text:
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHARON L. MOFFAT, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant).
    First District (1st Division)
    No. 1—88—2688
    Opinion filed December 18, 1989.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Kimary Lee, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
    No brief filed for appellee.
   JUSTICE O’CONNOR

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Secretary of State appeals a circuit court order directing the Secretary to issue a judicial driving permit to defendant Sharon Moffat. For the reasons below, we hold that the circuit court erred.

On December 20, 1982, Sharon Moffat was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. (Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 11—501).) Moffat refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, and her driver’s license was suspended for six months pursuant to section 11 — 501.1 of the Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 11-501.1.

On April 20, 1988, Moffat was again arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and submitted to a breathalyzer test, which showed a blood-alcohol level of .19. Immediately following, Moffat was served with notice of a summary suspension of driving privileges pursuant to section 11 — 501.1 of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 — 501.1.) The Secretary of State imposed a 12-month suspension, beginning June 5,1988.

On May 9, 1988, Moffat filed a petition for judicial driving permit to relieve undue hardship (JDP), pursuant to section 6 — 206.1 of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6-206.1.) On May 26, 1988, the trial court issued an order directing the Secretary of State to issue a JDP to Moffat for employment purposes. The JDP allowed Moffat to drive only to and from work at prescribed hours of the day and on prescribed routes. The State moved to reconsider issuance of the JDP because Moffat was a second offender, and on July 27, 1988, the trial court denied the motion.

The Secretary of State, not a party to the case, appealed, and in a Rule 23 order we followed People v. Bluett (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 593, 520 N.E.2d 395, appeal denied (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 573, and held that the Secretary of State lacked standing. In People v. Pine (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 88, 542 N.E.2d 711, however, the supreme court held that the Secretary of State has standing to appeal orders directing the issuance of a JDP. Our judgment was subsequently vacated and remanded by the supreme court on October 5, 1989, with instructions to proceed in accordance with Pine. We further note that although the appellee, Ms. Moffat, filed no brief, we may consider the merits of the case. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.

The issue here is whether the circuit court erroneously exceeded statutory limitations when it directed the Secretary to issue a JDP to a person who was not a first offender as defined by the Code. Although this case appears moot because Moffat’s 12-month suspension ended on June 5, 1989, we apply the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. The enforcement of laws against driving while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs is of general public concern, balancing an individual’s desire and need to drive his car against the State’s compelling need to remove a manifest threat to public safety. But despite efforts to curb drunken driving, the habit unfortunately persists. Thus, the scope of the circuit court’s discretion in directing the Secretary to issue a JDP is a question likely to recur and requires an authoritative determination. (See In re a Minor (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 247, 537 N.E.2d 292.) Therefore, while our decision can no lónger affect Ms. Moffat, we proceed to the merits of the case.

The JDP is authorized by section 6 — 206.1 of the Code, which declares the policy of removing impaired drivers from the roads, but recognizes, in some cases, the need for those whose driving privileges have been revoked to drive. The legislature balanced the compelling public need to remove dangerous drivers with the individual’s need to drive his car for specific purposes, such as going to and from work or performing his work (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 — 206.1(a)(1)), or for seeking alcohol or drug treatment, or other medical care (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 — 206.1(a)(2)). But the legislature struck that balance by limiting JDPs to “first offenders,” defined in section 11 — 500 of the Code, which provides:

“For the purposes of interpreting Sections 6 — 206.1 and 6— 208.1 of this Code, ‘first offender’ shall mean any person who has not had a previous conviction or court assigned supervision for violating Section 11 — 501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or a conviction in any other state for a violation of driving while under the influence or a similar offense where the cause of action is the same or substantially similar to this Code, within the last 5 years; or any person who has not had a driver’s license suspension for Section 11 — 501.1 after January 1, 1982, or a previous statutory summary suspension as provided in this Code, except in cases where the driver submitted to chemical testing resulting in an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more and was subsequently found not guilty of violating Section 11 — 501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 11—500.)

Under section 11 — 500, “first offenders” are persons who have had neither a previous conviction, court supervision, nor driver’s license suspension for DUI. (See also People v. Doyle (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 689, 693, 512 N.E.2d 798.) The legislature expressly stated limits on who may receive a JDP and the purposes for which it could be used, and gave the courts no discretion to exceed the statutory limitations.

Here, Moffat’s second conviction for DUI occurred more than five years after the first, but her first arrest resulted in a statutory suspension under section 11 — 501.1. Thus, Moffat was a second offender, not eligible to receive a JDP. By directing the Secretary to issue a JDP to Moffat, a multiple offender, the circuit court clearly exceeded the limitations imposed by section 6 — 206.1.

No doubt the circuit court recognized that Ms. Moffat’s livelihood would have been jeopardized had she been unable to drive to and from work, and sought to avoid that harsh result. But if limiting JDPs to first offenders yields harsh results, the solution is not for the circuit court to ignore the express intent of the legislature, but for the individual to not drive while under the influence of alcohol in the first place.

We hold that the circuit court erred in directing the Secretary to issue a judicial driving permit to a person who was not a first offender as defined by section 11 — 500 of the Code. Accordingly, we reverse.

Reversed.

CAMPBELL and BUCKLEY, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PRESIDING JUSTICE MANNING

license: Public Domain

text:
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD M. DALEY, State’s Attorney, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL GRADY, Indiv. and d/b/a Direct by Owner, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    First District (1st Division)
    No. 1—88—2721
    Opinion filed December 18, 1989.
    Cecil A. Partee, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (David Melcer and Allen Reiffman, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.

      Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (Stephen R Swofford, Thomas M. Burnham, and Bruce L. Carmen, of counsel), for appellees.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE MANNING

delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Michael Grady, is the owner of a real estate business, which operates under the name of “Direct by Owner.” The defendant is not licensed by the State of Illinois as a real estate broker or salesperson. The nature of this business is the matching of prospective buyers to the sellers and the marketing and advertisement of homes that are for sale by the owner. As compensation for these services, the defendant charges the sellers a commission based on the actual selling price of the homes and charges the buyers a “flat fee” to view the list of available homes for sale.

A two-count complaint was filed on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois seeking injunctive relief, restitution and civil penalties against the defendant. Count I of the first amended complaint alleges that the defendant employed deceptive practices in the operation of his business in violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (the Consumer Fraud Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 1211/2, par. 262). Count I specifically alleges that the Consumer Fraud Act is violated based on the defendant’s failure to fulfill his consumer promises regarding the sale of their property and his misrepresentations regarding his refund policy.

Count II of the first amended complaint alleges that the defendant was engaged in the practice of real estate without a license in violation of the Real Estate License Act of 1983 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 5801 et seq.). Specifically, count II asserts that the defendant is engaged in the practice of real estate as defined by the Illinois Real Estate License Act of 1983 (Illinois Real Estate License Act), in light of his practice of maintaining listings of homes for sale, soliciting potential buyers and matching the buyers with the sellers. A staff attorney for the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, familiar with the defendant’s real estate business, verified by affidavit that it is the opinion of the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation that the defendant’s business constitutes the practice of real estate which requires a real estate license. Plaintiff further contends that the defendant’s conduct, which violates the Real Estate License Act, constitutes a deceptive business practice. Thus, plaintiff alleges defendant’s conduct is also a violation of section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act. This final contention is the subject of this appeal.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss only count II, finding that a violation of the Real Estate License Act does not constitute a deceptive practice under the Consumer Fraud Act. The court made an express written finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. The sole issue presented for review is whether a business practice, which if violative of public policy as established by the Real Estate License Act, would automatically constitute a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.

As previously noted, plaintiff contends that a violation of the Real Estate License Act is an unfair or deceptive practice that also violates the Consumer Fraud Act. Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act forbids unfair or deceptive acts including the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, in the conduct of any trade or business with the intent that others rely on the deceptive practices. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 1211/2, par. 262; Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home International (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 279, 284, 430 N.E.2d 1012; Lane v. Fabert (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 698, 705, 533 N.E.2d 546.) Moreover, “trade or commerce” is defined as “the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 1211/2, par. 261(f); Scott, 88 Ill. 2d at 284.

It is well settled that when courts are interpreting a statute, the legislature’s intent must be ascertained and given effect, and the determination as to intent begins with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute without resorting to other aids. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Washburn (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 486, 492, 493 N.E. 2d 1071; Coldwell Bankers Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 389, 396, 475 N.E.2d 536; Town of Libertyville v. Bank of Waukegan (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1070, 504 N.E.2d 1305.

In the present case, section 20 of the Consumer Fraud Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 1211/2, par. 262Q) provides a list of “other Acts” which if violated would automatically violate the Consumer Fraud Act. The express language of section 20 specifically provides that, “[a]ny person who knowingly violates the ‘Dance Studio Act,’ the ‘Physical Fitness Services Act,’ the ‘Hearing Aid Consumer Protection Act,’ the ‘Illinois Union Label Act’ or the ‘Travel Promotion Consumer Protection Act’ commits an unlawful practice within the meaning of [the Consumer Fraud Act].” Ill. Rev. Stat, 1987, ch. 1211/2, par. 262O.

Our supreme court has held that under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, when certain things are enumerated in a statute, that enumeration implies the exclusion of all other things even if there are no negative words of prohibition. (In re Estate of Leichtenberg (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 545, 552, 131 N.E.2d 487; see also Lunde v. Rockford Public Library Board (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 803, 809-10, 506 N.E.2d 385; In re Estate of Orzoff (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 265, 268, 452 N.E.2d 82; Roth v. Department of Public Aid (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 457, 460, 440 N.E.2d 910.) There is no indication in the language of either statute to suggest that the legislature’s intent was to provide that a violation of the Real Estate Licensing Act constitutes a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. Neither do we find any support in Illinois case law for such a proposition. The appellate court does not have the authority to restrict or enlarge the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute (People v. McCray (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26, 451 N.E.2d 985), and we decline to set such a precedent. For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of count II.

Judgment affirmed.

BUCKLEY and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur.


author: JUSTICE O’CONNOR

text:
    THE DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVE DORNER et al., Defendants-Appellants.
    First District (1st Division)
    No. 1—88—2726
    Opinion filed December 18, 1989.

      James R Platt and William M. Doty, Jr., both of Chicago, for appellants.
    Neil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Earl L. Neal & Associates, of Chicago (Earl L. Neal and Terrance Lee Diamond, of counsel), for appellee.
   JUSTICE O’CONNOR

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Illinois Department of Conservation (IDOC) instituted an action in 1982 to exercise its right of eminent domain over 13 subdivided lots owned by the defendants, Edward and Ann Twarog, Steven and Dorothy Dorner, and Wanda Miles (referred to collectively as the owners). After a trial to determine the value of the lots, a jury returned a verdict establishing the value at $5,450 per lot, a value within the range of values testified to during the trial. The owners appeal, arguing that the trial court improperly ruled on several motions in limine. For the reasons below, we affirm.

Wolf Road Prairie is an 80-acre subdivision located in Westchester, Illinois, bounded by 26th Street to the north, 31st Street to the south, Wolf Road to the east, and Forest Road to the west. Wolf Road Prairie is traversed by the middle and south forks of Salt Creek. Improved subdivisions lie to the east and west of Wolf Road Prairie, to the south lies forest preserve, and to the north, undeveloped land. In 1925, Wolf Road Prairie was subdivided into 597 lots of 3,087.5 and 4,075.5 square feet, zoned R-l for single-family residence. Wolf Road Prairie has not been improved or developed: there are no streets, curbs, or sidewalks, no water, sewer, storm drainage, power, or utilities.

Thirteen lots, five owned by the Twarogs, five owned by the Dorners, and three owned by Miles (the subject lots) lie in the flood-way of Salt Creek’s south fork. Construction in a floodway is prohibited by regulations of the Illinois Department of Transportation, Division of Water Resources. Seven of the thirteen lots have been targeted as “Protected Wetlands” under section 404 of the Clean Harbors Act (33 U.S.C. 1344 (1982)). Designation as wetlands necessitates a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers before any construction on the property.

In 1976, owners of property in Wolf Road Prairie, including Steven Dorner, filed a mandamus action, unrelated to the instant case, to compel the Village of Westchester to install streets, sidewalks, sewers, water, and other utilities necessary to development in Wolf Road Prairie. The suit was unsuccessful and subsequently was dismissed voluntarily by the property owners in March 1986. See Thomas v. Village of Westchester (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 190, 477 N.E.2d 49.

Between 1976 and 1982, a conservation group called Save the Prairie purchased at least 40 Wolf Road Prairie lots for prices between $3,350 and $4,000. In 1979, Curtis Calvert, an attorney who later testified at trial, represented his father in the sale of 47 Wolf Road Prairie lots for $3,500 each. Seventeen of the Calvert lots were sold to owners Dorner and Twarog. The sales to Save the Prairie and from Calvert shall be referred to collectively as “the Wolf Road Prairie sales.”

In 1982, IDOC filed the instant action for eminent domain, to use Wolf Road Prairie for flood control. Several defendants were dismissed, and now only the owners of the 13 subject lots remain. A jury trial was held to determine the value of those lots. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled on three motions in limine.

The owners moved to exclude the Wolf Road Prairie sales, contending that the mandamus action had “tainted” the sales, making them involuntary, and therefore, not comparable to determine the fair market value of the subject lots. The motion was denied.

IDOC moved to exclude as not comparable recent sales of improved lots from the adjacent Woodland View and Mayfair subdivisions. The Woodland View and Mayfair lots were buildable, improved lots, twice the size of the Wolf Road Prairie lots, and had recently sold for $35,000 each. IDOC also moved to preclude the owners’ experts from basing opinions on the value of the subject lots on a “cost less development” formula, which determined the value of the property by subtracting improvement and development costs from $35,000, a price derived from the Woodland View and Mayfair sales. IDOC contended that use of the formula would allow the property owners to introduce evidence of the Woodland View and Mayfair sales, even though the property owners’ experts had admitted in depositions that those sales were not comparable to the subject lots.

The trial court ruled to exclude evidence of the Woodland View and Mayfair sales, but that at the proper time, the evidence would be heard without the jury, and the ruling would then be reconsidered. At trial, the court excluded the evidence. The trial court further ruled that the parties could not use the cost less development formula to establish the value of any lots outside Wolf Road Prairie, but that such sales could be testified to in accordance with applicable rules of evidence.

Trial commenced on May 13, 1988. IDOC witnesses testified to the Save the Prairie and Calvert sales. Thompson Dyke, a land use consultant, testified that development of Wolf Road Prairie was infeasible, and that the highest and best use of the subject lots was as open space because the subject lots were either in or affected by the Salt Creek floodway. Joseph Zgonina, a civil traffic engineer, testified that the subject lots could not be developed because Federal regulations prohibited construction in a floodway unless there was compensatory storage, i.e., a temporary holding area for flood waters. Zgonina further testified that development was infeasible due to the prohibitive cost of installing utilities, and that even if Wolf Road Prairie were developed as a single property, the subject lots would remain open because they were in a designated floodway.

James Curtis, a real estate appraiser called as an expert, testified, relying in part on the Wolf Road Prairie sales, that 10 of the subject lots were worth $4,950, while the three lots owned by Miles, which were a little larger, were worth $5,040. Curtis also testified on cross-examination that the highest and best use of the land was assemblage of the single lots and development as multifamily residences. Curtis testified that assemblage was likely due to increased property values in the area, but that in his experience, assemblage was difficult and took a long time. At the close of IDOC’s case, the trial court denied the owners’ motion for a directed verdict.

The owners’ first witness was Thomas Slowinski of the Army Corps of Engineers, who testified that the subject lots were located in a “Protected Wetland,” and that a permit for construction would have been required as early as 1977. The owners, Wanda Miles, Edward Twarog, and Steven Dorner, testified to their purchase of the subject lots prior to 1976. Ralph Lindley, an engineer, testified to an existing flood-diversion plan that would allow construction in Wolf Road Prairie, but at an estimated cost of nearly $4 million. Lindley also testified that the plan required assemblage. John Enright, a real estate appraiser, testified that the fair market value of the subject lots was $24,750, but did not specify any comparable sales relied upon or considered in arriving at the value.

James Paul, a real estate developer called as an expert, testified that the highest and best use of Wolf Road Prairie would be multifamily residential, and that the value for five of the subject lots was $24,750 each. In a sidebar, the trial court ruled that Paul could not testify to the sale of 10 improved lots from the Woodland View and Mayfair subdivisions, upon which he had based his opinion of the value of the subject lots.

The jury returned a verdict which valued the 13 lots at $5,040 each. The owners’ post-trial motion was denied, and they appeal.

The owners raise four arguments. The first argument challenges admission of the Wolf Road Prairie sales as independent evidence of the subject lots’ Value, asserting that the sales were not comparable. The second and third arguments raise the same issue: the extent to which a valuation expert may testify to data and information that form the basis for his opinion, where that data and information are otherwise inadmissible. The fourth argument challenges the trial court’s denial of the owners’ motion for directed verdict. Each argument is without merit.

The owners first argue that the trial court erred in admitting the Wolf Road Prairie sales as evidence of the value of the subject lots. The value of condemned property may be established with evidence of sales of comparable property (comparable sales). Sales are comparable if the land was physically similar to the condemned property and the sales were made at about the same time as the condemnation. (City of Chicago v. Blanton (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 198, 202, 154 N.E.2d 242.) Other condemnation sales are not admissible as comparable sales because they are involuntary and often a seller has settled on a price below market value to avoid litigation costs. See Oak Brook Park District v. Oak Brook Development Co. (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 221, 524 N.E.2d 213, appeal denied (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 579.

Here, the owners contend that the Wolf Road Prairie sales were not comparable sales. Extrapolating from the principle that condemnation sales generally are inadmissible, the owners assert that any litigation impacting on the condemned land should be inadmissible. The owners contend that the Wolf Road Prairie sales were “tainted” by the pending mandamus action, which limited the uses for the property, affecting its value and compelling the sales. Thus, say the owners, the Wolf Road Prairie sales were involuntary and should not have been admitted as comparable sales.

But the Wolf Road Prairie sales met the criteria for comparable sales. The land was physically identical to the subject lots. Further, the record shows that the sales were made within six years of the instant condemnation action, were negotiated between willing buyers and willing sellers, and made for approximately the same price. The mandamus action might have been a factor affecting the price of the lots, but there was no compulsion. In a condemnation action, the sale is forced: ownership of the property transfers to the State by decree or execution (City of Chicago v. Vaccarro (1951), 408 Ill. 587, 600, 97 N.E.2d 766), something more than economic expedience. Because the Wolf Road Prairie sales were comparable, they were properly admitted as evidence of the value of the subject lots.

The owners next challenge James Curtis’ testimony on the Wolf Road Prairie sales, which he relied on to form his opinion of the value of the subject lots. The owners argue that Curtis’ testimony should have been stricken because the sales were not comparable. The owners’ argument, although without merit, raises an unsettled question concerning the extent to which a valuation expert may testify to the basis for his opinion, where it was based on otherwise inadmissible data or information.

Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322, adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705 in Illinois, and Department of Transportation v. Beeson (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 908, 485 N.E.2d 511, held that valuation witnesses were experts whose testimony was subject to Rules 703 and 705. Rule 703 provides:

“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.” (28 U.S.C. R. 703 (1982).)

Rule 705 provides:

“The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.” (28 U.S.C. R. 705 (1982).)

Under Rules 703 and 705, a valuation expert could base his opinion on data and information that are otherwise inadmissible, such as noncom-parable sales. But the extent to which the expert could testify concerning the noncomparable sales remained unclear.

The established rule stated that where an expert relied on non-comparable sales to form an opinion, he could testify to the sales in general terms, but could not testify to the sale price. (Lake County Forest Preserve District v. Bank & Trust Co. (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 856, 436 N.E.2d 237, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 570.) The sales were admissible because they were not offered to assert their truth, but the court had the discretion to exclude prejudicial or confusing evidence. See People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 495 N.E.2d 485.

Beeson apparently allowed the expert to testify specifically to all sales relied upon as a basis for his opinion, but the comparability of the sales relied on was not controverted. Department of Transportation v. Amoco Oil Co. (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 479, 528 N.E.2d 298, however, where the comparability of the sales was controverted, held that the trial court had the discretion to determine whether the information underlying the expert’s opinion was reasonably relied upon, although no determination was required. (174 Ill. App. 3d at 491.) Therefore, under Beeson and Amoco, a valuation expert should be allowed to testify specifically to all sales reasonably relied on, subject to the trial court’s discretion to exclude prejudicial or confusing information. See Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (5th Cir. 1984), 739 F.2d 1028; Bauman v. Centrex Corp. (5th Cir. 1980), 611 F.2d 1115.

Here, the owners argue that the trial court misapplied Beeson in allowing Curtis’ testimony because, as the owners maintain, the Wolf Road Prairie sales were not comparable. But Beeson was not implicated because the Wolf Road Prairie sales were independently admitted as evidence of the subject lots’ value; Curtis relied on admissible evidence. Even had the Wolf Road Prairie sales not been admitted, there was no error in allowing Curtis to testify to his reliance because the sales were comparable and of the type upon which valuation experts reasonably rely.

The owners further maintain that Curtis’ testimony should have been stricken because he admitted that he did not know whether the parties to the Wolf Road Prairie sales were informed buyers and sellers, but it is well settled that an expert need not interview the specific buyers and sellers to rely on a given sale. (Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Hufeld (1966), 68 Ill. App. 2d 120, 215 N.E.2d 312.) Here, Curtis had inspected the subject lots, inspected public records and sales contracts, and had heard testimony by the owners concerning their purchases and sales of the lots, activities sufficient to support his opinion testimony. (Lake County Forest Preserve District v. Bank & Trust Co. (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 856, 436 N.E.2d 237, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 570.) Curtis’ testimony was properly admitted.

The owners next argue that the trial court misapplied Beeson in excluding James Paul’s testimony concerning the Woodland View and Mayfair subdivision sales, upon which he relied to form his opinion that the subject lots were worth $24,750 each. This argument presents a proper application of Beeson and Amoco, but the trial court was within its discretion in not allowing testimony concerning the Woodland View and Mayfair sales because they were not comparable.

The Woodland View and Mayfair subdivisions are located east of Wolf Road from Wolf Road Prairie. The land is physically similar to Wolf Road Prairie, and the lots were undeveloped when originally purchased. But the sales in Woodland View and Mayfair were of improved lots either developed or buildable, and approximately twice the size of the Wolf Road Prairie lots, meeting minimum size requirements for building set by Village of Westchester zoning ordinances. In contrast, the Wolf Road Prairie lots were unimproved, undeveloped, and did not meet minimum size requirements. Moreover, the subject lots lie in the flood plain of the Salt Creek. The Woodland View and Mayfair lots, developed, improved, and buildable, were not comparable. (See Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Gibbel, (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 890, 382 N.E.2d 846, appeal denied (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 585.) Further, Paul had admitted in his deposition that the Woodland View and Mayfair lots were not comparable.

The owners contend that the Woodland View and Mayfair sales presented proper evidence of the value of the subject lots in their highest and best use, but the sales were not offered for that purpose. Rather, the sales were offered as the basis for Paul’s opinion of the value of the subject lots in their present use. Because the Woodland View and Mayfair subdivision sales were not comparable, the trial court reasonably concluded that they were not sales of the type normally relied upon by experts, and was within its discretion to exclude testimony concerning the sales.

Finally, the owners argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for directed verdict, arguing that IDOC failed to establish the value of the subject lots in their highest and best use, and therefore failed to establish a value necessary to maintain a condemnation action. This argument misconstrues the evidence. IDOC did not attempt to establish a value at the highest and best use. Rather, IDOC sought to establish that the subject lots’ highest and best use was as open space and that development, though possible, was infeasible, given the need for assemblage prior to that use, the need to rezone, the need to obtain building permits from the Army Corps of Engineers, and the prohibitive cost of installing streets and necessary utilities. Further, IDOC established a value for the subject lots in their present use. James Curtis testified that in his opinion, the three larger lots were worth $5,040 each, while the 10 smaller lots were worth $4,950 each. IDOC presented sufficient evidence to establish a value at the subjects lots’ present use, and show that development was infeasible and not reasonably probable. There was no error in denying the motion for a directed verdict.

In conclusion, if a verdict in an eminent domain trial falls within the range of the minimum and maximum values testified to, it will be upheld (Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Rider (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 326, 146 N.E.2d 48), unless a palpable mistake of law or clearly misleading evidence influenced the verdict. (City of Chicago v. Vaccarro (1951), 408 Ill. 587, 97 N.E.2d 766.) Here, the record contained testimony that the subject lots were worth as little as $4,950 per lot, and as much as $24,750 per lot. The jury returned a verdict of $5,450 per lot. There was no error of law, the owners’ arguments notwithstanding. The Wolf Road Prairie sales were properly admitted as comparable sales and properly served as the basis for James Curtis’ opinion testimony. The Woodland View and Mayfair subdivision sales were properly excluded. IDOC established a value for the subject lots in their present use. Aside from arguing that the Wolf Road Prairie sales were not comparable, the owners did not challenge any evidence as misleading or confusing. Therefore, the verdict setting the value of the subject lots at $5,450 per lot is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL and BUCKLEY, JJ., concur.