text:
    FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS LOCAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et at., Respondents-Appellees.
    First District (6th Division)
    No. 1—88—1834
    Opinion filed October 27, 1989.

      Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, of Chicago (Andrea R. Waintroob, Charles P. Rose, and Peter R. Bulmer, of counsel), for petitioner.
    Neil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and William D. Frazier, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondents.
   JUSTICE QUINLAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, the Forest Preserve District of Cook County (District), appealed to this court the final decision of respondent, the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board (Board), entered in favor of respondent, the Fraternal Order of Police, Illinois Labor Council (FOP). The Board had ordered the District to cease and desist from displacing incumbent District police officers who failed to achieve a score of at least 70% on the civil service examination for District police officers until it had bargained in good faith with the FOP over the examination. The Board also ordered the District to reinstate with back pay all incumbent police officers who had been dismissed for failing to achieve a 70% or higher score.

The District, an independent unit of local government created by State law, maintains its own police force in order to patrol District property, enforce laws and ordinances, and assist those using the Cook County forest preserves. Cook County, the county in which the District is located, is governed by civil service laws. Accordingly, the District is also governed by the same civil service laws, including the civil service laws pertaining to the selection of employees. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 96V2, par. 6420.

Pursuant to the Cook County civil service laws, all applicants for civil service jobs must take a civil service examination. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 34, par. 1110.) Based on the results of the examination, the Civil Service Commission (Commission) prepares a register of those who have attained at least the minimum test score fixed by the rules of the Commission. Applicants who have passed the exam, the “eligibles,” are then ranked according to their respective scores. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 34, par. 1112.) When a position is available, the Commission certifies the highest ranking candidate to the head of the institution, office or department in which the position is classified. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 34, par. 1114.

The Commission also has its own rules and regulations providing that those entered on the civil service register must obtain an average of at least 70% out of 100% on the civil service exams. (Cook County Civil Service Rule IV.) Further, if there is a vacant position and the list of eligible applicants on the register has been exhausted, the Commission rules provide that the Commission may make a temporary appointment. (Cook County Civil Service Rule VI.) A temporary appointment is defined in the Commission rules as “[t]he employment of a person in a position from day to day when an appointment by certification or reinstatement cannot be made and which shall be terminated when an eligible can be certified or reinstated to the position.” Cook County Civil Service Rule I.

At the time of the administrative hearings in this case, the District employed 70 full-time police officers, 40 of whom were temporary appointments and had served as temporaries for a period ranging from 2 to 12 years. On April 23, 1986, the Commission announced that it would conduct Examination 3818, a three-part examination, for candidates for District police officer positions (the last District police officer examination had been administered in 1979). The first part of the exam was administered in July 1986 and consisted of a written exam and psychological testing. The second part was administered in September 1986 and was a physical examination, which included drug screening. The third and last part of the examination was an oral exam. Approximately 2,000 applicants took the examination, including all of the District’s temporary police officers. Out of the 2,000 applicants, 258 were found eligible. However, 17 of the temporary police officers were found ineligible because they did not receive a score of at least 70% on the exam. The other 23 temporary officers ranked from 6 to 252 out of the 258 eligible applicants. Based on the results of Examination 3818, the District told the 17 temporary officers who had failed to achieve 70% on the exam to find other employment. The District also informed the 23 eligible temporary officers that they would be given a position on the District police force when their position or rank on the register was reached.

Around this same time, on May 12, 1986, respondent FOP was certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of the District police officers, including the 40 temporary officers. On December 12, 1986, the FOP filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, alleging that the District unilaterally implemented drug screening and psychological tests as part of the civil service examination, tests which had never been part of the examination before, without first bargaining in good faith with the FOP. The Board investigated this charge and issued a complaint on February 25, 1987. Three hearings were held on this complaint (June 8, September 28, and October 27, 1987). Six weeks after the October 27 hearing, the FOP filed a motion to amend the complaint to challenge Examination 3818 in its entirety. This motion was allowed over the District’s objections.

The FOP charged that the District had violated section 7 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Labor Act), which requires a public employer to bargain over any matter concerning wages, hours or other conditions of employment not provided for in any other law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1607), when it implemented Examination 3818 and required the temporary officers to pass the exam without first bargaining over the exam with the FOP. The District responded that the complaint should be dismissed because the FOP’s complaint was not timely filed and the FOP had waived its right to bargain because it had never requested bargaining. The District also contended that it had no duty to bargain over Examination 3818.

On January 29, 1988, the hearing officer issued his recommended decision and order. The hearing officer’s findings of fact were as follows: the FOP was a labor organization within the meaning of section 3(i) of the Labor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1603(i)); the District was a public employer within the meaning of section 3(o) of the Labor Act and was under the Board’s jurisdiction pursuant to sections 5(b) and 20(b) of the Labor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, pars. 1603(o), 1605(b), 1620(b)); the District police officers were public employees within the meaning of section 3(n) of the Labor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1603(n)); the status of a District police officer as certified or temporary was the same in all respects, except that certified officers were entitled to notice and a hearing by the Commission before they could be dismissed from the force or suspended for more than 29 days; the sheet announcing Examination 3818 did not mention that the temporary police officers would be required to take and pass Examination 3818 in order to keep their jobs; results from Examination 3818 were posted on January 9, 1987; and there was no evidence as to how, when or if the temporary officers were told that they were required to take and pass Examination 3818 in order to retain their jobs, nor was there evidence that the District ever offered to bargain over the exam.

In his conclusions of law, the hearing officer held that the FOP’s charge was timely filed and the FOP had not waived its right to bargain over the examination. The hearing officer then held, however, that the District had not violated section 7 of the Labor Act, concluding that application of the Commission prerequisites for eligibility to the temporary officers did not involve the terms and conditions of employment of the temporary officers. The hearing officer, therefore, recommended that the complaint charging the District with Labor Act violations be dismissed.

Both parties filed exceptions to the hearing officer’s recommended decision and order with the Board. The Board agreed with the hearing officer that the FOP’s charge was timely filed and that the FOP had not waived its right to bargain. The Board disagreed, however, with the hearing officer’s conclusion that the District had no duty to bargain over the administration of the exam. Accordingly, on May 18, 1988, the Board ordered the District to cease and desist from displacing the temporary officers for failing to achieve a certain score on Examination 3818 until it had bargained with the FOP, in good faith, over the proposal. The Board also ordered the District to reinstate with back pay any officers who had been dismissed, demoted, reduced in grade or laid off as a result of the exam. The District now appeals that order to this court.

On appeal, the District first claims that the FOP’s charge was untimely filed because it was filed more than six months after the alleged unfair labor practice, the administration of Examination 3818, occurred. The District notes that a charging party has six months from the date on which he had notice of an unfair labor practice to file an unfair labor practice charge. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1611(a).) The District alleges that the FOP had notice of its alleged unfair labor practice, the civil service examination, on April 23, 1986, when the examination was announced, but nonetheless did not file its charge until December 12, 1986, after the six-month limitation period had run. In response to the Board’s finding that the six-month period did not begin when the examination was announced, but instead began at an undetermined later date when the District decided to dismiss the temporary police officers, the District argues that it never made an affirmative decision to dismiss the officers who failed to receive a score of at least 70% on the exam, but that it was required by law to dismiss those officers, and the District could not have retained the officers in any case. Finally, the District contends that the fact that it announced the examination put the FOP on notice that the District was preparing a list of eligible police officers to replace the temporary officers, and the fact that all of the temporary police officers took the examination proves that those officers knew they were required to complete and pass the examination in order to retain their jobs.

Respondent Board, however, claims that the temporary officers were never told that they had to take and pass the civil service examination in order to keep their jobs; thus, merely announcing the examination was not sufficient to provide notice. Accordingly, the Board contends that the FOP’s charge was timely filed. Likewise, respondent FOP contends that the temporary officers here were never notified that a certain score on the examination was required in order to retain their jobs; hence, the FOP’s delay in filing the charge was excused. The FOP also argues that the fact that all the temporary officers took the examination does not prove that those officers had notice, but merely shows that those officers were trying to achieve the “advantages and protections” of civil service status.

The parties correctly observe that a charge based upon an unfair labor practice must be filed within six months of the alleged unfair labor practice, “unless the person aggrieved thereby did not reasonably have knowledge of the alleged unfair labor practice.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1611(a).) Here, the hearing officer and the Board found that there was no evidence in the record that the temporary officers were ever informed that they were required to take and pass Examination 3818 with a score of at least 70% in order to keep their jobs. Accordingly, the Board held that the six-month date did not begin when the examination was announced, but began at an unknown later date, and that under these circumstances, the FOP’s delay in filing the unfair labor practice charge was excused.

An administrative agency’s findings of fact are presumed prima facie true and correct, and a reviewing court will reverse the agency’s findings only if those findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Brewington v. Illinois Department of Corrections (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 54, 72, 513 N.E.2d 1056, 1068.) Here, there is no evidence in the record contradicting the Board’s finding that the temporary officers did not reasonably have knowledge that they were required to take and pass Examination 3818 in order to retain their jobs. Consequently, we cannot say that the Board’s finding that the FOP was excused for its delay in filing the unfair labor practice charge was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Hence, we cannot say that the Board’s decision on this issue was improper.

The District next appeals the Board’s finding that Examination 3818 was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The District contends that this finding was erroneous as a matter of law. The District argues that the examination was not a mandatory subject of bargaining because the District was legally required, under the civil service rules, to terminate the temporary officers once a new list of eligibles was established. Since it was required by law to terminate the temporary officers, the District contends that the duty to bargain set forth in the Labor Act did not apply, noting that the Labor Act imposes an obligation to bargain over matters related to wages, hours and conditions of employment not specifically provided for in any other law.

The Board maintains that the requirement that the temporary officers take and pass Examination 3818 in order to keep their jobs is a matter with respect to wages, hours and condition of employment and, therefore, the issue was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board also claims that conflicts between public employee bargaining laws and local civil service laws should be resolved in favor of the bargaining laws. Finally, the Board contends that the District is estopped from requiring the temporary officers to meet the requirements of the civil service rules, given the length of time the temporary officers have held their positions, in addition to the fact that some of the officers retained their positions as temporary officers even after the 1979 civil service examination was administered.

Respondent FOP also urges this court to affirm the Board’s finding that Examination 3818 was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The FOP argues that the Labor Act predominates over the civil service rules, citing section 15 of the Labor Act, which provides: “In case of any conflict between the provisions of this Act and any other law, executive order or administrative regulation relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment and employment relations, the provisions of this Act or any collective bargaining agreement negotiated thereunder shall prevail and control.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1615.) In addition, the FOP contends that the civil service rules do not require the District to terminate its temporary employees once a new list of eligibles is established, nor does it prevent the District from negotiating over employment of the temporary employees.

Both the Board and the FOP rely on the Illinois Supreme Court decision in City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268 (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 353, 522 N.E.2d 1219, in support of their claim that the Labor Act’s mandatory bargaining provisions predominate over the civil service rules. In Decatur, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the City of Decatur (City) was required to bargain under section 7 of the Labor Act over a union proposal which would allow employees to submit disciplinary grievances to arbitration, despite the City’s adoption of statutory civil service provisions. (Decatur, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 522 N.E.2d 1219.) The City had argued that it had no duty to bargain over disciplinary matters that fell within the scope of the civil service provisions. (Decatur, 122 Ill. 2d at 357, 522 N.E.2d at 1220.) The court noted that other jurisdictions have favored public employee bargaining laws over local civil service rules when faced with a conflict between the two. (Decatur, 122 Ill. 2d at 363, 522 N.E.2d at 1223.) The court then stated, “We do not believe that the legislature intended to make the broad duties imposed by the [Labor] Act hostage to the myriad of State statutes and local ordinances pertaining to matters of public employment.” (Decatur, 122 Ill. 2d at 364, 522 N.E.2d at 1224.) The Decatur court also observed that the civil service scheme adopted by the City was optional; thus, the City could eliminate the provisions at issue in the case if it chose. Decatur, 122 Ill. 2d at 365-66, 522 N.E.2d at 1224.

The District distinguishes the Decatur case from this case based on the fact that the adoption of the civil service scheme in Decatur was optional and the City could eliminate the provision at issue, while the application of the civil service rules in this case was mandatory and the District, therefore, could not eliminate the provision at issue in this case even if it wanted to do so. Respondents, however, urge this court to take a broader view of the Decatur case, recognizing a policy favoring public employee bargaining laws over civil service rules.

In reviewing issues involving an agency determination on a question of law, the reviewing court must determine whether the agency abused its discretion. (City of Chicago v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board (1988), 182 Ill. App. 3d 588, 594, 536 N.E.2d 1219, 1223.) We hold that the Board did not abuse its discretion here in finding that the administration of Examination 3818 was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In doing so, we decline to adopt the District’s narrow interpretation of the Decatur case as holding that the Labor Act predominates over civil service rules only when the civil service scheme is optional. We believe the Board correctly interpreted the Decatur case as recognizing a policy favoring public employee bargaining laws over civil service rules. Applying a policy favoring public employee bargaining laws over civil service rules to the facts of this case then, we find that the Labor Act predominates over the Commission rules concerning temporary employees and that the administration of Examination 3818 was a matter involving wages, hours and conditions of employment under the Labor Act. As such, the examination was a mandatory subject of bargaining.

We also find that the Board’s decision here which required arbitration was correct because the District was estopped from applying Examination 3818 requirements to the temporary officers. The doctrine of estoppel may be applied against a municipal corporation if, under the circumstances of the case, the affirmative acts of the municipality have caused another to take certain actions, thereby creating a situation where it would be inequitable and unjust to allow the municipality, in effect, to retract what it had previously done. (City of Chicago v. Sievert Electric Co. (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 552, 556, 481 N.E.2d 1, 4.) Here, the doctrine of estoppel applies because the temporary officers had been allowed to retain their jobs for a period from 2 to 12 years, and because those temporary officers hired before 1979 were allowed to retain their jobs as temporary officers following the 1979 civil service examination. Given the length of time that the temporary officers held their jobs, as well as the failure of the District to dismiss those officers following the 1979 exam, we conclude that it would be inequitable and unjust to allow the District to now dismiss those officers.

Finally, the District appeals the Board’s conclusion that the FOP did not waive its right to bargain by failing to request bargaining. The District notes that the FOP never requested bargaining over Examination 3818, even though the Labor Act expressly provides that employers will be required to bargain over matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment upon the request of the employee representatives. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1604.

In response, the Board and the FOP argue that the FOP never requested bargaining because it was unaware of the District’s plan regarding the temporary officers. Respondents state that absent timely, clear notice of proposed changes in the terms and conditions of employment for employees, a union is not required to request bargaining. In this case, respondents contend, there was no timely, clear notice and, therefore, the FOP’s failure to request bargaining was excused.

We agree with the Board’s finding that the FOP’s failure to request bargaining was excused because the FOP did not have notice of the unfair labor practice. As noted previously an administrative agency’s findings of fact are presumed prima facie true and correct and will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Brewington, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 72, 513 N.E.2d at 1068.) Because there was no evidence in the record that the FOP had notice that the District would discharge those temporary officers who failed to pass Examination 3818, we cannot say that the Board’s finding excusing the FOP’s failure to request bargaining was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is affirmed in its entirety.

Judgment affirmed.

EGAN, P.J., and LaPORTA, J., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JUSTICE BUCKLEY JUSTICE QUINLAN,

license: Public Domain

text:
      In re MARRIAGE OF ROBERT J. MORRIS, Petitioner-Appellee, and BEVERLY R. MORRIS, Respondent-Appellant.
    First District (1st Division)
    No. 1—87—2871
    Opinion filed October 30, 1989.
    QUINLAN, J., dissenting.

      William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte, of counsel), for appellant.
    Grant & Grant, of Chicago (Burton F. Grant, of counsel), for appellee.
   JUSTICE BUCKLEY

delivered the opinion of the court:

The marriage of Beverly and Robert Morris was dissolved pursuant to a judgment of dissolution of marriage entered April 17, 1984. An oral property settlement agreement was incorporated into that agreement by a supplemental judgment entered July 24, 1984, the terms of which were to apply retroactively to April 10, 1984. Beverly appealed from these judgments, and this court issued its opinion affirming the circuit court on July 7, 1986. On May 5, 1987, Beverly filed a “Petition for Turnover Order, Determination of Interest on Judgment and Other Necessary Relief.” The circuit court denied Beverly’s request for interest, and she now appeals from that denial. In issue is whether an award of interest on a supplemental judgment is mandatory or discretionary. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the circuit court erred in denying Beverly’s petition for interest and reverse and remand.

The July, 24, 1984, supplemental judgment, which incorporated the oral property settlement agreement into the April 17, 1984, divorce decree, provides-in pertinent part, as follows:

“1.01 *** During the first year only, Husband shall pay the Wife’s additional maintenance only in the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000).”

The judgment further requires Robert to pay the following:

“2.04 Further Property Settlement Husband shall pay ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($125,000) to Wife as and for a further property settlement herein, same to be considered nontaxable to Wife and nondeductible for tax purposes to Husband. The payments of said property settlement will be as follows, without interest:
(a) $50,000 on or before October 10,1984
(b) $50,000 on or before October 10, 1985
(c) $25,000 on or before October 10,1986.”

Based upon this supplemental judgment, Beverly’s 1987 “Petition for Turnover Order, Determination of Interest on Judgment and Other Necessary Relief” requested that the circuit court compel Robert to pay the accrued interest on the $100,000 additional maintenance due her under paragraph 1.01 of the supplemental judgment from July 24, 1985, to and including April 10, 1987, and the accrued interest on the aggregate sum property settlement of $125,000 due her under section 2.04, from the dates each of the amounts became due.

In response to Beverly’s petition, Robert denied that he had failed to tender payment, maintaining that he had offered to pay the amounts set forth in the supplemental judgment during the pendency of the appeal of that judgment. Correspondence between the parties and their attorneys was submitted as evidence of these purported offers. Robert also argued that Beverly was equitably estopped from asserting her claim for interest by virtue of the provisions found within an agreed order, executed by the parties in October 1984, which set forth an arrangement for pendente lite relief and a supersedeas agreement.

After hearing argument from counsel, the circuit court denied Beverly’s request for interest on the basis that section 2 — 1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1303), which provides for the inclusion of interest “[w]hen judgment is entered upon any award, report or verdict,” is inapplicable because the payments in question were not “reduced to judgment.”

Beverly’s sole contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred in refusing to award interest on the payments due her under the supplemental judgment. We agree.

Initially, we must determine whether the supplemental judgment is a final judgment within the meaning of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 413(a)). Section 413(a) provides:

“A judgment of dissolution of marriage or of legal separation or of declaration of invalidity of marriage is final when entered, subject to the right of appeal. *** An order directing payment of money for support or maintenance of the spouse or the minor child or children shall not be suspended or the enforcement thereof stayed pending the appeal.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 413(a).)

We find that section 413(a) applies with equal force to both the judgment of dissolution and the supplemental judgment, containing the property settlement agreement between the parties. (See In re Marriage of Cannon (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 552, 556, 494 N.E.2d 490, 492; In re Marriage of Lawrence (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 307, 310, 496 N.E.2d 538, 541.) Therefore, the additional maintenance of $100,000 due under section 1.01 and the aggregate sum property settlement of $125,000 due under section 2.04 were “reduced to judgment” on the entry date of the supplemental judgment, July 24, 1984, and became immediately enforceable at that time. See Cannon, 112 Ill. 2d at 556, 494 N.E.2d at 492; Lawrence, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 496 N.E.2d at 540-41.

Because the sums due under the supplemental judgment are final judgments as set forth above, we find that interest attaches to these amounts as if it were any other final judgment. Section 2 — 1303 of the Code provides, in pertinent part:

“Judgments recovered in any court shall draw interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the judgment until satisfied or 6% per annum when the judgment debtor is a unit of local government, as defined in Section 1 of Article VII of the Constitution, school district, a community college district, or any other governmental entity. When judgment is entered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall be computed at the above rate, from the time when made or rendered to the time of entering judgment upon the same, and included in the judgment.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1303.)

The language of section 2 — 1303 has been held to be mandatory because it states that “[¿judgments *** shall draw interest” and refers to judgments recovered before any court and judgments entered upon any award, report or verdict. (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1303.) Reviewing courts have held that this language is positive and self-executing (Lucas v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 398, 400, 384 N.E.2d 938, 939) and that the accrual of interest cannot be limited (In re Marriage of Passiales (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 629, 640, 494 N.E.2d 541, 550).

The supreme court in Finley v. Finley (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 317, 410 N.E.2d 12, however, while noting a split of authority on the general issue of whether allowance of interest on a judgment in a divorce proceeding is mandatory or discretionary (compare Sutton v. Leib (7th Cir. 1952), 199 F.2d 163; Matzen v. Matzen (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 69, 387 N.E.2d 14; In re Estate of Neirinck (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 189, 379 N.E.2d 356; Atwater v. Atwater (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 202, 309 N.E.2d 632 (cases holding the allowance of interest to be discretionary), with Ellingwood v. Ellingwood (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 587, 323 N.E.2d 571; Neeland v. Neeland (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 803, 308 N.E.2d 651; Gregory v. Gregory (1964), 52 Ill. App. 2d 262, 202 N.E.2d 139; Shuff v. Fulte (1951), 344 Ill. App. 157, 100 N.E.2d 502; Wadler v. Wadler (1945), 325 Ill. App. 83, 59 N.E.2d 505 (cases holding the award of interest to be mandatory)), held that the allowance of interest on child support arrearages is not mandatory, but within the sound discretion of the circuit court.

We find that Finley is inapposite to the case at bar. In Finley, plaintiff was awarded interest on past-due periodic child support payments of which she had been deprived for a period in excess of 10 years. In determining whether to award interest to plaintiff on these sums, the court reasoned that since “a divorce proceeding partakes so much of the nature of a chancery proceeding *** it must be governed to a great extent by the rules that are applicable thereto.” (Finley, 81 Ill. 2d at 332, 410 N.E.2d at 19.) The court further stated, “[i]n a chancery proceeding, the allowance of interest lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and is allowed where warranted by equitable considerations and is disallowed if such an award would not comport with justice and equity.” Finley, 81 Ill. 2d at 332, 410 N.E.2d at 19.

We narrowly construe Finley as applying only to those cases involving past-due periodic child support payments. The supreme court, apparently for humanitarian reasons, carved out an exception to the interest statute by making it discretionary whether to award interest on past-due periodic child support payments. We find that its holding is not reasonably applicable to our facts, as the basis for the equitable consideration in Finley is wholly absent here.

The case at bar involves a division of marital property pursuant to an agreement between the parties, incorporated into the judgment of dissolution by a supplemental judgment. We see no just reason to expand the Finley exception to include judgments, such as the supplemental judgment presented here, which are certain, final and self-executing. To allow family law courts discretion concerning whether to award interest on final judgments would not only provoke litigation, but would further burden an already overburdened family court system.

With regard to Robert’s affirmative defenses in response to Beverly’s petition for interest, which he again raises here on appeal, we find that they lack merit.

Robert first asserts that he offered to pay Beverly the sum of $100,000, but she refused to accept payment. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that Beverly offered to accept payment of this sum, but Robert never tendered payment because his tax consultants informed him that there was “little, if any, financial benefit” under the agreement. Robert also contends that the parties signed an “Agreed Order,” in which Beverly would receive certain maintenance payments during the pendency of her appeal, in lieu of the payments ordered by the supplemental judgment. Under section 413(a) of the Act, however, maintenance payments cannot be “suspended or the enforcement thereof stayed pending [an] appeal.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 413(a).) Finally, Robert argues that Beverly, through her attorney, filed a responsive pleading admitting that she and Robert entered into a supersedeas agreement, which suspended the effect of the supplemental judgment. We find that the purported supersedeas is nebulous at best and could not have supported the circuit court’s determination to deny Beverly interest.

As to the correct computation of interest to be awarded here, we hold that interest at the legal rate of 9% (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1303) accrues beginning with the date that the payments became due under the supplemental judgment. (See Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317, 410 N.E.2d 12; Pope v. Pope (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 152, 117 N.E.2d 65; Dunn v. Thompson (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 944, 529 N.E.2d 297.) Interest will not attach for the period between the entry date of the supplemental judgment and the date the money judgments became due.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause to the circuit court to recompute the award of interest on the past-due amounts set forth in the supplemental judgment, consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

O’CONNOR, J., concurs.

JUSTICE QUINLAN,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision that an award of interest, pursuant to section 2 — 1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1303), on the supplemental judgment entered by the trial court here was mandatory. I believe, contrary to the majority, that this determination, i.e., whether interest on the supplementary judgment is mandatory, is controlled by our supreme court’s decision in Finley v. Finley (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 317, 410 N.E.2d 12.

The majority here does recognize that the supreme court in Finley specifically held “that a divorce proceeding partakes so much of the nature of a chancery proceeding that it must be governed to a great extent by the rules that are applicable thereto” and that, accordingly, “the allowance of interest lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and is allowed where warranted by equitable considerations and is disallowed if such an award would not comport with justice and equity. [Citations.]” (Finley, 81 Ill. 2d at 332, 410 N.E.2d at 19.) However, the majority dismisses Finley here simply by construing Finley narrowly, to apply “only to those cases involving past-due periodic *** payments” (190 Ill. App. 3d at 297) since, as the majority observes, the supreme court must have merely “carved out an exception to the interest statute *** [for] past-due periodic child support payments [on a humanitarian basis].” 190 Ill. App. 3d at 297.

Initially, I reject this construction of Finley by the majority because I do not believe it is the prerogative of the appellate court to limit a supreme court’s decision to its particular facts merely because it does not find that court’s ruling particularly compelling. Rather, we, as an intermediate court of review, are required to apply such precedent to all those situations where the ruling is reasonably applicable. Additionally, in any event, here there is nothing in the supreme court’s opinion to give any support to the majority’s gratuitous conclusion that the court was merely carving out an exception to the interest statute, for humanitarian reasons, in the case of past-due child support payments. In fact, to the contrary, the supreme court specifically found that section 2 — 1303 did not apply at all to divorce proceedings since divorce proceedings were in the nature of a chancery proceeding and not similar to actions at law. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d at 332, 410 N.E.2d at 19.

Of course, it is also not the function of an intermediate appellate court, such as ours, to alter the law as pronounced by our State supreme court. As the supreme court noted in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 546, 551, 457 N.E.2d 1, 3:

“[T]he nature of our court system requires that law established by this court’s decision be followed when the question decided arises again before a court. If precedent is not judicially respected, the uniformity and stability of decision, which is essential to the proper administration of justice, will be destroyed. The appellate court panel [here] usurped the function of this court, *** and created a conflict in appellate court decisions. *** [In Beagley v. Andel (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 588, 591, 374 N.E.2d 929, 932] the appellate court properly observed: ‘It is fundamental that appellate courts are without authority to overrule the supreme court or to modify its decisions.’ ”

We are, thus, in my opinion, without any authority to restrict our supreme court’s decision in the Finley case solely to cases of past-due child support payments involving humanitarian considerations. See Robinson v. Robinson (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612, 488 N.E.2d 1349, 1351, where this court followed Finley and held that the award of interest in a divorce proceeding, in spite of section 2 — 1303, was not mandatory but was within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Here, I further believe that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying an award of interest on the payments that Robert agreed to pay under the supplemental judgment. The supplemental judgment directed that the additional maintenance was to be paid over a one-year period of time and that the monies to be paid as a property settlement were to be paid in three installments. In addition, there was evidence here that the parties entered into another “agreed order” as a supersedeas, pending the appeal of the validity of the supplementary judgment filed by Beverly, which contended that the supplementary judgment itself was unfair and was obtained through coercion. (This court upheld the validity of the settlement, as noted by the majority, in In re Marriage of Morris (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 380, 497 N.E.2d 1173.) Moreover, there was also evidence that Robert was, in fact, willing to pay the additional maintenance award and property settlement (although, perhaps, no formal tender was made), but that Beverly was fearful that any such payment might prejudice her then-pending appeal. In fact, Robert did make payments pursuant to the “agreed order” of the parties pending appeal. In any event, based on the record here, the trial court could well have concluded that Robert acted in good faith and had not arbitrarily withheld the payments and that, therefore, interest was not appropriate. (See In re Marriage of Bjorklund (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 576, 410 N.E.2d 890.) In such circumstances, under the supreme court’s ruling in Finley, I do not see how this court could find that the trial court abused its discretion.

Hence, I would affirm the decision of the trial court and, therefore, I dissent.

      Beverly filed a motion to vacate the judgment of dissolution of marriage incorporating the oral property settlement agreement, alleging that the settlement was unfair and obtained through coercion. The motion was denied and Beverly appealed to this court, where we upheld the validity of the settlement agreement in In re Marriage of Morris (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 380, 497 N.E.2d 1173.

      The $100,000 additional maintenance was paid on April 10, 1987, and the $125,000 aggregate sum property settlement was ultimately paid sometime after August 26, 1987, the date in which the circuit court ordered Robert to make the payments under section 2.04 of the supplemental judgment.

      I also concur with the trial court, which held that section 2 — 1303 was inapplicable for, as the trial court noted, both of the orders here requiring the making of additional payments had not been “reduced to judgment,” that is, they were not “certain, final and self-executing” judgments for the payment of money. I find that the supplemental judgment was more in the nature of a decree, merely ordering certain types of payments to be made in the future, and thus, similar to orders typically found in a chancery proceeding, and not similar to a judgment for the payment of a fixed and certain sum of money, characteristic of a law proceeding. This difference, in my opinion, renders section 2 — 1303 not applicable to the supplemental judgment.


author: JUSTICE QUINLAN JUSTICE O’CONNOR,

text:
    T.J. GENDRON, Indiv. and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    First District (1st Division)
    No. 1—88—1630
    Opinion filed October 30, 1989.

      O’CONNOR, J., dissenting.
    Schopf & Weiss, of Chicago, and Timothy D. Kelly and Cindy J. Larson, both of Minneapolis, Minnesota (Steven A. Weiss and Arthur J. Howe, of counsel), for appellants.
    Harold C. Hirshman and Jeffrey L. Dorman, both of Sonnenschein, Carlin, Nath & Rosenthal, and James P. Daley, Stuart F. Gassner, and Myles L. Tobin, all of Chicago & North Western Transportation Company, both of Chicago, for appellee Chicago & North Western Transportation Company.
    Susan Getzendanner and Eileen A. Kamerick, both of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, of Chicago, for appellee Fox River Valley Railroad Corporation.
   JUSTICE QUINLAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is brought by creditors of a railroad to enjoin the sale of a portion of the railroad as a fraudulent conveyance and for damages occasioned by the fraudulent conveyance. The trial court entered judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint on the basis that it was preempted by the minor dispute provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) (45 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1982)), and by the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) (49 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. (1982)). The trial court also held that Illinois common law preempts plaintiffs’ claim of civil conspiracy. We affirm.

Defendant Chicago and North Western Transportation Company (C&NW) is one of the nation’s largest rail systems. Defendant Fox River Valley Corporation (FRVR) was incorporated in September 1987 for the purpose of acquiring 208 miles of Wisconsin rail line and incidental trackage rights from C&NW (Duck Creek South Line).

Plaintiff T.J. Gendron (Gendron) is an employee of C&NW and alleges that he is a creditor of C&NW. Plaintiff Railway Labor Executives’ Association (RLEA) is a voluntary, unincorporated association of the chief executive officers of the standard national and international railway unions in the United States and alleges that it also is a creditor of C&NW.

In late 1987, C&NW and FRVR began negotiating C&NW’s sale of the Duck Creek South Lines and certain other trackage rights to FRVR. As part of the transaction, FRVR is to receive trackage rights over C&NW lines and C&NW has reserved an easement over FRVR lines. C&NW is to receive $61.1 million from the sale and will continue to operate as a Class I railroad.

On December 23, 1987, C&NW and FRVR filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) a notice of exemption, seeking approval of the sale and requesting clarification of the Commission’s jurisdiction over labor issues arising from line sale transactions.

On January 29, 1988, the Commission granted defendants a license exemption, giving defendants authority to proceed with the sale. On February 19, 1988, the RLEA filed a petition for revocation of the exemption from regulation. At the time this appeal was filed, that petition was still pending before the Commission.

Prior to the granting of the license exemption, on January 22, 1988, plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County.

The complaint alleged that the sale constituted a fraudulent conveyance under Illinois law and was the product of a civil conspiracy. The complaint sought to enjoin the sale or to create a lien on the track to be sold, other injunctive relief and damages.

In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that C&NW’s purpose in making the sale to FRVR was to avoid the cost burden of ownership, including continuing to pay plaintiffs’ wages and benefits. Plaintiffs claim that the transaction is a highly leveraged buyout and that C&NW will use the proceeds of the sale to pay favored creditors or to pay dividends or other benefits to its shareholders rather than addressing plaintiffs’ debts. It also alleges that FRVR will be left dangerously undercapitalized, with the bulk of its assets pledged as security for the benefit of persons other than the plaintiffs.

On February 1, 1988, C&NW and FRVR filed a petition for removal under 28 U.S.C. §§1441 and 1446 and the case was removed to Federal court. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, and defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss, asserting that plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted by the RLA and ICA. The Federal district court held that neither the RLA nor the ICA was a complete preemption statute and, thus, did not give rise to Federal removal jurisdiction.

Upon remand to the circuit court, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as preempted by the RLA and ICA. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and plaintiffs now bring this appeal.

The principal issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs’ causes of action under the Illinois fraudulent conveyance act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 59, par. 4) are preempted by the Railway Labor Act and the Interstate Commerce Act. Plaintiffs’ contention is that their fraudulent conveyance action is not a “minor dispute” within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act and, therefore, the claim is not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railway Adjustment Board (NRAB). Defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ contentions are in fact matters within the collective-bargaining agreement and are accordingly a minor dispute within the Railway Labor Act. Furthermore, the defendants assert, the plaintiffs’ claims here are preempted by the Interstate Commerce Act.

Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act in an effort to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing “effective and efficient remedies for the resolution of railroad-employee disputes arising out of the interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements.” (Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Sheehan (1978), 439 U.S. 89, 94, 58 L. Ed. 2d 354, 359, 99 S. Ct. 399, 402 (per curiam).) More specifically, the RLA was enacted to prevent disruption in rail service by providing for the prompt and orderly settlement “of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions” and “all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. §151a (1982).

Labor disputes under the RLA are classified as either “major” or “minor.” A “major dispute” involves the acquisition of new rights, such as the formation of a collective-bargaining agreement or changes to an existing agreement. (See Gregory v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co. (D. Minn. 1986), 638 F. Supp. 538, 541, aff'd (8th Cir. 1987), 822 F.2d 1092.) A “minor dispute,” which defendants assert is what is at issue here, involves the interpretation or application of existing contracts. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R. Co. (1957), 353 U.S. 30, 33, 1 L. Ed. 2d 622, 625, 77 S. Ct. 635, 637.

The exclusive remedy for “minor disputes” is the Federal dispute resolution procedure set forth in RLA section 3 First (45 U.S.C. §153 First (1982)), which requires that such disputes must be pursued initially through the railroad’s internal procedures, and, if not resolved there, may be submitted to a division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB). (See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell (1987), 480 U.S. 557, 94 L. Ed. 2d 563, 107 S. Ct. 1410.) Exclusive jurisdiction over “minor disputes” is vested with the NRAB because of the Board’s administrative expertise in interpreting collective-bargaining agreements and because of the importance of uniform administrative interpretation of such agreements. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Day (1959), 360 U.S. 548, 551-52, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1422, 1426, 79 S. Ct. 1322, 1324.

In our view, plaintiffs’ claims in this case are substantially related to the rights and obligations embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement and would, of necessity, require interpretation of the agreement. Therefore, we agree with defendants’ argument that the RLA preempts plaintiffs’ fraudulent conveyance action and provides the sole and exclusive remedy for plaintiffs’ claims here.

Our supreme court recently considered a similar issue in Koehler v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 542. There the court determined that any claim involving a State tort claim is preempted by the RLA regardless of the nature of the claim.

In Koehler, the supreme court found in pertinent part:

“The RLA is an elaborate and extensive administrative scheme. (45 U.S.C. secs. 151 through 163 (1982).) Under *** [which] ‘disputes *** growing out of grievances’ are to be resolved in the first instance by the parties. If the parties are unsuccessful, the RLA provides that the dispute be referred to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for resolution. (45 U.S.C. sec. 153 First (i) (1982).) Decisions of the Adjustment Board are final and binding. (45 U.S.C. sec. 153 First (m) (1982).) Under the RLA, a party dissatisfied with a decision of the Adjustment Board may obtain limited review in Federal district court with appeal to the court of appeals. (45 U.S.C. sec. 153 First (q) (1982).) The RLA does not accord original jurisdiction over employment-related disputes to either Federal or State courts. Original, exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Adjustment Board. (45 U.S.C. sec. 153 First (i) (1982).) ***
[Hence] [o]ur review of the RLA indicates that plaintiff’s [tort] suit for retaliatory discharge is precluded as an ‘undue interference’ with the dispute-resolution scheme of the RLA. Stripped to its essentials, plaintiff’s suit is a reformulation in tort of his grievance which, as the record shows, fell within the purview of the RLA. Allowing plaintiff’s suit to proceed would allow a State court, applying State law, to resolve ‘disputes *** growing out of grievances.’ (45 U.S.C. sec. 153 First (i) (1982).) *** [Such a] result would unduly interfere with the operation of the dispute-resolution machinery of the RLA.” Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 479-80, 488 N.E.2d at 545-46.

The court there concluded:

“A thorough reading of the RLA makes clear Congress’ intent that employment-based disputes between parties covered by the RLA are to be resolved exclusively pursuant to the Act. Under the RLA, State courts have no jurisdiction to hear and resolve such disputes. (45 U.S.C. secs. 153 First (i), (q) (1982).)” (Emphasis added.) Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 479-80, 488 N.E.2d at 545-46.

The plaintiffs argue, however, that Koehler must be reexamined because of the Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988), 486 U.S. 399, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 108 S. Ct. 1877, decision, in which the Supreme Court held that a State retaliatory discharge claim was not preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) (29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982)). We do not find this argument persuasive. In fact, our supreme court, prior to Lingle, considered a similar issue in Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 308, and found that although a claim for retaliatory discharge was not preempted by section 301 of the LMRA, this did not have any bearing on its prior decision in Koehler. The court specifically noted that its decision in Koehler was based not on the LMRA but the RLA, and that, therefore:

“Prestress’ [the plaintiff’s] reliance on Koehler *** [was] misplaced. Koehler involved the preemptive effect of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. secs. 151 through 164 (1982)) and is therefore clearly inapposite [to this case, which involves the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)].” Gonzalez, 115 Ill. 2d at 11, 503 N.E.2d at 313.

Additionally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a related case, which involved these same parties held, addressing essentially the same claims asserted by the plaintiffs here, that the claims were a minor dispute under RLA, and as such, a controversy within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railway Adjustment Board (NRAB). (Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Ry. Labor Executives Association (7th Cir. 1988), 855 F.2d 1277, 1286.) The court stated:

“RLEA insists that C & NW does not have a right under the collective bargaining agreements to abolish jobs within the context of a rail line sale and concurrently refuse to negotiate over the effects of that sale on its present employees. ***
*** C & NW contends [on the other hand] that the job abolishment, layoff and reassignment actions it will take as a result of the Duck Creek South line sale are fully authorized by the collective bargaining agreements. ***
* * *
We have carefully evaluated the claims of the parties and examined the evidence in the record as to the terms of their collective bargaining agreements and the relevant past practices attendant to those agreements. There can be no doubt that the agreements and past practice arising thereunder embrace matters of job abolishment, layoff and reassignment resulting from a layoff with regard to the individuals affected by the Duck Creek South line sale who are able to retain their employment with C & NW. ***
* * *
Our analysis leaves us convinced that even though C & NW’s interpretation of the agreements and its contentions are subject to challenge, they are at least plausible. See Machinists, 830 F.2d at 748. Because C & NW’s position has at least an arguable basis in the collective bargaining agreements and relevant past practice, it cannot be said to constitute the type of clear departure from those agreements necessary to trigger a finding of a §6 major dispute under the RLA format. See Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 802 F.2d at 1022.
* * *
*** Therefore, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that because the present controversy is a minor dispute under the RLA, it is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB, and must be resolved under the Act’s §3 RLA procedures. 45 U.S.C. §153.” Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 855 F.2d at 1284-86.

Also, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the very same issues presented here in Deford v. Soo Line R.R. Co. (8th Cir. 1989), 867 F.2d 1080. The court there held that the State claims based upon the Minnesota common law and the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act were preempted by both the Railway Labor Act and the Interstate Commerce Act. In determining that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims and found:

"The existence and extent of the creditor’s rights asserted by Deford [individual plaintiff] and the RLE A *** can be determined only by interpreting the collective bargaining agreements. Even on the face of the complaint Deford predicates his claims upon entitlements to accrued but unpaid wages, vacation pay, life and health insurance, pension contributions, and severance benefits arising ‘pursuant to continuing labor contracts and employee protection agreements.’ Similarly, RLE A alleges entitlements ‘pursuant to the various collective bargaining agreements.’ In fact, all of plaintiffs’ allegations regarding ‘creditors’ rights’ and ‘creditor obligations’ are based entirely upon supposed rights to unspecified and unquantified ‘wages, benefits and labor protection’ pursuant to the labor agreements. Deford and RLEA further assert as a basis for relief that ‘[ejmployees who quit would waive their rights under the Labor Agreements.’ Indeed, a theme that runs throughout the complaint is the defendants’ alleged ‘circumvention of the burden of the Labor Agreements for Lake States’ employees’ through the sale.
* * *
Deford [further asserts] *** that the Minnesota fraudulent transfer act ‘imposes duties and obligations on all creditors completely independent of any collective bargaining agreement.’ This statement, however, mischaracterizes the nature of the fraudulent conveyance statute. The *** Fraudulent Transfer Act is not substantive in nature, but instead merely confers an alternate remedy for protecting preexisting creditor rights. The creditor rights a party seeks to enforce must exist under independent law, such as contract law. See Brill v. W.B. Foshay Co., 65 F.2d 420, 423 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 643, 54 S. Ct. 61, 78 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1933) (interpreting the Minnesota Fraudulent Transfer Act). The purpose of the statute is to grant creditors additional enforcement possibilities when a debtor transfers his assets to a third party. In this case the creditors rights asserted are based upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreements and the Minnesota statute only provides an additional method for enforcing the terms of the agreements. We therefore affirm the district court’s finding that Deford’s claims directly involve the collective bargaining agreements and constitute ‘minor disputes’ under the RLA.” Soo Line R.R. Co., 867 F.2d at 1086-87.

The Court summarized its ruling as follows:

“In conclusion, [the plaintiff] is essentially claiming that if the sale of rail lines from Soo Line to Wisconsin Central is not, in effect, unwound, the transaction will result in a breach of Soo Line’s obligations under the existing collective bargaining agreements. Thus, by asserting state law claims, [plaintiff] seeks enforcement of the terms of the collective bargaining agreements. The fraudulent conveyance act serves only as an enforcement mechanism. We believe [plaintiff] is only trying to invoke a state law remedy in place of the mandatory and exclusive remedies of the Railway Labor Act, and we therefore affirm the district court’s removal of the suit to federal court and its subsequent dismissal of the case.” Soo Line R.R. Co., 867 F.2d at 1088.

This is exactly what plaintiffs Gendron and RLEA have attempted to do here. Thus, we believe that under both State law and Federal law, their claims here are also preempted by the RLA.

The plaintiffs, on the other hand, cite Ry. Labor Executives Association v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. (3d Cir. 1988), 858 F.2d 936 (cited hereafter as P & LE) and claim that it warrants a contrary result. We do not agree. First, the Eighth Circuit Court in Soo Line R.R. Co. considered the P & LE case in its opinion and did not find it persuasive. We concur with the Eighth Circuit and find its analysis of the issues to be more persuasive. Second, a careful reading of the Third Circuit opinion does not suggest that a different result, i.e., concerning RLA preemption, would be appropriate here. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the P & LE case merely concluded that the case should not have been removed from the State court, and not that the State court action was not preempted. The court there specifically found that those issues were quite different, stating:

“We conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction under [the] applicable principles of removal law. As we explicate *** [later], we also conclude that the district court should have addressed the removal issue first and remanded to the state court, leaving the issues of forum preemption for determination by the state court. *** [We also] emphasize that our holding is a narrow one and identify the issues that we leave for resolution by the state court. Among those issues is the question of whether the rules of law provided by the [Pennsylvania Fraudulent Conveyance Act] are preempted by federal law. As we shall see, this ‘ordinary preemption’ issue concerning the applicable principles of substantive law is distinct from the ‘complete preemption’ [removal] issue ***.” P & LE, 858 F.2d at 939.

Moreover, we also concur with the Eighth Circuit’s finding in Soo Line R.R. Co. that the Interstate Commerce Act so pervasively occupies the field of railroad governance that it completely preempts the State claims here also. We further believe, contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, that the United States Supreme Court decision in Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Title Co. (1981), 450 U.S. 311, 67 L. Ed. 2d 258, 101 S. Ct. 1124, also warrants our conclusion that the ICA preempts the asserted State claims here. The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the present case on the basis that in Kalo the Commission there had addressed the merits of the issues raised in the State action, that there is no equivalent remedy under the ICA for an allegedly defrauded creditor, and that the ICC process of revocation of a sale [which is allegedly the remedy available] is not equivalent to State remedies here, because such remedies are only granted in extraordinary circumstances and then only if the national transportation policy is affected. Again, we find the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals consideration of this issue in Soo Line R.R. Co. to be persuasive here. There, the Eighth Circuit rejected similar efforts by the plaintiffs to distinguish the Kalo case. That court found such assertions in support of the State-law claims there to be merely a collateral attack upon the ICC’s decision to exempt the sale of a portion of the railroad from regulation under the statute. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such an effort to prevent the sale through an action brought in State court under the guise of State law was completely preempted by the IGA. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also found that the United States Supreme Court had reached that same result in Venner v. Michigan Central R.R. Co. (1926), 271 U.S. 127, 70 L. Ed. 868, 46 S. Ct. 444, in similar circumstances. The Eighth Circuit there quoted certain portions of that Supreme Court decision which we find to be relevant here. The Supreme Court in Venner stated:

“ ‘[The State claim is] essentially one to annul or set aside the order of the [ICC]. While the [complaint] does not expressly pray that the order be annulled or set aside, it does assail the validity of the order and pray that the defendant [companies] be enjoined from doing what the order specifically authorizes, which is equivalent to asking that the order be adjudged invalid and set aside.’ ” Soo Line R.R. Co., 867 F.2d at 1091, quoting Venner, 271 U.S. at 130, 70 L. Ed. at 869, 46 S. Ct. at 445.

This, again, is exactly what the plaintiffs here attempt to accomplish by the asserted State claims in this case. Consequently, we find the above authorities to be relevant, persuasive, and controlling. Thus, we must also conclude that the plaintiffs’ State claims are additionally barred by the exclusivity of the provisions of the ICA, as well as those of the RLA.

Finally, we concur with the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim here is also preempted by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. In Bartley v. University Asphalt Co. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 318, 489 N.E.2d 1367, our supreme court ruled that Federal labor law preempted Illinois tort claims for retaliatory discharge and civil conspiracy which, we believe, also bars any attempt to plead a civil conspiracy claim here. (Bartley, 111 Ill. 2d at 333, 489 N.E.2d at 1374.) The plaintiffs in the present case argue that Bartley, too, has been overruled by Lingle. We disagree and find Lingle inapposite to the situation described in Bartley. There, our supreme court held:

“Although styled as a State tort suit for retaliatory discharge and civil conspiracy, it is clear that plaintiff’s complaint alleges a violation of a collective-bargaining agreement ***. ***
*** As such, plaintiff has alleged a violation of ‘a duty grounded in Federal statutes, and that Federal law therefore governs his cause of action.’ [Citation.]
*** [Plaintiff] argues, however, that the action for civil conspiracy is sufficiently independent from the Federal claim so as to avoid preemption. We disagree. An evaluation of plaintiff’s cause of action for civil conspiracy reveals that it is ‘substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of [the collective-bargaining] agreement.’ [Citation.] *** Thus, plaintiff’s State tort claim for civil conspiracy is ‘inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.’ [Citation.]” Bartley, 111 Ill. 2d at 330-32, 489 N.E.2d at 1372-73.

It is clear from this language that the court in Bartley considered the specific assertions of the plaintiff and found that they were intertwined with the collective-bargaining agreement. Therefore, we believe that the Lingle decision does not affect the supreme court’s decision in Bartlett, since the Lingle Court itself held that if the resolution of a State claim depended upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the State-law claim was preempted and Federal labor law principles must resolve the dispute. (Lingle, 486 U.S. 399, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 108 S. Ct. 1877.) As we noted earlier, plaintiffs’ claims here are also founded upon alleged rights they obtained under the collective-bargaining agreement. Hence, the plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim alleging an abridgement of these rights is also preempted under Federal law.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.

Judgment affirmed.

MANNING, P.J., concurs.

JUSTICE O’CONNOR,

dissenting:

In light of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988), 86 U.S. 399, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 108 S. Ct. 1877, decided after the order was entered by the trial court below, I respectfully dissent.

I believe that a determination of plaintiffs’ claim in this case is substantially independent of rights and obligations embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement, as it requires no interpretation of the agreement. Therefore, I cannot adopt the majority’s conclusion that the Railway Labor Act preempts plaintiffs’ fraudulent conveyance action and provides the sole and exclusive remedy for plaintiffs’ claims here.

In Lingle, the Court traced the history of preemption under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) and concluded:

“[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for §301 pre-emption purposes.” (Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 421,108 S. Ct. at 1883.)

That this is a practical, straightforward test, which preserves the consistency and integrity of the collective-bargaining process while not interfering with workers’ State and Federal substantive rights which are independent of the collective-bargaining process was recognized in Bettis v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. (7th Cir. 1989), 878 F.2d 192, 196, Douglas v. American Information Technologies Corp. (7th Cir. 1989), 877 F.2d 565, 569, and International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, IAM Local 437 v. United States Can Co. (1989), 150 Wis. 2d 479,_, 441 N.W.2d 710, 711. The Lingle court went on to state that while a collective-bargaining agreement might contain information on rates of pay and other benefits that a court might resort to in determining damages under a State-law claim, the underlying State-law claim would not be preempted despite the fact that Federal law would govern the interpretation of the agreement with respect to the question of damages. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 n.12, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 423 n.12,108 S. Ct. at 1885 n.12.

The majority’s response to Lingle is that it was decided under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and is therefore irrelevant to the determination of any case brought under the RLA. The majority maintains that under Koehler v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 542, which held that a suit for retaliatory discharge was preempted by the Railway Labor Act, plaintiffs’ fraudulent conveyance action is clearly preempted.

While Koehler would appear to require that all State tort claims be preempted by the RLA irrespective of the nature of the claim, I belleve that Lingle requires us to examine the relationship between the State-law claim and the bargaining agreement in order to determine whether the State tort law “purports to define the meaning of the contract relationship” and is therefore preempted (see Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 213, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 216-17, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912), or is sufficiently independent of the contract that it is not. (Lingle, 486 U.S. at 412-13, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 423, 108 S. Ct. at 1885.) Although Koehler states that the RLA preempts “employment-based disputes” (Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 480), the actual claim at issue in Koehler stemmed from a grievance. Koehler did not hold that the RLA preempted all State law; it held that a claim for retaliatory discharge was preempted where the suit was simply a reformulation in tort of a grievance. Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 480.

While the RLA has been held to preempt State-law causes of action if the claim derives from the railroad employment relationship (see, e.g., Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley (1945), 325 U.S. 711, 722-23, 89 L. Ed. 1886, 1894, 65 S. Ct. 1282, 1289-90; Leu v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (7th Cir. 1987), 820 F.2d 825, 831), it is generally recognized that the RLA is not completely preemptive. See, e.g., Price v. PSA, Inc. (9th Cir. 1987), 829 F.2d 871, 874-76 (and cases cited therein); cf. Deford v. Soo Line R.R. Co. (8th Cir. 1989), 867 F.2d 1080, 1085.

Various approaches have been used to determine whether a State-law claim is preempted by the minor dispute provisions of the RLA. In Stephens v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (6th Cir. 1986), 792 F.2d 576, mod. (1986), 811 F.2d 286, the court stated that such claims should be evaluated in the following manner:

“If the ‘action is based on a matrix of facts which are inextricably intertwined with the grievance machinery of the collective bargaining agreement and of the R.L.A.,’ exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB preempts the action.” (Stephens, 792 F.2d at 580, quoting Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (9th Cir. 1978), 576 F.2d 1367, 1369).)

In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 105 S. Ct. 1904, the Court held that a dispute must be more than merely “incident to” an employment relationship in order to be preempted. The Court stated:

“[N]ot every dispute concerning employment or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is preempted by §301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.” (Emphasis added.) Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 215, 105 S. Ct. at 1911.

The Allis-Chalmers Court framed the test as “whether the [tort claim] *** confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 216, 105 S. Ct. at 1912.

In a section 301 context, then, a court must inquire whether the labor agreement contains provisions governing the conduct that gave rise to the State claim. If it does so, the court must determine whether the State has articulated a standard sufficiently clear so as to avoid consideration of contract provisions and whether the State has shown an intent not to allow its prohibitions to be altered or waived by contract. (Miller v. AT&T Network Systems (9th Cir. 1988), 850 F.2d 543, 546-47.) In order to avoid preemption, a claim must be based on a genuine public policy, i.e., one expressed in State statute; and it must pose no threat to the collective-bargaining process. Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc. (9th Cir. 1987), 830 F.2d 993, 1001.

While I recognize that Lueck and Lingle were brought under the LMRA and that the RLA and the LMRA differ in certain significant respects, it is clear that the Federal courts frequently rely on the reasoning of cases brought under the LMRA and other labor legislation in reaching results in actions brought under the RLA and vice versa. (See, e.g., Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. (1972), 406 U.S. 320, 323, 32 L. Ed. 2d 95, 99, 92 S. Ct. 1562, 1564 (RLA case relying on LMRA cases); Leu v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (7th Cir. 1987), 820 F.2d 825, 830 (concluding that the reasoning of Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, brought under the LMRA, is applicable to determining whether a cause of action brought under State tort law actually arises under an RLA collective-bargaining agreement); see also Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (7th Cir. 1985), 773 F.2d 807; Minehart v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. (6th Cir. 1984), 731 F.2d 342 (preemption case in context of National Labor Relations Act found applicable in context of RLA). Lingle, while brought under the LMRA, relied on the reasoning of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell (1987), 480 U.S. 557, 94 L. Ed. 2d 563, 107 S. Ct. 1410, an RLA case rejecting a claim that Federal labor law preempted a State statute and holding that a State-law claim can coexist with a Federal labor remedy.

Having concluded that the principles set out in Lingle are applicable here, I believe the determinative issue is whether adjudication of a claim under the Illinois fraudulent conveyance act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 59, par. 4) would require interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement and therefore be subject to preemption under the RLA. I believe it does not. In order to state a claim under the fraudulent conveyance act, plaintiffs must set forth sufficient facts from which it can be inferred that plaintiffs are creditors of the railroad making the conveyance and that the transfer of property made between C&NW and FRVR will impair their rights as creditors. Both Gendron and RLEA have alleged that they are creditors of C&NW and that C&NW’s purpose in selling track and related property is to avoid the cost burden of paying certain wages and benefits. Whether these allegations state a cause of action for fraudulent conveyance can be evaluated without recourse to the collective-bargaining agreement. They are purely factual questions that pertain to the status of plaintiffs as creditors and the conduct and motivation of the defendant railroads in transferring the property in issue. In my view, the State-law remedy is independent of the collective-bargaining agreement in that “resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 420, 108 S. Ct. at 1882.

This result would not conflict with the national policy underlying the RLA, which is to avoid interruption of interstate railway transportation (see Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley (1945), 325 U.S. 711, 722-23, 89 L. Ed. 1886, 1894, 65 S. Ct. 1282, 1289-90), as there is no suggestion or likelihood that an action brought under a State fraudulent conveyance action would jeopardize the stability of railway transportation. Equally important is that the issues raised by a fraudulent conveyance claim are squarely within the expertise of a court of law and outside the expertise of the National Railway Adjustment Board, whose sole function is to interpret negotiated agreements. (See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 219-20, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 220-21, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1915; Southern Pacific Co. v. Joint Council of Dining Car Employees, Locals 456 & 582 (9th Cir. 1947), 165 F.2d 26.) The right to pursue a fraudulent conveyance action based on a leveraged buyout is outside the scope of an agreement that could be collectively bargained inasmuch as parties to a collective-bargaining agreement may not contract for something that is illegal under State law nor may they forego rights or obligations provided under State law that are independent of the labor contract. (International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, IAM Local 437 v. United States Can Co. (1989), 150 Wis. 2d 479, 441 N.W.2d 710.) In summary, I believe that plaintiffs’ fraudulent conveyance action is a State-law claim not subject to preemption under the RLA, as the action requires no substantial interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement and the right claimed would at most require tangential reference to the collective-bargaining agreement.

I also am not persuaded that the Interstate Commerce Act preempts plaintiffs’ fraudulent conveyance claims. While the majority cites Deford v. Soo Line R.R. Co. (8th Cir. 1989), 867 F.2d 1080, 1091, to the effect that the State-law claim must necessarily be barred as it was brought to annul or set aside a valid ICC order, plaintiffs here have plainly stated that they are not seeking to bar the sale of the Duck Creek South line by attempting to set aside the ICC order. Nor are they seeking labor protective conditions, which they acknowledge that the ICC has the authority to impose on certain rail transactions. (See, e.g., New York Dock Ry.—Control—Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal (1979), 360 I.C.C. 60.) Rather, plaintiffs are seeking to bar what they allege to be the fraudulent form of the sale and to ensure that the sale takes place in a manner that does not violate the Illinois fraudulent conveyance act.

The ICA does not have as broad a preemptive scope as certain other legislation related to labor. (See, e.g., Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux (1987), 481 U.S. 41, 46-47, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39, 46-47, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1551-53 (discussing broad preemptive effect of ERISA).) While the ICA provides comprehensive regulation of common carriers by rail in interstate commerce, this regulation focuses primarily on the licensing and pricing of rail services. (See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §10102 (1982).) Although the ICC has broad powers, it does not regulate every aspect of a railroad’s operations, and State action is not necessarily precluded. In short, in the absence of a specific statement of preemptive intent by Congress or persuasive reasons for finding such intent, preemption of State law by Federal statute or regulation is simply not favored. Hayfield Northern R.R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. (1984), 467 U.S. 622, 632-34, 81 L. Ed. 2d 527, 536, 104 S. Ct. 2610, 2616-17; Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co. (1981), 450 U.S. 311, 317, 67 L. Ed. 2d 258, 264-65, 101 S. Ct. 1124, 1130, citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul (1963), 373 U.S. 132, 142, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248, 257, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217.

The jurisdictional section at issue here, 49 U.S.C. §10901 (1982), provides that a newly formed carrier seeking to acquire and operate an existing rail line must obtain the prior approval of the ICC. That section also provides exemptions for certain sales under Class Exemption for the Acquisition and Operation of Rail Lines Under U.S.C. §10901 (1985), 1 I.C.C. 2d 810 (Ex Parte No. 392). Under the policy established by Ex Parte No. 392, transactions involving the acquisition of railroad lines by noncarriers are automatically exempted from licensing seven days after an application is filed without addressing the financial aspects of the sale or the impact on the railroad’s creditors. Nothing under section 10901 addresses the question of whether the ICC should consider the interests of the railroad’s unsecured creditors in making an exemption determination; in fact, such considerations are left to State common law. See Deford v. Soo Line R.R. Co. (8th Cir. 1989), 867 F.2d 1080, 1093, (Lay, C.J., dissenting).

The majority relies principally on Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co. (1981), 450 U.S. 311, 67 L. Ed. 2d 258, 101 S. Ct. 1124, in which the Supreme Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act precludes a shipper from pressing a State-court action for damages against a regulated carrier when the Interstate Commerce Commission, in approving the carrier’s application for abandonment, has reached the merits of the matters the shipper sought to raise in State court. (Kalo Brick, 450 U.S. at 327, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 271, 101 S. Ct. at 1135.) The ruling in Kalo specifically focused on the fact that the Commission had already addressed the merits of the issues the shipper sought to raise in the State court and noted that a shipper who was harmed had specific statutory remedies available. Circumstances here are distinguishable from those in Kalo, in that here the ICC did not reach the merits of the fraudulent conveyance issue, nor was it required to do so. (See 49 U.S.C. §10901 (1982); Ex Parte No. 392 (1985), 1 I.C.C. 2d 810.) Kalo Brick is further distinguishable in that here, there is no equivalent remedy for a creditor who is defrauded by a fraudulent conveyance of a railroad. The ICC revocation process is not comparable to the statutory remedies noted in Kalo Brick in that under Ex Parte No. 392, revocations are only granted in extraordinary circumstances that would justify the imposition of labor protective conditions and ICC exemptions are revoked only when regulation is necessary to carry out the transportation policy of section 10101(a). (49 U.S.C. § 10505(d) (1982).) Thus, even if the ICC were presented with facts evidencing a fraud on creditors, it would not be required to revoke the exemption and impose regulations absent some interference with national rail transportation policy.

The railroads in their brief also relied on Ry. Labor Executives’ Association v. Staten Island R.R. Corp. (2d Cir. 1986), 792 F.2d 7, 11-12, in which the court dismissed the RLEA’s attempt to enjoin the sale of a railroad, finding that to do so would impinge on the plenary authority of the ICC to approve the sale in question. That case is distinguishable in that it involved the sale of a railroad pursuant to ICA section 10905, a forced sale provision requiring a financially ailing railroad to sell its assets as an alternative to abandonment. Since the ICC order had directed the seller to complete the sale, the court concluded that an injunction could not be granted without modifying the mandatory order and that such an attack could be made only on direct appeal from the ICC order. (Staten Island, 792 F.2d at 12.) Plaintiffs here are not seeking to stop the sale of the railroad, or in other respects interfere with the need for a “nondivided authority over interstate commerce” (Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Stroud (1925), 267 U.S. 404, 408, 69 L. Ed. 683, 685, 45 S. Ct. 242, 245), but to delay the transaction until it is determined whether it conforms to State fraudulent conveyance law.

In Terry v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 1986), 679 F. Supp. 1467, an interstate carrier argued that it was exempt from the Illinois franchise disclosure act because the ICC had previously approved the acquisition of a majority of its stock and the franchise act improperly hindered the carriers’ exercise of its franchise agreements. The court found that requiring compliance with the franchise act would not interfere with what the ICC authorized the carrier to do. (Terry, 679 F. Supp. at 1473.) As in Terry, plaintiffs’ claims under the fraudulent conveyance act ultimately will not interfere with what the ICC authorized the railroads to do. I therefore conclude that the ICG’s authorization of the sale does not remove the transaction from the application of State laws which do not conflict with the ICC’s authority over national transportation policy.

The railroads in their brief also assert that plaintiffs have failed to plead a fraudulent conveyance and that the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs would constitute an equitable attachment, which is prohibited by Illinois law under Exchange National Bank v. Harris (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 382, 386-88, 466 N.E.2d 1079. They argue that a conveyance by a solvent debtor who retains sufficient property to pay his debts will not be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance.

Illinois recognizes two types of fraudulent conveyance; those involving fraud in law, in which there is no consideration for the transfer (see, e.g., Gary-Wheaton Bank v. Meyer (1984), 130 Ill. App. 3d 87, 94, 473 N.E.2d 548), and fraud in fact, which involves a conveyance supported by consideration but which is nonetheless intended to defraud or hinder creditors. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 59, par. 4; Alan Drey Co. v. Generation, Inc. (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 611, 618, 317 N.E.2d 673.) Whether a debtor is solvent is only one consideration in determining whether there is fraud in fact. Other considerations include whether the conveyance is characterized by secrecy and whether the debtor is conveying previously unencumbered assets. (Alan Drey, 22 Ill. App. 3d at 618.) A plaintiff alleging fraud in fact must plead and prove a specific intent to defraud creditors. Tcherepnin v. Franz (N.D. Ill. 1979), 475 F. Supp. 92, 96.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the sale was cloaked in secrecy, that the consideration was inadequate and that C&NW will use the proceeds of the sale to pay debts other than those owed to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged that they are creditors of C&NW. The term “creditors” as applied to the fraudulent conveyance act is liberally construed to encompass “all parties who have demands, accounts, interests or causes of action for which they might recover any debt, damages, penalty, or forfeiture,” in actions in tort or contract. Bongard v. Block (1876), 81 Ill. 186, 187.

The injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs is authorized by section 4 — 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 4 — 101), which provides:

“[A] creditor having a money claim, whether liquidated or unliquidated, and whether sounding in contract or tort, may have an attachment against the property of his or her debtor *** (8) Where the debtor is about fraudulently to conceal, assign, or otherwise dispose of [the] *** property or effects, so as to hinder or delay *** creditors.”

Exchange National Bank v. Harris (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 382, 466 N.E.2d 1079, does not bar the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. Harris involved an “equitable attachment”; an impermissible attempt to attach funds that were not the funds in controversy in certain pending litigation and which would not be the subject of any final adjudication of the matter. (Harris, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 388.) The injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs here, however, is expressly permitted under section 4 — 101(8) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 4 — 101(8)).

The majority also concludes that plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is preempted under the authority of Bartley v. University Asphalt Co. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 318, 489 N.E.2d 1367. Bartley held that a plaintiff’s Illinois tort claims for retaliatory discharge and civil conspiracy were preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Relying on Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 220, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 221, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1915, the court in Bartley noted that the plaintiff’s cause of action for civil conspiracy was substantially dependant upon analysis of the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement, in that the plaintiff had alleged the existence of the agreement, the violation of the terms of the agreement, a conspiracy to violate the agreement, and a breach of the duty to represent plaintiff adequately during proceedings established by the collective-bargaining agreement. The court’s finding that the civil conspiracy claim was preempted was based on its determination that the claim was “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” (Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 216, 105 S. Ct. at 1912.) Plaintiffs’ allegations here, in contrast, do not hinge on the existence of a collective-bargaining agreement, nor do they allege the violation of the agreement. Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim addresses the alleged intent of the railroads to defraud plaintiffs by converting equity into debt, the proceeds of which will be channeled to various shareholders and other creditors. The analysis of plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim requires neither recourse to nor interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. In light of Lingle, I conclude that plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is not preempted by Federal labor law.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

      The defendant, C&NW, points out in its brief that there have actually been five different attempts to block the sale here by plaintiffs. This is so, it says, because the plaintiff, RLEA, is an unincorporated association composed of railroad unions, and all the various individual plaintiffs are union members; hence, the plaintiffs in this action were previously also represented in all the prior lawsuits as well.

      It is also noteworthy that in Bartley, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a claim by the plaintiffs that the Federal court had found against preemption of the State claim because it had remanded that case back to the State court, as the Federal court did here, finding that there was no basis for removal. Our supreme court there observed that a defense of Federal preemption is not enough by itself to support removal of an action filed in a State court to the Federal court, since such a defense is not a basis for original Federal court jurisdiction. Thus, the supreme court said that the Federal court’s decision, which refused to allow removal, had not determined the preemption issue but had merely found, as the Federal court did here, that there was no original exclusive Federal jurisdiction. See Bartley, 111 Ill. 2d at 325-27, 489 N.E.2d at 1370-71; see also P & LE, 858 F.2d at 939.