author: PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY

text:
    FRANK LOWNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARY JO ARCIOM, Defendant-Appellee.
    Third District
    No. 3—91—0356
    Opinion filed July 28, 1992.
    William E. Hourigan, of Law Offices of William E. Hourigan, of Bloom-ington, for appellant.

      Robert Marc Chemers and Scott 0. Reed, both of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago, for appellee.
   PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Frank Lowney, brought a personal injury action against the defendant, Dr. Mary Jo Arciom, for injuries he suffered following a chiropractic procedure the defendant performed upon him. The jury found in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

Initially, we note that the record on appeal is not complete. The plaintiff has not provided this court with transcripts of all of the witnesses who apparently testified below, including the plaintiff and the defendant. However, we find that enough of the record has been provided for this court to decide the merits of the plaintiff’s claim on appeal.

Based on the record provided, it appears that the plaintiff consulted the defendant because he had been experiencing neck pain. The defendant performed a chiropractic adjustment to the plaintiffs neck, which the plaintiff claimed caused him great pain. Three days after the chiropractic treatment, the plaintiff suffered a stroke. The deposition of Dr. Jeffrey A. Bounds, who treated the plaintiff following the stroke, reveals Bounds’ opinion that there was a 75% to 85% likelihood that the chiropractic treatment caused the stroke by injuring the vertebral artery.

During his deposition, Dr. Charles E. Duvall, Jr., a chiropractor and the plaintiff’s expert, was asked by defense counsel for every opinion he formulated regarding the care the defendant gave the plaintiff. Essentially, Duvall responded that the plaintiff should not have received the chiropractic treatment at all. During his deposition, Duvall never testified concerning the defendant’s alleged failure to warn the plaintiff about any risks associated with the procedure she performed. However, during his direct testimony at trial, Duvall testified over the defendant’s objection that the defendant should have informed the plaintiff of the risks of the procedure. The plaintiff testified that the defendant never warned him of any risk associated with the chiropractic procedure she performed on him.

One of the plaintiff’s theories for recovery was that the defendant was negligent in both failing to warn the plaintiff of the possible risks involved in the procedure and in failing to obtain his informed consent. To that end, the plaintiff requested that the jury be instructed on the issue of the duty to warn. The trial court refused the plaintiff’s tendered instruction.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in not allowing the jury to be instructed on the issue of the duty to warn. He urges this court to ignore or overrule the well-established rule enunciated in St. Gemme v. Tomlin (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 766, 455 N.E.2d 294.

The St. Gemme court addressed the issue of whether the plaintiff had met her burden of establishing that the lack of a warning proximately caused her injury. The court held that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove by objective evidence that a reasonable person, in possession of the allegedly omitted information, would have rejected the treatment in question. The St. Gemme court noted that it agreed with the following rationale of the supreme court of California:

“The patient-plaintiff may testify on this subject but the issue extends beyond his credibility. Since at the time of trial the un-communicated hazard has materialized, it would be surprising if the patient-plaintiff did not claim that had he been informed of the dangers he would have declined treatment. Subjectively he may believe so, with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, but we doubt that justice will be served by placing the physician in jeopardy of the patient’s bitterness and disillusionment. Thus an objective test is preferable: i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient’s position have decided if adequately informed of all significant perils.” Cobbs v. Grant (1972), 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-16, quoted with approval in St. Gemme, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 769, 455 N.E.2d at 296.

We find the above-noted reasoning to be sound and find unpersuasive the plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary. In this regard, we note that the plaintiff has cited no authority for ignoring the well-established principle enunciated in St. Gemme. Therefore, we will follow the rule as stated in St. Gemme in the instant case.

At the conference on jury instructions, the trial court determined that the plaintiff had not met the “objective requirement” of presenting testimony that a prudent person in the plaintiff’s position would have refused the chiropractic procedure had he been informed of all the risks. The record presented to this court on appeal confirms the trial court’s assessment. Furthermore, on appeal the plaintiff does not argue that any such testimony was presented below. Therefore, the trial court properly refused the plaintiff’s tendered jury instruction concerning the duty to warn. Although a party has a right to have a jury instructed on his theory of the case, provided there is sufficient evidence for the instruction, it is reversible error for a court to instruct a jury on an issue that is not supported by the evidence. In re Estate of Loesch (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 766, 481 N.E.2d 32.

We note also that Dr. Duvall’s direct testimony at trial concerning the defendant’s failure to warn the plaintiff of the risks of the procedure was admitted in violation of Supreme Court Rule 220(d) (134 Ill. 2d R. 220(d)). That rule provides:

“To the extent that the facts known or opinions held by an expert have been developed in discovery proceedings through interrogatories, depositions or requests to produce, his direct testimony at trial may not be inconsistent with or go beyond the fair scope of the facts known or opinions disclosed in such discovery proceedings. However, he shall not be prevented from testifying as to facts or opinions on matters regarding which inquiry was not made in the discovery proceedings.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 220(d).

Testimony which goes beyond the scope of facts and opinions disclosed in discovery is properly excluded. F.L. Walz, Inc. v. Hobart Corp. (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 727, 586 N.E.2d 1314.

Here, although Duvall was asked during his deposition to give every opinion he had concerning the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff, Duvall did not mention anything about a duty to warn. Duvall’s testimony in this vein at trial was therefore improperly admitted in violation of Supreme Court Rule 220(d).

In sum, since no testimony was introduced which satisfied the requirements of St. Gemme, and because Duvall’s testimony concerning the duty to warn was admitted in violation of Supreme Court Rule 220(d), we hold that the trial court properly refused the plaintiff’s tendered instruction on informed consent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GORMAN and HAASE, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JUSTICE LaPORTA

license: Public Domain

text:
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
    First District (6th Division)
    No. 1—90—1790
    Opinion filed July 31, 1992.

      Michael J. Pelletier and Maria A. Harrigan, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Jack O’Malley, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Maureen Hartón, and Daniel P. Nikolic, Jr., Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE LaPORTA

delivered the opinion of the court:

Ronald Watkins was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 55 years in prison. He appealed, contending: (1) he was denied his right to a fair trial when the State introduced evidence of defendant’s subsequent arrest for murder in direct violation of an order in limine barring such testimony; (2) the prosecutor’s introduction of defendant’s aliases deprived defendant of a fair trial because such evidence was immaterial and irrelevant and prejudiced the jury against him; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to appoint new counsel for defendant at his post-trial motion when defendant specifically alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective.

Defendant Ronald Watkins was charged with armed robbery in August of 1987. Before trial, the judge granted a defense motion in limine barring any State witness from mentioning before the jury that defendant had been arrested on a murder charge in Texas subsequent to the alleged armed robbery.

At the April 1990 trial the State called several witnesses, including the victim, John Bowen, and another person, Lawrence Davis, who was the victim of a similar crime charged against defendant in a different indictment and who could also identify the defendant.

Bowen, a roofer living in Harvey on August 21, 1987, testified at trial that he went to Ken’s food and liquor store that evening at about 10 p.m. to buy some juice. Before he entered the store, a man and a woman asked him to help jump start their car. He testified that he went into the store and when he returned he asked the couple where their car was located. They told him it was across the street and then they entered his car, the man seated to his right and the woman in the back seat. After he drove a little, he asked them again where their car was located but instead of answering, the man put a gun in Bowen’s mouth and the woman put a knife to his neck. Bowen identified the defendant as the man who put the gun in his mouth.

Bowen testified that the defendant told him: “This is a stick-up. This is a robbery. Give me your money.” Bowen said he took off his watch and gave the defendant his watch and money. He testified that he drove another block before defendant told him to pull over and when he did, the defendant came around to the driver’s side of the car and pushed Bowen to the passenger side. He told Bowen to undress and throw his clothes out the window. Bowen said defendant hit him twice in the head with a chrome revolver. He heard the lady in the back seat say, “Let’s do him like we did the other ones. Let’s take him and kill him and throw him in the canal.”

When the defendant told Bowen he would be killed, Bowen testified that he struggled to get the gun away from the defendant. The defendant told the woman to stab Bowen with her knife and she stabbed him in the side. Bowen testified that he grabbed the knife and bent it while he continued to struggle with defendant. As a result, the defendant drove the car into a ditch. Bowen testified that people began to gather around as he continued to struggle with the defendant, who then fled.

When the police arrived, Bowen found the knife in the muddy water but the gun was not found. Bowen testified that the woman was arrested at the scene after he identified her. He identified the knife used in the robbery.

He testified that on September 16, 1987, he went to the Harvey police station to look at photographs of possible suspects. He identified for the jury the same picture of Watkins that he had recognized and identified at the police station that day.

On cross-examination, defendant’s attorney questioned Bowen’s ability to identify defendant in the car since he did some of the driving and the whole incident occurred at night after dark and while driving on side streets. Bowen testified that he did not recall whether he told police what color his assailant’s pants were or whether his assailant had a beard or was clean shaven. He acknowledged that he did not tell the police about any scars the assailant had on his body. He testified that 9 of the 10 photographs he observed at the police station had the words “Harvey Police Department” stamped on them and that defendant’s picture had no such stamp.

On redirect examination he stated that the parking lot at the food store was well lit, enabling him to see defendant’s face. He stated that he did not pick out defendant’s picture from the photo lineup based on whether the words “Harvey Police Department” were stamped on it.

Lawrence Davis testified that at about 3 a.m. on August 18, three days before Bowen’s assault, he, Davis, was lost while driving and he stopped three people on the street and asked them for directions. He testified that a man in a red shirt and black pants gave him directions and asked whether Davis could give the three of them a ride to a nearby liquor store. He identified defendant as the man in the black pants and red shirt. Davis testified that he agreed and the defendant and his two friends, a man and a woman, climbed in the car.

As they drove, defendant asked Davis to stop. Davis stopped and defendant’s male companion in the back of the car jumped out and ran into a building and then returned. Davis testified that a few minutes later, the defendant asked him to stop again and when he did, defendant got out of the car, opened Davis’ door and hit him in the face with a nickel-plated revolver. Davis said defendant told him, “This is a stick-up.”

Davis testified that defendant took his wallet and told him to take off his clothes. Davis testified that the defendant told him to crouch down in the front seat of the car and take his clothes off and throw them out the window. Davis testified that when he looked up momentarily, the defendant told him if he looked up again he “was going to blow my face off.” Davis testified that they drove a little longer before the defendant had him get out of the car, crouch down and that defendant then drove away.

Davis testified that when the car left, he found a man who gave him some clothes and took him to the police station. He testified that he returned to the station September 16, 1987, and identified defendant as his assailant after viewing a group of pictures. Davis testified that he also saw defendant’s male companion standing in the station. He then identified the man for police officers. At trial he identified a photo of the man for the jury.

On cross-examination, Davis testified that he was not drinking the evening of the assault. He admitted that while he and the other three drove around that night, the man in the red shirt and black pants sat in the back of the car and he could not see the man’s face. He testified, however, that he did see the man in the red shirt and black pants after he was hit in the face with the gun and the man climbed into the front seat of the car and started driving.

Before trial resumed the next day and outside the presence of the jury, the defendant moved that the court appoint new counsel for him. He argued that he was not receiving effective assistance of counsel, in part, because he was represented by two public defenders, one who had used profane language with him and told him “if I don’t cop out he’s not going to at no time fight this case. If I goes before a judge or I take a jury trial I was going to be found guilty of all charges pending against me any way.” Defendant argued that he could not receive a fair trial and asked for a private attorney.

Assistant State’s Attorney Linehan informed the court that the defendant had prior criminal convictions and if found guilty could be sentenced to natural life under the habitual offenders statute. Linehan stated that the defendant should be informed of this before the court admonished defendant of his right to represent himself.

The trial judge informed defendant that he would not appoint a private attorney “at this late date” but told defendant he had a right to fire the public defenders and represent himself. The judge warned defendant that he would have to comply with the rules of evidence, subpoena his own witnesses and conduct his own cross-examination. Defendant responded that he did not know how to represent himself and did not want to act as his own attorney but he also did not want the two public defenders representing him. The trial judge took a break to give defendant a chance to think about whether he wanted to represent himself. When court resumed, defendant refused to answer when asked whether he wanted to proceed alone. The judge ordered the public defenders to continue to represent defendant and the jury trial resumed.

Harvey police officer Perry Cornelious testified that on August 21, 1987, he was dispatched to an armed robbery in progress at 153rd and Western in Harvey. When he arrived he found a red vehicle in a drainage ditch and found a man, later identified as Bowen, standing in the street without clothes and bleeding. He testified that Bowen told him he had been robbed at gunpoint and knife point.

Cornelious testified that he also spoke to someone at the scene who refused to identify himself and who gave him the name “Parion.” Defense counsel’s objection to the hearsay testimony was overruled. Comelious testified that a woman named Kim Downs was taken into custody at the scene after Bowen identified her as the woman who stabbed him. He testified that a large hunting knife was recovered at the scene.

Comelious testified that Downs was turned over to juvenile officers and then he spoke with her. After he spoke with her he went to “check the areas” that Downs had identified to locate Bowen’s clothes. He testified that he found a pair of pants and returned them to Bowen. Comelious testified over defense objections that he spoke with detectives about the case and gave them the names of Tommy Parion and Herman Parion.

On cross-examination, Comelious admitted that he never found the revolver allegedly used in the robbery. He acknowledged that police made no effort to obtain fingerprints from Bowen’s car. Cornelious testified that the person who gave him the name Parion told him they had attended elementary school together and that the man was now 32 years old.

On redirect examination, Comelious detailed the description of the assailant given to him by Bowen. He also acknowledged that the man at the scene who would not identify himself told Comelious that the offender’s last name was Parion and that he had a brother named Herman Parion. He testified that they searched unsuccessfully for the gun in the muddy water at the drainage ditch.

The State called a former East Hazel Crest police officer, Mary Sanfrantello, who testified that she worked at the Harvey police department in October 1987. She testified that one night as she processed the release of a prisoner named Johnny Saxton, who had posted bond, the defendant stepped forward, identified himself as Saxton and was released from custody. She stated that she later learned of the mistake.

Harvey police officer Jeff Wilkins testified that he investigated the two armed robberies by first considering the names listed on the report, Tommy Parion and Tommy Smith. He testified that Smith was a known alias for Ronald Parion. He testified that he located a photograph and identified the suspect’s real name as Ronald F. Watkins. He identified Herman Parion as the defendant’s brother.

Wilkins testified that he showed defendant’s picture to Bowen and Davis along with other photos on September 16, 1987, and both of them identified defendant as their assailant. He testified that Davis also identified Herman Parion, who was at the Harvey police station that day. He testified that an arrest warrant was issued for defendant.

He testified that on October 16, 1987, defendant was arrested but then escaped from custody before he could be placed in a lineup. Wilkins testified that another warrant was lodged against defendant. The following colloquy then occurred:

“[PROSECUTOR]: In late November, and in particular approximately November 21st, 1987, was [sic] the Harvey Police contacted by the Odessa City Police?
[WILKINS]: Yes, we were.
[PROSECUTOR]: Was that in relation to a Ronald Parion?
[WILKINS]: Yes, it was.
[PROSECUTOR]: Could you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the Jury what the Odessa, Texas — what information the Odessa Police were looking for?
[WILKINS]: They wanted a description of him. They informed me he was in custody on a murder charge there.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Ask for a sidebar.
[THE COURT]: Sustained. The Jury will please be excused.”

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial because the disclosure was in violation of the order in limine. The prosecutor stated that the disclosure was not intentional and admitted that he had not instructed this police officer with regard to the restrictions of the order in limine. The judge stated: “Intentional or not, it did happen. It’s expressly in violation of my ruling at 9:20 this morning, so there certainly was ample time for the State to instruct its witnesses that this was verboten grounds [sic] because of the inflammatory nature. I don’t know if the damage can be cured by the Court sustaining the objection and instructing the jury to disregard the answer. By tendering such an instruction, I may be magnifying the significance of the answer and I can’t erase what’s been implanted in the minds of the jury.”

The judge reserved ruling on the motion for mistrial and then told the prosecutor he was “miffed” that in the five hours since he had ruled on the motion in limine the State had failed to instruct its witnesses. The jury was brought back and instructed to disregard the last question and answer.

Wilkins returned to the stand and on cross-examination admitted that when Davis and Bowen viewed the photos at the police station on September 16, 1987, 9 of the 10 photographs had “Harvey Police Department” stamped on them and the people in the nine stamped pictures were standing in front of a wall with lines from a height chart on them. Only the defendant’s picture had no lines or “Harvey Police Department” stamp. He acknowledged that no fingerprints were taken from Bowen’s car.

On redirect examination, Wilkins testified that his department was unable to take fingerprints from Bowen’s car because another police department had recovered the car and had turned it over to the owner directly.

Odessa, Texas, police officer William S. Woody testified that he arrested the defendant November 21, 1987. He identified defendant as having several aliases including Anthony Hollis, James Holland, Ronald Parion, Ronald Watkins, and the nickname Popeye. He said a computer check established that the defendant was wanted by Harvey police. He testified that it took three days to positively identify the defendant as Ronald Watkins.

At the close of the State’s case, the trial judge denied the defense motion for a directed finding. The defendant stated that he wished to call two witnesses, his brother, Herman Parion, who was in the court building and available to testify, and Dale Robertson, then in custody at the county jail. Defense counsel stated that he had interviewed Pa-rion and did not intend to call him as a witness. Defense counsel stated that no subpoena had been issued to Robertson and Robertson was not listed on defendant’s answer to a discovery request. The trial court stated that it would not permit further delays on a 2V2-year-old case. Defense counsel said he had no offers of proof to make about the testimony of either witness.

Defendant told the judge he thought his rights had been violated. He stated that he wanted to testify on his own behalf. Defense counsel stated that he had advised defendant not to testify. Defendant renewed his objection to having these particular lawyers represent him. After a recess defendant stated that he would not be testifying.

The trial court then denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial that was raised immediately after a police officer testified about defendant’s arrest for a Texas murder. A final witness, Cook County sheriff’s police officer Neal Linehan, testified that he attempted to serve Kim Downs with subpoena several times but was unsuccessful in locating her. Both sides rested and made closing arguments. After deliberating the jury returned a guilty verdict against defendant.

On June 7, 1990, at post-trial motion, defense counsel, the public defender, moved to withdraw from the case because defendant had accused him of improper conduct and incompetence, and because defendant refused to speak with him. Defense counsel suggested that outside counsel be appointed because the public defender’s office would not appoint another attorney to argue that one of their own attorneys was incompetent.

The trial judge noted defendant’s continuing objection to his counsel through trial and commented that the defendant had been dilatory in proceeding to trial and that “it was only through the persistent efforts of this Court that it finally did proceed to trial.” The trial judge stated that under the Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, standard it appeared to him that from the totality of the circumstances defense counsel’s actions at trial were proper. He stated that defendant’s charge of ineffective assistance of counsel was spurious and dilatory. The defendant stated that he did not want to argue his post-trial motion pro se and did not want the public defender’s office representing him.

The trial judge then reinstated the same public defender as defense counsel and heard arguments, including the defense contention that the testimony about defendant’s murder arrest in Texas was highly prejudicial and in violation of the court’s pretrial order in limine. Defense counsel also argued that the court erred in permitting references to defendant’s many aliases because the evidence was not relevant, was prejudicial and implied prior contact with the law.

After arguments by respective counsel, defendant was asked if he wanted to argue with regard to his motion for a new trial. He responded: “No. I don’t even want a new trial. I just want to be sentenced.” Defendant was sentenced to 55 years in prison.

Defendant appealed, contending initially that he was denied his right to a fair trial when the State introduced evidence of defendant’s subsequent arrest for murder in direct violation of an order in limine barring such testimony.

Defendant contends that his cause must be remanded for a new trial because of the flagrant violation of the order in limine that occurred when the jury heard testimony that defendant had been arrested for a murder in Texas. Defendant argues that the revelation was highly prejudicial and was avoidable because the State had five hours after the order was entered to prepare its witnesses for trial.

Defendant contends that his case is very similar to People v. Whitlow (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629, in that in both cases a pretrial order in limine was entered prohibiting the State from inquiring into the defendants’ past criminal activities. In Whitlow, defendants were tried on various charges as a result of an alleged securities fraud. At trial the State made comments such as: “maybe this time he will get caught.” (89 Ill. 2d at 340.) After defendants’ convictions, the appellate court consolidated their cases, affirmed one conviction and reversed three others because of prosecutorial misconduct. On appeal, the State asked the supreme court to affirm the convictions and find that the prosecutor’s comments were not so prejudicial as to make a fair trial impossible. The supreme court, however, found that numerous comments by the prosecutor, including inferences that defendants had committed other crimes, prejudiced the jury by their cumulative impact and warranted a new trial. (Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d at 340-41.) It should be noted that the court stated that it would not assess the prejudicial effect of each isolated comment by the prosecutor. Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d at 341.

Defendant cites several additional cases in support of his position that such highly prejudicial material elicited at a jury trial mandates reversal and a new trial. People v. Lampkin (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 418, 430, 457 N.E.2d 50 (mere proof of an individual’s arrest cannot be used against that individual in a criminal case since the evidence of an arrest would prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jurors); People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129, 140-41, 402 N.E.2d 238 (erroneous admission of evidence of other crimes carries a high risk of prejudice and ordinarily calls for reversal; a conviction will only be upheld if the properly admitted evidence is so overwhelming that no fair-minded jury could have voted for acquittal); People v. Mitchell (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 189, 197, 472 N.E.2d 114 (evidence of crimes other than the one for which defendant is on trial cannot be admitted unless it is shown that a crime actually occurred and that defendant committed the crime); People v. Alford (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 741, 743, 444 N.E.2d 576 (evidence of other crimes inadmissible if admitted merely to establish a propensity to commit criminal acts); People v. Spiezio (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 769, 773, 434 N.E.2d 837 (reversible error to admit evidence of other crime when the crime was not an integral part of the police investigation of the crime).

Defendant contends that although the trial judge admonished the jury to ignore the State’s question and Wilkin’s answer, a curative instruction could not correct the damage that had been done. Defendant cites in support People v. Brown (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 625, 447 N.E.2d 1011, where the court observed: “[d]riving a nail into a board and then pulling the nail out does not remove the hole.” Brown, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 629.

The State contends, however, that the error was not prejudicial and that any prejudice that might have occurred was cured by the judge’s instruction to disregard the question and answer. The State acknowledges that the testimony was a violation of the court’s order in limine.

The State cites in support People v. Green (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 361, 483 N.E.2d 606, where the trial court permitted testimony that the defendant had been arrested for two unrelated murders. The trial court admonished the jury that the evidence could not be used against the defendant, on trial for four other murders, but was offered only to explain how the defendant came to be in police custody. (Green, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 366.) The appellate court found that the jury was properly instructed as to the limited purpose of the evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting use of the testimony. (Green, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 367.) The State contends that the trial court relied on Green in part when it denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial. We note, however, that the trial judge gave no explanation for his ruling. The State’s reliance is misplaced because Green was vacated by the United States Supreme Court prior to this trial. Green v. Illinois (1987), 479 U.S. 1076, 94 L. Ed. 2d 131, 107 S. Ct. 1270.

The State also cites in support People v. Yonder (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 376, 391, 256 N.E.2d 321 (answer by State witness, later stricken, that indicated the witness was in protective custody, was “not responsive to or called for by the question, and as such is not reversible error”), and People v. Myles (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1042, 467 N.E.2d 1333 (nonresponsive answer by State witness, later stricken, that indicated a photograph of defendant appeared to show him holding marijuana, was improper but was not prejudicial error).

The State cites other cases in support of its position that any error was cured by the court striking the testimony. People v. Kirkwood (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 23, 160 N.E.2d 766; People v. Lindsay (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 638, 384 N.E.2d 793; People v. Nelson (1970), 124 Ill. App. 2d 280, 260 N.E.2d 251.

Defendant responds that Yonder and Myles are factually distinguishable because they did not deal with an order in limine that put the State on notice about unacceptable testimony. Defendant argues that this was not a case where a witness blurted out something without warning and the State could not prevent its disclosure.

The State argues erroneously that any nonresponsive answer by a witness, even if highly prejudicial, is not reversible error. This position would lead to absurd results if witnesses were permitted to respond with prejudicial testimony only to have the State or defense claim that it was not solicited from the witness and therefore was not reversible error.

We agree with defendant that the testimony regarding the Texas murder charge was erroneously admitted and not cured alone by the court’s admonishment. However, we agree with the State that the error was harmless because of the overwhelming evidence against defendant. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d at 140-41.

Next we consider whether the prosecutor’s introduction of defendant’s aliases deprived defendant of a fair trial because such evidence was immaterial, irrelevant and prejudicial to defendant

Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial and his conviction must be reversed because two officers who testified stated that defendant had several aliases, specifically Tommy Parion, Tommy Smith, Anthony Hollis, James Holland, Ronald Parion and the nickname Popeye. Defendant contends that mention of these aliases served only to imply that he had been involved in other crimes. Defendant acknowledges that the trial court denied his request for an order in limine prohibiting mention of defendant’s aliases.

Defendant cites in support of this argument People v. Burns (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 178, 524 N.E.2d 1164, People v. Brown (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 101, 496 N.E.2d 1020, and People v. Pumphrey (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 94, 366 N.E.2d 433.

The court in Pumphrey held that when a defendant testifies on his own behalf, questions regarding assumed names are only appropriate where the testimony is shown to be material and admissible. Such testimony is prejudicial when elicited to imply that the defendant used the assumed names to evade apprehension. (Pumphrey, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 99.) The Burns court adopted this identical analysis. Burns, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 187.

The court in Brown, relying on Pumphrey, stated that a defendant’s alias can be admitted into evidence only if the evidence is relevant to some fact at issue in the case. Brown, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 101.

The State contends that testimony on defendant’s aliases was admissible to show the necessary and important consequential steps that began with a witness’ tip on the name “Parion” and led to defendant’s arrest in Texas three months later. People v. Hayes (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 89, 130, 564 N.E.2d 803.

The State also contends the testimony was admissible to establish evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt, because he escaped from the county jail, went to Texas and then provided the Odessa police with other names when arrested. Evidence of flight may be a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt. People v. Jimerson (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 12, 45, 535 N.E.2d 889.

The State cites in support People v. Scott (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 634, 551 N.E.2d 288, where the court considered the prejudicial effect of an FBI agent’s testimony that he knew the defendant by another name because of previous contact. The appellate court found that the agent’s familiarity with defendant by an alias did not constitute evidence of other crimes and thus no unfair prejudice resulted. Scott, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 643.

The State also contends that if error occurred in admitting the aliases, the error was harmless because the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming.

We agree with the State that admission of defendant’s aliases was not prejudicial to his case. Police witnesses identified the aliases as part of their testimony on the apprehension of defendant. The State did not dwell on the aliases at trial. We find admission of the aliases was not prejudicial and therefore find no error on the part of the trial court in ruling the testimony admissible.

Finally we consider whether the trial court erred in failing to appoint new counsel for defendant at his post-trial motion when defendant specifically alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective representation at trial.

Defendant contends the trial judge erred in not appointing a private attorney for him when he disclosed to the judge that before trial his assistant public defender threatened him with poor representation if he refused to “cop” a plea or if he took a jury trial. This disclosure was made to the court after Bowen, the victim, and Davis had testified. Instead of appointing other counsel the court told defendant he could continue with the assistant public defender or represent himself pro se.

During trial and after the State had rested defendant asked the court for appointment of new counsel because his attorney refused to call two witnesses he had identified who would testify on his behalf. Defense counsel told the court that he had interviewed one of the witnesses and had no intention of calling either witness. The trial judge refused to appoint other counsel, telling defendant he must represent himself or stick with the assistant public defender assigned to the case.

After his conviction, the defendant asked the court for appointment of a private attorney to represent him in his post-trial motion claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The assistant public defender filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and asked that a private attorney be appointed. The trial judge refused both requests, telling defendant that under the standards enunciated in Strickland, he believed the defendant had adequate assistance of counsel. The trial judge told defendant that although he had a constitutional right to counsel, he did not have a right to counsel of his own choosing unless he was going to pay for the representation. The judge denied defendant’s request for appointed counsel stating that he perceived defendant’s request as another dilatory tactic. He told defendant he would be permitted to argue the motion pro se. Defendant refused to represent himself, and the trial judge reinstated the assistant public defender and directed him to argue the other points of defendant’s motion for a new trial. No one argued defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on the assistant public defender’s refusal to call the two witnesses requested by defendant.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his request during and after trial for appointment of new counsel and in failing to explore defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance. Defendant cites in support People v. Krankel (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 181, 189, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (the defendant should have had counsel, other than his originally appointed counsel, appointed to represent him at his post-trial hearing in regard to his allegations that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Jameson (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 650, 663, 508 N.E.2d 267 (Krankel does not mandate appointment of new counsel every time a defendant presents a post-trial argument of ineffective assistance of counsel; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the underlying conduct alleged to have prejudiced defendant); People v. Jackson (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 128, 474 N.E.2d 467.

The court in Jackson, relying on Krankel and People v. Johnson (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 228, 424 N.E.2d 610, explained how a court should handle defendant’s post-trial motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel:

“The trial court should examine the factual matters underlying the defendant’s claim. *** If the claim goes to matters of trial tactics or strategy, the defendant’s claim should be found spurious and his request for new counsel denied. This was the case in Johnson. If, however, the factual matters show possible neglect of the defendant’s case, the court should appoint new counsel who can undertake an independent evaluation of the defendant’s claim and present the matter to the court from a detached, yet adversarial, position. This was the case in Krankel, where defendant alleged that his attorney failed to interview an alibi witness.” Jackson, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 139.

Though the opinion was published after defendant’s trial in this case, the Illinois Supreme Court approved of the Jackson court’s interpretation of Krankel in People v. Nitz (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 82, and more recently in People v. Williams (1991), 147 Ill. 2d 173, 250. In Williams the court stated that a pro se motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel does not per se require appointment of new counsel. The court noted that “Only if the allegations show possible neglect of the case *** should new counsel be appointed.” Williams, 147 Ill. 2d at 251.

The State maintains that defense counsel’s decision not to call the two witnesses identified by defendant was a matter of trial strategy. The State notes that one, Herman Parion, was in the courthouse and had been interviewed by defense counsel. The other, Dale Robertson, was not present in the courtroom, was not listed on defendant’s answer to discovery, prepared by the public defender, and was not under subpoena. We note that the defense attorney and the defendant himself offered no proof as to the potential testimony of the witnesses.

The State contends that “an examination of the factual matters underlying defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily involves an analysis under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.” In Strickland the court stated that in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the performance prejudiced the defense of the case. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.) The Strickland standard was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246.

Strickland is a stringent test to determine whether a defendant’s counsel was competent. Williams does not make such a determination but instead specifically states that new counsel should be appointed to investigate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only “if the allegations show possible neglect.” (Williams, 147 Ill. 2d at 251.) Under the facts of this case, Williams is the proper standard to apply because defendant alleges that his case might have been prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to call Parion and Robertson.

The allegation of neglect by failure to call two witnesses falls squarely within the rationale in Krankel, Nitz and Williams which mandate that an inquiry be made by the trial judge and outside counsel be appointed if necessary to investigate the charges of ineffective representation. We note that on inquiry from the trial judge, defense counsel acknowledged that he had interviewed Pa-rion and would not be calling him as a witness. This decision is clearly trial strategy. When the judge inquired with regard to Robertson, defense counsel stated that he had never heard of the potential witness. Defendant did not offer, during or after trial, any indication as to what Robertson might testify.

The trial judge found that defense counsel’s conduct at trial does not support the conclusion that he failed to effectively represent defendant. The record establishes that, prior to trial, counsel made a motion for an order in limine to prohibit testimony regarding defendant’s arrest on a murder charge in Texas subsequent to the armed robbery. The motion was granted. At trial defense counsel conducted appropriate cross-examination of witnesses, made proper objections to the testimony of State witnesses, moved for a mistrial when the order in limine was violated, moved for a directed finding at the close of the State’s case and made a proper closing argument on defendant’s behalf. Defense counsel filed an appropriate post-trial motion for a new trial based on the State’s violation of the motion in limine and contended it was error for the trial court to permit references to the defendant’s several aliases based on relevance and prejudice. We conclude that the trial judge committed no error in finding defendant had not sustained his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; the record clearly supports the finding of the trial judge.

Because we agree with the State that the evidence overwhelmingly supports the guilty finding against defendant, we affirm defendant’s conviction.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction and sentence of 55 years in prison are affirmed.

Affirmed.

EGAN, P.J., and RAKOWSKI, J., concur.

      Justice LaPorta authored this opinion before her death.


author: JUSTICE DOYLE

text:
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN D. PRINTY, Defendant-Appellant.
    Second District
    No. 2—90—0692
    Opinion filed August 12, 1992.
    Rehearing denied September 14, 1992.

      G. Joseph Weller, Manuel S. Serritos, and Anne S. Quincy, all of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
    James E. Ryan, State’s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
   JUSTICE DOYLE

delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, John Printy, was indicted in the circuit court of Du Page County on one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 14(aXl)) and one count of criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 13(aXl)). The State dismissed the criminal sexual assault count, and, following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty in a jury trial of aggravated criminal sexual assault and was sentenced to a 12-year term of imprisonment.

Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the marital exemption created by section 12 — 18(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 18(c)) violates equal protection and due process; (2) whether defendant was denied due process by the trial court barring his access to the victim’s mental health records; and (3) whether defendant was denied his sixth amendment right of confrontation when the trial court barred defendant from cross-examining the victim concerning her mental health.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion for additional discovery in which he requested production of “[a]ny and all reports regarding the treatment of [the victim] for manic-depression, including releases for any doctors involved to speak with Defendant’s representatives.” At a hearing on September 20, 1989, the prosecutor stated that, as to the medical reports pertaining to the victim, the State had already obtained one report and was awaiting two additional reports from other hospitalizations. The State suggested that the matter be continued for an in camera inspection of the reports, and defense counsel agreed that all the reports would be subject to in camera inspection to determine their admissibility and relevance.

On November 6, 1989, the prosecutor stated to the court that the State possessed the reports from Parkside Lutheran Hospital and Warrenville Clinic related to the victim’s hospitalizations. Defendant’s newly appointed counsel asked for leave to file a second motion for additional discovery, a copy of which he had previously tendered to the State. There is no such motion contained in the record in this case. On that same date, the court entered an order that it would review, in camera, the reports from Parkside Lutheran Hospital and Warrenville Clinic.

At the hearing on November 14, 1989, the trial court stated that it had reviewed an intake report from Central Du Page Hospital and psychiatric reports from Warrenville Clinic and Parkside Lutheran Hospital. The court ruled that defendant was entitled to the intake report from Central Du Page Hospital. The State then argued that the remaining reports should not be disclosed because they contained no “Brady” material, did not indicate any denials, retractions or recantations by the victim or any evidence of hallucinations or tremors, and did not contain any relevant material. Defendant maintained that because the victim testified in a domestic relations case that she was hospitalized for a manic-depressive disorder from October 21, 1988, to November 2, 1988, and that because the offense occurred on October 7, 1988, there was a need to know how the victim’s “mental condition relates to her credibility, perception and memory.” (Defendant incorrectly noted the date of the offense was October 7, 1988; it was actually September 7, 1988.)

In denying defendant’s motion as to the remaining reports, the court stated that it had reviewed the documents on two occasions and noted “absolutely no statements at all with respect to this incident by the victim.” The court further commented that there was nothing in the reports that in any way reflected on the truth or veracity of the victim. Likewise, the court found “nothing at all with respect to any memory problems or perception problem” of the victim. The court pointed out that there were even references in the reports that the victim’s memory was intact and excellent. Finally, the court found nothing in the report that could be used to impeach the victim.

The State subsequently filed a motion in limine seeking to bar defendant from eliciting testimony or introducing evidence of the victim’s prior psychiatric hospitalization and of the victim having been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder. The trial court granted the motion as to both points.

The evidence at trial established that on September 7, 1988, defendant was married to but separated from the victim. The victim testified that at about 10:30 p.m. on that date defendant forced her into her apartment and ordered her to undress. The telephone rang, and the victim answered it. Realizing it was a male acquaintance calling, the victim said, “Hi, Mother. Everything is fine. I will see you tomorrow. Everything is fine.”

After the telephone call, defendant pushed her into the bedroom, and she removed all her clothes except her pantyhose. Defendant pulled them down and got on top of her. After asking the victim if she called the police, defendant stated that he would kill her if she did and pulled out a knife, putting it to her throat. The victim identified a knife found between the mattresses of her bed by the police as the one used by defendant to threaten her.

Defendant held the knife to her throat as he penetrated her with his penis. Defendant rolled over and told the victim to perform oral sex on him. She did so, and then defendant placed his mouth on her genitals.

Eventually there was a knock at the door; defendant ran out and returned saying, “It is the cops.” He told the victim to get dressed and tell the police nothing was wrong. As the victim approached the door, she saw two police officers and ran out the door and behind them. She told the police to arrest defendant and repeatedly told them she had an order of protection. After the police arrested defendant and left, she telephoned a male acquaintance and told him she had been raped and needed to go to the police station. Prior to her leaving for the police station, the victim observed that the screen around the lock on the sliding door had been cut.

One of the officers who arrested defendant at the victim’s apartment testified that he saw the victim again on the following morning at about 12:14 a.m. at the police department. At that time, the victim related that she had been raped by defendant at knifepoint. On cross-examination, the officer added that the victim asked him whether he could arrest defendant if defendant had put a knife to her throat and threatened to kill her. According to the officer, the victim never mentioned the word rape to him or the other officer while they were at her apartment.

Detective Kenneth Watts of the Wheaton police department testified that he went with the victim to her apartment the following morning. He observed a cut in the screen next to the lock on the patio door. Upon lifting the top mattress of the bed where the alleged assault occurred, he found a closed folding knife lying on the exposed box springs. He identified the same knife that the victim previously identified as defendant’s as the knife he found between the mattresses. He also identified a pair of pantyhose as those he found on the floor near the bed and described them as being inside out with a tear about halfway around the top.

According to Detective Watts, he met with defendant later that day. After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant told Watts that he climbed onto the victim’s balcony, cut the screen with his knife and entered her apartment. After some period of waiting for her to come home, defendant went outside. When she returned, he took out his knife and forced her into the apartment and made her perform oral sex on him. He also admitted to having had vaginal intercourse with the victim. He asked Watts if the police had found the knife and stated that he hid it under the mattress after he observed the police at the victim’s door.

Defendant testified in his own behalf. He stated that the knife found in the victim’s apartment looked like one he owned except the tip of his knife was not broken. While he admitted to using a knife to open the screen door on a prior occasion, he denied having made the cut discovered by Detective Watts. He could not locate his knife the day following his using it to open the screen door although he did not intentionally leave it at the victim’s apartment.

According to defendant, he spoke on the telephone to the victim on September 7, 1988, just before she got off of work. He asked her if she found his knife, and she responded yes. He asked if he could come over later that evening and pick up his knife, and the victim said that would be fine.

He arrived at her apartment around 9:15 p.m. and sat outside waiting for the victim to arrive. He eventually decided to enter the apartment via the patio screen door and look for his knife. Upon discovering the screen door was unlocked, he entered the apartment. He then exited the apartment through the hallway door and went to the parking lot.

When the victim arrived, he had a conversation with her outside the apartment resulting in her spitting in his face, and his slapping her with a glove. Defendant and the victim then entered the victim’s apartment. They eventually engaged in sexual intercourse twice with the victim’s consent. Defendant denied having a knife in his hand during that evening or forcing the victim into the bedroom. After the second sexual encounter, the victim asked defendant to withdraw an affidavit he had prepared in a custody case apparently involving the victim and a former husband. Defendant denied making the incriminating statements testified to earlier by Detective Watts.

A short time after the incident, defendant went to Texas to live with his father. While there, the victim telephoned him. When defendant asked her why she did not drop the charges against him, the victim responded that she could not because of the custody case. According to defendant, in another telephone conversation with the victim in November 1988, she told him that the reason she made the rape complaint against him was because of his submitting the affidavit in the custody case. Again, in a conversation with the victim in jail after defendant’s arrest, the victim told defendant, in reference to the custody case, that if nothing happened to her daughter, nothing would happen to defendant. Defendant did in fact testify in the custody case.

The jury found defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. He then filed this timely appeal.

Defendant’s first appellate contention is that the challenged statutory scheme, in effect at the time of his conviction, violated equal protection and substantive due process because it provided for prosecution of a defendant for aggravated criminal sexual assault against a spouse while exempting persons from prosecution for three other sex crimes when perpetrated against spouses. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 18(c).) It is irrational, the argument continues, to exempt spouses from prosecution for other sex offenses which, according to the circumstances of individual cases, might be equally or more serious in nature than the circumstances supporting a prosecution for aggravated criminal sexual assault.

This court, in a recent decision, addressed this same issue in the context of a defendant’s being charged under a more recent statutory scheme which eliminated the marital exemption for criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 — 18(c)). (See People v. M.D. (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 176.) The defendant there contended that applying the marital exemption to only the criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal sexual abuse statutes violated equal protection and due process under both the State and Federal constitutions. (M.D., 231 Ill. App. 3d at 185-86.) This court held that the marital exemption violated equal protection and due process but went on to affirm that defendant’s aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction. M.D., 231 Ill. App. 3d at 193.

In the present case, defendant’s conviction also must stand as he was convicted under a statute to which the marital exemption did not apply; therefore, defendant is in no position to benefit from any determination that the marital exemption is constitutionally infirm. He was not denied due process in that regard as he was on notice at the time of his alleged conduct that such actions were prohibited under the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute.

Even assuming the validity of the marital exemption, defendant cannot prevail with the argument that the absence of an exemption applicable to the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute denied him equal protection and due process. The fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution requires equal treatment between groups of persons similarly situated. (Jenkins v. Wu (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 468, 477.) It does not prohibit a State from treating different classes of persons differently. (Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at 477.) In the present case, defendant attempts to characterize himself as part of a group that is “similarly situated” to other groups in that he is a spousal member of a group of individuals subject to the proscriptions of one of the four sex offenses listed above. The statutes at issue in this case do not differentiate, however, between similarly situated persons. But for the coincidental fact that defendant belongs to a group consisting of spousal offenders, he cannot be said to be similarly situated to those persons who have violated the statutory provisions other than aggravated criminal sexual assault. The statutes establish four separate and distinct offenses, and a person who commits one offense cannot be held to be similarly situated to persons who have committed others.

Aggravated criminal sexual assault, unlike the other three sex offenses, requires a defendant to have committed an act of sexual penetration accompanied by certain aggravating factors distinguishing it from criminal sexual assault. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 14.) Thus, aggravated criminal sexual assault is distinct from criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 15) and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 16) as these latter two offenses do not have the element of sexual penetration. Likewise, aggravated criminal sexual assault is different from criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 13) because the former has various aggravating factors, at least one of which must be present to constitute the offense.

It is evident that the legislature chose to create four distinctly different offenses, each of which has its own specific penalty. Although there may be some overlap between the offenses in that criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault both require sexual penetration, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal sexual assault have some of the same aggravating factors, they are nevertheless different offenses that proscribe distinctly different conduct. Accordingly, defendant, as a person convicted of violating the aggravated criminal sexual assault provision, cannot claim to be a member of a group similarly situated to those persons who violate any of the other sex offenses proscribing distinctly different conduct.

Moreover, defendant, as a spousal sex offender, is not subject to different treatment under the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute than a nonspousal sex offender. All persons who commit aggravated criminal sexual assault are subject to prosecution regardless of their marital status. Defendant is in no worse position under the statute because of his membership in a group consisting of spouses. We hold, therefore, that equal protection principles are not implicated in this case.

Defendant also contends that the aggravated criminal sexual assault’s applicability to a spouse denied him due process. Specifically, he maintains that it was irrational for the legislature to allow for prosecution of spouses who commit aggravated criminal sexual assault.

We begin by emphasizing that legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the party challenging the statute has the burden of clearly establishing its invalidity. (People v. Lindner (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 174, 178.) Furthermore, it is the province of the legislature to define offenses and determine the penalties required to protect the interest of society. People v. Terrell (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 178, 216.

A legislative enactment is required to bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the intended objective. (People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180; People v. Wick (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 62, 65.) In applying this test, we must identify the public interest the statute is intended to protect, examine whether the statute bears a reasonable relationship to that interest and determine whether the method used to protect or further that interest is reasonable. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180.

While the effect of the Criminal Sexual Assault Act of 1984 was to recodify the existing sexual offenses into a comprehensive statute (see People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 263, 271), the underlying purpose was to protect the victims and punish the perpetrators of sexually impermissible conduct. Thus, the public interest served by the statutes is to curtail sexually harmful and offensive conduct.

The aggravated criminal sexual assault statute bears a reasonable relationship to the State’s interest in that it proscribes certain sexual conduct which is harmful and offensive to its victims. Additionally, the method used to protect or further the State’s interest is reasonable. The aggravated criminal sexual assault statute is designed to protect victims of forcible sexual penetration where such conduct is accompanied by certain aggravating circumstances. It is apparent that the legislature viewed the protection of victims of acts of forcible sexual penetration accompanied by one of the aggravating circumstances to be of prime importance as it provided for the offense to be punished as a Class X felony. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 14(c).

Because the legislature apparently considered the protection from the conduct proscribed in the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute as being more important than the protection afforded by the other three sex offense provisions, it is reasonable for the legislature to have allowed for the prosecution of spouses thereunder, notwithstanding its attempt to exempt spouses from prosecution under what it apparently considered to be less serious sex crimes. Consequently, the legislature’s decision to provide for the prosecution of spouses who engaged in conduct violative of the most serious of the sex offenses was a reasonable method of furthering its goal of protecting victims, particularly those victimized by their spouses, and no violation of due process has been shown.

Defendant next contends that he was denied his due process right to the disclosure of evidence by the trial court’s exclusion of evidence concerning the victim’s mental health records. In this regard, defendant argues that the victim waived any privilege as to her medical records because she never asserted the privilege in court, because she testified about her mental health and hospitalization in a prior legal proceeding, and because she had apparently released the records to the State’s Attorney’s office. Similarly, defendant maintains that he was entitled to the victim’s mental health records to determine the basis for her diagnosis of a manic-depressive disorder and what effects her prescribed medication might have.

In People v. Bean (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 65, our supreme court held that a defendant was not denied his sixth amendment right of cross-examination or his fourteenth amendment right to due process by the trial court’s refusal to order disclosure of a witness’ mental health records. The court approved the procedure whereby the trial court conducted an in camera inspection of the witness’ mental health records to determine whether they contained relevant information which could be used to impeach the witness. (Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 99-100.) While the records in Bean were privileged under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 911/2, par. 801 et seq.), as they were in this case, the court held that such privilege must give way to a defendant’s sixth and fourteenth amendment rights but only to the extent that a trial court determines the privileged information to be relevant and impeaching. (Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 100.) Just as a trial judge may limit cross-examination to prevent inquiries that are irrelevant, repetitive, or too time-consuming, that harass a witness, or that threaten to distract a jury from the actual issues by unduly emphasizing details of the witness’ life, he may also limit a defendant’s access to statutorily privileged information. (Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 100-01.) When the patient or a therapist asserts the privilege, a trial judge may review in camera a witness’ mental health records and disclose only those portions that are relevant when that relevance is not outweighed by other factors. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 101.

We consider Bean to control the resolution of this issue. Here, the defendant sought, in a motion for additional discovery, to examine the mental health records of the victim. Those records, which apparently had been reviewed by the State’s Attorney’s office, were then reviewed in camera by the trial court. Defendant’s counsel agreed that the court should review the records in camera as to their admissibility and relevance. At the hearing following the trial court’s in camera review, the court allowed defendant to review the victim’s intake report to Central Du Page Hospital but refused defendant access to the remaining reports because it found the records to contain no statements of the victim relating to the incident in question. The court further found nothing in the reports relevant to the truth or veracity of the victim, relevant to her memory or perception, or of an impeaching nature. Based on the holding in Bean, the procedure followed in this case struck the proper balance between defendant’s right to access information relevant to the credibility of a key witness and the need to maintain the confidentiality of the victim’s mental health records.

Furthermore, we note that we have also reviewed the victim’s mental health records submitted to the trial court. (See Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 102.) We agree with the trial court that those records contained no additional material relevant to the cross-examination or impeachment of the victim.

Defendant additionally argues, however, that the victim waived her privilege of confidentiality under the Act by not asserting her statutory privilege and by testifying concerning her mental health in a previous legal proceeding. Defendant also maintains that the fact of the State’s possession of the requested records suggests waiver of the victim’s privilege. The question of whether the victim failed to assert or, by her conduct, waived the statutory privilege is of no importance in this case as the trial court conducted an in camera review of the reports and rendered the ultimate determination as to the relevancy of the records. Once the court ruled the records to be irrelevant, there was no longer a need to assert the privilege inasmuch as the records would not be available for impeachment purposes. Thus, whether the victim did or did not assert or waive the statutory privilege in this case is inconsequential. Furthermore, we note that defendant acquiesced in the court’s in camera review of the records. Defendant cannot now be heard to complain that such a procedure was improper when he agreed to the procedure in the trial court.

Finally, we turn to defendant’s contention that he was denied his sixth amendment right to cross-examine the victim when the court granted the State’s motion in limine prohibiting defendant from eliciting testimony of the victim’s prior psychiatric hospitalizations and her prior diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder. A trial judge may limit cross-examination to prevent irrelevant inquiries or inquiries that threaten to distract the jury from the actual issues by unduly emphasizing details of a witness’ life. (Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 100-01.) The reception of evidence collateral to an issue in a case and intended to affect the credibility of a witness rests usually within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Renslow (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 288, 293-94.) Absent an abuse of discretion in that regard, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling. {Renslow, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 294.) Relevant evidence is evidence that tends to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be absent the evidence. (People v. Gonzalez (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 481, 487-88.) There is nothing about a witness’ mental health generally that renders it relevant to the issue of a witness’ credibility. A defendant must at the very least make some showing of how the witness’ mental health bears on the question of credibility.

In this case, defendant failed to make any showing of how his proposed inquiry on cross-examination concerning the victim’s hospitalization or diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder would be relevant to her credibility at trial. There was nothing in the victim’s mental health records, aside from the intake report, which was relevant to her impeachment. Absent any showing of relevancy by defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring defendant from cross-examining the victim as to the hospitalization or diagnosis.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.

Affirmed.

MCLAREN and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur.


author: JUSTICE NICKELS

text:
      In re MARRIAGE OF CORAL L. MOLL, Petitioner and Counterrespondent-Appellee, and DAVID L. MOLL, Respondent and Counterpetitioner-Appellant.
    Second District
    No. 2—91—0956
    Opinion filed July 30, 1992.

      John A. Leemon, of Mount Carroll, for appellant.
    Karl F. Winkler, of Rockford, for appellee.
   JUSTICE NICKELS

delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, David A. Moll, appeals that part of the circuit court’s order of dissolution of marriage that apportioned the marital property. The circuit court awarded to David the proceeds of certain unsecured loans, which David had unilaterally made to his father using marital funds (David’s father’s notes). Petitioner, Coral L. Moll, was awarded two parcels of land totalling 218 acres (the farm property), which Coral and David owned as tenants in common, but which David had again unilaterally leased to his father and brother. David asserts that: (1) the marital property was unjustly apportioned; (2) the circuit court failed to consider all relevant statutory factors (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503); (3) the circuit court failed to consider the ef-feet its award of the farm property to Coral would have on the farming operation of David’s father and brother (Moll family farming operation); (4) the circuit court incorrectly found David’s conduct in unilaterally loaning money and leasing the farm property to the Moll family farming operation to be improper and considered such conduct as a factor in apportioning the marital property; (5) the circuit court considered improper evidence of valuation; (6) the circuit court improperly valued David’s father’s notes; (7) the circuit court failed to assign a portion of both the farm property and David’s father’s notes to each party; and (8) the circuit court failed to consider David’s contribution to the family after the separation of the parties and before the order of dissolution.

The parties were married in 1970, at which time Coral was 17 years old and David was 19 years old. During the almost 20 years prior to their separation, three children were bom, Rachael, Aaron, and Monica, ages 20, 17, and 15, respectively, at the time of the dissolution proceeding. Shortly after their marriage, the parties moved into a farmhouse on one of David’s father’s farms, where they lived rent free, although the parties provided services to David’s father as part of the families’ farming operations. After the parties’ separation in April 1990, David continued to live in that house with Monica and Aaron, and Rachel attended college studying to become a nurse. David paid a portion of Rachel’s college expenses, and she provided the balance of her needs.

Beginning immediately and throughout most of their marriage, Coral and David operated their own farm, as did David’s father and brother. Both Coral and David participated in the operation of the farm, although David performed the majority of the field work while Coral raised their family. In 1986, health reasons forced David to give up farming as a livelihood. David then began work at Kelly Springfield Tire Company, where he continued to work at the time of these proceedings. However, he continued to participate in his father’s and brother’s farming operations. In 1987, for the first time in their marriage, Coral began working outside the home.

As is common in families with several generations devoted to farming, David and Coral’s finances were inexorably intertwined with that of David’s father and brother with minimal record-keeping. In 1986, when David and Coral ceased farming, their equipment and livestock were sold with little cash remaining after the payment of taxes and outstanding liens. At that time, cattle that David and Coral owned jointly with David’s father were also sold, realizing a net profit to David and Coral of $84,810.42. David immediately loaned that amount to his father in exchange for unsecured notes from his father. The notes were payable to David alone and lacked any indication of an interest rate or due date.

In 1987, David’s father loaned David and Coral $10,000 to purchase a Chevy Eurosport car which Coral was using at the time of the dissolution proceeding. The $10,000 was offset against the balance of David’s father’s notes. Although no note was executed reflecting this transaction, Coral admitted the partial repayment of David’s father’s notes. At the time of the dissolution proceeding, David was driving the parties’ 1987 Dodge Raider, which had an outstanding loan of $1,100 and had been acquired from Coral’s parents. In addition, the parties’ 1978 Ford truck, which had an outstanding loan of $1,066, was being driven by David’s father.

In June 1989, David and Coral, together with David’s father and brother and their respective spouses, accomplished a restructuring of all of the debt associated with the Moll family farming operation. The restructuring was based on a five-year special interest rate at 2% to 3% less than the then prevailing rate, which was extended to all property within the restructuring. The restructuring was premised on the repayment abilities of all of the property and of all of the members of the Moll family, including David and Coral. As a result of that restructuring, David and Coral purchased the farm property from David’s parents at a price of'$324,800. To accomplish this purchase, David and Coral assumed the existing mortgage in addition to making a down payment of $64,000. The funds for the down payment were comprised of David and Coral’s savings in addition to loans from their children’s savings, against their insurance policies, against Coral’s car and a car driven by Aaron, and an advance on the rental of the acreage.

After the restructuring, David immediately leased the farm property for a term of five years to a company operated by David’s father and brother at an annual rent of $26,562.50. The lease provided that the income of $3,000 received from the rental of the home located on the farm property was payable to David’s father, which David testified was in lieu of rent from the house occupied by David and Coral at that time and eventually by David and the children. The annual rent from the farm property was insufficient to pay the annual mortgage, taxes, and insurance of $29,562.50, $4,576, and $653, respectively, without regard to any maintenance costs. David alone executed the lease with his father and brother.

In January 1990, David executed a note to his father for $12,000, which David testified was used to make the biannual mortgage payment on the farm property. In addition, David’s father made two loans to David of $6,000 each in June and July 1990 to pay the notes on Coral’s car and Aaron’s car. In September 1990, David’s father loaned him an additional $6,000, of which $5,000 was used to repay Rachel’s notes so that she could purchase a car. David testified that these amounts, unlike the $10,000 used to purchase the Chevy Euros-port in 1987, were loans rather than repayment of David’s father’s notes. This was necessary because the restructuring required David’s father to repay the secured mortgages within the restructuring agreement prior to unsecured notes. Each of these notes was executed by David alone and, similar to his father’s notes, contained no due date or interest rate.

Thus, the marital assets included the cars and trucks, the farm property, and the notes from David’s father. The marital liabilities included the mortgage on the farm property, the balance of the notes to the parties’ children, and the notes to David’s father. Neither the distribution of the household goods between David and Coral nor two cemetery plots valued at $2,000, David’s pension of approximately $2,000, and David’s one-fourth share of a 1978 semitractor of indeterminate value, which were awarded to David, are disputed.

Coral’s expert valued the farm property at between $1,750 and $1,600 per acre or $367,150. David’s expert valued the property at $1,100 per acre, or $240,000, specifically because the long-term lease lowered its value. David’s expert further testified that the value of the land without the lease was closer to the value determined by Coral’s expert. David’s affidavit valued the land at $327,000, which he arrived at by extending the rounded per-acre purchase price used in the restructuring. David testified that the balance on the notes owed by his father was $74,000 or $76,000, plus interest.

The circuit court valued the farm property at $324,800, which was the amount the parties had paid for the property two years before at the time of the restructuring, subject to the mortgage of $256,000, and it awarded the farm property to Coral for a total award of marital assets of $68,800. David was awarded the net of the notes from his father, which the circuit court valued at $75,000. David was ordered to pay the 1990 taxes on the farm property, the outstanding loans on the truck he was driving and that driven by his father, and each party was to repay a portion of the children’s notes. Thus, the net award to Coral was $66,300 and to David, $68,100, plus the other undisputed property David received.

David appeals, asserting that the circuit court abused its discretion because: (1) the marital property was unjustly apportioned; (2) the court failed to consider all the relevant statutory factors (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503); (3) the court failed to consider the effect its award of the farm property to Coral on the Moll family farming operation; (4) the court improperly found David’s conduct in unilaterally loaning money and leasing the farm property to be improper and considered such conduct as a factor in apportioning the marital property; (5) the circuit court considered improper valuations of the marital property; (6) the circuit court improperly valued David’s father’s notes; (7) the court failed to assign a portion of both the farm property and David’s father’s notes to each party; and (8) the circuit court failed to consider David’s contribution to the family after the separation of the parties and before the order of dissolution. More succinctly argued, David asserts that (1) the court's valuations of the two predominant marital assets, the farm property and David’s father’s notes, were against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in apportioning the marital assets and liabilities.

Valuation of marital assets is for the trier of fact, and a valuation within the range presented by the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. (In re Marriage of Olson (1992), 223 Ill. App. 3d 636, 646; In re Marriage of Stone (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 62, 71.) The court cannot determine such value without competent evidence. (In re Marriage of Stone, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 71.) However, it is the burden of the parties to present evidence for the court’s consideration. (In re Marriage of Benz (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 273, 285.) We will not reverse and remand an order of distribution when a party had ample opportunity to present evidence of value and failed to do so. In re Marriage of Benz, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 285.

Coral’s expert testified that the land was worth between $1,750 and $1,600 per acre or $367,150. David himself in his affidavit attested that the land was worth $327,000, which was an approximation of the value of the land at the time of the restructuring. Finally, David’s expert testified to a value of $1,100 per acre or $240,000, but that such value was depressed due to the long-term lease that David had executed with his father and brother and that absent the lease the value determined by Coral’s expert was accurate.

In valuing the land at $324,800, the circuit court indicated that it was using the value placed on the land two years prior at the time of the restructuring. Not only was such value admitted by David himself, but was well within the range testified to by both parties’ experts. Therefore, we find that such value was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Marriage of Olson, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 646.

The second significant asset of the parties was the obligation of David’s father, evidenced by his notes payable to David alone. David’s father executed the unsecured notes in 1986 in exchange for the loan of $84,810.42 in cash, which was David’s and Coral’s share of the profits from the sale of cattle when the couple stopped farming.

David himself placed the value of his father’s notes at $74,000 or $76,000, plus interest. Coral’s counsel argued that the notes were in fact worth something in excess of $84,000 after allowing appropriate credits for David’s notes, his father’s 1987 partial repayment, and the addition of interest at 9V4%. The court expressly relied on David’s testimony and Coral’s counsel’s argument in valuing the notes. It further allowed David the opportunity, which he failed to exercise, to substitute more definitive numbers for the calculation of such value. Therefore, we interpret David’s challenge to the valuation of his father’s notes to pertain only to their worth relative to David’s father’s entire financial position and not the method of calculation.

David asserts that the unsecured notes were worth less at the time of this proceeding because of the priority of the restructuring loans against David’s father’s only collateral, his farming operation. However, although David offered evidence that the notes occupied a fourth position after the liens created by the restructuring, he offered no evidence that such position was inferior to the notes’ unsecured status prior to the restructuring. Rather, David testified that the restructuring agreement was necessary to consolidate the then existing debt on his father’s and brother’s farming operations, which threatened the existence of the farming operation. Thus, there was some evidence, and certainly the inference, that the collateral that secured the restructuring obligations at the time of this proceeding was equally encumbered at the time the unsecured notes were executed. Therefore, the circuit court’s finding that David’s father’s notes had a net value of $75,000 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Having found that the circuit court’s valuations of the farm property and of David’s father’s notes were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we next turn to David’s assertion that the court abused its discretion in apportioning such property. To successfully assert an abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s apportionment of marital property, it must be shown that the circuit court acted ‘arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded] the bounds of reason and ig-nor[ed] recognized principles of law so that substantial injustice resulted.’ ” (In re Marriage of Jacks (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 112, 119, quoting In re Marriage of Lee (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 1123, 1127; see In re Marriage of Smith (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1024-25, citing In re Marriage of Lee (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 1123, 1127.) Equal distribution is not required (In re Marriage of Aschwanden (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 31, 37), and an equitable distribution may be best achieved by unequal apportionment if relevant factors warrant unequal apportionment (In re Marriage of Jacks, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 119). In apportioning marital property, the court is required to take into account the statutory factors, together with other factors deemed relevant in any particular case. (In re Marriage of Aschwanden, 82 Ill. 2d at 37.) The statutory factors include: (1) the contribution or dissipation of both parties to the marital property; (2) the value of other property given to each spouse; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the economic circumstances of each party at the time of division of the property, specifically, the desirability of an award of the marital home to the party with custody of minor children; (5) obligations arising from a prior marriage; (6) an antenuptial agreement; (7) the age, health, station, occupation, education and abilities, amount, and sources of income available to meet each party’s needs; (8) the custody of minor children; (9) any award of maintenance; (10) the opportunity of each party for acquisition of future assets and income; and (11) tax consequences of the property division. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503(d).

In this instance, we find the farm property and David’s father’s notes to be merely a share of David’s family’s farming operation, which is analogous to a closely held business. Similar to a closely held business that depends for its success on the skills of the owner/ operator, the family farming operation is dependant on the unique skills and talents of David’s family, which we deem to be an extension of David under the peculiar facts presented here. Thus, we find precedent addressing the court’s discretion in apportioning closely held businesses to be persuasive. Both finality to avoid continued need for court intervention (In re Marriage of Hellwig (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 452, 459) and division of the property to avoid ongoing association between the parties are goals to be considered in apportioning such marital assets (In re Marriage of Banach (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 327, 331; In re Marriage of Hellwig, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 459).

The court found the total marital estate to be valued at $134,400, exclusive of vehicles and other personal and household property not at issue. The court noted that David received more of the parties’ household goods and the one-fourth share of the tractor trailer and expressly considered that fact in apportioning the remaining property. The court awarded David property valued at $68,100, consisting of his father’s notes plus interest, less offset for David’s own notes to his father, and a portion of the parties debts to their children. Coral received property valued at $66,300, which included the farm subject to the mortgage and a portion of the parties’ debts to their children. Thus, David received slightly more than 50% of the parties’ marital property and Coral received slightly less than 50%.

Equal distribution of marital property is favored unless the statutory factors demonstrate that such distribution will be inequitable. (In re Marriage of Jacks, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 119.) We must now consider such equal distribution between David and Coral in light of such statutory factors to determine if the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to apportion more than 50% of the parties’ assets to David.

In this instance, the circuit court considered the length of the parties’ marriage; the relative contribution of each to the marital estate; the age, education, and the like of each of the parties; the ability of each of the parties to generate future assets or income; and the separate property awarded to David. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, pars. 503(d)(1), (dX2), (dX3), (dX4), (dX7), (dX10).) David asserts that the court failed to consider the contribution of David to the family after the parties’ separation and prior to the order of dissolution. This argument then reasons that David is entitled to a greater share of the marital property than Coral because, during the marriage, he contributed a greater share to the acquisition of the marital estate. However, the record reflects that the court adequately considered the contribution of each of the parties to the acquisition of the marital estate. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503(dXl).) It found Coral’s contribution to the marriage for I8V2 years as a farm wife and homemaker, and eventually as a wage earner, to be equal to David’s contribution as a farmer and wage earner for the same period in addition to his contribution as a homemaker for 18 months after the parties’ separation.

The balance of the statutory factors are inapplicable in this case. Aaron reached majority shortly after this proceeding, and David thereafter had custody of only Monica, for whom Coral was ordered to pay support. Therefore, we find that David’s custody of the minor children did not justify a disproportionate award. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503(dX8).) David asserted that such custody warranted the circuit court’s award of the farm property to David as the marital home. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503(dX4).) The circuit court, however, rejected such argument because David did not reside on the farm property with the children. There was no antenuptial agreement (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40 par. 503(dX6)), no prior obligations from previous marriages (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503(dX5)), and no award of maintenance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503(dX9)). Finally, neither David nor Coral offered any evidence of the tax consequences of the distribution for the court’s consideration. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503(dXll); In re Marriage of Olson, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 650 (speculative tax consequences are inappropriate for circuit court’s consideration).) Thus, we find that the circuit court considered all the relevant applicable statutory factors in this instance.

David argues, however, that the circuit court improperly considered his conduct in loaning marital funds to his father and in leasing the farm property to his father and brother as a dissipation of marital property. The record does not support this conclusion. The court expressly indicated that it did not consider the loan to be such a dissipation because no separation was contemplated at the time the loans were made. Further, the circuit court considered the lease as a factor, not in apportioning the marital estate, but rather in determining the value of the farm property. The circuit court found that David could not unilaterally act to lower the value of such a marital asset and then claim the benefit of such an act. Moreover, the source of a marital debt, the party who signed for the debt, and the overall circumstances of the parties are appropriate considerations in apportioning debt. (See In re Marriage of Schaufelberger (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 114, 116.) We see no reason to ignore similar considerations in apportioning marital assets.

Finally, David asserts that the circuit court failed to consider other nonstatutory factors. He asserts that the court failed to consider Coral’s inability to meet obligations arising from the farm property and the effect of such possible inability on the Moll family farming operation. The record also belies this assertion. The court expressly stated that it agonized for many hours and days in reaching its decision. It was keenly aware of the part that the farm property played in the entire Moll family farming operation. The court provided an option by which David could purchase the farm property from Coral during the term of the lease for $68,800 plus any principal payment made by Coral and provided a right of first refusal during the same term to protect the interests of the Moll family farming operation.

On David’s motion for reconsideration, the court acknowledged the problem created by Coral’s lack of financial ability and modified its order to provide that no quitclaim be executed from David to Coral until all claims against the farm property were fully settled and to allow David to pay any deficit and be reimbursed from the proceeds of any such sale. Therefore, the court not only considered the applicable statutory factors, but the other relevant factors in equally apportioning the parties’ marital estate.

David also asserts that the court abused its discretion in awarding the farm property entirely to Coral and awarding David’s father’s notes entirely to David. He asserts that a more equitable distribution would have resulted had the parties each shared in both the farm and notes until such time as the lease expired and both the farm property and David’s father’s notes could be untangled from the Moll family farming operation. Such an argument ignores, however, an equally important goal to be achieved in the apportionment of the marital estate. Finality, both to avoid future court intervention and to allow the parties to plan their futures with some certainty, is also a goal to be achieved by the allocation and division of property. (In re Marriage of Hellwig, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 459.) An ongoing business association between former spouses, such as would have been required in the management of the farm property, is disadvantageous. (See In re Marriage of Hellwig, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 459-60.) The circuit court carefully considered the complicated and intertwined affairs of David and Coral and the entire Moll family in light of these goals. We find that the apportionment achieved by the circuit court was not arbitrary and did not lack “conscientious judgment” or “exceed the bounds of reason and ignore recognized principals of law” so as to be an abuse of discretion. (See In re Marriage of Jacks, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 119.) We therefore reject David’s attempt to have us substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court.

The circuit court’s valuations of the two major assets in the marital estate were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court properly considered all the relevant statutory and other factors in apportioning those assets and did not abuse its discretion in so doing. Therefore, the order of the circuit court apportioning the marital estate of David and Coral Moll is affirmed.

Affirmed.

INGLIS, P. J., and DUNN, J., concur.