author: PETERS, C. J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GREGORY WILLIAMS
    (15325)
    Peters, C. J., and Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued June 5
    officially released July 16, 1996

      Susann E. Gill, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, and Linda N. Howe, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

      DeborahDelPrete Sullivan, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
   PETERS, C. J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the intent to cause death and the intent to cause serious physical injury are mutually exclusive states of mind under the circumstances of this case. After a jury trial, the defendant, Gregory Williams, was convicted of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, and assault in.the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (l). The trial court rendered judgment on the jury verdict and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed his convictions. State v. Williams, 39 Conn. App. 18, 663 A.2d 436 (1995). We granted the state’s petition for certification, and now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the facts that the jury reasonably could have found. “In April, 1991, the defendant and the victim had been living together on and off for about five years, and had a two year old son. On April 12, 1991, the victim traveled to California with her parents and her son. After spending time in California, the victim’s son returned to Connecticut with the victim’s parents. The victim traveled to North Carolina to attend a training course offered by her employer. At that time, the victim decided not to resume living with the defendant upon her return. Accordingly, when she returned to Connecticut on April 19, she and her son moved in with her parents in Stratford.

“On April 20,1991, the defendant came to the parents’ home in Stratford looking for the victim. When the victim’s father told the defendant that he was not welcome on the property and asked him to leave, the defendant began yelling at the victim’s father that he would be sorry, that it may take one or two weeks but he would five to regret this day. The defendant also attempted to challenge the victim’s father out into the street to fight him.

“The following morning, the victim received a call from a coworker informing her that the defendant had just called from a mental hospital. The victim’s former next-door neighbor also called to let her know that there was a pile of women’s and children’s clothing stacked behind the fence in the back of the victim’s former residence. Believing that the defendant would not be at the house, the victim, her son and her sister went to the victim’s former residence to retrieve their belongings.

“The victim’s sister, who had driven, parked behind the house near a pile of clothing. The women hurried from the car and began putting clothes into garbage bags. While the women were collecting the clothes, the defendant appeared. The victim ran, yelling to her sister to call the police. The defendant caught her and fell to his knees begging her not to leave him. The victim attempted to keep the situation under control by pretending to go along with him, but winked at her sister signaling her to go for help.

“The victim’s sister screamed at the victim to get into the car. The defendant then ran to the car, removed his son from the car seat and ran into the house. While holding his son, the defendant pushed the victim through the door of the house. The defendant then punched the victim in the face and hit her in the head with a baseball bat from the neighbor’s yard. The defendant delivered eight blows to the victim’s head until the baseball bat finally broke. The victim suffered serious head injuries and was close to death.” Id., 20-21.

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter aha, that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury. During its final charge, the trial court stated that “the law does recognize that a person who is acting intentionally — was found to be acting intentionally can simultaneously intend to cause some injury — to cause the victim some injury and at the same time, intend to cause that person’s death . . . .” The defendant claimed that the trial court’s instruction improperly permitted the jury to render inconsistent guilty verdicts on the counts of attempted murder under §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a and assault in the first degree under § 53a-59 (a) (1). Id., 21.

The Appellate Court held that although a jury may properly find that, during an attack on a victim, a defendant’s intent changed from the intent to cause serious physical injury to the intent to cause death, a jury cannot properly find, as a matter of law, that a defendant possessed these intents simultaneously with respect to the same victim. Id., 22, 22 n.6. In light of this holding, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court’s instruction improperly permitted the jury to render legally inconsistent verdicts for attempted murder under §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a and assault in the first degree under § 53a-59 (a) (1), and thus necessitated a new trial. Id., 22-23, 25.

On appeal to this court, the state claims that the trial court properly instructed the jury because, under the circumstances of this case, the intent to cause the victim’s death was not legally inconsistent with the simultaneous intent to cause her serious physical injury. The defendant contends, to the contrary, that, as a matter of law, the two intents are mutually exclusive and thus that the trial court’s instruction impermissibly permitted the jury to render inconsistent verdicts. We agree with the state that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court properly instructed the jury that the defendant simultaneously could have possessed the specific intents required for conviction of attempted murder under §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a and assault in the first degree under § 53a-59 (a) (1).

The issue, broadly stated, is whether the intent to cause death and the intent to cause serious physical injury are mutually exclusive as a matter of law. We conclude that such mutual exclusivity is not to be presumed. Indeed, we have already held that, under some circumstances, these intents can be possessed simultaneously. In State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 305, 630 A.2d 593 (1993), the defendant fired a single shotgun blast into a group of men, killing three and injuring another. Addressing the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly accepted inconsistent verdicts of guilty on counts of attempted murder and assault in the first degree, we concluded that “[i]t is clear that an assault in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (1) and (2) would be consistent with an attempted murder count in violation of §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a if [the actual victim] were the defendant’s intended victim, because those statutory sections require intentional conduct.” Id., 318-19. Because the counts of attempted murder and intentional assault had been premised on a single act of violence, our approval of verdicts of guilty for both offenses with respect to the same victim and the same act necessarily acknowledged that a defendant may simultaneously possess the intent to cause death and the intent to cause serious physical injury. Accord People v. Mayes, 257 Ill. App. 3d 137, 153, 630 N.E.2d 878 (1993), cert. denied, 156 Ill. 2d 563, 638 N.E.2d 1121 (1994) (intents for aggravated battery and attempted murder not mutually exclusive); People v. McDavis, 97 App. Div. 2d 302, 304-305, 469 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1983) (intents for assault in first degree and attempted murder not mutually exclusive); see also People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 761, 104 P.2d 794 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 703, 61 S. Ct. 806, 85 L. Ed. 1136 (1941) (“[tjhere is no repugnancy between an intent to kill the victim and an intent to injure him”), overruled in part on other grounds, People v. Snyder, 50 Cal. 2d 190, 197, 324 P.2d 1 (1958), and People v. Horn, 12 Cal. 3d 290, 301 n.8, 524 P.2d 1300, 115 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1974).

The defendant contends that, because the intent required to violate § 53a-54a differs from the intent required to violate § 53a-59 (a) (1), it is legally impossible to possess these two intents simultaneously. We are unpersuaded.

Although §§ 53a-54a and 53a-59 (a) (1) require the same mental state, namely, a specific intent; State v. Hinton, supra, 227 Conn. 318-19; the particular intents required to violate these statutes are not the same. For each intent, a distinct conscious objective is sought. A verdict of guilty of attempted murder requires a finding of the specific intent to cause death. General Statutes §§ 53a-49, 53a-54a and 53a-3 (11). A verdict of guilty of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (1), in contrast, requires a finding of the specific intent to cause serious physical injury. General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a) (1) and 53a-3 (11).

The defendant’s argument founders on the mistaken presumption that one who intends to kill a person may not also intend to cause serious physical injury to that person. We can perceive no logical reason to preclude, as a matter of law, the simultaneous possession of these intents by a defendant toward the same victim. It is entirely consistent and reasonable, under the facts of a particular case, for a jury to find that a defendant intended to inflict serious wounds upon a victim while also intending to cause that victim’s death. A defendant “can intend both to cause the victim a serious physical injury and to kill the victim. No temporal separation is required for the intent, but obviously one is required for the result. A possible factual scenario would have a defendant intending to kill a person but first causing serious physical injuiy or disfigurement, so as to make the victim suffer before dying. The intent is simultaneous, as the conscious objective to cause the requisite results is simultaneous, while the results themselves are separated by time.” State v. Williams, supra, 39 Conn. App. 26 (Foti, J., dissenting); cf. People v. Womack, 40 Cal. App. 4th 926, 931, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76 (1995) (intent to kill victim inconsistent with intent to induce same victim to give false testimony or to withhold true testimony).

The defendant relies on State v. King, 216 Conn. 585, 583 A.2d 896 (1990), on appeal after remand, 218 Conn. 747, 591 A.2d 813 (1991), but that case does not compel a different conclusion. In King, the trial court had improperly instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty both of attempted murder under §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a and assault in the first degree under § 53a-59 (a) (3) with respect to the same victim. Id., 592-95. We determined that the juiy’s verdict of guilty on the count of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (3) necessitated a finding that the defendant had acted recklessly. The jury’s verdict of guilty on the count of attempted murder, in contrast, necessitated a finding that the defendant had acted with specific intent. With respect to the same victim and the same act, however, specific intent and recklessness are distinct and mutually exclusive mental states under our penal code “because one who acts recklessly does not have a conscious objective to cause a particular result. . . . Therefore, the transgression that caused the victim’s injuries was either intentional or reckless; it could not, at one and the same time, be both. . . . Where a determination is made that one mental state exists, to be legally consistent the other must be found not to exist.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 594; see Griffin v. Parker, 219 Conn. 363, 370, 593 A.2d 124 (1991); see also State v. Beccia, 199 Conn. 1, 4, 505 A.2d 683 (1986). In State v. Hinton, supra, 227 Conn. 318-19, we declined to extend these principles to encompass scenarios involving the simultaneous possession of the same mental state, and we similarly decline to do so now.

The holding in King was premised on the conclusion that, because a defendant cannot act recklessly and intentionally at the same time toward the same victim, a guilty verdict based on a finding that a defendant acted with recklessness is inconsistent with a guilty verdict based on a finding that the defendant acted intentionally. State v. King, supra, 216 Conn. 594. That is not this case. The trial court in the present case did not instruct the jury that it could find that the defendant simultaneously had acted recklessly and intentionally toward the victim. Rather, the trial court instructed the jury that it could find that the defendant had intended to inflict serious physical injury upon the victim and, at the same time, intended to cause her death. King, therefore, is inapposite.

We conclude that, under the appropriate circumstances, a defendant can simultaneously intend to cause the death of, and intend to cause serious physical injury to, the same victim. “Intent is a question of fact, the determination of which should stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an unreasonable one.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeJesus, 236 Conn. 189, 197, 672 A.2d 488 (1996); State v. Patterson, 229 Conn. 328, 333, 641 A.2d 123 (1994). In this case, the defendant repeatedly struck the victim over the head with a baseball bat until the bat broke. The jury reasonably could have inferred from the defendant’s conduct that he had possessed, at the same time and by the same acts, the intent to cause the victim’s death and the intent to cause the victim serious physical injury while he was attempting to kill her. Because the defendant could have possessed both intents simultaneously, the trial court’s instruction to that effect did not permit the jury to return legally inconsistent verdicts. See State v. Hinton, supra, 227 Conn. 313; State v. King, supra, 216 Conn. 594. Accordingly, the trial court properly instructed the jury.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-49 provides in relevant part: “Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense, (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. . . .”
      General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “Murder, (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person . . . .”

       General Statutes § 53a-59 provides in relevant part: “Assault in the first degree: Class B felony, (a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument . . . .”
      The jury acquitted the defendant of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3).

       We granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues:
      “1. Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, for purposes of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a and 53a-59 (a) (1) intent to cause death and intent to cause serious physical injury are mutually exclusive states of mind?
      “2. If the answer to the first question is yes, was the error of the trial court harmless?” State v. Williams, 235 Conn. 920, 920-21, 665 A.2d 909 (1995).

       The defendant also claimed that the trial court had improperly: (1) admitted evidence of his prior misconduct; (2) allowed the state on rebuttal to present evidence establishing his intent; and (3) submitted to the jury an alternate means of committing attempted murder for which there was no support in the evidence. The defendant claimed, in addition, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted murder and assault in the first degree. The Appellate Court rejected the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, and did not address the remaining claims in light of its resolution of the claim of instructional error. State v. Williams, supra, 39 Conn. App. 23-25.

       See, e.g., State v. Glover, 40 Conn. App. 387, 395, 671 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 918, 673 A.2d 1145 (1996); State v. Fernandez, 27 Conn. App. 73, 94, 604 A.2d 1308, cert. denied, 222 Conn. 904, 606 A.2d 1330 (1992).

       Verdicts are legally inconsistent if “the existence of the essential elements for one offense negates the existence of the essential elements for another offense of which the defendant also stands convicted.” State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 313, 630 A.2d 593 (1993); State v. King, 216 Conn. 585, 594-95, 583 A.2d 896 (1990), on appeal after remand, 218 Conn. 747, 591 A.2d 813 (1991).

       General Statutes § 53a-59 provides in relevant part: “Assault in the first degree: Class B felony, (a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when ... (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical iryury to another person . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

       The trial court properly instructed the jury, in accordance with our holding in State v. King, supra, 216 Conn. 593-94, that “it would ... be inconsistent to find that [the defendant] intended to cause the victim’s death and simultaneously acted recklessly to cause her injury.”

       We note that the Appellate Court determined that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intent to cause the victim’s death and the intent to cause her serious physical injury. State v. Williams, supra, 39 Conn. App. 24-25.

       We recognize that there are circumstances in which a jury could find that a defendant had the specific intent necessary for assault in the first degree but not the specific intent necessary for attempted murder. The definition of “serious physical injury” as “physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death”; General Statutes § 53a-3 (4); raises the possibility that an actor may intend to cause a substantial risk of death but not death itself. In that case, if death were to occur, it would result not because the actor specifically intended that death, but because he or she acted in the face of that risk.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KATZ, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    SOUTHINGTON ’84 ASSOCIATES v. SILVER DOLLAR STORES, INC., ET AL.
    (15338)
    Peters, C. J., and Callahan, Borden, Norcott and Katz, Js.
    Argued May 29
    officially released July 16, 1996

      Francis X. Drapeau, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Joseph R. Crispino, for the appellees (defendants).
   KATZ, J.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court had the authority to render judgment awarding money damages greater than the amount stated in the demand for relief attached to the plaintiffs complaint. We conclude that it had such authority.

The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, Southington ’84 Associates, the lessor of commercial property in Southington Caldor Village, brought this action against the defendants, its tenant, Silver Dollar Stores, Inc. (Silver Dollar), and Louis M. Ursini, president of Silver Dollar, as guarantor of the lease for breach of contract for the failure to pay rent. In compliance with General Statutes § 52-91 and Practice Book § 131, the plaintiff annexed to its complaint a statement that the amount “in demand is more than Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) but less than $15,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs.” (Emphasis added.) The defendants filed a special defense claiming that the construction project in front of an adjoining property was so disruptive to Silver Dollar’s business that it violated its right to quiet enjoyment, thereby relieving the defendants of the obligation to pay rent. Because the defendants failed to appear for trial, the trial court, Langenbach, J., entered a default against them. See Practice Book § 351.

Thereafter, pursuant to Practice Book § 365 et seq., the case was tried to the court as a hearing in damages. Although neither defendant had filed a notice of defenses pursuant to Practice Book § 367, at the hearing in damages Ursini argued that he had signed the guarantee as president of Silver Dollar, and not in his individual capacity, and both defendants argued that the plaintiff had breached the lease by permitting renovations elsewhere in Southington Caldor Village that violated Silver Dollar’s right of quiet enjoyment and interfered with its business. The trial court rejected both defenses, finding that Ursini had signed the lease in his individual capacity and that the renovations to other sections of the shopping center did not so disrupt the traffic flow as to cause significant financial loss to Silver Dollar. Finally, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff had attempted to mitigate the damages caused by the defendants’ breach. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff against both defendants. The court computed damages as follows: losses to the date of the judgment in the amount of $22,144.03, and losses from the date of the judgment to the end of the contract period in the amount of $128,529.98. After allowing a credit to the defendants for their security deposit in the amount of $4085.44, the court awarded the plaintiff $146,588.57. Although the defendants were made aware, during the hearing in damages, that the plaintiff was seeking money damages in excess of the amount stated in the demand for relief attached to the complaint, they did not object to the amount being sought on the basis that it exceeded that demand.

The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, challenging the trial court’s rejection of its two defenses as well as its finding regarding mitigation. Southington ’84 Associates v. Silver Dollar Stores, Inc., 39 Conn. App. 608, 608 n.1, 665 A.2d 920 (1995). The Appellate Court labeled the issues raised as factual and, consequently, summarily rejected them. Id., 608. Although the parties waived oral argument, following its own examination of the record the Appellate Court asked for supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the trial court had the authority to render judgment for an amount in excess of the amount stated in the demand for relief attached to the plaintiffs complaint. Id., 608-609. Reasoning that the case was controlled by Davis v. Naugatuck, 15 Conn. App. 185, 543 A.2d 785 (1988), the Appellate Court concluded, pursuant to Practice Book § 4185, that it was plain error for the trial court to have awarded damages in excess of $15,000 and, accordingly, reversed the judgment as to damages and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to modify the judgment “so that it totals no more than $15,000 plus costs.” Southington ’84 Associates v. Silver Dollar Stores, Inc., supra, 610.

The plaintiff petitioned this court for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which we granted, limited to the following issue: “Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that it was plain error to render judgment in an amount in excess of the statement re amount in demand?” Southington ’84 Associates v. Silver Dollar Stores, Inc., 235 Conn. 937, 937-38, 668 A.2d 375 (1995). We conclude that, absent unfair surprise or prejudice to the defendants, the trial court was not bound by the amount in that statement and that, consequently, the trial court did not commit plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The plaintiff contends that by limiting its claim for damages to the amount in the demand for relief, the Appellate Court has, in effect, resurrected the ad damnum requirement that once served to limit the trial court’s jurisdiction and that was eliminated nearly twenty years ago by the legislature, and that the Appellate Court has concomitantly undermined the arbitration and fact-finding programs created by the legislature. We agree.

We begin with a discussion of the history of the statement of the demand for relief, the purpose of that statement and the limitations it imposes on the plaintiff, if any. At the same time that the legislature adopted a uniform court system, vesting in the Superior Court the power to entertain all actions except those in which the Probate Court had original jurisdiction; General Statutes § 51-164s; it also enacted No. 77-497 of the 1977 Public Acts, which amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 52-91 and thereby eliminated the ad damnum requirement because it was no longer needed as a basis for limiting a particular court’s jurisdiction in rendering a judgment. See Holmquist v. Spinelli, 139 Conn. 429, 431-32, 94 A.2d 621 (1953) (amount in demand as disclosed by complaint determined whether jurisdiction was in Superior Court or in Court of Common Pleas); Bridgeport Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Bouniol, 89 Conn. 254, 261, 93 A. 674 (1915) (same); see also Thomas v. Katz, 171 Conn. 412, 415, 370 A.2d 978 (1976) (damages awarded cannot exceed amount of ad damnum).

In 1982, the legislature created fact-finding and arbitration programs in civil litigation; Public Acts 1982, No. 82-441; and in 1983, the legislature again amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 52-91 to require a plaintiff to attach to the complaint a demand for relief in order to assist our trial courts in identifying cases that were eligible for the newly enacted fact-finding and arbitration programs. Public Acts 1983, No. 83-144 (P.A. 83-144). Unlike the previous ad damnum requirement, however, the statement contemplated by the amended § 52-91 does not require the plaintiff to state the exact amount being sought. To comply with the amended statute, a plaintiff need only state which of the three categories applies to the case: less than $2500; $2500 or more, but less than $15,000; or $15,000 or more. See footnote 1. These categories correspond to the eligibility requirements for the fact-finding and arbitration programs that had been created by legislation prior to P.A. 83-144. See General Statutes §§ 52-549n and 52-549u. Thereafter, the rules of practice were amended to reflect those statutory changes. See Practice Book § 546D (trial court may refer to fact finder any contract action “in which money damages only are claimed, which is based upon an express or implied promise to pay a definite sum, and in which the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars”); and Practice Book § 546N (court may refer to arbitrator “any civil action in which the damages, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs”).

The plaintiff contends, and we agree, that if we were to conclude that General Statutes § 52-91 and Practice Book § 131 limit the amount of recovery, plaintiffs would be compelled to over inflate their demands for relief to choose the “$15,000 or more” option, so as to avoid the risk that a subsequent judgment for that amount might be set aside in accordance with the Appellate Court’s prior opinion in this case. As a consequence, many cases that would otherwise qualify for arbitration and fact-finding programs would never be properly labeled and identified. The important goal of judicial economy that underlies these programs would, therefore, likely be undermined.

We recognize that Practice Book § 313 provides that, in personal injury cases tried to a jury, the amount of the verdict cannot exceed the amount demanded. This rule recognizes the difficulty a jury may have in placing a value on an injury. Although that provision is clearly inapplicable to this contract action adjudicated as a hearing in damages, it is useful as a point of contrast because, had the legislature and the judges of the Superior Court wanted to apply this kind of limitation to all awards, they were aware of how to accomplish that goal. See Plourde v. Liburdi, 207 Conn. 412, 416, 540 A.2d 1054 (1988) (“the use of different words [or the absence of repeatedly used words in the context of] the same [subject matter] must indicate a difference in legislative intention” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 694-95, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996).

Section 313 may also serve to avoid the surprise and prejudice that an unanticipated damage award could bring to a defendant. Indeed, it was those very concerns that the Appellate Court expressed in Davis v. Naugatuck, supra, 15 Conn. App. 192-93, an appeal from a judgment rendered in a trial to the court wherein the Appellate Court held that the plaintiff was limited in the recovery of damages by the amount requested in the demand for relief and that the failure of the plaintiff to amend the demand pursuant to General Statutes § 52-259 operated to limit his recovery.

In the present case, there was no such surprise or prejudice to the defendants. The record clearly reflects that, at the hearing in damages, the defendants knew that the damages to the plaintiff had accumulated to exceed $15,000. Pointedly, the defendants failed to indicate any surprise when the plaintiff announced that back rent totaled $22,144.33 and future rent totaled $128,598, and they never objected to the plaintiffs claim for five years worth of rent on the basis that it exceeded the amount in the demand for relief. On the basis of this record, in the absence of any prejudice to the defendants, the plaintiff could have amended its complaint at any time to conform to the proof. Practice Book § 182. We would be elevating form over substance to limit damages in this case to the amount requested in the demand for relief. To the extent that Davis v. Naugatuck, supra, 15 Conn. App. 185, requires a fact finder to limit damages to the amount stated in the demand for relief, in the absence of a showing of surprise or prejudice, it is hereby overruled.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 52-91 provides: “Pleadings; contents of complaint. There shall be one form of civil action. The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint and shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and, on a separate page of the complaint, a demand for the relief, which shall be a statement of the remedy or remedies sought. When money damages are sought in the demand for relief, the demand for relief shall set forth: (1) That the amount, legal interest or property in demand is fifteen thousand dollars or more, exclusive of interest and costs; or (2) that the amount, legal interest or property in demand is two thousand five hundred dollars or more but is less than fifteen thousand dollars, exclusive of interest a.nd costs; or (3) that the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than two thousand five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. In addition, in a contract action in which only money damages are sought and in which the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, the demand for relief shall also set forth whether or not the remedy sought is based upon an express or implied promise to pay a definite sum.”

       Practice Book § 131 provides: “ — Contents of Complaint
      “The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint. It shall contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and, on a separate page of the complaint, a demand for relief which shall be a statement of the remedy or remedies sought. When money damages are sought in the demand for relief, the demand for relief shall include the information required by Gen. Stat. § 52-91. (See Gen. Stat., § 52-91 and annotations.)”

       The court also awarded costs of $849.10 and attorney’s fees of $3767 to the plaintiff against both defendants.

       At one point in the hearing, the defendants stated: “They are claiming five years worth of rent practically, plus expenses.” At another time, the plaintiff stated: “[W]e are looking for back rent in the amount of [$22,144.33]. Future rent, [$128,598.00].”

       Practice Book § 4185 provides in relevant part: “Errors Considered
      “The court on appeal shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court.”

       We agree that the Appellate Court had the discretion to review this issue despite the defendants’ failure to raise the claim and to preserve it for appellate review. We therefore do not challenge the exercise of that court’s discretion to determine whether the trial court was limited by the demand for relief. In order for an appellate court to invoke the plain error doctrine to reverse a judgment, however, that court must conclude that “the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ralto Developers, Inc. v. Environmental Impact Commission, 220 Conn. 54, 59, 594 A.2d 981 (1991). Because we conclude that the trial court was not limited by the demand for relief, that court did not commit plain error. Accordingly, the Appellate Court improperly applied the plain error doctrine in reversing the trial court’s judgment.

       General Statutes § 51-164s provides: “Superior court sole trial court. Jurisdiction transferred from court of common pleas and juvenile court. The superior court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute. All jurisdiction heretofore conferred upon and exercised by the court of common pleas and the juvenile court prior to July 1, 1978 shall be transferred to the superior court on July 1, 1978.”

       Number 77-497 of the 1977 Public Acts, entitled “An Act Concerning the Elimination of the Ad Damnum Clause in Civil Cases,” provides in pertinent part: “Sec. 2. Section 52-91 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof:
      “There shall be but one form of civil action and the pleadings therein shall be as follows: The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint and shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for the relief [to which he supposes himself to be entitled], WHICH SHALL NOT ALLEGE THE AMOUNT OF MONEY DAMAGES SOUGHT, IF ANY, BUT SHALL BE A STATEMENT OF THE REMEDY SOUGHT AND AN ALLEGATION THAT THE MATTER IS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
      The emphasized portion is the language added to § 52-91.

       Number 82441 of the 1982 Public Acts provides in pertinent part: “AN ACT CONCERNING FACT FINDING AND ARBITRATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION AND JURISDICTION AND APPOINTMENT OF MAGISTRATES.
      “Section 1. Section 8 of public act 81-462 is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof:

        “In accordance with the provisions of section 51-14, the judges of the [supreme court and judges of the] superior court [shall] MAY make such [orders and] rules as they deem necessary to provide A PROCEDURE . . . IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH THE COURT, IN ITS DISCRETION, MAY REFER TO A FACT-FINDER FOR PROCEEDINGS AUTHORIZED PURSUANT TO THIS ACT, ANY CONTRACT ACTION PENDING IN THE SUPERIOR COURT IN WHICH ONLY MONEY DAMAGES ARE CLAIMED AND WHICH IS BASED UPON AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED PROMISE TO PAY A DEFINITE SUM, AND IN WHICH THE AMOUNT, LEGAL INTEREST OR PROPERTY IN DEMAND IS LESS THAN FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS EXCLUSIVE OF INTEREST AND COSTS. SUCH CASES MAY BE REFERRED TO A FACT-FINDER ONLY AFTER THE PLEADINGS HAVE BEEN CLOSED, A TRIAL LIST CLAIM HAS BEEN FILED, NO CLAIM FOR A JURY TRIAL HAS BEEN FILED AT THE TIME OF REFERENCE, AND THE TIME PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 52-215 FOR FILING A JURY TRIAL CLAIM WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE RETURN DAY OR WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF FACT HAS BEEN JOINED HAS EXPIRED. . . .
      “Sec. 7. (NEW) In accordance with the provisions of section 51-14 of the general statutes, the judges of the superior court may make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure in accordance with which the court, in its discretion, may refer to an arbitrator, for proceedings authorized pursuant to this act, any civil action in which the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs and in which a claim for a trial by jury and a claim for the trial list have been filed. . . .”

       Number 83-144 of the 1983 Public Acts, entitled “An Act Concerning the Demand for Relief in Civil Actions,” provides: “Section 52-91 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof:
      “There shall be one form of civil action. The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint and shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and, ON A SEPARATE PAGE OF THE COMPLAINT, a demand for the relief, which [shall not allege the amount of money damages sought, if any, but] shall be a statement of the remedy OR REMEDIES sought, [and an allegation that the matter is within the jurisdiction of the court or, on or after July 1, 1981, a statement that] WHEN MONEY DAMAGES ARE SOUGHT IN THE DEMAND FOR RELIEF, THE DEMAND FOR RELIEF SHALL SET FORTH: (1) THAT the amount, legal interest or property in demand is [less than] fifteen thousand dollars OR MORE, exclusive of interest and costs; [, or is not] OR (2) THAT THE amount, LEGAL INTEREST OR PROPERTY IN DEMAND IS TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS OR MORE BUT IS less than fifteen thousand dollars, [as the case may be. If] EXCLUSIVE OF INTEREST AND COSTS; OR (3) THAT the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than [five thousand dollars or is less than] two thousand five hundred dollars, [a statement that the demand is less than five thousand dollars or is less than two thousand five hundred dollars shall be included in the complaint in lieu of the statement that the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars] EXCLUSIVE OF INTEREST AND COSTS. IN ADDITION, IN A CONTRACT ACTION IN WHICH ONLY MONEY DAMAGES ARE SOUGHT AND IN WHICH THE AMOUNT, LEGAL INTEREST OR PROPERTY IN DEMAND IS LESS THAN FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS, EXCLUSIVE OF INTEREST AND COSTS, THE DEMAND FOR RELIEF SHALL ALSO SET FORTH WHETHER OR NOT THE REMEDY SOUGHT IS BASED UPON AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED PROMISE TO PAY A DEFINITE SUM.”

       For administrative purposes these same categories are also listed in a box found in the upper right hand corner of the summons, making it easier for judicial administrative personnel to ascertain immediately into which category the case falls. Prior to 1978, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-259, one entry fee had been required for entering civil cases in the Superior Court, and a lower fee had been required for entering cases in the Court of Common Pleas. Since then, § 52-259 has been amended to coincide with the amendments to § 52-91, requiring a different entry fee depending upon whether the amount in the demand for relief is more or less than $2500.

       Speaking on behalf of the judicial department in support of P.A. 83-144, Faith Arkin Mandell, the department’s legislative counsel, explained: “This bill requires that in a civil action, the Plaintiff in [his] complaint specify whether or not the amount of damages he seeks is less than $2500 or is $2500 or more but less than $15,000 or is $15,000 or more. This bill will assist the court in identifying which cases are eligible for reference to a fact finder or arbitrator. A system which was established last session and it, will also assist the courts in identifying the proper entry fees.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 3, 1983 Sess., p. 833.

       General Statutes § 52-549n provides: “Certain contract actions referred to fact-finders. Rules of procedure. In accordance with the provisions of section 51-14, the judges of the superior court may make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure in accordance with which the court, in its discretion, may refer to a fact-finder for proceedings authorized pursuant to this chapter, any contract action pending in the superior court in which only money damages are claimed and which is based upon an express or implied promise to pay a definite sum, and in which the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs. Such cases may be referred to a fact-finder only after the pleadings have been closed, a trial list claim has been filed, no claim for a jury trial has been filed at the time of reference, and the time prescribed in section 52-215 for filing a jury trial claim within thirty days of the return day or within ten days after the issue of fact has been joined has expired.”
      General Statutes § 52-549u provides: “Arbitration of certain civil actions. Rules of procedure. In accordance with the provisions of section 51-14, the judges of the superior court may make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure in accordance with which the court, in its discretion, may refer to an arbitrator, for proceedings authorized pursuant to this chapter, any civil action in which the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs and in which a claim for a trial by jury and a claim for the trial list have been filed.”

       Although the trial court may refer a case to a fact finder, the trial court nevertheless retains jurisdiction of the case to review, remand or reject the findings in whole or in part pursuant to Practice Book § 546J. We further note that the trial court retains jurisdiction of a case it sends to arbitration and hears the case de novo upon a proper request of one of the parties who appeared at the arbitration. Practice Book § 546S. In the present case, the demand for relief did not affect who ultimately adjudicated this case. Although the case had been sent to an attorney trial referee, who did not have the restricted jurisdictional authority of a fact finder; E. I. Constructors, Inc. v. Scinto, 12 Conn. App. 348, 352-53, 530 A.2d 1081 (1987); when the defendants failed to appear, the trial court entered a default against them and then presided over the hearing in damages, rendering the judgment from which this appeal was taken.

       Additionally, giving plaintiffs an incentive to over inflate their demands could return us to the problems we eliminated with the repeal of the ad damnum clause requirement — inflated demands to control the forum in which a case is tried.

       Practice Book § 313 provides: “In any action seeking damages for injury to the person, the amount demanded in the complaint shall not be disclosed to the jury. In 1he event that the jury shall return a verdict which exceeds the amount demanded, the court shall reduce the award to, and render judgment in, the amount demanded.”

       Practice Book § 182 provides: “Amendment of Amount in Demand
      “A party may amend his statement concerning the amount in demand by order of the court upon filing of a motion for leave to file such amendment, with a copy of the amendment appended, after service upon each party as provided by Sec. 120, and with proof of service endorsed thereon. After obtaining permission of the court, the moving party shall file the original amendment with the clerk. If the amount, legal interest or property in demand was alleged to be less than $2500 in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 131, or, prior to October 1, 1979, was alleged to be less than $7500, and the party has been given court permission to amend his demand to an amount in excess of either amount, he shall pay any entry fee prescribed by statute to the clerk when he files the amendment.”


text:
    DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SERVICES OF GREATER NEW HAVEN, INC. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15407.

      Victor R. Perpetua, in support of the petition.

      Patricia Reilly, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 14892) is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the defendant’s appeal as either moot or as an attempt to secure an advisory opinion?”


text:
    FRANKLIN L. FRANK v. LEON E. COOPER ET AL.

      Leon E. Cooper, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Lawler and Margaret A. Triolo, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15469/15617) is denied.


text:
    PRESIDENTIAL CAPITAL CORPORATION v. ANTONIO REALE
   Joseph Reale and Nella Reale’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15477) is granted, limited to the following issue:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15406.

Peter B. Rustin, in support of the petition.

Julia B. Morris, in opposition.

Decided April 22, 1996

“If, in postjudgment proceedings, a judgment creditor seeks to examine nonparties to discover undisclosed assets of its judgment debtor, must an appeal by the nonparties from a trial court order denying then-motions from protective orders be dismissed for lack of a final judgment?”


text:
    HARTFORD STEAM BOILER INSPECTION AND INSURANCE COMPANY v. INDUSTRIAL RISK INSURERS

      Maurice T. FitzMaurice and Carolyn A. Magnan, in support of the petition.

      Stephen E. Goldman and Raymond T. DeMeo, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15403) is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN ROY

      John Roy, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 481 (AC 12281), is denied.


author: BERDON, J.,

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALLAN LYLE

      Brian J. Kombrath, in support of the petition.

      Christopher T. Godialis, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 288 (AC 13283), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LARRY SHEETS

      Beth A. Merkin, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn K. Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 328 (AC 13170), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANDRE BOISVERT
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 420 (AC 14338), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant certification on the following issues:

“1. Did the stop of the defendant by the police at a roadside sobriety check or roadblock while operating his motor vehicle violate his rights under article first, §§ 7 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution?

Robert J. McKay and Gregory A. Thompson, in support of the petition.

Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided April 22, 1996

“2. In the alternative, if a police roadblock sobriety checkpoint is determined to be a valid procedure in Connecticut, were the defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights violated by the failure of the police to follow specific guidelines and/or procedures?”


text:
    KENNETH F. LEMOINE, JR. v. JAMES F. MCCANN

      Kenneth F. Lemoine, Jr., pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 460 (AC 14741), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN MALONE

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 470 (AC 15175), is denied.

Susann E. Gill, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided April 22, 1996


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TERRY RICHARDSON

      Ellen A. Jawitz, in support of the petition.

      Robert J. Scheinblum, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 526 (AC 13045), is denied.


text:
    BANK OF BOSTON CONNECTICUT v. AVON MEADOW ASSOCIATES ET AL.

      Peter B. Rustin, in support of the petition.

      Ann M. Siczewicz and Ben Krowicki, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 536 (AC 13326), is denied.


text:
    SAMUEL MALBAURN ET AL. v. ALBERT E. WEISS, JR.

      Albert E. Weiss, Jr., pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 914 (AC 14340), is denied.


text:
    DEREK J. JACKSON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Derek J. Jackson, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Ronald G. Weller, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The petitioner Derek J. Jackson’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 924 (AC 14405), is denied.


text:
    CAROL ANN RUBIN v. HARVEY BRUCE RUBIN

      Carol Ann Rubin, pro se, in support of the petition.

      William M. Bloss, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 929 (AC 14708), is denied.


text:
    SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEVISION SERVICE COMPANY, INC., ET AL. v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY

      Benjamin Ancona, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Stuart G. Blackburn, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 930 (AC 13982), is denied.


text:
    ERIC PLOURDE v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES

      Jeffrey Brownstein, in support of the petition.

      Robert T. Morrin, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 932 (AC 14524), is denied.


text:
    GRANT WESTERSON v. VINCENT COCCOLI ET AL.

      Michael E. Cronin, Jr., in support of the petition.

      John S. Bennet, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 933 (AC 14112), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVID MORALES
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 935 (AC 14243), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Does General Statutes § 46b-127 authorize a conviction for manslaughter of a child who was validily transferred to the regular criminal docket to stand trial for murder?
“2. If the statute authorizes such a conviction, does the statute violate the child’s constitutional rights to equal protection or due process?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15405.

Patricia A. King, in support of the petition.

Timothy J. Sugrue, executive assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided April 22, 1996


text:
    PAUL VAZZANO v. ROCCO FABRIZIO

      Laurence V. Pamoff, in support of the petition.

      Ronald D. Japha, Richard S. Scalo and Abraham I. Gordon, in opposition.
    Decided April 22, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 941 (AC 14563), is denied.


text:
    LUMBER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. WARD HOLMES
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15410.

      Donna L. Buttler, in support of the petition.

      Cynthia D. Whipple, in opposition.
    Decided May 2, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15543) is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the defendant’s appeal for lack of a final judgment?”


text:
    CITY OF BRIDGEPORT v. RONA V. FINIZIE ET AL.

      Roña V. Finizie, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided May 2, 1996
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15371) is denied.


text:
    DAN A. WILLOCKS v. ARTHUR O. KLEIN

      Arthur O. Klein, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided May 2, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15414) is denied.


text:
    DAVID BOURQUIN, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF GAYLE BOURQUIN) v. B. BRAUN MELSUNGEN ET AL.

      Eugene A. Cooney, in support of the petition.

      Steven J. DeFrank, in opposition.
    Decided May 2, 1996
   The petition of the defendant St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 302 (AC 13003), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. REYNALDO CRUZ
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 515 (AC 13452), is denied.

Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Mary H. Lesser, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided May 2, 1996


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TERRY RICHARDSON

      Robert J. Scheinblum, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Ellen A. Jawitz, in opposition.
    Decided May 2, 1996
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 526 (AC 13045), is denied.


text:
    MICHAEL IOVIENO v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15411.
   The petitioner Michael Iovieno’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 553 (AC 14077), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the second habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant a new ten day period to appeal from the judgment of the first habeas court?
“2. If the answer to the first question is no, did the Appellate Court nonetheless reach the proper result because of the petitioner’s failure to establish prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?”

Christopher C. Sheehan, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Mary H. Lesser, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided May 2, 1996


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD POUNCEY
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15412.

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 2, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 624 (AC 12128), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“In the circumstances of this case, should the Appellate Court have exercised its supervisory power to order a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecutor’s closing argument?”


text:
    BEVERLY SCOVISH, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE OF WALTER SCOVISH) v. THE UPJOHN COMPANY ET AL.

      R. Cornelius Danaher, Jr., and Vincent A. Errante, Jr., in support of the petition.
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15618) is denied.

Angelo A. Ziotas, in opposition.

Decided May 9, 1996


text:
    SECURITY PACIFIC SAVINGS BANK v. JOAN NEDOVICH ET AL.

      Norman J. Voog, in support of the petition.

      Leanne M. Kinsley, in opposition.
    Decided May 9, 1996
   The petition of the defendants Joan Nedovich and Paul Nedovich for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15500) is dismissed.


text:
    BANK OF BOSTON CONNECTICUT v. SCOTT REAL ESTATE, INC., ET AL.

      Bruce L. Elstein, in support of the petition.

      Robert A. Izard and Linda L. Morkan, in opposition.
    Decided May 9, 1996
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 616 (AC 13753), is denied.


text:
    CHERYL SCHULT v. JEFFREY SCOT SCHULT
   The petition by the guardian ad litem for the minor child for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 675 (AC 13482), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“In an action for dissolution of a marriage, if a child is represented by both a guardian ad litem and an attorney, does the attorney for the child have the authority to express an opinion on behalf of the child that differs from the opinion of the guardian ad litem?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15418.

Elizabeth Gleason, in support of the petition.

John J. Bennett and Colette Griffin, in opposition.

Decided May 9, 1996


text:
    CHERYL SCHULT v. JEFFREY SCOT SCHULT

      Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, in support of the petition.

      John J. Bennett and Colette S. Griffin, in opposition.
    Decided May 9, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 675 (AC 13482), is denied.


text:
    MAURICE REYNOLDS v. CHRYSLER FIRST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION

      Markus L. Penzel, in support of the petition.

      Jacqueline D. Bucar, in opposition.
    Decided May 9, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 725 (AC 14278), is denied.


text:
    WILLIAM A. MARCHETTI v. JOHNNY RAMIREZ ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15417.

      David Thomas Ryan and Bradford S. Babbitt, in support of the petition.

      Dante R. Gallucci, in opposition.
    Decided May 9, 1996
   The petition of the defendants Johnny Ramirez and APA Truck Leasing Company for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 740 (AC 13926), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. What is the proper legal standard by which to evaluate expert medical testimony in support of an award for future medical expenses?
“2. Applying that standard, should the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the jury verdict be affirmed?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TYRONE CAROLINA

      Michael K. Courtney, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      LeonF. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 9, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 762 (AC 13885), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVID SMITH

      Hope C. Seeley and Hubert J. Santos, in support of the petition.

      Tim,o thy J. Sugrue, executive assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 9, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 789 (AC 14454), is denied.


author: BERDON, J.

text:
    ROBERT JOHNSTON v. BOARD OF TAX REVIEW OF THE CITY OF MIDDLETOWN

      David R. Schaefer, in support of the petition.

      Trina A. Solecki, city attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 9, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 946 (AC 14317), is denied.

BERDON, J.

dissenting. I would grant the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    WAFEEK ABDELSAYED v. MURTY NARUMANCHI

      Murty Narumanchi, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Robin Stevens, in opposition.
    Decided March 11, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 778 (AC 13548), is denied.


text:
    VICTORIA E. TYC v. JOSEPH W. TYC

      William J. Shea, in support of the petition.

      Richard D. Grabow, in opposition.
    Decided May 20, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 562 (AC 13968), is denied.


text:
    COMMISSIONER OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES v. WILLIAM GERACE
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15423.

      Robert A. Nagy, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.

      Steven F. Meo and David M. Poirot, in opposition.
    Decided May 20, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 829 (AC 14273), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“What information must an attorney present to the commissioner of administrative services, pursuant to General Statutes § 17b-94, to trigger the thirty day period for advising the attorney of the amount of the state’s lien against the proceeds of a cause of action?”


text:
    JOSEPH SAVENELLI v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      David B. Rozwaski, in support of the petition.
    Decided May 20, 1996
   The petitioner Joseph Savenelli’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 949 (AC 14039), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHRISTOPHER RUSSELL

      Robert M. Berke, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Christopher T. Godialis, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 20, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 941 (AC 14686), is denied.


text:
    WILLIAM HAMILTON, JR. v. COMMISIONER OF CORRECTION

      Louis S. Avitabile, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 20, 1996
   The petition of the petitioner William Hamilton, Jr., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 950 (AC 14726), is denied.


text:
    JAMES BARRY v. POSI-SEAL INTERNATIONAL, INC.

      Harry E. Calmar, in support of the petition.

      Mark R. Kravitz, Ian E. Bjorkman and Bonnie L. Patten, in opposition.
    Decided May 28, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 577 (AC 12101), is denied.


text:
    JAMES BARRY v. POSI-SEAL INTERNATIONAL, INC.

      Mark R. Kravitz, Ian E. Bjorkman and Bonnie L. Patten, in support of the petition.

      Harry E. Calmar, in opposition.
    Decided May 28, 1996
   On consideration of the conditional petition by the defendant for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 577 (AC 12101), it is hereby ordered that no action is necessary on this petition. See the order of this court denying the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LAWAUN JENKINS

      David M. Walkman, in support of the petition.

      Ronald G. Weller, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 28, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 601 (AC 13340), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GREGORY KING

      Mark Diamond, special public defender, in support of the petition.
    Decided May 28, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 757 (AC 13766), is denied.


text:
    STONE AND STONE PENSION PLAN ET AL. v. PATRICIA MCKENNA ET AL.

      Ahmed A. Dadi, pro se, and Patricia McKenna, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided May 28, 1996
   The petition of the defendants Ahmed A. Dadi and Patricia McKenna for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 936 (AC 14399), is denied.


text:
    DONALD E. BRYANT, JR. v. HELEN V. BRYANT

      Donald E. Bryant, Jr., pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided May 28, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 944 (AC 14682), is denied.


text:
    DONALD E. BRYANT, JR. v. HELEN V. BRYANT

      Donald E. Bryant, Jr., pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided May 28, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 944 (AC 14199), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MAURICE CORBEIL

       On September 18, 1996, the appeal was dismissed as moot because of the death of the defendant.

   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 7 (AC 13990), is granted, limited to the following issue:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15427.

Todd Edgington, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Ronald G. Weller, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided May 28, 1996

“Under the state constitution, if initial statements made by a defendant are excluded only because of a Miranda violation, and not because they were coerced, must the subsequent post-Miranda statements be excluded in the absence of a showing of a break in the stream of events?”


author: NORCOTT, J.,

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES OLIVER, JR.

      John A. East III, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Jon L. Schoenhom, in opposition.
    Decided May 28, 1996
   The petition of the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 139 (AC 13048), is denied.

NORCOTT, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petition of the state of Connecticut for certification to appeal.


text:
    DIEGO MICELI ET AL. v. GARRY C. HELYER ET AL.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 336 (AC 13455), is denied.

Henry C. Winiarski, Jr., in support of the petition.

Sandra Rachel Baker and Vincent F. Sabatini, in opposition.

Decided May 31, 1996


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. VAN SNYDER

      John M. Gesmonde, in support of the petition.

      Rita M. Shair, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 31, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 544 (AC 13785), is denied.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES JETER

      Robert M. Berke, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
    Decided June 6, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 901 (AC 14688), is denied.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. THOMAS MARTIN, JR.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 731 (AC 12797), is denied.

Hugh F. Keefe and Suzanne L. McAlpine, in support of the petition.

Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided June 6, 1996


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TOMMY BATTLE

      Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 6, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 742 (AC 13256), is denied.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EDWARD A. OWEN

      Thomas J. Rechen, in support of the petition.

      Jo Anne Sulik, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 6, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 132 (AC 13341), is denied.


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    AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS v. HORACE B. WETHERALL ET AL.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15481) is denied.

Augustus J. Simmons, pro se, in support of the petition.

Arnold K. Shimelman, assistant attorney general, in opposition.

Decided June 17, 1996


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    DWAIN CHARLTON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15450.

      James A. Shanley, Jr., special public defender, in support of the petition.

      James A. Kitten, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15198) is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Does the failure of a person aggrieved by a decision on a petition for habeas corpus to seek certification to appeal within the time limits of General Statutes § 52-470 (b) deprive the Appellate Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal?”


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    PAUL MILLER v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT ET AL.

      Paul Miller, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15461) is denied.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARK T. WALL

      Richard E. Hayber, in support of the petition.

      LeonF. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 643 (AC 12765), is denied.


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    ALEXANDER CISLO v. CITY OF SHELTON
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15451.

      Steven J. Errante, in support of the petition.

      John H. Welch, Jr., and Thomas J. Welch, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 705 (AC 13249), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, was the plaintiff entitled to indemnification under General Statutes § 53-39a?”


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    MT. MAUMEE PARTNERSHIP v. ROGER PEET

      Roger J. Frechette and Matthew E. Frechette, in support of the petition.

      Jeffrey B. Sienkiewicz, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 752 (AC 13741), is denied.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEFFREY PETERS

      Susan M. Hankins, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      LeonF. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 805 (AC 13599/ 14240), is denied.


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    TINA ELDERKIN v. HAMILTON PAVILION HEALTH CARE ET AL.

      Amy M. Stone, in support of the petition.

      David C. Davis, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 943 (AC 14474), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EUGENE WILLIAMS

      Paul J. Ferencek, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.
   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 180 (AC 14451), is denied.

Susan M. Hankins, assistant public defender, in opposition.

Decided June 17, 1996


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES ROGERS

      Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Donald Dakers, special public defender, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 204 (AC 13685), is denied.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES ROGERS

      Donald Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 204 (AC 13685), is denied.


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    SHADHALI, INC. v. SIRVART K. HINTLIAN ET AL.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 225 (AC 14360), is denied.

Richard P. Weinstein, in support of the petition.

Timothy Sheehan, in opposition.

Decided June 17, 1996


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAY HOWARD MCCOLLUM

      Mary Miller Haselkamp, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Paul J. Ferencek, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 901 (AC 14041), is denied.


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    DONNA DENEHY ET AL. v. INLAND WETLANDS AND WATERCOURSES COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF BURLINGTON ET AL.

      James H. Throwe and Gregory P. Granger, in support of the petition.

      Peter J. Zagorsky, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The petition by the plaintiffs Donna Denehy, Richard Denehy and Lake Como Concerned Citizens for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 901 (AC 14332), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the plaintiffs’ petition for certification to appeal.


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    LOIS VERTUCCI ET AL. v. DAVID LINDSAY ET AL.

      Joshua D. Koskoff, in support of the petition.

      John H. Barton, associate city attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 902 (AC 14630), is denied.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JACOB CARATTINI

      Christine Perra Rapillo, supervisory assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Ronald G. Weller, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 903 (AC 14117), is denied.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALEJANDRO ORTIZ

      Donald Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 904 (AC 13608), is denied.


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    MIDCONN BANK v. WALTER H. BUTLER ET AL.

      Walter H. Butler, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Suzann L. Beckett, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The defendant Walter H. Butler’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 904 (AC 15088), is denied.


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    LESLIE SRAGER ET AL. v. ELLIOT KOENIG ET AL.

      John Timbers, in support of the petition.

      Christopher C. Vaugh, in opposition.
    Decided June 17, 1996
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 905 (AC 14500), is denied.


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    DELORES D. STEWART v. LEROY STEWART

      Delores D. Stewart, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided June 24, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 906 (AC 13252/ 13876), is denied.


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    BANK OF NEW HAVEN ET AL. v. JENNITH LINER ET AL.
   The petition by the defendants Jennith Liner and Sheldon M. Liner for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 908 (AC 15031), is denied.

Jennith Liner, pro se, and Sheldon M. Liner, pro se, in support of the petition.

Lori B. Alexander, in opposition.

Decided June 24, 1996


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    EVA GRIFFITH-PATTON v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ET AL.

      Eva C. Griffith, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided June 24, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 911 (AC 14707), is denied.


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    HEIDI MILNER v. STEVEN MILNER

      Steven Milner, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided July 1, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court is denied.


text:
    FRANKLIN L. FRANK v. LEON E. COOPER ET AL.

      Leon E. Cooper, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Kevin L. Bums, in opposition.
    Decided July 1, 1996
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15617) is dismissed.


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    STATE OF CONNETICUT v. CYRUS TAHERI

      Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided July 1, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 147 (AC 13821), is denied.


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    SACHEM ENTERPRISES v. SOUTHERN CONNECTICUT GAS COMPANY ET AL.

      George D. Royster, Jr., Harris B. Appelman and Daniel P. Scapellati, in support of the petition.

      Steven J. Errante, in opposition.
    Decided July 1, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 161 (AC 14059), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES COLEMAN
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 255 (AC 12812), is granted, limited to the following isssues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court improperly disregard the state’s concession that, in this case, the defendant should not receive multiple punishment for his two burglary convictions?
“2. Whether, under our supervisory powers or the state constitution, we should adopt the presumption set forth in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), pertaining to the imposition of a greater sentence after having successfully attacked his first conviction?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15468.

Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Harry Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided July 1, 1996


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SANTOS MIRANDA
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15467.

      Robert J. Scheinblum, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.
    Decided July 1, 1996
   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 333 (AC 14439), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant could not be convicted of violating General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3) because he had no legal duty to protect the victim from parental abuse?”


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BILLY JOE SANTOS
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 361 (AC 14990), is denied.

Sheila A. Huddleston, in support of the petition.

Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided July 1, 1996


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    BRIAN W. PRUCKER v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

      Robert M. Fitzgerald, in support of the petition.

      Darlene F. Reynolds, assistant bar counsel, in opposition.
    Decided July 1, 1996
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 906 (AC 14949), is denied.


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAIMUNDO ORTIZ
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 908 (AC 14377), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant certification on the following question: Was the court correct in finding the police had, as required by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), reasonable articulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of the defendant, Raimundo Ortiz, a Hispanic, on the third floor porch of a home at 82 Madison Street, Hartford, where the police were investigating a recent, but past, report of gunshots fired on Wolcott Street, five to six blocks away, by persons described only as “Hispanic males,” where neither the defendant nor his companion were ever identified as the shooters or as ever being on Wolcott Street, and where no one indicated they saw any shooter or suspect ran into 82 Madison Street? The issue raises important rights of privacy with respect to this Hispanic defendant.

G. Douglas Nash, public defender, in support of the petition.

Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided July 1, 1996


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GUILLERMO MARTINEZ

      Paula J. Waite and Richard S. Cramer, in support of the petition.

      Michele C. Lufcban, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided July 1, 1996
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 910 (AC 14647), is denied.