author:
JUSTICE WEBER
      JUSTICE GRAY, JUSTICE TRIEWEILER,

text:
    EDMUND F. SHEEHY, MARGARET FLEMING, GEORGE McGOVERN, DONALD ZACK, RICHARD G. BRANCH, CHARLES W. VanDIEST, and ARNOLD S. WIRTALA, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated federal employees, both civil service employees and military employees, residing in the State of Montana, who have been subjected to paying state income tax on their pensions, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE OF MONTANA, the DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, a State Agency within the Executive Branch of State Government, of the State of Montana, Defendants and Respondents.
    No. 90-450.
    Submitted Aug. 15, 1991.
    Decided Nov. 14, 1991.
    250 Mont. 437.
    820 P.2d 1257.

      Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., argued, Cannon & Sheehy, Helena, for plaintiffs and appellants.
    R. Bruce McGinnis argued, Department of Revenue, Helena, for defendants and respondents.
   JUSTICE WEBER

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this case, we affirm a decision of the District Court for the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to refunds for state taxes paid for the years 1983 through 1988 on their retirement benefits received under the Federal Employees’ Retirement Act.

The issue is whether the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury (1989), 489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891, should be retroactively applied, entitling the plaintiffs to refunds for taxes paid in previous years.

Plaintiffs are retired federal employees who filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking to have § 15-30-lll(2)(c)(i), MCA (1989), declared unconstitutional. That statute provided that Montana state income tax would be assessed on benefits received under the Federal Employees’ Retirement Act in excess of $3,600. In contrast, under § 19-3-105, MCA (1989), all retirement benefits received under Montana’s Public Employees’ Retirement System were exempt from state and local taxes.

Following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Davis in March 1989, the District Court adopted the parties’ stipulation to the effect that § 15-30-lll(2)(c)(i), MCA (1989), is invalid for tax years commencing after December 31, 1988. The plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment that Davis should be applied retroactively and that they are entitled to refunds for previous tax years, subject to the statute of limitations. (In Davis, the state had conceded that refunds for previous years would be proper if the court found for plaintiffs.)

Using the factors set forth in LaRoque v. State (1978), 178 Mont. 315, 583 P.2d 1059, the District Court determined that Davis should not be applied retroactively. The court ruled that the Davis decision was neither predictable nor clearly foreshadowed. It decided that retroactive application of Davis would not promote the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity because it had already required that, in the future, federal and state retirees must be treated the same. Finally, it stated that adding the cost of refunds to Montana’s budget deficit would be inequitable to the citizens of Montana. Plaintiffs appeal.

Should the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis be applied retroactively, entitling the plaintiffs to refunds for taxes paid in previous years?

We will first review the major elements of the opinion of the United States Supreme Court inDavis. In that case, the plaintiffs challenged a Michigan tax scheme which exempted from state taxation all retirement benefits paid by the state to its retired employees but taxed retirement benefits paid by other employers, including the federal government. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the tax scheme, ruling that 4 U.S.C. § Ill did not apply to retirees and that, under a rational basis test, the taxing scheme was not unconstitutional because it furthered the state’s interest in attracting and retaining qualified employees. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the Michigan tax scheme violated the concept of intergovernmental tax immunity.

In delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice Kennedy first disposed of the State’s argument that 4 U.S.C. § Ill applies only to current employees of the federal government. In relevant part, that statute provides:

“The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for personal service as an officer or employee of the United States ... by a duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation.”

The Court stated that:

“We have no difficulty concluding that civil service retirement benefits are deferred compensation for past years of service rendered to the Government.” [Citations omitted.] And because these benefits accrue to employees on account of their service to the Government, they fall squarely within the category of compensation for services rendered ‘as an officer or employee of the United States.’ ”

Davis, 489 U.S. at 808, 109 S.Ct. at 1503-04. The Court then went on to conclude that the nondiscrimination clause applies to retirement benefits because retirement benefits are included in “pay or compensation.” Davis, 489 U.S. at 809, 109 S.Ct. at 1504.

The Court next discussed 4 U.S.C. § Ill as a codification of the rule that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity does not prohibit nondiscriminatory state taxation of federal employees. Davis, 489 U.S. at 810-14, 109 S.Ct. at 1505-07. The Court stated that although intergovernmental tax immunity is based on the need to protect each sovereign’s governmental operations from undue influence by the other, private entities or individuals who are subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of their dealings with a sovereign can also receive the protection of the constitutional doctrine. Davis, 489 U.S. at 814-15, 109 S.Ct. at 1507.

The Court then stated that the mode of analysis developed in equal protection cases was “inappropriate” in Davis. Instead, the test is whether the inconsistent tax treatment is related to and justified by significant differences between the two classes. Davis, 489 U.S. at 816, 109 S.Ct. at 1508.

The Court concluded that significant differences were not present and that therefore the tax act in question violated principles of intergovernmental tax immunity. Davis, 489 U.S. at 817, 109 S.Ct. at 1508. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs also direct the Court’s attention to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia (1991), 501 U.S._, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481. The opinion in Jim Beam was issued on June 20, 1991, after oral argument in the present case. In Jim Beam, the Court held that it is error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so. Plaintiffs argue that rule is dispositive and the decision in Davis must be applied retroactively here because it was applied retroactively in that case. Both parties submitted supplemental briefs discussing the application of Jim Beam to this case.

When Jim Beam was decided, pending before the Court on applications for certiorari were two cases in which retired federal employees in South Carolina and Virginia seek refunds of state income taxes under theories similar to those argued here. After Jim Beam was decided, the Court granted certiorari in both of those cases, vacated the state court decisions denying refunds, and remanded the cases to the state courts for “further consideration” in light of Jim Beam. Bass v. State of South Carolina (1991),_U.S._, 111 S.Ct. 2881, 115 L.Ed.2d 1047; Harper v. Virginia (1991),_U.S._, 111 S.Ct. 2883, 115 L.Ed.2d 1049.

The fact that the Supreme Court remanded Bass and Harper rather than simply reversing them indicates the Court’s uncertainty as to whether Jim Beam applies to the issue of Davis’ s retroactivity. We conclude that it does not apply. In Davis, the State had conceded that a refund was appropriate if the Court ruled for the appellants. Davis, 489 U.S. at 817, 109 S.Ct. at 1508. Because of that concession, the Court did not consider the issue of whether retroactive application should be granted. We therefore conclude that Davis is not authority for application of its rule retroactively. The underpinnings of the decision in Jim Beam are the doctrine of stare decisis and the principle of equality to all similarly situated litigants. Jim Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2446. Because Davis did not rule upon the issue of retroactivity, we conclude that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply. We conclude that the principle of equality or equal treatment to similarly situated litigants does not require that all future litigants, including the litigants in the present case, are bound by the stipulation of the State of Michigan in Davis.

We now consider whether retroactive application of the law set forth in Davis is appropriate in this case. In Chevron Oil v. Huson (1971), 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296, the United States Supreme Court recognized three factors to be considered before a rule of nonretroactive application of a judicial decision is adopted. Those factors are 1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law either by overruling established precedent on which litigants have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not foreshadowed, thereby leading to the conclusion that the decision should not be applied retroactively; 2) whether retroactive application will further or retard operation of the rule in question; and 3) whether substantial inequity will result from retroactive application. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355. Use of these three factors was adopted by this Court in LaRoque, 583 P.2d at 1061.

Plaintiffs argue that the result in Davis was clearly foreshadowed under the long-standing principle of intergovernmental tax immunity and as a logical extension of the Court’s decisions in a series of cases. However, as the State points out, the holding in Davis required three extensions of prior law. We will examine all three extensions of prior law to determine if each extension was clearly foreshadowed by previous cases.

In its first extension, the Davis Court pointed out that while retirement pay is not actually disbursed dining the time an individual is working for the government, the amount of benefits to be received in retirement are based and computed upon the individual’s salary and years of service. The Court “had no difficulty” concluding that civil service retirement benefits are deferred compensation for past years of service and therefore fall within the category of compensation for services rendered as an officer or employee of the United States. As authority for that conclusion, three federal circuit cases were cited. Davis, 489 U.S. at 808, 109 S.Ct. at 1503-04.

In its Davis holding, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the contention that 4 U.S.C. § 111 invalidated the Michigan tax, noting that the statute applied only to federal “employees.” Then the Michigan court determined that the appellants’ status under federal law in Davis was that of an “annuitant,” rather than as an employee, and that, as a result, 4 U.S.C. § 111 had no application. The logical determination by the Michigan court together with the action of other states which used tax schemes like Michigan’s and Montana’s, suggest there is a significant question of foreshadowing the application of 4 U.S.C. § 111.

The second extension of prior law took place when the Court established the connection between the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity and the protection against discriminatory taxation of individuals under 4 U.S.C. § Ill. Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity had been extended to protect individuals at least since the decision in Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist. (1960), 361 U.S. 376, 80 S.Ct. 474, 4 L.Ed.2d 384. But the Davis language addressing the relationship between intergovernmental tax immunity and 4 U.S.C. § Ill clearly breaks new ground:

“[I]t is reasonable to conclude that Congress drew upon the constitutional doctrine [of intergovernmental tax immunity] in defining the scope of the immunity retained in § Ill .... Hence, we conclude that the retention of immunity in § Ill is coextensive with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes embodied in the modern constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.”

Davis, 489 U.S. at 813, 109 S.Ct. 1506. The conclusion that the protection against discriminatory taxation retained under 4 U.S.C. § Ill is coextensive with the protection under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity represented an extension of prior law.

The third extension of prior law made in Davis follows from the first two extensions. In determining whether the state tax discriminated against federal employees, the Court decided that a “significant difference” standard should be used rather than one of the standards typically applied in equal protection cases. As plaintiffs point out, a “significant difference” standard had been used in matters involving intergovernmental tax immunity. See Phillips, 361 U.S. at 387, 80 S.Ct. at 481. However, in taxation cases in which equal protection is at issue, the Court had used as a standard the reasonableness of the classification. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. (1973), 410 U.S. 356, 359-60, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1003-4, 35 L.Ed.2d 351, 355. Until the Court determined in Davis that retirement benefits are protected under 4 U.S.C. § 111 and that the protections under that statute are coextensive with those provided under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, the standard of analysis was not clear.

The majority opinion in Davis clearly describes the Michigan view which rejected the contention that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity rendered the Michigan tax unconstitutional as follows:

“The Michigan Court of Appeals next rejected appellant’s contention that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity rendered the state’s tax treatment of federal retirement benefits unconstitutional. Conceding that ‘a tax may be held invalid ... if it operates to discriminate against the federal government and those with whom it deals,’... the court examined the State’s justifications for the discrimination under a rational-basis test. Ibid. The Court determined that the State’s interest in ‘attracting and retaining ... qualified employees’ was a ‘legitimate state objective which is rationally achieved by a retirement plan offering economic inducements,’ and it upheld the statute.”

Davis, 489 U.S. at 807, 109 S.Ct. at 1503. Using an equal protection analysis, the Michigan court concluded that the legitimate Michigan objective was a rational reason for the discrimination. That of course is directly contradictory to the conclusion reached in Davis, where the Supreme Court concluded that an equal protection analysis was not applicable and used a different standard. The critical significance of the standard of analysis is plain from the following passage from the Court’s opinion:

“The State points to two allegedly significant differences between federal and state retirees. First, the State suggests that its interest in hiring and retaining qualified civil servants through the inducement of a tax exemption for retirement benefits is sufficient to justify the preferential treatment of its retired employees. This argument is wholly beside the point, however, for it does nothing to demonstrate that there are ‘significant differences between the two classes’ themselves; rather, it merely demonstrates that the State has a rational reason for discriminating between two similar groups of retirees. The State’s interest in adopting the discriminatory tax, no matter how substantial, is simply irrelevant to an inquiry into the nature of the two classes receiving inconsistent treatment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Davis, 489 U.S. at 816, 109 S.Ct. at 1508. Thus, while it appears that the State of Michigan’s tax statutes would have been constitutional under an equal protection analysis, the tax statutes could not pass the “significant difference” test which the Court concluded must be applied.

In his dissent in Davis, Justice Stevens distinguished Phillips, upon which the majority relied as precedent for use of the “significant difference” standard. In Phillips, the tax was imposed only on lessees of federal property. Justice Stevens stated that:

“The States can tax federal employees or private parties who do business with the United States so long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States ... The Court today strikes down a state tax that applies equally to the vast majority of Michigan residents, including federal employees, because it treats retired state employees differently from retired federal employees. The Court’s holding is not supported by the rationale for the intergovernmental immunity doctrine and is not compelled by our previous decisions. I cannot join the unjustified, court-imposed restriction on a State’s power to administer its own affairs.
"... When the tax burden is shared equally by federal agents and the vast majority of a State’s citizens, however, the nondiscrimination principle is not applicable and constitutional protection is not necessary.
“The Michigan tax here applies to approximately 4V2 million individual taxpayers in the State, including the 24,000 retired federal employees. It exempts only the 130,000 retired state employees. Once one understands the underlying reason for the McCulloch [v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)] holding, it is plain that this tax does not unconstitutionally discriminate against federal employees.”

Davis, 489 U.S. at 818-21, 109 S.Ct. at 1509 -11. Injustice Stevens’ view the Court’s holding is not supported by the rationale for the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine and is not compelled by the Supreme Court’s previous decisions. Under the established equal protection analysis, the Michigan tax scheme appeared constitutional, but it failed the “significant difference” test which the Court applied. Applying the first factor under Chevron to this aspect, it appears that Davis did establish a new principle of law.

Plaintiffs further argue that the issue of whether the Davis decision was foreshadowed is controlled by this Court’s opinion in Jenson v. State Dept. of Labor and Industry (1984), 213 Mont. 84, 689 P.2d 1231, aff’d after remand, 221 Mont. 42, 718 P.2d 1335. In Jenson, the issue was whether this Court’s opinion in Crabtree v. Montana State Library (1983), 204 Mont. 398, 665 P.2d 231, was foreshadowed. This Court held that Crabtree did not create any new law because it simply was stating the plain language of the Veteran’s Preference Act. Jenson, 689 P.2d at 1233. Plaintiffs argue that in Davis the Court simply was stating the plain language of 4 U.S.C. § 111.

However, in Davis, as the State has pointed out, there was an additional step. 4 U.S.C. § 111 prohibits discriminatory taxation of “pay or compensation” received from the federal government. The Court held that federal retirement benefits were included in “pay or compensation” so that 4 U.S.C. § 111 applied. Davis, 489 U.S. at 808. In Crabtree, the Court was not faced with a comparable preliminary issue of whether the statute was applicable to the case at hand.

We conclude that this Court’s opinion in Jenson does not control as to whether Davis was foreshadowed. Further, because the Davis opinion required at least three extensions of previous law as discussed above, we hold that the result was not clearly foreshadowed.

The second element of the Chevron test is whether retroactive application will further or retard operation of the rule in question. The District Court stated that it could not “see how a retroactive application of the Davis decision would in any way promote” the concept of intergovernmental tax immunity. Plaintiffs argue that “the state’s total disregard for 4 U.S.C. § 111 would be condoned if Davis is not applied retroactively.”

Because we have concluded that the decision in Davis was not foreshadowed, the plaintiffs’ assertion that the tax imposed was illegal is an overstatement. The taxation scheme was not “illegal” until the Davis decision was issued, and the tax has not been imposed since that time. We conclude that refunds, as a result of retroactive application of Davis, would not promote the concept of intergovernmental tax immunity.

In considering the third factor under Chevron, the District Court concluded that equity directed that refunds not be made due to the financial burden on the citizens of the State of Montana. Plaintiffs argue that equity favors making refunds because it is Montana’s public policy to provide refunds of illegally collected taxes. But, as we have discussed above, taxes collected before the opinion in Davis were not illegally collected taxes.

4 U.S.C. § Ill was enacted in 1939. Between that time and the date of the Davis decision, twenty-two other states enacted and used tax plans much like Montana’s, giving tax advantages to state retirees over other retirees. We conclude that, in view of the acceptance and usage of similar tax plans for approximately 50 years, it would be inequitable to provide refunds to federal retirees when those refunds would of necessity be made at the expense of all Montana taxpayers.

After considering the three factors set out in Chevron, we conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that Davis should not be applied retroactively. We therefore hold that the court did not err in ruling that the plaintiffs are not entitled to tax refunds for the years 1983 through 1988.

CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICES McDONOUGH, L.C. GULBRANDSON, Retired, sitting in for JUSTICE HARRISON, and C.B. McNEIL, District Judge, Retired, sitting in for JUSTICE HUNT concur.

JUSTICE GRAY,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur with that part of the majority’s opinion which holds that James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia (1991), 501 U.S._, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481, is not applicable to the issue of the retroactivity of Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury (1989), 489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891. However, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion which holds that Davis should not be applied retroactively.

I agree with the majority that the determination of whether the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Davis is to be applied retroactively or only prospectively is governed by the three-pronged test enunciated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson (1971), 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 and utilized by this Court in LaRoque v. State (1978), 178 Mont. 315, 583 P.2d 1059. However, I disagree with the conclusions reached by the majority under each prong of the test as applied to the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis. Furthermore, I believe that the weakness of the majority’s opinion is clearly demonstrated by its heavy reliance on the overturned decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals and the lone dissent of Justice Stevens in Davis. Such reliance by the majority largely ignores the Davis Court majority’s rationale in reaching its decision.

For a decision to be applied only prospectively, the first prong of the Chevron test requires that the decision “establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.” Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106, 92 S.Ct. at 355.. Because Davis did not overrule clear past precedent, this Court’s analysis is properly limited to the consideration of whether the decision in Davis was clearly foreshadowed.

The majority states that the Davis decision was not clearly foreshadowed on the bases that in order to reach its decision in Davis, the Supreme Court had to (1) extend 4 U.S.C. § Ill to federal retirees receiving pension benefits; (2) extend the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity to employees of the governmental entity, as well as the entity itself; and (3) decide that the proper standard for determining the validity of a state statute where intergovernmental tax immunity is involved is a “significant difference” standard, rather than a rational basis standard. The majority also states that the fact that twenty-three states, including Montana, had tax schemes similar to that of Michigan which the Supreme Court invalidated in Davis, lends support to its conclusion that the holding in Davis was not clearly foreshadowed.

It is my view that a plain reading of the Davis decision itself, together with previous United States Supreme Court decisions, leads to the irrefutable conclusion that the Davis decision was clearly foreshadowed. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the Supreme Court in Davis did not “extend” 4 U.S.C. § 111 to federal retirees receiving pension benefits. The Supreme Court made it very clear that § 111 applies to both current and past employees and to pension benefits based upon the plain language of the statute:

“As a threshold matter, the State argues that § 111 applies only to current employees of the Federal Government, not to retirees such as appellant. In our view, however, the plain language of the statute dictates the opposite conclusion. Section Ill by its terms applies to ‘the taxation of pay or compensation for personal services as an officer or employee of the United States.’
“We have no difficulty concluding that civil service retirement benefits are deferred compensation for past years of service rendered to the Government.” [Emphasis in original.]

Davis, 489 U.S. at 808, 109 S.Ct. at 1503-04.

“Any other interpretation of the nondiscrimination clause would be implausible at best. It is difficult to imagine that Congress consented to discriminatory taxation of the pensions of retired federal civil servants while refusing to permit such taxation of current employees, and nothing in the statutory language or even in the legislative history suggests this result.”

Davis, 489 U.S. at 810, 109 S.Ct. at 1505. Assuming that the majority of eight Justices of the United States Supreme Court intended the plain meaning of its words, there is no room for doubt that the Supreme Court’s holding that federal retirees fall within the protection of § Ill was clearly predictable or foreshadowed.

Furthermore, I believe that Davis is directly on point with Jensen v. State Department of Labor and Industry (1984), 213 Mont. 84, 689 P.2d 1231. As the majority opinion notes, this Court in Jensen held that Crabtree v. Montana State Library (1983), 204 Mont. 398, 665 P.2d 231, did not create any new law because it simply was stating the plain language of the Veteran’s Preference Act. In Davis, the Supreme Corut did not create any new law because, as the Supreme Court itself stated, the plain language of § Ill dictated its holding that the statute applies to both current and past employees and to the pension benefits. Davis, 489 U.S. at 808, 109 S.Ct. at 1503-04.

The majority would have the reader believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis constituted an unforeshadowed, abrupt and fundamental change in the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity through its holding that employees of the governmental entity, as well as the governmental entity itself, come within the protection of the doctrine. The majority states that “[t]he Davis language addressing the relationship between intergovernmental tax immunity and 4 U.S.C. § 111 clearly breaks new ground.” At 1260-61. This is simply not the case as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s own observations in Davis.

“On its face, § Ill purports to be nothing more than a partial congressional consent to nondiscriminatory state taxation of federal employees. It can be argued, however, that by negative implication § Ill also constitutes an affirmative statutory grant of immunity from discriminatory state taxation in addition to, and coextensive with, the pre-existing protection afforded by the constitutional doctrine. Regardless of whether § Ill provides an independent basis for finding immunity or merely preserves the traditional constitutional prohibition against discriminatory taxes, however, the inquiry is the same. In either case, the scope of the immunity granted or retained by the nondiscrimination clause is to be determined by reference to the constitutional doctrine. Thus, the dispositive question in this case is whether the tax imposed on appellant is barred by the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.” [Emphasis added.] Davis, 489 U.S. at 813-14, 109 S.Ct. at 1507.

“It is true that intergovernmental tax immunity is based on the need to protect each sovereign’s governmental operations from undue interference by the other. Graves [v. People ex rel. O’Keefe], 306 U.S. [466], at 481 [59 S.Ct. 595, 83 L.Ed. 927]; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at [316] 435-436, [17 U.S. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579], But it does not follow that private entities or individuals who are subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of their dealings with a sovereign cannot themselves receive the protection of the constitutional doctrine. Indeed all precedent is to the contrary. In Phillips Chemical Co., supra, for example, we considered a private corporation’s claim that a state tax discriminated against private lessees of federal land. We concluded that the tax “discriminate[d] unconstitutionally against the United States and its lessee,” and accordingly held that the tax could not be exacted. 361 U.S., at 387, [80 S.Ct. at 481] ... . [Emphasis in original.] The State offers no reasons for departing from this settled rule, and we decline to do so.” [Emphasis added.]

Davis, 489 U.S. at 814-15, 109 S.Ct. at 1507. Again, assuming the Davis Court intended the plain meaning of its words, there can be no question that it was clearly predictable or foreshadowed that federal retirees fall within the protection of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.

I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Davis was not clearly foreshadowed because the Supreme Court had to decide that the proper standard for determining the validity of the state tax scheme is a “significant difference” standard, rather than a rational basis standard. The Supreme Court in Davis made it clear that the proper standard to be applied when intergovernmental tax immunity is involved was settled under existing authority.

“Under our precedents, £[t]he imposition of a heavier tax burden on [those who deal with one sovereign] than is imposed on [those who deal with the other] must be justified by significant differences between the two classes.’ Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S., at 383 [80 S.Ct. at 479.] In determining whether this standard of justification has been met, it is inappropriate to rely solely on the mode of analysis developed in our equal protection cases. We have previously observed that ‘our decisions in [the equal protection] field are not necessarily controlling where problems of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved,’ because ‘the Government’s interests must be weighed in the balance.’ Id., at 385, [80 S.Ct. at 480]. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the inconsistent tax treatment is directly related to, and justified by, ‘significant differences between the two classes.’ Id., at 383-385, 80 S.Ct. at 479-80.” [Emphasis added.]

Davis, 489 U.S. at 815-16. 109 S.Ct. at 1508. The Supreme Court was citing its decision in Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist. (1960), 361 U.S. 376, 80 S.Ct. 474, 4 L.Ed.2d 384, decided nearly thirty years before Davis. Thus, the Supreme Court’s application of the “significant difference” standard in Davis was clearly foreshadowed in light of this existing precedent.

The majority places great weight on the State’s (and other states’) reliance on the previously uncontested nature of 4 U.S.C. § Ill with respect to its application to federal retirees. In my view, the fact that twenty-three states, including Montana, had tax schemes similar to the one invalidated in Davis is conclusive of nothing more than that Davis decided an issue of first impression. It does not follow, as the majority opinion implies, that the Davis decision was not foreshadowed. Where the plain language of the statute involved, together with existing precedent, mandates a particular holding, as was clearly shown in Davis, the prevalence of the wrong is irrelevant to the determination of whether that holding was clearly foreshadowed.

In applying the second prong of the Chevron test, the majority concludes that retroactive application of Davis would not promote the concept of intergovernmental tax immunity. I disagree. In my view, the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity can only be furthered by the retroactive application of Davis. Refusing to apply Davis retroactively means that this Court has condoned the State’s total disregard for the plain language of 4 U.S.C. § 111 and is akin to a continuation of past discrimination. Such a result does not further and, indeed, retards the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity in that it does not tend to deter future State violations of the doctrine.

With respect to the third prong of the Chevron test, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the equities in this case favor a non-retroactive application of Davis. In considering the equities of retroactive application of a judicial decision, I am fully aware that great weight must be given to the State’s reliance upon a presumptively valid statute, enacted in good faith and by no means plainly unlawful. See Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973), 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151. However, where the statute in question is plainly violative of federal statutory and case law, as was Montana’s tax scheme in light of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Davis, the State’s reliance interests are of little or no import. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (1990), 495 U.S. 18,_, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 2257, 110 L.Ed.2d 17, 44.

It is true, as the majority states, that refunds to the federal retirees would result in a financial burden on the other taxpayers of the State; it also is true, however, that those taxpayers have benefited greatly from the federal retirees’ overpayment of taxes over many years. In any event, the State’s and taxpayers’ exposure to the disruptive impact of the tax scheme’s invalidation is limited because of the five-year statute of limitations.

Furthermore, the State would not necessarily have to refund the unconstitutionally collected taxes. The federal retirees have indicated their willingness to accept a tax credit mechanism in lieu of actual refunds as a possible remedy which, in my view, has the potential of softening the impact on the State’s financial stability even more.

Finally, it must be recognized that, notwithstanding the financial impact to the State, substantial inequities have been wrought upon the federal retirees over a period of many years. Retirees who paid the discriminatory tax and have since left Montana or died would receive no remedy even under a proper resolution of this case. Others would receive back only a small portion of the discriminatory taxes they paid, no matter what remedy might be fashioned, because of the applicable statute of limitations. How the majority can conclude that the Chevron “equities” prong favors the State, as opposed to the federal retirees who were wrongfully discriminated against by the State, is simply beyond my understanding.

I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and hold that under the Chevron test, the Davis decision is to be applied retroactively. Having so held, I would remand this case to the District Court for a determination of the proper remedy to be provided to the federal retirees.

JUSTICE TRIEWEILER,

dissenting:

I dissent from the majority opinion in its entirety.

I concur with that part of Justice Gray’s opinion which concludes that the case of Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury (1989), 489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891, should be applied retroactively based upon the three-prong test set forth in Chevron Oil Company v. Huson (1971), 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296.

Contrary to the majority’s argument, the result in Davis was clearly foreshadowed by the plain language of 4 U.S.C. § 111 and by the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in Phillips Chemical Company v. Dumas Independent School District (1960), 361 U.S. 376, 387, 80 S.Ct. 474, 481, 4 L.Ed.2d 384, 391-92, and Memphis Bank and Trust Company v. Garner (1983), 459 U.S. 392, 397 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 692, 696 n. 7, 74 L.Ed.2d 562, 567 n. 7.

As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Davis:

“When the first part of § Ill is read together with the nondiscrimination clause, the operative words of the statute are as follows: The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation ... if the taxation does not discriminate ... because of the source of the pay or compensation.’ ”

Davis, 489 U.S. at 809, 109 S.Ct. at 1504, 103 L.Ed.2d at 901.

Retirement benefits are clearly deferred compensation. Therefore, I cannot comprehend how 4 U.S.C. § Ill could be construed any way other than the manner in which it was construed in Davis. As pointed out in Justice Gray’s dissent, we have previously held in Jensen v. State Department of Labor and Industry (1984), 213 Mont. 84, 689 P.2d 1231, that the plain language of a statute is sufficient to foreshadow a judicial decision which applies that statute. I cannot think of a clearer example of that being the case than the United States Supreme Court’s application of 4 U.S.C. § 111 in Davis.

The majority opinion is a nearly verbatim adoption of the Department of Revenue’s strained rationale that Davis was not foreshadowed because it resulted in three extensions of prior law. However, that same argument was made by the State of Michigan in Davis and in each respect was refuted by the eight out of nine Supreme Court Justices who subscribed to the majority opinion in Davis. The fact that this Court would then ignore the majority opinion and subscribe to the Department of Revenue’s argument on the basis of the lone dissent, is at best a peculiar way to apply controlling United States Supreme Court precedent.

Having pointed out that I agree with Justice Gray’s thorough analysis of the Chevron test for retroactivity, and concluding that that test requires retroactive application of Davis, I do not feel that it is necessary to apply the Chevron analysis.

The United States Supreme Court has recently gone even further to make clear that the result arrived at by the majority in this case is incorrect.

In James B. Beam Distilling Company v. Georgia (1991), _U.S._, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481, the United States Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue regarding retroactivity.

In the Beam case, the Court was asked to decide whether its decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias (1984), 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200, should apply retroactively to claims based on facts which preceded that decision. The effect of the Bacchus decision was to hold that state laws which imposed an excise tax on imported alcoholic beverages at a rate greater than those imposed on alcoholic beverages manufactured within that state violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Following the Bacchus decision, the petitioner in Beam claimed that Georgia’s law amounted to the same violation, and, on that basis, sought a refund of the taxes it had previously paid in the years 1982,1983, and 1984. The state courts in Georgia, however, refused to apply Bacchus for the years in question based upon their analysis of Chevron Oil Company v. Huson (1971), 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296. In other words, the Supreme Court in Georgia applied the same rationale in Beam to deny a refund that the majority relies on in this case to deny a refund to the plaintiffs.

Beam sought a writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted Beam’s petition and reversed the Supreme Court of Georgia on June 20, 1991.

In arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court concluded that unless it specifies that its decisions are prospective only, they are to be applied retroactively. It furthermore stated that where its decisions are applied retroactively to one set of litigants, they must be applied retroactively to similarly situated persons who are not barred procedurally from asserting their rights. Particularly relevant to this case was the Court’s holding that its decision limits the possible applications of the Chevron Oil analysis. The Supreme Court stated in part as follows:

“Questions of remedy aside, Bacchus is fairly read to hold as a choice of law that its rule should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the Court. Because the Bacchus opinion did not reserve the question whether its holding should be applied to the parties before it... it is properly understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application in civil cases ... . Because the court in Bacchus remanded the case solely for consideration of the pass-through defense, it thus should be read as having retroactively applied the rule there decided. See also Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 28, 105 S.Ct. 2465, 2474, 86 L.Ed.2d 11 (1985); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196-197, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 2308-2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983); cf. Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 1508, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989). Beam,_U.S. at_, 111 S.Ct. at 2445-46, 115 L.Ed.2d at 490-91.”

It is significant that the Supreme Comb actually cited Davis for the principle of retroactivity. The Court then went on to add:

“Bacchus thus applied its own rule, just as if it had reversed and remanded without further ado, and yet of course the Georgia courts refused to apply that rule with respect to the litigants in this case. Thus, the question is whether it is error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so. We hold that it is, principles of equality and stare decisis here prevailing over any claim based on a Chevron Oil analysis.
“... To this extent, our decision here does limit the possible applications of the Chevron Oil analysis, however irrelevant Chevron Oil may otherwise be to this case. Because the rejection of modified prospectivity precludes retroactive application of a new rule to some litigants when it is not applied to others, the Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the particular case. Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is chosen for all others who might seek its prospective application.
"... [W]hen the Corut has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one case, it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata.” [Citations omitted.]

Beam,_U.S. at_,_, 111 S.Ct. at 2446, 2447-48, 115 L.Ed.2d at 491, 493.

The majority concludes that Beam is not applicable to this case because the Supreme Court did not apply Davis retroactively. It was applied retroactively, based on the stipulation of the parties to that case. However, that reasoning ignores Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion which was joined in by Justice Marshall and Justice Black-mun to the effect that both “selective prospectivity” and “pure prospectivity” are beyond the power of the Court. The implication, as far as those Justices were concerned, is that Davis could not have been applied prospectively even if the parties had not agreed to apply it retroactively. Beam,_U.S. at_, 111 S.Ct. at 2450-51, 115 L.Ed.2d at 496-97 (Justice Scalia, concurring). The majoritys conclusion ignores Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion wherein she states that the Beam decision “seriously curtails the Chevron Oil inquiry.” Beam,_U.S. at_ 111 S.Ct. at 2452, 115 L.Ed.2d at 499 (Justice O’Connor, dissenting). Finally, the majoritys reasoning ignores the fact that eight days after Beam was decided, the United States Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari to retired federal employees in South Carolina and Virginia who sought retroactive application of the Davis decision under circumstances identical to the circumstances in this case. In those cases, the Supreme Courts of South Carolina and Virginia rendered decisions similar to the holding of the majority in this case. See Bass v. State (1990), 302 S.C. 250, 395 S.E.2d 171; Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation (1991), 241 Va. 232, 401 S.E.2d 868. Both of those decisions were vacated by the United States Supreme Court, and both were remanded to the state courts for “further consideration in light of James B. Beam Distilling Company v. Georgia.” Bass v. South Carolina (1991),_U.S._, 111 S.Ct. 2881, 115 L.Ed.2d 1047 (mem.); Harper v. Virginia Dept., of Taxation (1991),_U.S._, 111 S.Ct. 2883, 115 L.Ed.2d 1049 (mem.).

It does not seem to me that the intent of the Supreme Court to apply Davis retroactively could be any clearer. The majority’s opinion merely postpones the inevitable and unnecessarily prolongs the delusion of state government that it can continue to spend money which was illegally collected and which it will ultimately have to repay.

As far as I am concerned, the issue involved in this case is a simple one. The State took the petitioners’ money illegally. That fact is obvious from the plain language of 4 U.S.C. § 111. If a private citizen took someone’s money illegally, he or she would be forced to give it back. The State ought to do the same.

The majority talks about equity. What is equitable about allowing the State, with all its power, to illegally seize someone’s property and then, after being told what it did was illegal, allowing the State to keep it?

The majority’s strained rationale regarding the foreseeability of Davis is transparent. When the State of Montana establishes a policy of arbitrarily treating one group of taxpayers differently than another group that is similarly situated, it is certainly foreseeable that what the State is doing is illegal.

The majority’s conclusion about how to best effectuate the purpose of the Davis decision is similarly illogical. The purpose of the Davis decision was to assure that federal employees are treated the same as state employees. How can that purpose possibly be furthered by allowing the State to keep the money that was illegally taken from federal employees and spend it for the benefit of citizens who were not similarly taxed?

The majority’s decision is clearly a result-oriented decision arrived at for the purpose of protecting the State’s coffers. However, the State’s coffers are not the responsibility of this Court. The rights of this state’s citizens are.

For the reasons set forth above, the State of Montana can take little comfort in the temporary reprieve granted by this decision.

       This case was argued to the Montana Supreme Court on May 7,1991. At the time of oral argument, both parties advised this Court of the pending Beam case and agreed that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in that case could be dispositive of the issue in this case.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JUSTICE WEBER JUSTICE HUNT,

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANKLIN F. McKNIGHT, Defendant and Appellant.
    No. 90-623.
    Submitted on briefs July 25, 1991.
    Decided Nov. 14, 1991.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 1991.
    250 Mont. 457.
    820 P.2d 1279.

      J. Dirk Beccari, Missoula, for defendant and appellant.
    Marc Racicot, Attorney General; Elizabeth L. Griffing, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; M. Shaun Donovan, County Attorney, Superior, for plaintiff and respondent.
   JUSTICE WEBER

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Defendant was found guilty of sexual intercourse without consent after a jury trial in the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Mineral County. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

The issues for our consideration are:

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by allowing evidence of prior sexual assaults?

2. Did the District Court err by denying defendant’s motion for mistrial?

On December 20,1989, Franklin “Nick” McKnight, defendant, was charged with three counts of sexual intercourse without consent, two perpetrated against S.W. in 1981 and one against K.O. in 1984; and three counts of sexual assault, two perpetrated against S.W. in 1981 and one against S.B. in 1981. On February 6, 1990, the information was amended to include a count of sexual assault perpetrated against L.W. in 1981.

At the omnibus hearing, defendant moved to dismiss the charges as being barred by the statute of limitations. The State responded and concurred with defendant’s motion. All charges, except for the count of sexual intercourse without consent against K.O. in 1984 were dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.

The State filed a Just notice of intent to introduce evidence of the charges dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations, citing State v. Tecca (1986), 220 Mont. 168, 714 P.2d 136, as authority. It sought to introduce the evidence “for the purpose of supporting the State’s proof on the issue of defendant’s intent and state of mind and consistent with the proposition that the defendant’s acts were consistent with a common scheme, plan or system, as permitted by Rule 404(b).”

Defendant maintained that the admission of testimony of the alleged victims of the dismissed charges would prejudice the defendant since they were untried, unproven allegations. He also argued that the other evidence was too remote in time to satisfy the Just rule.

After a hearing, the District Court allowed the State to introduce evidence of the other acts under the Just rule. The dismissed counts of sexual intercourse without consent were not introduced at trial.

Defendant is the great-uncle of K.O. In 1984, nine-year-old K.O. was visiting Montana with her family. Defendant’s step-granddaughter, S.B., was one of K.O.’s friends. One day in the summer of 1984, S.B. and K.O. were playing in the area of defendant’s house because S.B.’s father was staying in a trailer parked on the defendant’s property. While the girls had planned on spending the night together, S.B.’s father picked her up, and K.O. was left at defendant’s house. K.O. testified that on that evening while she was lying on the couch in the defendant’s living room and after Mrs. McKnight had gone to bed, defendant sat down on the couch next to K.O. She testified he put his hand under her shirt, and rubbed her chest. She testified he then started rubbing her genital area, and “actually put his fingers inside me.” When K.O. asked him what he was doing, defendant told her that he was giving her a massage and not to tell anyone.

After this incident, K.O. began having severe stomach aches. She became withdrawn, especially from older men, and was afraid to go places alone or to be left alone. She testified she did not want to be near defendant. She also testified she did not trust people anymore. When K.O.’s family moved from California to Montana in 1988, defendant came to California to help them move and K.O. refused to ride alone with him.

Lindsay Clodfelter, a mental health therapist and member of the Montana Sex Offender Treatment Association, testified that child victims often will tell of earlier experiences involving sexual abuse only when they become adolescents. She testified that “most children don’t tell right away because by keeping it a secret, they protect themselves and they protect their family. The closer the kid is to the offender, the less likely the kid is to report.” If they tell once they emerge into adolescence, it is because “that’s a time when they are — they’re branching out further and further from their family.” She testified that she interviewed K.O. and then gave her expert opinion that K.O. had been sexually assaulted by someone.

S.B. testified that in the summer of 1981 she and a friend, S.W., were playing around defendant’s house. Both girls were eight years old in 1981. Defendant asked them if they wanted to see his old car. When they went into the garage, defendant picked up S.B. and set her on a ledge. He rubbed S.B. on her chest and genital area. He then assaulted S.W., putting his hands in her shirt and down her pants. S.W. also stated that “he stuck his hand inside of me and moved it around.” S.B. testified she saw the assault on S.W. She then walked around behind the vehicle so that she would not have to watch “the rest of it.” S.B. testified defendant threatened to kill them if they told anyone what had happened. A similar assault happened to S.B. again that summer while she was sitting on defendant’s couch under a blanket. S.B. testified defendant sat down beside her on the couch, covered them both with the blanket, stuck his hand under her shirt, and rubbed her chest and back. She further testified that defendant said “nobody would believe me if I told, and he’d kill me.”

S.W.’s twin sister, L.W., testified that she was molested by defendant in 1981 when she was eight years old. She had been playing with S.B. in the trailer on defendant’s property. L.W. testified that after S.B. left to go get something, defendant threw L.W. on the mattress, grabbed her chest and then stuck his hand down her pants. She asked him what he was doing, and defendant said that he was just playing with her. L.W. became mad, kicked him in the groin, and ran from the trailer. He threatened to kill L.W. if she told anyone. L.W. further testified that defendant said if she ever told, “he would make it look like we wanted it.”

After a jury trial, defendant, 76 years old at the time, was found guilty of sexual intercourse without consent and sentenced to 20 years in the Montana State Prison, with 10 years suspended. The District Court further ordered that defendant would not be eligible for parole until he successfully completed the sex offender treatment program at the prison. Defendant appeals.

I

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by allowing evidence of prior sexual assaults?

Defendant maintains the District Court erred in allowing S.B., L.W., and S.W. to testify about unproven allegations of sexual acts committed by defendant against them because the evidence did not meet the standards of Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid., and State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957. Defendant maintains that the “other acts” were not sufficiently similar to the charged offense because the other acts were alleged sexual assaults while the crime defendant was convicted of here was sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant also argues that the other acts were too remote in time to be admissible as evidence, and that they did not tend to show common scheme, plan system or motive. The State maintains the evidence met the Just test and was properly admitted into evidence.

Recently, in 1991, this Court adopted the Modified Just Rule in State v. Matt (Mont. 1991), [249 Mont. 136,] 814 P.2d 52, 48 St.Rep. 614.

The Modified Just Rule sets forth the basis for the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts:

“(1) The other crimes, wrongs or acts must be similar.
“(2) The other crimes, wrongs or acts must not be remote in time.
“(3) The evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity with such character; but may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
“(4) Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

State v. Matt, [249 Mont. 136,] 814 P.2d at 56, 48 St.Rep. at 616. The Matt Court also applied the procedural protections as part of the Modified Just Rule. Those procedural protections are:

“(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may not be received unless there has been written notice to the defendant that such evidence is to be introduced. The notice to the defendant shall specify the evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to be admitted, and the specific Rule 404(b) purpose or purposes for which it is to be admitted.
“(2) At the time of the introduction of such evidence, the trial court shall explain to the jury the purpose of such evidence and shall admonish it to weigh the evidence only for such purposes.
“(3) In its final charge, the court shall instruct the jury in unequivocal terms that such evidence was received only for the limited purposes earlier stated and that the defendant is not being tried and may not be convicted for any offense except that charged, warning them that to convict for other offenses may result in unjust double punishment.”

State v. Matt, [249 Mont. 134,] 814 P.2d at 56, 48 St.Rep. at 616.

Similarity of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts

Defendant maintains that evidence of unproven sexual assaults perpetrated against other victims than the victim of the crime charged is inadmissible. His argument is twofold. First, he maintains that the victims are not the same and neither is their relationship to the defendant, so, therefore, the similarity requirement is not met. Secondly, he maintains that the crimes of sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent are not sufficiently similar.

The State maintains the other evidence is sufficiently similar because the charged offense and each one of the other crimes involved sexual contact between the defendant and a young girl who was eight or nine years old; each assault occurred on defendant’s property; defendant’s actions during each assault and the charged offense were basically the same; and defendant’s threats toward each of the girls were essentially the same.

As the State points out, defendant’s actions toward K.O. were similar to the actions against S.B., L.W. and S.W. In all cases, defendant rubbed the girls breasts and genital area. With S.W. and K.O., defendant went one step further and inserted his fingers into their vaginas, and, thus, the charge of sexual intercourse without consent. The assaults on all girls happened when they were eight or nine years old; each assault occurred on defendant’s property; and defendant threatened all the girls in essentially the same way. See State v. Tecca, 220 Mont. 168, 714 P.2d 136. As stated above, defendant’s actions towards S.B., L.W. and S.W., as well as the charged actions toward K.O. were clearly similar. We conclude that the similarity of the other crimes, wrongs or acts test has been met.

Nearness in Time

Defendant contends that the 1981 assaults against S.W., L.W. and S.B. are too remote in time to be admissible since those alleged assaults took place about three years earlier than the crime charged, and nothing occurred in the interim. The State maintains that the remoteness question is directed to the discretion of the district court. It argues that here, the three-year period of time was not so remote as to supersede the discretion of the District Court.

Here the assaults on S.W., S.B. and L.W. occurred in 1981; three years prior to the 1984 crime against K.O. For a comparison of time periods, see Just 602 P.2d at 961 (three years); State v. Stroud (1984), 210 Mont. 58, 71, 683 P.2d 459, 466 (three and one-half years); State v. Eiler (1988), 234 Mont. 38, 48, 762 P.2d 210, 216-17 (five years); and Tecca, 220 Mont. 168, 170, 714 P.2d 136, 139 (nine years). In addition to the three-year time span in the present case, we have considered the similarity in conduct when comparing the assaults on S.W., S.B. and L.W. to the assault against K.O., which demonstrates a pattern of similar conduct which may be properly considered on the issue of remoteness. See Tecca, 220 Mont. at 172, 714 P.2d 139. We conclude the evidence was not too remote in time.

Proof of Notice, Opportunity, Intent, Preparation, Plan, Knowledge, Identity, or Absence of Mistake or Accident

Defendant contends that this element is not satisfied because the alleged crimes were perpetrated against different victims. He further argues that mere repetition of an act does not constitute a common scheme, plan or system. The State maintains that the actions of the defendant were sufficiently similar to constitute a common scheme, plan or system.

We note that this element has recently been modified in Matt and that the admission of evidence is not limited only to common scheme, plan or system. The Matt case recognized the inconsistencies in our previous holdings regarding other crimes evidence. In modifying the Just Rule, the Matt Court explained:

‘While the Just Rule was entirely appropriate to the factual situation in that case, it has led to contradictory results. The third element of the Just Rule provides that evidence may be admissible for the purpose of showing a common scheme, plan or system. We agree with that conclusion in that case. However, we emphasize that Rule 4040?) is not limited only to common scheme, plan or system. Rule 404(b) provides that evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Clearly Rule 404(b) provides for the admission of evidence for many purposes other than the common scheme, plan or system stated in Just. We point out that the ‘common scheme, plan or system’referred to in Just is listed as ‘plan’ under Rule 404(b), according to McCormick on Evidence, 3rd Ed., § 190, pp. 558-564 (1984); 22 C. Wright and K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure, Evidence, § 5244, p. 499 (1978); and 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 830 (1989).”

Matt, [249 Mont. 134,] 814 P.2d 55, 48 St.Rep. at 615. We conclude that under the Modified Just Rule, the other crimes, wrongs or acts evidence here tended to prove defendant’s motive and intent.

Probative Value Outweighs the Prejudicial Effect

Defendant maintains that the other acts evidence introduced amounted to unproven, untried allegations against different victims and that such evidence was highly prejudicial to him. The State maintains that the probative value of the prior crimes evidence is established by the satisfaction of the first three elements of the Just Rule.

We first point out that the parties agree that the procedural precautions were taken in this case. The defendant received proper notice; the trial court admonished the jury at the introduction of the evidence; and the trial court instructed the jury in its final charge on the purpose of the evidence. Thus, the only question then is whether the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by unfair prejudice. This Court recently addressed this question at length in State v. Paulson, (1991) [250 Mont. 32,] 817 P.2d 55, 48 St.Rep. at 616, citing and adopting 10 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 403.10:

“To guide courts in balancing the ‘probative value’ and the ‘unfair prejudice’ of evidence, the Committee states that the latter term means evidence which has ‘an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.’ Application of this thought and the ultimate determination of admissibility are matters left to the discretion of the trial court and will necessarily be decided on a case by case basis. However, by restricting the rule to evidence which will cause ‘unfairprejudice’ the draftsmen meant to caution courts that mere prejudicial effect is not a sufficient reason to refuse admission. Probative evidence will frequently be prejudicial to a party, but that does not mean that it will cause the factfinder to ground a decision on an emotional basis. Thus, evidence which tends to horrify, evoke sympathy or increase a desire to punish due to a prior act of a party and whose probative value is slight may be properly excluded.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Paulson, [250 Mont. 32,] 817 P.2d at 1143-44.

In the present case, the testimony of S.W., L.W. and S.B. was clearly prejudicial, but because it meets other aspects of the Modified Just Rule, such prejudice alone is not a sufficient reason to refuse admission. Paulson, [250 Mont. 32, 43,] 817 P.2d at 1144. The jury was properly instructed and admonished regarding the testimony on the other acts. The evidence presented established without question the similarity in assaults perpetrated against all the victims. Defendant’s conduct was similar; the age of the girls at the time the crimes were committed was about the same; all the acts took place on defendant’s property; and defendant’s threats to all the girls were similar. We conclude that the probative value of the evidence in question outweighed any prejudicial effect of admitting it.

We conclude that the four elements of the Modified Just Rule have been met. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing evidence of prior sexual assaults.

II

Did the District Court err by denying defendant’s motion for mistrial?

At trial, the last witness to testify was Dawn Terrill, S.W.’s teacher. The State prosecutor asked the teacher what she had been told by S.W., and the teacher responded:

“Q. What exactly did she tell you about the details of the assault against her?
“A. The first time that I met with [S.W.] she didn’t tell me, but the third time she came into my room to talk to me she told me she had been sexually assaulted as a child.
“Q. Did she tell you what exactly happened?
“A. She told me that everything happened, and ‘everything’ was her word.”

The defendant moved for a mistrial on the basis of Dawn Terrill’s use of the word “everything.” The District Court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant argues it was error for the District Court not to declare a mistrial. He maintains that the word “everything,” as used, implied to the jury that the defendant had penis-in-vagina sex. He argues that he was severely prejudiced by that statement because the jury would be totally disgusted with the thought of an old man copulating with a little child. The State argues that “everything” has such a vague meaning. It argues that the teacher’s reference to “everything” could easily be construed to include exactly what S.W. testified to at trial “that defendant put his hands in her shirt and down her pants, rubbed her chest and put his finger inside of her.

This Court set forth the standard for declaring a mistrial in State v. Clawson (1989), 239 Mont. 413, 423, 781 P.2d 267, 273-74.

“There must be a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial and the defendant must have been deprived of a fair and impartial trial. State v. Brush (1987), 228 Mont. 247, 741 P.2d 1333, 1336. 44 St.Rep. 1495, 1499.

“The test for declaring a mistrial was stated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Perez [(1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165.].... The law has invested Combs of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject... The power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plan and obvious causes; ...” (Citations omitted).

Considering all the circumstances and viewing the trial as a whole, we conclude that the use of the word “everything” was not prejudicial to defendant. K.O., S.B., L.W. and S.W. had all testified prior to S.W.’s teacher. None of the girls’ testimony implied that there was ever penis-in-vagina sexual contact between the defendant and themselves. Therefore, it would be highly -unlikely that the jury would take the meaning of the word “everything” as used in the teacher’s testimony out of the context of the rest of the testimony they heard throughout the trial.

We conclude that the defendant was not deprived of a fair and impartial trial, and there is no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. We hold that the District Court correctly denied defendant’s motion for mistrial.

Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICES HARRISON, TRIEWEILER, GRAY, and McDONOUGH concur.

JUSTICE HUNT,

dissenting:

I dissent from the foregoing opinion for the reasons set forth in my dissent in State v. Matt (1991), [249 Mont. 136,] 814 P.2d 52, 48 St.Rep. 614.


author: JUSTICE HARRISON

text:
    BRADLEY H. ARMSTRONG, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent and Respondent.
    No. 91-297.
    Submitted on briefs Oct. 10, 1991.
    Decided Nov. 14, 1991.
    250 Mont. 468.
    820 P.2d 1273.
    Erik Rocksund, Columbia Falls, for petitioner and appellant.
    Marc Racicot, Atty. Gen., Peter Funk, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena; Ted O. Lympus, County Atty., and Thomas J. Esch, Dep. Co. Atty., Kalispell, for respondent.
   JUSTICE HARRISON

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Bradley H. Armstrong appeals from an order of the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District for Flathead County, Montana, denying him attorney's fees and costs. We affirm.

The issue before the Court is whether the District Court erred in refusing to award attorney’s fees and costs to the appellant.

Abrief recitation of the facts of the underlying case from which this appeal originally stems is necessary. In Armstrong v. State (1990), 245 Mont. 420, 800 P.2d 172, (hereinafter Armstrong I), a Columbia Falls Police officer observed the appellant driving down an alley at approximately 2:00 a.m. The officer stopped the appellant and arrested him for driving while under the influence. The appellant refused to take a breathalyzer test and subsequently had his license taken away. Later, the DUI charges were dropped and the appellant petitioned the District Court for reinstatement of his license. At a hearing to determine the reinstatement issue, the State conceded that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to stop the appellant, but maintained the stop was lawful due to the officer’s particular suspicion. The District Court denied the request and, on appeal, this Court reversed and reinstated the appellant’s license. Armstrong I, 245 Mont. at 423, 800 P.2d at 174.

One day prior to our issuance of Remittitur in Armstrong I, the appellant petitioned the District Court to recover the attorney’s fees and costs he incurred. The District Court denied the petition, and this appeal results.

An award of attorney’s fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court. State Dept. of Revenue v. Frank (1987), 226 Mont. 283, 293, 735 P.2d 290, 297; citing Joseph Russell Realty Co. v. Kenneally (1980), 185 Mont. 496, 605 P.2d 1107. Such an award is also governed by § 25-10-711, MCA, which states:

“(1) In any civil action brought by or against the state ... the opposing party, whether plaintiff or defendant, is entitled to the costs enumerated in 25-10-201 and reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court if:
“(a) he prevails against the state ... and;
“(b) the court finds that the claim or defense of the state ... that brought or defended the action was frivolous or pursued in bad faith.”

By prevailing in Armstrong I, the appellant satisfies the first requirement of the statute, but there must also be a showing of bad faith or frivolousness. A claim pursued frivolously or in bad faith is outside “the bounds of legitimate argument on a substantial issue on which there is a bona fide difference of opinion.” Dept. of Revenue v. New Life Fellowship (1985), 217 Mont. 192, 195, 703 P.2d 860, 862; citing Albertson’s Inc. v. Dept. of Business Regulation (1979), 184 Mont. 12, 18, 601 P.2d 43, 46.

The record discloses that the District Court did not find that the defense of the State was frivolous or pursued in bad faith. Section 25-10-711(b), MCA, requires such finding before an award of attorney’s fees can be made.

The record supports the District Court not making a finding that the State’s defense of the action was frivolous or pursued in bad faith. We hold that the denial of attorney’s fees and costs was proper, and we will not disturb the District Court’s order to that effect.

Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICES TRIEWEILER, McDONOUGH and WEBER concur.


author: JUSTICE McDONOUGH

text:
    THE FEDERAL LAND BANK OF SPOKANE, a corporation, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. TEXACO, INC., a corporation, Defendant and Respondent.
    No. 86-430.
    Submitted Sept. 18, 1991.
    Decided Nov. 14, 1991.
    250 Mont. 471.
    820 P.2d 1269.

      W.H. Bellingham argued, Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, Billings, for plaintiff and petitioner.
    Raymond K. Peete argued, Billings, for defendant and respondent.
   JUSTICE McDONOUGH

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This matter is before us on certification from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division. We accepted certification pursuant to Rule 44 of the M.R.App.P.

Plaintiff-petitioners, Federal Land Bank (FLB), are lessors and defendant-respondent, Texaco, is lessee under an oil and gas lease. FLB brought suit in the United States District Court of Montana to terminate the lease as to all land not producing oil and gas upon expiration of the 5-year primary term under the lease. Texaco maintains the lease is in effect for all the lands under the lease due to the production of FLB No. 1 oil and gas well. The parties disagree as to the effect of the Pugh clause, paragraph 23, on the Habendum clause, paragraph 5, in the lease. We conclude the Habendum clause is modified by the Pugh clause.

On December 18, 1973, FLB leased the land to Ray Kemmis for the purpose of drilling for oil and gas. Kemmis assigned the lease to Texaco. The lease, which contained a five-year primary term, expired on December 18, 1978.

Texaco completed FLB well No. 1 on February 4,1978. The well is located at the NEV4, SEL4 of Section 7-T22N-R60E.

The Oil and Gas Conservation Board of the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation for the State of Montana (the Board) is the agency charged with regulating matters pertaining to drilling of oil and gas for the State of Montana. Section 82-11-111, MCA. The Board named all of the leased lands in question the Mon Dak West Field (The Field). The Field contains several sections of land totaling 1,580 acres. In attempting to determine how wells should be spaced on this acreage, the Board initially determined 320 acre spacing per well.

Section 82-11-201, MCA, provides in part: “To prevent or assist in preventing waste of oil or gas prohibited by this chapter, the board, upon its own motion or upon application of an interested person, after hearing, may by order establish well spacing units for a pool as to oil wells or as to gas wells or both ...” The Board issued its spacing requirements for a period of one year, after which permanent spacing of the producing well was to be sought by the operator of the well. Texaco never applied for a permanent spacing order. On May 26, 1977; August 18, 1977; and May 12, 1978 the Board issued orders spacing the units in question. On June 7,1978, the Board conducted a hearing and issued an Advisory Opinion. Certain members of the Board made a motion for spacing to be changed to one well per 160 acres, but the motion failed. The spacing of wells, upon failure of the motion, reverted to “state-wide” spacing; one well per 320 acres. Administrative Rules of Montana 36.22.701, et seq.

The spacing per 320-acre drilling unit of the field is important here because it is pivotal to the understanding of the disputed clauses included in the lease. The Habendum clause reads as follows:

“It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of 5 years from this date and as long thereafter as oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline or any of them is produced from said leased premises, or drilling operations are continued as hereinafter provided. If, at the expiration of the primary term of this lease, oil or gas is not being produced on the leased premises but lessee is then engaged in drilling operations, then this lease shall continue in force so long as drilling operations are being continuously prosecuted on the leased premises; and drilling operations shall be considered to be continuously prosecuted if not more than sixty days shall elapse between the completion or abandonment of one well and the beginning of operations for the drilling of a subsequent well. If oil or gas shall be discovered and produced from any such well or wells drilled or being drilled at or after the expiration of the primary term of this lease, this lease shall continue in force so long as oil or gas shall be produced from the leased premises.”

The Habendum clause sets the term of the lease. The Habendum clause in the FLB lease provides the lessee can extend the five-year term by producing oil and gas from said leased premises and in addition can be extended past the five-year term by the continuous drilling clause. Also, the lease could be extended during the five-year term by payment of yearly delay rental. Texaco paid FLB the delay rental fee on December 18, 1977, to continue the lease for another year. FLB No. 1 well has been producing since February 4, 1978.

Paragraph 23 of the FLB lease, known as the Pugh clause, reads as follows:

“23. Should any of the lands hereunder be included in a unit or units, during the primary term, either by written consent of the lessor or as the result of action by any duly authorized authority having jurisdiction thereof, then operations on or production from a well situated on lands embraced in such emit, shall serve to maintain this lease in force as to that portion of the leased premises embraced in such a unit, but shall not so maintain the lease on the remainder of the leased premises not embraced in such a unit and not otherwise maintained under the terms hereof beyond the next rental paying date, unless on or before such rental date lessee shall pay or tender to lessor, or to lessor’s credit in the manner provided in this lease, the amount of rental provided herein to be paid upon the area then covered hereby, reduced in the proportion that the acreage covered by this lease and contained in such unit or units bears to the total acreage then covered by this lease and further reduced by the amount of any shut-in gas well royalty payments made by lessee during the rental period or portion thereof immediately preceding such rental payment date on that portion of the leased premises not embraced in such a unit. By similar tender or payments on each succeeding annual rental date this lease may be so maintained in force during the remainder of the primary term as to the portion thereof not included in such unit or units.”

The main purpose of a Pugh clause is to “segregate the lands under the lease outside the unit from lands included in the unit for purposes of payment of delay rentals or perpetration by unit production or both.” Hemingway, Oil and Gas, 464-465 3rd edition (1991). The Pugh clause may therefore, modify a Habendum (or term) clause to the extent that the lease terminates as to all of the lands included therein, with the exception of a unit containing a producing well. In construing an oil and gas lease courts will apply the rules of contract interpretation. We have previously stated:

“[T]he intention of the parties is to be pursued if possible. This intention is to be gathered from the entire agreement, not from particular words or phrases or disjointed or particular parts of it... The contract must be viewed from beginning to end, and all its terms must pass in review; for one clause may modify, limit or illuminate the other.”

Lee v. Lee Gold Mining Co., et al. (1924), 71 Mont. 592, 599, 230 P. 1091, 1093. Further we stated:

“[I]t is well established that a court, in interpreting a written instrument, will not isolate certain phrases of that instrument in order to garner the intent of the parties, but will grasp the instrument by its four corners and in light of the entire instrument, ascertain the paramount and guiding intention of the parties.”

Steen v. Rustad (1957), 132 Mont. 96, 102, 313 P.2d 1014, 1018. In Riis v. Day (1980), 188 Mont. 253, 257, 613 P.2d 696, 698, we said:

“A contract is to be construed so as to make provisions effective, if possible. Repugnant provisions should be interpreted in such a way as will give them some effect, subordinate to the general intent and purpose of the entire contract.” Sections 28-3-201, 28-3-202, and 28-3-204, MCA. Followed in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cumiskey (1983), 204 Mont. 350, 363, 665 P.2d 223, 229. See also Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins (1990), 246 Mont. 125, 145, 804 P.2d 359, 371.

For our purposes, the pertinent part of the Habendum clause provides:

“It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of five years from this date, and as long thereafter as oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline or any of them is produced from said leased premises, or drilling operations are continued as hereinafter provided.”

Without more, inasmuch as FLB No. 1 well began producing during the five-year primary period, the lease would remain in effect as to the entire leased premises. However, the pertinent part of the Pugh clause provides:

“Should any of the lands hereunder be included in a unit or units, during the primary term, either by written consent of the lessor or as a result of action by any duly authorized authority having jurisdiction thereof, then operations on or production from a well situated on lands embraced in such unit, shall serve to maintain this lease in force as to that portion of the leased premises embraced in such a unit, but shall not so maintain the lease or the remainder of the leased premises not embraced in such a unit...” (Emphasis added.)

Here the Pugh clause modifies the Habendum clause. Therefore, the two clauses are not in conflict with one another. Reading both paragraphs together, and the lease as a whole, their meaning is clear. The Pugh clause does just what it provides; it terminates the lease as to lands not embraced in a producing oil and gas omit. The main purpose of the Habendum clause is to:

"... describe the duration of the interest granted, subject to other provisions contained in the lease (emphasis added) which may provide for an earlier or later termination under prescribed circumstances or upon the happening of certain events.” 2 Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas, §§ 26.1, p. 318, (1989).

The Pugh clause here is another provision contained in the lease.

Texaco maintains that the SV2 of Section 7 where the well is located has not been established as a unit and therefore the Pugh clause does not apply. We disagree. To determine whether the Pugh clause applies in this instance, it is necessary to set forth some factual background. The producing well Texaco completed in February of 1978 extracts oil and gas from the Red River, Stony Mountain, Mission Canyon and Radcliff formations. The Red River and Stony Mountain formations are part of the Ordovician geological time period and the Mission Canyon and Radcliff formations are part of what has been termed the Madison group, which is part of the Mississippian geological time period. Texaco argues that the result of the June 7, 1978, hearing before the Board reverting the Mon Dak West Field to statewide spacing, did not have an effect on the Red River Formation. It did have an effect, however, because prior thereto, on May 15, 1978, Texaco requested and was given permission to commingle the production from these two zones. The Advisory Notice from the June 1978 hearing, refers to the Madison and Devonian Formations.

On May 26, 1977, the Board spaced the Madison and Devonian formations (which include Mission Canyon and Radcliff) for a period of one year upon 320 acre drilling and spacing units. On May 12,1978, the Board continued this order until July 1, 1979.

On August 18,1977, the Board spaced the Silurian and Ordovician formations (which include Red River and Stony Mountain) upon 320-acre drilling and spacing units.

FLB maintains that even though the Board used different nomenclature than the specific four formations from which production was eventually obtained, that the four producing formations are included in terms used in the various Board orders.

Further, FLB argues that Texaco in filing a Notice of Intention to Drill with the Board, indicated that the land was located in the Mon Dak West Field. And, Texaco specifically designated the SV2 Sec. 7 as a 320-acre spacing unit. The Board approved the application. FLB further argues that both Texaco’s and FLB’s division orders covered the SV2 of Section 7-22N-60E only and Texaco paid royalties under the division order, which further indicates the tract was a properly spaced unit.

We agree that the Board’s orders established well spacing units for the field in question. We also hold that the lands covered in the lease were included in a unit. Based on the above discussion, we answer the certified questions separately.

The following questions were certified:

“1. Is the term provision of the basic lease as set forth verbatim in paragraph 5 in conflict with paragraph 23 of the basic lease, and if so, what is the legal effect of such conflict? No, as stated above, the Pugh clause modifies the Habendum clause.
“2. Are paragraphs 5 and 23 of the basic lease referred to in the foregoing paragraph so indefinite, uncertain and ambiguous that they are incapable of being interpreted? No.
“3. Under the facts of this case, have any of the lands covered by the basic lease been ‘included in a unit or units’ as set forth in paragraph 23 of the basic lease and if so, what is the legal effect of such inclusion? Yes, as stated above, the inclusion of the land in a unit triggered the Pugh clause.
“4. Under the facts of this case, do the provisions of paragraph 23 of the basic lease operate to terminate and cancel the lease as to all of the lands included therein with the exception of those lands located in Section 7-22N-60E? Yes.
“5. Have any formations in the Mon Dak West Field been spaced under the applicable Montana statutes, rules and regulations by Orders numbered 23-77, 42-77, 33-78 and 51-79 and Advisory Notice dated June 8, 1979, of the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation? Yes.”

CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICES HARRISON, TRIEWEILER, HUNT, GRAY, and WEBER concur.