author: MARCUS, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Barbara MAYS. STATE of Louisiana v. Mary K. NOTO and Betty D. May.
    Nos. 83-KA-1237, 83-KA-2052 and 83-KA-2053.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1984.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., William R. Campbell, Jr., Dean R. Yellin, Anne Neeb, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    David E. Hogan, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   MARCUS, Justice.

Barbara Mays, Mary K. Noto and Betty D. May were charged by separate informa-tions with falsifying information on racing license applications in violation of La.R.S. 14:118.2. Defendants filed separate motions to quash the informations on the grounds that the statute was not applicable to them and, alternatively, the statute was unconstitutional. Judge Miriam G. Waltzer (83-KA-1237) and Judge Frank A. Marullo, Jr. (83-KA-2052 and 83-KA-2053) granted the motions to quash the informations, finding La.R.S. 14:118.2 unconstitutionally vague. The state appealed to this court under the authority of La. Const, art. 5, § 5(D).

Defendants applied for work at the Fair Grounds Racetrack in New Orleans in November and December of 1982. Mays sought a job as a cook, Noto as a “stand girl” (selling candy, cigarettes and soft drinks), and May as a nurse. Each applicant signed an “APPLICATION FOR LICENSE,” which is a pre-printed form provided by the Louisiana State Racing Commission. On lines 12 and 14, the applicant certified that she had neither been convicted of a felony nor been arrested or indicted. Pursuant to a review of applications for licenses by the state police, it was discovered that, contrary to defendants’ assertions on the applications, Mays had been arrested and convicted and Noto and May had been arrested. Because of these alleged false statements, they were arrested and charged with falsifying a racing license application.

Judge Waltzer granted Mays’ motion to quash. She “seriously questioned” whether the statute applied to a cook and held that it was unconstitutionally vague on its face. Judge Marullo granted Noto’s and May’s motions to quash. He also questioned whether the statute was intended to apply to a “stand girl” or nurse. Consequently, he held the informations should be quashed on the grounds that the statute was inapplicable to defendants and was unconstitutionally vague. It is from these rulings that the state has appealed to this court.

Falsifying a racing license application was made a criminal offense by the enactment of La.R.S. 14:118.2, effective September 10, 1982. This statute provides:

Falsifying information on racing license applications
A. Falsifying racing license applications is the intentional falsification of any information required on an application for a Louisiana racing license.
B. Whoever commits the crime of falsifying racing license applications shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.

Our initial inquiry is whether defendants’ alleged conduct is a crime under La.R.S. 14:118.2. The state contends the phrase “racing license” means any license issued by the Louisiana State Racing Commission. Since defendants’ applications were for licenses from the commission, they were “racing license applications” within the meaning of La.R.S. 14:118.2. On the other hand, defendants contend “racing license” was intended to encompass only those licenses issued by the commission to those who are involved in the actual conduct of racing. Since a nurse, “stand girl” and cook are not directly connected with racing, the applications for these jobs are not applications for racing licenses. We agree.

It is conceded that defendants’ applications were for licenses from the commission, but the crucial question is whether these licenses are “racing licenses.” The phrase “racing license” is not defined in the Louisiana Criminal Code (La.R.S. 14:1-513), the laws regulating horse racing (La. R.S. 4:141-197), or the Louisiana State Racing Commission’s rules of racing (LAC 11-6:1-57). The criminal code’s only reference to “racing license” is in La.R.S. 14:118.2, which only uses the phrase but does not define it. The provisions of the revised statutes dealing with horse racing contain a definitions section and a detailed regulatory scheme, but they do not define “racing license.” Section 143 of Title 4 defines three types of persons who are licensed by the commission: an “association” is any person licensed by the commission to conduct horse racing for any stakes, purse or reward (the Fair Grounds is one of the six racing associations in the state); a “licensee” is any person who receives a license, permit or privilege from the commission to conduct races during a designated period; and, a “permittee” is any person who receives a license, permit or privilege from the commission to engage in a business on the premises of an association. Since defendants sought licenses to engage in a business on the premises of the Fair Grounds, they are probably classified as permittees. They are further classified by LAC 11-6:14.17 as “miscellaneous employees of an Association” who, according to La.R.S. 4:169, “may be licensed” and who, according to LAC 11-6:14.17, “shall be licensed” (emphasis added). Hence, a comprehensive analysis of these three bodies of laws reveals that “racing license” has not been defined and that defendants, who are classified both as “permittees” and “miscellaneous employees,” were required to obtain merely a “license” from the Louisiana State Racing Commission.

Absent a statutory directive, we are unable to equate a license issued to a nurse, “stand girl” or cook with a racing license merely because the license has been obtained from the Louisiana State Racing Commission. According to La.R.S. 14:3, this court is required to give - La.R.S. 14:118.2 a “genuine construction, according to the fair import of [its] words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.” Using this standard, a “racing license” can not be interpreted to include a license for a job as a nurse, “stand girl” or cook. Hence, the alleged facts do not constitute the crime of falsifying a racing license application. Accordingly, the motions to quash the informa-tions were correctly granted on the ground that La.R.S. 14:118.2 is not applicable to defendants. Because of this holding, we do not reach the constitutionality of the statute and reverse the rulings of the trial judges declaring the statute unconstitutionally vague for this reason.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the rulings of the trial judges declaring La.R.S. 14:118.2 unconstitutional are reversed, and the judgments granting defendants’ motions to quash are affirmed.

      . Due to the procedural posture of this case, the alleged facts have been drawn from the bills of information, bill of particulars, parties’ briefs to the trial courts and this court, and counsels' arguments before the trial court and this court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DENNIS, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert SPENCER.
    No. 82-KA-2196.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1984.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Kay Kirkpatrick, John Sinquefiled, Ralph L. Roy, Asst. Dist. At-tys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    David Price, M. Michele Fournet, Edwin C. Scott, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
   DENNIS, Justice.

Defendant, Robert Spencer, was indicted for first degree murder, convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. He appealed alleging 14 assignments of error. Because none of them have merit, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

On the evening of May 7, 1981, defendant Robert W. Spencer visited with his half-brother and the brother’s girlfriend at their house. During the evening the half-brother, Stanley Allen Smith, went out to a bar to purchase quaaludes. While there, he met a seaman, Arvid Mikkelsen, who was carrying a large amount of cash. By telephone, Smith asked his girlfriend, Beth E. Bourgeois, to lure the seaman from the bar to their house so that Smith could rob him. Bourgeois went to the bar and was introduced by Smith to Mikkelsen. Smith returned home and persuaded defendant Spencer to help him rob the seaman. When Bourgeois brought Mikkelsen to the house, Smith and Spencer hid in the back bedroom, and Bourgeois gestured for Mik-kelsen to enter the bedroom. As Mikkel-sen entered, Smith struck him in the back of the head with a piece of driftwood and a wine bottle. A struggle began during which Mikkelsen was beaten severely about the face and head; he also sustained multiple stab wounds to his chest, back and flank. Mikkelsen’s hands were tied behind his back, a pillowcase was placed over his head, and he was. dumped in a deserted area where fishermen found his body the next day.

Since we have found that all but three of Spencer’s assignments of error concerned settled application of accepted principles of law, we have rendered our decision on those assignments in an unpublished opinion.

Assignment of Error No. 5

By this assignment, defendant argues that the trial court erred in excusing a juror after the entire jury was sworn and empanelled, outside the presence of appellant and his attorney. The argument presents, or at least suggests, a two-pronged attack: (1) the trial court erred in dismissing the regular juror because he was not unable to perform his duty; (2) the court’s action denied the defendant his right to be present at every stage of the proceeding. Ultimately, we conclude that this assignment is without merit.

Code of Criminal Procedure article 789 provides that an alternate juror “shall replace jurors who become unable to perform or disqualified from performing their duties prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict....” The regular juror who was discharged was confined to a wheelchair. During the voir dire, in response to questioning, he stated that the only reason he would be unable to serve was “that if the accommodations that the facility where you will house the jurors does not have accessible restroom facilities ...” The trial judge inquired about the facilities and informed the juror that the hotel would be able to accommodate any special needs that he may have. After the juror’s selection, sequestration and arrival at the hotel with the other jurors that evening, however, it was discovered that the bathroom doors were too narrow for his wheelchair. The trial judge was informed by telephone about this situation and the juror’s growing discomfort at about 6:30 p.m. After briefly considering and rejecting the alternatives of separating the handicapped juror or moving the entire jury, the trial judge decided the only feasible course was to discharge the juror immediately and send him home. The trial judge did not inform counsel of the action until the next morning in court, at which time the defendant’s attorney moved unsuccessfully for a mistrial.

First, under the circumstances of this ease the discharged juror was, because of his handicap, unable to perform his duties as a juror. Although the jury ultimately returned a second degree murder verdict, this was a capital case in which it was required that each juror be sequestered after he was sworn. Code of Crim. Proc. art. 791(B). The purpose of the sequestration is to insulate the jurors from outside influence or the possibility thereof, even unconscious; and, in capital cases especially, the sequestration is strictly enforced so that, upon a separation of a juror after he is sworn, a rebuttable presumption of misconduct and reversible error arises. State v. Parker, 372 So.2d 1037 (La.1979). To move the entire jury to another hotel without any prior arrangements would have been impracticable and disruptive. To separate the handicapped juror from the jury on the chance that he could be housed in another hotel with wider bathroom doors would have invited reversible error. Consequently, although the juror’s confinement to a wheel chair may not have rendered him unable to perform his duties in another type of case or in a situation in which more careful prearrangements had been made, in the context of this case, he was not able to perform as a juror.

Second, Code of Criminal Procedure article 831(3) provides that a defendant charged with a felony shall be present at the calling, examination, challenging, em-panelling, and swearing of the jury and “at any subsequent proceedings for the discharge of the jury or a juror.” Id. See State v. White, 244 La. 585, 153 So.2d 401 (1963). This rule is broader than the defendant’s constitutional right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), see Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-08, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332-33, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516, 521 (10th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922, 92 S.Ct. 959, 30 L.Ed.2d 793 (1972), however, and does not prevent a trial court from acting summarily to dismiss a juror in an emergency unless the defendant can show that he has been prejudiced thereby. Although every effort should be made to afford the defendant and his attorney an opportunity to be present and to be heard before a juror is discharged, situations may sometimes arise when a respect for the rights of jurors will require the judge to take immediate action without consulting counsel, e.g., if a juror is taken so ill that he cannot come to court or has a family emergency requiring him to leave during the night or over a weekend. United States v. Garafolo, 385 F.2d 200 (1967); vacated on other grounds, 390 U.S. 144, 88 S.Ct. 841, 19 L.Ed.2d 970 (1968); United States v. Houlihan, 332 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 828, 85 S.Ct. 56, 13 L.Ed.2d 37 (1964).

In the present case, the judge’s proper respect for the rights and needs of the handicapped juror required him to take immediate action without consulting counsel. The handicapped juror had placed the court and counsel on notice of the risk that he would be unable to serve if the hotel bathroom facilities were inadequate. Accordingly, when it was learned at 6:30 p.m. aftér the court had recessed for the day, that the handicapped juror who had been sequestered in this capital case was unable to use the toilet facilities in the hotel where the jury was sequestered, the trial judge was presented with an emergency justifying his summary action. In the absence of such an exigency, of course, the judge would have been obliged to conduct a hearing or at least confer with counsel in chambers or by telephone before taking action. However, under exigent circumstances summary action does not constitute error in the absence of a showing of prejudice, and defendant has shown none.

Assignments of Error Nos 6 & 7

By these assignments defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied a motion for a mistrial based on the “improper exclusion of blacks from the jury” and when it denied defense an opportunity to present evidence on the issue. We hold that defendant waived this objection by failing to object at the time of selection of the jury. Defendant objected to the composition of the jury on the second day of trial, one hour before the State rested its case. As we held in State v. Bazile, 386 So.2d 349 (La.1980), a purported error in the selection of the jury cannot be availed of on appeal unless a contemporaneous objection is lodged, pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 841. That article states: “An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.” In State v. Bazile, supra, we applied this rule to irregularities occurring in the selection of the jury. Here, the manner of selecting the jury was not complained of until midway into the trial. Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to have denied a motion for mistrial based on improper exclusion of certain jurors.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


author: BLANCHE, Justice. LEMMON, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Murl Lynn ALLEN.
    No. 82-KA-2284.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1984.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald C. Martin, Dist. Atty., Eric Harrington, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Charles Seaman, Natchitoches, for defendant-appellant.
   BLANCHE, Justice.

Murl Lynn Allen was charged by bill of information with aggravated battery and theft of property valued over $100, in violation of R.S. 14:34 and R.S. 14:67. At arraignment, defendant waived counsel and entered pleas of not guilty. Prior to trial defendant again appeared without counsel and, pursuant to a plea bargain for dismissal of the theft charge, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated battery. The trial judge ordered a pre-sentencing investigation and on April 10, 1981, sentenced Allen to two years in the Natchi-toches Parish Jail under a work-release program. Under that program, Allen was to report to jail at 6 p.m. on Fridays and would be released at noon on Sundays.

On June 19, 1981, Allen filed an application for post-conviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that he was unrepresented and did not understand the ramifications of his guilty plea. A hearing was held on July 10, 1981 which resulted in the trial court’s granting defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant then stood trial before a jury on April 27, 1982 and, was convicted of aggravated battery. Prior to sentencing the trial judge recused himself and the case was transferred back to Judge Cunningham, who had accepted the earlier guilty plea and imposed the sentenced thereon. After a second pre-sentence investigation was completed, Allen was sentenced to serve three years with the Louisiana Department of Corrections. Allen has appealed this sentence, relying on three assignments of error.

Assignment of Error No. 5

By this assignment defendant contends that he was denied due process of law. Allen argues that the substantial increase in sentence (from 2 years in parish prison under a work-release program to 3 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections) was due solely to the fact that he chose to exercise the rights and remedies available to him under the law and to apply for post-conviction relief. Allen relies upon the rule announced in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), and this court’s adoption of that rule in State v. Rutledge, 259 La. 543, 250 So.2d 734 (1971).

In Pearce, the U.S. Supreme Court framed the issue as follows:

When at the behest of the defendant a criminal conviction has been set aside and a new trial ordered, to what extent does the Constitution limit the imposition of a harsher sentence after conviction upon trial? 397 U.S. at 713, 89 S.Ct. at 2074, 23 L.Ed.2d at 662.

The Court concluded that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the rights of equal protection serve as an absolute bar to the imposition of a more severe sentence upon reconviction.

A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words, from imposing a new sentence, whether greater or less than the original sentence, in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant’s “life, health, habits, conduct, and, mental and moral propensities.” 395 U.S. at 723, 89 S.Ct. at 2079, 23 L.Ed.2d at 662; quoting, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1082, 93 L.Ed.2d 1337 (1949). (emphasis added)

The Pearce Court cautioned, however, that the inquiry did not end with a consideration of double jeopardy or equal protection, but that the requirements of due process must also be considered. The Court held that due process of law prohibits vindictiveness or retaliation against a defendant who has successfully attacked his first conviction, since the fear of such vindictiveness or retailiation by way of imposition of a harsher sentence would deter a defendant from exercising his right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction. The Court concluded:

In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal. 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081, 23 L.Ed.2d at 670.

In the instant case, though a pre-sen-tence investigation was ordered after the guilty verdict was rendered, there is absolutely no indication in the record of the sentencing hearing of any “identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding” which would serve as a basis for the increased sentence. We therefore conclude that, since Allen’s sentence was significantly increased without articulated reasons for the more severe sentence as required by North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, we must vacate the sentence in this case and remand to the trial court for re-sentencing consistent with this opinion. See also, State v. Rutledge, 259 La. 543, 250 So.2d 734 (1971); State v. Franks, 391 So.2d 1133 (La.1980); State v. Upton, 396 So.2d 1309 (La.1981).

In its brief, the State relies upon Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.1980); cert. denied, 454 U.S. 840, 102 S.Ct. 148, 70 L.Ed.2d 123, for the proposition that Pearce is inapplicable to the case at bar. The State’s reliance, however, is misplaced.

First, the facts in Frank are totally inap-posite to those of the instant case because there was no re-trial or re-sentencing in Frank. Jimmy Frank was tried and convicted of armed robbery; once prior to trial and once during trial Frank was offered plea bargains with the judge guaranteeing a 20-year sentence in return for a plea of guilty. Frank rejected the bargain in both instances, stood trial, was convicted, and received a sentence of thirty-three years in prison. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the rule of North Carolina v. Pearce did not apply to cases where the initial sentence exceeded that in a proffered but rejected plea bargain.

Second, the State overlooked the fact that the Pearce decision actually involved two cases which presented the same issue of permissibility of a harsher sentence upon re-sentencing. The second case, Simpson v. Rice, involved a factual situation virtually identical to the case at bar. Rice had pled guilty to four separate charges of second-degree burglary and was sentenced to a total of ten years. Two and one-half years later, the guilty pleas and judgments thereon were vacated on the ground that Rice had not been accorded his constitutional right to counsel. Rice then went to trial on three of the charges, was convicted, and was given sentences total-ling twenty-five years. The U.S. Supreme Court reached the same conclusions in Rice as it did in Pearce.

Assignments of Error Nos. 3 and 4

In these assignments of error, the defendant first contends that the trial court improperly relied upon previous convictions in imposing sentence. The defendant argues that the prior convictions should not have been used because all were obtained without benefit of counsel.

Had these convictions been used to enhance defendant’s sentence under the multiple-offender statute, R.S. 15:529.1, there might be some merit to this contention, but that is not the ease. Similarly, defendant cannot complain of the consideration of these convictions insofar as the first sentence was concerned because that sentence is not before us. We note, however, that La.C.Cr.P. art. 875(A)(1), in dealing with pre-sentence investigation reports, specifically directs the probation officer preparing the report to inquire into “... the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality ...” The first pre-sentence investigation, therefore, properly contained information regarding defendant’s prior arrests and convictions.

Insofar as the imposition of sentence after re-conviction is concerned, the defendant is correct that his previous convictions should not have been a consideration in imposing the harsher sentence. As explained above, only conduct occurring after the time of the original sentencing can serve as a basis for the imposition of a harsher sentence upon re-conviction. North Carolina v. Pearce, supra.

Such .information may come to the judge’s attention from evidence adduced at the second trial itself, from a new presentence investigation, from the defendant’s prison record, or possibly from other sources. 395 U.S. at 723, 89 S.Ct. at 2079.

The defendant’s second contention in these assignments of error is that the trial court failed to comply with La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. Defendant contends that the trial court did not consider mitigating circumstances as brought out in the trial testimony, as indicated in the pre-sentencing investigation, and as testified to by defendant during the sentencing hearing. Since we have already held that the case must be remanded for re-sentencing, including a full articulation for the record of the basis for any sentence imposed, we do not reach defendant’s argument that the sentencing court failed to comply with La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned above, the sentence is vacated and the case remanded for re-sentencing in compliance with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

DENNIS, J., concurs.

LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

LEMMON, Justice,

concurring.

The trial judge perhaps made a tactical mistake by exercising his discretion in favor of permitting defendant to withdraw an apparently valid guilty plea. Once the judge did so, however, he was stuck with that decision, and the sentence after the trial (following withdrawal of the guilty plea) could not be based on vindictiveness against defendant for exercising his right to trial.

Nevertheless, there is a suggestion that the original two-year sentence with work release on weekdays was part of a plea bargain. This question may be addressed at the hearing on remand. If the-evidence on remand establishes that the sentence was part of a plea bargain which the court set aside on defendant’s motion, then defendant in effect rejected a proffered (although initially accepted) plea bargain. See Frank v. Blackburn, cited in the majority opinion. Under such circumstances, the original sentence was not a reasoned exercise of discretion based on the circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, but was a compromise of many considerations, including the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s evidence. Therefore, the rule of the Pearce case would not be applicable to the subsequent sentence.

      . Neither the recusal nor any reasons therefor appear in the record.

      . Counsel argues exclusively about the post-trial sentencing, apparently conceding the correctness of defendant’s conviction.

      . Defendant had previously served time in the penitentiary and was apparently delighted to serve the sentence for this offense under a work release program. However, defendant moved to withdraw the guilty plea when the victim filed a civil suit against him for damages. Defendant stated to the judge in chambers (according to the judge’s per curiam) that he did not want the conviction on his record when the civil suit came to trial.

      . Defense counsel in brief makes the following statement:
      "When Murl Lynn Allen originally plead[ed] guilty to Aggravated Battery on March 2, 1981, he did so while representing himself, and after entering into negotiations with the presiding judge, Judge W. Peyton Cunningham, Jr., and the District Attorney’s office acting through Eric R. Harrington. Based upon his negotiations with these entities, defendant pleadfed] guilty on March 2, 1981 to Aggravated Battery, with the understanding that he would receive a sentence of confinement of two (2) years at the Natchi-toches Parish Jail and that he would be released during the week under a work release program”. (Emphasis supplied.)


author: BLANCHE, Justice. CALOGERO, Justice,

text:
    Labertha COLBERT v. LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY DENTAL SCHOOL and Underwriters Adjusting Company.
    No. 83-C-1753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1984.

      Mary H. Thompson, Felix R. Weill, Watson, Blanche, Wilson & Posner, Baton Rouge, for applicant.
    Norman Mopsik, New Orleans, for respondents.
   BLANCHE, Justice.

This case presents the question of whether an oral compromise of a workers’ compensation claim, made in open court and approved by the trial judge prevents the plaintiff from subsequently withdrawing from the compromise before a joint verified petition is presented to the court.

Labertha Colbert, the plaintiff, was an employee of the Louisiana State University Dental School. In June, 1980, she tripped on a telephone cord during work, and suffered injuries to her back and neck. Plaintiff then filed suit against her employer, claiming total and permanent disability arising from an injury incurred during the course and scope of her employment. On the day set for trial, the parties agreed on a compromise settlement of $4,710.00. This compromise was presented in open court to the trial judge, who dictated his approval of the settlement into the record. The apparent understanding of the parties at the time, as evidenced from the record, was that settlement papers would be presented by the parties in the future, reflecting the terms of the oral compromise.

Subsequent to the oral agreement, plaintiff was examined by another physician, who diagnosed additional back injuries and estimated that plaintiff would continue to have a 15% permanent disability over her whole body. Because of this additional medical opinion, plaintiff refused to accept defendant’s settlement cheek or sign the accompanying releases. Defendant then filed a motion to enforce the oral settlement, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order to execute settlement documents, arguing that the agreement in open court was not binding.

The 4th Circuit reversed, finding that the oral agreement did not comply with the explicit terms of La.R.S. 23:1272, which requires that compromises of workers’ compensation claims be presented to the court in the form of a joint verified petition. 436 So.2d 665. Absent the joint, written petition, the Court of Appeal concluded that no settlement was effected.

In support of his argument that a binding compromise was effected, defendant cites this Court’s decision in Martin v. Holzer Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 376 So.2d 500 (La.1979). The Martin case involved a compromise between an injured employee and his employer in open court on the day the case was to be tried. The trial judge approved the compromise and one month later signed a written judgment. After-wards, the employer attempted to appeal, and the employee moved for a dismissal of the appeal on the basis that no appeal can be taken by a party who has confessed judgment. La.Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 2085. This court concluded that the employer’s acquiescence to the compromise did constitute a confession of judgment for purposes of Art. 2085 “because it was made in open court and amounted to an admission by the employer to the validity of Martin’s claim.” 376 So.2d at 502. Defendant contends that the same principle which barred the employer’s appeal in Martin ought likewise to preclude the instant plaintiff from withdrawing from her compromise.

La.Civil Code Article 3071 provides that a compromise between two parties must be “reduced to writing or recited in open court and capable of being transcribed from the record of the proceeding.” Both forms of compromise may be judicially enforced. Applying only this general codal principle and the Martin definition of confession of judgment, defendant’s contention would appear to have much force. However, we must also consider the language and legislative intent of R.S. 23:1272, to determine what variations from the statutory directives are permissible.

R.S. 23:1272 sets forth quite specifically the requirements for a compromise of a workers’ compensation'claim. Quite significantly, the statute uses the imperative “shall” in stating the requirement for a joint petition verified by all the parties to the agreement. In the past, this court has recognized that the form provided in R.S. 23:1272 sets forth a mandatory and invariable guideline, which “creates an exception to other general statutory or jurisprudential rules of compromise and supersedes them in the area in which it is intended to operate.” Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So.2d 398, 402 (La.1980). Thus, the general rules of compromise and confession of judgment are not applicable to workers’ compensation suits. The legislative purpose is evident from a reading of the statute as. a whole. R.S. 23:1272 was designed to provide numerous safeguards to prevent an employee from being coerced. Recognizing the economic pressures on an injured worker to settle quickly, the legislature created a system whereby both parties must submit a verified petition for the court’s approval. Thereupon, the trial judge is obligated to discuss the compromise thoroughly with the employee. The judge is further entitled to ask for additional facts if he feels the petition is inadequate for him to assess its validity. By thus requiring the employee to sign the agreement he wishes to undertake, and then discuss the compromise with the judge, the statute prevents a hasty and possibly ill-advised resolution of the worker’s claim.

We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s holding that, unless the parties comply with the statutory requisite joint verified petition, an oral settlement in open court will not give either party the right to specific performance. See. Jasmin v. Gafney, 357 So.2d 539 (La.1978).

Defendant’s reliance on Martin is misplaced. Martin dealt with the right of an employer to appeal once he has let an oral judgment be signed by the trial court without objections, rather than the issue of whether the employee could withdraw before a written petition was presented. However, Martin’s suggestion that an in court oral settlement, without more, acts as a confession of judgment is erroneous, insofar as it applies to the approval of a compromise settlement of a disputed workmen’s compensation claim, and to this extent, is overruled.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeal, reversing and remanding the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

DIXON, C.J., concurs, but is of the opinion the Martin case should not be overruled.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., dissent and will assign reasons.

CALOGERO, Justice,

concurring.

The Martin case is distinguishable and need not be overruled. A judgment was entered in Martin.

      . Tr., p. 2 states:
      THE COURT:
      Let the record reflect that this case was docketed for trial on its merits as of today’s date. Following a pretrial conference, the attorneys of record informed the court that they have settled and they will subsequently present workmen’s compensation settlement forms or papers. They have asked the Court to approve of the settlement and the Court has approved and spoken to the claimant. The settlement is for the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $4,500.00 plus the costs of Dr. Soboloff's treatment of the plaintiff in connection with this particular case.


author: LEMMON, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nolan CAMP, Jr.
    No. 83-K-1938.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1984.
    Clyde Merritt, Dwight Doskey, New Orleans, for applicant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., William Campbell, Mary Charlott McMullan, Beryl M. McSmith, Asst. Dist. Attys., for respondent.
   LEMMON, Justice.

We granted defendant’s application for certiorari to review his complaint that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of receiving stolen things in violation of La.R.S. 14.69. 440 So.2d 758. The evidence outlined in the opinion of the court of appeal (which we assume, when considering a defendant’s application for certiorari in a criminal case, represents the evidence most favorable to the prosecution) did not appear to support the jury’s verdict. Upon review of the record, we conclude that a “rational trier of fact could [not] have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitution therefore requires that the conviction be reversed.

I.

An unidentified person stole a green refrigerator and other items from an unoccupied apartment at 8615 Green Street between late July, 1980, when a tenant vacated the premises, and August 5, 1980, when a real estate agent visited the premises with a prospective tenant and discovered the burglary. The agent told a friend in the neighborhood of the missing items. At some unspecified time thereafter, the neighbor informed the police that he had seen a refrigerator fitting the description of the stolen property when he looked through the window of an apartment in an adjacent building at 8611 Green Street. He further stated that the apartment was shared by defendant and a woman.

On October 14, 1980, police executed a search warrant at the apartment at 8611 Green Street and recovered the refrigerator. However, defendant was not present when the search warrant was executed, and he was not residing there when police sought to arrest him later on an arrest warrant charging him with receiving a stolen refrigerator.

II.

La. Const. Art. V, §§ 5 and 10 (1974) limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Louisiana and of the courts of appeal in criminal cases to questions of law. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is a question of law, although the determination of this question necessarily involves a review of the record evidence. The standard for performing this review, mandated in Jackson v. Virginia, above, is that the reviewing court must determine that the record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to convince a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of which he has been convicted.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The Jackson decision imposed the “rational jur- or” standard for reviewing the jury’s determination that the evidence constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The standard for appellate review mandated by the United States Supreme Court also applies in cases which involve circumstantial evidence. The United States Supreme Court has rejected a contention that the trial judge is constitutionally required to instruct the jury that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); see also Jackson v. Virginia, above, footnote 9. The Court stated that “the better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect”. 348 U.S. at 139, 75 S.Ct. at 137.

La.R.S. 15:438 provides the following rule for circumstantial evidence in Louisiana:

“The rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”

Therefore, when the defendant requests an instruction in a Louisiana case involving circumstantial evidence, the trial judge is statutorily required to instruct the jury in accordance with Section 438. However, the standard of appellate review of a conviction is the same in all cases, whether or not circumstantial evidence is involved: The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of the crime. Nevertheless, the rule stated in Section 438 is useful in determining the existence of a reasonable doubt, because when the overall evidence, direct and circumstantial, does riot exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, there exists a reasonable doubt as to guilt.

III.

The state’s evidence in this case established only that defendant and the stolen refrigerator were both located at 8611 Green Street at about the same time between August 5 and October 14, 1980. Although the neighbor testified that defendant lived there at some time during the pertinent months in 1980, the witness did not know whether others also lived there. Neither did he know when or under what circumstances defendant had vacated the apartment, nor did he know who owned the building. The officers who executed the search warrant were not sure whether the electricity was turned on at the time or whether defendant (or anyone else) was occupying the apartment when they seized the stolen refrigerator.

The evidence did not establish the circumstances surrounding the arrival of the refrigerator at the apartment. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the presence of the refrigerator in the apartment indicated that there was no effort to conceal its presence.

When the record in this case is considered under the appropriate standard of review, there is not sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have concluded that defendant was guilty of “procuring, receiving, or concealing” the stolen refrigerator or even that he had guilty knowledge that the refrigerator located in his apartment was stolen. See State v. Moms, 414 So.2d 320 (La.1982); State v. Ennis, 414 So.2d 661 (La.1982).

Accordingly, the conviction is reversed, and defendant is ordered discharged.

DIXON, C.J., concurs.

CALOGERO, J., concurs.

      . At the time of the 1980 offense, the statute provided in pertinent part:
      "Receiving stolen things is the intentional procuring, receiving, or concealing of anything of value which has been the subject of any robbery or theft, under circumstances which indicate that the offender knew or had good reason to believe that the thing was the subject of one of these offenses.”
      The statute was amended by Act 552 of 1982 to proscribe illegal possession of stolen things.

      . The court of appeal by two to one vote affirmed the conviction. 436 So.2d 723.

      . Over six months after the refrigerator was recovered, defendant was arrested on the outstanding arrest warrant, after he had been detained for an unrelated traffic offense. The state endeavored to develop a theory that defendant fled the apartment to avoid apprehension on the charge of receiving the stolen refrigerator, but offered no evidence in support of this theory. Nothing in the record indicated when defendant was last seen at the residence. Thus, there was no evidence to support an inference that defendant left because he was trying to escape prosecution.

      .In Jackson, the Court upheld the conviction because "a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found that the petitioner committed murder in the first degree under Virginia law”. 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. at 2793.

      .An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts,established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. As stated by this court in State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 470 (La.1983), Section 438 "may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror's reasonable doubt formula, [but] it emphasizes the need for careful observation of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence”.

      . The statute under which defendant was charged and convicted required the state to prove that defendant was guilty of “procuring, receiving or concealing, and not merely of possessing", the stolen refrigerator. See State v. Walker, 350 So.2d 176 (La.1977). See also footnote 1.

      . Essentially, we agree with the view stated in the dissenting opinion of the intermediate court:
      "In this case the State only proved the defendant’s apartment was next door to the burglarized residence and the stolen refrigerator was in his apartment. There is no evidence to show how the refrigerator got into defendant's possession. The State failed to show that the defendant knew or even had reason to know of the theft.
      "Importantly, there was testimony the defendant was not the sole occupant and did not have exclusive control of the apartment. It is certainly conceivable the other resident brought the refrigerator there. Also, there was a stolen stove which was not found in defendant’s apartment.
      "The fact that two refrigerators were in the apartment does not create a suspicion of guilt because there was testimony the other one wasn't working. It is certainly possible the defendant (or the other occupant) purchased the stolen refrigerator to replace the broken one. The defendant made no effort to conceal the refrigerator." 436 So.2d at 725-726 (Citations omitted.)

      . Additionally, there is no evidence in the record from which the jury could have concluded that the refrigerator had a value of $499, as charged in the bill of information. See State v. Peoples, 383 So.2d 1006 (La.1980). No witness testified concerning the value of the refrigerator.
      Because we reverse on failure to prove other essential elements of the crime, we need not decide whether, under different circumstances in which all other elements were satisfactorily established, we might hold that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that the thing had "some value", whereby we could affirm the conviction of the lesser offense of misdemeanor theft. See State v. Byrd, 385 So.2d 248 (La.1980).

      . In cases in which the evidence does not reasonably support the verdict (or a verdict of guilty of a lesser included responsive offense), a judgment of acquittal is required. State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1983).


author: IjER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Floyd QUEBEDEAUX.
    No. 82-KA-0072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1984.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bernard E. Boudreaux, Jr., Dist. Atty., J. Phil Haney, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Keith Comeaux, New Iberia, for defendant-appellant.
   IjER CURIAM.

Floyd Quebedeaux was charged by bill of information with simple burglary in violation of La.R.S. 14:62. After trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged. The trial judge sentenced defendant to serve the maximum sentence for simple burglary— twelve years at hard labor. On appeal, defendant’s conviction was affirmed by this court; however, because the trial judge did not state for the record any mitigating circumstances before imposing the maximum sentence as directed by La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, we vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for re-sentencing. State v. Quebedeaux, 424 So.2d 1009 (La.1982). On remand, after a sentencing hearing in compliance with La. Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, the trial judge again sentenced defendant to serve twelve years at hard labor.

Defendant appeals to this court urging one assignment of error, that the sentence imposed is excessive. Given compliance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of the trial judge’s wide sentencing discretion. State v. Spencer, 874 So.2d 1195 (La.1979). After review of the record in this case, we are unable to say that the trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing defendant to twelve years at hard labor. Hence, we do not find defendant’s sentence excessive. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence is affirmed.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerome KNOX.
    No. 82-KA-0473.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1984.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Allen W. Helm, Kay Kirkpatrick, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appel-lee.
    M. Michele Fournet, Asst. Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Jerome Knox was charged by bill of information with two counts of felony theft, La.R.S. 14:67 and a single count of forgery, La.R.S. 14:72. The basis of the theft charge was the taking of two ladies dress suits valued at $160 from a department store. In a separate incident, defendant and two other persons negotiated a United States Treasury check for $283. On September 28, 1981, the defendant entered pleas of guilty to the forgery charge and to one theft charge. The second theft count was deleted from the bill as part of a plea bargain. The trial court, after considering a presentence investigation report, sentenced defendant to two years at hard labor for the theft charge and to eight years at hard labor for the forgery offense, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, defendant’s convictions were affirmed by this court; however, because the trial court failed to provide an adequate record of its sentencing considerations and the factual basis therefor, we vacated the sentence imposed and remanded the case for resen-tencing in accordance with the law. State v. Knox, 426 So.2d 707 (La.1982). On remand, the trial court conducted a resen-tencing hearing and again sentenced the defendant to two years at hard labor on the theft charge and eight years at hard labor on the forgery charge, to run concurrently, and stated additional reasons, which, in pertinent part, were as follows:

[T]he defendant was first referred to the Family Court Center on February 18, 1974, for theft. He was counselled and warned. On July 9th of 1975 the defendant was again referred to the Family Court Center for theft, and on October 22nd of 1975 the defendant was placed on a suspended commitment to L.T.I. with the special condition that he attend the Mental Health Clinic. However, the defendant was arrested on three subsequent occasions on March 16th of 1976, April 10th of 1976 and April 16th of 1976 and charged with theft. As a result, on May 5th of 1976 the defendant was committed to L.T.I., and he was later discharged on January 19th of 1977 after serving the interim period at that institution. As an adult, the defendant's rap-sheet indicates that on January 31st of 1978 he was found guilty of theft and sentenced to serve six months in the parish jail. On July the 5th of 1977 the defendant was found guilty of theft .and sentenced to pay $50.00 plus ten days and court costs. On September 16th of 1981 the defendant was sentenced to pay $200.00 or sixty days for — on the charge of fistic encounter, $20.00 or five days and twenty-four straight time days for Contempt of Court for failure to appear in Court in connection with those charges.
Also the defendant is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution, and the Court cites that although the defendant is classified as a first felony offender, he has shown a pattern of pursuing a life of criminal activity ’ dating back to 1974. Also the Court notes that the defendant is being sentenced for two separate felony incidents non-related as well as the fact that the Division of Probation and Parole recommends this sentence of incarceration — pardon me — the Division of Probation and Parole recommends the maximum sentence of incarceration although this is not the maximum sentence.

Defendant appealed from the reimposition of these sentences urging one assignment of error, that the sentences imposed are excessive. Our review of the record indicates that the trial court imposed these sentences after careful assessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s commission of two independent crimes, and after being fully informed of the defendant’s personal background and past juvenile and adult criminal record. Although these are the defendant’s first felony convictions, the record reflects his consistent involvement in criminal activity over a four year period preceding the reimposition of the sentences. In view of the record in this case and the additional sentencing reasons given by the trial court, we are unable to say that the sentencing judge abused his discretion or that the defendant’s sentences are excessive. Accordingly, the defendant’s sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


author: DIXON, C.J.,

text:
    MARK INVESTMENTS, INC., et al. v. MOHAWK CUSTOM TAILORS, INC., and Murlidhar G. Sadhwani.
    No. 84-CC-0257.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 9, 1984.
   In Re: Mark Investments, Inc., Meyer Glazer, Canal Gift Shop, Inc., and Mot-wane’s America, Inc., applying for Writs of Review, Certiorari, and Mandamus, to the Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal, Number C-1807; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Number 84-43.

Granted. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, the exception of lis pen-dens is overruled and the matter is, remanded to the trial court. The suits do not have the same object. (See C.C.P. article 531).

DIXON, C.J.,

dissents from the summary reversal, without reasons, of the judgments of the two courts below. If there is doubt, the writ should be granted and brought up for argument.

DENNIS, J., would deny the writ.


author: LEMMON, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph CLAY.
    No. 84-K-0074.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 9, 1984.
    Reconsideration Denied April 23, 1984.
   In Re: Joseph Clay applying for a Writ of Certiorari and Review to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 82-KA-1089, from the Thirty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne No. 104-215.

Case below: 441 So.2d 1227.

Denied.

LEMMON, J.,

concurs. The trial judge, upon replacing the juror, should have stated for the record the precise reasons that the juror was unable to continue serving, as well as any alternatives to replacement that the judge had considered. Otherwise, our appellate court cannot review for abuse of discretion. However, since defendant failed .to apply for a new trial to make a record in support of his objection or otherwise to establish prejudice, I concur in denying the application.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


author: BLANCHE, Justice

text:
    Ronald J. SPILLMAN et al. v. The CITY OF BATON ROUGE.
    No. 84-C-0140.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 9, 1984.
   In Re: The City of Baton Rouge, applying for writ of Certiorari and/or Review to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, Number 14, 528; 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, Number 205,847.

Case below: 441 So.2d 1243.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.

BLANCHE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

BLANCHE, Justice

(dissenting from the denial of the writ).

Article XIV, § 26 of the 1974 Constitution provides that the 1974 Constitution “shall not be retroactive and shall not create any right or liability which did not exist under the Constitution of 1921 based upon actions or matters occurring prior to the effective date of this Constitution.” La. R.S. 33:1992 et seq., upon which plaintiffs base their claim, became effective in 1969, under the Constitution of 1921.

In the case of Lafleur v. City of Baton Rouge, 124 So.2d 374 (La.App. 1st Cir.1960), we held that R.S. 33:1992 did not apply to the City of Baton Rouge because of the city's home rule charter. Thus, pri- or to the effective date of the 1974 Constitution, plaintiffs had no right to pay increases under R.S. 33:1992.

This court, however, has somehow determined that Article VI, § 14 of the 1974 Constitution automatically renders R.S. 33:1992 et seq. applicable to cities with home rule charters, without the necessity of any legislative reenactment of the statute. To begin with, there is considerable doubt whether supplemental pay is included within the term “minimum wages” under Art. VI, § 14. Even if one is willing to assume that the legislature is given authority under § 14 to require averaging of supplemental and base pay in computing longevity increases and holiday pay, the legislature would have to enact a statute pursuant to this authority. Art. VI, § 14 contains no express language which would indicate an intent to be retroactive; therefore, the general rule of Art. XIV, § 26 would apply, making Art. VI prospective only. To say that a legislative act passed under the 1921 Constitution may form the basis for a right which is claimed under the 1974 Constitution, when the clear language of the 1974 Constitution provides otherwise, is wrong.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald Lee CAGE.
    No. 84-K-0173.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 9, 1984.
   In Re: Donald Lee Cage, applying for Certiorari, or Writ of Review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-KA-0828; 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 5-81-963.

Case below: 444 So.2d 347.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J.,

would grant because the “enhancement” contingency (14:95.2) was not charged in a count in the bill. The treatment of this issue in State v. Roussell, 424/226, should probably be overruled.

Reconsideration denied, 449 So.2d 1024.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William Anthony SISK.
    No. 84-K-0178.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 9, 1984.
   In Re: William Anthony Sisk, applying for Writ of Certiorari, or Writ of Review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Numbers 83-KA-0740 and 83-KA-0741; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Numbers 1-82-744 and 12-82-290.

Case below: 444 So.2d 315.

Denied on showing.

DIXON, C.J.,

concurs in the denial. It is not before us, but the analysis of the Boy-kin examination is in error. From the opinion, defendant was adequately (if not completely) informed of his right against self incrimination.


author: LEMMON, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bruce WHEELER.
    No. 81-KA-2537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 20, 1984.
   LEMMON, Justice,

Dissenting.

The state laid a proper foundation showing that the officer had special knowledge, based on experience, of the conduct typical of a marijuana distributor. Moreover, the officer’s special knowledge was helpful to the jury in deciding whether defendant was guilty of distribution of marijuana.

The import of the officer’s testimony was that defendant’s conduct was typical of a person involved in the distribution of marijuana. It was unimportant that the form of the question was improper, since the content of the answer constituted admissible evidence. I would hold that the improper form was not so prejudicial as to require reversal of the conviction of this clearly guilty party.


text:
    Bonnie R. BROEL, R. Tucker Fitzhugh, Barry M. Fox, W. Boatner Reily, III, Garden District Association, St. Charles Avenue Business Assoc., Inc. d/b/a St. Charles Avenue Association, Coliseum Square Association, Inc, and all Others Similarly Situated v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, Hon. Earnest N. Morial, Mayor of New Orleans, Hon. Salvador Anzelmo, City Attorney of New Orleans, Board of Zoning Adjustments of New Orleans, Hon. William Katz, Chairman of the Board of Zoning Adjustments, Hon. Evelyn Pugh, Director of Department of Safety and Permits and Jerome L. Goldman.
    No. 84-CC-0454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 1984.
   In re Board of Zoning Adjustments and Hon. William Katz, Chairman, applying for supervisory and remedial writs of certiorari and review, Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. C 1987, Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 84-3696.

Writ granted. “Stay Order” granted by the Court of Appeal is vacated and set aside. Case remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with law.


text:
    Mary H. Decedue, Wife of/and Charles DECEDUE v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-0092.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Mary H. Decedue and Charles De-cedue, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-429; Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, No. 267-442.

Case below: 441 So.2d 72.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Eddie Lee MAYES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-0219.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Eddie Lee Mayes, applying for writ of mandamus, 7th Judicial District Court, Parish of Catahoula, No. 79-1540.

Granted. The trial court is ordered to furnish relator a transcript of the guilty plea proceedings.


text:
    Anthony J. DALMADO, Jr., v. CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.
    No. 84-C-0234.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Anthony J. Dalmado, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0983; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 82-12811.

Granted.


text:
    Lois E. Halter, wife of and Claude CANCIENNE v. Rodrigo M. SAAVERDRA, The Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York and State Farm Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-0274.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Lois E. Halter, wife of and Claude Caneienne, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-694, Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 82-12642.

Granted.


text:
    Paul ROCHE v. CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, INC.
    No. 84-C-0279.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Paul Roche, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1027; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 81-16016.

Granted.


text:
    Joseph CORONA, Jr. v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-0287.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Joseph Carona, Jr., applying for certiorari, or review, to Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0694, from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 82-12642.

Case below: 444 So.2d 763.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. William J. GUSTE, Jr., Attorney General, The Department of Natural Resources, and the State Mineral Board v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT.
    No. 84-C-0312.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re State of Louisiana, ex rel. William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General, The Department of Natural Resources, and the State Mineral Board, applying for certiora-ri, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-0915, Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 81-13759.

Case below: 444 So.2d 1313.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. James E. SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-0317.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re James E. Smith, applying for writ of mandamus from the Twenty-first Judicial District Court, No. 42077, Parish of Tangipahoa.

Granted. The trial court is ordered to act on relator’s application within 14 days.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joseph N. WILLIAMS, v. 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, STATE OF LOUISIANA.
    No. 84-KH-0330.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Joseph N. Williams, applying for writ of mandamus to the 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 3-78-127.

Granted. It is ordered that a Boykin transcript be furnished defendant forthwith.


text:
    Walter E. BLESSEY, Jr., & Assoc. v. BRITISH SPORTS SHOP, INC.
    No. 84-CC-0378.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Walter E. Blessey, Jr., & Assoc., applying for Supervisory writs of certiora-ri, mandamus, prohibition and/or review to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. C-1831; Civil District Court, Parish of Or leans, No. 83-13796.

Granted. Rulings of the courts below are reversed. Exception of improper venue is overruled. Case remanded to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans for further proceedings.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Dennis PETERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-0393.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Dennis Peters, applying for remedial writs to the Twenty-second Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington, Nos. 36368, 36892 and 36891.

Granted. Boykin transcript ordered furnished to relator by district court. Otherwise, denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry C. LAWRENCE.
    No. 84-KK-0472.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Larry C. Lawrence, applying for remedial writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus to the 1st Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, No. 125426-A; to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 16340-KW.

Granted. Bail reduced to $175,000.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., William J. COOPER v. Sheriff Laymon GODWIN.
    No. 83-KH-2242.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re William J. Cooper, applying for writ of habeas corpus from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, No. 40140.

Granted. The application is dismissed at relator’s request.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Kenneth ROBICHAUX v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 84-KH-0192.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Kenneth Robichaux, applying for writs of certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus and other remedial writs to the 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia, No. 54023.

Granted. Relator’s application dismissed at his request.


text:
    MADISON COMMUNITY APARTMENTS, INC. and Starr Lodge Apartments, Inc. v. MADISON PARISH POLICE JURY; James D. Sevier, Madison Parish Tax Assessor; Louisiana Tax Commission & R.R. Mitchell, Sheriff & Ex-Officio Tax Collector.
    No. 84-C-0336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Madison Community Apartments, Inc. and Starr Lodge Apartments, Inc., applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 15875-CA; Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Madison, No. 80-360.

Case below: 444 So.2d 1352.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Christopher J. WATKINS v. Hon. Rudolph F. BECKER, III, Judge, Criminal District Court, Section “E”.
    No. 83-KH-0851.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Christopher J. Watkins; applying for remedial writs, Orleans Parish, No. 285-590.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Isaac L. CONLEY v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-1134.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Isaac L. Conley, applying for supervisory writs, Parish of Caddo, No. 123362.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher J. WATKINS v. Orleans Criminal District Court, Judge Rudolph F. BECKER, III, Section “E”.
    No. 83-KH-2063.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Christopher J. Watkins, applying for writ of habeas corpus, from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 285-590.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Christopher J. WATKINS v. Criminal District Court, Sec. “E”, Judge Rudolph F. BECKER, III.
    No. 83-KH-2348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Christopher J. Watkins, applying for remedial writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 285-590.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Richard Glen NAAS.
    No. 83-KP-2631.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Richard Glen Naas, applying for writ of post-conviction relief, from the Fourth Judicial District Court, No. 38271, Ouachita Parish.

Denied.

CALOGERO and LEMMON, JJ., would grant an evidentiary hearing.


text:
    Leah Maxine LACOUR, Administratrix v. Joseph E. SANDERS.
    No. 84-C-0086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Leah Maxine Lacour, Administra-trix, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-282; 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, No. 122252.

Case below: 442 So.2d 1280.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Clarence GOODLOW v. 23RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 84-KH-0166.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Clarence Goodlow, applying for writ of mandamus to the 23rd Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension.

Denied. District court has no record of filing. Relator must refile motion in district court.


text:
    Beverly V. BARANCO v. Laura Mae Joseph BARANCO.
    No. 84-CC-0211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Laura Mae Joséph Baranco, applying for remedial writ to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CW-83-1408; The Family Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, Division “C”, No. 27699.

Denied.


text:
    Lawrence J. KEATING, et al. v. Douglas A. CAMBRE, et al.
    No. 84-C-0278.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Lawrence J. Keating, et al, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 82-CA-70; Parish of St. John the Baptist, Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court, No. 11417.

Case below: 420 So.2d 1355; 446 So.2d 326.

Denied.


text:
    Reynard John ROCHON, Sr. v. Dennis WOLTER, Jim Boyer, WWL-TV, Channel 4, Loyola University and Unknown Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-0277.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Reynard John Rochon, Sr., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1497; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 82-17667.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Aaron HALL v. LOUISIANA COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, LTD.
    No. 84-C-0289.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Aaron Hall, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0881, from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 81-7923.

Case below: 444 So.2d 747.

Denied.

DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Audrey Mae BELLOWS.
    No. 84-K-0291.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Audrey Mae Bellows, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83327; 7th Judicial District Court, Parish of Con-cordia, No. 813671.

Case below: 442 So.2d 889.

Denied.


text:
    Louis J. SARDENGA v. Patricia Betancourt, wife of Louis J. SARDENGA.
    No. 84-C-0292.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Patricia Betancourt, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-517, from the Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, No. 228-954, Division “N”.

Denied.


text:
    Rebecca L. CAMPBELL, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Children, Jerry Wayne Campbell, Jr., Candace Renee Campbell, and Shannon Campbell v. CONTINENTAL-EMSCO COMPANY and Phillip Rosamond Drilling Co., Inc., and Scott Insurance Agency, Inc.
    No. 84-CC-0293.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Rebecca L. Campbell, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Children, Jerry Wayne Campbell, Jr., Candace Renee Campbell, and Shannon Campbell, applying for writs of certiorari and/or review to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 15,791-CW; 4th Judicial District Court, Parish of Morehouse, No. 79466.

Case below: 445 So.2d 70.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    RIVER CITIES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., et al. v. BERNARD AND BURK, INC.
    No. 84-C-0300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Rivers Cities Construction Company, Inc., et al., J. King Woolf, Jr., and Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-0238, from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 224,961.

Case below: 444 So.2d 1260.

Denied.


text:
    P.E. ODENDAHL COMPANY v. SCARIANO BROTHERS, INC.
    No. 84-C-0302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re P.E. Odendahl Company, applying for writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0919, from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 81-16853.

Case below: 444 So.2d 758.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry BARBER.
    No. 84-K-0303.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Henry Barber, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. KA-1020; Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 292-292.

Case below: 445 So.2d 463.

Denied.


text:
    Anaise M. GUILBEAU v. Louise Larive ROGER and South Carolina Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-0309.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Anaise M. Guilbeau, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-368; 15th Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette, No. 82-4327-1.

Case below: 443 So.2d 773.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    THOMAS JORDAN, INCORPORATED and Thomas Jordan v. Wallace C. WALKER, Partnership Known as Wallace C. Walker-Bay Point Project, Clifford C. Walker and the Members of the Partnership.
    No. 84-CC-0311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Wallace C. Walker, Partnership Known as Wallace C. Walker-Bay Point Project, Clifford C. Walker and the members of the Partnership, applying for writ of review to the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 549-658; Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. C-1777.

Denied.


text:
    Mrs. Cheryl EDWARDS v. Mr. Kent BREARD, Sr.
    No. 84-C-0313.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Mrs. Cheryl Edwards, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 16273-CA, from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, No. 126845.

Denied.


text:
    Wayne G. SARRATT v. CAPPAERT ENTERPRISES.
    No. 84-C-0314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re F.L. Cappaert and Home Indemnity Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 83-CA-477; 24th Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, No. 222-060.

Case below: 442 So.2d 783.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Elvis CAUBARREAUX v. Cicero E. HINES, et al.
    No. 84-C-0316.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Cicero E. Hines, et al., applying for supervisory writs to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-346, Parish of Avoyelles; 12th Judicial District Court, No. 82-2535.

Case below: 442 So.2d 898.

Denied.


text:
    Gertha Mae DUPLESSIS, Individually and on Behalf of the Minor Child, Michael Duplessis v. SCHWEGMANN GIANT SUPER MARKETS, INC.
    No. 84-C-0323.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc., applying for writs of certiorari and review to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0804; 34th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Bernard, No. 34-915.

Denied.


text:
    Donna Renee POYNOR, etc., et al. v. Martin J. CURE, et als. Sharon Marie KENNEDY, etc., et als. v. Martin J. CURE, et als. Kermit Evans KING v. Martin J. CURE, et als.
    No. 84-C-0324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Barriere Construction Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 82-CA-44; 82-CA-45 and 82-CA-46; 29th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Charles, Nos. 21824; 21367 and 21462.

Case below: 443 So.2d 1151.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Melvin TYLER.
    No. 84-KP-0325.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Melvin Tyler, applying for writ of habeas corpus to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 250-524, Section “l”.

Denied.


text:
    TERRA BUILDERS, INC. v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-0333.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Terra Builders, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 15903-CA, from the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto, No. 41240.

Case below: 445 So.2d 79.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Billy Roy TYLER v. SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
    No. 84-KH-0337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Billy Roy Tyler, applying for writ of habeas corpus or certiorari, to the 26th Judicial District Court, Parish of Bossier, Nos. 60706 and 60776; to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 16225-KA.

Denied.


text:
    RIVER CITIES CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. v. BERNARD AND BURK, INC.
    No. 84-C-0338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Bernard and Burk, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-0238, from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 224961.

Case below: 444 So.2d 1260.

Denied.

LEMMON, J.,

concurs, believing that the judgment was interlocutory, but that the ultimate result was correct.


text:
    Donald L. REAM v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES.
    No. 84-C-0339.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Donald L. Ream, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CM-1191; State Civil Service Commission, No.. 2844.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Morace MADDEN v. Hon. Cecil P. CAMPBELL, Judge.
    No. 84-KH-0340.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Morace Madden, applying for remedial writs, from the Twenty-Sixth, Judicial District Court, Parish of Bossier, Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 15635-KA.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Charles ORLANDO. SUCCESSION OF Josephine B. ORLANDO. SUCCESSION OF Josephine Barbara ORLANDO.
    No. 84-C-0341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Frank C. Orlando, applying for writ of certiorari, or review, to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, Nos. 83 CA 259, 83 CA 260 and 83 CA 261, from the Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, Nos. 166-925, 198-104 and 209-844.

Case below: 442 So.2d 501.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry E. BOOKER.
    No. 84-K-0348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
    Reconsideration Denied April 23, 1984.
   In re Larry E. Booker, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-KA-0471; 32nd Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne, No. 117985.

Case below: 444 So.2d 238.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William KENNEDY a/k/a Jerry Payne.
    No. 84-K-0350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re William Kennedy a/k/a Jerry Payne, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-KA-0705; 32nd Judicial District Court, Parish of Terre-bonne, No. 122808.

Case below: 444 So.2d 301.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael P. JORDAN.
    No. 84-KK-0351.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Michael P. Jordan, applying for remedial writs, to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 16240-KW, from the Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Jackson, No. 22760.

Denied.


text:
    Pam Reeves HEYL v. Cleveland George HEYL, Jr., as Administrator of the Succession of Cleveland George Heyl, III, a/k/a Cleve G. Heyl, III.
    No. 84-C-0352.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Pam Reeves Heyl, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 15,914-CA; to the Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court, No. 25145.

Case below: 445 So.2d 88.

Denied.


text:
    James A. JEWELL v. Ricky E. THOMPSON, Lonnie Blackmon, Blackmon Trucking Company, Inc., Shirley D. Smith, Distributors Oil Company, Inc., Sinclair Oil Corporation, White Motor Corporation, Cummins Engine Company, Inc., Boise Southern Company, Continental Oil Company, Inc.
    No. 84-C-0365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re James A. Jewell, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-364; 36th Judicial District Court, Parish of Beauregard, No. C-520-79.

Case below: 445 So.2d 776.

Denied.

WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joyce BARGE.
    No. 84-K-0367.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Joyce Barge, applying for writ of certiorari to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-KA-530, Parish of Jefferson; 24th Judicial District Court, No. 249-656.

Case below: 444 So.2d 735.

Denied.


text:
    Shirley McNAMARA, Secretary of the Department of Revenue and Taxation, State of Louisiana v. FIRST COMMERCE CORPORATION.
    No. 84-C-0368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re First Commerce Corporation, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA 0828; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, No. 7-19641.

Case below: 442 So.2d 1266.

Denied.


text:
    Brenda Lee COOLEY v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-0376.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Allstate Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 0909, from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 81-16061, Division “I”.

Case below: 443 So.2d 739.

Denied.


text:
    Brenda Hickman wife of/and Miller SMITH v. CASTRO BROTHERS CORPORATION.
    No. 84-C-0377.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Castro Brothers Corporation, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0744, from First City Court for the City of New Orleans, Parish of Orleans, No. 235-369.

Case below: 443 So.2d 660.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Delbert ROBINSON v. CLERK OF COURT, PARISH OF BIENVILLE, 2ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 84-KH-0380.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Delbert Robinson, applying for writ of mandamus to the Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Bienville.

Denied. District court has no record of filing. Relator should refile in district court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rex H. ROGERS.
    No. 84-K-0382.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Rex H. Rogers, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. Cr 83-720, from the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, No. 10191-82.

Case below: 445 So.2d 174.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert CLARK, et al.
    No. 84-KK-0384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re State of Louisiana, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. K-1740, from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 298-618.

Denied.


text:
    Mary Page Moran, wife of Martin B. FLAMM v. Martin B. FLAMM.
    No. 84-C-0385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Martin B. Flamm, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA 0651; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 79-16883.

Case below: 442 So.2d 1271.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky LEWIS.
    No. 84-K-0387.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Ricky Lewis, applying for certiora-ri, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CR-82-718; 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, No. 203491.

Case below: 445 So.2d 195.

Denied.


text:
    Brenda Hickman, wife of/and Miller SMITH v. CASTRO BROTHERS CORPORATION.
    No. 84-C-0388.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Brenda Hickman, wife of, and Miller Smith, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-0744; First City Court, City of New Orleans, No. 235-369.

Case below: 443 So.2d 660.

Denied.


text:
    Edwin P. COMPASS, Guy Mitchell, Don Esposito, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated v. PAN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-0392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Edwin P. Compass, Guy Mitchell, Don Esposito, Individually and on Behalf of all others Similarly Situated, applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-0639; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 81-12333.

Case below: 443 So.2d 720.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie MEARS.
    No. 84-K-0398.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Willie Mears, applying for certiora-ri, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CR 83-525; 14th Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, No. 10744-82.

Case below: 445 So.2d 167.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roosevelt BATISTE.
    No. 84-KK-0409.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Roosevelt Batiste, applying for writ of certiorari to the 29th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. John the Baptist, No. 46-80; Court of Appeal, 5th Circuit No. 84-K-114.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Johnny SMITH v. Charles FOTI, Sheriff.
    No. 84-KH-0411.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Johnny Smith, applying for remedial writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 294-040.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carnell C. MORRIS.
    No. 84-KH-0424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Carnell C. Morris, applying for writ of mandamus to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 5-82-150.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    James A. JEWELL v. Ricky E. THOMPSON, Lonnie Blackmon, Blackmon Trucking Company, Inc., Shirley D. Smith, Distributors Oil Company, Inc., Sinclair Oil Corporation, White Motor Corporation, Cummins Engine Company, Inc., Boise Southern Company, Continental Oil Company, Inc.
    No. 84-C-0435.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 1984.
   In re Georgia Casualty and Surety Company, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 84-364; 36th Judicial District Court, Parish of Beauregard, No. C-520-79.

Case below: 445 So.2d 776.

Denied.

WATSON, J., would grant the writ.