author: WENTWORTH, Judge.

text:
    Virginia L. ROBERTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. AQ-270.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 20, 1984.
    Keith J. Kinderman, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Lawrence A. Ka-den, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
   WENTWORTH, Judge.

Appellant seeks review of judgments of conviction and sentences upon four counts of grand theft, arguing that all evidence should have been suppressed as the product of an unlawful search. We find that the exclusionary rule does not apply in the circumstances of this case, and we therefore affirm the judgments and sentences appealed.

Appellant worked for the Florida State University Alumni Association, an organization in the Office of Alumni Affairs. A state-employed membership clerk in the Alumni Office testified that she had received several complaints from membership applicants and that she needed “to find out what was going on.” Appellant was in charge of processing such applications, and one day while appellant was away from her office the membership clerk, with the assistance of a co-employee, entered appellant’s locked desk and discovered incriminating documents. After another such entry several months later, ostensibly for the purpose of obtaining certain application forms, again revealed incriminating documents, a letter was sent to the state attorney’s office and a criminal investigation ensued which resulted in appellant’s arrest.

The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is “a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority,” Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921), and the exclusionary rule does not apply to private searches “not conducted for or stimulated by law enforcement officers.” U.S. v. Winbush, 428 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 918, 91 S.Ct. 179, 27 L.Ed.2d 157 (1970); accord, Bur-deau. In the present case the contested search was made by persons whose jobs and announced motives were unconnected with law enforcement purposes. Although these persons were governmental employees purportedly acting in furtherance of their employment duties, to the extent that their actions were unconnected with law enforcement purposes the exclusionary rule, intended to deter over-zealous law enforcement, should not apply. Cf, People v. Scott, 43 Cal.App.3d 723, 117 Cal.Rptr. 925 (1st DCA, division 3, 1974). As did the court in Scott, we expressly decline to extend the application of the exclusionary rule to “the large numbers of people employed by the federal, state and local governments in capacities entirely unrelated to any element of law enforcement.” We therefore conclude that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in the circumstances of the present case, and the trial court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress.

The judgments and sentences appealed are affirmed.

SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In the Interest of E.H., a minor, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Appellee.
    No. 82-1900.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 24, 1984.
    Sullivan, Admire & Sullivan, Coral Gables, and John G. Admire, Miami, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Bruce Bark-ett, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
    Before HENDRY and HUBBART and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a final order adjudicating a child dependent and awarding temporary custody of the child to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The natural mother prosecutes this appeal raising three alleged errors. We affirm.

First, the natural mother contends that Section 39.01(26), Florida Statutes (1981), under which her child was adjudicated dependent, is unconstitutional because it provides a facially vague standard as a basis for removing a child from a parent’s custody. We cannot agree. The above statute provides, in pertinent part, that a child is considered neglected “when a parent ... permits a child to live in an environment when such ... environment causes the child’s ... mental or emotional health ... to be in danger of being significantly impaired.” § 39.01(26), Fla.Stat. (1981). We think that, under the established Florida case law interpreting analogous statutes, the instant statute meets the minimal constitutional tests for definiteness in a non-penal statute. As the statute is clearly designed to protect children in need of care, and because circumstances warranting such protection arise in such a variety of ways, the legislature was not required, as urged, to state explicitly all activities or actions by parents which could result in a finding of child neglect. The statute, we think, gives sufficient notice to parents of the type of activity they must avoid to preclude such a finding. State v. Joyce, 361 So.2d 406 (Fla.1978); In Re Camm, 294 So.2d 318 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 866, 95 S.Ct. 121, 42 L.Ed.2d 103 (1974); see also D’Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 164 (Fla.1977).

Second, the natural mother contends that certain testimony given at the hearing below by a psychiatrist concerning the latter’s examination of the natural mother was erroneously admitted in evidence over objection. We cannot agree. Plainly, the testimony was not excludable as falling within the psychotherapist-patient privilege [§ 90.503, Fla.Stat. (1981)] because such privilege is by statute specifically abrogated in cases, as here, “involving known or suspected child abuse or neglect.” § 827.07(8), Fla.Stat. (1981). Contrary to the natural mother’s contention, we think this statute by its express language applies to Chapter 39 child neglect proceedings, as the statute is made applicable to “any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect.” § 827.07(8), Fla. Stat. (1981). Beyond that, we are unable to say, as urged, that the psychiatric examination conducted herein violated the natural mother’s self-incrimination rights under Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.190(f), 8.220(c). These rules apply only to testimony given by a parent or guardian at certain court hearings, not to answers given by a parent or guardian during a psychiatric examination.

Finally, the natural mother contends that the evidence presented below was insufficient to sustain a finding of child neglect. We cannot agree. Without detailing the evidence presented, we think it more than sufficient to sustain the order under review. Interest of J.L.P., 416 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

Affirmed.


author: BASKIN, Judge.

text:
    B.P., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-172.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 24, 1984.

      Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Howard K. Blumberg, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Jack B. Ludin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
    Before BASKIN, FERGUSON and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
   BASKIN, Judge.

We affirm the lower court’s order adjudicating appellant delinquent for projecting a deadly missile and for committing criminal mischief by shooting a BB gun in the direction of a neighbor’s apartment, causing damage to both the sliding glass door and screen enclosure of the bedroom.

Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1981), provides:

Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles. — Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied, or public or private bus or any train, locomotive, railway car, caboose, cable railway car, street railway car, monorail car, or vehicle of any kind which is being used or occupied by any person, or any boat, vessel, ship, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through the airspace of this state shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

We hold that the conduct of B.P., a juvenile, was prohibited by law. See Depasquale v. State, 438 So.2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).

Affirmed.


text:
    SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY and Kevin Dowling, Appellants, v. Dwight BARNES, Appellee.
    No. 83-1593.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 24, 1984.

      Shutts & Bowen and John T. Kolinski and Sally M. Richardson, Miami, for appellants.
    duFresne & Bradley and Amy Lehman and Elizabeth duFresne, Miami, for appel-lee.
    Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We find that publication of slander can occur in intra-corporation communications. See: Glynn v. City of Kissimmee, 383 So.2d 774 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Drennen v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 328 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Arison Shipping Company v. Smith, 311 So.2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Restatement 2d of Torts, § 596. We do not read Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 432 So.2d 1323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) to prohibit such a finding. We also find no error in this case in submitting the question of qualified privilege to a jury. Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Copeland, 51 So.2d 789 (Fla.1951); Abraham v. Baldwin, 52 Fla. 151, 42 So. 591 (1906); Riggs v. Cain, 406 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 3th DCA 1981); Lewis v. Evans, 406 So.2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

Therefore the final judgment on the jury verdict be and the same is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.


text:
    The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jules SPENCER, Appellee.
    No. 83-2064.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 24, 1984.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Penny H. Brill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
    Gregory A. Prebish, Miami, for appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARK-DULL and HUBBART, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

The order dismissing the information in this cause is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The sole basis for the dismissal of the information herein was that the defendant Jules Spencer had been unlawfully arrested by the police without probable cause. Even if this be true, and we express no opinion thereon, the law is well-settled that an indictment or information may not be dismissed by a trial court on the ground that the police unlawfully arrested the defendant based on no probable cause. This being so, we have no alternative but to reverse the order of dismissal under review. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 68 (1975); State v. Schroeder, 112 So.2d 257, 261 (Fla.1959); State v. Colquitt, 411 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); State v. Brooks, 388 So.2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); State v. Mach, 187 So.2d 918, 922-23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).

Reversed and remanded.


author: SCHOONOVER, Judge.

text:
    James GIDDENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-53.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Jan. 25, 1984.
    Dennis J. Rehak, Fort Myers, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Diane Barrs, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
   SCHOONOVER, Judge.

The appellant, James Albert Giddens, has appealed the judgment and sentence entered against him pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of methaqualone in violation of section 893.-13(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1981). We agree with the appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and accordingly reverse.

This case arose out of the execution of a search warrant by officers of the Fort Myers Police Department in cooperation with deputies from the Lee County Sheriffs Department. At the time the warrant was executed, seven or eight people were present in the residence. The appellant and two other males were sitting in the living room, the appellant’s wife was in the southwest bedroom, and the others were scattered throughout the house. During the execution of the warrant, it was ascertained that the appellant claimed to live in the middle bedroom. Women’s clothing was discovered in the southwest bedroom.

The search resulted in the seizure of seven methaqualone tablets which had been concealed under a bathtub, ninety-six methaqualone tablets found outside the residence under a pushed out screen of the southwest bedroom window, and three plastic baggies of cannabis concealed in a box located in a storage room. Three sets of scales, one containing cannabis residue, were also seized.

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of methaqualone and with unlawful sale or delivery of cannabis. At the conclusion of the state’s case in chief, the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on the charge of unlawful sale or delivery of cannabis. The jury found the appellant guilty of unlawful possession of methaqua-lone. He was subsequently adjudged guilty and sentenced to serve five years in state prison and pay a $5000 fine. This appeal timely followed.

Since the appellant did not physically possess the methaqualone, the propriety of his conviction must be considered upon the basis of constructive possession. Constructive possession exists when a person has knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance on his premises and has the ability to maintain control over it. Hall v. State, 382 So.2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Frank v. State, 199 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967).

If the premises on which a controlled substance is found is in the exclusive possession and control of the accused, knowledge of the presence of that controlled substance on the premises coupled with the ability to maintain control over it may be inferred. Frank.

However, if the premises on which the controlled substance is found is not in the exclusive but in the joint possession of the accused, knowledge of the presence of the substance and the ability to maintain control over it will not be inferred, but must be established by proof. Such proof may consist either of evidence establishing actual knowledge by the accused, or evidence of incriminating statements and circumstances from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge. Frank.

In the case sub judice, the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove exclusive possession of the premises by the appellant, and accordingly, knowledge and ability to maintain control cannot be inferred.

The fact that an accused has been or is present in a place where a controlled substance is found, is not sufficient proof that he is in possession of the drug where he is not in exclusive possession of the place. Arant v. State, 256 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972).

Although there was evidence that the appellant occupied the residence and slept in the middle bedroom, there was also evidence that a woman resided in the house. In addition, at the time the search warrant was executed, there were several other people present in the residence. The meth-aqualone found were not in plain view nor were they in the room the state proved was occupied by the appellant.

Therefore, since the state did not prove the premises were in the exclusive possession of the appellant and failed to present other evidence sufficient to establish actual knowledge by the appellant, or evidence of incriminating statements and circumstances from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge of the drugs on the premises, the court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to discharge the appellant on this charge.

RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.


author: MILLS, Judge.

text:
    Tyrone WIGGINS, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Ben C. WILLIS, Circuit Judge, Second Judicial Circuit, In and For GADSDEN COUNTY, Respondent.
    No. AW-194.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 20, 1984.
    Michael Allen, Public Defender, P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Andrew Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
   MILLS, Judge.

Wiggins petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition, contending that he is entitled to be discharged because he was not brought to trial within 180 days of his arrest as required by Rule 3.191(a)(1), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We agree and grant the petition.

On 7 September 1982, Wiggins was arrested for attempted armed robbery. He was subsequently released on bond, and arraignment was set for 18 October 1982. Wiggins failed to appear for arraignment, however, and the trial court ordered that a capias be issued. For some unknown reason, no capias was issued until 13 September 1983, almost a year after the arraignment date. Subsequently, Wiggins filed a motion for discharge, contending that any attempt to bring him to trial would violate his right to a speedy trial.

At the hearing on this motion, L.R. Evans, Wiggins’ bondsman, testified that he had received notice prior to 18 October 1982 that Wiggins was to be in court on that date. Evans telephoned what he thought was Wiggins’ home and left word with some unidentified person that Wiggins was to appear for arraignment on 18 October. However, Wiggins testified that he was never notified of his arraignment date.

The State contends that Wiggins had constructive notice of his arraignment date by virtue of the notice to Evans. We disagree with that contention and'adopt the reasoning of the majority opinion in State v. Collie, 390 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Thus, Wiggins was not “unavailable for trial” within the meaning of Rule 3.191(e), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and he was therefore entitled to be tried on the offense charged within 180 days of his arrest.

The petition is granted and the trial court is instructed to discharge Wiggins.

THOMPSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.


author: DIXON, Chief Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie Lawrence CELESTINE.
    No. 83-KA-0916.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1984.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Nathan Stansbury, Dist. Atty., Michael Harson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Robin Rhodes, Don Landry, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appel-lee.
    David Clarke, Lafayette, for defendant-appellant.
   DIXON, Chief Justice.

On September 23, 1981 a Lafayette Parish grand jury indicted defendant Willie Lawrence Celestine for the first degree murder of Marcelianne Richard, eighty-one years old, in violation of R.S. 14:30. Following the guilt phase of his bifurcated trial, the jury unanimously found defendant guilty as charged. After the sentencing phase, the jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, finding that three aggravating circumstances existed: the victim had been killed during the commission of an aggravated rape; the defendant had previously been convicted of an unrelated aggravated rape; and the offense had been committed in an especially cruel manner. Subsequently, the trial judge sentenced defendant to death. On appeal to this court, Celestine designates five assignments of error. After considering the oral and written arguments of the parties and the evidence on the record, we affirm Celestine’s conviction and sentence.

The facts reveal that on September 13, 1981 the Lafayette City Police Department obtained an arrest warrant for Celestine for the aggravated burglary of a house the previous weekend. Celestine was found at the home of his parents that afternoon. That same evening he waived his rights and gave a taped statement to the police. In the statement, he admitted breaking into three different homes in the Lafayette area and to forcing women on each of those occasions to engage in sexual intercourse with him. As to the crime against Mrs. Richard, he relates in the statement how he had been out all night drinking and taking “speed.” Early that morning a friend dropped him off near his house, and he began to walk until he saw a light on in the house of Mrs. Richard whom he claimed not to know. He said he entered through the bathroom window and found Mrs. Richard sitting in the living room. He then put his hand over her mouth, and, after a struggle, “had sex” with her on her bedroom floor. He remembered how she had tried to get to the telephone, knocking it off the hook. He then stated he left through the back door, went home, and slept until the police arrived that afternoon.

On that same morning of September 13, 1981 Mrs. Richard was preparing to visit her sisters. Her friend, Arthur Boulet, called her at 5:30 a.m. to see if she was ready for the trip. Later, at about 6:55 a.m., Boulet, accompanied by his wife and a cousin, drove by Mrs. Richard’s home to pick her up. No one answered the front door. Finding the back door open, they entered the house and discovered Mrs. Richard’s body lying on the floor of her bedroom. Boulet testified that there was no sign of breathing, that she was without undergarments, that her face was bruised, and that there was bleeding from the nose.

A police officer who .investigated the scene substantiated Boulet’s testimony and described Mrs. Richard’s face as very much disfigured. The investigating pathologist testified that Mrs. Richard died of strangulation. The hialate bone in her neck was broken. To fracture this bone, he testified, required a blow of “tremendous force.” He found considerable bruising of the face and neck as well as seven broken ribs. He also found evidence of recent sexual intercourse.

In addition to an edited version of the taped statement (references to the other crimes were deleted), the state introduced a palm print found in Mrs. Richard’s bathroom. An expert compared it to Celes-tine’s and found them identical, finding twenty-five points of similarity. Examination and comparison of defendant’s seminal fluid and that found near Mrs. Richard’s body indicated that the offender and Celes-tine had similar blood groupings.

Although Celestine claimed not to know Mrs. Richard, he lived one block away with his parents. At the time of the crime, he was twenty-five years old.

The defense attempted to suggest that the confession had been coerced, that the palm prints were suspect, and that defendant was intoxicated to such an extent that it precluded his forming the requisite specific intent to have actively desired either the victim’s death or to have inflicted great bodily harm. The defendant did not testify at the trial or at the sentencing hearing.

Celestine’s mother testified that he had had six beers before going out on Friday evening at 10:00 p.m. She did not see him until daybreak the next morning. She stated she saw no evidence of tearing or blood on his clothing. Both she and her husband testified that Celestine was difficult to wake up when the police arrived to arrest him at about 5:30 p.m. that evening.

Other friends testified that he had been drinking. The witness to see him last, however, at 3:30 a.m. on the morning of the crime, could not say whether he had been drinking. Defendant, in his statement, said, “I mean that I really didn’t mean to do it. Like I said I was full of speed you know and (?) and drinking you know and I just caught myself doing the wrong thing. I don’t know what I was thinking about at the time. I was all high.” The jury heard this in the edited tape introduced at trial.

Assignment of Error No. 1

By this assignment Celestine argues that a Mrs. Holmes was improperly excused for cause at the insistence of the state, thereby tainting his jury and violating his right to due process under the principles announced in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).

The Supreme Court in Witherspoon, supra at 522, held that “a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Under Witherspoon, only a juror who would automatically vote against the death penalty may be excluded for cause. Id. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21. “The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings.” Id. See also C.Cr.P. 798; State v. Jordan, 420 So.2d 420, 423 (La.1982).

We find that Mrs. Holmes clearly stated that she was irrevocably committed to vote against the death penalty and that she expressed much more than general objections or religious scruples against its imposition. For example, she stated to the prosecutor, “I don’t feel like I could vote for the death penalty.” Her lifelong beliefs would prevent her from imposing the penalty, she said, no matter what the facts and circumstances of the case showed. Defense counsel inquired whether she would:

“... consider all of the laws ... both penalties, including the death penalty in arriving at your decision?
No, sir. I don’t think so. I don’t think I could.”

Later, the prosecutor asked:

“... would you be able to accept that instruction by the Court and consider the imposition of the death penalty?
No, sir.”

Near the end of the questioning, the prosecutor asked whether she would:

“... just more or less disregard entirely the death penalty as a possible penalty? And you could not under any circumstances come back with a recommendation of death in the case, regardless of what the facts and circumstances are which are brought out?”
That’s right.”

Although she did reply affirmatively to several general questions as to her ability to consider the law as told to her by the judge, she nevertheless consistently stated that she could not vote for the death penalty whenever it was specifically mentioned in a question.

This assignment is without merit.

Assignment of Error No. 2

This assignment was neither briefed nor argued; hence it would normally be considered abandoned. However, this court will review all assignments of error in cases where the death penalty has been imposed. State v. Narcisse, 426 So.2d 118, 131 (La.1983). By this assignment Celes-tine argues that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse a Mrs. Broussard for cause at his request, forcing him to use one of his peremptory challenges.

Since Celestine exhausted his peremptory challenges by the time the jury was completed, he has the right to complain of the trial court’s ruling. C.Cr.P. 800; State v. Edwards, 406 So.2d 1331, 1345 (La.1981). However, to be successful, he must show that the trial court abused its broad discretion in an arbitrary and unreasonable way. State v. Edwards, supra.

During voir dire, Mrs. Broussard disclosed that she was a good friend of the victim’s granddaughter. She also stated she knew the prosecutor who had represented her father on occasion. She stated several times that she would try to be fair, however, and said that she would try to do her “civic duty.” The court asked her if it would embarrass her to face either the prosecutor or the victim’s granddaughter in the event of a not guilty verdict. She replied that it would not. She concluded her interrogation with the following statement: “Well, the way I feel, if he’s right, I would vote him right, but if he done wrong, I would vote him wrong.” When defense counsel challenged for cause, the trial judge denied, stating:

“... from my interrogation of her, I can find no reason why she can’t serve. In other words, it’s very hard to find a perfect juror. But one who is candid I would trust a lot more than one who would not tell you. I think she has made a complete disclosure. I will deny the motion.”

Upon review of Mrs. Broussard’s entire examination, we agree with the trial judge and find no abuse of his broad discretion in denying the motion.

This assignment is without merit.

Assignment of Error No. 3

By this assignment Celestine argues that a vial of blood, allegedly taken from him, was improperly admitted into evidence because the state failed to show a proper chain of custody. In particular, he argues that the doctor who extracted the blood should have testified.

The state relies on State v. Godeaux, 378 So.2d 941 (La.1979), in contending that it proved by a preponderance of evidence that the vial of blood was that taken from the defendant. Defendant counters that this preponderance of the evidence rule should apply only to “ordinary” demonstrative evidence and that a higher standard of proof should be required for blood extracted from a defendant.

At trial two police officers testified who were present when the doctor extracted the blood from the defendant. One officer stated that the blood was drawn and handed directly to him. He then placed it in a container, marked it with his signature, placed it in a refrigerator at his office, and later personally delivered it to a chemist at the crime lab. He recognized his signature and handwriting on the container.

The chemist at the crime lab testified that he received the vial from the officer. He identified the vial by its unique crime lab number. Following his analysis, he testified that he turned the vial over to the custodian of evidence at Lafayette Police headquarters. The custodian testified that he put the vial in the evidence room where it remained until he delivered it to court on the day he testified. The seal was unbro'ken.

We find that the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the admissibility of the vial of blood in this case. This assignment is thus without merit.

Assignment of Error No. ⅛

By this assignment Celestine argues that the court erred in permitting the jury to view pictures of the victim taken at the scene of the crime.

The pictures had been properly admitted into evidence following the testimony of the officer who took them. No objection was made by defense counsel. The photographs were in color and depicted the victim’s house, the interior of various rooms in the house, and the position of Mrs. Richard on her bedroom floor. After further testimony, the state rested. Defense counsel called his first witness, Celestine’s father. He was sworn, but before any questions were put to him, the prosecutor asked the court for permission to “re-open” the state’s case for the purpose of allowing the jury to view the previously introduced photographs. Over defense objection, the court permitted the jury to view the photographs. The defense then began its questioning of Mr. Celestine.

Under C.Cr.P. 765(5) the trial court is granted discretion to permit the introduction of additional evidence prior to argument. See State v. Bonanno, 373 So.2d 1284, 1293 (La.1979). There is no reason that the court cannot allow the jury to see previously introduced evidence at any time prior to argument. We find no abuse of that discretion in this case. The state had apparently rested only minutes before, and no questions had yet been put to the defense’s first witness. Under these circumstances, we find that no prejudice tp the defendant resulted.

This assignment is without merit.

Assignment of Error No. 5

By this assignment Celestine complains that it was error to play an edited version of his taped confession rather than the entire tape. He argues that the jury was presented a “distorted and out-of-context picture of the evidence.” He does not argue, nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest it, that his confession was coerced or involuntary.

In his taped statement, Celestine confessed to three different rapes. The state proposed either to edit the tape or to introduce a transcription of that portion of the tape relevant to the murder of Mrs. Richard. The trial court offered defendant the choice to play the entire tape or an edited version. He chose the latter. Significantly, Celes-tine's exculpatory claim that he was so high he did not know what he was doing was left in the edited tape.

This court has consistently held that “when a statement refers to other crimes, a defendant has the option of having only that portion of the statement which pertains to the instant offense submitted as evidence or having the whole statement introduced.” State v. Sonnier, 379 So.2d 1336, 1355 n. 7 (La.1979). See also State v. Snedecor, 294 So.2d 207, 210 (La.1974). Defense counsel in this case clearly chose the alternative which did the least prejudice to his client. We find no error in the playing of the edited tape.

This assignment is also without merit.

Death Sentence Review

Pursuant to C.Cr.P. 905.9, this court reviews every sentence of death in this state to determine if it is constitutionally excessive. In making this determination, the law requires that the court consider whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors, whether the evidence supports the jury’s findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.

The uniform capital sentence report submitted by the trial judge reveals that Celes-tine is a black male who was twenty-five years old at the time of the crime. He was unmarried and had fathered a child, but had not contributed to its support. His parents owned their own home. His father is a carpenter, and his mother is a domestic. In his teen years his behavior and grades steadily deteriorated. He dropped out of school at age sixteen. His juvenile record reveals five convictions for theft, possession of stolen property, disturbing the peace, burglary and theft of auto. As a result, he spent some eight months at the Louisiana Training Institute. In 1975 he joined the Army. He was dishonorably discharged in 1979 for, according to Celes-tine, disobeying orders. Thereafter, he worked as a carpenter’s helper with his father, earning $5.00 an hour. As an adult, he was convicted in 1980 for disturbing the peace by intoxication, and he had two convictions for the aggravated rapes which occurred prior to the rape and murder of Mrs. Richard.

Psychological tests at LTI in 1973 indicated a non-verbal IQ score of 81 and a verbal IQ score of 69. Psychiatric evaluation following his conviction for murder showed an ability to distinguish right from wrong, an ability to adhere to the right, and the ability to assist counsel. His intelligence level was determined to be in the medium range, with an IQ of 77.

The victim lived in his neighborhood; however, defendant claimed not to know her. She was eighty-one years old and had been strangled and beaten during the commission of an aggravated rape.

Passion, Prejudice and Arbitrary Factors

Defendant has made no contention that his sentence was the result of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors. Although he is black and Mrs. Richard was an elderly white woman, the record does not reveal any evidence that indicates his sentence was a result of racial prejudice. Several blacks served on the jury. The record presents no reason to question the jury verdict based on any of these factors.

Aggravating Circumstances

The jury found three aggravating circumstances: the offense was committed in an especially cruel manner; it was committed during an aggravated rape; and the defendant had been previously convicted of an aggravated rape.

The verdict stated that the offense was committed in an especially cruel manner. The evidence supports this finding. Even if it did not, the deficiency would not constitute reversible error. The lack of evidence as to one statutory aggravating circumstance does not invalidate the death sentence when other aggravating circumstances found by the jury are supported by the evidence. State v. Narcisse, supra at 138; accord, Zant v. Stephens, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). Accordingly, if the evidence supports either one of the aggravating circumstances, then it is unnecessary to consider either the sufficiency of the evidence on this issue or whether the language chosen by the jury would be sufficient for the purposes of C.Cr.P. 905.4(g). See State v. Mattheson, 407 So.2d 1150, 1168 (La. 1981); C.Cr.P. 905.3.

In this case the record clearly shows that Celestine murdered Mrs. Richard in the course of committing an aggravated rape. In his statement he admitted that he entered her home, that he struggled with her, and that he had sex with her. The autopsy findings established the presence of motile spermatazoa in her vaginal tract indicating recent sexual intercourse. The seminal fluid found near Mrs. Richard was compatible with that of Celestine. The testimony and photographs corroborate the sexual nature of the attack and that the victim resisted to the utmost but was overcome by force, satisfying the requirements for aggravated rape under R.S. 14:42. The evidence amply supports the jury finding as to this aggravating circumstance.

Defendant’s prior conviction of aggravated rape was also clearly established, but the record does not reflect that the conviction was final. However, proof that the murder was committed in the course of an aggravated rape is sufficient to support the death penalty.

Proportionality

The sentence review memorandum submitted by the state and concurred in by the defendant shows that there have been eight other first degree murder prosecutions in the Fifteenth Judicial District. Of these eight cases, four have resulted in the death penalty. In those which resulted in life imprisonment, one (Aucoin) involved a mentally disturbed defendant. The other three (Thibeaux, Francis and Thibodeaux) can all be classified as “heat of passion” killings involving, respectively, a thirty-nine year old mother of four for the shooting death of her husband, a man who began shooting when he saw a former girl friend dancing with another man, and a man who shot another man in a pool hall following an argument.

Those cases, however, in which the death penalty was imposed share several characteristics with the present case. The victims in Fuller, Narcisse and Glass were elderly and were attacked in their homes. The murders were committed during an armed robbery. In Watson, the victim was young, and she was the victim of a rape. She was kidnapped and forced to drive to an isolated area, where she was raped anally and vaginally, robbed, then shot in the head from behind.

Considering both the crime and the defendant, the death sentence is not disproportionate to similar cases involving the murder of elderly victims in their homes during the commission of an enumerated felony. In particular, it is not disproportionate with State v. Narcisse, supra, the only one of the four to be finally affirmed as of this date by this court. The jury in this case did not act arbitrarily in comparison with other juries in similar cases recommending the death penalty.

The conviction and sentence are affirmed.

      . Defense counsel did object to the photographs after the jury had left to deliberate as being inflammatory and having no probative value in light of the testimony describing the scene. Even though we are not called on specifically to review this issue, we nevertheless find any objection on this basis meritless. A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of such photographs will be disturbed only if their prejudicial effect clearly outweighs their probative value. State v. Germain, 433 So.2d 110, 118-19 (La. 1983). Such photographs are generally admissible to prove a corpus delicti, to corroborate other evidence, to establish a cause of death, to establish the identity of the victim, or to establish the number and severity of the wounds. State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158, 169 (La.1983). We find no error in the trial court's ruling.

      . The statement was made after full advisement and waiver of his rights. Celestine said so in the tape, and he signed a waiver form which is in the record. At trial defense counsel was relegated to asking suggestive questions to police officers on cross-examination, such as, "You didn’t threaten to break his arm if he didn't make a statement?” Several officers testified, none of them raising even a hint of coercion. In light of the absence of evidence by the defense on this issue, the lack of any defense objection, and the affirmative evidence presented by the state that the confession was given voluntarily and without coercion, there is no doubt that the state carried its burden in showing that Celestine’s custodial interrogation and the statement it produced was in full compliance with Miranda. C.Cr.P. 703(C); State v. Narcisse, 426 So.2d 118, 125 (La.1983).

      . State v. Aucoin, 362 So.2d 503 (La.1978); State v. Thibeaux, 366 So.2d 1314 (La.1978) (reversed due to the trial court’s ruling which limited the amount of evidence of prior physical abuse; case is still pending below); State v. Francis, 403 So.2d 680 (La.1981); State v. Thibodeaux, 383 So.2d 1264 (La. 1980) (life imprisonment affirmed per curiam); State v. Narcisse, 426 So.2d 118 (La. 1983); State v. Watson, 423 So.2d 1130 (La. 1982) (death penalty vacated due to improper jury instruction; upon resentencing death penalty was again recommended and the case is now pending before this court, No. 81-KA-2227); State v. Fuller, (presently on appeal to this court, No. 83-KA-0619); State v. Glass (presently on appeal to this court, No. 83-KA-1735).

      . Narcisse, Watson, Fuller and Glass.


author: DENNIS, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Angelo TROSCLAIR, III.
    No. 82-KA-2014.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1984.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., William R. Campbell, Beryl McSmith, Bridget Bane, Judith Lombar-dino, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appel-lee.
    Servando C. Garcia, III, Frank J. Uddo, Basile J. Uddo, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

       Calogero and Lemmon, JJ., would grant a rehearing.

   DENNIS, Justice.

Defendant, Angelo Trosclair, III, was convicted following a bench trial of two counts of bribery of sports participants in violation of La.R.S. 14:118.1 and sentenced to four years at hard labor on each count. The sentences were suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation for five years under the terms and conditions set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 895. As a special condition of probation, defendant was ordered to serve ninety days in the parish prison and to pay a fine of twenty-five hundred dollars. Defendant appeals his conviction, and raises important questions of statutory and constitutional law.

On May 28, 1981, defendant was indicted in the Parish of Orleans for two counts of bribery of a sports participant. The grand jury accused defendant of offering and giving L.J. Durousseau, a jockey who rode in the fourth race at the Fairgrounds Racetrack on February 14, 1981, three hundred dollars with the intent to influence Durous-seau’s performance that day. The grand jury also accused defendant of giving another jockey who rode in the fourth race, Curtis Hale, six hundred dollars in exchange for Hale’s promise not to finish first, second or third in that race.

The District Attorney of Orleans Parish sought the indictment after Messrs. Hale and Durousseau testified at an eviction proceeding instituted by the Fairgrounds Corporation against Mr. Larry Solow, an alleged gambler. During the civil inquiry and again at the criminal trial, Durousseau testified that he was approached by defendant at some point between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on February 14, 1981 while he was in the kitchen at the Racetrack. At this time defendant allegedly asked Du-rousseau to “take hold” of his mount in the fourth race. Durousseau testified that he agreed to stop his horse from running to win if defendant would pay him three hundred dollars. According to this witness, the money was given to him by the defendant several hours later while the two men were preparing for the race.

Curtis Hale testified that while he was sitting in the jockey’s room prior to the fourth race defendant approached him, said “do you know what to do,” and handed him a wad of one hundred dollar bills. Then, according to Hale, defendant warned him that the people supplying the money were dangerous and that he should not finish first, second or third. Hale further testified that he was aware of the danger as he had been accosted on the eve of the race by several unknown men who warned that a first, second or third place finish in the fourth race would result in him never touching another horse.

Assignments of Error Numbers One, Two and Three

Through his first and second assignments of error defendant argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion in arrest of judgment which was based on grounds that defendant was not advised of and did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to trial by jury. In his third assignment defendant argues that the trial court erred in cutting short the hearing on his motion in arrest of judgment.

In our opinion, the statement by defendant’s attorney during a pretrial hearing that he planned to waive trial by jury, the minute entry showing such a waiver in defendant’s presence in open court on the day of trial, and the defense counsel’s testimony at the motion in arrest of judgment hearing that the defendant had been advised of his right to a jury trial, collectively, constitute adequate proof that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a trial by jury. See, State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304 (La.1978); State v. Muller, 351 So.2d 143 (La.1977); State v. McCarroll, 337 So.2d 475 (La.1976).

The trial court fell into error, however, when it terminated the motion in arrest of judgment hearing without permitting the defendant to attempt rebuttal of the state’s prima facie showing of a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to jury trial. Accordingly, we will provisionally reject defendant’s assignment of error and affirm his conviction, but we will remand the case for completion of the hearing, instruct the trial court to rule anew on the motion, and preserve the parties’ rights to a further appeal from the ruling.

Assignment of Error Number Four

Through assignment of error number four defendant challenges four rulings by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge committed reversible error in each instance. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that defendant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit.

A. Denial of Motion for Production of Grand Jury Testimony

Defendant moved pretrial for production and inspection of testimony of certain witnesses before the grand jury which indicted him. After a pretrial hearing, the trial court overruled the motion. At the hearing the defendant’s attorney gave his reasons for the request to inspect the grand jury testimony: Certain witnesses may have perjured themselves before the grand jury; certain witnesses, some of whom were known to the defense counsel, may have given testimony favorable to the defendant before the grand jury. However, in his motion and argument, the defense counsel gave no specific facts to show the court that there was reason to believe these assertions.

It is a long established policy that the secrecy of grand jury proceedings should be carefully maintained. Many reasons for this have been stated. Secrecy helps to prevent the escape of prospective indictees by providing no forewarning to them of the investigation in progress; it insures that the grand jury investigation can proceed freely by protecting the grand jurors from outside influences and threats of reprisal; it serves to prevent the subornation of perjury and tampering of witnesses by targets of the investigation; it promotes free and open disclosure of information by witnesses without fear of retaliation; and finally, it acts as a shield by protecting innocent people under investigation from the injury to their reputations that could be caused by the disclosure of baseless accusations. However, the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is not absolute. The Supreme Court has stated that “in some situations, justice may demand that discrete portions of transcripts be made available for use in subsequent proceedings.” Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 at 219-20, 99 S.Ct. 1667 at 1673, 60 L.Ed.2d 156. 8 Moore’s Federal Practice § 6.05.

Thus, Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 434 generally prohibits members of the grand jury and others present from divulging the testimony and other matters oceuring during meetings but permits disclosure of grand jury materials in several situations: First, after the indictment, members of the grand jury and other persons present may reveal statutory irregularities in grand jury proceedings to defense counsel, the attorney general, the district attorney or the court; second, a court may direct disclosure of testimony given before the grand jury to show that a witness committed perjury in his testimony before the grand jury; third, attorneys for the state and for a person under investigation or indicted, are permitted access to witnesses for the purpose of discussing their testimony before the grand jury without court permission.

The difficulty encountered by the courts has been that on one hand, there is a strong public policy in favor of maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, while on the other hand, there is a strong policy in favor of openness in civil, as well as criminal, discovery and grand jury transcripts often provide “a storehouse of relevant fact.” Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 1851, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966). Thus, the courts have been forced to strike a balance between these two competing forces.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that the indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings must not be broken except where there is a compelling necessity. While there may be instances in which a party’s need for grand jury materials outweighs the need for continued secrecy, that need must be demonstrated “with particularity”. That is, the party seeking disclosure must prove that without access to the grand jury materials the party’s case would be “greatly prejudiced” or that an “injustice would be done.” Furthermore, a general wholesale request for transcripts does not satisfy the requirement of demonstrative particularized need. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958). The Louisiana Supreme Court has followed basically the same approach in determining whether to permit discovery of grand jury transcripts. State v. Ates, 418 So.2d 1326 (La.1982); State v. Peters, 406 So.2d 189 (La.1981); State v. Martin, 376 So.2d 300 (La.1979).

The court must balance the continuing need for secrecy and the particularized need for disclosure in arriving at its determination. The party seeking disclosure has the burden of proving that the need for disclosure outweighs the continuing need for secrecy. If disclosure is permitted, it must be closely confined to the limited portion of the material for which there is particularized need. In any event, disclosure is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. See Douglas Oil Company v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979).

A general claim such as that made by Trosclair that disclosure of grand jury transcripts would reveal exculpatory evidence or evidence of perjury is usually not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a showing of particularized need. See United States v. Short, 671 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1982). While the grand jury proceedings had been completed at the time of defendant’s requested disclosure, there is always a continuing need for secrecy to promote free and open disclosure of information by witnesses before future grand juries without fear of retaliation. Because defendant failed to allege any specific facts showing that he would be greatly prejudiced or that an injustice would be done without disclosure, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the defendant failed to prove a particularized need of disclosure which outweighed the need for secrecy and in disallowing disclosure.

B. Refusal to Permit Impeachment Through Evidence of Past Disciplinary Action Taken Against State Witnesses by Racing Officials.

Defendant appeals the trial judge’s refusal to permit defense counsel to impeach Durousseau and Hale with their records as jockeys. The trial judge sustained the State’s objection to defense counsel’s attempt to use evidence of fines, suspensions and disbarments to impeach the credibility of these witnesses.

Defense counsel argues on appeal that questioning these witnesses about their racing records was proper impeachment of their credibility, La.R.S. 15:490, and that the trial judge’s refusal to permit this line of questioning constitutes reversible error. Counsel further argues that he has a statutory right to expose the witnesses’ possible bias, interest or corruption, La.R.S. 15:492, and that evidence of prior misconduct is relevant in as far as it might tend to establish that state officials could, if they so desired, prevent these two jockeys from returning to the track.

Each side has the right to impeach the testimony and credibility of every witness sworn on behalf of the other side. La.R.S. 15:486. The credibility of a witness must be attacked generally, however, and the inquiry must be limited to an examination or discovery of a witness’s general reputation and cannot be expanded to include testimony concerning particular acts, vices or courses of conduct. La.R.S. 15:490, 491; State v. Stevenson, 390 So.2d 1292, 1294 (La.1980).

During his cross-examination of Durous-seau, defense counsel asked, “have you ever been thrown off of a major race track for ...” The state objected to the question as improper impeachment and defense counsel explained to the trial judge that he desired to impeach Durousseau through evidence of prior rulings by the State Racing Commission against Durousseau. The trial judge properly sustained the State’s objection as counsel was attempting to introduce evidence of specific acts of misconduct which, as we noted above, is inadmissible for impeachment purposes.

Defense counsel argues on appeal, however, that evidence of prior misconduct by Hale and Durousseau which exposes them to possible disciplinary action by racing officials is relevant to their motives for testifying and is, therefore, admissible under La.R.S. 15:492.

A defendant has a constitutionally and statutorily protected right to expose through cross-examination facts tending to show that a witness is biased, has an interest in the outcome of the trial, or has been corrupted by the State. La.R.S. 15:492; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); State v. Kellogg, 350 So.2d 656 (La.1977). Furthermore, this court has permitted counsel to inquire into the possibility of civil liability, which would include disciplinary action by the State Racing Commission, when such facts indicate that the witness has an interest in the criminal case. State v. Kellogg, supra at 658 and the jurisprudence cited therein.

Defendant was permitted by the trial judge to introduce evidence of the fact that both Hale and Durousseau had been granted immunity from criminal prosecution for crimes in which they may have participated related to race fixing during the 1980-1981 season and that these grants were revocable if these men did not “cooperatively testify” before the grand jury and at trial. During the cross-examination of Durous-seau defense counsel first elicited testimony to the effect that Durousseau was under supervision at the time of trial and that the suspension proceedings had begun the February 14th race. The court was informed that Durousseau was permitted to ride in that race because his case was on appeal. The trial judge also heard testimony that the State Racing Commission had agreed to honor this grant in Durousseau’s case and that the two jockeys received $785.00 a month for “living expenses” from the Commission for a short period of time prior to trial. Furthermore, Curtis Hale testified that while he was still licensed at Jefferson Downs, he could not ride there and defense counsel was repeatedly allowed to question both witnesses about possible threats or promises by state officials.

The trial court did not commit reversible error. Defendant was permitted to introduce evidence of particular acts establishing these witnesses’ possible bias, interest or corruption. The only evidence which the trial judge refused to admit was of suspensions and fines imposed prior to the February 14, 1981 race. These particular facts were not sufficiently related to this case to show bias, interest or corruption with regard to the witness’s present testimony.

C. Refusal to Permit Counsel for Defendant to Qualify Either Carl Daigrepont or Dr. Rob Hartwick as Experts in Field of Horse Racing.

Defense counsel attempted to qualify Mr. Carl Daigrepont, the custodian of the jockey’s room at the Fairgrounds, as an expert in horse racing. Mr. Daigrepont, who was a jockey for seven years, estimated that he had seen thousands of race films in his thirty-two years at the track, but admitted that he did not analyze films for the race track. Dr. Rod Hartwick, a veterinarian, was also offered as an expert in horse racing by the defense. Under cross-examination the prosecutor emphasized that Dr. Hartwick was a patrol judge, an official who viewed races for any irregularities, approximately twenty-five years ago and that since that time he had dedicated himself to the practice of veterinary medicine. The trial judge refused to qualify either of the witnesses as experts in horse racing and would not allow them to view films of the fourth race and testify as to any irregularities they may or may not have seen.

The defense was attempting to prove, through the testimony of these two witnesses, that nothing unusual happened during the fourth race on February 14, 1981 and that all the jockeys rode to win. Thus the witnesses were not called to testify about an element of the crime charged, but to offer indirect, circumstantial evidence that no crime occurred.

Defendant strenuously argues that observing races for irregularities is not a matter of common knowledge and that the opinions of experts are, therefore, admissible at trial. La.R.S. 15:464. The record before us indicates, however, that the trial judge did not sustain the state’s objection to defense counsel’s attempt to qualify these two witnesses as experts on the grounds that expert testimony was unnecessary or inappropriate. On the contrary, Dr. Hartwick was not allowed to testify as an expert because the trial judge agreed with the prosecution that the defense had failed to properly qualify him as an expert in the field of horse racing. As to Mr. Daigrepont, there is some confusion as the trial judge did not expressly rule on his competency. We are convinced, however, that the trial judge implicitly rejected Mr. Daigrepont as an expert in horse racing.

Before any witness can give evidence as an expert his competency so to testify must have been established to the satisfaction of the court. La.R.S. 15:466. It is a well settled rule that a trial judge is vested with wide discretion in determining the competence of an expert witness. State v. Michel, 422 So.2d 1115 (La.1982). Competence of an expert is a question of fact to be determined within the sound discretion of the trial judge; his rulings on the qualification of expert witnesses will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error. State v. Stucke, 419 So.2d 939 (La. 1982); State v. Drew, 360 So.2d 500 (La. 1978). As we are convinced that the trial judge’s rulings are not manifestly erroneous, they will not be disturbed.

On cross-examination Mr. Daigrepont testified that he did not routinely view films for the race track, never viewed them in a professional capacity and was employed as the custodian of the jockey’s room. Dr. Hartwick did have more impressive credentials but his skills in the field had not been employed in the past twenty-five years and he was not responsible for making an analysis of the races at the Fairgrounds. Considering the wide discretion given to the trial judge it cannot be said that he committed reversible error.

D. Allowing State’s Rebuttal Witness to Testify That He Had Viewed the Film and Had Detected Irregularities

During rebuttal the State recalled Charles LeBlanc, a stewart at the Fairgrounds, who testified, over objections by defense counsel, that he had viewed the film of the fourth race and had noticed irregularities in the running of the race. LeBlanc testified that he saw several horses go wide through the turn at the head of the stretch, opening a path for Bye Gem, the winning horse.

In brief, counsel for defense asserts that this rebuttal testimony was improper as the state was reserving part of its case-in-chief, State v. Gatlin, 396 So.2d 1294 (La. 1981), and because the result of the trial judge’s ruling was that only the state’s version of the race was presented to the trier of fact. The record before us simply does not support these assertions, as we find that through LeBlanc’s testimony the state properly rebutted earlier testimony by Anthony Rini, a defense witness, that he had viewed the race films four or five times and had not noticed any irregularities.

Rebuttal evidence is that which is offered to explain, repel, counteract or disprove facts given in evidence by the adverse party. La.R.S. 15:282; State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982). LeBlanc’s testimony was, by definition, rebuttal evidence.

Assignment of Error Number Five

Defendant contends, through his fifth assignment of error, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires this court to review the evidence upon which a criminal conviction is based to determine whether it is minimally sufficient. State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 (La.1982). A defendant has not been afforded due process, and his conviction cannot stand, unless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could conclude that the state proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Applying this standard to the instant case, we conclude that the evidence is constitutionally sufficient and supports the convictions of the defendant.

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of bribery of a sports participant. La.R.S. 14:118.1. Bribery of a jockey, one of the professions within the ambit of the statute, is the giving or offering to give, directly or indirectly, anything of apparent present or prospective value to any jockey with the intent to influence him to lose or cause to be lost, or corruptly to affect or influence the result of a horse race or to limit his mount or beast’s margin of victory in any race.

The state presented two witnesses who testified that they had been offered, and had actually received, significant sums of money in exchange for their promises not to finish first, second or third in the fourth race at the Fairgrounds on February 14, 1981. The testimony of the two jockeys, Hale and Durousseau, undoubtedly provided an adequate basis for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by a rational trier of fact. The defendant claims, however, that a guilty verdict could not properly be founded upon the testimony of these witnesses as their credibility was destroyed. But it is not our function to assess credibility or reweigh the evidence. Our review for minimal constitutional sufficiency of evidence is a limited one which ends upon our finding that the rational trier-reasonable doubt standard has been satisfied.

The defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed, but the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

       Bailes, J. sitting for Justice Marcus.

      . The crime of bribery of a sports participant is the giving, or offering to give anything of value to any jockey participating or expecting to participate in any horse race with the intent to influence him to lose or corruptly to affect or influence the results of a race. La.R.S. 14:118.1. The state is, therefore, not burdened with proving that the race was actually fixed or corrupted and defense counsel was not, as he argued in brief, attempting to qualify these witnesses as experts in an effort to elicit testimony about an element of the crime charge. Furthermore, we note that Durousseau testified at trial that he renegged on his agreement with defendant and rode to win.


author: BLANCHE, Justice.

text:
    LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. Jerry B. DAYE.
    No. 82-B-2812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1984.
    Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., Richard A. Deas, Wood Brown, III, New Orleans, Robert J. Boudreau, Lake Charles, Sam J. D’Amico, Baton Rouge, Carrick R. Inabnett, Monroe, Harold J. Lamy, New Orleans, Alfred S. Landry, New Iberia, Philippi P. St. Pee, Metairie, Roland J. Achee, Shreveport, Gerard F. Thomas, Jr., Natchitoches, for relator.
    Dennis C. Weber, Baton Rouge, Jerry B. Daye, Ferriday, for respondent.
   DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

BLANCHE, Justice.

The Louisiana State Bar Association, through its Committee on Professional Responsibility, instituted this disciplinary proceeding against Jerry B. Daye, a member of the Louisiana State Bar Association practicing in Ferriday. By certified letters dated July 22, 1982 and September 30, 1982, respondent was informed of four specifications for which disciplinary action was sought. The first two specifications alleged violation of Disciplinary Rules 1-102 and 6-101(A)(3) in that respondent was retained by Ms. Modena Pippens Hocken-berry to represent her 1) in an action for damages relating to her purchase of a mobile home, and 2) in the settlement of community property existing between Ms. Hockenberry and her former husband and that respondent failed, despite repeated requests, to take any action to protect the interests of his client, all to her detriment. The third and fourth specifications alleged violations of Disciplinary Rules 1-102 and 9-102 in connection with a sale of property by Ms. Dorothy Culpepper Lee to Mr. and Mrs. J.B. Toney; the specifications charged that respondent received funds for Ms. Lee from the Toneys and, again despite repeated requests, he failed to transfer those funds to his client, but instead commingled the funds with his own account and for his own use.

After the proper and timely notice given by these letters from the Committee, an investigatory hearing was held on the charges on November 3, 1982, at which respondent failed to appear.

As to the first specifications of misconduct, the uncontroverted evidence at the investigative hearing established that the respondent failed to properly represent his client, Ms. Hockenberry, in obtaining a community property settlement. In fact, respondent failed to take any action in the matter whatsoever, causing loss of valuable property rights to his client. Further, the respondent so neglected to adequately advise and represent Ms. Hockenberry in making a claim against the manufacturer of a mobile home for alleged defects that Ms. Hockenberry was eventually dispossessed of her property.

With respect to the third and fourth specifications of misconduct, the uncontrovert-ed evidence at the investigatory hearing established that respondent was also guilty of having violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102 and 9-102 in connection with funds he received for his client, Ms. Dorothy Culpep-per Lee, in connection with an April 9, 1975 credit sale of immovable property from Ms. Lee to Mr. and Mrs. J.B. Toney. The consideration for the sale was $8,500, of which $500 was paid down with the remainder to be paid in monthly installments of $70.00 for five years with a “balloon payment” for the remaining principal and interest to be made at the end of that time. All of the monthly payments were to be made to respondent for Ms. Lee, who was confined to a nursing home at the time of the sale. The monthly payments were paid to respondent until the spring of 1980 when the Toneys became delinquent in their monthly payments. At that time, foreclosure proceedings were instituted as a result of which the Toneys sold personal property and paid to respondent, through his secretary, the balance due of $7,604.00. This sum was paid in cash, and the Toneys were given a receipt therefor. Further, the original promissory note given by the Toneys and identified with the act of credit sale was marked paid by respondent and delivered for cancellation to the Recorder of Mortgages of Concordia Parish.

Ms. Lee is an elderly, incapacitated individual who has been confined to a nursing home for several years. Doris Leland, administrator of the nursing home where Ms. Lee has been maintained since 1979, testified that Ms. Lee had not received any of the monies collected for her benefit by respondent, despite repeated requests. According to Ms. Leland, Ms. Lee was virtually destitute and in debt for medicines, clothing, and other necessities of life to the nursing home. After repeated attempts to speak with respondent, Ms. Leland was finally able to see him in March, 1981, and presented to him a list of debts for payment, as well as a request for money in order to purchase clothing which Ms. Lee needed. Ms. Leland was advised by the respondent that he would go to the bank the next day, get checks for the amounts needed, and make payment, but nothing was ever received. Later, the attorney for the corporation which owned the nursing home, the secretary/treasurer of the corporation and the comptroller were all contacted to assist Ms. Lee in obtaining the funds from the respondent. The attorney and the comptroller each wrote to respondent making demands, but to no avail.

Following the investigative hearing, a petition for disciplinary action against Daye was filed by the Committee; petitioner was served with the petition, but he failed to file any answer. A Commissioner was appointed by this court, and a hearing conducted by him on March 16, 1983. The respondent appeared and represented himself at this hearing, though no evidence in ■rebuttal was offered, the respondent choosing only to offer an excuse as to why he did not appear at the investigative hearing. Upon respondent’s request, the record of the hearing was left open for a period of seven days for the purpose of receiving whatever documentation or correspondence respondent eared to offer on his behalf. None was received and the record was closed.

The Commissioner found clear and convincing evidence that Daye had violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102 and 6-101(A)(3) in that he neglected legal matters entrusted to him by his client Ms. Modena Pippins Hockenberry. The Commissioner also found clear and convincing evidence that Day had violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102 and 9-102 with respect to the funds collected by him for Ms. Lee’s benefit, in that he did not notify his client of the receipt of her funds, did not render appropriate accounts to her regarding these funds, and did not promptly pay or deliver to Ms. Lee the funds despite numerous requests on her behalf. We concur in these findings.

As this court has stated in the past, the purpose of lawyer disciplinary proceedings is not so much to punish the attorney as it is to maintain the appropriate standards of professional conduct in order to protect the public and the administration of justice. See, e.g., Louisiana State Bar Association v. Causey, 393 So.2d 88 (La. 1980), and cases cited therein. High standards of honesty have been erected for those engaged in the legal profession, and all members of the profession are required to take an oath to uphold these ideals of exemplary conduct. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Philips, 363 So.2d 667 (La. 1978); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Haylon, 250 La. 651, 198 So.2d 391 (1967). It can hardly be said that Daye has conducted his practice of law in a manner consistent with the oath he took upon his admission to the Louisiana State Bar Association. To so neglect the legal matters entrusted to him by a client as to result in her loss of substantial property interests cannot be excused, nor has Daye offered any excuse or other evidence of mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, Daye’s actions in refusing to pay funds due and owing to his client, despite repeated requests and demands, and despite his awareness that the client was elderly, institutionalized, and virtually destitute are not only reprehensible, but are totally repugnant to the honorable profession to which he laid claim as his own.

Respondent has previously been disciplined for the misappropriation of a client’s funds which were converted for his personal purposes. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Daye, 427 So.2d 840 (La.1983). We agree with the recommendation of the Commissioner and the Committee that this pattern of conduct cannot be tolerated. As we have stated repeatedly, the misuse of clients’ funds represents the gravest form of professional misconduct and so strikes at the heart of public confidence as to call for disbarment. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Selenberg, 270 So.2d 848 (La. 1972), cert. den. 414 U.S. 1021, 94 S.Ct. 443, 38 L.Ed.2d 312 (1973); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Philips, 363 So.2d 667 (La.1978); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Weysham, 307 So.2d 336 (La.1975); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Haylon, 250 La. 651, 198 So.2d 391 (La.1967). We therefore conclude that the protection of the public and the administration of justice require that the respondent be removed from the practice of law.

DECREE

Accordingly, for the reasons assigned, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the name of Jerry B. Daye, respondent, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the state of Louisiana be revoked.

DISBARMENT ORDERED.


text:
    Dorothy James ARAMBURO, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Stephen J. Aramburo, and Joseph J. Aramburo v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Its Insured, Emma Franklin; Reserve Insurance Company and Allstate Insurance Company.
    No. 83-C-2267.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 9, 1983.
   In Re: Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal. Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, No. 79-6326.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Solomon POLLARD v. N. Burl CAIN, et al. Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 83-KH-0652.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1983.
   In re Solomon Pollard, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans. No. 267-925.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lionel REED.
    No. 83-KK-2471.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 1983.
   In re Lionel Reed, applying for writ of certiorari. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 298-627.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Willie Lee JACKSON v. Donald R. GUILLORY, Warden, Wade Correctional Center.
    No. 82-KH-1385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 9, 1983.
   In Re: Willie Lee Jackson, applying for Reconsideration on denied writ of November 11, 1983, 441 So.2d 755. Second Judicial District Court, No. 19471. Parish of Jackson.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Hayward Joseph SIMMONS, Jr. v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 16, 1983.
   In re Hayward Joseph Simmons, Jr., applying for reconsideration on denied writ of November 28, 1983, 441 So.2d 773. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. Nos. ’ 229-445, 222-960, 223-026, 223-028 and 223-042.

Denied.


text:
    Clarence P. FORET, Sr. v. Paul R. VALTEAU, Jr., Civil Sheriff, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
    No. 84-CC-0023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 4, 1984.
   In re Clarence P. Foret, Sr., applying for writ of mandamus, and stay order. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 83-19487, Section “E”. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. C 1676.

Denied on the showing made.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lue Elbert SULLIVAN.
    No. 83-KP-2491.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Lue Elbert Sullivan, applying for writ of certiorari. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 73-996.

Granted: The trial judge’s ruling is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to the trial judge to furnish relator and his counsel with a uniform application.

LEMMON, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., John Charles STEIN, Jr. v. Hon. W. Orie HUNTER, et al. Clerk of Court, Caddo Parish.
    No. 83-KH-2512.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re John Charles Stein, Jr., applying for writ of mandamus. First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo. Nos. 94-047, 94-048, and 99-012HC.

Granted. District Court is ordered to furnish relator Boykin transcript he seeks.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Aubrey Ray WILLIAMS v. Honorable Warren E. HOOD, Judge, Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, State of Louisiana, Clerk of Court, Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, State of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 83-KH-0653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Aubrey Ray Williams, applying for writ of mandamus, supervisory and review. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 14046-81.

Granted in part. The application is transferred to the district court with instructions to consider the expanded application filed in this Court as a motion for out-of-time appeal. Otherwise, denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Louis HALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-2495.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Louis Hall, applying for writ of certiorari and mandamus. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 287-370.

Granted for purpose of transferring to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit for consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Wilbert H. WINSTON v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Wilbert H. Winston, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Calca-sieu. No. 1557-75-A.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Jessie GREEN v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0510.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Jessie Green, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 6-79-164.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Emmet HILLS v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0534.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Emmet Hills, applying for writ of habeas corpus and/or motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 63715.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., George E. TAYLOR v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re George E. Taylor, applying for writs of certiorari, habeas corpus, and mandamus. Parish of Avoyelles. Nos. 45414, 45415, and 45416.

Denied.


text:
    Ida Mae Williams McKENZIE v. WINN DIXIE LOUISIANA, INC.
    No. 83-CC-2508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Ida Mae Williams McKenzie, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. C-1454. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 83-4569.

Not considered. Not timely filed. Rule 10 § 4(b) La. Supreme Court Rules.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Jack LYLES v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0629.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Jack Lyles, applying for writ of habeas corpus and mandamus. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, Section “A”. No. 269-921.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Joe ALMORE v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0700.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Joe Almore, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans. No. 278-172.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., James CARNEY v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0703.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re James Carney, applying for writs of certiorari and habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans, Section “E”. No. 243-263.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald Ray LINK.
    No. 83-KH-0709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Donald Ray Link, applying for writs of certiorari and/or review, mandamus, and prohibition. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 12-72-2398.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Roger Dale DOUCET v. Hon. Charles S. KING, District Judge, Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Division “C”—Calcasieu Parish, Lake Charles, Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-0714.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Roger Dale Doucet, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Parish of Cal-casieu. No. 10083-76.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. James R. BLAND v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0715.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re James R. Bland, applying for supervisory writs. Sabine Parish. Nos. 27088, 27088-D.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Thomas L. PHILLIPS v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0896.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Thomas L. Phillips, applying for remedial writs of certiorari and habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court. No. 254-434.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darnell Jerome HUNTLEY.
    No. 83-K-2339.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Darnell Jerome Huntley, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. No. CR-83-20. Fifteen Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermilion. No. 22045.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cathy MERCER.
    No. 83-K-2394.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Cathy Mercer, applying for writ of review. Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. No. 15,418-KA. Parish of Caddo, First Judicial District Court. No. 120416.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Keith SIMONTON.
    No. 83-K-2406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Robert Keith Simonton, applying for writ of certiorari. Second Circuit Court of Appeals. No. 15584-KA. Parish of Ouachita, Fourth Judicial District Court.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert I. SIMMONS.
    No. 83-K-2410.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Robert I. Simmons, applying for writ of review. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 15535. Parish of Caddo, First Judicial District Court. No. 117837.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leonard MESHELL.
    No. 83-K-2412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Leonard Meshell, applying for writ of certiorari. Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. No. 15534-KA. Parish of DeSoto, Eleventh Judicial District Court. No. 46933.

Denied.


text:
    BRUMFIELD MOTOR COMPANY, INC. v. Alma C. KING and Cynthia Mary King White.
    No. 83-C-2416.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Alma C. King and Cynthia King White, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82 CA 1129. Twenty-first Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa. No. 63011.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terry LAPRARIE.
    No. 83-K-2424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Terry Laprarie, applying for a writ of certiorari. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 15532-KA. Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of DeSoto. No. 48607.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Billy Roy TYLER v. BOSSIER PARISH DISTRICT COURT JUDGES CAMPBELL, KITCHEN, LOWE & WYCHE PRESIDING.
    No. 83-KH-2557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Billy Roy Tyler, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Bossier, Twenty-sixth Judicial District Court.

Denied. Relator’s application is presently pending in the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald CLARK.
    No. 83-K-2428.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Donald Clark, applying for writ of certiorari. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 15547-KA. Parish of DeSoto, Eleventh Judicial District Court. No. 47339.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., William Dewey THURMAN v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-2519.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
    Reconsideration Denied Jan. 27, 1984.
   In re William Dewey Thurman, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 6-78-271. Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of Charles Marion MARUSAK.
    No. 83-CK-2634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Charles Marion Marusak, applying for writ of review. Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin. No. 2926. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. No. K83-1122.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Elvis J. LANE.
    No. 83-K-2337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Elvis J. Lane, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Thirty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant. No. 39929.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald Wayne FOX.
    No. 83-K-2345.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Donald Wayne Fox, applying for a writ of certiorari, or review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Sabine, Eleventh Judicial District Court. No. 30612.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Medford Carltrail MAXIE.
    No. 83-K-2347.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Medford Carltrail Maxie, applying for writ of certiorari. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Sabine, Eleventh Judicial District Court. No. 30612.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lloyd LINTZEN.
    No. 83-K-2350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Lloyd Lintzen, applying for writ of certiorari prohibition, and mandamus. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Calcasieu, Fourteenth Judicial District Court. No. 4611-81.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant to review the sentences.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerome MELLION.
    No. 83-K-2359.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Jerome Mellion, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge, Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 4-82-141.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Curtis R. GERMAIN.
    No. 83-KP-2369.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Curtis R. Germain, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 81-819.

Denied.


text:
    John Allen STEPHENS v. The STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, and Bernice Stanfield. MID FLORIDA TRUCKING, INC. v. The STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, et als. C.H. KNIGHT LIVESTOCK, INC. v. Herman FISHER, d/b/a Mid Florida Trucking Co. and State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation & Development.
    No. 83-C-2392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re The Department of Transportation and Development, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Webster, Twenty-sixth Judicial District Court. Nos. 38095, 38342 and 38222.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Alonzo LEWIS.
    No. 83-C-2414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Aggie Lewis Hays, et al., applying for writ of review and/or certiorari. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo. No. 279-822.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Wanda SINGLETON v. Rose Marie SIMMS.
    No. 83-C-2419.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Wanda Singleton, applying for writ of certiorari. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 82-11594.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Alfred HARRISON, Sr., v. Jerome M. WINSBERG, Judge Section “C”—Criminal District Court Parish of Orleans 2700 Tulane Ave. New Orleans, Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-0654.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Alfred Harrison, Sr., applying for writs of certiorari and review. Parish of Orleans. No. 272-522.

Denied. Relator’s application urging the same issue was denied by this Court December 10, 1982, 423 So.2d 1156.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Michael McCAFFREY v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute, Jackson, Louisiana, et al.
    No. 83-KH-1222.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Michael McCaffrey, applying for reconsideration of denied writ of October 7, 1983, 439 So.2d 1078. Twenty-First Judicial District Court. No. 3135. Parish of Livingston.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert DeWayne McCARTY and Robert Lee Nugent.
    No. 83-K-2353.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Robert DeWayne McCarty and Robert Lee Nugent, applying for writ of certiorari, or review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Sabine, Eleventh Judicial District Court. Nos. 30801, 31146.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of T.M. and W.M.
    No. 83-CK-2492.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re State of Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources, applying for writ of certiorari. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. City Court of West Monroe. No. W-3167 Juvenile, Parish of Ouachita.

Denied.

MARCUS, DENNIS and BLANCHE, JJ„ would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Franklin GREEN.
    No. 83-K-2420.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Franklin Green, applying for writ of review. Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Caddo, First Judicial District Court. No. 116324.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Curtis WALTON.
    No. 83-K-2422.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Curtis Walton, applying for writ of certiorari. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of DeSoto, Eleventh Judicial District Court. No. 48460.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Walter L. SHELTON.
    No. 83-KP-2448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Walter L. Shelton, applying for a remedial writ. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 287-623.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    COAST WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY v. Paul YOUNG.
    No. 83-C-2480.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Paul Young, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 250-032.

Denied.


text:
    Guinn BOSSIER and Hilma E. Bossier v. DESOTO GENERAL HOSPITAL.
    No. 83-C-2489.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re DeSoto General Hospital, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of DeSoto. No. 38964.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ„ would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward JONES.
    No. 83-K-2498.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Edward Jones, applying for certio-rari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 296-357.

Denied.


text:
    Mary Ann BLACKLEDGE a/k/a Mary Ann Schwegmann v. John G. SCHWEGMANN, Jr.
    No. 83-C-2500.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Mary Ann Blackledge a/k/a Mary Ann Schwegmann, applying for writ of cer-tiorari and review. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. Twenty-fourth Judicial Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 231-175.

Denied.


text:
    Melvin THIBODEAUX v. HERCULES, INC.
    No. 83-C-2503.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Melvin Thibodeaux, applying for writs of certiorari and/or review. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu. No. 80-3378.

Denied.


text:
    Virgie DELCO v. HERITAGE MANOR NURSING HOME and Ranger Insurance Company.
    No. 83-C-2504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Heritage Manor Nursing Home and Ranger Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia. No. 49807.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eli JACKSON.
    No. 83-K-2360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Eli Jackson, applying for writ of certiorari or review. First Circuit Court of Appeal, 83-KA-0279. Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 2-81-572.

Granted as to assignment of errors 2 & 3; otherwise denied. See order attached.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Howard DAVIS, Jr.
    No. 83-K-2358.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Howard Davis, applying for writs of certiorari and review. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Thirty-first Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis. No. CR-4028-81.

Not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Ike GOOCH, Jr. v. Hon. Matthew S. BRANIFF, Judge, Criminal District Court, Section “B” Parish of Orleans.
    No. 83-KH-0371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Ike Gooch, Jr., applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. No. 281-115. Criminal District Court, Section “B”.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Eddie FOREMAN, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-0606.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Eddie Foreman, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari, habeas corpus, and mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge, Section “I”. No. 65685.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Keith W. LEDET v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Keith W. Ledet, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Terrebonne. No. 52995.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Joseph ROBERTSON v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0721.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Joseph Robertson, applying for writ of certiorari and habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 267-314.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Dwyane David COLEMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-0725.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Dwyane David Coleman, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Calcasieu. No. 13523-80.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vernon SIMMS.
    No. 83-KH-0747.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Vernon Simms, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 282-741.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Carol RICHARDSON v. Johnnie JONES, Warden, Louisiana Correctional Institute For Women.
    No. 83-KH-0770.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Carol Richardson, applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans. No. 257-125.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant an eviden-tiary hearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnny POLLARD.
    No. 83-K-2335.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Johnny Pollard, applying for writ of certiorari of review. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Natchitoches. Nos. 69667, 69668.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas W. BROWN and Charles Wayne Foy.
    No. 83-K-2336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Thomas W. Brown and Charles Wayne Foy, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu. No. 8438-82.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin L. DONALD.
    No. 83-K-2507.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 6, 1984.
   In re Calvin L. Donald, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. Thirty-seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Caldwell. No. 25105.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.