author: PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY

text:
    CYNTHIA LEONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant.
    First District (5th Division)
    No. 1—91—0264
    Opinion filed September 4, 1992.

      Kelly R. Welsh, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Brian Trubitt, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.
    Joseph R. Curcio, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY

delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant City of Chicago (City) appeals the decision of the trial court holding it liable to plaintiff for a police officer’s ordinary negligence in enforcing traffic laws. Because we find, as did the trial court, that while the officer was performing an ordinary traffic stop, he assumed and breached a special duty of care to plaintiff, we affirm his (and the City’s) liability for negligence.

On October 19, 1983, Chicago police officer William M. Coffey stopped plaintiff Cynthia Leone in the 500 block of east 31st Street for driving with an expired license plate. In effectuating the traffic stop, Officer Coffey halted plaintiff’s vehicle in the active traffic lane of a two-lane street, parked his police car two to three feet from plaintiff’s rear bumper, and informed an unbelieving Cynthia Leone of the violation. When Leone questioned the fact that her license plate had expired, Officer Coffey told her, “If you don’t believe me, then get out and look.” Leone, preceded by the officer, walked between her car and the police car to examine the license plate. At this point, a car driven by Calvin Blakely collided with the rear of the police car, which was thrown forward, trapping Leone, and causing her severe injuries. A jury trial ensued, and the City of Chicago was found liable (through Officer Coffey’s negligence) for Leone’s damages.

On appeal, the City alleges that the trial court’s ruling is contrary to established law as the applicable statutory authority provides that no municipal employee is to be held liable for acts done in the enforcement of any law unless those acts were wilful and wanton (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 2 — 202), and in the instant action the jury specifically found that Officer Coffey’s actions were not wilful and wanton. The City further contends that its liability cannot be predicated on its “special duty” to the plaintiff, as the necessary elements for this common law exception to the general blanket immunity for the failure to provide police protection services have not been met. The City additionally posits that even if a special duty and its breach could be established, the applicable standard of care would be wilful and wanton negligence, and thus, a finding of liablility based on simple negligence is erroneous. Finally, the City argues that even if it breached a special duty to Leone, it did not proximately cause the damages she suffered.

If our analysis of Officer Coffey’s actions led to the conclusion that he was solely engaged in law enforcement, then, as the City argues, the applicable standard of care would be mandated by statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 2 — 202), and liability would not be imposed absent a finding of wilful and wanton behavior. (See Fitzpatrick v. City of Chicago (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 211, 492 N.E.2d 1292 (in which a police officer was found to be enforcing the law when he was involved in investigating a highway accident); see also Thompson v. City of Chicago (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 429, 484 N.E.2d 1086 (in which a police officer was found to be enforcing the law when he was attempting to break up an unruly crowd and backed his squad car into the plaintiff).) In both of these cases, the combination of law-enforcing activity and lack of wilful and wanton behavior led to findings of nonliability on the part of the police officer and the city. However, a close inspection of the facts at bar distinguish the instant action from the previously cited authorities and support the trial judge’s determination that because of the conversation and sequence of events following the routine traffic stop, Officer Coffey was not merely “enforcing the law” but had assumed a special duty to Leone, entitling her to a higher standard of care.

Although the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (hereinafter Tort Immunity Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 4 — 102) provides that municipalities have no duty to provide police protection to the general public, case law supports the finding of a special duty of protection when the following four requirements are met:

“(1) the municipality must be uniquely aware of the particular danger or risk to which the plaintiff is exposed [citation];
(2) there must be allegations of specific acts or omissions on the part of the municipality [citation];
(3) the specific acts or omissions *** must be either affirmative or wilful in nature [citation]; and
(4) the injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the direct and immediate control of employees or agents of the municipality [citation].” Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 501, 508, 565 N.E.2d 654, 659, citing Bell v. Village of Midlothian (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 967, 970, 414 N.E.2d 104, 106.

The following cases have determined municipal liability based on the existence and breach of a special duty to plaintiff: Anthony v. City of Chicago (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 733, 523 N.E.2d 22; Brooks v. Lundeen (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 1, 364 N.E.2d 423; and Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge (1966), 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147. In Anthony, the trial' court declined to recognize a “special duty” exception capable of piercing the statutory immunity shielding fire fighters from liability. On review, the appellate court first determined that the special duty exception applied to fire fighters as well as police, and then found that plaintiff, Mark Anthony, met all four elements of the cause of action. It concluded that the first three elements were met because the defendant firemen were “experienced in combatting blazes and observing the dangerous effects of updrafts in elevator shafts and that they permitted an untrained, unequipped civilian to open the door of a burning elevator.” (Anthony, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 737, 523 N.E.2d at 25.) Furthermore, the element of direct and immediate control was met when the fire fighters “instructed” and “directed” Anthony to open the elevator door and encouraged Anthony to “aid” defendants in combatting the fire. The police in Brooks, like the fire fighters in Anthony, had taken affirmative steps to bring plaintiff under their control (by directing him as to where to park his car in relation to the newly erected roadblock) and then failing to warn him of the dangers posed by the roadblock and the high-speed vehicle heading towards it. Testimony adduced at trial further indicated defendants’ heightened awareness of the unique dangers involved with roadblocks as demonstrated in a roadblock training manual. Likewise, the police in Gardner had a special obligation to plaintiff because they had a “unique awareness” of plaintiff’s position of peril and had him under their control when they took him to the side of a highway to identify four suspects who had attacked him earlier that evening. Consequently, they were liable in negligence for the beating plaintiff suffered when he was attacked a second time by the improperly restrained suspects.

Like the defendants in Anthony, Brooks, and Gardner, Officer Coffey had a heightened awareness of the risk of injury posed to Cynthia Leone, when he halted her car in an active traffic lane, parked his police vehicle several feet behind her rear bumper and directed her to step between the cars in order to observe the expired license plate. At trial, Officer Coffey agreed that one of the most important things in a routine traffic stop is to find a safe location. He further agreed in his depostion testimony (which was used to impeach him at trial) that you would never stand between two cars which were parked on the road to hold a conversation because of the potential hazards of being struck by another vehicle proceeding in the same direction. Additionally, the police department’s own training bulletin provides further awareness of this potential risk by advising officers to keep 8 to 15 feet between cars they stop and their own cars.

Although the City argues that case law supports its contention that Officer Coffey did not have a unique awareness of the dangers at issue, we do not find this to be the case. The City’s reliance on Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 999, 513 N.E.2d 1026, is misplaced. The Schaffrath plaintiff, an injured passenger in a drunk driver’s vehicle, argued unsuccessfully that the police breached a special duty to him by not detaining the inebriated driver once they had stopped his car for having a loud muffler. The appellate court’s decision, affirming the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, focused not on the unique awareness element of the “special duty” cause of action, but on the lack of defendant’s direct or immediate control. Assuming the plaintiffs have satisfied the first three requirements to establish a special duty, the only allegations in the pleadings dealing with the fourth requirement indicate that the injury occurred in another municipality out of the presence and apparent jurisdiction of Officer Haisley. Therefore there is a failure on the part of plaintiffs to adequately allege facts to establish that they were injured while “under the direct and immediate control of employees or agents of the municipality.” Similarly, Santy v. Bresee (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 658, 473 N.E.2d 69, also cited by defendant as supportive of its argument that Officer Coffey was not uniquely aware of the danger facing plaintiff Leone, does not deal with the issue of unique awareness. Rather, this appellate court decision, which also affirmed a trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss, states that the existence of a duty depends on more than the foreseeability of harm. It goes on to note that a request for police protection from the criminal acts of a third party, even though accompanied by a police promise to provide the same, does not create the special relationship envisioned by the special duty cause of action. In other words, though this decision uses the foreseeability of harm language, it hinges not on this factor, but on the same direct and immediate control element absent in the Schaffrath decision.

Lane v. City of Harvey (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 270, 533 N.E.2d 75 (decided on defendant’s motion for summary judgment), and Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 501, 556 N.E.2d 654 (decided on defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action), do address the issue of “unique awareness” but do not support defendant’s argument. In Lane, an injured security guard alleged that the defendant city was “uniquely aware” of a particular danger confronting him when he was engaged in directing traffic outside of the Arco Plant in Harvey. The trial court found, and the appellate court agreed, that although the city was aware that the plaintiff may have been doing things that were unsafe, it was not specifically aware of any unique danger to which plaintiff was exposed. Similarly, the Burdinie court held that allegations of superior knowledge on the part of an employee swimming instructor (as to the dangers of jumping into the shallow end of a swimming pool) did not create a special duty to the plaintiff. These facts distinguish Lane and Burdinie from the case at bar, as Officer Coffey’s testimony and his familiarity with the police training manual established that he was well aware of the substantial danger posed to plaintiff by halting her car in an active traffic lane, stopping his police car several feet behind plaintiff’s vehicle, and by standing and conversing between the two cars.

Defendant City also contends that even if Officer Coffey was “uniquely aware” of the particular danger which threatened plaintiff Leone, Leone was not under the officer’s direct and immediate control and, therefore, the fourth prong of the “special duty” test was not satisfied. The facts of the case as established at trial show that when Leone was pulled over, she asked the officer what she had done wrong. She testified that he responded in a “gruff” manner, “Wait until I get to the window and I’ll tell you.” At this point, Leone was not technically under arrest, though she believed, and we think rightly so, that she was not free to drive away. While a custodial relationship was not effectuated, Leone’s freedom of movement was definitely restricted. Following this initial interchange, Leone expressed disbelief of the fact that her license plate had expired. At this point, the officer replied, “If you don’t believe me then get out and look.” Leone testified that she thought the officer was giving her an order, and furthermore, that when she did get out of her car, the officer “led” her to the back of her car and in between it and his vehicle. Although defendant argues that Officer Coffey did not “control” plaintiff Leone’s actions and that his words did not constitute an order, case law supports an opposite conclusion. In Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 501, 565 N.E.2d 654, plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that he was under the direct control of a park district swimming instructor. In analyzing this contention, the Illinois Supreme Court compared the authority of a swimming instructor to that of a policeman. “Police and fire departments are paramilitary organizations. The very essence of their duties is to be cloaked in State authority, making refusal to obey an order or suggestion a difficult proposition in the mind of a private citizen. There is a tremendous qualitative difference between following'a police officer’s command and following a municipal recreational program instructor’s command.” (Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d at 525, 565 N.E.2d at 667.) Applying this reasoning to the facts at bar, we can only conclude, as did the trial judge, that plaintiff Leone was under the direct control of Officer Coffey, thus satisfying the final element of the “special duty” cause of action.

Defendant City next asserts that even if the elements of the special duty cause of action are satisfied, the requisite standard of care is wilful and wanton conduct as defined by the Tort Immunity Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 2 — 202.) In support of this argument, the City relies on article XIII, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, §4), which provides that the General Assembly has the power to prescribe tort immunities for municipalities. The City then reasons that the Tort Immunity Act, as enacted by the General Assembly, provides that police officers engaged in the enforcement of law will only be held liable where they are guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 2 — 202.) What the City neglects to note, however, is the fact that the special duty exception is a common law doctrine, an exception to the blanket immunity provided by section 4— 102 of the Tort Immunity Act, recognized by the courts of Illinois both before and after the passage of the relied upon statutory immunities provisions. (See Huey v. Town of Cicero (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214; Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge (1966), 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147; see also Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 241, 540 N.E.2d 342.) Although none of these cases (except Gardner) involve a decision on the merits, all contain language implying that a showing of simple negligence is sufficient to establish liability under the special duty exception. The Huey court states that the “rule [of nonliability] has been maintained in the face of decisions holding municipalities liable for affirmative negligent or wilful acts by their employees” (emphasis added) and that “[e]xceptions to the rule have been found only in instances where the municipality was under a special duty to a particular individual, such as protecting a material witness from threatened injury by third parties.” Huey, 41 Ill. 2d at 363, 243 N.E.2d at 216.

Similarly, the court in Gardner notes that the defendant policemen had assumed a “duty to exercise reasonable care to protect [plaintiff] against injury from the suspected persons.” (Emphasis added.) (Gardner, 71 Ill. App. 2d at 380, 219 N.E.2d at 150.) In its Trepachko decision, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to “meet the requirements of the ‘special duty’ exception to the general rule of immunity of municipalities and police officers for acts of ordinary negligence.” (Emphasis added.) (Trepachko, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 244, 540 N.E.2d at 343.) In addition to the above-mentioned case law, the very language of the doctrine at issue provides that the specific acts or omissions of the police may be either affirmative or wilful, thus further implying that a showing of simple negligence is sufficient to establish breach of the special duty and the ensuing liability.

The City finally argues that even if it breached a duty to plaintiff, such breach did not proximately cause the injuries at issue. Instead, the City asserts that the wild recldess driving of the third-party motorist who crashed into the parked squad car constituted a superseding cause of Leone’s injuries and that the City’s conduct at most created a condition that made plaintiff’s injuries possible. Established case law provides that proximate cause exists where an injury is the natural and probable result of a negligent act or omission and is of such a character that an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen it as likely to occur as a result of the negligence. (N. W. v. Amalgamated Trust & Savings Bank (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 554 N.E.2d 629.) Furthermore, a proximate cause need not be the only, last or nearest cause; it is sufficient if it occurs with some other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes injury. (United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 46, 504 N.E.2d 123.) Therefore, it follows that when there is more than one proximate cause of an injury, one guilty of negligence cannot avoid liability simply because another person was guilty of negligence contributing to the same injury even though the injury would not have occurred but for the latter’s negligence. (Turner v. Roesner (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 482, 549 N.E.2d 1287.) However, if the alleged negligence of a defendant does nothing more than furnish a condition making an injury possible through the independent negligence of a third party (as in Hinojosa v. City of Chicago Heights (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 319, 519 N.E.2d 976 (where a defendant’s failure to secure his property against entry by trespassers led to plaintiff’s injury when a third party rubbed a caustic substance into plaintiff’s eyes)), then the two acts are not concurrent and the existence of the condition is not a proximate cause of the injury. Long v. Friesland (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 42, 532 N.E.2d 914.

In the case at bar, the injury to plaintiff Leone was a natural and probable consequence of the officer’s negligent parking of his police vehicle and his directing plaintiff to stand between the cars to observe the expired license plate. That the police department and Officer Coffey were aware that such practices were unsafe and could lead to rear-end collisions is evident from both the department bulletin and the deposition testimony. This reasonable foreseeability of injury to plaintiff (even though the actual injury was caused by a third-party motorist’s reckless driving) distinguishes the instant action from situations in which a defendant’s negligence only furnished the condition making a plaintiff’s injury possible. (See Hinojosa v. City of Chicago Heights (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 319, 519 N.E.2d 976; but see Long v. Friesland (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 42, 532 N.E.2d 914.) Finally, in reviewing a jury’s determination of probable cause, our standard of review is whether the conclusion of the trier of fact is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the jury’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based on the evidence. (Topp v. Logan (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 285, 554 N.E.2d 454.) It cannot be said that based on the foregoing standard the jury’s determination on the proximate cause issue was unreasonable, arbitrary or not based on the evidence or that the opposite conclusion was clearly evident. We therefore affirm the finding of proximate cause.

For the reasons stated above, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

MURRAY and GORDON, JJ., concur.

      The Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 4 — 102) provides a broad immunity to municipalities for failure to provide police protection.

      In Brooks, a police department’s guidelines and bulletin were similarly used to imply awareness of a heightened risk of danger.

      The Lane court also determined that plaintiffs allegations did not satisfy the second, third, and fourth requirements of the special duty cause of action.

      Defendant also argues that the trial court employed a subjective rather than objective standard of review and further that it incorrectly applied the Pedrick standard (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504) and viewed these facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Even assuming arguendo such to be the case, the appellate court may make an independent determination as to a question of law. (See 134 Ill. 2d R. 366(b)(1)(i). See also Havens v. Miller (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 558, 429 N.E.2d 1292.) Moreover, a trial court’s judgment may be affirmed on appeal upon any basis appearing in the record. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Sierracin Corp. (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 63, 70, 479 N.E.2d 1046, 1051.

      No Illinois case law to date has defined the relationship between the common law special duty doctrine and the Tort Immunity Act (see Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d at 529 (Miller, J., specially concurring)), although the relationship between sections 2 — 102 and 4 — 102 of the Tort Immunity Act has been reached by several appellate court decisions (see Luber v. City of Highland (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 758, 502 N.E.2d 1243; Nieder v. Gacy (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 854, 560 N.E.2d 342; Jamison v. City of Chicago (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 567, 363 N.E.2d 87). However, applicable case law does imply that a special duty analysis may be applied to a police officer who is also enforcing the law. See Laco v. City of Chicago (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 498, 507 N.E.2d 64.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE DAVIDSON, Defendant-Appellant.
    First District (5th Division)
    No. 1—88—1863
    Opinion filed September 18, 1992.

      Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Shelton O. Green, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
    Jack O’Malley, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Gael M. O’Brien, and John P. O’Grady, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY

delivered the opinion of the court:

On October 5, 1987, defendant Clarence Davidson was charged by indictment with attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery, and armed violence. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of all three offenses and sentenced to 30 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. He now appeals these convictions alleging that his motion to suppress was incorrectly denied, that he was denied a fair trial both by the erroneous rulings of the trial judge as well as by the prejudicial assertions and misstatements of law made by the prosecuting attorney, and finally that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts were adduced at trial: The incident in question occurred on September 20, 1987, at approximately 9:50 p.m. Davidson testified that he was carrying a tool box and walking with a friend, Melvin Douglas, when he saw and recognized Vincent Spraggins (the alleged victim) walking down the street toward him. Davidson also testified that Spraggins had a bottle of some type in his hand, and that he was afraid of him because Spraggins had attacked him the week before with a wine bottle and he had required neurosurgery for his injuries.

When Davidson observed Spraggins coming toward him, he set down the tool box and reached in for something with which to defend himself. The first thing he found was a knife. He ended up struggling with Spraggins and stabbing him. Afterwards, Davidson and his companion walked away and were arrested by the police.

Spraggins testified that he had just bought a bottle of beer and was on his way to Grant Park to drink it when two men (whom he had seen before, but with whom he had not “socialized” and could not recall fighting) approached him. One of them (later identified as Melvin Douglas) inquired about a tool box and then asked if he could have some of Spraggins’ beer. When Spraggins refused, the man punched him, knocking him to the ground, where Clarence Davidson proceeded to stab him three times in the chest.

Two additional witnesses, Greg Freeman and Lorraine Lorenzini, testified that they saw Davidson straddling Spraggins and stabbing him in the chest. They did not see the events which precipitated the stabbing.

Defendant’s first contention on appeal is that the denial of his motion to suppress was manifestly erroneous not only because the prosecutors denied his requests for medical attention until he confessed, but also because they violated his right to remain silent. In support of his allegation that medical assistance was withheld, defendant testified (at the hearing on the motion to suppress) that he had repeatedly requested medical attention for a leg injury incurred during the fight. The police and assistant State’s Attorneys who interrogated Davidson categorically denied any such requests. The Cook County Hospital doctor who finally treated Davidson on September 22, 1987 (the confession was given on September 21), testified that defendant had cel-lulitis, an infection of the soft tissue of the skin and the underlying tissues. (Davidson was hospitalized for five days for this infection and treated with intravenous antibiotics.) The doctor further stated that this infection was consistent with a wound which was greater than 24 hours old. In fact her notes indicated that Davidson had told hospital personnel that the wound was four days old, a statement which noticeably contradicts his sworn testimony that he received this injury in the fight on September 20.

Case law does support the proposition that where medical attention is withheld until a statement is given, such statement will be deemed to be involuntary. (People v. Strickland (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 550, 544 N.E.2d 758.) In Strickland, defendant had suffered a gunshot wound to the finger. In that case, the trial judge noted that the evidence was uncontradicted that the police were aware of defendant’s injury from the time of his arrest (paramedics had been called to the station to treat a codefendant), even though there was contradictory evidence as to whether defendant had ever requested medical treatment. In the instant action, while there is medical evidence that defendant suffered a substantial infection, there is no such evidence (outside of defendant’s testimony) that the police were aware of defendant’s injury at the time of the arrest. There is no record, even at the time of the bond hearing, that defendant ever requested medical attention. In fact, defendant was routinely processed in Cook County jail before he was referred to Cermak Hospital and then to Cook County Hospital for medical attention. Based on these facts, and defendant’s contradictory statements as to whether the wound was received during the fight which precipitated his arrest or four days earlier, the trial judge found that defendant’s claim that medical attention had been withheld was an “entirely fabricated assertion.” Without underestimating the discomfort that defendant endured at the time of his admission to Cook County Hospital, we cannot say, as defendant urges, that the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.

Defendant further maintains that his confession was involuntary as the police did not “scrupulously honor” his right to remain silent. He argues that after he asserted his right to remain silent, a “continuing interrogation” ensued. The State, on the other hand, maintains that defendant never asserted his right to remain silent. A review of the testimony regarding this issue reveals that defendant’s first interrogation took place at 4:30 a.m. on September 21 and lasted for 10- minutes. Those present were Detective Kelly, Detective Ward, and Assistant State’s Attorney Brogan. At trial Kelly testified that Brogan advised defendant of his- constitutional rights, after which defendant said he had no knowledge of the stabbing. Ward also said that Brogan advised defendant of his rights and that defendant never said that he didn’t want to talk. (Detective Brogan did not testify.) The detectives’ typed report of the interview indicated that “at this time [defendant] stated that he did not wish to give an account of this incident at this time.” However, Kelly’s progress notes (prepared closer to the time of the interview) reflected that defendant said that he had no knowledge of the incident. At the second and third interviews, conducted at 9:30 a.m. and 3 p.m., respectively, Detectives Tansey and Mcguire and Assistant State’s Attorney Schreiber were present. Schreiber testified that Brogan’s notes indicated that Davidson did not wish to speak at that time. Detective Tansey testified that when he read defendant Miranda warnings, defendant indicated his willingness to speak and at first denied any knowledge of the incident. However, after he was confronted with an account of the incident given by a codefendant, Davidson gave a statement. At the third interview, which took place after the detectives spoke with Spraggins (the alleged victim) at the hospital, Schreiber advised defendant of his constitutional rights, and defendant gave a full confession.

In finding that defendant’s confession was voluntary, the trial judge reviewed the above conflicting testimony as to whether defendant said he had no knowledge of the incident, or whether what he said was that he did not want to talk. The judge explicitly stated that “there’s no merit whatsoever to the claim in the motion that the defendant asserted his right to remain silent. I believe Kelly. I believe Tansey. I believe the officers that testified here. I disbelieve the defendant.” It is well settled that it is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Where the evidence is in conflict, a court of review may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Rhodes (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1009-10, 457 N.E.2d 1300, 1307.) For this reason, we affirm the trial judge’s determination that defendant’s confession was freely and voluntarily given. The motion to suppress defendant’s confession was therefore correctly denied.

Defendant next contends that he was denied a fair trial because he was prohibited by the court from proving the prior violent acts of the injured party. Defendant maintains that the court’s refusal to admit evidence of the injured party’s prior violent acts prevented him from presenting his theory of the incident (that the degree of force used by defendant was somehow justified by the alleged victim’s propensity for violent acts). Case law supports the proposition that where, as in the instant action, the defense is self-defense, a defendant has the right to present evidence of prior violent and/or aggressive acts by the injured party. (People v. Lynch (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 194, 470 N.E.2d 1018.) In finding that a victim’s three battery convictions were admissible, the Lynch court stated that “the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s violent tendencies necessarily affects his perceptions of and reactions to the victim’s behavior. The same deadly force that would be unreasonable in an altercation with a presumably peaceful citizen may be reasonable in response to similar behavior by a man of known violent *** tendencies.” (Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 200.) In the case at bar, the trial court did allow some evidence of Spraggins’ violent tendencies. Defendant himself testified to the claim that he was attacked the week before by Spraggins. This claim also appeared in defendant’s confession, which was read into the record by Assistant State’s Attorney Schreiber. Additionally, the defense attorney questioned Spraggins about a prior battery conviction, which he admitted, an aggravated assault conviction, which he denied, and the fight with defendant the week before, which he did not recall. Defendant was also allowed to introduce evidence of Spraggins’ prior theft convictions, hospitalizations, and drug and alcohol dependencies. The trial judge found that based upon the above admissions, defendant already had a “mountain of evidence reflecting on the person’s character.” He therefore denied defendant’s request to admit evidence that Sprag-gins had threatened the staff at the mental hospital with bodily harm and had to be placed in restraints, stating that such evidence involved the invasion of confidentiality rights and could “perhaps lead the jury astray.”

While substantial evidence of the victim’s character was introduced, as noted by the trial judge, it did not all bear on his propensity for violence. Furthermore, a good part of the evidence which did substantiate the victim’s violent tendencies consisted of the testimony of defendant, whose credibility was at issue throughout the trial. In People v. Gossett (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 655, 451 N.E.2d 280, the appellate court ordered a new trial when evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts was excluded and defendant’s testimony was the only evidence admitted to show that the deceased was the aggressor. The Gossett court stated that the defendant was the one “who was on trial, directly interested in the verdict, and these circumstances might very well affect his credit with the jury. He had a right to have the evidence of the disinterested witnesses which he offered heard.” (Gossett, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 664.) Moreover, neither the Gossett nor Lynch decision balances competing interests in deciding to admit the evidence of prior violent acts. (But see People v. Carini (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 264, 502 N.E.2d 1206 (which found that the evidence was not admissible because there was no connection between the evidence offered and the asserted defense of compulsion); People v. Ward (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 443, 463 N.E.2d 696 (which held that the subject evidence was not admissible because it was too uncertain and speculative).) The incident at bar was not speculative, nor remote in time (actually occurring in February 1988, five months after the instant occurrence) and was undeniably connected to the self-defense argument. While we do find that the trial judge’s evidentiary ruling was unduly narrow, we decline to find that this determination alone denied defendant a fair trial.

Defendant next alleges that he was denied a fair trial because of prejudicial assertions made during cross-examination, as well as misstatements of law and evidence made during closing arguments. Although defendant did not object to at least two of the improper questions, we may review this issue under the “plain error” doctrine. (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) Defendant first maintains that the State’s Attorney incompletely impeached him during cross-examination with unsubstantiated insinuations that he was using cocaine and heroin at the time of the incident. The objected-to testimony was as follows:

“Q. [Mr. Malevitis, Assistant State’s Attorney]: As a matter of fact, when you were in Cook County Hospital for a scrape on your knee, you told the personnel there at the hospital that you had just done heroin and cocaine, correct?
A. [Defendant]: No.
Q. [Mr. Malevitis]: You never said that?
Q. [Mr. Carey, Defense Attorney]: Objection, Judge.
Defendant: I told them I had used it before, but I didn’t tell them I just got through using it.
Mr. Malevitis: I’ll be prepared to prove it up.”

Relying on the assistant State’s Attorney’s representation, the trial judge never ruled on the objection presented but allowed the questioning to proceed. However, the assistant State’s Attorney never proved up his assertion that defendant was using cocaine and heroin just before the incident at issue. The State argues that defendant was not harmed by this incomplete impeachment because it was not repeated, it did not affect a major issue in the case, and that the use of heroin and cocaine would in fact make defendant’s character “more mellow.” While it is true that the assistant State’s Attorney did not repeat these charges, it is not true that such insinuations did not affect defendant’s credibility, nor can we rely on the State’s unsubstantiated assertions that such insinuations actually worked to defendant’s advantage. Furthermore, it is plain error for a prosecutor to imply that a defendant has committed other crimes than those for which he is on trial. (People v. Thomas (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 854, 318 N.E.2d 342.) Illinois courts have repeatedly held that the asking of leading questions with impeaching overtones or insinuations without presenting evidence to substantiate them is reversible error. (People v. Nuccio (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 375, 253 N.E.2d 353 (the guilt of the accused was not manifest and the substantial number of unsupported insinuations could have impeached the credibility of the defendant).) In People v. Robinson (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 323, 545 N.E.2d 268, the appellate court found that the prosecutor’s persistent redirect examination tactic of substituting innuendo for proof discredited highly favorable defense testimony, and deprived defendant of a fair trial. In reversing defendant’s conviction, the court said: “The tactic of constructing a foundation for impeachment without supporting evidence is condemned precisely because impeachment by innuendo is intolerable.” (Robinson, 189 Ill. App. 3d 323, 339, 545 N.E.2d 268. But see People v. Jurczak (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 206, 497 N.E.2d 1332 (in which the prosecutor made an unsupported insinuation of misconduct on cross-examination without producing supporting evidence, and the appellate court found that reversal was only required where the insinuations were substantial, repeated, and definitely prejudicial). See also People v. Redman (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 534, 481 N.E.2d 1272 (in which evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, so the failure to complete impeachment was not found to be reversible error).) In the case at bar, the imperfected impeachment was not repeated, although it undeniably affected defendant’s credibility, which in turn affected the finding of guilty.

As additional trial error, defendant notes that the assistant State’s Attorney blatantly misstated the evidence in the dialogue which follows:

“Q. [Mr. Malevitis]: And when he walked towards you, he didn’t have anything in his hands, did he?
A. [Defendant]: Yes, he had something in his hands.
Q. [Mr. Malevitis]: You didn’t tell us that earlier, did you?
A. [Defendant]: I think I did.”

Defendant’s earlier testimony in fact established that when the victim walked towards him he had a large object in a paper bag. Although the trial judge did sustain defense attorney’s objection to the above line of questioning, defendant was nevertheless prejudiced by the placing of the prosecutor’s recollection and credibility against his own.

As further grounds of prosecutorial error, defendant argues misstatement of the law and the evidence during closing arguments. The prosecutor noticeably misstated the law when he told the jury that it would have to disbelieve all the State’s witnesses in order to find defendant not guilty. Because defendant had confessed to the stabbing, the only issue to be decided was whether defendant had attacked the victim without provocation (and for revenge as argued by the State) or whether he had reacted in self-defense. The State’s witnesses either did not see what started the incident (Greg Freeman, Lorraine Lorenzi, and William Estay) or their testimony concerned events subsequent to the incident (the arresting police officers’ testimony). The only witness about whom it could fairly be said that either the defendant or he was lying was the assistant State’s Attorney who took defendant’s statement,' Thus, to state that the jury would need to disbelieve all the State’s witnesses in order to believe defendant clearly obscures the correct standard for jury consideration of evidence in a criminal case.

The Illinois Appellate Court considered this issue in People v. Crossno (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 808, 417 N.E.2d 827, and reversed defendant’s murder and aggravated battery convictions finding that the prosecutor’s argument that if the jurors acquitted the defendant they would have to find that the prosecution witnesses were lying, distorted the burden of proof and affected substantial rights of the defendant. Crossno also involved other misstatements of law and improper prosecutorial comments, and the evidence regarding defendant’s guilt was closely balanced. See also United States v. Phillips (1975), 527 F.2d 1021 (which reversed defendant’s conviction when a prosecutor argued that if the jury were to find the defendant not guilty of distribution and attempted distribution of a controlled substance, it would also have to find that the government agent had violated defendant’s civil rights, and that the prosecutor himself had conspired with him in bringing the case).

Defendant also argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in closing arguments when he misrepresented the contents of defendant’s statement to the jury. In referring to defendant’s statement, the prosecutor stated, “in his own statement [defendant] tells us that he got mad and he wanted revenge.” Although the trial judge overruled defense attorney’s objection to this characterization of defendant’s statement, saying that the prosecutor was entitled to argue the reasonable inferences of the evidence, we note that defendant denied he was mad at the victim and wanted revenge and that his signed confession did not admit to this theory. While it may have been reasonable for the State to infer from the circumstances surrounding the incident that defendant was mad and wanted revenge, we question whether it was reasonable for the State to assert this as admitted in defendant’s own statement and to so inform the jury.

While we find that none of the prosecutorial errors standing alone would mandate a reversal of the jury’s verdict, we nevertheless conclude that the imperfected impeachment combined with an overly narrow evidentiary ruling, as well as misstatements of law and evidence, sufficiently deprived defendant of his right to a fair trial so as to require us to reverse and remand. Because we find that a new trial is warranted by these trial errors, we do not address defendant’s further contention that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

Reversed and remanded.

LORENZ and GORDON, JJ., concur.


author: JUSTICE SCARIANO

text:
    JOHN RINCHICH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF BRIDGEVIEW et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    First District (2nd Division)
    No. 1—90—2378
    Opinion filed Septmber 22, 1992.

      Richard H. Kane & Associates, Ltd., of Naperville (Richard H. Kane, of counsel), for appellant.
    Ancel, Glink, Diamond & Cope, P.C., of Chicago (Steven E. Glink and Marvin J. Glink, of counsel), for appellees.
   JUSTICE SCARIANO

delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 7, 1989, plaintiff John Rinchich filed suit against the Village of Bridgeview (the Village), its president and chief executive officer and its board of trustees (collectively, defendants). In his amended complaint Rinchich alleged the following facts to be common to all counts: (1) that “[o]n March 28, 1979, [he] was appointed by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners to the position of Fire Prevention Education and Training Officer[ ]”; (2) that on May 8, 1989, the Village and its board of trustees enacted ordinance No. 89 — 9, which set the salary for officials and employees of the Village and that on July 24, 1989, the Village enacted ordinance No. 89 — 27, which “eliminated the salary of Ordinance Officer which under the annual salary ordinance was $7,597.28” and “[eliminated the salary of Fire Prevention and Education Training Officer which under the annual salary ordinance (Ordinance No. 89 — 9) was $27,761.05”; and (3) that defendants’ actions “in abolishing [his] position as Fire Prevention Training and Education Officer” violated division 2.1 of article 10 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10— 2.1 — 1), which vests the board of police and fire commissioners with the authority to regulate the employment of firefighters, and contravened section 3 — 13—1 of the Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 3 — 13—1), which provides that the salaries of municipal officers may not be diminished so as to take effect during the term of their appointment.

Count I of his complaint sought judgment declaring (1) that ordinance No. 89 — 27 is void; (2) that any salary decreases and eliminations pursuant to that ordinance are unlawful; (3) that his position as fire prevention and training officer was illegally abolished; and (4) that he was entitled to be reinstated immediately as fire prevention and training officer.

Count II of his complaint sought to enjoin defendants from taking action under ordinance No. 89 — 27 on the ground that it deprived him of his position as fire prevention training and education officer without due process of law.

In count III, Rinchich alleged (1) that he began working as a volunteer firefighter in March of 1963, and subsequently attained the rank of captain in the volunteer fire department; (2) that in 1971, the Village, by virtue of its having exceeded 5,000 population, became subject to the provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code and that pursuant thereto he became a full-time firefighter with the Village, with the rank of lieutenant, and that he was compensated as a lieutenant; (3) that although he resigned in 1973, he was reappointed as a lieutenant when he returned in August of 1977; (4) that from August 1, 1977, to March of 1979, he served as a lieutenant; (5) that he was appointed by the board of police and fire commissioners to the position of fire prevention training and education officer in March of 1979, and served in both that position and as lieutenant in the Village’s fire department until August of 1989; (6) that he “was compensated from March 1979, to April, 1977 [sic], as a Lieutenant *** and thereafter as a Fire Prevention Training and Education Officer”; (7) that in October of 1983 Chief Billig advised defendant Oremus of his qualifications “as both a Training and Education Officer and Lieutenant”; (8) that in April of 1977 the Village advised him he would no longer be permitted to attend collective bargaining sessions because it was its opinion that he was “not a valid officer of the Village,” and that he was subsequently denied further compensation as a lieutenant; (9) that the Village enacted ordinance No. 89 — 27, which eliminated his salary and position as fire prevention training and education officer, and that the Village advised him to report as a firefighter rather than lieutenant; (10) that he had never received any complaints relative to his service and had never been charged by the board of fire and police commissioners with any wrongful acts; (11) that he had been denied the opportunity to participate in collective bargaining negotiations with the Village and deprived of the salary of a lieutenant by the actions of the Village notwithstanding the fact that he had served as a lieutenant and as fire prevention training and education officer; and he concluded with the charge that (12) defendants’ actions were motivated in part by their desire to punish him for his political activities.

Therefore, count III sought judgment declaring (1) that he was entitled to hold the rank of lieutenant; (2) that he was entitled to the compensation due a lieutenant; (3) that his position as fire prevention training and education officer was illegally abolished; and (4) that he “should be immediately reinstated to Lieutenant and Fire Prevention Training and Education Officer.”

On March 16, 1990, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in which they argued that (1) because upon his return in 1977 Rinchich did not meet the statutory requirements for becoming a firefighter he was hired as a civilian employee, and that inasmuch as he was not a firefighter he could not be a lieutenant; (2) that the position of fire prevention training and education officer was created by the Village, which retained the power to abolish it; (3) that Rinchich provided no evidence that he was duly appointed to the rank of lieutenant; and (4) that they did not violate Rinchich’s civil rights because he had no constitutionally protected right to retain the position of fire prevention training and education officer. They point out that Rin-chich has alleged a due process violation only in regard to the position of fire prevention training and education officer. Finally, defendants argued that the Village had no duty to engage in collective bargaining with Rinchich.

At the May 21, 1990, summary judgment hearing, the circuit court struck certain affidavits submitted by Rinchich in opposition to defendants’ motion; allowed him, pursuant to his request, time to file amended affidavits; and continued the matter until July 16, 1990. However, he filed no additional affidavits. At the July 16, 1990, summary judgment hearing, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and made its order final. Specifically, the court found that Rinchich’s statement of facts was not supported by the record; that he was not a municipal officer; that he was not entitled to the rank of lieutenant because he did not fulfill the legal requirements of the position; that he was not eligible to be appointed as a firefighter in 1977; and that he failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact pertaining to the allegations that defendants’ actions were politically motivated. Rinchich appeals.

I

Rinchich’s first contention is that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to strike certain affidavits submitted by him in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Although the parties have not raised the issue, we have the duty to inquire into our jurisdiction and to dismiss an appeal if we determine that it is wanting. (Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539.) Supreme Court Rule 303(c)(2) (134 Ill. 2d R. 303(c)(2)) provides that the notice of appeal shall specify the judgment or part thereof appealed from and the relief sought from the reviewing court. (134 Ill. 2d R. 303(c)(2).) We note further that the no-

tice of appeal is to be liberally construed. Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433.

In this case, the notice of appeal states:

“Plaintiff-Appellant, John Rinchich *** appeals *** from an Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Chancery Division, dated July 16, 1990, granting Summary Judgment to the Defendant [sic] and against Plaintiff as to Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendant’s [sic] Counter-claim. *** By this Appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully suggests that the Trial Court erred in granting Defendant’s [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff-Appellant’s Complaint and as to Defendant-Appellee’s [sic] Counter-claim, and Plaintiff-Appellant will ask the Appellate Court to vacate the Trial Court’s Order of July 16, 1990; to reverse the Trial Court’s Order granting Summary Judgment to the Defendant [sic]; to remand this cause to the Circuit Court for further proceedings

However, as noted above, the order striking the affidavits was entered on May 21, 1990.

In Burtell (76 Ill. 2d at 434-35), the court stated:

“When an appeal is taken from a specified judgment only, or from a part of a specified judgment, the court of review acquires no jurisdiction to review other judgments or parts thereof not so specified or not fairly to be inferred from the notice as intended to be presented for review on the appeal. If from the notice of appeal itself and the subsequent proceedings it appears that the appeal was intended, and the appellant and the appellee so understood, to have been taken from an unspecified judgment or part thereof, the notice of appeal may be construed as bringing up for review the unspecified part of the order or judgment. Such a construction would be appropriate where the specified order directly relates back to the judgment or order sought to be reviewed. *** [T]he unspecified judgment is reviewable if it is a ‘step in the procedural progression leading’ to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal. [Citation.]”

In Jewel Cos. v. Serfecz (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 543, the defendants specified the court’s order granting summary judgment in their notice of appeal, but did not specify its earlier order finding a lease provision ambiguous. The court reasoned that the earlier order was a step in the procedural progression leading to summary judgment; and it therefore reviewed both orders. (Jewel Cos., 220 Ill. App. 3d at 548.) Similarly, in Smock v. Hale (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 732, appeal denied (1990), 133 Ill. 2d 573, the plaintiff specified the court’s order granting summary judgment in her notice of appeal, but did not specify its earlier orders disqualifying her medical expert and closing discovery. Because it found that the two orders contributed directly to the entry of summary judgment, the appellate court reviewed all of the orders. Smock, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 738.

In this case, we find that the court’s order striking the affidavits was a step in the procedural progression leading to summary judgment; we shall therefore review it on appeal.

Nevertheless, defendants maintain on the authority of Continental Building Corp. v. Union Oil Co. (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 513, appeal denied (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 550, and Oak Trust & Savings Bank v. Annerino (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 1030, that Rinchich “has waived an assignment of error due to the trial court’s order striking the affidavits because [he] elected to stand on his own affidavit.” We note that because he did not file a reply brief, Rinchich has not responded to defendants’ waiver argument. In Continental, the appellate court granted Union Oil’s motion to strike Continental’s prayer to amend its complaint “because Continental failed to request such relief at the trial level.” (Continental, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 515.) In Oak Trust the court held that the defendant waived his objection to an affidavit because although he had moved to strike it, the record was devoid of any ruling by the court on the motion. According to the court, it is the movant’s duty to bring his motion to the court’s attention and to preserve the rulings thereon. Oak Trust, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 1032.

At the May 21, 1990, summary judgment proceeding, after hearing arguments from both sides as to whether certain affidavits submitted by Rinchich in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be stricken, the circuit court, as previously noted, struck them in their entirety; allowed Rinchich, pursuant to his request, time to file amended affidavits; and continued the matter until July 16, 1990. It is clear from a review of the transcript of proceedings on July 16, 1990, that no additional affidavits were filed and that Rinchich elected to stand on his own affidavit, which had not been stricken. However, the following excerpt from the record indicates that Rinchich attempted to stand on the stricken affidavits as well:

“MR. KANE: *** Now with respect to the other affidavits, this Court struck those affidavits and we did not file an amendment. I would like to read into the record—
THE COURT: You said Mr. Rinchich’s affidavit covered all of your arguments.
MR. KANE: That’s correct. There’s also the other affidavit of Russell Rakowski.
MR. STEVEN GLINK: Judge, those affidavits were—
THE COURT: Objection sustained.
MR. KANE: I want to address for the record our reasons for standing on those affidavits, because this matter—
THE COURT: You made that last time.
MR. KANE: Your Honor asked for additional matters that aren’t covered by the briefs. I wanted to cite a couple of—
THE COURT: The record reflects no additional affidavits were filed. You made a statement that Rinchich’s affidavit covers all of your arguments. Now, get to the point.”

Accordingly, we hold that Rinchieh did not waive this issue.

Among the affidavits submitted by Rinchieh in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment were those of Christ Lam-matos, Leo Perion and Andrew Russel, all of whom were former trustees of the Village of Bridgeview. Rinchieh also submitted the affidavits of James Russell, a lieutenant in the Bridgeview fire department, and of John Rutkowski, a firefighter for the Bridgeview fire department. In reply, defendants argued that the affidavits of Lammatos, Perion and Andrew Russel were conclusory and therefore should be stricken. Similarly, defendants claimed that the affidavits of James Russell and Rutkowski should be stricken because they contained inadmissible hearsay evidence.

Supreme Court Rule 191(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 191(a)) governs affidavits submitted in support of motions for summary judgment. (134 Ill. 2d R. 191(a).) In order to comply with Rule 191(a), “an affidavit must meet five requirements:

(1) it must be made on the personal knowledge of the affiant;
(2) it must consist of facts admissible in evidence;
(3) it must state relevant facts, not conclusions;
(4) it must have attached sworn or certified copies of all documents on which the affiant relies; and
(5) it must affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn as a witness,'can testify competently to its contents.” (4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice §39.2, at 244 (1989).)

We note further that only the improper matter itself should be stricken from an affidavit. 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice §39.2, at 246 (1989), citing Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 444, 462-63.

The affidavit of Christ Lammatos provides:

“1. I served as a duly elected Trustee of the Village of Bridgeview from 1969 to 1981. During that period of time I served as chairman of the Public Safety Committee which oversaw the Village Fire Department. As a consequence, I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit and know the same to be true and correct and if I were sworn to testify at trial, I would testify competently with respect to the matters contained herein.
2. During my tenure as Trustee, I helped formulate the ordinance creating a full time Fire Department in the Village of Bridgeview.
3. In 1971, the Village of Bridgeview created a full time Fire Department. At that time John Rinchich became a full time firefighter with the rank of Lieutenant, by virtue of his previous eight years of service as a volunteer firefighter for the Village with the rank of Captain.
4. In 1973, Plaintiff had a break in service as a lieutenant for the Village of Bridgeview, but resumed his duties as Lieutenant of the Village of Bridgeview Fire Department, with the full knowledge and approval of the Board of Trustees of the Village and the Board of Fire and Police Commission of the Village.
5. On February 16, 1977, Deputy Chief Don A. Billig had a break in service from the Bridgeview Fire Department but resumed his duties as firefighter with the rank of Deputy Chief in 1979. At the time Chief Billig resumed his duties, he was 39 years of age.”

The affidavit of Leo Perion, who also served on the board of trustees from 1969 to 1981, is virtually identical to that of Lammatos except that Perion’s indicates that in 1985 he “was appointed by the Mayor of the Village of Bridgeview to the Civil Service Commission of the Village.” In addition, Perion’s indicates that “John Rinchich was not carried on any roster of civilian employees of the Village, but rather, was at all times classified as a firefighter on all records of the Village of Bridgeview.”

The affidavit of Andrew Russel, who served on the board of trustees from 1965 to 1981, is also nearly identical to those of Lammatos and Perion except that Russel’s affidavit states that he “served as Chairman of the Public Safety Committee which oversaw the Fire Department of the Village.”

Compliance with the requirement that an affidavit must affirmatively show that the affiant is qualified to testify at trial is to be determined from the contents of the affidavit itself, and an express statement to that effect is neither helpful nor required. (4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice §39.2, at 247 (1989), citing Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241.) Upon examining the contents of the affidavits, we find that the affiants are qualified to testify at trial. Contrary to defendants’ argument, we do not find the affidavits to be conclusory. We note further that the circuit court denied defendants’ motion to strike Rinchich’s affidavit, which contains similar information stated in a like manner, and that the affidavit submitted by defendants is similar in quality and format. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in striking the affidavits of Lammatos, Perion and Andrew Russel.

The affidavit of James Russell provides:

“1. I am a Lieutenant in the Bridgeview Fire Department, and personally know John Rinchich, having served with him in the Fire Department of the Village of Bridgeview for the last eighteen years. As a consequence, I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit, and know the same to be true and correct both in substance and in fact, and if I were sworn to testify at the trial of this cause, I would testify competently with respect to the matters contained herein.
2. John Rinchich has served the Village of Bridgeview, as a member of its Fire Department, with the rank of Lieutenant, ¡ since 1971, and, after a break in service from 1973 to 1977, Lieutenant Rinchich resumed his position as Lieutenant in the Fire Department in September 1977.
3. Throughout my employment with the Bridgeview Fire Department, I have worked with Lieutenant Rinchich on numerous occasions, including working in the field *** in response to fire calls and other fire related emergency situations.
4. On several occasions, the management of the Bridgeview Fire Department has advised me, that it was their intention to fire Lieutenant Rinchich because of a lawsuit which [he] had filed against the corporate authorities of the Village of Bridge-view. Specifically, on March 29, 1989, I had a conversation with then Chief Martin Dooley of the Village of Bridgeview Fire Department, at Station House #3 in the Village of Bridgeview. During the course of that conversation, Chief Dooley told me that it was the intention of both [him] and the corporate authorities of the Village of Bridgeview to fire John Rinchich in retaliation for a lawsuit which Lieutenant Rinchich had brought against the Village of Bridgeview and its corporate authorities.
5. In 1979, Lieutenant Rinchich, in addition to his duties as lieutenant in the fire department, was duly appointed the Fire Prevention Training and Education Officer by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the Village of Bridgeview. Since 1979, and until late August 1989, Lieutenant Rinchich served as both Lieutenant, and Fire Prevention and Education Officer ***, discharging both the duties of the Lieutenant of the Fire Department, and that of Fire Prevention and Education Officer.”

John Rutkowski’s affidavit provides:

“1. I am a duly appointed firefighter for the Fire Department of the Village of Bridgeview and I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit and know the same to be true and correct, and if sworn to testify at trial, I would testify competently as to the matters contained herein.
2. On August 11, 1987, at approximately 10:00 a.m., I had a conversation with Martin Dooley, then Chief of the Village of Bridgeview and Lt. John Rinchich in the kitchen of the Fire Station No. 1 in the Village of Bridgeview.
3. In response to an inquiry from John Rinchich relative to a pay raise, Chief Dooley stated, in my presence that Rinchich would not receive a pay raise because the Village officials of the Village of Bridgeview hated him and that they were going to fire him the first chance they got.
4. In that same conversation, Chief Dooley stated to me that there was pressure being applied by the Village administration to get rid of both the affiant and Rinchich because we both belonged to the wrong political party and we did not play the game the way they wanted us to.”

Defendants rely mainly on the authority of Kalb v. Village of Oak Lawn (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 481, in support of their position that these affidavits contain inadmissible hearsay and therefore were properly stricken by the trial court. In addition, they claim that Russell’s affidavit contains multiple hearsay because he is testifying as to what Chief Dooley told him that the corporate authorities told the chief. The problem, defendants argue, is compounded by the fact that the statements are not attributed to any identifiable person who was a corporate authority and because the intent of one of the trustees could not be attributed to all of them or to the Village. In Kalb, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling striking affidavits submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment because they related statements made by others to the affiant. Kalb, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 485.

Rinchich relies mainly on the authority of Burgard v. Mascoutah Lumber Co. (1955), 6 Ill. App. 2d 210, and Gannon v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1983), 561 F. Supp. 1377, in support of his position that the statements were made by Chief Dooley, an agent of the Village, within the scope of his employment, and that therefore they constitute admissions. In Burgard, the court noted that “[t]here is a general rule that whatever is said by an agent, during the course of his duties and within the scope of his authority, relative to business contemplated by the agency in which he is then engaged is in legal intendment said by his principal and is admissible in evidence against such principal.” (Burgard, 6 Ill. App. 2d at 215-16.) There, the court held that testimony concerning statements made by plaintiff’s son at the time an accounting was being completed were admissible. (Burgard, 6 Ill. App. 2d at 215-16.) In Gannon, the plaintiff’s testimony that the bureau chief for the State’s Attorney told him that there was going to be a number of changes made because plaintiffs had supported or were members of an opposing political party was admissible. According to the court, it was undisputed that the bureau chief was defendant’s agent and there was evidence indicating that his duties included making personnel recommendations. Gannon, 561 F. Supp. at 1381.

According to Cleary and Graham, “[relevant admissions of a party, whether consisting of a statement or conduct, are admissible when offered by the opponent as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.” (M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §802, at 594-95 (5th ed. 1990).) The authors state further:

“Whether a statement of an agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of her employment, made during the existence of the relationship, is an admission of her employer has been decided at common law by applying the traditional agency test of whether the particular statement was authorized by the principal. Not surprisingly, courts generally decide that damaging statements were not within the scope of authority, even of relatively high level employees. ***
Obviously the difficulty with applying the strict agency principles is that agents or servants are very rarely authorized to make damaging statements. ***
This strict view, which requires authority to make the statement, is contrary to the general present trend in the direction of admitting the statement of the agent if made concerning matters within the scope of his employment. *** Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) [citation] declares statements of an agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment to be admissions if made during the existence of the relationship. Authority to speak under the Federal Rule is no longer of concern; all that is required is that the statement concern a matter within the scope of the agency or employment and that the agent or servant still be employed at the time of making the statement.” (M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §802.9, at 609-10 (5th ed. 1990).)

The authors note that although many Illinois cases represent the modem trend, the strict view continues to retain adherents. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §802.9, at 609-10 (5th ed. 1990).

We conclude that these statements were made by an agent concerning matters within the scope of employment during the existence of the employment relationship and that they are therefore admissible. We make note once more that the circuit court declined to strike Rinchich’s affidavit which contained similar information stated in a similar format. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in striking these affidavits.

II

Section 2 — 1005(c) of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 — 101 et seq.) authorizes the entering of summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2— 1005(c).) The appellate court reviews summary judgment orders de novo (Quality Lighting, Inc. v. Benjamin (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 880, 884), and it is to construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits in support of the motion strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of the opponent. (Pyne v. Witmer (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 351, 358; Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 240.) Although the use of summary judgments is encouraged in order to aid in the prompt disposition of lawsuits, because it is a drastic means of disposing of litigation, it should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 358; Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 240.

A

Rinchich argues that defendants, by eliminating his position as fire prevention training and education officer, violated section 3 — 13— 1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 3 — 13—1), which he claims “governs the establishment and fixing of salaries by the corporate authorities of all city officers and employees.” Rinchich alleged that he was appointed to the position of fire prevention training and education officer in 1979. He contends that “[i]t is virtually undisputed, that Pie] was characterized by the Village as its Fire Prevention Training Officer *** [and that he] was given full authority by the Village to discharge his duties with respect to that position.” According to Rinchich, on May 8, 1989, the Village and its board of trustees enacted ordinance No. 89 — 9, which set the salary for the position of fire prevention and education training officer at $27,761.05. However, on July 24, 1989, the Village enacted ordinance number 89 — 27, which amended the earlier ordinance and eliminated the position of fire prevention and education training officer.

Contrary to Rinchich’s position, defendants argue that section 3— 13 — 1 regulates only the salaries of municipal officers and not the salaries of all municipal employees. They contend that Rinchich was, as the trial court ruled, “merely a civilian employee, who could be terminated at will in the discretion of the Village.” Defendants assert that a municipality has the power to create and abolish an office or position. (People ex rel. Jacobs v. Coffin (1918), 282 Ill. 599.) On the other hand, defendants argue, a municipal officer is generally appointed to serve for a specified time, takes an oath of office and has supervisory and discretionary authority which an employee does not. (Daniels v. City of Venice (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 788, 790, citing City of Rockford v. Industrial Comm’n (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 597, 603-05.) Therefore, defendants argue that Rinchich does not fit within the definition of a municipal officer under section 3 — 13—1. For example, they claim: that his appointment was not for a fixed term; that he had no authority or discretionary powers; that he did not have authority to act on behalf of the Village; that he took no oath of office for the position; and that he admitted that he applied for coverage in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, and that his applications to the Firefighters’ Pension Fund were denied. In addition, they argue that Rinchich has “offered absolutely no credible evidence in opposition to Chief Billig’s affidavit,” which states that he was hired as a municipal employee.

Section 3 — 13—1 provides in pertinent part:

“All municipal officers, except as otherwise provided, shall receive the salary, fees, or other compensation that is fixed by ordinance. After they are once fixed, these salaries, fees, or other compensation shall not be increased or diminished, so as to take effect during the term of any elected municipal officer. The salaries, fees or other compensation of any appointed municipal officer, not including those appointed to fill vacancies in elective offices, may be increased but not diminished so as to take effect during the term for which such officer was appointed. Every municipal officer except the mayor, village president, aldermen and trustees shall make and return to the mayor or president, a semi-annual report verified by affidavit, of all fees, and other compensation received by them.
This amendatory Act of 1975 is not a limit on any municipality which is a home rule unit.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 3-13-1.

Contrary to Rinchich’s assertion, it is clear from a careful reading of its provisions that section 3 — 13—1 applies only to municipal officers and not to municipal officers and employees.

Section 3 — 8—1 of the Code, which governs appointed officers in rillages, provides:

“The president, by and with the advice and consent of the board of trustees, may appoint (1) a treasurer; (2) one or more street commissioners; (3) a village marshal; and (4) such other officers as may be necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred upon villages.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 3— 8-1.)

Section 3 — 14—2 provides further:

“Whenever a person has been appointed or elected to office, the mayor or president shall issue a certificate of appointment, or election, under the corporate seal, to the municipal clerk. All officers elected or appointed under this Code except the municipal clerk, alderman [sic], mayor, trustees, and president, shall be commissioned by warrant, under corporate seal, signed by the municipal clerk and the mayor, acting mayor, or mayor pro tern, or presiding officer of the board of trustees.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 3 — 14—2.)

In addition, section 3 — 14—3 provides that “[b]efore entering upon the duties of their respective offices all municipal officers, whether elected or appointed, shall take and subscribe the following oath.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 3 — 14—3.

At any rate, in this case Rinchich alleges that he was appointed as fire prevention training and education officer by the board of fire and police commissioners and that it had the authority to appoint him. Because he is bound by these allegations (Calloway v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549), Rinchich cannot claim that he has met the above-stated requirements for the appointment of village officers contained in article 3 of the Code. Moreover, he has neither argued nor demonstrated how the status of fire prevention training and education officer equates with that of a “municipal officer” under section 3 — 13—1 of the Code.

B

Rinchich also contends that the “facts of this case clearly disclose that [he] is entitled to the position of Lieutenant in the Village of Bridgeview’s Fire Department.” Specifically, he argues that from 1971 until 1989, except for a break in service from 1973 to 1977, he served as a full-time firefighter, and until August of 1989 held the rank of lieutenant. He claims that he wore the uniform and badge of a lieutenant; carried the identification card of a lieutenant; was referred to as a lieutenant; fulfilled the duties of a lieutenant, was depicted as a lieutenant in the chain of command; served as a command officer in emergencies; was held out to the public as a lieutenant; and until 1987, when he was excluded from collective bargaining, was compensated in excess of a lieutenant’s salary. He claims further that the affidavits of trustees Lammatos, Perion and Andrew Russel demonstrate that the corporate authorities of the Village recognized him as a full-time lieutenant in the fire department.

Defendants maintain that “the totality of the record clearly refutes [Rinchich’s] conclusions and supports the findings of the trial court.” They argue that Rinchich “has provided no evidence that he was duly appointed to the rank of Lieutenant with the Bridgeview Fire Department.” Defendants argue that section 10 — 2.1—6 of the Municipal Code requires all applicants for positions in the fire department to be under the age of 35. In addition, it provides for firefighter appointments to be made by the board of fire and police commissioners, for public notice to be given, and for a competitive examination to be administered. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10 — 2.1—6.

Rinchich’s identification card, which he submitted along with his amended complaint, indicates that he was 37 in 1977 when he returned to the fire department. However, section 10 — 2.1—6 also provides that the “foregoing age limitation does not apply to any person previously employed as a policeman or fireman in a regularly constituted police or fire department of any municipality, or a Fire Protection District whose obligations were assumed by a municipality under Section 21 of ‘An Act in Relation to Fire Protection Districts’ or to any person who has served a municipality as a regularly enrolled volunteer fireman for 5 years immediately preceding the time that municipality begins to use full time firemen.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10 — 2.1—6.

Defendants also assert that Rinchich has offered no evidence of a commission card certifying his rank as lieutenant. However, the letter of appointment submitted by Rinchich indicates that he was appointed by the board of fire and police commissioners. In addition, attached to the deposition of Chief Billig in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment is a letter from Billig to the board of fire and police commissioners which, although it does not prove that he ever received a commission card, indicates that he was to receive one.

Rinchich testified in his deposition that he took a test in 1979 to become the fire prevention training and education officer, which he claims classified him as a lieutenant. However, he alleged in a Federal civil rights action in 1985 that although he was certified for the position of fire prevention education officer, he received no notice of examinations for the rank of certified lieutenant which were administered in 1983 and 1984.

Nevertheless, attached to the deposition of Chief Billig, which was submitted by Rinchich in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, is a letter written by Chief Robert E. Murray to the Director of Personnel Standards and Education in Springfield, Illinois, “as documentation of Fire Officer experience for Lieutenant John E. Rin-chich of this department.” The letter states in part that in May of 1972, he was a full-time lieutenant of the Training Fire Prevention Bureau. The letter also states that in June of 1977, he was appointed as lieutenant and in April of 1979, he was “[cjertified as Lieutenant by the Fire and Police Commission of Bridgeview.” Moreover, defendants do not deny that Rinchich wore the uniform and badge of a lieutenant, but they claim that he wore these items because there was no uniform for his position as fire prevention training and education officer. Nor do defendants dispute that the identification card, which was issued to him upon his return in 1977 after his resignation in 1973, clearly indicates that he is a lieutenant. Further, in his deposition, Chief Billig stated that Rinchich was referred to as a lieutenant and that Rinchich was indicated as a lieutenant in the chain of command. However, the salary ordinance submitted by Rinchich does not demonstrate that he received the salary of a lieutenant, but rather, that the salary of the fire prevention training and education officer was below that of a lieutenant and above that of a firefighter.

Rinchich relies on the authority of People ex rel. Siegal v. Rogers (1947), 397 Ill. 187, and People ex rel. Bubash v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 1042. In Siegal, the relator joined the Village of Skokie police force in 1934 pursuant to an oral appointment by the village president. Although the president administered an oath to him, Siegal never filed an oath of office or bond with the village clerk and was not appointed by the trustees. In 1945, the village adopted article 14 of the revised Cities and Villages Act (Act), which provided for fire and police commissioners. Soon thereafter Siegal was discharged without a hearing, a protection afforded by the Act. The court noted that the office of policeman was unknown to the common law and that unless created by statute or by ordinance adopted under statutory authority, no such office legally exists. Prior to his discharge, the village did not have an established police department. (Siegal, 397 Ill. at 189.) The village argued that Siegal, because of his failure to observe the statutory requirements of appointment and oath, was no more than a de facto officer of the village who was subject to discharge at will. In order to compel reinstatement by mandamus, the village argued, Siegal had to show he was a de jure police officer. (Siegal, 397 Ill. at 190-91.) Siegal relied on a provision of the Act which provided that all officers and members of the police department who held their positions for more than one year prior to its adoption were city officers and were entitled to its protection. The court reasoned:

“The act describes a member of the police department as holding a ‘position’ and not an ‘office.’ This is not without significance, because a municipal position need not be created by formal ordinance but may be established by contract, express or implied, and because an appropriation ordinance accompanied by performance of the duties of the position is sufficient to establish the existence of the position. (People ex rel. Jacobs v. Coffin, 282 Ill. 599.) Relator, having performed the duties of policeman for eleven years prior to his discharge and having been paid therefor by appropriate ordinances, must be deemed to have held the position of policeman. The plain meaning of the statute is that one who holds the position of member of a police department is automatically elevated to the status of city officer. Thus, a municipality can no longer defeat a policeman’s right to the protection of the statute by the simple expedient of refusing to enact an ordinance creating the office of policeman. *** Where a policeman has regularly performed the duties of a member of the police force for a period of one year prior to the adoption of the act and has been remunerated under the authority of an ordinance, a mere recital of the statute in a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel reinstatement obviates the necessity of showing that the office or position was created by ordinance, or that strict compliance was had with the statutory requirements of appointment to office. In short, the statute not only creates the office of municipal policeman, but also specifically directs that any person who has occupied the position of policeman for more than one year prior to the adoption of the act is a municipal officer and is entitled to the protection of the act.” Siegal, 397 Ill. at 193-94.

The court stated further:

“The statutory provisions relating to the appointment of municipal officers are not controlling on appointments to municipal positions. Upon the authority of People ex rel. Jacobs v. Coffin, 282 Ill. 599, we hold that a position may be created and an appointment made thereto by contract, either express or implied, and that one may lawfully hold a municipal position by virtue of a colorable appointment coupled with performance of the duties of the position and remuneration therefor under applicable appropriation ordinances.” Siegal, 397 Ill. at 195.

Defendants respond that Siegal does not apply because “the plaintiff in that case was appointed as a policeman, took an oath of office as a policeman, was paid as a policeman and performed the duties of a policeman, exclusively for eleven years[ ]” whereas in this case the “plaintiff took no oath of office as a firefighter or lieutenant, was not paid as a firefighter or lieutenant, and did not perform the exclusive duties as a firefighter or lieutenant[, and] [a]t best, plaintiff performed as a firefighter and/or lieutenant on an as needed basis. However, plaintiff’s primary duties were as the Fire Prevention Training Officer.”

Yet, in Siegal, as previously noted, the village had never established a police department or created the office of policeman. The subject of the police force was governed by a 1906 ordinance which provided for the appointment of deputy marshals by the president and board of trustees. (Siegal, 397 Ill. at 189-90.) Therefore, despite the fact that Siegal was appointed and took an oath, it is clear that his appointment, by the president alone, was in contravention of the ordinance. In addition, it is clear that his appointment would have been invalid under the Act, had it applied at the time. (Siegal, 397 Ill. at 190.) Further, as in Siegal, Rinchich alleges that he served as a full-time firefighter with the rank of lieutenant. However, although Rinchich also alleges that he was compensated as a lieutenant, the salary ordinance submitted by him does not support this allegation.

In Bubash, the court held on the authority of Siegal that the plaintiff, who held a position on the police force for almost two years prior to the adoption of the Act, was “blanketed into” the classified service of the police department and was therefore entitled to the protections of the Act. In rejecting the defendants’ arguments that the plaintiff was not entitled to revert to the rank of captain because that office was not validly created and therefore the plaintiff’s appointment to it was invalid, the court reasoned that Siegal and the amendments it interpreted made “the holding of a municipal position not a municipal office, the relevant concept in discussing a claim brought under the Act.” (Emphasis added.) (Bubash, 14 Ill. App. 3d at 1048.) Therefore, because the plaintiff was seeking to revert to his previous position, and because a position may be held by virtue of a colorable appointment coupled with performance of the duties of the position and remuneration therefor, he was entitled to revert to the rank of captain upon his reinstatement to the department. In addition, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that amendments to the Act which provided that its provisions applied only to full-time policemen of a regularly constituted police department changed the outcome required by Siegal. Bubash, 14 Ill. App. 3d at 1046-48.

However, even assuming that Rinchich, by virtue of his prior service as a volunteer fireman, became a full-time firefighter with the rank of lieutenant when the Village adopted article 10 of the Municipal Code, and that pursuant to its provisions he became a city officer, he lost that status when he resigned in 1973. Nevertheless, Rinchich argues on the authority of Bubash and Kagann v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 209, that he served as both lieutenant and fire prevention training and education officer and that upon his return to the department he should revert to his previous rank as lieutenant. But as defendants correctly point out, Bu-bash and Kagann are distinguishable from this case because their holdings rely on section 10 — 2.1—4 of the Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 24, par. 10 — 2.1—4), which provides that a police or fire chief may revert to a previous rank upon resignation or discharge prior to attaining a retirement pension. Rinchich was not a fire chief. Upon his return in 1977, statutory procedures for the appointment of firefighters were in place. It is clear that Rinchich was not appointed in accordance with the statute and that, due to his resignation, he was no longer entitled to the protection of the Act by virtue of his service prior to its adoption.

The cases on which Rinchich relies involved situations in which someone who occupied a position prior to the adoption of the Act was, pursuant to the terms thereof, accorded the status of an officer once the Act was adopted. The plaintiffs in those cases were claiming entitlement to a municipal position, to which, in the absence of statutory authority, appointment may be made by contract and which may be held by virtue of a colorable appointment, performance and remuneration therefor. (Siegal, 397 Ill. at 194; Bubash, 14 Ill. App. 3d at 1047; see also Reilly v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 142.) However, Rinchich is seeking entitlement to a municipal office based on a colorable appointment, performance and compensation therefor, while statutory authority is in place.

The Code provides that “[t]he sole authority to issue certificates of appointment shall be vested in the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10 — 2.1—4; see also City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 499, 529 (in which the court stated that “[t]he authority to hire, promote, discharge and reward firefighters is vested by statute in the board of fire and police commissioners. [Citation])”.) Once the board of fire and police commissioners is established, the president and the board of trustees no longer have the right to appoint any police officers except the chief of police. (Young v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 689, 693, citing People ex rel. Gasparas v. Village of Justice (1967), 88 Ill. App. 2d 227, 237-38.) Therefore, the corporate authorities did not have the authority to appoint Rinchich. Further, as defendants point out, contracts which are expressly void may not be rendered valid by estoppel. (Ligenza v. Village of Round Lake Beach (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 286, 291.) Consequently, we reject this contention of error.

C

As previously noted, in his amended complaint Rinchich alleged that “[o]n March 28, 1979, [he] was appointed by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners to the position of Fire Prevention Education and Training Officer.” In support of this allegation, he submitted a letter he received from the board of fire and police commissioners which stated in part:

“By action of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, you are hereby appointed to the position of Fire Prevention Education and Training Officer.”

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants argued that the position of fire prevention training and education officer was created by the Village and that the Village retained the authority to abolish that position. In support of this position, defendants submitted the affidavit of Chief Billig which stated in part:

“On or about April 1, 1979, John Rinchich became the Village’s Fire Prevention Training Officer, which is a civilian position.”

Rinchich contends on appeal that defendants abolished the position of fire prevention training and education officer in order to punish him for his political activities. Section 10 — 2.1—18 of the Municipal Code provides in part:

“Fire or police departments — Reduction of force — Reinstatement. When the force of the fire department or of the police department is reduced, and positions displaced or abolished, seniority shall prevail and the officers and members so reduced in rank, or removed from the service of the fire department or of the police department shall be considered furloughed without pay.
If any positions which have been vacated because of reduction in forces or displacement and abolition of positions, are reinstated, such members and officers of the fire department or of the police department as are furloughed from the said positions shall be notified by the board by registered mail of such reinstatement of positions and shall have prior right to such positions if otherwise qualified, and in all cases seniority shall prevail.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 10 — 2.1—18.

Although Rinchich acknowledges that, pursuant to section 10— 2.1 — 18, a municipality has a right to reduce its force, he argues that a reduction in force motivated by a desire to punish a party for political activity is invalid. (Yeley v. Bartonville Fire & Police Comm’n (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 271.) Rinchich contends that the affidavits of James Russell and Rutkowski demonstrate that the Village intended to retaliate against him because of his participation in the activities of an opposing political party and that because the statements were made by Chief Dooley, an agent of the Village who was acting in the scope of his employment, they are not hearsay. Moreover, he further contends that his affidavit, which was not stricken by the trial court, sets forth the same facts with respect to the conversation with Chief Dooley. Because defendants have failed to rebut these contentions, Rinchich argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists, precluding the entry of summary judgment.

Defendants respond, pursuant to the assumption that Rinchich’s cause of action “is based upon a due process constitutional claim” that, as in the case of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701, Rinchich “had no constitutionally protected interest in the training officer’s position[ ]” because “as the Fire Prevention Training and Education Officer, John Rinchich was a municipal employee who was terminable at will.”

Defendants argue further that the affidavits submitted by Rinchich did not comply with Supreme Court Rule 191(a), and that even assuming they were not stricken, they would not create an issue of material fact. They note that Chief Dooley was not a policy maker for the Village and that he did not identify to which corporate authority he was referring. They note further that Rinchich has not shown a nexus between the statements and defendants’ actions. Moreover, defendants argue on the authority of Elrod v. Burns (1976), 427 U.S. 347, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547, 96 S. Ct. 2673, that because Rinchich was not terminated or discharged when the position of fire prevention training and education officer was eliminated but was returned to the rank of a fireman, he has not stated a cause of action.

Rinchich’s affidavit, which was not stricken by the trial court, provides in pertinent part:

“12. On several occasions in the year 1987, I had conversations with Fire Chief Dooley, wherein he advised me that the corporate authorities of the Village of Bridgeview were determined to fire me, for the following reasons:
(a) The Mayor and the Board of Trustees wished to fire me because I was a member of an opposing political party;
(b) The corporate authorities wished to fire me in retaliation for a lawsuit previously filed against the Village of Bridgeview protesting certain actions that the Village had taken, which I deemed to be unlawful.”

In light of Rinchich’s complaint, Rinchich’s letter of appointment, Rinchich’s affidavit, defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Chief Billig’s affidavit, we hold that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Rinchich was or was not a civilian employee and, therefore, as to whether the position of fire prevention training and education officer was abolished in good faith. However, we note that Rinchich has waived the collective bargaining issue by failing to argue it on appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).

For all of the above-stated reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s May 21, 1990, order striking the affidavits referred to above. We affirm the court’s July 16, 1990, order insofar as it holds that defendants did not violate section 3 — 13—1 of the Municipal Code and that Rinchich was not entitled to the position of lieutenant in the Bridge-view fire department. However, we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Rinchich was a civilian employee and therefore as to whether the position of fire prevention training and education officer was abolished in bad faith.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.

DiVITO and McCORMICK, JJ., concur.