text:
    The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Derrick Hamilton, Respondent.
    Argued January 11, 1988;
    decided February 9, 1988
    APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attorney (Barbara D. Underwood, Nikki Kowalski and Stephen H. Kessler of counsel), for appellant.

      George Sheinberg for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

We agree with the Appellate Division that defendant’s convictions required reversal because his Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him” was violated by the People’s introduction, as part of its case-in-chief at trial, of the Grand Jury testimony of a witness, Patricia Lee.

In her Grand Jury testimony, Lee stated that defendant had made incriminating admissions to her. Prior to trial, Lee informed the trial court that if called to testify at trial, she would invoke her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Upon the People’s request, the trial court ordered a hearing pursuant to United States v Mastrangelo (693 F2d 269 [2d Cir], cert denied 467 US 1204) and Matter of Holtzman v Hellenbrand (92 AD2d 405) to determine whether defendant had forfeited his confrontation right by allegedly causing Lee’s unavailability as a trial witness.

At the hearing, Lee testified that neither defendant nor anyone in his family had threatened her or asked her not to testify at trial. She claimed that instead the police had coerced her into giving false testimony incriminating defendant before the Grand Jury. Defendant’s sister testified that Lee had stated that the police had forced her to lie before the Grand Jury. The People called the detective who was in charge of the investigation and had taken a statement from Lee prior to her Grand Jury testimony. He testified that neither he nor any officer in his presence forced Lee to testify. The People did not, however, produce any evidence that defendant had threatened Lee. Indeed, the prosecuting attorney testified that Lee had previously told him that although "she feared difficulties from the defendant and his family”, she had not been threatened by them.

We agree with the majority at the Appellate Division that the hearing court erred because there is no evidence that defendant or someone acting on his behalf tampered with this witness.

The People’s remaining arguments are without merit.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.

Order affirmed in a memorandum.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Carl A. Capasso, Respondent-Appellant, v Nancy Capasso, Appellant-Respondent.
    Submitted December 14, 1987;
    decided February 9, 1988
   Motion for leave to appeal denied. Cross motion for leave to appeal dismissed as untimely.

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    In the Matter of the Arbitration between Justin N. Feldman et al., Respondents, and Edward Brill et al., Respondents, and Paul R. Frank et al., Appellants. PFPF&G Leasing Corporation, Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.
    Submitted December 14, 1987;
    decided February 9, 1988
   Motion for leave to appeal from that portion of the Appellate Division order affirming the orders of Supreme Court denying the motion to amend and denying the motion to intervene dismissed upon the ground that that part of the order does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution; motion for leave to appeal otherwise denied.

Judges Kaye and Titone taking no part.


text:
    Olive Jones, Appellant, v City University of New York et al., Respondents.
    Submitted December 21, 1987;
    decided February 9, 1988
   Motion to amend remittitur dismissed as untimely (22 NYCRR 500.11 [g] [3]). [See, 57 NY2d 984.]

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    McCaskey, Davies and Associates, Inc., Appellant, v New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, Respondent.
    Submitted November 23, 1987;
    decided February 9, 1988
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed for failure to show compliance with CPLR 321 (a).


text:
    Paul B. S., Respondent, v Pamela J. S., Respondent. Legal Aid Society, as Law Guardian for Jessica S., an Infant, Intervenor-Respondent. In the Matter of Paul B. S., as Father of Jessica S., an Infant, Respondent, v Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York, Appellant, and Pamela J. S. et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Jessica S., an Infant. Paul B. S., Respondent; Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York, Appellant.
    Submitted January 11, 1988;
    decided February 9, 1988
   Motion to amend remittitur dismissed for untimeliness (22 NYCRR 500.11 [g] [3]). [See, 70 NY2d 739.]

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    Elena Skibinski, Appellant, v Aziz Youssess, Respondent.
    Submitted December 14, 1987;
    decided February 9, 1988
   Motion dismissed upon the ground that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for leave to appeal from the nonfinal order of the Appellate Division entered in a proceeding commenced in the Civil Court of the City of New York (NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b] [6], [7]; CPLR 5602 [a] [1] [i]).

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    Thomas Ughetto et al., Appellants, v Wendy Acrish, as Executive Director of Harlem Valley Psychiatric Center, et al., Respondents.
    Submitted January 11, 1988;
    decided February 9, 1988
   Motion for reconsideration of the November 17, 1987 order of dismissal or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal denied. [See, 70 NY2d 871.]

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    In the Matter of David Steyer, Appellant. In the Matter of Richard Burns, Appellant.
    Argued January 7, 1988;
    decided February 11, 1988

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      William J. McClusky for appellants.

      George E. Mead, III, County Attorney, for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memokandum.

The judgment of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

On February 26, 1984, William Oakes (a murder suspect) confessed to police and was then transported to the Jefferson County jail by Investigator Robert Cooke and Detective Edward Simser. At his trial several months later, Oakes testified that Cooke and Simser had beaten and abused him during the trip, including firing a gun near his head and threatening him with it, in an effort to locate evidence. As a result of this testimony, the District Attorney questioned groups of officers about the incident, among them petitioners, but no one supported Oakes’ version of the incident. According to the District Attorney, his cross-examination of Oakes was based on these interviews indicating that Oakes was lying. Through all of this, petitioners disclosed no knowledge of the incident either to the District Attorney or to their own superior officers in the course of their office communications about the incident. After a mistrial, in October 1985 Oakes was retried and convicted of murder.

Roughly two years after the incident — on January 24, 1986 —Steyer prepared a sworn statement relating (1) that Simser told him on February 27, 1984 about the "night of terror” when he and Cooke "scared the hell out of Oakes” in an effort to strengthen the case, including discharging a gun three times near his ear, pointing it at him and threatening to shoot, and roughing him up, and (2) that during a break while both attended Oakes’ trial, Cooke told him of the shooting and the beating. On April 7, 1986, Steyer gave the affidavit to Acting Sheriff Franklyn Cowing, when he learned that Cowing was considering promoting Simser to the position of undersheriff. Cowing notified the District Attorney and County Attorney of the affidavit, and an investigation commenced. After investigators questioned Burns about the incident, on April 17, 1986 he executed an affidavit stating that on February 27, 1984, both Simser and Cooke told him of the shooting and beating; Burns’ affidavit contained many of the same details as Steyer’s affidavit.

One month later, on May 23, 1986, the Sheriff preferred disciplinary charges against both petitioners. Each was charged with one specification of failing- Lo. report knowledge of crimes by a fellow officer and one specification of failing to report knowledge of crimes; petitioners were found guilty of both. Although the Hearing Officer recommended demotion, the Sheriff determined that petitioners should be removed. By the present article 78 proceeding petitioners challenged their dismissals principally on the ground that the 18-month limitations period of Civil Service Law § 75 (4) precluded any disciplinary proceedings against them. The Appellate Division confirmed the administrative determination, concluding that the "continuous nature of petitioners’ misconduct * * * prevented the statutory period from running” (129 AD2d 994). We affirm, but on a different ground.

On this record, petitioners are estopped from asserting the Statute of Limitations to bar the disciplinary proceedings. This doctrine — rooted in the principle that one may not take advantage of one’s own wrongdoing — operates to bar a party from asserting the Statute of Limitations when that party’s own wrongful concealment has engendered the delay in prosecution (see, e.g., Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 448-449; General Stencils v Chiappa, 18 NY2d 125; Jordan v Ford Motor Co., 73 AD2d 422, 424; Erbe v Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 13 AD2d 211, rearg and lv denied 14 AD2d 509, appeal dismissed 11 NY2d 754; see also, 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac 201.13). Here, petitioners remained silent about asserted criminal conduct and concealed their own wrongdoing by failing to respond when the District Attorney attempted specifically to elicit the facts from them about an incident pertinent to an ongoing murder trial. Given the respective parties’ positions and special relationships, it is apparent that petitioners’ concealment prevented filing of the disciplinary charges within the 18-month statutory period. The charges were lodged promptly after their disclosures.

Petitioners’ remaining contentions are all without merit. There was sufficient evidence to support the Hearing Officer’s findings — petitioners’ own sworn statements constituted substantial evidence. The imposed penalty of removal was not unconscionably harsh (see, Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222).

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.

       Oakes was indicted for perjury; those charges were dismissed.


text:
    Town of Brookhaven, Respondent, v Marian Chun Enterprises, Inc., Trading as the Lakeview Lodge Motel, Appellant.
    Submitted December 14, 1987;
    decided February 11, 1988
   Motion for leave to appeal granted. Motion for a stay granted. Motion by the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services for leave to appear amicus curiae granted.

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    Salomon Brothers, Inc., Plaintiff, and International Nickel Company, Inc., Respondent, v New York Plaza Building Company, Appellant.
    Submitted December 21, 1987;
    decided February 11, 1988
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed as untimely (CPLR 5513 [b]; 2103 [b] [2]).

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Dwayne Boulware, Respondent.
    Decided February 11, 1988
   On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), appeal dismissed upon the ground that the reversal by the Appellate Division was not "on the law alone or upon the law and such facts which, but for the determination of law, would not have led to reversal” (CPL 450.90 [2] [a]).

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur; Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    Robert Smith, Respondent, v Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., Respondent and Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent. Steel Contracting Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.
    Argued January 12, 1988;
    decided February 17, 1988

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      W. Donn McCarthy for appellant.

      Victor Alan Oliveri for Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., respondent.

      Paul William Beltz and Russell T. Quinlan for Robert Smith, respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes upon owners and contractors a nondelegable duty to provide adequate safety devices to afford proper protection to those working on a building or structure (Bland v Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452: Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513). The trial court, affirmed by the Appellate Division, did not err in its determinations that defendants violated Labor Law § 240 (1) in not providing adequate safety devices, and that the violation was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. Thus we do not reach the issue whether defendants could be liable if adequate safety devices had been made available to plaintiff but he simply refused to use them (see, 89 AD2d 361 [Simons, J.]).

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Kaye, Alexander, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur; Judges Simons and Titone taking no part.

Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Peter Colavito, Appellant.
    Argued February 4, 1988;
    decided February 17, 1988

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Richard E. Mischel and llene Durst for appellant.

      Carl A. Vergari, District Attorney (Maryanne Luciano, Richard L. Hecht and Richard E. Weill of counsel), for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Order affirmed (see, People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858).

Concur: Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Hancock, Jr., Bellacosa and Dillon.

       Designated pursuant to NY Constitution, article VI, § 2.


text:
    Thomas C. Shed, Appellant, v Terry L. Sofia, Formerly Known as Terry L. Shed, Respondent.
    Decided February 17, 1988

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Lawrence J. Vilardo and Michael J. Shea for appellant.

      Rocco Lucente, II, for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order affirmed, with costs. There is no basis upon which we can disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion, balancing the interests of all concerned, especially the best interests of the children, or its application of the Weiss v Weiss (52 NY2d 170) extraordinary circumstances test, as affirmed by the majority at the Appellate Division.

Concur: Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa. Taking no part: Judge Titone.


text:
    In the Matter of Martin A. Berchenko, a Disbarred Attorney, Appellant. Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts, Respondent.
    Submitted January 25, 1988;
    decided February 17, 1988
   Treating appellant’s submissions as an appeal taken as of right, or alternatively as a motion for leave to appeal, from the Appellate Division order entered June 15, 1987, motion to dismiss appeal granted and appeal dismissed, without costs, and motion for leave to appeal dismissed, each as untimely.

Treating appellant’s submissions as an appeal taken as of right, or alternatively as á motion for leave to appeal, from the Appellate Division order entered November 9, 1987, motion to dismiss appeal granted and appeal dismissed, without costs, and motion for leave to appeal dismissed each upon the ground that the order of the Appellate Division does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for assignment of counsel dismissed as academic.

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    Town of Brookhaven et al., Appellants, v State of New York et al., Respondents.
    Decided February 17, 1988
   Appeal transferred, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, to the Appellate Division, Third Department, upon the ground that a direct appeal does not lie when questions other than the constitutional validity of a statutory provision are involved (NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b] [2]; § 5 [b]; CPLR 5601 M [2]).

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    Richard Drzewinski et al., Respondents, v Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co., Inc., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant. Bowery Savings Bank, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v Rambusch Decorating Co., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. Swanke Hayden Connell Architects, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v Rambusch Decorating Co., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.
    Submitted January 25, 1988;
    decided February 17, 1988
   Motion to amend remittitur dismissed as untimely (22 NYCRR 500.11 [g] [3]). [See, 70 NY2d 774.]

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    Robert W. Kohn, Appellant, v Fredda S. Kohn, Respondent.
    Submitted December 28, 1987;
    decided February 17, 1988
   Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from so much of the Appellate Division order as pertains to the distribution of the marital abode’s contents, dismissed upon the ground that that portion of the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution; motion for leave to appeal otherwise denied.

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    In the Matter of Lillian Michelson, as Executrix of the Estates of Carmella J. Russo and Another, Deceased, Appellant, v State of New York Public Service Commission et al., Respondents.
    Submitted December 21, 1987;
    decided February 17, 1988
   Motion for leave to appeal as against the Public Service Commission denied. Motion for leave to appeal as against Brooklyn Union Gas dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Cross motion by Brooklyn Union Gas for leave to appeal dismissed as academic. Motion for a stay dismissed as academic.

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    Bernard L. Schwartz, Respondent, v Gerald Guterman et al., Appellants.
    Submitted February 8, 1988;
    decided February 17, 1988
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution (Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals §§ 15, 38, 39, 43 [d]).

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    James L. Seago, Appellant, v Jill P. Arnold, Respondent.
    Submitted December 14, 1987;
    decided February 17, 1988
   Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the Appellate Division orders of September 26, 1986 and May 22, 1987, dismissed upon the ground that those orders do not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution; motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from so much of the Appellate Division order of November 10, 1987 as affirmed Family Court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to hold respondent in contempt, dismissed upon the ground that that portion of the order does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution; motion for leave to appeal otherwise denied.

Judge Titone taking no part.


text:
    State Division of Human Rights on the Complaint of Alphonzo G. Fowlkes, Appellant, v Goodwill Industries, Respondent.
    Submitted December 14, 1987;
    decided February 17, 1988
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed for failure to demonstrate timeliness as required by section 500.11 (d) (1) (iii) of the Court of Appeals Rules of Practice.

Judge Titone taking no part.


author: Titone, J. Bellacosa, J.

text:
    Fred Boreali et al., Respondents, v David M. Axelrod, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, et al., Appellants.
    Argued October 13, 1987;
    decided November 25, 1987

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Peter H. Schiff, O. Peter

      Sherwood, Nancy A. Spiegel and Denise A. Hartman of counsel), for appellants.
    I. The Legislature has properly delegated
    authority to the Public Health Council to establish and amend the Sanitary Code to deal with any matter for the preservation and improvement of the public health, including the adverse effects of environmental tobacco smoke. (Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109; Matter of City of Utica v Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 NY2d 164; Matter of Levine v

      Whalen, 39 NY2d 510; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v Public Serv. Commn., 47 NY2d 94; Matter of Sullivan County Harness Racing Assn. v Glasser, 30 NY2d 269; Matter of Sleepy Hollow Lake v Public Serv. Commn., 43 AD2d 439, 34 NY2d 519; Yakus v United States, 321 US 414; United States v Southwestern Cable Co., 392 US 157; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367; National Broadcasting Co. v United States, 319 US 190.) II. The regulations’ limited exemptions have a rational basis and are not arbitrary. (Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510.)

      Bartley J. Costello, III, Eileen M. Kelley and Bruce N. Gyory for respondents.
    I. The court below properly concluded that the regulations constitute an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. (Matter of County of Oneida v Berle, 49 NY2d 515; Under 21 v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; People ex rel. Burby v Howland, 155 NY 270; Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157; People v Tremaine, 252 NY 27; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v Public Serv. Commn., 47 NY2d 94, 447 US 530; Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Public Serv. Commn., 69 NY2d 365; Messersmith v American Fid. Co., 232 NY 161; Rozell v Rozell, 256 App Div 61, 281 NY 106; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24.) II. The regulations are invalid because they are arbitrary and irrational. (Matter of Hawley v Cuomo, 46 NY2d 990; Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510; Flowers v Webb, 575 F Supp 1450.)

      John F. Banzhaf III for Action on Smoking and Health, amicus curiae.

    I. The court below failed to recognize the limited nature of the doctrine of separation or distribution of powers and misapplied that doctrine to nullify the smoking limitation regulations validly made under Public Health Law § 225. (Meyer v Burns, 16 Misc 2d 252; Dreyer v Illinois, 187 US 71; Matter of Trustees of Vil. of Saratoga Springs v Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 191 NY 123; People v Tremaine, 252 NY 27; Yakus v United States, 321 US 414; American Power Co. v S. E. C., 329 US 90; Matter of Richardson, 247 NY 401; Matter of City of Utica v Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 NY2d 164; Matter of Van Allen v McCleary, 27 Misc 2d 81.) II. The New York Legislature, in enacting Public Health Law § 225, did not engage in any illegal delegation of legislative authority, and the smoking regulations made thereunder did not exceed the limits of the powers granted to the Public Health Council by the Legislature. (Matter of Slezia v

      Melton, 97 Misc 2d 944; Dubendorf v New York State Educ. Dept., 97 Misc 2d 382, 71 AD2d 837, 48 NY2d 829; Matter of City of Utica v New York State Health Dept., 96 AD2d 719; Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 31 Misc 2d 554, 12 NY2d 109; Matter of Putnam Lake Community Council Bathing Beaches v Deputy Commr. of Health, 90 AD2d 850.) III. The court below erred in holding that the exemption of certain establishments from the Public Health Council’s smoking limitation regulations was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, particularly since the regulations are in accord with many clean indoor air laws throughout the United States. (Matter of Bernstein v Toia, 43 NY2d 437; Ostrer v Schenck, 41 NY2d 782; Matter of Cohn v Flacke, 84 AD2d 595; Matter of Sommerich v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 98 Misc 2d 736; Matter of Fein v Rent Stabilization Assn., 101 Misc 2d 261.)

      Peter L. Zimroth, Corporation Counsel (Francis F. Caputo and Spencer Fisher of counsel), for the City of New York, amicus curiae.

    Part 25 is a proper exercise of the validly delegated powers of the Public Health Council and is not inconsistent with State law. (City of New York v State of New York Commn. on Cable Tel., 47 NY2d 89; Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109; Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510; United States v Southwestern Cable Co., 392 US 157; Matter of City of Utica v Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 NY2d 164; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24; Matter of Bates v Toia, 45 NY2d 460; People v New York Trap Rock Corp., 57 NY2d 371; Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v Town of Caledonia, 51 NY2d 679; People v Cook, 34 NY2d 100.)

      Beatrice S. Frank, Robert Eisenstadt, Barry Ensminger, Glenn E. Jenkins and Ellen B. Simon for Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Medicine and Law and others, amici curiae.

    I. There is substantial new medical and scientific evidence that exposure to tobacco smoke harms nonsmokers as well as smokers. II. There is ample precedent in other jurisdictions for regulating smoking in public places. III. Based on recent scientific evidence, regulation of smoking in public places is now necessary and sound public health policy. IV. Contrary to the decision below, legislative enactment of section 225 of the Public Health Law authorizes the Public Health Council to regulate public smoking. (Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109.)

      Charles J. Engel, Jr., for the Pyramid Companies, amicus

      curiae.

    The rule is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. (Aerated Prods. Co. v Godfrey, 290 NY 92; People v Pagnotta, 25 NY2d 333; People v Grogan, 260 NY 138; People v Firth, 3 NY2d 472; People v Berck, 32 NY2d 567; People v Diaz, 4 NY2d 469; People v Scott, 26 NY2d 286; Calderon v City of Buffalo, 61 AD2d 323.)

      John J. Cavanaugh, Jr., pro se, and for John J. Cavanaugh, Jr., and others, amici curiae.

    Appellants may not foist their notions of a social agenda upon this State’s citizens under the guise of a health measure. (Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24; Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185; Under 21 v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157; Matter of Davies, 168 NY 89; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v Public Serv. Commn., 47 NY2d 94; Matter of Federal Tel. & Radio Corp. [Corsi], 301 NY 95; Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay, 39 NY2d 641; Subcontractors Trade Assn. v Koch, 62 NY2d 422; Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109.)

      William L. Kandel, Charles H. Kaplan and Roberta V. Romberg for the New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc., amicus curiae.

    I. Only the Legislature has the power to authorize the regulation of smoking and it cannot delegate that authority wholesale to an administrative agency. (Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157; Under 21 v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; Matter of County of Oneida v Berle, 49 NY2d 515; People ex rel. Burby v Howland, 155 NY 270; Messersmith v American Fid. Co., 232 NY 161; Rozell v Rozell, 256 App Div 61, 281 NY 106; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24; Martin v State Liq. Auth., 43 Misc 2d 682, 15 NY2d 707; Packer Coll. Inst. v University of State of N. Y., 298 NY 184; Subcontractors Trade Assn. v Koch, 62 NY2d 422.) II. The Legislature has not delegated to the Public Health Council the authority to issue the smoking regulations in question. (Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109; Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24; Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157; Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185; Packer Coll. Inst. v University of State of N. Y., 298 NY 184; Matter of City of Utica v Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 NY2d 164; Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510.) III. The Public Health Council’s smoking regulations go beyond the framework established by the Legislature to regulate the workplace. (Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293; Sabetay v Sterling Drug, 69 NY2d 329; Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 NY2d 455.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Titone, J.

We hold that the Public Health Council overstepped the boundaries of its lawfully delegated authority when it promulgated a comprehensive code to govern tobacco smoking in areas that are open to the public. While the Legislature has given the Council broad authority to promulgate regulations on matters concerning the public health, the scope of the Council’s authority under its enabling statute must be deemed limited by its role as an administrative, rather than a legislative, body. In this instance, the Council usurped the latter role and thereby exceeded its legislative mandate, when, following the Legislature’s inability to reach an acceptable balance, the Council weighed the concerns of nonsmokers, smokers, affected businesses and the general public and, without any legislative guidance, reached its own conclusions about the proper accommodation among those competing interests. In view of the political, social and economic, rather than technical, focus of the resulting regulatory scheme, we conclude that the Council’s actions were ultra vires and that the order and judgment of the courts below, which declared the Council’s regulations invalid, should be affirmed.

I.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND REGULATORY SCHEME

More than two decades ago, the Surgeon General of the United States began warning the American public that tobacco smoking poses a serious health hazard. Within the past five years, there has been mounting evidence that even nonsmokers face a risk of lung cancer as a result of their exposure to tobacco smoke in the environment. As a consequence, smoking in the workplace and other indoor settings has become a cause for serious concern among health professionals (see, e.g., Collishaw, Tobacco Smoke in the Workplace, an Occupational Health Hazard, 131 Canadian Med Assocs J [Nov. 15, 1984]; Repace, The Problems of Passive Smoking, Bull of NY Acad of Med, at 936-946 [Dec. 1981]).

This growing concern about the deleterious effects of tobacco smoking led our State Legislature to enact a bill in 1975 restricting smoking in certain designated areas, specifically, libraries, museums, theaters and public transportation facilities (L 1975, ch 80, codified at Public Health Law, art 13-E, §§ 1399-0 — 1399-q). Efforts during the same year to adopt more expansive restrictions on smoking in public places were, however, unsuccessful (see, A-4768, introduced Mar. 4, 1975 [Hevesi] [covering school auditoriums, sports arenas, commercial stores and public elevators]; A-5772, introduced Mar. 4, 1975 [Orazio] [covering elevators and school or college classrooms]; A-7796, introduced Mar. 25, 1975 [Orazio] [covering elevators and school or college classrooms]; A-7199, introduced Mar. 25, 1975 [Cooperman] [elevators, public areas of health care institutions, public waiting rooms of designated health care practitioners, school buildings and indoor sports arenas]). Subsequent attempts to broaden the coverage of the antismoking statute have similarly failed (see, e.g., A-2746, introduced Feb. 1, 1983 [Grannis, Hevesi, Levy and Bennett] [banning smoking in workplace and other indoor areas open to the public, with certain specifically delineated exceptions]). In fact, it is undisputed that while some 40 bills on the subject have been introduced in the Legislature since 1975, none have passed both houses.

In late 1986 the Public Health Council (PHC) took action of its own. Purportedly acting pursuant to the broad grant of authority contained in its enabling statute (Public Health Law § 225 [5] [a]), the PHC published proposed rules, held public hearings and, in February of 1987, promulgated the final set of regulations prohibiting smoking in a wide variety of indoor areas that are open to the public, including schools, hospitals, auditoriums, food markets, stores, banks, taxicabs and limousines. Under these rules, restaurants with seating capacities of more than 50 people are required to provide contiguous nonsmoking areas sufficient to meet customer demand. Further, employers are required to provide smoke-free work areas for nonsmoking employees and to keep common areas free of smoke, with certain limited exceptions for cafeterias and lounges. Affected businesses are permitted to prohibit all smoking on the premises if they so choose. Expressly excluded from the regulations’ coverage are restaurants with seating capacities of less than 50, conventions, trade shows, bars, private homes, private automobiles, private social functions, hotel and motel rooms and retail tobacco stores. Additional "waivers” of the regulations’ restrictions may be obtained from the Commissioner upon a showing of financial hardship (10 NYCRR part 25). Implementation of these regulations, which were to become effective May 7, 1987, has been suspended during the pendency of this litigation.

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Commenced by several parties affected by the PHC’s anti-smoking regulations, the present litigation was initially brought as an article 78 proceeding, but was later converted to an action for declaratory relief. On motions by all sides for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the challenged regulations were inconsistent with the policies expressed in Public Health Law article 13-E (imposing more limited restrictions on indoor smoking) and were, accordingly, invalid and unenforceable.

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, albeit on a somewhat different theory. Although it rejected the analysis of the trial court, the majority at the Appellate Division was troubled by the possibility of the PHC having virtually "limitless” authority and noted the need to conduct a "realistic appraisal of [that agency’s] powers * * * to constitutionally 'limit the field’ of authority delegated.” (130 AD2d, at 114.) Observing that the PHC’s antismoking regulations "effectuate[d] a profound change in social and economic policy” and that the agency had obviously based the details of its regulatory scheme as much on concerns about "economic impact” as on considerations of public health, the court held that the PHC must be deemed to have acted in excess of its delegated authority.

III.

ANALYSIS

Preliminarily, we stress that this case presents no question concerning the wisdom of the challenged regulations, the propriety of the procedures by which they were adopted or the right of government in general to promulgate restrictions on the use of tobacco in public places. The degree of scientific support for the regulations and their unquestionable value in protecting those who choose not to smoke are, likewise, not pertinent except as background information. Finally, there has been no argument made concerning the personal freedoms of smokers or their "right” to pursue in public a habit that may inflict serious harm on others who must breathe the same air. The only dispute is whether the challenged restrictions were properly adopted by an administrative agency acting under a general grant of authority and in the face of the Legislature’s apparent inability to establish its own broad policy on the controversial problem of passive smoking. Accordingly, we address no other issue in this appeal.

A. The Delegation/Separation of Powers Issue

Section 225 (5) (a) of the Public Health Law authorizes the PHC to "deal with any matters affecting the * * * public health”. At the heart of the present case is the question whether this broad grant of authority contravened the oft-recited principle that the legislative branch of government cannot cede its fundamental policy-making responsibility to an administrative agency. As a related matter, we must also inquire whether, assuming the propriety of the Legislature’s grant of authority, the agency exceeded the permissible scope of its mandate by using it as a basis for engaging in inherently legislative activities. While the separation of powers doctrine gives the Legislature considerable leeway in delegating its regulatory powers, enactments conferring authority on administrative agencies in broad or general terms must be interpreted in light of the limitations that the Constitution imposes (NY Const, art III, § 1).

However facially broad, a legislative grant of authority must be construed, whenever possible, so that it is no broader than that which the separation of powers doctrine permits (see, Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-17, at 288-289). Even under the broadest and most open-ended of statutory mandates, an administrative agency may not use its authority as a license to correct whatever societal evils it perceives (see, e.g., Matter of Council for Owner Occupied Hous. v Abrams, 125 AD2d 10). Here, we cannot say that the broad enabling statute in issue is itself an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. However, we do conclude that the agency stretched that statute beyond its constitutionally valid reach when it used the statute as a basis for drafting a code embodying its own assessment of what public policy ought to be. Our reasons follow.

Derived from the separation of powers doctrine, the principle that the legislative branch may not delegate all of its lawmaking powers to the executive branch has been applied with the utmost reluctance — even in the early case law. In Wayman v Southard (10 Wheat [23 US] 1, 42-43), for example, Chief Justice Marshall observed: "It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself * * * [A] general [statutory] provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details” (see also, Buttfield v Stranahan, 192 US 470; Field v Clark, 143 US 649). Similarly, this court stated in Matter of Trustees of Vil. of Saratoga Springs v Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co. (191 NY 123, 138) that "[a] review of the * * * judicial authorities in this state * * * clearly shows that while powers inherently and exclusively legislative cannot be delegated, there is a large field in which the legislature * * * 'may certainly delegate to others powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself ” (see, e.g., Ross v Arbury, 206 Mise 74, affd 285 App Div 886).

The modern view is reflected in this court’s statement in Matter of Levine v Whalen (39 NY2d 510, 515 [citations omitted]): "Because of the constitutional provision that '[t]he legislative power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and the Assembly’ (NY Const, art III, § 1), the Legislature cannot pass on its law-making functions to other bodies * * * but there is no constitutional prohibition against the delegation of power, with reasonable safeguards and standards, to an agency or commission to administer the law as enacted by the Legislature”. (Accord, Matter of County of Oneida v Berle, 49 NY2d 515; Matter of Bates v Toia, 45 NY2d 460, 464; Matter of City of Utica v Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 NY2d 164.) It is also reflected in many of this court’s decisions upholding legislative delegations of authority that are circumscribed in only the most general of terms (see, e.g., Matter of Levine v Whalen, supra, at 516-517 ["protection and promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the State”; "fit and adequate” facilities]; Matter of Sullivan County Harness Racing Assn. v Glasser, 30 NY2d 269, 277 ["public interest, convenience or necessity”; "best interests of racing generally”]; Martin v State Liq. Auth., 15 NY2d 707 [public convenience and advantage”]). Indeed, the precise provision that is at issue in this case— Public Health Law § 225 (5) (a) — has been upheld against a constitutional challenge based upon the "nondelegation” doctrine (Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109, 119-120).

This does not mean, however, that the regulations at issue here should be deemed valid without further analysis. To the contrary, the courts have previously struck down administrative actions undertaken under otherwise permissible enabling legislation where the challenged action could not have been deemed within that legislation without giving rise to a constitutional separation of powers problem (see, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v American Petroleum Inst., 448 US 607, 645-646; National Cable Tel. Assn. v United States, 415 US 336, 341-342; Moore v Board of Regents, 44 NY2d 593, 602; Matter of Natilson v Hodson, 264 App Div 384, affd 289 NY 842; cf., Kent v Dulles, 357 US 116; see also, Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v Public Serv. Commn., 47 NY2d 94, 102).

A number of coalescing circumstances that are present in this case persuade us that the difficult-to-define line between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-making has been transgressed. While none of these circumstances, standing alone, is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the PHC has usurped the Legislature’s prerogative, all of these circumstances, when viewed in combination, paint a portrait of an agency that has improperly assumed for itself "[t]he open-ended discretion to choose ends” (Tribe, op. cit, at 285), which characterizes the elected Legislature’s role in our system of, government.

First, while generally acting to further the laudable goal of protecting nonsmokers from the harmful effects of "passive smoking,” the PHC has, in reality, constructed a regulatory scheme laden with exceptions based solely upon economic and social concerns. The exemptions the PHC has carved out for bars, convention centers, small restaurants, and the like, as well as the provision it has made for "waivers” based on financial hardship, have no foundation in considerations of public health. Rather, they demonstrate the agency’s own effort to weigh the goal of promoting health against its social cost and to reach a suitable compromise. Indeed, in its "declaration of findings and intent,” the PHC itself asserted: "[Regulations addressing [this] hazard will cause certain economic dislocations and governmental intrusions which must be justified by the nature and extent of the public health hazard. A balance must be struck between safeguarding citizens from involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke on the one hand, and minimizing governmental intrusion into the affairs of its citizens on the other” (10 NYCRR 25.1 [g]).

Striking the proper balance among health concerns, cost and privacy interests, however, is a uniquely legislative function. While it is true that many regulatory decisions involve weighing economic and social concerns against the specific values that the regulatory agency is mandated to promote, the agency in this case has not been authorized to structure its decision making in a "cost-benefit” model (cf., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v Donovan, 452 US 490, 543-548 [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]) and, in fact, has not been given any legislative guidelines at all for determining how the competing concerns of public health and economic cost are to be weighed. Thus, to the extent that the agency has built a regulatory scheme on its own conclusions about the appropriate balance of trade-offs between health and cost to particular industries in the private sector, it was "acting solely on [its] own ideas of sound public policy” and was therefore operating outside of its proper sphere of authority (Matter of Picone v Commissioner of Licenses, 241 NY 157, 162; see, Packer Coll. Inst. v University of State of N. Y., 298 NY 184, 191). This conclusion is particularly compelling here, where the focus is on administratively created exemptions rather than on rules that promote the legislatively expressed goals, since exemptions ordinarily run counter to such goals and, consequently, cannot be justified as simple implementations of legislative values (see, Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24; see also, People v Klinck Packing Co., 214 NY 121, 138-139). In this regard, the regulations at issue here are fundamentally different from those challenged in Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe (supra, at 114-118), where the specific limits on the use of X-ray and fluoroscopic equipment were all promulgated in direct furtherance of the health-related goal of avoiding unnecessary exposure to harmful radiation.

The second, and related, consideration is that in adopting the antismoking regulations challenged here the PHC did not merely fill in the details of broad legislation describing the over-all policies to be implemented. Instead, the PHC wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules without benefit of legislative guidance. Viewed in that light, the agency’s actions were a far cry from the "interstitial” rule making that typifies administrative regulatory activity (see, Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, supra, at 31; Packer Coll. Inst. v University of State of N. Y., supra, at 190; see also, Tribe, op. cit., at 285).

A third indicator that the PHC exceeded the scope of the authority properly delegated to it by the Legislature is the fact that the agency acted in an area in which the Legislature had repeatedly tried — and failed — to reach agreement in the face of substantial public debate and vigorous lobbying by a variety of interested factions. While we have often been reluctant to ascribe persuasive significance to legislative inaction (see, e.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 NY2d 84, 89-90; cf., 41 Kew Gardens Rd. Assocs. v Tyburski, 70 NY2d 325, 335; but see, Matter of Knight-Ridder Broadcasting v Greenberg, 70 NY2d 151; Matter of Bliss v Bliss, 66 NY2d 382, 389), our usual hesitancy in this area has no place here. Unlike the cases in which we have been asked to consider the Legislature’s failure to act as some indirect proof of its actual intentions (see, e.g., Clark v Cuomo, supra, at 190-191), in this case it is appropriate for us to consider the significance of legislative inaction as evidence that the Legislature has so far been unable to reach agreement on the goals and methods that should govern in resolving a society-wide health problem. Here, the repeated failures by the Legislature to arrive at such an agreement do not automatically entitle an administrative agency to take it upon itself to fill the vacuum and impose a solution of its own. Manifestly, it is the province of the people’s elected representatives, rather than appointed administrators, to resolve difficult social problems by making choices among competing ends.

Finally, although indoor smoking is unquestionably a health issue, no special expertise or technical competence in the field of health was involved in the development of the antismoking regulations challenged here. Faced with mounting evidence about the hazards to bystanders of indoor smoking, the PHC drafted a simple code describing the locales in which smoking would be prohibited and providing exemptions for various special interest groups. The antismoking regulations at issue here are thus distinguishable from those at issue in Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe (supra, at 120), in which we stressed that the PHC’s technical competence was necessary to flesh out details of the broadly stated legislative policies embodied in the Public Health Law.

In summary, we conclude that while Public Health Law § 225 (5) (a) is a valid delegation of regulatory authority, it cannot be construed to encompass the policy-making activity at issue here without running afoul of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Further, the "separability” provision of the agency’s rules (10 NYCRR 25.7) cannot be used to save those rules from the conclusion that, taken as a whole, they are invalid. The PHC’s own "Declaration of findings and intent” makes clear that the agency considered the regulatory scheme it adopted to be an integrated code in which the need to protect citizens from "involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke” was delicately balanced against the goal of minimizing "economic dislocations and governmental intrusions” (10 NYCRR 25.1 [g]). It would be pragmatically impossible, as well as jurisprudentially unsound, for us to attempt to identify and excise particular provisions while leaving the remainder of the PHC’s antismoking code intact, since the product of such an effort would be a regulatory scheme that neither the Legislature nor the PHC intended.

B. Preemption and the Legislature’s Intentions

Plaintiffs have also argued that the Legislature "preempted the field” of indoor smoking by enacting Public Health Law article 13-E, which imposes restrictions on smoking in a narrow class of public locations. However, we decline to adopt this contention as an alternative ground for our holding. The preemption doctrine is most often applied where inferior levels of government have attempted to regulate despite pronouncements on the same subject at a higher governmental level (see, e.g., New York State Club Assn. v City of New York, 69 NY2d 211; Consolidated Edison Co. v Town of Red Hook, 60 NY2d 99; Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v Town of Caledonia, 51 NY2d 679). It has limited utility where, as here, a perceived conflict between legislative policy and administrative action at the same level of government is at issue. In such cases, the salient inquiry is not whether a higher level of government has demonstrated an intention to preclude local regulation in a particular area, but rather whether the legislative branch of government has shown an intent to grant regulatory authority over a specific subject matter to an administrative agency which exists as part of the coequal executive branch (see, Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185, 190, supra). The inquiry includes an examination of both the scope of the statute authorizing the regulatory activity and the degree to which the administrative rules are either consistent or "out of harmony” with the policies expressed in the statute (see, e.g., Matter of McNulty v New York State Tax Commn., 70 NY2d 788; Clark v Cuomo, supra; Finger Lakes Racing Assn. v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 45 NY2d 471; Matter of Jones v German, 37 NY2d 42, 53; see also, Subcontractors Trade Assn. v Koch, 62 NY2d 422).

Here, it is apparent that the Legislature has given the PHC a wide field for the exercise of its regulatory authority (Public Health Law § 225 [5] [a]; see, Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, supra, at 119-120), and nothing in the Legislature’s 1975 adoption of a limited antismoking provision (Public Health Law art 13-E) suggests a legislative intention to narrow the statutory mandate or exclude the area of smoking restrictions. Although the PHC’s regulations prohibit smoking in a wider variety of indoor settings than do the Legislature’s enactments on the subject, both the regulations and the relevant statutes have a common underlying policy objective — minimizing nonsmokers’ exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (see, Clark v Cuomo, supra). Thus, whether phrased in terms of "preemption” or in terms of consistency with the existing statutory scheme, plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the effect of Public Health Law article 13-E on the PHC’s power to regulate public smoking must fail.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Although Public Health Law § 225 (5) (a) confers broad powers on the Public Health Council and there is no indication that the Legislature intended to circumscribe those powers when it enacted a limited antismoking measure of its own (see, Public Health Law art 13-E), the fundamental constitutional limitations on the respective powers of the legislative and executive branches foreclose a construction of the statute that would include the administrative activity challenged here. In promulgating its antismoking rules, the PHC transgressed the line that separates administrative rule making from legislating and thereby exceeded its statutory powers. Consequently, its actions cannot be upheld.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should foe affirmed.

Bellacosa, J.

(dissenting). I would reverse and uphold the Public Health Council (PHC) regulation, adopted to preserve and improve the public health, prohibiting smoking indoors in some public places and in designated portions of workplaces (10 NYCRR 25.2). This comprehensive plan, based on a thoroughly documented record and a carefully deliberated public procedure, was promulgated to protect innocent bystanders from involuntary exposure to the environmental smoke of others.

The majority accepts the Legislature’s delegation of broad authority to the PHC to make regulations concerning a wide range of issues affecting the public health (see, Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510, 515). They recognize that the legislative delegation may be granted in the most generous terms (Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109, 120), that the regulation is in harmony with the statute (State Div. of Human Rights [Valdemarsen] v Genesee Hosp., 50 NY2d 113, 118; Matter of Jones v Berman, 37 NY2d 42, 53), and that this court has held the particular delegation under Public Health Law § 225 (4), (5) (a) to be valid (Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, supra). They even acknowledge that the Legislature did not preempt the field of public smoking or evince an intent to constrict the PHC mandate by enacting its own 1975 narrow smoking ban in Public Health Law article 13-E.

Yet, the majority, wrongly I respectfully submit, concludes that the separation of powers doctrine has been transgressed by the Legislature and by the PHC and, on that basis alone, they uphold the judicial invalidation of the smoking ban regulation.

The statutory authority for protecting the public health was delegated by the Legislature to the PHC 75 years ago in the broadest possible mandate and it has not been withdrawn or narrowed. Indeed, it has been exercised regularly with this court’s express approbation (Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510, 517, supra; Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109, 120, supra). That power includes adoption and amendment to the Sanitary Code dealing with the root source of authority here — "matters affecting the security of life or health or the preservation and improvement of public health” (Public Health Law § 225 [4], [5] [a]). This court, in a definitive ruling, has held that mission, that delegation and its broad implementation, to be constitutionally proper (Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, supra, at 120 [under State Constitution the Legislature properly delegated power to the PHC in Public Health Law § 225]).

This antismoking regulation is a fortiori valid compared to the regulation in Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe (supra), which was a restriction on the freedom and access to chiropractic X-ray treatments, protecting patients from their own choices. Inasmuch as the Public Health Council could do that with our approbation, we search in vain for reasons in the majority’s decision that the same statutory source of authority cannot protect the public health of innocent, involuntary third-party victims from others with this limited regulation.

"[I]t is not necessary that the Legislature supply administrative officials with rigid formulas in fields where flexibility in the adaptation of the legislative policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the very essence of the programs. Rather, the standards prescribed by the Legislature are to be read in light of the conditions in which they are to be applied” (Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24, 31).

The Legislature declared its intent that there be a PHC in this State and empowered it to adopt a Sanitary Code for the preservation and improvement of the public health. The Legislature also wisely refrained from enacting a rigid formula for the exercise of the PHC’s critical agenda of concerns because that calls for expert attention. That legislative forbearance represents both a sound administrative law principle and, at the threshold, a constitutional one as well (Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510, 515, supra; Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109, 120, supra). The Legislature could not have foreseen in 1913 the specific need for PHC regulations in areas of human blood collection, care and storage; X-ray film usage; pesticide labels; drinking water contamination; or a myriad of other public health topics (see, New York State Sanitary Code, 10 NYCRR parts 1-25). It was prescient and sound governance as well to grant flexibility to the objective expert entity so it could in these exceptional instances prescribe demonstrably needed administrative regulation for the public health, free from the sometimes paralyzing polemics associated with the legislative process. Just as many of the other specified categories in the State Sanitary Code have properly been regulated by the PHC, so, too, does the subject of public indoor smoking and its impact on the health and well-being of innocent third-party victims comfortably fall within that identical, broad legislative embrace.

While the court admits the difficulty under the high separation of powers standard of articulating the basis for drawing, and even finding, some line limiting the PHC’s conceded exercise of authority, it nevertheless goes ahead and does so. Its line is no line, but rather an arbitrary judgment call of its own. It is this judicial branch intrusion which constitutes the truly egregious separation of powers breach into the exercise of prerogatives of the Legislature (Public Health Law § 225 [4], [5] [a] [enabling legislation]) and of the executive (10 NYCRR 25.2 [implementing regulation]).

It is painfully ironic that the PHC, as the legislatively designated body of experts for a vast litany of public health concerns (see, Chiropractic Assn. v Hilleboe, 12 NY2d 109, 119-120, supra), is declared for the first time and against a long line of precedents to lack expertise in this instance. The majority assertion in this regard collapses under the weight of the medically proven fact that environmental tobacco smoke, especially indoors, is hazardous and even deadly to the health of thousands of innocent bystander nonsmokers (see, Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking, A Report of the Surgeon General [Dec. 1986]; Friedman, Prevalence and Correlates of Passive Smoking, 73 Am J of Pub Health, No. 4 [1983]; Repace, Problems of Passive Smoking, Bull of NY Acad of Med, at 936-946 [Dec. 1981]). The context and the record upon which the PHC exercised, carefully and narrowly, its conceded authority and its medical and scientific expertise on an overwhelming record are directly relevant and compel reversal. The legal denigration of the PHC and its work is a grave mistake.

Along the way to its decision, the majority somewhat hesitantly deals with a legislative history aspect of the case. It concludes that the law passed by the Legislature and on the books for 75 years (Public Health Law § 225 [4], [5] [a]) is nullified or neutralized by the inability of the Legislature to broaden its existing narrow ban (Public Health Law § 1399-o). The functional consequence of the negatively implied repeal of the broader authorization, Public Health Law § 225 (4), (5) (a), imputed by the majority to these recent failed legislative efforts, will be welcomed by opponents of all kinds of existing laws from now on, because the majority’s rule dramatically changes the use of legislative history and of the principles of ordinary statutory construction. This will come back to haunt us as much as the apologetic side step of directly controlling recent authority (41 Kew Gardens Rd. Assocs. v Tyburski, 70 NY2d 325, 335).

No decision of this court and no relevant administrative law principle have been found where general rule-making power was nullified by a court because exceptions to the rule were also promulgated by the regulating entity in response to ancillary social, economic or even policy factors. The majority argument in this respect seems to assert that the PHC was too reasonable and too forthright, and that what it perhaps should have done was create an absolute ban on indoor smoking expressly and pristinely premised on public health concerns. Life and government are not so neatly categorized. Surely, if the greater power exists, the lesser, as responsibly exercised here, should not be forbidden! In any event, the regulatory provisions at issue contain a severability provision (10 NYCRR 25.7) which would permit the invalidation of objectionable exceptions without overturning the validity of the adopted limited ban on indoor smoking.

Finally, there should be great concern about another and broader precedential regression lurking behind the diaphanous analysis of the majority’s holding. Modern administrative and regulatory law principles are profoundly implicated by the majority’s expression of and reliance on the anachronistic nondelegation theory embodied in a concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist (Industrial Union Dept. v American Petroleum Inst., 448 US 607, 671 [Rehnquist, J., concurring]). The majority’s invocation of the nondelegation doctrine sounds a discordant note which can summon no good in future administrative law disputes. This doctrine was last used to invalidate an act of Congress in 1935 in the infamous Schechter Corp. case (295 US 495; see also, Industrial Union Dept. v American Petroleum Inst., supra, at 717, n 30 [Marshall, J., dissenting]), and arises from a line of Supreme Court decisions responsible for a historical upheaval in the Supreme Court and in the main subsequently overruled anyway (Industrial Union Dept. v American Petroleum Inst., supra, at 674 [Rehnquist, J., concurring]).

The cloud deposited by the instant case on modern administrative and regulatory law is bad enough in the legal sense. But nothing could be more tragic than the harm and hazard inflicted involuntarily on many thousands of innocent third persons, nonsmokers, whose public health was entrusted to the expert protection of the PHC. Its effort is crushed without analytical or precedential justification. That is the human dimension of this case which the court cannot avoid, however awkwardly it tries, by its dry doctrinal discussion. The case represents, simply, a substitution of judicial preference for the expert authorized action of an agency which is a "creature[] of the Legislature * * * possessed only of those powers expressly or impliedly delegated by that body” (Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24, 31, supra; Matter of City of Utica v Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 NY2d 164, 168-169).

Neither the Legislature nor the PHC has transgressed the gossamer lines marked by the separation of powers doctrine, either in delegation or in implementation. That doctrine demands respect from all three branches of government, including this one.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander and Hancock, Jr., concur with Judge Titone; Judge Bellacosa dissents and votes to reverse in a separate Opinion.

Order affirmed, without costs.

      . For a brief period in the 1930’s, the Supreme Court dusted off the "nondelegation” principle and breathed new life into it by using the doctrine as a basis for striking down certain New Deal legislation (see, Schechter Corp. v United States, 295 US 495; Panama Ref. Co. v Ryan, 293 US 388). Our court also invoked the doctrine on several occasions to invalidate legislation giving an executive officer or administrative agency what was deemed to be overly broad discretion to establish policy (see, e.g., Packer Coll. Inst. v University of State of N. Y., 298 NY 184, 189-192; Matter of Small v Moss, 279 NY 288; People v Klinck Packing Co., 214 NY 121, 138-139). However, the Schechter-Panama line of cases has, quite rightfully, fallen into disrepute.

      . To be distinguished from the cases challenging legislative delegations of authority to administrative agencies are those cases in which an elected executive’s rule-making activities are challenged on the ground that the legislative policy-making prerogative has been usurped. In such cases, we have had less difficulty striking down executive fiats under the separation of powers doctrine, presumably because the challenged actions depended wholly on the executives’ implied authority to enforce the laws, rather than on an express legislative delegation of authority (Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY2d 24, 33, n 2; see, e.g., Under 21 v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344; Subcontractors Trade Assn. v Koch, 62 NY2d 422; Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157, 163; Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay, 39 NY2d 641; cf., Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185; see also, Youngstown Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579).


author: Alexander, J.

text:
    Board of Education of the Hudson City School District, Plaintiff, v Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. Thompson Construction Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent, et al., Third-Party Defendants. (And a Fourth-Party Action.)
    Argued November 11, 1987;
    decided December 17, 1987

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Fred J. Hutchison and Kenneth G. Varley for defendant and third-party plaintiff-appellant.
    I. Sargent’s claim for contribution against Thompson is properly interposed. (Schauer v Joyce, 54 NY2d 1; Crow-Crimmins-Wolff & Munier v County of Westchester, 90 AD2d 785; Dole v Dow Chem. Co., 30 NY2d 143; Smith v Sapienza, 52 NY2d 82; Lippes v Atlantic Bank of N. Y., 69 AD2d 127; City of Rochester v MacKnight, Kirmmse

      & French, 75 AD2d 990; State Univ. Constr. Fund v United Technology Corp., 78 AD2d 748; State of New York Facilities Dev. Corp. v Kallmann & McKinnell, Russo & Sonder, 121 AD2d 805; Nassau Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v Facilities Dev. Corp., 125 AD2d 754; Nassau Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v Celotex Corp., 74 AD2d 679.) II. The issue of negligence on behalf of both the architect and general contractor is a relevant issue in this lawsuit. (Sosnow v Paul, 43 AD2d 978; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs., 43 NY2d 389; Bay Ridge Air Rights v State of New York, 44 NY2d 49; Grace & Co. v State Univ. Constr. Fund, 64 NY2d 709.) III. Sargent’s right to contribution should be preserved in order to shield architects from crushing exposure to liability. (Baden v Staples, 45 NY2d 889; Matter of Eckart, 39 NY2d 493.)

      George F. Carpinello for third-party defendant-respondent.
    I. This is purely a contract action alleging only economic loss. (Martin v Dierck Equip. Co., 43 NY2d 583; Schiavone Constr. Co. v Mayo Corp., 81 AD2d 221, 56 NY2d 667; Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v Walter Corp., 94 AD2d 834; Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F2d 280; Mid-Hudson Mack v Dutchess Quarry & Supply Co., 99 AD2d 751; Hemming v Certainteed Corp., 97 AD2d 976, 61 NY2d 758; East Riv. S. S. Corp. v Delaval Turbine, 752 F2d 903; Hart Eng’g Co. v FMC Corp., 593 F Supp 1471; Butler v Caldwell & Cook, 122 AD2d 559.) II. Absent an express indemnification agreement between Sargent and Thompson, there is no basis for a claim for indemnification or contribution. (Dole v Dow Chem. Co., 30 NY2d 143; Mendel v Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 25 NY2d 340; Martin v Dierck Equip. Co., 43 NY2d 583; McDermott v City of New York, 50 NY2d 211; State Univ. Constr. Fund v United Technology Corp., 78 AD2d 748; City of Rochester v MacKnight, Kirmmse & French, 75 AD2d 990; Nassau Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v Celotex Corp., 74 AD2d 679.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Alexander, J.

Under New York State’s contribution statute, "two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among them whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered against the person from whom contribution is sought” (CPLR 1401). The issue presented on this appeal is whether CPLR 1401 permits contribution between two parties whose potential liability to a third party is for economic loss resulting only from a breach of contract. We conclude that it does not.

This third-party action arises from a high school construction project undertaken for the Hudson City School District (District). Appellant Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley (Sargent) is the architectural firm that was hired by the District to work on the project; respondent Thompson Construction Corp. (Thompson) was hired as the project’s general contractor. Each was party to a separate contract with the District. Sargent’s contract, entered into on March 21, 1966, required it to prepare plans and specifications for the building, supervise its construction, inspect the building subsequent to its construction, and advise the District of any measures required to remedy possible defects in the building. Thompson’s contract, entered into on February 28, 1969, required it to perform the actual construction work.

Sargent issued its final certificate of completion for the building on September 18, 1972, and soon thereafter the building’s roof began to leak. It was not until 1980, however, that the District commenced an action against Sargent and Thompson seeking damages for breach of contract. In its complaint, the District alleged that the roofing on the high school was defective and not of the type for which it contracted. Sargent was charged with having failed to obtain a 20-year guarantee bond and certificate of compliance from the manufacturer of the roofing materials; to obtain proper approval of the roofing subcontractor; to obtain a two-year written guarantee for the roof signed by Thompson and the roofing subcontractor; and generally, to perform its required duties in the administration of the contract. Thompson was alleged to have failed to construct the proper type of roof; to provide guarantees for the roof; to inspect the roof for a two-year period after construction; and to make repairs on the roof. The District further alleged, as explanation for its delay in bringing the lawsuit, that Sargent and Thompson had fraudulently concealed both the defective condition of the roof and the fact that the various guarantees for the roof had not been furnished.

Sargent and Thompson each moved to dismiss the complaint as being barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to contract actions (CPLR 213 [2]). Special Term granted Thompson’s motion to dismiss but denied Sargent’s motion, holding that the "continuous treatment” doctrine, applicable in cases of professional malpractice, operated to toll the Statute of Limitations so as to make the action brought against the architect timely (see, Greene v Greene, 56 NY2d 86; see also, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs., 43 NY2d 389). The Appellate Division affirmed in all respects (Board of Educ. v Thompson Constr. Corp., 111 AD2d 497), concluding specifically that the District’s cause of action sounded in contract, and was therefore governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations.

Sargent subsequently instituted this third-party action seeking contribution or indemnification from Thompson for whatever damages it might incur in the action brought by the District. Thompson moved to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Special Term denied the motion, holding that "the dismissal of a plaintiff’s cause of action against one primary defendant based upon a statutory bar does not vitiate a primary codefendant’s ability to maintain a third-party action against the dismissed primary defendant”. The court thus concluded that Sargent’s third-party action could go forward, and it left for trial the determination of whether the action was properly one for contribution or indemnification.

The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the third-party complaint, concluding that the contribution statute (CPLR 1401) has no application where "the potential liability to the plaintiff of both the defendant and the third-party defendant is purely for contractual benefit of the bargain * * * or loss of the value of promised performance” (125 AD2d, at 29). The court held further that Sargent had not set forth the elements of an indemnity claim, but it granted leave to replead that cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [e]). The lone dissenting Justice would have affirmed, concluding that not only had Sargent adequately stated a cause of action for indemnification, but that "[i]n causes of action for contribution, the emphasis has been on whether the parties involved in the third-party action contributed to the same injury rather than the particular theories of law sued upon” (125 AD2d, at 32).

The Appellate Division granted leave to this court, certifying the following question: "Did this court err, as a matter of law, in reversing the order of Special Term, granting the motion and dismissing the third-party complaint against third-party defendant Thompson Construction Corporation, with leave to replead so much thereof as asserted a cause of action for indemnification within 20 days after service of a copy of the order?” We now affirm and answer the certified question in the negative.

That purely economic loss resulting from a breach of contract does not constitute "injury to property” within the meaning of New York’s contribution statute is made plain by the legislative history of CPLR 1401 (L 1974, ch 742, § 1). That statute, proposed by the Judicial Conference of the State of New York, was intended as a codification of Dole v Dow Chem. Co. (30 NY2d 143), a watershed case that "drastically chang[ed] the law of this State regarding the apportionment rights of joint tort-feasors” (D’Ambrosio v City of New York, 55 NY2d 454, 461-462; see, Ravo v Rogatnick, 70 NY2d 305, 312; Guzman v Haven Plaza Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 69 NY2d 559, 567; Schauer v Joyce, 54 NY2d 1, 5).

The common-law rules of contribution were extremely rigid, precluding apportionment of liability among tort-feasors. As we observed in Dole, "[t]he basic theoretical bar at common law to any apportionment among those who committed torts, either by indemnity or by contribution, was the unwillingness of the law as a matter of policy to make relative value judgments of degrees of culpability among wrongdoers” (Dole v Dow Chem. Co., 30 NY2d 143, 147, supra [citation omitted]). This absolute bar to apportionment eventually gave way to limited contribution among tort-feasors under former CPLR 1401 (L 1962, ch 308, as amended by L 1964, ch 388, § 5), which permitted contribution only on a pro rata basis between tort-feasors who were subject to the same money judgment (see, McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, C1401:l, at 360-361). This restrictive rule, however, retained in the plaintiff the power to choose which defendants should be adjudicated joint tort-feasors. Consequently, those defendants who were not sued by the plaintiff could not be required to contribute to the plaintiffs damages (DAmbrosio v City of New York, 55 NY2d 454, 460, supra; see, Green Bus Lines v Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 74 AD2d 136, 148-149, Iv denied 52 NY2d 701; McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, C1401:l, at 360-361).

To ameliorate the harshness of this contribution rule upon those tort-feasors who happened to be sued by an injured plaintiff, a theory of "implied indemnification” was employed to permit an adjudicated tort-feasor to seek indemnification from other nonparty tort-feasors if the negligence of the adjudicated tort-feasor was only "passive” or of a secondary nature (see, D’Ambrosio v City of New York, 55 NY2d 454, 461, supra). Under this implied indemnification theory, however, there was no apportionment of liability between the tort-feasors; one was either "secondarily” negligent and completely free from liability, or one was "primarily” negligent and responsible for all of the plaintiff’s damages. No form of liability in between the two extremes could lie (see, DAmbrosio v City of New York, 55 NY2d 454, 461, supra).

Dole liberalized the contribution rules to allow an adjudicated tort-feasor to seek contribution, or "partial indemnity”, from another tort-feasor whether or not the second tort-feasor had been made a party to the action (see, DAmbrosio v City of New York, 55 NY2d 454, 462, supra; Dole v Dow Chem. Co., 30 NY2d 143, 147, supra). After Dole, courts were no longer restricted to "apportioning liability for contribution on a pro rata basis * * * or shifting responsibility entirely from one tortfeasor to another under the primary-secondary tortfeasor doctrine of indemnification” (12th Ann Report of NY Jud Conf on CPLR, 1974 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1803; see, DAmbrosio v City of New York, 55 NY2d 454, 462, supra); instead, they could now apportion liability according to the tort-feasors’ relative degrees of fault for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff (see, CPLR 1402; Ravo v Rogatnick, 70 NY2d 305, 312-313, supra; D'Ambrosio v City of New York, 55 NY2d 454, 462, supra).

Thus, as a codification of Dole, CPLR 1401 had its genesis in tort law and in the complications surrounding the apportionment of liability among joint tort-feasors. The legislative history makes clear, and indeed we have recognized, that the statute applies not only to joint tort-feasors, but also to concurrent, successive, independent, alternative, and even intentional tort-feasors (12th Ann Report of NY Jud Conf on CPLR, 1974 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1805-1806; McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, C1401:l, at 362-363; see, Ravo v Rogatnick, 70 NY2d 305, 312, supra; Schauer v Joyce, 54 NY2d 1, 5, supra). Contribution is also permitted under the statute in cases involving strict liability in tort (12th Ann Report of NY Jud Conf on CPLR, op. cit., at 1807; see, Doundoulakis v Town of Hempstead, 42 NY2d 440, 451). While "[i]t is the fact of liability to the same person for the same harm rather than the legal theory upon which tort liability is based which controls” (12th Ann Report of NY Jud Conf on CPLR, op. cit., at 1807 [emphasis added]; see, Guzman v Haven Plaza Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 69 NY2d 559, 568, supra), it is nonetheless true that the existence of some form of tort liability is a prerequisite to application of the statute. We find nothing in the legislative history or the common-law evolution of the statute on which to base a conclusion that CPLR 1401 was intended to apply in respect to a pure breach of contract action such as would permit contribution between two contracting parties whose only potential liability to the plaintiff is for the contractual benefit of the bargain.

To permit apportionment of liability, pursuant to CPLR 1401, arising solely from breach of contract would not only be at odds with the statute’s legislative history, but also do violence to settled principles of contract law which limit a contracting party’s liability to those damages that are reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract is formed (see, Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 351 [1] [1979]; Calamari and Perillo, Contracts § 14-5, at 523 [2d ed]). Here, Thompson was entitled to expect at the time it contracted with the District that its liability would be determined by its own contractual undertaking. Thompson should not now be confronted with potential liability based on the promise made by Sargent in its separate contract with the District. Sargent’s argument that without a right of contribution, architects will be exposed to crushing liability is unpersuasive. Nothing prevented Sargent from negotiating for protection from liability in its contract with the District. Having neglected to do so, it may not now be heard to complain that it is exposed to a claim for damages.

Nor are we persuaded that we should create a common-law right of contribution in contract actions. The policy considerations that underlay Dole — the need to liberalize the inequitable and harsh rules that once governed contribution among joint tort-feasors — are not pertinent to contract matters. Parties to a contract have the power to specifically delineate the scope of their liability at the time the contract is formed. Thus, there is nothing unfair in defining a contracting party’s liability by the scope of its promise as reflected by the agreement of the parties. Indeed, this is required by the very nature of contract law, where potential liability is determined in advance by the parties.

Finally, Sargent contends that it is entitled to seek contribution under the statute because the District will be permitted to argue in its primary action that appellant breached a "duty of due care” in performing the terms of the contract. This argument is without merit. As we have recently explained, "[m]erely charging a breach of a 'duty of due care’, employing language familiar to tort law, does not, without more, transform a simple breach of contract into a tort claim” (Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R. R. Co., 70 NY2d 382, 390). Here, the District seeks only pecuniary damages resulting from the defective condition of the roof. No legal duty independent of appellant’s contractual obligations to supervise construction and apprise the District of defects is claimed to have been breached (see, Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R. R. Co., 70 NY2d 382, 390, supra; Schiavone Constr. Co. v Mayo Corp., 56 NY2d 667, revg on dissenting opn below 81 AD2d 221, 227-234; Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 92 [5th ed]). Under these circumstances, we conclude that Sargent’s contribution claim was properly dismissed, as was the indemnity claim. As originally pleaded, the third-party complaint$ does not allege facts showing that Sargent was unfairly required to discharge a duty that should have been discharged by another,, such that a contract to indemnify should be implied by law (see, McDermott v City of New York, 50 NY2d 211, 216-217, supra; Restatement of Restitution § 76). Sargent was appropriately granted leave to replead such facts as might exist to support an indemnification claim.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in the negative.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacos a concur.

Order affirmed, etc.

      . Former CPLR 1401 was derived from section 211-a of the Civil Practice Act, which was enacted by the Legislature in 1928 (see, D’Ambrosio v City of New York, 55 NY2d 454, 460; Green Bus Lines v Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 74 AD2d 136, 148).

      . The conclusion that CPLR 1401 does not apply to actions based solely on a breach of contractual obligations is further supported by General Construction Law § 25-b, which defines "injury to property” as "an actionable act, whereby the estate of another is lessened, other than a personal injury, or the breach of a contract” (emphasis added).
      Furthermore, while it is true that the statute is applicable in cases where a tort-feasor is charged with "breach of warranty” in connection with a defective product that causes injury, in such cases the breach of warranty is as much a tortious wrong as it is a breach of contract (see, 12th Ann Report of NY Jud Conf on CPLR, 1974 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1807; see, e.g., Codling v Paglia, 32 NY2d 330; Noble v Desco Shoe Corp, 41 AD2d 908; Walsh v Ford Motor Co., 70 Misc 2d 1031). Indeed, we have recognized that the appellation "breach of warranty” in product liability cases is misleading, for "strict products liability sounds in tort rather than in contract” (Martin v Dierck Equip. Co., 43 NY2d 583, 590, quoting Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 NY2d 395, 402).