author: BERDON, J.

text:
    BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL.
    (15224)
    (15225)
    Callahan, Borden, Berdon, Katz and Palmer, Js.

      Argued January 12
    officially released May 21, 1996

      Martin S. Echter, deputy corporation counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Steven G. Mednick, corporation counsel, for the appellants in Docket No. 15224 (named defendant et al.).

      Markus L. Penzel, for the appellant in Docket No. 15225 (defendant board of aldermen of the city of New Haven).

      Kimberly A. Mango, with whom was Robert J. Cathcart, for the appellees in both cases (plaintiffs).
   BERDON, J.

The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the New Haven board of education has discretion to reallocate funds appropriated to it by the New Haven board of aldermen in its annual capital budget.

The plaintiffs, the New Haven board of education and Eeginald Mayo, superintendent of schools, brought this action for a declaratory judgment against the defendants, the city of New Haven, the board of aldermen, the board of finance, the mayor, the controller and the capital projects committee, to determine whether the board of aldermen may: (1) unilaterally alter the annual capital budget submitted by the board of education; (2) alter specific items of the annual capital budget submitted by the board of education; and (3) direct the manner in which funds appropriated to the board of education in its capital budget may be expended within any capital project classification.

The trial court concluded that the board of aldermen and the capital projects committee: (1) have the authority to alter the annual capital budget submitted by the board of education; (2) have the authority to alter specific items in the capital budget submitted by the board of education; but (3) do not have the authority to direct the manner in which funds appropriated to the board of education for the ensuing year may be expended within any capital project classification. Essentially, the trial court declared that the city has the authority to alter the capital budget proposed by the board of education, but once the capital budget is appropriated for the ensuing year the board of education has discretion over how the funds will be expended within any capital project classification.

The defendants appealed from that portion of the declaratory judgment regarding the board of education’s discretion over capital appropriations to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We reverse and direct the trial court to render judgment in favor of the defendants on the issue before us.

The parties set forth the following pertinent facts in a joint stipulation of facts: As was then required by the city’s charter, the board of finance was responsible for reviewing the annual operating budget requests for the city’s individual departments, including the board of education, and for making recommendations to the board of aldermen with respect to operating appropriations. Similarly, the capital projects committee, established by the city’s charter, was responsible for reviewing the annual capital projects budget requests submitted by the city’s departments and for making recommendations regarding such submissions to the board of finance for the city’s capital improvement program, which included projections of capital expenditures for a six year period.

A “capital project” is defined by the city charter as “any physical public betterment or improvement or any preliminary studies and surveys relative thereto; the acquisition of property of a permanent nature; and equipment for any public betterment or improvement when first erected or acquired; major alterations and repairs to existing buildings or structures; and major pieces of equipment.” New Haven Charter § 78. The city’s capital budget instruction manual further defines capital projects as those which “have a useful life of at least five years,” and defines “major equipment” as equipment costing “at least $5,000 per unit.”

On March 16, 1988, the board of education submitted its capital project budget request and project descriptions for the 1988-89 fiscal year to the controller for submission to the capital projects committee. Along with its proposed budget, the board of education submitted its six year capital improvement program estimates for fiscal years 1988-89 through 1993-94. The capital projects committee amended the board of education’s original budget request by revising the particular projects that were to receive funding. The amended capital budget was approved by the board of finance and the revised amounts were appropriated to the board of education by the board of aldermen.

Subsequently, the board of education attempted to expend capital funds on projects that were not included in its annual appropriation. It is those actions that constitute the factual basis for the issues raised in this appeal. Specifically, the board of education requested funds from the “Furniture Replacement” account to purchase new furniture for its central office; funds in that account had been designated to purchase furniture for instructional areas and libraries. Similarly, the board of education requested funds from the “Rolling Stock” account to purchase an automobile for the school superintendent’s use; funds in that account had been designated to purchase two vans for the food services department, a delivery truck for stockroom operations, a dump truck and a sidewalk sweeper. The board of education also requested funds from the “Paving and Fencing” account to repair various schools’ roofs and to pave a parking lot; funds in that account had been appropriated to implement a six year paving and fencing program to resurface playgrounds and pedestrian walks. Each of those requests was denied by the city’s controller.

In discharging its state constitutional mandate to provide free public primary and secondary education; Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 647, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); the state has delegated the duty to educate a municipality’s children to local boards of education. General Statutes § 10-220; see Fowler v. Enfield, 138 Conn. 521, 532, 86 A.2d 662 (1952). In addition, the state has delegated to the municipalities other duties related to its educational obligation. See General Statutes § 10-241; New Haven v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn. 699, 705-706, 638 A.2d 589 (1994); Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 258, 438 A.2d 88 (1980) (“[t]his court has recognized that ‘[t]he state, in the exercise of its policy to maintain good public schools, has [also] delegated important duties in that field to the towns’ ”).

Relevant to this case, the legislature has charged the local boards of education with “the care, maintenance and operation of buildings, lands, apparatus and other property used for school purposes . . . .” General Statutes § 10-220 (a). On the other hand, the legislature has charged the municipalities with constructing, equipping and renovating their schools, as well as partially financing the education provided. General Statutes § 10-241. Moreover, in this case, the city has delegated some of its statutory duties to the board of education. New Haven Charter § 174.

Traditionally, there has been a tension between local boards of education, which seek sufficient funds to fulfill their educational mission, and municipalities, which are concerned with their overall financial condition. As this court noted in Baston v. Ricci, 174 Conn. 522, 523, 391 A.2d 161 (1978), there has been a “long-continuing problem of providing local education under a system in which the local boards of education are charged with the duty of maintaining good public elementary and secondary schools (General Statutes § 10-220) but are dependent for the funds necessary to perform this duty upon the appropriation of funds by the municipalities or one of their boards.” See also, e.g., New Haven v. State Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 699 (whether town has satisfied its obligation by merely funding statutory minimum expenditure requirement); Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Furlong, 162 Conn. 390, 399-400, 294 A.2d 546 (1972) (“a municipal legislative or finance body may not impede implementation of the statutory obligation of the board of education”); Board of Education v. Ellington, 151 Conn. 1, 193 A.2d 466 (1963) (board of finance had no discretionary power to refuse to allocate funds that statutorily belonged in board of education’s budget); Fowler v. Enfield, supra, 138 Conn. 521 (board of finance refused to recommend additional appropriation for board of education); State ex rel. Board of Education v. D'Aulisa, 133 Conn. 414, 52 A.2d 636 (1947) (action for writ of mandamus compelling city’s comptroller to certify payment for certain teachers’ and superintendents’ payroll items); Board of Education v. Board of Finance, 127 Conn. 345,16 A.2d 601 (1940) (declaratory judgment action brought by board of education against town of Stamford and board of finance as to respective powers of two boards regarding expenditures for school purposes); Groton & Stonington Traction Co. v. Groton, 115 Conn. 151, 160 A. 902 (1932) (board of education is statutorily vested with discretion over matters regarding transportation of students).

We commence our analysis of the issue before us with a review of established principles regarding the fiscal management of an educational district. Previously this court has recognized that “the financial relationship between the local board of education and the municipal government ... is complex.” New Haven v. State Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. 705-706. A board of education’s annual operating budget is governed by General Statutes § 10-222 (a), which provides that each local board shall submit to the appropriate municipal board a proposed budget ‘ for the ensuing year.” (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, a submitted budget need not be adopted as proposed: “Where a town board of education includes in the estimates it submits to a board of finance expenditures for a purpose which is not within statutory provisions imposing a duty upon it nor within one which vests it with a discretion to be independently exercised, the board of finance may, if in its judgment, considering not only the educational purpose to be served but also the financial condition of the town, it finds that the expenditure is not justified, decline to recommend an appropriation for it . . . .” Board of Education v. Board of Finance, supra, 127 Conn. 350. “To hold otherwise would be tantamount to the giving of a blank check to boards of education to spend the money of the municipality without regard to economy, efficiency or other local needs.” Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Furlong, supra, 162 Conn. 399. If “the estimate is for an expenditure for a purpose which the statutes make it the duty of the board of education to effectuate or they vest in the board of education a discretion to be independently exercised as to the carrying out of some purpose, [then] the town . . . has not the power to refuse to include any appropriation for it in the budget it submits and can reduce the estimate submitted by the board of education only when that estimate exceeds the amount reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, taking into consideration along with the educational needs of the town its financial condition and the other expenditures it must make. The [municipality] in such a case must exercise its sound judgment in determining whether or to what extent the estimates of the board of education are larger than the sums reasonably necessary and if it properly exercises its discretion and the budget is approved by the town the board of education has no power to exceed the appropriations made.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. State Board of Education, supra, 706-707.

Notwithstanding a municipality’s discretion with respect to the total annual operating appropriation, § 10-222 (a) provides that the “money appropriated by any municipality for the maintenance of public schools shall be expended by and in the discretion of the board of education.” In other words, “all appropriations placed in the [board of education’s operating] budget may be expended by the [board] within its discretion.” Board of Education v. Ellington, supra, 151 Conn. 11. Therefore, even if the board of education justifies an appropriation for its annual operating budget based upon an anticipated expenditure for a particular educational purpose, it has the discretion to expend operating funds for an alternative educational purpose.

The plaintiffs argue that the board of education has the same discretion with respect to the annual capital appropriation within any capital project account as it has with respect to its annual operating budget appropriation. We disagree. The plaintiffs fail to appreciate the distinction between the functions that the state has delegated to the board of education under § 10-220 and those that the state has delegated to the municipalities under § 10-241.

“In construing a statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . [W]e are guided by the principle that the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 235 Conn. 448, 454-55, 668 A.2d 340 (1995). Although § 10-220 (a) charges boards of education with “the care, maintenance and operation of buildings, lands, apparatus and other property,” when that provision is read in conjunction with § 10-241, it is obvious that “maintenance,” as used in § 10-220, refers to general maintenance, such as the daily upkeep of school facilities and equipment, the cost of which is provided for in an annual operating budget. Section 10-241, which delegates certain duties to municipalities, however, pertains to capital expenditures, such as the construction and renovation of physical facilities, the purchase of real property, or the purchase of capital equipment.

A local board of education acts as an agent of the state when it performs those duties delegated to it by the state. Cheshire v. McKenney, supra, 182 Conn. 258. In other words, if a school board is engaged in the provision of primary and secondary education, it is acting under the authority of the state and as the state’s agent. Nevertheless, even in performing its duties as an agent of the state, “a local charter may limit the powers of the local board of education where its provisions are not inconsistent with or inimical to the efficient and proper operation of the educational system otherwise entrusted by state law to the local boards.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 259.

Local boards of education, however, are also agents of the municipalities that they serve. Id., 258. A board of education acts as an agent of its respective municipality when it performs those functions originally entrusted by the state to the municipality that the municipality has subsequently delegated to the board of education; e.g., the construction of schools or the acquisition of capital equipment. While acting as an agent of the municipality, the local boards of education must comply with the municipality’s charter, ordinances and established fiscal procedures.

New Haven’s charter and ordinances distinguish between operating budgets and capital budgets and contain express provisions governing capital expenses and capital budgets. New Haven Charter §§77 through 79; New Haven Code of Ordinances § 2-25. Under the city’s ordinances, all decisions relating to capital expenditures are made by the board of aldermen, not the board of education. Consequently, the board of education is constrained when expending funds that are allocated for capital projects — duties for which the municipality is ultimately responsible pursuant to § 10-241 — by the municipality’s charter, ordinances and fiscal procedures.

The plaintiffs rely on Board of Education v. Ellington, supra, 151 Conn. 1, to support their argument that the board of education has the same discretion over capital budget expenditures as it has over operating budget expenditures. In Ellington, the board of education and the board of finance “disagreed over their respective powers in the management of funds appropriated by the town for school purposes.” Id., 3-4. The town refused the board of education’s request for funds to finance the position of curriculum coordinator. Id., 4. In order to prevent the board from diverting other funds to finance that position, appropriations for three new teacher positions and a capital outlay were placed in reserve accounts over which the board of finance had control. This court noted, however, that “[t]he number of teaching positions necessary in the public schools, the need for a curriculum coordinator, and the maintenance of school properties are matters within the sound discretion of the board of education under General Statutes § 10-220.” Id., 9. Accordingly, the court held that “[t]he moneys belonged in the [board of education’s] budget.” Id., 13.

The plaintiffs’ reliance on Ellington is misplaced. In Ellington, there was no indication that either the town’s charter or its ordinances provided for separate operating and capital budgets to fund the respective statutory duties of the board of education and the town. Rather, it appears that a single operating budget, which included a capital outlay, was submitted to the board of finance and that all the funds appropriated to the board of education were accounted for under the board of education’s annual operating budget. The town never attempted to distinguish operating funds from capital funds, nor did it distinguish between the duties delegated to it and those delegated to the board of education. In fact, the town conceded “that all appropriations placed in the [board of education’s] budget may be expended by the [board of education] within its discretion.” Id., 11. Under those circumstances, this court held that the funds in question were for educational purposes and therefore should have been allocated to the board of education under its operating budget, over which it had exclusive discretion. Id., 11-12.

We conclude that a local board of education must comply with the charter, ordinances and established procedures of its respective municipality when expending capital funds that have been appropriated to it for the accomplishment of the municipality’s statutory educational duties. Consequently, in this case, the board of education does not have the authority to reallocate appropriated capital budget items, regardless of whether the reallocation is within or outside of a project classification.

Our holding in this case is consistent with the overall financial planning that is required for capital expenditures. Fiscal prudence requires long-term planning for these expenditures. In this case, for the fiscal year 1988-89, more than twelve million dollars was appropriated to the board of education for various capital projects. Given the magnitude of the amounts involved, the defendants required six year projections of capital expenditures. To grant aboard of education discretion over the reallocation of capital funds could wreak financial chaos on a municipality. For example, a municipality may recognize that the food services department is in need of a van to adequately feed the schoolchildren. Accordingly, the municipality would appropriate funds for such a purchase. Yet, if the board of education had unfettered discretion to reallocate those funds for an alternative propose, such as the purchase of an automobile for the superintendent’s use, the municipality’s ability to discharge its duty to acquire a van would be frustrated. If such discretion is allocated to the board of education, a municipality could never be assured that its statutory obligations would be discharged.

In summary, the board of education of the city of New Haven does not have the authority to reallocate funds appropriated to it by the city under its capital budget, unless it receives permission to do so pursuant to the charter and ordinances of the city.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment in favor of the defendants.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The trial court was presented with the narrow issue of whether the board of education had discretion to reallocate funds within a capital

        project account. Because our decision makes clear that the board of education does not have discretion under the capital budget to expend funds, either within or outside of a capital project account, in a manner different from which they were specifically appropriated, and because the legal arguments of the parties subsume this broader issue, we address the broader issue as phrased.

       Because the defendants’ respective individual duties and responsibilities imposed under the city’s charter are not at issue in this appeal, the defendants are at times referred to in a general manner as “the defendants.”

       Effective July 1, 1993, after this action was commenced, the board of finance of the city of New Haven, consisting of the mayor, the controller, one alderman and six appointed citizens, was abolished by an amendment to the charter of the city of New Haven. The board of aldermen has subsequently assumed the pertinent duties of the board of finance.

       The plaintiffs do not challenge the conclusion of the trial court that the defendants have the authority to alter the budget for capital projects proposed by the board of education.

       Two appeals were taken to the Appellate Court and subsequently transferred to this court. The defendants, the city of New Haven, the board of finance, the mayor, the controller, and the capital projects committee filed one appeal (Docket No. 15224), while the defendant board of aldermen filed a separate appeal (Docket No. 15225). We consolidated the appeals.

       See footnote 3.

         Section 77 of the New Haven city charter provides: “There shall be a capital projects committee consisting of the controller, president of the board of aldermen, minority leader of the board of aldermen, a member of the board of finance designated by said board, a member of the city plan commission appointed by the mayor, the planning director and three citizen members appointed by the mayor, whose terms shall be for the same period for which the mayor was elected.”

       Section 79 of the New Haven city charter provides: “The [capital projects] committee shall prepare and submit to the mayor and the board of finance a program of capital projects which programs shall be based on estimates of the costs of such projects as submitted by each department, office or agency annually in the same manner as estimates of other budgetary requirements are prepared. The mayor may submit such capital budget to the board of aldermen.”
      Under the capital improvement program, as adopted by the board of aldermen, city agencies were to project and prioritize future capital projects expected to occur over a six year period.

       In her affidavit, Ellen Kershaw, the director of New Haven’s office of legislative services, stated that “[c]apital projects applicable for consideration in the City’s Capital Projects Budget were major purchases or improvements which had a useful life of at least five years, cost at least $15,000 and were not customarily funded in the agency’s annual operating budget.”
      We note the inconsistency between the definition of “major equipment” provided in the city’s instruction manual and the definition provided in the testimony of Kershaw. This inconsistency, however, has no impact on the issues before us and therefore need not be resolved.

       Article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: “There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principal by appropriate legislation.”

       General Statutes § 10-220 (a) provides: “Each local or regional board of education shall maintain good public elementary and secondary schools, implement the educational interests of the state as defined in section 10-4a and provide such other educational activities as in its judgment will best serve the interests of the school district; provided any board of education may secure such opportunities in another school district in accordance with provisions of the general statutes and shall give all the children of the school district as nearly equal advantages as may be practicable; shall have charge of the schools of its respective school district; shall make a continuing study of the need for school facilities and of a long-term school building program and from time to time make recommendations based on such study to the town; shall have the care, maintenance and operation of buildings, lands, apparatus and other property used for school purposes and at all times shall insure all such buildings and all capital equipment contained therein against loss in an amount not less than eighty per cent of replacement cost; shall determine the number, age and qualifications of the pupils to be admitted into each school; shall employ and dismiss the teachers of the schools of such district subject to the provisions of sections 10-151 and 10-158a; shall designate the schools which shall be attended by the various children within the school district; shall make such provisions as will enable each child of school age, residing in the district to attend some public day school for the period required by law and provide for the transportation of children wherever transportation is reasonable and desirable, and for such purpose may make contracts covering periods of not more than five years; may arrange with the board of education of an adjacent town for the instruction therein of such children as can attend school in such adjacent town more conveniently; shall cause each child seven years of age and over and under sixteen living in the school district to attend school in accordance with the provisions of section 10-184, and shall perform all acts required of it by the town or necessary to carry into effect the powers and duties imposed by law. ”

       General Statutes § 10-241 provides: “Each school district shall be a body corporate and shall have power to sue and be sued; to purchase, receive, hold and convey real and personal property for school purposes; to build, equip, purchase and rent schoolhouses and make major repairs thereto and to supply them with fuel, furniture and other appendages and accommodations; to establish and maintain schools of different grades; to establish and maintain a school library; to lay taxes and to borrow money for the purposes herein set forth; to malee agreements and regulations for the establishing and conducting of schools not inconsistent with the regulations of the town having jurisdiction of the schools in such district; and to employ teachers, in accordance with the provisions of section 10-151, and pay their salaries. When such board appoints a superintendent, such superintendent may, with the approval of such board, employ the teachers.”

       Accordingly, municipalities are authorized “to lay taxes and to borrow money” for these purposes. General Statutes § 10-241.

       Section 174 of New Haven city charter delegates to the board of education “the entire charge, control and management of all the public schools in the city, and of the expenditure of all moneys appropriated for the support and maintenance of the same unless otherwise provided herein, and shall have charge and control of the construction, repair and maintenance of all school buildings, grounds and equipment, and shall possess all other powers and be subject to all other duties of boards of education, school committees, and school visitors in this state, so far as the same are consistent with the provisions of this charter . . . .”

       Each municipality comprises an educational district. General Statutes § 10-240.

       General Statutes § 10-222 (a) provides: “Each local board of education shall prepare an itemized estimate of the cost of maintenance of public schools for the ensuing year and shall submit such estimate to the board of finance in each town or city having a board of finance, to the board of selectmen in each town having no board of finance or otherwise to the authority making appropriations for the school district, not later than two months preceding the annual meeting at which appropriations are to be made. The money appropriated by any municipality for the maintenance of public schools shall be expended by and in the discretion of the board of education. Any such board may transfer any unexpended or uncontractedfor portion of any appropriation for school purposes to any other item of such itemized estimate. Expenditures by the board of education shall not exceed the appropriation made by the municipality, with such money as may be received from other sources for school purposes. If any occasion arises whereby additional funds are needed by such board, the chairman of such board shall notify the board of finance, board of selectmen or appropriating authority, as the case may be, and shall submit a request for additional funds in the same manner as is provided for departments, boards or agencies of the municipality and no additional funds shall be expended unless such supplemental appropriation shall be granted and no supplemental expenditures shall be made in excess of those granted through the appropriating authority. The annual report of the board of education shall, in accordance with section 10-224, include a summary showing (1) the total cost of the maintenance of schools; (2) the amount received from the state and other sources for the maintenance of schools, and (3) the net cost to the municipality of the maintenance of schools.”

       The plaintiffs limit their claim to discretionary reallocation within a capital project classification. Their argument, however, would have equal applicability to reallocations within the capital budget without regard to the limitation of a specific project.

       See footnotes 12 and 14.

       Section 2-25 (f) (2) and (3) of the New Haven code of ordinances provides: “(2) The board of aldermen may increase, reduce or eliminate, in its entirety, any capital project included in the proposed capital project budget, provided that the total of all such changes shall not increase the total amount of the capital budget as transmitted pursuant to subsection (e) above.
      “(3) The board of aldermen shall be empowered to amend any narratives or supporting language attached to or contained within the proposed capital budget.”

       Additionally, although not directly at issue because the plaintiffs allege that the bond documents involved in this case were general in nature and nowhere is it alleged that their terms would be violated by the plaintiffs’ attempted reallocation of funds, capital projects are financed by the sale of bonds and notes whose proceeds are sometimes restricted to a specific puipose. See New Haven Charter § 69.

       See footnote 8.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
NORCOTT, J.
      BERDON, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    JOLLY, INC., ET AL. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT ET AL.
    (15212)
    Peters, C. J., and Callahan, Borden, Berdon and Norcott, Js.

      Argued January 10
    officially released May 21, 1996

      Gregory M. Conte, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Arthur C. Laske III, assistant city attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Barbara Brazzel-Massaro, associate city attorney, for the appellee (named defendant).

      George J. Markley, with whom was Robert M. Josovitz, for the appellee (defendant Cyrco, Inc.).
   NORCOTT, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether we should continue to adhere to our longstanding interpretation of “aggrieved person” in General Statutes § 8-8. In accordance with existing precedent, any taxpayer in a municipality has automatic standing to appeal from a zoning decision involving the sale of liquor in that community. The plaintiffs, Jolly, Inc., Richard Tuliano and Carman Tuliano, appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, for lack of aggrievement, their administrative appeal from the decision of the named defendant, the zoning board of appeals of the city of Bridgeport (board), in favor of the defendant Cyrco, Inc. (Cyrco). The plaintiffs’ initial claim is that the trial court improperly concluded that Cyrco had not waived its right to contest jurisdiction by failing to file a motion to dismiss in accordance with § 8-8 (j). See footnote 1. The plaintiffs also claim that the trial court improperly concluded that they had failed to prove that they were aggrieved, in the classical sense, by the board’s decision. The plaintiffs also claim that the trial court, in dismissing their appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improperly ignored binding precedent wherein we have consistently concluded that taxpayers in zoning appeals involving the sale of liquor are a priori aggrieved under § 8-8 (a) and, consequently, have automatic standing to appeal.

We agree with the trial court that Cyrco did not waive its right to contest the court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal. We conclude, however, that our prior interpretation of § 8-8 (a) is proper and that the trial court ignored such precedent when it determined that the plaintiffs did not have standing to prosecute their appeal. We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs can pursue their appeal because they are taxpayers in the municipality and the board’s decision involves the sale of liquor; thus they are presumed to be aggrieved. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The facts underlying the plaintiffs’ claims are as follows. In November, 1993, Cyrco, acting through its president, James A. Cyr, petitioned the board for a variance from the city zoning regulations. The petition requested a variance of chapter 17, § 2, of the regulations, which provides for a minimum of 1500 feet between liquor establishments, to permit Cyrco to relocate its existing liquor store from 1426 Pembroke Street to 572-578 Boston Avenue, where it would be located 1430 feet from the plaintiffs’ liquor store.

After a public hearing, the board granted Cyrco’s petition and the plaintiffs appealed to the trial court. On appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that there had been insufficient proof of hardship to justify the board’s decision to grant the variance requested by Cyrco. Prior to reaching the issue of hardship, however, the court addressed the issue of the plaintiffs’ aggrievement because it implicated the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

At the outset, the court determined that the plaintiffs did not meet the criteria of statutory aggrievement, as provided in § 8-8 (a), whereby a person who owns land that abuts or is within a radius of 100 feet of the land involved in the board’s decision is considered automatically aggrieved.

The court further concluded that the plaintiffs were not classically aggrieved because they had failed to prove that their personal legal interests were specially and injuriously affected by the board’s decision. In that connection, the court found that there was no evidence that the board’s decision to grant the variance would have an adverse effect on the plaintiffs’ property from an increase in road traffic, a change in traffic patterns or any physical impact, and that the only special adverse impact advanced by the plaintiffs, namely, a loss of economic advantage due to increased business competition, was highly speculative and insufficient to establish classical aggrievement.

Finally, while acknowledging that the plaintiffs, as taxpayers challenging a zoning decision involving the sale of liquor, had established that they were automatically aggrieved under existing case law, the court, nevertheless, refused to allow the plaintiffs the benefit of this long-standing rule because it concluded that the reasoning of such prior cases was flawed, anachronistic and should be overruled. In light of its findings that the plaintiffs were neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved and, in the trial court’s view, should no longer be considered automatically aggrieved based solely on the fact that they were taxpayers appealing from a zoning decision involving a liquor outlet, the trial court concluded that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ appeal.

The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I

The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly concluded that Cyrco had not waived its right to contest the court’s jurisdiction by failing to file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with § 8-8 (j). The plaintiffs argue that § 8-8 (j) mandates that jurisdiction can be contested only by a motion to dismiss and that failure to file such a motion, therefore, results in a waiver of one’s right to contest jurisdiction in the future. We disagree.

We previously have indicated that pleading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of a plaintiff’s appeal. Park City Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 210 Conn. 697, 702-703, 556 A.2d 602 (1989); Fletcher v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 158 Conn. 497, 501, 264 A.2d 566 (1969); Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 509, 242 A.2d 705 (1968). Failure to raise the issue of aggrievement is not a bar to future consideration of that issue because aggrievement implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 307, 592 A.2d 953 (1991). “A possible absence of subject matter jurisdiction must be addressed and decided whenever the issue is raised. The parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent. Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 308, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993); In re Judicial Inquiry No. 85-01, 221 Conn. 625, 629, 605 A.2d 545 (1992); Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 429-30, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988); Practice Book §§ 143, 145.” Sadloski v. Manchester, 228 Conn. 79, 84, 634 A.2d 888 (1993), on appeal after remand, 235 Conn. 637, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995). “Ordinarily, a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction is raised by the filing of a motion to dismiss. However, ‘[w]henever a lack of jurisdiction to entertain a particular proceeding comes to a court’s notice, the court can dismiss the proceeding upon its own motion.’ ” Park City Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, supra, 702. Section 8-8 (j) does not present an exception to this rule. In the present case, therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly considered the issue of the plaintiffs’ aggrievement prior to reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ appeal.

II

The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court, by dismissing their appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improperly ignored binding Connecticut Supreme Court precedent wherein we have consistently concluded, pursuant to § 8-8 (a), that taxpayers in zoning appeals involving liquor outlets are presumed to be aggrieved and, therefore, have automatic standing to appeal. See Macaluso v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 167 Conn. 596, 600-601, 356 A.2d 885 (1975); Dolan v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 426, 428, 242 A.2d 713 (1968); M. & R. Enterprises, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 280, 281-82, 231 A.2d 272 (1967); Cowles v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 153 Conn. 116, 117, 214 A.2d 361 (1965); Whitney Theatre Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 150 Conn. 285, 287, 189 A.2d 396 (1963); London v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 149 Conn. 282, 284, 179 A.2d 614 (1962); Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 661, 145 A.2d 832 (1958); Zuckerman v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 160, 163-64, 128 A.2d 325 (1956); O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 71-72, 98 A.2d 515 (1953); Farrv. Zoning Board of Appeals, 139 Conn. 577, 583, 95 A.2d 792 (1953). The issues raised by the plaintiffs have two parts: (1) whether the trial court improperly ignored binding precedent in concluding that the plaintiffs could not establish aggrievement solely by showing that they were taxpayers appealing a zoning decision involving a liquor outlet; and (2) whether we should overrule our prior interpretation and subsequent application of § 8-8 (a), wherein we have held that taxpayers are, a priori, aggrieved persons under § 8-8 if the zoning decision involves premises used or to be used for the sale of liquor.

A

It is axiomatic that a trial court is bound by Supreme Court precedent. See Martin v. Plainville, 40 Conn. App. 179, 182, 669 A.2d 1242 (1996) (Appellate Court, as intermediate court, is prevented from reexamining or reevaluating Supreme Court precedent); Brunswick v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 25 Conn. App. 543, 553, 596 A.2d 463 (1991), rev’d on other grounds, 222 Conn. 541, 610 A.2d 1260 (1992) (same); Board of Education v. Bridgeport Education Assn., 9 Conn. App. 199, 203-204, 518 A.2d 394 (1986), cert. denied, 202 Conn. 802, 519 A.2d 1206 (1987) (same); see also O’Connor v. O’Connor, 4 Conn. App. 19, 20, 492 A.2d 207 (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (same). This principle is inherent in a hierarchical judicial system. In the present case, it is undisputed that the trial court determined that under existing case law the plaintiffs had standing to appeal because they were taxpayers appealing from a zoning decision involving premises concerned with the sale of liquor and, therefore, were considered to be automatically aggrieved. The trial court refused to follow the precedent compelling this conclusion, however, because the court disagreed with our existing interpretation of the phrase “aggrieved person” as set forth in § 8-8 (a). See footnote 1. Although the concerns raised by the trial court might ultimately have merit and support its contention that the time has come to reconsider the propriety of the automatic aggrievement rule, revision of Supreme Court precedent is not the trial court’s function. The trial court, therefore, improperly ignored this court’s precedent in concluding that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved.

B

The board and Cyrco contend, however, that even if we were to conclude that the trial court improperly ignored our precedent concerning automatic aggrievement, we should, nevertheless, reconsider the viability of that precedent and overrule it on our own. We decline to do so.

“ ‘Stare decisis gives stability and continuity to our case law. This court, however, has recognized many times that there are exceptions to the rule of stare decisis. Principles of law which serve one generation well may, by reason of changing conditions, disserve a later one. . . . Experience can and often does demonstrate that a rule, once believed sound, needs modification to serve justice better. . . . The adaptability of the common law to the changing needs of passing time has been one of its most beneficent characteristics. A court, when once convinced that it is in error, is not compelled to follow precedent. ... If, however, stare decisis is to continue to serve the cause of stability and certainty in the law — a condition indispensable to any well-ordered system of jurisprudence — a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it. . . . This is especially trae when the precedent involved concerns the interpretation or construction of a statute.’ . . . Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); see Kluttz v. Howard, 228 Conn. 401, 406, 636 A.2d 816 (1994); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 335-36, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990).” (Emphasis added.) General Electric Employees Federal Credit Union v. Zakrzewski, 235 Conn. 741, 744, 670 A.2d 274 (1996). We are not persuaded that the board and Cyrco have presented cogent reasons and inescapable logic for overruling our precedent interpreting § 8-8 (a) to establish a rule of automatic standing to appeal.

In O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 140 Conn. 71-72, we interpreted the aggrievement requirement for zoning appeals relying on the court’s reasoning in an earlier decision, Beard’s Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 534, 30 A. 775 (1894). Alth ough Beard’s Appeal involved our interpretation of the term “aggrievement” as used in a statute dealing with the granting of liquor licenses, in O’Connor we concluded that the reasoning in Beard’s Appeal applied “with like force and reason to the same word as used in [the zoning appeals statute].” O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 72. “In Beard’s Appeal, [supra, 534] Justice Simeon E. Baldwin [stated]: ‘[EJvery owner of property, assessed in the grand list of the town in which he resides, has a substantial interest in the prosperity and good order of that town. The expense of the local police of any town, as well as of criminal proceedings before its local tribunals, is largely dependent on the number of the liquor saloons and bar rooms within its limits, and the character of those who keep them. If licenses are granted with too free a hand, or without proper discrimination, the burdens of taxation are likely to be increased. Every taxpayer therefore has a certain, though it may be small, pecuniary interest in having the license law well administered; and if he is also a resident in the town where he pays his taxes, he has an additional interest, common to every citizen, in promoting the general welfare of the community. In view of these considerations, we think that any resident taxpayer of a town who feels aggrieved at the granting of a license for the sale of liquors therein, has the right of appeal under the [Public Acts] of 1893, and that he is not bound to show any grievance or interest in the matter peculiar to himself, either in his own motion for an appeal before the county commissioners, or by reasons of appeal in the Superior Court.’ ” O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 71-72.

Later, in Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 145 Conn. 661, another case in which we considered aggrievement in the context of a zoning appeal, we observed: “The essence of the holdings in Beard’s Appeal, supra, [64 Conn. 534] and the cases which have followed it, is that to be an aggrieved person within the meaning of the statute one must show a pecuniary interest injuriously affected by the action of the zoning board of appeals and that such a showing may be sufficiently made, in a case where liquor traffic is involved, by proof that one is a taxpayer in the town, in view of the pecuniary effect upon every taxpayer resulting from the incidents of such traffic. Such a distinction recognizes, again, that in liquor traffic there is a possible source of danger to the public which is not inherent in other businesses and that therefore such traffic warrants distinctive and particular treatment.”

More recently, we again addressed the policy reasons behind the automatic aggrievement rule. In Macaluso, the defendant had “attacked as anachronistic the policy considerations underlying our longstanding principle that in cases in which traffic in liquor is involved and a statute similar to § 8-8 conferring a right of appeal upon persons aggrieved by decisions of a zoning board of appeals is applicable, a resident taxpayer of a town is a priori an aggrieved person with standing to prosecute the appeal, and need not show that he has an interest peculiar to himself. . . . These cases have recognized that the sale and use of liquor may involve such a risk that a resident taxpayer of a town has a sufficient pecuniary interest as well as a sufficient interest in the general well-being of his community to allow him to appeal such decisions. . . . The defendant has not persuaded us to reconsider the merits of the principle of appellate procedure embodied in these decisions.” (Citations omitted.) Macaluso v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 167 Conn. 600-601.

The problems associated with the sale and use of alcohol in our society today are common knowledge. On appeal, neither the board nor Cyrco has presented any evidence to suggest that these problems have abated. We remain convinced that the sale and use of alcohol, and its concomitant abuse and significant role in criminal activity, result in an increased risk to the general well-being of the community as well as an increased risk of pecuniary loss to the taxpayer largely resulting from the increased need for policing.

The board and Cyrco argue that the rationale for the automatic standing rule is not applicable in the present case because the challenged zoning decision does not increase the number of liquor outlets in Bridgeport; rather, a single existing liquor outlet is being moved from one location to another and, therefore, there will not be an increased need for policing due to the board’s decision. In fact, Cyrco argues that there will be a reduction in the need for local police because its liquor store is being moved further away from the plaintiffs’ store and is being moved from an isolated area to a “far safer main thoroughfare.” We are not persuaded.

In O’Connor, we construed a zoning regulation similar to the 1500 foot regulation at issue in the present case as a declaration of policy by the town that the location of existing liquor stores has an effect on the general welfare of the community. O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 140 Conn. 70. “[T]he town council took cognizance of the potential danger from this traffic and that the [1500 foot] restriction was enacted as one means of attempting to keep it within bounds. Although under the present Liquor Control Act the so-called ‘old fashioned saloon’ of earlier days has been supplanted by the variously designated places of the licensed dispensing permittees for which it provides, the potential menace of the traffic persists. It is a matter of common knowledge that a large percentage of today’s serious crimes stems from the excessive use of alcohol and that the hazard to life and limb from intoxication has been tremendously increased by the advent of present-day automobile traffic. These are material considerations in determining the meaning of the word ‘aggrieved’ as used in [the zoning appeal statute] . . . .” Id., 70-71. We agree with the reasoning in O’Connor that Bridgeport has expressed a policy in its 1500 foot rule, namely, that the specific location of liquor stores within city bounds substantially affects the public welfare, regardless of any increase or decrease in the number of liquor stores in the aggregate. We conclude, therefore, that the rationale behind the automatic aggrievement rule is applicable in the present case.

In determining whether to overrule precedent, particularly precedent that is a product of statutoiy interpretation, such as the automatic aggrievement rule, subsequent legislative action or inaction is a key consideration. “[T]he legislature is presumed to be aware of the inteipretation of a statute and ... its subsequent nonaction may be understood as a validation of that inteipretation. . . . This presumption is strengthened when the legislature has affirmatively reenacted the statute after the interpretation in question.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund, 219 Conn. 620, 627, 594 A.2d 464 (1991).

This consideration is compelling in the present case. Since 1953, this court has consistently held that a resident taxpayer appealing a zoning decision involving the sale of liquor is, a priori, an aggrieved person under § 8-8 (a). See Macaluso v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 167 Conn. 600-601; Dolan v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 156 Conn. 428; M. & R. Enterprises, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 155 Conn. 281-82; Cowles v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 153 Conn. 117; Whitney Theatre Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 150 Conn. 287; London v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 149 Conn. 284; Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 145 Conn. 661; Zuckerman v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 144 Conn. 163-64; O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 140 Conn. 71-72; Farr v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 139 Conn. 583. Since that time the legislature has revisited § 8-8 on numerous occasions and has never indicated that our interpretation was not what it had intended.

In 1977, the legislature amended the definition of “aggrieved person” to include a presumption of aggrievement for a person whose land abuts or is within a 100 foot radius of the land involved in the decision. See Public Acts 1977, No. 77-470; Public Acts 1967, Nos. 348, 712. It has since rejected proposals to remove these automatic aggrievement provisions. See 32 H.R. Proc., Pt. 25, 1989 Sess., pp. 8816-27.

Furthermore, in 1988, we interpreted General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 8-8 (b) to require that the clerk of a municipality be a necessary party to the proper institution of a zoning appeal and be served properly with true and attested copies of the appeal, and we determined that failure to do so is a jurisdictional defect that renders the zoning appeal subject to dismissal. Simko v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206 Conn. 374, 383, 538 A.2d 202 (1988). Shortly thereafter, in direct response to our decision in Simko, the legislature adopted an amendment to § 8-8 (b), which clearly indicated its disagreement with our interpretation. See Public Acts 1988, No. 88-79, § 1; see also 31 S. Proc., Pt. 4, 1988 Sess., pp. 1118-36; 31 H.R. Proc., Pt. 4, 1988 Sess., pp. 1344-60. Thus, it is apparent that the legislature has had numerous opportunities to amend § 8-8 if our interpretation of “aggrieved person” was not what was intended. Its failure to do so is, in effect, a legislative validation of the automatic aggrievement rule in taxpayer appeals from decisions involving the sale of liquor.

Cyrco also claims that there is no rational distinction between allowing automatic aggrievement in appeals involving liquor outlets and not allowing it in appeals involving other dangerous businesses, such as adult video and bookstores, adult entertainment clubs, X-rated movie theaters, massage parlors, pool halls, gun dealers, pawn shops, and all-night convenience stores. Cyrco argues that the automatic aggrievement rule unreasonably discriminates against it as a beneficiary of a zoning variance involving the sale of liquor and deprives it of equal protection of the law. This claim has no merit.

“[W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did . . . that a legislature need not strike at all evils at the same time . . . and that reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind .... Legislatures may implement their program step by step . . . adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 478, 662 A.2d 1226 (1995). Even if Cyrco were correct that risks associated with the aforementioned businesses are as great as those associated with the sale of liquor, the legislature is permitted to address those concerns in its own time. Its failure to address all problems at once does not constitute impermissible discrimination.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a determination of the merits of the plaintiffs’ appeal.

In this opinion PETERS, C. J., and CALLAHAN and BORDEN, Js., concurred.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. The majority asserts two reasons for reaffirming this court’s interpretation of General Statutes § 8-8 that taxpayers are automatically aggrieved with respect to zoning decisions involving liquor outlets, thereby providing them with standing to appeal: (1) stare decisis; and (2) legislative silence. Under the circumstances of this case, neither of these reasons justifies reaffirmation of this anachronistic policy.

The plaintiffs Richard and Carman Tuliano (Tulianos), business competitors of the defendant Cyrco, Inc. (Cyrco), claim to be aggrieved and seek the benefit of the automatic aggrievement rule. The Tulianos are the owners and operators of the plaintiff Jolly, Inc., a corporation doing business as Jolly Time Package, a liquor store located appropriately 500 feet from the location of Cyrco’s liquor store. In November, 1993, Cyrco sought to move its business to a new location that was exposed to greater traffic and that would be 1430 feet away from the Tulianos’ store. For this reason, Cyrco filed two variance applications with the named defendant, the Bridgeport zoning board of appeals (board). The board granted both of Cyrco’s variances, one of which allowed a variance from the regulatory requirement that there be 1500 feet between liquor outlets. Subsequently, the Tulianos filed an appeal to challenge the board’s actions.

I agree that “[s]tare decisis gives stability and continuity to our case law”; Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); and we therefore should follow our own precedent. But when the reasoning of that precedent is patently flawed or it has no contemporary relevance it must be set aside. “[PJrinciples of law which serve one generation well may, by reason of changing conditions, disserve a later one. . . . Experience can and often does demonstrate that a rule, once believed sound, needs modification to serve justice better.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hospital, 188 Conn. 1, 17-18, 448 A.2d 190 (1982). In overruling prior case law because of a change in public policy considerations, we recently had occasion to quote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: “ ‘It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.’ O. Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law,’ 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).” Brunswick v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 222 Conn. 541, 554-55, 610 A.2d 1260 (1992).

The majority adheres to the rule of automatic aggrievement that is derived from the 1894 case of Beard’s Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 30 A. 775 (1894). In that case, aggrievement was based upon an interpretation of a statute which gave “resident taxpayers” the right to appeal the granting of a license to sell liquor. Id., 533. In justifying its interpretation to allow resident taxpayers the right to appeal, the court noted certain concerns associated with the operation of a liquor outlet. “The expense of the local police of any town, as well as of criminal proceedings before its local tribunals, is largely dependent on the number of the liquor saloons and bar rooms within its limits, and the character of those who keep them. If licenses are granted with too free a hand, or without proper discrimination, the burdens of taxation are likely to be increased. Every taxpayer therefore has a certain, though it may be a small, pecuniary interest in having the license law well administered; and if he is also a resident in the town where he pays his taxes, he has an additional interest, common to every citizen, in promoting the general welfare of the community.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 534. Based upon that reasoning, this court deemed all resident taxpayers to be automatically aggrieved with respect to zoning decisions that pertain to the sale of liquor. O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 71-72, 98 A.2d 515 (1953). Subsequently, this court expanded the rule to include nonresident taxpayers, such as the Tulianos here. Zuckerman v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 160, 164, 128 A.2d 325 (1956).

As indicated by the trial court in this case, every reason that has been advanced for granting taxpayers automatic standing to challenge decisions of zoning boards regarding the traffic of liquor has long ceased to exist. The liquor control commission has replaced the taxpayer in policing the character of those who dispense liquor and the manner in which a liquor outlet is operated, and other zoning regulations control the number of establishments. Indeed, as Judge Fuller wrote in his trial court memorandum of decision: “The interlocking scheme of controls by the municipal zoning ordinance and the department of liquor control mitigate possible harm to the public interest expressed in the cases upholding the liquor exception. Under the present scheme of liquor control there are many kinds of permits, and as a practical matter many of them create no danger to the public or result in turning intoxicated drivers or criminals loose in the municipality. . . . Maintaining an automatic appeal for any taxpayer in the municipality where a liquor permit is granted for any type of sale is unrealistic under the modem scheme of liquor regulation. Many if not most businesses conducted under one or more of the categories of liquor permits pose no greater danger to the public safety, morals or welfare than other businesses, including many types of retail stores, warehouses, garages, service stations and adult book stores.”

Secondly, the majority asserts that the legislature has impliedly consented to this court’s interpretation of § 8-8 that grants automatic aggrievement to taxpayers who wish to challenge zoning decisions pertaining to a liquor outlet. In this case, for the reasons mentioned previously, the automatic aggrievement rule has ceased to have any contemporary purpose. Therefore, unlike Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund, 219 Conn. 620, 627, 594 A.2d 464 (1991), which is relied upon by the majority, or Hansen v. Gordon, 221 Conn. 29, 35-36, 602 A.2d 560 (1992), both of which had contemporary purposes supporting the court’s respective statutory interpretations, the legislature’s silence in this matter should not be construed as an implicit approval of the rule.

This distinction is clearly demonstrated in the recent case of Brunswick v. Inland Wetlands Commission, supra, 222 Conn. 541, which was authored by Chief Justice Peters. In Brunswick, this court overruled the 1879 case of Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879), which interpreted the mesne process statute to prohibit an attorney, who is a commissioner of the Superior Court, from signing a writ in his own case. General Statutes (1875 Rev.) title 19, chapter 1, § 1, the statute at issue in Doolittle, now General Statutes § 52-45a, was amended at least six times after Doolittle was decided. At no time, however, did the legislature reverse the Doolittle holding by enacting an appropriate amendment to the statute. Nevertheless, the Brunswick court held that “ [ajbsent the public policy reasons that existed in 1879 . . . adherence to [that] rule ... no longer serves any purpose.” Brunswick v. Inland, Wetlands Commission, supra, 554. Similarly, this court’s statutory interpretation that taxpayers are automatically aggrieved when challenging a zoning decision relating to the sale of liquor should be abandoned.

In addition to determining that the Tulianos were not automatically aggrieved, the trial court also determined that they were not classically aggrieved. To be classically aggrieved, an appellant must satisfy a two part test: (1) the appellant must have a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision; and (2) this interest must have been specially and injuriously affected by the board’s decision. Walls v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 475, 477-78, 408 A.2d 252 (1979). The trial court found that “the [Tulianos] have not met their burden of proof that they are specially and injuriously affected by the shifting of [Cyrco’s] package store .... There is no evidence of any adverse affect from an increase in traffic, change in traffic patterns or any physical impact upon the [Tulianos’] property by the opening of a package store in an existing building 1430 feet away.”

Rather, the trial court determined that “[t]he impact claimed by the [Tulianos] amounts to a speculative fear of loss of economic advantage, or more specifically, [a] concern that the proposed package [store] . . . will cut into the [Tulianos’] liquor business. However, a business competitor of a successful applicant for a variance, zoning permit or special exception is not classically aggrieved without a showing of injury to his property rights, and merely being a business competitor is insufficient.” The Tulianos do not challenge the trial court’s classical aggrievement analysis and I do not find it to be erroneous. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s finding that the Tulianos have proven neither statutory aggrievement nor classical aggrievement.

In my view, the automatic aggrievement rule should be abandoned and the trial court’s decision affirmed on the ground that the Tulianos were not classically aggrieved.

Accordingly, I dissent.

       General Statutes § 8-8 provides in relevant part: “Appeal from board to court. Review by appellate court, (a) As used in this section:
      “(1) ‘Aggrieved person’ means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board and includes any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality charged with enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of the board. In the case of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, ‘aggrieved person’ includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board.
      “(2) ‘Board’ means a municipal zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission, zoning board of appeals or other board or commission the decision of which may be appealed pursuant to this section, or the chief elected official of a municipality, or his designee, in a hearing held pursuant to section 22a-250, whose decision may be appealed.
      “(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section and sections 7-147 and 7-147Í, any person aggrieved by any decision of a board may taire an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which the municipality is located. The appeal shall be commenced by service of process in accordance with subsections (e) and (f) of this section within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published as required by the general statutes. The appeal shall be returned to court in the same manner and within the same period of time as prescribed for civil actions brought to that court.
      “(c) In those situations where the approval of a planning commission must be inferred because of the failure of the commission to act on an application, any aggrieved person may appeal under this section. The appeal shall be taken within twenty days after the expiration of the period prescribed in section 8-26d for action by the commission.
      “(d) Any person affected by an action of a planning commission taken under section 8-29 may appeal under this section. The appeal shall be taken within thirty days after notice to him of the adoption of a survey, map or plan or the assessment of benefits or damages.
      “(e) Service of legal process for an appeal under this section shall be directed to a proper officer and shall be made by leaving a true and attested copy of the process with, or at the usual place of abode of, the chairman or clerk of the board, and by leaving a true and attested copy with the clerk of the municipality. Service on the chairman or clerk of the board and on the clerk of the municipality shall be for the purpose of providing legal notice of the appeal to the board and shall not thereby make the chairman or clerk of the board or the clerk of the municipality a necessary party to the appeal.

        “(f) Service of process shall also be made on each person who petitioned the board in the proceeding, provided his legal rights, duties or privileges were determined therein. However, failure to make service within fifteen days on parlies other than the board shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the appeal. If service is not made within fifteen days on a party in the proceeding before the board, the court, on motion of the party or the appellant, shall make such orders of notice of the appeal as are reasonably calculated to notify the party not yet served. If the failure to make service causes prejudice to the board or any party, the court, after hearing, may dismiss the appeal or may make such other orders as are necessary to protect the party prejudiced.
      “(g) The appeal shall state the reasons on which it has been predicated and shall not stay proceedings on the decision appealed from. However, the court to which the appeal is returnable may grant a restraining order, on application, and after notice to the board and cause shown.
      “(h) The authority issuing a citation in the appeal shall take from the appellant, unless the appellant is an official of the municipality, a bond or recognizance to the board, with surety to prosecute the appeal to effect and comply with the orders and decrees of the court.
      “(i) Within thirty days after the return date to court, or within any further time the court allows, the board shall transmit the record to the court. The record shall include, without limitation, (1) the original papers acted on by the board and appealed from, or certified copies thereof, (2) a copy of the transcript of the stenographic or sound recording prepared in accordance with section 8-7a, and (3) the written decision of the board including the reasons therefor and a statement of any conditions imposed. By stipulation of all parties to the appeal, the record maybe shortened. A party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by the court for additional costs. The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record.
      “Q) Any defendant may, at any time after the return date of the appeal, make a motion to dismiss the appeal. If the basis of the motion is a claim that the appellant lacks standing to appeal, the appellant shall have the burden of proving his standing. The court may, on the record, grant or deny the motion. The court’s order on the motion may be appealed in the manner provided in subsection (o) of this section. . . .’’

       Richard and Carman Tuliano are the owners and operators of Jolly, Inc., a corporation doing business as Jolly Time Package, a liquor store located at 874 Boston Avenue in Bridgeport. The property on which the store is located is owned by Richard and Carman Tuliano.

       Cyrco is a corporation that owns a liquor store located at 1426 Pembroke Street in Bridgeport, and an unoccupied building located at 572-578 Boston Avenue in Bridgeport.

       Because we conclude that the plaintiffs fall within the automatic aggrievement rule, we need not reach their classical aggrievement claim.

       Cyrco also petitioned the board for a variance of the regulations to permit it to expand a portion of its building located on Boston Avenue, wherein it intended to operate an ice cream store. This variance is not at issue in the present case. See footnote 7.

       Chapter 17, § 2, of the Bridgeport zoning regulations provides: “Within Fifteen Hundred Feet of Other liquor Establishments. No building or premises shall be used either in whole or in part for the sale of alcoholic liquor under any tavern, restaurant, druggist or all-alcoholic liquor package store permit issued by said Liquor Control Commission if any entrance to such building or premises within the territorial limits of the City of Bridgeport shall be within 1,500 feet in any direction from the entrance to any other building or premises which shall be used for the sale of alcoholic liquor under either a tavern, restaurant, druggist or all-alcoholic liquor package store permit, whether it is of the same or of a different class or permit.”

       Caiman Tuliano appeared at the public hearing in opposition to Cyrco’s petition for the variance in connection with the liquor outlet. On appeal to the trial court, the plaintiffs initially challenged the board’s grant of the variance in connection with the liquor outlet and the variance in connection with the ice cream store. During the trial court proceedings, however, the plaintiffs conceded that the variance relating to the relocation of Cyrco’s liquor store is the only variance at issue in the present case. Our analysis, therefore, is confined to that variance.

       The zoning regulations provide the board with the power to grant variances upon a showing of unusual hardship. See Bridgeport Zoning Regs., c. 21, § 2 (e).

       This finding has not been challenged on appeal.

       The trial court determined that our previous decisions involving the interpretation and subsequent application of § 8-8 (a) should be overruled for the following reasons: (1) that our reliance on the decision in Beard’s Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 534, 30 A. 775 (1894), which had been overruled in part by Morelli v. Manpower, Inc., 226 Conn. 831, 628 A.2d 1311 (1993), had been misplaced because the statute at issue in that case concerned the granting of liquor licenses, not zoning decisions; (2) that such an interpretation created an inconsistency in our law, whereby taxpayers do not have automatic standing to appeal other zoning decisions that affect the general welfare, but may appeal zoning decisions involving the sale of liquor that may affect the general welfare; (3) that other states do not confer automatic standing in zoning appeals involving the sale of liquor; (4) that the policy considerations supporting such an interpretation, namely, that there is a presumed pecuniary effect upon every taxpayer resulting from the incidents of the sale of liquor and that there is an increased source of danger from the sale of liquor that is not present in other businesses, are debatable; and (5) that if the legislature had intended to confer such automatic aggrievement status, it could have expressly done so, as it did in § 8-8 (a) with regard to property abutting or within 100 feet of the property involved in the zoning decision.

       Following its conclusion that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ appeal, however, the trial court stated that “[ojrdinarily it is not appropriate for the court to rule on the merits of the appeal where there is no subject matter jurisdiction. . . . However, the plaintiffs did have standing as resident taxpayers to challenge the variance for a package store under prior case law. A higher court may have a different view on whether the rule on standing in liquor cases should be changed, and in the interest of judicial economy a ruling on the merits is appropriate here if the plaintiffs successfully appeal on the aggrievement issue.” Thereafter, the trial court considered the merits of the plaintiffs’ appeal and found that Cyrco had failed to prove hardship and, therefore, that the board had improperly granted its variance.
      Cyrco contends that the trial court improperly considered the merits of the appeal after having concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs agree that this is ordinarily true, they argue that because of the highly unusual situation involved, wherein the trial court refused to follow existing Supreme Court precedent and conceded the possibility that a higher court might not agree with its decision, the trial court’s consideration of the merits of the case was appropriate. We agree with Cyrco.
      It is axiomatic that a court is bound to dismiss a case once it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 168, 172, 592 A.2d 386 (1991); Kinney v. State,
        213 Conn. 54, 58, 566 A.2d 670; Cahill v. Board, of Education, 198 Conn. 229, 238, 502 A.2d 410 (1985). Thus, the court’s consideration of the merits of the appeal in the present case was improper.

       See footnote 1.

       As an alternate ground for affirmance, Cyrco claims that the trial court improperly considered the issue of automatic aggrievement in zoning decisions involving the sale of liquor because the plaintiffs had neither properly pleaded nor proved such aggrievement. In support of this claim, Cyrco argues that an obligation to pay taxes does not necessarily establish that the plaintiffs had actually paid their taxes. We are unpersuaded.
      To establish aggrievement, first, “the plaintiff [must allege] facts which, if proven, would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law, and, second . . . [prove] the truth of those factual allegations.” Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419, 399 A.2d 1274 (1978). In their appeal to the trial court,, the plaintiffs alleged facts that, if true, would adequately support their claim of automatic aggrievement. Specifically, they alleged that Richard and Car-man Tuliano owned and operated the business and property located at 874 Boston Avenue in Bridgeport, that Cyrco had requested a waiver of the regulation prohibiting the establishment of a liquor outlet within 1500 feet of another liquor outlet, and that the plaintiffs, as the owners, operators and permittees of a liquor outlet within 1500 feet of the property that is the subject of the application, are aggrieved by such a decision. During the court proceedings, the plaintiffs testified and presented evidence to support their allegation that they owned and operated property and a business located in Bridgeport. No other evidence was presented on the issue of the plaintiffs' taxpayer status. Thereafter, in its memorandum of decision, the trial court concluded that “the plaintiffs did have standing as resident taxpayers to challenge the variance for a package store under prior case law.” Although Richard and Carman Tuliano are not residents of Bridgeport, we have previously held that nonresident taxpayer status is sufficient to establish automatic aggrievement in this context. See footnote 14. Thus, the court implicitly took judicial notice of the fact that proof of ownership of property within a city is sufficient to establish a presumption that one is a taxpayer in that city. Cyrco presented no evidence to contradict this finding. We conclude that the trial court’s determination is adequately supported by the evidence and, therefore, we reject Cyrco’s alternate ground for affirmance.

       Originally, we relied upon a plaintiffs status as a taxpayer and as a resident of the municipality in support of the automatic aggrievement rule. Later, however, we clarified that taxpayer status alone is sufficient to establish a presumption of aggrievement. See Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 145 Conn. 660; Zuckerman v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 144 Conn. 164.

       We note our agreement with the plaintiffs’ suggestion that “[p]erhaps a more appropriate decision would have been for the trial court to sustain the plaintiffs’ appeal based upon existing precedent and at the same time [to state] the court’s opinion as expressed in its decision regarding such rules. The defendants, collectively or individually, would then have had the right to appeal to [the Supreme Court] requesting that it review its prior decisions.”

       In O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 140 Conn. 70, we were interpreting § 160b of the 1951 Cumulative Supplement to the General Statutes, which was an earlier version of General Statutes § 8-8 (a), and provided in relevant part: “Appeals from board to court. Any person or persons severally or jointly aggrieved by any decision of said board . . . may . . . taire an appeal to the court . . . .”

       In Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 145 Conn. 657, we were considering § 379d of the 1955 Cumulative Supplement to the General Statutes, which was an identical, but later enactment of § 160b of the 1951 Cumulative Supplement. See footnote 16.

       In Macaluso v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 167 Conn. 600-601, we considered arguments similar to those raised by the board and Cyrco in the present case. In that case, the defendant had argued that the rationale underlying Beard’s Appeal did not apply in society at that time, and that the rule of automatic aggrievement was being used by competitors to thwart otherwise legitimate and fair competition.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 8-8 (b) provided: “Notice of such appeal shall be given by leaving a true and attested copy thereof with, or at the usual place of abode of, the chairman or clerk of said board, and by serving a true and attested copy upon the clerk of the municipality. The appeal shall state the reasons upon which it has been predicated and shall not stay proceedings upon the decision appealed from, but the court to which such appeal is returnable may, on application, on notice to the board and on cause shown, grant a restraining order.”

       Number 88-79, § 1, of the 1988 Public Acts, which amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 8-8 (b), provided: “Notice of such appeal shall be given by leaving a true and attested copy thereof with, or at the usual place of abode of, the chairman or clerk of said board, and by serving a true and attested copy upon the clerk of the municipality, PROVIDED SERVICE UPON THE CLERK OF THE MUNICIPALITY SHALL BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL NOTICE OF SUCH APPEAL TO SAID BOARD AND SHALL NOT THEREBY MAKE SUCH CLERK A NECESSARY PARTY TO SUCH APPEAL. The appeal shall state the reasons upon which it has been predicated and shall not stay proceedings upon the decision appealed from, but the court to which such appeal is returnable may, on application, on notice to the board and on cause shown, grant a restraining order.”

       The majority unfairly states that “neither the board nor Cyrco has presented any evidence to suggest that these problems have abated.” As Cyrco clearly states in its brief, “[sjince the trial court thoroughly researched and examined the issues [regarding the obsolescence of the automatic aggrievement rule], it would serve no purpose to simply reiterate the court’s reasoning . . .