author: NESBITT, Judge.

text:
    Roberta BLATT, as Guardian of Vera Horn, Incompetent and Estate of Vera Horn, Appellant, v. GREEN, ROSE, KAHN & PIOTRKOWSKI and Howard Rose, Appellees.
    No. 84-572.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Sept. 18, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 24, 1984.

      Albert J. Zemlock, Miami, for appellant.
    Green, Rose, Kahn & Piotrkowski and Howard Green, for appellees.
    Before NESBITT, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.
   NESBITT, Judge.

Roberta Blatt, as guardian of Vera Horn, incompetent, and estate of Vera Horn, deceased, appeals an order dismissing her amended complaint with prejudice as against Howard Rose, individually, and as a member of Green, Rose, Kahn & Pio-trkowski, a lawyer partnership. We reverse.

Vera Horn lived with Albert Gersh as his common-law wife for about 25 years. Gersh died on March 2, 1982, leaving $5,000 to Horn and his residuary estate to Gloria Reinhart, his granddaughter, and her children, Peter Lustig and Neil Lustig. An agreement was entered into between these beneficiaries whereby Reinhart and the Lustigs transferred and assigned to Horn thirty per cent of the residual portion of Gersh’s estate in return for Horn’s relinquishment of any and all claims against the estate. This written agreement was drawn up by Rose and was signed by the four beneficiaries.

Initially, Horn and Peter Lustig were appointed personal representatives of the estate. Shortly thereafter, however, Horn suffered a stroke which ultimately led to her being declared incompetent, with Blatt, her niece being appointed her guardian. Subsequently, Horn died leaving her entire estate to Blatt, who was appointed personal representative of Horn’s estate.

When Horn had fallen ill, she was removed as personal representative of Gersh’s estate. In her place, Reinhart and Neil Lustig were appointed as personal representatives. Thus, the three residuary beneficiaries became co-personal representatives of the estate.

Rose, a partner in Green, Rose, Kahn & Piotrkowski, was the resident agent of Reinhart and the Lustigs, all of whom lived outside the state of Florida. Rose was retained by Reinhard and the Lustigs, in their capacity as personal representatives of Gersh’s estate, to represent them in the administration of the estate. While in this position, Rose received a number of letters from Horn’s attorney which sought an accounting of the estate so that Horn’s share under the agreement could be determined. It is alleged that Rose ignored these letters until after the assets of the estate had been distributed.

Blatt brought this action charging in part that Rose had conspired with Reinhart and the Lustigs to deprive Horn of the thirty per cent of the residuary estate to which she was entitled pursuant to the agreement. Upon motion, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the complaint as against Rose and the law firm of which he is a partner. This appeal followed.

The gist of a civil action for conspiracy is not the conspiracy itself, but the civil wrong which is done pursuant to the conspiracy and which results in damage to the plaintiff. Liappas v. Augoustis, 47 So.2d 582 (Fla.1950); American Diversified Insurance Services, Inc. v. Union Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 439 So.2d 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Buckner v. Lower Florida Keys Hospital District, 403 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Thus, a cause of action for civil conspiracy exists in the present case only if “the basis for the conspiracy is an independent wrong or tort which would constitute a cause of action if the wrong were done by one person.” American Diversified, 439 So.2d at 906. We must examine the complaint, therefore, to determine whether it states a cause of action in civil conspiracy based upon an independent wrong.

The complaint alleges that Rose prepared the agreement whereby the residuary beneficiaries assigned thirty per cent of the residual portion of the estate to Horn, and Horn relinquished all claims she might have against the estate, as Gersh’s widow or otherwise. It also alleges that Reinhart and the Lustigs, as personal representatives of Gersh’s estate, failed to pay the thirty per cent portion, although demanded. Further, it is apparent that all the parties involved were fully aware of the agreement at all times. The complaint further alleges that Rose obtained court orders and took other various steps to have the assets of the estate distributed without regard to the agreement. Finally, it is alleged that Reinhart and the Lustigs “being the sole beneficiaries and personal representatives of the Estate[,] distributed all of the assets of the ESTATE OF ALBERT GERSH to themselves” without regard to the previously-entered agreement.

We find that the complaint states a cause of action for civil conspiracy based upon an independent wrong, specifically: a violation of the fiduciary duty imposed by the Florida Probate Code. It is clear that Horn, Reinhart and the Lustigs were all “interested persons” within the meaning of the code. § 731.201(21), Fla.Stat. (1981). Section 733.815 provides in pertinent part that:

competent interested persons may agree among themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amounts to which they are entitled under the will or under the laws of intestacy in a written contract executed by all who are affected. The personal representative shall abide by the terms of the agreement ....

Under the allegations of the complaint, such an agreement was executed in the present case, and, therefore, Reinhart and the Lustigs, as personal representatives, had a duty imposed by the statute to abide by the terms of the agreement. This duty they allegedly breached when they, in bad faith, ignored the agreement and improperly had all the assets distributed to themselves as the residuary beneficiaries. If these allegations are ultimately proved, the personal representatives would be liable to Horn for the damages or loss which resulted from the breach of this fiduciary duty. § 733.609. See In Re Francis’Estate, 153 Fla. 360,14 So.2d 803 (1943) (“payment to a legatee after notice of an assignment of his interest is at the risk of the representative”).

Admittedly, the complaint cannot be characterized as a model of clear-cut allegations of a civil conspiracy based upon the personal representatives’ breach of a fiduciary duty. Nonetheless, under the broad pleading concepts in this state, Blatt should be given the opportunity to prove, if she can, that Rose conspired with the personal representatives in committing the alleged breach of fiduciary duty. See American Diversified.

We emphasize that our holding is limited to finding that under Florida’s broad and liberal pleading concepts, Blatt has stated a cause of action. Her ability to prove the allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and the conspiracy of Rose in that breach is another matter. Extreme caution should be exercised when an attempt is made to hold an attorney liable for a wrong committed by his client by way of a civil conspiracy cause of action. It is appropriate in this context to reiterate the language of this court in Pickard v. Maritime Holding Corp., 161 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964):

It is recognized that an attorney acting under employment, at the direction of his client and in [a] legal manner is not liable for the consequences of his client’s actions. [citations omitted] Thus, the question now before us is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record upon which the jury could find that [the attorney] acted illegally or beyond his employment in order to secure an unconscionable advantage against the [plaintiff]. The action of an attorney in a lawsuit frequently angers his client’s opponent because the attorney by his energy often must advance his client’s cause at the expense of the opponent. It is not infrequent that persons who have lost a lawsuit because of actions undertaken by an attorney on behalf of his client, feel that they have been unjustly dealt with by the attorney. Such results are one of the unfortunate byproducts of the adversary system before the courts. Nevertheless, the advantages of the adversary system in securing a full disclosure of the facts to the courts is such that we must accept its disadvantages.

We find that this cautionary language is equally appropriate in the context of the present case.

We have considered the other points raised by the parties and find that they do not merit discussion. Upon the above reasoning, we reverse the order which dismissed Blatt’s complaint against Rose and the law firm and remand for further proceedings.

      . The record reflects that if Rose was representing any of the parties at the time the agreement was entered into, it was Reinhart and the Lus-tigs, and not Horn. Therefore, Rose owed no attorney-client fiduciary duty to Horn. See Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So.2d 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

      . The second type of civil conspiracy, sometimes referred to as an "economic boycott,” is not involved in the present case. See Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1977);

        Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So.2d 164 (Fla.1958); American Diversified.

      . This apparently included the $5,000 bequest to Horn.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    FINST DEVELOPMENT, INC., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES AND CONDOMINIUMS, Appellee.
    No. 83-1894.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Sept. 18, 1984.

      Talburt, Kubicki, Bradley & Draper and Betsy E. Hartley and Gail Kniskern, Miami, for appellant.
    Karl M. Scheuerman and Thomas A. Bell, Tallahassee, for appellee.
    Before NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ. and FERRIS, JOHN G., Associate Judge.
   ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of an administrative order which assesses a civil penalty in the amount of $7,500 for violation of laws regulating the sale of condominiums.

A developer of a condominium violates Section 718.502, Florida Statutes (1983), where it fails to file with the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums, documents required to be furnished to buyer or lessee by Section 718.503 (disclosure) and Section 718.504 (prospectus or offering circular) prior to an offering. For a violation of the statute, the Division may assess a penalty not to exceed $5,000 pursuant to Section 718.501(l)(d)4.

Separate offenses are committed under Section 718.502, Florida Statutes (1983) as to each offer of a contract for the purchase of a unit. A contrary interpretation would allow a developer to escape the full impact of the statute by simply adding $5,000, the maximum penalty allowed for a single offense under Section 718.501, to his operating expenses. This was certainly not the intention of the legislature when it enacted Section 718.502.

Since the statute authorizes a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000 for each offense, and the appellant clearly offered a number of contracts for the purchase of units, the $7,500 penalty imposed here is not subject to modification as being excessive. See Florida Real Estate Commission v. Webb, 367 So.2d 201 (Fla.1978).

Affirmed.

      . Section 718.502, Florida Statutes (1983) provides in pertinent part:
      718.502 Filing prior to sale or lease.—
      (1) A developer of a residential condominium shall file with the division one copy of each of the documents and items required to be furnished to a buyer or lessee by ss. 718.-503 and 718.504, if applicable. Until the developer has so filed, a contract for sale or lease of a unit for more than 5 years shall be voidable by the purchaser or lessee prior to the closing of his purchase or lease of a unit.
      (2)(a) Prior to filing as required by subsection (1), a developer shall not offer a contract for purchase or lease of a unit for more than 5 years but may accept deposits for reservations upon the approval of a fully executed escrow agreement and reservation agreement form properly filed with the Division of Flori-da Land Sales and Condominiums.

      . Florida Administrative Code Rule 7D-17.01(2) also requires that a developer comply with Sections 718.503 and 718.504 prior to making an offering. This is expressly a proscription against the same activity which the statute addresses and cannot form the basis for an additional penalty.


text:
    ARTHRITIS FOUNDATION, American Heart Association, the American Cancer Society, Inc., and Burn Center of the Shriner’s Hospital For Crippled Children and Burn Institute, Appellants, v. Robert C. BEISSE, Appellee.
    No. 84-236.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Sept. 19, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied Oct 25, 1984.
    William H. Namack, III of William H. Namack, III, P.A., and Ben Kay of Ben Kay, P.A., Sarasota, for appellants.
    Russell E. Carlisle of Carlisle & LeCates, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellants challenge the constitutionality of Section 732.803, Florida Statutes (1983). We hold that Section 732.803 is constitutional under the authority of Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So.2d 615 (1944), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666, 65 S.Ct. 49, 89 L.Ed. 541 (1944), rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 813, 65 S.Ct. 113, 89 L.Ed. 647 (1944).

Affirmed.

ANSTEAD, C.J., DELL, J., and GEIGER, DWIGHT L., Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Pedro SALVA, Sr., Felix Casana, Felix M. Casana, Israel Casana, Nicolas Cotes, Pedro Salva, Jr., Concepcion Salva, Carmen Lageyre, Stefan Bailis, Sara Salcines, Ibrahim Yarbazal, Justo Gonzales, Francisco Cardenas and Reinaldo Gonzalez, Appellees.
    Nos. 82-2125 to 82-2127, 82-2143, 82-2145 to 82-2147.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Sept. 25, 1984.

      Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Janet Reno, State Atty., and Arthur Joel Berger, Asst. State Atty., for appellant.
    Samek & Besser, Carin Kahgan, Michael Tarkoff, Lance Armstrong, Frank Freeman, Fred Robbins, Julio Jimenez, S.L. Gaer, Miami, for appellees.
    Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

The state appeals the trial court’s dismissal of seven separate drug conspiracy informations. We have reviewed the informations and find them indistinguishable from the information which was upheld in State v. Casesa, 392 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The informations are sufficient to advise the defendants of the nature of the accusations against them, and they can plead any resulting convictions or acquittals to any other indictments or infor-mations based on the same facts. State v. Smith, 240 So.2d 807 (Fla.1970); State v. Rodriguez-Jimenez, 439 So.2d 919 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

We recognize the trial court’s concern over how many separate conspiracies existed among these defendants. The decision of whether to charge one vast conspiracy or a number of smaller conspiracies, however, lies with the state. It then becomes the state’s burden to prove what it charges. In the present cases, the state must prove, at least with respect to the defendants charged in more than one conspiracy information, that separate conspiracies did in fact exist.

The test of the sufficiency of an information is found in Rule 3.140(o), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We find that the informations here are not so vague, indistinct and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass them in the preparation of their defense nor expose them to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense. The informations satisfy the test of Smith in that they are sufficiently precise to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. They supply the whys, hows and wherefores of the charges. Casesa. See also Rodriguez-Jimenez.

Accordingly, the order dismissing the in-formations is reversed and the causes are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.


text:
    Lulu JOHNSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Blanche J. Carey, a/k/a Blanche S. Carey, a/k/a Blanche J. Smith, Deceased, Appellant, v. WALTON LANTAFF SCHROEDER & CARSON, Appellees.
    No. 84-353.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Sept. 25, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 30, 1984.

      Malcolm Lewis Kneale, Miami, for appellant.
    Walton Lantaff Schroeder & Carson and Nicholas E. Christin and George Chesrow, Miami, for appellees.
    Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See In re Estate of Ryecheck, 323 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).


author: WENTWORTH, Judge.

text:
    Adolphus Daniel EVANS, Appellant, v. Rhoda Rea EVANS, Appellee.
    No. AV-53.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 26, 1984.
    Rhonda S. Martinec, John F. Daniel, Chartered, Panama City, for appellant.
    William E. Harris, Panama City, for ap-pellee.
   WENTWORTH, Judge.

Appellant seeks review of an order by which he is required to contribute to the support of his minor child until the child “reaches the age of 19 or graduates from high school, whichever occurs first.” The trial court expressly found that appellant’s seventeen year old offspring, who would reach his eighteenth birthday during his senior year of high school, “cannot fully support himself and properly attend to his high school studies _” Appellant contends that he may not be required to provide support beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday. We affirm the order appealed.

In removing the general disabilities of nonage for persons of eighteen years, § 743.07, Fla.Stat., expressly provides that it “shall not prohibit any court ... from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 .... ” In Finn v. Finn, 312 So.2d 726 (Fla.1975), the Florida Supreme Court indicated that such dependency should not be restricted to physical or mental incapacity, and may encompass the economic dependency of an offspring pursuing an education beyond the age of 18. Accord, Ulbrich v. Ulbrich, 317 So.2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In the present case there is evidentiary support for the trial court’s findings regarding the child’s continuing need for support, and appellant’s ability to contribute thereto, so as to establish the child’s economic dependency pursuant to Finn as a predicate for the continuing support awarded.

Keenan v. Keenan, 440 So.2d 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), en banc, reached a result contrary to that which we herein adopt, and dismissed as mere dicta the relevant principles espoused in Finn. However, we find the rationale in Finn to be more persuasive than that in Keenan, which fails to give sufficient regard to the actual and legal impact of a dissolution upon the familial relationship and attendant obligations. As Finn observes:

... a person over 18 ... may indeed be dependent on the help of others to obtain what education and training is needed to be competitive in the economic system in which he must make his way. He and society have a right to expect his parents to meet that need to the reasonable extent of their abilities....

While Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So.2d 853 (Fla.1984), also characterizes such language in Finn as dicta which refers to a “societal ideal” and which creates neither a legal duty nor a “new” cause of action, the narrow holding in Grapin did not encompass the issue addressed in the present case. In Grapin the court ruled only that a parent has no legal duty to provide post-majority support during an offspring’s college education, “absent either a finding of legal dependence or a binding contractual agreement....” However, Grapin did not directly address the issue of whether legal dependency, in the circumstances here presented, may be predicated on a finding of economic incapacity, apart from any mental or physical infirmity. We conclude that legal dependency may be so predicated, and that in the present case the trial court did not err in finding that appellant’s child, while pursuing a high school education, remains “a dependant person” within the ambit of § 743.07(2) so as to permit an award of continuing parental support beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday.

We hereby certify that the decision in the present case is in direct conflict with Keenan v. Keenan, supra, and we affirm the order appealed.

SMITH, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.

      . The present case is thus unlike Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), wherein the trial court made no express finding of need or dependency.


text:
    Alonzo KENNON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-2680.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Sept. 26, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 31, 1984.
    Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Russell S. Bohn, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED on the authority of Harvey v. State, 450 So.2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

LETTS and HERSEY, JJ., and RIVKIND, LEONARD, Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    Helen BENNETT, Appellant, v. Robert P. RIGGS, Appellee.
    No. 84-225.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 26, 1984.
    Max Rudmann of Martin Zevin, P.A., Boca Raton; and David L. Perkins of Linet, Rovenger, Perkins & Krakower, P.A., North Miami Beach, for appellant.
    Gerald W. Pierce of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, Fort Myers, for appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this medical malpractice action, we reverse the summary judgment rendered against plaintiff Helen Bennett.

Summary judgments are not favored in medical malpractice suits. McCoy v. Hoffmeister, 435 So.2d 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving the absence of factual issues. He must prove this conclusively and, through such proof, overcome all reasonable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla.1966); Werber v. Imperial Golf Club, Inc., 413 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The opposing party’s right to trial should not be foreclosed if it has not been shown that he cannot offer proof to support his position. Holl v. Talcott; McCoy v. Hoffmeister.

Here, the affidavit of Dr. Nagas-wami, filed by appellant in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, creates an issue of material fact with respect to the negligence of Dr. Riggs. Although the affidavit offers no medical explanation as to how the drug Butazolidin Alka caused or contributed to appellant’s vision loss, appel-lee, as the moving party, has not demonstrated that appellant cannot prove her claim of negligence. Nor has appellee conclusively established that Dr. Nagaswami is not competent to testify under section 768.45, Florida Statutes (1983). See Curry v. Cape Canaveral Hospital, 426 So.2d 64 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); McCoy v. Hoffmeister.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

HOBSON, A.C.J., and BOARDMAN and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Anthony ENNIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. AW-439.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 26, 1984.
    Charlene Y. Edwards, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    David P. Gauldin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983).

ERVIN, C.J., and MILLS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.


author: ORFINGER, Judge.

text:
    Archie CREWS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-1424.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Sept. 27, 1984.
    James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and David A. Henson, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Evelyn D. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dayto-na Beach, for appellee.
   ORFINGER, Judge.

The trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction for one-half of appellant’s sentences because, at time of sentencing, the statute permitted retention of jurisdiction for a maximum period of one-third of any sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The State’s contention that the absence of objection below to the sentence makes the issue non-applicable has previously been answered to the contrary. Brumley v. State, 455 So.2d 1096 (Fla.1984).

Those portions of the sentences which retain jurisdiction for one-half of each sentence are set aside, and the cause is remanded so that the trial court may amend such sentences by retaining jurisdiction for a period not to exceed one-third of each sentence.

DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur.


text:
    Olga GRANVILLE, Appellant, v. CAPITAL BANK, a Florida banking corporation, Appellee.
    No. 83-903.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 2, 1984.

      Papy, Poole, Weissenborn & Papy and Sheridan K. Weissenborn, Coral.Gables, for appellant.
    Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick & Hoehl and James C. Blecke; Mark Bloom, Greenberg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, Miami, for appellee.
    Before HUBBART and FERGUSON, JJ., and TILLMAN PEARSON (Ret.), Associate Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Olga Granville, was defendant and counter-claimant in the circuit court. The appellee, Capital Bank, brought suit against Olga Granville and her husband, Paul Granville, because of an overdraft of some $18,000.00. Olga Granville counterclaimed for alleged slander, trespass and false imprisonment. The court dismissed on the pleadings the false imprisonment count of the counterclaim. The counterclaim for slander and trespass was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict and the entry of final judgment for the counter-defendant bank. On the same date, the court entered its order on motions for partial summary judgment, granting the bank’s motion for summary judgment against both defendants upon the overdraft. This order was subsequently finalized by entry of final judgment for the plaintiff bank and against Olga Granville and Paul Granville upon the overdraft.

Olga’s notice of appeal was directed to: (1) the order granting summary judgment and not yet reduced to final judgment, (2) the final judgment for the counter-defendant bank on the counterclaim (rehearing motions having been denied as to the foregoing), and (3) two previous orders (a) granting the bank’s motion to dismiss the false imprisonment count of the counterclaim and (b) directing that the bank’s requests for admissions from Olga be deemed admitted.

One of appellant’s contentions is that the summary judgment entered in favor of the bank upon the overdraft was in error. The appellee argues that this issue is not properly presented for appeal because Olga Granville stated in her notice of appeal only that she was appealing from a (non-final) order granting summary judgment. However, the record is clear that at the time of filing of appellant’s notice of appeal the final summary judgment for plaintiff/bank had in fact been rendered, having been filed with the clerk of the circuit court less than one hour previous to the filing of the notice of appeal. The defect in the notice’s reference to the summary judgment order as non-final was non-jurisdictional and non-prejudicial, see Puga v. Suave Shoe Corp., 417 So.2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (en banc), and thus, this court may properly review the summary judgment. See Rule 9.110(h), Fla.R.App.P.

On the merits, we conclude that the trial court was correct in entering summary judgment for the bank. It is undisputed that Olga Granville was a signator to the bank account in question and that she personally signed the checks constituting the overdraft and cashed them by indicating her unqualified endorsement on the back of each check. Thus, Olga Granville’s liability upon the checks was established as a matter of law. Betz v. Bank of Miami Beach, 95 So.2d 891 (Fla.1957); I.W. Phillips & Co. v. Hall, 99 Fla. 1206, 128 So. 635 (1930); First State Bank of Miami v. Eisdorfer, 399 So.2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); New York Financial, Inc. v. J & W Holding Co., Inc., 396 So.2d 802 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Schwartz v. Disneyland Vista Records, 383 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA), pet. for rev. denied, 392 So.2d 1378 (Fla.1980); sections 673.403(2) and 673.414(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Additionally, the trial court correctly rejected Olga’s argument that she was acting merely as an agent, since the principal for whom she professed to act was an unincorporated association with no separate legal existence, I.W. Phillips & Co. v. Hall, supra; 2 Fla. Jur.2d Agency and Employment § 81 (1977).

Appellant also argues that as counter-plaintiff, she was prejudiced because the jury was told of the bank’s judgment upon the claim for the overdraft. Under the circumstances of this case where the counter-plaintiff sought to establish that she was slandered by untrue statements of her indebtedness to the bank, the determination that the money was in fact due the bank was relevant.

The additional points raised on appeal do not present error for the following reasons: (1) the counterclaim did not plead the elements of a cause of action for false imprisonment, Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 19 So.2d 699 (1944); Dodson v. Solomon, 134 Fla. 284, 183 So. 825 (1938); Johnson v. A. & A. Supermarkets, Inc., 14 Fla.Supp. 71 (Fla.4th Cir.Ct.1959); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 35, 36 (1965); and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the filing of responses to requests for admissions which were tendered several months late and after an order had been entered ruling the requests were admitted.

Accordingly, the judgments appealed are affirmed.

Affirmed.

      . This final judgment is the subject of a separate appeal by Paul Granville, Case No. 83-1154. The appeals were consolidated for purposes of the record only, by order of this court.


text:
    CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC., and Sea Chest, Inc., Appellant, v. Roger GUADAMUZ, Appellee.
    No. 83-2365.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 2, 1984.
    Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot and James L. Dennis, Miami, for appellant.
    Horton, Perse & Ginsberg; Charles R. Lipcon, Miami, for appellee.
    Before HENDRY, NESBITT and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellants were sued by appellee for personal injuries he sustained while working as an employee on appellants’ ship. Following a jury trial, a special interrogate-ry verdict and final judgment for damages were entered in favor of appellee.

Appellants seek reversal of the judgment on the ground that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to sustain appellant’s objection to the expert testimony of an attorney at law as to whether the appellants breached their duty to provide maintenance and cure to appellee, a seaman.

We have considered the briefs and record on appeal and have concluded that, in view of the jury’s verdict evincing its rejection of the expert’s opinion and its resolution of the issues according to the instructions given by the trial court, no harmful error has been demonstrated. See Patterson v. Slacker, 439 So.2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Division of Corrections v. Wynn, 438 So.2d 446, 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Warning Safety Lights, Inc. v. Gallor, 346 So.2d 92, 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert, denied, 355 So.2d 518 (Fla.1978). Therefore the judgment appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.


author: GRIMES, Judge.

text:
    Shawn ROACH, Appellant, v. Anabel MITCHELL and Florida Parole and Probation Commission, Appellees.
    No. 84-594.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 3, 1984.

      John D. Middleton, Gainesville, for appellant.
    Kurt E. Ahrendt, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Florida Parole and Probation Commission, Tallahassee, for appellee Florida Parole and Probation Commission.
   GRIMES, Judge.

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which appellant, an inmate in the Florida Department of Corrections system, asserts that his parole had expired prior to its revocation.

In 1976 appellant was sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment for robbery. Subsequently, he was notified by appellee, Florida Parole and Probation Commission, that he would be granted parole on July 24, 1979. On July 17, 1979, he signed a certificate of parole issued pursuant to section 947.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979), wherein he agreed to thirteen separate conditions of parole supervision as well hs the dates of his term of supervision. Specifically, he acknowledged that he would “remain under supervision subject to the conditions of parole listed on the reverse side of this certificate until January 22nd, 1986, unless otherwise released, or until other action may be taken by the Florida Parole and Probation Commission,” a period of six and one-half years.

Appellant’s parole was revoked in March 1983 for conduct occurring in 1982. After incarceration in Polk County, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he contended that he was being illegally detained because his parole had expired in 1981. The court denied appellant’s petition, and he appeals.

Appellant’s argument is predicated upon section 947.24, Florida Statutes (1979), which reads:

947.24 Discharge from parole.— When a person is placed on parole, the commission shall determine the period of time the person shall be on parole, such time not to exceed a maximum period of 2 years unless the commission designates a longer period of time, in which case it will advise the parolee in writing of the reasons for the extended period. In any event, the period of parole shall not exceed the maximum period for which the person has been sentenced. The commission, after having retained jurisdiction of a person for a sufficient length of time to evidence satisfactory rehabilitation and cooperation, may discharge the person from parole, may relieve a person on parole from making further reports, or may permit such person to leave the state or country, upon determination that such action is in the best interests of the person and of society.

Appellant reasons that because he did not receive written or oral reasons for the extension of his parole, the commission lost jurisdiction to subsequently revoke his parole after the initial two years of supervision. We do not accept this contention.

The plain language of section 947.24 clearly empowers the commission to determiné the length of an individual’s parole. The commission can impose any term up to the maximum period for which a person has been sentenced. If the parole period is to be longer than two years, the parolee should be informed in writing of the reasons for the extension. The absence of such written reasons, however, does not result in a loss of the commission’s statutory authority to impose an extended term or in a loss of jurisdiction over the parolee.

Appellant executed the certificate of parole with full knowledge of its contents, acquiescing to both the term and conditions of his parole without reservation. Had he requested a written statement of the reasons for his extended term of parole he surely could have obtained it. He did not seek administrative review pursuant to section 947.19(2), Florida Statutes (1979). He acted only upon violation of the conditions of his parole. Cf. Gallagher v. State, 421 So.2d 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (holding that one must attack a condition of his probation by appealing the probation order rather than upon breach of the condition). Since the failure to provide written reasons for the extended term was not jurisdictional, appellant was still on parole at the time of its revocation.

AFFIRMED.

RYDER, C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.


text:
    Raymond MILLS a/k/a Ravin Kemp, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-1502.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 3, 1984.
    Raymond Mills, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the denial, without hearing, of his motion for post conviction relief. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850.

Appellant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to an unknown number of crimes in five different informations. He filed his motion for post conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were involuntary. That portion of the record which the trial judge attached to the order denying relief is the transcript of a hearing at which appellant pleaded guilty to grand theft, one count of one information. It does not relate to any of the other charges, and therefore is inadequate to conclusively refute appellant’s allegations with respect to the other charges.

As to the grand theft, the record reflects that counsel walked out on his client during the plea hearing. When admonished by the trial judge, counsel stated that he didn’t know his client was entering a plea; he thought appellant had already pleaded to all charges, and was just being sentenced. This does not conclusively refute appellant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

REVERSED and REMANDED for an evidentiary hearing.

ANSTEAD, C.J., and HURLEY and DELL, JJ., concur.


author: FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.

text:
    Teresa HAMM, et al., Appellants, v. AMBASSADOR INSURANCE COMPANY, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. 83-1438.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 4, 1984.
    H. Terrell Griffin of Lawrence, Griffin & Landis, Orlando, for appellants.
    Andrew G. Pattillo, Jr., and Jonathan D. Ohlman of Pattillo & McKeever, P.A., Oca-la, for appellee Mark Olewinski.
    Charles P. Schropp and Raymond T. Elli-gett, Jr., of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, P.A., Tampa, for appellee Haas, Boehm, Brown, Rigdon & Seacrest, P.A.
    Raymond A. Haas, of Haas, Boehm, Brown, Rigdon & Seacrest, P.A., Orlando, for appellee Ambassador Insurance Company.
   FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.

The circuit court granted appellees’ (defendants below) motion to transfer venue from Orange County to Flagler County. Appellees’ motion alleged that all the events in question arose in Flagler County. The basis for the circuit court’s decision is not specifically stated in the order. Appellants claim that venue was proper in Orange County as appellee Haas, Boehm maintained an office there. See §§ 47.011, 47.021 and 47.051, Fla.Stat. (1983). Appel-lees counter that the court actually transferred venue under the forum non conven-iens doctrine, section 47.122, Florida Statutes (1983), and hence while venue may have been proper in Orange County, Fla-gler County was preferable.

The order transferring venue does refer to section 47.122, Florida Statutes, the forum non conveniens statute. Under that doctrine, the burden is on the party seeking the change of venue to show substantial inconvenience or undue expense would result from a trial in the chosen forum. Houchins v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 388 So.2d 1287 (Fla. ed DCA 1980); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Transportation, 352 So.2d 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

The problem here is that apparently no transcript of the hearing below on appel-lees’ motion was made and this court has no way of knowing what evidence was presented and whether the lower court abused its discretion in transferring venue under section 47.122. See Hu v. Crockett, 426 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Hughes Supply, Inc. v. Pearl, 403 So.2d 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Appellants have failed to supplement the record upon request with a transcript or a prepared statement of the proceedings as provided in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(3). In the absence of an adequate record demonstrating reversible error, we are bound to affirm. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1979).

AFFIRMED.

COBB, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.


text:
    Leonard L. WROTON and Joan Wroton, his wife, Appellants, v. WASH-BOWL, INC., a Florida corporation, and Ted Harris, individually, Appellees.
    No. 84-168.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 5, 1984.
    James A. Garland, Brandenton, for appellants.
    Robert H. Dillinger of Dillinger & Swisher, St. Petersburg, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

When this case was first before us we remanded for a new trial solely on the issue of damages without consideration of loss of profits as an element. Wash-Bowl, Inc. v. Wroton, 432 So.2d 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment for damages, ruling that the Wrotons were precluded from seeking damages for moving expenses and for their loss on the discount of a note. His ruling was predicated on the fact that because the trial judge in the first trial had ruled that these items were not proper elements of damage and the Wrotons had not cross-appealed from that ruling, the ruling had become the law of the case. We agree with the trial judge.

The law of the case precludes litigation of all issues necessarily ruled upon by the court, as well as of all issues upon which appeal could have been taken but which were not appealed. State v. Stabile, 443 So.2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). See Airvac, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co., 330 So.2d 467 (Fla.1976); Alford v. Summerlin, 423 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Marine Midland Bank Central v. Cote, 384 So.2d 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Flood v. Ware, 326 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); and Howell v. Howell, 207 So.2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

HOBSON, A.C.J., and DANAHY and LE-HAN, JJ., concur.


author: CAMPBELL, Judge.

text:
    Emmanuel H. SHAPIRO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-249.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 5, 1984.

      Jerry Hill, Public Defender, Bartow, and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty, Gen., Tallahassee, and Karla J. Staker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
   CAMPBELL, Judge.

Appellant, Emmanuel H. Shapiro, appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for habeas corpus. We affirm. In doing so, we find it" necessary to discuss only appellant’s first point on appeal. In that point, he questioned:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE EXTRADITION PAPERS FROM TEXAS WERE DEFECTIVE INASMUCH AS THEY FAILED TO INCLUDE A PROPER SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT TO THE WARRANT AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 941.03, FLORI-DA STATUTES?

Appellant was arrested in Florida on the basis of extradition documents filed with the State of Florida by the State of Texas as the extraditing state. Among the documents submitted by Texas was a copy of the indictment upon which appellant was charged with the felony offense of passing a forged document. In addition to the indictment, there was also included the capi-as that had been issued by the clerk of the court following the presentment of the indictment. Both the indictment and capias were duly authenticated by the clerk of the court in Texas from which they were issued.

Appellant argues that there was submitted in the extradition documents, in addition to the indictment, a warrant that was not sufficient to comply with section 941.03, Florida Statutes (1983), because it was not authenticated by a committing magistrate. He argues that since a warrant had been issued, it must be selected as the supporting document for extradition and must be supported by an affidavit before a committing magistrate. In support of his argument, he cites to us Britton v. State, 447 So.2d 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), and Blasi v. State, 192 So.2d 307 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). His reliance on Britton and Blast is based on the principle cited in those cases that there must be submitted for the purpose of extradition, under section 941.03, those documents which correspond to the stage in the proceedings to which the case against a defendant has progressed. While the principle stated in Britton and Blast is correct, as applied to proceedings which supplant prior proceedings, appellant’s reliance upon that principle here is misplaced.

It has been held by Britton and Blast, in support of the relied upon principle, that the most current of the three alternatives provided in section 941.03 must be selected by the extraditing state to submit in support of extradition. It is unfortunate that by the order of placement of the alternatives in section 941.03, it appears that the issuance of a warrant is a more current alternative than an indictment or information when it is not necessarily so, nor does either necessarily supplant the other.

First of all, in the case before us, the documents submitted were an indictment and a capias. A capias and a warrant, particularly as is contemplated by section 941.03, are not the same documents. The warrant, to be supported by affidavit of a committing magistrate as contemplated by section 941.03, is the warrant that issues upon probable cause for the arrest of an individual prior to an indictment or information. Such a warrant is issued by a committing magistrate upon a showing of probable cause, and thus arises the requirement in section 941.03, that a copy of such a warrant used for extradition purposes, must be supported by an affidavit made before a committing magistrate. While an indictment or information may at times supersede such a warrant, such is not necessarily so.

On the other hand, a capias is issued after an indictment or information has been returned, and does not replace or supplant the indictment or information. A ca-pias is normally issued by the clerk of a court from which the indictment or information is returned, and requires no further probable cause than the indictment or information itself. Cf., Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.131®.

Where there is both a warrant and an indictment or information that charges the same crime against the same person and in practically the same language, they may be used interchangeably in support of extradition. In that situation, the indictment or information does not deprive the affidavit, or its resulting warrant, of its efficacy and is but a continuation of the prosecution begun by the affidavit and issuance of the warrant. Mitchell v. Stoutamire, 113 Fla. 822, 152 So. 629 (1934); Shufty v. State, 419 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). It must be pointed out that interstate extradition is essentially a federal matter and state legislation may not conflict with or require more than the Federal Act, 18 U.S.C.A., section 3182, governing extradition. State v. Cox, 306 So.2d 156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Application of Evans, 512 S.W.2d 238 (Mo.App.1974). See also, Bruzaud v. Matthews, 207 F.2d 25 (C.A.D.C.1953).

In Britton and Blasi, there had not only been an indictment or information, but there had been a judgment and sentence which clearly supplants the indictment or information as the vehicle upon which custody may be sought.

In this case, the indictment and capi-as were both authenticated by affidavit of the clerk of the court from which they were issued. There was no warrant as contemplated by section 941.03. We therefore determine the extradition documents to be in order and affirm.

OTT, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.


author: OTT, Judge.

text:
    Darlene Pelham KLAPP, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-340.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 5, 1984.

      Jerry Hill, Public Defender, and Larry G. Bryant, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William E. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
   OTT, Judge.

We affirm appellant’s sentence which departed from the sentencing guidelines. Violation of a substantive condition of probation can be a basis for sentencing outside the guidelines. See Addison v. State, 452 So.2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see also Carter v. State, 452 So.2d 953 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). The trial judge’s failure to include written reasons for departing from the guidelines is not error because the reasons were clearly articulated at appellant’s sentencing hearing, a transcript of which is in the record. See Smith v. State, 454 So.2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

From the record before us, we are unable to determine whether there is merit to appellant’s argument that she was not given proper credit for time served. Consequently, our affirmance is without prejudice to appellant raising this issue in a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

AFFIRMED.

SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kathryn SHIPMAN, Appellant, v. PILOT OIL COMPANY and Aetna Life and Casualty Company, Appellees.
    No. 84-94.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 5, 1984.
    J.B. Donnelly of Grimes, Goebel, Parry, Boylston, Greene, Grimes & Donnelly, Bra-denton, for appellant.
    Claire L. Hamner of Dickinson, O’Rior-den, Gibbons, Quale, Shields & Carlton, P.A., Sarasota, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Gaidymowicz v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 371 So.2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

OTT, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Harold THOMAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-2178.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 9, 1984.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Robert Switkes, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Calvin L. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
    Before HENDRY, HUBBART and BAS-KIN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. State v. Murray, 443 So.2d 955 (Fla.1984); Ferguson v. State, 417 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla.1982).


text:
    CONKLIN AMUSEMENTS, INC., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Pamela ROSS, a minor, By and Through her parents and next friends, Jannine ROSS and Arthur Ross, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 84-24.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 9, 1984.
    Lanza, Sevier, Womack & O’Connor and Hector J. Lombana, Coral Gables, for appellant/ cross-appellee.
    Appel & Brown, Greene & Cooper and Joan M. Bolotin, Miami, for appellee/cross-appellant.
    Before NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ. .
   PER CURIAM.

Concluding that reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the trial court’s grant of a new trial and that, therefore, the appellant has not shown an abuse of discretion, we affirm the order under review. See Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis, 401 So.2d 1341 (Fla.1981); Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bell, 384 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1980); Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959); Staib v. Ferrari, Inc., 391 So.2d 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). On the appellee’s cross-appeal, we affirm the order denying her motion for a directed verdict as to liability.

Affirmed.


text:
    Jeanne C. JACK, Appellant, v. Lewis N. JACK, Appellee.
    No. 84-1069.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 9, 1984.
    Byrd Y. Duke, Jr., North Miami, for appellant.
    Mark E. Pollack, Miami, for appellee.

      Before NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

The order under review which overruled the appellant’s exceptions to the report of the General Master is reversed upon a holding that the changes, if any, in the wife’s circumstances were not such as would legally justify a reduction in alimony.

Reversed with directions to deny the husband relief on his Petition for Modification.

Reversed with directions.


text:
    FARRAND CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Franklin B. BYSTROM, Dade County Property Appraiser, Dade County, Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-727.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 9, 1984.
    Lee, Schulte, Murphy & Coe and Jack M. Coe, Jupiter, for appellant.
    Robert A. Ginsburg, County Atty., and Stephen J. Keating, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.
    Before HENDRY, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Walter v. Schuler, 176 So.2d 81 (Fla.1965); Bystrom v. Valencia Center, Inc., 432 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Dade County v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 285 So.2d 671 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).


text:
    Brenda CLEMONS, Appellant, v. Ronald Lee CLEMONS, Appellee.
    No. 83-2378.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 10, 1984.
    Lynn E. Szymoniak, Supervising Atty., and Mary G. Miller, Certified Legal Intern, of Nova Law Center Civil Law Clinic, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    No appearance on behalf of appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse and remand on authority of Pilch v. Pilch, 447 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

ANSTEAD, C.J., and HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM. COWART, Judge,

text:
    Charles Michael RAMSEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-1001.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 11, 1984.

      James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Larry B. Henderson, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Margene A. Roper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Day-tona Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED on the authority of Fike v. State, 455 So.2d 628 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).

ORFINGER and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur.

COWART, J., dissents with opinion.

COWART, Judge,

dissenting:

A criminal information must unequivocally allege the facts upon which the court’s jurisdiction is based. When the circuit court has jurisdiction over a felony charge and the county court has jurisdiction over a misdemeanor charge, an information dis-junctively alleging facts charging a felony or a misdemeanor is defective and legally insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of either court. Young v. State, 439 So.2d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), and Nelson v. State, 398 So.2d 920 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), are correct. See the dissent to Fike v. State, 455 So.2d 628 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).


text:
    JIM QUINLAN CHEVROLET COMPANY, Donald Ray Dodgin and American Automobile Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Hazel ADAMS and Frank Adams, her husband, Respondents.
    No. 84-1508.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 12, 1984.
    Chester L. Skipper of Lyle & Skipper, P.A., St. Petersburg, for petitioners.
    Guy N. Perenich, Clearwater, for respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

Petition denied for the sole reason that there is a full, adequate and complete remedy available to petitioners by appeal after final judgment. See Whiteside v. Johnson, 351 So.2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

HOBSON, A.C.J., and GRIMES and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Willie WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-1743.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 16, 1984.
    Samek & Besser, Miami, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Attorney Gen., and Calvin L. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
    Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We vacate the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction and remand with instructions that the court either enter an order stating with particularity the justification for retaining jurisdiction as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982) or relinquish jurisdiction over the first half of the sentence. Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031 (Fla.1982); Saname v. State, 448 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Abbott v. State, 421 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Hampton v. State, 419 So.2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

Retention of jurisdiction vacated; remanded with instructions.


text:
    James Lawrence HILL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-2092.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 16, 1984.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Rory Stein, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Charles M. Fahlbusch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
    Before BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See P.L.R. v. State, 455 So.2d 363 (Fla.1984); J.F. v. State, 452 So.2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Council v. State, 442 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Foxx v. State, 392 So.2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Adams v. State, 375 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Skelton v. State, 349 So.2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).


text:
    Mary RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. Bruno CARNESELLA, Appellee.
    No. 83-2951.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 16, 1984.
    Melvin A. Rubin, Kenneth Friedman, Miami, for appellant.
    Maurice Jay Kutner, Miami, for appellee.
    Before HUBBART, NESBITT and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Viewing the record, as we must, in a light most favorable to the prevailing party in this paternity action, we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial court erred.

The judgment in favor of the defendant is accordingly affirmed.


text:
    Samuel STREINER, Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-3007.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 16, 1984.

      Dean & Hartman and Douglas Hartman, Miami, for appellant.
    Jose Garcia-Pedrosa, City Atty., and Gisela Cardonne and Albertine Smith, Asst. City Attys., for appellee.
    Before NESBITT, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court’s denial of the writ of mandamus sought by petitioner Streiner upon a holding that his termination as a police officer from the City of Miami Police Department was effective as of March 20, 1982, and the subsequent review procedures sustaining the termination afforded Streiner his full measure of due process rights.

Affirmed.


text:
    Gerry ROW, Appellant, v. Marsha ROW, Appellee.
    No. 84-17.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 16, 1984.
    Barrett & Rogers and William Rogers, Miami, for appellant.
    Harold M. Braxton, Miami, for appellee.
    Before NESBITT, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Zimmer v. Zimmer, 328 So.2d 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).


text:
    Gladys MORENO, Appellant, v. Lola Intriago THOMPSON, Appellee.
    No. 84-411.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 16, 1984.
    Joseph Nazzaro, Golden Beach, for appellant.
    Frank H. Alvarez, Miami, and Maria G. Rodriguez, Coral Gables, for appellee.
    Before HENDRY, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from orders disallowing the claim of a creditor filed more than three years after the death of the decedent.

We hold that the trial judge was correct in ruling that the claim is barred by Section 735.206(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1981). No error having been demonstrated, the orders appealed are affirmed.

Affirmed.


text:
    Alvaro S. DONADO, Appellant, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 84-483.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 16, 1984.

      Penzick & Parker and John Parker, Miami, for appellant.
    Conroy & Simberg and Michael K. Wilen-sky, Hollywood, for appellee.
    Before HENDRY, HUBBART and BAS-KIN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Frazier v. Standard Guaranty Insurance Co., 382 So.2d 392 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Sun Life Insurance Co. of America v. Evans, 340 So.2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).


text:
    Jacob DORFMAN, Appellant, v. Beatrice SCHULTZ, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Fannie Dorfman, deceased, Appellee.
    No. 84-546.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 16, 1984.
    John J. O’Brien, Miami, for appellant.
    Joseph Gluckman, Kevin F. Kline, Miami Beach, for appellee.
    Before NESBITT, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1979).


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC., Appellant, v. TOWN OF LAKE PARK, Florida, a municipal corporation, Sheriff Richard P. Wille, Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Florida, and the City of Riviera Beach, Appellees.
    Nos. 83-2503, 84-37.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 17, 1984.
    Bernard A. Conko of Gibson & Adams and Joseph P. Metzger and Kevin Beutten-muller of Horty, Springer & Metzger, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Richard H. Gaunt, Jr., of Cibula, Gaunt & Pratt, West Palm Beach, for appellee-Town of Lake Park.
    Frank McKeown of McKeown & Gamot and Jane Kreusler-Walsh and Larry Klein, West Palm Beach, for appellee-Sheriff Richard P. Wille.
    Allan L. Hoffman, West Palm Beach and Allan Y. Everard, Riviera Beach, for appel-lee-City of Riviera Beach.
   PER CURIAM

Affirmed on authority of City of Plantation v. Humana, Inc., 429 So.2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

HERSEY, GLICKSTEIN and BARK-ETT, JJ., concur.


text:
    DUNE DECK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida Corporation not for profit, Richard I. Baron, Lewis Konigsberg, Louis Goldberg, Philip Jackson, Robert Kaye, Jeremiah Sundell, Steven Zneimer, Jerry Zises, Albert Krangle, Ralph Saret, Murray Bowen, Dan Gimbel, Alfred Geber, Arnold Grandberg, Robert Slater, Phil Garber, Robert Asch, C.S. Pyshos, Hyman Kertzman, R. Volk, William S. Vogel, Mable Kaplan, Jeanne Shapiro and Theresa Greenberg, Appellants, v. LINDBERG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, Town of South Palm Beach, etc., and D.M. Ambrose, Appellees.
    No. 84-561.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 17, 1984.
    Kenneth G. Spillias of Schneider, Maxwell, Considine, Spillias & Hill, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
    Richard L. Martens of Boose, Ciklin & Martens, West Palm Beach, for appellee-Lindberg Development Corp.
   PER CURIAM.

We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying with prejudice appellants’ petition for leave to intervene. Wags Transportation System v. City of Miami Beach, 88 So.2d 751 (Fla.1956); Citibank, N.A. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 398 So.2d 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Brickell Bay Condominium Association v. Forte, 410 So.2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); and Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230 and comments.

Accordingly, we reverse.

GLICKSTEIN, WALDEN and BARK-ETT, JJ., concur.


text:
    RABEN BUILDERS, INC., and Pastal Construction Company, Inc., d/b/a Raben-Pastal, a joint venture, Petitioners, v. POMPANO ROOFING CO., INC., Respondent.
    No. 84-1232.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 17, 1984.
    Michael S. Gellert, Margate, for petitioners.
    Russell L. Forkey of Russell L. Forkey, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

While we find merit in petitioners’ position, the errors complained of are capable of being remedied upon plenary appeal. For that reason we deny the petition for writ of certiorari.

DENIED.

HERSEY, GLICKSTEIN and DELL, JJ., concur.