author: PALMER, J.

text:
    DERRICK GARTRELL v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

    (SC 16467)
    Sullivan, C. J., and Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

      Argued March 22, 2001
    officially released January 15, 2002

      Karla A. Turekian, assistant attorney general, with whom were William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Gregory T. D’Auria, associate attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).

      Morris R. Borea, for the appellee (plaintiff).

       This opinion supersedes the opinion of this court in Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 258 Conn. 137, 779 A.2d 124 (2001), which was published on September 25, 2001.

   Opinion

PALMER, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Derrick Gartrell, who suffered from a preexisting, nonwork-related psychiatric condition that was aggravated by a work-related physical injury, is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for the aggravation of that psychiatric condition notwithstanding General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), which limits compensation for mental or emotional impairments to those that “[arise] from” a work-related physical injury. We conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On February 10, 1983, the plaintiff commenced employment with the defendant, the department of correction, as a correctional officer at what is now known as the Willard-Cybulski Correctional Institution in Enfield. As a result of several nonwork-related traumatic events in the plaintiffs personal life, the plaintiff developed mental health problems and, in June, 1994, was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, for which he subsequently received therapy.

On October 3, 1996, the plaintiff, who had had no prior history of cardiovascular disorders, began to experience intense pain in his chest and left arm, a feeling of tightness in his chest and difficulty breathing. Consequently, the plaintiff sought and received medical care. The plaintiff continued to experience periodic recurrence of these symptoms and, after a variety of tests were performed, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a cardiovascular disorder known as vasospastic angina and treated with various medications. After his medical condition began to affect his work performance, the plaintiff was placed on indefinite medical leave beginning October 21,1997, and, thereafter, sought workers’ compensation benefits.

The workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) held a formal hearing on the compensability of the plaintiffs claim and, on the basis of the evidence presented, concluded, inter alia, that: (1) the plaintiff had sustained a compensable injury, namely, vasospastic angina, on October 3, 1996, that arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant; (2) that injury qualified as a “condition of impairment of health” under General Statutes § 5-145a; (3) the plaintiffs work-related cardiovascular disorder had exacerbated his preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder; and (4) as a result of the foregoing conclusions, the post-traumatic stress disorder also constituted a compensable injury. The commissioner thereupon ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff temporary total disability benefits in accordance with § 5-145a,* *** along with all reasonable and necessary medical costs incurred in connection with both injuries.

In concluding that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition had been exacerbated by his work-related physical injury, the commissioner relied primarily on two pieces of evidence, the first of which was an April 21, 1998 letter prepared by Jeryl Brown, the plaintiffs therapist and a licensed clinical social worker. Brown stated in the letter that the plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, that he exhibits symptoms of depression, anxiety and panic, and that those symptoms were exacerbated by the physical symptoms associated with his cardiovascular disorder. Brown recommended therapy sessions twice weekly as treatment. The second piece of evidence was a signed note, dated April 23, 1998, that accompanied Brown’s letter, from Brown’s colleague, Eliot Barron, a psychiatrist. The note stated in its entirety: “I completely concur with Mrs. Brown’s letter of [April 21, 1998 and] fully support her treatment plan.”

The defendant appealed from the decision of the commissioner to the compensation review board (board). On appeal to the board, the defendant did not contest the compensability of the plaintiffs work-related physical injury, namely, the cardiovascular disorder. Rather, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition, namely, the post-traumatic stress disorder, did not arise from a physical injury and, therefore, that, in accordance with § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), the preexisting psychiatric condition was not compensable. The board affirmed the commissioner’s decision, concluding that the commissioner properly determined that the symptoms of the plaintiffs cardiovascular disorder had exacerbated his preexisting psychiatric condition and, therefore, that the preexisting condition also was compensable. The defendant appealed from the decision of the board to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

On appeal, the defendant renews its claims that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder was exacerbated by his work-related cardiovascular disorder; and (2) the exacerbation of the plaintiffs psychiatric condition did not “[arise] from” his cardiovascular disorder within the meaning of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii). The defendant further contends that, even if we conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the aggravation of his preexisting psychiatric condition by a compensable, work-related physical injury, his right to such compensation is limited, under § 31-275 (1) (D), to “that proportion of the disability . . . due to the aggravation of the preexisting [psychiatric condition] as may be reasonably attributed to the injury upon which the claim is based . . . ,” General Statutes § 31-275 (1) (D). We reject the defendant’s claims.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the evidence adduced at the hearing before the commissioner was insufficient to support a finding that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition was aggravated by his work-related cardiovascular disorder. We reject the defendant’s claim.

Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s claim, we set forth the standards governing our review of decisions by the board. “[W]hen a decision of a commissioner is appealed to the [board], the [board] is obligated to hear the appeal on the record of the hearing before the commissioner and not to retry the facts. . . . The commissioner has the power and duty, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts. . . . The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . Our scope of review of the actions of the . . . [board] is similarly limited.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Biasetti v. Stamford, 250 Conn. 65, 70-71, 735 A.2d 321 (1999). Furthermore, “[i]t matters not that the basic facts from which the [commissioner] draws this inference are undisputed rather than controverted. ... It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The [commissioner] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and [the commissioner’s] choice, if otherwise sustainable, maynotbe disturbed by a reviewing court.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Six v. Thomas O’Connor & Co., 235 Conn. 790, 799, 669 A.2d 1214 (1996).

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record from which the commissioner reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition was aggravated by his cardiovascular disorder. The plaintiffs therapist, Brown, stated in her letter that she had treated the plaintiff for post-traumatic stress disorder since 1994. She also indicated that the plaintiff suffers from depression, anxiety and panic. Although Brown did not expressly link those symptoms to the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder, it was reasonable for the commissioner to have inferred that those are the symptoms for which the plaintiff had sought treatment. Moreover, the reasonableness of this inference is buttressed by the fact that the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder include, inter alia, despair or hopelessness and increased risk of panic disorder. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Ed. 1994) p. 425. Brown also stated that the plaintiffs symptoms had been exacerbated by, among other things, his “cardiac spasms,” which resulted from his work-related cardiovascular disorder. Furthermore, the commissioner reasonably could have found that the note from Bar ron, a psychiatrist, in which Barron “completely concur [red]” with Brown’s diagnosis and treatment plan, provided adequate medical confirmation of that diagnosis. In view of the substantial deference that must be accorded the fact-finding role of the commissioner, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to permit a finding that the plaintiffs preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder was exacerbated by his work-related cardiovascular disorder.

II

We next consider the defendant’s claim that § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), which bars compensation for a mental or emotional impairment “unless [that] impairment arises from a physical injury or occupational disease”; (emphasis added) General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii); precludes compensation for the aggravation of a preexisting, nonwork-related psychiatric condition. Specifically, the defendant maintains that a mental impairment does not arise from a physical injury unless that mental impairment originates from the work-related physical injury. Under the defendant’s interpretation of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation for the exacerbation of his post-traumatic stress disorder because that mental impairment did not originate from his work-related cardiovascular disorder. The plaintiff contends that when the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition is a direct consequence of a work-related physical injury, as in the present case, the aggravation of the psychiatric condition is, itself, a sufficiently distinct and identifiable injury to constitute an “impairment” that “arises from” the compensable work-related physical injury. General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii). We agree with the plaintiff.

“The dispute between the parties [regarding compensability of the exacerbation of the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition] raises an issue of statutory construction. Statutory construction . . . presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. . . . According to our long-standing principles of statutory [interpretation], our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. . . . In determining the intent of a statute, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Polizos v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 255 Conn. 601, 607, 767 A.2d 1202 (2001).

Our starting point is the pertinent statutory language. Under § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), a mental impairment is compensable if it “arises from” a work-related physical injury, in this case, the plaintiffs cardiovascular disorder. As the defendant asserts, the term “arises from” is synonymous with “originates from,” or “caused by.” See Biasetti v. Stamford, supra, 250 Conn. 79. The crux of the issue, however, is not the precise meaning of the term “arises from,” but whether, for purposes of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), the term “mental or emotional impairment” includes the aggravation or exacerbation of a preexisting psychiatric condition. Although a strict reading of the statute arguably favors the interpretation advanced by the defendant, we believe that the plaintiffs construction also is entirely plausible. We are persuaded, moreover, that the plaintiffs construction is more consistent with the underlying purpose and intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act and, therefore, the better construction.

Under the plaintiffs interpretation of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition, in order to be compensable, must have been the result of a work-related physical injury. In other words, the work-related physical injury must be a “but for” cause of the aggravation of the preexisting psychiatric condition. It long has been a “fundamental tenet of workers’ compensation law . . . that an employer takes the employee in the state of health in which it finds the employee.” Epps v. Beiersdorf Inc., 41 Conn. App. 430, 435, 675 A.2d 1377 (1996), citing Cashman v. McTernan School, Inc., 130 Conn. 401, 409, 34 A.2d 874 (1943). We agree with the plaintiff that the burden falls upon the employer to establish a departure from this general rule of compensability, especially because we eschew a narrow and technical reading of our workers’ compensation statutes in favor of one that promotes compensability. See, e.g., Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation Co., 231 Conn. 469, 483, 650 A.2d 1240 (1994) (remedial purpose of Workers’ Compensation Act should not be defeated by narrow and technical construction); Szudora v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 552, 557, 573 A.2d 1 (1990) (“workers’ compensation legislation . . . should be broadly construed in favor of disabled employees”).

In addition, the legislature’s use of the term “impairment” supports the conclusion that § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) does not preclude compensability insofar as a preexisting psychiatric condition has been exacerbated by a work-related physical injury. “Impairment” is defined as “the act of impairing or the state of being impaired”; Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; and “impair” means “to make worse: diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength: do harm to . . . .” Id. To the extent that the term “impairment” suggests a condition that has worsened or deteriorated, that connotation is consistent with a reading of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) that does not exclude from its purview the deterioration, or exacerbation, of a preexisting condition.

Finally, our interpretation of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) is guided by the “principles underlying Connecticut practice in [workers’] compensation cases: that the legislation is remedial in nature . . . and that it should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 604-605, 748 A.2d 278 (2000); see also Luce v. United Technologies Corp., 247 Conn. 126, 137 n.16, 717 A.2d 747 (1998) (Workers’ Compensation Act “must be construed liberally to effectuate its beneficent purpose”). The “humanitañan and remedial purposes of the act counsel against an overly narrow construction that unduly limits eligibility for workers’ compensation." Herman v. Sherwood Industries, Inc., 244 Conn. 502, 511, 710 A.2d 1338 (1998). We, therefore, “do not construe the act to impose limitations on benefits that the act itself does not specify clearly.” Id., 512; accord Gil v. Courthouse One, 239 Conn. 676, 703 n.13, 687 A.2d 146 (1997). Finally, “[i]n appeals arising under workers’ compensation law, we must resolve statutory ambiguities or lacunae in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of the act.” Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692, 698, 699 A.2d 52 (1997); accord Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215, 221, 752 A.2d 1069 (2000). In light of these well established and oft repeated principles, and particularly because § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) does not clearly purport to bar compensation for the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition by a work-related physical injury, we conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to such compensation.

The defendant asserts that the pertinent legislative history supports its position that the plaintiff is not entitled to benefits based on the provisions of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii). As the defendant notes, the legislature reformed the workers’ compensation laws in 1993 with a fundamental purpose of “effect[ing] a dramatic decrease in the cost of workers’ compensation in Connecticut.” 36 H.R. Proc., Pt. 18, 1993 Sess., p. 6145, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor. To reduce the cost of workers’ compensation, the legislature introduced a number of systemic changes, including a reduction in the rate of compensation, the elimination of certain cost-of-living adjustments and a reduction in the number of compensable injuries. See generally Public Acts 1993, No. 93-228. In particular, the provisions of § 31-275 (16) (B) were enacted to limit, inter alia, the number of compensable claims for mental or emotional impairments. Cf. Biasetti v. Stamford, supra, 250 Conn. 75. Benefits for such impairments, however, were not eliminated entirely. Under § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), an employee who suffers from a mental or emotional impairment that “arises from a physical injury or occupational disease” still is entitled to compensation for that impairment. General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii). The question, therefore, is how far did the legislature intend to go in eliminating compensation for mental and emotional impairments.

We are not persuaded that the legislative goal of reducing the cost of workers’ compensation militates strongly in favor of the statutory interpretation that the defendant would have us adopt. It is doubtful that requiring coverage for claims like the one at issue in this case will place an unreasonable financial burden on employers because such claims are not likely to be especially large in number or in cost. Thus, compensating an employee for the exacerbation of a preexisting mental or emotional condition that was caused by a work-related physical injury furthers the beneficent purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act—claimants will receive benefits for work-related injuries that traditionally have been compensable under our statutory scheme—without undermining the legislature’s effort to reduce workers’ compensation costs. Mindful of the liberality with which we are to construe our Workers’ Compensation Act to accomplish its remedial purpose, we conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the aggravation of his post-traumatic stress disorder arising from his work-related cardiovascular disorder.

Ill

Finally, we must determine the proper compensation for the aggravation of the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder. General Statutes § 31-275 (1) (D) provides that, “for aggravation of a preexisting disease, compensation shall be allowed only for that proportion of the disability . . . due to the aggravation of the preexisting disease as may be reasonably attributed to the injury upon which the claim is based . . . .” At oral argument, the plaintiff conceded that any benefits to which he was entitled were subject to this limitation. Thereafter, however, the plaintiff sought to rescind his concession in fight of Cashman v. McTernan School, Inc., supra, 130 Conn. 401, in which this court held that the foregoing statutory language applies only to the aggravation of preexisting occupational diseases. Id., 408; see also Glenn v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 168 Conn. 413, 419-20, 362 A.2d 512 (1975). Under Cashman, the apportionment limitation of § 31-275 (1) (D) is inapplicable to the plaintiff because his preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder is not an occupational disease, that disorder having arisen from events unrelated to the plaintiffs employment.

It may be that the comprehensive 1993 legislative reform of the Workers’ Compensation Act; see generally Public Acts 1993, No. 93-228; casts doubt on our holding in Cashman, especially in regard to diseases, such as mental or emotional impairments, for which the legislature has sought to limit compensability. The parties, however, did not address that issue until after the opinion in this case initially was released, and, consequently, this court has not received the full benefit of adversarial argument regarding that issue. Thus, we are not persuaded that the present case is an appropriate one for reconsideration of our holding in Cashman. We, therefore, conclude that the compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled is not limited by the apportionment provisions of § 31-275 (1) (D).

The decision of the board is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 31-275 provides in relevant part: “As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise provides:
      “(1) ‘Arising out of and in the course of his employment’ means an accidental injury happening to an employee or an occupational disease of an employee originating while he has been engaged in the line of his duty in the business or affairs of the employer upon the employer’s premises, or while engaged elsewhere upon the employer’s business or affairs by the direction, express or implied, of the employer, provided . . . (D) for aggravation of a preexisting disease, compensation shall be allowed only for that proportion of the disability or death due to the aggravation of the preexisting disease as may be reasonably attributed to the injury upon which the claim is based ....
      “(16) (A) ‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ includes, in addition to accidental injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee which is causally connected with his employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease.
      “(B) ‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ shall not be construed to include . . .
      “(ii) A mental or emotional impairment, unless such impairment arises from a physical injury or occupational disease ....’’

       Vasospastic angina, also known as Prinzmetal’s angina, is characterized by severe pain resulting from intermittent spasms in the coronary arteries that interrupt the blood supply to the heart. See T. Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine (14th Ed. 1998) p. 1374.

       The evidence indicated that the plaintiffs cardiovascular disorder had been caused by work-related stress.

       General Statutes § 5-145a provides: “Any condition of impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in total or partial disability or death to a member of the security force or fire department of The University of Connecticut or the aeronautics operations of the Department of Transportation, or to a member of the Office of State Capitol Police or any person appointed under section 29-18 as a special policeman for the State Capitol building and grounds, the Legislative Office Building and parking garage and related structures and facilities, and other areas under the supervision and control of the Joint Committee on Legislative Management, or to state personnel engaged in guard or instructional duties in the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Medium, the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution, Enfield, John R. Manson Youth Institution, Cheshire, the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Niantic, the Connecticut Correctional Center, Cheshire, or the community correctional centers, or to any employee of the Whiting Forensic Division with direct and substantial patient contact, or to any detective, chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice or chief detective, or to any state employee designated as a hazardous duty employee pursuant to an applicable collective bargaining agreement who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of such condition, shall be presumed to have been suffered in the performance of his duty and shall be compensable in accordance with the provisions of chapter 568, except that for the first three months of compensability the employee shall continue to receive the full salary which he was receiving at the time of ipjury in the manner provided by the provisions of section 5-142. Any such employee who began such service prior to June 28, 1985, and was not covered by the provisions of this section prior to said date shall not be required, for purposes of this section, to show proof that he successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service.”

       The commissioner ordered the defendant to pay such benefits to the plaintiff for the period commencing October 21,1997, and ending September 8, 1998, excluding a two week period between November 7 and November 21, 1997. These dates are not at issue on appeal. The commissioner also ordered further hearings “to determine whether the [plaintiffs] temporary total disability extends beyond September 8, 1998.” That issue also is not a subject of this appeal.

       Brown’s letter provides in relevant part,: “[The plaintiff] has been a client of mine since [October, 1994], when he entered treatment for symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder following a serious incident of police harassment. During the course of treatment and related legal ordeal, [the plaintiff] was subjected to significant and repeated incidents of racial harassment by supervisors at his place of employment. He has met with repeated obstacles in his attempts to pursue his legitimate complaints through the appropriate channels.
      “As a result of the chronic stress, [the plaintiffs] physical and emotional well-being [has] been seriously compromised. He suffers from symptoms of depression, anxiety, and panic, which have been further exacerbated by the physical symptoms related to migraines, seizures, and cardiac spasms. Additionally, insomnia, nightmares, feelings of helplessness and victimization have interfered with his ability to live with a sense of personal safety and well-being.
      “The racial harassment at work, coupled with extreme disregard for his physical well-being, directly contributed to a retriggering of the symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. [The plaintiff] continually felt that his personal safety was compromised when he was repeatedly assigned to direct inmate contact after being undermined by his supervisors in front of the inmate population.
      “At this point, my recommendation for treatment is that [the plaintiff] attend two sessions weekly with me, to be reviewed in three months for reassessment purposes with the goal of regaining his former level of functioning. . . .”

       Commissioner Jesse M. Frankl dissented from the majority opinion of the board. In his view, the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to link the aggravation of the plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder to his cardiovascular disorder. Specifically, he concluded that Barron’s one sentence note did not provide an adequate medical basis upon which to support a conclusion that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition had been aggravated by his work-related physical injury.

       On appeal, the defendant does not dispute the fact that the plaintiff’s cardiovascular disorder is a compensable, work-related physical injury. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that the plaintiff is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for the exacerbation of his preexisting psychiatric condition if: (1) the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that that condition was aggravated by his cardiovascular disorder; and (2) the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition by a work-related physical injury is compensable notwithstanding § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii).

       Brown is licensed to practice clinical social work in accordance with the requirements of General Statutes § 20-195n. “Clinical social work” is defined as “the application, by persons trained in social work, of established principles of psychosocial development, behavior, psychopathology, unconscious motivation, interpersonal relationships and environmental stress to the evaluation, assessment, diagnosis and treatment of biopsychosocial dysfunction, disability and impairment, including mental, emotional, behavioral, developmental and addictive disorders, of individuals, couples, families or groups. Clinical social work includes, but is not limited to, counseling, psychotherapy, behavior modification and mental health consultation.” General Statutes § 20-195m (4).

       It reasonably can be inferred that, when Brown was referring to “cardiac spasms,” she was referring to the spasms in the coronary arteries that resulted in the plaintiffs angina. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

       We acknowledge that the evidence presented by the plaintiff with respect to the causal link between the exacerbation of his preexisting psychiatric condition and his work-related cardiovascular disorder is not strong. We nevertheless are persuaded, for the reasons set forth in the text of this opinion, that the evidence is minimally sufficient to warrant the commissioner’s factual finding in regard to that causal relationship.

       We recently had occasion to construe § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) in Biasetti v. Stamford, supra, 250 Conn. 65. In Biasetti, we concluded that the plaintiff, a police officer who suffered from work-related post-traumatic stress disorder, was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for that psychiatric condition. Id., 67. The plaintiff in Biasetti had been involved in a work-related high speed chase and gun battle. As a result of these events, he developed post-traumatic stress disorder, the physical symptomatology of which included dizzy spells and headaches. See id., 68-69. Although we held that the specific type of post-traumatic stress disorder with which the plaintiff was diagnosed is an occupational disease within the meaning of General Statutes § 31-275 (15); id., 74; we concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because the physical sequelae of the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder were a consequence of that impairment rather than a separate and distinct personal injury or occupational disease. See id., 79-80, 82. We explained: “Section 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) includes within the definition of ‘personal injury’ an emotional impairment that arises from or is caused by a physical injury or occupational disease. It does not, however, extend coverage to an emotional impairment which itself is an occupational disease. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the causation requirement encompassed within the term ‘arises.’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 79. The present case presents an entirely different issue, namely, whether § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) precludes an award of compensation to a plaintiff whose preexisting psychiatric condition has been aggravated by a work-related physical injury.

       “In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language . . . General Statutes § 1-1 (a). “To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition of the term.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188, 200 n.12, 736 A.2d 790 (1999).

       This claim was the subject of an October 4, 2001 motion in which the plaintiff sought our reconsideration of our initial decision in this case. See Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 258 Conn. 137, 779 A.2d 124 (2001). We granted the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration on December 17, 2001.

       The court in Cashman was interpreting General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 5223; see Cashman v. McTernan School, Inc., supra, 130 Conn. 403-404; which contained language identical in all material respects to the relevant language in § 31-275 (1) (D). See General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 5223 (“[i]n the case of aggravation of a pre-existing disease, compensation shall be allowed only for such proportion of the disability or death due to the aggravation of such pre-existing disease as may be reasonably attributed to the injury upon which the claim is based”).

       Specifically, the parties did not address this issue until after our initial decision in this case had been published in the Connecticut Law Journal on September 25, 2001. Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 258 Conn. 137, 779 A.2d 124 (2001).

       We intimate no view as to how we may resolve any future claim challenging our holding in Cashman in light of the 1993 revisions to the Workers’ Compensation Act or for any other reason.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    PAMELA DAVIS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.
    (SC 16598)
    Borden, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
    Argued December 7, 2001
    officially released January 15, 2002

      JohnH. Barton, associate city attorney, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Victor R. Perpetua, appellate attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, general counsel, for the appellee (named defendant).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Pamela Davis, the tax assessor of the city of Bridgeport, from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her appeal from an order of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission). The commission had ordered the plaintiff to provide the complainant, Barbara Brennan, with access to the city’s motor vehicle grand lists for 1997 and 1998, and to comply strictly with the provisions of General Statutes § 1-210 (a), formerly §1-19 (a).

The plaintiff claims that the federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act; 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq.; and General Statutes §§ 14-10,41-50a and 14-163, bar the disclosure of the motor vehicle grand lists in question. The plaintiff also claims that the grand lists are exempt from the public disclosure otherwise mandated by General Statutes § 12-55 (a) because “the phrase [in § 12-55 (a)] ‘except as otherwise specially provided by law’ would encompass the enactment of the Federal [Drivers Privacy Protection Act], as well as the subsequent revision to ... § 14-10 creating the Connecticut privacy exemption.”

Our examination of the record and briefs and our consideration of the arguments of the parties persuade us that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The issues were resolved properly in the trial court’s concise and well reasoned memorandum of decision. Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, 47 Conn. Sup. 309, 790 A.2d 1188 (2001). Because that memorandum of decision fully addresses all arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt it as a proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. See Kaluszka v. East Hartford, 60 Conn. App. 749, 752, 760 A.2d 1269 (2000).

The judgment is affirmed.

       The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statues § 51-199 (c).

       General Statutes § 1-210 (a) provides: “Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to inspect such records promptly during regular office or business horns or to receive a copy of such records in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212. Any agency rule or regulation, or part thereof, that conflicts with the provisions of this subsection or diminishes or curtails in any way the rights granted by this subsection shall be void. Each such agency shall keep and maintain all public records in its custody at its regular office or place of business in an accessible place and, if there is no such office or place of business, the public records pertaining to such agency shall be kept in the office of the clerk of the political subdivision in which such public agency is located or of the Secretary of the State, as the case may be. Any certified record hereunder attested as atrae copy by the clerk, chief or deputy of such agency or by such other person designated or empowered by law to so act, shall be competent evidence in any court of this state of the facts contained therein. Each such agency shall make, keep and maintain a record of the proceedings of its meetings.”

       Title 18 of the United States Code, § 2721 (1994 & Sup. 1999), provides: “Prohibition on release and use of certain personal information from State motor vehicle records

        “(a) In General.—Except as provided in subsection (b), a State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record.
      “(b) Permissible Uses.—Personal information referred to in subsection (a) shall be disclosed for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act, (15 U.S.G. 1231 et seq.), the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title 49, and may be disclosed as follows:
      “(1) For use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out its functions.
      “(2) For use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft; motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories; performance monitoring of motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts and dealers; motor vehicle market research activities, including survey research; and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers.
      “(3) For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business or its agents, employees, or contractors, but only—
      “(A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the business or its agents, employees, or contractors; and “(B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or is no longer correct, to obtain the correct information, but only for the purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual.
      “(4) For use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court or agency or before any self-regulatory body, including the service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and the execution or enforcement of judgments and orders, or pursuant to an order of a Federal, State, or local court.
      “(5) For use in research activities, and for use in producing statistical reports, so long as the personal information is not published, redisclosed, or used to contact individuals.
      “(6) For use by any insurer or insurance support organization, or by a self-insured entity, or its agents, employees, or contractors, in connection with claims investigation activities, antifraud activities, rating or underwriting.
      “(7) For use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles.
      “(8) For use by any licensed private investigative agency or licensed security service for any purpose permitted under this subsection.
      “(9) For use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain or verify information relating to a holder of a commercial driver’s license that is required under chapter 313 of title 49.
      “(10) For use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation facilities.
      “(11) For any other use in response to requests for individual motor vehicle records if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains.
      “(12) For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains.
      “(13) For use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates it has obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains.
      “(14) For any other use specifically authorized under the law of the State that holds the record, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety.
      “(c) Resale or Redisclosure.—An authorized recipient of personal information (except a recipient under subsection [b][ll] or [12]) may resell or redisclose the information only for a use permitted under subsection (b) (but not for uses under subsection [b][ll] or [12]). An authorized recipient under subsection (b)(ll) may resell or redisclose personal information for any purpose. An authorized recipient under subsection (b)(12) may resell or redisclose personal information pursuant to subsection (b)(12). Any authorized recipient (except a recipient under subsection [b] [ll])that resells or rediscloses personal information covered by this chapter must keep for a period of 5 years records identifying each person or entity that receives information and the permitted purpose for which the information will be used and must make such records available to the motor vehicle department upon request.
      “(d) Waiver Procedures.—A State motor vehicle department may establish and carry out procedures under which the department or its agents, upon receiving a request for personal information that does not fall within one of the exceptions in subsection (b), may mail a copy of the request to the individual about whom the information was requested, informing such individual of the request, together with a statement to the effect that the information will not be released unless the individual waives such individual’s right to privacy under this section.”
      Title 18 of the United States Code, § 2722, provides: “Additional unlawful acts
      “(a) Procurement for Unlawful Purpose.—It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted under section 2721(b) of this title.

        “(b) False Representation.—It shall be unlawful for any person to make false representation to obtain any personal information from an individual’s motor vehicle record.”
      Title 18 of the United States Code, § 2723, provides: “Penalties “(a) Criminal Fine.—A person who knowingly violates this chapter shall be fined under this title.
      “(b) Violations by State Department of Motor Vehicles.—Any State department of motor vehicles that has a policy or practice of substantial noncompliance with this chapter shall be subject to a civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General of not more than $5,000 a day for each day of substantial noncompliance.”
      Title 18 of the United States Code, § 2724, provides: “Civil action “(a) Cause of Action.—A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring a civil action in a United States district court.
      “(b) Remedies.—The court may award—
      “(1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500;
      “(2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law;
      “(3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred; and
      “(4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate.”
      Title 18 of the United States Code, § 2725, provides: “Definitions
      “In this chapter—
      “(1) ‘motor vehicle record’ means any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator’s permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor vehicles;
      “(2) 'person’ means an individual, organization or entity, but does not include a State or agency thereof; and
      “(3) ‘personal information’ means information that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver’s status.”

       General Statutes § 14-10 provides: “(a) For the purposes of this section: “(1) ‘Disclose’ means to engage in any practice or conduct to make available and make known, by any means of communication, personal information contained in a motor vehicle record pertaining to an individual to any other individual, organization or entity;
      “(2) ‘Motor vehicle record’ means any record that pertains to an operator’s license, learner’s permit, identity card, registration, certificate of title or any other document issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles;
      “(3) ‘Personal information’ means information that identifies an individual and includes an individual’s photograph or computerized image, Social Security number, operator’s license number, name, address other than the zip code, telephone number, or medical or disability information, but does not include information on motor vehicle accidents or violations, or information relative to the status of an operator’s license, registration or insurance coverage; and
      “(4) ‘Express consent’ means an affirmative agreement given by the individual who is the subject of personal information that specifically grants permission to the department to release such information to the requesting party. Such agreement shall (A) be in writing or such other form as the commissioner may determine in regulations adopted in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, and (B) specify a procedure for the individual to withdraw such consent, as provided in regulations adopted in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54.
      “(b) A number shall be assigned to each motor vehicle registration and operator’s license and a record of all applications for motor vehicle registrations and operators’ licenses issued shall be kept by the commissioner at the main office of the Department of Motor Vehicles.
      “(c) (1) All records of the Department of Motor Vehicles pertaining to the application for registration, and the registration, of motor vehicles of the current or previous three years shall be maintained by the commissioner at the main office of the department. Any such records over three years old may be destroyed at the discretion of the commissioner. (2) Before disclosing personal information pertaining to an applicant or registrant from such motor vehicle records or allowing the inspection of any such record containing such personal information in the course of any transaction conducted at such main office, the commissioner shall ascertain whether such disclosure is authorized under subsection (f) of this section, and require the person or entity making the request to (A) complete an application that shall be on a form prescribed by the commissioner, (B) provide two forms of acceptable identification, and (C) pay a fee of fifteen dollars to the commissioner in addition to any fee required under section 14-50a. An attomey-at-law admitted to practice in this state may provide juris number to the commissioner in lieu of the requirements of subparagraph (B) of this subdivision. The commissioner may disclose such personal information or permit the inspection of such record containing such information only if such disclosure is authorized under subsection (f) of this section.
      “(d) The commissioner may disclose personal information from a motor vehicle record pertaining to an operator’s license or a driving history or permit the inspection or copying of any such record or history containing such information in the course of any transaction conducted at the main office of the department only if such disclosure is authorized under subsection (f) of this section. Any such records over five years old may be destroyed a.t the discretion of the commissioner.
      “(e) In the event (1) a federal court judge, federal court magistrate or judge of the Superior Court, Appellate Court or Supreme Court of the state, (2) a member of a municipal police department or a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, (3) an employee of the Department of Correction, (4) an attomey-at-law who represents or has represented the state in a criminal prosecution, or (5) a member or employee of the Board of Parole submits a written request and furnishes such individual’s business address to the commissioner, such business address only shall be disclosed or available for public inspection to the extent authorized by this section.
      “(f) The commissioner may disclose personal information from a motor vehicle record to
      “(1) Any federal, state or local government agency in carrying out its functions or to any individual or entity acting on behalf of any such agency, or
      “(2) Any individual, organization or entity that signs and files with the commissioner, under penalty of false statement as provided in section 53a-157b, a statement on a form approved by the commissioner, together with such supporting documentation or information as the commissioner may require, that such information will be used for any of the following purposes:
      “(A) In connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls or advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers and removal of nonowner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers to implement the provisions of the federal Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 15 USC 1231 et seq., the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Saving Act, 15 USC 1901 et seq., the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 USC 1381 et seq., Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, 15 USC 2021 et seq., and the Clean Air Act, 42 USC 7401 et seq., as amended from time to time, and any provision of the general statutes enacted to attain compliance with said federal acts;
      “(B) In the normal course of business by the requesting party, but only to confirm the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the requesting parly;
      “(C) In connection with any civil, criminal, administrative or arbitral proceeding in any court or government agency or before any self-regulatory body, including the service of process, an investigation in anticipation of litigation and the execution or enforcement of judgments and orders, or pursuant to an order of any court provided the requesting party is a party in interest to such proceeding;
      “(D) In connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls or advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts and dealers, motor vehicle market research activities including survey research, motor vehicle product and service communications, and removal of nonowner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers, provided the personal information is not published, disclosed or used to contact individuals except as permitted under subparagraph (A) of this subdivision;
      “(E) By any insurer or insurance support organization or by a self-insured entity or its agents, employees or contractors, in connection with the investigation of claims arising under insurance policies, antifraud activities, rating or underwriting;
      “(F) In providing any notice required by law to owners or lienholders named in the certificate of title of towed, abandoned or impounded motor vehicles;
      “(G) By an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain or verify information relating to a holder of a passenger endorsement or commercial driver’s license required under the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, 49 USC 2304 et seq., and sections 14-44 to 1444m, inclusive;
      “(H) In connection with any lawful purpose of a labor organization, as defined in section 31-77, provided (i) such organization has entered into a contract with the commissioner, on such terms and conditions as the commissioner may require, and (ii) the information will be used only for the purposes specified in the contract other than campaign or political purposes;
      “Q For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations provided the commissioner has obtained the express consent of the individual to whom such personal information pertains;
      “(J) For the purpose of preventing fraud by verifying the accuracy of personal information contained in a motor vehicle record, including an individual’s photograph or computerized image, as submitted by an individual to a legitimate business or an agent, employee or contractor of a legitimate business, provided the individual has provided express consent in accordance with subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section.
      “(g) Any person receiving personal information from a motor vehicle record pursuant to subsection (Q of this section shall be entitled to use such information for any of the purposes set forth in said subsection.
      “(h) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, the disclosure of personal information from a motor vehicle record pursuant to subsection (D of this section shall be subject to the provisions of section 14-50a concerning (1) the fees that shall be charged for copies of or information pertaining to motor vehicle records and (2) the authority of the commissioner to establish fees for information furnished on a volume basis in accordance with such terms and conditions regarding the use and distribution of such information as the commissioner may prescribe.
      “(i) Notwithstanding any provision of this section that restricts or prohibits the disclosure of personal information from a motor vehicle record, the commissioner may disclose personal information contained in any such record to any individual who is the subject of such personal information or to any person who certifies under penalty of false statement that such person has obtained the express consent of the subject of such personal information.
      “(j) The commissioner may adopt regulations in accordance with chapter 54 to implement the provisions of this section.”
      Although § 14-10 has been amended since 1999, when this action was instituted, the changes are not relevant to this appeal. References to § 14-10 are to the current revision of the statute.
      General Statutes § 14-50a provides: “(a) The following fees shall be charged by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for the item or service indicated:
      “(1) Duplicate of a registration certificate, five dollars.
      “(2) First duplicate of a motor vehicle operator’s license, ten dollars, second duplicate of a motor vehicle operator’s license, twenty dollars and each duplicate of a motor vehicle operator’s license thereafter, thirty dollars.
      “(3) Replacement numberplate or set of number plates, except as provided in subsection (c) of section 14-253a, eleven dollars.
      “(4) Replacement number plate or set of number plates bearing same number as set of replaced plates, eleven dollars.
      “(5) Each search of the accident record files made pursuant to a request for a copy of an accident report which results in no document being produced, ten dollars and seventy-five cents.
      “(6) Each copy of an accident report, ten dollar's and seventy-five cents.
      “(7) Certified copy of an accident record, fourteen dollars.
      “(8) Certified statement of 'no record of accident’, fourteen dollars.
      “(9) Certified abstract of driving history record, or driving history record for applicants for commercial driver’s license with passenger endorsement or transportation permit, ten dollars.
      “(10) Name of registered owner, four dollars and fifty cents.
      “(11) Operator license information, five dollars and fifty cents.
      “(12) Certification of any copy or record, three dollars and fifty cents.
      “(13) Certified transcripts of hearing held by the commissioner, three dollars and fifty cents per page with a minimum charge of seventeen dollars and fifty cents.
      “(14) Each copy of a motor vehicle operator’s completed application for a license, seven dollars.
      “(15) Each copy of a completed application for registration of a motor vehicle, seven dollars.
      “(16) Each copy of a title document provided to a municipality, ten dollars.
      “(17) Each request for information as provided in section 14-10, the amount provided in said section.
      “(18) For any copy or material released from information maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles for which no fee is established by statute, an amount determined by the commissioner.
      “(b) The commissioner may establish fees not conforming to those of subsection (a) of this section for information furnished on a volume basis to persons or firms who satisfy the commissioner that the information furnished is properly required in connection with the conduct of such person’s or firm’s business.
      “(c) The commissioner may waive any fee specified in subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section in the case of any person who submits a police report to the commissioner indicating that the number plate or set of number plates have been stolen or mutilated for the purpose of obtaining the sticker attached to the plate denoting the expiration date of the registration.
      “(d) No person, firm or corporation furnished information by the commissioner as provided by this section shall distribute such information for any other purpose than that for which it was furnished.
      “(e) Any person, firm or corporation which violates any provision of this section shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars.”
      General Statutes § 14-163 provides: “The commissioner, on or before the first day of December, annually, shall furnish to the tax assessors in each town a list containing the names and addresses of the owners of motor vehicles and snowmobiles residing in their respective towns, as they appear by the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, with a description of such vehicles. The commissioner shall, on or before December 1, 2000, and December first, annually thereafter, furnish to the Commissioner of Revenue Services a list containing the names, addresses and federal Social Security account numbers or federal employer identification numbers, or both, if available, of the owners of motor vehicles as they appear by the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the vehicle identification numbers of such vehicles, in order to establish the identification of persons affected by the tax laws of the state.”

       General Statutes § 12-55 (a) provides: “When the declarations of any town have been so received or made by the assessor or board of assessors, they shall equalize the same, if necessary, and make any assessment omitted by mistake or required by law. The assessor or board of assessors may increase or decrease the valuation of property as named in any of such declarations or in the last-preceding grand list, but, in each case of any increase in valuation of such property above the valuation, if any, stated by the person filing such declaration or in each case of any increase of valuation above the valuation of such property in the last-preceding grand list, except with respect to the valuation of any motor vehicle, they shall send written notice by mall of such increase in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, or in accordance with subsection (f) of section 12-62 in the year of a revaluation, including in such notice the valuation prior to and after such increase with respect to each parcel of real property, the valuation of which has been increased, to the last-known address of the person whose valuation is so changed. If the methodology used to determine the value of personal property for which a notice of increase is required differs from that previously used to determine the value of such property by the assessor or assessors of such town, said notice shall include a statement concerning such change, which shall indicate the current methodology and that previously used. Such notice shall also include information describing the manner in which an appeal may be filed with the board of assessment appeals. When the review of such declarations has been completed, the assessor or board of assessors shall determine the assessed valuations resulting therefrom, including, where applicable, the twenty-five per cent assessment penalty added in accordance with section 12-41. The assessor shall publish all such assessed values, together with the assessed value of all other property in the town in the grand list abstract for the assessment year commencing on the October first immediately preceding completion of such grand list. Such grand list shall also reflect the statutory exemption or exemptions to which each taxpayer is entitled. The assessor or board of assessors shall lodge the same, except as otherwise specially provided by law, in the office of the assessor, on or before the thirty-first day of January following the commencement of such assessment year, for public inspection. Such assessor or board of assessors shall take and subscribe the oath provided by law, which shall be certified by the officer administering the same and endorsed upon or attached to such grand list abstract. For the grand list of October 1, 2000, and each grand list thereafter, each assessor who signs the grand list of the town shall be certified in accordance with the provisions of section 12-40a. Any assessor or board of assessors of any town who fails to comply with any provision of this section shall be fined five dollars.”
      Although § 12-55 (a) has been amended since 1999, when this action was instituted, the changes are not relevant to this appeal. References to § 12-55 (a) are to the current revision of the statute.