author: Fuchsberg, J.

text:
    In the Matter of the Claim of Donald Landgrebe, Claimant, v County of Westchester et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Appellant.
    Argued June 11, 1982
    decided July 1, 1982

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Robert Abrams, Attorney-General {Morris N. Lissauer, Peter Schiff and Henriette Frieder of counsel), for appellant.
    The court below erred as a matter of law in holding that the employer should receive full reimbursement for wages paid during a period of disability from a schedule award for a consequential injury incurred long after the period of disability. (Matter of Harley v Lamston Co., 5 AD2d 739; Matter of Lynch v Board of Educ., 1 AD2d 362,3 NY2d 871; Matter of Trageser v State Ins. Fund, 31 AD2d 857; Matter of Feeney v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 37 AD2d 888, 29 NY2d 487; Matter of Rubino v City of New York, 32 AD2d 44; Matter of Ulman v Jerome Glass & Shade Co., 266 App Div 643; Matter of Adolf v City of Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 71 AD2d 746, 50 NY2d 871; Matter of Ott v Green-Wood Cemetery, 262 NY 532.)

      Phyllis O’Connell for respondents.
    I. The employer’s liability to claimant for schedule loss of use awards resulting from the consequential injury on December 19, 1977, to claimant’s right fingers, was based upon the compensable accident on March 9, 1977. II. Since claimant’s right to schedule awards stemmed from the March 9,1977 accident under the applicable statutory and decisional law, the employer is entitled to full reimbursement for wages paid during all periods of disability following the March 9,1977 accident. (Matter of Ott v Green-Wood Cemetery, 262 NY 532; Matter of Adolf v City of Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 71 AD2d 746, 50 NY2d 871; Matter of Ulman v Jerome Glass & Shade Co., 266 App Div 643.) III. The court below correctly held that the employer’s right to full reimbursement for wages paid prior to a consequential injury should not be defeated by the fact that the schedule award source for such reimbursement was a consequential injury rather than the original injury.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Fuchsberg, J.

In a matter of first impression in this court, we are called upon to decide whether, pursuant to section 25 (subd 4, par [a]) of the Workers’ Compensation Law, an employer who has paid full wages to its employee during a period of disability may obtain full reimbursement of these payments out of a “schedule award” for a different though consequential injury. The question arises in a case in which the employee injured his back in the course of his employment and, some nine months later, suffered an injury to his hand when a recurrence of back pain attributable to the original injury led to the separate, non-work-related accident.

Claimant, Donald Landgrebe, a Westchester County correction officer, injured his back when he slipped on a wet floor in the county jail on March 9, 1977. The county, pursuant to its practice, continued to pay him full wages for the ensuing periods of disability until he fully returned to work as of June 30, 1977. As permitted by section 25 (subd 4, par [a]), the county, in order to advise its carrier that payment of compensation had commenced and that all payments were being made as advances, then filed a “request for reimbursement” form for the amount it had so expended, $3,383.07. Section 25, in relevant part provides: “If the employer has made advance payments of compensation, or has made payments to an employee in like manner as wages during any period of disability, he shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of an unpaid instalment or instalments of compensation due”.

Causal connection between the accident and the back injury having been established, in due course the Workers’ Compensation Board fixed the claimant’s award at what was then the maximum weekly total disability rate of $125. Since this was less than the sum advanced by the county by way of the full wages it had continued to pay during the period of disability, the board directed the carrier to pay the full amount of the weekly disability payments, $1,775, to the county. This meant, of course, that $1,608.07 ($3,383.07 minus $1,775) went unreimbursed.

One day during the next winter, after the claimant had been working uneventfully for many months, his leg gave way when he suffered a sudden recurrence of back pain while he was operating a snowblower away from work. As a result, he sustained partial amputation of two fingers when these were caught in the blower. During the relatively short time that his new injury kept him away from work, the county again routinely paid his full wages, this time amounting to but $547.07. After a hearing, the workers’ compensation referee found that the snowblower incident was consequential to the prior work-related accident and that, because the claimant had sustained a permanent loss of use of his fingers, he was entitled to $4,422.50 by way of a “schedule award”. Such awards are payable for specified permanent partial disabilities under subdivision 3 of section 15 of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

Before entering on our analysis, to avoid any confusion of concepts, some definition of terms may be in order. To this end, we first note that the Workers’ Compensation Law establishes four classifications of disability for which compensation may be rendered: (1) permanent total disability, (2) temporary total disability, (3) permanent partial disability, and (4) temporary partial disability. Moreover, subdivision 6 of section 2 of the Workers’ Compensation Law broadly defines “compensation” as “the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter”, while section 15 provides a “schedule of compensation” to be used in computing an “allowance” (or, in more common parlance, “an award”) under all four classifications. If we were to take these provisions at face value, then, it would seem that all awards for disability constitute “schedule” awards.

Nevertheless, “schedule award” has evolved as a much narrower phrase of art encompassing compensation allowed for specified permanent partial disabilities in which the loss or the loss of use of a member of the body listed in subdivision 3 of section 15 has occurred (see 66 NY Jur, Workmen’s Compensation, § 773). It goes without saying that this dichotomy between the statutory and the long-accepted nonstatutory uses of the term “schedule award” does not aid in interpreting a statute which, on the matter at hand, has no revealing statutory history.

This also appears to be an appropriate place at which to state the uncontroverted fact that the amount of a “schedule award”, in the loss-of-use-of-a-member sense, though independent of the time an employee actually loses from work, is fixed at a statutorily prescribed number of weeks of compensation. Multiplication of the weekly rate applicable to the employee by the number of weeks the schedule specifies for the particular loss then becomes the means by which the amount of a “schedule award” is computed. In particular “[t]he payment is not analogous to the payment of weekly compensation for temporary disablity” (Matter of Lynch v Board of Educ., 1 AD2d 362, 365, affd 3 NY2d 871). Indeed, when an employee who is entitled to a schedule award has received any disability payments for temporary total disability produced by his injuries, these are chargeable to the schedule award (Workers’ Compensation Law, § 15, subd 4-a).

In contrast, an award for any other type of disability, whether termed a “disability award”, an “award of weekly compensation”, or a “nonschedule award” is based on the actual period during which an employee is “disabled from earning full wages at the work at which the employee was last employed” (Workers’ Compensation Law, § 37, subd 1). In the case of “temporary total disability” (here the back injury was so treated), a specified percent (presently 66%) of the employee’s average weekly wages is payable “during the continuance thereof”, subject to a statutory maximum rate of compensation (§ 15, subds 2, 6).

Now, the claimant did not dispute the county’s right to look to the fund created by the “schedule award” for reimbursement of the $547.07 which the county had advanced subsequent to the hand injury. But the county, relying on what it asserts are the implications of Matter of Ott v Green-Wood Cemetery (262 NY 532), insisted that it also was entitled to have recourse to this fund for the balance of $1,608.07 of the wages it had paid the claimant for the time he lost from work because of his on-the-job injury. Reading the self-same Matter of Ott as compelling no such conclusion, the claimant contended that “reimbursement should not be allowed where wages were clearly never paid for a disability attendant to the schedulable injury”. This became the nub of their controversy.

On this record, the referee adopted the county’s position and directed the carrier to reimburse the county from the “schedule award” in full. Upon administrative appeal, however, the Workers’ Compensation Board modified the decision to allow reimbursement from the “schedule award” only for payments advanced after the date of the hand injury. The Appellate Division having reversed and remitted to the board for further proceedings (84 AD2d 598), the board now appeals as a matter of right (CPLR 5601, subd [a]). For the reasons which follow, we believe the board’s order should be reinstated.

Since section 25 (subd 4, par [a]) of the Workers’ Compensation Law itself does not speak to the precise problem confronting us, and, as noted earlier, the point at stake enjoys no legislative history, maxims of statutory construction are of limited utility (Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col L Rev 527, 544-545; Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand L Rev 395, 401-406).

Nevertheless the setting in which this section came into being is not to be overlooked (cf. Sharapata v Town of Islip, 56 NY2d 332, 336). For one thing, it is part of a remedial statutory scheme of which an important object is furtherance of the welfare of injured workers (see Matter of Merchant v Pinkerton’s Inc., 50 NY2d 492, 495; Matter of Husted v Seneca Steel Serv., 41 NY2d 140, 145). On the other hand, the greater certainty so provided for compensating victims of industrial accidents is not at the neglect of the interests of employers, since “[t]he price for these secure benefits is the loss of the common-law tort action in which greater benefits might be obtained” from the employer (O’Rourke v Long, 41 NY2d 219, 222).

In short, our compensation system is not a one-way street. And the general plan of the section before us now obviously is in this spirit. For, it compels neither “advance payments of compensation” nor “payments to an employee in like manner as wages during any period of disability”. Yet, so as not to discourage an employer from undertaking to make these, it provides a protected source of repayment.

To be sure, Matter of Ott v Green-Wood Cemetery (262 NY 532, affg without opn 237 App Div 860, supra) and the line of decisional law of which it is the forebear shed some light on how far the section’s promise of repayment goes. However, Ott, in which there was no appreciable judicial writing at either appellate level, hardly provides the answer the employer here would like. Rather, as the record there reveals, Ott, unlike the present case, involved but a single industrial episode. Following an accident to his hand for which the claimant suffered total disability for 19 1/6 weeks, he received a schedule award for 50% of the loss of use of this member. There was no intervening, consequential or other injury or event, work or nonwork related. As would be normal, while the full wages the employer had continued to pay during the disability period exceeded the fractional weekly compensation rate, it was less than the schedule award from which reimbursement of the employer’s advance was ordered.

Since then an employer’s right to reimbursement of any unreimbursed balance of “payments * * * in like manner as wages” has come to depend on whether a schedule award was or was not made. Obviously, if a disability award is rendered for the period of total disability alone, either an employer who has advanced only the payments of weekly compensation (in which event it will have advanced precisely the compensation amounts due the employee) or an employer who has made “payments * * * in like manner as wages” (in which event it will have advanced more than the amount due the employee) will be reimbursed to the full extent of the employee’s weekly compensation payments, but no more. If, however, an employee has received a “schedule award”, an employer who has made “payments * * * in like manner as wages” can look to the total “schedule award” (which, en gros, would include any weekly total disability payments "charged against it as aforesaid) as a resource to be applied toward full reimbursement of the employer. But, once again, it is to be emphasized that the cases in which this rule has been applied, in this court most recently in Matter of Adolf v City of Buffalo Bd. of Educ. (50 NY2d 871, affg 71 AD2d 746, supra), like Ott, are all single incident cases (see, e.g., Matter of Lynch v Board of Educ., 1 AD2d 362, affd 3 NY2d 871, supra; Matter of Ulman v Jerome Glass & Shade Co., 266 App Div 643; see, also, Matter of Manley v Board of Coop. Educational Servs. for Broome County, 66 AD2d 943).

It seems to us that, for the single incident cases, there is no reason to depart from these adjudications. It is reasonable to assume that moneys advanced by employers in such cases were intended to help tide the employee over the expected consequences of the injury. But, it is also to be assumed that, to the extent that the employee is entitled to an award for the compensation so advanced, absent any arrangement to the contrary, it is to be reimbursed to his employer. Unless this is done, whether out of weekly total disability payments or out of a more comprehensive schedule award, the employee will have benefited from a duplication of payments which very well may give him more than would his normal salary. There are, of course, employers who would so intend, but this is not to be assumed as a matter of course. Indeed, not too long ago, in related circumstances involving a single incident, we acted on the proposition that the norm is the avoidance of overlapping recoveries (see Matter of Jefferson v Bronx Psychiatric Center, 55 NY2d 69).

Much different from the frame of reference in a single incident case is that in which a second incident case must be examined. To begin with, the language of section 25 (subd 4, par [a]) of the Workers’ Compensation Law favors matching a reimbursement and an award when a particular event brought both about. Thus, it is possible to put meaning in the fact that the statutory phrase “during any period of disability” is in the singular and that “advance payment” and “unpaid instalment” connote an advance against a claim for the reality of an existing incident rather than the speculation of one yet in futuro.

In the context of this case, more telling is the nature of the hand-related “schedule award” which the employer would target for reimbursement of the wage differential it laid out because of the distinctly different nonschedule first incident injury.

The “schedule award”, as we have seen, in essence, was replacement for the partial loss of a hand; in fact, in the context of such a serious condition, the wage loss here, only for two weeks, was insignificant. The “schedule award” then has to be seen as an award for a dignitary loss or as a cushion against a future earning capacity at a time when the security and continuity of an ongoing employment may be gone. True, strictly speaking, this could be argued in a “schedule award” single incident case as well, but there we would be dealing with a direct situation in which a “schedule award” represented no more than recognition of a more lasting outcome of the very trauma which prompted the advance, instead, as here, of a completely uncontemplated future event.

There are also policy considerations that would dictate denial of the employer’s pursuit of the avails of the second event. For example, though the two incidents are not completely unconnected because of a finding of consequentially, this need not determine the issue of reimbursability presented here. The hand injury, even if consequential to the prior back injury, constituted a distinct physical occurrence and impairment. It was not merely an aggravation or complication of the back injury, but a new and physiologically different one. The two were unrelated temporally and medically.

Nor do courts appreciate arrangements in compensation cases which would in effect convert an unreimbursable portion of a past advance into a lien against funds which may likely be needed by an insured worker during times of future and largely unconnected disability (cf. Matter of Lynch v Board of Educ., 1 AD2d 362, 365, supra).

For all these reasons, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board should be reinstated.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen and Meyer concur with Judge Fuchsberg; Judges Gabrielli, Jones and Wachtler dissent and vote to affirm for reasons stated in the memorandum at the Appellate Division (84 AD2d 598).

Order reversed, etc.

      . On the basis of this incident, claimant’s compensation case, which otherwise was to be formally closed for lack of medical evidence of any further disability causally related to the original injury, subsequently was reopened (see Workers’ Compensation Law, § 123).

      . The ultimate decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board in this case refers to the referee as “Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (Referee)”. However, while, therefore, both titles appear to be in vogue, we continue to use the statutory one (Workers’ Compensation Law, § 150).

      . An exception exists for certain “non-schedule adjustments” specified in subdivision 5-b of section 15.

      . (Matter of Wilkosz v Symington Gould Corp., 14 AD2d 408, affd 14 NY2d 739.)

      . (Matter of Lynch v Board of Educ., 1 AD2d 362, affd 3 NY2d 871, supra.)

      . (Matter of Adolf v City of Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 50 NY2d 871, 875.)


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Fuchsberg, J. Jasen, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Robert E. Sawyer, Respondent.
    Argued June 9, 1982
    decided July 2, 1982

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      John T. Ward, District Attorney for appellant.
    The court below erred in holding that defendant had not waived his right to counsel. (Maynard v Meachum, 545 F2d 273;
      United States ex rel. Testamark v Vincent, 496 F2d 641; Matter of Legal Aid Soc. of City of N. Y. v Rothwax, 69 AD2d 801; Pizarro v Harris, 507 F Supp 642; Kates v Nelson, 435 F2d 1085; United States ex rel. Davis v McMann, 386 F2d 611; United States v Washington, 341 F2d 277; Carter v Illinois, 329 US 173; Johnson v United States, 318 F2d 855; Adams v United States ex rel. McCann, 317 US 269; Faretta v California, 422 US 806.)

      Charles Edward Fagan for respondent.
    I. This court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the order of the court below reversing respondent’s conviction and ordering a new trial was based on findings of fact which led to the reversal. (People v Mackell, 40 NY2d 59; People v Albro, 52 NY2d 619.) II. The court below did not err in holding that respondent had not waived his right to counsel. (People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10; Matter of Legal Aid Soc. of City of N. Y. v Rothwax, 69 AD2d 801; People v Medina, 44 NY2d 199; Maynard v Meachum, 545 F2d 273; Pizarro v Harris, 507 F Supp 642; United States ex rel. Testamark v Vincent, 496 F2d 641.) III. Even assuming, arguendo, that the court below erred in number II above, the reversal of respondent’s conviction and order for a new trial should be affirmed since reversible error was rampant throughout the trial court proceeding.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Fuchsberg, J.

Once again we face sensitive questions associated with an indigent defendant’s pro se representation in a criminal case.

After trial by jury, defendant, Robert Earl Sawyer, was convicted, and thereafter sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life imprisonment on two counts of murder arising out of the fatal shooting of a grocery clerk in Stow, Chautauqua County. Upon arraignment, the County Court, on March 2,1978, advised him of his right to counsel and gave him a week in which to secure one.

On the adjourned date, March 9, Charles Fagan, Esq., who until shortly prior thereto had occupied the post of Public Defender, in which he apparently had developed some familiarity with the charges against the defendant, appeared with him, but only at the instance of the defendant’s family and solely, as he explained to the County Judge, for the purpose of pursuing the representation matter. In particular, anticipating that defendant’s indigency would require the County Judge to assign counsel, he advanced the argument that a conflict of interest might render the Public Defender’s office ineligible for such an assignment. This he premised on the fact that Fagan’s successor as Public Defender, Richard V. Slater, Esq., had come to his new office from service as Chief Assistant District Attorney, thus, in turn, creating a vacancy which was filled when an Assistant Public Defender, Ronald J. Gibb, Esq., shifted his employment to the District Attorney’s office. The Trial Judge, who, in his position, of course, had to have been aware of these personnel changeovers in the relatively well-knit legal community of nonmetropolitan Chautauqua County, rejected Fagan’s contention with the observation that the court earlier made a disassociation order which separated Slater from the case. Without further exploration of the subject, the court then adjourned the case to March 16, so that defendant could determine whether Fagan was to be his lawyer.

When, on this date, Fagan again appeared but only to give the court formal notification that the defendant lacked sufficient funds to retain private counsel, the court announced the appointment of Bruce K. Carpenter, Esq., in his official capacity as Assistant Public Defendant under Slater, to represent him. The defendant promptly protested, “I don’t want the Public Defender, Your Honor.” Four days later, the court notified the defendant that, after further consideration, it had decided that he was not entitled to counsel of his choice, and therefore would either have to stay with Carpenter or proceed pro se. Defendant responded that he was not capable of defending himself, but still refused to be represented by the Public Defender. In the course of the colloquy, Carpenter informed the court that he had been unable to receive any co-operation from the defendant and suggested the appointment of alternate counsel to follow the case and be present at all proceedings. The court refused to do so or to appoint Fagan in place of Carpenter.

This as prelude, we move to March 22, when the case again appeared on the calendar, this time for pleading. There ensued the following:

“the court: And do you want a lawyer?
“defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
“the court: Then, you have the Public Defender, and I am asking you how you plead to this charge?
“defendant: I cannot plead now, Your Honor, because I cannot accept the Public Defender’s office as counsel.
“the court: I hold him in contempt of Court. The Public Defender — either you are your own lawyer, or the Public Defender is your lawyer. Now, which? Which?
“defendant: I don’t want the Public Defender, Your Honor.
“the court: Then, you are your own lawyer. I enter a plea of not guilty, on your behalf, and I give you 30 days in which to make motions on your behalf.
“mr. carpenter: [Public Defender] I take it, an order is entered relieving the Public Defender of representing Mr. Sawyer at this time? Thank you, Your Honor.
* * *
“the court: * * * I don’t know how you are going to make your own motions. It’s up to you. You have chosen to be your own lawyer, since you will not accept the lawyer I have assigned —
“defendant: I have not chosen —
“the court: You have chosen. I am giving you another chance. You may make your choice. One, represent yourself. Two be represented by the Public Defender. You have no other choice. You are facing a very serious charge. If guilty and convicted, a mandatory sentence is life imprisonment. I strongly suggest you stop playing games with this Court and look out for your own best interests. Your own best interests are probably served by having a lawyer represent you. You will not have me assign anybody, or accept the Public Defender. Now, I know you’ve been talking with another lawyer. I do not know whether or not he has given you any advice, but if he has given you any advice that is contrary to what the Courts of this State say, obviously it isn’t good advice. Now, if you want the Public Defender, I will re-appoint him; otherwise, you have no lawyer.
“defendant: I want to put on the record, I am not competent to defend myself, Your Honor.
“the court: In that case, I assign the Public Defender again to represent you, and I will not hear you say anything one way or the other. You have a lawyer, or you don’t have.”

On March 27, defendant was denied bail. At that time, he again refused the services of the Public Defender, who thereupon was formally relieved of further responsibility to the defendant in this exchange:

“the court: * * * At this time, the Public Defender has pointed out to me that I have not issued a formal order relieving him from the assignment which I made. Is it your desire that you now do so?
“defendant: Your Honor, it is completely up to you.
“the court: No, I am asking you. Would you please answer me yes, or no.
“defendant: We have already discussed this at the last hearing.
“the court: Do you want me to relieve the Public Defender?
“defendant: I do not consent' to have him assigned as my counsel.
“the court: And by not consenting, you say as such you would not accept him as your counsel?
“defendant: That’s correct.
“the court: And would not cooperate with him; would not talk to him and accept the services of his department, is that correct?
“(Whereupon there was no response from the Defendant.)
“the court: Is that correct?
“(Whereupon there was no response from the Defendant.)
“the court: You just don’t accept him, period?
“defendant: I do not consent to have him as assigned counsel, Your Honor.
“the court: Well, I relieve the Public Defender of the assignment which I have made. Please note for the record that Mr. Sawyer is his own counsel as such.”

On at least three subsequent occasions before the trial proper eventually got under way, the court offered to make the Public Defender’s office available, but the defendant was unswerving in his insistence that, while he desired counsel, he would not accept one from the Public Defender’s office. When his counsel-less defense did take place, the defendant proved the truth of his protestation that he was not competent to represent himself; neither disrespectful nor disorderly, he simply showed no comprehension of the applicable evidentiary or substantive law. In effect, the trial was an inquest.

It was essentially on this record that a sharply divided Appellate Division reversed and granted a new trial. In a writing by Justice Schnepp, the majority reasoned that, granted that an indigent did not have the right to select his assigned counsel, the Trial Judge had properly denied defendant’s request, but that, when he relieved Carpenter from further responsibility, the Trial Judge improperly deprived the defendant of a continuing choice of either relying on counsel or proceeding on his own. In contrast, the two dissenting Justices opined that the defendant effectively waived the right to counsel (83 AD2d 205). Though on a somewhat different rationale than the one it adopted, we believe the result the majority reached is the one that should be upheld.

Our analysis begins with the observation that it was incumbent upon the defendant to show “good cause” for the desired substitution. For, while it is true that an indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to assistance of counsel by both our Federal and State Constitutions, this is not to be equated with a right to choice of assigned counsel. Thus, while Trial Judges have a duty to carefully evaluate complaints concerning court-appointed counsel and, when appropriate, effect a change of counsel, “this is far from suggesting that an indigent’s request that a court assign new counsel is to be granted casually” (People v Medina, 44 NY2d 199, 207; see People v Brabson, 9 NY2d 173, 180-181).

Therefore, though a defendant’s confidence in appointed counsel is most desirable, as it is in any client-attorney relationship, a bald profession that it is lacking is not controlling. Good cause for such an opinion must be demonstrated before a substitution need follow. It goes without saying, for instance, that most compelling would be a showing that counsel is unable to provide the defendant effective assistance, as, for example, by reason of professional incompetence or the existence of a personal impediment which handicaps his or her professional performance. Surely, a genuine conflict of interest would entitle a defendant to relief.

In the base before us now the only objection raised was the one broadly uttered under the conflict of interest rubric but at no time was there anything to even slightly suggest that any of the former members of either the District Attorney’s staff or that of the Public Defender who recently had shifted their employments from one of these agencies to the other would not zealously honor the confidences and loyalties assumed in their original positions. Rather, as indicated earlier the County Judge made it known to the defendant that he had been circumspect enough to issue a disasspciation order which presumably was tailored to minimize the risk, if not entirely avoid the occasion, for any occurrence of conflict in fact. And, we note that the Appellate Division, alert to our admonitions in People v Shinkle (51 NY2d 417), thought the Trial Judge could draw a distinction between the circumstances created in Shinkle, where a defense counsel had joined the prosecutor’s office, and the converse here, where one formerly allied with the prosecutor had taken over direction of the Public Defender’s domain. Finally, absent any oral or written definition of the specifics of the disassociation order or any information on Carpenter’s prior vocational history, with neither of which the record here favors us, it can be argued that the details of the order in fact may have mandated a foolproof disassociation procedure and that Carpenter’s background and intended modus operandi would have reinforced it.

But then, of course, less summary treatment of the matter than the record revealed also might have disclosed a less ideal drawing of disassociation lines or, for instance, allowed for exploration of the relationship, if at all, of Gibbs’ successive employments to the handling of defendant’s case. Beyond all this, however, “even if the actuality * * * of prejudice were absent, what of the appearance of things (see Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 9)?” (People v Zimmer, 51 NY2d 390, 395.) Or, as Shinkle, in its more analogous context, explains, “We recognize that the rule applied in this case may impede the transfer of attorneys between offices of Legal Aid or Public Defender and of District Attorney. This circumstance, however, affords no basis to deny defendants the right to both the fact and appearance of unswerving and exclusive loyalty on the part of attorneys who represent them” (emphasis added) (People v Shinkle, supra, p 421).

Obviously then, to say the least, a fine line here had to be tread. But we need not decide whether it was. This is because a new trial is necessary in any event, since, as we read the record, the trial court did not ascertain that the defendant appreciated the risks of self-representation.

For, even if we assume the defendant’s request for other counsel was properly denied, in the posture of the two options to which he was confined, his unwillingness to accept Carpenter as counsel left the defendant no way to proceed but pro se. This then called upon the court to give the defendant appropriate warnings. Clearly, this requirement was not diminished because the defendant chose to become a pro se litigant because of the strictures of the options open to him rather than in the absence of such restraint. Whatever his displeasure at having to make such a choice, when it ultimately was made it was unequivocal. Indeed, it can be said that his decision was no less, but perhaps more, definite because it was evidenced by conduct rather than the mouthing of a verbal formula.

At the root of the rule calling for special inquiry before a defendant may proceed pro se is recognition that implicit in a defendant’s exercise of the right to do so is a concomitant right to forego the advantages of counsel (Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835). To make sure this is well understood, more is required than that the right be “unequivocally and timely asserted”. Substantively, it must be “knowing and intelligent” as well. (People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10, 17). To ascertain that it is, the court should undertake a sufficiently “searching inquiry” of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the “dangers and disadvantages” of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant (see Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835, supra; People v White, 56 NY2d 110, 117). Appropriate “colloquy on the record between the judge and defendant” will not only test the defendant’s understanding, but provide an objective basis for review (United States v Bailey, 675 F2d 1292; see United States v Dujanovic, 486 F2d 182; United States v Plattner, 330 F2d 271).

So measured, the precautionary inquiry in this case was woefully inadequate. In the main, the dialogue consisted of repeated judicial importunities that the defendant accept the services of the Public Defender and their repeated rejection by the defendant. The court’s declarations that defendant was “facing a very serious charge” and that “your own best interests are probably served by having a lawyer represent you” simply did not satisfy the duty to make a “searching inquiry”.

Interestingly, the only accounting of dangers of pro se representation that found its way into the record was that contained in an excerpt the defendant read from Gideon v Wainwright (372 US 335) months after Carpenter had been relieved. Though on its face this language could be deemed most informative, there is no way of telling whether and to what extent the defendant appreciated its significance, or whether he was doing no more than reading uncomprehended language supplied to him by another. Unexplored by a cross current of colloquy, we are left in the dark.

Finally, since there is to be a new trial, for the guidance of the trial court should the situation arise again, we now comment on the matter of “standby counsel”. It will be remembered that the trial court rejected Assistant Public Defender Carpenter’s suggestion, made after reporting on defendant’s mistrust, that alternate counsel be appointed to follow the case and be present at all proceedings. On this point, we agree, particularly in a case as serious as the one here, that, where a defendant decides on self-representation, a Judge “may — even over objection by the accused — appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s self-representation is necessary” (Faretta v California, supra, p 835, n 46). It may be advisable to do so to protect the defendant and to facilitate the trial, not only in serious cases, but “in cases expected to be long or complicated or in which there are multiple defendants” (ABA Standards for Criminal Justice [2d ed], Special Functions of the Trial Judge, standard 6-3.7).

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Jasen, J.

(dissenting). I vote to reverse. By repeatedly rejecting, without good cause, the services of the only attorney to which he was constitutionally entitled, defendant waived his right to counsel. On this point, I am in complete agreement with the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice Richard D. Simons at the Appellate Division. (83 AD2d 205, 210-216.) I find it necessary, however, to comment briefly on the rationale employed by the majority in needlessly sustaining the reversal of defendant’s conviction for the brutal murder of a teen-age girl.

At the outset, certain facts should be noted. It is not contended that Bruce Carpenter, the Chief Assistant Public Defender assigned to represent the defendant, is other than an experienced, qualified and highly respected trial attorney. At no time in the course of these proceedings has defendant offered a valid reason for not accepting his services as counsel. Indeed, the record suggests that defendant’s refusal to accept Carpenter as his attorney was more the product of appellate counsel’s dissatisfaction with the political turnover in the Public Defender’s office than any real concern over defendant’s constitutional right to full and fair representation at trial.

Be that as it may, defendant at the time of trial was 31 years old and by no means unfamiliar with the criminal justice system. Not only had he served time on prior felony charges, but he was involved in a lengthy extradition proceeding in the State of Maine which ended in his return to this State to face the present murder charges. On both these occasions, defendant was represented by counsel and, as a result, fully exposed to the role played by an attorney in the course of a criminal proceeding.

Although defendant was indigent, there is no indication that he was ignorant or that he lacked a basic understanding of the English language. In fact, the record is directly to the contrary. On each of the several occasions that he was confronted with the choice of either accepting Carpenter or proceeding pro se, defendant, while adamantly refusing the Public Defender’s assistance, continuously professed an inability to represent himself. Such self-proclaimed incompetence is some indication that he was aware of and appreciated the dangers involved in not being represented by a lawyer at trial. Furthermore, the court specifically advised defendant of the seriousness of the charges he was facing and the term of life imprisonment that could follow upon conviction. In addition, defendant, in the course of his opening statement, expressly acknowledged that “[t]he law is very complex”, that “[a] man has to go through many years of schooling before he can become a lawyer” and asked the court how it expected him “to do this in a few months”.

Beyond this, the clearest indication of defendant’s subjective appreciation of the risks involved in pro se representation came from his own mouth. At one point in the pretrial proceedings, the defendant addressed the court as follows: “I’m not familiar with the proceedings going on here, and I have tried, to the best of my ability, to understand what’s happening, and something I have read, a Supreme Court Decision, Gideon vs. Wainwright: The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.’ ” (See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 344-345.)

Nevertheless, the majority has concluded that a new trial is in order because “the trial court did not ascertain that the defendant appreciated the risks of self-representation.” (At p 20.) Yet, I know of no case in which such a clear articulation on the pitfalls of pro se representation has come from the lips of the defendant himself. The majority blithely "passes over this part of the record with the unfounded suggestion that there is no way of telling whether defendant understood the significance of what he was saying or whether he was merely “reading uncomprehended language supplied to him by another.” (At p 22.) Such a view is not only highly speculative, but wholly unrealistic. The defendant’s recitation concerning the dangers of s*jlf-representation provides a far clearer indication of his personal appreciation of the particular risks involved than if the court had uttered the warnings and the defendant merely acknowledged his understanding by a simple “yes”.

Nor is there any possiblity that further dialogue between the court and the defendant concerning the dangers of self-representation would have altered defendant’s unyielding position concerning Carpenter’s assistance at trial. On numerous occasions throughout these proceedings, defendant made it clear that he would accept no attorney from the Public Defender’s office. Under the circumstances, further questioning by the trial court of the type suggested by the majority would have been futile. On this record, I can only conclude that defendant fully appreciated the danger of proceeding pro se and, despite the risks involved, refused the assistance of court-appointed counsel.

No constitutional rights will have been protected by ordering a new trial in this case. Rather, by sanctioning the type of gamesmanship practiced here, this court’s decision will only serve to further undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. No defendant faced with the constitutionally permissible choice of either accepting competent, court-appointed counsel or proceeding pro se should be able to straddle both rights and, in so doing, frustrate the course of a criminal trial. As one court has aptly noted: “ ‘[W]e have recognized a right of a defendant to proceed without counsel and to refuse the representation of assigned counsel. * * * [H]e may not use this right to play a “cat and mouse” game with the court * * * or by ruse or stratagem fraudulently seek to have the trial judge placed in a position where, in moving along the business of the court, the judge appears to be arbitrarily depriving the defendant of counsel.’” (Kates v Nelson, 435 F2d 1085, 1088-1089, quoting United States ex rel. Davis v McMann, 386 F2d 611, 618-619 [citations omitted].)

Having clearly and unequivocally rejected the only attorney to which he was constitutionally entitled, the sole option that remained was for the defendant to represent himself. He should now be bound by that election. Instead, he is given an unwarranted, second opportunity to put the People to the task of establishing his guilt at trial, five years after the crime was committed. Since it is likely that defendant will not have any different or better counsel on the retrial than was available to him at the first trial, I fully agree with Justice Simons that “[n]either justice nor the appearance that justice has been done is satisfied by such a result.” (83 AD2d, at p 216.)

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jones and Meyer concur with Judge Fuchsberg; Judge Jasen dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Judges Gabrielli and Wachtler concur.

Order affirmed.

      . The defendant even went so far as to bring an article 78 proceeding against the Trial Judge to seek assignment of counsel not associated with the Public Defender. The Fourth Department denied the application (app dsmd 45 NY2d 835).

      . (NY Const, art I, § 6; People v Koch, 299 NY 378, 381; US Const, 6th, 14th Arndts; Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25; Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335.)

      . The defendant made the following statement during discovery proceedings held on July 19, 1978: “I’m not familiar with the proceedings going on here, and I have tried, to the best of my ability, to understand what’s happening, and something I have read, a Supreme Court Decision, Gideon vs. Wainwright: ‘The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.’ ” (See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 344-345.)