source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Cedric L. Burden
    Decided July 26, 1994

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 12258) is granted. It is further ordered that the matter be remanded to the Appellate Court for reconsideration in light of this court’s decision in State v. Patterson, 230 Conn. 385.


text:
    Brownstone Pharmacy, Inc. v. Mark Wrabel et al. Brownstone Pharmacy, Inc. v. Mary Archambault et al. Brownstone Pharmacy, Inc. v. Jack Ziskin et al.
    Decided July 27, 1994

      Jeffrey J. Mirman, in support of the petition.

      Mare L. Zaken and Wendi J. Kemp, in opposition.
   The defendants Mark Wrabel, Mary Archambault and Jack Ziskin’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13475) (AC 13476) (AC 13477) is denied.


text:
    Nancy Tremaine v. John Tremaine
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 785 (AC 11164), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court misconstrue the initial presentation of the separation agreement as an ‘approved agreement’ with respect to the award of alimony where the initial agreement reserved the determination of alimony for a date in the future?

Decided July 27, 1994

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14985.

Herman H. Tamow, in support of the petition.

Wesley W. Horton, in opposition.

“2. Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that in a separation agreement that reserves the issue of ‘alimony’ for determination at a later date, that the term ‘alimony’ was limited to periodic alimony and did not include lump sum alimony?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Scott Cavell
    Decided August 11, 1994

      Richard Emanuel, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Susan C. Marks, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 276 (AC 10605), is granted. It is further ordered that the matter be remanded to the Appellate Court for reconsideration in light of this court’s decision in State v. Robinson, 230 Conn. 591.


text:
    Kenneth Gelormino, Sr. v. Warden
   The petition of the petitioner Kenneth Gelormino, Sr., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court is dismissed.

Decided September 14, 1994

Michael A. Fitzpatrick, in support of the petition.

Carolyn K. Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    Oops, Inc. v. Gustave A. DeCortin
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Gustave A. DeCortin, pro se, in support of the petition.

      David W. Griffin, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13508) is denied.


text:
    Garland Hall v. Gilbert and Bennett Manufacturing Company et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Stewart M. Casper, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13523) is denied.


text:
    Paul Reeder v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Paul Reeder, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Beth Z. Marguiles, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13507) is denied.


author: Berdon, J.,

text:
    David Gordon et al. v. Rafael Villegas et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Scott M. Karstm and Michael Lefebvre, in support of the petition.

      Burton M. Weinstein, in opposition.
   The defendants Miguel Cardozo, John Cueto and Daniel Domkowski’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13559) is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petition for certification filed by the defendants Miguel Cardozo, John Cueto and Daniel Domkowski.


text:
    CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Taufiqul Chowdhury et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      John Timbers, in support of the petition.

      Frank G. Usseglio, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 12406) is denied.


text:
    People’s Bank v. James A. Miller, Jr., et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      James A. Miller, Jr. ', pro se, in support of the petition.

      Mary E. Wexler, in opposition.
   The defendants James A. Miller, Jr., and Joyce R. Miller’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13303) is denied.


text:
    City of Bridgeport v. Rona V. Finizie et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Roña V. Finizie, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Ronald D. Japha, in opposition.
   The defendant Roña V. Finizie’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 12828) is dismissed.


text:
    DeWitt Boyce v. State Farm Insurance Company
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Bruce D. Jacobs, in support of the petition.

      Daniel P. Scapellati, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 40 (AC 12280), is denied.


text:
    Angel David Baez v. Commissioner of Correction
    Decided September 14, 1994

      John W. Watson, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Angel David Baez’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 236 (AC 11719), is denied.


text:
    Angel David Baez v. Commissioner of Correction
    Decided September 14, 1994

      MitchellS. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.
   The respondent’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 236 (AC 11719), is denied.


text:
    Allstate Insurance Company v. Benjamin Lenda
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Joan C. G. Grear, Raymond T. DeMeo and Stephen E. Goldman, in support of the petition.

      David W. Cooney, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 444 (AC 11362), is denied.


text:
    Allstate Insurance Company v. Benjamin Lenda
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Kathryn Calibey, in support of the petition.

      Raymond T. DeMeo and Stephen E. Goldman, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 444 (AC 11362), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Bruce Harrison
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Susan C. Marks, acting supervisory assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 473 (AC 10980), is denied.


text:
    Gerardo Mastronardi et al. v. Josephine Infante et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Daniel Shepro, in support of the petition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 584 (AC 11870), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Scott Elijah
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Nancy L. Gillespie, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 595 (AC 12340), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Denny Tate
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 610 (AC 12270), is denied.

Decided September 14, 1994

Christopher M. Cosgrove, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    Middlesex Insurance Company v. Thomas Rady, Administrator (Estate of Audrey Rady)
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Thomas P. Moriarty, in support of the petition.

      Frederick M. Vollono, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 679 (AC 11941), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Zulfi Strikani
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Richard M. Maraño, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 691 (AC 12242), is denied.


text:
    Joan Erisoty v. Merrow Machine Company et al.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 708 (AC 12341), is denied.

Decided September 14, 1994

Leon M. Rosenblatt, in support of the petition.

Richard A. Mills, Jr., and Sheila Huddleston, in opposition.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Omar Lopez
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in opposition.
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 717 (AC 11458), is granted. It is further ordered that the matter be remanded to the Appellate Court for reconsideration in light of this court’s decision in State v. Patterson, 230 Conn. 385.


text:
    Gus Pelarinos v. Genevieve Henderson et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Eliot B. Gersten, Andrea A. Hewitt and Wendy J. Davies, in support of the petition.

      William F. Gallagher, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 726 (AC 12218), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Delmar Earl Jones
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 807 (AC 12172), is denied.

Decided September 14, 1994

Margaret P. Levy, in support of the petition.

David J. Sheldon, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    Richard Rogozinski v. American Food Service Equipment Corporation et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      William C. Turney, in support of the petition.

      James E. Kernan, Robert H. Hall, Joseph A. La Bella, Thomas L. Brayton III and Randolph E. Richardson II, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 732 (AC 12396), is denied.


text:
    Sandra A. Leon v. Steven J. Leon
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Lloyd Frauenglass, in support of the petition.

      Martha Anne Cosgrove, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 917 (AC 12132), is denied.


text:
    High Street Associates v. William J. Zisk
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 922 (AC 12482), is denied.

Decided September 14, 1994

William J. Zisk, pro se, in support of the petition.

Joseph E. Milardo, Jr., in opposition.


text:
    Donna Gorneault v. Larry Gorneault
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Alfred F. Morrocco, in support of the petition.

      Allen J. Segal, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 923 (AC 12505), is denied.


text:
    Maria Gutierrez et al. v. Elise Nugent et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Melvin G. Silverman, in support of the petition.

      Thomas Galvin Cotter, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 928 (AC 12451), is denied.


text:
    Pearl-Main Investment Company v. Homecrest Builders and Remodelers, Inc., et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Max F. Brunswick, in support of the petition.

      Lloyd S. Lowinger, in opposition.
   The defendant Anthony Fappiano’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 929 (AC 12832), is denied.


text:
    Deborah Sheiman v. Stuart M. Sheiman
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Wesley W. Horton, Susan M. Cormier and Joy Fausey, legal intern, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 933 (AC 12418), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Philip Mann
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Philip Mann, pro se, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 933 (AC 12672), is dismissed.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Ralph Vuolo, Jr.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Robert S. Rger, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 935 (AC 12523), is denied.


text:
    South Farms Associates Limited Partnership v. J. William Burns, Commissioner of Transportation
   The petition of the substitute plaintiff Martin W. Hoffman, trustee, for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 9 (AC 12078), is denied.

Decided September 14, 1994

William H. Champlin III and Glory Martyn Lena, in support of the petition.

Lawrence G. Widem, assistant attorney general, in opposition.


text:
    P and L Properties, Inc. v. Schnip Development Corporation et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Mark G. Sklarz and Keith Bradoc Gallant, in support of the petition.

      Jill Hartley, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 46 (AC 12439), is denied.


text:
    Madison Hills Limited Partnership II v. Madison Hills, Inc., et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Susan C. Webb, in support of the petition.

      Edwin L. Doernberger, in opposition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 81 (AC 12278), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Stefan Bagley
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 138 (AC 11596), is denied.

Decided September 14, 1994

Richard A. Fuchs, in support of the petition.

Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    Luba Hill v. James T. Hill
    Decided September 14, 1994

      John R. Williams, in support of the petition.

      Richard L. Albrecht, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 160 (AC 11464), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Sean Siering
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Kevin A. Randolph, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 173 (AC 12008), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Robert Wiedl
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Robert G. Golger, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 262 (AC 11360), is denied.


text:
    Teresa Martins, Conservatrix (Estate of Carlos Martins), et al. v. Connecticut Light and Power Company
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Maureen Danehy Cox and Brian T. Henebry, in support of the petition.

      Carey B. Reilly, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 212 (AC 12165), is denied.


text:
    In re Emmanuel M.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      David Mandell, in support of the petition.

      James Kelly, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
   The respondent mother’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 276 (AC 13135), is denied.


text:
    Century Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Mary E. George
    Decided September 14, 1994

      David F. Weber, in support of the petition.

      William T. Barrante, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 326 (AC 12264), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. William Walker
    Decided September 14, 1994

      DennisF. O’Toole, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Leah Hawley, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 431 (AC 12481), is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification.


text:
    Alan A. Neri et al. v. Carl A. Neri et al.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Wesley W. Horton, in support of the petition.

      Robert C. Mirto and William F. Gallagher, in opposition.
   The defendant Carl A. Neri’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 812 (AC 12115), is denied.


text:
    Haynes Construction Company v. Cascella and Son Construction, Inc.
    Decided September 14, 1994

      Michele C. Lukban and Donald Gaudreau, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 29 (AC 12636), is denied.


text:
    Michael C. Ruotolo v. Madison Inland Wetlands Agency
    Decided September 20, 1994

      Michael C. Ruotolo, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Gail S. Kotowski, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13521) is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Kevin Lee Jackson

    Decided September 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15044.

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, and Susan C. Marks, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

       The defendant’s appeal was withdrawn October 18, 1994.

   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 599 (AC 11674), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant’s claim regarding limiting instruction on the defendant’s felony conviction was not reviewable for failure substantially to comply with Practice Book § 852?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Andrew Robins
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 694 (AC 11321), is granted, limited to the following issue:

Decided September 20, 1994

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15046.

Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Mary H. Lesser, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

“Whether the Appellate Court correctly decided that the state did not have to show as an element of larceny by defrauding a public community that the defendant obtained benefits to which he was not otherwise entitled.”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. John Roy
    Decided September 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15040.

      Daniel S. Blinn, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Nancy L. Gillespie, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 751 (AC 12281), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant was not entitled to review of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction?”


text:
    Aetna Life and Casualty Company v. Marie Braccidiferro

       The plaintiff’s appeal was withdrawn September 1, 1995.

   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 833 (AC 11058), is granted, limited to the following issues:

Decided September 20, 1994

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15038.

Michael P. Del Sole, in support of the petition.

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that Public Acts 1993, No. 93-77, applied to the defendant’s claim because that claim was not a ‘final judgment’ within the meaning of Public Acts 1993, No. 93-77?
“2. If the answer to question 1. is yes, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the application of Public Acts 1993, No. 93-77, to the facts of this case did not violate the plaintiff’s rights under: (a) article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution; (b) article first, § 10, of the United States constitution; (c) the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; or (d) article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution?”


text:
    Aetna Life and Casualty Company v. Marie Braccidiferro

       The defendant’s appeal was withdrawn September 1, 1995.

   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 833 (AC 11058), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that Public Acts 1993, No. 93-77, applied to the defendant’s claim because that claim was not a ‘final judgment’ within the meaning of Public Acts 1993, No. 93-77?
“2. If the answer to question 1. is yes, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the application of Public Acts 1993, No. 93-77, to the facts of this case did not violate the plaintiff’s rights under: (a) article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution; (b) article first, § 10, of the United States constitution; (c) the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; or (d) article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution?”

Decided September 20, 1994

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15039.

George H. Romania, in support of the petition.


text:
    Robert V. Squeglia, Jr. v. Robert V. Squeglia, Sr.
    Decided September 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15041.

      David R. Babbitz, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn P. Gould and David J. Crotta, Jr., in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 866 (AC 12706), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Was the Appellate Court correct in holding that the doctrine of parental immunity shielded the parent from liability to the minor child for damages under General Statutes § 22-357, the dog bite statute?”


text:
    Patricia Krafick v. John H. Krafick
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 930 (AC 12717), is granted, limited to the following issues:

Decided September 20, 1994

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15043.

David S. Maclay, in support of the petition.

Daniel P. Weiner, in opposition.

“1. In a dissolution action, is a vested defined benefit pension a part of the property that must be equitably distributed?
“2. If the first issue is answered yes, what is the proper method for valuing the pension?”


text:
    Home Insurance Company v. Aetna Life and Casualty Company
    Decided September 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15052.

      Edward W. Case, in support of the petition.

      William F. Gallagher, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 94 (AC 12434), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly reverse the trial court’s summary judgment on the ground that this was a sufficient question of fact regarding whether Barry Schuss intended to cause damage, within the meaning of the defendant’s policy exclusion?”


text:
    Home Insurance Company v. Aetna Life and Casualty Company
   The petition of Barry Schuss for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 94 (AC 12434), is granted, limited to the following issue:

Decided September 20, 1994

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15051.

Donald W. O’Brien, Lois Tanzer and Kathleen M. Grover, in support of the petition.

William F. Gallagher, in opposition.

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the psychiatric records of Barry Schuss were disclosable under General Statutes § 52-146Í (5)?”


text:
    Glastonbury Education Association v. Freedom of Information Commission et al. Marilyn Campbell, Commissioner of Education, et al. v. Freedom of Information Commission et al.
    Decided September 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15049.

      Colleen M. Murphy, commission counsel, in support of the petition.

      William J. Dolan, Martha M. Watts, assistant attorney general, and Ralph E. Urban, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
   The petition of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 111 (AC 12493), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Do binding interest arbitration proceedings conducted pursuant to General Statutes §§ 10-153a through 10-153n fall within the exemption from public disclosure contained in General Statutes § l-18a (b)?”


text:
    Thomas Gore et al. v. People’s Savings Bank et al.
    Decided September 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15042.

      Lawrence F. Reilly, in support of the petition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 126 (AC 12203), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendants’ violation of General Statutes §§ 47a-7 and 47a-8 or 47a-54f (b) imposed strict liability on the defendants for the minor plaintiff’s injuries?
“2. What is the effect of the enactment of Public Acts 1994, No. 94-220 (11), on the liability of the defendants in this case?”


text:
    Martin J. Sullivan v. Nameaug Walk-In Medical Center, P.C.
    Decided September 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15047.

      Penny Q. Seaman and Joaquina Borges King, in support of the petition.

      Bruce L. Elstein, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 185 (AC 12498), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant’s failure to pay rent did not provide a basis for summary process under General Statutes § 47a-23 (a) (1) (E)?”


text:
    James A. Dinnis et al. v. John Roberts et al.
    Decided September 20, 1994

      Todd R. Bainer, in support of the petition.

      Benson A. Snaider, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 253 (AC 12417), is denied.


text:
    Harry Childs v. Frank Bainer
    Decided September 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15048.

      Karen P. Blado, in support of the petition.

      James A. Mulhall, Jr., in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 301 (AC 12693), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Is it an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse an additur in a personal injury case in which the jury awarded economic damages but no noneconomic damages?”


text:
    Allstate Insurance Company v. Regina Link
    Decided September 20, 1994

      Raymond T. DeMeo, in support of the petition.

      Bruce D. Jacobs, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 338 (AC 12486), is denied.


text:
    Frank De Leonardis v. Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc., et al.
    Decided September 20, 1994

      Edward Wood Dunham and Kevin M. Kennedy, in support of the petition.

      B. T. Canty and Anastasios T. Savvaides, in opposition.
   The petition of the defendant Doctor’s Associates, Inc., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 353 (AC 12736), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Domingo Paredes
    Decided September 20, 1994

      David A. Leff, in support of the petition.

      Mary H. Lesser, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 360 (AC 12346), is denied.


text:
    M and L Building Corporation v. Housing Authority of the Town of Enfield
    Decided September 20, 1994

      James W. Abrams, in support of the petition.

      Thomas G. Librizzi, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 379 (AC 12448), is denied.


text:
    Bloomfield Education Association v. Robert A. Frahm et al.
    Decided September 20, 1994

      Ronald Cordilico, in support of the petition.

      Ralph G. Elliot and Collen M. Murphy, commission counsel, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 384 (AC 12695), is denied.


text:
    Frederick Maroun v. Richard Tarro et al.
    Decided September 20, 1994

      Barbara E. Gardner, in support of the petition.
   The petition of the substitute plaintiff Eileen D. Maroun, administratrix, for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 391 (AC 12209), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Burton E. Merritt
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15045.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 76 (AC 12377), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court correctly hold that harmless error occurred when the trial court improperly admitted horizontal gaze nystagmus test results and improperly allowed the jury to hear evidence that if eye jerking occurs prior to a forty-five degree angle a subject is more than likely above the legal limit of 0.10 of one percent for intoxication in a trial under General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1)?”

Decided September 20, 1994

Conrad O. Seifert, in support of the petition.

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Samuel Finley
    Decided October 4, 1994

      Susan M. Hankins, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      James A. Killen, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 823 (AC 13324), is denied.


text:
    Ronald M. Hedberg v. Pantepec International, Inc.

    Decided October 4, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15070.

      Richard J. Burtula, in support of the petition.

      L. Page Heslin, in opposition.

      The defendant’s appeal was withdrawn February 21, 1995.

   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 19 (AC 12253), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court improperly interpreted the plaintiff’s employment agreement in concluding that it permitted him to terminate his services upon a change of control of the company?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Charles Coleman
    Decided October 4, 1994

      Bonnie L. Amendola, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Judith Rossi, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 279 (AC 12287), is denied.


text:
    Johanna C. Newman v. Fred M. Newman
    Decided October 4, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15069.

      Sharon Wicks Domfeld, in support of the petition.

      Sheila K. Rosenstein, in opposition.
   The minor children’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 449 (AC 13088), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that minor children, acting through counsel appointed pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-54 and not through a guardian ad litem or next friend, lack standing to appeal from a trial court’s order regarding their support?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Troy Jaynes
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 541 (AC 13074), is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.

Decided October 4, 1994

Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, in support of the petititon.

Judith Rossi, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    Robert L. Patron et al. v. Simon Konover et al.
    Decided October 4, 1994

      Richard P. Weinstein, in support of the petition.

      Richard C. Robinson, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 504 (AC 12076), is denied.


text:
    Town of Monroe v. John C. Mandanici, Jr., et al.
    Decided October 13, 1994

      Joseph R. Mirrione, in support of the petition.

      William J. Varese, in opposition.
   The named defendant’s petiton for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 915 (AC 12922), is denied.


text:
    Helen F. Misinonile v. Joseph C. Misinonile
    Decided October 13, 1994

      Abraham I. Gordon and Ronald D. Japha, in support of the petition.

      Thomas J. Rosati, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 228 (AC 12581), is denied.


text:
    Jonathan Medley v. Commissioner of Correction
    Decided October 13, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15086.

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Jonathan Medley’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 374 (AC 12858), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court violated Practice Book § 698 by failing to apprise the petitioner that he could withdraw his plea?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Michael A. Patterson
    Decided October 13, 1994

      Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Nancy L. Gillespie, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 405 (AC 11399), is denied.


text:
    Eugene Wrinn v. State of Connecticut et al.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 464 (AC 12415), is granted, limited to the following issues:

Decided October 13, 1994

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15085.

Karen L. Murdock, Wesley W. Horton and Michael S. Taylor, legal intern, in support of the petition.

Philip F. von Kuhn, in opposition.

“1. In the circumstances of this case, should the trial court have instructed the jury in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes § 14-240?
“2. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, does the failure to so charge require a new trial?”


text:
    Donald Levy v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities et al.
    Decided October 13, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15087.

      Jeffrey J. Mirman, in support of the petition.

      Lynn D. Wittenbrink and Robert B. Hempstead, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 474 (AC 12238), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Was direct evidence of discrimination presented to the hearing officer so as to require the hearing officer to shift the burden of proof to the defendant?”


text:
    In re Felicia D.
   The petition of the respondent mother Kathleen D. for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 490 (AC 12593), is denied.

Decided October 13, 1994

Barbara J. Claire, in support of the petition.

Nina F. Elgo, assistant attorney general, in opposition,


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Herbert A. Gross
    Decided October 13, 1994

      M. Donald Cardwell, in support of the petition.

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 631 (AC 12638), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Julius Brown
    Decided October 13, 1994

      Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Jacqueline J. Footman, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 699 (AC 11713), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Julius Brown
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 699 (AC 11713), is denied.

Decided October 13, 1994

Jacqueline J. Footman, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, in opposition.


text:
    United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company et al. v. Lorenzo Pitruzzello et al. Lorenzo Pitruzzello et al. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company et al. Troy Kreder et al. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company et al.
    Decided October 13, 1994

      Lester Katz, in support of the petition.

      John Serrano, in opposition.
   The United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 638 (AC 12821), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Philip F. Wieler II
    Decided October 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15091.

      IraB. Grudberg and David A. Leff, in support of the petition.

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 566 (AC 11428/11429), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Does the crime of larceny by embezzlement require an intent to permanently deprive another of his property?”


text:
    Anthony J. Paige et al. v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission of the Town of Fairfield et al.
    Decided October 20, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15092.

      Frederic S. Ury, in support of the petition.

      Roy H. Ervin and John F. Fallon, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 646 (AC 12324), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“In the circumstances of this case, did trees and wildlife on the property of the defendant university fall within ‘natural resources’ as that term is used in General Statutes § 22a-19 (a) and (b), so as to require the defendant commission expressly to consider the possible environmental impact of a proposed subdivision plan?”


text:
    Thomas A. McSwiggan v. Kera A. Kaminsky et al.
    Decided October 20, 1994

      Paul E. Pollock and Colleen D. Fries, in support of the petition.
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 673 (AC 12283), is denied.


text:
    Gaetana Mary Keans v. Paul Bocciarelli
    Decided November 3, 1994

      Craig A. Fontaine and Matthew G. Conway, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 239 (AC 12056), is denied.


text:
    Putnam Trust Company of Greenwich v. Gerhard P. Hutter et al.
    Decided November 3, 1994

      Gerhard P. Hutter, pro se, and Nance Hutter, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Michael J. Jones, in opposition.
   The defendants Gerhard P. Hutter and Nance Hut-ter’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13672) is denied.


text:
    Pie Plate, Inc., et al. v. Texaco, Inc.
    Decided November 3, 1994

      Neil F. Murphy, Jr., in support of the petition.

      PaulD. Sanson and Sheila Huddleston, in opposition.
   The petition of the plaintiff Pie Plate, Inc., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 305 (AC 11483), is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petition for certification for review filed by the plaintiff Pie Plate, Inc.


text:
    Andres Rodriquez v. Commissioner of Correction
    Decided November 3, 1994

      Deborah DelPrete Sullivan, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Jacqueline J. Footman, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Andres Rodriquez’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 527 (AC 12237), is denied.


text:
    Third Taxing District of the City of Norwalk v. Michael Lyons et al.
    Decided November 3, 1994

      Ridgely W. Brown and Benjamin E. Gershberg, in support of the petition.

      Richard A. Silver, Jonathan M. Levine, Jonathan L. Mannina and Mitchell J. Rosenfeld, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 795 (AC 12292), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Lake Spears
    Decided November 3, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15117.

      C. Robert Satti, Sr., state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Richard D. Haviland, in opposition.
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 106 (AC 12908), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the state of Connecticut does not have jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed by the defendant on the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Reservation in Ledyard?”


text:
    Darryl McKnight v. Commissioner of Correction
   The petitioner Darryl McKnight’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 762 (AC 12849), is denied.

Decided November 4, 1994

Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant certification on the following issue: “Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at a probable cause hearing is waived by a guilty plea under the doctrine of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), when the petitioner’s decision to enter such a plea could reasonably have been predicated upon the result of the probable cause hearing.”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Adrian King
    Decided November 4, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15118.

      Marilyn B. Fagelson, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Jacqueline J. Footman, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 781 (AC 12363), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Under the circumstances of this case, was the Appellate Court correct in upholding the admissibility of the identification of the defendant at trial?
“2. Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to sever the cases?”


text:
    Leonard P. Cottiero et al. v. Donald W. Ifkovic, Jr., et al.
    Decided November 17, 1994

      Gerald L. Garlick, in support of the petition.

      Raymond A. Garcia and Gregory R. Faulkner, in opposition.
   The defendant Chemical Bank’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 682 (AC 12997), is denied.


text:
    Bernard O’Shea v. Jeffrey Mignone et al.
    Decided November 17, 1994

      Peter J. Dauk, in support of the petition.

      Ernest F. Teitell, JohnD. Josel and JackZaremski, in opposition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 828 (AC 11522), is denied.


text:
    Carlene E. Kulisch v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company

      The appeal was withdrawn August 25, 1995.

   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 141 (AC 13620) is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Does the retroactive application of Public Acts 1993, No. 93-77, to the facts of this case violate article first, § 10, of the United States constitution?
“2. If the answer to question 1. is no, does the retroactive application of Public Acts 1993, No. 93-77, to the facts of this case violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution?”

Decided November 17, 1994

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15126.

Rodd J. Mantell, in support of the petition.


text:
    Alexandra Teguis v. Carey Ann Reber et al.
    Decided December 12, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15157.

      David Tilles, in support of the petition.

      Louis B. Blumenfeld, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Curt (AC 13619) is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly grant the [defendant St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center’s] motion to dismiss the appeal?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Susan DeFrancesco
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14971X01.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 741 (AC 12700), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the defendant’s conviction for possession of a hybrid bobcat on the ground that General Statutes § 26-40a was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case?”

Decided December 12, 1994

Michael J. Graham, in support of the petition.

Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    Audra Sung et al. v. Russell Butterworth et al.
    Decided December 12, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15156.

      Nicholas P. Cardwell, in support of the petition.

      Andrew J. O’Keefe, in opposition.
   The named plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 154 (AC 12102), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the issue was incorrectly framed by the Appellate Court as the failure of the [named] plaintiff to furnish the required notice pursuant to Practice Book § 220 (D) when the issue was whether, under the circumstances of this case, a treating physician can be compelled to furnish expert testimony on the standard of care?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Thurman Goodman
    Decided December 12, 1994

      Louis S. Avitabile, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn K. Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 438 (AC 12271), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. John Denby
    Decided December 12, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15155.

      Donald Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 609 (AC 12216), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Where a defendant has been charged with possession of narcotics with intent to sell, within 1000 feet of a school, in violation of General Statutes §§ 21a-278 and 21a-278a (b), is it an essential element that the defendant has the specific intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Karol Domian
    Decided December 12, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15154.

      Deborah DelPrete Sullivan, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 714 (AC 13080), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the Appellate Court was correct in concluding that the defendant’s plea to arson in the first degree was entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily when he was not informed of the mandatory minimum sentence?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Philip Cardany
    Decided December 12, 1994

      Hubert J. Santos and Hope C. Seeley, in support of the petition.

      MaryH. Lesser, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 728 (AC 11743), is denied.


text:
    James Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc.
    Decided December 12, 1994

      Mary R. Kravitz, Jeffrey R. Bobbin and Bonnie L. Patten, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 1 (AC 12101), is denied.


text:
    James Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc.
    Decided December 12, 1994

      Wesley W. Horton and Harry E. Calmar, in support of the petition.

      Mark R. Kravitz, Jeffrey R. Bobbin and Bonnie L. Patten, in opposition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 1 (AC 12101), is denied.

      Superseded. See Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 235 Conn. 901 (1995).


text:
    State of Connecticut v. William O’Connell
    Decided December 12, 1994

      William O’Connell, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Michael J. Weber, Jr., supervisory assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 135 (AC 13680), is denied.


text:
    Bernard Thomas v. Commissioner of Correction
    Decided December 12, 1994

      Denise Ansell, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Bernard Thomas’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 906 (AC 12463), is denied.


text:
    Recovery Alliance, Inc. v. Department of Revenue Services, Division of Special Revenue
    Decided December 12, 1994

      Francis W. Benner, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 913 (AC 12361), is denied.


text:
    Patricia Harvey v. Ralph Harvey
    Decided December 12, 1994

      Ralph Harvey, pro se, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 915 (AC 12435), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Gerrod Ellis
    Decided December 12, 1994

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Nancy L. Gillespie, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 916 (AC 13386), is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    Stamford Hospital v. Nelly E. Vega
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13998) is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Was the Appellate Court correct in dismissing the defendant’s appeal for mootness in view of the defendant’s claim that it was ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ ”?

It is further ordered, sua sponte, that the defendant also address here the issues she raised in her appeal to the Appellate Court, but which it did not reach, namely:

Decided December 22, 1994

The Supreme Court docket number is 15162.

Ikechukwu Umeugo and Donald T. Ridley, pro hac vice, in support of the petition.

William H. Narwold and Charles D. Ray, in opposition.

“1. Does a hospital have standing to assert the state’s parens patriae interest in the welfare of a minor child whose adult parent is hospitalized and is refusing allegedly lifesaving medical treatment?
“2. Is the state’s alleged parens patriae interest in the welfare of a minor child whose parent is refusing allegedly lifesaving treatment for religious and medical reasons a compelling state interest that overrides the parent’s common law right of bodily self-determination, federal constitutional rights of bodily self-determination and religious free exercise, and state constitutional right of religious liberty?
“3. Is the forcible administration of unwanted medical treatment to a competent adult the least restrictive, least intrusive means of protecting the state’s alleged parens patriae interest in the welfare of that adult’s minor child?”


text:
    Armond Rouillard v. Commissioner of Correction
    Decided December 22, 1994

      Edwin C. Pearson, in support of the petition.

      Margaret Gaffney Radionovas and Jack Fischer, assistant state’s attorneys, in opposition.
   The petitioner Armond Rouillard’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 35 Conn. App. 754 (AC 12205), is denied.


text:
    Keith Johnson v. State of Connecticut
    Decided December 22, 1994

      Brian J. Kornbrath, in support of the petition.

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Keith Johnson’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 59 (AC 12591), is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petition for certification for review filed by the petitioner Keith Johnson.


text:
    Robert Gelormino et al. v. Alexander Liberman Alexander Liberman v. Robert Gelormino et al.
    Decided December 22, 1994

      Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, in support of the petition.

      John P. Febbroriello, in opposition.
   The petition of Robert Gelormino and Shirley Gelor-mino for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 153 (AC 12671), is denied.


text:
    CTB Meriden Properties, Inc. v. Janet S. Curry et al.
    Decided December 22, 1994

      F. Woodward Lewis, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Thomas A. Kaelin, in opposition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 907 (AC 13127), is denied.


text:
    CTB Meriden Properties, Inc. v. Catherine S. Zygmont et al.
    Decided December 22, 1994

      F. Woodward Lewis, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Thomas A. Kaelin, in opposition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 908 (AC 13128), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Scott Cavell
    Decided December 22, 1994
    The Supreme Court docket number is 15161.

      Richard Emanuel, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Susan C. Marks, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 912 (AC 10605), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Was the Appellate Court correct in concluding that any error in the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of a defense expert witness, due to an alleged violation of a sequestration order, was harmless?
“2. Was the Appellate Court correct in concluding that the trial court acted properly in allowing the state to present forensic evidence in rebuttal and, if so, in preventing the defense from introducing surrebuttal evidence?”


text:
    John F. Ashton v. Heinke P. Ashton
    Decided December 22, 1994

      Heinke P. Ashton, pro se, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 918 (AC 12308), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Bienvenido Santiago
    Decided December 22, 1994

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      James G. Clark, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 921 (AC 12521), is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petition for certification for review filed by the defendant.


author: Callahan, J.

text:
    State of Connecticut v. James D. Leroy
    (14879)
    Peters, C. J., and Callahan, Borden, Berdon and Katz, Js.
    Argued October 27, 1994
    decision released January 31, 1995

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Keith Duboff assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

      Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
   Callahan, J.

The defendant, James Leroy, was convicted after a jury trial of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 53a-60d (a). He appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial when it instructed the jury that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the victim’s injuries if his conduct was “a substantial factor” in bringing about those injuries. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court are as follows. “On September 29, 1984, at approximately 3 a.m., the defendant, James Leroy, was involved in a two vehicle collision with Leslie Daniel in Enfield. The defendant’s car was traveling east and Daniel’s car was heading west on Shaker Road when the two cars collided. The area where the impact occurred was rural, dark and badly lit, with curves and hills. Ralph Adamczyk was the only eyewitness to the accident. He was traveling behind Daniel’s car and observed both headlights of the defendant’s oncoming car as it came around a corner. As the defendant’s car approached, the driver’s side headlight disappeared twice from Adamczyk’s view. Both cars swerved to avoid a collision. Adamczyk spoke with and observed the defendant after the collision and did not consider him to be intoxicated. At the accident scene, police officers noted the smell of alcohol on the defendant, and the defendant had difficulty maintaining his balance and exhibited slurred speech. The defendant was unable to perform two field sobriety tests satisfactorily. The defendant’s breath test yielded a blood alcohol reading of 0.215 of 1 percent, revealing that he had consumed between ten to thirteen beers.

“As a result of the accident, Daniel suffered serious injuries. She was unconscious from the time of the accident until October 19,1984, and remained hospitalized until late November, 1984. Upon release from the hospital, Daniel’s speech and memory were impaired, she could not walk or use her left arm, and her vision was limited. She received more than seven months of physical, occupational and educational rehabilitation therapy. Daniel’s speech is no longer impaired and she has relearned to read and write, but has not regained all of her memory. Daniel cannot walk or use her left arm or hand, and has impaired vision.” State v. Leroy, 33 Conn. App. 232, 234-35, 635 A.2d 305 (1993).

The defendant subsequently was charged with assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle while intoxicated. At trial, the defendant offered evidence to prove that the accident had occurred on his side of the highway, and thus that it was Daniel, not he, who had crossed the center line and had caused the collision. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court instructed the jury, without objection from the defendant, that if the defendant’s conduct was “a substantial factor” in bringing about the victim’s injuries, his conduct was the proximate cause of those injuries. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to five years incarceration, execution suspended after two years, and five years of probation.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court determined that the trial court’s instruction to the jury with regard to proximate cause was improper because it required the defendant’s conduct to have been only “a substantial factor” in bringing about the victim’s injuries rather than “the substantial factor” or “the predominating cause.” (Emphasis added.) The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court’s instruction did not comply with the language used by this court in State v. Spates, 176 Conn. 227, 405 A.2d 656 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922, 99 S. Ct. 1248, 59 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1979), and consequently violated the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. State v. Leroy, supra, 33 Conn. App. 238-40.

In Spates, we said that proximate cause “in the criminal law does not necessarily mean the last act of cause, or the act in point of time nearest to death. The concept of proximate cause incorporates the notion that an accused may be charged with a criminal offense even though his acts were not the immediate cause of death. An act or omission to act is the proximate cause of death when it substantially and materially contributes, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient, intervening cause, to the resulting death. It is the cause without which the death would not have occurred and the predominating cause, the substantial factor, from which death follows as a natural, direct and immediate consequence.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Spates, supra, 176 Conn. 233-34. The Appellate Court stated that although “[i]t is not crucial for jury instructions to include the exact language offered in Spates,” an instruction must not allow “a guilty verdict simply if the defendant’s conduct was one of the many factors that caused the injuries.” State v. Leroy, supra, 33 Conn. App. 239. The court concluded that “Spates requires that an accused’s conduct be the predominating cause or the substantial factor of the resulting injuries and that this element be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ... As we stated, it is possible that an accused’s conduct may be a substantial factor in resulting injuries, but not the predominating cause or the substantial factor. A jury, faced with these instructions, could reasonably convict without finding that the actions were the predominating cause or the substantial factor. Because the trial court’s instructions to the jury did not provide a substantively accurate statement of the law on the essential element of causation, an issue strongly contested at trial, it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled in rendering the verdict.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 240. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the case for a new trial. This appeal followed.

I

The state claims that the Appellate Court misapplied Spates and improperly determined that the trial court’s jury instruction on proximate cause violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. The state also argues that even if the trial court’s instruction was incorrect, its error was harmless under the facts of this case. We agree that the Appellate Court misapplied Spates, and reverse the judgment without engaging in a harmless error analysis.

We begin by noting that an improper jury instruction as to an essential element of the crime charged may result in the violation of the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial, and thus require the reversal of a conviction based upon that instruction. State v. Allen, 216 Conn. 367, 383, 579 A.2d 1066 (1990); State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 537, 522 A.2d 277 (1987); State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 269-70, 502 A.2d 886, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143, 106 S. Ct. 1797, 90 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1986). When reviewing the challenged jury instruction, however, we must “adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court’s charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. ... As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Blanchette v. Barrett, 229 Conn. 256, 280-81, 640 A.2d 74 (1994).

In order to determine whether the trial court’s jury instruction was incorrect, it is useful to analyze our cases that have discussed proximate causation in criminal prosecutions. In State v. Spates, supra, 176 Conn. 229, the defendant had informed the victim and his wife that he intended to rob them. After the defendant had bound the victim and his spouse in the basement, the victim, who had previously had four heart attacks, suffered a heart attack and died. After the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree by a jury, he challenged on appeal the trial court’s jury instruction as to causation. Although we did indicate that an act is the proximate cause of a victim’s injuries when it is “the substantial factor” or “the predominating cause” of the injuries, those words must be viewed within the framework of the entire Spates opinion.

First, we note that in Spates, the defendant’s challenge to the jury instruction had nothing to do with whether “the substantial factor” or “a substantial factor” language should have been used. Rather, the defendant argued that the instruction given did not explain to the jury his view that there must be an actual infliction of external physical injury upon the victim by the defendant before a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s death may be found to exist. State v. Spates, supra, 176 Conn. 231. Our holding was not that the trial court was required to state that the defendant’s conduct was “the substantial factor” or “the predominating cause” of the victim’s injuries, but rather was that “[i]t is unnecessary for ‘proximate cause’ purposes that the particular kind of harm that results from the defendant’s act be intended by him. In many situations giving rise to criminal liability, the harm that results is unintended, yet is directly or indirectly caused by an act of the defendant. In such cases, where the death or injury caused by the defendant’s conduct is a foreseeable and natural result of that conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the defendant criminally responsible. ... A review of the trial court’s charge discloses that it instructed the jury substantially in accord with those principles.” Id., 234-35.

Second, the actual jury instruction that we approved in Spates not only lacked the words “the substantial factor” or “the predominating cause,” but also expressly permitted a guilty verdict even if the defendant’s conduct was not the only cause of the victim’s death. We concluded that “[t]he test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result. . . . When considered in this context, the instruction complained of was not erroneous.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 235.

Third, it is significant that the Spates decision cited State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 75 A.2d 67 (1950), as controlling authority. In Tomassi, the defendant was charged with murder. At trial, he contended that it was not the bullet wound that he had inflicted upon the victim that had caused the victim’s death, but rather the treatment that the victim had received from the doctors at the hospital. The trial court instructed the jury as to proximate cause, in part, that “under the law an injury is the cause of a death if the death follows—if the death naturally ensues from it. It is not necessary that it be the immediate cause of death, provided that it has operated to produce the immediate cause. If a wound starts in operation a chain of circumstances and conditions which ultimately result in death, then under the law the wound is regarded as the cause of the death. On the other hand, even though death follows a wound, in point of time, if the death is brought about by some cause independent of the wound, if it would have happened, that is, if there had been no wound, then of course the wound is not the cause of the death. . . . In other words, it is not essential that the wound be the sole cause of the death. It is not essential that it be the immediate cause of the death. It is essential that it be a substantial factor in bringing about the death. ... So where a wound, either operating directly or indirectly, by causing some other condition which produces death, has been a substantial factor in causing a death, it is still to be regarded as the cause of the death even though some negligence in the treatment of the wounded man by physicians and others is also a contributing factor.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Tomassi, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, April Term, 1950, Pt. 2, Record, pp. 32-34. On appeal, we approved this instruction, stating that “[t]he court’s instructions gave the defendant all he was entitled to and were correct.” State v. Tomassi, supra, 137 Conn. 119.

On January 16, 1979, more than two months after our decision in Spates, we decided State v. Wilkinson, 176 Conn. 451, 408 A.2d 232 (1979). In Wilkinson, we upheld a challenged jury instruction, but instead of relying on the language in Spates to do so, we stated that “[t]he charge given by the trial court was taken from [State v. Alterio, 154 Conn. 23, 220 A.2d 451 (1966),] which outlines the law in this state on proximate cause and concurrent liability.” Id., 461. The Alterio charge stated, in part, that “[p]roximate cause is that cause or act which, as a natural consequence, unbroken by any other intervening act, produced the death and without which the death would not have resulted. In other words, the act, to be the proximate cause, must be a substantial factor in producing the death and to be a substantial factor in producing the death, the act must have continued down to the moment of the injury or the death or at least down to the setting in motion of the final active, injurious force which materially produced or preceded the death. . . . So, you see, with respect to the cause and effect, ladies and gentlemen, you have a factual situation. It is up to you to evaluate the evidence and determine wherein you think the truth lies and after you have determined that, then you will determine whether or not either or both of these particular operators were substantial factors in producing this particular death.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Alterio, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, May Term, 1966, Record, pp. 40-41.

Moreover, in the years after Spates, this court repeatedly has affirmed the law as to proximate cause as stated in Tomassi and Alterio. In State v. Jacobs, 194 Conn. 119, 125-26, 479 A.2d 226 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190, 105 S. Ct. 96, 83 L. Ed. 2d 968 (1985), we stood by that portion of the Tomassi charge that required that a wound be “a substantial factor” in causing a death to be the proximate cause, when we concluded that proximate cause existed in that case because “[t]he wound itself contributed to the victim’s death in a substantial way . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Likewise, in State v. Pellegrino, 194 Conn. 279, 480 A.2d 537 (1984), the defendant was charged with manslaughter in connection with the death of his accomplice. The defendant argued that “where an accomplice accidentally kills himself, there should be no criminal responsibility because a defendant’s conduct would not then be a substantial factor in causing the accomplice’s death.” Id., 295. We disagreed, stating that “[although we agree that a defendant’s conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about his accomplice’s death, we do not agree that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the defendant Pellegrino’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing [the victim’s] death.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

In view of the fact that Spates cited Tomassi as controlling authority for its definition of proximate cause, and upon review of the actual jury instruction approved in Spates, we conclude that in this case the trial court’s charge that permitted a guilty verdict if the defendant’s conduct was “a substantial factor” in causing the victim’s injuries, and that permitted a guilty verdict even if the defendant’s conduct was only one of several factors that caused the victim’s injuries, was proper. The cases that we have decided subsequent to Spates demonstrate that we have never attached talismanic significance to the words “the substantial factor” and “the predominant cause.” Rather, those words merely reflect our repeated insistence that when several factors contribute, in a chain of events, to cause a victim’s injury, in order to be the proximate cause of that injury, the defendant’s conduct must have been a cause that necessarily set in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. In short, a jury instruction with respect to proximate cause must contain, at a minimum, the following elements: (1) an indication that the defendant’s conduct must contribute substantially and materially, in a direct manner, to the victim’s injuries; and (2) an indication that the defendant’s conduct cannot have been superseded by an efficient, intervening cause that produced the injuries. See State v. Spates, supra, 176 Conn. 234. Because the trial court’s charge complied with these mandates, we conclude that the Appellate Court’s finding of error was improper.

II

The defendant argues, however, that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the trial court’s jury instruction was erroneous because the legislature, in 1985, in the process of amending § 53a-60d by No. 85-147 of the 1985 Public Acts, specifically deleted the language “a substantial factor” from a draft amendment. We disagree.

Although in 1985 the General Assembly revised § 53a-60d, it is undisputed that the “legislative history of this amendment reveals that the modification . . . was not made to change any previously defined burden of proving causation.” State v. Kwaak, 21 Conn. App. 138, 143, 572 A.2d 1015, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 811, 576 A.2d 540 (1990). The revision was intended “to remove the language in [§ 53a-60d] that referred to a person’s being ‘intoxicated’ and instead to insert the requirement that a person has to be ‘under the influence’ in order to ‘get tougher on drunk drivers’ and to avoid the result reached in an uncited court decision where an individual escaped liability under the law because the court found that the individual was not ‘intoxicated’ even though he may have been under the influence.” Id., 144.

The defendant points out that in the process of amending § 53a-60d, a draft amendment initially contained the phrase “a substantial factor.” The defendant also points out that the phrase was later specifically excised by a House Amendment. Although we do not disagree with the defendant’s version of the drafting history of the 1985 amendment, we cannot accept the defendant’s explanation that the reason for the removal of the phrase “a substantial factor” was that it set too low a standard of proximate cause. Instead, we conclude that the legislative history is unclear. On the one hand, Representative William A. Wollenberg argued that the word “substantial” would impose upon the prosecution a lesser burden of proof with respect to causation than would “as a consequence of.” On the other hand, Representative Robert M. Frankel simply thought that the word “substantial” was too ambiguous and difficult for a trial court to define. Neither representative, however, commented as to the dispositive issue here—the difference between the phrases “a substantial factor” and “the substantial factor.”

In view of the conflicting legislative history, we decline to adopt the import ascribed by the defendant to the removal of “a substantial factor” from the draft bill. Our decisions permit a jury to find that a defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of a victim’s injuries if the conduct was a direct and substantial factor in bringing about the victim’s injuries, and if there was no superseding intervening and efficient cause. We are unpersuaded that anything said in the proceedings in the General Assembly concerning No. 85-147 of the 1985 Public Acts, which was proposed to remedy an unrelated aspect of § 53a-60d, changed that rule of law. Because the trial court’s jury instruction complied with these essential mandates, the Appellate Court incorrectly reversed the defendant’s judgment of conviction.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for consideration of the defendant’s remaining claims.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The Appellate Court incorrectly stated that the defendant was charged with violating General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 53a-60d, as amended by Public Acts 1985, No. 85-147, § 2, as the statute provides today. State v. Leroy, 33 Conn. App. 232, 233 n.1, 635 A.2d 305 (1993). In fact, the defendant was charged under General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 53a-60d, which provides in pertinent part: “assault in the second degree with a motor VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED: CLASS D FELONY, (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle while intoxicated when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes serious physical injury to another person. For the purposes of this section, ‘intoxication’ shall include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both.”

       We granted the state’s petition for certification limited to the following issues: (1) “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court’s instruction on proximate cause constituted a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights?” and (2) “If the answer to question (1) is yes, has the state established harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt?” State v. Leroy, 228 Conn. 922, 638 A.2d 36 (1994).

       Although the defendant conceded that his claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to proximate cause was unpreserved, the Appellate Court held the issue to be reviewable under the test set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). State v. Leroy, supra, 33 Conn. App. 235.

       The trial court’s entire jury instruction on proximate cause was as follows: “Now, as I previously instructed, the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged intoxication of the defendant caused the serious injury of another person. Therefore, if you find intoxication but also find that it was not a substantial factor in causing the alleged injuries of the victim, then the intoxication was a condition surrounding the injury, not a cause of it, and you must return a finding of not guilty.
      “For the defendant to be found guilty, the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt a cause or a relation between the accident caused by the defendant being intoxicated, and the injury it claims resulted from it. This causal connection must rest upon more than surmise, speculation or conjecture. You, as triers of the facts, are not to be concerned with possibilities but only with reasonable probabilities.
      “In consideration of the causes of this accident and the result, you should keep in mind that all collisions that occur on the highways are not necessarily caused by the fault of some person. Accidents may happen when neither party is at fault.
      “An accident which could not be prevented by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence is called an unavoidable accident, and if you believe from the evidence that this occurrence was of such a character, the defendant is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.
      “As I have said, the state must prove that the defendant’s intoxication proximately caused serious physical injury to Leslie Daniel. Proximately caused is a direct cause. It’s an act or a failure to act, followed in its natural consequence by a result, without the intervention of any other superseding cause.
      “Whether the sequence of events is unbroken by any intervening cause, an act or a failure to act is a proximate cause of the result. Proximate cause, thus, is an act or a failure to act which is a substantial factor in producing the result.
      “Now, the intoxication of the defendant need not be the sole proximate cause of the injuries. All that is required is that the intoxication of the defendant, if you find that he was intoxicated, be a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries to Leslie Daniel.
      “Now, if you find that the defendant’s intoxication—if you find intoxication, but if you find that such intoxication . . . was a substantial factor, then the state has met its burden in this element.” (Emphasis added.)

       On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly: (1) instructed the jury as to proximate cause; (2) denied a motion to strike expert testimony on the ground of lack of an evidentiary foundation; and (3) instructed the jury as to reasonable doubt thereby diluting the state’s burden of proof. The Appellate Court considered only the first of these claims. State v. Leroy, supra, 33 Conn. App. 233-34. On remand, the Appellate Court will be required to consider the remaining two claims.

       Causation is an essential element of the crime of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle while intoxicated. See General Statutes § 53a-60d. In order for legal causation to exist in a criminal prosecution, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was both the cause in fact, or actual cause, as well as the proximate cause of the victim’s injuries. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law (1972) § 35, pp. 246-51. “In order that conduct be the actual cause of a particular result it is almost always sufficient that the result would not have happened in the absence of the conduct; or, putting it another way, that ‘but for’ the antecedent conduct the result would not have occurred.” Id., p. 249. On the other hand, proximate cause requires that “the forbidden result which actually occurs must be enough similar to, and occur in a manner enough similar to, the result or manner which the defendant intended (in the case of crimes of intention), or the result or manner which his reckless or negligent conduct created a risk of happening (in the case of crimes of recklessness and negligence) that the defendant may fairly be held responsible for the actual result even though it does differ or happens in a different way from the intended or hazarded result . . . .” Id., p. 248.

       The jury instruction stated, in part, that “[i]f the defendant’s conduct, in his relations with [the victim], inflicted upon the latter physical or emotional injury or stress or trauma which was in this sense the proximate cause of his death, then the defendant’s conduct, under the circumstances, caused his death and satisfied this element of the law or charge upon this offense, even though such physical or emotional stress or trauma were not the only cause of [the victim’s] death, and although [the victim] had already been enfeebled by poor physical condition of severe heart disease, and even though it is probable that a person in sound physical condition would not have suecumbed from the effects of the defendant’s conduct upon him, and even though it is probable that the defendant’s conduct only hastened [the victim’s] death, or that he would have died soon thereafter from another cause or causes. Let us be very plain upon this point. So long as [the victim’s] admittedly and recognizable predisposition of heart disease was not the only substantial factor in bringing on his death, that condition . . . does not operate to prevent the defendant’s responsibility for his conduct having caused [the victim’s] death. If the defendant’s unlawful conduct ... set in operation factors . . . such conduct establishes the defendant’s guilt . . . even though his conduct or the factors he set in motion were not the only cause of [the victim’s] death . . . .” (Emphasis added.) State v. Spates, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, October Term, 1978, Pt. 4, Defendant’s brief pp. 29-30.

       The statute’s language was changed, in part, from “in consequence of his intoxication” to “as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug.”

       The legislative commissioner had inserted the language “a substantial factor” into the proposed House Bill. House Amendment “A” changed the “a substantial factor” language in the proposed bill back to the original “consequence of.” Representative William A. Wollenberg proposed the amendment to this bill, and spoke on its behalf as follows: “Mr. Speaker, in the file copy, the language of in consequence of was changed to substantial cause. Now, substantial cause is a lesser, there is a lesser burden to prove the fact that the individual was under the influence under substantial cause, in consequence of, rather than substantial cause.
      “It’s been brought to our attention that perhaps it should be a more difficult burden to prove, and we have asked that the language be changed from ‘substantial’ to ‘in consequence of.’ It does require that the entire language of this statute be moved around a little because the ‘substantial’ and ‘in consequence of’ are different terms entirely.
      “Basically it makes it more difficult under in consequence of.
      * * *
      “Through you, Mr. Speaker. We had substituted language. We had substituted the word, ‘substantial’ rather than words, ‘as a consequence of.’ As a consequence of is a stricter burden to prove by a prosecutor than substantial. It would have been easier to prove that someone was under the influence if the substantial language were in there, rather than, ‘in consequence of.’ ‘Substantial’ could be a degree, not reaching as high as ‘in consequence of.’
      * * *
      “Through you, Mr. Speaker. I can’t give you exact percentages because I don’t know what the percentage of substantial is, but if we are looking from 50 to 100%, substantial might be 70%. In consequence of might be 80 or 90%.
      * * *
      “Mr. Speaker. If I may, just to clarify and I understand the problem here. The causation of the damage, the death or damage in the case of assault, the causation may have been in part because of the intoxication or being under the influence, and in part for some other reason.
      “Under the in consequence of rises above the proof of substantial.” 28 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1985 Sess., pp. 3124-28.
      On the other hand, Representative Robert M. Frankel understood the reason for the removal of the word “substantial” as follows: “Yes, Mr. Speaker, I’d like to attempt to try to assist the chamber in understanding the reason for the amendment. The file copy was designed to correct a problem that arose from a court decision. It was an attempt to use the right definition for under the influence, because in that court case, someone escaped from being found guilty because the statute that is on the books today, talks about intoxication, instead of about the words, ‘under the influence,’ and that is what the file copy tried to do, to put the words, ‘under the influence’ in, and take the word ‘intoxication’ out, because the courts interpreted them differently, and the file copy would indeed make the law more tough on drivers, but I believe inadvertently [the legislative commissioner’s office] threw in some new language that the committee didn’t consider, and they threw in the words, ‘substantial,’ and we have no definition for substantial.
      “Is it 20%, is it 50%, is it 60%? It’s something more than a little, but is it 70 or 80. We don’t know, and I don’t think it was appropriate to put it there. The existing law says, ‘in consequence of,’ and that is what Rep. Wollenberg’s amendment would do, would use that same language. But it would still leave the file copy intact to toughen up our drunk driving laws to do what was intended by the committee, and to correct the problem that that court decision brought about.
      “And so I would urge the membership to support the amendment, which I think will make the file copy to do what the committee intended, toughen up our laws, but not interject and introduce something brand new called ‘substantial’ as opposed to ‘in consequence.’ It’s technical, it’s legal, but I think if we put this new language in, that inadvertently slipped into the file copy, we’re going to have an enormous problem in interpreting what is something even beyond civil law, below civil law, in terms of its consequence. . . .” Id., pp. 3129-31.
      Representatives Wollenberg and Frankel were the only two legislators who spoke to the substance of the amendment.
      House Amendment “A” was adopted and ruled technical. Id., p. 3132.

       Notably, Representative Wollenberg’s criticism was directed at the word “substantial,” not at the phrase “a substantial.” See footnote 9. Thus, Representative Wollenberg’s statements, even if taken as definitive regarding the omission of “a substantial,” do not support the defendant’s argument.