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    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL J. SUTTON, Defendant-Appellant.
    First District (3rd Division)
    No. 1—92—0337
    Opinion filed August 11, 1993.
    Rehearing denied September 28, 1993.

      Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Janet Stewart, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

      Jack O’Malley, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Judy DeAngelis, and Kristin E. Piper, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE RIZZI

delivered the opinion of the court:

After a jury trial, defendant, Darryl J. Sutton, was found guilty of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault (HI. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 8 — 4, 12 — 14), attempted criminal sexual assault (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 8 — 4, 12 — 13), attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 8 — 4, 12 — 16), aggravated battery of a physically handicapped person (HI. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4(a)(6)), and aggravated battery on a public way (HI. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4(b)(8)). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 10 years for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, seven years for attempted criminal sexual assault, five years for attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse and five years for each count of aggravated battery. We affirm in part, reverse in part and vacate in part.

The issues before this court for review are (1) whether defendant’s convictions were based upon a “doubtful” identification; (2) whether the trial court properly responded to the jury’s three questions during its deliberation; (3) whether defendant was improperly convicted of multiple offenses arising from the same physical acts; (4) whether defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the basis that the trial court improperly considered the fact that the victim was handicapped at the time of the crime and the impact upon the victim as factors in aggravation; (5) whether defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the grounds that his convictions for multiple offenses prejudiced the trial judge and influenced him to sentence defendant to 10 years’ imprisonment for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault; and (6) whether defendant’s sentences were excessive.

The following fact scenario occurred. As of March 21, 1991, the complainant, A.R., lived with her mother in Summit, Illinois. At approximately 7:15 p.m., A.R. left her house and walked to a nearby fast food restaurant known as Nicki’s Hot Dog Stand located on West 63rd Street in Summit, Illinois. A.R. testified that she chose to take the fastest route to and from the hot dog stand, which was through the alley behind her home, because she had spina bifida, a disease which impaired her ability to walk. (See Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1315 (24th ed. 1982).) A.R. was inside the hot dog stand for approximately five minutes. Once A.R. purchased her food, she proceeded back through the alley towards her home.

A.R. told the court that as she approached the gate to her back yard, she heard footsteps progressing towards her, whereupon she turned around and saw defendant. A.R. testified that defendant was wearing a white sweatshirt and grey pants at that time. A.R. further testified that she noticed that defendant had a very short haircut, a mustache and stubble on his face. A.R. recalled that defendant grabbed her around her neck whereupon she dropped her food and screamed “help.” A.R. further testified that defendant then dragged her toward the garbage dumpsters in the alley behind her house and pushed her down on the ground as she continued to scream. A.R. recalled that defendant asked her if she would stop screaming if he stopped choking her and that she indicated she would. A.R. told the court that defendant responded by removing his hand from her mouth, at which time she screamed again and defendant struck her on her face. A.R. testified that defendant then grabbed the waistband of her pants. A.R. told the court that she subsequently tried to escape but that defendant pushed her back down on the ground and dragged her further behind the dumpsters where he removed her shoe, pulled her pants and underwear down and placed his body on top of hers. A.R. recalled that defendant then pushed her closer to a building. A.R. testified that she attempted to hit a door on the building in the hopes of making enough noise to get someone’s attention. A.R. further testified that after banging on the door she screamed again and defendant told her to “shut up.”

Erika Gross, an employee of Video Junction, a video rental business located at 7520 West 63rd Street in Summit, Illinois, testified that at approximately 7:30 p.m. on March 21, 1991, she heard a woman scream while she was counting video rental receipts and money in the rear office of the establishment. Gross informed the court that the rear office had a door which led to the alley. Gross testified that upon hearing the scream she walked over to the back door to listen whereupon she heard a man say “shut up, shut up.” Gross stated that she then telephoned the police.

A.R. further testified that while she was lying on the ground she looked underneath the dumpsters and saw lights moving down the alley towards her. A.R. stated that after seeing the lights, she heard defendant pull the zipper on his pants down. A.R. further testified that she heard someone get out of a car and that she screamed again but that defendant placed his hand over her mouth in an attempt to silence her. A.R. recalled that she was looking right at defendant while his hand was covering her mouth. A.R. further testified that she then saw the police move towards the dumpster whereupon defendant got up and ran away.

Police officer Joseph Marrotta testified that on March 21, 1991, he was on patrol in Summit, Illinois, when he received a message on his squad car radio informing him of an assault. Officer Marrotta testified that he responded to the radio dispatch by proceeding down an alley located behind a Video Junction establishment whereupon he heard a female voice screaming and he saw a man jump out from behind some dumpsters and run. Officer Marrotta testified that he then exited the squad car, yelled “stop, police” and chased the suspect. Officer Marrotta was unable to detain the suspect. However, he observed that the suspect was wearing a white shirt, dark trousers and white athletic shoes. He also noted that the suspect was approximately 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed approximately 200 pounds. Officer Marrotta testified that he got back into his squad car and patrolled the area after losing sight of the suspect. Officer Marrotta stated that when he reached the alley at 75th Avenue, in Summit, Illinois, he saw a green Ford automobile. Officer Marrotta testified that defendant was the driver of that automobile and that he was wearing a soiled white shirt. Officer Marrotta further testified that he questioned defendant, but he did not arrest him at that time.

Next, Sergeant Michael Stancato testified that on March 21, 1991, he was on patrol in Summit, Illinois, when he heard a radio dispatch informing him of an assault. Sergeant Stancato testified that he responded by proceeding to an alley near 75th Avenue and driving down the alley whereupon he observed a man jump from behind a garbage dumpster and run past his patrol unit. Sergeant Stancato testified that he then approached the dumpster at which time he observed a female sitting on the ground crying. Sergeant Stancato recalled that she was wearing a jogging suit and that her pants and underwear were pulled down to her ankles. Sergeant Stancato testified that he helped the victim, A.R., collect her clothes and that he asked her if she was all right. Sergeant Stancato testified that he then escorted the victim to his squad car and requested, over his radio, that the police dispatcher ask medical personnel to meet him and the victim at the Summit police station. Sergeant Stancato testified that A.R. subsequently gave him a description of her assailant.

A.R. was then taken to the Summit police station, where she was treated by the paramedics. The victim sustained abrasions on her nose, right arm, right buttock, right leg and bruises around her right eye. The victim also talked to Detective Charles Wasko while she was at the police station.

After this preliminary interview, Detective Wasko, Sergeant Stancato, Officer Marrotta and the victim all returned to the scene of the crime. Detective Wasko testified that when the group arrived at the scene of the crime on the night of March 21, 1991, there were four streetlights in the alley and that all of these lights were illuminated. In addition, the officers found one of the victim’s earrings, a spilled soft drink and a bag of food that she dropped.

After investigating the crime scene, they all returned to the Summit police station, where Detective Wasko prepared a composite of the victim’s assailant at her direction. A.R. described her assailant as a black male in his mid-twenties who was approximately 5 feet 11 inches to 6 feet tall, weighing between 190 and 200 pounds, with short curly hair and a mustache. A.R. also told Detective Wasko that he was wearing a white shirt with dark-colored pants and white or light-colored shoes at the time of the assault.

On March 23, 1991, the victim returned to the Summit police station, where she viewed a physical lineup. After viewing the lineup, A.R. identified defendant as her assailant. A.R. later testified that she had never had any direct contact with defendant but that she had seen him before and she knew that he lived in the neighborhood.

After presenting the above evidence, the State rested. Defendant made a motion for a directed finding which was denied by the trial court. The defense then presented its case. Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant told the court that he was wearing a tan shirt and brown pants on March 21, 1991. Defendant maintained that on that date, he had a full bushy mustache but he did not have a beard. Defendant further testified that he and Terry Kirksy were working on a car until 7:30 p.m. on that date. Defendant testified that while Kirksy left to get a soft drink, he stayed with the car and talked to another man, named Tony Purchase. Defendant maintained that when Kirksy returned at 7:45 p.m., he and Kirksy went to a liquor store to purchase wine. Defendant testified that they then drove around and that while they were driving, Officer Marrotta stopped them at approximately 8 p.m. and asked them what they were doing but that the policeman allowed defendant to drive away. Defendant testified that he then drove Kirksy home.

Kirksy testified that defendant exited the car around 7:30 p.m. and walked down an alley behind the Acme Food Store in Summit, Illinois. Kirksy further testified that he later encountered defendant hiding behind a garbage dumpster at Nicki’s Hot Dog Stand whereupon defendant jumped into the driver’s seat of the car and told him to move over. Kirksy testified that defendant appeared to be nervous when he entered the car. Kirksy recalled that defendant then put on a jacket which he removed from the back seat. Kirksy testified that the two men then drove down the alley to 75th Avenue, where he and defendant were stopped by Officer Marrotta. Kirksy testified that the two men subsequently went to a liquor store after which defendant went home.

Defendant further testified that on March 31, 1991, he participated in two lineups which were held approximately 5 to 10 minutes apart. Defendant claimed that he could see A.R. in the viewing room, that he could hear her talking and that she told the police she could not identify anyone in the lineup as her assailant. Defendant admitted that he went to school with A.R.’s brother and that A.R. knew him by sight.

Sergeant Gary Misicka, Detective Wasko and Officer Marrotta also testified concerning the aforementioned lineups. Sergeant Misicka explained that on March 23, 1991, defendant participated in two lineups but that A.R. only viewed the first lineup and the victim of another separate crime viewed defendant in a second lineup. Detective Wasko testified that the second lineup was held for Hilda Walker, a robbery victim. Sergeant Misicka further testified that A.R. viewed the first lineup defendant participated in while she was in a dark room which had a small peephole which allowed her to view the suspects. Officer Marrotta maintained that none of the participants in the lineup could see A.R.

During the jury’s deliberations, the jurors submitted the following three questions to the judge:

“1. Did [A.R.] initially say anything about a shadow of stubble on his face during the composite drawing?
2. Why are there scissor cuts on evidence pants?
3. What was the exact question that defendant’s attorney asked defendant when he asked him did he attack the [victim]? What was the date defendant’s attorney stated the attack occurred?”

The trial court convened in order to discuss the questions and possible responses with defense counsel, defendant and the prosecution. After extensive discussion as to what the answers to the questions should be, the trial court responded “yes” to question 1. The response to question 2 was as follows: “There is no evidentiary testimony during the course of the trial about scissor cuts in [the victim’s] pants.” The court responded to question 3 in the following manner: “Collectively as jurors you will have to determine what the question and answer was [sic] with regard to question number three.”

Following deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted criminal sexual assault, attempted criminal sexual abuse, aggravated battery of a physically handicapped person and aggravated battery on a public highway. After hearing arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the trial judge sentenced defendant to one 10-year, one 7-year and three 5-year terms to be served concurrently.

First, defendant maintains on appeal that all of his convictions should be reversed on the basis that A.R.’s identification of him as her assailant was “doubtful.” The State maintains that the victim’s identification of defendant was sufficient to sustain his convictions because the victim had ample opportunity to observe defendant during the crime and she was able to identify him shortly thereafter. We agree.

A vague or doubtful identification will not sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Slim (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307, 537 N.E.2d 317, 319; People v. Ash (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 485, 494, 468 N.E.2d 1153, 1157.) When the identification of a defendant is at issue, however, a single witness’ identification of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even though such testimony is contradicted by the accused, providing the witness is credible and she viewed defendant under circumstances that would permit a positive identification to be made. (Slim, 127 Ill. 2d at 307, 537 N.E.2d at 319; Ash, 102 Ill. 2d at 494, 468 N.E.2d at 1157.) In assessing identification testimony, a reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence and it will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Johnson (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 170, 189-90, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1363; People v. Pietruszynski (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1076-77, 545 N.E.2d 942, 946.

The identification of defendant by A.R. in the present case is not so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. First, A.R. had ample opportunity to view defendant’s face both before and during the assault. A.R. testified that she saw defendant just prior to the assault when he approached her while she was standing in an alley at the gate to her backyard. A.R. also gave the police a detailed description of defendant’s appearance at that time. Furthermore, A.R. testified that she was looking right at defendant while she was lying on the ground and he was positioned on top of her. Detective Wasko also testified that there were illuminated streetlights in the alley on the night of A.R.’s assault. The victim was attacked at 7:30 p.m. In addition, A.R. testified that she had seen him in the neighborhood before and defendant himself admitted that A.R. knew him on sight.

Second, the victim’s identification of defendant was credible. The record shows that A.R.’s identification of defendant was clear and unequivocal. The victim saw defendant during the assault, she was able to describe defendant to the police and she identified defendant as her assailant when she viewed him in a lineup two days after her attack. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the police encouraged A.R. to identify defendant as her assailant. Later, during the trial, A.R. testified concerning her identification of defendant in the lineup. She stated: “I knew who my attacker was right away. I had no trouble.” In addition, she positively identified defendant in open court. The credibility of A.R.’s identification of defendant is enhanced because she testified and defendant admitted that she had seen him in and around her neighborhood prior to the assault (see People v. Pietruszynski (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1076, 545 N.E.2d 942, 946 (the credibility of a witness’ identification is enhanced when the witness testifies that she knew the defendant prior to the crime)).

Defendant’s argument that A.R.’s identification of him is doubtful on the basis that there is some discrepancy between her descriptions of his facial hair to the police and her trial testimony regarding his facial hair is not convincing. Defendant specifically contends that his identification was doubtful because A.R. testified that he did not have a beard but that she in fact told the police that he did have a beard. Defendant also argues that his identification was doubtful because Detective Wasko, who interviewed A.R. and drafted a composite of the suspect, contradicted her testimony about defendant’s facial hair when he testified that she did not tell him that her assailant had a beard. The record shows that the victim testified that she originally told the police that defendant had a beard. She further explained that he did not have a full, thick beard but that his face appeared “scruffy” and “unshaven.” Even if there was a discrepancy between the victim’s description of her assailant to the police and the victim’s testimony concerning her prior description of defendant, her failure to notice or perfectly describe defendant’s facial hair was not fatal to her positive and otherwise credible identification. People v. Slim (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 302, 310, 537 N.E.2d 317, 320; see also People v. Sakalas (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 59, 69, 405 N.E.2d 1121, 1130 (victim’s identification testimony held to be sufficient despite his inability to recall whether his assailant had a moustache or a scar); People v. Calhoun (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 665, 668, 270 N.E.2d 450, 452 (conviction sustained where the defendant had a thick moustache which the victim did not mention in any preliminary descriptions).

For the above reasons, we find that the victim’s positive identification of defendant is sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions.

Defendant next alleges that the trial court’s response to the jury’s three questions during its deliberation abridged his right to a fair trial. The State maintains that defendant waived his right to appellate review of this issue. In the alternative, the State argues that the trial court’s response to the jury’s questions was proper.

In the present case, defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review because he failed to object to the above issue and he failed to raise it in his post-trial motion. (See People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-88, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129-32.) We will, however, review defendant’s allegation pursuant to our authority granted under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5). 134 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5); Palomar v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 182, 188, 587 N.E.2d 1067, 1071; City of Wyoming v. Liquor Control Comm’n (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 404, 407-08, 362 N.E.2d 1080, 1083; Occidental Chemical Co. v. Agri Profit Systems, Inc. (1975), 37 Ill. App. 3d 599, 603, 246 N.E.2d 482, 485.

During deliberations, the jury submitted three questions to the judge. The trial court reconvened and discussed the questions and possible responses with defense counsel and the prosecution. With regard to the jury’s first question, which was whether or not A.R. mentioned that defendant had a “shadow of stubble” on his face when she assisted Officer Wasko in drafting a composite drawing of her assailant, the trial court’s response to the question did not abridge defendant’s right to a fair trial. The record shows that after a discussion, defense counsel, the prosecution and the trial court all agreed that the response to the jury’s first question should be “Yes.” Later, during the discussion of the responses to the second and third questions submitted by the jury, the trial judge asked defense counsel whether he wanted to withdraw the response to the first question. Defense counsel answered: “No, no.” Where a defendant acquiesces in the trial court’s answer to a jury’s question, he cannot later complain that the trial court abused its discretion. (People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 27, 38, 554 N.E.2d 174, 179.) Since defense counsel in the present case acquiesced with respect to the trial court’s answer to the jury’s first question, he is now precluded from complaining that the trial court abused its discretion. Furthermore, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s response. In light of all of the evidence, the trial court’s affirmative response to the jury’s first question would not have changed the jury’s verdict. Defendant, therefore, was not prejudiced by the trial court’s response to question 1.

With regard to the jury’s second question, concerning scissor cuts on the victim’s pants, defendant again acquiesced to the trial court’s response. After discussing what the appropriate answer to the jury’s second question should be, defendant, the State and the trial court all agreed that the trial court should tender the following response to the jury: “There’s no evidentiary testimony during the course of the trial about scissor cuts.” After further discussion both parties and the court agreed that the response should be modified to read: “There was no evidentiary testimony during the course of the trial about scissor cuts in [the victim’s] pants.” Accordingly, defendant cannot now complain that the trial court abused its discretion in rendering this answer to the jury’s question. See Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 38, 554 N.E.2d at 179.

Furthermore, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s response. Whether or not the victim’s pants had scissor cuts in them was not a critical issue in the present case. For the aforementioned reasons, the answer to the jury’s second question was neither improper nor prejudicial.

With regard to the jury’s third inquiry concerning defense counsel’s question to defendant about the date of the assault, we find that the trial court’s response to the jury was proper. The decision to furnish a jury with transcripts of testimony rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision on this matter will not be disturbed on review. (People v. Olinger (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 324, 348-49, 493 N.E.2d 579, 591-92; People v. D’Aguila (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 905, 908-09, 581 N.E.2d 336, 339.) In the present case, when the jury asked for the exact question that defense counsel asked defendant, they were in fact requesting a portion of the transcript of defendant’s testimony. For some reason, this portion of the transcript was not available to the trial court. In exercising its discretion, the trial court determined that since the transcripts were not available, it should respond to the jury’s question in the following manner: “Collectively as jurors you will have to determine what the question and the answer was [sic] with regard to the question number three.” There is no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion on this matter.

Accordingly, the trial court’s response to the jury’s questions during its deliberation did not deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial.

Next, defendant contends that he was improperly convicted of multiple offenses arising from the same physical acts. Specifically, he alleges that attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse, attempted criminal sexual assault and both battery convictions were lesser-included offenses of the offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and should thus be vacated. Defendant reasons that the act which led to the attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, that of “[p]unching, choking and threatening” the victim, was the same act which was the basis of his convictions for attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse and attempted criminal sexual assault, and which caused the bodily harm upon which the two aggravated battery convictions were based.

The State maintains that defendant waived his right to appellate review of the above issue because he failed to make an objection at trial and to mention the issue in his post-trial motion. (See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186-88, 522 N.E.2d at 1129-32.) In the alternative, the State argues that defendant was properly convicted and sentenced for the aforementioned crimes because he committed five separate acts which support his five separate convictions.

Although defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review, we will review the allegation pursuant to our authority granted under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5). 134 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5); Palomar, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 188, 587 N.E.2d at 1071.

The Criminal Code of 1961 defines an “included offense” in the following manner:

“§2 — 9. ‘Included offense’. Included offense means an offense which
(a) Is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the offense charged, or
(b) Consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense included therein.” (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 2-9.)

Similarly, Illinois courts have defined a “lesser-included offense” as one “composed of some, but not all, of the elements of the greater offense, and which does not have any element not included in the greater offense.” (People v. Jones (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 288, 293, 595 N.E.2d 1071, 1073; People v. Russell (1992), 234 Ill. App. 3d 684, 687-88, 600 N.E.2d 1202, 1204.) Multiple convictions and sentences may be imposed where a defendant has committed several interrelated acts if each one of the acts would support a different offense. People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 565, 363 N.E.2d 838, 843.

The first crime that defendant was convicted of and sentenced for was the offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. An accused commits an attempted crime when, “with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 8 — 4(a).) The intent with which an act is committed may be inferred from the act itself and the surrounding circumstances. (People v. Chambers (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 23, 27, 303 N.E.2d 24, 27.) By considering the surrounding circumstances, it may be determined whether or not the defendant took a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. (People v. Bonner (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 553, 562, 229 N.E.2d 527, 533.) An accused commits “aggravated criminal sexual assault” if he commits criminal sexual assault upon a victim who was physically handicapped at the time of the incident. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 14(a)(6).) “Criminal sexual assault” is defined as an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 13(a)(1).) “Sexual penetration” is defined as “any contact, however slight, between the sex organ of one person and the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person *** into the sex organ or anus of another person ***. Evidence of emission of semen is not required to prove sexual penetration.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 12(f).

In the present case, defendant was charged with attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault on the basis that he performed the following acts: “He, with the intent to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted an act of sexual penetration by force, to wit: Punching, choking and threatening [A.R.] while pulling her pants off and while he attempted to take off his pants while [A.R.] was a physically handicapped person when the act was committed[.]”

There is evidence that defendant committed each element of the crime of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. The record shows that the victim was handicapped within the meaning of the statute because she was afflicted with spina bifida, making it difficult for her to walk. In addition, the record shows that defendant used force when he pushed the victim down on the ground, dragged her behind a garbage dumpster, struck her and attempted to choke her. Furthermore, the record shows that defendant forcefully removed the vietim’s right shoe, pulled down her pants and unzipped his own pants while he was lying on top of her. These actions by defendant evidence his intent to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault and are sufficient to prove that he took a substantial step towards the commission of that offense. Thus, the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that defendant was guilty of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The second offense for which defendant was convicted and sentenced was attempted criminal sexual assault. A person commits this offense when he commits an act which constitutes a substantial step toward committing an act of sexual penetration. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 8 — 4(a), 12 — 13(a)(ll).

Defendant in the present case was charged with attempted criminal sexual assault on the basis that he performed the following acts: “He with the intent to commit criminal sexual assault, attempted an act of sexual penetration by force or threat of force upon [A.R.], to wit: Punching, choking and threatening [the victim] while pulling her pants off and while he attempted to take off his pants.”

Upon examining the charge above, the elements of the crimes of attempted criminal sexual assault and attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and the applicable law on included offenses, we find that defendant’s conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault must be vacated. Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and his conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault were both based upon his punching, choking and threatening the victim while removing her pants and his effort to remove his pants in an attempt to penetrate her. It is not readily apparent from the record that defendant was convicted of attempted criminal sexual assault based upon acts different from the acts which were the basis of his conviction for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. Therefore, we conclude that attempted criminal sexual assault is an included offense in attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault because it may be established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts than that which are required to establish that defendant committed attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 2 — 9(a).) Attempted criminal sexual assault is also a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault because attempted criminal sexual assault is composed of some, but not all, of the elements of the greater offense and does not have any element not included in the greater offense. (See People v. Russell (1992), 234 Ill. App. 3d 684, 687-88, 600 N.E.2d 1202, 1204.) Accordingly, we must vacate defendant’s conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault.

The third offense that defendant was convicted of was attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse. This offense occurs when the accused attempts to commit an act of sexual conduct by the use of force or threat of force and the victim is a physically handicapped person. P. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 8-4, 12-15(aXl), 12-16(aX4).) “Sexual conduct” is defined as “any intentional or knowing touching or fondling by the *** accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus or breast of the victim or the accused *** for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 12(e).

Defendant in the present case was charged with attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse on the basis that “[h]e with the intent to commit criminal sexual abuse, attempted an act of sexual conduct by the use of force or threat of force, to wit: Punching, choking and threatening [A.R.] while pulling her pants off and while he attempted to take off his pants while [A.R.] was a physically handicapped person when the act was committed and such conduct was for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.” There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that defendant was guilty of attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s act of touching the victim’s body with his constituted a substantial step toward committing sexual conduct.

Upon examining the above charge, the elements of the crimes of attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse and attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, we find that attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse is not a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and his conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault were both based upon his punching, choking and threatening the victim while removing her pants and his effort to remove his pants. In the present case, however, attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse is not a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault because although attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse is composed of some but not all of the elements of the greater offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, it has the following elements which were not included in the greater offense: (1) “Sexual conduct” required under the aggravated criminal sexual abuse statute is a different act than the element of “sexual penetration” required by the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute (see People v. Singleton (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 675, 698, 577 N.E.2d 838, 852); and (2) the act upon which a conviction for attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse is based must been committed for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse.

The fourth crime for which defendant was convicted and sentenced was the offense of aggravated battery to a physically handicapped person. An accused commits this crime when in committing a battery he knows that the victim is a physically handicapped person. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4(b)(14).) A person commits battery if he intentionally or knowingly without legal justification and by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 — 3.

There was sufficient evidence that defendant was guilty of aggravated battery of a physically handicapped person beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant stated that he recognized the victim from the way that she would limp. The record therefore shows that defendant was aware of the victim’s limp and he intentionally approached her from behind and placed his right arm around her neck, so that she could not breathe.

Defendant was charged with aggravated battery of a physically handicapped person on the basis that “[h]e, in committing a battery on [the victim], intentionally and knowingly and without legal justification caused bodily harm to [the victim], and knew the individual harmed to be a person who is physically handicapped.”

Upon examining the above charges, the elements of the crimes in question and the applicable case law, we find that aggravated battery of a physically handicapped person is not a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. Although defendant’s guilt of aggravated battery to a handicapped person could be established by proof of the same facts needed to establish his guilt of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, the crime of aggravated battery of a handicapped person has the following elements which are not included in the offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault: (1) Defendant intentionally, knowingly and without legal justification caused bodily harm to the victim; and (2) defendant knew the victim to be a physically handicapped person. (See People v. Russell (1992), 234 Ill. App. 3d 684, 686, 600 N.E.2d 1202, 1203-04.) Defendant testified that he knew the victim because he had seen her walk around the neighborhood. Thus, we affirm defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery of a physically handicapped person.

The final offense for which defendant was charged, convicted and sentenced was aggravated battery of the victim on a public way. A person commits this offense when he is committing a battery and the battery occurs on a public way. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12— 4(b)(8).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for this offense. The record shows that defendant knowingly and intentionally touched the victim in a harmful manner and rendered bodily harm to her while she was on a public way. An alley such as the one where defendant was assaulted constitutes a “public way” within the meaning of the aggravated battery statute because it was accessible to the public. People v. Ward (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 283, 287-88, 419 N.E.2d 1240, 1244. See also People v. Pennington (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 641, 644, 527 N.E.2d 76, 78-79 (sidewalk adjacent to privately owned dormitory was accessible to the public and constituted a “public way” within the meaning of the statute); People v. Pico (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 225, 231, 514 N.E.2d 224, 228 (a street is a public way); People v. Lee (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1036, 512 N.E.2d 92, 94 (parking lot of a convenience store is a public way).

Aggravated battery on a public way is not a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault because the crime of aggravated battery on a public way has the following element which is not included in the offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault: Defendant intentionally, knowingly and without legal justification caused bodily harm to the -victim. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery of the victim on a public way.

For the above reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse, aggravated battery of a physically handicapped person and aggravated battery on a public way. We reverse defendant’s conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault and we vacate his sentence for that offense because the crime is a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault.

Defendant also contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing pursuant to People v. Garrett (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 212, 504 N.E.2d 236, and People v. Rhodes (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 362, 490 N.E.2d 169, because the trial court considered the fact that the victim was handicapped as a factor in aggravation, while this was an element which was inherent in the crimes of attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated battery. Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court considered in aggravation the impact on the victim of which there was no testimony.

The State maintains that defendant has waived his right to appellate review of this issue because he failed to object to the alleged error at trial and he failed to mention the allegation of error in his post-trial motion. In the alternative, the State maintains that defendant has failed to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant.

Although defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review (see People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186-88, 522 N.E.2d at 1129-32), we will review his allegation pursuant to our authority granted under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5). 134 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5); Palomar, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 188, 587 N.E.2d at 1071.

A trial court’s sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884; People v. Jenkins (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 249, 263, 568 N.E.2d 122, 132.) In order to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant, defendant must affirmatively show that the sentence was based upon improper considerations or was otherwise erroneous. (People v. Anderson (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 39, 46, 490 N.E.2d 1263; People v. Conley (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 122, 133, 454 N.E.2d 1107.) There is a rebuttable presumption that a sentence imposed for a crime was proper, and this presumption may only be overcome by an affirmative showing that the sentence varies greatly from the purposes and spirit of the law or is manifestly violative of constitutional guidelines. (People v. Escobar (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 30, 46, 522 N.E.2d 191, 201.) A trial court’s determination of an appropriate sentence for a defendant is entitled to great deference, as the trial judge is in the best position to make a sound determination regarding the appropriate punishment. People v. Cabrera (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 474, 494, 508 N.E.2d 708, 716; People v. Trimble (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 338, 350, 580 N.E.2d 1209, 1220.

Defendant’s contention that improper aggravating factors were relied upon by the trial court in determining his sentences is insufficient to rebut the presumption that his sentences were proper. The trial judge made the following statement upon sentencing defendant:

“THE COURT: Without taking away from the seriousness of the offense, taking into consideration what rehabilitation value you may have, the sentence of the Court will be 10 years as to the Class 1.
With regard to the Class 2, which is the attempt criminal sexual assault, that’s 3 to 7 years, the sentence of the Court will be considering its a handicapped person and the fact that you are already on felony probation, there will be a sentence of 7 years as to the Class 3 which is the aggravated battery of a physically handicapped person. Aggravated battery on a public way and the other one is 2 to 5. The sentence of the Court will be 5 years. 10 years, 7 years, 5 years.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Concurrent?
THE COURT: Concurrent is correct, counsel.”

One of the factors in aggravation that a trial court may consider when sentencing a defendant is the fact that the defendant committed the crime in question against a person who was physically handicapped at the time of the offense. (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(9).) The record shows that when the trial judge stated that he was considering the fact that the victim was a handicapped person, he was considering this fact as an aggravating only factor for the offense of attempted criminal sexual assault. The fact that a victim is physically handicapped is not a factor implicit in the crime of attempted criminal sexual assault. Moreover, we reversed defendant’s conviction and vacated his sentence for attempted criminal sexual assault above, making defendant’s contention with respect to his sentence for this crime moot. In addition, the record shows that the trial judge never stated or implied that he was considering the victim’s handicap as an aggravating factor when he was sentencing defendant for the other four crimes. We therefore cannot remand this cause for a new sentencing hearing on the basis that the trial court’s consideration of the fact that the victim was handicapped was improper.

Defendant also contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court improperly commented on the impact that this crime will have on the victim’s future. The State maintains that this comment was proper. We agree. When determining whether a sentence was improperly imposed, a reviewing court should not focus on a few words or statements made by the trial court. The determination of whether or not a sentence was improper must be made by considering the record as a whole. (People v. Ward (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 516, 526-27, 499 N.E.2d 422, 425-26.) In addition, a trial court may consider the nature of the offense when sentencing a defendant. (People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268, 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1143.) There is a strong presumption that a trial court’s sentencing decision is based upon proper legal reasoning and that the court has considered all evidence in mitigation. People v. Glass (1992), 239 Ill. App. 3d 916, 931, 606 N.E.2d 655, 666.

Furthermore, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that a victim of such crimes may be affected by them in the future. See Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 200, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 412, 93 S. Ct. 375, 382-83; People v. Testa (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1045, 466 N.E.2d 1126, 1131 (a victim of sexual assault who was conscious during her attack “was no casual observer, but rather the victim of one of the most personally humiliating of all crimes”).

Upon examining defendant’s allegation of error and the record in light of the above case law, we conclude that defendant’s sentences were proper. The remark in question is insufficient in and of itself to rebut the presumption that the sentences are proper. The trial court’s comment was not sufficiently erroneous or prejudicial to warrant reversal.

Accordingly, defendant’s sentences for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse, aggravated battery of a physically handicapped person and aggravated battery on a public way may not be vacated on this basis.

The two remaining issues before this court concern sentencing. First, defendant maintains that this cause should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing on the basis that the superfluous convictions could have influenced the trial judge in imposing a 10-year sentence for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, the most serious offense of which defendant was convicted.

Again, the State maintains that defendant waived his right to appellate review of the above issue because he failed to make an objection at trial and to mention the issue in his post-trial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186-88, 522 N.E.2d at 1129-32.

Although defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review, we will review the allegation pursuant to our authority granted by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5). 134 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5); Palomar, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 188, 587 N.E.2d at 1071.

We decline to remand defendant’s cause for resentencing on the grounds that his conviction for attempted criminal sexual abuse influenced the trial judge to sentence him to 10 years for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, because defendant has failed to show that this occurred.

Finally, defendant maintains that his sentences are excessive. We disagree. The trial court considered factors in aggravation and mitigation, including the fact that defendant was on probation at the time he committed the crimes in question. Since all of defendant’s sentences are within the legislatively prescribed guidelines (HI. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—1(a)), and defendant has failed to prove that the trial court abused its discretion, defendant’s sentences for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and both counts of aggravated battery are affirmed. Defendant’s conviction and sentence for attempted criminal sexual assault are reversed and vacated, respectively, because attempted criminal sexual assault is a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part and vacate in part the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part and vacated in part.

CERDA and GREIMAN, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JUSTICE RIZZI

license: Public Domain

text:
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA SHELTON, Defendant-Appellant.
    First District (3rd Division)
    No. 1—90—1233
    Opinion filed August 11, 1993.
    Rehearing denied September 28, 1993.

      Michael J. Pelletier and Debra R. Salinger, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

      Jack O’Malley, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Randall Roberts, and Brian Clauss, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE RIZZI

delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant, Linda Shelton, was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56x/2, par. 1401(a)), bribery (HI. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 33 — 1(e)), and official misconduct (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 33 — 3(b)). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 12 years for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, seven years for bribery and five years for official misconduct. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

The issues before this court for review are (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to obtain a waiver of defendant’s constitutional right to testify; (2) whether the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, bribery and official misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) whether this cause must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing on the basis that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant pursuant to the one-act-one-crime doctrine, since a single act was the basis for defendant’s sentence for two counts of bribery, and three counts of official misconduct, because another single act formed the basis for defendant’s sentence for two more counts of bribery, and because defendant’s sentence for six counts of official misconduct was based upon the same act as the sentences for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; (4) whether defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the basis that she was wrongly penalized for inmate overcrowding at the Cook County jail; and (5) whether defendant’s sentences were excessive.

Defendant worked as a guard at the Cook County jail from May of 1985 through July of 1988. On December 11, 1987, defendant was arrested and charged with official misconduct, bribery and intent to deliver controlled and look-alike substances.

Agents James Kizart and Tommy Wofford testified for the State. Agent Kizart testified that he had been an Illinois State Police undercover agent for approximately 14 years. Agent Kizart further testified that the following events occurred just prior to defendant’s arrest. Agent Kizart had his initial contact with defendant at approximately 9 p.m. on November 24, 1987, when he returned a page and she answered the telephone. During the telephone conversation, defendant identified herself as “Linda” and stated that she was calling to make arrangements to pick up a package for “Melvin.” Agent Kizart recalled that defendant told him she was a guard at the Cook County-jail and that she wanted to deliver the package during her shift. Defendant then asked Agent Kizart if she could pick up the package that evening so that she would not be late to work. Agent Kizart told defendant that he would deliver the package to her the next day.

Agent Kizart telephoned defendant at approximately 11 a.m. on November 25, 1988, at which time he told her that he was ready to deliver the package. They agreed to meet outside of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant located at 75th Street and South Lafayette in Chicago, Illinois, around noon. Defendant told Agent Kizart that she would be driving an orange and white Oldsmobile Cutlass. Defendant also inquired about the contents of the package she would be receiving and Agent Kizart told her that the package would contain .5 ounce of cocaine. The package to be used actually contained the substance aspertimine, an artificial sweetener, and was labeled “MikeVaO.”

Agent Kizart then went to the Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise at noon on November 25, 1988, where he gave defendant the package. Defendant asked Agent Kizart if the package contained heroin. Agent Kizart told defendant that the package contained cocaine. Agent Kizart also gave defendant $100 for herself and $50 for Melvin. Defendant put the money and the package in her pocket.

Agent Kizart then offered defendant $500 to serve as an escort when he made drug deliveries. Defendant agreed to serve as his escort and asked him if he was a drug dealer. Agent Kizart told defendant that he was a drug dealer. Defendant then asked him how much cocaine she could purchase from him for $500. Agent Kizart told defendant that he only dealt in ounce amounts which normally ran between $900 and $1,200 per ounce; however, he agreed to sell her cocaine for $600 an ounce. Defendant asked Agent Kizart if he offered her a price reduction because of her “badge” and Agent Kizart replied in the affirmative.

Agent Kizart then inquired as to when Melvin would receive the drugs and defendant stated that she would personally deliver them between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. Before exiting the car, Agent Kizart told defendant that he would contact her in the coming weeks in order to orchestrate another drug delivery to Melvin. Defendant said “okay” and Agent Kizart got out of the car at approximately 12:10 p.m. at which time he observed and memorized defendant’s license plate number. Upon returning to his squad car, he researched the number in his portable computer database and discovered that the license number was registered to defendant.

Agent Kizart telephoned defendant on the evening of November 28, 1987. Defendant told him that some men in a blue car stopped her and stole her badge, her gun and the drugs. Agent Kizart told defendant that nothing could be done about the badge or the gun but that she should not be concerned about the drugs because he gave her the package in order to determine whether or not she could really smuggle drugs into the Cook County jail. Agent Kizart then promised defendant that he would give her another package for Melvin.

On December 9, 1987, Agent Kizart obtained reversed role authorization, a consent to overhear and two crime-lab-prepared packages of cocaine. Telephone conversations between defendant and Agent Kizart were hereinafter recorded. Agent Kizart telephoned defendant later on that same day and told her that he wanted to give her more drugs to take to Melvin. Defendant was pleased. On December 10, 1987, Agent Kizart called defendant again to set up another appointment to meet at the same parking lot where they met before, at approximately 2 p.m. on the following day.

Agent Kizart received an unexpected page from defendant shortly after midnight on December 11, 1987. She wanted the agent to give her the cocaine so that she would be able to deliver the drugs later during the day. Defendant then told the agent that she had previously delivered drugs to numerous inmates, including Melvin. She also asked the agent to bring her some cocaine for her own personal use.

Agent Kizart called defendant later on December 11, 1987, from a pay telephone and verified the scheduled 2 p.m. meeting. The agent pulled into the Kentucky Fried Chicken parking lot at 75th and Lafayette around 1:55 p.m. and saw defendant standing in the lot. Agent Kizart parked and defendant got into his car. The agent gave defendant a package containing 16.3 grams of crime-lab-prepared cocaine and a second package containing 27.5 grams of a crime-lab-prepared look-alike drug for defendant herself. Agent Kizart also gave defendant $100 in prerecorded funds.

During the conversation in the car, defendant admitted to having smoked cocaine and delivered drugs to someone named Tony Rome. The agent told defendant that he would give her cocaine and money for any referrals of cocaine purchasers. She again stated that she had previously delivered drugs to Melvin in the Cook County jail.

Defendant and Agent Kizart exited the car and police officers from a nearby surveillance unit arrested defendant. The packages that defendant obtained from Agent Kizart were found in her undergarments and the $100 in prerecorded funds were found in her pocket.

After laying a foundation, the State played tape recordings of four conversations between Agent Kizart and defendant. The State presented the tapes and tape transcripts to be admitted into evidence. Defendant objected to the admission of the transcripts. The court, however, admitted the transcripts into evidence. The State rested.

Following the State’s case, defendant moved for a directed finding. The judge asked the prosecution if there was any evidence that Melvin existed and that he was actually an inmate in the Cook County jail. When the State argued that there was a reference to Agent Kizart’s understanding that Melvin was an inmate, the judge reminded the State that she had not seen any concrete evidence that Melvin was an inmate. The State then referred to a comment in the transcript referring to Melvin’s “wing” after which the court replied that Melvin could be in the hospital. The prosecutor then characterized the judge’s comment as being “hypertechnical” and argued that defendant’s state of mind at the time of the crimes could be established through Agent Kizart. Following extensive argument, defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was granted for the one count alleging possession of a look-alike substance and denied on all others. The court made the following statement when ruling on the motion:

“THE COURT: At this point, again looking in the light most favorable to the State, I'm not going to grant it as to any of the other counts. I’m going to give the benefit of the doubt. I have some questions in my mind, but looking in the light most favorable to the State I will come down on the side of the State. I do have some questions, as indicated, however, they are not such at this point that I would grant a motion for directed finding as to the other counts.”

The case was continued from January 19,1990, until March 27, 1990.

Ultimately, the trial court found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, bribery and official misconduct. While discussing the evidence against defendant, the trial judge made the following statement:

“THE COURT: It was clear from the testimony that Melvin was an inmate in the Cook County Jail and that [defendant] was aware and was readily participating in and had original contact with the agent with the idea of getting something to take in to Melvin.”

When sentencing defendant, the trial judge stated that it was “beyond her” to understand why a person in a position of public trust would take contraband into Cook County jail. The court also noted that the jail was crowded and analogized defendant’s act to throwing a match into a keg of gunpowder. Defendant was then sentenced to concurrent terms of 12, 7 and 5 years in the Hlinois Department of Corrections. Defendant now appeals.

First, defendant contends that her convictions must be reversed and her cause remanded because she was supposed to testify and the record does not contain any written or oral waiver of her constitutional right to testify Defendant further argues that the trial court should have informed her of her right to testify, sua sponte, so that she could have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of said right. Initially, the State maintains that this issue has been waived. In the alternative, the State argues that the trial court has no duty to inform a defendant of her right to testify, sua sponte, and that there is no law requiring that a defendant’s waiver of his right to testify be incorporated in the record. We agree.

A party waives his right to appellate review of an alleged error made during trial unless he preserves said right by objecting to the alleged impropriety in a timely manner and by mentioning the specific objection in a post-trial motion. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-88, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129-32.) In the present case, defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review since she failed to make a timely objection at trial and to raise the issue in her post-trial motion.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a), however, provides as follows: “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) “[P]lain error ‘encompasses those errors which are obvious *** and which, if uncorrected, would be an affront to the integrity and reputation of the judicial proceedings.’ ” (People v. Stuckey (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 550, 568, 596 N.E.2d 646, 658-59, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1035 (5th ed. 1979).) We cannot, however, review the merits of defendant’s allegation pursuant to Rule 615(a) because there is no evidence that the alleged error constituted plain error.

Instead, we will review defendant’s allegation pursuant to our authority granted under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5). (134 Ill. 2d R. 366(aX5).) Rule 366(aX5) provides that this court may, in the exercise of its duty to insure that a cause has a just result, ignore the doctrine of waiver and decide a case on grounds not properly raised or not raised at all by the parties. 134 Ill. 2d R. 366(aX5); Palomar v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 182, 188, 587 N.E.2d 1067, 1071.

Every criminal defendant has a right to testify in his own defense. (Harris v. New York (1971), 401 U.S. 222, 225, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 4, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645.) When a defendant contends on appeal that he was precluded from testifying at trial, however, his conviction cannot be reversed on the basis that he was precluded from exercising his right to testify, unless he contemporaneously asserted his right to testify by informing the trial court that he wished to do so. People v. Brown (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 21, 24, 294 N.E.2d 285, 287; People v. Knox (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 761, 767, 374 N.E.2d 957, 962.

A majority of the courts in other States have held that a defendant’s waiver of his right to testify is presumed if, as in the present case, he fails to testify or to notify the court of his desire to do so. United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1989), 883 F.2d 750, 760; In re Mecier (1983), 143 Vt. 23, 28, 460 A.2d 472, 475-76 (defendant waived his right to testify by failing to assert it before or during trial).

In addition, courts in many jurisdictions have also held that a defendant’s waiver of his right to testify does not have to be incorporated in the record. Torres-Arboledo v. State (Fla. 1988), 524 So. 2d 403, 409-10 (the right to testify is not a right which must be waived on the record by the defendant himself); Aragon v. State (1988), 114 Idaho 758, 763, 760 P.2d 1174, 1179 (a waiver on the record of defendant’s right to testify is not required).

In the present case, there is no evidence in the record that defendant asked the court to permit her to testify. Therefore, we hold that she waived her right to do so.

Furthermore, we find that the trial court did not have a duty to sua sponte advise defendant of her right to testify, or to inquire as to whether she knowingly and intelligently waived that right. United States v. Goodwin (7th Cir. 1985), 770 F.2d 631, 637; see also Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760; United States v. Bernloehr (8th Cir. 1987), 833 F.2d 749, 751 (the trial court does not have an affirmative duty to inquire as to why the witness did not testify); United States v. Systems Architects, Inc. (1st Cir. 1985), 757 F.2d 373, 375 (a trial court does not have an affirmative duty to determine whether a witness’ decision to remain silent was voluntary and intelligent); Commonwealth v. Hennessey (1989), 23 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 389, 502 N.E.2d 943, 947 (a trial court is not required to conduct a colloquy with defendant on the record to assure that defendant has knowingly relinquished his right to testify); Commonwealth v. Waters (1987), 399 Mass. 708, 716, 506 N.E.2d 859, 865 (the trial judge was not required to conduct voir dire to determine whether or not defendant waived his right to testify); State v. Albright (1980), 96 Wis. 2d 122, 131, 291 N.W.2d 487, 493 (trial judge does not have a duty to advise a defendant, sua sponte, of his right to testify).

There are several reasons why a trial judge is not required to inform a defendant of his right to testify. First, a defendant’s decision as to whether or not to testify is often made as the trial unfolds. (Waters, 399 Mass, at 716, 506 N.E.2d at 865.) By advising a defendant of his right to testify, á court could influence the defendant to waive his right not to testify, “thus threatening the exercise of this other, converse, constitutionally explicit and more fragile right.” Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760; Siciliano v. Vose (1st Cir. 1987), 834 F.2d 29, 30.

Second, a court could intrude upon the attorney-client relationship by advising a defendant of his right to testify. (Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760; United States v. Goodwin (7th Cir. 1985), 770 F.2d 631, 637; Commonwealth v. Hennessey (1989), 23 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 389, 502 N.E.2d 943, 947.) “A trial judge must take great care not to assume the functions of trial counsel.” (Goodwin, 770 F.2d at 637.) It is primarily the responsibility of defense counsel, not the trial judge, to advise a defendant as to whether or not he should testify and to explain the tactical advantages and disadvantages of each option. (Goodwin, 770 F.2d at 637.) If a trial judge were to advise a defendant, sua sponte, of his right to testify, such an act could frustrate a decision on the matter made by the defendant and defense counsel who are designing trial strategy. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d at 134, 291 N.W.2d at 493.

Finally, a trial judge is not required to inform a defendant of his right to testify because it is difficult for a judge to determine the appropriate time that he should advise a defendant concerning his right to testify, since “the judge cannot know that the defendant has not testified until the defense [rests and such a moment is not an opportune] time to engage in a discussion with the defendant which might lead to a rupture with defense counsel *** or might undo a trial strategy based on the defendant’s not testifying.” Hennessey, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 389, 502 N.E.2d at 947.

Accordingly, we conclude that defendant waived her right to testify because she did not contemporaneously assert her right to do so and that the trial court in the present case did not err by failing to advise defendant of her right to testify or in failing to require that defendant’s waiver of said right be incorporated in the record.

Next, defendant contends that she was not proved guilty of intent to deliver a controlled substance, bribery and official misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt. First, defendant argues that evidence of her guilt of intent to deliver a controlled substance was insufficient because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to deliver and not to personally consume the cocaine given to her by Agent Kizart.

Upon judicial review of a conviction, all evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789; People v. Schorle (1990), 206 Ill. App. 3d 748, 759, 565 N.E.2d 84, 91.) The relevant inquiry upon review of the sufficiency of the evidence of a defendant’s guilt is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that defendant committed the essential elements of the crime for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; People v. Stuckey (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 550, 566, 596 N.E.2d 646, 657.) A guilty verdict will not be reversed on appeal unless it is inconclusive, improbable, unconvincing or contrary to human experience. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Stuckey, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 566, 596 N.E.2d at 657.

Upon considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that defendant was guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is neither inconclusive, improbable, unconvincing nor contrary to human experience. A rational jury could have found defendant guilty of the above offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act provides as follows:

“1401. Manufacture or delivery unauthorized by Act — Penalties *** Except as authorized by this Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to *** deliver, or possess with intent to *** deliver, a controlled or counterfeit substance or controlled substance analog. ***
Except as provided in Section 401.1 any person who violates this Section with respect to:
(a) the following amounts of controlled or counterfeit substances or controlled substance analogs, notwithstanding any of the provisions of subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) to the contrary, is guilty of a Class X felony. The fine for violation of this subsection (a) shall not be more than $500,000:
(2) 15 grams or more but less than 100 of any substance containing cocaine or an analog thereof ***.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. SW-k, par. 1401(a).

In the present case, defendant told Agent Kizart that she worked as a guard in the Cook County jail and that she wanted to obtain drugs from him so that she could deliver them to Melvin. The record also shows that defendant met Agent Kizart in the parking lot of the Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise located at 75th Street and South Lafayette whereupon she obtained 16.3 grams of cocaine from him and accepted money for her services. A defendant’s intent to deliver a controlled substance is necessarily established by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Marshall (1987), 165 Ill. App. 3d 968, 976, 521 N.E.2d 538, 543.) The record shows that defendant had knowledge of the cocaine, that it was within her immediate control and possession and that she intended to deliver it. (See People v. Pintos (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 286, 292, 549 N.E.2d 344, 346-47.) For the above reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

Defendant supports her contention that she was not found guilty of the above crime beyond a reasonable doubt by arguing that the State failed to show that she did not intend to personally consume the cocaine since testimony established that she used drugs and that she inquired about obtaining drugs for her own personal use. Although it is plausible that defendant’s discussion with Agent Kizart regarding his status as a drug dealer and the reduction in his price he offered her for each ounce of cocaine to be sold to her in exchange for taking drugs into Cook County jail was her arrangement for obtaining cocaine for her own personal use, defendant fails to acknowledge that she agreed to deliver drugs to Melvin as part of this arrangement and that she then obtained possession of 16.3 grams of cocaine.

Accordingly, we find that defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver that substance.

Defendant also contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support her convictions for bribery and official misconduct because the trial judge’s comments reflected uncertainty regarding her guilt and because the evidence failed to establish that Melvin was an inmate in the Cook County jail.

First, we find that the trial judge’s comments, when considered in their totality, show that the judge was articulating and applying the proper legal principles. Defendant cites to various portions of the record to support her argument that the trial judge expressed doubt about whether Melvin was an inmate in the Cook County jail. Defendant, however, fails to mention the following key portions of the colloquy wherein the judge stated that she was satisfied with the sufficiency of the evidence:

“THE COURT: I’m not trying to be completely unreasonable. I’m just concerned about this and I have been throughout this because I have been waiting to find out how we knew Melvin was in jail, but I don’t know that it has been established to the extent that it would be recognized that Melvin is in fact in jail and I just wondered if I had missed it, if it had come in. We had quite a bit with tapes and so forth and a lot of testimony, but from the agent.
THE STATE: If you look into her state of mind I don’t know if it would make it any easier. The fact he proves there’s a Melvin in Cook County Jail, how does that prove her state of mind?
THE COURT: If there is a Melvin on her wing and that’s established it could be argued that she was acting with that in mind. I’m just throwing that out because I had that as a question. I felt this is the appropriate time to raise it because I wanted to make sure I had not missed it. You have addressed it. Do you want to finish your argument?
THE STATE: [I]f he [gave] her the cocaine on the 25th and the understanding from these transcripts and their other conversations it’s clear it’s going to be delivered shortly after he gave it to her. And from that comment right there, that there is a mutual understanding right after he gave her this purported cocaine she’s going to work, and we have what the State is referring to the code, slang for the narcotics, cookies. And the reference to Melvin, and Melvin’s wing. Your Honor, it is like every other case, you can’t look at one piece of evidence — .
THE COURT: I understand that. I just wanted you to point that point out to me — .
At this point, again looking in the light most favorable to the State, I’m not going to grant [a directed verdict] as to any other counts. I’m going to give the benefit of the doubt. I have some questions in my mind, but looking in the light most favorable to the State I will come down on the side of the State. I do have some questions, as indicated, however, they are not such at this point that I would grant a motion for directed finding as to the other counts.”

Defendant argues that the trial judge’s comment that she would evaluate the evidence at the end of the case under a stricter standard than she did upon denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict indicates that the trier of fact had a reasonable doubt with respect to defendant’s guilt. Defendant’s argument, however, fails in light of the applicable law.

When a defendant moves for a directed verdict, the motion will be denied if the trial judge determines that upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable mind could fairly conclude that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Withers (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 224, 229, 429 N.E.2d 853, 856.) On the other hand, a defendant must have been proved guilty of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of the evidence. See In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 361-63, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 374-75, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071-72.

Accordingly, the trial judge’s comment regarding the applicable evidentiary standards was appropriate and in no way indicates that the trier of fact had a reasonable doubt regarding defendant’s guilt at the close of the evidence.

Defendant was found guilty of bribery at the close of the evidence. The Criminal Code of 1961 makes the following pertinent provision regarding bribery:

“33-1. Bribery
*** Bribery. A person commits bribery when:
(d) He receives, retains or agrees to accept any property or personal advantage which he is not authorized by law to accept knowing that such property or personal advantage was promised or tendered with intent to cause him to influence the performance of any act related to the employment or function of any public officer, public employee, juror or witness; or
(e) He solicits, receives, retains, or agrees to accept any property or personal advantage pursuant to an understanding that he shall improperly influence or attempt to influence the performance of any act related to the employment or function of any public officer, public employee, juror or witness.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 33 — 1(d), (e).

Defendant argues that the State must also prove that the person to whom she was to deliver the cocaine in fact existed. This argument defies case law. In People v. Wright (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 187, 190, 434 N.E.2d 26, 28, we held that in order for a defendant to be convicted of bribery, “[t]he statute requires only that the defendant received, retained or agreed to accept the money knowing that it was offered with the intent that it influence the defendant as public officer in the performance of an official act.” In the present case, ample evidence existed from which the trial court could have reasonably concluded that defendant knew that the money she received was offered with the intent to influence her in the performance of her duties.

Upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found that there was sufficient evidence that defendant was guilty of bribery beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, defendant’s convictions for bribery are affirmed.

Defendant next argues that the State failed to prove that she was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of official misconduct because the prosecution failed to show that she was going to deliver cocaine to an inmate at the Cook County jail in her official capacity, since the State never established that Melvin was an inmate. We disagree.

Section 33 — 3 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:

“33 — 3 Official misconduct
*** Official Misconduct. A public officer or employee commits misconduct when, in his official capacity, he commits any of the following acts:
(b) Knowingly performs an act which he knows he is forbidden by law to perform; or
(c) With intent to obtain a personal advantage for himself or another, he performs an act in excess of his lawful authority; or
(d) Solicits or knowingly accepts for the performance of any act a fee or reward which he knows is not authorized by law.” HI. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 33 — 3(b) through (d).

In order to support a conviction for official misconduct, the State must also show that the law which defendant violated was specified in the indictment. People v. Lutz (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 204, 213, 383 N.E.2d 171, 174; People v. Dixon (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 29, 35, 592 N.E.2d 1104, 1108.

Upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions for bribery beyond a reasonable doubt. A rational trier of fact could have found that defendant obtained drugs pursuant to an agreement to deliver them to Melvin in her official capacity as a jail guard. Defendant does not contend that she did not know that said acts were illegal and she does not contend that the law she violated, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, was not specified in the indictment. Whether or not Melvin was actually an inmate is not an element of the offense.

The next three issues before this court concern alleged errors made by the trial court in sentencing defendant. First, defendant contends that this cause must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing because she should not have been sentenced for any of her official misconduct convictions and should only have been sentenced for two of her bribery convictions based upon acts performed upon November 25, 1987, and December 11, 1987. Defendant also argues that her sentence for official misconduct should be vacated because the convictions for that crime were based upon the same act as her conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The State concedes that defendant’s sentences for bribery and official misconduct must be modified, but it maintains that this cause should not be remanded for a new sentencing hearing because there is no indication that the official misconduct convictions influenced the trial court with respect to its sentencing of defendant on the other counts. We agree.

In the present case, defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, bribery and official misconduct. Two bribery counts are based on the single act of receipt of money on November 25, 1987, and two more are based on the single act of the receipt of money on December 11, 1987. Thus, defendant should be sentenced for one count of bribery for the November 25 act and on one count of bribery for the December 11 act.

Furthermore, the six counts of official misconduct are based on the same act as defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is a Class X felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56V2, par. 1401(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8— l(a)(2X3)), whereas official misconduct based on a violation of the same statute is a Class 2 felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 33— 3(d)); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—l(aX2)(5)). Since the six counts of official misconduct are based on the same act as the act which is the basis of defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the sentences for official misconduct should be vacated. See People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 556, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45.

Although defendant has requested a new sentencing hearing, re-sentencing is not warranted in this case. When a defendant receives multiple convictions, a new sentencing hearing is not warranted when a conviction is vacated where there is nothing in the record to indicate that the vacated conviction had any effect on the other sentences. (People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45, 55, 456 N.E.2d 44, 49; People v. Ivory (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 448, 455, 487 N.E.2d 1035, 1040.) In the present case, there is no indication that defendant’s official misconduct convictions influenced the trial court when sentencing defendant for bribery and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. A reviewing court cannot conclude, solely from a trial court's imposition of separate sentences for multiple convictions, that the sentence imposed for one offense has been influenced by the conviction or sentence for another offense. People v. Martin (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 196, 215, 459 N.E.2d 279, 293.

Accordingly, defendant’s convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver are affirmed, defendant’s conviction for two counts of bribery is affirmed, but two of defendant’s bribery convictions and all of her official misconduct convictions are vacated. Defendant’s request for remandment for resentencing is denied.

Next, defendant contends both that her sentences were excessive and that she was penalized for overcrowding at Cook County jail. We find that the trial court properly sentenced defendant after a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense.

Defendant’s argument that she was penalized for overcrowding at Cook County jail does not pass muster. When considered in its proper context, the trial judge’s comment on the nature and circumstances surrounding defendant’s offense was permissible. The trial judge likened defendant’s bringing drugs to an inmate in an overcrowded jail to throwing a match into a keg of gunpowder. The trial judge was not required to ignore the fact that it is impermissible for a correctional officer to bring drugs into a correctional facility. (See People v. Roby (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 143, 146-47, 559 N.E.2d 843, 843 (courts do not operate in a vacuum and they may take judicial notice of facts which are generally known or verifiable from accurate sources).) Even if it was improper to consider the conditions in Cook County jail when sentencing defendant, any error in so doing was harmless in light of the other factors in aggravation and mitigation considered by the trial court. (See People v. Bourke (1986), 96 Ill. 2d 327, 332, 449 N.E.2d 1338, 1340.) Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the basis of the trial judge’s comment concerning the propriety of her bringing drugs to inmates in a crowded jail.

Finally, defendant maintains that her sentences are excessive. We find that the trial court properly sentenced defendant to 12 years for possession with intent to deliver and seven years for each bribery count. A reasoned judgment as to the proper sentence to be imposed on a defendant must be based upon the particular circumstances of each individual case. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884.) The trial court made the statement upon sentencing defendant:

“THE COURT: Certainly we take into account the fact that you have really accomplished quite a lot ***. Most of the people in this courtroom have little or no education, don’t have much of a job and perhaps have turned to these kinds of offenses, dealing in drugs and what have you, to support themselves.
You don’t have that as a reason ***. I do believe that law enforcement official should be held to a standard. You have the public trust ***. So it is certainly a very tragic kind of situation because you had accomplished so much, but I do believe a sentence over and above the minimum sentence should be imposed.”

The above statement reflects that the trial judge sentenced defendant after careful thought, deliberation and consideration of the nature of the crime.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to excessive terms for her crimes. The sentences imposed upon defendant were within the statutory parameters for minimum and maximum sentences for the offenses for which defendant was convicted. Possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is a Class X felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 561k, par. 1401(a).) Section 5 — 8—l(aX2X3) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides that a defendant may be sentenced to not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years for a Class 1 felony. (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—l(a)(2)(3).) Bribery is a Class 2 felony. (HI. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 33 — 1(f).) Section 5 — 8—l(aX2X5) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides that a defendant may not be sentenced to less than three years or more than seven years for a Class 2 felony. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—l(aX2)(5).

The trial court is in the best position to determine the appropriate punishment to be imposed upon a defendant. (Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154, 368 N.E.2d at 884.) A sentencing judge is vested with wide discretion in determining the appropriate sentence and this determination is to be afforded great deference on appeal and, absent an abuse of discretion, this decision will not be reversed. (Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154, 368 N.E.2d at 884.) For the above reasons, defendant’s sentences for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and two counts of bribery are affirmed.

For the aforementioned reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part. We affirm defendant’s conviction and 12-year sentence for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and defendant’s convictions and seven-year sentences for two counts of bribery. Defendant’s sentences for official misconduct and her remaining convictions for bribery are hereby vacated.

Affirmed in part; vacated in part.

CERDA and GREIMAN, JJ., concur.