author: WATSON, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie WATSON, Jr.
    No. 81-KA-2227.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 1984.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Morel, Jr., Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, Kurt F. Sins, Gregory Champagne, Asst. Dist. At-tys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Victor E. Bradley, Jr., Norco, John L. Diasselliss, III, LePlece, for defendant-appellant.

      . "In his brief, Watson waives argument as to special charge number six which states: ‘Beyond the aggravating circumstances set forth above, you may not rely on any other factor or circumstances as a basis for deciding in favor of the death penalty. You are not to be influenced by any passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.”’ This charge contains an incorrect statement of the law, and in any event, the subject matter was fully and correctly covered in the general charge.

   WATSON, Justice.

This is Willie Watson, Jr.’s second appeal from a death sentence for the slaying of Kathy Newman. After the first appeal, his first degree murder conviction was affirmed, the death sentence reversed because of improper jury instructions, and the case remanded for a new sentencing proceeding. State v. Watson, 423 So.2d 1130 (La.,1982). On remand, the state and the defense joined in a change of venue motion and the hearing was transferred to Vermilion Parish. Watson was again sentenced to death in accordance with the new jury’s recommendation. In this appeal, Watson relies on fourteen assignments of error, consolidated into nine arguments, for reversal of his death sentence.

FACTS

On April 5, 1981, Willie Watson abducted Kathy Newman, a third year Tulane medical student, at gunpoint from the parking lot of her apartment complex in the Carroll-ton section of New Orleans. Defendant forced Ms. Newman to drive to an isolated road in St. Charles Parish where he robbed her and raped her vaginally and anally. Watson then told Kathy Newman to dress herself. As she stood outside her car putting on her clothes, Watson shot her fatally in the back of the head. Defendant subsequently confessed to the killing and stated that he shot her because he was afraid she could identify him.

ASSIGNMENTS OF PROCEDURAL ERROR AFFECTING SENTENCE: ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting a state motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Father Lundy or any expert in the field of Christian morality.

At the sentencing hearing in defendant’s first trial, Father Lundy, a Roman Catholic priest, qualified as an expert in Christian theology. Citing Biblical sources, he testified that the death penalty is an impermissible punishment under any circumstances. Two other Roman Catholic priests testified in rebuttal that their church is not opposed to the death penalty.

In her written reasons for excluding the expert testimony here, the trial judge stated: “Philosophical and moral considerations are not issues for the jury ... It is irrelevant to the jury’s decision whether one person or one group believes that capital punishment should not be in the statutes or should not be an available sentence to any case.” (Tr., Yol. 1, p. 30)

Defendant argues that that testimony was admissible because LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.5(h) provides that the jury shall consider “[a]ny other relevant mitigating circumstance”, and the court has no right to limit the evidence of mitigating circumstance.

Relevancy of proffered evidence depends on whether it tends to prove or disprove a material fact at issue. LSA-R.S. 15:435. A trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. State v. Kimble, 407 So.2d 693 (La.,1981).

LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 defines material issues at a sentencing hearing. “The sentencing hearing shall focus on the circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender.” To accomplish this, the jury considers evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether a particular defendant should receive a death sentence for the particular crime committed.

In State v. Unger, 362 So.2d 1095 (La.1978) defendant argued that reversible error occurred when the trial court sustained state challenges to eight prospective jurors because they could not consider returning a verdict of death. Defendant argued that a juror's firm opposition to the death penalty was a relevant mitigating circumstance under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.-5(h). Unger held that “ ‘other relevant mitigating circumstances’ are those related to the offender, and not to the moral convictions and sentiments of the juror.” 362 So.2d 1095 at 1100. The reasoning of Un-ger is controlling here. Louisiana’s capital punishment scheme is constitutional. An individual’s opinion that the death penalty has no place in the criminal justice system is irrelevant to a sentencing jury’s deliberations. Mitigating circumstances must be offender-focused.

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBER TWO AND FIVE

Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in admitting photographs of the victim and allowing them to be viewed by the jury. Further error allegedly occurred when the prosecutor was permitted to wave these photographs before the jury.

State exhibits numbers one, two and three are photographs from different angles of the victim’s body as it was found by the police. Exhibit number four is a photo of the victim’s hand showing a ring removed from the middle finger. Exhibit number five is a crime scene close-up of the victim’s face. Exhibits numbers six and nine are victim photos taken at the morgue. Exhibits eight and nine are close-ups of the bloody entry and exit bullet wounds to her head. All the photographs were admitted in evidence at the guilt phase of Watson’s trial.

The core of the defense argument is that this sentencing hearing was heard by a different jury and only evidence relevant to aggravating or mitigating circumstances was admissible. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 states that “[t]he jury may consider any evidence offered at the trial on the issue of guilt.” Defendant argues that the word “may” means admission is not automatic. He maintains that the probative value of these pictures was outweighed by their prejudicial effect, and, since the defense offered to stipulate to the facts of the crime, they were not necessary for their probative value.

LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 allows the sentencing jury to “consider any evidence offered at the trial on the issue of guilt.” The state may introduce into evidence at the sentencing hearing all the previous testimony, physical evidence, and stipulations that were entered in the case-in-chief at the guilt phase of the proceedings. State v. Jordan, 420 So.2d 420 (La., 1982); State v. Monroe, 397 So.2d 1258 (La., 1981); State v. Kelly, 375 So.2d 1344 (La., 1979). Photographs of the victim are probative of the “circumstances of the offense” which is by law the focus of the sentencing hearing. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2; State v. Monroe, supra. The governing statutes do not distinguish this situation where two different juries pass on the issues of guilt and penalty.

Under Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXVIII, mandated by LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.1, all capital sentences must be reviewed to determine whether they were influenced by passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factors. The pictures must be tested under this standard.

Post-mortem photographs of a murder victim are admissible to prove corpus delicti, to corroborate other evidence establishing the cause of death, and to provide positive identification. State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466 (La., 1981); State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158 (La., 1983). The admission of gruesome photographs will not be overturned unless it is clear that their prejudicial effect outweighs their probative value. An offered stipulation bears upon this balancing test, but the decision is primarily one for .the trial court. State v. Lindsey, supra; State v. Bodley, 394 So.2d 584 (La., 1981). The state cannot be robbed of the moral force of its case merely because the stipulation is offered. State v. Harvey, 358 So.2d 1224 (La., 1978).

The photographs are not unduly prejudicial. None are so gruesome as to “overwhelm reason” to associate the accused with the atrocity without sufficient evidence. State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d at 476. The record does not establish that the state waved the photographs before the jury to arouse passion or prejudice.

These assignments lack merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting his confession into evidence without a proper foundation.

At the hearing, Sergeant Ronald Dou-cette testified that he had personally read Watson his Miranda rights, was present when defendant signed a rights of arrestee form, and was the officer who took Watson’s statement. After Doucette’s testimony, the state offered defendant’s confession into evidence and it was admitted. In overruling defendant’s objection, the trial court stated that the voluntariness of the confession had already been decided at the guilt phase of the trial.

This assignment is “palpably without merit.” State v. Monroe, 397 So.2d 1258 at 1273 (La., 1981). LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 clearly permits the sentencing jury to “consider any evidence offered at the trial on the issue of guilt.” State v. Jordan, 420 So.2d 420 (La., 1982).

Defendant’s argument that evidence presented to a different sentencing jury has to be treated without regard to its introduction ab initio lacks merit. LSA-C. Cr.P. arts. 905.1 and 905.2 do not make this distinction.

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

Defendant assigns as error the trial court’s failure to give four special jury charges. The charges requested by Watson are as follows:

“4.
“By law, a jury may not consider the imposition of the death penalty unless and until the jury finds, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least one of the aggravating circumstances set forth above exists. The aggravating circumstances which the law permits you to consider if you find that any of them is established by the evidence are:
“a) The offender was engaged in the perpetration of aggravated rape and armed robbery; and
“b) The offender has a significant prior history of criminal activity.
“These are the only aggravating circumstances you may consider. You are not allowed to take into account any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case.
“14.
“There is noting (sic) that prevents you from affording Willie Watson mercy in thise (sic) proceedings by sentencing him to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence regardless of the evidence presented to you and even if you have not found the existence of any mitigating circumstances.”
“16.
“If upon the evidence in this phase of the proceeding you have any doubt as to the appropriate sentence, then you must return a verdict sentencing Willie Watson to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.”

The trial court ruled that all three charges were not wholly correct statements of the law and were otherwise included in the general charges.

LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 807 provides in pertinent part that “[a] requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent. It need not be given if it is included in the general charge or in another special charge to be given.” The requested special charges were properly excluded. State v. Lovett, 359 So.2d 163 (La., 1978); State v. Rault, 445 So.2d 1203 (La., 1984).

Special charge number four erroneously includes a statement that the jury was “not allowed to take into account any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case.” LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.3 mandates that the jury consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances prior to any death penalty recommendation. Also, special charge number four was included in the trial court’s general charge.

Special charge number fourteen is also generally covered in the trial court’s jury charges. The jury was instructed that it was free, even in the absence of mitigating evidence, to return a verdict of life imprisonment. (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 270)

The use of the word “doubt” in special charge number sixteen would require judicial explanation or clarification and the charge was properly excluded.

This assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBER SIX AND SEVEN

By these assignments, defendant complains that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Officer Dou-cette, and failing to grant a mistrial when the officer made a statement regarding the commission of another crime.

Sergeant Doucette, an investigating officer in the Kathy Newman murder, testified about the facts and circumstances surrounding his investigation. During the course of his testimony he stated that the victim’s roommate told him of Ms. Newman’s activities on the night of her murder. A defense hearsay objection was overruled. Doucette recounted the course of the investigation, including the circumstance of and the substance of Watson’s confession. Doucette said other officers executed a search warrant at defendant’s residence, where Ms. Josie Massey, Watson’s common law wife, refused to answer questions because “she feared her life for Mr. Watson." (Tr., Vol. 6, p. 103) Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, alleging that Doucette, an officer of the court, referred in hearsay testimony to ’ another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by defendant as to which evidence was not admissible. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial but did admonish the jury to disregard Ms. Massey’s remark.

Hearsay evidence is testimony in court of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter. State v. Martin, 356 So.2d 1370 (La., 1978). A witness is generally competent to testify that a statement was made to him so long as no attempt is made to vouch for the credibility of its contents. State v. Ford, 368 So.2d 1074 (La., 1979); State v. Edwards, 406 So.2d 1331 (La., 1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 945, 102 S.Ct. 2011, 72 L.Ed.2d 467. A police officer, in explaining his own actions, may refer to statements made to him by other persons involved in the case. Such statements are admitted not to prove the truth of the assertion, but to explain the sequence of events leading to the arrest of the defendant from the viewpoint of the investigating officer. State v. Calloway, 324 So.2d 801 (La., 1976); State v. Smith, 400 So.2d 587 (La., 1981); State v. Edwards, supra. Much of officer Dou-cette’s testimony was admitted to explain the sequence of events leading to defendant’s arrest. His testimony concerning statements made by the victim’s roommate is not hearsay.

LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 770 provides: “Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to:
* # ⅜ 5⅜ S¡S *
“(2) Another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant as to which evidence is not admissible;
A police officer is not a court official within the meaning of Article 770. State v. Foote, 379 So.2d 1058 (La., 1980); State v. Carter, 412 So.2d 540 (La., 1982); State v. Hayes, 414 So.2d 717 (La., 1982). The statement in question did not actually refer to another crime despite a possible inference to that effect. The jury was admonished to disregard the remark and this was sufficient to assure the defendant a fair trial. LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 771.

These assignments lack merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBER EIGHT AND TEN

Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence not relevant to aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Also, defendant contends the trial judge erred in allowing the testimony of Detective Burns concerning fingerprints on the victim’s car and in admitting into evidence the victim’s raincoat with blood on it.

In its case-in-chief, the state offered much of the same testimony and physical evidence presented during the guilt phase of Watson’s trial. The physical evidence included certain articles of clothing found on the victim’s body. Detective Burns, qualified as an expert witness in the field of latent fingerprint identification, explained through the use of enlarged pictures how a latent print from Kathy Newman’s car was matched to a known fingerprint from Watson. All of this evidence was properly admitted at the guilt phase of trial.

Defendant argues that this evidence was irrelevant in the sentencing proceeding, and LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 requires that the sentencing hearing “shall be conducted according to the rules of evidence.” One rule of evidence set out in LSA-R.S. 15:435, states that “the evidence must be relevant to the material issue.” Watson contends the only material issues at a sentencing hearing involve the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Defendant’s arguments disregard the language of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 which requires that “[t]he sentencing hearing shall focus on the circumstances of the offense.” This jury, which did not decide the issue of guilt, had to be provided with an accurate picture of the events surrounding Watson’s first degree murder conviction to fulfill their responsibility of deciding an appropriate punishment.

These assignments lack merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBER NINE AND FOURTEEN

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in restricting his voir dire questioning and allowing the state extraneous voir dire examination. Defendant claims the state was given greater latitude than the defense in its Witherspoon questioning. Defendant contends he was prejudiced and was unable to choose a fair and impartial jury and to properly build challenges for cause.

In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) the United States Supreme Court held that “a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” On the other hand, the court found no constitutional bar to excluding jurors who stated in advance of trial that they could not even consider returning a verdict of death.

In response to Witherspoon, LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 798 was amended and now provides in pertinent part:

“It is good cause for challenge on the part of the state, but not on the part of the defendant, that:
“(2) The juror tendered in a capital case who has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment and makes it unmistakably clear (a) that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before him, ...”

In viewing the voir dire examination in its entirety, no prejudice to defendant is shown. At defendant’s request, much of the voir dire was conducted individually. Defendant conducted extensive voir dire and was able to intelligently exercise his right to challenge prospective jurors for cause.

During questioning of Ms. Bessie Moore, she indicated in response to court questioning that she would automatically vote against the death penalty under all circumstances. Defense counsel, in attempting to rehabilitate her, asked if she could listen to the evidence before making a decision and she said she could. Because of her contradictory responses, the judge asked her directly if she could ever vote for the death penalty. She responded in the negative. Defense counsel objected arguing that the exact language of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 798 must be employed to properly comply with Witherspoon. In overruling the objection, the court noted that the prospective juror had given a negative answer to a question posed in the specific language of Article 798.

During defense questioning of Ms. Bel-laire, the trial court interjected to comment that a defense question was misleading because counsel implied that the juror was being asked how she would vote. Defendant objected arguing that such judicial comment could be viewed as commenting on the evidence. Objections, he argued, should come from the state or not at all.

The defense is entitled to wide latitude in examining prospective jurors. This right must be exercised within the court’s discretion, which determines the scope of the examination under the prevailing facts and circumstances. State v. James, 431 So.2d 399 (La., 1983); State v. Robinson, 404 So.2d 907 (La., 1981). Here, the trial court did not curtail defense questioning but interjected a comment about the misleading nature of a question. The argument that only the state is capable of objecting to defense voir dire questioning is meritless.

When both sides had concluded their questioning of prospective juror Hebert, the trial court asked one more question to ascertain the juror’s position: “If it is established that Kathy Newman was murdered, that she was raped twice and that she was also robbed, could you consider imposing the death penalty?” (Tr., Vol III, p. 457) Ms. Hebert answered, “I can’t be sure of that.” After the court explained that she was not asking how Ms. Hebert would vote, but rather whether she could consider the death penalty, Ms. Hebert stated: “I don’t think I could.” The state moved to excuse Ms. Hebert for cause and the defense objected, arguing that this jur- or had never said that she would automatically vote against the death penalty.

In allowing the state challenge for cause, the trial court held that Ms. Hebert’s unwillingness to consider imposition of the death penalty was firm, relying on Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir., 1982).

The Fifth Circuit in Williams declared:

“Witherspoon and its progeny do not mandate that a prospective juror aver that she would refuse to consider the death penalty in every ease that could possible (sic) arise. If she knows enough about the case to know that she could not consider imposition of the death penalty regardless of what evidence might be presented, she must be excused. Ms. Brou’s responses demonstrate that she would be unwilling to consider the death penalty where the crime charged was murder committed during a robbery. She does leave open the possibility that she would consider this penalty in a more ‘hideous’ case. Her unwillingness to do so here, however, is firm.” 679 F.2d at 385-386.

The rationale of Williams had previously been adopted by this court. State v. LaFleur, 398 So.2d 1074 (La., 1981) involved the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed in an atrocious, cruel or heinous manner. During voir dire, prospective jurors were asked whether they could return the death penalty if they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in such a manner. LaFleur held: "This is a legitimate question inasmuch as a juror who could not recommend the death penalty under such circumstances is subject to a challenge for cause by the state.” 398 So.2d at 1078.-This assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ELEVEN

Defendant argues, that the trial court erred in refusing to qualify Willie Jackson as an expert on the effects and use of “tees and blues”, thereby prejudicing' his defense.

Before any witness can give evidence as an expert his competency must be established to the satisfaction of the court. LSA-R.S. 15:466. Competency of an expert witness is a question of fact within the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Coleman, 406 So.2d 563 (La., 1981). A trial judge’s rulings on qualifications of experts will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error. State v. Stucke, 419 So.2d 939 (La., 1982); State v. Trosclair, 443 So.2d 1098 (La., 1983).

Mr. Jackson testified that he attended but never graduated from Southern University in New Orleans where he majored in psychology and minored in drug abuse. He has no background or formal training in any field of medicine and is currently employed. at a V.A. Hospital as a rehabilitation counselor. While Mr. Jackson admitted that he is a former addict, he did not say that he ever used the drugs in question. He had attended numerous lectures and seminars, conducted workshops, and wrote papers on drug abuse, including the abuse of “tees and blues”. Mr. Jackson had never qualified as an expert witness on the effects of “tees and blues” in any court.

The trial court’s ruling denying Mr. Jackson expert witness status was not manifestly erroneous in view of Mr. Jackson’s lack of expertise.

This assignment is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THIRTEEN

Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they were not to be influenced by sympathy.

The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:

“You are not to be influenced by sympathy, passion, prejudice or public opinion. You are expected to reach a just verdict.”. (Tr., Vol. VII, p. 274)

Watson argues that this instruction lessened the impact of and ordered the jury to disregard the mitigating circumstances. Defendant cites the Georgia Supreme Court opinion in Legare v. State, 250 Ga. 875, 302 S.E.2d 351 (1983) where a similar charge was given. The Georgia Supreme Court found an irreconcilable conflict between the charge eliminating sympathy and the charge on mitigating circumstances. Legare concluded: “Because the charge complained of might well confuse the jury and limit their constitutional required consideration of evidence in mitigation, we hereby disapprove it.” 302 S.E.2d at 354. Since in Legare there was reversible error in a prior argument, the court did not reach the state argument that, viewing the charges as a whole, the jury members could not have been misled by the challenged charge.

The state argues here that the given charge was not improper. Had the jury members been told that they could be influenced by sympathy, they would logically have sympathy for the victim, not the defendant.

The charges as a whole did not inflict prejudice or any arbitrary factor into these sentencing proceedings. The trial court fully enumerated the statutory mitigating circumstances and stressed that the jury must consider any other relevant mitigating circumstances, not being limited to those defined. Importantly, the jury was charged that:

“Although you may unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists, you may still conclude that the overall circumstances are insufficient to warrant death, and you would be free, even in the absence of any evidence in mitigation, to return a verdict of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” (Tr., Vol. VII, p. 270)

This particular sentence made clear to the jury that they were free to consider any aspect of the case in arriving at their verdict. The challenged charge did not confuse the jury in its deliberations.

This assignment of error is without merit.

CAPITAL SENTENCE REVIEW

LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.9.1 (Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXVIII) requires each death sentence be reviewed to determine if it is constitutionally excessive. The following three factors must be considered:

(a) Whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors;
(b) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance; and
(c) Whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.

A Uniform Capital Sentence Report with attached pre-sentence investigation report has been submitted by the trial court. The report indicates that Willie Watson, Jr., a black male, was twenty-four years old at the time of the crime. He is unmarried with no children or dependents. Watson was born of a common law union when his mother was a teenager. Until his early teens he grew up in a rural area under the supervision of a friend of his mother. When this woman died, defendant was taken against his will by his natural mother to New Orleans where he lived in the projects. Defendant has a low normal I.Q., left school after the seventh grade, and has a minimal employment record. Most of his adult years were spent in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Defendant has been involved with drugs since the age of thirteen.

PASSION, PREJUDICE AND ARBITRARY FACTORS

The sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors.

While defendant is black and his victim white, race was not an issue at trial. Local passion was eliminated when the venue was changed from St. Charles Parish, the site of the crime and first trial, to Vermilion Parish.

The victim’s photographs, defendant’s confession, and other evidence admitted initially at the guilt portion of defendant’s trial, did not interject prejudice or arbitrary factors in this jury’s deliberations. The jury instructions were proper statements of the law.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

The jury in its verdict found the following statutory aggravating circumstances:

(a) The defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape;
(b) The defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery; and
(e) The offender had a significant prior history of criminal activity.

The evidence presented at the sentencing hearing is clearly sufficient to support the jury’s findings with respect to the commission of aggravated rape and armed robbery. Defendant’s confession along with his testimony at the sentencing hearing established that he raped Kathy Newman both vaginally and anally. Testimony by the pathologist and medical technologist support Watson’s confession. Defendant also testified that he robbed Ms. Newman at gunpoint of her purse, money, and jewelry during the course of the murder.

The third aggravating circumstance, a significant prior history of criminal activity, is also substantiated by the record. Watson has three prior convictions for simple burglary, a conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and an extensive juvenile record. Defendant testified as to his extensive use of marijuana, heroin, and “tees and blues”.

The jury findings with respect to all three aggravating circumstances are supported by the record.

PROPORTIONALITY OP SENTENCING

The final aspect of sentence review requires a determination of whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. An inference of arbitrariness arises when a jury’s recommendation is inconsistent with sentences imposed in similar cases in the same jurisdiction.

Defendant’s contention that the proportionality of the sentence cannot be determined in this case because there were no similar first degree murder cases in Vermilion Parish is without merit. According to statistics provided by the district attorney for the Twenty-Ninth Judicial District, there have been a total of nine first degree murder prosecutions within the Fifteenth Judicial District, which includes Vermilion, Acadia and Lafayette Parishes.

State v. Aucoin, 362 So.2d 503 (La., 1978) involved the prosecution of a mother for the murder of her eight year old daughter. The killing was done by strangulation, beating, stabbing, and ultimately by driving a car over the child. The mother was found guilty of first degree murder and the jury recommended life imprisonment. In mitigation, the defense argued her mental disease and drug addiction.

State v. Francis, 403 So.2d 680 (La., 1981) involved the prosecution of a man who pulled a gun and began shooting when he saw a former girlfriend dancing with another man. A security guard and the dancing partner were killed. This defendant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder with the jury recommending a life sentence.

In State v. Thibodeaux, 383 So.2d 1264 (La., 1980) defendant shot four times, killing his victim after the two argued over a pool game. Thibodeaux received a life sentence following his first degree murder conviction.

State v. Narcisse, 426 So.2d 118 (La., 1983) involved a prosecution for a brutal and fatal stabbing of defendant’s seventy-four year old great aunt during an armed robbery. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and- recommended the death sentence.

In State v. Celestine, 443 So.2d 1091 (La., 1983) defendant received a sentence of death for the rape and murder of an elderly woman in her home.

State v. Thibeaux, 366 So.2d 1314 (La., 1978) involved the prosecution of a thirty-nine year old mother of four for the shooting death of her husband. At trial defendant claimed self-defense and the state offered no aggravating circumstances. She was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life. This court reversed the conviction and defendant has not been retried.

Two eases presently on appeal to this court, State v. John F. Fuller, Docket No. 83-KA-0619 and State v. Jimmy Glass, Docket No. 83-KA-1735, both involve brutal murders committed during the course of armed robberies. In both cases, the juries returned death recommendations.

The Aucoin, Thibeaux, Francis and Thibodeaux juries recommended life imprisonment. In each case there was mitigating evidence persuasive to the jury. Fuller, Narcisse, Glass and Celestine all involved murders perpetrated upon elderly victims in their homes. Rape or armed robbery was an aggravating circumstance in each case. These cases involved coldblooded murder with no clear mitigating circumstances involved, the same situation as presented here.

In mitigation, Watson argues that at the time of the offense he lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law because of his drug addiction. Although the defendant was a heavy user of “tees and blues”, it was not established that he was incapable of knowing right from wrong at the time of the crime.

Defendant did not act in the heat of passion. He fully admitted that after twice raping Ms. Newman, he shot her, not in anger, but because she would be able to identify him.

Considering the crime and the defendant, the sentence is not disproportionate.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the death sentence of defendant, Willie Watson, Jr., is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

DIXON, C.J., concurs, disagreeing with the treatment of hearsay in Assignments of Error number six and seven.

       Judge Denis A. Barry participated in this decision for Lemmon, J., recused.

      . "You are required to consider the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding which sentence should be imposed. The statutory aggravating circumstances which the State has relied on are that the offender has a significant prior history of criminal activity; that the offender was engaged in the commission of aggravated rape; and that the offender was engaged in the commission of armed robbery. * * * Before you may consider that a sentence of death should be imposed, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists. The State has the burden of proving this. Reasonable doubt — The State has the burden of proving this beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 264-266).

      . Extensive questioning of this juror had elicited contradictory statements on the ultimate question. She stated that her tendency would be to block out the death penalty and to consider life from the beginning. She answered in the affirmative when asked if she had any moral compunction against capital punishment. However, when the prosecutor asked her if she were saying that there were no circumstances under which she would consider imposing the death sentence, she stated: "It would be a very rare one, ’cause none comes to mind at all.” (Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 451)

      . “Tees and blues” is a street expression for the drugs Talwin and Pyribenzamine when taken together.

      . Assignment of Error Number Twelve assigns as error any and all errors patent on the face of the record. There are no errors patent on the face of the record.

      . The Legare charge read as follows:
      " ‘[T]he law does not permit Jurors in arriving at their verdict to be governed by sympathy or prejudice. You may not and should not, therefore, render a verdict in this case upon sympathy for either party or prejudice against either party. Any verdict you return must be supported by evidence produced upon the trial, or inferences which could be reasonably drawn therefrom without in any way being affected by either sympathy or prejudice.”’

      . See State v. Williams, 410 So.2d 217 (La., 1982) which approved a charge cautioning the jury against letting sympathy for the victim influence its verdict.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WATSON, Justice. MARCUS, Justice BLANCHE, Justice LEMMON, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Wanda KAHL, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of Her Minor Children, John Irving Kahl, Jr. and Shawna Kahl v. Chester C. BAUDOIN, et al.
    No. 83-C-2120.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 1984.
    Dissenting in Part and Concurring in Part April 3, 1984.
    Rehearings Denied May 31, 1984.

      Gerald J. Block, Come & Block, Lafayette, for plaintiff-applicant.
    Henry D. Salassi, Frank S. Craig, III, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, Baton Rouge, Nicholas F. LaRoeca, Jr., Lippman, Mahfouz, Martin, Larocca & Stansbury, Morgan City, for defendant-respondent.
   WATSON, Justice.

In this workers’ compensation claim by the widow and children of a St. Mary Parish Deputy Sheriff, the issues are: (1) who employed Deputy Kahl at the time of his death on June 4, 1980; and (2) did suit against the Sheriff of St. Mary Parish interrupt prescription against the State of Louisiana?

FACTS

Deputy Sheriff John I. Kahl, Sr., was fatally shot on June 4, 1980, while attempting to serve a search warrant for narcotics. The trial court concluded that Kahl was an employee within the meaning of LSA-R.S. 23:1034 entitling his widow to recover death benefits under the workers’ compensation act. Kahl’s death occurred within the course and scope of his employment. Since Kahl’s wages were paid by the sheriff and the state and he performed services for both entities, the trial court found a joint employment. On the basis of Rodrigue v. Breaux, 388 So.2d 60 (La.App. 1 Cir.1980), the trial court decided that the State of Louisiana was responsible for payment of compensation benefits. The judgment was reversed in Kahl v. Baudoin, 436 So.2d 1271 (La.App. 1 Cir.1983) which stated that Act 25 of 1981, effective November 19, 1981, excluded state coverage for Kahl by defining deputy sheriffs as public officials. Two judges disagreed with this retroactive application of Act 25 but concurred on the basis that suit against the State of Louisiana had prescribed. The state was named as a defendant on October 80, 1981, more than one year after Deputy Kahl’s death.

CONCLUSION

At the time of Kahl’s death, Act No. 318 of 1978 provided that the state was not liable for damages caused by a sheriffs employee acting within the course and scope of his official duties. Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office, 402 So.2d 669 (La.,1981) considered this legislation’s effect on delictual responsibility for the torts of a deputy sheriff and held that the sheriff was responsible in his official capacity because of the employment relationship between a sheriff and his deputies. Both Act 318 of 1978 and Jenkins concerned tort liability. They are not controlling in this claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

Kahl was clearly an employee of Sheriff Chester C. Baudoin of St. Mary Parish within the meaning of the Louisiana workers’ compensation act. LSA-R.S. 23:1034(A). However, that employment relationship does not exclude the possibility of a joint employer.

By Act 25 of 1981, the legislature undertook to limit the liability of the state in workers’ compensation suits. Although termed interpretative and clarifying legislation, Act 25 is substantive in its effect and cannot be applied retroactively to preexisting causes of action.

At the time of Deputy Kahl’s death, LSA-R.S. 23:1034(A) had been amended by Act No. 528 of 1977. Act No. 528 provided that the workers’ compensation act applied “to every person in the service of the state or political subdivision thereof.” Although this act gave compensation benefits to criminal deputy sheriffs in the Parish of Orleans, it did not specifically exclude other deputy sheriffs from coverage. See Phillips v. State, Through Dept. of Transp., 400 So.2d 1091 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1981), writ denied 401 So.2d 1195 (La.), writ not considered 403 So.2d 70 (La.).

Although Deputy Kahl was an employee of the Sheriff of St. Mary Parish, he also worked for the state. While the sheriff had primary control and direction of Deputy Kahl and paid the major portion of his salary, the state also paid Kahl and called upon him for services in the enforcement of state laws. “ ‘It is not necessary, that each partner or joint venturer personally control the work of the injured employee. It is sufficient that they are engaged in a common enterprise that contemplates the employment and control of the claimant by one of the interested parties for the benefit of all.’ ” Babineaux v. Southeast ern Drilling Corporation, 170 So.2d 518 at 529 (La.App. 3 Cir.1965), writ denied 247 La. 614, 172 So.2d 700, appeal dismissed 86 S.Ct. 67, 38 U.S. 16, 15 L.Ed.2d 12. As a result of the wage payments by the state and the services rendered to the state, Kahl is presumed to be an employee of the state as well as the sheriff. LSA-R.S. 23:1044. The state did not rebut the statutory presumption in favor of coverage. Since Kahl was employed and paid by the sheriff and the state, both are liable for compensation benefits. LSA-R.S. 23:1031. The sheriffs liability is not personal; it exists only because of his official capacity. Jenkins, supra.

Since the State of Louisiana and the Sheriff of St. Mary Parish exercised some degree of control over Deputy Sheriff Kahl and both paid his wages, the joint employers are solidarily liable. Humphreys v. Marquette Casualty Company, 235 La. 355, 103 So.2d 895 (1958). Because of the solidary liability, the suit against Sheriff Baudoin interrupted prescription against the state and plaintiffs’ claim against the State of Louisiana did not prescribe.

While the State and the Sheriff are solidarily liable to plaintiffs as between themselves, each employer is liable only for its pro rata share of compensation payments according to its respective wage liability. LSA-R.S. 23:1031; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. American Employers Insurance Company, 315 So.2d 822 (La.App. 3 Cir.1975); Fontenot v. Town of Kinder, 377 So.2d 554 (La.App. 3 Cir.1979), writ denied 379 So.2d 1102 (La.,1980).

In Humphreys, supra, one of the two defendants was clearly liable for compensation, and penalties and attorney’s fees were assessed against both. Here, both defendants had a defense with arguable merit. The trial court correctly determined that defendants are not subject to penalties and attorneys’ fees under these circumstances.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and judgment is rendered as follows:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there be judgment herein in favor of plaintiff, Wanda Kahl, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Shawna Kahl and John Irving Kahl, Jr., and against defendants, the State of Louisiana and Chester C. Baudoin, in his official capacity as Sheriff of St. Mary Parish, jointly and in solido, for the maximum amount of weekly compensation benefits provided in LSA-R.S. 23:1231, et seq., from the date of John Irving Kahl, Sr.’s death, being June 4, 1980, until termination according to law, as well as all funeral and burial expenses and any medical expenses incurred, with legal interest on all unpaid benefits from date of judicial demand until paid.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.

LEMMON, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part.

MARCUS, Justice

(dissenting).

I dissent, being of the opinion that Deputy Kahl was not an employee of the state.

BLANCHE, Justice

(dissenting).

Deputy Kahl was a public official and thus excluded from the benefits provided under La.R.S. 23:1034(A) at the time of his death. See La.R.S. 44:1 and R.S. 33:1433. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.

LEMMON, Justice,

dissenting in part and concurring in part.

While I agree that the Sheriff of St. Mary Parish was liable in his official capacity for workmen’s compensation benefits, I disagree that the State of Louisiana was also liable as a joint employer.

The determination of an employer-employee relationship depends upon the examination of many factors, and that determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. The most important factor is the right of the alleged employer to exercise control over the employee.

In the present case, the Sheriff of St. Mary Parish clearly had the complete right of control over Deputy Kahl at all times and had actual control at the time of the incident in which he was killed. Admittedly, the Sheriff on occasions permitted his deputies to work with the state police in a particular operation and temporarily surrendered actual control for a brief period of time. On such an occasion, however, the Sheriff never lost the right to control the deputies, but in fact exercised that right to control by temporarily permitting the deputies to operate under the control of others. Perhaps if Kahl’s death had occurred while some other authority was exercising actual control over the operation in which he was involved, then Kahl might be considered an employee of that other authority at that point in time. However, Kahl at the time of the fatal shooting was operating under the actual control of the Sheriff of St. Mary Parish, and the fact that the Sheriff had on other occasions temporarily relinquished actual control of certain deputies was not highly significant in the determination of an employer-employee relationship in this case.

The other factor on which the majority relies in the determination of any employment relationship between Kahl and the State of Louisiana is the Legislature’s providing of supplemental pay for policemen. That factor also lacks considerable significance in the relationship determination in this particular case.

The Louisiana Legislature has long exhibited concern for policemen and firemen as public servants who actually put their lives on the line daily to serve the people of this state. One manifestation of that concern is the enactment of supplemental pay legislation, which has been of considerable assistance to the parishes and municipalities of this state in attracting a higher quality of employees into critical positions which involve danger to life or limb. However, if this financial assistance extended by the Legislature to parishes and municipalities results in the State’s becoming liable for significant sums of workmen’s compensation benefits, then the Legislature may well reconsider its position of providing financial assistance.

It is unfortunate that the Sheriff did not have workmen’s compensation insurance in the present case, because previous (although questionable) jurisprudence indicated that it was not necessary. Nevertheless, the Sheriff will probably bear the ultimate responsibility for paying benefits in this case involving two employers. The holding of the State as a second employer, while serving to interrupt prescription, does a disservice to the developing jurisprudence in this area.

      . "One distinguishing characteristic of the true public official is the fact that he is often vested with important policy-declaring functions. Those who are entrusted with the making of public policy usually receive salaries which are fairly commensurate with- the responsibility of their positions and hence they may be regarded as outside the protective scope of the compensation acts. It is also noteworthy that policy-determining officers are not usually exposed to employment hazards. Other positions are commonly regarded as official and are subject to an official oath merely because of the public importance of the function, even though the duties are entirely routine and even though the positions can be filled by any trustworthy person of moderate capacity. These persons are paid in terms of the expectable demands of their duties, rather than in terms of the dignity of their positions, and their work is often ultra-hazardous in character, as in the cases of policemen and firemen. To exclude such persons from compensation tends to defeat the broad purpose of the Act.” Malone & Johnson, Workers’ Compensation, § 98 in 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 219-220 (1980).

      . Brodnax v. Cappel, 425 So.2d 232 (La.App. 3 Cir.1982) erroneously held that Act 25 of 1981 was retroactive in its effect and is overruled.

      . Virgil M. Skinner, Jr., a fellow deputy sheriff, testified:
      “There were several times when we worked with State Police Detectives from Region II and when it come to vice, prostitution cases, gambling, drugs and these were all cases that the State originated and asked for help on and we worked with them and took orders from them.

      “There was also quite a few times with the ABC Board of the State that we worked under. They came to us and asked for assistance and we worked along with them. Of course, they were in charge of the program. Most of the cases depending on who originated really boiled down to who was in charge of the time or who expected to take charge.
      "Also, working side by side with the troopers that worked on the road, had accidents on top of accidents." [Emphasis added] (Tr. 347)

      . Similarly, the Sheriff of St. Mary Parish undoubtedly cooperated with other adjoining parishes in certain investigations or operations and temporarily relinquished actual control of the St. Mary deputies to some other authority.

      . The exception of prescription was properly overruled on the basis that the plaintiffs were misled by prior jurisprudence indicating that deputy sheriffs either were not entitled to workmen’s compensation or were employees of the State. Although the Sheriff was not joined as a defendant within a year of the incident (until recent jurisprudence indicated the necessity to do so), the Sheriff had timely notice of the employment incident and was not prejudiced.


author: LEMMON, Justice. DIXON, Chief Justice WATSON, Justice,

text:
    Vera Lydia SCHNEIDER, et al. v. Dorman STRAHAN, et al.
    No. 82-C-2903.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied May 31, 1984.
    Dissenting Opinion June 1, 1984.

      James J. Gleason, III, Mandeville, for applicants.
    Louis M. Keifer, Jr., Metairie, for respondents.
   LEMMON, Justice.

This is a workmen’s compensation suit in which the widow and child of Horst Schneider seek to recover benefits on account of Schneider’s death which plaintiffs contend arose out of his employment. The trial court, finding that there was no causal connection between Schneider’s work activities and his fatal heart attack, dismissed the suit. The court of appeal .affirmed. 422 So.2d 1377. We granted certiorari to review these rulings. 427 So.2d 1199.

Defendant was a painting contractor. At the time of his death in June, 1977, Schneider had worked for defendant for more than ten years and was a painting foreman, performing both supervisory work and manual labor. Schneider’s crew, consisting basically of himself and two other men, was painting at a shopping center construction site, usually working forty hours a week. About six hours of Schneider’s eight-hour workday was spent in physical labor. The crew performed both outside and inside work, but there was no air conditioning available for the interior work. The average daily high temperature for the month was 96 degrees.

Because a major tenant had scheduled the opening date for its store, there was considerable pressure on Schneider for his crew to complete the job. Although the work was proceeding on schedule, the tenant urged Schneider to finish the painting so that carpets could be laid. '

On Wednesday, June 15, defendant’s crew was doing touchup painting of an area high up on the outside wall. While one worker was painting on a ladder anchored against a loading platform, Schneider extended his arms above his head and held the ladder away from the freshly painted building. After 15 or 20 seconds, Schneider suddenly asked the worker to get down because he could not hold the ladder any -longer. When Schneider put the ladder down, he was “flustered” and red in the face, according to the description of his coworker, who was apprehensive that Schneider was about to faint.

Schneider eventually resumed his duties and worked the remainder of the day, as well as on Thursday and Friday, without displaying any further symptoms. During that time, Schneider's chores included pulling along a scaffold on which other workers were painting. One painter testified that this chore was particularly difficult and strenuous because one of the wheels on the scaffold was broken at the time.

On Saturday, June 18, while eating breakfast at home, Schneider suffered severe chest pains.- The doctor diagnosed a coronary insufficiency and hospitalized Schneider through Friday, June 24. While Schneider was in the hospital, defendant’s painting work got so far behind that overtime work was scheduled for Saturday, June 25. Schneider also learned that an atrium had been painted the wrong color.

Upon releasing Schneider from the hospital, the doctor instructed him to go home, to remain cool, to observe a special diet, and to refrain from strenuous activity. However, Schneider had his wife drive him from the hospital to the job site, where he spent one and a half hours discussing the progress of the work. When he left for home, he stretched out on the car seat and took a nitroglycerine pill that the doctor had prescribed.

The next day (Saturday), despite his wife’s disapproval, Schneider drove to the job site and remained there for about two hours. He discussed the job and watched the workers, but he also assisted twice in moving a scaffold. When he returned home, he was extremely tired, and he rested the remainder of the weekend.

At 1:00 a.m. on Monday, June 27, Schneider was rushed to the hospital by ambulance. He died later that morning of an acute myocardial infarction.

Schneider’s physician, Dr. Millet, had been treating him since October, 1975 for gastrointestinal problems, but had not suspected any heart trouble. Dr. Millet had determined that Schneider had a slight hia-tal hernia, acute gastritis, and a duodenal ulcer. Chest X-rays and an electrocardiogram in 1976 were reported within normal limits.

An electrocardiogram at the hospital on June 18, 1977 revealed heart disease (myocardial ischemia) of recent onset, but no myocardial infarction. At the time of discharge, Dr. Millet diagnosed coronary insufficiency syndrome and arteriosclerosis heart disease.

Dr. Millet testified that Schneider had reported during his hospitalization that he had previously experienced chest pains while lifting objects. The doctor further opined that Schneider’s heart condition could have been aggravated by tension, heat, isometric exercise (such as pulling a ladder with his arms above his head) and driving. The doctor who performed the autopsy found an acute coronary occlusion of the left anterior descending artery, severe extensive coronary arteriosclerosis, an old small posterior myocardial infarction, and a recent extensive myocardial infarction.

The trial court, in reasons for judgment, noted that Schneider had an extensively diseased heart, that the Saturday, June 18 incident at breakfast was the first occasion on which Schneider evidenced symptoms directly attributable to heart disease, that the fatal attack occurred at home in the middle of the night, that both attacks occurred off the job many hours after performance of work without any related on-the-job symptoms, and that Dr. Millet had not attached any particular significance to the incident which occurred while Schneider was supporting a coworker on the ladder. While the court conceded that compensation may be awarded when the death occurs off the job after an on-the-job incident if there is medical correlation between the job duties, the incident and the resulting death, the court concluded there was insufficient medical correlation between Schneider’s employment activities and his death. After reviewing the record, the court of appeal was “unable to say that the trial court’s finding of lack of work causation is clearly wrong.” 422 So.2d at 1379.

When the employee has a preexisting heart disease, a heart accident may be found to arise out of employment if the work exertion is of a degree greater than that generated in everyday nonemployment life. Guidry v. Sline Indus. Printers, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La.1982). Thus, if there is a personal causal contribution (in the form of a diseased heart) to the heart accident, the employment causal contribution must take the form of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment life. IB A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation § 38-83, 7-233 (1980). However, whether or not there is a personal weakness or disease, the claimant must also establish medically that employment exertion contributed causally to that heart attack. Larson, above.

Schneider’s fatal attack did not occur on the job. The only on-the-job incident which suggested possible medical problems caused by employment exertion occurred 13 days earlier. While plaintiffs proved that Schneider’s exertion which caused this incident was greater than that of nonem-ployment life, there was little medical proof that employment exertion was linked to the fatal attack or that the ladder incident on the job progressed to the fatal attack 13 days later. Dr. Millet stated that “it was difficult to identify the precipitating cause for the problem on the 18th” and that “any number of factors” could have caused the acute infarction on the 27th.

The treating physician’s testimony was equivocal at best. If the trial court had awarded compensation, an appellate court may well have found that the medical and lay evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, was sufficient to support the judgment. However, the trial court ruled against plaintiffs on the basis of insufficient medical proof. An appellate court reviewing this record under the appropriate standard of review simply should not disturb the supported conclusions of the trier of fact.

Accordingly, the judgments of the lower courts are affirmed.

DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., dissent.

DIXON, C.J., dissents with reasons.

DIXON, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

Even if there is doubt that the June 18 incident was job-related, there can be no doubt that the decedent’s work activities upon his release from the hospital were causally related to his fatal attack.

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

WATSON, Justice,

dissenting.

The majority’s recitation of the facts clearly demonstrates that compensation is due and that the trial court was wrong. Workers’ compensation laws are to be liberally interpreted in favor of the injured employee or his heirs. Here, the deceased suffered an accident while holding the ladder. Later, he commendably, but foolishly, attempted to return to work or at least to discharge his supervisory duties and suffered exacerbation of his condition. On one of the days he attempted to return to work, he had to stretch out on the car seat and take a nitroglycerine pill.

The majority seizes on the fact that Schneider lived long enough to return home and rest there for about one and a half days before dying in the hospital. This does not negate his accident on the job which obviously contributed to his death.

Serious questions are raised concerning the standard of review in compensation cases when this court says essentially that the court of appeal was required to go along with the trial court, which was either right or wrong on a simple set of facts. Actually, this court is probably saying that the court of appeal is correct in affirming the trial court when the latter is wrong on a question of law, not of fact. Such a decision is small solace to the surviving widow and child.

I would grant the application for rehearing.


text:
    TEXAS BANK OF BEAUMONT v. Kazem Michel BOZORG.
    No. 84-C-0508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Massey-Ferguson, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari or review, to Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 82-CA-57, from Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, No. 249-503.

Granted.


text:
    Emile L. TURNER, Jr. v. Helen Ruth Gubbels TURNER.
    No. 84-C-0557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Emile L. Turner, Jr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-0988; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 79-4277.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Clinton C. HOWARD, Jr. v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT and District Attorney, New Orleans.
    No. 84-KH-0677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Clinton C. Howard, Jr., applying for writ of mandamus to Criminal District Court, for the Parish of Orleans.

Granted. The relator’s writ is transferred to the 4th Circuit, Court of Appeal for consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph V. FOSTER, Jr.
    No. 84-KH-0770.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Joseph V. Foster, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari, 21st Judicial District Court, Livingston Parish, Nos. 4646, 4647, 4648, 4649, 4650, 4708 and 4709.

Granted. Transferred to Court of Appeal, 1st Circuit to act.


text:
    LOUISIANA DISTRICT COUNCIL OF the ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, INC. v. VICTORY TEMPLE ASSEMBLY OF GOD. VICTORY TEMPLE ASSEMBLY OF GOD, Louisiana District Council of the Assembly of God, Inc., Present Members of Victory Temple Assembly of God v. Ralph ADAMS, Estelle Adams, Gloria Castanza, Barbara Swan and Victory Temple, Inc., an unincorporated association. The Reverend Ralph ADAMS and Victory Temple Assembly of God v. The Reverend Cecil Thomas JANWAY and Louisiana District Counsel of the Assemblies of God, Inc.
    No. 84-C-0495.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Ralph Adams, Estelle Adams, Gloria Castanza, Barbara Swan and Victory Temple, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, Nos. 5-268, 5-269, 5-270, from the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, Nos. 202-438, 214-013, 232-908.

Denied. Result correct.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.

LEMMON, J., recused.


text:
    Archie SAUCIER v. Drs. HOUSTON, ROY, FAUST & EWIN and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
    No. 84-CC-0496.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Archie Saucier, applying for supervisory writs to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. C-1894, and Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Div. “E”, No. 83-3165.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin BROWN.
    No. 84-K-0540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Calvin Brown, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 15856-KA; Parish of Caddo, First Judicial District Court, No. 121514.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    In re E.L. “Bubba” HENRY.
    No. 84-CC-0549.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Commission on Ethics For Public Employees, applying for writ of certiorari and review, Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CW-0831; Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, Nos. 82-05 and 82-41.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric B. ROBERSON.
    No. 84-K-0561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Eric B. Roberson, applying for writ of review, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. KA-0959, from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 292-728.

Denied.


text:
    Harold JOHNSTON d/b/a Johnston’s Community Grocery v. MOREHOUSE PARISH POLICE JURY, et al.
    No. 84-C-0578.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Harold Johnston, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 15,898-CA, from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Morehouse, No. 8334.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Wilford Leroy THOMPSON, Jr. v. COPOLYMER INTERNATIONAL, INC.
    No. 84-C-0604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd., applying for writ of certiorari, or review to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-0061, from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 225491.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    John MORRIS v. SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., et al.
    No. 84-C-0605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Phillips Petroleum Company, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-374; Parish of Cameron, Thirty-Eighth Judicial District Court, No. 7775.

Denied.

WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles FAULKNER.
    No. 84-KO-0607.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Charles Faulkner, applying for writ of certiorari to the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany, No. 96597; First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-KA-0772.

Denied


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry SAVOIE.
    No. 84-K-0609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Jerry Savoie, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-KA-0598, from the Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafourche, No. 122022.

Denied.


text:
    Gustave M. KAPLAN, Individually, and Sidney Kaplan, for the Estate of the Interdict Linda Kaplan v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and L.B. Crain.
    No. 84-C-0612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Gustave M. Kaplan, Individually, and Sidney Kaplan, for the Estate of the Interdict Linda Kaplan, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-343; Parish of Rapides, Ninth Judicial District Court, No. 123907, Division “F”.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William WILLIAMS, Jr.
    No. 84-K-0613.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re William Williams, Jr., applying for writ of review to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CR-83-730; 15th Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermillion, No. 22663.

Denied.


text:
    Okbay GELA v. Shaker HAMDAN and Asad Esmail Individually and d/b/a Shugs Grocery.
    No. 84-C-0624.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Shaker Hamdan and Asad Esmail, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0989, from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 82-8691.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Isaac E. SMITH.
    No. 84-K-0634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Isaac E. Smith, applying for writ of certiorari or review, to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CR-83-594, from the Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, No. 202601.

Denied.


text:
    James D. MACK v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, J.T. Howell, Monroe Nelson, Frank Selder, Jr. and the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-0645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re James D. Mack, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-0401, from the Parish of East Feliciana, Twentieth Judicial District Court, No. 18047.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Rudy Raymond RODRIGUEZ v. Cathy Ann Morvant RODRIGUEZ.
    No. 84-C-0646.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Cathy Ann Morvant Rodriguez, applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0580; Family Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 43871.

Denied.


text:
    Wilford Leroy THOMPSON, Jr. v. COPOLYMER INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.
    No. 84-C-0648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Marvin R. McCarty, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-0061, from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 225491.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Oris JOHNSON.
    No. 84-K-0649.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Oris Johnson, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-KA-0910; 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 11-82-6.

Denied. The result is correct.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David RAYMOND.
    No. 84-K-0655.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re David Raymond, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-KA-0999, from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 2-83-316.

Denied.


text:
    C & A TRACTOR COMPANY v. HOLLAND AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 84-C-0657.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re C & A Tractor Company, applying for writs of certiorari and review to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-321, Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles, No. 82-2019.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Darryl TERRANCE v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT SECTION “J”.
    No. 84-KH-0674.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Darryl Terrance, applying for remedial writ, to the Criminal District Court, Section “J”, Parish of Orleans, No. 275-363.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Harry COLE.
    No. 84-KK-0678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re State of Louisiana, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. K-2019, from the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, No. 299-773, Section “H”.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Danny BREWINGTON v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Through C. Paul PHELPS.
    No. 84-C-0687.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Louisiana Department of Corrections Through C. Paul Phelps, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to thé Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-632; Parish of Beauregard, Thirty-Sixth Judicial District Court, No. C-420-78.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Ronnie INSECO v. CAMBRIDGE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-0688.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Ronnie Inseco, applying for supervisory writs to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-608, from the Ninth Judicial District Court, for the Parish of Rap-ides, No. 122217.

Denied.


text:
    Alton J. KNIGHT, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of the Minor, Amy D. Knight v. Laura G. SAMUEL, et al. Alton J. KNIGHT, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of the Minor, Amy D. Knight v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE CO., et al.
    No. 84-C-0689.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Alton J. Knight, et al., applying for writ of. certiorari and/or review to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, Nos. 83-473 and 83-474; 30th Judicial District Court, Parish of Vernon, Nos. 34203 and 36160.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Larry N. DICKERSON v. BEGNAUD MOTORS, INC. and General Motors Corporation.
    No. 84-C-0690.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Larry N. Dickerson, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-479; Parish of Lafayette, Fifteenth Judicial District Court, No. 48-805148-H.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Ronnie INSECO v. CAMBRIDGE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-0698.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari, and supervisory writs to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-608, from the Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, No. 122217.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mamie Dalgo JUNEAU, et al. v. Carolyn Barr ALEXANDER, et al.
    No. 84-C-0699.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Mamie Dalgo Juneau, et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-459; 12th Judicial District Court, Parish of Avo-yelles, No. 82-3248.

Denied.


text:
    James B. EZELL v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
    No. 84-C-0700.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re James B. Ezell, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-521; 28th Judicial District Court, Parish of LaSalle, No. 17957.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Melvin BUJOL v. Honorable James F. McKAY, Judge, Criminal District Court, Orleans Parish, State of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-0706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 1984.
   In re Melvin Bujol, applying for writ of mandamus to the Criminal District Court, No. 202-129, Section “H”, Parish of Orleans.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William Gary MITCHELL.
    No. 84-KK-0821.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 1984.
   In re William Gary Mitchell, applying for supervisory writ and stay order to the Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Cata-houla, Nos. 82-1889 thru 82-1895, from the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. K-84-362.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Joseph SEPULVADO v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0925.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Joseph Sepulvado, applying for reconsideration of a denied writ of April 2, 1984, 447 So.2d 485, to the 11th Judicial District Court, Parish of DeSoto, No. 31349.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Claudia Ruth Newell DARBY, Individually and as Curatrix of Andrew Darby, III v. METHODIST HOSPITAL, ANESTHESIA EAST, INC., Anthony Lott, Dr. Paul Lea and Dr. Daniel E. Buras.
    No. 84-CC-0487.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Dr. Paul A. Lea, applying for reconsideration of writ denial of April 13, 1984, 448 So.2d 689, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. C-1977; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Division “E”, No. 83-6849.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Leroy SMITH v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-2324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Leroy Smith, applying for reconsideration of denied writ of February 10,1984, 445 So.2d 435, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 257-124.

Denied.


text:
    Marshall W. ANDERSON and Louise G. Anderson v. W.A. MC CARTY.
    No. 84-C-0568.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Marshall W. Anderson and Louise G. Anderson, applying for writ of review to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 15967-CA; Parish of Winn, Eight Judicial District Court, No. 24407.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William TANNER.
    No. 84-KK-0608.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re William Tanner, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, to the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, No. 12573-80, from Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. K 83-76.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Aaron MINTZ.
    No. 84-KK-0752.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Aaron Mintz, applying for writ of review to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 299-888, Section “G”; Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. K-1947.

Granted. Ruling of the court of appeal is reversed. Judgment of the trial court is reinstated.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William G. THOMPSON.
    No. 84-KH-0810.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re William G. Thompson, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus to the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, No. 2593-83, Parish of Calcasieu.

Granted. Application, transferred to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    ASCENSION SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION v. Carol Gueret, wife of/and Herbert J. CHAMPAGNE.
    No. 84-C-0741.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Carol Gueret, wife of/and Herbert J. Champagne, applying for writs of certio-rari and review to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-674, from the Twenty-ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. John the Baptist, No. 13790, Div. “A”.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    Albert Joseph HENRY v. ALLIED INDUSTRIAL SERVICE, INC., et al.
    No. 84-C-0742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
    Reconsideration Denied June 15, 1984.
   In re Albert Joseph Henry, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 83-CA-675, Parish of St. John the Baptist, Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court, No. 11561, Division “B”.

Not considered. Judgment is definitive. La.C.C.P. art. 2166.


text:
    Madalyn COCHRANE v. WINN DIXIE OF LOUISIANA, INC.
    No. 84-C-0766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
    Reconsideration Denied May 25, 1984.
   In re Madalyn Cochrane, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1311, from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 81-10880, Division “G”.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Augusta Leland, wife of George Evans BURGESS, Sr.
    No. 84-OC 0288.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re George E. Burgess, III, applying for supervisory and remedial writs to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1737, from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 520-822.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Augusta Leland, wife of George E. BURGESS, Sr. SUCCESSION OF George E. BURGESS, Sr.
    No. 84-CC-0297.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re George E. Burgess, Jr. and Mrs. Lenore W. Burgess, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or supervisory writs to the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Nos. 520-822 and 82-5808; Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. C-1775, CA-1737 and C-1816.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Augusta L. BURGESS. SUCCESSION OF George E. BURGESS, Sr.
    No. 84-CC-0328.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Michael W. Burgess, applying for supervisory writs, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, Nos. C-1775, CA-1737 and C-1816, to Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Nos. 520-822 and 82-5808.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Bruce E. CHOYCE v. Criminal District Court Magistrate Andrew J. SCIAMBRA for the State of Louisiana.
    No. 84-KH-0554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Bruce E. Choyce, applying for writ of execution of judgment to the Criminal District Court, No. 279-940, Parish of Orleans.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Darren HOOKS v. Hon. Matthew S. BRANIFF, Judge, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 84-KH-0577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Darren Hooks, applying for writ of mandamus to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 278-617.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie Moses ADAMS.
    No. 84-K-0627.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Willie Moses Adams, applying for writs of certiorari or review to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CR83-431, from the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, No. 8551-82.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sammy MILLER.
    No. 84-K-0633.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Sammy Miller, applying for writs of certiorari and review, to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-KA-0756, from the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa, No. 44181.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Linda HOWARD. STATE of Louisiana v. John HOWARD and Carl Hill.
    No. 84-K-0651.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Linda Howard, John Howard and Carl Hill, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, Nos. 83-KA-0866 and 83-KA-0796; 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 4-81-1092.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Karl J. ACOSTA.
    No. 84-K-0652.
    •Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Karl J. Acosta, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-KA-1056, from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 2-83-485, Section III.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clinton J. FARBER.
    No. 84-K-0654.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Clinton J. Farber, applying for cer-tiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-KA-0929; 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. lr83-949.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jessie James FREEMAN.
    No. 84-K-0667.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Jessie James Freeman, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CR 83-407, from the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline, No. 29452.

Denied.


text:
    Kenneth Lee RICHARD v. WEILL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. and Kenhar Industries, Ltd.
    No. 84-C-0680.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Kenneth Lee Richard, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-507; Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette, No. 82-4937.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Gladys A. SMITH, Natural TUTRIX of Gilbert M. SMITH, III v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Andrew Boisseau, Jerome Bondy, Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-0683.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1065; Civil District Court, No. 81-12914, Division “H”, Parish of Orleans.

Denied.


text:
    L.J. BROUSSARD v. James BOOTH, et al.
    No. 84-C-0685.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re L.J. Broussard, applying for writ of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-607, from the Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, No. 120-123.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Vincent PIZZITOLO, Jr. v. The KENNER MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD, et al.
    No. 84-C-0712.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Vincent Pizzitolo, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-582; 24th Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, No. 251-474, Division “I”.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Johanna Jackson, wife of Melvin WHITE, Sr., et al. v. Russell MILLER, et al.
    No. 84-C-0714.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Johanna Jackson, wife of Melvin White, Sr., et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 84-CA-634; 29th Judicial District Court, Parish of St.’ Charles, No. 25988.

Denied.


text:
    In the Interest of Rejeanne, Rhonda and Rondell WILLIAMS.
    No. 84-CK-0717.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Lucille Braud, wife of/and Eugene Braud, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-676, from the Twenty-Ninth Judicial District' Court, Parish of St. John the Baptist, No. J-1996, Division “A”.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terry DOOLEY and Stella White.
    No. 84-KK-0719.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Terry Dooley and Stella White, applying for writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. K-1901, from the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 299-572.

Denied.


text:
    LADEL, INC. v. Greg FOX, d/b/a Greg Fox Productions.
    No. 84-C-0726.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Greg Fox, d/b/a Greg Fox Productions, applying for writs of certiorari or review, to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 83-CA-425, from the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, No. 244-344.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David SIMPSON.
    No. 84-KK-0729.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re David Simpson, applying for writ of certiorari, review, prohibition and mandamus, to the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa, No. TR 62203; First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. KW 84/0387.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Felix A. PRICE.
    No. 84-KP-0735.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Felix A. Price, applying for writ of certiorari, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 269-823.

Denied.


text:
    Felicia L. FUKSMAN, Roslyn F. Morris, Roslyn F. Beth Hellman, Abbie E. Fuksman, and Fox Furniture Store, Inc. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, The City of New Orleans, and Mossy Motors, Inc.
    No. 84-C-0739.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Fox Furniture Store, Inc., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1203; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 83-6401.

Denied.


text:
    John R. TUSSON v. The HERO LAND COMPANY, Numa C. Hero, Numa C. Hero, Jr. and George A. Hero, Jr.
    No. 84-C-0753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re John R. Tusson, applying for writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0777, from the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Plaquemines, No. 14-366. '

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Patricia COURTNEY v. WINN DIXIE LOUISIANA, INC.
    No. 84-C-0755.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Patricia Courtney, applying for writ of certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 83-CA-578; Parish of Jefferson, Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, No. 256-969, Division “0”!

Denied.


text:
    Steven M. CROSS v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, Department of Safety and Permits and Board of Zoning Adjustments.
    No. 84-C-0767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Steven M. Cross, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0588, from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 822166.

Denied.


text:
    Gladys A. SMITH, Natural Tutrix of Gilbert M. SMITH, III v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Andrew Boisseau, Jerome Bondy and Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-0769.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Andrew Boisseau and Jerome Bon-dy, applying for writ of certiorari, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1065, from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 81-12914.

Denied.


author: CALOGERO, J.,

text:
    Glenn E. MAXWELL v. Darlene LEBLANC.
    No. 84-CD-0783.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Glenn E. Maxwell, applying for remedial writs, 29th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Charles, No. 12470.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J.,

concurs. Relator’s complaints concerning lack of notice of adoption proceedings should be directed toward an attack on the judgment in the adoption matter.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph V. FOSTER, Jr.
    No. 84-KH-0800.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Joseph Y. Foster, Jr., applying for writ of certiorari, to the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Livingston, Nos. 4646, 4647, 4648, 4649, 4650, 4708, and 4709; First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. KH84/0419.

Denied.


text:
    Dominic J. CARLONE v. Shirley B. CARLONE.
    No. 84-C-0531.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 1984.
   In re Dominic J. Carlone, applying for reconsideration of writ denied April 13, 1984, 448 So.2d 112, to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-0761 from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 550-179.

Reconsideration denied.