author: PALMER, J.

text:
    JOE’S PIZZA, INC. v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY
    (15164)
    Callahan, Borden, Berdon, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued December 7, 1995
    officially released May 7, 1996

      Louis W. Flynn, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Joel J. Rottner, with whom was Robyn L. Sondak, for the appellee (defendant).
   PALMER, J.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court properly rendered summary judgment against the plaintiff, Joe’s Pizza, Inc. (Joe’s Pizza), on the ground that its claim against the defendant, Aetna Life and Casualty Company (Aetna), is barred by principles of res judicata. We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court.

The pertinent facts and procedural history are not in dispute. At all times relevant to this appeal, Joe’s Pizza was a closely held corporation owned and operated as a restaurant in Windsor by its sole shareholders, Giuseppe and Tina Cappello, who are husband and wife. On November 28, 1991, the restaurant was severely damaged by fire. Prior thereto, the Cappellos, acting on behalf of Joe’s Pizza, had purchased a fire insurance policy from Aetna. Following the fire, the Cappellos filed a claim with Aetna seeking payment for the fire damage sustained by Joe’s Pizza. Shortly thereafter, Aetna notified the Cappellos that it intended to question them about the claim at an examination under oath scheduled for January 17,1992. In its notice, Aetna also requested that the Cappellos provide it with certain documents, including copies of the books and records of Joe’s Pizza. At the time the Cappellos received this notice, however, Giuseppe Cappello was the subject of a criminal investigation for setting the fire that had damaged the restaurant. On the advice of counsel, therefore, both he and Tina Cappello asserted their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and refused either to submit to an examination under oath or to produce the books and records of Joe’s Pizza. Aetna twice rescheduled the examination under oath, but on each occasion the Cappellos failed to appear.

Following these unsuccessful attempts by Aetna to obtain the information that it sought from Joe’s Pizza pursuant to the policy provision, Giuseppe Cappello was arrested and charged with arson in the first degree for his alleged role in the fire at the restaurant. After the filing of the criminal charges, the Cappellos, claiming that they were entitled to invoke their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in response to Aetna’s request for information, initiated an action in the Superior Court, Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV92-0510478S (April 5, 1993), seeking a “declaratory judgment adjudicating [their] rights and obligations . . . with respect to [Aetna’s] request for the production of [Joe’s Pizza’s] documents and an examination under oath and that [Aetna] be restrained and enjoined from attempting such examination or request for production prior to a final ruling of [the] court.”

Aetna moved for summary judgment on the ground that it had been relieved of its obligation to pay the fire damage claim under the policy because of the Cappellos’ refusal to submit to an examination under oath. The Cappellos, in response, did not address this claim. They argued, rather, that their constitutional right to remain silent took precedence over Aetna’s contractual right to obtain the information it had sought under the policy and, accordingly, that they were entitled to a postponement of the examination pending a resolution of the criminal case against Giuseppe Cappello. On April 5,1993, the trial court, Aurigemma, J., granted Aetna’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Cappellos’ refusal to submit to an examination under oath constituted a material breach of the insurance contract that relieved Aetna of its payment obligation under the policy. The Cappellos neither sought an articulation under Practice Book § 4051 nor took an appeal from the judgment of the trial court.

On May 17, 1993, the Cappellos notified Aetna that they were willing to submit to an examination under oath at a mutually agreeable date and time. Aetna, however, informed the Cappellos that it did not intend to proceed with the examination in light of Judge Aurigemma’s determination that it had no payment obligation to Joe’s Pizza due to the Cappellos’ breach of the insurance contract. Thereafter, on July 28, 1993, Joe’s Pizza brought this action, seeking payment under the policy for its losses from the fire, as well as interest and attorney’s fees. Aetna moved for summary judgment, claiming that the judgment rendered by Judge Aurigemma in its favor in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, barred this action under principles of res judicata. The trial court, Hale, J., granted Aetna’s motion without opinion, and this appeal followed.

On appeal, Joe’s Pizza makes two claims. First, it contends that it is not bound by the summary judgment rendered by Judge Aurigemma in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, because it was not a party to that action. Second, it claims that the summary judgment rendered in that case does not bar it from proceeding with this action because Judge Aurigemma improperly exceeded the scope of the Cappellos’ declaratory judgment action in concluding that the Cappellos’ refusal to answer questions under oath relieved Aetna of any liability under the policy. We reject both of these arguments and conclude that principles of res judicata bar Joe’s Pizza from relitigating the breach of contract issue decided by Judge Aurigemma.

I

Joe’s Pizza first claims that this action is not barred by the summary judgment rendered in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, because it was not a party to that litigation. Aetna, on the other hand, contends that Joe’s Pizza is bound by the judgment rendered therein because the Cappellos, as the owners, operators and sole shareholders of Joe’s Pizza, are in privity with Joe’s Pizza for purposes of res judicata. We agree with Aetna.

“While it is commonly recognized that privity is difficult to define, the concept exists to ensure that the interests of the party against whom collateral estoppel [or res judicata] is being asserted have been adequately represented because of his purported privity with a party at the initial proceeding. ... A key consideration in determining the existence of privity is the sharing of the same legal right by the parties allegedly in privity.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 304, 596 A.2d 414 (1991). “Although ‘there is no bright line rule as to whether or not [corporate officers or] shareholders are in privity with their corporation for res judicata purposes’; Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d 634, 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 992, 108 S. Ct. 511, 98 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1987); the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides useful guidance.” Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., 227 Conn. 175, 194, 629 A.2d 1116 (1993).

The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 59, sets forth the general rule that “a judgment in an action involving a party who is an officer, director, stockholder, or member of a non-stock corporation [does not] have preclusive effects on the corporation itself.” This rule of general applicability, however, is subject to an exception for corporations that are closely held: “If the corporation is closely held, in that one or a few persons hold substantially the entire ownership in it, the judgment in an action by . . . the holder of ownership in it is conclusive upon the [corporation] as to issues determined therein . . . except when relitigation of the issue is justified in order to protect the interest of another owner or a creditor of the corporation.” 2 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 59 (3) (b) (1982).

The comments to § 59 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments explain why a judgment rendered against the shareholders of a closely held corporation may be binding on the corporation. “When the corporation is closely held . . . interests of the corporation’s management and stockholders and the corporation itself generally fully coincide. . . . For the purpose of affording opportunity for a day in court on issues contested in litigation . . . there is no good reason why a closely held corporation and its owners should be ordinarily regarded as legally distinct. On the contrary, it may be presumed that [the interests of the shareholders and the closely held corporation itself] coincide and that one opportunity to litigate issues that concern them in common should sufficiently protect both.” Id., comment (e), p. 99. These principles have been accepted by other courts; see, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 875 F.2d 1252, 1258-59 (7th Cir. 1989); Red Carpet Corp. v. Roberts, 443 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. App. 1983), rev. denied sub nom. Hatcher v. Roberts, 488 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1986); Spickler v. Dube, 644 A.2d 465, 468 (Me. 1994); Missouri Mexican Products, Inc. v. Dunafon, 873 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Mo. App. 1994); and Joe’s Pizza has failed to advance any reason why we should not follow them in this case.

It is undisputed that Giuseppe and Tina Cappello were the sole owners and shareholders of Joe’s Pizza and that they exercised complete control over the management and operation of the restaurant. In effect, therefore, the enterprise was a proprietorship or partnership conducted in corporate form. See 2 Restatement, supra, § 59, comment (e), p. 99. In such circumstances, the commonality of interest between the Cappellos and Joe’s Pizza is sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the Cappellos’ opportunity “to litigate issues that concern them in common [will] sufficiently protect both.” Id. Joe’s Pizza has presented nothing to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, we conclude that the summary judgment rendered in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, is binding not only on the Cappellos, but on Joe’s Pizza, as well.

II

We must now determine whether Aetna was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that principles of res judicata bar Joe’s Pizza from proceeding with this action for payment under the policy. We conclude that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in Aetna’s favor.

“Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeMilo & Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 233 Conn. 281, 292, 659 A.2d 162 (1995); New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 128, 627 A.2d 1257 (1993); see also 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 19 (1982). “[C]laim preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., supra, 227 Conn. 188. The judicial doctrine of res judicata “ ‘express [es] no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest.’ ” Carol Management Corp. v. Board of Tax Review, 228 Conn. 23, 32, 633 A.2d 1368 (1993); State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 464-65, 497 A.2d 974 (1985), on appeal after remand sub nom. State v. Paradise, 213 Conn. 388, 567 A.2d 1221 (1990). “ ‘The doctrine of res judicata [applies] ... as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction’; Wade’s Dairy, Inc. v. Fairfield, 181 Conn. 556, 559, 436 A.2d 24 (1980); and promotes judicial economy by preventing relitigation of issues or claims previously resolved.” Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., supra, 188. Furthermore, “the appropriate inquiry with respect to [claim] preclusion is whether the party had an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier proceeding . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. R. G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 717-18, 627 A.2d 374 (1993); State v. Ellis, supra, 464-65 n.22.

In determining whether principles of res judicata bar Joe’s Pizza from proceeding with this action, we must first examine the claim presented in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, because “the scope of matters precluded [in the subsequent suit] necessarily depends on what has occurred in the former adjudication.” State v. Ellis, supra, 197 Conn. 467. This requires a comparison of the complaint in this action with the pleadings and the judgment in the earlier action. Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., supra, 227 Conn. 189-90. The following factual and procedural background is necessary to our determination of this issue.

As we have previously indicated, the Cappellos initially sought a declaratory judgment that they were not required to submit to an examination under oath during the pendency of the criminal charges against Giuseppe Cappello. In its brief accompanying its motion for summary judgment in that action, Aetna claimed that the Cappellos’ repeated refusal to answer questions about the fire insurance claim constituted a material breach of contract that relieved it of its payment obligation under the policy. The brief filed by Aetna contains a detailed analysis of its breach of contract claim, including an extensive discussion of cases from other jurisdictions that hold that an insured’s assertion of his or her constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in response to an insurer’s reasonable request for information bars any recovery by the insured under the policy. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that Aetna clearly and distinctly raised the breach of contract claim in support of its motion for summary judgment.

The Cappellos sought and received a continuance in order to prepare a response to Aetna’s motion, claiming, inter alia, that extensive research was necessary to address the cases upon which Aetna had relied. In then-brief, however, the Cappellos chose not to address Aetna’s breach of contract claim. Instead, they asserted, apparently for the first time, that their counsel’s unavailability on the dates of the scheduled examinations provided sufficient independent reason to excuse the Cappellos from providing Aetna with the requested testimony and documents. In fact, prior to this appeal neither the Cappellos nor Joe’s Pizza has ever maintained that Aetna’s breach of contract claim was beyond the scope of the declaratory judgment action.

In accordance with the claim asserted by Aetna, Judge Aurigemma, in her memorandum of decision on Aetna’s summary judgment motion, characterized the question before her as whether “the [Cappellos] failed to meet [their] contractual obligation of submitting to an examination under oath as required in a fire insurance policy.” Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra. After full consideration of that issue, Judge Aurigemma concluded that, although the Cappellos were entitled to assert their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination rather than respond to Aetna’s questions, their failure to provide the requested testimony constituted a breach of contract that relieved Aetna of its payment obligation under the policy. Notwithstanding Judge Aurigemma’s disposition of Aetna’s claim, the Cappellos neither sought an articulation or clarification of the decision pursuant to Practice Book § 4051 nor appealed from the summary judgment rendered against them.

Joe’s Pizza asserts that Judge Aurigemma, in concluding that the Cappellos’ repeated refusal to answer questions at an examination under oath relieved Aetna of its payment obligation under the policy, improperly exceeded the scope of the Cappellos’ claim for declaratory relief, which sought only a determination of whether the Cappellos were entitled to a postponement of the examination under oath while the criminal charges were pending against Giuseppe Cappello. Joe’s Pizza contends, therefore, that it is not bound by Judge Aurigemma’s resolution of Aetna’s contract claim and, consequently, that it is not barred by principles of res judicata from litigating that claim in this case. We disagree.

We accept as true that the Cappellos, in seeking declaratory relief, intended that the court render a judgment limited to the issue of whether they were entitled to a further postponement of the examination under oath pending the disposition of the criminal charges against Giuseppe Cappello. Aetna’s claim for summary judgment, however, placed the Cappellos on notice that, in Aetna’s view, their repeated refusal to submit to an examination under oath constituted a breach of contract that barred any recovery under the policy and, further, that the declaratory judgment action should be decided on that basis. Because Aetna’s contract claim, if sustainable, was dispositive of the action, we see no reason why Judge Aurigemma was precluded from deciding it. Indeed, considerations of judicial economy militated strongly in favor of Judge Aurigemma’s resolution of Aetna’s claim in the case before her, for otherwise the issue was likely to have spawned unnecessary further litigation. It was incumbent upon the Cappellos, therefore, to have responded to Aetna’s claim on the merits or, in the alternative, to have demonstrated the existence of disputed facts material to the adjudication sought by Aetna. See footnote 13. For reasons that remain unexplained, however, the Cappellos did neither.

Furthermore, the Cappellos failed to appeal from the summary judgment rendered by Judge Aurigemma. “Unless a litigant can show an absence of subject matter jurisdiction that makes the prior judgment of a tribunal entirely invalid, he or she must resort to direct proceedings to correct perceived wrongs in the tribunal’s conclusive decision. Lampson Lumber Co. v. Hoer, 139 Conn. 294, 297-98, 93 A.2d 143 (1952). A collateral attack on a judgment is a procedurally impermissible substitute for an appeal.” Convalescent Center of Bloomfield, Inc. v. Dept. of Income Maintenance, 208 Conn. 187, 200-201, 544 A.2d 604 (1988). Because the Cappellos were afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate Aetna’s breach of contract claim in the trial court and to challenge the summary judgment rendered against them on direct appeal, neither they nor those in privity with them may use this action as a vehicle to relitigate that claim. We conclude, therefore, that Judge Hale properly granted Aetna’s motion for summary judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The insurance policy was issued to Joe’s Pizza in its corporate name.

       The insurance policy provided in relevant part:
      “Section VIII — COMMERCIAL PROPERTY CONDITIONS ....
      “e. Duties in event of loss or damage.
      “You must see that the following are done in the event of loss or damage to Covered Properly. . . .
      “7. If requested, permit us to question you under oath at such times as may be reasonably required about any matter relating to this insurance or your claim, including your books and records. In such event, your answers must be signed.”

       Aetna rescheduled the examinations of Giuseppe Cappello for February 24, 1992, and of both Giuseppe and Tina Cappello for March 24, 1992.

       The record of this appeal does not reflect the disposition of the criminal case against Giuseppe Cappello. We take judicial notice, however, of the file in State v. Cappello, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CR92-0086098S (April 5, 1993), which indicates that on that date Cappello entered a plea of nolo contendere to arson in the second degree in connection with the fire at Joe’s Pizza. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years, execution suspended, and three years probation.

       Aetna had earlier filed its own action against Joe’s Pizza seeking a declaratory judgment that the Cappellos’ refusal to submit to an examination under oath constituted a material breach of the fire insurance policy and, consequently, that Joe’s Pizza was not entitled to payment under the policy. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Joe’s Pizza, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV92-0511280S (June 1,1993). Aetna withdrew that action, however, following the summary judgment rendered in its favor by Judge Aurigemma in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra.

       Although Joe’s Pizza unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of Judge Hale’s ruling, it did not file a motion for articulation. We assume, therefore, that the trial court’s judgment is founded on Aetna’s contention that this action is foreclosed by principles of res judicata.

       Joe’s Pizza appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

       Joe’s Pizza also asserts that the trial court should not have entertained Aetna’s claim of res judicata because Aetna failed to plead that doctrine as a special defense under Practice Book § 164, electing instead to seek summary judgment before it filed an answer or any special defenses. Joe’s Pizza, however, did not raise this issue in the trial court, and it has not demonstrated any prejudice flowing from Aetna’s failure to plead res judicata as a special defense. Moreover, summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for raising a claim of res judicata; Jackson v. R. G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993); Zizka v. Water Pollution, Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985); and, under Practice Book § 379, a party may move for summary judgment at any time. Aetna, therefore, was not barred from raising the claim of res judicata in its motion for summary judgment.

       We do not decide whether the trial court in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, was correct in concluding that the Cappellos’ refusal to submit to an examination under oath relieved Aetna of its payment obligation under the policy. As we conclude hereinafter, the Cappellos’ failure to appeal from the summary judgment rendered in that case bars Joe’s Pizza from utilizing this appeal to attack that judgment. Thus, the only question presented by this appeal is whether Joe’s Pizza is precluded by principles of res judicata from litigating in this case the issue of Aetna’s liability to it under the insurance policy.

       This claim was raised for the first time at oral argument in this court. Because Aetna has not argued that we should refrain from considering the claim, however, we shall address it.

       We recognize that even though the interests of the proprietors of a closely held corporation and the corporation itself are usually identical, the corporation nonetheless retains a distinct legal identity for purposes such as taxation, regulation and liability, at least so long as the corporation’s proprietors do not ignore the corporate form. See 2 Restatement, supra, § 59, comment (e).
      We also note that a judgment in a suit brought by a shareholder of a closely held corporation generally is not binding on the corporation where the preclusive effect of the judgment would cause prejudice to third parties, such as other shareholders or creditors. Id.; see also Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 875 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1989). No claim of prejudice to any third party has been raised in this case.

       That this issue was not raised until oral argument in this court lends support to the conclusion that neither Joe’s Pizza nor the Cappellos, who are represented by the same counsel, have treated the former as separate and distinct from the latter for res judicata purposes. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the Cappellos, in their complaint in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, alleged not that the policy had been issued to and paid for by Joe’s Pizza but, rather, that Aetna “had issued a business policy of insurance to the Plaintiffs for which they had paid the requested premium.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, the Cappellos’ assertion of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as grounds for refusing to provide Aetna with copies of the corporate books and records also suggests that the Cappellos treated the business affairs of the corporation as their own.

       The standard of review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Practice Book § 384. “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact . . . a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 202, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995).

       Although the file in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, has not been made a part of the record on appeal, we take judicial notice of its contents. See Drabik v. East Lyme, 234 Conn. 390, 398, 662 A.2d 118 (1995); State v. Allen, 205 Conn. 370, 382, 533 A.2d 559 (1987).

       Among the cases discussed by Aetna in its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment are Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 901 F.2d 944 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 899, 111 S. Ct. 255, 112 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1990), Saucier v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 765 F. Sup. 334 (S.D. Miss. 1991), Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 290 F. Sup. 141 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1969), and Hickman v. London Assurance Corp., 184 Cal. 524, 195 P. 45 (1920), each of which stands for the proposition that an insured’s refusal to answer questions propounded by the insurer about the insured’s fire insurance claim constitutes a breach of contract that relieves the insurer of its payment obligation under the policy even though the insured faces arson charges for the fire that is the subject of the claim.

       We note that the Cappellos’ brief failed to cite any authority to support their contention that they should have been permitted to postpone the examination under oath until a resolution of the criminal charges against Giuseppe Cappello.

       In her memorandum of decision on Aetna’s motion for summary judgment, Judge Aurigemma expressly stated that “Cappello has chosen to invoke [his constitutional] privilege [against self-incrimination] but lose on his contract claim.” (Emphasis added.) Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra.

       It is undisputed that the contract claim decided by Judge Aurigemma in Cappello v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, is the same claim raised by Joe’s Pizza in this case.

       The Cappellos have never contended that Aetna was required to raise its breach of contract claim in a counterclaim, and Joe’s Pizza has not raised that claim on appeal. Under the circumstances, we know of no reason why Judge Aurigemma should have declined to decide the breach of contract claim simply because it was raised in a motion for summary judgment rather than in a counterclaim.

       We note that if the Cappellos had had any questions about the scope or import of the summary judgment rendered by Judge Aurigemma, they could have sought an articulation by the trial court. See, e.g., Lashgari v. Lashgari, 197 Conn. 189, 200, 496 A.2d 491 (1985).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    T. O. RICHARDSON COMPANY, INC. v. STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK
    Decided January 17, 1996

      Stephen W. Brockbank, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Dennis F. Kerrigan, Jr., in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court is dismissed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JONATHAN BRADLEY
    Decided January 17, 1996

      Max Brunswick, in support of the petition.

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 82 (AC 12942), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES B. ANGELO
    Decided January 17, 1996

      Roger J. Frechette and Matthew E. Frechette, in support of the petition.

      Edward F. Reynolds, Jr., assistant attorney general, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 709 (AC 13734), is denied.


text:
    WILLIAM J. LOIKA ET AL., COADMINISTRATORS (ESTATE OF CHEYENNE I. LOIKA) v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY ET AL.
    Decided January 17, 1996

      Rodd J. Mantell, in support of the petition.

      Robert P. Dutcher, in opposition.
   The defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 714 (AC 13777), is denied.


author: BERDON, J.,

text:
    JAMES RANDALL DAVIS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    Decided January 17, 1996

      Mary Miller Haselkamp, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Lawrence J. Tytla, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    DIME SAVINGS BANK OF NEW YORK, FSB v. CLARE MURANELLI ET AL.
   The petition of the defendant Laurelton House Condominium Association, Inc., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 736 (AC 14269), is denied.

Decided January 17, 1996

William W. Ward and Steven Stanford Berizzi, in support of the petition.

James J. Byrne, in opposition.


text:
    LEWIS J. BUSCONI ET AL. v. RONALD DIGHELLO ET AL.
    Decided January 17, 1996

      Bernard Green, in support of the petition.

      Todd H. Lampert, in opposition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 753 (AC 14330), is denied.


text:
    KRISTOFER BASTEK ET AL. v. JAMES SCHULTZ
    Decided January 17, 1996

      James J. Schultz, pro se, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 923 (AC 13912), is denied.


text:
    RECOVERY ALLIANCE, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE SERVICES, DIVISION OF SPECIAL REVENUE
    Decided January 17, 1996

      Francis W. Benner, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 924 (AC 14669), is denied.


text:
    ALLEN UNGER v. BRUCE PILEGGI
    Decided January 17, 1996

      Joseph Dimyan, in support of the petition.

      Cheryl Ann Gordon, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 927 (AC 14216), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROGER GODFREY
    Decided January 29, 1996
   The appeal by the state of Connecticut (SC 15329) following this court’s granting of certification, State v. Godfrey, 235 Conn. 923, is dismissed as moot because of the death of the defendant.


text:
    HOME SAVINGS OF AMERICA, F.A. v. ROCCO ACERBO
    Decided January 29, 1996

      Rocco Acerbo, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Elizabeth Tyler Grove, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15221) is denied.


text:
    DARNELL TATEM v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
   The petitioner Darnell Tatem’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 813 (AC 14236), is denied.

Decided January 29, 1996

Michael A. Rubino, Jr., special public defender, in support of the petition.

Christopher T. Godialis, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    JEFFREY A. WALKER v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT
    Decided January 29, 1996

      Jeffrey A. Walker, pro se, in support of the petition.

      James A. Killen, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 910 (AC 14263), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSE GARCIA
    Decided February 5, 1996

      Monte P. Radler, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Denise B. Smoker, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES DARDEN
   The petition of the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 645 (AC 14010), is granted, limited to the following issue:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15360.

Decided February 5, 1996

Lawrence J. Tytla, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

Jeremiah Donovan, in opposition.

“Having found that the state had inadvertently destroyed evidence relevant to the defendant’s guilt, did the Appellate Court properly order a new trial rather than an evidentiary hearing?”


text:
    RICHARD W. BALLARD ET AL. v. ASSET RECOVERY MANAGEMENT COMPANY ET AL.
    Decided February 5, 1996

      Michael S. McKenna, in support of the petition.

      Joseph P. Secola, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 805 (AC 14148), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRUCE FELDER
    Decided February 5, 1996

      Matthew J. Collins, in support of the petition.

      James A. Killen, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 840 (AC 13501/ 13503), is denied.


text:
    AMITY BANK v. GEORGE J. SCARVELES ET AL.
    Decided February 5, 1996

      Max F. Brunswick, in support of the petition.

      Thomas E. Crosby, in opposition.
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 910 (AC 11173), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RUSSELL C. HUNTER
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15364.
    Decided February 13, 1996

      Richard M. Morano, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 907 (AC 13358), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“Under the circumstances of this case: 1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of the defendant’s polygraph evidence?

“2. Should this court reconsider the applicability of the test for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHRISTIAN PORTER
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15363.
    Decided February 13, 1996

      M. Hatcher Norris, in support of the petition.

      Kevin T. Kane, state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 800 (AC 13642), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“Under the circumstances of this case: 1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of the defendant’s polygraph evidence?

“2. Should this court reconsider the applicability of the test for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)?”


text:
    SOUTHINGTON SAVINGS BANK v. KIMBERLY RODGERS ET AL.
    Decided February 13, 1996

      Thomas T. Lonardo, in support of the petition.

      Janet C. Hall and Christopher J. Hug, in opposition.
   BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendants’ petition for certification.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HECTOR S. SOTO
    Decided February 13, 1996

      Donald Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 21 (AC 13569), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. NOEL MENDOZA
    Decided February 21, 1996

      Michael L. Moskowitz, in support of the petition.

      Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15008) is denied.


text:
    DONALD LEE WILLIAMSON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    Decided February 21, 1996

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Denise B. Smoker, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Donald Lee Williamson’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 773 (AC 14406), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DANA MOZELL
    Decided February 21, 1996

      William H. Narwold and Charles D. Ray, in support of the petition.

      John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    COLUMBIA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK v. INTERNATIONAL SITE CONSULTANTS, INC., ET AL.
    Decided February 21, 1996

      Joseph A. Kriz, in support of the petition.

      Roy H. Scharf, in opposition.
   The petition of the defendant Newbrook Associates, Inc., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 64 (AC 14346), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARK LEIGH
    Decided February 21, 1996

      Robert G. Golger, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 904 (AC 14561), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. FREDERICK PAYNE
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15395.
    Decided March 11, 1996

      John Watson, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 1 (AC 12993), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly hold that General Statutes § 53-21 is violated by conduct posing a risk of injury to a child’s mental health?

“2. Did the Appellate Court properly hold that, so construed, General Statutes § 53-21 is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness?

“3. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court adequately instructed the jury on the applicability of General Statutes § 53-21 in the circumstances of this case?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LIONEL LIZASOIN
    Decided March 11, 1996

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Robert J. Scheinblum, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 903 (AC 14182), is denied.


text:
    AMERICAN BANK OF CONNECTICUT v. KATHERINE G. IVIMEY ET AL.
    Decided March 19, 1996

      Max Brunswick, in support of the petition.

      Leanne M. Kinsley, in opposition.
   BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petition for certification filed by the defendants Katherine G. Ivimey and John Ivimey.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EDWARD A. OWEN
    Decided March 19, 1996

      Jo Anne Sulik, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Thomas J. Rechen and James A. Budinetz, in opposition.
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 132 (AC 13341), is denied.


text:
    BARBARA MARTIN ET AL. v. TOWN OF PLAINVILLE ET AL.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 179 (AC 13797), is granted, limited to the following issue:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15393.

Decided March 19, 1996

Steven J. Errante, in support of the petition.

David J. Mathis, in opposition.

“Was the Appellate Court correct in deciding that the notice sent in this case to the defendant municipality pursuant to General Statutes § 31a-149 was defective?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSEPH B. MARION
    Decided March 19, 1996

      Joseph B. Marion, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 906 (AC 14007), is denied.


text:
    ARTHUR BARLOW v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    Decided March 19, 1996

      David B. Rozwaski, in support of the petition.

      James A. Killen, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Arthur Barlow’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 910 (AC 14455), is denied.


text:
    CHRISTINE B. O’SULLIVAN v. JERRYL MANISCALCO
    Decided March 19, 1996

      Robert H. Boynton, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 919 (AC 14722), is denied.


text:
    CAROLYN GEYER ET AL. v. PETER DANASI ET AL.
    Decided March 19, 1996

      William F. Gallagher, in support of the petition.

      Angelo A. Ziotas, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 919 (AC 14335), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KEITH LAWS
    Decided April 1, 1996

      G. Douglas Nash, public defender, in support of the petition.

      Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grantthe defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    MARY S. MEEHAN v. TIMOTHY MEEHAN
    Decided April 1, 1996

      Reuben S. Midler, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 107 (AC 13300), is denied.


text:
    MAX JAVIT ET AL. v. MARSHALL’S, INC., ET AL.
    Decided April 1, 1996

      Robert P. Dolian, William H. Bright and John P. McKinney, in support of the petition.

      Peter B. Rustin, in opposition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 261 (AC 13445), is denied.


text:
    SHAWMUT BANK CONNECTICUT, N.A. v. CONNECTICUT LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC.
    Decided April 1, 1996

      Rodger C. Boe, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 268 (AC 13812), is denied.


text:
    KYMBERLY S. ROBERTS v. WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 294 (AC 14194), is denied.

Decided April 1, 1996

Frank A. Bailey, in support of the petition.

Gary C. Cooper, in opposition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSE ORTIZ
    Decided April 1, 1996

      Christopher L. Ulrich, in support of the petition.

      Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 374 (AC 13786), is denied.


text:
    VINCENT SHIMKO v. FERRO CORPORATION ET AL.
    Decided April 1, 1996

      Kevin M. Blake, in support of the petition.

      Jules Lang, in opposition.
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 409 (AC 14746), is denied.


text:
    SUZANNE M. SEARLES v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD

      Suzanne M. Searles, pro se, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 902 (AC 14107), is denied.

Decided April 1, 1996

Marjorie S. Wilder, corporation counsel, in opposition.


text:
    SUZANNE M. SEARLES v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD
    Decided April 1, 1996

      Suzanne M. Searles, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Elizabeth Dee Bailey, assistant corporation counsel, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 901 (AC 13880), is denied.


text:
    RIMIKO CAFFE v. BENEDICT CAFFE
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15400.
    Decided April 8, 1996

      Barbara L. Cox, in support of the petition.

      Gary Oberst and Joshua Kammerman, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 178 (AC 12819), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this dissolution of marriage case, did the Appellate Court properly reverse the judgment of the trial court as to financial matters on the ground that the trial court did not refer to the statutes governing such matters?”


text:
    MINESHWAR KATHURIA ET AL. v. RICHARD K. PURCELL
    Decided April 8, 1996

      William C. Franklin, in support of the petition.

      Donald J. Deneen and Janis C. Jerman, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 227 (AC 13993), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DONALD GLOVER
    Decided April 8, 1996

      Michael L. Moscowitz, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 387 (AC 13500), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES R. WELCH, SR.

      Kent Drager, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
   BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.

Decided April 8, 1996

Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    FLOYD WILLIAMS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    Decided April 8, 1996

      Leopold F. DeFusco, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Floyd Williams’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 512 (AC 14241), is denied.


text:
    EVERETTE MCGREGOR v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    Decided April 8, 1996

      William Andrew Lichtenfels, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Timothy J. Sugrue, executive assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Everette McGregor’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 926 (AC 14103), is denied.


text:
    SANDRA KOEHLER v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION/PRATT AND WHITNEY AIRCRAFT DIVISION
   The petition by the Second Injury Fund for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 14067) is denied.

Decided March 5, 1996

Loida John-Nicholson, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.


text:
    LUBA HILL v. JAMES T. HILL
    Decided March 5, 1996

      Luba Hill, pro se, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 14523) is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DONALD LEE MCELYEA
    Decided March 5, 1996

      Richard Emanuel, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Paul J. Ferencek, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 60 (AC 13844), is denied.


text:
    BUILDING SUPPLY CORPORATION v. LAWRENCE BRUNOLI, INC., ET AL.
    Decided March 5, 1996
    NORCOTT, J., did not participate in the decision.

      John Rose, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Robert L. Trowbridge, in opposition.
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 89 (AC 13183), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSEPH R. SCARPIELLO
    Decided March 5, 1996

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification.


text:
    ELIZABETH GALLAGHER v. COVENANT INSURANCE COMPANY
    Decided March 5, 1996

      Prescott W. May, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 908 (AC 13969), is denied.


text:
    MICHAEL JORRIN v. VALERIE JORRIN
    Decided March 5, 1996

      Lois B. Tanzer, in support of the petition.

      Ellen B. Lubell, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 909 (AC 12815), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL STINSON
    Decided March 5, 1996

      Robert G. Golger, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Susann E. Gill, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SCOTT DESMOND
    Decided March 11, 1996

      Frederick W. Odell, in support of the petition.

      Ronald G. Weller, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 915 (AC 13487), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KENNETH PRUTTING

      Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
   BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.

Decided March 11, 1996

Susann E. Gill, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    MARIA MOURA ET AL. v. JOSEPH PULIERI ET AL.
    Decided March 11, 1996

      Gregory P. Lynch, in support of the petition.

      Richards. Scalo and Ronald D. Japha, in opposition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 183 (AC 14063), is denied.


author: BERDON, J.

text:
    CARLOS FIGUEROA ET AL. v. C AND S BALL BEARING ET AL.
    (15241)
    Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued November 30, 1995
    officially released May 14, 1996

      Houston Putnam Lowry, for the appellant (plaintiff Veterans Memorial Medical Center).

      William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant state of Connecticut).

      Charlene M. Russo filed a brief for Aetna Casualty and Surety Company as amicus curiae.

       As the employer in four of the consolidated cases, the state is a defendant and has chosen to participate in this appeal. The other employers have not taken part in this appeal.

   BERDON, J.

This appeal from a decision of the compensation review board (board) raises the issue of whether, under the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), the workers’ compensation commission (commission) has jurisdiction to hear cases brought by a medical provider seeking payment for medical services provided to an injured employee.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. The plaintiff Veterans Memorial Medical Center (plaintiff) provided medical services to a number of individuals who claimed to have been injured in connection with their employment. The plaintiff notified the individuals’ respective employers concerning the services provided. Along with the notification, the plaintiff included a bill for its services. A number of these bills were never paid. Thereafter, the plaintiff requested an informal hearing before the commission seeking compensation for each of those outstanding bills. Hearings were scheduled, but then postponed indefinitely by order of the commission’s chairperson. The plaintiff then consolidated its outstanding claims and appealed to the board pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301 (a). In none of the cases involved in this appeal did the employee in question submit a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. On January 20, 1995, the board issued a written decision in which it dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The board held that the commission “lack[ed] jurisdiction over the res as no claim was asserted by the alleged employees of their right to [workers’ compensation] benefits.” The board further concluded that “a medical provider [does not have] standing before this commission in the absence of a claim by an injured employee or his dependents) for benefits under [the act]. Without, at the very least, an underlying assertion by a claimant to an entitlement of workers’ compensation benefits, there is no basis upon which a commissioner would inquire as to the medical services provided.” The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court, and the case was subsequently transferred to this court, pursuant to General Statutes §51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 4023. We agree, in part, with the reasoning of the board and affirm its decision.

“Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. . . . A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy. . . . It is a familiar principle that a court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation. . . .

“This concept, however, is not limited to courts. Administrative agencies [such as the commission] are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and their jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the validity of the statutes vesting them with power and they cannot confer jurisdiction upon themselves. . . . We have recognized that [i]t is clear that an administrative body must act strictly within its statutory authority, within constitutional limitations and in a lawful manner. ... It cannot modify, abridge or otherwise change the statutory provisions, under which it acquires authority unless the statutes expressly grant it that power. . . .

“[0]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case. . . . Subject matter jurisdiction, unlike jurisdiction of the person, cannot be created through consent or waiver.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 427-30, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988).

Under the act, before the commission has jurisdiction to hold a hearing to determine whether a party is entitled to compensation, a written notice of claim must be filed with either the employer or a workers’ compensation commissioner; General Statutes § 31-294c (a); or one of the statutory jurisdictional alternatives must be satisfied. General Statutes § 31-294c (c). Pursuant to § 31-294c (c), the commission may acquire jurisdiction if, within the applicable period of time: (1) there has been a hearing or a written request for a hearing or an assignment for a hearing; (2) a voluntary agreement has been submitted within the applicable period; or (3) the employer has furnished the employee, for the respective work related injury, with medical or surgical care as provided in General Statutes § 31-294d. Accordingly, a notice of claim or the satisfaction of one of the statutory exceptions is a prerequisite that conditions whether the commission has subject matter jurisdiction under the act. Collins v. West Haven, 210 Conn. 423, 430, 555 A.2d 981 (1989); see also Rice v. Vermilyn Brown, Inc., 232 Conn. 780, 786, 657 A.2d 616 (1995); Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 348-49, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993); J. Asselin, Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Practice Manual (1985) p. 11.

I

In ascertaining whether the commission’s jurisdiction was properly invoked, we first focus on the notice of claim requisite. The plaintiff argues that the act does not restrict who may provide notice of a claim, and that the notices that it sent to the respective employers regarding the services it rendered satisfied the jurisdictional requisite. The question, therefore, becomes whether a medical provider may furnish the requisite notice on behalf of the employee in order to initiate a workers’ compensation claim.

Although the statute does not explicitly state that an “employee” shall provide the notice of claim, it is clear from a reading of the act that employees, not medical providers or other third parties, have standing to initiate a claim. “It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is to be found not in an isolated phrase or sentence but, rather, from the statutory scheme as a whole.” State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 226, 663 A.2d 1026 (1995). Therefore, “[a] statute should be read as a whole and interpreted so as to give effect to all of its provisions.” Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 216 Conn. 412, 418, 581 A.2d 1050 (1990); see also Office of Consumer Counsels. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 234 Conn. 624, 646, 662 A.2d 1251 (1995); State v. Spears, 234 Conn. 78, 91, 93, 662 A.2d 80 (1995). Furthermore, a statute must be read in light of the purpose it intends to serve. Conservation Commissions. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 426, 479 A.2d 187 (1984).

The act was specifically designed to benefit injured employees. Crochiere v. Board of Education, supra, 227 Conn. 349 (“purpose of the act is to compensate employees for injuries ‘arising out of and in the course of employment,’ without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on employers”). In at least two ways, the statutory scheme reflects this intention and requires that the injured employee invoke the commission’s jurisdiction by furnishing the required notice if he wishes to take advantage of the act. First, General Statutes § 31-294b focuses directly on the employee by requiring him to report the nature of his injury to his employer (“Any employee who has sustained an injury in the course of his employment shall immediately report the injury to his employer .... If the employee fails to report the injury immediately, the commissioner may reduce the award of compensation proportionately . . . .”). Second, § 31-294c provides that only the dependents or legal representatives of a deceased employee may initiate a claim on an employee’s behalf (“a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the deceased employee, may make claim for compensation”). In view of the purpose of the act and the legislative scheme, we conclude that a medical provider does not have the statutory authority to furnish the notice required of an employee to invoke the jurisdiction of the commission.

The plaintiff also claims that as a medical provider it independently has standing to initiate a claim under the act. No statutory authority, however, is cited by the plaintiff for this proposition. Rather, the plaintiff cites several decisions of the board. In particular, the plaintiff cites Gonzalez v. Electric Transport (Penske), 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 6, 7-8 (1994), wherein the commissioner held that “the medical provider stands in the shoes of the claimant . . . [and] has the same right to a hearing and award as does the claimant.” Gonzalez and the other decisions cited by the plaintiff do not, however, hold that a medical provider has an independent basis for standing to initiate a claim under the act. The issue presented in each of the decisions cited by the plaintiff concerned the amount of compensation to which the medical provider was entitled. In each of those cases, the issue of compensation due the medical provider was addressed only after the jurisdiction of the commission had been appropriately invoked by either the employee or the employer.

The state concedes that “once jurisdiction has been established, it is clear that the medical provider does have standing before the commission.” Professor Arthur Larson, in his treatise on workers’ compensation, concurs and notes that “[t]he rights of a [medical provider] to recover fees in a compensable case are derivative; that is, there must first have been compensation claim proceedings initiated by the employee or employer. The [medical provider] has no independent standing to make claims within the compensation system, unless this right has been expressly created by statute.” 2 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation (1995) § 61.12 (k). We note that when confronted with this exact issue, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that a “medical services provider, simply has no standing in the workmen’s compensation forum to make a claim on its own where there is no subsisting liability or proceeding established on behalf of the injured [employee] or his dependents.” Medical College of Pennsylvania v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 139 Pa. Commw. 632, 591 A.2d 338, 340 (1991).

The filing of a workers’ compensation claim is not required by law for every injury an employee may sustain while at work. An injured employee has the option of taking advantage of the act. Rather than filing a claim, an employee may want to pay for his treatment personally or have it paid through other means. If an employee decides not to utilize the act, however, he exposes himself to liability for the services performed by a medical provider. A medical provider, however, does not have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the commission by giving notice on behalf of the employee or by independently filing a claim.

In the present case, the board determined that none of the employees in question who received treatment from the plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of the commission by filing a claim. With respect to the one individual employee who had filed a claim, the board remanded that case for a hearing.

II

Nevertheless, our inquiry regarding jurisdiction does not end here. The plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a hearing before the commission to determine whether the commission’s jurisdiction was invoked in some manner. We agree in part with the plaintiff.

It is fundamental that a court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Fairfield Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 180 Conn. 223, 227, 429 A.2d 478 (1980). “It should be no different concerning the matter of the jurisdiction under the Workers’ Compensation Act, where the commissioner’s jurisdiction is confined by the Act and limited by its provisions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Castro v. Viera, supra, 207 Conn. 430.

An important distinction, however, must be made between tribunals of general jurisdiction as opposed to those of limited jurisdiction. Because courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have jurisdiction, jurisdictional facts need not be alleged or proved to establish the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. State ex rel. Morris v. Bulkeley, 61 Conn. 287, 374, 23 A. 186 (1892); 1 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (2d Ed. 1970) § 7f. This presumption of jurisdiction, however, does not apply to tribunals of limited jurisdiction, such as the commission. Rather, the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of such a tribunal must allege and prove the necessary jurisdictional facts. Griswold v. Mather, 5 Conn. 435, 439 (1825) (“facts requisite to show that they have cognizance, in any given case, must be averred”); 1 E. Stephenson, supra, § 7f. Because the commission is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and because a medical provider has no standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the commission, we conclude that a medical provider must, in good faith, allege sufficient facts that, if proven, would invoke the commission’s jurisdiction before the commission is required to hold a hearing to determine whether it in fact does have jurisdiction.

In the present case, the plaintiff, in each of its requests for a hearing, merely alleged that it sought payment for the medical services that it had provided to an injured employee, the date the services were provided, the name and address of the employee, and the name of the employer and its insurer. The plaintiff failed to allege any jurisdictional facts, such as whether the employee provided his employer with adequate notice of his injury, or whether the employer furnished the employee with medical services. See General Statutes § 31-294c (c). Consequently, the plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to invoke the commission’s jurisdiction to determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction.

The decision of the board is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.

       The individual employees to whom the medical services were provided were also named as plaintiffs in these cases. The employees, however, are not involved in this consolidated appeal.

       Commissioner John Arcudi, in a dissent to the chairperson’s order, wrote that: “Ordering an indefinite postponement of hearings in eighteen cases ... is an adjudicatory act because it deprives the provider of its right to present evidence before a commissioner on the basis of which the commissioner may adjudicate its claim. The distinction between ‘indefinite postponement’ and ‘denial’ of a hearing is merely a semantic one. The order denied hearings and therefore denied due process.” Because we find that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we need not reach the issue of whether an indefinite postponement is within the statutory authority of the chaiiperson or whether it constitutes a deprivation of due process.

       In one case that is not subject to this appeal, it was determined that a claim for workers’ compensation benefits had been filed by the employee. That case was remanded by the board for a hearing on the plaintiffs claim.

       Subsequent to filing this appeal, as the plaintiff noted in its reply brief, the board, on August 15, 1995, ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing with respect to two of the individual employees, Eddie Fluker and Lisa Chabot: “On the basis of the commissioner’s electronic records it appears [that] a claim relating to [Fluker and Chabot] may exist. The matter should therefore be scheduled for a hearing.” (Compensation Review Board Case No. 3063 CRB-8-95-5.) Accordingly, the plaintiffs appeals with respect to Fluker and Chabot are moot and therefore dismissed.

       General Statutes § 31-294c (a) provides in relevant part: “No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury, provided, if death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the deceased employee, may make claim for compensation within the two-year period or within one year from the date of death, whichever is later. Notice of a claim for compensation may be given to the employer or any commissioner and shall state, in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting from the accident, or the date of the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease and the nature of the disease, as the case may be, and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed. An employee of the state shall send a copy of the notice to the commissioner of administrative services. . . .”

       Merely because the commission has jurisdiction does not render an employee’s workers’ compensation claim compensable. See Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 349, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993) (“[T]o recover for an injury under the act, a plaintiff must prove that the injury is causally connected to the employment. To prove causal connection, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury claimed [1] arose out of the employment, and [2] in the course of the employment. . . . Proof that the injury arose out of the employment relates to the time, place and circumstances of the injury. . . . Proof that the ii\jury occurred in the course of the employment, means that the injury must occur [a] within the period of the employment; [b] at a place the employee may reasonably be; and [c] while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties of the employment or doing something incidental to it.” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).

       “[Standing has jurisdictional implications.” Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co., 192 Conn. 591, 595, 473 A.2d 787 (1984). “Standing focuses on whether a party is the proper party to request adjudication of the issues . . . . It is a basic principle of law that a plaintiff must have standing for the court to have jurisdiction. Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 234 Conn. 51, 61-62, 661 A.2d 988 (1995).

       The plaintiff cited the following cases in support of its assertion that a medical provider has standing to bring a claim for compensation: Gonzalez v. Electric Transport (Penske), 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 6 (1994); Derman v. Norwalk, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 100 (1990); Tanner v. Walgren Tree Experts, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 16 (1990); and Tanner v. Walgren Tree Experts, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 129 (1989).

       The pertinent Pennsylvania statute provides in relevant part: “If, after any injury, the employer or his insurer and the employeje] or his dependent, concerned in any injury, shall fail to agree upon the facts thereof or the compensation due under this act, the employe [e] or his dependents may present a claim petition for compensation to the department. . . Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, § 751 (West 1992). The Pennsylvania statute states explicitly what the Connecticut statute states implicitly: With a few statutory exceptions, the employee or his dependents must file a claim to invoke the jurisdiction of the commission.

       Should an employee decide to forgo the benefits offered under the act, the employee is still limited to the legal recoveries permitted under the act. See General Statutes §§ 31-284 and 31-293a.

       See footnote 5.

       After this issue was raised at oral argument, we ordered the parties, and invited the amicus, to file supplemental briefs on whether the commission has jurisdiction to determine its own subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, we requested that the briefs “indicate the nature of the allegations that must be made by a medical provider, as well as any other requirements that must be satisfied, in order to obtain an informal hearing before the commission to determine jurisdiction.”

       “An administrative agency, as a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, must act strictly within its statutory authority.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. State Employees’ Review Board, 231 Conn. 391, 406, 650 A.2d 158 (1994).

       General Statutes § 31-298 provides that “no formal pleadings shall be required” of either party. A medical provider can become a “party” to a workers’ compensation hearing only after the jurisdiction of the commission has been established.