author: WATSON, Justice. DENNIS, J., MARCUS, Justice LEMMON, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lane C. NELSON.
    No. 83-KA-0767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 15, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 15, 1984.
    Concurring Opinion Nov. 19, 1984.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mam-oulides, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Jo Ellen McMillen, Philip Boudousque, G. Michael Grosz and William C. Credo, Dorothy A. Pendergast, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Matt Greenbaum, Law Offices of Matt Greenbaum, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   WATSON, Justice.

Defendant, Lane Christian Nelson, was convicted of committing a first degree murder on July 22, 1981, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:3o. After a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended death on the ground that Nelson was engaged in an armed robbery at the time of the murder, a statutory aggravating circumstance. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(a). Defendant has appealed his conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On July 23, 1981, at about 7:00 P.M., a traffic accident occurred on Interstate 10 in Madison County, Florida. Trooper Homer Melgaard investigated the accident, which involved a disabled truck hit in the rear by a Mercury automobile, despite the truck driver’s efforts to flag traffic. Witnesses at the scene advised Trooper Melgaard that two men walking down the road had been in the Mercury. One of them, Lane C. Nelson, was arrested for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcoholic beverages and both he and his companion, Robert Wilhelm, were taken to the Madison County jail. Because Trooper Melgaard had to wait for a wrecker, the trio reached the jail between 8:30 and 8:45 P.M. Mel-gaard requested a breathalyzer test on Nelson which showed a .24 reading. In the course of doing his paperwork on the accident report, Trooper Melgaard engaged Nelson in a general conversation and inquired about the ownership of the vehicle. Nelson said he had borrowed the rented automobile from a friend in Louisiana to go to the store, and Trooper Melgaard suspected that the car might be stolen. During the course of the conversation, Nelson volunteered: “Looking at me, you do not think I would kill anybody,” (Tr. 245). At this point, Trooper Melgaard broke off the conversation and summoned Officer William Pheil, who gave Nelson his Miranda rights at approximately 10:00 P.M. After those rights were fully explained and Nelson signed a waiver, the officers began questioning him about his startling statement.

Nelson had been hitchhiking to New Orleans when he was picked up by Beauvais Randall in Bunkie, Louisiana. Randall, apparently a transvestite, was dressed like a woman. After Nelson told Randall that he had no money, Randall offered to pay Nelson for a photography session at Randall’s apartment in New Orleans. Following an early morning arrival at the Randall apartment, the two men took a nap, and Randall showed Nelson magazine illustrations of women in bondage positions which he wished duplicated. Randall was trussed in ropes and Nelson took Polaroid photographs. During a break, Nelson received twenty dollars from Randall and purchased cigarettes, a pint of vodka, and two six packs of beer. Before Nelson left for the store, he retied Randall who performed oral sex on Nelson. Subsequently, there were approximately three hours of photography with Randall dressed in a woman’s black slip and high heels. Randall then assumed men’s clothes and the two went to a pizza parlor where Nelson drank beer. After they returned to Randall’s apartment, Randall asked Nelson to tie him up again before Nelson left to do some laundry. While doing the laundry, Nelson decided that he would leave in Randall’s rented Mercury with Randall’s money. When he announced his plan to Randall, the latter began to scream. Nelson stabbed Randall repeatedly with an eight inch knife which had been in Randall’s suitcase, took sixty-five or seventy dollars from Randall’s jeans, and drove off in the Mercury. He intended to drive to Florida but went west instead of east and spent the night at a rest stop about one hundred miles from New Orleans. Nelson then retraced his steps to New Orleans and continued on to Florida where he picked up hitchhiker Wilhelm. Nelson told Wilhelm about what had happened to Randall because he “had to tell someone”. (Appendix B, page 52)

According to Trooper Melgaard and Officer Pheil, Nelson did not appear to be too intoxicated to make a statement and spoke coherently. During the course of the statement, Pheil called special agent Robert Kinsey with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Kinsey repeated Nelson’s Miranda rights to him at approximately 10:20 P.M. and Nelson signed another waiver. Kinsey and Pheil first talked to Wilhelm and then interviewed Nelson at approximately 10:30 P.M. Nelson gave directions to Randall’s apartment, speaking directly to the Jefferson Parish authorities. Nelson’s cooperation enabled the Jefferson Parish police to find Randall’s body still tied in a locked bedroom. Nelson gave a taped confession to Officer Kinsey. A transcript of the confession, in which Nelson sounds completely sober, coherent, and candid, is attached as Appendix A.

Nelson also consented to a search of the Mercury automobile, but the search was not completed until the following day. In the automobile were some aluminum cans, a short piece of white nylon rope, and one photograph showing a white male tied up in bed wearing a woman’s slip. Although there were numerous knife wounds, Randall’s death resulted from two stabs which severed his common carotid artery.

Subsequently, on July 27, 1981, when Detective DeNoux of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s office arrived in Madison, Florida, to transport defendant back to Louisiana, Nelson was again advised of his Miranda rights and gave a second taped statement, a transcript of which is attached as Appendix B. Both recordings were heard by the jury-

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his original oral inculpatory statement to Trooper Homer Melgaard because he had not been warned of his Miranda rights and he was too intoxicated to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights before his confession.

Trooper Melgaard erred in not advising Nelson of his constitutional rights. Berkemer v. McCarty, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). However, the error was inadvertent; there is no indication of any official misconduct or bad faith. See State v. Kent, 391 So.2d 429 (La.1980). Miranda states that “where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated.” Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 475-476, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724.

Despite being in custody, Nelson was not being interrogated at the time of his statement, certainly not about anything even remotely connected with murder. His arrest was entirely legal. Compare Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Nelson’s unsolicited incriminating statement was unresponsive to the car ownership about which he was being questioned. At most, Nelson was suspected of possible car theft. Trooper Melgaard was unaware that a murder had been committed and could not have known that his conversation might elicit the incriminating response. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) and State v. Castillo, 389 So.2d 1307 (La.,1980). As to the crime of murder, Nelson’s outburst was as voluntary as if he had walked into the police station and announced his guilt. Miranda, supra. “Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence .... Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment _” Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 5.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.

Nelson had already confessed his guilt to Wilhelm. Wilhelm, a disinterested hitchhiker, was also in custody and may have been driving the Mercury. (Appendix B, page 52). At some point, Wilhelm would have undoubtedly incriminated Nelson, who was in the car rented by Randall and had left his finger prints throughout Randall’s apartment. Therefore, despite Melgaard’s error in not advising Nelson of his Miranda rights, the police would inevitably have discovered Nelson’s involvement with Randall’s murder. “[W]hen, as here, the evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.” Nix v. Williams, — U.S. - at -, 104 S.Ct. 2501 at 2511, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 at 390 (1984).

The state carried its burden of proof as to the admissibility of Nelson’s oral incul-patory statement. LSA-R.S. 15:451.

Despite Nelson’s blood alcohol level, the evidence is that he was competent to waive his constitutional rights. On the basis of the testimony of the Florida police officers and the clarity of the first taped confession, the trial court and the jury concluded that Nelson was not too intoxicated to make a voluntary statement. Nelson apparently had a great tolerance for alcohol; his taped statement itself fully supports the conclusion that Nelson was sober enough to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights prior to his confession. See State v. Delore, 381 So.2d 455 (La.,1980).

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBER TWO AND THREE

Defendant contends that his two taped statements were inadmissible because they were fruits of his illegal interrogation by Trooper Melgaard. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

As to the second statement, on July 27, 1981, the connection between Nelson’s incriminating remark on July 24 and the statement was so attenuated that any taint had been dissipated. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939); State v. Harper, 430 So.2d 627 (La.,1983). In any event, the poisonous tree doctrine is inapplicable; there was no primary taint because Nelson’s initial statement was not the product of interrogation.

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the state to exercise a peremptory challenge on juror Sampey after she had been sworn in violation of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 795.

The court allowed the objection because juror Sampey had failed to inform the court during voir dire that her son was under indictment for theft when asked if any member of her family had been arrested or convicted. Defendant had not used all of his peremptory challenges when the state was allowed to excuse juror Sampey and the state’s peremptory challenges were not exhausted. There was no prejudice to the defendant and no error in the trial court excusing the juror from service. LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 921; State v. Cormier, 272 So.2d 686 (La., 1973); State v. Thornhill, 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1937).

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FIVE

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing gruesome photographs of the homicide to be displayed to the jury after the defense had stipulated that the body was that of Beauvais Randall. Since there was no issue about the identity of the victim or the murderer, it is argued that the probative value of the photographs was outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

Some of the postmortem photographs of the victim are extremely unpleasant, but they were admissible to corroborate the details of Nelson’s confessions and the medical evidence about the cause of death. They depict the helplessness of the victim at the time of the stabbing; see assignment of error number six, infra. The probative value of the photographs is not outweighed by their prejudicial effect. State v. Watson, 449 So.2d 1321 (La., 1984); State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158 (La., 1983); State v. Parker, 425 So.2d 683 (La., 1982); State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466 (La., 1981); State v. Bodley, 394 So.2d 584 (La., 1981); and State v. Rideau, 249 La. 1111, 193 So.2d 264 (1966).

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER SIX

Abandoned in brief, defendant contends in this assignment that the trial court erred in prohibiting cross-examination of police officers about the victim’s violent nature.

Since it is clear from the photographs that the victim was unable to make any hostile demonstration or overt act toward Nelson at the time he was killed, evidence of his violent nature was inadmissible. State v. Faulkner, 441 So.2d 721 (La., 1983); LSA-R.S. 15:482.

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER SEVEN

Defendant contends that the trial court refused to allow the cornerstone of his defense, to-wit: evidence from two members of the sanity commission about Nelson’s mental capacity on the day of the murder to have the requisite specific intent.

Nelson pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, as well as not guilty. Therefore, testimony about any insanity or mental defect at the time of the offense was admissible evidence. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 651. Compare State v. Lecompte, 371 So.2d 239 (La., 1979). Under LSA-R.S. 14:14, the Louisiana codification of the M’Naughten rule, an offender is only exempt from criminal responsibility if incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the offense. Evidence of a mental defect which does not meet the M’Naughten definition of insanity cannot negate a specific intent to commit a crime. State v. Rideau, supra.

Defense counsel focused his inquiry on whether defendant on the day of the murder had the mental capacity to form the requisite specific intent to murder. The trial court disallowed questions designed to elicit expert opinion about defendant’s ability to have a specific intent to murder on the day of the crime. The court agreed that the experts could be asked hypothetical questions based on the facts in evidence about Nelson and specific questions about his mental capacity at the time of the offense. Defense counsel refused to accept the court’s parameters for his questioning.

Due process requires the prosecution • to bear the burden of persuasion with respect to each element of a crime. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). Thus, the state has the burden of proving that an offender had specific intent. However, defendant attempted to negate his specific intent to commit the crime by showing a mental defect which did not meet the M’Naughten definition, and Louisiana does not allow evasion of the M’Naughten rule in this fashion. State v. Rideau, supra. State v. Lecompte, supra; State v. Murray, 375 So.2d 80 (La.,1979).

Since defense counsel refused to phrase his questions to the expert psychiatrists in the context of Louisiana law, the trial court correctly rejected the questions as improper.

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER EIGHT

In this assignment, abandoned in brief, defendant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing both defense attorneys to address the jury in closing argument.

Conduct of judicial proceedings is within the discretion of the trial court. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 17; State v. Chaisson, 425 So.2d 745 (La.,1983). There is no allegation or showing that defendant suffered any prejudice. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 921, supra.

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER NINE

Defendant contends that a mistrial should have been granted when the prosecutor made an inflammatory attack on defense counsel during his rebuttal argument.

The prosecutor stated that defense counsel’s “function in life, or with this defendant, is to make inside look out, black look white, up seem down — confuse and befuddle the issue, whatever you want to do.” (Tr. 1093). After an objection, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the remark and the prosecutor apologized. Any influence from the improper remarks was cured by the precautionary instruction. Mistrial is only warranted when there has been substantial prejudice to the defendant. State v. Jarman, 445 So.2d 1184 (La.,1984).

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TEN

Defendant contends that it is unconstitutional to require him to bear the burden of proof on the defense of insanity as required by LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 652.

This assignment lacks merit. State v. Felde, 422 So.2d 370 (La.,1982); State v. Thompson, 429 So.2d 862 (La.,1983); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319,-53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ELEVEN

Defendant objects to the prosecutor’s arguing to the jurors at the sentencing phase of trial that “your recommendation will be reviewed and perhaps rereviewed by this court.” (Tr. 1164)

The trial court sustained an objection and instructed the jury that “this is going to be your determination — that’s why you’re here — a binding recommendation to the court; not just a recommendation. It is binding .... It will not be reviewed by this court and I want you to disregard any comment about any possible review by any court.” (Tr. 1167-1168).

Any remark by the prosecutor which lessens the jury’s sense of responsibility is prejudicial. However, the judge’s instruction clarified the jury’s role. During his general charge, the trial court again told the jury:

“[Y]ou, the jury, and, you, alone, in this case, are given the authority to make a binding recommendation to the trial judge, which is me, as to the sentence that should be imposed on the defendant.” (Tr. 1169)

In view of the court’s curative instructions, there was no prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Knighton, 436 So.2d 1141 (La.,1983); State v. Moore, 414 So.2d 340 (La.,1982); State v. Mattheson, 407 So.2d 1150 (La.,1981). Compare State v. Willie, 410 So.2d 1019 (La.,1982).

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWELVE

Defendant contends that the state introduced insufficient evidence of armed robbery, arguing that there was no force, intimidation or taking of anything of value. LSA-R.S. 14:64 A.

Apart from the automobile, Nelson took Randall’s money which constitutes something of value under the statute.

Defendant relies on the fact that the victim was tied at his own request to argue that no force or intimidation was necessary to accomplish the robbery. However, Randall was killed solely to prevent him from screaming his objections to Nelson’s departure with his car and money. He was stabbed, i.e., force was applied, to accomplish the robbery. The murder facilitated the robbery. It unquestionably occurred while defendant was engaged in armed robbery. Nelson said that if Randall had been gagged and unable to scream, he would not have had to kill him. (Appendix A, page 27).

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTEEN AND FOURTEEN

These assignments contend that the death sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases and will be considered in connection with the proportionality review of the death sentence.

DEATH SENTENCE REVIEW

Under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.9.1, every sentence of death is reviewed for excessiveness on the basis of three factors:

“(a) whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors, and “(b) whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and
“(c) whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.”

A. There is no indication that the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors. Randall and Nelson, both white males, were, respectively twenty-five and twenty-six years old at the time of the crime. Voir dire questions were used to exclude prospective jurors who would be influenced by the homosexual aspects of the murder.

B. The fact that the murder was performed during the course of an armed robbery, a serious felony, is an adequate statutory aggravating circumstance and the evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that the murder occurred during the course of an armed robbery.

C. SENTENCE REVIEW:

Proportionality of the sentence

Although not constitutionally mandated by the United States Supreme Court under Pulley v. Harris, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984), a proportionality review is part of the Louisiana statutory scheme for imposition of the death penalty. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.9.1(c), supra.

The only similar case from Jefferson Parish is State v. Taylor, 422 So.2d 109 (La.,1982). All of the other capital cases can be distinguished by on the facts of the crime or some mitigating factor with reference to the defendant. Taylor also involved a murder committed with multiple stab wounds during the course of an armed robbery. While the Taylor jury also found that the offense was .committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner and the jury did not make that finding here, Randall received eighteen stabbing wounds. Since both crimes were brutal and senseless, the death sentence imposed on Nelson is not disproportionate to Taylor’s death sentence.

Nelson was depressed over the impending death of his mother from throat cancer. He had a history of heavy drinking and drug abuse, and both his parents were alcoholics. He was allegedly intoxicated at the time of the crime. The jury did not find that these mitigating factors justified a lesser sentence, and they do not render the penalty imposed disproportionate.

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of defendant, Lane Christopher Nelson, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

CALOGERO, J., concurs, disagreeing only with the treatment of the Miranda issue.

MARCUS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

DENNIS, J.,

concurs in the result, disagreeing with treatment of the Miranda issue and the statement of federal and state law regarding proportionality review. See State v. Brogdon, 457 So.2d 616; State v. Welcome, 458 So.2d 1235 (dissenting opinion).

LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

DIXON, C.J., concurs, disagreeing with the treatment of Assignment # 7.

MARCUS, Justice

(concurring).

Agreeing with the majority that Nelson’s initial statement was not the product of interrogation, I do not consider that Miranda warnings were necessary. Accordingly, I cannot agree that Trooper Melgaard erred in not advising Nelson of his Miranda rights.

LEMMON, Justice,

concurring.

The trial court may have erred in admitting the evidence of defendant’s initial statement to the investigating policeman (“looking at me, you do not think I would kill anybody”). The defendant was in custody, and the officer during the interrogation suspected that the vehicle may have been (as, in fact, it was) stolen. Thus, the officer probably should have known that his words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (at least as to the car theft) and should have provided the warnings required by Miranda v, Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The fact that the incriminating response did not relate to the offense of theft of an automobile (but did relate indirectly to the circumstances surrounding the taking of the vehicle) is probably of no moment under Miranda. The Miranda prophylactic rule generally excludes voluntary statements made by unwarned suspects during custodial interrogation. See New York v. Quarles, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984).

However, a decision that the initial statement should have been excluded because of violation of the prophylactic rule does not conclude the* inquiry. The officers immediately warned defendant of his rights before any further statements were made. The record clearly supports the “knowing and intelligent” nature of defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights and the voluntariness of the subsequent statements. Thus, the subsequent inculpatory statements were not compelled by police conduct which overcame defendant’s will to resist. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). Furthermore, the subsequent statements were clearly “attenuated” from and not the “product” of defendant’s earlier statement. See United States v. Ceccolini, 485 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978).

Furthermore, the “holding” of Miranda does not require suppression of derivative evidence (here, voluntary statements from a properly warned suspect) merely because there can be established a causal connection between such evidence and a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Miranda. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974); New York v. Quarles, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550, above, (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Compare Oregon v. Elsted, 61 Or.App. 673, 658 P.2d 552 (1983), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1437, 79 L.Ed.2d 759, 36 Cr.L. 4020 (1984).

The initial statement was only marginally incriminating when compared to the subsequent statement. Since the subsequent statements were admissible, and since the initial statement was clearly voluntary, any error in admitting the initial statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. La. C.Cr.P. Art. 921; State v. Gibson, 391 So.2d 421 (La.1980).

      . LSA-R.S. 14:30 provides in pertinent part:
      "First degree murder is the killing of a human being: "(1) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, or simple robbery;
      ******
      "Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in accordance with the recommendation of the jury.”

      .LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(a) provides:
      "The following shall be considered aggravating circumstances:
      “(a) The offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery: ...”

      . In Florida, as in Louisiana, there is a presumption of intoxication with a reading of .10.

      . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

      . Appendices A and B were transcribed at this court to facilitate review of Nelson’s appeal. They are attached to and comprise a part of the opinion, but are designated “Not for Publication”.

      . The issue of harmless error was pretermitted in Berkemer v. McCarty, supra.

      . LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 795 provides:
      "A juror cannot be challenged for cause by the state or the defendant after having been accepted by the challenging party, unless the ground for the challenge was not known by the challenging party prior to acceptance. A challenge for cause must be made before the indictment is read to the jury. "A peremptory challenge may be made by the state at any time before the juror is accepted by it, and by the defendant at any time before the juror is sworn.”

      . LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 921 provides:
      "A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any error, de-feet, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights of the accused."

      . LSA-R.S. 15:482 provides:
      "In the absence of evidence of hostile demonstration or of overt act on the part of the person slain or injured, evidence of his dangerous character or of his threats against accused is not admissible.”

      . LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 651 provides:
      "When a defendant is tried upon a plea of ‘not guilty’, evidence of insanity or mental defect at the time of the offense shall not be admissible.
      “The defenses available under a combined plea of ‘not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity’ shall be tried together.”

      .LSA-R.S. 14:14 provides:
      “If the circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility.”

      . LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 17 provides:
      "A court possesses inherently all powers necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its lawful orders, including authority to issue such writs and orders as may be necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdiction. It has the duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so control the proceedings that justice is done. A court has the power to punish for contempt.”

      . LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 652 provides:
      "The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.”

      . LSA-R.S. 14:64 A. provides:
      "Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon."

      . It is not clear that defendant was being questioned at the time of the statement. If the questioning had been completed and defendant made a voluntary outburst completely unrelated to the scope of the completed interrogation, the statement would have been admissible.

      . Defendant had already told his companion of the murder and obviously wanted to tell the officers. Thus, the subsequent statements were clearly the product of defendant’s own free will; that is, of his own manifest desire to reveal to the police the details of the murder.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MARCUS, Justice. LEMMON, J., DIXON, Chief Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. Ronald P. WHITTINGTON.
    No. 83-B-2479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 26, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1985.

      Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., Wood Brown, III, New Orleans, Robert J. Boudreau, Lake Charles, Sam J. D’Amico, Baton Rouge, Carrick R. Inabnett, Monroe, Harold J. Lamy, New Orleans, Alfred S. Landry, New Iberia, Phillippi P. St. Pee’, Metairie, Roland J. Achee, Shreveport, Gerald P. Thomas, Natchitoches, for applicant.
    Ronald P. Whittington, St. Rose, for respondent.
    Donald P. Abaunza, New Orleans, Commissioner.
   MARCUS, Justice.

The Louisiana State Bar Association, through its Committee on Professional Responsibility, instituted this disciplinary proceeding against Ronald P. Whittington, a member of said association. The committee had previously conducted an investigation of respondent’s alleged misconduct in accordance with article 15, section 3 of the articles of incorporation of the association. Notice of two separate specifications of misconduct was given to respondent in a communication from the committee dated April 19, 1983.

Specification No. 1 alleged:
In 1981, you were retained by Loyola University to collect certain delinquent accounts on their behalf and, did, in fact, collect monies due and owing the University. That, despite repeated requests, you failed, refused and neglected to turnover to the University funds collected in the sum of $5,586.82, and did comingle (sic) and convert said funds to your own use; all in violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102 and 9-102 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility for the Louisiana State Bar Association.
Specification No. 2 alleged:
In order to provide security for funds wrongfully retained by you, as set forth in Specification number 1 above, you did sign a promissory note in favor of said University. Despite repeated demands, you failed to pay installment payments on said note when due and, as further evidence of your commingling and conversion of funds due the University, you attempted payment on the above described note with an NSF check in the sum of $504.00 on September 27, 1982, and failed, refused and neglected to make said check good, despite repeated requests; all in violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102 and 9-102 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility for the Louisiana State Bar Association.

A formal investigatory hearing was held on May 20, 1983, as provided by article 15, section 3(b) of the articles of incorporation. Respondent was present and represented himself at the hearing and testified on his own behalf.

Based on the evidence adduced at the formal investigatory hearing, the committee, by majority vote, was of the opinion that respondent had been guilty of a violation of the laws of this state relating to the professional conduct of lawyers and to the practice of law of sufficient gravity as to evidence a lack of fitness for the practice of law; that, specifically, respondent was guilty of the misconduct set forth in Specifications Nos. 1 and 2. On December 7, 1983, the committee instituted in this court a suit for disciplinary action against respondent under the provisions of article 15, section 4(c) of the articles of incorporation. Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Thereafter on motion by the committee, we appointed Donald R. Abaunza commissioner to take evidence and to report to this court his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Louisiana State Bar Association Articles of Incorporation, article 15, section 6(b) and (d).

A hearing before the commissioner was conducted on April 12, 1984. Respondent appeared at the hearing without counsel. The committee introduced in evidence, over respondent’s objection, the entire record of the earlier investigatory hearing. Upon termination of the hearing, the commissioner filed with this court his written report wherein he stated his findings of fact and conclusions of law and submitted the matter for this court’s determination. The committee concurred in the commissioner’s findings of fact and law, but opposed the commissioner’s conclusion that the committee had not proven conversion of Loyola’s funds by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent filed neither concurrence nor opposition to the report of the commissioner. After oral argument before this court, the matter was submitted for our determination on the record before the commissioner.

Respondent was retained in 1979 by C.U.A., Inc. (CUA) to act as attorney in the collection of various delinquent student loan accounts for Loyola University. Respondent was paid a monthly retainer fee by CUA and received attorney fees on the accounts collected by him. Respondent provided periodic accountings to CUA of the status of the Loyola accounts, and CUA sent monthly invoices to Loyola. In mid-1981, Loyola became aware that CUA was not issuing the monthly invoices and had not turned over funds collected on Loyola accounts. Loyola terminated its relationship with CUA and asked respondent to work directly for the university in collecting the delinquent accounts. Respondent continued to handle the files he had been assigned by CUA, yet he did not institute a practice of accounting to Loyola for funds collected nor of forwarding these funds to the client.

In February of 1982, Loyola learned from a former student whose file was considered delinquent that she had in fact paid $700 to respondent. Loyola thereafter made verbal demand on respondent for an accounting and for payment of monies he had collected on its accounts. Written demand was made April 15, 1982, and when respondent still did not comply, Loyola hired counsel to assist it in obtaining payment and an accounting. Respondent testified that he did not comply with Loyola’s demands because both Loyola and CUA owed him fees for his collection services. He contended that he was unable to calculate these fees because certain accounts had been paid directly to Loyola or CUA and Loyola would not provide him with information on these accounts. Loyola, however, denied that it had received any direct payments on accounts turned over to respondent for collection and respondent offered no evidence to support his contention. In late June, he delivered to Loyola all files relating to its accounts. Loyola reviewed the files and after deducting court costs and attorney fees from the amount collected, made written demand on respondent on July 22, 1982 for the sum of $4,804.22.

In September of 1982, Loyola and respondent negotiated an agreement whereby respondent was to pay the amount due in installments. He presented Loyola with a check in the amount of $504.22 and a promissory note in the amount of $4,300 secured by a mortgage on his home. Both the note and mortgage were drafted by respondent and evidenced an unconditional promise to pay a debt. Respondent received notice on October 7, 1982 that the check had been returned for insufficient funds. In response to a letter from Loyola’s counsel demanding payment of the check, respondent replaced it with a cashier’s check on November 4, 1982. The first installment payment on the note, due October 27, 1982, was not made and Loyola’s counsel recorded the mortgage the next day and filed suit to foreclose by executory process. After receiving notice of the date his home was to be sold by the sheriff, respondent tendered a check to Loyola on December 7, 1982 in the amount of $5,863.99, representing principal, interest and attorney fees as provided for in the note, together with court costs.

Although respondent maintained a client “trust account,” he did not deposit the funds collected for Loyola into that account because he feared the Internal Revenue Service would levy his bank accounts for back taxes he allegedly owed. Respondent contended that he converted Loyola’s funds into cash and placed them in an envelope inside a black box which he held first in his office and later in his home. Loyola was not informed of this practice and respondent kept no documentation of the total amount of cash he held on Loyola’s behalf. Each individual file contained notes reflecting the amount of cash held, as well as court costs and fees. Respondent testified that he kept his own cash in the black box in a separate envelope. He claimed that when he ultimately paid the balance due on the note in December of 1982 he used the funds that he had retained in the black box since he received them. Respondent offered no evidence to substantiate his assertion that he continuously held Loyola’s funds in cash in a black box until he turned them over in December of 1982. The record reflects that while four previous complaints have been registered against respondent with the committee, none of these involved charges of theft or dishonesty and none resulted in disciplinary action.

The bar association has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was guilty of the alleged specifications of misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Martin, 451 So.2d 561 (La.1984); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Dowd, 445 So.2d 723 (La.1984).

Respondent’s failure to place Loyola’s funds in an identifiable bank account constituted a violation of DR 9-102(A). When he finally attempted to transfer the amount he owed to Loyola, he presented a check which was returned for insufficient funds and a promissory note. He subsequently failed to make payment on this note. If the funds had in fact been held in cash in the black box throughout respondent’s dealings with Loyola, he would have been able to pay the amount owed in cash rather than issuing an NSF check and a promissory note. Considering these facts together with his lack of documentation of the amount of cash held and his admission that his own cash was kept in the black box, we find clear and convincing proof that respondent commingled his client’s funds and converted them to his own use in violation of DR 1-102 and DR 9-102.

Additionally, respondent’s failure to account to Loyola and notify it of his receipt of funds collected on its behalf constituted violations of DR 9-102(B)(l) and DR 9-102(B)(3). The record further reflects that respondent violated DR 9-102(B)(4) by failing, despite repeated demands, to promptly turn over his client’s funds. While respondent averred that he delayed payment only to secure his fee, we cannot condone such a practice in view of the requirement in DR 9-102(B)(4) that a lawyer promptly remit funds “which the client is entitled to receive.”

The purpose of lawyer disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer but rather to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct to safeguard the public, to preserve the integrity of the legal profession and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The discipline to be imposed will depend upon the seriousness of the offense involved and the facts and circumstances of each case. The court will take into account both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Martin, supra; Louisiana State Bar Association v. Dowd, supra.

We consider that the violations found herein are of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary action. Respondent has made full restitution to Loyola for the withheld funds, and although complaints have been made against respondent to the committee, none have resulted in disciplinary action. Under the circumstances, we do not feel that respondent should be disbarred but rather he should be suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time. The commissioner recommended a suspension from the practice of law for 24 to 36 months and the committee concurred. We consider suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years as an appropriate penalty.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, it is ordered, ajudged and decreed that Ronald P. Whit-tington be suspended from the practice of law in the State of Louisiana for the period of two years. Respondent is to bear all costs of these proceedings.

LEMMON, J.,

concurs, but would place the burden of proof on an attorney who does not use a trust fund to prove that he did not commingle his client’s funds or convert to his own use.

DIXON, C.J., dissents with reasons.

DIXON, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

When a lawyer embezzles his client’s fund without mitigating circumstances, he should be disbarred. Here, respondent’s “black box” defense is a continuing demonstration of basic dishonesty from which the public should be protected.

      . DR 1-102. Misconduct.
      (A) A lawyer shall not:
      (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
      (2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
      (3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
      (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
      (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
      (6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
      DR 9-102. Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.
      (A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
      (1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited therein.
      (2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
      (B) A lawyer shall:
      (1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other properties.
      (2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable.

        (3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his client regarding them.
      (4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.

      . See footnote 1 above.

      . The IRS did in fact levy respondent’s bank accounts on September 15, 1981.

      . This finding conflicts with the conclusion of fact by the commissioner, opposed by the committee, that the committee did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent converted Loyola’s funds.


author: WATSON, Justice,

text:
    In re Judge John B. WHITAKER, 10th Judicial District Court, No. 0029, Before the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana.
    No. 84-0-2035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 1, 1984.
   ORDER

Acting under the authority of Article V, Section 25(C), Constitution of 1974, and considering the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana that Judge John B. Whitaker be disqualified from exercising any judicial function, without loss of salary, during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him in this court,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The Honorable John B. Whitaker, Judge of the Tenth District Court for the Parish of Natchitoches, be and he is hereby disqualified from exercising any judicial function, without loss of salary, during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him in this Court.

WATSON, J., dissents from the order.

WATSON, Justice,

dissenting.

The charges filed by the Judiciary Committee (for whose members I have great respect) seem to relate to alleged events of 1980 and 1982. They are based largely on testimony by persons engaged in dope and prostitution. Judge Whitaker has been reelected to office, without opposition, by the people of his district since the alleged acts.

It is entirely inappropriate for this Court, acting with great haste and without time to study the record and the charges to summarily suspend from office a duly elected, Constitutional officer of this state.

True, the Court has the authority. It “may disqualify” during the pendency of the charges. La. Const. Art. 5 § 25(C). This discretionary power should be exercised only when there is a showing of mental or physical disability or when there are serious criminal charges pending against a judge.

Here the charges are principally that the judge is or was in the past immoral plus one charge that he erred in a case involving a hunting friend. These charges are properly addressed to the voters of his district and are not appropriate as a basis for summary suspension.

There is no charge of present disability; indeed, lawyers of the district have indicated that Judge Whitaker is effectively and efficiently carrying out his duties. There are no criminal charges pending. I would give him a full and fair hearing before acting on his case.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.


author: DIXON, C.J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin BRANCH.
    No. 84-OK-2045.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 3, 1984.
   In re Branch, Kevin, applying for Stay, REMEDIAL WRIT AND OUT OF TIME APPEAL Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Number KA-84-1017; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “J”, Number 10-82-831.

Granted. Defendant’s appeal is reinstated in the Court of Appeal.

DIXON, C.J.,

concurs in the order of the Court. The right to appeal is a right granted under the Louisiana Constitution. The Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the method of taking an appeal. Courts should not thwart the right to appeal because a lawyer is tardy in filing a brief. Other measures for enforcing its rule are available to a court (such as contempt proceedings against the lawyer).


text:
    Glenn GASTAL, et al., Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Child v. Archbishop Philip M. HANNAN, Bishop Gerald L. Frey, Vicar General Richard Von Puhl Mouto Monsignor Harry E. Benefiel, Monsignor H.A. Larroque, the Archdiocese of New Orleans d/b/a the Roman Catholic Church, the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lafayette, the Roman Catholic Church, St. John Parish, Representing the Communities of Esther and Henry, Vermilion Parish, Louisiana, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, Interstate Insurance Company and Father Gilbert Gauthe.
    No. 84-CC-1833.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 1984.
   In re: Gastal, Glenn et al., applying for Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Review, MANDAMUS, PROHIBITION Parish of Vermilion 15th Judicial District Court Div. “A” Number 84-48175; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Number 84-882.

Granted. The order of the District Court pursuant to its rule of court 12(b) which ordered sealed and confidential proceedings bearing Docket Nos. 84-48174, 84-48176 and 84-48177 is hereby set aside only insofar as it affects any and all discovery rights accorded relator under the discovery articles of the Code of Civil Procedure.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leander H. PEREZ, Jr. and Eugene E. Leon, Jr.
    No. 84-KK-0743.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 12, 1984.
   Notation for the Record by WATSON, Justice.

A motion for my recusal was filed on June 13, 1984. Shortly thereafter I informed my colleagues that since (1) there is no legal basis for my recusal, LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 671, and (2) the state and the defendants are entitled under the Constitution to have the duly elected members of the court consider the case, I declined to recuse myself.

The other members of the court have considered the matter out of my presence subsequently and I have not participated in any further action in the case since the motion is still pending. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 673. I did not participate in the writ grant. 458 So.2d 108 (La.1984).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin HOLLINGSWORTH.
    No. 84-KD-1907.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 6, 1984.
   In re Hollingsworth, Kevin, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review, stay, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “C”, Nos. 300609, 301648.

Granted and transferred to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Glen Ray GERISH.
    No. 84-KK-1918.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 6, 1984.
   In re Gerish, Glen Ray, applying for writ of certiorari, stay, prohibition and mandamus, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 128042; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16892-KW.

Stay Order vacated. Writ denied.


text:
    ARROW TRUCKING COMPANY v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY. Phillip R. O’CONNOR, Director of Insurance For the State of Louisiana As Liquidator of Reserve Insurance Company v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-1453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re North American Reinsurance Corp., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 83-CA-0696, 83-CA-0697; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “M”, Nos. 240-066, 232-501.

Prior report: 452 So.2d 217.

Granted.


text:
    Brenda Ann KEELAN v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE, RECREATION, AND TOURISM.
    No. 84-C-1710.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Keelen, Brenda Ann, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0832; Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 60721.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 147.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jameelah RAHEEM and Tahir Milik Raheem.
    No. 84-K-1729.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Raheem, Jameelah et al., Raheem, Tahir Milik, applying for writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 84-KA-0094; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “J”, No. 982-264.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 214.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James PORTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-1448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
    Writ Granted Feb. 15, 1985.
   In re Porter, James, applying for writ of mandamus, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 278-168.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act on relator’s petition on or before December 10, 1984.


text:
    Lela Naquin MOREAU, Lawrence Wayne Moreau and Janie Mae Moreau Hull v. Raymond MORAN, Bob Smallen’s Mobile Homes, Inc., Flintstone Industries, Inc., Whirlpool Corporation and Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership Corp.
    No. 84-CC-1754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Bob Smallen’s Mobile Homes Inc., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 84-798; Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 87210-C.

Granted. The decision of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for briefing, argument and opinion.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wilfred D. SMITH v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 84-KH-1884.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Smith, Wilfred D., applying for remedial writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 269-397.

Granted. The district court is ordered to comply immediately with this Court’s order of September 20, 1984.


text:
    Betty Thornton SMITH v. Crown ZELLERBACH, et al.
    No. 84-CC-1594.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Navratil, Boris F., applying for writ of certiorari, mandamus, Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “H”, No. 227167; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 84-0309.

Granted in part; denied in part. Sentence reduced to time served only; otherwise denied.

CALOGERO and LEMMON, JJ„ would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Murray S. LUCKY.
    No. 84-KO-1720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Lucky, Murray S., applying for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. KA-83-1244; Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 83207.

Prior report: 453 So.2d 1234.

Not considered. Untimely.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Melinda MOBLEY.
    No. 84-K-1779.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Mobley, Melinda, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review, stay to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 16110-KA, 16110-KA; Parish of Ouachita, Fourth Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, Nos. 41137, 41244.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1298.

Denied. Stay order recalled.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Arthur C. YOUNGBLOOD v. Judge William F. KLINE, Jr., 20th Judicial District Court, Parish of West Feliciana.
    No. 83-KH-1915.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Arthur C. Youngblood, applying for writ of review, 20th Judicial District Court, Parish of West Feliciana, No. 11083 — Div. A.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Kathy Darlene LEE v. Honorable J.E. WRIGHT, Clerk of Court, Parish of Sabine, State of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-1199.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Kathy Darlene Lee, applying for writ of mandamus, 11th Judicial District Court, Parish of Sabine, Nos. 28113-A and 26963.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Walter A. WILLIAMS v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KH-1210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Walter A. Williams, applying for supervisory writ to the Criminal District

Court, Section “A”, No. 261-128, Parish of Orleans.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nathan MOON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-1221.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Nathan Moon, applying for writ of mandamus, to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 285-350, Division D.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rickey Wayne MANGERCHINE v. Hon. Lionel R. COLLINS, Judge, 24th Judicial District Court.
    No. 84-KH-1254.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Rickey Wayne Mangerchine, applying for writs of mandamus to the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, No. 81-2342.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Calvin BLACKBURN v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KH-1298.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Calvin Blackburn, applying for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 251492, Section “B”.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Ronald MARTIN v. 34TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. BERNARD, State of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 84-KH-1321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Ronald Martin, applying for writ of mandamus, 34th Judicial District Court, St. Bernard Parish, No. 47-070.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony J. MYERS v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KH-1322.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Anthony J. Myers, applying for supervisory and remedial writs, to the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Walter W. WEST v. Wayne McELVEEN, Criminal Sheriff, Parish of Calcasieu, Lake Charles, Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-1334.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Walter W. West, applying for writ of mandamus, 14th Judicial District Court, No. 2977-79, Parish of Calcasieu.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Joseph N. WILLIAMS v. 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE.
    No. 84-KH-1375.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Joseph N. Williams, applying for remedial writs, 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 3-78-127.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robbin Eugene ZACHARIE v. STATE of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr.
    No. 84-KH-1390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Zacharie, Robbin Eugene, applying for remedial writ, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 282-584.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert L. THIBODEAUX v. Hon. Miriam G. WALTZER, District Judge, Section “A”.
    No. 84-KH-1430.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Thibodeaux, Robert L., applying for mandamus, Parish of Orleans, Criminal .District Court, Div. “A”, No. 260-072.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry GREEN v. Hon. John R. JOYCE, Judge, Hon. Robert T. Farr, Judge, Hon. Austin T. Goddnight, Clerk, Parish of Morehouse.
    No. 84-KH-1432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Green, Larry, applying for writ of certiorari, mandamus, habeas corpus, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 82-2683A.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James JONES v. Major SOBOLA, Superintendent of the Downtown City Jail, In Baton Rouge, Louisiana et al.
    No. 84-KH-1449.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Jones, James, applying for remedial writ, Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “H”.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stanley Earl ROBINSON v. ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DESOTO PARISH and Donald R. Guillory.
    No. 84-KH-1451.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Robinson, Stanley Earl, applying for remedial writ to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16716-KH; Parish of DeSoto, 11th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 13512.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Irvin MELANCON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-1460.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Melancon, Irvin, applying for remedial writ to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-2571; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “D”, No. 279-552.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reinier NESLO.
    No. 84-KH-1485.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Neslo, Reinier, applying for mandamus, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, No. 276-264.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John WILLIAMS v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KH-1489.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re John Williams, applying for remedial writs, Parish of Tensas, 6th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 15607.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry WILLIS.
    No. 84-KH-1491.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Willis, Jerry, applying for remedial writ, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 6790-82.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ray GRIFFIN v. CLERK OF COURT 26TH JDC, PARISH OF BOSSIER.
    No. 84-KH-1492.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Griffin, Ray, applying for writ of mandamus, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mr. Joseph Dalton RIDEAUX Sr. v. FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 84-KH-1502.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Rideaux, Joseph Dalton Sr., applying for remedial writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry Dale STEGALL v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, L.S.P.
    No. 84-KH-1522.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Stegall, Larry Dale, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review, Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “F”, No. 9-78-388.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. David SINGLETON v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT SECTION B.
    No. 84-KH-1537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Singleton, David, applying for remedial writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “B”, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-2340.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eddie J. YOUNG v. Donald R. GUILLORY, WDN WCC.
    No. 84-KH-1542.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Young, Eddie J., applying for remedial writ, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 119004.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. McBeth MITCHELL v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden, L.S.P.
    No. 84-KH-1562.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Mitchell, McBeth, applying for writ of habeas corpus, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “E”, No. 272-296.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eddie J. CATES v. Hon. Matthew BRANIFF, Judge, Orleans Criminal Court, Parish of New Orleans.
    No. 84-KH-1569.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Cates, Eddie, applying for writ of mandamus, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “B”, No. 251-375.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    Charles Joseph CERTAIN v. EQUITABLE EQUIPMENT COMPANY and Allen-Bradley Company.
    No. 84-C-1571.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
    Reconsideration Denied Dec. 7, 1984.
   In re Certain, Charles Joseph, applying for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 13150-CA; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “F”, No. 77-8335.

Prior report: 453 So.2d 292.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and LEM-MON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael GLASPER v. H.J. HYMEL, Judge, 19th JDC.
    No. 84-KH-1583.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Glasper, Michael, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “J”, No. 2-81-389; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. KW-84-0879.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Allen CROSBY v. Dennis J. WALDRON, Judge, Section “F”, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-1586.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Crosby, Allen, applying for writ of mandamus, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, No. 271-972.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles LINDSEY v. Ross MAGGIO, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KH-1596.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Lindsey, Charles, applying for remedial writ, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “A”, No. 251463.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Richard S. MONK.
    No. 84-K-1644.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re'Monk, Richard S., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CR-83-1054; Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 206874.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 421.

Denied.


text:
    Eddie BOUDREAUX v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON Through the DEPARTMENT OF ROADS AND BRIDGES.
    No. 84-C-1665.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Boudreaux, Eddie, applying for writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 83-CA-812; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “G”, No. 235-711.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and LEM-MON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Theodora Gomez, Wife of/and Henry GOMEZ v. SCAFFOLD RENTAL AND ERECTION COMPANY and Zurich Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-1679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Gomez, Theodora et vir, Gomez, Henry, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 83-CA-810; Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 23888.

Prior report: 453 So.2d 588.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Robert J. FRANCIS v. GERVAIS F. FAVROT CO., INC. and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company.
    No. 84-C-1686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Francis, Robert J., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-2013; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “J”, No. 83-121 J.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1272.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    JACK PARKER AND ASSOCIATES, INC. v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE, et al.
    No. 84-C-1697.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Parker, Jack A. & Assoc., Inc., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0877; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “I”, No. 238365.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 162.

Denied.

BLANCHE and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SHREVEPORT v. Ruth May CRAWFORD.
    No. 84-C-1708.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re First National Bank/Shreveport, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16389-CA; Parish of DeSoto, 11th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 40596.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1209.

Denied.

MARCUS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Dodge E. MULLINS v. James Franklin PAGE.
    No. 84-C-1709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Mullins, Dodge E., applying for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16386-CA; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “F”, No. 276624.

Prior report: 457 So.2d 64.

Denied.


text:
    Jackie STARKS v. Peter E. SILTON, Richard Gerlach, and State Farm Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-1711.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Starks, Jackie, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1543; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “G”, No. 81-15199.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 1230.

Denied.


text:
    Cecil J. BIZETTE, Individually and on Behalf of his Minor Daughter, Deanna Bizette v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-1713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Bizette, Cecil J. etc. et al, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0936; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “I”, No. 260793.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 197.

Denied.


text:
    E. Stanley ANDERSON v. Freda O. GREEN.
    No. 84-C-1718.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Green, Freda 0., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0942; Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 66438.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 200.

Denied.


text:
    Verna COOPER v. AMI, INC. and Ranger Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-1719.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re AMI, Inc. et al., Ranger Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0876; Parish of Tangi-pahoa, 21st Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 65573.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 156.

Denied.


text:
    NEWMAN, GRACE AND HOLLOWAY ARCHITECTS, INC., A Professional Architectural Corporation v. Robert E. TILLERY.
    No. 84-C-1721.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Tillery, Robert E., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0805; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “J”, No. 214659.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 140.

Denied.


text:
    Ernest H. LAMPKINS v. Thomas H. LITTLE, Matsushita Electric Corporation of America, and The Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co.
    No. 84-C-1724.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Lampkins, Ernest H., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16418; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “F”, No. 263695.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1298.

Denied.


text:
    CLOVER CONTRACTORS, INC. v. JAMES H. JONES-1980, A Louisiana Partnership in Commendam and Harry Baker Smith Architects, Inc.
    No. 84-C-1733.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Clover Contractors Inc., applying for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1646; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “H”, No. 81-11137.

Prior report: 453 So.2d 983.

Denied.


text:
    In re Donald KAUFMAN v. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-1736.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Aetna Casualty & Suty. Co., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1773; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “E”, No. 80-13991.

Denied.


text:
    Augustin CHIN v. Herbert J. ROUSSEL, Jr. and Roussel Engineering, Inc. Douglas C. LEWIS v. Herbert J. ROUSSEL, Jr. and Roussel Engineering, Inc.
    No. 84-C-1739.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Roussel Engineering Inc.,. Roussel Engineering Inc., applying for writ of cer-tiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 83-CA-859, 83-CA-860; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “F”, Nos. 253-046, 253-045.

Prior report: 456 So.2d 673.

Denied.


text:
    Lizzie WILLIAMS v. Catherine S. ANDERSON, Frederick Anderson, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company and Commercial Union Assurance Company. Frederick ANDERSON, Individually and as Head of the community existing between him and his Wife Catherine S. Anderson v. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY and Commercial Union Assurance Company.
    No. 84-C-1743.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Williams, Lizzie, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 84-CA-16, 84-CA-17; Parish of St. John Baptist, 29th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, Nos. 10178, 10282.

Prior report: 456 So.2d 666.

Denied.


text:
    Larry MORGAN v. CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE.
    No. 84-C-1744.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Morgan, Larry, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1778; Civil Service Commission, Div. “ ”, No. 2165.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1242.

Denied.

DENNIS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert KALTENBACH.
    No. 84-KK-1746.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Kaltenbach, Robert, applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review, Opelousas City Court, Div. “ ”, No. 83-S-2276; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. K84-771.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ernest McGEE v. Hon. Miriam G. WALTZER, Criminal District Court, Sec. “A” and Hon. Edwin Lombark, Clerk, Criminal District Court.
    No. 84-KH-1747.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re McGee, Ernest, applying for writ of review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “A”, No. 281-981.

Denied. Appeal pending.


text:
    AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION CORPORATION.
    No. 84-C-1753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1759; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “L”, No. 83-11570.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1260.

Denied.


text:
    AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION CORPORATION.
    No. 84-C-1755.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Amoco Production Co., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1759; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “L”, No. 83-11570.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1260.

Denied.


text:
    HIBERNIA NATIONAL BANK IN NEW ORLEANS v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 84-C-1757.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Hibernia National Bank of N.O., applying for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1679; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “E”, No. 83-9909.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1239.

Denied.


text:
    Marvin PIERCE v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION and the Hartford Insurance Company.
    No. 84-CC-1759.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Georgia-Pacific Corp. et al., Hartford Insurance Co., applying for writ of certiorari, writs of prohibition and mandamus, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 29767-C; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CW-1122.

Denied.


text:
    AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION CORPORATION.
    No. 84-C-1760.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Trendwood Foundation Inc., Forrest, John, Silver Mount Corp., Barton, John Jr., Forrest, Ray John, Forrest, Beverly Rachel Janis, applying for writ of cer-tiorari, supervisory writs to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1759; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “L”, No. 83-11570.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 1260.

Denied.


text:
    Raymond ROCHON v. FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ACADIA.
    No. 84-CD-1762.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Rochon, Raymond, applying for writ of mandamus, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “F”, No. 46000.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    Mrs. Emma P. TAMPKE, Michael S.S. Tampke and Juliet P. Tampke v. FINDLEY ADHESIVES, INC., H.B. Stuck Adhesives, Inc. and CNA Insurance Company.
    No. 84-CC-1764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Findley Adhesives, Inc. et al., CNA Insurance Co., applying for writ of certio-rari, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “E”, No. 82-6873; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. C-2820.

Denied.


text:
    Sylvia ANDREWS v. LOUISIANA COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO., LTD., W. Breaux, Commercial Union Insurance Company and James Steward.
    No. 84-C-1766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Andrews, Sylvia, applying for writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1723; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “L”, No. 82-1816.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 1193.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth RODGERS.
    No. 84-KH-1827.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Rodgers, Kenneth, applying for. writ of certiorari, mandamus, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, Nos. 295-084, 294-492; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-2665.

Denied. Relator may consult counsel who has now been appointed relative to documents requested for appellate review.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John SIENDA v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KH-1841.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Sienda, John, applying for writ of certiorari, mandamus, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “F”, No. 173-364.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry L. LEWIS.
    No. 84-K-1845.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Lewis, Jerry L., applying for writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 16322-KA; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 123187.

Prior report: 455 So.2d 685.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sherman HODGE and Charlie Ray Hodge.
    No. 84-KK-1864.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Hodge, Sherman et al., applying for writ of review, stay order to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 16452-KW, 16454-KW; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 125672.

Prior report: 457 So.2d 152.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George L. JACKSON.
    No. 84-KH-1875.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 1984.
   In re Jackson, George L., applying for writ of habeas corpus, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 41811; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 16496-KH, 16839-KH.

Denied. Moot.