author: Meyer, J. Jasen, J.

text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Morse, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Curtis Covington, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Saul Vega, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Thomas Frank, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jack Johnson, Appellant.
    Argued March 29, 1984;
    decided May 17, 1984

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Marilyn A. Kneeland and William E. Hellerstein for appellant in the first above-entitled action.
    I. Appellant was improperly adjudicated a persistent violent felony offender (a) on the basis of two prior violent felony convictions obtained on the same date, a sentencing which would be impermissible under the discretionary sentencing scheme for persistent felons, and (b) because the 1978 persistent violent felony offender statute (Penal Law, § 70.08) is unconstitutional as applied to appellant because it ex post facto classifies his pre-1978 offenses as “violent felonies”. (People v Ayala, 107 Mise 2d 874, 85 AD2d 931; People v Santana, 117 Mise 2d 1016; Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24; Malloy v South Carolina, 237 US 180; Rooney v North Dakota, 196 US 319; Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574; Kring v Missouri, 107 US 221; People v Barbour, 111 Mise 2d 266; People v Baker, 112 Mise 2d 496; People v Jenkins, 100 Mise 2d 935.) II. The two éyewitnesses’s out-of-court and in-court identifications of appellant should have been suppressed because of the impermissible suggestiveness of the pretrial identification procedures and the People’s failure to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, an independent source of the in-court identifications. (People v Adams, 53 NY2d 241; People v Ballott, 20 NY2d 600; People v Johnson, 79 AD2d 617; Foster v California, 394 US 440; Israel v Odom, 521 F2d 1370; United States ex rel. Cannon v Montanye, 486 F2d 263; United States v Wade, 388 US 218.)

      Mario Merola, District Attorney (Robin Dolsky and Steven R. Kartagener of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.
    I. Appellant’s guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt by overwhelming evidence. (People v Henderson, 41 NY2d 233.) II. Appellant was properly adjudicated a persistent violent felony offender. (.People v Santana, 117 Mise 2d 1016; People v Ayala, 107 Mise 2d 874, 85 AD2d 931; People v Helm, 69 AD2d 198; People v Taylor, 16 AD2d 944,13 NY2d 675.; People ex rel. Janosko v Fay, 6 NY2d 82; People ex rel. Brown v Martin, 264 App Div 746; People ex rel. Plosier v Foster, 193 Mise 596, 274 App Div 1086; People ex rel. Bravata v Morhous, 186 Mise 893, 273 App Div 929; People ex rel. Reynolds v Morhous, 268 App Div 843; Matter of Terwilliger v Turk, 156 Mise 246.) III. The court properly held the pretrial lineup identifications and in-court identifications of appellant admissible at trial. (.People v McPherson, 56 NY2d 696; People v Malloy, 80 AD2d 793, 55 NY2d 296; People v Adams, 53 NY2d 241; Manson v Brathwaite, 432 US 98; Simmons v United States, 390 US 377; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230; People v Gonzalez, 27 NY2d 53; People v Dickerson, 67 AD2d 122, 50 NY2d 937.)

      J. Mitchell Rosenberg for appellant in the second above-entitled action.
    Appellant’s sentence was unconstitutional in violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. ('Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24; People v Aiello, 93 AD2d 864; People v Barbour, 111 Mise 2d 266; People v Correa, 113 Mise 2d 919.)

      Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attorney (.Rebecca J. Clement and Barbara D. Underwood of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.
    Defendant was properly sentenced as a second violent felony offender. His claim that the second violent felony offender statute is an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to him is not preserved for appellate review and is in any event devoid of merit. (People v Pellegrino, 60 NY2d 636; People v Pascale, 48 NY2d 997; Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24; Cummings v State of Missouri, 4 Wall [71 US] 277; Gryger v Burke, 334 US 728; Graham v West Virginia, 224 US 616; People ex rel. Prisament v Brophy, 287 NY 132, 317 US 625; People v Carlesi, 154 App Div 481, 208 NY 547, affd sub nom. Carlesi v New York, 233 US 51; People v Wilson, 13 NY2d 277.)

      Robert A. Goldschlag and LeonB. Polsky for appellant in the third above-entitled action.
    I. Appellant’s constitutional right to due process of law was violated by the imposition of a mandatory sentence based upon unproven accusations. (People v Drummond, 40 NY2d 990; People v Felix, 58 NY2d 156; People v Brian R., 78 Mise 2d 616, 47 AD2d 599; People v Griffin, 7 NY2d 511.) II. The persistent violent felony offender information is jurisdictionally defective. (People v Hall, 48 NY2d 927; People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589; People v Case, 42 NY2d 98; People v Newell, 95 AD2d 815; People v Russo, 57 AD2d 578.) III. A retroactive interpretation of the Penal Law which would result in enhanced punishment violates the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws. (Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24; People v Barbour, 111 Mise 2d 266.) IV. Appellant’s constitutional challenges are properly before this court. {People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152.)

      Mario Merola, District Attorney {Richard P. Marin and Kevin B. Hurley of counsel), for respondent in the third above-entitled action.
    I. Appellant’s guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt by overwhelming evidence. II. Appellant was properly sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender in all respects. {People v Felix, 58 NY2d 156; People v Griffin, 7 NY2d 511; People v Giuliano, 52 AD2d 240; People v Levin, 57 NY2d 1008; People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589; People v Charleston, 54 NY2d 622; People v Cohen, 52 NY2d 584; Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24; Gryger v Burke, 334 US 728, 335 US 837; MacDonald v Massachusetts, 180 US 311.)

      Marilyn A. Kneeland, William E. Hellerstein and trand J. Kahn for appellant in the fourth above-entitled action.
    Appellant was improperly adjudicated a persistent violent felony offender (a) because the 1978 persistent violent felony statute, on its face, is inapplicable to appellant, whose would-be predicates were committed prior to the statute’s effective date; (b) because the statute, if applied to appellant, is an unconstitutional ex post facto law in that it would retroactively classify his pre-1978 offenses as “violent felonies” thereby altering the legal consequences of those offenses to his detriment; and (c) because that adjudication was based upon two prior violent felony convictions obtained on the same date, a result which would be impermissible under the analogous sentencing scheme applicable to persistent felony offenders.
      (People v Correa, 113 Mise 2d 919; People v Crawford, 94 AD2d 950; Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24; Malloy v South Carolina, 237 US 180; Rooney v North Dakota, 196 US 319; Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574; Kring v Missouri, 107 US 221; People v Barbour, 111 Mise 2d 266, 96 AD2d 842; People v Ayala, 107 Mise 2d 874, 85 AD2d 931; People v Herloski, 118 Mise 2d 358.)

      Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney (Jeanne E. Zunich and Amyjane Rettew of counsel), for respondent in the fourth above-entitled action.
    The persistent violent felony offender statute is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to defendant. Defendant was properly sentenced pursuant to this statute. (Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24; Cummings v State of Missouri, 4 Wall [71 US] 227; Gryger v Burke, 334 US 728; People v Wilson, 13 NY2d 277; People ex rel. Prisament v Brophy, 287 NY 132, 317 US 625; People v Pacheco, 53 NY2d 663; People v Butler, 92 AD2d 1071; People v Dippolito, 88 AD2d 211; People v Mangia-pane, 87 AD2d 851; People v Pray, 50 AD2d 987.)

      Albert Mayer for appellant in the fifth above-entitled action.
    I. Section 70.04 (subd 1, par [b], cl [i]) of the Penal Law may not be applied retroactively. (People v Barbour, 111 Mise 2d 266; Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24.) II. Retroactively redefining appellant’s predicate conviction in order to bring it within the postconviction enhancement provisions of the statute is illegal. (People v Correa, 113 Mise 2d 919.)

      Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney (Jeanne E. Zunich and Amyjane Rettew of counsel), for respondent in the fifth above-entitled action.
    The second violent felony offender statute is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to defendant. Defendant was properly sentenced pursuant to this statute. (People v McGowen, 42 NY2d 905; People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152; Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24; Cummings v State of Missouri, 4 Wall [71 US] 277; Gryger v Burke, 334 US 728; People v Wilson, 13 NY2d 277; People ex rel. Prisament v Brophy, 287 NY 132, 317 US 625; People v Pacheco, 53 NY2d. 663; People v Butler, 92 AD2d 1071; People v Dippolito, 88 AD2d 211.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Meyer, J.

Both the second violent offender law and the persistent violent offender law require imposition of enhanced punishment upon conviction as a second or persistent violent felony offender, even though at the time of the prior conviction on which enhanced punishment is based the prior crime was not classified as a violent felony offense. So to construe the statutes involves no violation of the constitutional proscription upon ex post facto laws. Nor, under those statutes, where the predicate offense is only so classified because it occurs after a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense, is there any statutory infirmity in the failure to recite in the information that the prior conviction was obtained upon a plea of guilty or any constitutional defect because the same offense would not be classified as a violent felony if conviction had been obtained after trial. The Legislature did not intend the persistent violent felony offender law to apply, however, unless each of the two or more predicate violent felony convictions other than the first was for a felony which occurred after sentence had been imposed for the conviction which preceded it. In People v Morse and People v Frank, the orders of the Appellate Division should, therefore, be modified by substituting for the persistent violent felony offender adjudication a second violent felony offender adjudication and remitting for resentence and, except as so modified, should be affirmed. In each of the other three cases, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

I

These five appeals all concern the provisions for mandatory enhanced prison sentences of violent felony offenders established by article 70 of the Penal Law. Each of the defendants has been convicted as either a second violent felony offender (Penal Law, § 70.04) or as a persistent violent felony offender (Penal Law, § 70.08) and, though not questioning that the present conviction is for a violent felony offense, each the determination that one or more of his prior convictions was for a predicate violent felony offense. The relevant facts may be briefly stated.

James Morse, Thomas Frank and Saul Vega were each adjudicated a persistent violent felony offender; Curtis Covington and Jack Johnson were sentenced as second violent felony offenders. Morse’s two prior convictions were both for robbery in the first degree and resulted from his pleas of guilty on one day to two separate indictments in satisfaction of some 17 separate incidents occurring in 1972 and 1973. He was sentenced on a single day in 1974 to concurrent prison sentences on the two indictments. Frank’s prior convictions were for burglary in the second degree and robbery in the second degree. Although those charges arose from separate incidents, Frank pleaded guilty to both on the same day and on March 29, 1978, concurrent prison sentences were imposed on the basis of those pleas. Robbery in the first and second degrees and burglary in the second degree were classified as violent felony offenses when section 70.02 of the Penal Law was enacted in 1978 (L 1978, ch 481, § 3, eff Sept. 1, 1978).

Vega’s, Covington’s and Johnson’s predicate convictions were all for attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. In none of the three cases, however, did the persistent or predicate violent felony information specify that the conviction had been obtained after a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense. Vega was sentenced on the first predicate conviction on November 10,1975 and on the second on April 24, 1979. Covington’s prior conviction occurred in 1978 and Johnson’s in 1973. Attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree was classified as a violent felony by 1980 amendment to section 70.02 of the Penal Law (L 1980, ch 233, § 2, eff Aug. 12, 1980). Thus, all of the predicate convictions involved in these cases antedated the effective date of the statute classifying the crime on which the conviction was based as a violent felony offense.

The legal issues thus presented for our determination are: (1) whether the Legislature intended that a crime not classified as a violent felony offense when committed should constitute a predicate violent offense and, if so, whether enhancement of the punishment for the present violent crime on the basis of such a predicate crime violates the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws; (2) whether the Legislature intended that the two or more predicate violent felony offenses required under the persistent violent felony offender law as the predicate for enhanced punishment under that statute be determined individually (i.e., by the separate crimes committed without regard to the fact that convictions may have been jointly obtained), or sequentially (i.e., so that the second offense, to be counted as a predicate, must be committed after sentence was imposed on the first); (3) whether there is any due process violation in the fact that under section 70.02 (subd 1, par [d]) attempted criminal possession of a weapon is a violent offense only when conviction results from a guilty plea; and (4) whether a predicate felony information which does not specify that a prior conviction of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree was obtained on a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense is

II

That the Legislature intended the enhanced punishment provisions of sections 70.04 and 70.08 of the Penal Law to apply when the prior crime was committed between September 1, 1967 (the effective date of the present Penal Law) and September 1, 1978 (the effective date of the violent offender law [L 1978, ch 481]) is evidenced by the provisions of section 70.04 (subd 1, par [b]) of the Penal In six separately numbered clauses that paragraph establishes the criteria by which to determine whether a prior conviction is a predicate violent felony conviction. Two of those criteria are of significance on the present question. Clause (i) enumerates four categories of convictions which may qualify as predicate violent felony offenses: class A felonies other than drug offenses, violent felony offenses as defined in subdivision 1 of section 70.02, offenses defined by the Penal Law in effect prior to September 1,1967 which contain all the essential elements of such a felony, and convictions in other jurisdictions of an offense including all the essential elements of such a felony for which a term of imprisonment in excess of one year or a sentence of death was authorized and is authorized in this State. Clauses (iv) and (v) exclude felonies sentence was imposed more than 10 years prior to the present offense, exclusive of periods of incarceration.

The Legislature has directed that the Penal Law “be construed according to the fair import of [its] terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law” (Penal Law, § 5.00) and has listed among its general purposes: “To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection” (Penal Law, § 1.05, subd 6) and “To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction” (id., subd 2).

Construing the violent felony offender sections in accordance with those provisions, we find the intent of the Legislature unmistakable, for it has in clause (i) provided for retroactive application of the sections to class A felonies; to offenses committed prior to September 1,1967; and to offenses committed in other jurisdictions. It is, therefore, inconceivable that the Legislature intended to exclude from the predicate crime category crimes committed in New York between September 1, 1967 and September 1, 1978, but not the identical crimes committed prior to September 1, 1967 or committed in another State. That retroactivity was intended is also strongly suggested by clauses (iv) and (v), made effective as of September 1,1978, and which require enhanced punishment for predicate crimes that may have occurred 10 years (or possibly longer) before the present conviction.

That the predicate crime was not designated a “violent felony offense” when committed does not require a contrary conclusion so long as the elements of the crime when committed were the same as those of an offense now defined as a violent felony offense by subdivision 1 of section 70.02 of the Penal Law, for in such a case, the offender has been given fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed in advance of his or her commission of the present offense and at the time of its commission has fair warning of the sentence authorized as a result of the prior offense upon conviction. Thus, the legislative purpose declared in subdivision 2 of section 1.05 of the Penal Law is not infringed.

On similar reasoning, there is no violation of the restriction against ex post facto laws contained in article I (§ 10, cl 1) of the United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court has recognized in Weaver v Graham (450 US 24, 30): “Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is * * * the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” But a sentence as a multiple offender “is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one” (Gryger v Burke, 334 US 728, 732; accord People ex rel. Prisament v Brophy, 287 NY 132, 135, cert den 317 US 625; People v Parker, 41 NY2d 21, 26).

Thus, on neither statutory nor constitutional grounds is an offense committed between September 1, 1967 and September 1, 1978 excluded from classification as a predicate violent felony notwithstanding that it was not so classified when committed.

The Morse and Frank cases present the further question whether sentence can be imposed under section 70.08 of the Penal Law as a persistent violent felony offender when the predicate violent felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas entered on the same day to two separate violent felony charges as to which concurrent sentences were imposed on the same day. The problem is complicated by the fact that subdivision 1 of section 70.08, which defines when a person has two or more predicate violent felony convictions and can thus be classified as a result of his present conviction as a persistent violent felony offender, refers, in an apparent redundancy, in both paragraphs (a) and (b), to the criteria set forth in section 70.04 (subd 1, par [b]), which in its clause (ii) includes the requirement that sentence on the prior conviction have been imposed before commission of the present felony. It is further complicated by the fact that section 70.10, which defines “persistent felony offender,” expressly states in its paragraph (c) of subdivision 1 that “two or more convictions of crimes that were committed prior to the time the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for any of such convictions shall be deemed to be only one conviction.” Defendants argue that omission from section 70.08 of such a limitation was inadvertent; the People contend that it was an intentional rejection of a requirement of sequenti-ality between prior violent felony convictions.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the history of New York’s multiple offender laws establishes the policy that enhanced punishment not be imposed unless the chastening effect of sentence on the prior conviction have preceded commission of the latest crime, and that to construe section 70.08 as the People urge would be contrary not only to that policy but also to accepted rules of statutory construction and would result in ambiguities in the persistent violent felony offender statues that cannot reasonably be said to have been intended.

A

New York, which was the first State in the country to adopt a recidivist statute, enacted such legislation in 1796 (L 1796, ch 30). It enhanced sentence only for the second conviction, however (id.; Penal Code of 1881, § 688, L 1881, ch 676). Provision for further enhancement of punishment was not made until 1907, when, by the addition of section 688-a to the Penal Code (L 1907, ch 645), increased punishment for fourth offenders was added. The latter provision, which without change in substance became section 1942 of the Penal Law of 1909, contained no explicit language concerning the sequence of the first three convictions, and sequentiality of the convictions does not appear to have been litigated prior to its amendment in 1926.

Fourth felony convictions became more likely with the amendment of section 1942 in 1926 to delete the requirement that prior convictions be alleged in the indictment and proved at trial and with the addition, in the same year, of a provision requiring imposition of a fourth felony sentence upon a prisoner already sentenced if previously undiscovered convictions thereafter became known (Penal Law of 1909, § 1943). It then was held that the three prior convictions need not be sequential (People ex rel. Reynolds v Morhous, 268 App Div 843; People ex rel. Terwilliger v Brophy, 256 App Div 894; Matter of Terwilliger v Turk, 156 Misc 246; contra People v Spellman, 136 Misc 25, 29).

Multiple crime indictments and the consolidation of indictments for trial was permitted for the first time when section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted by chapter 328 of the Laws of 1936. In conjunction with the adoption of that section, section 1941 of the Penal Law, pertaining to second felony offenders, and section 1942, pertaining to fourth felony offenders, were each amended by addition of a sentence reading: “For purposes of this section, conviction of two or more crimes charged in separate counts of one indictment or information, or in two or more indictments or informations consolidated for trial, shall be deemed to be only one conviction.” As thereafter construed, section 1942 mandated a life sentence for a fourth offender three of whose four prior convictions resulted from guilty pleas, taken simultaneously, to consecutively numbered but separate forgery indictments (People v Taylor, 13 NY2d 675, affg without opn 16 AD2d 944) but did not require such a sentence when two of the prior indictments were tried before the same Judge and jury and resulted in simultaneous guilty verdicts, notwithstanding that the charges arose from different transactions and that the sentences on them were directed to be served consecutively (People ex rel. Janosko v Fay, 6 NY2d 82). The distinguishing feature was that although in the latter case the indictments had not technically been consolidated, they were “consolidated for trial” within the meaning of section 1942, whereas in the former there had been no consolidation.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code (Commission) found the sentencing structure of the Penal Law “permeated * * * with inconsistencies, ambiguities, inequities and archaisms” (1963 Report to Legislature, NY Legis Doc, 1963, No. 8, p 27). The 1965 Penal Law, enacted on recommendation of the Commission, discarded the prior mandatory second and fourth felony offender provisions. It treated second felony offenders no differently than first, and even as to a persistent felony offender substituted discretionary enhancement of punishment for the prior mandatory provision. Section 70.10 (subd 1, par [a]) defined a persistent felony offender as “a person who stands convicted of a felony after having previously been convicted of two or more felonies”, but paragraphs (b) and (c) limited the prior convictions that could be considered predicates. Paragraph (b) required that a sentence of imprisonment greater than one year have been imposed (cl [i]), that the defendant have been imprisoned prior to commission of the present felony (cl [ii]), and that defendant not have been pardoned on the ground of innocence (cl [iii]). Additionally, paragraph (c) provided that: the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more previous felony convictions, two or more convictions of crimes that were committed prior to the time the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for any of such convictions shall be deemed to be only one conviction.” Each of these limitations was an explicit rejection of the prior law as interpreted by the courts (Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law, § 70.10, pp 222-223; Proposed New York Penal Law, Commission Staff Notes, pp 283-286). Moreover, as the Commission made clear, the purpose of the statute was to permit enhanced sentencing “for persons who persist in committing serious crimes after having been subjected to repeated terms of imprisonment” and the section was to be applied to a person who commits a felony “after having been incarcerated for two separate felonies, the second of which was committed subsequent to incarceration for the first” (Commission Staff Notes, p 283; see, also, id., p 285; 1964 Report to Legislature, NY Legis Doc, 1964, No. 14, pp 18-19; Report to Legislature, NY Legis Doc, 1966, No. 28, p 24).

When in 1973 mandatory enhanced sentences for second felony offenders were reinstated (L 1973, ch 277, § 9, enacting Penal Law, § 70.06), the Legislature made clear, by the repetition in section 70.06 (subd 1, par [b], cl [ii]) of the chronological sequence requirement of section 70.10 (subd 1, par [b], cl [ii]), its intention to retain the policy established by the 1965 Penal Law that enhanced punishment not be imposed merely for repeated criminality, but only for refusal to reform after sentence on a prior crime had been imposed. It strengthened the criteria established by section 70.10, however, by providing that a sentence in excess of one year need only be authorized (§ 70.06, subd 1, par [b], cl [i]), rather than have been imposed (§ 70.10, subd 1, par [b], cl [i]), and that probation, a suspended sentence, and the like, be deemed a sentence (§ 70.06, subd 1, par [b], cl [iii]).

B

It is against this background that the violent felony provisions enacted by chapter 481 of the Laws of 1978 must be viewed. That statute enacted section 70.02 enumerating the offenses classified as violent and the sentences authorized for each, section 70.04 defining a second violent felony offender and detailing the sentences required, and section 70.08 defining a persistent violent felony offender and stating the sentences required to be imposed. It also amended section 70.06 to exclude from the definition of second felony offender “a second violent felony offender as defined in section 70.04” and section 70.10 to exclude from the definition of persistent felony offender “a persistent violent felony offender as defined in section 70.08.”

Section 70.08 differs from the other three recidivist statutes in that, instead of listing its own criteria limiting and defining the meaning of “two or more predicate violent felony convictions,” it cross-references in both paragraphs (a) and (b) of its subdivision 1 (quoted in n 7 above) to section 70.04 (subd 1, par [b]). Nothing in the legislative history explains why the cross reference to section 70.04, which deals with the relation between the present conviction and a prior conviction, was thought sufficient even though section 70.08 involves “two or more” prior convictions. Subdivision 1 of section 70.08 is, however, to be so construed that all of its parts are harmonized and meaning and effect is given to all its language (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, §§ 98, 231). That can only be done by reading paragraph (a) of that subdivision to define the relationship between the present violent felony conviction and each of the prior violent felony convictions, and reading paragraph (b) to define the relationship between the two predicate convictions so that sentence on the first must have been imposed before commission of the second. Unless that is done the sequentiality criterion of section 70.04 (subd 1, par [b], cl [ii]), already brought into play by the paragraph (a) cross reference would serve no purpose through the cross reference in paragraph (b). Moreover, so to construe the subdivision is consistent with the use of section 70.04 criteria, “[f]or the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more predicate violent felony convictions,” as its paragraph (b) expressly requires.

Section 70.08 differs from section 70.10 in that it does not include by cross reference or adoption of the same language, a provision similar to section 70.10 (subd 1, par [c]) specifically requiring that two or more convictions of crimes committed prior to imprisonment under sentence for any of them be treated as one conviction. Absent the cross reference to section 70.04, with its incorporation of sequentiality, the omission of a provision paralleling section 70.10 (subd 1, par [c]) might be read as indicating a legislative desire to treat persistent violent felony offenders more harshly in terms of the sequentiality of their prior convictions. But the contrary is suggested not only by the cross reference to section 70.04, but also by the rejection in 70.04 (and thus by cross reference in 70.08) of section 70.10’s requirement of an actual prison sentence greater than one year, and its inclusion of probation, suspended sentence and the like as a prior sentence. By recognizing that failure to reform after a sentence of the latter type is as blameworthy, if not more so, as failure to do so after imprisonment, the Legislature has indicated its continued recognition in section 70.08 of the opportunity to reform implicit in the sequentiality provisions of all of the other multiple offender statutes.

The conclusion that sequentiality remains a factor in the persistent violent felony offender provisions of section 70.08 is consistent with the rule for construction of statutes in pari materia. Under that rule “where the legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a system of related general provisions indicative of a settled policy, new enactments of a fragmentary nature on that subject are to be taken as intended to fit into the existing system and to be carried into effect conformably to it, excepting as a different purpose is plainly shown” (United States v Jefferson Elec. Co., 291 US 386, 396; accord Delaware Midland Corp. v Incorporated Vil. of Westhampton Beach, 39 NY2d 1029, affg on opn at Special Term 79 Misc 2d 438, 444; City of Rochester v Union Free School Dist. No. 4, 280 NY 531, affg 255 App Div 96, 102; Matter of New York, Westchester & Boston Ry. Co. [Huntington], 193 NY 72, 89). Here a legislative policy of sequentiality is established for second felony offenders (§ 70.06, subd 1, par [b], cl [ii]), persistent felony offenders (§ 70.10, subd 1, par [b], cl [ii]), second violent felony offenders (§ 70.04, subd 1, par [b], cl [ii]) and by cross reference to the latter provision for persistent violent felony offenders as well (§ 70.08, subd 1, pars [a], [b]), and nothing in the history of the latter provision, other than the failure also to refer to section 70.10 (subd 1, par [c]), suggests that the Legislature intended that sequentiality should apply between the present and each of the prior convictions but not between the prior convictions themselves.

To conclude that as to persistent violent felony offenders the Legislature purposefully but silently accepted sequen-tiality between present and predicate convictions but rejected sequentiality as between the predicate convictions themselves is to ignore the importance attached to the principle by the Commission and to return, as to predicate violent felony convictions, to the pre-1965 ambiguity and arbitrariness which the Commission decried. The fourth felony offender provision of section 1942 of the 1909 Penal Law at least contained a sentence, quoted above, directing that convictions on charges separately stated in one indictment or in two indictments consolidated for trial be deemed but one conviction. If section 70.08 is construed to have abandoned sequentiality between predicate convictions, it would provide no direction as to the situations covered by that former sentence or as to two offenses arising from the same transaction but resulting in convictions under different indictments or as to two convictions on different charges obtained by plea on the same day. It is not reasonable to conclude that the Legislature so intended. The more reasonable construction, because it eliminates all such problems and accords with the rules of construction by which legislative intent is to be determined, is that under section 70.08 sequentiality applies as between predicate convictions as well as between present and predicate convictions.

The remaining issues can be dealt with more summarily. Defendant Vega’s argument that the persistent violent felony offender information filed against him was jurisdictionally defective because it did not state that his prior conviction for attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree was on a guilty plea is answered by People v Harris (61 NY2d 9, 20). There we held the failure to file a predicate statement was harmless, the statutory purpose of apprising the court of the facts and providing defendant with reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard having been satisfied. There can be no question that such is the present case, for the minutes of defendant’s present sentencing include the Judge’s statement that “there has been no jury connected with any of these prior criminal acts.” There was, in any event, no jurisdictional defect. The information stated the prior conviction to have been for attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and made specific reference to subdivision 1 of section 70.02 of the Penal Law. Paragraph (d) of that subdivision by its reference to “a lesser included offense * * * as defined in section 220.20 of the criminal procedure law” makes clear that the offense could be a lesser included offense only when conviction is on a plea of guilty and not by verdict (CPL 220.20, subd 2). The claimed missing allegation is, therefore, sufficiently incorporated by reference (People v Cohen, 52 NY2d 584).

No more successful is Vega’s contention that his enhanced punishment results partly from the previous charge rather than what he was convicted for. That is true only in the sense that had he been charged with attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree rather than with the offense of possession itself, his guilty plea would not constitute a violent felony conviction within the meaning of section 70.02 (subd 1, par [d]) of the Penal Law. He was, however, aware when he entered his guilty pleas to the prior offenses that the offense to which he pleaded existed essentially only for purposes of plea negotiation (see Bellacosa, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11 A, CPL 220.20, p 277). Unlike the situation in People v Drummond (40 NY2d 990), on which defendant relies, the punishment now imposed upon him is not wholly dependent on an unproven charge. Here reliance on the prior indictment is minimal and the enhanced punishment imposed constitutes no violation of due process, for, to paraphrase our recent holding in People v Felix (58 NY2d 156, 163): “[adjudication, though with something less than trial formality, thus [had] an important role [in the prior conviction]; sentence [for the present offense] does not depend solely on [the prior] accusation.”

Accordingly, in People v Morse and People v Frank the orders of the Appellate Division should be modified by vacating the persistent violent felony adjudication, and remitting for sentence as a second violent felony offender and, except as so modified, should be affirmed. In People v Covington, People v Vega and People v Johnson, the orders of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Jasen, J.

(dissenting in People v Morse and People v Frank). Today the majority holds that the defendant in People v Morse, who stands convicted of robbery in the first degree and burglary in the first degree and has two prior convictions for previous separate crimes of robbery in the first degree to which he pleaded guilty in satisfaction of 17 separate indictments for 17 different robberies on 17 different days in 1972 and 1973, cannot be sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender, merely because the sentences for his two prior convictions were imposed on the same date. Likewise, the majority holds the same for the defendant in People v Frank who stands convicted of burglary in the first degree and had two prior convictions for previous separate crimes of burglary in the second degree and robbery in the second degree. With that portion of the majority’s opinion, I cannot

In my view, because the defendants in Morse and Frank had multiple prior violent felony convictions, they were correctly adjudicated persistent violent felony offenders under section 70.08 of the Penal Law (hereafter the “persistent-violent statute”), and their sentences ought to be affirmed. I strongly disagree with the majority’s position that a defendant may not be sentenced as a persistent offender, regardless of the number of prior violent felony convictions, unless, in addition to that, the defendant has already received at least two separate sentences as a result of those convictions. The persistent-violent statute is utterly devoid of such a requirement. Nevertheless, the majority has lifted the requirement from the penal section applicable to persistent (nonviolent) felony offenders (Penal Law, §,70.10, subd 1, par [c]) (hereafter the “persistent-nonviolent statute”), whose provisions are explicitly inapplicable to persistent violent offenders (§ 70.10, subd 1, par [a]), and appended it to the persistent-uioZeni statute (§ 70.08), which otherwise clearly contains no such provision. In effect, the majority finds in the persistent-uioZerci statute a requirement which, I believe, the Legislature chose to exclude.

Furthermore, this case does not involve a statute which, as unmodified, is either constitutionally infirm, lacking in rationale or fundamentally unjust, and, therefore, would warrant a heightened exercise of judicial scrutiny. (See United States v Carotene Prods. Co., 304 US 144, 152-153, n 4.) Rather, this is simply a case where the majority deduces from the legislative history of related statutes a different policy from that enunciated in the subject statute as it is written. An examination of the statutory scheme for repeat felony offenders clearly demonstrates that under the persistent-violent statute there is no requirement for multiple separate prior sentences. Rather, multiple prior convictions are sufficient to trigger its enhanced sentencing provisions.

The statutory provisions pertaining to persistent violent felony offenders are in critical respects different from those applicable to persistent (nonviolent) felony offenders. The persistent-nonviolent statute specifically requires that a defendant have received at least two separate prior sentences before being subject to enhanced punishment for a subsequent felony conviction. It does so by explicitly providing that: “For the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more previous felony convictions, two or more convictions of crimes that were committed prior to the time the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for any of such convictions shall be deemed to be only one conviction.” (Penal Law, § 70.10, subd 1, par [c].) Hence, under the provisions for nonviolent offenders, all previous convictions committed prior to the first sentence imposed are considered to be only one predicate conviction for the purpose of determining whether a repeat offender should be sentenced as a persistent or only a second offender. Where a defendant has received only one previous sentence, regardless of the actual number of prior convictions, that defendant may only be sentenced as a second offender. Only where a defendant has received at least two separate prior sentences may that defendant be sentenced as a persistent offender.

Contrawise, however, there is no such provision in the persistent-uzoZeni statute. Though its format is similar to that of the persistent-nonviolent statute, where the latter explicitly contains the requirement for multiple separate prior sentences, the former is utterly silent. Contrary to the majority’s contention, this silence does not complicate matters but, rather, it simplifies interpretation by accentuating the contrast between the two statutes. Indeed, this is particularly true in light of the fact that the statutory definition of a persistent (nonviolent) felony offender, including the requirement of multiple separate prior sentences, explicitly states that its provisions do not apply to a persistent violent felony offender. (Penal Law, § 70.10, subd 1, par [a].) There can be no clearer legislative statement that the provisions of section 70.08 of the Penal Law governing persistent violent felony offenders were intended to be independent arid distinct from those of section 70.10 of the Penal Law pertaining to persistent (nonviolent) felony offenders. In fact, the statute, enacted in 1978, in addition to not containing a requirement for multiple separate prior sentences, is quite different as well in other important respects from the persistent-nonviolent statute already in existence since 1965, further demonstrating the majority’s error in attempting to read the two separate statutes as twins.

The persistent-nonviolent statute requires that the defendant have actually served previous sentences of imprisonment. It provides, in pertinent part, that:

“A previous felony conviction within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this subdivision is a conviction of a felony in this state, or of a crime in any other jurisdiction, provided:
“(i) that a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year, or a sentence to death, was imposed therefor; and
“(fi) that the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for such conviction prior to the commission of the present felony; and
“(in) that defendant was not pardoned on the ground of innocence.” (Penal Law, § 70.10, subd 1, par [b].)

As the majority acknowledges, there is no such requirement contained in the persistent-yioZeni statute. Instead, it is sufficient under the latter that the defendant have had a prior “[sjuspended sentence, suspended execution of sentence, a sentence of probation, a sentence of conditional discharge or of unconditional discharge, [or] a sentence of certification to the care and custody of the division of substance abuse services”. (Penal Law, § 70.08, subd 1, pars [a], [b]; § 70.04, subd 1, par [b], cl [iii].) The persistent violent offender scheme is clearly intended to be stricter than the nonviolent scheme, permitting enhanced sentencing of a repeat violent felony offender whether or not that offender has already been incarcerated and released twice before.

Likewise, the persistent-aioZe?ii statute differs from the nonviolent one in the sentences authorized. Again, the former is harsher. The statute mandates the imposition of an indeterminate life sentence. (Penal Law, § 70.08, subds 2, 3.) By contrast, the persistent-nonviolent one permits a greater measure of leniency, authorizing the sentencing court to exercise discretion in imposing a range of permissible sentences. (Penal Law, § 70.10, subd 2.)

Moreover, while the persistent-nonaioZeni statute contains its own definition of qualifying predicate convictions, listing certain specific requirements that must be satisfied, including multiple separate prior sentences of imprisonment (Penal Law, § 70.10, subd 1, pars [b], [c]), it is significant that the persistent-yioZerci statute does not rely upon or even refer to that definition. Rather, while it does not contain its own separate definition, it explicitly incorporates the provisions of the second violent felony offender statute (hereafter the “second-violent statute”) which, in turn, requires only that the predicate convictions be prior to the commission of the present felony and that some previous sentence have been imposed. (Penal Law, § 70.04, subd 1, par [b].) There is plainly no requirement, either expressed or to be inferred, that multiple separate sentences must precede adjudication of a defendant as a persistent violent offender.

Additionally, further examination of the second-violent statute reveals yet another significant difference between the violent and nonviolent recidivist statutory schemes. The statute defines a second violent felony offender as one “having previously been subjected to a predicate violent felony conviction”. (Emphasis added.) (Penal Law, § 70.04, subd 1, par [a].) Only one prior conviction is necessary. Whenever a violent offender already has more than one previous conviction, that offender no longer falls within the scope of the second-violent statute but, rather, the persistent-violent one. By sharp contrast, the second (nonfelony offender statute defines a second offender as a person “having previously been subjected to one or more predicate felony convictions”. (Emphasis added.) (Penal Law, § 70.06, subd 1, par [a].) Hence, under the nonviolent recidivist scheme, although a convicted defendant has several prior convictions, that defendant may still fall within the provisions of the second offender statute rather than the persistent one. Such would be the case, for example, where the prior convictions did not result in sentences of imprisonment or where those sentences were not separately imposed. But the violent recidivist statutory scheme makes no allowance for such exceptions. Only an offender having a single prior violent felony conviction falls within the scope of the second-violent statute. Any offender with more than one such predicate, regardless of whether that offender has previously received separate sentences of imprisonment, is covered by the persistent-violent statute.

In my view, the majority’s attempt to analogize the violent with the nonviolent recidivist statutory scheme is mistaken, and their interpretation of the statutory language is forced. Indeed, the majority does not really interpret the persistent-violent statute; they amend it. The statutory language clearly does not say what the majority holds that it does. There is simply no such requirement for multiple separate prior sentences as invoked by the majority. To be sure, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that where the provisions of one statute differ from that of another, it is reasonable to assume that a distinction was intended. (Matter of Albano v Kirby, 36 NY2d 526, 530.) Here, where a specific requirement for multiple separate prior sentences is explicitly stated in the persistent-nonui-olent statute and not mentioned in the persistent-yzoZerci statute, “‘an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included [in the latter] was intended to be omitted or excluded’ ”. (Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205,208-209, quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 240; see, also, Felt v Felt, 62 NY2d 691.) A statute, as enacted by the Legislature and signed into law by the Governor, stands for what its words unambiguously manifest, not for the unstated requirements for which the majority infers support in the legislative history of related recidivist statutes. (People v Graham, 55 NY2d 144, 151; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 76.) The persistent-violent statute expressly requires only multiple prior violent felony convictions, not multiple separate prior sentences, and its provisions ought to be applied accordingly.

Of course, it has been a long-standing legislative and judicial policy in this State to consider multiple prior convictions for crimes which share the same time, place and nature as one predicate for the purposes of recidivist statutes. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Janosko v Fay, 6 NY2d 82, 87-88; cf. People v Taylor, 13 NY2d 675.) But in neither People v Morse nor People v Frank, before us today, is there any such identity or proximity of the prior convictions justifying their treatment as one. Though in each case the defendant had been convicted of the subject prior violent felonies on a single day, in fact, each felony was distinct, having been committed on different days and in different places. Consequently, in neither case is there any requirement for deeming the multiple prior convictions to be one.

Accordingly, I would affirm the adjudications of persistent violent felony offender status and the sentences in both People v Morse and People v Frank.

In People v Covington, Vega and Johnson: Order affirmed.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wacht-ler, Simons and Kaye concur.

In People v Morse: Order modified and case remitted to Supreme Court, Bronx County, for sentence in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.

In People v Frank: Order modified and case remitted to Supreme Court, New York County, for sentence in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Wachtler and Kaye concur with Judge Meyer; Judge Jasen dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judges Jones and Simons concur.

      . Article 70 differentiates as to sentence between felonies and violent felonies and as to each category requires imposition of enhanced punishment for a second offense and of even heavier punishment for a persistent offender. Section 70.00 of the Penal Law establishes sentences of imprisonment for felony; section 70.06 defines a second felony offender and requires imposition of maximum and minimum sentences for such an offender; section 70.10 defines a persistent felony offender and the authorized sentences for such an offender. Section 70.02 of the Penal Law categorizes, by cross reference to other sections of the Penal Law, various crimes as violent felony offenses and establishes the sentences of imprisonment authorized for violent felony offenders; section 70.04

      . Morse and Prank raised their present objections prior to sentence. Although Covington, Vega and Johnson did not, they have not controverted the allegations of the predicate or persistent felony information, which would require timely objection (CPL 400.15, subd 3; 400.16, subd 2), nor are they arguing that the court omitted a required procedure or failed to exercise its discretion, prior to imposing a permissible sentence (cf. People v McGowen, 42 NY2d 905; People v Drummond, 40 NY2d 990, cert den sub nom. New York v Luis J., 431 US 908). Rather, conceding the facts, they attack the power of the court to sentence as it did. Such a challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal (People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152, 156).

      . While the fact is that Morse, and also Prank, pleaded guilty to two prior crimes on the same day, the dissent is in error in suggesting (p 227) that the fact that “the sentences for his two prior convictions were imposed on the same date” is the basis for the result reached. The same result would follow from sentences on different days where sentence for the first was not imposed prior to commission of the second.

      . The definition of “violent felony offense” in section 70.02 (subd 1, par [d]) of the Penal Law includes “an attempt to commit any of the felonies of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivisions four and five of section 265.02 as a lesser included offense of that section as defined in section 220.20 of the criminal procedure law.” As the reference to CPL 220.20 makes clear, the convictions would have had to have been on guilty plea to a lesser included offense, not on conviction by verdict.

      . Morse’s brief also raises identification issues, which we do not consider because they were not raised at the Wade hearing, his counsel having then conceded that in-court identification was for the jury and that there was nothing improper about the photo identification.

      . Section 70.04 (subd 1, par [ab of the Penal Law defines “second violent felony offender” as a person convicted of a violent felony as defined in section 70.02 of the Penal Law “after having previously been subjected to a predicate violent felony conviction as defined in paragraph (b).” Section 70.08 (subd 1, par [b]) of the Penal Law directs that as to a persistent violent felony offender “[fjor the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more predicate violent felony convictions, the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.04 shall apply.”

      . That subdivision reads:
      “1. Definition of persistent violent felony offender.
      “(a) A persistent violent felony offender is a person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 after having previously been subjected to two or more predicate violent felony convictions as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.04.
      “(b) For the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more predicate violent felony convictions, the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.04 shall apply.”

      . Among the reasons suggested for the absence of litigation as to sequentiality are the requirement that the three prior convictions be alleged in the indictment and proven at trial, the hesitancy of juries to convict in view of the harsh penalty, the absence of a national fingerprint identification system, and the ability of the defendant charged as a fourth felony offender to plead guilty as a first offender, all of which combined to make such convictions rare (People v Spellman, 136 Misc 25, 28; see McQuillan, New York’s Persistent Felony Offender Laws: The Importance of the Sequence of the Prior Convictions [unpublished paper, submitted with defendant Frank’s brief], pp 14-15, 18).

      . It is, thus, incorrect to say, as does the dissent (p 232), that Janosko and Taylor evidence a policy that crimes which share the same time, place and nature be considered as one predicate conviction under the statute. On their facts those cases involved separate transactions; they turn simply on whether the resulting indictments were consolidated for trial.

      . The latter language on which the dissent places such great emphasis was, thus, no more than a conforming amendment intended to obviate any ambiguity that might otherwise exist as to the nonviolent offenses defined in sections 70.06 and 70.10. To read it as rejecting sequentiality as to the persistent violent felony offender defined in section 70.08 is to ignore the parallel amendment of section 70.06, which includes a sequentiality provision, and the cross references in section 70.08 (subd 1, pars [a], [b]) to section 70.04 (subd 1, par [b]), which also includes an identically worded sequentiality provision.

      . In light of the cross reference and the inclusion in section 70.04 (subd 1, par [b], cl [ii]) of the requirement that the “prior conviction must have been imposed before commission of the present felony”, it is difficult to understand the statement in the dissent (pp 231-232) that “a specific requirement for multiple separate prior sentences is * * * not mentioned in the persistent-uiole/ii statute” (emphasis in original).

      . Notwithstanding the majority’s protestations to the contrary (majority opn, p 214, n 3), under their rationale the critical obstacle to sentencing defendants in Morse and Frank as persistent offenders is the fact that in each case the prior sentences were imposed on the same day. In each of the subject cases, the sentences were imposed ‘before commission of the present felony” as the law requires. (Penal Law, § 70.08, subd 1, par [b]; § 70.06, subd 1, par [b], cl [ii].) They were not imposed, however, on different days between each of the separate prior felonies as, today, the majority requires. Thus, it would seem that the majority decides these two cases as it does only because the sentences were imposed at the same time.

      . Contrary to the majority’s assertion (majority opn, p 222, n 10), we clearly do not “read Tthis provision] as rejecting sequentiality” standing by itself. We do, however, cite it for the meaning of its plain language, which is that the provisions of the persistent-nonviolent statute cannot be read into the persistent-violent statute as the majority nevertheless attempts to do. (See majority opn, pp 221-222.)

      . Despite the majority’s interpretive efforts in discovering a requirement for multiple separate prior sentences in the persistent-violent statute (majority opn, pp 223-224) and their criticism of the dissent for failing to find the same (p 223, n 11), it should be apparent even to the casual reader that such a requirement is simply not there. (Compare Penal Law, § 70.10, subd 1, pars [a], [b] and [c], with § 70.08, subd 1, pars [a] and [b], but no [e].)


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Grace M. Caporino, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Gabriel A. Caporino, Deceased, Respondent, v Travelers Insurance Company, Appellant, et al., Defendants, and Prudential Insurance Company of America, Appellant.
    Argued April 30, 1984;
    decided June 5, 1984

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Martin M. McGlynn for Travelers Insurance Company, appellant.
    I. Since there are no ambiguities and uncertainties as to meaning of the insurance policy, Travelers is entitled to have its contract of insurance enforced without a construction contrary to its express terms. (Gertner u Glens Falls Ins. Co., 193 App Div 836, 233 NY 568; Jacobs v Maryland Cas. Co., 198 App Div 470, 234 NY 622; Breed v Insurance Co. of North Amer., 46 NY2d 351; Johnson v Travelers Ins. Co., 269 NY 401; Warren v Postal Life Ins. Co., 163 App Div 638; Paul v Travelers Ins. Co., 112 NY 472; Hunter v Federal Cas. Co., 199 App Div 223; Gale v Mutual Aid & Acc. Assn., 66 Hun 600; Regan v National Postal Transp. Assn., 53 Mise 2d 901; Dupee v Travelers Ins. Co., 253 App Div 278, 278 NY 659.) II. Since plaintiff failed, in opposition to defendant Travelers’ motion for summary judgment, to present facts having probative value sufficient to demonstrate an unresolved material issue under the terms of Travelers’ policy providing for accidental death benefits and supplemental benefits which can be determined only at a plenary trial, it was error, as a matter of law for the court below to reverse the Special Term order granting summary judgment. (Stirk v Mutual Life Ins. Co., 199 F2d 874; Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v Village of Hempstead, 48 NY2d 218.)

      Ferdinand M. Schwartz for Prudential Insurance Company of America, appellant.
    I. The court below based its opinion on a hypothetical question having no applicability to the issues in the case at bar. II. Insurance companies are entitled to have their contracts enforced as written. (Johnson v Travelers Ins. Co., 269 NY 401; Government Employees Ins. Co. v Kligler, 42 NY2d 863; Breed v Insurance Co. of North Amer., 46 NY2d 351; Norris v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 116 Mise 2d 296.) III. Under the terms of Prudential’s policy, there can be no recovery for accidental death benefits if plaintiff is unable to establish that the bodily injuries were evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior part of the body. (Dupee v Travelers Ins. Co., 253 App Div 278, 278 NY 659; Breslow v Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 36 AD2d 676; Williams v Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 95 AD2d 886.) IV. The court below relied upon the decision of Judge Marks which was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law. (Daranowich u United States, 73 F Supp 1004.)

      Emilio Nunez, Harry H. Lipsig, Pamela Anagnos Lia-pakis and Cheryl R. Eisberg for respondent.
    I. Neither failure to produce direct proof of a visible wound or contusion of the body nor unavailability of the body for autopsy should bar recovery for accidental death benefits. (Begley v Prudential Ins. Co., 1 NY2d 530; Vargas v Insurance Co. of North Amer., 651 F2d 838; Ruder & Finn v Seaboard Sur. Co., 52 NY2d 663; Home Mut. Ins. Co. v Presutti, 78 AD2d 968; Lo Tempio v Safeco Ins. Co., 71 AD2d 799; Darano-wich v United States, 73 F Supp 1004, affd sub nom. Da-ranowich v Land, 186 F2d 386; Ursaner v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 274 App Div 77; Burr v Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Assn., 295 NY 294; Gittelson v Mutual Life Ins. Co., 266 App Div 141.) II. A triable issue concerning Gabriel Caporino’s date of death has been raised. III. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should not be granted herein where there are triable issues of fact as to the manner and date of death. (Barrett v Jacobs, 255 NY 520; Travelers Ins. Co. v Kownack, 72 AD2d 881; Holender v Cammann Prods., 78 AD2d 233; Kidder, Peabody & Co. v General Cigar Co., 77 AD2d 532; Shear son Hayden Stone v Teitelbaum, 78 AD2d 791; Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Where insurance policies provided that additional benefits would be paid upon proof that the insured’s death resulted from external, violent and accidental means evidenced by a visible exterior wound, and that supplemental benefits would be paid if death occurred before a specified date, the beneficiary raised no triable issue of fact concerning her right to recover either additional or supplemental benefits by presenting evidence of the insured’s unexplained disappearance, and summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the insurers dismissing her claims.

Respondent’s husband, Gabriel Caporino, disappeared on March 7,1974, while in New Orleans on a business trip. The circumstances of his disappearance have never been explained, and his body has not been found. In November, 1979, the Surrogate’s Court decreed Caporino to be dead due to his unexplained absence and, pursuant to EPTL 2-1.7, fixed the date of his death as March 7, 1979 — five years from his disappearance — on the ground that there was no proof that Caporino was exposed to a specific peril of death before that date, as is required for a finding that death occurred earlier. At the time of his death Caporino held life insurance policies issued by appellants, Travelers Insurance Company and Prudential Insurance Company of America, each of which named respondent as beneficiary. Upon the Surrogate’s decree, each appellant paid respondent the face amount of its policy.

At issue on this appeal is respondent’s entitlement to additional benefits under an “additional indemnity provision” and “supplemental agreement” in the Travelers policy, and an “accidental means death benefit” in the Prudential policy. The relevant language of the accidental death benefit provision in the Travelers policy is as follows: “THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY agrees to pay to the Beneficiary named in the above-numbered Life Contract, the amount of Additional Indemnity above stated in addition to the amount of insurance payable in the event of the death of the Insured under the said Life Contract immediately upon receipt of due proof that the death of the said Insured has resulted from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means within ninety days from the date of the accident which shall have caused such injuries and of which (except in the case of drowning or internal injuries revealed by an autopsy) there is a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body, and provided such death does not result from a risk stated herein as not assumed.” The Prudential policy has a similar clause which also requires “due proof” of death “solely through external, violent and accidental means” that is “evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body.” The Travelers policy, in addition, contains a supplemental agreement that provides in pertinent part: “The Travelers Insurance Company agrees that if the insurance under the above numbered life contract shall become payable by the death of the Insured prior to the above Termination Date [September 14, 1978], the amount payable to the Beneficiary under the life contract shall be increased by the amount of supplemental benefit stated above [$10,000].”

After appellants refused to pay the additional benefits under these provisions, respondent brought suit to recover and appellants separately moved for summary judgment. At Special Term, Travelers’ motion was granted, and Prudential’s motion denied. In a combined appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the grant of summary judgment to Travelers and affirmed the denial to Prudential. The Appellate Division granted each appellant leave to appeal on a certified question. We now reverse. In view cf respondent’s failure to present any evidentiary facts showing accidental death and visible exterior wounds, or that death occurred prior to September 14, 1978, there is no basis for recovery under the additional benefit provisions of either insurance policy.

The additional benefit provisions at issue in both the Travelers and Prudential policies are unambiguous, and as such their construction is solely a question of law for the court. (Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v Wesolowski, 33 NY2d 169, 172.) We may not disregard clear provisions which the insurers inserted in the policies and the insured accepted (Johnson v Travelers Ins. Co., 269 NY 401, 407), and equitable considerations will not allow an extension of coverage beyond its fair intent and meaning in order to obviate objections which might have been foreseen and guarded against (Breed v Insurance Co. North Amer., 46 NY2d 351, 355; Weinberg & Holman v Providence Washington Ins. Co., 254 NY 387, 391).

Under the accidental indemnity provision contained in each policy, respondent may not recover unless she presents due proof that her husband’s death resulted from violent or accidental bodily injuries, including evidence of visible contusions or wounds on the exterior of his body. (Dupee v Travelers Ins. Co., 253 App Div 278, 281, affd 278 NY 659.) The appellant insurers had the perfect right, if they saw fit, to require proof of such evidentiary facts as an indispensable basis for recovery (Rosenthal v American Bonding Co., 207 NY 162, 169). Respondent has the burden of satisfying the particular requirements of the contract, and may not rest on the fact of her husband’s absence or circumstantial evidence that he could have died an accidental or violent death. (Stirk v Mutual Life Ins. Co., 199 F2d 874.) Here, respondent has raised no issue of material fact as to her right to recover the additional benefits, and appellants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Respondent has similarly failed to raise any issue of material fact as to her right to recover the “supplemental benefit” payable under the Travelers policy for death of the insured prior to September 14, 1978. Although respondent now claims that the date of death for such purposes should be the date of her husband’s disappearance in 1974, she has presented no evidentiary facts that would support a finding that his death occurred on that date or at any time before the September 14, 1978 termination date. Thus, the death of respondent’s husband falls outside the scope of the provision allowing supplemental benefits, and appellant Travelers is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim as well.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, summary judgment granted in favor of appellants, the complaint dismissed as against them, and the certified questions answered in the negative.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wacht-ler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye concur in Per Curiam opinion.

Order reversed, etc.