text:
    LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. Tommy K. CRYER.
    No. 82-B-2937.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
    Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., Richard A. Deas, Wood Brown, III, New Orleans, Robert J. Boudreau, Lake Charles, Sam J. D’Amico, Baton Rouge, Carrick R. Inabnett, Monroe, Harold J. Lamy, New Orleans, Alfred S. Landry, New Iberia, Philippi P. St. Pee, Metairie, Roland J. Achee, Shreveport, Gerard F. Thomas, Jr., Natchitoches, for relator.
    Tommy K. Cryer, pro se, Thomas A. Wilson, Shreveport, for respondent.
   WATSON, Justice.

This is a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Louisiana State Bar Association through its Committee on Professional Responsibility against a member of the bar, Tommy K. Cryer.

The Committee on Professional Responsibility held an investigatory hearing on August 23,1982, to consider the allegation that Cryer had neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. Following that hearing, a petition for disciplinary action was filed by the LSBA and Commissioner Stuart D. Lunn was appointed to conduct a fact-finding hearing.

Mount Sinai Missionary Baptist Church of Shreveport, Louisiana, was referred to attorney Cryer by People’s Mortgage and Loan, Inc., in connection with the church’s purchase of three lots in Shreveport. Cryer was paid a fee of eight hundred to a thousand dollars to incorporate the church, search the title of the three lots, handle the purchase, and close the loan. The articles of incorporation of the church were filed in the office of the Louisiana Secretary of State on November 7, 1977. The deed to the three lots, dated October 26, 1977, was not recorded until December 9, 1981. As a result of Cryer’s neglect, the church was required to pay ad valorem taxes of $1,215.14 for 1978 through 1981. Had the deed been timely recorded, the church would have been exempt from ad valorem taxes during that period.

Cryer was first contacted by members of the church about his failure to record the deed in October of 1979, but he took no corrective action for two years. Shortly after the petition for disciplinary action was filed, Cryer reimbursed the church for its loss by a check dated January 3, 1983.

The commissioner concluded that Cryer had violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102 and 6-101(a)(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Louisiana State Bar Association, by failing to timely record the deed and make good the church’s loss at an earlier date.

Attorney Cryer was born in September of 1949, and had just had his twenty-eighth birthday when he handled the transaction for the Mount Sinai Church. He graduated from L.S.U. Law School with honors as a member of Order of the Coif, took a job with a Shreveport firm, and then opened his own office. He lost his father on October 7, 1979, approximately the time he was first advised of his oversight in not recording the church’s deed. In the interim period, from October of 1979 through December of 1981, he was on the brink of an emotional breakdown and also in severe financial straits.

According to Cryer, he had an exaggerated emotional reaction to the sudden, unexpected loss of his father at a young age and “associated this particular piece of embarrassment with that, and I believe that that is the only reason that that file was singled out. When I picked it up, I had to put it right back down, and like I said, I picked the file up totally, not less than two hundred times.” (Tr., Investigatory Hearing, p. 38) Each time, Cryer thought:

“I’ll take it next time, and basically, it was a failure on my part to confront a piece of embarrassment that I associated with a problem, a serious problem.” (Tr., Investigatory Hearing, p. 35)

Cryer’s failure to pay the church’s damages at an earlier date was attributed to insolvency. He had entered into the private practice of law without adequate funds or business. Neglecting to record the deed after notice of his initial failure was the result of a “chemical imbalance” and “depression” (Tr., Commissioner’s Hearing, p. 37). That delay, an isolated act of misconduct, was admittedly irrational. After medical treatment for his depressive state in December of 1982 and January of 1983, Mr. Cryer had a complete change in attitude and ability to function.

According to Cryer’s testimony he has been denied a promising job opportunity, suffered remorse and lost public reputation and esteem because of these proceedings.

The commissioner stated that Cryer did not benefit from his course of action, but recommended suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months. Because the commissioner noted some further legal work which was needed in connection with the church’s purchase, Cryer recorded three corrective documents the following day.

The Louisiana State Bar Association, through its Committee on Professional Responsibility, concurs in the commissioner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, but recommends a period of suspension of at least six months. The Committee contends that Cryer’s testimony about his emotional problems was unsubstantiated by his physician, who did not appear at either hearing. While this is correct, Cryer’s sworn testimony is also unrebutted. According to the commissioner’s factual findings, it was “apparent that Respondent was suffering from emotional problems characterized by him as depression during the period. His actions were not reasonable actions.” (Commissioner’s Report, p. 9)

Since Cryer’s neglect involved such a simple act, and he realized no benefit from his nonfeasance, his behavior is inexplicable on any rational ground. The commissioner correctly found that it must have resulted from some emotional problem. Although not timely made available to the committee, a report by psychiatrist Charles W. Armi-stead corroborates Cryer’s testimony and sheds some light on his otherwise inexplicable behavior:

“It is my opinion that prior to his treatment in December 1982, Mr. Cryer unknowingly suffered from a depressive illness dating back at least to 1979 and very likely further.
“Depressive illness is now regarded by psychiatrists as most often a biological imbalance treated primarily with anti-depressant medications and an illness with protean manifestations often unrecognized by family, friends or the individual himself. It is therefore a primary cause of behavioral problems rather than secondary to environmental causes as was formerly believed. When depression is lifted by appropriate treatment, the negative behavioral aspects disappear as well.
“Mr. Cryer’s failure to record the deed after it came to his notice and the continuing failure to record the deed when it obviously had nothing but negative consequences is explainable as a typical aspect of depressive behavior. Mr. Cryer’s description during his testimony at the investigative hearing of picking up the file and putting it back down, resolving each time to record the deed the next time is typical of a depressive condition and consistent with the diagnoses. Likewise his description of himself after treatment, noted in the Commissioner’s Hearing, is equally consistent with recovery from this condition.” (Respondent’s Brief, Exhibit B, pp. 1-2)

Dr. Armistead concluded that: recurrence of the depressive condition is unlikely; Cryer functioned unusually well considering the duration and depth of his depressive condition; Cryer has demonstrated remorse for his conduct; and no benefit could be realized from additional punitive action.

The committee has called attention to other disciplinary cases: Louisiana State Bar Association v. Van Buskirk, 249 La. 781, 191 So.2d 497 (1966) involved conversion of client’s funds. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Jacques, 260 La. 803, 257 So.2d 413 (1972) involved conversion of client’s funds, other acts of misconduct, and an attorney against whom thirty-seven complaints had been lodged. In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Thompson, 427 So.2d 1144 (La., 1983) an attorney was suspended for two years where he was guilty of four counts of misconduct. Thompson had not made restitution, gave no evidence of mitigating circumstances, failed to cooperate with, the investigation, failed to appear at two of the three hearings held in connection with his malpractice, and did not make a court appearance personally or by brief. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Bubert, 421 So.2d 831 (La., 1982), involved an attorney who had allowed a client’s tort claim to prescribe and was suspended from the practice of law for one year. In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Causey, 393 So.2d 88 (La., 1981), an attorney was suspended for ninety days because he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. However, Causey accepted an excessive fee; his client remained in jail for eight and one-half months while the attorney procrastinated and there was apparently no excuse for the failure to act.

The penalty imposed in disciplinary proceedings should protect the courts and the public. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Klein, 253 La. 603, 218 So.2d 610 (1969); In re Craven, 204 La. 486, 15 So.2d 861 (1943). Attorney discipline is protective rather than punitive. It deters future misconduct by an appropriate penalty. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Summers, 379 So.2d 1065 (La., 1980); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Jones, 372 So.2d 1186 (La., 1979).

Because the problems which caused attorney Cryer’s single act of client neglect have now been cured, his suspension would serve no purpose. It would not have a salutary effect on other members of the bar or the integrity of the courts. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Kramer, 420 So.2d 1110 (La., 1982); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwards, 387 So.2d 1137 (La., 1980); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Mundy, 423 So.2d 1126 (La., 1982).

In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Rivette, 368 So.2d 1045 (La., 1979) an attorney was reprimanded for intentionally failing to perform services for which he had been paid. Cryer’s inaction was not intentional; it resulted from illness. Thus, it is doubtful that willful violation of a disciplinary rule reflecting upon Cryer’s moral fitness to practice law has been established. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Causey, 440 So.2d 125 (La., 1983). The only appropriate sanction is a public reprimand for Cryer’s violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. See Louisiana State Bar Association v. Mundy, supra.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Tommy K. Cryer be publicly reprimanded for his violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. All costs are assessed to respondent, Tommy K. Cryer.

      . Roland J. Achee, member of the Committee, has recused himself in this matter.

      . Rule 1-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
      “A. A lawyer shall not:
      “(6) Engage in any ... conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.”

      .Rule 6-101(A)(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
      “(A) A lawyer shall not:
      “(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.”

      . Dr. Armistead is a member of the Louisiana State Bar Association and also a well known, board certified psychiatrist. The Committee on Professional Responsibility, Louisiana State Bar Association, does not oppose consideration of his report.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WATSON, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    CITY OF SHREVEPORT v. STANDARD PRINTING COMPANY OF SHREVEPORT, INC.
    No. 83-C-0962.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.

      Charles B. Peatross, Roland J. Achee, Charles C. Grubb, City Atty., Joseph M. Clark, Sr., Asst. City Atty., Shreveport, for applicant.
    H.F. Sockrider, Jr., James E. Bolin, Jr., Soekrider & Bolin, Shreveport, for respondent.
   WATSON, Justice.

The City of Shreveport instituted an expropriation proceeding to take land and a building owned by Standard Printing Company of Shreveport, Inc., which operated an office supply and printing business on the premises. The parties stipulated the public purpose and necessity for the taking of the property in connection with construction of the Downtown Transit Terminal Project, but differed on the damages due Standard Printing, the latter rejecting a final offer of payment by the City of $165,000. The parties further stipulated that the fair market value of the land and building was $160,000. The question of compensation was tried under the mandate of Art. 1, § 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 which in pertinent part provides as follows:

“Property shall not be taken or damaged by the State or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit .... and the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss.”

The trial court awarded defendant $573,006 as replacement cost of the land and building, $10,475.60 as loss of business as a result of the move, actual moving expenses (no sum set), as well as attorney fees and fees for the experts who testified. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit carefully reviewed the decision of the trial court and affirmed it except to increase by $2,000 the amount fixed for attorney fees. 427 So.2d 1304 (La.App. 2 Cir.1983). On application by the City, a writ was granted to review the correctness of the judgment. 435 So.2d 426 (La., 1983).

The facts as developed by the defendant, Standard Printing, through the testimony of several lay and expert witnesses reflected the following:

Standard Printing has been located in the building in question in the central business district of Shreveport since 1941. The lot measures forty feet by one hundred twenty feet, and is entirely covered by the building. Constructed in 1922, the building was remodeled in 1945 and, according to the testimony of the experts, it was entirely suitable for the business. Some of the features of the building were obsolete, particularly the hand operated elevator, the stairs, and the electrical wiring. The building contained approximately 4,800 square feet on each of two floors, although the upper floor had a low ceiling and was not air conditioned, being used principally as an area for storage of merchandise and supplies, notably paper.

Standard Printing is a family owned business with the stockholders being employed either full or part time in the business. The testimony of Frank Fulco, president of the company, indicated that virtually all of the company’s business came from individuals, firms, or public offices located in downtown Shreveport. The economic experts who testified indicated that moving the business out of the downtown area would have a severe economic impact on Standard Printing and cause a substantial loss of patronage.

An expert realtor, Joseph M. Wilkinson, testified on behalf of defendant that he had personally located and examined twenty-three potential sites in the central business district where Standard Printing might consider relocating. All except one of these available sites were rejected for one reason or another, too large, too small, too expensive, or too much renovation required. The only suitable property was a vacant lot on Crocket Street available at a price of $49,-000.

Having demonstrated that its business would be severely damaged by a move from downtown Shreveport and having further established that a suitable replacement building was not available, Standard Printing then presented Richard Gay, a civil engineer and an officer of the Werner Construction Company who qualified as an expert in the construction of commercial buildings. He testified that a building could be built on the Crocket Street lot with square footage equivalent to the expropriated building at a cost, including the price of the land, of $573,000. It is to be noted that the building estimate was for a structure as similar as possible to the present Standard Printing building, but with changes necessitated by the City’s building code. These would include (1) an eight foot ceiling on the second floor instead of a six foot clearance, (2) an electric elevator instead of manual, (3) fire-resistant stairs, and (4) improvements to the electrical system.

Opposing Standard Printing’s position, the City presented only two witnesses, Jack Landon and Walter L. Hunter, who gave conventional appraisals of the property as it stood. These appraisals were far less than the figure given by Mr. Gay, but their testimony “... was seriously disputed,” as noted by the trial court. (Tr. 42) The trial court obviously had doubts about “... the substantive content and their concept of replacement value ...” which was supported by “no evidence other than the appraisers’ opinion.” (Ibid.) Accepting Standard Printing’s theory of the case and the testimony of their experts, the trial court held that to compensate defendant to the full extent of its loss, the City would be required to pay damages of $573,000 for the land and building plus the various other lesser items noted above.

Our review of the record indicates a paucity of evidence on behalf of the City and also no argument or legal theory which would invalidate the conclusions of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

For these reasons, we have determined that the writ was improvidently issued and it is recalled.

WRIT RECALLED.

CALOGERO, J., concurs.

      . The thirty-nine page opinion by the late Judge Paul Lynch under date of August 6, 1982, is a model of a detailed and thorough statement of reasons for judgment.

      . Drs. Terrence M. Clauretie and Melvin W. Harju, L.S.U. Shreveport, testified for defendant; there were no experts in the field of economics for the City.

      . It is interesting to note that the testimony indicated that the price of this lot was less than a non-downtown lot located on Youree Drive, apparently another commercial area in Shreveport, available for $100,000.


author: LEMMON, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert J. SMITH.
    No. 82-KA-2018.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.

      William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., William R. Campbell, Michael M. Simpson, Beryl McSmith, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Dennis Jude Dannel, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   LEMMON, Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction of possession of pentazocine. Defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labor on the basis of his three prior felony convictions, although he was not charged as a multiple offender.

The evidence consisted of the testimony of Officer Eddie Selby, who observed the incident and made the arrest, and of a chemist, who analyzed the pills seized by the police and determined the pills contained pentazocine, a controlled dangerous substance.

Officer Selby testified that he was patrolling on Orleans Avenue in New Orleans in a police unit with another officer in mid-afternoon, when he noticed two Negro males standing on North Roman Street near the corner. He saw them exchange money and another object, but he could “not [be] sure exactly what it was”. The officers then circled the block and approached North Roman Street through a driveway between two buildings. When the police car came into view, one of the two men discarded a small tinfoil package onto the street, and they walked off in opposite directions.

Selby stopped the two men and detained them, while his associate retrieved the tinfoil package. The officers opened the package and found several small pink and blue pills which they recognized as “T’s and Blues”.

The officers then arrested and searched the two men. Defendant had a ten dollar bill and several five dollar bills in his possession. The other man had several empty tinfoil containers. Selby testified without objection that such containers were commonly used as storage units for narcotics.

On cross-examination, Selby admitted that he did 'not actually see any tinfoil packages exchanged between the two men on his initial observation and could not discern which of the two men discarded the tinfoil package when the police unit suddenly came upon them. However, he stated that he saw a hand from one of the two men discard the package into the immediate area where the two men were standing. In answer to an inquiry about their purpose in going around the block, Selby stated that the exchange of money and another object in an area of high drug traffic had aroused their suspicion.

In order to satisfy due process standards, the record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). La.C. Cr.P. Art. 821, added by Act No. 144 of 1982, tracks the Jackson language in setting up a Louisiana standard pertaining to post-verdict motions for acquittal based upon insufficiency of the evidence.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983). Moreover, this court recently noted that “[although the circumstantial evidence rule [La.R.S. 15:438] may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror’s reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful observation of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence”. State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 470 (La.1983).

In the present case, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence established that defendant exercised actual or constructive possession of the drugs by having them under his control or dominion. The police officer witnessed an exchange of money and an unknown object between the defendant and another man in an area known for drug transactions. A short while later, the officer observed a tinfoil package dropped from the hand of one of the two men as soon as the police car came into sight, whereupon the men hastily departed from the scene. A prompt search revealed that one of the men had empty packages, similar to the discarded package of drugs, and that the other man had cash on his person. Thus, there was direct evidence (1) of an exchange which appeared to be a drug sale, (2) of a search (after a brief period during which the two participants were not observed) which yielded money possessed by one participant in the exchange and empty drug containers by the other; and (3) of a discarding of a package of drugs by one of the two participants.

We conclude that the overall evidence, direct and circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had knowledge of and dominion and control over the package of drugs at the time the package was discarded or shortly prior thereto. No hypothesis of innocence which is sufficiently reasonable or sufficiently strong to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a rational juror may be inferred from the record facts, and defendant offered no evidence or argument affirmatively suggesting a theory of innocence.

Accordingly, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.

      . Defendant’s other assignment of error involves settled principles of law and is treated in an unpublished appendix, which is attached to this opinion and is a part of the official record.

      . The other arresting officer did not testify. The state obtained an instanter subpoena on the day of trial, but the return indicated that the officer was on furlough. Defense counsel, who also wanted to question the officer, had not subpoenaed him.


author: LEMMON, Justice. WATSON, Justice

text:
    STATE ex rel I.W. CORBELLO v. Hon. W. Ellis BOND, District Judge.
    No. 83-KK-1173.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
    Thomas L. Lorenzi, Hunt, Godwin, Painter, Roddy, Lorenzi & Watson, Lake Charles, for defendant-applicant.
    Leonard Knapp, Jr., Dist. Atty., Eugene Bouquet, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent.
   LEMMON, Justice.

This case presents the issue, in the posture of a pretrial motion to quash, of the constitutionality of Calcasieu Parish Ordinance No. 2263, which provides:

“As authorized by R.S. 33:4852, it shall be unlawful for any person in this parish to gamble with cards, or to participate in any card game by whatever name the game may be called or known, at which money, or anything representing money, or any article of value shall be pledged, bet, or hazarded. This section shall not apply to any private game played in a private home occupied by a family as such, or game in private clubs, conducted without rake-off for gain.”

Because the ordinance prohibits “non-business gambling” with cards in places other than private homes and private clubs, it proscribes conduct which is not encompassed within the proscription of the state gambling statute, La.R.S. 14:90. The critical issue is whether the Legislature, under its constitutional mandate to define and suppress gambling, may define the offense of gambling in a prohibitory criminal statute of statewide application as gambling conducted “as a business” and may additionally permit (through La.R.S. 33:4852) individual parishes to enact ordinances prohibiting all gambling with cards (whether or not the gambling is conducted as a business) in places other than private homes and private clubs.

Defendant and several others were arrested by Calcasieu sheriff deputies for gambling with cards in defendant’s trailer. The bill of information charged defendant with violating Calcasieu Parish Ordinance No. 2263 in that he “did unlawfully gamble with cards or participate in a card game by whatever name the game may be called or known at which money or anything representing money, or any article of value, was pledged, bet or hazarded....” Thus, the bill merely tracked the language of the ordinance.

Defendant filed, a motion to quash, in which he challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. Citing State v. Kaufman, 353 So.2d 995 (La.1978), he argued that the ordinance proscribed “non-business conduct” and was therefore inconsistent with the legislative definition of gambling in La. R.S. 14:90.

The trial court denied the motion to quash. The court of appeal denied defendant’s application for review, finding no error in the ruling. We granted certiorari. 435 So.2d 454.

The Kaufman decision is premised on the 1974 Constitution’s mandate that the Legislature define and suppress gambling. La. Const. Art. XII, § 6 (1974). See also La. Const. Art. XIX, § 8 (1921), which formerly provided in pertinent part that “gambling is a vice and the Legislature shall pass laws to suppress it.” In declaring unconstitutional a city ordinance (enacted under a home rule charter apparently without reference to La. R.S. 33:4852), this court in Kaufman said:

“To the extent that a local government seeks to punish as ‘gambling’ conduct which falls outside the definition enacted by the legislature (now La.R.S. 14:90), it attempts to exercise authority which is inconsistent with Article 12, Section 6 of the Constitution.
“As (solely) authorized by the constitution, the legislature has defined certain conduct as gambling when conducted ‘as a business.’ A local government may be authorized to punish the offense of gambling, as thus defined by the legislature; it may not, however, similarly punish non-business conduct as ‘gambling’, since the legislature alone is given the constitutional power to define what conduct shall be suppressed as constituting gambling.
“The district court correctly held the Shreveport gambling ordinance unconstitutional, in the light of the principles stated, because: ‘ * * * by legislative definition, the prohibited activities must be conducted as a business. The city ordinance at issue includes the definition, but goes far beyond that and prohibits [social] activities which would not be classified as a ‘business’.” 353 So.2d at 997 (Emphasis supplied, parenthetical material in original text).

Thus, the Kaufman decision clearly established the principle that the Constitution mandates the Legislature to preempt the field and to exercise the exclusive authority to define that conduct which must be suppressed as gambling. The court accordingly held a local government cannot constitutionally enact a statute which proscribes as gambling conduct not encompassed by the legislative definition of gambling. See City of Alexandria v. LaCombe, 220 La. 618, 57 So.2d 206 (1952). Since the Kaufman decision did not mention or consider the relationship between La.R.S. 33:4852 and the constitutional mandate of exclusive authority to the Legislature, the instant case presents the further issue of whether the provisions of La.R.S. 33:4852 in effect constitute an alternative legislative definition of gambling which may (or may not) be adopted by individual parish governing bodies.

We hold that La. Const. Art. VII, § 6 (1974), which granted the Legislature the exclusive mandate to define and suppress gambling, prohibits the Legislature from granting to the parish governing bodies the perogative to decide what shall be in effect local gambling crimes, as was done here. A contrary holding would allow the Legislature to abdicate its constitutional mandate to “define” and “suppress” gambling by simply giving relatively general guidelines regarding the limits of parochial ordinances. Thus, Ordinance No. 2263 is unconstitutional because its proscription of non-business conduct as gambling exceeds the legislative definition in La.R.S. 14:90. See State v. Kaufman, above.

Accordingly, the ruling of the trial court is set aside, and defendant’s motion to quash is granted.

CALOGERO, J., concurs.

DENNIS, J., dissents.

WATSON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

BLANCHE, J., dissents and will assign reasons.

WATSON, Justice

concurring.

The majority is correct in holding that a parish may not declare non-business gambling with cards to be unlawful when the legislature has previously defined gambling to require the conduct of a game as a business. I concur merely to point out that the defendant could have been charged under LSA-R.S. 14:90 and there would be no problem of constitutionality.

I respectfully concur.

      . Ordinance No. 2263 was enacted pursuant to the specific legislative authorization of La.R.S. 33:4852, which provides:

        “Police juries may suppress and prohibit gambling with cards, or any card game by whatever name the game may be called, at which anything of value is pledged, bet, or hazarded. This Section shall not apply to any private game played in a private home occupied by a family as such, or game in private clubs, conducted without rake-off for gain.”

      . La.R.S. 14:90 provides:
      “A. Gambling is the intentional conducting, or directly assisting in the conducting, as a business, of any game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit.
      * * * * * *
      “Whoever commits the crime of gambling shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.”

      . La. Const. Art. XII, § 6 (1974) provides in pertinent part:
      “Gambling shall be defined by and suppressed by the legislature.”

      . At a hearing on motions filed by defendant, the evidence established that deputies raided a card game in progress in the trailer, having been signaled by an undercover deputy inside the trailer. Cards and varying sums of money were on the table in front of each player. The undercover deputy testified that he had played in several games of poker over a two-week period and had seen defendant “cut from the pot” over 30 times during the games.

      . Although the undercover deputy had seen defendant “rake off” from the “pot”, defendant was charged merely with gambling with cards. He was not charged under the ordinance with conducting a “rake off” from a game in a private home or private club. Nor was he charged under La.R.S. 14:90 with conducting a gambling game with cards “as a business”.
      The state asserts in brief that defendant has conceded the trailer in which the games took place was not a “private home” or a “private club”. However, the state was not required to negative the private home or club exception in the bill of information, which is the only thing before the court for consideration at the present time. See La.C.Cr.P. Art. 479.

      . Defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the charging document, although the bill merely tracked the language of the statute and further charged in a “disjunctive” fashion. See State v. Gainey, 376 So.2d 1240 (La.1979); La. C.Cr.P. Art. 480.

      . “Gambling” is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 932 (1971) to include any playing for money or wagering, and not simply wagering as a business. The legislative definition in La.R.S. 14:90 is clearly more limited than the general definition of “gambling” in that the offense does not include “non-business conduct”. State v. Kaufman, above.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin DUNNS.
    No. 81-KA-0527.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., William R. Campbell, Tom Cowan, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Philip R. Johnson, George E. Escher, Kat-ner & Escher, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Calvin B. Dunns was charged by bill of information with armed robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. After trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged. The trial judge, after denying defendant’s motion for a presentence investigation, sentenced him to serve forty years at hard labor. On appeal, defendant’s conviction was affirmed by this court; however, because the trial judge had failed to comply with the sentencing guidelines of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, we vacated his sentence and remanded the ease to the trial court for re-sentencing. State v. Dunns, 404 So.2d 1235 (La.1981). On remand, after a pre-sentence investigation and in compliance with La. Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 at a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced defendant to serve forty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Defendant appeals to this court urging one assignment of error, that the sentence imposed is excessive. Given compliance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of the trial judge’s wide sentencing discretion. State v. Spencer, 374 So.2d 1195 (La.1979). The penalty provision for armed robbery (La. R.S. 14:64) is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. After review of the record in this case, we are unable to say that the trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing defendant to forty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Hence, we do not find defendant’s sentence excessive. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence is affirmed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lionel C. HILL.
    No. 83-KA-0516.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 30, 1983.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., William Campbell, Richard Thomas, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-ap-pellee.
    Lloyd N. Frischhertz, Seelig, Cosse’ & Frischhertz, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed, reserving the right to the defendant to raise the “Brady ” issue in post-conviction relief proceedings.


text:
    Jon ENGLISH v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION and Tulane University of Louisiana.
    No. 83-C-2125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 1983.
   In re Jon English, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 83-14981.

Denied.

MARCUS and WATSON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Malcolm R. GOMEZ.
    No. 83-K-1734.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 17, 1983.
   In re Malcolm R. Gomez, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. First Circuit Court of Appeal. Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany. No. 93357.

Denied. While the Court of Appeal was in error on the contemporaneous objection rule (during argument) the error is not reversible. State v. Lee, 346 So.2d 682.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Louis HALL.
    No. 83-KH-1992.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 28, 1983.
    Reconsideration Denied Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Louis Hall, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 287-370.

Denied. No new trial motion now pending.


text:
    John VINTURELLA, Floyd Trascher, Elaine Guillot, Dorothy Kehoe, George Brown, Dina Baute, Billy June Langford, Barbara Dodds and James Lamz v. Bruce E. UNANGST, Parish President of St. Tammany, and the Parish Council of St. Tammany.
    No. 83-C-2138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 4, 1983.
   In re John Vinturella, et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Twenty-second Judicial District Court. Parish of St. Tammany. No. 71605.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION of George DAVIS, Jr. Mrs. George DAVIS, Jr. v. Lorena Davis ARDOIN and Oscar Davis.
    No. 83-C-2015.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Lorena Davis Ardoin and Oscar Davis, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court. Nos. 77-5528 and 78-1300. ■

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Jean E. GENDUSA, et al. v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 83-C-2018.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re J. Carlos Pisarello, M.D. and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court. No. 601-540.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    James E. DASPIT and His Wife, Janet S. Daspit, d/b/a Swann Supply v. Ellen Tooley SWANN, Widow of Francis E. Swann, Individually, and as Administratrix of the Succession of Francis E. Swann. Ellen T. SWAN v. James E. DASPIT. U.S. FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Ellen Tooley SWANN, Individually and as Administratrix of the Succession of Francis E. Swann.
    No. 83-C-2025.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Ellen Tooley Swann, applying for writ of certiorari. First Circuit Court of Appeal, Parish of St. Tammany. Nos. 15070,15071 and 15072. Twenty-second Judicial District Court. Nos. 54668, 54773 and 56126.

Denied.


text:
    Jean E. GENDUSA, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Son, Michael Jean GENDUSA v. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 83-C-1986.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Michael Jean Gendusa, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 601-540.

Denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Merlin BRISSET (DHHR, Office of Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans).
    No. 83-C-2020.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Department of Health and Human Resources, Office of Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. First Circuit Court of Appeal. Civil Service Commission. No. 2365.

Denied. The issue of the constitutionality of La.R.S. 42:1451 is not raised in'the only application for certiorari.


text:
    GULF BUILDING SERVICES, INC. v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY.
    No. 83-C-2024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Gulf Building Services, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans. Civil District Court. No. 573-759.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., CALOGERO and MARCUS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Soula O’BANNON v. Dr. Robert AZAR.
    No. 83-C-2026.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Soula O’Bannon, applying for writ of certiorari. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 80-16227, Division “B”.

Denied.


text:
    Roberto MIRANDA v. CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY, et al.
    No. 83-C-2028.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Roberto Miranda, applying for writ of certiorari, P/R, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA0591, from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 82-9913.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald Ray LOVE.
    No. 83-K-1924.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Donald Ray Love, applying for writ of review. Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. Parish of Caddo, First Judicial District Court. No. 118,700.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Eugene NEPVEAUX and Catherine Nepveaux v. LINWOOD REALTY COMPANY, INC. and Donald Fitzgerald.
    No. 83-C-1991.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Linwood Realty Company, Inc. and Donald Fitzgerald, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Twenty-seventh Judicial District Court. No. 84454-1. (St. Landry Parish).

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Virginia E. HENRY (Linda Gaspard, Provisional Administratrix of the Succession of Virginia E. Henry) v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, et al.
    No. 83-C-1993.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Virginia E. Henry, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides. No. 118914.

Denied.

WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Richard CLARK v. AQUA AIR INDUSTRIES, INC. and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company a/k/n Aetna Life Insurance Company a/k/n, Aetna Life and Casualty Company.
    No. 83-C-1996.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Aqua Air Industries, Inc. and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company a/k/n Aetna Life Insurance Company a/k/n, Aetna Life and Casualty Company, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of Jefferson, Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 257-209.

Denied.

BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Kathleen WERNER v. NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT.
    No. 83-C-2038.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re New Orleans Police Department, applying for writ of certiorari. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Civil Service Commission of the City of New Orleans. No. 1807. Parish of Orleans.

Denied.


text:
    Elizabeth Foy BROWN v. Edwin EDWARDS, etc., et al. Lawrence SMITH and Irma Smith v. Edwin EDWARDS, etc., et al.
    No. 83 C 2042.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Elizabeth Foy Brown, Lawrence Smith and Irma Smith, applying for writ of review. First Circuit Court of Appeal. Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nos. 167857,167858.

Denied.


text:
    Arthur Dixon COLLEY v. Diana Lee Day COLLEY.
    No. 83-C-2044.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Diana Lee Day Colley, applying for writ of review. First Circuit Court of Appeal. Family Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 48774.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Daniel Paul ZIEGLER v. DEPARTMENT OF FIRE.
    No. 83-OC-2045.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Daniel Paul Ziegler, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Civil Service Commission, City of New Orleans. No. 1752.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    John V. REED v. HOUSE OF DECOR & Gulf Insurance Company.
    No. 83-C-2004.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re John V. Reed, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court. No. 77-5672.

Granted. The order of the Court of Appeal for new trial is reversed; the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal which is ordered to decide the case on the record. See Gonzales v. Xerox, 320 So.2d 163.

MARCUS, and LEMMON, JJ., concur.


text:
    UNITED CREDIT PLAN OF GRETNA, INC. v. Richard PULLEN and Bobalin Pullen.
    No. 83-C-2011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re United Credit Plan of Gretna, Inc. applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Thirty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Bernard. No. 35-590.

Granted.


text:
    Michael TEBBE, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of the Minor Children, Jane Tebbe, Michael Tebbe, Jr., Taylor Tebbe, Charlotte Tebbe, and Charleen Tebbe, and Sue Tebbe, Individually v. Frank AVEGNO, Jr., and His Insurer, Allstate Insurance Company and the Travelers Insurance Company.
    No. 83-C-2037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Michael Tebbe, et al., applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Division K, No. 80-4876.

Not considered; not timely filed. C.C.Pr. 2166.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael Carl PIGLER, Sr.
    No. 83-KH-2062.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Michael Carl Pigler, Sr., applying for remedial writ. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 295-173, Section “G”.

Granted and transferred to Court of Appeal, 4th Circuit.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Eric JONES A/K/A Earl Coleman v. Honorable Miriam WALTZER, Judge Criminal District Court, Section “A”, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-0635.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Eric Jones A/K/A Earl Coleman, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 250-337.

Granted and transferred to the district court for action.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie CULLIVER.
    No. 83-KH-2286.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Willie Culliver, applying for remedial writs. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 296-089.

Granted and transferred to the district court for action.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Oscar McCLENDON.
    No. 83-KH-2089.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Oscar McClendon, applying for writ of mandamus. Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Madison. Nos. 33-884, 34-352, 34-353.

Granted for the following purpose only:

It is ordered that relator be provided with a free copy of his Boykin transcript. Otherwise, the application is denied.


text:
    Audie Ray CUTRER v. DIXIE ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 83-CC-1999.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Dixie Electric Membership Corporation, Mark A. Coston and Federated Rural Electric Insurance Corporation, applying for supervisory writs and stay order. Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 257963. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 83-CW-0917.

Not considered. Untimely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Theophield MARTIN v. STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 82-KH-0938.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Theophield Martin, applying for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 265-020.

Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Jack NAIL v. Municipal Court Judge Eddie SAPIR and City Attorney, Sec. A Municipal Court.
    No. 82-KH-1275.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Jack Nail, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans, Municipal Court. No. 664311.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Noah Lee BROCK v. Dewaine SEAL.
    No. 82-KH-1276.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Noah Lee Brock, applying for supervisory writs and remedial writs. Parish of Washington.

Denied.


text:
    CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. Thomas JOHANNING MEYER.
    No. 82-KH-1316.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Thomas Johanning Meyer, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Municipal Court. No. 660486. Parish of Orleans.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Willie Lee JACKSON v. Donald R. GUILLORY, Warden.
    No. 82-KH-1385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
    Reconsideration Denied Dec. 9, 1983.
   In re Willie Lee Jackson, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Jackson. No. 19471.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Matt B. DOWNEY v. ORLEANS INDIGENT DEFENDER PROGRAM Orleans Parish, State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-1601.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Matt B. Downey, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans. No. 281-029.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Paul THOMAS v. BURL-CAIN Warden Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 82-KH-1838.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Paul Thomas, applying for writs of certiorari or review. Parish of Rapides. No. 180-533.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel., Rayfield WILSON v. I.G. OLINDE, Clerk and 18th Judicial District Court Parish of Pointe Coupee State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-2958.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Rayfield Wilson, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Pointe Coupee. No. 23708 and 23970.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Lionel BUCHANAN v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, et al. and Clerk of Court/for the Parish of Orleans.
    No. 83-KH-0609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Lionel Buchanan, applying for writ of mandamus/supervisory remedial. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. Nos. 286-398 and 242-432 Section “B”.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    DEHART, HOHENSEE, LAPEYROUSE & MATHERNE, a Partnership Comprised of Wilfred R. Dehart, Wendell J. Hohen-see, Elray J. Lapeyrouse and Floyd H. Matherne, D/B/A United Industries v. The ROBICHAUX COMPANY, INC. and David A. Robichaux.
    No. 83-C-2002.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Dehart, Hohensee, Lapeyrouse and Matherne, a Partnership Comprised of Wilfred R. Dehart, Wendell J. Hohensee, Elray J. Lapeyrouse and Floyd H. Math-erne, D/B/A, United Industries, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82-CA-0861. Thirty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne. No. 57695.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Meltress Painter, Wife of and Patrick J. TOOLEY v. Robert (Bob) LAMONDRA & the First National Bank of Saint Tammany Parish, Covington, La.
    No. 83-C-2019.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Meltress Painter, Wife of and Patrick J. Tooley, applying for writ of certiora-ri and/or review. First Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 82-CA-0869. Parish of St. Tammany, Twenty-second Judicial District Court. No. 60104.

Denied.

CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Leslie F. WALGAMOTTE v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 83-KH-1954.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Leslie F. Walgamotte, applying for writ of mandamus or prohibition. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 224-588, Section I.

Denied.


author: DIXON, C.J.,

text:
    DUPLESSIS CADILLAC, INC. v. Dawn HEATHER.
    No. 83-C-2031.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Dawn Heather, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82-CA-0920. Parish of East Baton Rouge, Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 249-441, Division F.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J.,

would grant the writ for the reasons assigned by the dissenting judge.


text:
    Beverly D. SETLIFF v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY and Dellic A. Martin.
    No. 83-CC-2036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, applying for supervisory writs of cer-tiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. No. 252-745. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, Parish of Jefferson. No. 83-C-573.

Not considered. See Rule X Section 5(b). The writ was untimely.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Austin FLUGENCE.
    No. 83-KP-2058.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Austin Flugence, applying for supervisory and remedial writs. Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia. No. 83-53253.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would order evidentiary hearing.


text:
    Delores TOMASEO, Individually and in Her Capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Her Minor Child, Rocco Tomaseo v. The STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Debbie Stokes, Wife of/and Albert Craig Stokes, ABC Insurance. Debbie Stokes, Wife of/and Albert Craig STOKES v. BARRIERE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., XYZ Insurance Company and the State of Louisiana Through the Department of Transportation and Development.
    No. 83-CC-2060.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Barriere Construction Company, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company and George Wilson, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Thirty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Bernard. Nos. 39-895, 40-072. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. C-1074.

Denied.

DENNIS, J. would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Andrew VESSELL, Jr.
    No. 83-K-2064.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Andrew Vessell, Jr. applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. No. 82-KA-1117. Parish of East Baton Rouge, Nineteenth Judicial District Court. No. 6-81-703.

Denied. Not timely filed.

DIXON, C.J., would deny the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Esther PENNS v. Johnnie JONES, Warden.
    No. 83-KH-2092.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Ms. Esther Penns, applying for remedial writs. Criminal District Court, Par- • ish of Orleans. No. 270-578.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Wayne MASON v. 2ND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL.
    No. 83-KH-2093.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Wayne Mason, applying for remedial writs. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 15980-1, H. Parish of Bossier, Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court. No. 59590.

Denied


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Henry HARPER v. THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 83-KH-2137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Henry Harper, applying for remedial writs. Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Lincoln. No. 26160-F.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Roderick W. PARKER v. CITY COURT OF BATON ROUGE, Parish of East Baton Rouge, and Court of Appeal, First Circuit, State of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-2208.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Roderick W. Parker, applying for writs of certiorari and mandamus. City Court of Baton Rouge. No. 8209-6048. Parish of East Baton Rouge, First Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 83 CW 1133.

Denied.


text:
    The SAVINGS BANK OF BALTIMORE v. VENTURE ’73, a Louisiana Partnership in Commendam and Quinn-L Corporation 1974, a Louisiana Partnership in Commendam.
    No. 83-CC-2243.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Quinn-L Corporation 1974, applying for writ of certiorari/review and stay order. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 83-770. Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides. No. 125433.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mary Lisa West MURPHY.
    No. 83-KK-2244.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Mary Lisa West Murphy, applying for supervisory writs of review, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita. No. M52080. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 16040-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilma Jean ELMORE.
    No. 83-KK-2245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Wilma Jean Elmore, applying for supervisory writ of review, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita. No. M52074. Second Circuit Court of Appeals. No. 16038-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeffery ROSE.
    No. 83-KK-2246.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Jeffery Rose, applying for writs of review, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita. No. M52085. Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. No. 16039-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Winston J. LANDRY.
    No. 83-KK-2247.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Winston J. Landry, applying for supervisory "writs of review, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita. No. M52079. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 16031-KW.

Denied.


text:
    CITY OF MONROE v. Charles K. RAINWATER.
    No. 83-KK-2274.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Charles K. Rainwater, applying for writs of certiorari and review, prohibition, mandamus, and stay order. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. No! 16017-KW. Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita. No. 334.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alton McCLOUD v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT SECTION “G” PARISH OF ORLEANS.
    No. 83-KH-1121.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Alton McCloud, applying for writ of remedial. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 249-024 Section “G”.

Granted. The district court is ordered to appoint counsel for relator for the appeal. It is further ordered that the record on appeal be lodged in this Court within 60 days.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Sergio SANTOS v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 82-KH-0817.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Sergio Santos, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court. No. 268-423.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ronnie WILLIAMS v. Honorable Leon FORD, III, Judge 21st Judicial District Court Parish of Tangipahoa Amite, Louisiana 70422.
    No. 82-KH-1039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Ronnie Williams, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Tangipahoa. No. 41248.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Douglas JOHNSON v. Warden Roger AUCOIN.
    No. 82-KH-1291.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Douglas Johnson, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Edgar W. CASTON v. N. Burl CAIN/Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.
    No. 82-KH-1882.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Edgar W. Caston, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Livingston. No. 3297.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Matthew MITCHELL v. CLERK OF COURT, FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, Parish of Calcasieu, State of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-0241.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Matthew Mitchell, applying for writ of mandamus. Calcasieu Parish. No. 6629-80.

Denied.


text:
    Carolyn Parker MARTIN v. RILEY STOKER CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 83-CC-1921.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Linden-Alimak, A.B., applying for supervisory writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Pointe Coupee. No. 16409. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. No. 83-CW-0946.

Denied.

DENNIS and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David M. BUCHANAN.
    No. 83-KP-2005.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re David M. Buchanan, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Jefferson Parish. No. 81-1073.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joel K. WOODS.
    No. 83-K-2010.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Joel K. Woods, applying to the First Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 83-KA-1089. Parish of East Baton Rouge, Nineteenth Judicial District Court.

Denied.


text:
    LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, et al. v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al. Daryl Claire Sins, Wife of/and Alvin R. CHILDRESS, III v. Ernest N. MORIAL, Mayor, et al. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al. v. The BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF ORLEANS PARISH, et al.
    No. 83-OC-2046.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Daryl Claire Sins, et al., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Nos. CA-0868, CA-0869, CA-0870 and CA-0871. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. Nos. 79-5381, 79-12699, 80-5256 and 81-2655.

On the showing made, Denied.

DIXON, C.J., CALOGERO and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robert MYLES v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-2224.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Robert Myles, applying for supervisory writs from the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 265-242.

Denied.


text:
    WEEDEN ENGINEERING CORP., et al. v. Anthony HALE and Louis M. Corne.
    No. 83-C-2065.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Louis M. Corne, et al, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette. No. 811827-H.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    WEEDEN ENGINEERING CORPORATION, et al. v. Anthony HALE and Louis M. Corne.
    No. 83-C-2068.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Weeden Engineering Corporation, et al., applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition and/or review. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Lafayette, Fifteenth Judicial District Court. No. 811827-H.

Denied.


text:
    Abe MILLER and Paul Miller v. AGUILAR/WILSON, INC. AGUILAR/WILSON, INC. v. Abe MILLER, et al.
    No. 83-C-2013.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Abe Miller, Paul Miller and Miller Timber Company, Inc., applying to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Nos. 239170 and 246525.

Denied.

LEMMON, J., concurs in the denial. The result is correct.


text:
    Mable Herbez MALEIG v. Calvin J. MALEIG.
    No. 83-C-2014.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Mable Herbez Maleig, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 78-5058.

Denied.

CALOGERO and MARCUS, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    David JOHNSON and Earl Roberts, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of His Son, Ryan Roberts v. Alvin P. DUFRENE, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and the City of New Orleans.
    No. 83-C-1868.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re The City of New Orleans, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Thirty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Bernard. No. 33-998.

Denied.

MARCUS, DENNIS, and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    John M. ELLIS, Jr., et al. v. Gwendolyn Ann DEARING.
    No. 83-C-2047.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Gwendolyn Ann Dearing, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 259510, Div. M.

Denied.

DENNIS, J., votes to grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Billy Roy TYLER v. Honorable Cecil P. CAMPBELL, II, Judge and Vol Dooley, 26th Judicial District Court.
    No. 83-KH-2301.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Billy Roy Tyler, applying for remedial writs. Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Bossier.

Writ denied. This matter is pending in the 2nd Circuit, Court of Appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Lonzell GARDNER v. Honorable Douglas J. NEHRBASS Judge, 15th Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette.
    No. 83-KH-2212.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Lonzell Gardner, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Lafayette. Nos. 45538 and 43137.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Larry J. SYLVESTER v. Honorable H. Garland PAVY, Judge, 27th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry.
    No. 83-KH-2290.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 11, 1983.
   In re Larry J. Sylvester, applying for writ of mandamus. Twenty-seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry. No. 28054.

Denied. Relator must first file in the district court and allow a reasonable length of time for the court to rule before applying for mandamus.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reginald DUNCAN.
    No. 83-KK-2346.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 1983.
   In re Reginald Duncan, applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans. Fourth Circuit, Court of Appeal. No. K-1560.

Denied. Adequate remedy by appeal in event of conviction.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William G. THOMPSON.
    No. 83-KH-2114.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re William S. Thompson, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Fourteenth Judicial District Court. Parish of Calcasieu. RC-68-83.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring this application to the Third Circuit, Court of Appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William G. THOMPSON.
    No. 83-KH-2364.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re William G. Thompson, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu. No. RC68-83.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring this application to the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. John FULFORD v. Honorable Norbert C. RAYFORD, Commissioner, 19th Judicial District Court, East Baton Rouge Parish.
    No. 82-KH-2850.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re John Fulford, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Granted. The Commissioner is ordered to rule in 239,867, 244,810 and 245,240 by December 31.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Freddie Lee FONTENBERRY v. 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 83-KH-1893.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Freddie Lee Fontenberry, applying for remedial writ, Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. Div. G No. 80-1489.

Granted. Trial judge is ordered to obtain Boykin transcript and furnish to relator.


text:
    Richard ROBERTSON v. SCANIO PRODUCE & INSTITUTIONAL FOODS, INC., State Farm Fire & Casualty Company.
    No. 83-C-2009.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Richard Robertson, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Civil District Court, No. 81-3986, Division B. Parish of Orleans.

Granted.


text:
    KENNER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. SEWELL PLASTICS, INC. and Joe N. Guy Company, Inc.
    No. 83-C-2128.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Kenner Industries, Inc., applying for writs of certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. John the Baptist. No. C.D. 10959.

Granted.


text:
    FRANK L. BEIER RADIO, INC. v. BLACK GOLD MARINE, INC.
    No. 83-C-2141.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Black Gold Marine, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari and review. Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. Parish of Jefferson, Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court. No. 82-18480.

Granted.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Joseph D. TUCKER v. Helen Tucker POCHE.
    No. 83-C-2172.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Helen Tucker Poche, applying for writ of certiorari or review. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, No. 82-6199.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Daryal LACOSTE v. Honorable Miriam WALTZER, Judge Criminal District Court, Section “A”.
    No. 82-KH-1253.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Daryal Lacoste, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 278-556.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Floyd FALKINS v. Honorable M. WALTZER Judge Criminal District Court Section “A” Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana New Orleans, Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-1532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Floyd Falkins, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 254-699.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    Wanda KAHL, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of Her Minor Children, John Irving Kahl, Jr. and Shawna Kahl v. Chester C. BAUDOIN and the State of Louisiana.
    No. 83-C-2120.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Wanda Kahl, et al, applying for writs of certiorari or review. First Circuit, Court of Appeal. Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary. No. 64196.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. John BOUDREAUX v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 82-KH-1566.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re John Boudreaux, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Jefferson. Twenty fourth Judicial District Court. No. 77-2546.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Larry THOMAS v. 39TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR the PARISH RED RIVER.
    No. 82-KH-2095.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Larry Thomas, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Red River. Thirty ninth Judicial District Court.

Denied. The district court has no record of relator’s application. Relator must file anew in the district court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. James PUGH v. John T. KING and State Parole Board.
    No. 82-KH-2315.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re James Pugh, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Nineteenth Judicial District Court.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Junior SMITH v. 18TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF IBERVILLE.
    No. 82-KH-2828.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Junior Smith, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Iberville. Nos. 3207-79 and 3208-79.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Tyrone WRIGHT v. Honorable Rudolph F. BECKER, III, Judge, Criminal District Court, Section “E”, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 83-KH-0300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Tyrone Wright, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Parish of Orleans. No. 265-580.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Noland Joseph GASPER v. Ross MAGGIO, et al, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-1176.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Noland Joseph Gasper, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. Criminal District Court. No. 185-634.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    Warren J. HEBERT v. LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY COMPANY.
    No. 83-C-1770.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Warren J. Hebert, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, First Circuit. City Court. No. 8204-2173. Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Denied.


text:
    Meriam JACOBY v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN RESOURCES, et al.
    No. 83-C-2007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 1983.
   In re Newell Frosch, Anita Frosch Mi-chenheim, Sherry Frosch Ledoux, Bob Frosch, Bertrand Earl Frosch, Joan Frosch Smythe, Clide Frosch, Norman Frosch, Peggy Frosch Mundahl, and Andre Frosch, applying for certiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Twenty-second Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany. No. 52422.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roy HARTMAN.
    No. 83-KK-2368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 23, 1983.
   In re Roy Hartman, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Third Circuit Court of Appeal. Fifteenth Judicial District Court. Parish of Vermilion. No. 23105.

Denied.


text:
    GAYLORD BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. v. The SACKETT GROUP, INC., Richard David Sackett, and Sackett & Associates, Inc.
    No. 83-CC-2366.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re The Sackett Group, Inc., Richard David Sackett, and Sackett & Associates, Inc., applying for writ of certiorari or review, or mandamus or prohibition, and for a stay order. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. No. C-1453. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 77-11806.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Rule 10 § 5(b).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Isaac L. NORRA v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ORLEANS SECTION A.
    No. 82-KH-1412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Isaac L. Norra, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 260-937.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Johnell McCullough, v. Honorable Frank SHEA, Judge Criminal District Court Section “G” Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
    No. 82-KH-2277.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Johnell McCullough, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans. No. 250-497.

Denied. Relator must first apply to Section “G” of the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., Richard M. BROWN v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Richard M. Brown, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 250-927.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ronald PALMISANO v. Honorable Frank V. ZACCARIA, Judge, 24th Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson.
    No. 83-KH-0391.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Ronald Palmisano, applying for writ of certiorari and review. Twenty fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson. No. 80-3420, Div. B.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Isaac KITT v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 83-KH-0406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
    Reconsideration Denied Dec. 16, 1983.
   In re Isaac Kitt, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and habe-as corpus. Parish of Orleans. Nos. 250570 and 259240.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Julius BRIDGES v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0420.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Julius Bridges, applying for writ of certiorari and writ of habeas corpus. Parish of Orleans. No. 263-815.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Hayward Joseph SIMMONS, Jr. v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden.
    No. 83-KH-0426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Hayward Joseph Simmons, Jr., applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans.

Denied.


text:
    John D. GARNER, Jr. v. Cheryl B. GARNER.
    No. 83-C-2189.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Cheryl B. Garner, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review. Court of Appeal, Second Circuit. No. 15644^CA. Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Lincoln. No. 31698.

Denied.


text:
    Alvin WISE v. HOLSUM BAKERIES, INC. and Kemper Insurance Co.
    No. 83-C-2205.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Alvin Wise, applying for writ of certiorari. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. Number 12872. Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. No. 79-5400.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, City of West Monroe v. Reginald Gary OLDEN.
    No. 83-KK-2207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Reginald Gary Olden, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Second Circuit Court of Appeal. No. 15939-KW. West Monroe City Court, Parish of Ouachita. No. 62296.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Connie B. HORN.
    No. 83-KK-2219.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Connie B. Horn, applying for remedial writs. Twenty eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of LaSalle. No. 28342. Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. No. K 83-799.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Bruce E. WALKER v. Honorable Wilmore J. BROUSSARD, Jr., Judge and Clerk of Court, et al.
    No. 83-KH-2255.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Bruce E. Walker, applying for writ of mandamus. Thirty-Second Judicial District Court. Parish of Terrebonne. No. 73884.

Denied. Relator must first file in the district court which has no record that relator has filed an application there.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel., Norman BLANCHARD v. CLERK OF COURT 25TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES, State of Louisiana.
    No. 83-KH-2098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 1983.
   In re Norman Blanchard, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Plaquemines. No. 685-25.

Granted. The trial court is ordered to hold a hearing on relator’s Habeas application on or before December 7, 1983.