author: JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH

text:
    AKIYO GIBBS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MADISON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee (Danny Gibbs, Plaintiff).
    Fifth District
    No. 5 — 91—0547
    Opinion filed March 10, 1993.

      Gordon Lambert, of Harris & Lambert, of Marion, for appellants.
    Larry E. Hepler, J. Todd Hayes, and David G. Phoenix, all of Burroughs, Simpson, Hepler, Broom & MacDonald, of Edwardsville, and James B. Bleyer, of Bleyer & Bleyer, of Marion, for appellee.
   JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Akiyo Gibbs, Faye Greer, Alisa Gibbs, a minor, by Akiyo Gibbs, her mother and next friend, Tia Gibbs, a minor, by Akiyo Gibbs, her mother and next friend, and Kristina Brooke Horton, a minor, by Clark Horton and Gina Horton, her father and mother and next friends, appeal from a declaratory judgment of the circuit court of Massac County in favor of defendant, Madison Mutual Insurance Company, barring plaintiffs from stacking the bodily injury and underinsured motorist coverages on each of the four vehicles insured under a policy owned by Danny Gibbs, another plaintiff, who takes no part in this appeal. The declaratory judgment also provided that any payments made to plaintiffs under the bodily injury liability coverage should be reduced (set off) by any payments due and owing plaintiffs under the underinsured motorist provisions, and that any payments made to plaintiffs under the underinsured motorist provisions should set off any payment due and owing under the bodily injury liability provisions. In this cause there are two areas we must address — the antistacking provisions in the policy and the setoff provision in the policy. More specifically, the issues presented are: (1) whether the antistacking clauses in the policy in question bar stacking of the bodily injury liability coverages and the underinsured motorist coverages on the four motor vehicles insured under the policy, and (2) whether defendant is entitled to set off what it pays on behalf of the policy owner, Danny Gibbs, under the bodily injury liability section of the policy against what it owes under the underinsured motorist provision of the policy and whether defendant is entitled to set off what it pays under the underinsured motorist provisions of the policy to any plaintiff against what it owes under the bodily injury liability sections of the policy. We reverse and remand.

I

The facts are not in dispute. Defendant issued Danny L. Gibbs a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance, policy No. 00479725, which was effective from June 20, 1988, to December 20, 1988. There were four automobiles covered under policy No. 00479725: a 1986 Lincoln Town Car, a 1982 Dodge 400, a 1987 Chevrolet Spectrum, and a 1976 GMC half-ton pickup. Each automobile under the policy carried coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident for bodily injuries. The underinsured coverage under the aforementioned policy also set limits at $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident for each automobile. The-premium was broken down as follows: a premium of $159.45 was required for coverage on the 1986 Lincoln, $267.20 was required for the 1982 Dodge 400, $171 was required for the 1987 Chevrolet Spectrum, and $96.40 was required for the 1976 GMC half-ton pickup. Policy No. 00479725 also contained antistacking provisions under “Part A — liability coverage” and “Part D — underin-sured motorists coverage.”

On September 11, 1988, Danny Gibbs was driving the Lincoln Town Car on Illinois Route 145 in Massac County when a collision occurred between his automobile and an automobile driven by Patrick Burkhart. Passengers in the Gibbs automobile are the other plaintiffs in this suit. At the time of the collision, Patrick Burkhart was insured by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company with policy limits of $30,000 per person and $100,000 per accident for bodily injuries. State Farm has tendered its policy limit of $30,000 to Akiyo Gibbs. The parties stipulated that Akiyo Gibbs, Faye Greer, Alisa Gibbs, Tia Gibbs and Kristina Brooke Horton each sustained some personal injuries arising out of the collision between Danny Gibbs and Patrick Burkhart. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint for declaratory judgment states that Akiyo Gibbs sustained injuries and damages in an amount in excess of $800,000.

Suit for declaratory judgment was filed by plaintiffs. The case was tried without a jury. Plaintiffs took the position that policy No. 00479725 provides $100,000 coverage on each of the four vehicles for a total of $400,000 per person bodily injury coverage and a total of $400,000 per person underinsured motorists coverage. According to plaintiffs, the underinsured motorist coverage is available to them because Patrick Burkhart is an underinsured motorist. Plaintiffs concede that any payments made by Burkhart’s insurance company to any plaintiff may be offset against the total underinsured motorist coverage available to that plaintiff. Defendant took the position that only $100,000 is available under the policy as bodily injury liability coverage as to each plaintiff and, likewise, that only $100,000 is available under its policy for each plaintiff as underinsured motorists coverage. As to the setoff issue, defendant argued that it is entitled to a credit against underinsured motorist coverage payments due under the policy to any one plaintiff for any payment made to that plaintiff under the bodily injury provisions of the policy. Defendant also argued it was entitled to a credit against any payment due under its bodily injury liability coverage to any plaintiff for any payment made under its policy to that plaintiff under the underinsured motorists provisions of the policy. The trial court agreed with defendant’s position and held as follows:

“1. That Madison Mutual Insurance Company’s Policy No. 00479725, issued to Danny L. Gibbs, was in full force and effect on September 11, 1988, and provided insurance coverage for four motor vehicles, to-wit: 1982 Dodge, 1987 Chevrolet Spectrum, 1976 GMC Vz ton truck and 1987 Lincoln automobile, and as such provides bodily injury liability coverage for all plaintiffs, Akiyo Gibbs, Faye Greet [sic], Alisa Gibbs, Tia Gibbs and Kristina Brook [sic] Horton, against Danny L. Gibbs, for personal injuries sustained by them arising out of a motor vehicle accident on September 11, 1988, in the amount of $100,000 per individual and not to exceed a total for said occurrence of $300,000.00.
2. That Madison Mutual Insurance Company’s Policy No. 00479725, issued to Danny L. Gibbs, was in full force and effect on September 11, 1988, and provided insurance coverage for four motor vehicles, to-wit: 1982 Dodge, 1987 Chevrolet Spectrum, 1976 GMC Vz ton truck and 1987 Lincoln automobile, and as such provides underinsured motorist coverage for all plaintiffs, Akiyo Gibbs, Faye Greet [sic], Alisa Gibbs, Tia Gibbs and Kristina Brook [sic] Horton, against Danny L. Gibbs, for personal injuries sustained by them arising out of a motor vehicle accident on September 11, 1988, in the amount of $100,000.00 per individual and not to exceed a total for said occurrence of $300,000.00.
3. That any payments made to any of the plaintiffs, Akiyo Gibbs, Faye Greet [sic], Alisa Gibbs, Tia Gibbs and Kristina Brook [sic] Horton, Under Part A — Bodily Injury Liability Coverage shall reduce any payment that might be due and owing to any of them under Part D — Underinsured Motorist Coverage.
4. That any payments made to any of the plaintiffs, Akiyo Gibbs, Faye Greet [sic], Alisa Gibbs, Tia Gibbs and Kristina Brook [sic] Horton, under Part D — Underinsured Motorist Coverage, shall reduce any payment that might be due and owing to any of them under Part A — Bodily Injury Liability Coverage.”

Plaintiffs, excluding Danny Gibbs, now appeal the trial court’s decision.

II

The first issue we are asked to consider is whether the anti-stacking clauses of the policy in question bar stacking of the bodily injury liability coverages and the underinsured motorists coverages on the four motor vehicles insured under the policy. Plaintiffs contend that the antistacking clauses are not applicable to the facts in this case and thus they should be allowed to stack both the bodily injury and underinsured motorists provisions. Defendant replies that the language of the policy clearly and unambiguously prohibits stacking of policy coverages in all situations, including the one presented here. We find the antistacking provisions to be ambiguous and, under the facts presented, believe that the coverages may be stacked.

When construing insurance policies, the agreement is to be enforced as written so long as it is unambiguous and only to the extent that it does not contravene public policy. (Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 401 N.E.2d 539.) Section 143a — 2(6) of the Illinois Insurance Code (the Code) provides that an insurer is not prohibited from including antistacking provisions in motorists’ policies (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 73, par. 755a — 2(6)). That section of the Code is essentially a codification of that portion of Menke which holds antistacking provisions are not per se violative of public policy. (78 Ill. 2d at 425, 401 N.E.2d at 539.) However, it remains that if any provision in the policy is ambiguous, such ambiguity must be construed in favor of the insured. (Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 167, 180, 370 N.E.2d 1044, 1049; Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 336, 312 N.E.2d 247, 250.) In determining whether there is an ambiguity, the provision must be read in its factual context and not in isolation. (57 111. 2d at 336, 312 N.E.2d at 250.) An examination of the clause at issue reveals an ambiguity.

The antistacking provisions under scrutiny here are found in both the liability and the underinsured motorists sections of the policy. Both provisions are identical and read as follows:

“LIMIT OF LIABILITY
*** If two or more vehicle liability policies issued by us to you apply to the same accident, the total limits of liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the policy with the highest limit of liability, and The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for each person injured in any one accident: This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
1. Insureds;
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.”

The first clause of this provision clearly states that this provision to limit liability only comes into play “if two or more vehicle liability policies” are issued to the insured. Defendant asks us to construe the second clause as independent of the first clause in order to limit its liability. Defendant contends that the first provision of section A addresses multiple policies while the second provision addresses multiple automobiles insured under one policy and that neither provision is contingent upon the application of the other. We disagree, however, that the provision is clear and unambiguous.

The provision, as written, is only one sentence, not two separate paragraphs. The first clause ends with a comma and the word “and” followed by a second clause. In such a situation, we believe plaintiffs’ interpretation is reasonable. In our estimation, if these two clauses were two separate paragraphs, or even two separate sentences, there would be a period after the word “liability” and the word “and” would not appear. As written, however, there is one continuous sentence.

Plaintiffs contend that the first clause starting with “If two or more vehicle liability policies” and ending with “the highest limit of liability” is a qualifying phrase. In order for the second phrase to come into play, the first qualification must be fulfilled, namely, two policies must be issued. Because only one policy was issued in the instant case, this antistacking provision does not come into play. We agree. Here, it is apparent that the antistacking clause can be read in more than one way. When an insurer attempts to limit its liability within a policy, such limitation must be construed liberally in favor of the policy holder and against the insurer. (Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 69 Ill. 2d at 180, 370 N.E.2d at 1049.) Because there are at least two ways to read the “LIMIT OF LIABILITY” provision within this policy, the provision must be construed in favor of the insured. We hold that plaintiffs may stack the bodily injury liability coverage under part A of the policy for a total of $400,000 per person or $1.2 million per occurrence as well as the underinsured motorists coverages under part D of the policy.

Ill

The second issue we are asked to address concerns setoff. Specifically, we are asked to consider whether defendant is entitled to set off what it paid on behalf of the policy owner, Danny Gibbs, under the bodily injury liability section of the policy against what it owes under the underinsured motorist section of the policy and, likewise, whether defendant is entitled to set off what it pays under the underinsured motorists section of the policy to any plaintiff against what it owes under the bodily injury liability section of the policy. Plaintiffs submit that no setoff of either kind should be allowed for payment under the bodily injury section or for payment under the underinsured motorists section, as the two are completely different methods of recovery. Defendant replies that its policy specifically provides for setoff of any payment under the policy’s underinsured motorists coverage from any payments made under this policy’s bodily injury provisions and any other policy as well as for a setoff of any payments under the policy’s bodily injury provisions from any payments which may be due and payable under the policy’s underinsured motorists provisions. We agree with plaintiffs.

Section 143a — 2(3) of the Code defines an underinsured motor vehicle as one whose ownership, maintenance or use has resulted in bodily injury or death to the insured, and for which “the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance policies or under bonds or other security” maintained by the person responsible for the vehicle is less than the limits of underinsured coverage provided the insured under his policy at the time of the accident. (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 73, par. 755a — 2(3).) Section 143a — 2(3) then addresses the insurer’s liability:

“The limits of liability for an insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, less those amounts actually recovered under the applicable bodily injury insurance policies, bonds or other security maintained on the underinsured motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 73, par. 755a-2(3).)

There is no question that plaintiffs’ recovery under the underinsured portion of the instant policy is to be offset by the $30,000 paid by Patrick Burkhart’s insurance company. Plaintiffs have conceded as much. But we do not believe that defendant is entitled to any other setoffs.

The General Assembly’s intent in enacting section 143a — 2(3), the underinsured motorist provision, is to place the insured in the same position he would have occupied if the tortfeasor had carried adequate insurance. (Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555, 591 N.E.2d 427, 429.) Likewise, the purpose behind the statutorily mandated uninsured motorist provision, section 143a — 2(4), is to place the insured in substantially the same position as if the wrongful uninsured driver had been minimally insured. (Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 1, 4, 269 N.E.2d 295, 297; Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 335, 312 N.E.2d 247, 250.) Recently, our supreme court considered a case similar to the instant case, except that the drivers of the other automobiles were uninsured motorists rather than under-insured motorists. (Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 272, 592 N.E.2d 1031.) We look to Hoglund for guidance in the instant matter and apply its reasoning to the case at bar.

In Hoglund, two cases were consolidated on appeal. Both the plaintiffs were passengers in uninsured automobiles whose drivers collided with another. In each case, the drivers of both vehicles were at fault. The other vehicles each had $100,000 bodily injury limits, and both the plaintiffs allegedly suffered injuries over $200,000. In both cases, the plaintiffs collected the policy limits of $100,000 from the drivers of the insured vehicles and then sought their own uninsured motorist coverage policy limits of $100,000. The uninsured motor vehicle policies issued to the plaintiffs by the defendant included setoff and subrogation provisions which the defendant argued supported a setoff. The defendant argued it was entitled to a setoff of $100,000 in both cases because of the $100,000 bodily injury limits recovery received from the drivers of the insured automobiles. The defendant claimed it owed the plaintiffs nothing. The Hoglund court disagreed with the defendant, holding that under both the policy provision and the statute the insurance company was entitled to a setoff for uninsured motorist coverage only to the extent necessary to prevent double recovery. 148 Ill. 2d at 280-81, 592 N.E.2d at 1035.

The Hoglund court reasoned that a literal interpretation of the limits-of-liability language in the policies indicated that uninsured motorist coverage should be reduced by any amount paid the insured by any other party. But, because a premium had been paid for uninsured motorist protection, if such protection was not given, the policy holder would be denied substantial economic value in return for the premiums which it paid. (148 Ill. 2d at 278, 592 N.E.2d at 1034.) The Hoglund court also pointed out that to allow the insurer to set off the $100,000 paid by the other driver would frustrate the public policy behind the uninsured motorist statute:

“If, for instance, the uninsured motorcycle driver had been insured for $100,000, Miss Hoglund could have collected that sum in full from that driver’s insurer, along with the $100,000 she collected from the other insured driver. The separate collections of $100,000 from each of the two culpable drivers would have fully compensated her for her $200,000 in damages. State Farm’s position, however, is to insist that it receive a full setoff for the payment made on behalf of the insured driver. Such a result would violate the public policy behind the uninsured motorist statute that the injured party be placed in the same position as if the uninsured driver had been insured. Additionally, the insurance policies at issue were intended to provide coverage for damages caused by uninsured motorists. To allow a literal interpretation of the policy language would nullify the coverage intended by the policies. Further, to endorse State Farm’s interpretation of the setoff provision would deny the policyholder substantial economic value in return for the payment of premiums. That is to say, the insured would be denied the very insurance protection against uninsured motorists for which he had paid premiums. Thus, because the setoff provision at issue is subject to a second reasonable interpretation when viewed in light of the above extrinsic evidence, the provision is ambiguous. Under Illinois law, any ambiguity in an insurance policy must be construed in favor of coverage for the insured. [Allstate Insurance Co. v. ]Elkins [(1979)], 77 Ill. 2d [384,] 390-91[, 396 N.E.2d 528].” 148 Ill. 2d at 280, 592 N.E.2d at 1035.

Here, the underinsured motor vehicle provisions included a setoff provision:

“B. Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this coverage shall be reduced by all sums:
1. Paid because of the bodily injury by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible. This includes all sums paid under Part A; and Part B, and
2. Paid or payable because of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar law:
a. workers’ compensation law; or
b. disability benefits law.
C. Any payment under this coverage will reduce any amount that person is entitled to recover for the same damages under Part A, and Part B.”

The Hoglund court pointed out that such exculpatory language cannot be read in isolation but must be read in conjunction with the policy holder’s reasonable expectations along with the public policy behind the statute and the coverage intended by the insurance policy itself. (148 Ill. 2d at 279, 592 N.E.2d at 1034.) Here, as in Hoglund, when this is done, a latent ambiguity in the policy language is disclosed.

For purposes of this discussion, we assume both drivers were at fault. Danny Gibbs had bodily injury limits of $100,000/$300,000 which we have determined may be stacked together. Danny Gibbs also had underinsured motorist coverage in an equal amount. Thus, under section 143a — 2(3) of the Code, there is no way Danny Gibbs can be an underinsured driver. Plaintiffs seek to recover under the policy issued to Danny Gibbs for bodily injury coverage because of Danny Gibbs’ degree of fault in the accident. Additionally, plaintiffs seek to recover under the policy issued to Danny Gibbs because of Patrick Burkhart’s status as an underinsured driver. Plaintiffs are correct that recovery under “Part A — Liability Coverage” is separate and distinct from “Part D — Underinsured Motorist Coverage.” Relying on Hoglund, we conclude that defendant is entitled to a setoff under the underinsured motorists provisions only for the $30,000 paid by Patrick Burkhart’s insurance company.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Massac County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

CHAPMAN, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN

license: Public Domain

text:
    RUPERT POTTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HERBERT M. ABLES, Defendant-Appellant.
    Fifth District
    No. 5 — 92—0044
    Opinion filed March 11, 1993.

      Herbert M. Abies, of East St. Louis, appellant pro se.

    Terry L. Peebles, of Cahokia, for appellee.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

Herbert Abies recorded a mechanic’s lien against Rupert Potter’s property. Subsequently, Potter conveyed the real estate to Neilton Sanders by warranty deed which was recorded on July 3, 1990. On June 25, 1991, Potter filed a complaint praying for an order declaring the mechanic’s lien invalid and unenforceable. The court declared the lien invalid and unenforceable because Abies had not filed a complaint or counterclaim within two years of filing the lien. Abies’ motion to reconsider contended that Potter lacked standing to file the complaint and that the statute of limitations did not render the mechanic’s lien unenforceable. The trial court denied Abies’ motion. Abies appeals from the judgment of the trial court and from the court’s denial of his motion to reconsider. We affirm.

The first issue for our consideration is whether Rupert Potter lacked standing to file a complaint. Abies contends that after Potter transfered his interest in the real estate to Neilton Sanders, Potter no longer had sufficient interest in the matter to litigate the validity of the mechanic’s lien.

Standing in Illinois requires only some injury to a legally cognizable interest. (Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492, 524 N.E.2d 561, 574-75.) To have standing, a plaintiff must present an actual controversy between adverse parties and, as to the controversy, the plaintiff must not be merely curious or concerned but must possess some personal claim, status, or right, a distinct and palpable injury which is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and substantially likely to be redressed by the grant of such relief. (Kluk v. Lang (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 306, 314, 531 N.E.2d 790, 793.) Although standing is designed to preclude persons having no interest in a controversy from bringing suit, it should not preclude a valid suit from being litigated. (In re Marriage of Rodriguez (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 273, 280, 545 N.E.2d 731, 734.) In determining whether a party has standing, a court must determine whether the party will be benefitted by the relief granted. Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d at 280, 545 N.E.2d at 734.

It is undisputed that Potter conveyed a warranty deed to the property. A warranty deed

“shall be deemed and held a conveyance in fee simple, to the grantee, his heirs or assigns, with covenants on the part of the grantor, {1) that at the time of the making and delivery of such deed he was the lawful owner of an indefeasible estate in fee simple, in and to the premises therein described, and had good right and full power to convey the same; (2) that the same were then free from all incumbrances; and (3) that he warrants to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, the quiet and peaceable possession of such premises, and will defend the title thereto against all persons who may lawfully claim the same. Such convenants shall be obligatory upon any grantor ***.” (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 30, par. 8.)

Potter argues that the mechanic’s lien is an encumbrance on the property and he has a duty to defend the title from all encumbrances because he had conveyed by warranty deed. (See Fechtner v. Lake County Savings & Loan Association (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 128, 361 N.E.2d 575.) By reason of the statute, Potter warranted against more than failure of title; he also warranted “the quiet and peaceable possession of such premises” and that he would “defend the title thereto against all persons who may lawfully claim the same.” Potter does have a personal claim in the case at bar and stands to benefit in the event relief is granted in his favor. We conclude that Potter had standing to file his complaint.

Aside from the issue of standing, Abies’ motion to reconsider before the trial court also raised the issue of whether the statute of limitations on the enforceability of his mechanic’s lien was tolled. Supreme Court Rule 341(e) requires that an appellant’s brief contain a statement of the issues presented for review, argument, and citation of authority in support of the arguments made. (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e).) Defendant’s brief is devoid of any reference to the issue of whether the statute of limitations in this case was arrested. Furthermore, oral argument before this court was waived by the parties. Points not argued on appeal are waived. (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).) We therefore decline to address this issue. See County of Cook v. Renaissance Arcade & Bookstore (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 123, 522 N.E.2d 73.

The judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.


text:
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    Fifth District
    No. 5 — 92—0008
    Opinion filed March 16, 1993.

      Daniel V. O’Brien and Lawrence A. Baerveldt, both of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.

      Robert Haida, State’s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Scott A. Manuel, all of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Michael Lopez, was convicted of one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 56V2, par. 1401(a)(2)(A) (now 720 ILCS 570/401 (West 1992))), at a bench trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County. Defendant was sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment. On appeal defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm.

Before addressing the merits, we must first consider the effect of defendant’s failure to raise the issues of sufficiency of the evidence and ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his post-trial motion. The only issue defendant raised in his post-trial motion was a challenge to the criminal information. Generally, the failure to raise an issue in a motion for a new trial results in a waiver of the issues sought to be raised on appeal. (People v. Marron (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 975, 496 N.E.2d 297.) Exceptions to this rule have been made, however, where the allegation of error would not normally be expected to be included in the post-trial motion (such as an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel) or if the reviewing court elects to take notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). (See People v. Friesland (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 369, 375, 488 N.E.2d 261, 263; People v. Harrawood (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 163, 383 N.E.2d 707.) Because the issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel are recognized exceptions to the waiver rule, we will address them.

At trial Charley Sheppard, a codefendant, testified that in exchange for being permitted to plead guilty to a lesser charge he agreed to testify in defendant’s case. Sheppard testified that in February of 1991, a friend of his, Lester Briggs, telephoned to make arrangements for Sheppard to sell one ounce of cocaine to Robert Goodman. Sheppard was unaware that Goodman was a police officer. During the evening of February 28, 1991, Sheppard met Briggs and Goodman at the Hardee’s restaurant parking lot in O’Fallon, Illinois. Goodman was reluctant to pay Sheppard for the cocaine until he could examine it, so Sheppard advised Goodman that he would retrieve the cocaine from his supplier, Michael Lopez.

Sheppard testified that earlier that week he had made arrangements for Lopez to bring him two ounces of cocaine. During the evening of February 28, Sheppard drove to a McDonald’s restaurant where he met with Lopez. Lopez got into Sheppard’s car, and they drove around the restaurant parking area. Lopez gave Sheppard a McDonald’s bag containing two ounces of cocaine, each of which was packaged in a separate, clear plastic bag. Sheppard testified that he paid Lopez $1,800 but that the money was for “prior meetings that had nothing to do with that.” Sheppard testified that the cocaine was worth $1,600 an ounce. He told Lopez that he would get him the money for the Goodman transaction later in the week. Sheppard returned to the Hardee’s restaurant where he again met Briggs and Goodman in the parking lot. Sheppard showed Goodman the two ounces of cocaine. Goodman purchased one ounce and paid $1,600. Three hours later Sheppard was arrested at his home. Sheppard testified that he flushed the second ounce of cocaine down the toilet.

Robert Goodman testified that he is a police officer and has had special training in narcotics and controlled substances. He testified that on February 28, 1991, he and a confidential informant, Lester Briggs, went to the Hardee’s restaurant to purchase one ounce of cocaine from Charley Sheppard. Goodman testified Sheppard told him to stay put and that he would be back with an ounce of cocaine for him as soon as he could. When Sheppard left the Hardee’s parking lot, Goodman advised his assisting police officers that Sheppard was en route to meet his supplier. Approximately 20 minutes later Sheppard returned to Hardee’s, got out of his car and came over to Goodman’s vehicle. He reached into his coat pocket and pulled out a McDonald’s sack and handed it through the window to Goodman. Inside the sack was a plastic bag with approximately one ounce of what appeared to be cocaine. Goodman testified that he told Sheppard that the cocaine did not appear to be as chunky as the last cocaine that he had sold. Sheppard then reached into his coat pocket and produced a second ounce of cocaine. Goodman took the second package, gave the original package back to Sheppard and paid him $1,600.

Police officer John Stover testified that during the evening of February 28, 1991, he was on duty as a surveillance officer and was stationed outside Sheppard’s residence. Stover observed Sheppard leave his residence around 7:30 p.m. and proceed directly to the Hardee’s restaurant where he met with Goodman and Briggs. Stover followed Sheppard to the McDonald’s restaurant and while sitting approximately 100 yards away observed the occupants of a pickup truck get into Sheppard’s car. Stover testified he may have used binoculars to observe Sheppard’s actions at McDonald’s, but he does not recall whether he did so or not. Stover testified that he was not close enough to observe whether or not the person in the pickup truck was carrying anything when he got into Sheppard’s vehicle. Sheppard’s car circled the parking area a few times, the occupants of the pickup truck returned to their vehicle, and Sheppard returned to Hardee’s. Stover testified that Sheppard was at the McDonald’s restaurant for approximately six minutes. Stover followed Sheppard back to Hardee’s where he saw Sheppard meet with Goodman. Stover testified that from the time he saw Sheppard leave his residence to the time Sheppard left the Hardee’s lot the second time he did not lose sight of him.

Clinton Cook, a police officer, testified that he was assigned to surveil Goodman’s purchase of cocaine from Sheppard. Cook followed Sheppard to the McDonald’s restaurant. Cook testified that neither Sheppard nor Lopez went inside the restaurant, but instead they drove around the parking lot. Cook testified that from his vantage point, approximately 150 yards away, he could not tell whether or not the occupant of the pickup truck had anything in his hands when he got into Sheppard’s vehicle or when he returned to his pickup truck. After the suspects drove away, Cook followed Lopez, stopped his vehicle, and placed Lopez under arrest. Cook searched Lopez’ pickup truck and found an envelope containing $1,800. Cook testified that Lopez told him at that time that the money was given to him by Sheppard. Lopez did not say what the money was for.

Lopez contends that he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues in particular that Sheppard’s testimony lacked credibility. Lopez contends that accomplice testimony is inherently suspect and should only be accepted with the utmost caution, especially in a case such as this where Sheppard agreed to plead guilty to a Class II felony rather than go to trial on the Class X felony charges pending against him. Sheppard received a three-year prison sentence and testified that in exchange for his testimony he would not be charged with several previous narcotics sales.

While accomplice testimony is subject to careful scrutiny, such testimony, whether corroborated or not, is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction if it convinces the trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Williams (1991), 147 Ill. 2d 173, 233, 588 N.E.2d 983, 1006; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 538 N.E.2d 461.) A beneficial plea bargain agreement is not sufficient reason for an accomplice’s testimony to be unworthy of belief. (People v. Jackson (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 626, 639, 495 N.E.2d 1207, 1218.) The credibility of a witness and the weight to be given the testimony are determinations exclusively within the province of the finder of fact. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261-62, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277.

Lopez argues that there are numerous discrepancies in Sheppard’s testimony and that his testimony was not supported by corroborating evidence. For instance, it is undisputed that Sheppard gave Lopez $1,800 at their meeting on February 28, 1991. However, throughout the trial Sheppard maintained that the money was for “prior meetings” and had nothing to do with the purchase of the cocaine. In addition, Lopez points out alleged discrepancies regarding the events at McDonald’s restaurant. When asked if Lopez had the McDonald’s sack containing the drugs in his hand when they met, Sheppard responded affirmatively. However, when asked if the defendant had the sack concealed, Sheppard answered: “Yeah. I guess in his coat.” Sheppard further testified: “I didn’t see it until he brought it out into my car.” Lopez also notes discrepancies in how the delivery was made. Sheppard testified that he kept the two bags inside the McDonald’s sack after receiving the drugs from the defendant. When Sheppard met with Goodman he pulled the McDonald’s sack from his coat. Sheppard testified that he pulled one bag of cocaine out of the sack and gave it to Goodman. Goodman then examined and returned that bag to him. Sheppard testified that he then pulled the second bag of cocaine from the McDonald’s sack and handed it to Goodman. Officer Goodman testified that Sheppard reached into his coat and pulled out a McDonald’s sack which contained one bag of cocaine. Goodman held the first bag while Sheppard reached into his coat pocket and produced a second bag of cocaine.

Lopez argues that not only is the manner of the delivery disputed, but whether or not Sheppard actually received two ounces of cocaine from Lopez is disputed. Lopez refers in particular to Sheppard’s statement at trial that upon arrest he only told the police officers about one ounce of cocaine. At trial Sheppard testified that Lopez gave him two packages, each containing one ounce of cocaine.

In addition to the alleged discrepancies, Lopez asserts that there is no credible evidence to support the testimony of the accomplice, Charley Sheppard. Officer John Stover testified that he was on surveillance approximately 100 yards from the McDonald’s restaurant and was not close enough to notice whether either Lopez or Sheppard was carrying anything. Officer Clinton Cook, also on surveillance of the area, testified that he could not tell whether defendant had anything in his hands. Neither officer was privy to the conversation between Lopez and Sheppard. Lopez argues that the officers’ testimony does not establish him as the supplier of the cocaine. All that is established by their observations is that Sheppard met with Lopez that evening.

Defendant analogizes this case to People v. Gnat (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 107, 519 N.E.2d 497. In Gnat the appellate court reversed, the defendant’s conviction of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance because it found the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice was insufficient to sustain the conviction. In Gnat the evidence showed only that the accomplice was seen talking to the defendant and then the accomplice went, unobserved, to a parking lot where, according to the accomplice’s testimony, he retrieved the drugs from the defendant’s unlocked car. The court noted that there was no evidence establishing the ownership or even the existence of an unlocked car from which the drugs allegedly came. Gnat is distinguished from the instant case because in Gnat there was absolutely no evidence, other than the word of the accomplice, tying the defendant to the drugs. In the case at bar, Sheppard was observed by police with Lopez at the McDonald’s restaurant. Both Sheppard and Officer Goodman testified that Sheppard had a McDonald’s sack which contained the cocaine. Assuming that Sheppard did not have the drugs until he met with the defendant, a reasonable inference is drawn that Sheppard received the drugs from Lopez. Furthermore, in this case Lopez admitted to receiving $1,800 from the accomplice. Unlike Gnat, there was circumstantial evidence that the defendant delivered the drugs to Sheppard.

When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of the appellate court to retry the defendant. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277; People v. House (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 298, 303, 490 N.E.2d 212, 216.) The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and the judgment upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261, 478 N.E.2d at 277.) A conviction may be upheld on circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact is not required to disregard the natural inferences to be drawn from the evidence in order to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Dahlin (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 59, 63, 539 N.E.2d 1293,1295-96.

The alleged discrepancies in the testimony do not go to the underlying inferences which can be drawn from the evidence. Sheppard testified that when he first met Goodman he did not yet have the drugs with him, which necessitated a meeting with his supplier. Sheppard went directly to meet with Lopez and then went directly back to meet with Goodman. Sheppard made no stops en route to McDonald’s or on his return trip to Hardee’s restaurant. While Lopez makes much of the fact that the officers on surveillance did not observe anything in the defendant’s hands, Sheppard testified that he gave $1,800 to Lopez, and Lopez agreed that Sheppard gave him the money. It is for the jury to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. (Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261, 478 N.E.2d at 277.) While the jury need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to establish guilt, it is sufficient if all the evidence taken together satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. (Dahlin, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 63, 539 N.E.2d at 1296.) After reviewing the record we conclude that Sheppard’s testimony, along with the inferences to be drawn from the circumstances, supports the trial court’s verdict.

The second issue raised by the defendant is whether he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer is not licensed in Illinois.

On September 3, 1991, six months after entering his appearance in the case, defendant’s counsel, Sean O’Hagen, filed an “Entry of Appearance/Motion for Continuance.” The motion indicates that an application to proceed pro hac vice was filed contemporaneously therewith, but neither the application nor an order allowing counsel to proceed pro hac vice appears in the record. An order signed by the trial judge on the same day granted the continuance but failed to address the matter of counsel’s lack of an Illinois law license. The State concedes that the attorney representing defendant in the trial court was not licensed in Illinois. The record indicates that he is licensed in Missouri. The State argues that defendant has failed to demonstrate that his attorney’s lack of either an Illinois license or an order pro hac vice prejudiced him in any way.

The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) The constitutional question before us is whether a criminal defendant in Illinois is denied his sixth amendment right where his trial lawyer was licensed in another State but not licensed in Illinois and was not admitted pro hac vice in Illinois.

Deviating for a moment from the criminal context, our attention is drawn to the civil arena where courts have addressed the issue of out-of-State attorneys practicing law in Illinois. Three civil cases which represent the manner in which the issue has been addressed in the civil realm are Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 697, 342 N.E.2d 475, aff’d (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 398, 362 N.E.2d 1047, Fruin v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc. (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 551 N.E.2d 1010, and McEvers v. Stout (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 469, 578 N.E.2d 321. Each of these cases is premised on the general rule that an attorney not licensed in Illinois may not practice law in this State. In Lozoff the court barred recovery to a Wisconsin lawyer for legal services he performed in Illinois. In Fruin the first district dismissed plaintiff’s cause of action as a nullity because the lawyer who filed the complaint was not licensed in Illinois. In McEvers, however, the fourth district refused to follow Fruin in order to avoid unnecessary injustice. While we agree with McEvers that “a nullity rule appears to punish the litigant rather than the offending attorney” (McEvers, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 472, 578 N.E.2d at 322), we also agree that due to the different procedural and evidentiary requirements of the various States there is good reason to restrict the practice in Illinois to those persons licensed by the supreme court.

Defendant is asking, however, that we impose a per se rule that nonlicensure equals incompetency. Perhaps the presumption of competency (see Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052) should not attach to a nonlicensed lawyer’s acts on behalf of a criminal defendant, but we are unwilling to adopt a per se rule of incompetency.

Queries of what constitutes the sixth amendment right to counsel are not new to the courts. In fact, the recent Illinois Supreme Court case, People v. Brigham (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 58, 600 N.E.2d 1178, dealt with two sixth amendment questions: (1) whether a defendant is denied the sixth amendment right to counsel where he is represented by a nonlawyer, and (2) whether a defendant is denied the sixth amendment right to counsel where his lawyer is licensed in Illinois but is delinquent in paying State bar dues. With regard to the second issue, the Brigham court held that nonpayment of dues alone does not render counsel ineffective. The court observed that the cases it cites in support of its holding note an important distinction between unlicensed persons and attorneys admitted to practice but under suspension for nonpayment of State bar dues: “Overwhelmingly, they hold that representation by members of the former category constitutes denial of defendant’s right to counsel, whereas representation by members of the latter category does not.” (Emphasis added.) Brigham, 151 Ill. 2d at 67, 600 N.E.2d at 1183.

The distinction made in Brigham focuses on the operative words of the sixth amendment, “right to counsel.” Counsel has been defined as “a duly licensed and qualified lawyer, and not an attorney in fact or a layman.” (People v. Cox (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 265, 269, 146 N.E.2d 19, 22.) It is undisputed that defendant’s trial attorney is a lawyer. Query, is defendant’s attorney’s status as a lawyer vitiated under the circumstances of this case because he was not admitted pro hac vice? We think not. The out-of-State attorney, whether or not admitted pro hac vice, is still an attorney. In Reese v. Peters (7th Cir. 1991), 926 F.2d 668, the court observed:

“ ‘Counsel’ in 1791 meant a person deemed by the court fit to act as another’s legal representative and inscribed on the list of attorneys. *** Courts grant motions allowing representation by persons who do not belong to their bars. Usually the person admitted pro hac vice belongs to some bar, but it may be the bar of a distant state or foreign nation. The enduring practice of admission pro hac vice demonstrates that there is no one-to-one correspondence between ‘Counsel’ and membership in the local bar.” Reese, 926 F.2d at 669-70.

In Johnson v. State (1979), 225 Kan. 458, 590 P.2d 1082, a case which the Brigham court found instructive, the court stated: “Just as the payment of the fee does not guarantee that an attorney will practice law in a competent manner, the nonpayment of the fee does not necessarily imply that the nonpaying attorney will perform in an incompetent manner.” (Johnson, 225 Kan. at 465, 590 P.2d at 1087.) This logic is easily applied to the issue at bar: Just as the grant of a petition to proceed pro hac vice does not guarantee that an attorney will practice law in a competent manner, the failure to file a petition to proceed pro hac vice or to enter an order allowing such a petition does not necessarily imply that the out-of-State attorney will perform in an incompetent manner. Whether licensed in Illinois or not, counsel’s effectiveness for sixth amendment purposes is determined by the standards set forth in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246, cert. denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1044, 85 L. Ed. 2d 335, 105 S. Ct. 2061.

In order to establish that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, counsel made errors so serious he was no longer functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense, that is, counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. (People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525-26, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.) Counsel’s performance is considered deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.) It is not enough to show that counsel’s errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings. To establish actual prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) We need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, then that course should be followed without determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

In the instant case defendant argues that his attorney’s performance fell below the Strickland standard by the very fact that his attorney was not licensed in Illinois and did not receive permission to proceed pro hac vice. Defendant has not shown how the failure to take the formal step of having an order entered permitting him to proceed pro hac vice prejudiced his defense. A violation of the sixth amendment does not result from the single circumstance, unaided by other facts, that defendant’s counsel is unlicensed in Illinois. We conclude that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel simply because his lawyer was not licensed to practice in Illinois.

There remains to be resolved defendant’s argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney: (1) failed to adequately investigate and prepare a defense; (2) conducted untimely discovery; and (3) failed to adequately challenge the prosecution’s case in that counsel stipulated to the chemical analysis and chain of custody.

With regard to defendant’s attorney’s alleged failure to investigate and prepare a defense, Lopez points out that no witnesses were called in his defense. Lopez contends that counsel should have called witnesses, including Lopez, to explain why Lopez was at McDonald’s and why there was an exchange of money.

Whether a failure to investigate is incompetence depends upon the value of the evidence and the closeness of the case. (People v. Jarnagan (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 187, 194, 506 N.E.2d 715, 721.) Defendant does not identify any witnesses who should have been called to testify but were not. Furthermore, defendant has not indicated how his own truthful testimony would have differed from any of the evidence presented at trial. Although no witnesses testified for the defendant and defendant did not take the stand, counsel is not required to manufacture a defense where none exists. (People v. Holman (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 60, 65, 450 N.E.2d 432, 435.) There is a presumption that the challenged action of counsel was the result of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; People v. Barrow (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 226, 549 N.E.2d 240.

Defendant further argues that trial counsel was ineffective for waiting until five days prior to trial to file a request for. discovery. Lopez’ attorney interviewed the State’s key witness, Sheppard, seven months prior to trial and again on the eve of trial. Lopez argues that waiting until the eve of trial to interview the witness was prejudicial. The record of proceedings demonstrates that defendant’s counsel brought out discrepancies and inconsistencies during cross-examination of Sheppard. Trial counsel also impeached Sheppard’s testimony with prior inconsistent statements which Sheppard made to the police. It is undisputed that defendant’s counsel conducted discovery and interviewed the State’s key witness. Defendant has not shown how he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged lack of diligence.

Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is shown by his stipulation to the chemical analysis of the drugs and also to the chain of custody. Defendant argues that because Sheppard did not initially tell the police that he received two ounces of cocaine from Lopez, there may have been only one ounce. Defendant maintains that assuming Sheppard received only one ounce of cocaine and it was flushed down the toilet as Sheppard testified, the State could not meet its burden of proof. Defendant contends that because counsel stipulated to the chain of custody and the substance as being cocaine, no meaningful challenge to the prosecution occurred. We disagree.

Defendant’s trial counsel did not stipulate that the ounce of cocaine produced by the State came from the defendant. Counsel’s only stipulation was that the substance produced by the State at trial was cocaine. Counsel also stipulated to the chain of custody. Therefore, the only question raised by the defendant’s argument is whether the substance produced by the State was the same ounce that Sheppard testified he received from the defendant. Counsel did not stipulate that it was, hence the defendant’s argument is meritless.

We conclude that the allegations which Lopez submits as the foundation for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not operate to his prejudice. We conclude that defendant received effective representation.

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GOLDENHERSH and LEWIS, JJ., concur.