text:
    William “Doc” COATES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. AX-317.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 16, 1984.

      Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, Ann Terry Carley, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Wallace E. Allbrit-ton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for ap-pellee.
   SHIVERS, Judge.

Appellant/defendant appeals his sentence for burglary of a dwelling. Appellant raises several points on appeal. We find merit in one and reverse and remand this cause for resentencing.

On June 21, 1983, appellant was charged with armed burglary, contrary to section 810.02, Florida Statutes, and grand theft, contrary to section 812.014, Florida Statutes. Appellant initially pled not guilty to these offenses. Appellant then changed his plea, as a result of plea negotiations, and entered a plea of nolo contendere to burglary of a dwelling. As its part of the bargain, the State nolle prossed the grand theft charge.

At the plea hearing, the following colloquy transpired between the trial judge, defense counsel (Ms. Dekker), and appellant:

THE COURT: Okay. I also show plea entered for Mr. Coates on May 24th. All right. So, we will go ahead at this point. Previously entered plea of not guilty.
MS. DEKKER: Yes, Your Honor. At this time we would request that we be allowed to withdraw the previously entered plea entered [sic] of not guilty as to the Amended Information and enter a plea — tender a plea of no contest Count 1 but have that charged [sic] reduced to burglary of a dwelling. This is the result of plea negotiations.
THE COURT: And that would be what degree felony?
MS DEKKER: Felony of the second degree, 15 years, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And what would be the disposition of Count 2?
MS. DEKKER: Count 2 would be nol prossed.
THE COURT: Is there any recommendation from the prosecution and defense?
MS. DEKKER: No, Your Honor, not at this time.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Coates, I need to ask you a few questions. Do you realize that by entering your plea to this charge, which is a second degree felony, would expose you to 15 years in the state penal system of the State of Florida? You’re aware of that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

After this colloquy, the trial court proceeded to determine that appellant’s plea was freely and voluntarily entered and that there was a factual basis for appellant’s plea. Sentencing was set for July 5, 1983.

Appellant did not show up at the sentencing hearing set in July, nor did he show up for a subsequently scheduled hearing. Sentencing was finally held on February 9, 1984, at which time appellant elected to be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines. Appellant’s scoresheet shows a score of 54 points resulting in a recommended sentence of community control or 12 to 30 months incarceration.

The trial court decided to depart from the recommended sentence of the guidelines. Appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment to be followed by a term of probation ending in 1991. The trial court’s stated reason for departure was that, under the plea agreement, the prosecution and defense agreed to court discretion within a 15 year cap on prison time. This reason apparently was derived from the colloquy set forth above.

Appellant’s counsel objected to the trial court’s departure from the guidelines stating that there was no agreement on sentencing and that the 15 year cap related only to the fact that appellant pled to a crime which, at most, exposed appellant to 15 years imprisonment. Moreover, appellant’s counsel informed the trial court that the prosecutor and she argued whether appellant had been properly charged with burglary in the first degree, rather than burglary in the second degree, and that, as a result, the charge was reduced to burglary of the second degree. The prosecutor agreed with appellant’s counsel’s statements.

Appellant first contends that his sentence is improper since the record is silent as to whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to parole, thereby creating an ex post facto laws problem. Appellant’s position on this point has been decided adversely to him in recent decisions of this court. See Kiser v. State, 455 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Moore v. State, 455 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Next, appellant contends that the trial judge erred in failing to sign his name to the document which delineates his reason for departure from the guidelines, even though the reason so written is the same as that articulated at the sentencing hearing. Appellant’s argument is that it is impossible to determine whether the writer of this reason was the trial judge or someone else. We find this argument to be without merit, since the reason articulated at the hearing and the reason in writing, which reason is part of the record, are the same. The written statement therefore is of sufficient specificity to inform all parties, as well as the public, of the trial judge’s reason for departure in the instant case. Committee Note (d)(ll) to RCrP 3.701. Moreover, we note that there is no requirement in Rule 3.701 that a trial judge sign his or her name to the written reason(s) for departure, especially where, as here, the reason is the same as that articulated at the sentencing hearing.

Third, and the point we find to have merit, appellant contends that the trial judge’s reason for departure from the guidelines is not clear and convincing. As noted, we agree. Here, the colloquy enumerated above does not indicate that the plea bargain specified appellant’s permissible sentence. Cf. Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (that court holding that a departure from the guidelines is clearly warranted when there is a plea bargain which specifies the permissible sentence); Key v. State, 452 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Rather, the colloquy indicates only that appellant was aware that by entering into this plea he was exposing himself to 15 years imprisonment. We do not construe this awareness on appellant’s part as an agreement as to his permissible sentence.

Accordingly, appellant’s sentence is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial judge for resentencing in accord with the sentencing guidelines and our opinion.

WENTWORTH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.

      . We note that upon resentencing, if the trial judge wishes to impose a split sentence, the total sanction imposed cannot exceed the maximum guideline range. See Roux v. State, 455 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Committee Note (d)(12) to RCrP 3.701.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Brian Clay RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. AY-98.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 16, 1984.
    Michael E. Allen, Public Defender and Andrew Thomas, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Gregory G. Costas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. Johnson v. State, 357 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

ERVIN, C.J., and MILLS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.


author: MILLS, Judge.

text:
    Dallas SELF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. AY-105.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 16, 1984.
    Michael Allen, Public Defender, Andrew Thomas, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., David P. Gauldin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
   MILLS, Judge.

Self appeals from an order of restitution. He contends the trial court erred in requiring him to pay the victim of his crime $15 per week for loss of income. There is evidence in the record from which the trial court could conclude the victim lost wages in the amount awarded as a result of Self’s criminal conduct.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, C.J., and ZEHMER, J., concur.


author: WENTWORTH, Judge.

text:
    CONSOLIDATED NATURES PRIME and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Carlo LORENZONI, Appellee.
    No. AZ-41.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 16, 1984.

      Eugene N. Betts, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    C. Randal Moreroft, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   WENTWORTH, Judge.

The appealed order, finding claimant to be an employee for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act, patently fails to dispose of all matured issues and is therefore dismissed. City of Tampa v. Fein, 438 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Winkel v. Grand Union Stores, 436 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Crown Hotel v. Friedman, 420 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Town of Palm Beach v. Watts, 426 So.2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Monroe County Sheriff's Department v. Ruth, 424 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Wash House v. Tucker, 413 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

SHIVERS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Frank SOLIMENA, Appellant, v. Arnold GINSBERG, an individual, and Horton, Perse and Ginsberg, a Florida general partnership, Appellees.
    No. 83-2351.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 20, 1984.
    Stephen J. Finta, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Carey, Dwyer, Cole, Eckhart, Mason & Spring and Harriet Lewis, Miami, for appel-lees.
    Before BARKDULL, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. McIntyre v. McCloud, 334 So.2d 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Scott-Steven Development Corp. v. Gables By The Sea, Inc., 167 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); 1 Fla.Jur.2d, Actions § 26.


text:
    ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Appellees.
    No. 84-175.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 20, 1984.
    Lee Weissenborn, Miami, for appellant.
    High, Stack, Lazenby, Palahach & Laca-sa, Coral Gables, and Philip J. Cole, Adolfo Del Castillo, Miami, for appellees.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUB-BART and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 436 So.2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).


text:
    Ardelle LIEUX and David Lieux, her husband, Appellants, v. ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY; Josie’s Management Corporation, Appellees.
    No. 84-670.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 20, 1984.
    Henry T. Courtney and William Ploss, Miami, for appellants.
    Haddad, Josephs & Jack and Gary Ger-rard, Coral Gables, for appellees.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARK-DULL and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the summary judgment in this “slip and fall” case because there are disputed issues of fact or reasonable inferences therefrom as to what caused the fall and the resulting injury. Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 351 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1977); Visingardi v. Tirone, 193 So.2d 601 (Fla.1966); Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla.1966).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.


author: BASKIN, Judge.

text:
    Hugo R. BLANCO, Appellant, v. Ana Maria BLANCO, Appellee.
    No. 84-854.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 20, 1984.
    Maurice Jay Kutner, Miami, for appellant.
    Edward Schroll, Miami, for appellee.
    Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
   BASKIN, Judge.

Because the record fails to reflect the terms of the property settlement agreement approved by the trial court in its final judgment, we reverse the final judgment as to all matters other than the dissolution and remand with directions to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the final judgment entered by the predecessor judge accurately reflects the parties’ agreement. See Bird v. Bird, 436 So.2d 981 (Fla.3d DCA 1983).

Reversed in part and remanded with directions.


author: PER CURIAM. JORGENSON, Judge

text:
    Mildred Irene ROBISON, Incompetent, By and Through her guardian, Ethel M. BUGERA, Appellant, v. FLORIDA PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND, Appellee.
    No. 84-934.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 20, 1984.
    Barwick & Dillian, Miami Shores, and Michael C. Siboni, Miami, Yates & Fann, Miami Shores, for appellant.
    Thomas R. Post, Evan J. Langbein, Miami, for appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund on the authority of Fabal v. Florida Keys Memorial Hospital, 452 So.2d 946 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Lugo v. Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund, 452 So.2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Taddiken v. Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund, 449 So.2d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Consistent with our decision in Lugo, we certify the issue presented in this case as one of great public importance. We note conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Tillman, 453 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

Affirmed.

JORGENSON, Judge

(concurring specialty)-

I agree that an affirmance is required based on the authorities cited in the court’s opinion. Were I free to do so, I would adopt the well-reasoned dissenting view of my brother Ferguson in Fabal v. Florida Keys Memorial Hospital, 452 So.2d 946, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), which in my judgment represents a more appropriate disposition of the issue presented.


text:
    David DICKERMAN, Appellant, v. Norman L. HUGHES, Appellee.
    No. 84-986.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 20, 1984.
    Long, Finkel & Cave and Charles Finkel, Hallandale, Ronald L. Miller, Hollywood, for appellant.
    Nolan P. Chipman, Jeffrey N. Marks, Miami, for appellee.
    Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See A.J. Spagnol Lumber Co. v. Trauger, 442 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1983); Carroll v. Gore, 106 Fla. 582, 143 So. 633 (1932).


text:
    Isacco NEUMANN, et al., Appellants, v. GRANDMA’S, INC., etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. 84-1154.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 20, 1984.
    Riskin & Dishowitz, Hollywood, for appellants.
    Hall & O’Brien and Richard F. O’Brien III, Miami, for appellees.
    Before HENDRY, BARKDULL and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Engineered Storage Systems, Inc. v. National Partitions & Interiors, Inc., 415 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); § 48.193, Fla.Stat. (1983).


text:
    Pedro PEREZ, Appellant, v. Marguerite F. WINSTON, Appellee.
    No. 84-1623.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 20, 1984.
    Gaston R. Alvarez, Miami, and Jose M. Insua, Hialeah, for appellant.
    Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson and William J. Gray, Miami, for appellee.
    Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellee, Marguerite F. Winston, has confessed error. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction upon the authority of Griffin v. Zinn, 318 So.2d 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.


text:
    Harold William WARICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-2399.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 20, 1984.
    Harold William Warick in pro. per.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., for appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Gonzalez v. State, 410 So.2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Wallace v. State, 397 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).


text:
    Gerald T. EATON, as Personal Representative of the estate of K.W. Van Landingham; Gerald R. Schommer; and Ronald W. Van Landingham, Appellants, v. Blair MADSEN, Lawrence R. Giacin, Russell L. Bailey, Richard C. Finucan, Harry R. Padula, and J. William Watkins, Appellees.
    No. 82-1333.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 21, 1984.
    Gary M. Farmer of Gary M. Farmer, P.A., Stuart, for appellants.
    Kenneth G. Stevens of Dale & Stevens, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

There was substantial competent evidence for the trial court to conclude, as it did, that the grants of easement were made for the purpose of providing ingress and egress to the common way to the south; namely, to Stirling Road. Accordingly, we affirm.

LETTS, HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.


text:
    PRECISION PLATING, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. JONES ENTERPRISES, Larry Jones, and Laura R. Jones Flanagan, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
    No. 83-882.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 21, 1984.
    Michael L. Cohen of Michael L. Cohen, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant/ cross-appellee.
    Law Offices of James F. Simpson, West Palm Beach, and Amy Shield Levine of Levine & Levine, Boca Raton, for appel-lees/cross-appellants.
   PER CURIAM.

The court below granted directed verdicts against both the appellant and cross-appellants as to their respective claim and counterclaim on a lease. We find that there was evidence upon which a jury could have found for the respective non-moving parties, and accordingly, neither directed verdict should have been granted. McDaniel v. Zoldak, 423 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Gates v. Chrysler Corp., 397 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Consequently, we reverse the final judgment and remand for a jury trial upon the issues presented in the complaint and counterclaim.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

DOWNEY, DELL and BARKETT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Norman Francis HAFT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-2255.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 21, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1984.
    Daniel W. Levin of Law Offices of Daniel W. Levin, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Joan Fowler Rossin, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

There is no error in the judgment that Norman F. Haft is guilty of criminal contempt. The appropriate fine for such an offense cannot exceed $500, however, the fine imposed here was $2,500. Section 775.02, Florida Statutes (1983); Aaron v. State, 284 So.2d 673 (Fla.1973) and Thomas A. Edison College, Inc. v. State Board of Independent Colleges & Universities, 411 So.2d 257 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Thus, the order appealed is remanded to the trial court with directions to reduce the fine to not more than $500.00. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

HERSEY, GLICKSTEIN and DELL, JJ., concur.


text:
    Donald HANDO, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. WOODLAKE VILLA’S, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 84-403.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 21, 1984.
    Robert A. Huth, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant/cross-appellee.
    Anthony J. Titone of Titone, Roarke & Rebalko, Lauderhill, for appellee/cross-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Both parties agree that the trial court erred by applying an incorrect measure of damages. We cannot tell from the final judgment entered in this cause whether the trial court found liability in breach of contract or in negligence. There is evidence sufficient to support the finding of liability; however, there is no basis in the record for the amount of damages awarded by the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to conduct a trial solely upon the issue of damages.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

DOWNEY, DELL and BARKETT, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM. ANSTEAD, Chief Judge,

text:
    Ervin Leroy YOKES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-109.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 21, 1984.
    Robert L. Bogen of Braverman & Holmes, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Sarah B. Mayer, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

HURLEY and DELL, JJ., concur.

ANSTEAD, C.J., specially concurs with opinion.

ANSTEAD, Chief Judge,

specially concurring:

I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s order refusing to dismiss charges alleging appellant’s illegal possession of two (2) loaded firearms in a pouch attached to the inside of the door of appellant’s motor vehicle. Appellant contends that his possession was lawful pursuant to the provisions of Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1983), which exempt from prosecution the possession of any weapon that “is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use.” The elasticized pouch involved herein is clearly more accessible than the zippered case involved in Alexander v. State, 450 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), wherein this court also approved of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss predicated upon the provisions of Section 790.25(5). From the record that has been lodged in this court there is evidence that the weapons were both concealed and that they were easily accessible by the appellant’s merely sticking his hand inside the pouch and gripping one of the weapons. Surely this would appear to be the kind of concealed possession of a firearm that the statutory scheme seeks to outlaw.


author: PER CURIAM. GLICKSTEIN, Judge,

text:
    John WOLMER, Appellant, v. STAPLETON BOAT CORPORATION and Schmahl and Schmahl, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 83-2010.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 21, 1984.
    Robert C. Meacham of Gillespie, McCormick, McFall, Gilbert & McGee, Pompano Beach, for appellant.
    Kenneth S. Dobkin, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

HERSEY and BARKETT, JJ., concur.

GLICKSTEIN, J., dissents with opinion.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge,

dissenting.

I agree with appellant that there are genuine issues of material fact, including that of reliance, which preclude summary judgment.


text:
    Eddie Lee PITTMAN, d/b/a Eddie’s Dive Inn, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, Appellee.
    No. 84-281.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 27, 1984.
    Arthur M. Garel, Miami, for appellant. William H. Hatch, Tallahassee, for appel-lee.
    Before HENDRY, HUBBART and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Lash, Inc. v. State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 411 So.2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).


text:
    CORAL RIDGE NATIONAL BANK OF FT. LAUDERDALE as Trustee, a national banking corporation, Appellant, v. NEIGHBORS RESTAURANT, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
    Nos. 84-285, 84-695.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 27, 1984.
    Meyer, Weiss, Rose, Arkin, Shampanier, Ziegler & Barash and F. William Harvey, Miami Beach, for appellant.
    John H. Lipinski, A.M. Schwitalla, Miami, for appellee.
    Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the trial court’s final summary judgment on the grounds that the trial court erred in interpreting the lease and subsequent lease amendments made between Neighbors Restaurant, Inc.’s assign- or and the lessor, Coral Ridge National Bank of Ft. Lauderdale, when it failed to consider the effect of the lease modification agreement when determining the base rental figure to be used for computing the monthly rent due to the lessor. See Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 302 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1974). On remand the trial court is directed to compute the rental on the basis of $26,400 per annum as stated in the lease modification agreement. The cross appeal is without merit.

Reversed and remanded.


text:
    Ruben RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. FISHERMEN’S HOSPITAL, INC., Appellee.
    No. 84-722.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 27, 1984.

      Yernis, Bowling, Montalto, Goodman, Blank & Traitz, Fort Lauderdale, Richard H.W. Maloy, Key Biscayne, for appellant.
    Hayt, Hayt & Landau and Alan M. Fisher, Miami, for appellee.
    Before HENDRY, HUBBART and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla.1984).


text:
    Olga GONZALEZ, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William E. Hartman, et al., Appellants, v. Dorothy J. SMITH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Alexius Guy Smith, Jr., Deceased, et al., Appellees.
    No. 84-833.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 27, 1984.
    Ferrero, Middlebrooks & Strickland, Hoffmann & Burris and Nancy Little Hoff-mann, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    Magill, Reid & Lewis and R. Fred Lewis, Talburt, Kubicki, Bradley & Draper and Gail L. Kniskern, Miami, for appellees.
    Before HENDRY, HUBBART and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Devlin v. Florida Rent-A-Car, Inc., 454 So .2d 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).


text:
    Karen THOMPSON and Allen Thompson, Appellants, v. Debra Marie Spear CARUSO and Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Appellees.
    No. 83-1682.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 28, 1984.
    Rehearings Denied Dec. 20, 1984.
    Richard G. Newhouse of Law Offices of Richard G. Newhouse, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    Marcia E. Levine of Fazio, Dawson & DiSalvo, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse and remand for a determination of Thompson’s out-of-pocket expenses, on the authority of Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So.2d 12 (Fla.1982) and Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Worthy, 447 So.2d 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). We have reviewed the other allegations of error, and find they are without merit.

GLICKSTEIN and HURLEY, JJ„ and GOLDMAN, MURRAY, Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    Harvey KALIFF, Appellant, v. Joan D. KALIFF, Appellee.
    Nos. 83-1869, 83-2202.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 28, 1984.
    Kenneth P. Wurtenberger of Bauman, Wurtenberger, Schottenfeld & Baker, Plantation, for appellant.
    Carole C. Meek, Oakland Park, and Richard T. Shankweiler of Shankweiler & Stol-berg, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We find no error in the trial court’s rulings below with respect to granting the wife continued exclusive possession of the homeplace, modification of the rehabilitative alimony to permanent and an award of attorney’s fees. In addition, because we find the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the husband’s ability to pay, we find no error in the trial court’s order directing the husband to continue to provide certain educational expenses for his children based upon the husband’s prior agreement to pay such expenses.

ANSTEAD, C.J., and HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ„ concur.


text:
    WORLDWIDE MOTORCARS, INC., Appellant, v. FOREST LANE PORSCHE AUDI ASSOCIATES, a Texas limited partnership, Kirk Franceschini, and. Fernando S. Urcuyo, general partners, and David Roeper, Appellees.
    No. 83-2478.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 28, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 20, 1984.
    Steven J. Gutter of Kahn & Gutter, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant and appellee-David Roeper.
    William C. Crenshaw of Valdes-Fauli, Cobb & Petrey, P.A., Miami for appellees-Forest Lane Porsche Audi Associates, Kirk Franceschini and Fernando S. Urcuyo.
   PER CURIAM.

The order on appeal contains claims which are interrelated to matters still pending in the trial court and, accordingly, this appeal is sua sponte dismissed. See S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1974).

GLICKSTEIN and HURLEY, JJ., and GOLDMAN, MURRAY, Associate Judge, concur.


author: HERSEY, Judge.

text:
    Robert BLACK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-88.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 28, 1984.
    Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Ellen Morris, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carolyn V. McCann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   HERSEY, Judge.

The convictions and sentences are affirmed; however, assessment of $2.00 of court costs against this indigent defendant was improper, Cox v. State, 334 So.2d 568 (Fla.1976), and imposition of a $15.00 assessment for the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund without notice and without full opportunity to object and be heard was error. Jenkins v. State, 444 So.2d 947 (Fla.1984). We reverse both assessments and remand for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.

GLICKSTEIN and BARKETT, JJ., concur.


text:
    Martin STEINHARDT, et al. Appellants, v. Vannoy BANKS, Appellee.
    No. 84-916.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 28, 1984.
    Alexander Myers, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
    Phillip T. Crenshaw of Crenshaw & Cren-shaw, Lake Worth, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm. See Wimbledon Townhouse Condominium I Association, Inc. v. Kessler, 425 So.2d 29, 32 n. 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Insurance Company of North America v. Twitty, 319 So.2d 141, 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 330 So.2d 22 (Fla.1976).

LETTS, HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Modesto MONTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-510.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Nov. 28, 1984.
    Jerry Hill, Public Defender, Bartow, and L.S. Alperstein, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Theda James Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In requesting permission of this court to withdraw as counsel of record pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the public defender suggests that the record is not clear as to whether appellant elected to be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines or if counsel was simply requesting that the court take into account what the sentence would be if the guidelines were used. However, it is clear from the record that appellant, whose crimes were committed prior to October 1, 1983, never “affirmatively selected” to be sentenced under the guidelines. We are convinced that the court did not intend for appellant’s sentence to be under the guidelines.

Affirmed.

RYDER, C.J., and GRIMES, J., and LOGAN, PAUL E., Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    Nicholas A. STELLA, as personal representative of the Estate of Cynthia Lee Stella, deceased, etc., et al., Appellants, v. Terrence M. ASH, D.C., Appellee.
    No. 80-2335.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    December 4, 1984.
   WHEREAS, the judgment of this court was entered on December 28, 1982 (425 So.2d 122) reversing the summary judgment of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida in the above styled cause; and

WHEREAS, on review of this court’s judgment, by certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida, by its opinion and judgment filed October 11, 1984, 457 So.2d 1377, and mandate now lodged in this court, quashed a portion of this court’s judgment relating to the running of the statute.

NOW, THEREFORE, It is Ordered that the mandate of this court heretofore issued in this cause on February 18, 1983 is withdrawn; the judgment of this court filed in this cause on December 28, 1982, except as is affirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Court dated October 11, 1984 is vacated; and the said opinion and judgment of the Supreme Court is herewith made the opinion and judgment of this court. The summary judgment appealed from herein is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. Costs allowed shall be taxed in the trial court (Rule 9.400 a Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure).