author: MCDONALD, J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRYANT K. ROLLINS
    (SC 15718)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz and McDonald, Js.

      Argued March 18
    officially released July 28, 1998

      Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin Kane, state’s attorney, and Stephen Carney, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

      James B. Streeto, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

MCDONALD, J.

The issues in this certified appeal are whether the defendant, Bryant K. Rollins, invoked his right to counsel and whether his subsequent confession without counsel physically present was the result of interrogation initiated by the police in violation of his right to counsel. We conclude that the defendant invoked his right to counsel and that subsequently, through counsel, he initiated a permissible police interview that led to his confession.

It is undisputed that while incarcerated on an unrelated offense, the defendant was arrested and charged with multiple offenses. On April 9,1992, after the police gave the defendant Miranda? warnings, the defendant stated that he wished to speak with an attorney. The police made no attempt to interrogate the defendant at that time. The defendant and Nancy Radoff, a public defender appointed to represent him, met on April 15, 1992, at which time Radoff instructed him to remain silent until she had an opportunity to speak with the state’s attorney. Thereafter, Radoff spoke with the state’s attorney many times in an attempt to resolve the defendant’s numerous pending cases. Radoff reported her discussions with the state’s attorney to the defendant, after which the defendant decided to talk to the police. Radoff then told the state’s attorney that the police could question the defendant “about [the] burglaries.” State v. Rollins, 44 Conn. App. 162, 163-64, 688 A.2d 876 (1997). Thereafter, on May 12, 1992, officer Mark Kalinowski of the Norwich police department went to the jail to interview the defendant. After signing a waiver of his rights, the defendant gave a statement implicating himself in one of the burglaries in connection with which he was charged. Radoff was not physically present when the defendant signed the waiver and gave his statement on May 12. Id.

The defendant later filed a motion to suppress the May 12 statement. The trial court denied that motion. The defendant then entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to one count of burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with his plea and sentenced the defendant. State v. Rollins, supra, 44 Conn. App. 164.

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress his May 12 statement because it was taken in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. State v. Rollins, supra, 44 Conn. App. 166-67. The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant had fully invoked his right to counsel, and that the defendant’s subsequent statement was made during a police-initiated interrogation, in violation of his fifth amendment right to have counsel present. Id., 167-70. Accordingly, the Appellate Court ruled that the May 12 statement must be suppressed and ordered a new trial. Id., 170,172. The state petitioned this court for certification, which we granted as to the following issue: “Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed by the trial court because (1) it was made after the defendant had requested counsel and (2) the subsequent communication that led to the confession was not initiated by the defendant as required by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), and its progeny?” State v. Rollins, 241 Conn. 921, 697 A.2d 361 (1997). We disagree with the reasoning of the Appellate Court and, accordingly, reverse its judgment.

I

Because “[invocation and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries”; Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S. Ct. 490, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1984); we begin our analysis with the issue of the limited invocation of counsel. It is undisputed that on April 9, 1992, while in custody on other charges, the defendant was served with an arrest warrant. After being read his Miranda warnings, the defendant said that he wanted to speak with a lawyer. After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court found that the defendant “did make requests for counsel.” Nevertheless, the state argues that the defendant invoked only a limited right to counsel.

In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court established the standard for determining when the accused has invoked his right to counsel. Id., 458-59. The court stated: “[T]he suspect must unambiguously request counsel.” Id., 459. “[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.” Id. In Davis, the suspect said: “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 455. Concluding that this statement was sufficiently ambiguous, the court held that continued police interrogation was appropriate. See id., 462. In State v. Anonymous, 240 Conn. 708, 694 A.2d 766 (1997), the defendant asked the police during custodial interrogation: “Do I still have a right to an attorney?” Id., 720. We held that the question was sufficiently ambiguous to permit continued police interrogation. Id., 724-25.

In this case, the defendant’s statement that he wanted to speak with a lawyer was an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. When a person, after being advised of his or her Miranda rights, asks to speak with a lawyer, it is only reasonable to conclude that the person believes that, without counsel, he or she is not competent to continue any conversation with the police.

The defendant’s words also set this case apart from Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S. Ct. 828, 93 L. Ed. 2d 920 (1987). In Barrett, the defendant limited his invocation of his right to counsel by agreeing to speak with police but not agreeing to sign a written statement without a lawyer present. Id., 526. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had thereby waived his right to counsel for purposes of his oral confession. Id., 527-29. In the case before us, however, there was no ambiguous or limited request for counsel because the ordinary understanding of the defendant’s words indicated that he wished to deal with the police only through an attorney. See id., 529; see also Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1988).

II

The defendant argues that Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1990), requires that counsel, once requested, must always be physically present when a defendant makes statements to the police. The Appellate Court held that, because Radoff was not physically present at the May 12 interview with Kalinowski, his statement should be suppressed as the interrogation was initiated by the police. State v. Rollins, supra, 44 Conn. App. 169. Minnick, as the Appellate Court observed, holds that the police “may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.” Minnick v. Mississippi, supra, 153.

The defendant conceded at oral argument that Radoff “was authorized by him to go to the police and tell them that he was willing to make a statement.” Radoff s testimony supports this concession. She testified at the suppression hearing that the defendant wanted to make the statement, that he agreed to make it, and that she then told the state’s attorney that the police could interview the defendant. It was not Radoff s practice to be present at a confession, and she did not forbid an interview with the defendant in her absence or request that she be present at the interview. Moreover, the defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he spoke with Radoff about whether to talk to the police before they interviewed him. The defendant testified, with respect to the May 12 meeting, that “[Radoff] made the indication that [the police] would probably be coming by shortly.” The court then asked the defendant if, on May 12, “when Kalinowski called the jail to get [his] permission to come down and see [him], did [he] approve that?” The defendant said “yes.” According to the defendant, the interview “was arranged beforehand” by Radoff. This arrangement, he testified, followed his discussion with Radoff, who suggested that he “would be facing a substantial amount of time if [he] did not confess.” The defendant further testified that he gave Kalinowski permission to visit him in jail, and once the police arrived, he did not ask that Radoff be present at the interview.

Based on this evidence, the trial court found that Radoff “was aware . . . that the police were going to speak to [the defendant] . . . gave [the police] permission to speak to [the defendant] without her being there, and . . . advised [the defendant] that the police [would be coming] to speak to [him] and . . . told [him] to make whatever deal [he] could with the police.”

As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Patterson v. Illinois, supra, 487 U.S. 291, the essence of Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. 477, and its progeny, is “preserving the integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with police only through counsel. . . .” In this case, the evidence clearly shows that all communications with the police concerning the arrangements for the May 12 interview were made by the defendant only through his counsel. It was through counsel that the defendant told the police that he was prepared to waive his Miranda rights and submit to an interview. Although the defendant was not present when Radoff spoke to the state’s attorney, there was ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Radoff spoke as she did in furtherance of the defendant’s desire to cooperate with and confess to the police.

The United States Supreme Court observed in Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. 477, that an “accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 484-85. Furthermore, the court held in Edwards that a defendant’s valid waiver of his or her right to counsel, once invoked, cannot be demonstrated “by showing only that he [or she] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he [or she] has been advised of his [or her] rights.” Id., 484. This rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his [or her] previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1990). Where the defendant initiates the later interview, however, the defendant waives his or her fifth amendment right to counsel, and the police may act consistently with his or her wishes. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 484-85.

In Minnick v. Mississippi, supra, 498 U.S. 146, the defendant invoked his right to counsel and met with counsel several times, but the prison guards later told him that he would have to talk to other police officers and that he “could not refuse.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 149. He thereafter confessed without his counsel present. See id. The United States Supreme Court decided that Edwards' “bright-line rule,” requiring counsel’s presence during any interrogation occurring after the defendant’s invocation of the right to counsel, was not terminated or suspended by the defendant’s superseding consultation with counsel, and it suppressed the confession. Id., 152-53. The Min-nick court also observed that “Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of fifth amendment protections after counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the conversation or discussions with the authorities”; id., 156; but that was not the case in Minnick.

In this case, in contrast to Minnick, following the defendant’s request for counsel, the police dealt with him only through counsel, as he requested, and it was the defendant, through counsel, who arranged for the subsequent interview that resulted in the May 12 statement.

The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant did not initiate the May 12 interview, but “merely responded to the actions of the police. . . .” State v. Rollins, supra, 44 Conn. App. 170. There is, however, no evidence in the record, nor did the trial court find, that the police had any direct communications with the defendant once he requested counsel until after Radoff gave her permission on his behalf to the state’s attorney for the police to interview him. The police in this case interviewed the defendant in response to his decision, communicated by Radoff to the state’s attorney, to talk to the police. Any earlier request by police to interview the accused before the right to counsel is invoked does not render the interview “police-initiated.” As the court in Minnick recognizes, it is the “reinitiation” of interrogation after counsel has been requested that is prohibited. Minnick v. Mississippi, supra, 498 U.S. 156. The United States Supreme Court has described “initiation” as simply meaning “to call for such a meeting” or to “call for [the police].” Patterson v. Illinois, supra, 487 U.S. 291. The evidence indicates that the defendant did call, through Radoff, for such a meeting.

The evidence, the trial court’s findings and the defendant’s concession at oral argument all make clear that the May 12 interview with police was arranged by Radoff under the defendant’s direction and with his consent, and any reinitiation of interrogation occurred in the presence of counsel.

In this case, there axe “both particular and systematic assurances that the coercive pressures of custody were not the inducing cause” of the defendant’s statement. Minnick v. Mississippi, supra, 498 U.S. 155. Those assurances took the form of Radoff s exclusive role in dealing with the police on the defendant’s behalf and at his direction. Miranda and its progeny envision that a suspect may waive, with the assistance of counsel, his or her right to remain silent and give a statement.

Neither the defendant’s arrangement of the interview with police through Radoff, nor the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel at the interview, require that his statement be suppressed and society be deprived of its use.

Because we conclude that the defendant arranged the May 12 interview with police only through Radoff, his May 12 statement was admissible.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for consideration of the defendant’s remaining claim.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       In twelve separate informations, the defendant was charged with ten counts of burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103, four counts each of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123, and larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124, two counts of larceny in the sixth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125b, and one count each of larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122, criminal mischief in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-116, criminal mischief in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117, credit card theft in violation of General Statutes § 53a-128c, and attempt to commit larceny in the fifth degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-125a.

        Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

       Although the defendant had made statements to the police concerning his involvement in some of the burglaries with which he was allegedly connected, this appeal concerns only the suppression of a statement made by the defendant to Kalinowski on May 12, 1992, confessing to his involvement in one of those burglaries.

       General Statutes § 53a-103 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.”

       Because the Appellate Court’s review of the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was limited to the defendant’s May 12 statement, our certified issue and decision in this case necessarily concern only the May 12 statement.

       The defendant did not brief the state constitutional issue and the Appellate Court therefore did not address it. State v. Rollins, supra, 44 Conn. App. 167 n.5. Accordingly, because there is no state constitutional claim raised before us, we address only the federal claim.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PALMER, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    COLONIAL PENN INSURANCE COMPANY v. D. EUGENE BRYANT D. EUGENE BRYANT v. ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY D. EUGENE BRYANT v. COLONIAL PENN INSURANCE COMPANY
    (SC 15778)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Palmer and McDonald, Js.

      Argued February 17
    officially released July 28, 1998

      Constance L. Epstein, for the appellant (Royal Insurance Company).

      Frederick L. Murolo, with whom was Jeffrey L. Fisher, for the appellee (Colonial Penn Insurance Company).

      Kerin M. Woods and Dennis A. Ferdon filed a brief for the appellee (D. Eugene Bryant).
   Opinion

PALMER, J.

In Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, 219 Conn. 764, 594 A.2d 468 (1991), we held that under General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175c (a) (2), a written request to reduce uninsured motorist coverage signed by only one of two named insureds under an automobile liability insurance policy was ineffective to reduce the uninsured motorist benefits available to a third party who had been injured in an accident while a passenger in a vehicle covered under the policy. In this certified appeal, we must decide whether, under that statutory subsection, a written request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage submitted by one of two named insureds under an automobile liability policy is effective when it is the insured who signed the reduction request form who seeks uninsured motorist benefits. We conclude that, in such circumstances, our decision in Pasión does not apply and, furthermore, that the named insured’s request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage is binding as against that insured.

The material facts and procedural history are undisputed. At all times relevant to this appeal, the defendant, D. Eugene Bryant (Bryant), and his wife, Judith Bryant, owned three vehicles. Two of those vehicles were insured under a policy issued by Colonial Penn Insurance Company (Colonial Penn), and the third vehicle was insured under a policy issued by Royal Insurance Company (Royal). Bryant and his wife were the named insureds under each of the two policies. The Royal policy provided for $250,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. Prior to March, 1988, the Colonial Penn policy provided uninsured motorist coverage of $100,000 for each of the two vehicles covered under the policy.

Upon notification by Colonial Penn that its policy was due to expire, Bryant renewed the policy in March, 1988. Bryant also signed and forwarded to Colonial Penn a form requesting a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage from $100,000 per vehicle to $20,000 per vehicle. Judith Bryant, however, did not sign the reduction request form. As a result of Bryant’s request, he and his wife paid a lower premium for the reduced uninsured motorist coverage.

Bryant thereafter was injured in an automobile accident on September 20, 1989. After exhausting the tort-feasor’s liability coverage of $25,000, Bryant sought to recover uninsured motorist benefits under the Colonial Penn and Royal policies. The parties stipulated that the Colonial Penn policy provided primary uninsured motorist coverage, and that, under then applicable law, the coverage under the Colonial Penn policy could be stacked.

Bryant claimed that because his wife had not signed the form requesting a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage under the Colonial Penn policy, his request was ineffective in light of our decision in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn. 764, and, consequently, he was eligible under that policy for uninsured motorist benefits in the total amount of $200,000 ($100,000 x 2 vehicles). Colonial Penn claimed that Bryant’s request for a reduction in the amount of uninsured motorist coverage was binding on him and, therefore, the policy provided for a maximum of $40,000 ($20,000 x 2 vehicles) in uninsured motorist coverage.

The case proceeded to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the Colonial Penn policy. The arbitration panel, with one of the three members dissenting, concluded that: (1) Bryant had sustained damages totaling $180,000; (2) because Bryant had received $25,000 from the tortfeasor, he was entitled to a balance of $155,000 under the uninsured motorist provisions of the applicable policy or policies; (3) in light of our decision in Pasión, Bryant’s request for a reduction in coverage under the Colonial Penn policy was ineffective because the signature of the second named insured, Judith Bryant, did not appear on the request form and, consequently, Bryant was entitled to $200,000 in uninsured motorist coverage under that policy; and (4) Colonial Penn, as the primary insurer, was obligated to pay Bryant $155,000 in uninsured motorist benefits. Consequently, Bryant’s claim against Royal was moot because the uninsured motorist benefits payable to Bryant by Colonial Penn were less than the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage under the Colonial Penn policy.

Colonial Penn appealed from the arbitration award to the trial court. The trial court, relying on our opinion in Pasión, affirmed the decision of the arbitrators. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that Bryant’s request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage under the Colonial Penn policy was binding on Bryant notwithstanding the fact that his wife had not signed the request form. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 45 Conn. App. 558, 565-56, 696 A.2d 1267 (1997). The Appellate Court determined that, under the circumstances, our holding in Pasión was not controlling because, in this case, unlike in Pasión, the injured party seeking recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy was the same insured who had signed the form requesting a reduction in coverage and, thus, Bryant’s request was binding on him. Id., 562. The Appellate Court also identified what it described as “another more compelling reason ... to conclude that the coverage reduction form was effective and binding on both [the insureds]”; id.; namely, the retroactive applicability of an amendment to § 38-175c (a) (2); Public Acts 1993, No. 93-297, § 1 (P.A. 93-297, § l); adopted after our decision in Pasion. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 565. The relevant part of P.A. 93-297, § 1 expressly authorized any named insured” to request and obtain a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage. (Emphasis added.) P.A. 93-297, § 1. In accordance with its determination that Bryant’s request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage was effective, the Appellate Court remanded the case to the trial court with direction that it render judgment ordering Colonial Penn to pay Bryant $15,000 under its policy and ordering Royal to pay Bryant $140,000 under its policy. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 566.

Royal petitioned for certification to appeal to this court. We granted Royal’s petition limited to the following issues: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that: (1) Under General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175c (a) (2), and Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, [supra] 219 Conn. 764, the signature of the defendant, D. Eugene Bryant, was sufficient to render the reduction in coverage form effective as to him; and (2) the subsequent amendment to § 38-175c (a) (2), and codified at General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (2), clarified § 38-175c (a) (2), with retroactive effect?” Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 243 Conn. 919, 701 A.2d 340 (1997).

On appeal to this court, Royal contends that this case is controlled by Pasión and, consequently, that Bryant’s request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage was not effective. Royal further asserts that the Appellate Court improperly gave retroactive effect to the amendment to § 38-175c (a) (2) authorizing “any named insured” to obtain a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage. See P.A. 93-297, § 1. Although we disagree with the Appellate Court’s retroactive application of the amendment to § 38-175c (a) (2), we agree that our holding in Pasión does not control this case and, moreover, that Bryant is bound by his request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on that ground.

I

Before turning to the question of whether Pasión is applicable in the circumstances of this case, we first address the Appellate Court’s conclusion that P.A. 93-297, § l, which amended § 38-175c (a) (2) by replacing the term “the insured” with “any named insured,” applies retroactively. We disagree that the amendment has retrospective applicability.

“Whether to apply a statute retroactively or prospectively depends upon the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. See, e.g., State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 284, 528 A.2d 760 (1987). In order to determine the legislative intent, we utilize well established rules of statutory construction. ‘Our point of departure is General Statutes § 55-3, which states: “No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have retrospective effect.” The “obligations” referred to in the statute are those of substantive law. . . . Thus, we have uniformly interpreted § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only.’ ” Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc., 243 Conn. 311, 316, 702 A.2d 1180 (1997). This presumption in favor of prospective applicability, however, maybe rebutted “when the legislature clearly and unequivocally expresses its intent that the legislation shall apply retrospectively.” In re Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 372, 678 A.2d 462 (1996); accord Bayusik v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 233 Conn. 474, 483-84, 659 A.2d 1188 (1995); Miano v. Thorne, 218 Conn. 170, 175, 588 A.2d 189 (1991). “Where an amendment is intended to clarify the original intent of an earlier statute, it necessarily has retroactive effect.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Toise v. Rowe, 243 Conn. 623, 628, 707 A.2d 25 (1998). We generally look to the statutory language and the pertinent legislative history to ascertain whether the legislature intended that the amendment be given retrospective effect. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. American Casually Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, 238 Conn. 285, 290, 679 A.2d 925 (1996); Rice v. Vermilyn Brown, Inc., 232 Conn. 780, 787, 657 A.2d 616 (1995).

Colonial Penn concedes, and the Appellate Court recognized, that there is nothing in the legislative history of P.A. 93-297, § 1, to indicate that the legislature intended that the term “any named insured” is to be applied retroactively. Moreover, the statutory language itself contains no suggestion that the legislature intended for the term to be given retrospective effect.

The Appellate Court nevertheless concluded that, in light of the fact that the legislature’s decision to change the statutory language from “the insured” to “any named insured” was prompted by our decision in Pasión, the legislature must have been clarifying its original intent and, accordingly, the term “any named insured” should be given retrospective effect. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 45 Conn. App. 564-65. We disagree. Assuming arguendo that the change in language was made in response to our decision in Pasión; see footnote 16; that fact alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption against retroactive applicability; indeed, it sheds little, if any, light on whether the legislature intended for the amendment to be applied retroactively. The mere fact that the legislature changes the language of a statutory provision in response to a judicial decision interpreting that provision does not mean that the legislature necessarily intended that the amendatory language be retroactive. See, e.g ., Bayusik v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 233 Conn. 478 n.2; Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 200 Conn. 630, 640-41, 513 A.2d 52 (1986).

Colonial Penn contends that Reliance Ins. Co. v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, supra, 238 Conn. 285, supports its claim that P.A. 93-297, § 1, as it amended subsection (a) (2) of § 38-175c (hereinafter P.A. 93-297, § 1 [a] [2]), should be applied retroactively. In Reliance Ins. Co., we concluded that a different and unrelated part of P.A. 93-297, § 1, later codified at General Statutes § 38a-336 (f), was clarifying legislation and, consequently, had to be given retrospective effect. Reliance Ins. Co. v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, supra, 291. In so holding, however, we observed that the pertinent legislative history of § 38a-336 (f) provided “uncontroverted support”; id., 290; for the conclusion that the legislature considered the amendatory language to be “a declaration of the legislature’s original intent” rather than a change in the existing statute. (Emphasis added.) Id., 291. By contrast, the legislative history of P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) contains no indication that the legislature enacted that provision to clarify, rather than to change, the existing law.

Furthermore, P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) provides that no request for a reduction in uninsured motorist benefits by “any named insured” shall be effective unless that insured has signed an informed consent form containing: (1) an explanation of uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverage; (2) a list of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage options available from the insurer; (3) the premium cost for each of those coverage options; and (4) a specific admonition, in twelve-point type, informing the insured of the consequences of choosing reduced coverage and advising the insured to seek assistance from a qualified advisor if he or she is uncertain about the effect of such an election. Neither Bryant nor Royal, however, claims that these requirements are also to be applied retroactively, even though, by their very nature, they are inextricably linked to the statutory change that allows “any named insured” to elect a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage that is binding on all insureds under the policy. We see no reason why the legislature would have intended for certain provisions of P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) to be given retrospective effect and the other, integrally related provisions of that very same subdivision, to be afforded prospective effect only.

Finally, P.A. 93-297, entitled “An Act Concerning Automobile Insurance Reform,” made comprehensive changes to the law of uninsured motorist coverage. Among other things, the act abolished intra-policy and inter-policy stacking; allows an insured to purchase uninsured motorist coverage with limits up to twice that of the policy’s bodily injury coverage; allows an insured, in certain circumstances, to recover the highest amount of any one policy under which he or she may be insured; establishes rules prioritizing uninsured motorist benefits due under multiple policies; and creates “underinsured motorist conversion coverage,” an optional form of coverage that authorizes an insured to collect for damages sustained up to the limit of the conversion coverage without having such coverage reduced by a third party payment or barred altogether due to the fact that the tortfeasor’s policy equals or exceeds the limit of the insured’s conversion coverage. J. Berk & M. Jainchill, Connecticut Law of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage (1993) § 1.1, pp. 8-9. Thus, the overriding purpose of the act was to change, rather than to clarify, existing law. Because there is no persuasive evidence that the legislature had a different purpose with respect to P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2), we conclude that the Appellate Court was incorrect in holding that the term “any named insured” has retrospective applicability.

II

We next turn to the question of whether our decision in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn. 764, controls this case. We conclude that it does not.

In Pasion, we determined that, under § 38-175c (a) (2), a request for a reduction in uninsured motorist benefits by Carlos Londono, who, along with his wife, Alexis, was a named insured on an automobile liability policy issued to the Londonos by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, was not binding on a third party who was injured in an accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle covered under the policy. Id., 771. In so holding, we concluded, first, that the requirement that any reduction in uninsured motorist coverage be requested in writing by the “insured” was ambiguous because it was not clear, in the circumstances of that case, whether the term “insured” referred to any named insured or to all named insureds. Id., 769.

We then reviewed the pertinent legislative history, and observed that “[t]he apparent intent of the legislature in adopting [subdivision] (2) . . . was to assure that consumers purchasing automobile liability insurance would be made aware of the low cost of equal amounts of uninsured coverage by requiring any reduction in that coverage to be in writing.” Id., 770-71. On the basis of our determination regarding the legislative intent, we concluded as follows: “Although the named insureds on the policy involved in [the] case are husband and wife and by virtue of that personal relationship it could be assumed that Alexis Londono was both made aware of the availability of low-cost uninsured motorist coverage and acquiesced in the reduction sought by her husband, such an assumption is far from a certainty. We are even less certain that in situations where the joint owners of an automobile and named insureds on an automobile liability insurance policy are, for example, brother and sister, roommates, or friends, all of whom would be consumers, a conscious choice to reduce uninsured motorist coverage would have been made by all consumers when only one owner/named insured had signed the authorization for reduction in coverage. To permit the signature of one named insured to bind other, possibly uninformed, named insureds would circumvent the legislature’s intent that the decision to reduce uninsured motorist coverage by consumers be an informed one.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 771.

Relying on our conclusion in Pasion that the legislative objective underlying the signature requirement of § 38-175c (a) (2) was to promote informed decision-making by purchasers of uninsured motorist coverage; id., 770-71; the Appellate Court reasoned that in view of the fact that Bryant himself had sought the reduction in coverage, his “election was not uninformed”; Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 45 Conn. App. 562; and, consequently, Bryant’s endorsement and submission of the reduction request form was sufficient to effect a reduction in coverage “[a]s to him.” Id. We agree with the conclusion of the Appellate Court. “It is not our practice to construe a statute in a way to thwart its purpose or lead to absurd results; Sutton v. Lopes, 201 Conn. 115, 121, 513 A.2d 139, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S. Ct. 466, 93 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986); or in a way ‘that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.’ Fairfield Plumbing & Heating Supply Corp. v. Kosa, 220 Conn. 643, 651, 600 A.2d 1 (1991).” Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996); see also Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc., supra, 243 Conn. 319-20. In light of the intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting § 38-175c (a) (2), we see no reason why a named insured who personally has elected a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage under that provision, and who has paid a premium commensurate with that choice, should not be bound by that decision.

This interpretation of § 38-175c (a) (2) is supported by the relevant scholarly commentary. For example, shortly after our decision in Pasión, and prior to the Appellate Court’s decision in this case, the authors of an authoritative work on Connecticut’s uninsured motorist law presaged the scenario presented by this case: “An immediate question posed by the holding of Pasión is whether a rejection of higher limits would be effective if signed by only one of the named insureds if that named insured was the one making claim for benefits.” (Emphasis in original.) J. Berk & M. Jainchill, supra, § 1.10.2, p. 63. As those commentators noted, “[certainly under [such] circumstances if the court is concerned that appropriate information be disseminated to the named insured so that an ‘informed decision’ may be made by the named insured, such concern has been satisfied where the injured claimant is the named insured who signed the rejection.” Id. Because our holding in Pasión was expressly predicated upon the legislative purpose underlying § 38-175c (a) (2), namely, that “consumers purchasing automobile liability insurance would be made aware of the low cost of equal amounts of uninsured coverage by requiring any reduction in that coverage to be in writing”; Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn. 770-71; a named insured who, like Bryant, makes a conscious choice to reduce the uninsured motorist coverage under an automobile liability policy cannot reasonably claim that his or her decision is not binding as against him or her simply because another named insured under the policy failed to sign the reduction request form. See Plaster v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 791 P.2d 813, 814 (Okla. 1989) (under Oklahoma statute providing that “[t]he named insured shall have the right to reject . . . uninsured motorist coverage in writing,” written rejection of such coverage, though not effective as to named insured who failed to sign rejection form, is binding on named insured who signed rejection form). Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court properly reversed the judgment of the trial court affirming the arbitration award.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175c (a) (2) provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, every [automobile liability insurance] policy issued or renewed on and after July 1, 1984, shall provide uninsured motorist coverage with limits for bodily injury and death equal to those purchased to protect against loss resulting from the liability imposed by law unless the insured requests in writing a lesser amount .... Such written request shall apply to all subsequent renewals of coverage and to all policies or endorsements which extend, change, supersede or replace an existing policy issued to the named insured, unless changed in writing by the insured.”

       Throughout this opinion, the term uninsured motorist coverage encompasses underinsured motorist coverage as well. See Rydingsword v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 8, 14 n.11, 615 A.2d 1032 (1992).

       The reduction request form filled out and signed by Bryant provided various uninsured motorist coverage options and set forth with specificity the cost of each option. Bryant chose the minimum uninsured motorist limits of $20,000/$40,000.

       The accident occurred while Bryant was operating one of the two vehicles insured under the policy issued by Colonial Penn.

       “Intrapolicy stacking is the aggregation of the limits of liability for under-insured motorist coverage of each automobile covered under one insurance policy.” Kent v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 226 Conn. 427, 428 n.3, 627 A.2d 1319 (1993).

       Royal also took this position.

       On appeal to the trial court, Colonial Penn claimed that it was liable under the policy for a total of $15,000 ($40,000 of coverage less the $25,000 paid by the tortfeasor). In a separate appeal from the decision of the arbitration panel, Bryant claimed that if Colonial Penn prevailed on its appeal, then he was entitled to a judgment ordering Royal to pay him $140,000 under its policy ($140,000 from Royal, $25,000 from the tortfeasor, and $15,000 from Colonial Penn, for a total payment of $180,000). In a third appeal, Royal maintained that the arbitration panel properly concluded that Colonial Penn was liable to Bryant under its policy in the amount of $155,000 and, consequently, that Bryant was not entitled to any recovery under the Royal policy. The three appeals were consolidated by the trial court.

       Colonial Penn and Bryant filed separate appeals to the Appellate Court, which consolidated the two cases.

       The Appellate Court characterized our holding in Pasión as follows: “Pasión clearly holds that, coowners of a car who are named insureds on an automobile liability insurance policy must both sign the authorization for a reduction in coverage ... in order for a reduction in coverage to be effective when a passenger in the insureds’ car, driven by the nonsigning owner suffers injuries.” Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 45 Conn. App. 562.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175c (a) (2) was recodified at General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (2) in the General Statutes as revised to 1991. Section 38a-336 (a) (2) was later amended by P.A. 93-297, § 1. See footnote 13. The legislature subsequently made a technical amendment to § 38a-336 (a) (2) in 1994; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., May 25, 1994, No. 94-1, § 35; that is not relevant to this appeal.
      Because § 38-175c (a) (2) is the provision relevant to this appeal, we hereinafter refer to P.A. 93-297, § 1, as an amendment to § 38-175e (a) (2), despite the intervening recodification of § 38-175c (a) (2) at § 38a-336 (a) (2).

       Bryant also seeks reversal of the Appellate Court judgment for the reasons set forth by Royal.

       Colonial Penn raises the doctrines of equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment as alternate grounds for affirmance. Because we agree with the Appellate Court that Colonial Penn is entitled to prevail as a matter of statutory interpretation, we do not reach Colonial Penn’s alternate equitable claims.

       Public Act 93-297, § 1 provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, each automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed on and after [July 1,1984] THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACT, shall provide uninsured AND UNDERINSURED motorist coverage with limits for bodily injury and death equal to those purchased to protect against loss resulting from the liability imposed by law unless [the] ANY NAMED insured requests in writing a lesser amount, but not less than the limits specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112. Such written request shall apply to all subsequent renewals of coverage and to all policies or endorsements which extend, change, supersede or replace an existing policy issued to the named insured, unless changed in writing by [the] ANY NAMED insured. NO SUCH WRITTEN REQUEST FOR A LESSER AMOUNT SHALL BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS ANY NAMED INSURED HAS SIGNED AN INFORMED CONSENT FORM WHICH SHALL CONTAIN: (A) AN EXPLANATION OF UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE APPROVED BY THE COMMISSIONER; (B) A LIST OF UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE OPTIONS AVAILABLE FROM THE INSURER; AND (C) THE PREMIUM COST FOR EACH OF THE COVERAGE OPTIONS AVAILABLE FROM THE INSURER. SUCH INFORMED CONSENT FORM SHALL CONTAIN A HEADING IN TWELVE-POINT TYPE AND SHALL STATE: ‘WHEN YOU SIGN THIS FORM, YOU ARE CHOOSING A REDUCED PREMIUM, BUT YOU ARE ALSO CHOOSING NOT TO PURCHASE CERTAIN VALUABLE COVERAGE WHICH PROTECTS YOU AND YOUR FAMILY. IF YOU ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW THIS DECISION WILL AFFECT YOU, YOU SHOULD GET ADVICE FROM YOUR INSURANCE AGENT OR ANOTHER QUALIFIED ADVISOR.’ ” (Emphasis added.)

       The parties have not disputed that Colonial Penn’s substantive rights are affected by the amendatory language.

       See Colonial Penn. Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 45 Conn. App. 563 n.6.

       The Appellate Court did not expressly explain its conclusion that the legislature had been prompted by our holding in Pasión to replace the term “the insured” with the term “any named insured” in § 38-175c (a) (2). We presume, however, that the Appellate Court’s determination was based on the temporal proximity of the release of our decision in Pasión in 1991 and the passage of the amendment effecting that linguistic change in 1993, as well as the fact that the change addressed the precise issue that we had decided in Pasión.

       General Statutes § 38a-336 (f) provides in relevant part: “[A]n employee of a named insured injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment shall be covered by such insured’s otherwise applicable uninsured and undeiinsured motorist coverage.” Section 38a-336 (f) was enacted in response to our decision in CNA Ins. Co. v. Colman, 222 Conn. 769, 610 A.2d 1257 (1992), in which we concluded that due to the exclusive remedy provision of our workers’ compensation law; see General Statutes § 31-284 (a); “an employee injured in an automobile accident during the course of his or her employment who had received workers’ compensation benefits was barred . . . from recovering against a commercial insur-anco provider on an uninsured motorist insurance policy procured by [his or her] employer.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reliance Ins. Co. v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, supra, 238 Conn. 287-88.

       Indeed, even Colonial Penn does not claim that these four requirements should be applied retroactively. See Bayusik v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 233 Conn. 483 (unreasonable to conclude that legislature would have intended retrospective application of new statutory requirement in circumstances where party subject to mandate had no notice or opportunity to comply with requirement). Royal and Bryant do claim, however, that the four requirements should be given retrospective effect if, and only if, we conclude, contrary to the primary argument espoused by Royal and Bryant, that the “any named insured” language of P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) is to be given retroactive effect. Royal and Bryant further argue that they would prevail under such a scenario because the reduction request form provided by Colonial Penn and executed by Bryant did not comply with those requirements. We conclude, however, that the provisions of P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) are not retroactive.

       Although the legislative history is silent on the issue, it is apparent that the legislature, when it replaced the term “the insured” with the term “any named insured” in P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2), also sought to ensure that the decision by a named insured to seek a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage would be an informed one by requiring that any such election be made on an informed consent form provided to the insured by the insurer. See J. Berk & M. Jainchill, Connecticut Law of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage (1993) § 1.10.3, pp. 65-66.

       Public Act 93-297 also made other significant changes in the law of automobile insurance, including the abolition of no-fault insurance coverage. See generally P.A. 93-297, §§ 10 through 15, 28.

       In particular, we relied on the statements of Senator Wayne Baker, the cochairman of the Committee on Insurance and Real Estate in 1983, when the legislature passed Senate Bill 123, which added subdivision (2) to § 38-175c (a). Senator Baker, “in moving for acceptance of that committee’s favorable report and passage of Senate Bill 123, stated that this provision would require each insured who purchases more than the legally required amount of liability insurance [to] receive the same amount of uninsured motorist coverage. The insured would have an opportunity to waive in writing the additional uninsured motorist coverage. This change would increase the consumer’s awareness of the value of low-cost uninsured motorist coverage which protects the insured and [his or her] family members. Apparently many drivers pinchase $100,000.00 or more of liability coverage but leave their uninsured motorist coverage at the minimum of $20,000-$40,000. [Subdivision] 2 . . . gives such a driver an increased amount of uninsured motorist coverage, unless he [or she] makes a conscious decision not to purchase it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn. 770, quoting 26 S. Proc., Pt. 9, 1983 Sess., p. 3055.

       See also 2 I. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance (3d Ed. 1995) § 36.04 [1], p. 36-8 (“There are a number of possible rejection results where there is more than one insured qualifying as ‘the named insured’: (1) A rejection by A may delete coverage for only A; (2) A rejection by A may delete coverage for both A and B; (3) A rejection by A, absent a rejection by B, has no rejection effect whatever. The mandate of these statutes is that [uninsured motorist] coverage shall be provided ‘for the protection of persons insured thereunder.’ Consistent with this, an appropriate interpretation of the wording, in light of the ambiguities invited by a multiple-named insured situation, is that a rejection by one named insured, unless he is authorized to act for others, applies only to himself and not the others." [Emphasis added.]).


text:
    ROGER FRANTZ v. UNITED STATES FLEET LEASING, INC., ET AL. WILLIAM GRABEK ET AL. v. UNITED STATES FLEET LEASING, INC., ET AL. BARBARA KELSEY v. UNITED STATES FLEET LEASING, INC., ET AL.
    (SC 15784)
    Callahan, C. J, and Borden, Katz, Palmer and McDonald, Js.

      Argued February 17
    officially released July 28, 1998

      Philip T. Newbury, Jr., for the appellants (defendants).

      Michael Jainchill, with whom, was Kathryn Calibey, for the appellees (plaintiffs in the first and second cases).

      Susan M. Phillips, for the appellee (plaintiff in the third case).

      Jon S. Berk and Claudia A. Baio filed a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
   Opinion

PALMER, J.

These consolidated appeals require us to determine the proper application of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 38a-336 (a) (2) to a written request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage under a commercial fleet automobile liability insurance policy. Specifically, we must decide whether such a request was effective in this case even though the request form did not contain the signatures of all of the named insureds under the policy. We conclude that the reduction request was effective.

The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed. On September 11, 1992, the plaintiffs Roger Frantz, Barbara Kelsey and William Grabek, employees of the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation (General Dynamics), and participants in a work van pool program, were injured when an automobile driven by Robert Nowosad (tortfeasor) struck the van in which they were riding. The van, which was owned by the named defendant, United States Fleet Leasing, Inc. (Fleet Leasing), and which was leased to General Dynamics, was insured under an automobile liability insurance policy that had been issued by the defendant Insurance Company of North America (INA) to General Dynamics. The vehicle driven by the tortfea-sor was insured under a liability policy that had been issued to the vehicle’s owner, John Nowosad (Nowo-sad), with liability limits of $100,000 per accident.

Under the terms of the lease agreement between Fleet Leasing and General Dynamics, General Dynamics agreed to maintain liability coverage of at least $1 million on the leased vehicles, as well as collision coverage, and to designate Fleet Leasing as an additional insured under the policy. The lease agreement was silent with respect to uninsured motorist coverage. Fleet Leasing, however, relied on General Dynamics to arrange for uninsured motorist coverage in those jurisdictions where such coverage was required, including Connecticut; see General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-112 (a); and authorized General Dynamics to designate the level of such coverage. Pursuant to this understanding, a representative of General Dynamics completed and signed a “selection form” for Connecticut uninsured motorist coverage, choosing the minimum amount.

The INA policy covered approximately 2208 private passenger vehicles that were either owned or leased by General Dynamics and that were located in various states. The policy provided liability coverage of $2 million per accident and, in accordance with General Dynamics’ election, a “minimum” level of uninsured motorist coverage. A schedule depicting the minimum level of uninsured motorist coverage required in various states, which appeared in an endorsement to the policy, showed minimum uninsured motorist coverage in Connecticut of $40,000 per accident. The declarations section of the policy listed General Dynamics as the named insured. The term “named insured,” however, was expanded by endorsement to include, subject to certain limitations, various subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures of General Dynamics, the United States of America and “any other person or organization for which [General Dynamics] has agreed in writing to provide insurance . . . .”

Frantz, Kelsey and Grabek commenced separate actions against the tortfeasor, seeking damages for injuries sustained as a result of the accident. After a trial in July, 1995, the trial court determined that the tortfeasor was solely responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries and rendered judgment in their favor as follows: Frantz, $1,300,000; Kelsey, $750,000; and Grabek, $650,000. Nowosad’s insurer paid a total of $100,000, thereby exhausting the liability limits of Nowosad’s policy.

The plaintiffs also commenced these separate actions against Fleet Leasing and INA seeking underinsured motorist benefits under the policy issued by INA to General Dynamics. These actions were subsequently consolidated.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to Grabek’s complaint, claiming that: (1) his exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation; and (2) because General Dynamics had elected uninsured motorist coverage of $40,000, the tortfeasor’s vehicle was not an “underinsured motor vehicle” within the meaning of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 38a-336 (d). The court denied the defendants’ motion.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, claiming that: (1) under our decision in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, 219 Conn. 764, 594 A.2d 468 (1991), General Dynamics’ election of lower uninsured motorist coverage was invalid because it had not been signed by Fleet Leasing, a named insured, and, consequently, the uninsured motorist coverage under the policy was equal to the liability limit of $2 million; and (2) because the issue of damages had been decided in the earlier action against the tortfeasor, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the defendants from rehtigating that issue. The defendants filed cross motions for summary judgment, asserting that General Dynamics’ election-of reduced uninsured motorist limits was binding because § 1 of No. 93-297 of the 1993 Public Acts, as it amended subsection (a) (2) of § 38a-336 (hereafter P.A. 93-297, § 1 [a] [2]); see footnote 1 of this opinion; clarified existing law and, therefore, apphed retroactively to permit any one of several named insureds under the policy to request and obtain such a reduction. The defendants alternatively claimed that even if P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) did not apply retrospectively, our holding in Pasión; see footnote 16 of this opinion; was inapplicable to this case and, thus, the plaintiffs were bound by General Dynamics’ election of $40,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment, concluding that: (1) P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) does not apply retroactively, and, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to uninsured motorist coverage of $2 milhon under our decision in Pasión because Fleet Leasing, a named insured, had failed to submit a written request for a reduction in such coverage; (2) the defendants were collaterally estopped from rehtigating the issue of damages; and (3) the defendants were not entitled to a setoff for the social security disability benefits paid and payable to Kelsey. The trial court therefore awarded damages to the plaintiffs in accordance with the judgment that had previously been rendered in their favor against the tortfeasor, subject to applicable credits, set-offs and interest. Following a hearing on the issue of setoffs for workers’ compensation and social security disability benefits, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs as follows: Frantz, $722,898.95; Kelsey, $407,664.43; and Grabek, $396,824.91. The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we granted the plaintiffs’ motions to transfer the consolidated appeals to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4024, now Practice Book § 65-2, and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

The defendants claim that the trial court improperly concluded that Fleet Leasing’s failure to submit a written request for reduction of uninsured motorist coverage rendered General Dynamics’ election of such coverage ineffective in light of our decision in Pasión The plaintiffs assert that the trial court properly determined that Pasión applies to this case. We conclude that General Dynamics’ election of $40,000 uninsured motorist coverage was effective and, therefore, the tortfeasor’s vehicle was not an underinsured vehicle at the time of the accident. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

“The standard of review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book § 384 [now Practice Book § 17-49].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peerless Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 241 Conn. 476, 481, 697 A.2d 680 (1997). The sole issue that we must decide is whether, as a matter of law, the construction of § 38-175c (a) (2) — recodified at § 38a-336 (a) (2) in the General Statutes as revised to 1991 — that we articulated in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn. 771, applies to the different factual scenario presented by this case. Consequently, our review is plenary. Charles v. Charles, 243 Conn. 255, 258, 701 A.2d 650 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1136, 118 S. Ct. 1838, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1089 (1998).

In Pasión, “we determined that, under § 38-175c (a) (2), a request for a reduction in uninsured motorist benefits by Carlos Londono, who, along with his wife, Alexis, was a named insured on an automobile liability policy issued to the Londonos by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, was not binding on a third party who was injured in an accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle covered under the policy. [Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn.] 771. In so holding, we concluded, first, that the requirement that any reduction in uninsured motorist coverage be requested in writing by the ‘insured’ was ambiguous because it was not clear1, in the circumstances of that case, whether the term ‘insured’ referred to any named insured or to all named insureds. Id., 769.” (Emphasis in original.) Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 245 Conn. 710, 723, 714 A.2d 1209 (1998).

“We then reviewed the pertinent legislative history, and observed that [t]he apparent intent of the legislature in adopting [subdivision] (2) . . . was to assure that consumers purchasing automobile liability insurance would be made aware of the low cost of equal amounts of uninsured coverage by requiring any reduction in that coverage to be in writing. [Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn.] 770-71. On the basis of our determination regarding the legislative intent, we concluded as follows: Although the named insureds on the policy involved in [the] case are husband and wife and by virtue of that personal relationship it could be assumed that Alexis Londono was both made aware of the availability of low-cost uninsured motorist coverage and acquiesced in the reduction sought by her husband, such an assumption is far from a certainty. We are even less certain that in situations where the joint owners of an automobile and named insureds on an automobile liability insurance policy are, for example, brother and sister, roommates, or friends, all of whom would be consumers, a conscious choice to reduce uninsured motorist coverage would have been made by all consumers when only one owner/named insured had signed the authorization for reduction in coverage. To permit the signature of one named insured to bind other, possibly uninformed, named insureds would circumvent the legislature’s intent that the decision to reduce uninsured motorist coverage by consumers be an informed one. . . . Id., 771.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 245 Conn. 723-25.

The defendants contend that the factual differences between Pasión and the present case warrant a different application of § 38a-336 (a) (2). Specifically, they argue that the policy considerations underlying the enactment of § 38a-336 (a) (2) that formed the basis of our holding in Pasión are inapplicable in the context of commercial fleet insurance. They claim, moreover, that to construe that statutory provision to require the written consent of all named insureds on a commercial fleet policy would place an unreasonable and unintended burden on insurers because, as in this case, the number of prospective insureds under a fleet policy is likely to be substantial. We agree.

“[O]ur fundamental objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Derwin v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 234 Conn. 411, 420, 661 A.2d 1025 (1995). “Moreover, there is a presumption that the legislature intends to accomplish a reasonable and rational result rather than a difficult and possibly bizarre one.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 27, 670 A.2d 851 (1996). Accordingly, if there are two possible interpretations of a statute, we will adopt the construction “that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.” Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc., 243 Conn. 311, 319-20, 702 A.2d 1180 (1997).

Application of these well established principles of statutory construction leads us to conclude that the legislature did not intend to require the written consent of all named insureds on a commercial fleet policy as a necessary prerequisite to a reduction in coverage. First, we are not persuaded that requiring Fleet Leasing to provide a written request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage under the INA policy would further the legislative goal of ensuring that consumers are informed of the relative cost of this type of insurance. Although a corporation like Fleet Leasing may be considered a “consumer” of insurance in the broadest sense of that word, we do not believe that a company that, like Fleet Leasing, is covered under a commercial fleet policy, falls within the class of consumers that the legislature sought to protect in requiring the signature of all named insureds under § 38a-336 (a) (2). Fleet Leasing, like many other large corporations covered under commercial fleet policies, has departments that specialize in legal and insurance matters. It is highly likely, therefore, that the Fleet Leasing personnel who negotiated the insurance provisions of the lease contract with General Dynamics were fully aware of the relative cost of uninsured motorist coverage and the implications of their decision to leave to General Dynamics the determination of the amount of uninsured motorist coverage.

Moreover, the primary legislative purpose in requiring a written request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage is to ensure that one named insured not be bound, to his or her detriment, by the unilateral decision of another named insured to seek such a reduction. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 245 Conn. 725 (under § 38-175c [a] [2], written request for reduction in uninsured motorist coverage submitted by one of two named insureds is effective when insured who signed reduction request form seeks uninsured motorist benefits). Such a concern has little or no applicability in the context of a commercial fleet policy. It may be presumed that Fleet Leasing’s chief interest in requiring General Dynamics to arrange for certain insurance coverage was to protect itself from exposure to liability and to safeguard the value of its vehicles. Fleet Leasing took steps to do that by incorporating into its lease contract with General Dynamics the requirements that General Dynamics procure collision and liability insurance and designate Fleet Leasing as an additional insured. Moreover, Fleet Leasing expressly left all matters pertaining to uninsured motorist coverage to General Dynamics. If Fleet Leasing had desired a particular level of uninsured motorist coverage, it could have bargained for the inclusion of such coverage in the lease in the same manner it did with liability and collision coverage.

Furthermore, strict adherence in this case to the rule that we deemed applicable in Pasión would have required the written consent not only of Fleet Leasing, but of all other named insureds on the policy, a result that is both unreasonable and impracticable. Under the terms of the endorsement to the policy, “named insured” includes any other person or organization for which General Dynamics had agreed in writing to provide insurance and, subject to certain limitations, the United States of America and various joint ventures of General Dynamics, as well as partners, executive officers and directors of those joint ventures. See footnote 11. Identifying all such persons and entities and securing their written consent to a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage would have created formidable administrative burdens for General Dynamics or its insurance underwriter, burdens that we believe it is most unlikely our legislature intended to impose under § 38a-336 (a) (2).

The conclusion that our holding in Pasión is inapplicable to commercial fleet policies finds support elsewhere in our jurisprudence relating to uninsured motorist coverage. For example, although we had routinely upheld the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage in the context of separate personal automobile insurance policies; see, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Vetre, 174 Conn. 329, 333-35, 387 A.2d 539 (1978); Pecker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 171 Conn. 443, 452-53, 370 A.2d 1006 (1976); and where a number of vehicles insured under one personal automobile policy were described separately and individual premiums were charged for each vehicle; see, e.g., Dixon v. Empire Mutual Ins. Co., 189 Conn. 449, 453, 456 A.2d 335 (1983); we had rejected principles of stacking under commercial fleet policies because of the fundamental difference between commercial fleet insurance, on the one hand, and personal automobile insurance, on the other. See, e.g., Wilson v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Conn. 532, 535-36, 569 A.2d 40, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814, 111 S. Ct. 52, 112 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1990), and cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005, 112 S. Ct. 640, 116 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1991); Cohn v. Aetna Ins. Co., 213 Conn. 525, 530, 569 A.2d 541 (1990); see also Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 218 Conn. 646, 668-72, 591 A.2d 101 (1991). Thus, we will not ignore the fact that commercial fleet insurance gives rise to a significantly different set of expectations and considerations than does personal automobile insur-anee. In light of these considerations, and in the absence of any persuasive contrary argument or authority, we conclude that General Dynamics’ election of $40,000 of uninsured motorist coverage was effective.

In view of this determination, the plaintiffs are not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under the INA policy because the tortfeasor’s automobile is not an “underinsured motor vehicle” within the meaning of § 38a-336. Section 38a-336 (d) defines that term as “a motor vehicle with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy against which claim is made under subsection (b) of this section.” Thus, under § 38a-336, “in determining whether a motor vehicle is ‘underinsured’ the total of all liability insurance coverage available to an individual claimant must be compared to the amount of underinsured motorist coverage in each of the policies against which the victim has a claim. If the total of the liability insurance is less than the uninsured motorist limits of the individual’s policy, then the uninsured motorist coverage becomes applicable.” Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, 220 Conn. 30, 34, 594 A.2d 977 (1991). Conversely, a claim is not triggered if the uninsured motorist limit of a particular policy is less than or equal to the liability insurance available. See Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 215 Conn. 157,160, 574 A.2d 1300 (1990) (“[sjince the liability limits were not less than the uninsured motorist limits, the [tortfeasor’s] vehicle was not under-insured”). Moreover, if a claimant can assert a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under more than one policy, “the analysis directed by § 38a-336 requires a comparison between the aggregate of liability limits available to the victim against the underinsured motorist limits in each single policy against which the victim has a claim.” (Emphasis added.) Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, supra, 36. See generally J. Berk & M. Jainchill, Connecticut Law of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage (1993) §§ 1.6 through 1.6.2, pp. 30-38.

In this case, the limit of the liability insurance available with respect to the tortfeasor’s vehicle at the time of the accident was $100,000. We have concluded that because General Dynamics’ election was effective, the plaintiffs are entitled to $40,000 worth of uninsured motorist coverage under the INA policy. In light of the fact that the tortfeasor’s liability insurance exceeded the uninsured motorist limits of the policy, the tortfea-sor’s vehicle was not an underinsured vehicle within the meaning of § 38a-336 (d). The plaintiffs therefore have failed to establish a valid claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the INA policy.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment for the defendants.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 38a-336 (a) (2) provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, each automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed on and after July 1, 1984, shall provide uninsured motorist coverage with limits for bodily injury and death equal to those purchased to protect against loss resulting from the liability imposed by law unless the insured requests in writing a lesser amount .... Such written request shall apply to all subsequent renewals of coverage and to all policies or endorsements which extend, change, supersede or replace an existing policy issued to the named insured, unless changed in writing by the insured.” Hereafter, all references to § 38a-336 (a) (2) are to the 1991 revision.
      Section 38a-336 (a) (2) was amended by Public Acts 1993, No. 93-297, § 1, which provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any provision of the section to the contrary, each automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed on and after [July 1, 1984] THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACT, shall provide uninsured AND UNDERINSURED motorist coverage with limits for bodily injury and death equal to those purchased to protect against loss resulting from the liability imposed by law unless [the] ANY NAMED insured requests in writing a lesser amount, but not less than the limits specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112. Such written request shall apply to all subsequent renewals of coverage and to all policies or endorsements which extend, change, supersede or replace an existing policy issued to the named insured, unless changed in writing by [the] ANY NAMED insured. NO SUCH WRITTEN REQUEST FOR A LESSER AMOUNT SHALL BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS ANY NAMED INSURED HAS SIGNED AN INFORMED CONSENT FORM WHICH SHALL CONTAIN: (A) AN EXPLANATION OF UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE APPROVED BY THE COMMISSIONER; (B) A LIST OF UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE OPTIONS AVAILABLE FROM THE INSURER; AND (C) THE PREMIUM COST FOR EACH OF THE COVERAGE OPTIONS AVAILABLE FROM THE INSURER. SUCH INFORMED CONSENT FORM SHALL CONTAIN A HEADING IN TWELVE-POINT TYPE AND SHALL STATE: ‘WHEN YOU SIGN THIS FORM, YOU ARE CHOOSING A REDUCED PREMIUM, BUT YOU ARE ALSO CHOOSING NOT TO PURCHASE CERTAIN VALUABLE COVERAGE WHICH PROTECTS YOU AND YOUR FAMILY. IF YOU ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW THIS DECISION WILL AFFECT YOU, YOU SHOULD GET ADVICE FROM YOUR INSURANCE AGENT OR ANOTHER QUALIFIED ADVISOR.’ ” (Emphasis added.)

       Throughout this opinion, the term uninsured motorist coverage also encompasses underinsured motorist coverage. See Rydingsword v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 8, 14 n.11, 615 A.2d 1032 (1992).

       A fleet insurance policy “refer[s] to any insurance policy designated as a ‘fleet’ or ‘garage’ policy, or any insurance policy covering a number of vehicles owned by a business, a governmental entity, or an institution.” Cohn v. Aetna Ins. Co., 213 Conn. 525, 530, 569 A.2d 541 (1990).

       William Grabek’s wife, Robin F. Grabek, who seeks damages for loss of consortium, also is a plaintiff in this action. Hereafter, all references to “Grabek” in this opinion are to William Grabek.

       John Nowosad is Robert Nowosad’s father.

       Both Fleet Leasing and General Dynamics are large corporations with their own legal and risk management departments.

       The lease contract, dated January 28, 1976, provided in relevant part: “Lessee, for each Vehicle and for any other vehicles provided by Lessor for Lessee’s use, shall provide and maintain in full force and effect, at Lessee’s expense, a policy of primary coverage insurance written by a company satisfactory to Lessor by the terms of which Lessee is named as the ‘Insured’ and Lessor is named as an ‘Additional Insured’ and both are protected against: (i) liability and/or loss arising out of the condition, use or operation of each Vehicle in the amount of not less than $1,000,000.00 single limit (or such greater amount as may be required by law) for bodily injury and property damage; (ii) loss to vehicles caused by collision or upset . . . .”

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-112 (a) provides in relevant part: “To entitle any person to receive or retain a motor vehicle operator’s license or a certificate of registration of any motor vehicle . . . the commissioner shall require from such person proof of financial responsibility to satisfy any claim for damages by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, any one person, of twenty thousand dollars, or by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, more than one person on account of any accident, of at least forty thousand dollars . . . .”

       The form contained the following language: “REDUCED LIMITS: I/We wish to reject Uninsured Motorists insurance at limits equal to the policy Bodily Injury Liability limits and select instead limit(s) of liability, specified as follows, which are less than the policy Bodily Injury Liability limit(s), but not less than the limits of the Connecticut Financial Responsibility Law:
      9 Combined Single Limit amount of $Minimum Bodily Injury each accident . . .

       The endorsement also provided that “any statutory change in the Mandatory Minimum Uninsured Motorists Limits shall be automatically afforded by the policy.”

       The endorsement provided in relevant part: “The term ‘Named Insured’ includes in addition to the person or organization named in the Declarations: General Dynamics . . . and/or any subsidiary, affiliated, associated, owned or controlled company, including Material Service Corporation and its subsidiaries, as previously now, or hereafter constituted in which General Dynamics . . . has 51% or more ownership interest . . . and any other person or organization for which Named Insured has agreed in writing to provide insurance; and
      “The United States of America but only with respect to operations performed by the Named Insured under written contracts entered into by and between the Named Insured and the United States of America, and where by virtue of the terms of the contract the Named Insured is obligated to provide insurance such as [is] afforded by this policy; and any joint venture of which the insured was or is a partner or member provided that:
      “1. The Joint Venture is controlled by the Named Insured, or
      “2. The Named Insured is the operating interest, or
      “3. The Named Insured is obligated under the terms of the written contract to provide coverage; and
      “Any partner, executive officer, director [or] stockholder thereof while acting within the scope of his duties and/or while acting on behalf of the Named Insured . . . .”

       Frantz, Kelsey and Grabek each received a share of the $100,000 in an amount proportionate to his or her damages award as follows: Frantz, $48,000; Kelsey, $28,000; and Grabek, $24,000.

       Frantz, Kelsey and Grabek also sought underinsured motorist benefits under their respective personal automobile insurance policies. On September 30, 1996, judgment in the amount of $129,000 was rendered in favor of Kelsey in her suit against Peerless Insurance Company. Frantz’ action against Allstate Insurance Company and Grabek’s action against Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford were consolidated with the present cases. Those two actions have been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.

       Because it was determined that Frantz, Kelsey and Grabek were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident, they were awarded workers’ compensation benefits for their injuries. Kelsey was also collecting social security disability benefits.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 38a-336 (d) provides: “For the purposes of this section, an ‘underinsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy against which claim is made under subsection (b) of this section.” Hereafter, all references to § 38a-336 (d) are to the 1991 revision.

       In Pasion, we held that, under General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175c (a) (2), a written request to reduce uninsured motorist coverage signed by only one of two named insureds under an automobile liability insurance policy was ineffective to reduce the uninsured motorist benefits available to a third party who had been injured in an accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle covered under that policy. Nationwide Mutual Ins.

        Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn. 771. Section 38-175c (a) (2) was recodified at § 38a-336 (a) (2) in the General Statutes as revised to 1991. The statutory language that we construed in Pasión is virtually identical to the statutory language at issue in this case.

       The court allocated the policy’s $2 million in underinsured motorist coverage as follows:
      FVantz: pro rata share of $960,000, minus $48,000 received from the tortfea-sor and $189,101.05 in workers’ compensation benefits.
      Kelsey: pro rata share of $560,000, minus $28,000 received from the tortfea-sor and $124,335.57 in workers’ compensation benefits.
      Grabek: pro rata share of $480,000, minus $24,000 received from the tortfeasor and $59,175.09 in workers’ compensation benefits.
      The court disallowed a setoff against the $29,487 of social security disability benefits to which the parties had stipulated with respect to Kelsey.

       The defendants also claim, contrary to the determination of the trial court, that P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) has retrospective applicability. In Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 245 Conn. 710, 723, 714 A.2d 1209 (1998), we today have concluded that P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) is not retroactive. Accordingly, we reject the defendants’ contention regarding the retrospective effect of that provision.

       The plaintiffs have also asserted certain claims regarding the measure of damages payable under the policy, including the claim that the trial court properly determined that the defendants were not entitled to a setoff for the social security disability benefits paid and payable to Kelsey. We recently decided this latter issue in a manner contrary to the determination of the trial court. See Vitti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 245 Conn. 169, 195, 713 A.2d 1269 (1998) (insurer is entitled to reduction in its liability limits for underinsured motorist coverage by amount equal to sum of social security disability benefits paid or payable to insured). The issue is moot, however, in light of our conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover under the INA policy. It is also unnecessary for us to reach the plaintiffs’ other claims regarding the proper measure of damages under that policy.

       See footnote 16 of this opinion.

       ‘‘Stacking refers to the ability of the insured, when covered by more than one insurance policy, to obtain benefits from a second policy on the same claim when recovery from the first policy alone would be inadequate. . . . Intra-policy stacking is the aggregation of the limits of liability for uninsured-motorist coverage of each car covered in one policy, whereas inter-policy stacking involves the aggregation of coverage under more than one policy.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386, 388-89 n.2, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds, Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, 220 Conn. 30, 594 A.2d 977 (1991). “Stacking is a judicially adopted doctrine, never expressly mandated by our legislature.” Lash v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 236 Conn. 318, 327 n.12, 673 A.2d 84 (1996). “In 1993, [however] the legislature enacted [P.A. 93-297] which, among other things, eliminated stacking of underinsured motorist coverage for all purposes.” Id., 327.

       Our conclusion also is consistent with our decision in Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 245 Conn. 710, also decided today, in which we eschewed a rigid application of the rule that we adopted in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn. 764, and concluded that, under § 38-175c (a) (2), a written request for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage signed by only one of two named insureds is binding on the insured who signed the request form. In Bryant, as in this case, we determined that the policy considerations underlying the enactment of subsection (a) (2) militated against a construction of that provision that required the signatures of all of the named insureds. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 725-26.