant’s assignments of error lack merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 8

Defendant’s final assignment of error is that the trial court erred in defining “cohabitation” as “any act of intercourse.” He argues that the meaning expressed by the trial court is not realistic nor within the purpose that the statute seeks to present.

Cohabitation as set forth in La.R.S. 14:78 has been interpreted as sexual intercourse since its enactment in 1884. See State v. Spurling, 115 La. 789, 40 So. 167 (La.1906). As such, defendant’s final assignment of error also lacks merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED.


author: KLIEBERT, Judge.

text:
    SUCCESSION OF Dorothey DePasquale BERTOLINO. In re DESERT PALACE, INC. v. SUCCESSION OF Dorothey DePasquale BERTOLINO.
    No. 83 C 570.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    Aug. 18, 1983.

      Lanny R. Zatzkis, Lynne W. Wasserman, New Orleans, for relator.
    Richard J. McGinity, New Orleans, for respondent.
    Before BOUTALL, KLIEBERT and GRISBAUM, JJ.
   KLIEBERT, Judge.

This matter comes before us on application for Writs of Review, Certiorari and Mandamus brought on behalf of Desert Palace, Inc. from the trial judge’s denial of a motion to consolidate and the upholding of the succession’s exception of no right or cause of action.

The relator, Desert Palace, Inc., pursuant to the provisions of La.C.C.P. Article 3241, filed a proof of claim with the succession representative asserting an indebtedness due to it of $750,000.00 represented by three checks of the decedent. Relator then filed a motion to traverse the inventory showing assets valued at $457,300.00 filed by the succession representative. In response, the succession representative filed an exception of no right or cause of action grounded in the contention the claimant was not an “interested party” within the meaning of La.C.C.P. Article 3137. This article provides in pertinent part as follows:

“... any interested person may traverse the descriptive list at any time, on contradictory motion served on the person filing it...”

The trial on the motions and exceptions was set for July 1,1983. On June 30,1983, the relator filed an ordinary suit seeking a money judgment for the $750,000.00 indebtedness set out in the proof of claim. Apparently, this petition had not been served on the succession representative at the time of the hearing. On July 15, 1983, the trial judge rendered judgment upholding the exception of no right or cause of action and denying the motion to compel discovery.

The relator properly submitted his proof of claim to the succession representative as required by La.C.C.P. Article 3241. Under the provisions of La.C.C.P. Article 3242, if the executor fails to take action on the claim within thirty days, the claim is considered rejected. Then, the claimant is entitled to enforce his claim judicially, La.C. C.P. Article 3246.

At the time of the hearing, the claimant was entitled to and was judicially seeking to enforce his claim and, as such, was an “interested party” within the meaning of La.C.C.P. Article 3137. Accordingly, the trial judge’s judgment denying the relator’s motion to compel discovery and upholding the succession representative’s exception of no right and no cause of action is set aside, and he is instructed to permit discovery and proceed with the motion to traverse the inventory in accordance with the views herein expressed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


author: DOUCET, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maverick HARMON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. CR82-818.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Aug. 30, 1983.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 1983.
    Nolan J. Edwards, Edwards, Stefanski & Barousse, Crowley, for defendant-appellant.
    Charles Brandt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellee.
    Before DOUCET, YELYERTON and KNOLL, JJ.
   DOUCET, Judge.

QUESTION OF TIMELINESS OF APPEAL

Defendant, Maverick Harmon, was convicted of second degree murder on October 19, 1982. He was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence on October 26, 1982. Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, an order to show cause was issued ordering defendant to show why his appeal should not be dismissed as having been untimely perfected under LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 914.

This article requires:

A motion for an appeal may be made orally in open court or by filing a written motion with the Clerk. The motion must be made no later than five days after the rendition of the judgment or ruling from which the appeal is taken. The motion shall be entered in the minutes of the Court.

Defendant was sentenced on October 26, 1982; however, he did not move for an appeal of his conviction until November 5, 1982. This time delay is beyond the five (5) day requirement established by the Legislature in article 914. Thus, the appeal has not met the requirements of this article.

In reply to the order to show cause, the defendant argues that the counsel for the defendant relied upon the notice given by the trial court that there would be a fifteen day delay in which to file the motion for an appeal. The following is taken from the record:

THE COURT: Okay. We had set sentencing for this morning.
Based on the findings of the jury, the Court sentences the defendant, Maverick Harmon, to life imprisonment at hard labor with the Department of Corrections, without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. I understand if there is a motion for appeal to be filed, that would have to be done by Mr. Edwards or—
MR. DEBLANC: Within fifteen (15) days.
THE COURT: All right. Court is adjourned.

It is contended that the above colloquy actually amounts to a grant by the trial court to an extension of time. Regardless of the construction we put on the colloquy, the trial judge would not have had the right or authority to extend the time within which the appeal may be taken. State v. Dartez, 222 La. 9, 62 So.2d 83 (La.1953). Therefore, the defendant’s reply to the order to show cause is without merit.

The proper course of action would have been for the defendant to have applied to this Court for an out-of-time appeal. Uniform Rule 3-2.1 of the Courts of Appeal provides:

In a criminal action, a defendant who, without fault, has failed to timely take an appeal may, by written motion supported by affidavit, apply to the court for an order permitting the taking of a delayed or out-of-time appeal.

However, the defendant has not applied to this court for an out-of-time appeal.

Inasmuch as the defendant’s motion for an appeal was untimely perfected under the requirements of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 914, it should be dismissed.

APPEAL DISMISSED. UNTIMELY FILED.

ORDER

After due consideration, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant-appellant, Maverick Harmon, for a delayed appeal be granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant’s application for rehearing be denied.

      . Acts 1982 No. 143 amended LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 914. Prior to the amendment, article 914 imposed a fifteen day requirement for filing a motion for appeal. The effective date of the amendment to article 914 was September 10, 1982; thus, the amendment was in effect at the date of the defendant’s sentencing.