text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Frank WILLIAMS v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-2927.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Frank Williams, applying for remedial writs of certiorari and habeas corpus. Parish of Rapides. No. 160-312.

Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Renard J. CARTER v. Honorable Jerome M. WINSBERG, Judge Section “C” Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 82-KH-2975.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   Re: Renard J. Carter, applying for writs of certiorari and review. Parish of Orleans. No. 283-771.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Alphonse JOHNSON v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.
    No. 82-KH-2979.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Alphonse Johnson, applying for remedial writs. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 63461.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Chester FRAZIER v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0022.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
    Reconsideration Denied Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Chester Frazier, applying for writ of certiorari, Parish of Caddo. No. 114558.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Roger Dale YATES v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0043.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Roger Dale Yates, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 248-553.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Edward J. BELL v. Honorable Louis DESONIER, Jr., Judge, Parish of Jefferson.
    No. 83-KH-0195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Edward J. Bell, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Jefferson, Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 80-1629.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Lavada ANTHONY v. Honorable Gordon E. CAUSEY, Judge, 21st Judicial District Court, Division “B”.
    No. 83-KH-0392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Lavada Anthony, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Tangipahoa. No. 41867.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel., William SCHLICHER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-0264.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re William Schlicher, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Plaquemines. No. 58265.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., John Ira PERKINS v. N. Burl CAIN/Warden, D.C.I. Hon. M.A.V. Lemmon, Judge 29th Judicial District Court Parish of Hahnville.
    No. 83-KH-0508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re John Ira Perkins, applying for writ of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Parish of St. Charles.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant and reopen evidentiary hearing.


text:
    Connie L. DAVIS, et al. v. SENTRY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 83-C-1268.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Connie L. Davis, et al., applying for writs of certiorari, review, and/or supervisory writs. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82 CA 0677. Parish of East Baton Rouge, Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 240319.

Denied. The result is correct.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Marie PALMER v. JEFFERSON DAVIS BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Zurich Insurance Company, Bartley, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 83-C-1270.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Marie Palmer, applying for certiora-ri, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. No. 82-644. Thirty-first Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis. No. C-140-81.

Denied. The result is correct.


text:
    Huey W. HOYT & Mrs. Sylvia L. Hoyt v. Tony WOLFE & Mrs. Judy G. Wolfe.
    No. 83-C-1308.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Tony Wolfe & Mrs. Judy G. Wolfe, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82 CA 0747. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 244549, Nineteenth Judicial District Court.

Denied.


text:
    Shelia CEASER v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WORK TRAINING FACILITY.
    No. 83-C-1325.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re State of Louisiana, Through the Louisiana Department of Corrections, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82-CA-0601. Civil Service Commission. No. 2841.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Oliver W. CARDEN v. PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE.
    No. 83-C-1326.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Oliver W. Carden, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82-CA-0820. Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 247145, Div. J.

Denied-


text:
    Irene BENOIT v. George SPEIGHTS, Coroner.
    No. 83-C-1327.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Irene Benoit, applying for certiora-ri, or writ of review.. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Jefferson Davis. No. 82-826. Thirty-first Judicial District Court. No. C-425-82.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jesse M. TRAVATHAN.
    No. 83-K-1332.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Jesse M. Travathan, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. First Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 82-KA-1049. Parish of Terrebonne; Thirty-second Judicial District Court. No. 112071.

Denied.


text:
    CITY OF WEST MONROE v. Timothy K. HUDSON.
    No. 83-K-1337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Timothy K. Hudson, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. No. 15,687-KW. Parish of Ouachita, Fourth Judicial District Court. No. 62131.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Fran T. NITCHING v. CLERK OF COURT DIV. “D” CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CALCASIEU, STATE OF LOUISIANA.
    No. 83-KH-1468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Fran T. Nitching, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 12-194^-79.

Denied. The matter is moot as the District Court represents that relator has been furnished the Boykin transcript which he requested.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Melvin TYLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-1532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Melvin Tyler, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 250-524.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Anthony SCOTT v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 83-KH-1534.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Anthony Scott, applying for writ of mandamus and prohibition. Parish of Orleans.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Tony TRAHAN et al v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr.
    No. 83-KH-1611.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Tony Trahan, et al, applying for writ of mandamus. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. No. K83-614. Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu. No. K83-614.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Simon DUPLESSIS v. Henry MORRIS, Chief of Police.
    No. 83-KH-1674.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Simon Duplessis, applying for writ of mandamus. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. Section H No. 275-904.

Denied.


text:
    James S. KENNEDY, Sr. v. Robert S. GREEN, Jr.
    No. 83-CC-1732.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re James S. Kennedy, Sr., applying for writs of certiorari, review, prohibition and mandamus. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 281-368. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 83-C-551.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Gregory OLIVIER and Beverly Olivier Applying for Adoption of William Cody Segura v. Elvira SEGURA.
    No. 83-CK-1806.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Gregory Olivier and Beverly Olivier, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Third Circuit Court of Appeal, Parish of Calcasieu. No. 82-743. Fourteenth Judicial District Court. No. 2885.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Kenneth w RIDEAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-1878.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Kenneth W. Rideaux, applying for remedial writs. Criminal District Court, Orleans Parish.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Daniel Avery TEAT.
    No. 83-KK-1932.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Daniel Avery Teat, applying for writ of certiorari, mandamus and stay order. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. No. K83-502. Thirty-third Judicial District Court, Parish of Allen. No. CR-2863-82.

Denied.


text:
    Samuel B. CARRUTH, and his wife, Frances Reed Carruth v. GOULD, INC., also known as ITE-Gould, and its insurer, John Doe Insurance Company; Jack Stanley, Jerrell Price, and other executive officers and employees of/and their insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company, Texas-Connecticut Petroleum, Inc., and its insurer, ABC Insurance Company, Lambert Electric, Inc., and its insurer, XYZ Insurance Company. G.H.R. ENERGY CORP., Formerly Good Hope Refineries v. GOULD, INC., a/k/a ITE-Gould, ITE Imperial Corporation and ITE, Inc., New Orleans, Electric Supply, Inc., (formerly New Orleans Armiture Company) a Division of National Electric Coil and a Subsidiary of McGraw-Edison, Inc., Lambert Electric Company, a/k/a Lambert Electric, Inc., Southeastern Industrial Contracting, Inc. and Control Systems, a Department of the National Electric Coil Division of McGraw-Edison Company.
    No. 83-CC-1976.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Gould, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review and mandamus. Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court. Nos. 273-954 c/w 248-276. Parish of Jefferson, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 83-C-635.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky LEWIS.
    No. 83-K-1063.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Ricky Lewis, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Rapides. Ninth Judicial District Court. No. 203491. 431 So.2d 125.

Granted. This matter is remanded to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal to decide the issue of excessiveness of sentence after permitting defendant to file an assignment of error in accordance with law.


text:
    Mary Jane HEBERT v. Karen Ann NEYREY and Sandy T. Russo.
    No. 83-C-1261.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Karen Ann Neyrey and Sandy T. Russo, applying for writ of certiorari. First Circuit Court of Appeal. The City Court, City of Baton Rouge. No. 8202-0770. 432 So.2d 396.

Granted.


text:
    A BETTER PLACE, INC. v. GIANI INVESTMENT COMPANY. A BETTER PLACE, INC. v. MOTWANE’S AMERICA, INC.
    No. 83-C-1298.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Giani Investment Company and Motwane’s America, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. Nos. 81-7735, 81-7736, Div. “J”. 432 So.2d 946.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald DUNN.
    No. 83-KH-1873.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Ronald Dunn, applying for writ of mandamus, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 296-788, Sect. C.

Granted and transferred to Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal, for consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Joseph Henson CHILDERS, Minnie Louise Martin v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-1953.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Joseph Henson Childers, Minnie Louise Martin, applying for writ of mandamus and prohibition. Fourth Judicial District Court, Ouachita Parish. No. 41730.

Granted and transferred to the 2nd Circuit, Court of Appeal for consideration.


text:
    Robert G. CALOGERO v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 83-C-1876.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re City of New Orleans, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 77-10122. 434 So.2d 177.

Not considered. The judgment is definitive for the application was not timely filed; La.Code Civ.P. art. 2166, Rule 10, § 4(b), La. Supreme Court Rules.

CALOGERO, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Francis ZACHERY v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-2624.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Francis Zachery, applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition & mandamus. Parish of St. Landry. No. 33699.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Milton ARMSTEAD & Rubin Tackno v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-2977.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Milton Armstead & Rubin Tackno, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans. No. 249-185.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Kenneth BARNES v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 83-KH-0026.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Kenneth Barnes, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court. No. 284-A00.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Manuel DRAYDEN v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, State of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-0044.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Manuel Drayden, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Caddo. No. 108057.

Denied.


text:
    Frances Rotolo, wife of/and Thomas B. BECNEL and Gwendolyn Verdun, wife of/and Benjamin X. Becnel v. CITRUS LANDS OF LOUISIANA, INC.
    No. 83-C-1150.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Mr. and Mrs. Thomas B.. Becnel and Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin X. Becnel, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Plaque-mines, Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court. No. 22-365. 429 So.2d 459.

Denied.

BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    John A. STROUD v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 83-C-1155.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, applying for writ of review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Natchitoches, Tenth Judicial District Court. No. 47107. 429 So.2d 492.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant to consider relator’s right to subrogation.

BLANCHE, J., would grant on Assignments of Errors III and VI.


text:
    SIMON, CORNE & BLOCK v. Janice Smith DUKE and Justine P. Duke.
    No. 83-C-1165.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Simon, Corne & Block, applying for writ of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition and/or review. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Fifteenth Judicial District Court. No. 81-0829. Parish of Lafayette. 429 So.2d 507.

Denied.


text:
    Pamela THEARD, for the Use and Benefit of the Minors, Katina Marie THEARD and Shon Antheony Theard v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC.
    No. 83-C-1232.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Pamela Theard, et al, applying for writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court. Nos. 79-16352, 80-8663 and 79-10715. 433 So.2d 1083.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Lucille Brown BROCK, Individually and as Natural Tutrix for her minor Daughter, Arrendia Brock v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC. Pamela THEARD, for the Use and Benefit of the Minors, Katina Marie THEARD and Shon Antheony Theard v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC. Lucille Brown BROCK, Individually and as Natural Tutrix for her minor Daughter, Arrendia Brock v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC.
    No. 83-C-1857.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re New Orleans Public Service, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. Nos. 79-16352 C/W 80-8663 C/W 79-10715, Division “G”. 433 So.2d 1083.

Denied.

BLANCHE and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Warren J. MOITY, Sr. v. Gus GUILLORY.
    No. 83-C-1271.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Warren J. Moity, Sr., applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of St. Mary, Sixteenth Judicial District Court. No. 58974. 430 So.2d 1243.

Denied. Result correct.


text:
    James NAILOR on his own Behalf and on Behalf of his Minor Son, Charles Nailor, and Charles Nailor v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY et al.
    No. 83-C-1279.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re James Nailor on his own behalf and on behalf of his Minor Son, Charles Nailor, and Charles Nailor, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. Twenty-third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. James. No. 13134. 430 So.2d 784.

Denied.


text:
    Louis J. ROUGEAU, et al v. COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 83-C-1291.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Commercial Union Insurance Company, et al, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Rapides. Ninth Judicial District Court. No. 122,033. 432 So.2d 1162.

Denied.


text:
    The LOUBAT GLASSWARE & CORK CO., LTD. v. PIER ORLEANS, INC., Lionel E. Flotte, Jr., and Thomas G. Blankenship.
    No. 83-C-1293.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Lionel E. Flotte, Jr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 229-110. 430 So.2d 1317.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Joseph SCIORTINO, Jr. v. Thomas L. ALFANO, Jr., Individually and as Deputy Sheriff of the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 83-C-1299.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Alwynn J. Cronvich, Sheriff of the Parish of Jefferson, North River Insurance Company, and International Surplus Lines Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 216-937. 435 So.2d 1010.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Royal ZAMORA.
    No. 83-K-1300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Royal Zamora, applying for writs of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 81-4065, Div. “K”. 430 So.2d 274.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Thomas J. WEATHERALL v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, State of Louisiana.
    No. 83-C-1301.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Thomas J. Weatherall, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Thirty-second Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne. No. 62323. 432 So.2d 988.

Denied. Result is correct.


text:
    FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DENHAM SPRINGS v. SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 83-C-1306.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re South Carolina Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 200176. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. 393 So.2d 359.

Denied.


text:
    ESTATE OF Blaine WILLIAMS, et al v. AMERICAN WELL SERVICE AND SALVAGE, INC., et al. Jerry BARNHILL v. AMERICAN WELL SERVICE AND SALVAGE, INC., et al.
    No. 83-C-1310.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re American Well Service and Salvage, Inc., and Lawrence Paul Domingue, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Thirty-eighth Judicial District Court, Cameron Parish. Nos. 8112, 8113. 432 So.2d 921.

Denied.

MARCUS, DENNIS and LEMMON would grant the writ.


text:
    ESTATE OF Blaine WILLIAMS v. AMERICAN WELL SERVICE & SALVAGE INC., et al. Jerry BARNHILL v. AMERICAN WELL SERVICE & SALVAGE INC., et al.
    No. 83-C-1456.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Texas Brine Co., applying for writ of certiorari and review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Thirty-eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Cameron. Nos. 8112, 8113. 432 So.2d 921.

Denied.

MARCUS, DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Tommie J. WILLIAMS v. Robert McNEIL, James Kirkpatrick, James Lewis, William Ryer, Clarence Giarrusso, Individually and in his Capacity as Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, The New Orleans Police Department and the City of New Orleans.
    No. 83-C-1311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Tommie J. Williams, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 600-521. 432 So.2d 950.

Denied. The result is correct.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Josie V. JOHNSON v. John MORRIS, New Orleans Public Service, Inc., United States Fidelity and Guaranty and the City of New Orleans.
    No. 83-C-1313.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Josie V. Johnson, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court. No. 78-12610. 431 So.2d 429.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Joyce Lacour LANDRY, et al v. Tyrone H. DUFOUR, et al.
    No. 83-C-1314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Joyce Lacour Landry, et al., applying for certiorari, or review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Avoyelles. Twelfth Judicial District Court. No. 82-1962. 432 So.2d 1170.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph R. GUIDROZ.
    No. 83-K-1315.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Joseph R. Guidroz, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. First Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of East Baton Rouge, Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 10-80-640. 432 So.2d 348.

Denied.


text:
    Flemon DAY d/b/a Good Times Restaurant and Lounge v. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD and the Treasurer Department for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.
    No. 83-C-1316.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Alcoholic Beverage Control Board and the Treasurer Department for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 255349, Div. J. 431 So.2d 54.

Denied.


text:
    Manuel P. GARZA v. CHARLES CARTER & COMPANY, et al.
    No. 83-KK-1317.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. First Circuit Court of Appeal. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 208046, Division “D”, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 431 So.2d 62.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John LANGFORD.
    No. 83-KK-1319.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re John Langford, applying for writ of certiorari. Criminal District Court. No. 287-133. Parish of Orleans, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. K-0958.

Denied.


text:
    Helen REISS, Claire Morrison, Mimi Sumrall and James J. Morrison, Jr. v. SUPERIOR INDUSTRIES, INC. and Leon Greff.
    No. 83-C-1320.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Helen Reiss, et al, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 244-946. 430 So.2d 260.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT v. Ray A. TYNES, et al.
    No. 83-C-1322.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re State of Louisiana, through the Dept, of Transportation and Development. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Feliciana, Twentieth Judicial District Court. No. A-15-096. 433 So.2d 809.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Avery WILSON.
    No. 83-KK-1324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Avery Wilson, applying for writ of certiorari and review and stay order. Criminal District Court. No. 288-801. Parish of Orleans, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. K-0670.

Denied.


text:
    Daniel John DEBS, Pamela Gail Royer Debs, Roy Woodrow Nicholson, Linda Ann Bernard Nicholson, Individually and as Representatives of all Persons Similarly Situated and Having a Common Interest v. SUNRISE HOMES, INC., and Coast Quality Construction Corporation.
    No. 83-C-1328.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Daniel John Debs, Pamela Gail Roy-er Debs, Roy Woodrow Nicholson, Linda Ann Bernard Nicholson, Individually and as Representatives of all Persons similarly situated and having a common Interest, applying for certiorari or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 245-972. Jefferson Parish. 430 So.2d 110.

Denied. The trial judge may cumulate the actions if appropriate.


text:
    SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY v. John and Evelyn EISMAN.
    No. 83-C-1329.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re South Central Bell Telephone Company, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Twenty-ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Charles. • No. 22396. 430 So.2d 256.

Denied.


text:
    Cynthia Bender, wife of/and Anthony ORLANDO v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT CORPORATION.
    No. 83-C-1330.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re General Electric Credit Corporation, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of Jefferson, Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 195-646. 430 So.2d 750.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant on the penalties and attorney fees issue.


text:
    Jim MANNING v. Henry J. BERGERON, Henry J. Bergeron, Jr., and Huston Bergeron.
    No. 83-C-1335.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Jim Manning, applying for certiora-ri, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Parish of St. Charles. Twenty-ninth Judicial District Court. No. 20-590, Division “C”. 430 So.2d 108.

Denied.


text:
    T. Jay SEALE, III, et al v. Stephen C. SLEDGE. Stephen C. SLEDGE v. T. Jay SEALE, III, et al. FIRST GUARANTY BANK v. Stephen C. SLEDGE.
    No. 83-C-1336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
    Reconsideration Denied Oct. 7,1983.
   In re Stephen C. Sledge applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Twenty-first Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa. Nos. 57135 c/w 57884 c/w 58002. 430 So.2d 1028.

Denied.


text:
    Irion J. BORDELON v. Albert B. CRUTCHER.
    No. 83-C-1338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Albert B. Crutcher, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 80-9686. 430 So.2d 1107.

Denied. Result is correct.


text:
    Frank J. ARNONA v. ALGIERS HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION, Hugh E. Humphrey and Lorraine Alice Terrell Arnona.
    No. 83-C-1342.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Frank J. Arnona, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 80-3788. 431 So.2d 18.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT v. EXXON CORPORATION.
    No. 83-C-1391.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 221, 857 Division “B”. 430 So.2d 1191.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT v. EXXON CORPORATION (Jo Carolyn Langlois).
    No. 83-C-1407.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Jo Carolyn Langlois, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge, Nineteenth Judicial District. No. 221857. 430 So.2d 1191.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Darren HOOKS v. Honorable Matthew S. BRANIFF, Judge, Criminal District Court, Sec. “B”, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 83-KH-1714.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Darren Hooks, applying for writ of mandamus. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 278-617.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Dale HICKS.
    No. 83-KH-1589.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Robert Dale Hicks, applying for remedial writ. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 79-2495.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel., Clarence HOLMES, Jr., v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 82-KH-2790.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 1983.
   In re Clarence Holmes, Jr., applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 275-900.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel Johnny Michael WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-1894.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 1983.
   In Re: Johnny Michael Williams, applying for writ of mandamus. Fourth Judicial District, Parish of Ouachita. No. 41221.

Denied. This writ is a duplication of a writ filed and pending in the Court of Appeal, 2nd Circuit, and there has been no inordinate delay.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carolyn BOWERS and Acadian Medical Supply, Inc.
    No. 83-KK-2012.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 1983.
   In re Carolyn Bowers and Acadian Medical Supply, Inc., applying for writs of certio-rari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 294-594. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. K — 1372.

On the showing made, the writ is denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant in part, requiring the production of subscription figures and brochures describing the films.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jody MORRIS and Donald Morris.
    No. 83-KK-1451.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re State of Louisiana, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Thirty-second Judicial District Court. No. 117508. Parish of Terrebonne, First Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 83 KW 0007.

Granted.


text:
    VIENNA BEND SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al v. Linda Simpson Prudhomme MANNING, and the Natchitoches Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc.
    No. 83-CC-1981.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Linda Simpson Prudhomme Manning, and the Natchitoches Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc., applying for writs of certiorari and/or review and stay action. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 83-782. Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Natchitoches. No. 52299-B.

Granted. Trial judge ordered to grant a suspensive appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Anthony R. ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-1840.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Anthony R. Robinson, applying for remedial writs. Parish of St. Bernard. No. 53-704.

Denied. Relator must first file in the district court and obtain a ruling there.


text:
    Richard A. MILLER, Individually and as the Natural Tutor of Minor, Richelle MILLER v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC., Thad P. Ellzey, Dan Van Tran.
    No. 83-C-1375.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Richard A. Miller, applying for supervisory writs of certiorari, mandamus and review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. No. CA-0399. Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court. No. 80-5932.

Denied.


text:
    Robert BONDS v. NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT.
    No. 83-CC-1450.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Robert Bonds, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. No. C-0888. City Civil Service Commission. No. 2109.

Denied.


text:
    Willis Paul FUSELIER v. SURTLEFF & ANDREWS, INC. and Employers Casualty Company.
    No. 83-C-1453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Willis Paul Fuselier, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Calcasieu. No. 82-813. Fourteenth Judicial District Court. No. 81-4945.

Denied.


text:
    BROUSSARD TRAVEL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. Gerald J. LEONARD & Curtis Savoie.
    No. 83-CC-1987.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Broussard Travel Construction Co., applying for writ of certiorari and stay order. Fifteenth Judicial District Court. No. 83-3864. Parish of Lafayette, Third Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 83-828.

Denied, on the showing made.

LEMMON, J., concurs. Relator had an adequate remedy by devolutive appeal as to the merits of the dismissal of his action for nullity on exception of no cause of action.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jorell McKEE.
    No. 83-KH-0548.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Jorell McKee, applying for supervisory writs. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 272-868.

Granted. The Court Reporter is ordered to deliver a typed transcript of relator’s trial to the office of the Judicial Administrator of the Orleans Parish District Court on or before October 7, 1983.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne THOMAS.
    No. 83-KH-0987.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Wayne Thomas, applying for writ of mandamus and review. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 264-958, Section “G”.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act on relator’s petition.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Simon SMITH, Jr. v. Robert LOWE, Clerk of Court, 5th Judicial District Court.
    No. 83-KH-1123.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Simon Smith, Jr., applying for writ of mandamus. Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Franklin. No. 16110.

Granted.' Trial judge ordered to rule on relator’s motion filed in the district court forthwith.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Huey Joseph ESTEEN v. STATE of Louisiana: CRIMINAL JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SECTION “C”, Jerome Winsberg, Judge, Criminal Sheriff, at New Orleans, Louisiana (Custodian).
    No. 83-KH-1898.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Huey Joseph Esteen, applying for remedial writ. Criminal District Court. No. 296-612. Parish of Orleans.

Granted for the purpose of transferring this application to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Transfer ordered.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Herman JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana, CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, SECTION F, Judge Waldron and Criminal Sheriff Charles Foti.
    No. 83-KH-1900.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Herman Jackson, applying for remedial writ. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 272-868.

Granted. Transferred to the Court of Appeal, 4th Circuit, for action.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Lee BROWN.
    No. 83-KH-1935.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Robert Lee Brown, applying for remedial writ. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.

Granted. Application transferred to the Court of Appeal for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Ronald L. BONNET v. Nathan Burl CAIN, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 83-KH-1780.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Ronald L. Bonnet, applying for writ of mandamus. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 78-2382. Parish of Jefferson.

Granted and transferred to district court for consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Prince WILLIAMS v. Nathan Burl CAIN, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 83-KH-1669.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Prince Williams, applying for writ of mandamus. Twenty-first Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa. No. 44480.

Granted. Transferred to the district court to act.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., James MORRISON and Allen Anderson v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0046.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re James Morrison and Allen Anderson, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or habeas corpus. Orleans Parish. No. 233-762.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., concurs in the denial because of the plea bargain.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Robert JERVEY v. Honorable Robert M. FLEMING, Judge 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary, State of Louisiana, Franklin, Louisiana 70538.
    No. 83-KH-0076.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Robert Jervey, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Parish of St. Mary. No. 92920.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Michael SHEPHERD v. John McGOUGAN, Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Michael Shepherd, applying for supervisory writ and writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Denver George JACKSON v. Mr. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, and La. Dept. of Corrections, et al.
    No. 83-KH-0196.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Denver George Jackson, applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus and other remedial writs. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 9-81-902.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Albert PAUL v. N. Burl CAIN, et al, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 83-KH-0202.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Albert Paul, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Parish of Orleans. No. 281-333.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Samuel WILSON v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0209.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Samuel Wilson, applying for writs of certiorari or habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court. No. 260-036 Section “F”.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Richard KILGORE v. Larry JEAN, Asst. Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Richard Kilgore, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Calcasieu, Fourteenth Judicial District Court. Nos. 1811-82 and 4138-82.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Nolan MOTT v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0222.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Nolan Mott, applying for writs of habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Jefferson, Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 96-854.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Andre DONNAWAY v. CLERK OF COURT, First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana and Jeanette G. Garrett, Attorney.
    No. 83-KH-0236.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Andre Donnaway, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Caddo. No. 115996.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Samuel Ray LEWIS v. Honorable C.J. BOLIN, Jr., Judge 1st Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, Shreveport, Louisiana 71101.
    No. 83-KH-0239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Samuel Ray Lewis, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Parish of Cad-do. No. 106947.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel., Raymond HOGUE v. 4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF OUACHITA, STATE OF LOUISIANA.
    No. 83-KH-0221.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Raymond Hogue, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Ouachita. No. 39963.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel., Adolph F. LEE v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0226.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Adolph F. Lee, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 255-150.

Denied.


text:
    INMATES OF CADDO DETENTION CENTER, ROUTE 2 BOX 66, KEITHVILLE, LA. 71047 v. John DIXON, Chief Judge and all Associate Judges and all Deputy Clerks for the State of Louisiana, 301 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, La. 70112.
    No. 83-KH-1963.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Inmates of Caddo Detention Center, applying for remedial writ. First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Eric PERRON v. Larry JEANNE (Warden).
    No. 83-KH-1895.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Eric Perron, applying for a remedial writ. Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu.

Denied. Relator has application pending in district court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Leroy PAUL v. Charles C. FOTI.
    No. 83-KH-1612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Leroy Paul, applying for remedial writ, from Criminal District Court, Section F, Parish of Orleans.

Denied. Relator must first file in the trial court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Charles WEBB v. Sidney D. TORRES, Deputy Clerk of Court.
    No. 83-KH-1586.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Charles Webb, applying for writ of mandamus. Thirty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Bernard. No. 42-218, Division B.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Albert Curtis DAMOND v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, et al Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-1507.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Albert Curtis Damond, applying for writ of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari and prohibition. Parish of Orleans. No. 237-115.

Denied. Appeal pending.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles COLLINS.
    No. 83-KK-1422.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Charles Collins, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Twenty-ninth Judicial District Court. No. 5058. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, Parish of St. John the Baptist. No. 83-K-467.

Denied.


text:
    In the Matter of the SUCCESSION OF David WATKINS, Mrs. Mathilda Hunter Watkins, Mrs. Lavignia Watkins Hardy, Anderson Watkins, Willie Hardy, George Hardy and Washington Hardy.
    No. 83-C-1412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Benjamin Hardy, Jr., et al, applying for writs of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82 CA 0516. Parish of West Baton Rouge, Eighteenth Judicial District Court. No. 3326.

Denied.


text:
    Clarence H. JORDON v. STEVENS FORESTRY SERVICES, INC.
    No. 83-C-1405.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Clarence H. Jordon, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 83-779. Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Sabine. No. 33146.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Jimmy Lee TAYLOR v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0243
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Jimmy Lee Taylor, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans. No. 245-992.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael VINING a/k/a Keith Johnson.
    No. 83-KP-1216.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Michael Yining a/k/a Keith Johnson, applying for certiorari or review and habeas corpus. Criminal District Court. No. 271-037. Parish of Orleans, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. K-0937.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Woodrow E. WILSON and Mary Catherine McClin Wilson v. H.J. WILSON CO., INC. and Huey J. Wilson.
    No. 83-C-1346.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re H.J. Wilson Co., Inc., and Huey J. Wilson, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82-CA-0629. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 233380. East Baton Rouge Parish.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant on prescription issue.


text:
    Delores Jarvis JONES v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and Richard D. Scott.
    No. 83-C-1386.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 1983.
   In re Delores Jarvis Jones, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. CA-0268. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 76-9586.

Denied.


author: FORET, Judge.

text:
    George G. RUE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the CITY OF ALEXANDRIA EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 83-185.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Aug. 10, 1983.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 1983.
    Writ Denied Nov. 28,1983.
    William E. Skye, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellant.
    Gist, Methvin, Hughes & Munsterman, Howard B. Gist, III, Garrett, Ryland & Nunnally, B. Dexter Ryland, Alexandria, for defendant-appellee.
    Before GUIDRY, FORET and PICKETT, JJ.

       Judge John S. Pickett, Jr., 10th Judicial District Court, Judge Ad Hoc.

   FORET, Judge.

George G. Rue (plaintiff) brought this action for judicial review of a decision made by defendant, the Board of Trustees of the City of Alexandria Employees Retirement System (the Board), denying his application for disability retirement benefits.

The trial court, after trial on the merits, rendered judgment in favor of defendant, upholding its decision.

Plaintiff appeals and raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Board was in substantial compliance with the law;
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to reverse the Board’s decision to deny plaintiff disability retirement benefits, and
3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that, even if plaintiff was entitled to such benefits, the Board would be entitled to an offset for workmen’s compensation benefits received by him.

FACTS

Plaintiff was injured in a work-related accident on May 8, 1981. At that time, plaintiff was employed by the City of Alexandria (the City) as a Cathodic Protection Technician in the Gas Department. He had worked in that Department for approximately 18 years (prior to the date of the accident), and had held various positions therein. After the accident, the City and its workmen’s compensation insurer, The Home Indemnity Company (HIC), began paying plaintiff workmen’s compensation benefits. On December 15, 1981, the payment of these benefits to plaintiff was terminated.

Plaintiff then filed suit seeking to recover workmen’s compensation benefits for total and permanent disability. Plaintiff also sought to recover the statutory penalties and attorney’s fees.

Meanwhile, on May 17,1982, plaintiff applied to the Board for disability retirement benefits. Approximately one month later, the Board voted to deny the payment of such benefits to plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff sued the Board of Trustees of the City of Alexandria Employees Retirement System, docket number 123,533, Ninth Judicial District Court, Rapides Parish, seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision and a reversal thereof.

At a pre-trial hearing, the trial court, being informed of the existence of the two separate suits, requested that the parties look into the possibility of consolidating the two actions for trial. After being shown that both involved common issues of law and fact, it ordered that the actions be consolidated, and trial of the consolidated actions was held.

On December 3, 1982, the trial court rendered judgment in the workmen’s compensation suit, finding plaintiff to be totally and permanently disabled under the provisions of the Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Act

On January 3, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment in civil suit number 123,-533, rejecting plaintiff’s demand. The trial court found that,

“... the Board, although somewhat loose and informal in its procedures, was in substantial compliance with the law.”

Based on this finding, the trial court refused to invalidate the Board’s decision to deny disability retirement benefits to plaintiff. In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court went on to note that:

“In any event, for whatever effect it might have on this case, the Court feels that should plaintiff have been awarded disability benefits, this award would be subject [to an] off-set in the amount equivalent to any Workman’s Compensation benefits forthcoming to the plaintiff.”

It is from this judgment that this appeal is taken.

COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in finding that the Board was in substantial compliance with the law. Before discussing this contention, we note that (throughout his brief filed in this Court) plaintiff relies on the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (LSA-R.S. 49:950, et seq.).

LSA-R.S. 49:951(2) provides:

“§ 951. Definitions
As used in this Chapter:
(2) “Agency” means each state board, commission, department, agency, officer, or other entity which makes rules, regulations, or policy, or formulates, or issues decisions or orders pursuant to, or as directed by, or in implementation of the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution and statutes of Louisiana, except the legislature or any branch, committee, or officer thereof, any political subdivision, as defined in Article VI, Section 44 of the Louisiana Constitution, and any board, commission, department, agency, officer, or other entity thereof, and the courts.

(Emphasis ours.)

LSA-Const. Art. 6, § 44(2) and (3) provides:

“§ 44. Terms Defined
Section 44. As used in this Article:
(2) “Political subdivision” means a parish, municipality, and any other unit of local government, including a school board and a special district, authorized by law to perform governmental functions.
(3) “Municipality” means an incorporated city, town, or village.

The Board is an agency of the City of Alexandria. Thus, by the definitions contained in the provisions reproduced above, the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to the Board.

The Board, and the retirement system it manages, were created by Act # 459 of 1948 (the Act). A copy of the Act (as amended) was placed in the record by order of the trial court.

Section 6(1) of the Act provides:

“SECTION 6. DISABILITY RETIREMENT
(1) Upon the application of a member or his employer, any member who has had at least five years of creditable service may be retired by the Board of Trustees not less than thirty and not more than ninety days next following the date of filing such application, on a disability retirement allowance, provided that the medical board, after a medical examination, shall certify that he is mentally or .physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty, that such incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that he should be retired.” (Emphasis ours.)

Section 10(15) of the Act provides:

“(15) Medical Board. The Board shall designate a Medical Board to be composed of three physicians not eligible to participate in the retirement system. If required, other physicians may be engaged to report on special cases.
The Medical Board shall arrange for and pass upon all medical examinations required under the provisions of this Act, and shall investigate all essential statements and certificates by or on behalf of a member in connection with an application for disability retirement, and shall report in writing to the Board of Trustees its conclusions and recommendations upon all the matters referred to it.”

From these provisions, it can be seen that the Act mandates that the Board designate a “Medical Board” to pass on all claims such as plaintiffs, and that it report in writing to the Board its conclusions and recommendations with respect to such claims.

Richard Moriarty, the Board’s Executive Secretary, admitted that the Board had failed to designate a medical board as required by the Act. He explained that, when a medical question would arise, the Board would, “... utilize a series of a number of qualified doctors and physicians in Alexandria”. In the action sub judice, the Board simply used the medical reports of two physicians submitted by plaintiff with his application (and the report of a physician who examined plaintiff at its request) in making its decision to deny him disability retirement benefits. We do not consider the Board’s actions to be in compliance with Sections 6(1) and 10(15) of the Act.

In addition, Section 10(7) of the Act provides:

“(7) Subject to the limitations of this Act, the Board shall establish rules and regulations for the administration of the system created by this Act and for the transaction of its business and to give force and effect to the provisions of this Act wherever necessary to carry out the intent and purposes of the Legislature.”

Moriarty’s testimony leaves no doubt that the Board has failed to comply with this provision of the Act and many others.

It is our opinion that the trial court’s finding, that the Board is in substantial compliance with the law, is clearly wrong. We will remand this case to the trial court with instructions that it order the Board to make a determination on plaintiff’s application for disability retirement benefits in compliance with all applicable provisions of the Act. Because of our decision herein, there is no need to discuss the other two issues raised by plaintiff.

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court with instructions that it order the Board of Trustees of the City of Alexandria Employees Retirement System to reconsider plaintiff’s application for disability retirement benefits, and that it make a determination thereon in compliance with all applicable provisions of Act # 459 of 1948, as amended.

The assessment of all costs of this appeal, and in the trial court, shall await a final determination of this matter.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

      . That judgment condemned both the City and HIC to pay plaintiff workmen’s compensation benefits of $163 per week for the duration of his disability. Based on its finding that HIC had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and without probable cause in terminating the payment of such benefits to plaintiff, the trial court’s judgment awarded him the statutory penalties and attorney’s fees. This judgment is now final as no appeal was taken from it.

      . The procedural requirements for actions brought against a political subdivision of the State (or an agency thereof such as the Board) are found in LSA-R.S. 13:5101, et seq.

      . Section 2(7) of the Act provides:
      “ ‘Board’ shall mean the Board of Trustees provided in Section 10 of this Act to administer the retirement system herein created.’ ”


author: HALL, Judge

text:
    Elmer G. GREER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & DEVELOPMENT (Formerly the Department of Highways), Louisiana Paving Company, Inc. and Highland Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants.
    Nos. 15429-CA to 15438-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 15, 1983.

      James B. Frederick, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, Baton Rouge, for State of Louisiana, Dept, of Transp. & Development.
    Snellings & Barnes by O.P. Barnes, III, Monroe, for Louisiana Paving Co.
    Baker, Culpepper & Brunson by D.G. Brunson, Jonesboro, for Elmer G. Greer, C.H. Allen, Richard W. Wainwright and Dorothy Brunson Trahan.
    Baker, Culpepper & Brunson by Bobby L. Culpepper, Jonesboro, for I.S. Garris.
    John C. Blake, Jonesboro, for John Thrasher, W.A. Lawrence and Elizabeth T. Wyatt.
    McKeithen, Wear, Ryland & Woodard by Rebel G. Ryland, for Donnie R. Gibbs.
    Before HALL, JASPER E. JONES and NORRIS, JJ.
   HALL, Judge

The plaintiffs in these 10 consolidated suits sued the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development, the Department’s contractor, Louisiana Paving Company, and the contractor’s liability insurer, Highland Insurance Company, for property damages and mental anguish damages allegedly caused by defendants’ blasting operations in the course of demolishing an overpass. The defendants denied liability and the State filed third-party demands against the contractor. The third-party demands were severed from the trial of the principal actions, have not been decided, and are not before the court on these appeals.

After trial, pursuant to written reasons for judgment in which the trial court found that the blasting operation caused substantial damages to plaintiffs’ houses and buildings, judgments were rendered in favor of each plaintiff against the defendants in sol-ido. The defendants appealed, specifying as error the trial court’s findings that the established defects in plaintiffs’ structures were caused by the blasting operation and the court’s assessment of damages. The plaintiffs answered the appeals seeking an increase in the amount of damages awarded.

Our review of the record discloses that the trial court’s findings of fact on causation and damages are supported by substantial evidence in the record and are not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.

Plaintiffs are the owners of residences, rental dwellings, and a commercial building located within 230 feet to 1525 feet from the overpass in Jonesboro, Louisiana which was the subject of the demolition operation. On May 10, 1976, pursuant to its contract with the state, which included within its scope the demolition of the overpass, Louisiana Paving Company proceeded to demolish the structure by blasting with an explosive known as “C4”. There were three separate blasts, the first or test blast at about 9:30 in the morning using three pounds of explosive, a second blast at about 1:30 in the afternoon using 12 pounds of explosive, and a third blast at about 3:30 in the afternoon using Impounds of explosive. The second and third blasts were utilized to fell the vents and pilings underneath the bridge.

Several plaintiffs testified that they were at home when the blasting took place during the afternoon. The essence of their collective testimony is that the shock of the blast was dramatic, shaking their houses, cracking or breaking some windows, blowing open the doors of the houses, causing pictures to fall off the wall, breaking china inside the houses, and the like. The plaintiffs testified that prior to the explosions their structures were in good or excellent condition and after the blasting there were apparent significant damages to the structures in the nature of cracked exterior walls, separation of partitions, cracks in the foundations and floors, doors out of alignment, and the like, all of which damages became worse during the intervening time between the explosions and the trial of these cases several years later.

Plaintiffs offered the testimony of a civil engineer from Dallas with good credentials. The engineer made an extensive examination of all of the structures, verified the extent of damages to each one and at trial expressed the firm conclusion that the damages were caused by the blasting operations. His opinion was based primarily on the nature of the damages which he believed were caused by airborne shock and were not caused by settling or shifting of the soil, and on the fact that the damages were not present prior to the blasting operation. The engineer conceded that the force generated by the amount of explosives used would not have ordinarily caused the damages but was of the opinion the force was magnified by some process such as refraction or other unusual phenomenon which could not be scientifically explained absent knowledge of all factors which existed at the time of the blasting. According to the expert, the force of the shock hit the structures, moved them on their foundations and they rebounded, causing the structural damages.

Two construction experts testified for the plaintiffs. They described in detail the various defects in the structures and the cost of repairing or replacing them. In several instances the damage was so extensive that repairs were impossible or the cost of repairs would have exceeded the cost of replacing the structures.

The defendants presented a strong defense based on the testimony of four well-qualified experts, a geologist and three engineers. One of the engineers examined the structures and was of the opinion the defects were the result of shrinking, expansion, and shifting of the soil beneath the foundations of the structures. The other experts, using various scientific approaches, were of the opinion that the amount of explosives used in the blasting operation could not have caused the structural damages complained of.

The defendants also presented the testimony of several persons who observed the blasting operation from close by and who testified there was nothing unusual about the operation that caused them to be concerned about damage to nearby property.

The trial court noted that it was impressed by the expert testimony, but also noted that it was contradictory and offsetting. The court found the testimony of the plaintiffs to be credible and, in finding causation, relied heavily on their description of the blast and the existence of damage to the structures after the explosions that did not exist before the explosions.

On appeal the defendants emphasize the credentials and methods of their expert witnesses and their conclusions as to the improbability or impossibility of the explosions having caused the damage to plaintiffs’ property. They point out the lack of extensive glass breakage, glass being the weakest part of structures, as indicating the shock force was not great enough to have caused the structural damage complained of. Also emphasized is the fact that other structures in the area were not damaged to the same extent. Defendants argue that the defects in plaintiffs’ property were the result of settlement and shifting of the soil and that the defects preexisted the blasting operations but were only noticed after plaintiffs made critical examinations of their property following the blasting. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ interest in the outcome of the cases should be considered in evaluating their testimony. It is argued that the opinion of plaintiffs’ expert was not based on any reliable scientific theory and that defendants’ expert evidence showed no unusual effects such as a refraction could have occurred within the “near field” of the explosions.

Defendants contend specifically that the trial court erred in applying a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, arguing that this is a circumstantial evidence case and that plaintiffs are required to make out their case by convincing evidence, excluding every other reasonable hypothesis of causation of the damage to their structures.

There is substantial direct eyewitness evidence as to the blasting operation, how it was conducted, and its immediate effect. Plaintiffs did not rely primarily on circumstantial evidence to prove their case, but relied on direct evidence of the events that occurred. Causation often must be inferred from the proven circumstances, but that does not make every case where causation is at issue a circumstantial evidence case requiring a standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence. In this case the trial court properly applied the preponderance of evidence — more probable than not — standard of proof. See Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955).

The testimony of each of the several plaintiffs tends to corroborate that of the others. This testimony was corroborated by at least one witness in the neighborhood whose home was damaged but who chose not to bring suit. The nature of the damages to the structures was corroborated by the two construction experts. The opinion of plaintiffs’ civil engineer expert was formed after extensive examination of the structures and is entitled to weight. As noted by the trial court, acceptance of the opinions of the defendants’ expert witnesses as to the minimal effect of the blasting would almost necessarily require a finding that plaintiffs’ testimony concerning the considerable shock accompanying the explosions was untrue, a conclusion not warranted by the record.

We conclude after careful review of the voluminous record that the trial court’s credibility evaluations and resolution of the factual issue of causation in plaintiffs’ favor is supported by the evidence and is not clearly wrong. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978).

In assessing damages the trial court relied on the evidence of cost to repair and cost of replacement presented by the two building contractors who testified for the plaintiffs. In most instances the court awarded the cost of replacing the damaged structures, based on 1976 cost, less depreciation, there being evidence that the property could not be repaired or that the cost of repair would exceed the replacement cost of the damaged property, and there being no evidence of the difference in value of the properties before and after the damage. In one instance the court awarded the cost to repair. The trial court’s approach to calculating damages is consistent with the methods recognized in prior cases such ás Roshong v. Travelers Insurance Company, 281 So.2d 785 (La.App. 3d Cir.1973).

While defendants complain that the awards are excessive and that the properties could have been repaired at lesser cost as testified to generally by one of their expert witnesses, no specific cost figures were presented in the defendants’ evidence and no alternative calculation of damages is presented for this court’s consideration.

An appellate court can disturb an award of damages made by a trial court only where the record clearly reveals that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making the award. Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979). On the basis of the evidence presented in these cases we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of damages awarded. The awards are neither excessive as argued by defendants, nor inadequate as argued by plaintiffs.

For the reasons expressed, the judgments of the district court are affirmed, at the cost of defendants-appellants.

Affirmed.

      . The amounts awarded in each case were as follows, with the first figure representing property damage and the second figure representing mental anguish and inconvenience damages:
      Amount Awarded
      NO. 15,429-CA Greer $32,900.00 4,000.00
      NO. 15,430-CA Garris $61,500.00 3,000.00
      NO. 15,431-CA Thrasher $31,644.00 3,000.00
      NO. 15,432-CA Lawrence $25,000.00 1,000.00
      NO. 15,433-CA Allen $36,940.67 1,500.00
      NO. 15,434-CA Wainwright $75,000.00 1,500.00
      NO. 15,435-CA Wainwright $25,000.00 .00
      NO. 15,436-CA Trahan $ 8,400.00 1,500.00
      NO. 15,437-CA Wyatt $27,320.62 1,500.00
      NO. 15,438-CA Gibbs $50,000.00 3,000.00


author: PRICE, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Danny GOODSON, Appellant.
    No. 15533-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 15, 1983.

      M. Randal Fish, Indigent Defender Bd., Benton, for appellant.
    Henry N. Brown, Jr., Dist. Atty., Benton, for appellee.
    Before PRICE, MARVIN and NORRIS, JJ.
   PRICE, Judge.

Defendant, Danny Goodson, was indicted by the Bossier Parish Grand Jury on one count of aggravated rape (La.R.S. 14:42). The defendant was arraigned and pled not guilty. Following trial by jury the defendant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. The defendant has appealed his conviction on the basis of two assignments of error.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

During the ten-month period between November 1980 and early September 1981, a series of rapes occurred in the Highland area of Shreveport in Caddo Parish. Police authorities theorized the rapes were being perpetrated by one individual and the news media in its extensive coverage of these events began referring to the sought after criminal as the “Highland Rapist.” The defendant herein, Danny Goodson, was arrested on September 7, 1981, in the Highland area a short distance from the scene of a rape that had been reported a few moments earlier.

Goodson was interrogated for several days and confessed to twelve rapes, burglaries, and attempted rapes in the Highland area. He was also interrogated by Bossier City authorities and confessed to the July 25,1981, rape of a 20-year-old woman which gave rise to the conviction now being reviewed. Goodson was indicted on September 29, 1981, by the Caddo Parish Grand Jury on six counts of aggravated rape, two counts of attempted rape, two counts of aggravated crime against nature, and two counts of attempted aggravated burglary and simple burglary. He was arraigned and pled not guilty on all charges on October 9, 1981. All of these events as well as the subject charge in Bossier now under review were well publicized by Shreveport newspapers, television, and radio. Good-son’s name was published as well as his photograph.

Following his indictment by the Bossier Parish Grand Jury on September 25, 1981, for aggravated rape and his plea of not guilty at arraignment on October 5, 1981, Goodson filed a pre trial motion for a change of venue. The motion was denied and writs were granted by the Louisiana Supreme Court who ultimately vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case with instructions to defer a ruling of the motion for change of venue until after completion of voir dire. State v. Goodson, 412 So.2d 1077 (La.1982). Defendant’s trial began on June 14,1981, and at the conclusion of the voir dire, the motion for change of venue was again urged and overruled. The trial continued and resulted in defendant’s conviction of the crime charged.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1:

Goodson first complains of the trial court’s failure to sustain his challenge for cause as to prospective jurors James A. Fromme, Arlan R. Neill, and Myra G. Odum. These challenges were based on guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in its opinion remanding with instructions to the trial court to defer its ruling on the motion for a change of venue until completion of the voir dire. The Supreme Court in State v. Goodson, supra, directed that the voir dire examination be governed by the American Bar Association’s Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, Sec. 8-3.5, 1978, and to follow these guidelines:

Both the degree of exposure and the prospective juror’s testimony as to state of mind are relevant to the determination of acceptability. A prospective juror testifying to an inability to overcome preconceptions shall be subject to challenge for cause no matter how slight the exposure. If the prospective juror remembers information that will be developed in the course of the trial, or that may be inadmissible but does not create a substantial risk of impairing judgment, that person’s acceptability shall turn on the credibility of testimony as to impartiality. If the formation of an opinion is admitted, the prospective juror shall be subject to challenge for cause unless the examination shows unequivocally the capacity to be impartial. A prospective juror who has been exposed to and remembers reports of highly significant information, such as the existence or contents of a confession, or other incriminating matters that may be inadmissible in evidence, or substantial amounts of inflammatory material, shall be subject to challenge for cause without regard to the prospective juror’s testimony as to state of mind.

Prospective juror Fromme testified during voir dire that he had heard accounts of the defendant’s involvement in the Highland area rapes but was unfamiliar with the instant offense because he had been out of town. Mr. Fromme testified that he was not familiar with the specific facts of the Highland rapes, only that he remembered hearing the defendant’s name. Mr. Fromme testified repeatedly that he disassociated the defendant from the rapes in the Highland area. For example we quote his testimony in part:

Q Okay. Knowing that — that the — Mr. Goodson is the fellow that was connected at least by the newspaper with those incidents over in the Highland area, can you totally put that out of your mind?
A I believe I could, sir.
¡je ¡js ¡j¡ ⅜ ¡js ¡j¡
A I don’t really think so. I think I would accept each one as they’re — what the — what he’s being charged for. This is Bossier. This is where I live, and this is what I would be more concerned with. And, like I say, I read the papers, but I don’t read everything that’s in the papers.
* * * * * *

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION BY MR. BROWN

Q Do you have any preconceived opinion as to guilt or innocence in this case?
A No, sir.
Q Will you judge this case solely on the basis of the evidence presented to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Without any kind of uh — idea about what may have been said in the newspaper about this defendant anywhere else?
A Yes, sir. I believe I could.
THE COURT: Do you remember any significant details of the Shreveport offenses?
A No, sir, I don’t.
THE COURT: Do you know any significant detail of the Bossier offense for which this case is about—
A No, this one I—
THE COURT: —that is the Bossier charge?
A This one I wasn’t even familiar. I don’t — I don’t really remember reading anything about this.
THE COURT: Has the material that you have read, has it appeared to be inflammatory to you?
A Uh — I would say probably some of the stuff that was put in the Shreveport paper about the Highland area. I don’t know what you mean about inflammatory. If you mean does this cause me to form a judgment just by what I read, I don’t not from what I read.
¡je * * ¡j¡ * *
THE COURT: Well, let me just put it to you this way. If you were selected as a juror, and at that trial there was no mention of any evidence concerning the Highland rapist or any rapes that happened in Shreveport, would you be able to decide the facts of this case in total disregard of what had happened over in Shreveport, Caddo Parish, and in total disregard of what you read in the newspaper?
A I believe I could from the evidence that was given to me.
THE COURT: All right. Now, I want to know is there any doubt or equivocation in your mind about that?
A No, sir.

The Supreme Court ruled that both the degree of exposure and the prospective juror’s state of mind are relevant to the determination of acceptability. In the instant case, Mr. Fromme knew little about either the Highland offenses or the offenses involved at present. He appeared unaware of any of the victims or of the defendant’s confession. Mr. Fromme’s exposure to the case was minimal. In light of his numerous assertions that he could be open-minded with regard to the defendant, it must be said that his state of mind in no way prejudiced the defendant. Using the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court, the trial court acted correctly in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause.

A second prospective juror for whom challenge for cause was denied was Arlan R. Neill. Mr. Neill testified that he was aware of the defendant’s possible connection with the Highland rapist, having read most of the accounts that were published at that time. He knew the general range of ages of the Highland victims. Importantly, Mr. Neill was not aware of any confession made by the defendant to the authorities. Although Mr. Neill was familiar with the Highland rapes, he was emphatic that he would judge the defendant on the evidence presented. In particular:

Q Well, did—did—did you find ' that from reading what you read about the incidences, did you create a sense of outrage or a sense of ill will toward the man identified in the paper as Danny Good-son?
A No. I can’t say that. Uh—I think my reaction was, “Well, the authorities apparently believe that they have, you know, gotten the man responsible for the—the crimes.” I can’t say that I’m not aggravated over the fact that such crimes were committed, but I don’t associate that necessarily with, you know, the individual. I’m well aware of trial process and the fact that, you know, the defendant is innocent until proven guilty.
Q Yes, sir. Now, with remembering all that you’ve read about it in the paper, knowing that this is Danny Goodson that’s on trial here, and knowing that he’s accused of several rapes in Shreveport, if you’re chosen as a juror, can you put that totally out of your mind and—while we’re sitting through this trial?
A I would judge the man on the evidence that’s presented.
Q Well, what I’m asking you, though, is is that going to be in your mind—
A Is if—is the other things that I have read going to cloud my mind in the issue. Q Well, are you going to be thinking about—are they going to, say, cross your mind while you’re considering this?
A I don’t think so.
Q Do you think that possibly, say just as a hypothetical situation, that you’re listening to this evidence in this case, and it came down to a—it was close—it was a close case as far as the proof, you were— you were right there on the border line, would the fact that you remembered that he’s accused of several rapes in Shreveport, would that make you more likely to believe he was guilty of this rape?
A No. It’s entirely two different questions.

Again, considering the Supreme Court’s guidelines concerning exposure and state of mind, it is apparent that the trial court ruled correctly in denying the challenge for cause.

The third and final prospective juror for whom a challenge for cause was denied was Myra G. Odum. Mrs. Odum testified that she had only heard the defendant’s name in connection with the Highland rapes, but was unaware of what the Highland rapes were about. She was equivocal about her ability to remain impartial as evidenced by the following:

Q Now, is that going to—are you going to be able to put that out of your mind when you—if you’re chosen as a juror here? Are you going to be able to put it out of your mind that Mr. Goodson has been accused of some rapes in Caddo Parish?
A I would hope so. I — I’m not sure. I guess — I guess I could. I—
Q Well, if — if—if you can’t, we’d like to — there’s no right or wrong answer—
A Um hum. (Affirmative)
Q —to these questions. We just want an honest answer.
A I would say I would probably be able to put that out away from everything else.
Q Okay. Let me ask — ask you this way. Now, if you were listening to the evidence here in this case, and it came down to where it was a real close case, you were having a hard time deciding because the evidence was close, and you were right there on the border line between guilty and not guilty. Would the fact that you remembered Mr. Goodson was accused of several other rapes somewhere else, would that make you think that he’s more likely had done this one?
A Probably.
Q So you think that it could be a possibility that if you were chosen as a juror here in this case, that what you know about Mr. Goodson from what you’ve read and heard, could make a difference in your decision.
A Possibly.

Upon defendant’s challenge for cause, the trial court ruled that no foundation had been laid to justify his challenge; that it was not shown that Mrs. Odum had been highly exposed or that she had already formed an opinion concerning the defendant’s guilt or innocence. We agree with the trial court. Mrs. Odum exhibited no prejudicial opinions regarding the defendant. She appeared willing to apply the law to the facts of this instant charge without reference to other charges relating to the defendant.

The trial court in all three instances followed the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in State v. Goodson, supra. The jurors challenged either had little exposure to the Highland rapes or exhibited no prejudice toward the defendant.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2:

By his final assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion for change of venue. It is the defendant’s position that media coverage of the Highland rapist and the defendant’s association with that coverage, prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial in Bossier Parish.

Extensive media coverage was given to the Highland rapist during the months preceding and following defendant’s arrest. The defendant was immediately identified as the person the police believed to be the Highland rapist. The defendant’s confessions were widely publicized.

On the original motion to suppress, the trial judge found that although the media publicity had been extensive and that the Shreveport media had coverage over the entirety of Bossier Parish, the relator had not shown that the reports were inflammatory or that prejudice existed against him in the Bossier Parish public mind. The trial court also noted that the jury would be drawn from the entire parish of Bossier, much of which is situated some distance from the Highland area of Shreveport in Caddo Parish, and the site in Bossier City where the charged offenses occurred.

The Louisiana Supreme Court as mentioned earlier, granted writs to review the trial court’s ruling. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court should delay ruling on the motion for change of venue until after voir dire. The Court gave the following instructions:

Since there is a significant possibility that individual jurors will be ineligible to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the examination of each juror with respect to exposure shall take place outside the presence of other chosen and prospective jurors. An accurate record of this examination shall be kept by court reporter or tape recording whenever possible. The questioning shall be conducted for the purpose of determining what the prospective juror has read and heard about the case and how any exposure has affected that person’s attitude toward the trial, not to convince the prospective juror that an inability to cast aside any preconceptions would be a dereliction of duty.

Jury selection was conducted pursuant to these instructions. An accurate record of the examination was kept. That record reveals that of the 52 jurors called in the selection of 12 jurors, only 16 were challenged for cause due to publicity. The transcript of voir dire examination indicates that the majority of the venire was either unaware or unconcerned about who the defendant was.

The motion for change of venue was properly denied based on the instructions provided by the Supreme Court. This assignment of error is therefore without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of defendant, Danny Goodson, are AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Carole H. BURSTEIN, Elizabeth D. O’Neal, Citizens and Taxpayers of the City of New Orleans v. Ernest N. MORIAL, et al.
    Nos. C 1178, CA 1179.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Aug. 16, 1983.
    Writ Granted Aug. 25,1983.

      Barham & Churchill, Mack E. Barham, Charles F. Thensted and David R. Richardson, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants.
    Murray, Murray, Ellis, Braden & Landry, Stephen B. Murray, Jones, Nabonne & Wilkerson, Olka Jones, II and Ronald P. Nabonne, Galen Brown and Michael Bag-neris, City Attys., Ronald C. Davis and Maureen J. Feran, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.
    Before CHIASSON, LANDRY and SWIFT, JJ., AD HOC.
   PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs herein have applied for supervisory writs, and, alternatively, have appealed from judgment of the trial court rejecting their request for declaratory judgment decreeing the nullity of the vote of defendant, Council of the City of New Orleans (Council) taken July 7,1983 overriding the Mayoral veto of Municipal Ordinance 9237, which submits to the electorate of the City of New Orleans (City) a proposed change in the office of Mayor. Injunction is sought against the individual members of the Council, the Council, the Mayor, the State Commissioner of Elections and the Secretary of State, State of Louisiana, proposing inclusion of the allegedly invalid proposal from being included on the ballot in the forthcoming election scheduled for October 22, 1983.

The trial court held the assailed ordinance valid and declined to enjoin its inclusion on the ballot to be prepared for the October 22, 1983, election. We find the ordinance invalid for failure of the Council to follow pertinent provisions of the Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans (Charter) and the rules of the Council. Accordingly, we reverse.

In applying for writs, Appellants maintain that a similar ordinance has already been scheduled for inclusion on the October 22, 1983, election ballot and that inclusion of the ordinance in, question will serve only to confuse the electorate. Since the matter is before us and we are in position to decide the matter on its merits and issue the requested injunction which will be effective immediately, subject only to possible Supreme Court review on writs, we prefer to and do consider the matter on appeal rather than issue supervisory writs.

FACTS

An excellent and accurate statement of the case and pertinent facts is contained in the brief of counsel for Plaintiffs, which we adopt as follows:

“Plaintiffs-appellants are citizens, voters, and taxpayers of the City of New Orleans, who filed a Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on July 20, 1983, seeking a judgment declaring the vote of the Council of the City of New Orleans on July 7, 1983, to override the Mayor’s veto of Ordinance No. 9237 M.C.S., to be ineffective, and to enjoin the Mayor, the City Council, five individual Council members, the Clerk of Council, the Commissioner of Elections, and the Secretary of State from taking any action in furtherance of the invalid Ordinance. On July 22,1983, the Petition was amended to join the City of New Orleans as a defendant and to delete the name of one of three original plaintiffs.
The subject ordinance called for an election to submit to the voters of the City of New Orleans a proposal to amend Article IV of the Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans (the “Charter” or the “Home Rule Charter”) to allow for unlimited mayoral terms beginning in 1987. The effect of the proposed amendment would be to allow unlimited terms to anyone except the current mayor. It was passed by the Council on June 16, 1983.
On June 24, Mayor Morial vetoed the proposed Ordinance, pursuant to Section 4-206(2)(d) of the Home Rule Charter, which Section gives the mayor the power to veto ordinances. Proposed Ordinance 9237 M.C.S. was again presented to the Council at its next regular meeting, July 7, 1983, pursuant to Section 3-113(3) of the Home Rule Charter, which provides that:
Ordinances vetoed by the Mayor shall be presented by the Clerk to the Council at its next regular meeting and should the Council then or at its next regular meeting adopt the ordinance by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of all its members, it shall become law. (emphasis supplied)
Since the Council consists of seven members, five votes are required to override a veto.
At the July 7 meeting of the Council, Mayor Morial appeared and delivered his veto message on proposed Ordinance No. 9237 M.C.S., responded to a question by Councilman Boissiere, and left the Council Chambers, nineteen minutes before the override vote on Ordinance 9237 M.C.S. Immediately upon leaving the Council Chambers, the Mayor stepped into a waiting automobile and was driven directly to New Orleans International Airport where he took the first available flight to Dallas, Texas. He returned on July 8.
Shortly after the Mayor had left the Council Chambers, Councilman Giarrusso gave a speech, during the course of which Ann Wheeler, an employee of the Mayor’s office, handed Councilman Barthelemy a letter informing the Councilman of the Mayor’s absence and of the Councilman’s appointment as Acting Mayor. Thereafter, Ms. Wheeler distributed copies of the letter to the other Councilmen and it was read into the record of the Council.
At that point the Clerk announced the reconsideration of Ordinance 9237 M.C.S., and the Council voted on the question: “Shall the Ordinance pass the objection of the Mayor notwithstanding?”
Sections 3-107 and 4-204(3) of the Home Rule Charter prohibit a councilman who has been appointed Acting Mayor from voting, and Councilman Barthelemy was so advised at the time by City Attorney Salvador Anzelmo. Nevertheless, Acting Mayor Barthelemy voted on Ordinance 9237. His vote, subsequently held invalid by the Trial Court, appeared to give the proponents of the override a 5 to 2 margin. Later that afternoon, after conducting further business, the Council adjourned.
On July 21, 1983, the day after the present suit was filed, the Council met again. The minutes of the July 7 meeting were approved and adopted. After conducting some preliminary business, the Council began discussing another vote to override the Mayor’s veto, as insurance against the possibility that the July 7 vote might be held invalid. Councilman Boissiere moved that the Council “go to reconsider the vote on last week’s override of the vetoed Ordinance.” That motion to reconsider carried 5 to 1. Mr. Anzelmo advised the Council that the override vote could not be reconsidered again because the Council’s Rules forbade reconsideration of a motion to reconsider. At that point, Councilman Early moved to suspend the Rules and Regulations of the Council (the “Rules”). The motion passed, 5 to 1. Councilman Boissiere then moved “to reconsider the vote on this override of the vetoed ordinance”. The vote was 5 to 1 in favor of the override.
On the morning of trial, the Council, five individual Council members, and the Clerk of Council, filed an Answer, Exceptions of No Cause or Right of Action, and a Motion to Dismiss. The Answer denied that the Mayor had indeed been absent from the City at the time the vote was taken, urged that Councilman Barthele-my’s appointment as Acting Mayor was therefore invalid and consequently that the July 7 vote was valid, so that the veto was successfully overridden on July 7. In the alternative, the Answer alleged that Sections 3-107 and 4-204(3) (the Acting Mayor provisions) of the Home Rule Charter are unconstitutional.

The following provisions of the City’s Charter and rules are pertinent:

Charter Section 3-113 (3):

Ordinances vetoed by the Mayor shall be presented by the Clerk to the Council at its next regular meeting and should the council then or at its next regular meeting adopt the ordinance by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of all its members, it shall become law.

Rule 45 states:

Ordinances returned with the disapproval of the Mayor shall immediately stand as reconsidered...

Rule 40 provides:

A vote or question may be reconsidered at any time during the same meeting, or at the first regular or special meeting held thereafter. A motion for reconsideration having been once made and decided in the negative, shall not be renewed, nor shall a motion to reconsider be reconsidered. (Emphasis by the court).

Charter Section 4-204(2) provides:

In the absence or disability of the Mayor, his office shall be filled by an Acting Mayor who shall be appointed by the Mayor from the two Councilmen-At-Large. If within ten days the Mayor should fail to so appoint an Acting Mayor the district Councilmen shall, by majority vote, appoint one of the Councilmen-At-Large as Acting Mayor.

Charter Section 3-104(3) states:

The appointment of a Councilman as Acting Mayor shall not be deemed to create a vacancy in the office of Councilman-At-Large but while serving as Acting Mayor he shall not perform his duties as a member of the Council. His only compensation shall be that of a Councilman.

Charter Section 3-101(1) provides:

All legislative powers of the City shall be vested in the Council and exercised by it in the manner and subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth. (Emphasis by the court)

Charter Section 3-102 recites:

The Council shall consist of seven members of whom five shall be elected from districts and two from the City at large. Charter Section 3-107 states in part: ... All Councilmen, including the President, shall have the right to vote in the Council at all times, except when serving as Acting Mayor.
Rule 19 of the Council’s rules permits the Council to suspend its rules.

ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHARTER SECTION 3-104(3)

As contended by defendants this provision prohibits a Councilman from voting while serving as Acting Mayor. It is contended simply that this provision is unconstitutional in that it is contrary to Charter Section 3-101(1) which vests all legislative power in the Council and to deprive a Councilman of his vote while serving as acting Mayor is an unwarranted and impermissible restriction upon and invasion of this right.

We find the answer to this contention to be contained in the provisions of Section 3-101(1) itself which clearly recites that the legislative authority granted is expressly made subject to limitations subsequently set forth in the Charter. Section 3-104(3) is an express limitation on the authority granted in 3-101(1). The Charter was submitted to and approved by the electorate of the City with this limitation as part of its intrinsic provision. This being a Home Rule Charter, its provisions may include' any rule not contrary to express law. No such violation has been shown the Court. In adopting the Charter the electorate saw fit to place limitations on the exercise of legislative authority by Councilmen under circumstances clearly set forth. Councilmen have only such authority as was delegated to them.

We find Sections 3-107 and 3-104(3) are not invalid for unwarranted interference with the legislative authority of Councilmen-At-Large.

The trial court held the July 7,1983, attempt to override the Mayor’s veto was invalid for lack of a two-thirds vote. We find this ruling to be correct. The trial court further held, however, that the Council’s authority to suspend its rules and again vote on the matter is authorized by Charter Section 3-113(3) above, which permits two opportunities to override a mayoral veto. In this holding the trial court erred.

The plaintiffs contend that Section 3-113(3) of the Charter permits the Council only one opportunity to override the May- or’s veto, either by voting upon and adopting the Ordinance at the next regular meeting after the veto or by doing so at its following regular meeting, but not through a favorable vote at either meeting. On the other hand, the defendants’ position is that the Council is authorized to vote to override at both meetings, and if the vote is favorable at either meeting the ordinance becomes the law.

The latter interpretation is contrary to the Council’s own Rules 40 and 45, which are quoted above. Although the Council attempted to suspend these rules retroactively at the second meeting, apparently they were adopted by the Council long prior to the present incident, and certainly reflect the Council’s own interpretation of Section 3-113(3) of the Charter. It is clear that if this section of the Charter is interpreted by us as defendant’s wish, Rule 40 would be invalid. It specifically provides that there be only one vote upon consideration of a veto.

The authorities from other states that have been cited to us also appear to support the plaintiffs’ position that there can be no legislative reconsideration of a vote which fails to override an executive’s veto.

We agree that such is the proper interpretation of this section of the Charter as it establishes only a time frame within which the Ordinance may be adopted by a two-thirds vote and does not authorize voting on the Ordinance more than once.

We might also add that in our opinion the Council’s action at the second meeting in suspending its rules and voting to reconsider its prior vote was improper and without effect. Rules 40 and 45 were in effect when the vote to override failed at the first meeting. Therefore, the action was no longer subject to reconsideration under these rules, and it became final after the vote was tallied. This view is fortified by the adoption of the minutes of the first meeting before any attempt was made to suspend the Council’s rules. Consequently the Council’s subsequent step to suspend the rules was an invalid attempt to do so retroactively.

For these reasons we conclude that the Ordinance in question was validly vetoed by the Mayor and is of no effect.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be and the same is hereby rendered herein, declaring the vote of the Council of the City of New Orleans on July 7, 1983, and on July 21, 1983, to override the Mayor’s veto of Ordinance No. 9237 M.C.S. to be null, void and without any legal effect whatsoever;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a preliminary injunction issue herein, enjoining defendants herein from placing on the October 22, 1983 ballot, a proposition to amend Section 4-201 of the Home Rule Charter, pursuant to Ordinance No. 9237 M.C.S.; enjoining and prohibiting the Honorable Ernest N. Morial, Mayor, from directing city employees from performing functions necessary to the holding of the election on the proposed amendment; enjoining and prohibiting the Council of the City of New Orleans and its members, individually and collectively, from performing any act in furtherance of the invalid Ordinance No. 9237 M.C.S., including, but not limited to, placing on the October 22,1983 ballot of the proposed amendment; enjoining and mandating the Honorable Lea Siegel, Clerk of the Council of the City of New Orleans, to expunge Ordinance No. 9237 M.C.S. from the current and comprehensive index of all ordinances; enjoining and ordering Jerry M. Fowler, Commissioner of Elections, to refrain from taking or ordering any action in aid or furtherance of the election on the proposed amendment.

Costs in this matter are assessed against defendants, governmental entities and officials, as authorized by law, the amount to be determined by rule to tax costs upon the finality of this judgment.