text:
    [647 NE2d 762, 623 NYS2d 550]
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joseph Farrell, Appellant. Johnny Rivera, Appellant, v Justices of the New York State Supreme Court, Respondents.
    Argued January 3, 1995;
    decided February 16, 1995

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Elizabeth J. Miller, New York City, and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

      William L. Murphy, District Attorney of Richmond County, Staten Island (Jonathan J. Silbermann and Karen F. McGee of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

      Joel Atlas, New York City, and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

      Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General, New York City (Arnold D. Fleischer, Jerry Boone, Lillian Z. Cohen and Abigail I. Petersen of counsel), for respondents in the second above-entitied action.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Bellacosa, J.

These cases involve defendants who wish to pursue appeals as of right to the Appellate Division from denials, in postjudgment collateral proceedings, of vacatur of final criminal adjudications of guilt. The Legislature in 1971 curtailed such appeals as of right, restricting their availability only to a permissive procedure involving review and allowance by a single Justice of the Appellate Division before a full panel could review the merits (CPL 450.10, 450.15 [L 1971, ch 671]; CPL 460.15; compare, CPL 460.20). Because article VI, § 4 (k) of the New York Constitution froze the floor of the jurisdiction of the Appellate Divisions as it was in 1962, appellants claim that chapter 671 of the Laws of 1971 (§§ 1, 2) transgresses this constitutional limitation on legislative power.

Specifically, in the companion cases before us, we are faced with the denial of motions to vacate criminal judgments of conviction premised on (1) alleged prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct (CPL 440.10 [1] [f]), and (2) alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (CPL 440.10 [1] [h]). We conclude that article VI, §4 (k) of the New York Constitution does not restrict the Legislature from limiting a defendant’s right to appeal from nonfinal postjudgment collateral criminal proceeding orders denying vacatur of final judgments of conviction. Consequently, we uphold the respective orders of the Appellate Division in each case because the Legislature did not violate the article VI restraint.

L

People v Farrell

Defendant sought postjudgment relief, pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (f), to set aside his affirmed conviction of manslaughter in the first degree (judgment of conviction, Sup Ct, Richmond County, Jan. 4, 1991, affd 206 AD2d 541, lv denied 84 NY2d 825). He claimed prosecutorial trial prejudice because of an alleged Rosario violation (People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286, cert denied 368 US 866). Defendant complains of the prosecutor’s omission to provide defense counsel with an audio tape related to the preparation of the medical examiner’s autopsy report.

Supreme Court ruled that the audio tape was not Rosario material and denied defendant’s postjudgment effort (159 Mise 2d 992). The Appellate Division dismissed defendant’s appeal on the ground that an appeal as of right did not lie (decision and order on motion, Apr. 18, 1994; CPL 450.10, 450.15, 440.10 [1] [f]). Defendant now appeals, by leave of a Judge of this Court, alleging that this limitation on a criminal defendant’s automatic right to appeal a denial of a CPL 440.10 (1) (f) motion (premised on prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct not appearing on the record) violates article VI, § 4 (k) of the New York Constitution, as well as due process and equal protection guarantees.

II

Rivera v Justices of N. Y. State Supreme Ct.

Plaintiff Rivera was convicted of murder, second degree. The Appellate Division modified the judgment only by reducing the sentence and otherwise affirmed (133 AD2d 24). This Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s rejection of defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In a Per Curiam opinion, we ruled that defendant had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that counsel had acted less than adequately under the circumstances (People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709).

After this Court’s decision on the direct appeal, plaintiff filed a motion in Supreme Court to vacate the judgment on the same ineffective assistance of counsel grounds (CPL 440.10 [1] [h]). The motion was denied, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Also by motion, plaintiff sought leave to appeal the Supreme Court order (denying his motion to vacate judgment) to the Appellate Division and reserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of CPL 450.10 and 450.15. Plaintiff’s motion was denied by a Justice of the Appellate Division.

Subsequent to that denial, plaintiff’s counsel filed 10 copies of a brief in the Appellate Division for that Court’s upcoming term. The Appellate Division returned all the copies to plaintiff’s counsel with a card marked "rejected”. Counsel was subsequently informed by the Appellate Division that the briefs were rejected for lack of a jurisdictional predicate, but no formal court adjudication in this respect or order was rendered.

Plaintiff next moved in this Court for an order (1) deeming the Appellate Division’s "rejection” to be the equivalent of an order dismissing plaintiff’s appeal; or (2) directing the Appellate Division to issue an order reflecting its determination of the case. Plaintiff also made application to appeal to this Court from the Appellate Division Justice’s denial of leave to appeal to that Court. A Judge of this Court dismissed plaintiff’s leave application (76 NY2d 990; CPL 460.20). We also dismissed plaintiffs motion to this Court (76 NY2d 934). None of those determinations are procedurally appropriate for us to review or are before us.

Plaintiff finally commenced the instant action seeking a judgment declaring CPL 450.10 and 450.15 unconstitutional to the extent that they preclude appeals as of right from denials of CPL 440.10 (1) (h) motions, premised on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Supreme Court granted defendants Justices’ motion to dismiss, finding no constitutional violation based on either article VI, §4 (k) grounds or other constitutional claims.

The Appellate Division affirmed (200 AD2d 519), finding that: (1) the defendants Justices were not in an adversarial position with plaintiff and were, therefore, inappropriate parties against whom to seek declaratory relief; and (2) the order denying plaintiff’s CPL 440.10 motion was intermediate, not final, and that, therefore, no constitutional infirmity based on article VI, § 4 (k) existed. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to this Court, and we cocalendared this appeal with that in People v Farrell, now decided together because of the common issue.

III

CPL 450.10 prescribes and retains appeals as of right to intermediate appellate courts in certain instances that are not relevant in these cases. Denials of motions to vacate judgments made pursuant to CPL 440.10 are excluded from the as-of-right protocol. CPL 440.10 authorizes a court, upon motion of the defendant, to vacate a judgment of conviction on the grounds, among others, of "[i]mproper and prejudicial conduct [during trial] not appearing in the record” (CPL 440.10 [1] [f]) and "violation of a [defendant’s constitutional] right” (CPL 440.10 [1] [h]).

Appellants respectively claim, in their discrete procedural channels, that CPL 450.10 and 450.15 overstep the bounds of article VI, § 4 (k) of the New York Constitution because these provisions deprive defendants of preserved appeals as of right from a denial of a postjudgment conviction motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (f) or CPL 440.10 (1) (h).

Article VI, § 4 (k) of the New York Constitution fixed the floor of the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division as it existed on September 1, 1962 (People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264, 268). The Constitution declares:

"The appellate divisions of the supreme court shall have all the jurisdiction possessed by them on the effective date of this article [Sept. 1, 1962] and such additional jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law, provided, however, that the right to appeal to the appellate divisions from a judgment or order which does not finally determine an action or special proceeding may be limited or conditioned by law” (NY Const, art VI, § 4 [k]).

As of its effective date, the provision "permits the Legislature to expand the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division but not contract it, except with regard to appeals from nonfinal orders” (People v Pollenz, supra, at 270 [emphasis added]). Thus, New York Constitution, article VI, § 4 (k) precludes the Legislature from limiting appeals from final orders where "as of right” appeals existed as of September 1, 1962 (see, e.g, People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264, supra).

Appellants Farrell and Rivera, respectively, build their argument on a first foundational leg that an appeal as of right existed in 1962 from the denial of the equivalent of a motion to vacate a judgment on the grounds of prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellants assert that, in 1962, a collateral attack on a judgment for these grounds could have been brought in the form of a common-law writ of error coram nobis, and that an appeal as of right existed from the denial of coram nobis relief (Code Grim Proc §§ 517-519; L 1947, ch 706; L 1953, ch 602; People v Crimmins, 38 NY2d 407, 414).

A second, equally necessary, foundational leg of their argument is that the denial of the CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment constitutes a final order in a separate special proceeding. In support of their finality argument, appellants liken such postjudgment motions to habeas corpus proceedings. They assert that the better-late-than-never, off-the-record facts situations in collateral proceedings render those matters "special proceedings,” and that orders concluding them constitute final determinations. On these premises, appellants seek a declaration that CPL 450.10 and 450.15 undermine the jurisdictional preservation of article VI, §4 (k) of the New York Constitution.

IV.

Assuming without deciding the propriety of the declaratory judgment mode of appellant Rivera’s case against the Justices of the Supreme Court, appellants’ conclusion that article VI, §4 (k) is violated collapses under the finality premise. We conclude that a postjudgment motion to vacate a criminal adjudication, whose direct appeal track has run its course, is not a special proceeding. Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding governed by the CPLR (art 70). Coram nobis and its statutory look-alikes are tails to the criminal proceeding comet and are explicitly governed by the CPL. Thus, the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a criminal judgment, whether that motion is predicated on prosecutorial misconduct (CPL 440.10 [1] [fj) or ineffective assistance of counsel (CPL 440.10 [1] [h]), does not occur in a special proceeding and is nonfinal for purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction (see, People v Gersewitz, 294 NY 163, 168-169, cert dismissed 326 US 687; People v Thomas, 183 AD2d 457, 458, lv denied 80 NY2d 934; People v Simmonds, 182 AD2d 650, 651, lv denied 80 NY2d 910; People v Ghee, 153 AD2d 954, lv denied 76 NY2d 735; see also, People v Scanlon, 6 NY2d 185, 187-188; cf., Van Arsdale v King, 155 NY 325, 329-330). Due to the successory and necessarily interrelated nature of the order deciding the CPL 440.10 motion, the limitations of article VI, § 4 (k) do not circumscribe the Legislature’s range of authority in restricting these appeals to a permissive route only (see, People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264, 270, supra; People v Gersewitz, supra; see also, People v Scanlon, supra; cf., Van Arsdale v King, supra). It bears emphasizing that the Legislature did not eliminate such appeal opportunities, but merely interposed judicial screening reviews to allow permissively only those appeals that merit further full Court examination.

V.

The general nature of both a postjudgment motion to vacate a judgment of conviction and an order denying such a motion have previously been considered by this Court (People v Gersewitz, 294 NY 163, 168-169, cert dismissed 326 US 687, supra). In People v Gersewitz, decided in 1945, the issue was whether, absent express statutory authority, an appeal as of right existed from the Court’s refusal to vacate a judgment where defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (294 NY 163, 166, supra). Gersewitz was decided before the enactment of CPL 440.10 (L 1970, ch 996) and prior to the existence of any statutory right to appeal a judgment of conviction on grounds not appearing in the record (People v Gersewitz, id., at 167). Prior to Gersewitz, we recognized, however, the Court’s "inherent power” to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, violation of defendant’s constitutional rights or other similar trial errors (id., at 167, citing Matter of Lyons v Goldstein, 290 NY 19). Additionally, prior to 1947, there was no statutory right, permissive or as-of-right, for a defendant to appeal the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment of conviction (People v Gersewitz, supra, at 166; see, Code Crim Proc §§ 517-519; L 1947, ch 706; L 1953, ch 602 [explicitly providing for appeal as of right from denial of coram nobis relief]).

In holding that an appeal as of right did not lie in Gersewitz, we likened the defendant’s postjudgment motion (brought under the auspices of the Court’s then-recognized "inherent power”) to proceedings initiated by the common-law writ of coram nobis (People v Gersewitz, 294 NY 163, 168, cert dismissed 326 US 687, supra). Considering the traditional, historical and functional features of habeas corpus, we clearly distinguished between habeas corpus proceedings and the postjudgment collateral proceeding avenue seeking vacatur of judgment in Gersewitz (id., at 168-169).

We held that, in contradistinction to the habeas corpus track, the Gersewitz defendant’s underlying motion was not a "special proceeding,” and the order denying the relief was not final (id., at 168). We reasoned that habeas corpus proceedings were indeed special proceedings given that (1) they were classified by statute as separate civil proceedings; and (2) in a habeas corpus proceeding, a defendant seeks to invoke the power of a court other than the original court in which the prosecution was had and the conviction rendered (id.). On these significant distinctions, we treated orders in habeas corpus proceedings as final for purposes of jurisdictional and appellate analysis.

Using these guideposts, we found a postjudgment motion to vacate a conviction to be markedly different from habeas corpus (id., at 168-169). A motion collaterally attacking a judgment of conviction was not defined by statute to be a separate special proceeding (id., at 168). Moreover, we noted that a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction invoked only those powers of the same court in which the original prosecution and judgment of conviction was had (id.). The motion was, therefore, directly derived from and connected to the criminal proceeding (id.). Thus, statutorily and functionally, we found the postjudgment motion to vacate to be distinguishable from a habeas corpus proceeding (id., at 168-169). The motion’s interrelatedness with the original criminal proceeding logically and appropriately led to our conclusion that a denial of such a motion was an intermediate, not final, order (id.).

Our reasoning and result in People v Gersewitz are still substantively sound and relevant to resolving the central issue in the cases at bar. CPL 440.10, in substantial effect and sweep, codified already existing postjudgment remedies which could have been raised under coram nobis, including motions to vacate premised on prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel claims (see, People v Bachert, 69 NY2d 593, 598; Denzer, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11 A, CPL 440.10, at 183 [1971]; Cohen, Post-Conviction Relief in the New York Court of Appeals: New Wine and Broken Bottles, 35 Brook L Rev 1, 11-14). Thus, the People v Gersewitz rationale, which focuses on coram nobis proceedings, applies with equal analytical and jurisprudential force in the CPL 440.10 arena (see, People v Bachert, 69 NY2d 593, 598, supra; People v Thomas, 183 AD2d 457, 458, lv denied 80 NY2d 934, supra; People v Simmonds, 182 AD2d 650, 651 [likening CPL 440.10 motion to coram nobis relief], lv denied 80 NY2d 910, supra; People v Ghee, 153 AD2d 954, 955, lv denied 76 NY2d 735, supra).

Substantively, we also reject appellants’ claim that a post-judgment motion to vacate pursuant to CPL 440.10 constitutes a habeas-corpus-like or other "special proceeding” categorization for purposes of analyzing jurisdictional implications of the constitutional appellate limitation. A motion to vacate a judgment of conviction bears none of the indicia of a special proceeding (see, CPLR 403; Alexander, Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 403, 1995 Pocket Part, C403:l, at 129-131). The motion to vacate the judgment of conviction (1) does not seek a judgment; (2) is not commenced by filing notice of petition or an order to show cause; (3) does not require service of process and a pleading; and (4) is not designated by specific statutory authority (contrast, CPLR 403; see, Alexander, Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 403, 1995 Pocket Part, C403:l, at 129-131; see also, CPLR 7001-7012 [habeas corpus article]).

In addition, the decision to deny a postjudgment motion to vacate neither " 'add[s] to nor detracts] from the rights of the parties as already determined’ ” (Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, at 145 [rev ed], quoting Mokarzel v Mokarzel, 224 NY 340, 342; see, People v Scanlon, 6 NY2d 185, 187-188, supra; Matter of Town of Johnstown v City of Gloversville, 36 AD2d 143, appeal dismissed 29 NY2d 639). The postjudgment motion to vacate has no independent juridical function or existence and is inextricably tied to and incident to the original, seminal, finalized criminal proceeding that already ran its direct procedural appellate course (People v Gersewitz, 294 NY 163, 168-169, cert dismissed 326 US 687, supra; see, People v Scanlon, supra). Cohen and Karger teaches that "[t]here can hardly be two final determinations reaching identically the same result, in a single litigation; one or the other must be the final determination” (Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, at 145, op. cit).

Consequently, the orders denying the petitioners’ respective CPL 440.10 motions to vacate judgments of conviction are nonfinal, and the Legislature acted in accordance with article VI, § 4 (k) of the New York Constitution, not in violation of it (see, People v Gersewitz, supra; People v Thomas, 183 AD2d 457, 458, lv denied 80 NY2d 934, supra; People v Simmonds, 182 AD2d 650, 651, lv denied 80 NY2d 910, supra; People v Ghee, 153 AD2d 954, 955, lv denied 76 NY2d 735, supra; see also, People v Scanlon, 6 NY2d 185, 187-188, supra; cf., Van Arsdale v King, 155 NY 325, 329-330, supra).

We have considered both appellants’ additional points in each matter and conclude that they are without merit and warrant no additional discussion.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division in People v Farrell should be affirmed; the order in Rivera v Justices of N. Y. State Supreme Ct. should be modified, without costs, by granting judgment declaring that CPL 450.10 and 450.15, insofar as challenged here, are constitutional, and as so modified, affirmed.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.

In People v Farrell: Order affirmed.

In Rivera v Justices of N. Y. State Supreme Ct.: Order modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Titone, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    [647 NE2d 1243, 623 NYS2d 735]
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Fernando Luperon, Appellant.
    Argued October 19, 1994;
    decided January 12, 1995

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Laura Boyd, New York City, and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant.

      Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn (Ann Bordley, Roseann B. MacKechnie and Richard T. Faughnan of counsel), for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Titone, J.

Defendant was charged with attempted murder and related offenses in a felony complaint that was filed on August 2, 1989. More than 15 months later, defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the People’s October 26, 1990 statement of readiness came too late to satisfy their obligations under CPL 30.30. Inasmuch as a bench warrant for defendant had been issued and was outstanding during a substantial portion of the period between defendant’s arraignment and the People’s readiness declaration, the critical issue is the extent to which the People may rely on the exclusion provided in CPL 30.30 (4) (c) to excuse their protracted unreadiness. Resolution of that question, in turn, depends on whether the entire period between the issuance of a bench warrant for defendant’s arrest and the People’s readiness declaration is excludable even though a 69-day portion of that period elapsed before efforts to execute the warrant were initiated. Concluding that the police’s subsequent efforts to enforce the warrant do not insulate the People from judicial review of their prior inaction, we hold that the 69-day period of inaction is not excludable and that, in the absence of a cognizable explanation for other prereadiness delays, the indictment should have been dismissed.

I

Defendant, who was accused of wounding his landlord in a shooting incident, was arraigned on a felony complaint on August 2, 1989. He was released two days later when the prosecutor informed the court that no Grand Jury action had yet been taken against him (see, CPL 180.80). Defendant did not appear on the next scheduled adjourn date, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Defendant was arrested on unrelated charges on October 16, 1989, at which time the existence of the outstanding bench warrant was discovered. Since the Grand Jury had still not acted on the charges arising from the shooting incident, the court once again released defendant on his own recognizance four days later (see, id.).

Defendant was indicted for crimes associated with the assault on his landlord on December 8, 1989, but no Supreme Court arraignment was scheduled and no notice was sent to defendant or his attorney (see, CPL 210.10 [2]). An ex parte order for defendant’s arrest was issued on December 19, 1989. Defendant did not appear until October 5, 1990, when he was located and returned on the warrant. At that point, the People requested and were granted a short-term adjournment. Their "readiness” declaration was made on the adjourn date, October 26, 1990.

One month later, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the People were inexcusably "unready” for a total of "451 days,” far more than the 184 days that CPL 30.30 allowed them in these circumstances. According to the defense papers, a large segment of this period — i.e., the "289-day period” between the issuance of the second bench warrant (December 19, 1989) and defendant’s return on that warrant (October 5, 1990) — was not excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (c) because the People had not exercised due diligence in locating defendant during that period. Defendant also argued that the People were accountable for an additional "162 days” of unexcused delay. Notably, although there were no errors in the relevant dates cited in defendant’s motion papers, defense counsel had miscalculated the number of days involved in the various identified periods. In fact, the period between the issuance of the bench warrant and defendant’s return was 290 days, the additional days of claimed unexcused delay totaled 192 and the full period that defendant identified as being chargeable to the People totaled 482 days. Inasmuch as the court had indicated that "the hearing will be the determining factor” and that a lengthy reply was unnecessary, the prosecutor submitted only a brief responsive affirmation, stating that "[a] review of the papers submitted establish that the defendant’s motion will depend on the efforts made by the Police Department in arresting the defendant on the various warrants.”

At the hearing, the People called Police Officer Elliot Rice, who had been assigned the responsibility of executing the December 19, 1989 warrant on February 26, 1990. Rice immediately made inquiries about defendant with the Correction Department. In April 1990, he made an unsuccessful attempt to locate defendant at the address on the warrant. Over the succeeding few months, Rice made an inquiry at the Post Office, contacted the Correction Department again, checked with the Department of Motor Vehicles, visited a second address listed on defendant’s rap sheet and revisited defendant’s former landlady, the complainant’s wife. Finally, on October 4, 1990, defendant was located and arrested after his former landlady spotted him in the neighborhood and notified Rice.

During the oral argument following the hearing, defense counsel argued that although some efforts were made to locate defendant after February 26, 1990, there was no showing of any similar efforts between that date and December 19, 1989, the date the warrant was issued. Consequently, defense counsel contended, that period was not excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (c). And, when that period was added to other identified periods of unexcused delay, the statutorily authorized time for the People to become ready had been exceeded.

The People responded by arguing that Officer Rice had made "all reasonable * * * effort” to execute the warrant and that "the People are [not] under any obligation to pursue every potential avenue.” With respect to "the other aspect of defendant’s motion,” the prosecutor argued that a "substantial amount of th[e] time [before indictment] is excludable [if, in fact, defendant had put in a notice that he wished to testify before the Grand Jury].” Additionally, the prosecutor stated, "[t]he People have a reasonable time to arraign that would be excludable.”

On the basis of the argument and evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court ruled that the People had demonstrated over-all diligence, notwithstanding that two months had elapsed before their efforts to enforce the December 19, 1989 warrant began. Consequently, defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion for dismissal was denied, and the matter proceeded to trial. Defendant was ultimately convicted of one count of first degree assault and one count of second degree criminal possession of a weapon. The judgment of conviction was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Division, which enumerated Officer Rice’s efforts and found that they amounted to the requisite diligence. This appeal, taken by permission of a Judge of this Court, ensued.

II

Defendant’s appeal presents yet another variant on the question of the People’s CPL 30.30 obligation to ready their case during the absence or unavailability of the accused. The focus of the inquiry is CPL 30.30 (4) (c), which excludes from the calculation of the People’s readiness time "the period extending from the day the court issues a bench warrant pursuant to [CPL] 530.70 because of the defendant’s failure to appear in court when required, to the day the defendant subsequently appears in the court”. A condition precedent to the use of this provision is a showing that "the defendant [wa]s absent or unavailable and has either escaped from custody or has previously been released on bail or on his own recognizance” (CPL 30.30 [4] [c]). Under the statute, "[a] defendant must be considered absent whenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence” (id.). A defendant is "unavailable” "whenever his location is known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence” (id.).

Defendant’s first argument on this appeal is that the above-quoted provision, which was adopted to mitigate the effects of this Court’s decision in People v Sturgis (38 NY2d 625; see, People v Bolden, 81 NY2d 146, 152; Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11 A, CPL 30.30, at 171-172), is inapplicable to his case. As defendant points out, he was never notified of his indictment or of a scheduled arraignment date. Accordingly, defendant argues, the December 19, 1989 bench warrant was not one that was issued "because of the defendant’s failure to appear in court when required,” and the specific language of CPL 30.30 (4) (c) that was aimed at cases involving certain absconders is unavailable (cf., People v Bolden, supra, at 153, n 3).

Whether or not defendant’s argument has merit, it was not raised in the trial court and therefore cannot be considered here. While the defense may satisfy its initial burden under CPL 30.30 by alleging only that the prosecution failed to declare readiness within the statutorily prescribed time period (see, e.g., People v Cortes, 80 NY2d, at 201; People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333), that principle concerns the substantive burden of proof and does not alter the basic rules of preservation, which determine what questions are reviewable in this Court (see, CPL 470.05 [2]). Those rules require, at the very least, that any matter which a party wishes the appellate court to decide have been brought to the attention of the trial court at a time and in a way that gave the latter the opportunity to remedy the problem and thereby avert reversible error. In the CPL 30.30 context, the People must ordinarily identify the exclusions on which they intend to rely, and the defense must identify any legal or factual impediments to the use of these exclusions. Where, as here, the defense anticipates the People’s reliance on a particular exclusion and makes specific arguments about its availability, it cannot subsequently change course and make an entirely different argument on appeal about the same exclusion.

III

Turning to the argument that defense counsel did make before the trial court, we conclude that, as defendant contended, at least some of the period during which the December 19, 1989 bench warrant was outstanding is not excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (c). As we have recently held, a showing of diligent efforts to execute the bench warrant referred to in the statute is a prerequisite to the application of the statutory exclusion (People v Bolden, 81 NY2d 146, supra). While the question whether the People have exercised diligence in locating an individual is a mixed question of law and fact (see generally, People v Ayala, 75 NY2d 422, 428; People v Arroyo, 54 NY2d 567, 573-574, cert denied 456 US 979; People v Maneiro, 49 NY2d 769, 770; People v Budd, 46 NY2d 930), this Court may nevertheless inquire into whether the fact finder’s conclusions are supported by the record (see, People v Bolden, supra, at 155; see generally, People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 477-478).

In this case, both courts below found that the People had exercised the requisite diligence, but, with respect to the period between December 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990, that finding was not supported by any evidence on the record. Although the People’s only witness, Officer Rice, was able to describe the police’s efforts to locate defendant after the warrant was assigned to him on February 26th, he knew nothing of the efforts, if any, that were made before that date. Thus, no showing at all of diligence was made.

We reject the People’s suggestion that we should excuse the period of preassignment delay in recognition of the need to "process” bench warrants after they have been issued by Judges. In effect, the People are asking us to adopt a blanket exception for "reasonable administrative delay.” We conclude, however, that the adoption of such an exception is inappropriate, since the "due diligence” standard that is mandated by the statute is flexible enough to permit consideration of processing demands where warranted by the demonstrated facts. Our holding is not that time spent processing a warrant is always chargeable to the People but simply that, as a matter of law, there were no facts here from which a court could infer the requisite diligence, administrative or otherwise.

Contrary to the People’s contention, we are not prevented from considering their lack of diligence during the period from December 19, 1989 to February 26, 1990 because of the lower courts’ finding that the People acted diligently overall in their efforts to enforce the warrant. Nor does our holding mandate an unwarranted "[d]issection” of the prearrest period or otherwise increase the burden of law enforcement (dissenting opn, at 89). Speedy trial analysis has always taken discrete, logical time periods and determined whether, for some unifying reason, a particular period is or is not includable in the speedy trial time. Indeed, CPL 30.30 (4) (c) excludes only those specific "periods” when the authorities have acted with due diligence in attempting to locate or apprehend the defendant (People v Bolden, supra, at 150, 151-152). Thus, the statutory language itself mandates consideration of the excludability of discrete, legally relevant blocks of time within the total period of the People’s unreadiness. While it may often be difficult or impractical to divide the period of warrant enforcement into segments for purposes of analysis under CPL 30.30 (4) (c), no such difficulty is present in this case, where a clear line can be drawn between the period before and the period after the warrant was assigned to a police officer and the efforts to enforce it began (see, People v Fuggazzatto, 62 NY2d 862).

Additionally, it is no answer to suggest that the blame should be shifted to the defendant because of his failure to return to court. Defendant was released on October 20, 1989, before any indictment had been issued. Even after the indictment was filed on December 8, 1989, defendant was not given notice of a date that he should appear in court for arraignment.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the 69 days of delay between the date the warrant was issued and the date that it was assigned for enforcement are not excludable under the Sturgis amendment to CPL 30.30 (4) (c). Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, in the area of bench warrants, law enforcement officials are not privileged to adopt policies of "not churning their available law enforcement resources in chasing after the throngs of fugitives from justice” (dissenting opn, at 87). Those officials are bound by their oaths of office to make all reasonable efforts to enforce judicially issued warrants (see, People v Bolden, supra, at 154-155). Additionally, this Court is not privileged to defer to law enforcement’s resource-allocation choices; rather, it is duty-bound to determine whether the law enforcement arm of government has acted in compliance with CPL 30.30’s "due diligence” command. Notably, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion (dissenting opn, at 87), the People are chargeable with all unready time unless they can establish a statutorily recognized exclusion (e.g., People v Cortes, supra), and, in the case of exclusions claimed under CPL 30.30 (4) (c), the People must establish as co-equal elements both that the defendant was missing and that they exercised diligence.

IV.

When the 69-day period of delay between the date the court issued the warrant and the date it was assigned for enforcement is added to the other unexcused periods of prereadiness delay, the total period of the People’s unexcused unreadiness exceeds the six months permitted by the statute. Defendant’s motion papers placed in issue the entire period of delay before the People’s readiness declaration, including the 43 days between defendant’s arraignment (August 2, 1989) and his first failure to appear (September 14, 1989), the 85 days between that date and the filing of the indictment (December 8, 1989), the 11 days between the filing of the indictment and the issuance of the second bench warrant (December 19, 1989) and the 21 days between defendant’s return on the warrant (October 5, 1990) and the People’s readiness declaration (October 26, 1990) (a total of 160 days). Under well-established principles, the People had the burden of showing their entitlement to a statutory exclusion for some, if not all, of these periods (see, People v Cortes, supra, at 213; People v Santos, supra; People v Berkowitz, supra). Inasmuch as the People failed to offer any basis for excluding these periods, the 160 days they encompass must be added to the 69 days of unexcused unreadiness that elapsed between December 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990, resulting in a total unexcused delay that substantially exceeds what is permitted by CPL 30.30 (see, People v Cortes, supra; People v Santos, supra,).

We reject the People’s contention that defendant’s claims with regard to these additional 160 days were "unpreserved” and therefore cannot form the basis for an appellate dismissal under CPL 30.30. Although she had no burden to do so, defense counsel specifically referred to these periods in her detailed motion papers. Thus, there can be no doubt that the defense raised a "question of law” with regard to the People’s unreadiness during those periods. Moreover, since the People did not raise an issue with regard to these periods during the CPL 30.30 hearing, defense counsel’s failure to mention all of them during that hearing cannot be regarded as a waiver or an abandonment of the underlying issues.

We also reject the People’s argument that they should be afforded a second chance to litigate the excludability of these additional periods because the trial court’s statements and the arithmetic errors in defense counsel’s papers lulled them into believing that their excludability was not outcome determinative. The People’s reliance on defense counsel’s erroneous computation was unjustified, since the periods of delay in question were clearly and correctly identified in counsel’s motion papers and there was nothing to prevent the prosecutor from making his own calculations and drawing his own conclusions about the number of days of claimed delay that were at stake.

Nor do the trial court’s statements furnish a justification for the People’s failure to explain or excuse the People’s unreadiness during the prewarrant and postreturn periods identified in defendant’s motion papers. The People now claim that before the hearing on defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion began, the trial court "narrowed the issues * * * to the single question of whether the * * * period from December 19, 1989 to October 5, 1990 should be charged to the People,” but the claim is simply not supported by the record. The trial court merely told the prosecutor that he need not submit detailed response papers because "the hearing will be the determining factor.” Thus, insofar as the record reveals, it was the prosecutor who "narrowed” the scope of the inquiry, first by submitting an affirmation stating his view that resolution of the motion would depend on the police’s diligence "in arresting the defendant on the various warrants,” and thereafter by limiting his hearing proof to the efforts the police made to locate defendant following the issuance of the December 19, 1989 warrant.

Hence, there was no judicial "error of law which functionally deprive[d] the People of their * * * opportunity to put in their case” or otherwise caused them to limit their proof to the period of defendant’s second absence (People v Giles, 73 NY2d 666, 671; see, People v Crandall, 69 NY2d 459, 464-465; see also, People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94, 102). Indeed, the record does not even demonstrate the existence of an informal understanding that might have led the prosecutor to believe that he could safely limit his proof. Moreover, any prosecutorial assumption that the outcome would necessarily rest on the excludability of the period from December 19, 1989 to October 5, 1990 as a whole would have to have been dispelled when defense counsel specifically argued during the hearing that even if some of that period were excludable, the segment of time between the issuance of the warrant and its assignment to Officer Rice for enforcement was not. This argument, coupled with defense counsel’s additional hearing argument concerning delays during two other discrete periods, was certainly sufficient to place the prosecutor on notice that the excludability of delays outside the December 19, 1989 to October 5, 1990 period could become important — or even dispositive — in resolving defendant’s entitlement to a CPL 30.30 dismissal.

Since defense counsel’s oral and written arguments gave adequate warning that defendant’s position did not rise or fall with the disposition of that period as a whole, it was incumbent upon the prosecutor to offer some more specific and fact-based explanation for the other delays than that "[t]he People have a reasonable time to arraign” (but see, People v Cortes, 80 NY2d, at 213, supra; People v Correa, 77 NY2d 930) and that a "substantial amount” of the time before indictment might be excludable if, in fact, defendant had requested to testify before the Grand Jury. In this regard, it is worth repeating that the excludability of any period of prereadiness delay is a question on which the prosecution has the burden of proof (e.g., People v Santos, supra; People v Berkowitz, supra).

V.

Because of the People’s failure to establish the excludability of at least 160 days outside of the December 19, 1989-to-October 5, 1990 period and because of their failure to prove that they exercised due diligence during the 69 days that elapsed between the December 19, 1989 issuance of the bench warrant and the date that the warrant was assigned for enforcement, there exists a total of more than 184 days of unexcused prereadiness delay. Consequently, the People did not satisfy their statutory readiness obligation and the motion to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30 should have been granted.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the indictment dismissed.

Bellacosa, J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent and vote to affirm defendant’s conviction of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The essential question in this case turns on the trial court’s mixed law and fact determination that is affirmed by the Appellate Division. Since the majority bypasses that procedural obstacle, which would compel affirmance in this Court, and reaches the merits of this CPL 30.30 (4) (c) issue, we disagree with its imposition of a confusing and extraordinary "undue” diligence gloss on the statute.

I.

The merits issue on this appeal is whether the People satisfied the "due diligence” exception under CPL 30.30 (4) (c) with respect to their readiness to proceed to trial against a fugitive defendant. Due diligence, by its nature and function, is an elastic concept, best determined judicially on a record-by-record evidentiary weighing. That elasticity and appropriate respect for the fact-finding distribution of judicial authority are displaced by the holding of this case. Instead, fractionalized time line and time interval appraisals are mandated as a matter of law from this final judicial review perch (compare, People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445). The new mandate lacks jurisprudential realism or justification.

Reversal of this conviction and outright dismissal of the serious criminal charges, in our view, are unwarranted because:

(1) the People satisfied their statutory duty and burden;

(2) this counter-intuitive result finds no precedential support;

(3) the language and legislative history of CPL 30.30 do not support the strained statutory construction (see, People v White, 73 NY2d 468, cert denied 493 US 859);

(4) this result ”breed[s] contempt” for law and the judicial process generally and especially among defendants who receive a bonanza for negligent or intentional failure to return to court (Mem of State Exec Dept, 1972 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 3259; see also, Matter of Jose R., 83 NY2d 388); and

(5) the rationale imposes undue burdens on the People and the trial courts.

II.

On August 2, 1989, defendant was arrested and arraigned upon a felony complaint charging him with attempted murder. Defendant shot his .38 caliber revolver through his apartment door when his landlord presented himself to collect the rent. The landlord was seriously injured. Defendant was released two days later on his own recognizance, with his understanding reflected to the trial court that he should be present on September 14, 1989 (see, Temporary Order of Protection in favor of assault victim against defendant, signed by defendant). Defendant failed to appear, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. On October 16, 1989, defendant was arrested and arraigned on a new offense and remained in custody until October 20, at which time the court again released him on $25,000 bail. On December 8, 1989, the Grand Jury indicted defendant, and on December 19, 1989, another arrest warrant was issued to secure his presence in court to answer the criminal charges. Approximately 10 months passed before defendant was again involuntarily returned to court on the warrant.

At the due diligence hearing, Police Officer Elliot Rice, an officer with over 16 years experience and member of the Kings County Warrant Squad, testified that he was assigned defendant’s warrant on February 26, 1990, at which time he requested photos of the defendant. At the time Officer Rice received defendant’s warrant, he had as many as 60 other warrants to execute. On March 1, he requested the Department of Correction to check whether defendant was incarcerated on any unrelated charge. After receiving a negative response, Officer Rice continued his search by visiting defendant’s address listed on the warrant. On June 8, he visited a different address listed on defendant’s rap sheet, but was informed that defendant did not reside at that location. Also, Officer Rice did a postal check and ran a search with the Department of Motor Vehicles. On July 12, 1990, Officer Rice again checked with the Department of Correction but received another negative response. Finally, on October 4, 1990, defendant was captured after defendant’s former landlady, the assault victim’s spouse, spotted defendant back in the neighborhood and reported that to Officer Rice.

At the conclusion of the due diligence hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion, holding that the efforts made by the Warrant Squad were sufficient to meet the due diligence standard. In making this finding, the court stated correctly that "[i]t is not required that the police make attempts every week or every month; or that all possible avenues are exhausted. What is required and what the standard is [is] a reasonable attempt to locate the defendant and it is this Court’s finding[ ] that the People have met that burden.”

The Appellate Division stated in affirming:

"Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, he was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial * * *. Although approximately 14-Mi months elapsed between commencement of this criminal action * * *, and the People’s announcement of readiness for trial, this delay was directly attributable to the defendant’s absence * * *. We conclude that the People satisfied their obligation to attempt to determine the defendant’s location through the exercise of due diligence” (194 AD2d 807, 807-808 [citations omitted]).

Despite the undisturbed and mixed findings of law and fact made by the courts below, this Court now carves 69 days out of the due diligence determination of those courts. The lower courts’ decisions appropriately considered and covered the whole period of defendant’s absence. This Court declares that the 69-day extrapolation effects a violation of CPL 30.30 as a matter of law.

III.

CPL 30.30 is not a speedy trial statute. It is a prosecution ready rule (see, Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11 A, CPL 30.30 [Historical Background], at 167-168, 172; see also, People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 535). Section 30.30 (4) (c) states in pertinent part:

"In computing the time within which the people must be ready for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two, the following periods must he excluded: * * *
"(c) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant or, where the defendant is absent or unavailable and has either escaped from custody or has previously been released on bail or on his own recognizance, the period extending from the day the court issues a bench warrant pursuant to section 530.70 because of the defendant’s failure to appear in court when required, to the day the defendant subsequently appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or voluntarily or otherwise. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence” (CPL 30.30 [4] [c] [emphasis added]).

Thus, any period of readiness delay resulting from defendant’s absence must be excluded from the time chargeable to the People. That is the major premise of the statute itself. Absented time is chargeable to the People only if the People do not employ due diligence to locate a defendant (CPL 30.30 [4] [c]), or if they adopt a uniform policy of not churning their available law enforcement resources in chasing after the throngs of fugitives from justice (see, People v Leone, 65 NY2d 674, 675; People v Bratton, 65 NY2d 675, 677).

Defendant, nevertheless, argues that, as a matter of law, the prosecution cannot benefit from the plain, threshold statutory exclusion of time if some chunk or aggregated portion of his absence can be isolated from the People’s over-all due diligence effort to relocate and recapture him. Defendant’s exclusive support for this bold proposition, not found in the statute itself, is his perfunctory assertion that generalized law enforcement inaction might otherwise be encouraged. This argument suffers from numerous flaws. First, there is no statutory, legislative or precedential authority to support such a counter-intuitive flip of the due diligence prong of CPL 30.30 (4). Also, the argument resonates with a policy choice that belongs to the Legislature, not the courts. This case, after all, involves pure statutory construction, not common-law or constitutional adjudication, with respect to which courts have a significantly greater substantive role and responsibility.

Statutes should be construed according to the ordinary meaning of their words (see, People v White, 73 NY2d 468, 473, cert denied 493 US 859, supra). We have recently and unanimously emphasized in analogous circumstances that "Application of this cardinal rule * * * is not to be mechanically applied when an absurd or futile result would ensue, especially one at variance with the policy and purpose of the legislation” (Matter of Jose R., 83 NY2d 388, 393, supra). Accordingly, the controlling guidance in interpreting statutes is the legislative intent, expression, purpose and history (People v White, supra, at 473; see also, People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 535, supra).

Undeniably, section 30.30 was enacted to encourage prompt attention and resolution of criminal charges. Indeed, upon signing this measure into law, the Governor stated that this law "will provide a strong inducement for more rapid disposition of criminal cases in a manner consistent with available resources and the need to avoid creating additional danger to public safety” (Governor’s Approval Mem, 1972 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 3385). As to delays caused by defendants, the statute flatly recognizes that defendants are individually responsible for the time of their own absences from court when their whereabouts cannot be determined with due diligence by law enforcement authorities (see, CPL 30.30 [4] [c]). This Court has even acknowledged that the 1984 amendment to CPL 30.30 was designed to "lessen” the People’s burdens in defendant "absence or unavailability” circumstances (People v Bolden, 81 NY2d 146, 153, 158).

The determinative question, therefore, is not when the due diligence effort to locate and retrieve a fugitive defendant commences. At its most elemental level in these absent defendant situations, this case reduces to what is "diligence”, what is “due,” and when. This case is not just another “variant” (majority opn, at 77) of defendant unavailability, nor a mere burden of persuasion matter, nor simply about something called an ”[i]n effect” “reasonable administrative delay” exception (majority opn, at 79). Rather, the dispositive consideration is whether courts should examine the entire spectrum of efforts the People deploy to satisfy the flexible statutory concept of due diligence over the full span of a defendant’s unauthorized “holiday” from court in avoidance of answering criminal charges. That is precisely what both lower courts did. The majority scuttles that approach and substitutes a new judicial exercise and review, despite its disclaimer to the contrary. Dissection into discrete, daily, due diligence accounting periods and time intervals to determine when and to what extent the People satisfied the general statutory “due diligence” requirement is the inevitable consequence of today’s ruling.

Without question, the practical consequence of this new rule is a command to overburdened and conscientious law enforcement personnel that they henceforth keep pursuing and rearresting hosts of defendants continuously during pretrial release periods, no matter how many times courts set them free pending trial. Segmentation and aggregation of days and time frames are logically and inexorably the kinds of calculations that will have to be done from now on in judicial assessments of due diligence at every level. The new rubrics create a functionally impossible accounting and accountability burden in these multitudinous fugitive-from-justice scenarios that will result in uneven applications. Moreover, it is placed on the wrong parties and enables and facilitates accuseds to evade personal responsibility from answering for their criminal misdeeds (compare for practical consequences, People v Antommarchi, 80 NY2d 247, rearg denied 81 NY2d 759).

We emphasize that we would not diminish one iota the People’s accountability for their “readiness” and “due diligence” in accordance with the statute’s explicit commands. Correspondingly, however, released accuseds should be accountable for the sine qua non of their pretrial release— returning to court as the law requires. Without question, defendant knew of his responsibility to return to court by the express terms of the order of protection which he signed. Also, he cannot feign blissful ignorance of the fact of the unresolved felony complaint, which he knew all about and for which he kept getting arrested. Accordingly, there is no basis to excuse his absence on some lack of follow-up notice, as though the criminal charges had evaporated merely because of his release. No reasonable person and no reasonable rule of law or burden of proof should tolerate and condone such coy escapism.

By accepting defendant’s due diligence gloss on CPL 30.30, the majority erases any day of reckoning for these serious criminal charges. The emergence of this latest statutory twist that imposes continuous daily investigations into the whereabouts of every released missing defendant, as the pinpointed measurements of due diligence, will surprise the enactors and amendors of CPL 30.30 and delight the beneficiaries of this interpretative largesse (compare, People v White, 73 NY2d 468, cert denied 493 US 859, supra).

The majority purports to limit the sweep of its holding by stating that "[wjhile it may often be difficult or impractical to divide the period of warrant enforcement into segments for purposes of analysis under CPL 30.30 (4) (c), no such difficulty is present in this case, where a clear line can be drawn between the period before and the period after the warrant was assigned to a police officer and the efforts to enforce it began” (majority opn, at 80). That line drawing is pure fact-finding analysis and creates a maze of a rule for future application in every level of the court system. Moreover, two illustrations using the very facts of this case demonstrate, additionally, the transparency of the purported limitation which is reflected repeatedly in fact-differentiated terms and analysis (majority opn, at 78, 79-80).

Warrant Officer Rice attempted to locate defendant on only the following dates: February 26, March 1, April 11, May 16, May 30, June 8, June 21 and July 12, 1990. Thus, courts can isolate the following periods which represent blocks of time when law enforcement was not actively pursuing defendant: February 27 — February 28; March 2 — April 10; April 12 — May 15; May 17 — May 29; June 1 — June 7; June 9 — June 20; June 22 — July 11; and July 13 — October 4, 1990. Since there is no "evidence on the record” that the police "exercised the requisite diligence” (majority opn, at 78) during these time periods, and it is not "difficult” or "impractical” to segment these time periods, under the majority’s precedential reasoning, these periods, when challenged by defendants, must also be charged against the People. Second, if a Warrant Officer did some preliminary, timely, locating activity upon issuance of the warrant and then allowed a 69-day hiatus to occur to chase other fugitives, that interim block of time would fall on the People’s nondue diligence ledger — unless a tolling concept is also going to be added to the fractionalized due diligence concept. These are mere samples of the real world impacts of today’s precedent — a day-by-day due diligence "sword of Damocles” in every case.

IV.

The stated purpose of CPL 30.30 was to better utilize judicial resources to "attack * * * case backlogs” (Mem of State Exec Dept, 1972 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 3259, 3260), to "provide a strong inducement for more rapid disposition of criminal cases in a manner consistent with available resources,” (Governor’s Approval Mem, op. cit., at 3385) and "[t]o promote prompt trials for defendants” (Mem of State Exec Dept, op. cit, at 3259). The legislative exertion was designed to improve the "system” of justice and to reduce danger to the public safety. Correspondingly, "[t]he public, defendants and the victims of crimes all have a strong interest in the prompt trial of criminal cases. The knowledge that punishment for the guilty will be swift and sure acts as an effective deterrent to crime” (Mem of State Exec Dept, op. cit., at 3259). Today’s ruling recalibrates the "ready” policy variables and "breed[s] contempt for the law and convince^] criminals that they can 'beat the system’ ” (id.). Despite the Court’s recent expression in People v Bolden (81 NY2d 146, 151, supra) that this statute was "precisely worded” and drafted with "precision”, the majority now sua sponte adds substantive gloss and splinters the due diligence formula of this statute.

Mixed precedential signals also emerge in relation to this Court’s recent unanimous holding in Matter of Jose R. (83 NY2d 388, supra). In Jose R., a juvenile absconded following a delinquency adjudication and was returned to Family Court 14 months later. A motion to dismiss was made on the basis of denial of the right to a timely dispositional hearing. While the Court acknowledged the hurdle of the literal language of Family Court Act § 350.1, it concluded that the juvenile’s disobedience in failing to return to Family Court precluded dismissal of the charges. As with Jose R., the Court here should statutorily interpret this statute within the framework of the intent and policy behind CPL 30.30 and especially under subdivision (4) (c).

The due diligence component was not imposed on the People to be wielded as a sword by defendants who were granted the benefit of pretrial release, only to have them turn around and evade trial long enough to assert that their evasion morphs into dismissal of the criminal charges (compare, Matter of Randy K.. 77 NY2d 398, 407 [dissenting opinion by then-Judge Kaye]). By avoiding their day in court, defendants achieve a twin bonanza — they escape prompt trial, the essential goal of CPL 30.30, and they are granted dismissal of the criminal charges to boot. Defendants have no incentive to show up for a day of reckoning and every incentive to stonewall and lay low for however long it takes to secure improbable dismissals for their finesse or effrontery.

Since the erratic arithmetic calculations of this rule have nothing to do with guilt or innocence or individualized or idealized justice, we suggest that prosecutors and Trial Judges should experiment with two procedural counterploys to try to offset the widespread adverse consequences of today’s ruling: (1) give Parker warnings (People v Parker, 57 NY2d 136) and try defendants in absentia, so that when they are recaptured they can be immediately sent to State prison instead of through another round of local, pretrial rituals; or (2) remand many more accuseds to custody pending trial to insure presence for prompt, CPL 30.30-ready, satisfied trials or pleas.

The risk of failing to keep meticulous account books and logs is dismissals with prejudice of criminal charges, without reference to their merit. Courts, too, will be relegated to examining spreadsheets (see attached illustrative graphic for this case, at 95). To arm defendants with this potent ultimate weapon that will allow them to thwart the People’s efforts to be ready to dispose of the merits of criminal charges contradicts the sound and fair administration of justice. It could not possibly have been the contemplated legislative intent. Of course, the Legislature could reassert itself again to amend section 30.30, as it tried to do in 1982 and 1984 in its effort to overturn earlier untoward rulings of this Court under this same statute (see, People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625; L 1984, ch 670; Governor’s Approval Mem, 1984 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 3628 [the purpose of amending CPL 30.30 (4) (c) was "to correct (the) problem created by the * * * decision in People v. Sturgis”]).

V.

To comply with the fractionalized test of "due diligence” under CPL 30.30, prosecutors must remain customarily vigilant, keep accurate time logs, and announce in court that they are "ready” to proceed. They will also have to anticipate every conceivable shift in theory and argument at every level of court and engage in minute mathematical computations, projections and aggregations. To avoid being legally trumped by defendants using street-smart strategies in subsequent courts, the People will even have to challenge and press against the efforts of trial courts trying to limit and focus issues to those that are then relevant to varied ready-for-trial calculations.

Finally, this case is not about common-law interstitial development, a unique provenance of the Judicial Branch. It is pure statutory construction, which means the Judicial Branch is obligated to explore and execute the intent and will of the Legislative and Executive Branches in enacting law. The Judiciary’s policy preferences and choices are inappropriate and irrelevant. The articulated rationale of this case blinks the limitations in the distribution of governmental power, and the purported sufficiency articulation masks the substantive standard of law and ratio decidendi against which all future cases in this large inventory will be gouged. This case, in the end, turns exclusively on nonconstitutional, nonmerits, readiness time oscillations, variable by their very nature and ordinary case management tracking systems. The CPL 30.30 time requirements have not been shortchanged in this case, as a matter of fact or law, and under no view of this case is a reversal of a violent felony conviction rendered by a jury and affirmed by two prior courts warranted. Unlike the majority, we do not accept that some inexorable, abstracted sense of the law is responsible for defendant’s victory of form over substance (majority opn, at 81, n 5). Rather, judicial interpretative gloss grants the prize.

Almost 70 years ago, then-Judge Cardozo expressed troublement that criminals should go free "because the constable has blundered” (People v Defore, 242 NY 13, 21, cert denied 270 US 657). The tremendous impact and acceptance of the exclusionary rule laid that adage to rest as quaint and somehow out of tune with modern American jurisprudence. The instant case, however, is not about the exclusionary rule or about ultimate issues of guilt or innocence. Thus, the Cardozean discomfort, instinct with its sagacity in relation to a case of this kind, should be revitalized and fitted to this kind of case. Criminals should not go free because Constables are out-waited and out-witted by low-lying accuseds.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Smith and Ciparick concur with Judge Titone; Judge Bellacosa dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judge Levine concurs.

Order reversed, etc.

      . Defense counsel did not consent to this request (see, People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 216; People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843).

      . The description in People v Lewis (150 Misc 2d 886) of warrant-processing methods in the New York City Criminal Courts, upon which the People heavily rely, is no substitute for a showing on the record of the steps that were taken in connection with defendant’s warrant. Additionally, because of the record’s silence on the point, we do not consider whether the People’s burden of establishing due diligence may be satisfied by proof of the existence of local processing procedures that are calculated to expedite warrant enforcement (see, People v Lewis, supra; cf., People v Bratton, 65 NY2d 675, affg 103 AD2d 368). Notably, the opinion in Lewis indicates that a lag time of at least "two to three weeks” is normally expected before a precinct warrant officer actually receives the warrant for assignment (id., at 890). That delay is a far cry from the 69 days of unexplained delay that occurred in the present case.

      . Of course, diligence is not required under CPL 30.30 (4) (c) when the defendant is to be deemed "absent” because "his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution” — a claim not made by the People here.

      . The dissent misunderstands the holdings in People v Leone (65 NY2d 674, 675) and People v Bratton (65 NY2d 675, 676, supra). In those cases, the Court held that the People could adopt a policy of postponing indictments of absent defendants as a means of conserving scarce prosecutorial resources without running afoul of CPL 30.30’s readiness deadlines. In neither case was it suggested that the police may choose to conserve their law enforcement resources by postponing enforcement of bench warrants or selecting which warrants will be pursued "diligently.” Indeed, in both cases, the Appellate Division opinion adopted by this Court was careful to note that the threshold requirement of police diligence in attempting to locate the defendant had been satisfied (see, People v Leone, 105 AD2d 757; People v Bratton, 103 AD2d 368, supra).

      . In response to the dissent’s attempt to revive former Chief Judge Cardozo’s appealingly phrased argument against the exclusionary rule (People v Before, 242 NY 13, 21), we defer to the wisdom of former Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, who stated: " '[TJhere is another consideration— the imperative of judicial integrity’ * * * The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws” (Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 659, quoting Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 222). Indeed, contrary to the dissent’s claim that our straightforward application of CPL 30.30 " 'breed[s] contempt’ for law and the judicial process” (dissenting opn, at 85), we conclude that the real source of "contempt for law” is the disregard of the law’s dictates by government officials, who lead by example (Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 485 [Brandéis, J., dissenting]).

      . The People’s reliance on a notation in the court file characterizing the hearing as one "on due diligence” is unpersuasive, since there is no way of knowing the origin of or reason for that characterization (cf., People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 347-349, supra).

      . The majority twists the holdings and application of those cases and dangles a distinction without any legal differences as a justification for the courts, burying their heads like ostriches against the realistic appraisal of what is "going down” in these cases (majority opn, at 80, n 4).

      . Even if we were to agree with the majority’s analysis as to the 69-day period, the critical number of 184 days attributed to the People, as required by the readiness statute to warrant dismissal, was in no event reached in this case. Because the trial court limited receipt of evidence and its judicial review to the period after issuance of the warrant, this Court is absolutely prohibited from making a de nova review and retrospective rule concerning the preindictment period of time, which defendant is asserting must be charged to the People. To rule otherwise, as the Court does, is to ignore and override fundamental preservation principles and fair, even-handed procedures.


text:
    [647 NE2d 1258, 623 NYS2d 750]
    Florence Handelsman et al., Plaintiffs, v Sea Insurance Company, Ltd., Respondent, et al., Defendants, and Ann Samochwal, Appellant.
    Argued September 21, 1994;
    decided October 20, 1994

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Budin, Reisman & Schwartz, New York City (Robin Mary Heaney and Harlan S. Budin of counsel), for appellant.

      Stuart M. Herz, Garden City, for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Titone, J.

This action arises out of an automobile accident involving Thomas Alberino, who was driving a vehicle owned by his mother (Dorothy Alberino), and Florence Handelsman, who was driving her own car and was accompanied by Ann Samochwal at the time of the occurrence. The allegedly injured parties, including Samochwal, sued the two drivers. Dorothy Alberino was also sued as the owner of the Alberino vehicle. This appeal concerns the extent to which an insurance policy that was issued to Dorothy Alberino’s husband and provides for coverage of "family members” in some circumstances applies to this accident. We hold that because of the policy’s ambiguity, its terms must be construed to extend coverage to Dorothy and Thomas Alberino for any liability they may incur in connection with the Handelsman accident.

At the time of the accident, the car owned by Dorothy Alberino was insured under a $10,000/$20,000 liability policy. At the same time, Dorothy’s husband, Robert Alberino, owned two other automobiles, both of which were insured by defendant Sea Insurance Company under a combined single limit liability policy with a $300,000 limit. The present action was brought by the Handelsmans in an effort to obtain a declaration that, having failed to make a timely disclaimer, Sea was obligated to defend and indemnify Dorothy and Thomas Alberino under the policy issued to Robert Alberino. The other injured parties, including Samochwal, were joined as nominal defendants in the lawsuit.

In response to the Handelsman complaint, defendant Sea did not dispute that it had failed to register a timely disclaimer. Rather, the insurer took the position that it was nevertheless not liable because the policy issued to Robert Alberino did not cover this occurrence in the first instance and, under settled principles, a failure to disclaim cannot create coverage that the policy was not written to provide (see, Zappone v Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131, 143; Schiff Assocs. v Flack, 51 NY2d 692). This theory was tested when Sea and its nominal codefendant Samochwal cross-moved for summary judgment.

In its ruling on the cross motions, the Supreme Court held that Sea had no obligation to defend and indemnify Dorothy and Thomas Alberino under the policy it had issued to Robert Alberino, since, in its view, the occurrence in question was not within the scope of that policy’s coverage. On Samochwal’s appeal, a majority at the Appellate Division affirmed principally in reliance on this Court’s prior holding in Zappone v Home Ins. Co. (55 NY2d 131, supra). One Appellate Division Justice dissented, taking the position that the Sea policy was ambiguous and that, accordingly, it should be construed to encompass coverage for this accident. This appeal, taken by permission of this Court, ensued.

The fundamental governing legal principles are not in dispute. When a liability insurer is notified of a claim, it must timely disclaim coverage in order to avoid its duty to defend and indemnify (Insurance Law § 3420 [d]). A timely disclaimer is not required, however, when the policy on which the claim rests does not, by its terms, cover the incident giving rise to liability (Zappone v Home Ins. Co., supra). Thus, in the present case, the obligation of the insurer, which did not timely disclaim, depends on a construction of the particular provisions of the policy it issued to Robert Alberino.

The general coverage provision of the policy in issue states that the insurer will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any "insured” becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. The critical policy provision is the one that defines what constitutes an "insured”:

” B. 'Insured’ as used in this Part means:
"1. You or your 'family member’ for the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or 'trailer.’
"2. Any person using 'your covered auto.’
"3. For 'your covered auto,’ any person or organization but only with respect to legal responsibility for acts or omissions of a person for whom coverage is afforded under this Part.
"4. For any auto or 'trailer,’ other than 'your covered auto,’ any other person or organization but only with respect to legal responsibility for acts or omissions of you or any 'family member’ for whom coverage is afforded under this Part. This provision (B.4.) applies only if the person or organization does not own or hire the auto or ftrailer’ ” (emphasis supplied).

"Family member” is defined elsewhere in the policy as a person related to the policyholder by blood or marriage who is also a resident of the policyholder’s home.

It is undisputed for the purpose of this appeal that both Dorothy and Thomas Alberino qualify as "family members” under this definition. Further, under the terms of clause 1 of section B, both of those individuals are covered for their use or ownership of "any auto” — a term that is plainly broad enough to encompass the vehicle involved in the Handelsman accident. Thus, section B.l of the insurance policy issued to Robert Alberino unambiguously provides coverage for the Handelsman occurrence.

In support of its effort to avoid the obligation to defend and indemnify that is created by clause 1 of section B, Sea cites clause 4, which limits coverage to situations in which "the person or organization does not own or hire the auto or 'trailer.’ ” However, it is not clear from the language or structure of section B whether its provisions are intended to be independent or cumulative or whether clause 4 was intended to modify or narrow the coverage contemplated in clause 1.

Notably, there are no conjunctive or disjunctive connecting words to indicate how the four clauses in section B are supposed to relate to each other. Moreover, there is no indication as to whether the "other person[s]” referred to in clause 4 are intended to include the insured’s "family members” or whether the "person” referred to in the clause’s last sentence is intended to mean the same thing as the phrase "other person” that appears at the beginning of the clause. The better view would seem to be that, taken in context, the term "other person[s]” (emphasis added) means persons other than "you” (the person to whom the policy was issued) and "family members” and that "person” and "other persons” as used in clause 4 are synonymous.

In any event, the provision is, at best, ambiguous, and, as such, cannot serve to undermine the grant of coverage that is plain from the language of section B.l. Where there is ambiguity as to the existence of coverage, doubt is to be resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer (see, e.g., Lavanant v General Acc. Ins. Co., 79 NY2d 623, 629; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Annunziata, 67 NY2d 229, 232).

In this instance, our resolution of this coverage controversy against the insurer is further supported by the exclusionary provisions of the policy in issue. Those provisions state, in pertinent part, that the liability coverage described elsewhere in the policy does not apply for "the ownership, maintenance or use of’

"2. Any vehicle, other than 'your covered auto,’ which is:
"a. owned by you * * *
"3. Any vehicle other than 'your covered auto,’ which is:
"a. owned by any 'family member’ * *

The existence of this specific exclusion for vehicles owned by the person to whom the policy was issued or by "family members” suggests that, contrary to Sea’s contentions, the coverage described and defined elsewhere in the policy is not limited by the terms of section B.4 to "nonowned” vehicles. Indeed, if the coverage itself were limited to such "nonowned” vehicles, the above-quoted exclusion language would be superfluous. Thus, in this situation, it cannot be said that coverage is foreclosed because of the circumstance that the accident vehicle was owned by Dorothy Alberino.

We note that neither Zappone v Home Ins. Co. (55 NY2d 131, supra) nor Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Kligler (42 NY2d 863), on which Sea heavily relies, supports a different result, since the insurance policies in both of those cases were significantly different from the policy at issue here. In Zappone and Kligler, the basic coverage portions of the policies provided only for indemnification for liability "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of [a covered] or a non-owned automobile” (Zappone v Home Ins. Co., supra, Record on Appeal, at 53c; Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Kligler, supra, Record on Appeal, Exhibit A, at 18a [emphasis supplied]). Here, in contrast, no narrowing reference is made to "nonowned” vehicles; to the contrary, the policy covers damages "for which any 'insured’ becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident.”

In sum, the provisions of the policy issued by Sea to Robert Alberino could well be construed to extend coverage to a situation such as this, in which one family member (Thomas Alberino) may be held liable because of his use of an automobile and another family member (Dorothy Alberino) may be held liable because of her ownership of that vehicle. The Sea policy issued to Robert Alberino does not clearly limit the liability coverage to nonowned vehicles and, thus, the fact that one of the family members to be covered owned the accident vehicle does not negate the insurer’s obligations to defend and indemnify that family member. Finally, since the occurrence was within the policy’s coverage provisions, Sea’s failure to disclaim in a timely manner is dispositive and the insurer is now foreclosed from making efforts to avoid those obligations.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs to defendant Samochwal as against defendant Sea Insurance Co., defendant Sea Insurance Co.’s motion for summary judgment denied, defendant Samochwal’s cross motion for summary judgment granted and judgment granted declaring that Sea Insurance Co. is obligated to defend and indemnify the Alberino codefendants.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.

Order reversed, etc.


author: Bellacosa, J.

text:
    [647 NE2d 1261, 623 NYS2d 753]
    In the Matter of Earl Costello, as Commissioner of the Washington County Department of Social Services, on Behalf of Michelle Stark, Respondent, v Joseph Geiser, Appellant.
    Argued January 4, 1995;
    decided February 9, 1995

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Allen Lester Yates, Saratoga Springs, and Westlake A. Harper for appellant.

      Donald H. Clark, Jr., Fort Edward, for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Bellacosa, J.

The Washington County Department of Social Services commenced this proceeding against a third-party responsible person, pursuant to article 4 of the Family Court Act. It seeks recovery of its statutory subrogation reimbursement based on a Medicaid payment for medical services provided to another individual. The issue is whether, under Social Services Law § 367-a (2) (b), Geiser, a responsible "third party,” must reimburse the Department of Social Services the full amount paid by the Department to the medical providers, including such statutory Medicaid subsidies characterized as bad debt and charity surcharges (see, Public Health Law § 2807-c [14]). We hold that the municipality’s subrogation reimbursement rights do not entitle it to the portion of costs unrelated to and over- and-above the actual costs of the medical services provided. Thus, the order of the Appellate Division granting the County’s application for in toto reimbursement should be reversed.

I.

Medicaid is a jointly funded Federal and State medical assistance program, established by title XIX of the Social Security Act. It pays for necessary medical care for qualifying indigent individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of their medical care (42 USC § 1396 et seq.; Social Services Law § 363 et seq.). Because New York has adopted a comprehensive statutory scheme controlling in-patient hospitalizations, providers of medical services to Medicaid beneficiaries are paid with public funds on a fixed schedule of rates based upon the diagnosis related group (DRG) in which the patient falls (see, Public Health Law § 2807-c [1] [a][b]). The DRG rate is set by the State Department of Health and is based upon the cost of treating an average patient with a particular primary diagnosis. Pursuant to Public Health Law § 2807-c, payments made to a health care provider by the municipality include an allowance, over the actual cost of the particular services rendered, for statutory surcharges. Thus, under New York’s rate system, the actual cost of treating a particular patient may be more or less than the DRG grouping.

Medicaid programs are administered jointly through Federal-State partnerships between the Department of Health and Human Services and the designated State agency. In New York, the designated State agency responsible for the administration of Medicaid is the New York State Department of Social Services. Participating States are mandated to establish a State Medicaid program in accordance with Federal statutory and regulatory requirements. To that end, States are required, among other things, to adopt procedures to prevent fraud, abuse, unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services and excess payments (42 CFR 455.1, 456.3, 456.23).

Each participating State must also develop its own Medicaid plan and establish a payment rates-and-methods schedule (42 USC § 1396a). The State must particularly "take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties * * * to pay for care and services available under the plan” (42 USC § 1396a [a] [25] [A]) and must seek reimbursement from such third parties (42 USC § 1396a [a] [25] [B]). This requirement furthers the ultimate goal of Medicaid — that the program "be the payer of last resort” (Sen Rep No. 146, 99th Cong, 2d Sess, 312, reprinted in 1986 US Code Cong & Admin News 279; Matter of Steuben County Dept. of Social Serve, v Beats, 76 NY2d 451, 455). Thus, other available resources must be used or recouped.

Pursuant to these congressional mandates, New York enacted Social Services Law § 367-a, which entitles the State, through the Department of Social Services and local municipality payors, to invoke subrogation rights against third parties for paid Medicaid benefits. Furthermore, in order to comply with the Medicaid assignment-of-rights requirement, Social Services Law § 366 (4) (h) (1) provides: "an applicant for or a recipient of assistance under this title shall be required, as a condition of initial or continued eligibility for such assistance, to assign * * * any benefits which are available to him or her individually from any third party.”

II.

Respondent Stark gave birth to a daughter on March 13, 1990, at Moses Ludington Hospital in Ticonderoga, New York. The unwed mother and father were both unemployed and had no source of income or health insurance benefits. Accordingly, the mother applied for and ultimately was allowed Medicaid benefits. Following the birth of the child, the Washington County Department of Social Services paid the total confinement and delivery expenses arising from the childbirth, which according to the Department totaled $4,244.08 under the Medicaid rate payment formula: $3,181.30 attributable to the mother and $1,062.78 attributable to the child.

Shortly after the birth of his daughter, respondent Geiser obtained employment. The Commissioner of the Washington County Department of Social Services then commenced this proceeding, pursuant to article 4 of the Family Court Act, to recover from the father the confinement and delivery expenses associated with the care rendered to the mother and newborn. Geiser answered by challenging the reasonableness of the medical bill sought to be captured through reimbursement. Specifically, upon his own investigation, he learned that the actual hospital charges relating to care rendered to the mother and child totaled $802.07.

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulated facts, the matter was submitted to a Family Court Hearing Examiner, who concluded that the father should reimburse the Department for the full amount paid by the Department. Notwithstanding the fact that the Department failed to itemize the expenses, Family Court granted the Department’s petition, found the father liable for medical expenses attributable to the respondent Stark totaling $3,181.30, reserved decision on claimed additional expenses, and ordered that he repay the Department at a rate of $10 per week. In accordance with our decision in Matter of Steuben County Dept of Social Servs. v Deats (76 NY2d 451, supra), the father was found not liable for costs associated with care of the child. Family Court subsequently amended its order to include the cost of the attending physicians, increasing to $4,218.30 the amount owed by the father. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the State, pursuant to 42 USC § 1396a (a) (25) (B), was required to seek reimbursement for the entire Medicaid expenditure (198 AD2d 709, 710). This Court granted leave to appeal. We now reverse.

III.

In Matter of Steuben County Dept. of Social. Servs. v Deats (id.), the Court confirmed "third party” liability under the Family Court Act and Federal Medicaid statutes and regulations (see, 42 USC § 1396a [a] [25]; 42 CFR 433.136). We held that governing Federal law did not expressly declare a father —whether or not wed to the mother — to be a responsible "third party.” In New York, however, under Family Court Act §§ 514 and 545, the unwed father would be liable as a third party for the mother’s pregnancy and childbirth expenses. Geiser thus does not challenge his responsibility for actual medical expenses incurred in connection with the mother’s giving birth to his daughter. The question in this case is the full or pro tanto dollar extent of the responsibility, a question left unanswered in Deats (76 NY2d 451, supra).

The father argues that he is responsible only for the "reasonable expenses” incurred in connection with the birth. He relies principally on Family Court Act § 514, which provides that "[t]he father is liable to pay the reasonable expenses of the mother’s confinement and recovery and such reasonable expenses in connection with her pregnancy as the court in its discretion may deem proper” (emphasis added). Accordingly, he posits that he is not responsible to reimburse the Department for statutory subsidies characterized as the bad debt and charity care additional surcharge mandated and built into the State’s Medicaid reimbursement formula (see, Public Health Law § 2807-c [14]). Those public service features bear no direct relationship to the medical services provided to the individual Medicaid recipient.

The Department, on the other hand, contends that it is entitled to dollar-for-dollar reimbursement without regard to actual medical care cost because it is mandated by statute to reimburse hospitals for all statutory surcharges, including the bad debt and charity care subsidies. Although the parties refer to the Family Court Act and Public Health Law § 2807-c, the additional and more precise focus should be on the Department’s right to reimbursement under Social Services Law § 367-a (2) (b). It provides:

"Any inconsistent provision of this chapter or other law notwithstanding, upon furnishing assistance under this title to any applicant or recipient of medical assistance, the local social services district or the department shall be subrogated, to the extent of the expenditures by such district or department for medical care furnished, to any rights such person may have to medical support or third party reimbursement” (emphasis added).

As can be seen, the statute is silent as to whether the State is entitled to full reimbursement. The Department implicitly argues that because section 367-a (2) (b) states that reimbursement is required "to the extent of the expenditures by * * * [the] department for medical care furnished”, the third party becomes liable for dollar-for-dollar repayment in direct proportion to the State’s Medicaid reimbursement formula.

The first flaw in the Department’s contention is Social Services Law § 367-a (2) (b). It states that the Department is "subrogated” to any right of the recipient against a third party. Because statutes are to be read to give effect to all of their provisions, we may not overlook the legal significance of the term "subrogated” embedded centrally in the statute (see, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 97, 231). The term "subrogated,” without qualification or explanation, suggests that it is intended to incorporate ordinary subrogation principles. None other is set forth. Regardless of whether a right of subrogation arises by operation of law, by statute or regulation, or by contractual agreement, the controlling features are the same: subrogation is wholly dependent on the subrogor’s claim against the third party and they stand in one another’s juridical shoes (see, Gerseta Corp. v Equitable Trust Co., 241 NY 418, 425-426; Pittsburgh-Westmoreland Coal Co. v Kerr, 220 NY 137, 142). The State subrogee pays the obligation to the medical provider on behalf of the primary service recipient subrogor (in this case, the mother) and becomes substituted to the same rights she has to recover against a responsible third party (in this case, the father of the child) (see, Travelers Ins. Co. v Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 NY 273, 276-277). The State subrogee succeeds to the position of the subrogor and may recover only to the extent its subrogor could have recovered (see, Salzman v Holiday Inns, 48 AD2d 258, 262, mod on other grounds 40 NY2d 919; Servidori v Mahoney, 129 AD2d 944, 945). It gains no additional rights.

Moreover, subrogation is not a matter of right but an equitable doctrine, designed to promote justice and is thus dependent on the particular relationship of parties and nature of controversy in each case (see, North Star Reins. Corp. v Continental Ins. Co., 82 NY2d 281, 294; King v Pelkofski, 20 NY2d 326, 334; Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240 NY 37, 47). Equity should not countenance Social Services Law § 367-a (2) (b) being used in such instances to recoup for the public purse from a private citizen the additional public charge component of a medical assistance payment.

In this case, the uncontroverted actual hospital expenses relating to the birth of the child totaled $802 and an additional amount of $1,037 for the cost of the attending physicians. The State has nevertheless successfully pursued reimbursement for the entire Medicaid payment, $4,218.30. This is nearly 2Vi times greater than the actual expenses which would have been charged to the mother had she not qualified for Medicaid benefits. It is irrational to believe that the Legislature intended a needy recipient — and an ultimately responsible third party, needy himself, at the time the services were rendered — to subsidize at some later date the municipality’s entire payment, including proportionate public statutory surcharges built into the general formula.

Indeed, one can read the express language of Social Services Law § 367-a (2) (b) to limit the subrogation rights of the Department to reimbursement of expenses directly related to the "medical care furnished”. Since the bad debt and charity allowances provision has no relationship to the "medical care furnished” to the particular Medicaid patient, no statutory support exists for the extraordinary recoupment from an ultimately responsible third party.

To be sure, no express mention whatsoever exists in the Public Health Law justifying reimbursement from third parties for all expenses calculated under the reimbursement methodology created by the State’s Commissioner of Health. Public Health Law § 2807-c represents the methodology employed by the Commissioner of Health in calculating Statewide reimbursement rates which will be paid to hospitals for providing medical services to Medicaid patients (see, 42 USC § 1396a). It does not allow aggrandizement of what the State or municipality can collect from a third party beyond its subrogation rights under Social Services Law § 367-a (2) (b) (but see, Travelers Ins. Co. v Cuomo, 14 F3d 708 [2d Cir 1993], cert granted sub nom. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Ins. Co., 514 US —, 115 S Ct 305 [orally argued Jan. 18, 1995]).

Our holding gains additional persuasive force from the decisions in various other States construing municipal entitlement to exercise rights of subrogation to recover medical assistance payments from a responsible third party (see, e.g., Hedgebeth v Medford, 74 NJ 360, 378 A2d 226; White v Sutherland, 92 NM 187, 585 P2d 331, cert denied sub nom. Health & Social Servs. Dept, v White, 92 NM 79, 582 P2d 1292; State v Cowdell, 421 NE2d 667 [Ind Ct App]; Smith v Alabama Medicaid Agency, 461 So 2d 817 [Ala App]).

IV.

We reject the Department’s absolutist reading of 42 USC § 1396a (a) (25) in connection with the requirement to pursue responsible third parties. The Federal Medicaid laws do not require or even suggest that a State must seek dollar-for-dollar reimbursement, based on complicated, variable Medicaid formulas containing other public charge components for which society at large is ultimately responsible (see, 42 USC § 1396a [a] [25]). Federal law simply required that a State "take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties * * * to pay for care and services available under the plan” (42 USC § 1396a [a] [25] [A]). Whenever medical assistance is provided to an eligible recipient, the State must "seek reimbursement” from such third parties (42 USC § 1396a [a] [25] [B]). The most direct expression in Federal authority to the precise issue of how much "reimbursement” is due is found in the Federal regulation that provides that the "third party” "may be liable to pay all or part of the expenditures for medical assistance furnished under a State plan” (42 CFR 433.136 [emphasis added]; see also, 42 CFR 433.139 [b] [1], [2] [ii]). Indeed, the very next clause of the Federal Medicaid statute, 42 USC § 1396a (a) (25) (B), provides that where legal liability exists and the amount of reimbursement the agency can recover exceeds the costs of recovery, the agency "will seek reimbursement for such assistance to the extent of such legal liability” (emphasis added; see also, 42 USC § 1396a [a] [25] [C]). These legislations connote a Federal expectation of limitations to the State’s reimbursement rights, namely, that the responsible third party should be liable only for Medicaid expenditures related directly to the actual medical services provided to the patient. Medicaid statutory subsidies or surcharges, including bad debt and charity allowances, built into Medicaid payment formulas, surely do not relate to the actual medical service rendered to the individual Medicaid patient. Thus, these allowances are not "expenditures for medical assistance” even under Federal law.

Finally, as we have demonstrated, curtailing the public payor’s recoupment rights to the actual cost of medical services paid for does not offend or violate Federal Medicaid reimbursement mandates or place the New York program at any risk or jeopardy of loss of Federal participation or financial replenishment.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the proceeding remitted to Family Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Smith and Ciparick concur; Judge Levine taking no part.

Order reversed, with costs, and matter remitted to Family Court, Washington County, for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein.