text:
    Elmer William FAST, Jr., and Frances B. Fast, Appellant, v. FLORIDA PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND, Appellee.
    No. 84-370.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Feb. 6, 1985.
    John A. Lloyd, Jr., St. Petersburg, and Edgar A. Neely, III, Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
    James R. Freeman of Shear, Newman & Hahn, P.A., Tampa, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm on the authority of Burr v. Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund, 447 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA), pet. for review denied, 453 So.2d 43 (Fla.1984). In doing so, we acknowledge that we are in direct conflict with Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Tillman, 453 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

OTT, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and LE-HAN, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DANAHY, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    William W. CHASTAIN, William W. Chastain as president of William W. Chastain, P.A., William W. Chastain, P.A., World Navigation, Inc., and Hendrik Uiterwyk, Appellants, v. Laurie F. UITERWYK, Appellee.
    No. 84-1499.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Feb. 6, 1985.
    Ted R. Manry, III, and Chad W. Browne of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellants Chastain, etc., and World Navigation, Inc.
    A. Ann Arledge of Maney & Damsker, Tampa, for appellant Hendrik Uiterwyk.

      Steven T. Northcutt of Levine, Freedman, Hirsch & Levinson, Tampa, for appel-lee.
   DANAHY, Judge.

This is an appeal from three nonfinal orders entered in the dissolution of marriage proceedings between Hendrik Uiter-wyk and Laurie F. Uiterwyk. The appellants Chastain and World Navigation, Inc., are not and have never been made parties to these proceedings. World Navigation is a Florida corporation of which Hendrik Ui-terwyk is president and chairman of the board, but not the sole stockholder. Chas-tain, an attorney, is a personal friend of Hendrik Uiterwyk who represents World Navigation and apparently also represents Hendrik Uiterwyk personally in some matters.

The trial judge entered an order for payment of temporary support for Laurie Ui-terwyk and the parties’ children. Hendrik Uiterwyk filed a motion to reduce the amount of the temporary support and Laurie Uiterwyk filed a motion for contempt for nonpayment of temporary support. At hearings before the trial judge it was revealed that $50,000 of funds belonging to World Navigation had been placed in Chas-tain’s trust account subject to disbursement only upon orders given by Hendrik Uiterwyk. The funds had been partially disbursed, including payments to Chastain as retainers for legal services involving World Navigation, payments for business expenses of World Navigation, and payments for personal expenses of Hendrik Uiterwyk.

Laurie Uiterwyk moved the trial court to enjoin Hendrik Uiterwyk and Chastain from disbursing or dealing with $2,194.31 of World Navigation funds remaining in Chastain’s trust account, and $7,000 of the trust account funds which had previously been paid to Chastain for services to be rendered on behalf of World Navigation, but which had not yet been earned. The trial judge granted Laurie Uiterwyk’s motion and entered an order on June 4, 1984, enjoining Hendrik Uiterwyk and Chastain from disbursing any of the funds remaining in the Chastain trust account representing funds deposited by World Navigation and also enjoining them from disbursing the $7,000 which had been paid to Chastain from the trust account as a retainer for services to be rendered. The appellants appeal this order.

Laurie Uiterwyk then filed a motion for entry of an order directing Hendrik Uiter-wyk to pay costs incurred by her attorneys. The motion requested that the funds be paid directly to the attorneys for Laurie Uiterwyk from the funds previously enjoined. On June 19, 1984, the trial judge entered an order granting that motion and directing payment of $7,564.41 in costs from the enjoined funds of World Navigation and Chastain to counsel for Laurie Uiterwyk. The appellants appeal this order.

World Navigation and Chastain filed a motion to dissolve the June 4 injunction on the ground that the trial judge was without jurisdiction to control the funds of World Navigation, which was not a party to the lawsuit. The trial judge denied that motion and the appellants appeal.

The appellants argue that the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction in enjoining and directing disbursement of the funds of World Navigation in the possession of Chastain, when neither World Navigation nor Chastain are before the court and the funds do not represent marital assets of the parties to this dissolution action. We are compelled to agree. It is well settled in American jurisprudence that no court can make a decree which will bind anyone but a party. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.1930). While the trial judge clearly has jurisdiction to direct or enjoin Hendrik Uiterwyk personally as to funds in his possession or subject to his control, he had no jurisdiction to enter orders binding on Chastain or World Navigation, or affecting funds belonging to World Navigation.

Accordingly, we reverse the orders appealed and remand for further proceedings.

RYDER, C.J., and FOGLE, HARRY W., Associate Judge, concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Bobby Eugene HUTCHINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. AY-471.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 7, 1985.
    Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and David P. Gauldin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. Cochran v. State, 460 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

BOOTH and SHIVERS, JJ., and TILLMAN PEARSON (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    William J. THOMAS, Appellant, v. SOUTHEAST BANK NA, Guardian of Property of Jean M. Van Wooten, Incompetent, Appellee.
    No. 84-2271.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Feb. 8, 1985.
    Terence Matthews, Bradenton, for appellant.
    Carl J. Robie, III, Sarasota, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The trial court’s order granting a temporary injunction is affirmed. See Oxford Int’l Bank and Trust, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, etc., 374 So.2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So.2d 1199 (Fla.1980). However, the bond posted by appel-lee does not appear to fulfill the requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c). Therefore, we remand with instructions that unless a proper bond is posted within a short time to be fixed by the trial court, the injunction should be dissolved.

Affirmed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

RYDER, C.J., and OTT and LEHAN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Daniel M. ADAMS and Eddis Virginia Adams, his wife, Appellants, v. Hamilton G. KENNER, Appellee.
    No. AX-218.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 11, 1985.

      Jaek G. Williams of Bryant, Higby & Williams, Panama City, for appellants.
    Clinton E. Foster, Panama City, for ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the final summary judgment entered in favor of appellee. Contrary to appellee’s position, the undisputed material facts establish that he was a developer within the meaning of Section 718.103(13), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.). Therefore, appellee was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

BOOTH and SHIVERS, JJ., and TILLMAN PEARSON (Ret.),. Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    The PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY, the Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company, and the Procter & Gamble Distributing Company, Petitioners, v. Barbara POWELL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Bernadette R. Riley, Deceased, Respondent.
    No. BD-138.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 11, 1985.
    Stephen E. Day, of Taylor, Day, Rio & Mercier, Jacksonville, and Thomas S. Calder, Frank C. Woodside, III, and John E. Jevicky of Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, Ohio, for petitioners.
    Charles J. Kahn, Jr. of Levin, Warfield, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, Pensacola, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

On petition for writ of common law cer-tiorari, the only issue before us is whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by ordering the discovery of documents furnished from outside researchers to Procter & Gamble Company. This issue is controlled by Procter & Gamble v. Swilley, 462 So.2d 1188 (1985), in which this court upheld the trial court’s order permitting respondents to discover such research and related documents.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

ERVIN, C.J., and L. SMITH and NIM-MONS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Anthony Lynn FULTZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 82-446.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 12, 1985.

      Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and May L. Cain, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Calvin L. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
    Before BARKDULL, HUBBART and FERGUSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Ferguson v. State, 417 So.2d 639 (Fla.1982); State v. Cumbie, 380 So.2d 1031 (Fla.1980); Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla.1978); Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632 (Fla.1974); Section 924.33, Florida Statutes (1983).


text:
    Pablo Perez DE ALEJO, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Appellees.
    No. 83-997.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 12, 1985.
    Horton, Perse & Ginsberg, Herman Klemick, Miami, for appellants.
    Leesfield & Blackburn and David W. Johnson, Miami, for appellees.
    Before HENDRY, BASKIN and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Krouse v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, 459 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).


text:
    The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Charles SMITH, Jr., Appellee.
    No. 84-966.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 12, 1985.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Jack B. Ludin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
    Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England and Kevin M. Emas, Miami, for appellee.
    Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. State v. DelGaudio, 445 So.2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 453 So.2d 45 (Fla.1984); State ex rel. Wright v. Yawn, 320 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 334 So.2d 609 (Fla.1976).


text:
    Raye L. SINGER, Appellant, v. Alan Joseph SINGER, Appellee.
    No. 84-1133.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 12, 1985.

      Edward C. Vining, Jr. and Thomas Scott, Miami, for appellant.
    Milstein & Wayne and Richard Milstein, Coral Gables, for appellee.
    Before BARKDULL, HUBBART and FERGUSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Campbell v. Campbell, 432 So.2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Patrick v. Patrick, 399 So.2d 72 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).


text:
    W.D. DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Michael A. SEIDLE, a/k/a Michael Seidle, and Michelle F. Seidle, his wife, Appellees.
    No. 84-1359.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 12, 1985.
    Fred A. Harrison, Jr., Miami, Douglas D. Stratton, Miami Beach, for appellant.
    Ferdie & Gouz and Ainslee Ferdie, Coral Gables, and Jeffrey Solomon, Hollywood, for appellees.
    Before HENDRY, BASKIN, and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102 (Fla.1951), aff'd after remand, 62 So.2d 56 (Fla.1952); Affiliated Marketing, Inc. v. Dyco Chemicals & Coatings, Inc., 340 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 675 (Fla.1977); Weeki Wachee Orchid Gardens, Inc. v. Florida Inland Theatres, Inc., 239 So.2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970), cert. denied, 246 So.2d 110 (Fla.1971); National Airlines v. Metcalf, 114 So.2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959).


text:
    Frank DONEGAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-2614.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 12, 1985.
    Frank Donegan, in pro. per.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Randi Klay-man Lazarus, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.
    Before BARKDULL, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(g), having taken this appeal from the summary denial of his motion for post conviction relief under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 and this court having considered the record presented and having further determined that it conclusively appears therefrom that appellant is entitled to no relief, the denial of his motion is affirmed. Dumas v. State, 439 So.2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).


author: PER CURIAM. ANSTEAD, Chief Judge,

text:
    Robert GORDON and Jessie Mae Gordon, Appellants, v. The CITY OF LAUDERHILL, Belefonte Insurance Company, and Pine Top Insurance Company, Appellees.
    No. 84-376.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Feb. 13, 1985.
    John F. O’Donnell of O’Donnell & Lazarus, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    David F. Cooney of Conrad, Scherer & James, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee City of Lauderhill.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LETTS and DELL, JJ., concur.

ANSTEAD, C.J., dissents with opinion.

ANSTEAD, Chief Judge,

dissenting:

Although the facts of this case strongly suggest that either the appellant, Robert Gordon, or the motorist that rear-ended him was responsible for the accident in question, I believe that a reasonable juror could conclude that the city firemen, who were soliciting donations in the street, were also partly responsible for the accident. For that reason I would reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of the firemen.


text:
    Peter Paul GAESSER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-382.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Feb. 13, 1985.
    Jeffrey M. Harris, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carolyn V. McCann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on the authority of Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.1984).

HERSEY, HURLEY and DELL, JJ., concur.


text:
    Joseph Adeline PEREIRA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-930.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Feb. 13, 1985.
    Arnold T. Blostein of Arnold T. Blostein, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

      Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Sarah B. Mayer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LETTS and DELL, JJ., concur.

ANSTEAD, C.J., dissents with opinion.

ANSTEAD, Chief Judge,

dissenting.

I would reverse on the authority of Munford v. State, 343 So.2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) and English v. State, 301 So.2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), because of the trial court’s failure to grant the appellant’s motion to compel identity of the confidential informant.


text:
    Louis SYLVESTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 84-1315.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Feb. 13, 1985.
    Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Robert E. Adler, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carolyn V. McCann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

On authority of Young v. State, 454 So.2d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), we reverse appellant’s conviction of the offense of grand theft, and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate that conviction and resentence appellant on the robbery conviction.

ANSTEAD, C.J., and LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, concur.


text:
    Stella K. PARKER, Appellant, v. LANDMARK FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Appellee.
    No. 84-1558.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Feb. 13, 1985.
    Christopher B. Knox, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Robert A. Ware of English, McCaughan & O’Bryan, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Reversed. We believe the trial court erred in denying appellant’s petition for trust payments in accord with the provisions of Sections 738.04 and 738.12, Florida Statutes (1981). See In re Will of Bowen, 240 So.2d 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).

ANSTEAD, C.J., and LETTS and DELL, JJ., concur.


text:
    MODULAR COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. DIGITAL RESEARCH, INC., a California corporation, Appellee.
    No. 84-2500.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Feb. 13, 1985.
    James 0. Murphy, Jr. of Byrd & Murphy, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Lee B. Gartner of Sobo, Wellens & Baloc-co, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. Appellant was the party seeking affirmative relief in his second amended counterclaim. Thus, dismissal of Count I of that claim is not an order in favor of the party seeking affirmative relief. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) Fla.R.App.P.

DOWNEY, HERSEY and DELL, JJ., concur.


author:
CALOGERO, Justice. LEMMON, Justice,
      DIXON, Chief Justice MARCUS, Justice

text:
    STATE ex rel. Steven GALLAGHER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    Nos. 84-KH-0985, 84-KD-1378.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 14, 1985.

      Philip Johnson, Ed Jenkins, M. Craig Col-wart, New Orleans, for relator.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., William R. Campbell, Asst. Dist. Atty., T. Allen Usry, Usry & Weeks, New Orleans, for respondents.
   CALOGERO, Justice.

The issue presented in this rather unusually postured case is whether Steven Gallagher, imprisoned in Orleans Parish Prison on a two year sentence for felony theft, is entitled to either work credits or good time credits, or both. The case is before us both on writs of habeas corpus by Gallagher and on rehearing application by Sheriff Foti. It arose as follows.

On December 16, 1982, Gallagher was convicted of felony theft, an offense which occurred on June 7, 1982. On March 25, 1988 he was sentenced to two years in Orleans Parish Prison, with credit for time served.

While in prison, Gallagher made a request for his “roll-out” (release) date. The release date given to him by prison authorities was in September of 1984. It did not reflect any credit for good time, or for work he had performed while imprisoned.

On September 29, 1983, Gallagher filed a petition in the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans seeking a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that he had not been given credit for two months previously served and also that he was being denied work time and good time credits on his sentence.

Gallagher’s trade is plumbing and during his stay at the Parish prison he worked as a plumber in the prison and in its satellite facilities. After a hard freeze in December, 1983, he repaired seventeen broken lines in the Conchetta building. In addition to the plumbing detail, Gallagher worked in the welding workshop in the prison. He also participated in the construction of the Emergency Detention Center and the Ren-don Street facility.

Gallagher contends that he was led to believe that he would receive a diminution of his sentence for the work he performed. He also claims an entitlement to a diminution of his sentence for “good time.”

Gallagher’s petition was denied, and he sought writs from the Court of Appeal on October 24, 1983. On November 16, 1983 the Court of Appeal denied writs. Gallagher applied for writs from this Court on November 21, 1983. On December 16, 1983 this Court granted his application and ordered the trial court to conduct an evi-dentiary hearing. State ex rel Gallagher v. Foti, 442 So.2d 474 (La.1983).

The evidentiary hearing was conducted on January 13 and January 20, 1984. Gallagher called several witnesses, including Sheriff Foti, in an attempt to prove his entitlement to work credits and good time. On February 10, 1984, the district court denied Gallagher’s petition for habeas corpus. The trial court found that the sheriff maintained a strict policy of not awarding good time or work time credits to any inmates in Orleans Parish Prison. Based on that finding, the court held that Sheriff Foti had absolute discretion concerning diminution of sentences for “good time” and work performed while in prison, and that Sheriff Foti had not abused his discretion in denying work credits or good time credits to Gallagher. Gallagher’s application for writs from the court of appeal was denied, without a review of the hearing transcript, on March 23, 1984. Judge Red-mann dissented from the denial and assigned reasons in favor of granting writs.

Gallagher again applied for writs in this Court, seeking review of the lower court decisions. On April 23, 1984, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeal with an order for the court to reconsider its decision after a review of the transcript of the district court proceedings. State ex rel Gallagher v. State, 449 So.2d 1029 (La.1984). Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal denied writs in the case on May 16, 1984.

On May 17,1984, Gallagher again sought review of the Court of Appeal denial. We granted the application on June 27, 1984, and issued the following order:

The district court is ordered to grant relator mandatory work credit for work performed under La.R.S. 15:571.10(A). The Sheriff is ordered to exercise discretion on an individual basis on the issue of whether relator should be granted a diminution of sentence under La.R.S. 15:571.-10(B). State ex rel Gallagher v. State, 452 So.2d 166 (La.1984).

Sheriff Foti thereafter applied for a rehearing. While the rehearing application was pending in this Court, the district court, apparently responding to the then non-final June 27, 1984 action, conducted an evidentiary hearing on July 10, 1984 to determine whether Sheriff Foti had complied with this Court’s June 27th order. The district court held that the Sheriff had complied with our order notwithstanding the Sheriff’s position that Gallagher was entitled to no work credits or good time credits. The court was of the view that Gallagher had not performed work which entitled him to work credits under Section A of La.R.S. 15:571.10. With regard to other work performed by Gallagher, the court held that the sheriff had absolute discretion in allowing diminution of sentence for good time under R.S. 15:571.10(B) and that the sheriff had not abused his discretion in denying it in this case.

On July 19,1984, Gallagher again applied to this Court for supervisory writs, claiming that the district court had not complied with the order issued by this Court on June 27, 1984. On July 27, 1984, we granted Gallagher’s application for writs (complaining of the district court ruling of July 10, 1984) as well as Sheriff Foti’s rehearing application (complaining of our order of June 27, 1984). State ex rel Gallagher v. State, 453 So.2d 946 (La.1984). Because the case could not be docketed and decided prior to its becoming moot upon Gallagher’s forthcoming release in September, 1984 (without any work credits or good time credits) and because, if entitled to work credits, Gallagher had already accrued enough to effect his immediate release, we coupled the writ grant on July 27, 1984 with an order for Gallagher’s interim release pending disposition of the case. Since Gallagher’s writ application and Foti’s rehearing application involve the identical issues, they were consolidated for our consideration and review.

The issue central to both cases is whether an inmate of Orleans Parish Prison, convicted of a felony but sentenced to the custody of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff (rather than to the Department of Corrections), is entitled to either work credits for work he performs or good time credits for good behavior.

La.R.S. 15:571.10 is the basic statutory provision which authorizes the diminution of sentences of prisoners confined to parish prison for work credits and good time credits. La.R.S. 15:571.10, as amended in 1983, provides:

A. Any prisoner consenting to work under the provisions of R.S. 15:709 shall have as many days taken off or remitted from his sentence corresponding with the number of days during which he shall have performed work. The days shall be computed at the rate of ten hours work per day.
B. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any inmate not committed to the Department of Corrections who consents to, and participates in, any or all or any combination of the following may, at the discretion of the sheriff of the parish in which the conviction was had, be granted a diminution of sentence for:
(1) Work performed within the parish prison.
(2) Work performed on public works programs outside the parish prison.
(3) Attendance of rehabilitation programs.
(4) Demonstrations of good behavior.
C. Such diminution of sentence shall take off or remit from the sentence as many days as the prisoner has earned by compliance with the provisions of Subsection B.

The questions presented for our consideration are twofold: (1) whether La.R.S. 15:571.10 entitles Orleans Parish Prison inmates to mandatory work credits and/or mandatory good time credits, and, if so, (2) whether Steven Gallagher performed work while an inmate of parish prison which qualifies under La.R.S. 15:571.10. Our resolution of the issues in this case rests on the proper interpretation of La.R.S. 15:571.-10, Sections A and B.

Stripped of its historical background, La. R.S. 15:571.10, as amended in 1983, makes no sense as written. Section A states that any prisoner consenting to work on parish public works “shall” be given credit on his sentence at one day for every 10 hours. On the other hand, Section B provides that in addition to “demonstration of good behavior” and “attendance of rehabilitation programs” any prisoner consenting to work “within the parish prison ...” or “on public works programs outside the parish prison” “may” receive credit on his sentence (one day for one day) at the discretion of the sheriff. To confuse matters further, Section A still refers to prisoners consenting to work under the authority of La.R.S. 15:709, which was repealed in 1983. 1983 La.Acts No. 615. Nonetheless, through a historical analysis of the provision, the intent and state of the law can be discerned.

In 1888, the legislature passed Act 121 to authorize the sheriffs of the various parishes (Orleans included) to employ consenting prisoners “to perform manual labor upon any ... public works inside or outside of the prison ... as shall be determined by the police juries of the several parishes and the municipal authorities of the several towns and cities.” That original statute, 1888 La.Acts No. 121, first envisioned, for prisoners in the parish jails throughout the state including Orleans Parish, voluntary work (“whenever a prisoner ... shall be willing of his own free will and accord to perform manual labor_”) in return for mandatory credit of one day for every 10 hours.

In 1894, the legislature then began moving toward a system of compulsory work in all parishes except Orleans by providing that the police juries “may” use convicts for work through the entire length of their sentences and “may,” in return, reduce those sentences by one fourth. 1894 La. Acts No. 29. By 1908, the system of compulsory labor had solidified: work became mandatory in all parishes except Orleans (“all able bodied inmates over the age of eighteen years and under the full age of fifty-five years shall be worked ... and shall be kept working_”); and in return, the prisoners would receive mandatory (“shall”) credits of one-sixth off their terms. 1908 La.Acts No. 204. Those provisions for mandatory labor (still excluding Orleans Parish) were then carried over in Acts 1942, No. 289 and into La.R.S. 15:571.1 and La.R.S. 15:709 (1950).

La.R.S. 15:709 (originating in part in 1894 La.Acts No. 29) gave the governing bodies in each parish the authority to enact rules and regulations for convict labor under La.R.S. 15:571.1 (i.e., forced labor in all parishes except Orleans). Credit for that labor was computed at one-sixth the term of imprisonment, as it had been in 1908 and 1942. La.R.S. 15:571.9 (1950). However, the legislature never repealed the voluntary labor provisions of Acts 1888, No. 121 and that act reappeared in the Revised Statutes of 1950 as La.R.S. 15:708 (which contained Sections 1, 3 and 4 of 1888 La. Acts No. 121), with mandatory credits (again one day for ten hours) required by La.R.S. 15:571.10 (which contained Section 2 of 1888 La.Acts No. 121).

Louisiana, therefore, had a confusing and overlapping system of forced and voluntary labor, with different credits assigned toward early release until the Legislature repealed La.R.S. 15:571.1 (authorizing forced labor) by Acts 1966, No. 310, effective January 1, 1967.

The mandatory character of work day credits, however, remained constant since 1888. In 1977, the Attorney General’s Office thus issued the following opinion under R.S. 15:571.10 (as amended in 1966):

... since section 571.10 states unequivocally that any prisoner who works ‘shall’ have as many days taken off as he works ... once work credit days are earned by law they may not be forfeited or taken away by the sheriff.
Op.Atty.Gen., 1976-77, p. 294. (emphasis in the original).

In the meantime, good behavior credit (“good time” unrelated to work) has had a more varied history. Through the 1950’s, the Legislature authorized good behavior (good time) credits in the parish prisons. La.R.S. 15:571.3 (1950); Acts 1942, No. 50; Acts 1926, No. 311. In 1964, however, the Legislature amended La.R.S. 15:571.3 and restricted good time (good behavior) credits in the parish jails to prisoners serving misdemeanor sentences of one year or more. 1964 La.Acts No. 426. By contrast with mandatory work day credits, “good time” has always remained within the discretion of the sheriff. In the same 1977 opinion, the Attorney General’s office thus noted:

... since the awarding of good .time allowances rests in the discretion of the sheriff, he may revoke or forfeit good time he has previously allowed. Section 15:571.3 reads in part: 'The sheriff of the parish in which the conviction was had shall have the sole power to determine when good time has been earned on which diminution of sentence may be allowed.’ Under this same authority he may restore good time once taken away. Op.Atty.Gen., 1976-77, p. 293.

In 1966, or two years after it had denied good time/good behavior credits to prisoners serving felony (or 6 month misdemean- or) sentences in the parish jails, the legislature amended and reenacted La.R.S. 15:571.10. 1966 La.Acts No. 540. The purpose of the act was to provide for the “[Application of work days to sentences of prisoners voluntarily performing manual labor on public work of parish ...” and for the “diminution of sentences of prisoners confined in Orleans Parish Prison.” Section A thus continued unabated the Legislature’s policy of providing mandatory (“shall”) work day credits for “[a]ny prisoner consenting to work” on parish public works. Section B (new) provided that “[Notwithstanding any other provisions to the contrary ...” [i.e., notwithstanding La. R.S. 15:571.3 amended 2 years earlier] the Criminal Sheriff for Orleans Parish could reduce (on a one for one basis) the sentence of any prisoner consenting “... to work either within the parish prison or on public works programs outside of the parish prison and/or to attend rehabilitation programs and/or demonstrating good behavior....”

It has been argued that the effect of the 1966 amendment was to make Orleans Parish prisoners worse off than they were before the amendment because it placed work day credits within the discretion of the criminal sheriff instead of having them mandatory under Section A. To the contrary however, the overall effect of Section B as amended was favorable to the Orleans Parish inmates. Assuming that Orleans Parish had a criminal sheriff willing to exercise his discretion, the 1966 amendment restored at least the possibility of good time or good behavior credits for prisoners serving felony (or 6 month misdemeanor) sentences, whether they worked or not under Section A.

This view is supported by the amendment made to La.R.S. 15:571.10 in 1983. Therein, the Legislature, concerned about overcrowding in the parish prisons, amended La.R.S. 15:571.10(B) (leaving Section A unchanged) and gave similar authority to that given the Orleans Parish Sheriff in 1966 to every other parish sheriff in the state. Carrying forward the distinction drawn in 1966, the 1983 amendment provides for “Application of work days to sentences of prisoners voluntarily performing manual labor on public works of parish ...” and for “diminution of sentences of prisoners confined in parish prison....” Any doubt that the 1983 amendment was designed to increase, not restrict, the possibilities of early release is eliminated by the following verbatim transcript of testimony at the hearing on Senate Bill 530 (Act No. 608) in the Senate Finance Committee on May 16, 1983:

Jean Bell, Sheriffs Association
JEAN BELL — Senate Bill 530 is an amendment to the provisions of the Code relative to good behavior. Actually we found a hiatus in the law and they had suggested that we get corrected regarding overcrowding in parish jails.
SENATOR CHABERT — What does it deal with?
JEAN BELL — It seems that we had one of the DA’s in the state that had gotten concerned and had issued a ruling saying that the sheriffs could not give good time and actually Corrections was giving more good time than the sheriffs were. There is another provision in the statute that did allow the sheriff to give good time. So they just wanted to get it corrected. It was endorsed by the DA and the sheriffs.
SENATOR KELLY — Can the sheriff give good time under this bill?
JEAN BELL — Yes, sir. You give one for one.
Bill reported favorable.

Thus the present structure of La.R.S. 15:571.10 (198B), when considered in light of the historical background of both work time credits and good time credits, helps explain the intent and meaning of the provision.

The opening sentence of La.R.S. 15:571.-10(A) places a limitation on the type of work which qualifies for mandatory work credits. The provision is limited to “... prisoners] consenting to work under La. R.S. 15:709 ...”

As set forth above, since 1950, La.R.S. 15:709 had given authority to the governing bodies of each parish to enact “regulations for the working, safekeeping, clothing, housing and sustenance of those persons serving their sentences while working under its supervision as provided in La.R.S. 15:571.1 [i.e., forced labor]_” La.R.S. 15:709 had nothing whatsoever to do with prisoners who consented to work. La.R.S. 15:571.1, authorizing forced labor, was repealed in 1967, ending the system of forced prisoner labor. At that time, the Legislature neglected to repeal La.R.S. 15:709, which implemented the forced labor provision. However, in 1983, the legislature did repeal La.R.S. 15:709, 1983 La.Acts No. 615, making clear that its previous repeal of La.R.S. 15:571.1 in 1967 had rendered prisoner labor voluntary instead of mandatory.

The sheriff argues that the repeal of La.R.S. 15:709 undermines La.R.S. 15:571.-10(A) and renders it meaningless. For the reasons which follow, we disagree.

The most compelling reason for finding the Sheriffs argument to be without merit is the simple fact that the Legislature never intended that La.R.S. 15:571.-10(A) refer to La.R.S. 15:709. Rather, it was always intended that the reference in La.R.S. 15:571.10(A) be to La.R.S. 15:708, a viable provision today. The reference in La.R.S. 15:571.10(A) to La.R.S. 15:709 instead of La.R.S. 15:708 was an inadvertent error made in 1950 when the Revised Statutes were compiled and enacted.

The revisers, assigned the task of compiling the numerous acts which had accumulated in Louisiana were not empowered to make substantive changes in the law. Rather, they were authorized to compile the many Acts into a logical organizational scheme, eliminating unconstitutional, duplicating and obsolete material. 1942 La.Acts No. 42. And, as the Reviser’s Notes indicate “[n]o substantive policy changes [were] made.”

In accordance with the organizational scheme adopted, as is pertinent to the case before us, the revisers took the four sections of 1888 La.Acts No. 121 (on voluntary labor with mandatory credits of one day per 10 hours work) and divided them into what was then proposed to be two separate statutes, La.R.S. 15:571.10 (containing Section 2 of 1888 La.Acts No. 121) and La.R.S. 15:709 (containing Sections 1, 3 and 4 of 1888 La.Acts No. 121). The Reviser’s Notes expressly indicate that no change was intended to be made to the Act. Note, however, that at that time, the provision which became La.R.S. 15:708 was, in the Reviser's Notes, numbered one number higher, i.e., La.R.S. 15:709. See Louisiana Revised Statutes 1950, Reviser’s Notes, Title 14-15, February 1947. (No doubt this is why the reference in La.R.S. 15:571.10 was made to La.R.S. 15:709.)

However, before the final adoption of the revised statutes as proposed, some deletions were made of certain provisions. When a deletion was made, other remaining provisions were moved up a number. This is evident when you compare proposed sections with those ultimately enacted.

Originally, as provided in the Reviser’s Notes, there was a provision numbered La. R.S. 15:708 which was entitled “Employment of vagrants on public works.” The reviser’s notes which follow that provision state “[t]his statute has been included in the Revised Statutes but the Reporter recommends its deletion since it may be considered obsolete and special.” On the Reporter’s recommendation, the then proposed Section 708 (Section 3890 of the Revised Statutes of 1870) was deleted and not thereafter enacted as part of the Revised Statutes of 1950.

Accordingly, when the other provisions were moved up, because of the deletion of proposed Section 708, former Section 709 (concerning voluntary labor) became and was enacted as 708 and former Section 710 (concerning regulations for the working and housing of prisoners forced to work) became and was enacted as Section 709, etc. Unfortunately, the cross reference change in La.R.S. 15:571.10 was not coinci-dently made, so that La.R.S. 15:571.10 was enacted inadvertently referring to La.R.S. 15:709 when all along, as indicated by the Reviser’s Notes, no change in the law was intended, and the reference was intended to be to the statute which became La.R.S. 15:708.

No other explanation makes sense, since La.R.S. 15:571.10 applies to “any prisoner consenting to work” and La.R.S. 15:709 (repealed in 1983) had to do only with regulations for the housing and discipline of prisoners forced to work, and had nothing to do with prisoners consenting to work. It is and always has been La.R.S. 15:708 (the statute first proposed to be designated 709 in the Revision) which authorizes the use of prisoners, who consent to do so, to work on parish public works.

Furthermore, in the same act (1983 La. Acts No. 615) in which the Legislature repealed La.R.S. 15:709, the Legislature also amended and reenacted La.R.S. 15:708, governing voluntary labor, under the direction of the parish authorities. It is apparent from reading La.R.S. 15:709, before its repeal, and its companion provision, La.R.S. 15:708, that the Legislature’s reference in La.R.S. 15:571.10(A) to La.R.S. 15:709 was inadvertent and only meant to specify, under La.R.S. 15:708, that work performed for the parish on public works was the character of work which would trigger the mandatory work credits.

The legislature was free to repeal Section A when it amended Section B in 1983 and it chose not to do so. The fact that the Legislature did not repeal Section A (providing for mandatory work credits for volunteer work) when they repealed La.R.S. 15:709 leads us to conclude that it did not intend to change a policy dating back to 1888 of giving mandatory work credits for voluntary labor.

The Legislature’s use of the word “shall,” in La.R.S. 15:571.10(A), indicates an intent on their part for sentence credits to be mandatory under that section. Despite the Legislature’s inadvertent use of or reference to La.R.S. 15:709, in La.R.S. 15:571.10(A), instead of La.R.S. 15:708, as was intended (or perhaps we should say its inadvertent failure to correct a numerical error that was made 35 years ago when the provision was enacted in 1950), it is quite apparent that the Legislature intended to continue the basic policy established in the years 1888 and 1908 by maintaining a viable voluntary labor system under La.R.S. 15:571.10(A) with mandatory work credits. Therefore, parish prison inmates are entitled to credit for any work which falls within the ambit of Section A.

The governing authorities of the parishes may still use convict labor from the parish jails on designated parish projects, albeit now with the sheriff’s approval and on a wholly voluntary basis. In return, the prisoners consenting to such work “shall” receive credit on their sentences.

Moreover, every sheriff in the state may now, just as the Criminal Sheriff for Orleans Parish could, under the 1966 legislation, give additional credits toward early release, whether for good behavior, attendance of rehabilitation programs, or work. The sheriff may, for example, accelerate the work day credits on parish projects from one day for ten hours of work under La.R.S. 15:571.10(A) to one day for one day under La.R.S. 15:571.10(B), or give credits for work inside or outside the parish walls, and not specifically for the governing parish authorities. This reading of La.R.S. 15:571.10 is entirely consistent with the legislative history of the statute and Senate Bill 530 of 1983. In this manner we resolve the apparent conflict between Sections A and B of La.R.S. 15:571.10 consistent with the intent of the Legislature in the enactments and amendments to these confusing statutes.

Accordingly, under the interpretation of La.R.S. 15:571.10 which we render today, the Criminal Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans never had the discretion under either the 1966 or 1983 legislation to deny any prisoner, including Gallagher, credit for work performed on parish public works, that is, projects which benefit the parish directly. Such work must be distinguished, however, from the duties performed in the everyday upkeep of the prison. As to the latter, the sheriff has the right and duty to see that prisoners assist him in the every day maintenance of the prison. Although the sheriff has the authority to grant credit for this kind of work under La.R.S. 15:571.-10(B), he is not obliged to do so. Whether or not a prisoner is entitled to “good time” credits under Section B is, as it has always been, a matter entirely within the discretion of the Sheriff. The Sheriff does not abuse his discretion when he refuses to give good time credits to all inmates.

In order to qualify for the mandatory work credits under La.R.S. 15:571.-10(A), Gallagher is required to show he performed work on parish public works (of Orleans Parish). Gallagher worked on the construction of the Emergency Detention Center (commonly referred to as “tent” city). That project was undertaken in response to a severe problem of overcrowding in the Orleans Parish Prison. Gallagher ran pipes which were used as conduits for electrical lines. This work falls within the scope of La.R.S. 15:571.10(A). Notwithstanding the fact that the sheriff performed the immediate supervision of the project, it cannot be disputed that the Emergency Detention Center project was a public works project undertaken for the benefit of the community as a whole. It is clearly not the type of maintenance and upkeep work which is excluded from La. R.S. 15:571.10(A).

Gallagher’s participation in the construction of the Rendon Street facility likewise falls under La.R.S. 15:571.10(A). The Ren-don Street facility is a satellite prison facility. The construction of that facility, like the construction of the Emergency Detention Center, must be considered a public works project. Gallagher is entitled to credit of one day for every ten hours worked on the Emergency Detention Center and the Rendon Street facility.

Gallagher’s work on the plumbing detail and in the Conchetta building present a closer question. He repaired broken pipes in the Conchetta building after a freeze in December, 1983. This work, unlike the work on the Emergency Detention Center and Rendon Street, was not new construction. It was performed within the confines of an existing prison facility. The sheriff maintained immediate supervision and there was no immediate benefit to the community as a whole. This plumbing work cannot be construed as a public works project and therefore it does not qualify for mandatory credit under La.R.S. 15:571.10(A).

Notwithstanding that Gallagher’s work on the Conchetta building and the plumbing detail do not qualify under the mandatory work credit provisions of La.R.S. 15:571.10(A), it appears from the record that he nonetheless has earned sufficient work credits to have entitled him to his release on July 27, 1984, when we ordered it. Accordingly, Gallagher was properly ordered released by this Court on July 27, 1984, and to that extent the Sheriff’s rehearing application is denied.

However, our order of June 27, 1984 was twofold. We ordered the district court “to grant relator mandatory work credit for work performed under La.R.S. 15:571.-10(A).” For the reasons set out above, we reaffirm that action today. We also stated that “[t]he Sheriff is ordered to exercise discretion on an individual basis on the issue of whether relator should be granted a diminution of sentence under La.R.S. 15:571.10(B).” For the reasons set out above, we now find that the awarding of good time credits under La.R.S. 15:571.-10(B) is solely within the discretion of the parish sheriff to exercise, or not, as he sees fit. Accordingly, this latter part of our June 27, 1984 action is vacated.

Thus, in summary, we conclude as follows. Work performed on parish public works nets a parish inmate mandatory work credits at the rate of one day for each ten hours worked. The record evidences over 47 days of work credits due Gallagher and, accordingly, he was properly ordered releásed by this Court. Our order concerning the exercise of the sheriffs discretion regarding good time credits was erroneous and is hereby vacated. Should the sheriff institute a good time credit program under La.R.S. 15:571.10(B), he must exercise his discretion in a fair, even-handed and reasonable fashion. However, it is entirely within his discretion to institute such a program or not. Accordingly, we hold that the Sheriff does not abuse his discretion afforded him under La.R.S. 15:571.10(B) by his uniform system of denying good time credits to all inmates.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons, the district court judgment is reversed and the June 27, 1984 Per Curiam order of this Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

LEMMON, J., subscribes to the opinion and assigns additional reasons.

DIXON, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with reasons.

MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

WATSON., J., dissents being of the opinion that the discretion is solely with the sheriff and not this court for the reasons stated by MARCUS, J.

LEMMON, Justice,

subscribing and assigning additional reasons.

I interpret La.R.S. 15:571.10B to authorize the sheriff, in his discretion, to institute programs permitting inmates to obtain diminution’ of sentence for (1) work performed within the parish prison, (2) work performed on public works programs outside the prison, (3) attendance at rehabilitation programs and (4) demonstrations of good behavior. The Legislature, in my opinion, did not intend to require the sheriff to institute such programs, but rather set forth basic guidelines for a sheriff who decided in his discretion to provide incentives such as rehabilitation programs for his prisoners. Whether such incentive programs and the attendant administrative problems are really worthwhile and effective may depend on many variables, such as the size of the prison and the availability of personnel to supervise and keep records of such activities.

Thus, while the sheriff in his discretion may decide to institute incentive programs such as “good time” credits, he may also decide not to do so. However, if the sheriff institutes such a program, diminution of sentence must be administered in a rational, fair and evenhanded manner to those inmates who participate.

DIXON, Chief Justice

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

R.S. 15:571.10(B) gives the prisoner the right to credit for work under Paragraph B and gives the sheriff the power to control (discretion) the award of credit. A fair reading of the statute does not give the sheriff the option to institute such a system.

The interpretation of Paragraph A is correct.

MARCUS, Justice

(dissenting).

La.R.S. 15:571.10(A) limits mandatory work credits to “prisoner[s] consenting to work under the provisions of R.S. 15:709_” La.R.S. 15:709 provided for regulation and discipline of prisoners working for the governing authority of each parish. The repeal of § 709 by 1988 La. Acts No. 615 § 2 had the effect of eliminating mandatory work credit for voluntary work performed because no longer could a prisoner consent to work under the provisions of § 709. Hence, La.R.S. 15:571.-10(B) is the applicable provision to determine whether Steven Gallagher is entitled to work time and/or good time credits toward his two-year sentence for felony theft. Section 571.10(B) gives the sheriff full “discretion” to award a diminution of sentence for work performed in parish prison, work performed on public work programs outside parish prisons, attendance of rehabilitation programs, and demonstrations of good behavior. I do not consider that Sheriff Foti abused his discretion in denying work time or good time credits to Gallagher. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

      . Section A actually refers to work performed under La.R.S. 15:709. However, for the reasons set out hereinafter, we find that the Legislature intended that it refer, under La.R.S. 15:708, to parish public works.

      . 1888 La. Acts No. 121 provided:
      (author’s note)
      To authorize the criminal sheriffs of the different parishes of the State, the parish of Orleans included, to employ in the performance of manual labor upon the public roads or levees, or streets or public buildings and improvements, any prisoner sentenced to the parish prison for any crime or offense, provided the consent of the prisoner be first obtained.
      Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, That hereafter whenever a prisoner sentenced to the parish prison of any parish of this State, the parish of Orleans included, by any court of competent jurisdiction, shall be willing of his own free will and accord to perform manual labor upon any of the public roads, or levees, or streets, or public buildings and improvements or public f-works inside or outside of the prison, the criminal sheriff of said parish shall set said prisoners to work upon such labor as shall be determined by the police juries of the several parishes and the municipal authorities of the several towns and cities; provided, that such prisoners shall always remain under the custody and control of the several sheriffs. La. R.S. 15:708 (1950) (1983)
      Sec. 2. Any prisoner who shall thus consent to work shall have as many days taken off or remitted from his sentence corresponding with the number of days during which he L shall have performed work in the manner above mentioned; provided, that such days be computed at the rate of ten hours work per day. La. R.S. 15:571.10 (1950) La. R.S. 15:571.10A (1983)

        Sec. 3. That the council of the city of New Orleans and the police juries of the several parishes are hereby authorized to pass all such ordinances which they may deem necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this act, and for the discipline, working and employment of such prisoners. (author's note) La. R.S. 15:708 (1950) (1983)
      Sec. 4. This law shall not apply to criminals sentenced to hard labor. } La. R.S. 15:708 (1950) (1983)
      Sec. 5. That all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are repealed.

      . 1894 La. Acts No. 29 provided in pertinent part:
      (author’s note)
      Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, That when any person shall be convicted and sentenced by any competent court of the State, (the Parish of Orleans excepted) to imprisonment in the Parish Jail, or to such imprisonment and the payment of a fine, or to such imprisonment in default of the payment of a fine, he shall be committed to such jail there to remain in close , confinement for the full term specified in the sentence of the court, provided: that the Police Jury of any Parish may, in its “ discretion work such convicts upon any roads, levees, public farm, or any other public work, within such parish, or may hire or lease the services of such convicts to any person, for the purpose of working them within the Parish, such convicts to be kept at work until the expiration of the sentence of imprisonment; provided, that convicts sentenced to imprisonment shall remain in jail and not be worked, if the judge passing the sentence shall so order. La. R.S. 15:571.1 (1950)
      Sec. 5. Be it enacted, etc., Any convict working under the direction of the Police Jury who renders efficient services, and complies with all necessary rules and regulations, may have deducted from his term of imprisonment, one-fourth thereof. La. R.S. 15:571.9 (1950) (1983)
      Sec. 6. Be it enacted, etc., The Police Jury may establish regulations for the working, guarding, safe-keeping, clothing, housing, and sustenance of convicts, while working under its k supervision and for their discipline when idle or refractory; and may enforce such regulations by reasonable penalties. La. R.S. 15:709 (1950) (1982)

      . La.R.S. 15:571.1 as enacted in 1950 provided:
      When any person i,s convicted and sentenced by any competent court of this state, parish of Orleans excepted, to imprisonment in the parish jail or to imprisonment and the payment of a fine or to imprisonment in default of the payment of a fine he shall be committed to the parish jail and kept in close confinement for the full term specified by the court. All able-bodied males, over the age of eighteen years and under the age of fifty-five years, shall be worked upon the public roads, parish farms or any other public works of the parish and shall be kept at work until expiration of the sentence of imprisonment. Where, in the discretion of the court, the person sentenced to imprisonment should be kept in close confinement, the court may so order.
      La.R.S. 15:709, as enacted in 1950 provided:
      The governing authority of each parish may establish regulations for the working, safekeeping, clothing, housing and sustenance of those persons serving their sentences while working under its supervision as provided in R.S. 15:571.1 and for their discipline while idle and refractory, and may enforce reasonable penalties for infractions of their regulations.
      While any convicted persons are worked under the supervision of the governing authority, they may be kept overnight, and at such times as they are not at work, in the parish jail or other place for safekeeping, as the governing authority shall direct. The governing authority may employ guards to watch and direct the labor of all persons working under its supervision.

      . La.R.S. 15:708, as enacted in 1950 provided:
      Whenever a prisoner sentenced to the parish prison of any parish of the state, by and court of competent jurisdiction, shall be willing of his own free will to perform manual labor upon any of the public roads, levees, streets, or public buildings, works, or improvements inside or outside of the prison, the criminal sheriff shall set the prisoner to work upon labor determined by the governing authorities of the parishes and the municipal authorities of the towns and cities. The prisoners shall always remain under the custody and control of the sheriffs.
      The governing authorities of the parishes shall pass all ordinances which they may deem necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Section and for the discipline, working and employment of the prisoners.
      This section shall not apply to criminals sentenced to hard labor.

      . La.R.S. 15:571.10, as enacted in 1950 provided:
      Any prisoner consenting to work under the provisions of R.S. 15:709 shall have as many days taken off or remitted from his sentence corresponding with the number of days during which he shall have performed work. The days shall be computed at the rate of ten hours work per day.

      . The Attorney General’s office has tried twice to make sense of these work provisions. In 1942 (before Acts 1942, No. 289 superceded the earlier provision) it suggested simply that "[tjhere is no conflict in the provisions of Act 121 of 1888 and Act 204 of 1908, for the reason that the Act first mentioned has relation to voluntary manual labor by jail prisoners and Act 204 of 1908 contains provisions authorizing police juries to work or hire out jail prisoners without their consent and, therefore, the credit given a prisoner who performs work would depend upon the particular statute under which the work was performed.” Op., Atty Gen. 1940-42, p. 2915. In 1950 the Attorney General issued another opinion to the following effect: that all able bodied males 18 to 55 (except in Orleans Parish) were required to work (during the entirety of their confinement) by La.R.S. 15:571.1 and would receive as credit one-sixth the respective terms of imprisonment they were serving (La.R.S. 15:571.9); other prisoners not able bodied, under 18 or over 55, and female prisoners, who volunteered for work would receive credit at one day for every 10 hours (i.e., La.R.S. 15:571.10; 709). Op., Atty Gen. 1950-52, pp. 187-188.

      . The legislature did not at that time, however, repeal La.R.S. 15:571.9, assigning credits for forced labor at ⅛ the term, nor did they repeal La.R.S. 15:709, empowering the governing authority to make appropriate rules and regulations regarding prisoners forced to work. In fact, the legislature recently amended La.R.S. 15:571.9 to make minor changes in its wording. Of course, the ¼ ratio still used in the statute makes no sense now that parish prisoners can no longer be required to work the full term of their sentences. Vestiges of the former forced labor system still appear elsewhere in the law. La.C.Cr.P. art. 890 thus provides that ‘‘[a]ny ... sentence of imprisonment [other than to the state penitentiary] subjects the defendant to confinement, and to labor unless otherwise specified." However, with the repeal of La.R.S. 15:571.1 in 1967, forced labor for parish prisoners is no longer authorized.

      . La.R.S. 15:571.3, as enacted in 1950 provided:
      A. Single good time.
      Every Prisoner in the state penitentiary or parish prisons convicted of a felony or misdemeanor and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more may earn a diminution of sentence, to be known as single good time, by good behavior as follows: two months for the first year; two months for the second year; three months each for the third and fourth years; and four months for each subsequent year.
      The sheriff of the parish in which the conviction was had or the superintendent of the state penitentiary as the case may be, shall have the sole power to determine when single good time has been earned on which diminution of sentence may be allowed.
      B. Double good time.
      The superintendent of the state penitentiary may establish a special class of prisoners who have not been previously convicted and sentenced for a felony in any court in Louisiana, or in federal courts or courts of other states or countries and who have performed particularly meritorious service or maintained highly exemplary conduct. The prisoners in this class may be granted diminution of sentence of double the time specified in subdivision A of this Section to be known as "double good time.” Such additional diminution of sentence shall be allowed only with the written approval of the governor in each case.

      .La.R.S. 15:571.3, as amended in 1964 provided:
      A. Every prisoner in parish prison convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more may earn a diminution of sentence, to be known as "good time,” by good behavior, as follows: two months for the first year; two months for the second year; three months each for the third and fourth years; and four months for each subsequent year.
      The sheriff of the parish in which the conviction was had shall have the sole authority to determine when good time has been earned for purposes of diminution of sentence.

      . La.R.S. 15:571.10, as amended in 1966 provided:
      A. Any prisoner consenting to work under the provisions of R.S. 15:709 shall have as many days taken off or remitted from his sentence corresponding with the number of days during which he shall have performed work. The days shall be computed at the rate of ten hours work per day.
      B. Notwithstanding any other provisions to the contrary, for work performed and/or attendance in rehabilitation programs and/or good behavior, any prisoner in the Orleans Parish Prison consenting to work either within the parish prison or on public works programs outside of the parish prison and/or to attend rehabilitation programs and/or demonstrating good behavior may at the discretion of the Criminal Sheriff in Orleans Parish be granted a diminution of sentence which shall take off or remit from said sentence as many days as the said prisoner shall have worked and/or attended rehabilitation programs and/or demonstrated good behavior.

      . Section 1 of 1888 La.Acts No. 121 authorized the use of prisoners who consented, to work on parish public works. Section 2 of the Act provided "any prisoner who shall thus [as above in Section 1] consent to work....When the Act was split into two separate statutes by the reviser’s organizational scheme, the wording of Section 2 of the Act, which became La.R.S. 15:571.-10 was changed slightly to read: "[a]ny prisoner consenting to work under the provisions of R.S. 15:709 ...,” (instead of “thus consenting to work,” i.e., as above in Section 1 of the Act).

      . The amendment made three significant changes in the prior law governing voluntary labor. It placed responsibility for rules and regulations concerning prisoners at work on the parish projects in the sheriff’s office, rather than in that of the governing parish authorities. The amendment also gave the sheriff’s office some control over the use of his inmates. Former versions of R.S. 15:708 (reaching back to the original 1888 Act on voluntary labor) had provided that the criminal sheriff "shall set the [consenting] prisoner to work upon labor determined by the governing authorities of the parishes....” See, e.g., La.R.S. 15:708 (1950) (1966). La.R.S. 15:708 now provides that the criminal sheriff “may set the [consenting] prisoner to work upon labor determined by the governing authorities of the parish_” Finally, and for the first time, it included those prisoners sentenced to hard labor and awaiting transfer to the penitentiary, with the exception of certain serious offenses (e.g., murder, rape, etc.).
      La.R.S. 15:708, as amended in 1983 provides:
      A.Whenever a prisoner sentenced to a parish prison of any parish of the state, by any court of competent jurisdiction, or a prisoner in a parish prison awaiting transfer to a state correctional facility shall be willing of his own free will to perform manual labor upon any of the public roads, levees, streets, or public buildings, works, or improvements inside or outside of the prison or whenever a prisoner sentenced to the parish prison of any parish of this state, by any court of competent jurisdiction, or a prisoner in a parish prison awaiting transfer to a state correctional facility shall be willing of his own free will to perform manual labor upon any cemetery or graveyard, the criminal sheriff may set the prisoner to work upon labor determined by the governing authorities of the parishes and the municipal authorities of the towns and cities. The prisoners shall always remain under the custody and control of the sheriffs.
      B. The sheriffs of the parishes shall establish regulations which they may deem necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Section and for the discipline, working, and employment of the prisoners.
      C. This Section shall not apply to criminals convicted of a capital offense or those sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor as provided in R.S. 14:30, 30.1, 34, 41, 42 and 42.1 and R.S. 40:966(B).

      . Additionally, the above interpretation, when applied to the 1966 amendment (which gave only the Orleans Parish Sheriff the right, in his discretion, to give sentence credits under Section B), saves that legislation from constitutional attack on equal protection grounds. If that amendment is viewed as limiting only Orleans parish inmates' right, to work credits, where all other parish inmates have a right to mandatory work credits, it might not pass constitutional muster. However, viewed as giving the Orleans Parish Sheriff the additional authority in his discretion to bestow good time credits to solve an overcrowding problem in Orleans Parish, notwithstanding that other parish sheriffs cannot give such credits, is more likely to be viewed as rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

      . The prison work record, as it appears in the record in this case, is, at best, in poor condition. It shows mostly only successive check outs without corresponding check ins, the latter being just as necessary for establishing the hours Gallagher worked. Counsel for Gallagher states that he has examined the record and has found over 470 hours of work by Gallagher, which at the prescribed rate of one day per ten hours, entitled him to released on July 27, 1984 as ordered. The Sheriff has not disputed the fact that the record evidences over 470 hours of work by Gallagher. Rather, the sheriff argued that in order for the credit to be earned, the ten hour periods had to be worked at one time. We find this argument by the sheriff to be without merit and, therefore, find that the record supports the finding that Gallagher has worked over 470 hours for which he is due work credits, resulting in a diminution of sentence by over 47 days.

      . Justice Watson’s dissent, in which he says "the discretion is solely with the sheriff and not this Court,” implies that in this opinion the majority has usurped the authority of the sheriff, or chosen to exercise discretion which is not within its power. In a similar vein Justice Marcus’ dissent can be read to imply that the Court has held that the sheriff has abused his discretion afforded him under the law. In fact, neither is correct. With regard to La.R.S. 15:571.-10(B) we have expressly held that “the awarding of good time credits under La.R.S. 15:571.10(B) is solely within the discretion of the parish sheriff to exercise, or not, as he sees fit.” We thus denied Gallagher the relief he seeks under that statute. Relative to La.R.S. 15:571.10(A) we have made a purely statutory interpretation that "any prisoner consenting to work on parish public works” must be given the credits on his sentence prescribed by law, a determination wholly unrelated to the exercise of discretion by the Sheriff or anyone else.

      . An inmate is not constitutionally entitled to earn “good time” credits. See McCormick v. Hunt, 328 So.2d 140 (La.1976). The Legislature’s decision to leave such programs to the individual sheriff was a proper exercise of its authority.


text:
    Darryl L. BROWN v. EBASCO SERVICES, INC., Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc., Louis Joseph, Hillary Jones, ABC Insurance Company, XYZ Insurance Company and Louisiana Power and Light Co.
    No. 85-C-0008.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 1985.

      DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.
   PER CURIAM.

It is doubtful that Louisiana Power and Light Company was a principal under La.R.S. 23:1032. Nevertheless, this court on its own motion can notice that a petition fails to state a cause of action, and the factual allegations of this petition do not state a cause of action against Louisiana Power and Light Company. La.C.C.P. Art. 927.

Accordingly, insofar as the judgments of the lower courts dismissed the action against Louisiana Power and Light Company, the application is denied on the basis that the petition fails to state a cause of action against Louisiana Power and Light Company; however, the application is granted in part, and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to permit plaintiff to amend his petition as to Louisiana Power and Light Company. La. C.C.P. Art. 934.

Insofar as the judgments of the lower courts dismissed the action against Ebasco Services, Inc., the application is denied.


author: LEMMON, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Peter IMBORNONE.
    No. 83-KA-2553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 8, 1985.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., William R. Campbell, Asst. Dist. Atty., Susan Hunt, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
    Michele Gaudin, Frank DeSalvo, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
   LEMMON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction for issuing a $2,499.12 worthless check in violation of La.R.S. 14:71A(1). The principal issue is whether the evidence sufficiently established that defendant acted with a specific intent to defraud.

Defendant issued a $2,499.12 check dated February 28, 1981 to the sales manager of an auto dealership in order to retrieve his car which had been repaired. Defendant did not contest the fact that he knew, at the time of issuance, that his account contained insufficient funds to cover the check. He also admitted that he stopped payment on the check on Monday, March 2. His defense was that he lacked an intent to defraud because he issued the check under a bona fide, reasonable belief that funds were forthcoming to cover his financial obligations. He also contended that he issued the check one week prior to February 28 and that a postdated check cannot be the basis for a charge of issuing worthless checks.

Although defendant testified that he gave the check to the manager (and picked up his car) a week prior to February 28, the sales manager testified positively that the transaction occurred on the 28th. The trial judge (who tried the ease without a jury) resolved the conflict, finding as a fact that the check was issued on the 28th. Our review of the record, satisfies us that the evidence supports this factual finding, and it is not necessary to decide whether La.R.S. 14:71A(1) applies to a postdated check.

On the issue of intent to defraud, defendant introduced considerable evidence regarding the sale on February 3, 1981 of a restaurant that he owned. The purchaser had signed an agreement and had issued several checks in large sums to defendant. However, these checks had not been honored by the bank because they were drawn on accounts with inadequate funds, and defendant was on notice that the purchaser’s checks were not being honored well before he wrote the check to the auto dealer.

In closing argument to the judge, defendant contended that he had a reasonable belief that he would be paid and could therefore easily discharge his financial obligation to the auto dealer who repaired his car. This evidence, defendant argued, defeats any implication that he acted with an intent to defraud, as is required by the worthless checks statute.

The trial judge in convicting defendant stated that he was satisfied that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was aware, by the time he issued the check in question, that the checks issued for the purchase of his restaurant would not be honored and that the purchase price would not be immediately forthcoming. He therefore concluded that defendant acted with an intent to defraud. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings and conclusions were reasonably supported by the evidence.

The sale of the restaurant took place in early February, 1981. By February 28, 1981, defendant had made numerous efforts to collect the proceeds of the sale, and he was aware that the checks he accepted in payment were not good. Despite this, he issued a check to the automobile dealer so that he could retrieve his car. Because the service office was closed and the cashier was not there, the sales manager demanded specific assurance of defendant when he accepted defendant’s check on Saturday that the check was issued on sufficient funds. When the sales manager called the bank on Monday, he discovered that defendant had misrepresented his financial condition and had even stopped payment on the check. Although defendant testified that he believed when he wrote the check that the money was forthcoming, the trial judge was not required to accept that testimony as credible. Further, defendant did not offer to return possession of the car when the funds were not forthcoming. The overall circumstances, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, were therefore sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time of issuance of the check on February 28, defendant had no reasonable expectation that he would have “sufficient credit with the bank ... for the payment of such check ... in full upon its presentation”. La.R.S. 14:71A(1).

Finally, defendant contends that there was no proof of the required “exchange of anything of value”, since the debt had been incurred (and credit extended) at the time repairs were undertaken and completed, and he could have picked up his repaired car without issuing the check. The statute expressly applies “whether the exchange is contemporaneous or not”. Moreover, the automobile dealer in this case had the right to retain possession of the vehicle until paid. See La.C.C. Art. 3217(2); La.R.S. 9:4501; Babington v. Stephens Import, 421 So.2d 275 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982). Therefore, the evidence reasonably supported the inference that defendant intended to “trick” or “cheat” the dealer into releasing possession of his automobile in exchange for the worthless check which he represented was issued in full payment for the repairs. Thus, he intended to obtain something of pecuniary value (the possession of his repaired automobile) in exchange for the cheek which he knew was worthless. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with an intent to defraud. The fact that defendant himself may have been the victim of another person’s misrepresentations and may in fact have suffered a financial loss from worthless checks issued by another person does not alter this conclusion.

Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

      . La.R.S. 14:71A(1) provides in pertinent part:
      "Issuing worthless checks is the issuing, in exchange for anything of value, whether the exchange is contemporaneous or not, with intent to defraud, of any check ... upon any bank ..., knowing at the time of the issuing that the offender has not sufficient credit with the bank ... for the payment of such check ... in full upon its presentation.”

      . Defendant was sentenced to serve two years imprisonment at hard labor, to be served concurrently with a five-year hard labor sentence imposed on an unrelated theft conviction (for his part in staging a fake Wells Fargo holdup). That other conviction and sentence were summarily affirmed by this court. See State v. Imbornone, 450 So.2d 674 (La.1984).

      . The judge stated oral reasons for judgment as follows:
      "BY THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, considering the evidence that’s been introduced at this particular trial, both testimonial and physical evidence, and the law which this Court has charged itself with, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the issuing of the check Mr. Imbornone knew that the check would be insufficient, and that he issued that check for purposes of fraud. "I base this conclusion on the fact that negotiations for the sale of the business of Mr. Imbornone's took place — the actual sale took place on the third of February, 1981. Testimony was to the effect that on a number of occasions, after placing checks, or after making a determination as to whether the checks that were issued for that sale were good, Mr. Imbornone knew that those checks were not good; would not be cashed by the bank. This is not to say that he did not try to collect what he believed to be his from the sale of the restaurant and lounge, but on the day in question, the 28th of February, the time of the issuing of the check, particularly in regard to the stop payment and the negotiations that he issued prior to that; it's the opinion of the Court that Mr. Imbornone knew of the situation.
      "I’m sorry, and I might say in the record, for the position that Mr. Imbornone has been placed into by Mr. Eldridge, whom we have had testimony from before; but being sorry for an individual does not negate my duty under the law as I see it and as I see the evidence. I firmly believe that there was more than sufficient time for Mr. Imbornone to be aware that those checks had been — as a matter of fact one of the checks was returned N.S.F. upon it being — immediately the date of its issuance or the date after issuance, and Mr. Imbornone was called in to make a loan covering the proceeds or the split proceeds of that check. And at that time, immediately before the issuing of the check to Bernie Dumas, knew that he had — or should have known, at least, that he had a zero balance. I note in there that there were some checks deposited — $25.00, $200.00 — $25.00, $20.00 and $400.00 that were deposited after the loan was placed into the account, bringing the account to $445.00, however, a check was written in the amount of $200.00. I’m not counting the service charges on the N.S.F. overdraft, nor the regular service charge; bringing the account, again, down, on the 1st of March to $68.00. And the fact that on May 28 — 28th of February, a $2,400.00 some odd dollar check was written, again, convinces me beyond a reasonable doubt of my decision." These detailed findings by the trial judge have
      greatly facilitated appellate review.

      . As this court said in State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984):
      "When a case involves circumstantial evidence, and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant’s own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt."
      A A A * ⅜ ⅜
      "Such a finding of purposeful misrepresentation reasonably raises the inference of a ‘guilty mind', just as in the case of ‘flight’ following an offense or the case of a material misrepresentation of facts by a defendant following an offense. See State v. Davenport, 445 So.2d 1190 (La.1984). ‘Lying’ has been recognized as indicative of an awareness of wrongdoing. See State v. Rault, 445 So.2d 1202 (La.1984), in which this court, in rejecting as unreasonable an asserted ‘hypothesis of innocence’ (based on defendant’s own statement), stated: 'The jury could have reasonably concluded that Rault concocted this version of the crime to hide his own guilt’. 445 So.2d at 1213. Any contrary implications in State v. Savoy, 418 So.2d 547 (La.1982), and State v. Shapiro, 418 So.2d 372 (La.1983), simply mean that such evidence, although admissible to support a 'guilty mind’, are not alone sufficient to convict.” 448 So.2d at 680 and n. 4.

      . As originally proposed, La.R.S. 14:71 would have encompassed issuance of a check for an antecedent debt, but the proposal was not adopted when the Legislature enacted the Criminal Code in 1942. See La.R.S. 14:71, Reporter’s Comment. However, the Legislature made the statute applicable to some antecedent debts by adopting Acts 1976, No. 651, which added the language "whether the exchange is contemporaneous or not”.

      . In State v. Raymo, 419 So.2d 858 (La.1982), this court discussed the concept of intent to defraud in the context of the forgery article, La.R.S. 14:72. The court said:
      "To defraud in the sense intended by the forgery definitions means to injure or prejudice the rights of another.” 419 So.2d at 859.
      See also Black’s Law Dictionary 381 (5th Ed. 1979). The same concept of "injury or prejudicing” the rights of another would obviously also be applicable to the phrase "with intent to defraud” in the immediately preceding worthless checks article, La.R.S. 14:71.


text:
    Richard O. ALBA and Dyna-Sea, Inc. v. Roland RIVIERE, Individually and d/b/a Rolands New Orleans Skin Diving School and/or New Orleans Scuba Diving School and/or Roland’s Underwater Sports of New Orleans Skin Diving School, Ltd., Mary Bair, National Association of Scuba Diving Schools, Inc. Sos Torino (Italy), Scubapro, Barakuda, Werft, P & P International Sub Aquatic Systems, Pyramid Island Resort, and Taca International Airlines, S.A.
    No. 84-CC-2022.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 14, 1985.
   In re Richard O. Alba and Dyna-Sea, Inc., applying for reconsideration of denied writ of December 14, 1984, 462 So.2d 194; Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. C-1582, C — 1615; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Division C., No. 82-10241.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Winfredo CABELLO.
    No. 84-KK-1957.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 14, 1985.
   In re Winfredo Cabello, applying for reconsideration of denied writ of 12/14/84, 462 So.2d 192, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 81-039; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-1791.

Not considered. See Rule 9, § 6, La. Supreme Court Rules.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Sandra Zahn ORECK v. FRENCH EIGHTH, et al.
    No. 84-C-2023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 14, 1985.
   In re Sandra Zahn Oreck, applying for reconsideration of denied writ dated December 14, 1984, 462 So.2d 195, from Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1384; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Section “C”, No. 82-12087.

Not considered. The judgment is definitive.


text:
    ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY v. The FRENCH EIGHTH, T.C. Farrell, Jr. and Continental Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-2024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 14, 1985.
   In re St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, applying for reconsideration of denied writ, dated December 14, 1984, 462 So.2d 195, from Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1384; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Section “C”, No. 82-12087.

Not considered. The judgment is definitive.


text:
    Robert D. DUPRE v. The LOUISIANA RETAILERS ASSOCIATION SELF INSURER’S FUND.
    No. 85-CC-0132.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 1985.
   In re Louisiana Retailers etc. Fund, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, and supervisory; Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 41223; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 84-1114.

Denied.


text:
    Musette TURNER v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE INC.
    No. 84-C-0911.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re New Orleans Public Service Inc., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1407; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Section E, No. 82-13369.

Prior report: 449 So.2d 139.

Granted.


text:
    James V. DRUM v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY CO. et al.
    No. 84-C-1405.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company et al., applying for writ of review to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, No. CA-1563; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, No. 81-2699, Division B..

Prior report: 454 So.2d 267.

Granted.


text:
    Ora D. WATSON, Individually and as Administratrix of the Succession of Doyle Watson and Tutrix of the Minor, Jo Ann Watson, Rocky L. Watson, Beverly Watson Straham, Randy W. Watson, Delores Diane Watson Conerly, Jan Suzette Watson, and Luther Doyle Watson v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and Earl Creel.
    No. 84-C-2158.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Watson, Ora D. et al., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-2158; Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 51824.

Granted.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Salvador CAPRITO a/k/a S. Caprito.
    No. 84-C-2180.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Mayhew, James a/k/a, Caprito, Noel; Dailey, Gertrude Caprito, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-929; Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 20582.

Prior report: 458 So.2d 588.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James W. SIMMONS.
    No. 85-KH-0001.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Simmons, James W., applying for remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 267-071.

Granted. Trial judge ordered to comply with this Court’s order dated October 12, 1984, in No. 84-KH-1748, 458 So.2d 110.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Raymond A. TUCKER v. Hon. Frank J. SHEA, Judge, Criminal District Court.
    No. 85-KH-0011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Tucker, Raymond A., applying for writ of mandamus; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 257-140.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act, if it has not already done so, on the application filed in August, 1984, if application has been filed.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward L. FISHER v. Frank BLACKBURN.
    No. 85-KH-0024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Fisher, Edward L., applying for remedial writs; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “I”, Nos. 283-831, 284-131.

Granted. The district court is ordered to furnish relator with copies of his Boykin transcript under docket numbers 283-831 and 284-131 on the docket of said court.


text:
    Tim J. YOUNGWIRTH v. TELEDYNE-FARIS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, ABC Insurance Co., Groth Equipment Corporation of Louisiana, Inc. and XYZ Insurance Co.
    No. 85-CC-0027.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Youngwirth, Tim J., applying for supervisory and remedial writs; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 84-C-641; Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 23410.

Granted. Judgment of Court of Appeal is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reinstated.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lalinda J. PUCKETT.
    No. 85-KK-0108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Puckett, Lalinda J., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. K85-11; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “H”, No. 50914.

Granted. A hearing on the bond reduction request is ordered, to be held “contradictorily with the state”, pursuant to C.Cr.P. 313.

DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., would deny the writ.


text:
    Kevin NOVAK v. TELEDYNE-FARIS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Groth Equipment Corporation of Louisiana, Inc., and T.C.P. Construction Company, Inc.
    No. 85-CC-0110.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Novak, Kevin, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 84 — C—641; Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 23467.

Granted. Judgment of Court of Appeal is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reinstated.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John TUSCANO v. Michael HALEY, Warden, Washington Correctional Institute.
    No. 85-KH-0002.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Tuscano, John, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, writ of mandamus and remedial writ; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. “J”, No. 82-926.

Granted. Relator’s writ is transferred to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel., David NELSON et al. v. Harry CONNICK et al.
    No. 85-KH-0140.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Nelson, David et al., Brooks, Mitchell, applying for remedial writ; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “I”, No. 302-148.

Granted and transferred to Criminal District Court solely for consideration.


text:
    Marie BROWN v. WINN-DIXIE LOUISIANA INC; and XYZ Insurance Company, Inc.
    No. 84-C-2183.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Brown, Marie, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 14909; Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 59064.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 6.

Granted in part. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal to fix special damages. Otherwise, denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Andrew Lee JONES.
    No. 85-KA-0005.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Andrew Lee Jones, filing objection to uniform capital sentence report, 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, No. 2-84-743.

Granted. The trial judge is ordered to conduct a contradictory hearing as prayed for in this Court. See Rule 28, Section 3(c) [Supreme Court Rules].


text:
    Lucius DOUCET, D.D.S. v. DENTAL HEALTH PLANS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and Guaranty Income Life Insurance Company.
    No. 85-CC-0006.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Guaranty Income Life Ins. Co., applying for remedial writs; Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, Nos. 81591-2; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 84-1034.

Not considered. Not timely filed.

BLANCHE, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Shelia BOUDREAUX v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 84-C-1693.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Government Emp. Ins. Co., applying for writ of certiorari, writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0516; Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 64143.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 135.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Donna Geist BUNDY v. Ernest P. TOUPS, Allstate Insurance Company and the Insurance Company of North America.
    No. 84-C-1735.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Insurance Co. of N. America, applying for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0563; Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court, Div. “A”, No. 64809.

Prior report: 454 So.2d 138.

Denied.

MARCUS, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kelly M. MAHFOUZ.
    No. 84-KK-2034.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Mahfouz, Kelly M., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, prohibition and mandamus, Parish of Lafayette, City Court of Lafayette, Div. “B”, No. DT-84-194; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. K-84-808.

Denied.


text:
    Albert COLLIER v. WILLIAMS-McWILLIAMS COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 84-C-2128.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Employers Liability Assur. Corp., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-1855; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “H”, No. 76-19551.

Prior report: 459 So.2d 719.

Denied.


text:
    Frank BICKHAM, Jr. and Frank Bickham, Sr. v. Timothy H. GOINGS, Felder Goings and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 84-C-2155.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Goings, Timothy H. et al., Goings, Felder, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-0790; Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 51036.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 646.

Denied. The result is correct.


text:
    SIDNEY N. COLLIER MEMORIAL VOCATIONAL-TECHNICAL SCHOOL v. Audrey M. CAULFIELD.
    No. 84-C-2156.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Collier, Sidney N. et al., Louisiana Bd. Elem/Sec Educ., Memorial Vocational/Tech. Seh., applying for writ of certiora-ri and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA-83-1279; Parish of East Baton Rouge, Civil Service Commission, Div. “ ”, No. 2963.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 54.

Denied.


text:
    Harold G. DAVES and Daves Insurance Agency, Inc. v. STATE of Louisiana, Through DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT.
    No. 84-C-2157.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Alexander & Alexander, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA-83-1198; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “H”, No. 268281.

Prior report: 459 So.2d 1255.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Obadiah STEPHENSON v. Honorable William V. REDMANN, Judge, 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, Hon. Frank J. Shea, Judge, and Clerk of Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans.
    No. 84-KH-2161.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Stephenson, Obadiah, applying for remedial writs; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. K-2936; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “G”, No. 215-703.

Denied.


text:
    William J. MOSS v. Anthony J. GUARISCO, Sr., Sam C. Barbera, Jr. General Motors Corporation, Pontiac Motor Division, Guarisco Motor Company, Inc., and Guarisco-Barbera Pontiac-Cadillac-GMC, Inc.
    No. 84-C-2164.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Moss, William J., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 83-CA-0973, 83-CA-0974; Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, Nos. 59609, 57534.

Prior report: 459 So.2d 1.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Dorothy N. HAYES and Judson W. Hayes v. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, J.E. Fowler Petroleum Products, Inc., and Dudley L. Barron.
    No. 84-C-2168.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Hayes, Dorothy N. et al., Hayes, Judson W., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA-83-1196; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District, Div. “I”, No. 241498.

Prior report: 459 So.2d 1245.

Denied.


text:
    Curtis B. SELLERS v. CITY OF ABBEVILLE, et al.
    No. 84-C-2170.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Sellers, Curtis D., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 83-940; Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “D”, No. 83-45960.

Prior report: 458 So.2d 592.

Denied.

WATSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. Wilbert McCLAY, Jr.
    No. 84-KK-2172.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re McClay, Wilbert Jr., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, writ of mandamus; Parish of East Baton Rouge, Baton Rouge City Court, Div. “ ”, No. F-2968; 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “J”, No. 9-84-574; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. KW-84-1385.

Denied.


text:
    William D. CARTER and Nancy W. Carter v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AGRICULTURAL & MECHANICAL COLLEGE & Continental Insurance Co.
    No. 84-C-2174.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Louisiana St. Univ. Bd. Sup. et al., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. CA-83-1212; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 245127.

Prior report: 459 So.2d 1263.

Denied.

MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.


text:
    Helen H. LAMB v. W.C. LAMB. W.C. LAMB v. Helen H. LAMB.
    No. 84-C-2177.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Lamb, Helen H. Lamb, Helen H., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 83-897, 83-898; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, Nos. 81-0613-C, 82-0219-F.

Prior reports: 460 So.2d 634; 460 So.2d 641.

Denied.


text:
    FAUSTINA PIPE LINE COMPANY v. Harry Warren BERNARD et al. FAUSTINA PIPE LINE COMPANY v. Helen Lindstrom BERNARD.
    No. 84-C-2178.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Bernard, Harry Warren et ux, Bernard, Helen Lindstrom, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 83920, 83921; Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court, Div. “F”, Nos. 37316, 37697.

Prior reports: 458 So.2d 981; 458 So.2d 987.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Steven ANDREWS.
    No. 84-KK-2179.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Andrews, Steven, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 82-2447A.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Emile S. LANDRY.
    No. 84-C-2182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Pellerin, Gladys Landry, applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-1207; Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court, Div. “E”, No. 10993.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 29.

Denied.


text:
    GREAT SOUTHERN HOMES, INC. v. Roy H. HOLTEN, Et Ux.
    No. 84-C-2184.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Holten, Roy H. et ux, Holton, Cathy A., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 83-CA-1209; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, No. 254197.

Prior report: 460 So.2d 662.

Denied.


text:
    Helen H. LAMB v. W.C. LAMB. W.C. LAMB v. Helen H. LAMB.
    No. 84-C-2196.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 1985.
   In re Lamb, W.C., Lamb, W.C., applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 83-897, 83-898; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, Nos. 81-0613-C, 82-0219-F.

Prior reports: 460 So.2d 634; 460 So.2d 641.

Denied.

CALOGERO, DENNIS and BLANCHE, JJ., would grant the writ.