author: Berdon, J.

text:
    Dickie Murchison, Jr., et al. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of Waterbury et al.
    (15098)
    Peters, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Palmer, Js.

      Argued March 14
    decision released July 4, 1995

      James R. Smith, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Thomas K. McDonough, assistant corporation counsel, with whom, on the brief, were John F. Gorman, assistant corporation counsel, and Pamela J. Casagrande, assistant corporation counsel, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

      J. William Gagne, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Gregory C. Norsigian, for the appellee (intervening defendant).
   Berdon, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-474 (g), a dispute regarding the eligibility of Waterbury firefighters for promotion to the position of fire lieutenant is subject to the grievance procedure of the collective bargaining agreement between the city of Waterbury and the firefighters union. We conclude that it is not.

The following facts are undisputed. On July 11,1988, the plaintiffs, Dickie Murchison, Jr., and Michael Farrell, became firefighters for the city of Waterbury and joined the intervening defendant Waterbury Fire Fighters Association, Local 1339, AFL-CIO (union). Previously, Murchison had been employed as a firefighter by the Ridgefield fire department and Farrell had been similarly employed by the New Britain fire department.

On February 26,1992, the named defendant, the civil service commission of the city of Waterbury (commission), announced a promotional examination for the position of fire lieutenant. The closing date to file applications for the examination was March 20, 1992, and the announcement included the requirement that each candidate have “[f]our years firefighting experience comparable to Waterbury Fire Service in a qualitative and quantitative sense.” The union, the commission and Waterbury had formally agreed upon this requirement of previous firefighting experience on December 11, 1980, when they signed a certain contract known as the “St. John agreement.”

The plaintiffs successfully completed the examination. On June 26, 1992, the commission’s director of personnel determined that both plaintiffs were eligible to be promoted immediately and notified them that they would be promoted on June 29, 1992. Although on the closing date for applications for the examination, the plaintiffs were fifteen calendar days short of completing four years of service with the Waterbury fire department, the director of personnel determined that both Murchison and Farrell had attained the quantitative and qualitative equivalent of the four year requirement by virtue of their previous experience as firefighters in Ridgefield and New Britain, respectively.

The union disagreed with the director’s decision to credit the plaintiffs’ previous service, and on June 29, 1992, it submitted a grievance to the fire chief in accordance with the procedure in the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Waterbury. In the grievance, the union claimed that the personnel department “has, or is in the process of certifying certain ineligible candidates for the position of Lieutenant in the Fire Department,” and that these candidates did not comply with the four year requirement of equivalent service. The fire chief declined to take action on the union’s grievance and deferred to the next level of the grievance procedure, which requires that the grievance be submitted to the mayor.

On the same day, June 29, 1992, the union submitted its grievance to the mayor of Waterbury, Edward D. Bergin, who responded immediately. In his written decision, Bergin sustained the union’s appeal and directed the director of personnel to certify only those candidates who had comparable service in cities of comparable size. On July 8, 1992, the director of personnel notified the plaintiffs of Bergin’s decision and informed them that, in compliance with the order of the mayor, their eligibility for promotion to fire lieutenant would be postponed until July 11, 1992. As a result of that decision by the director of personnel, which had been directed by the mayor, the plaintiffs were not promoted to the rank of fire lieutenant.

The plaintiffs appealed from the July 8, 1992 decision of the director of personnel to the commission claiming that, under § 7-474 (g), their eligibility was not a proper subject for the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiffs claimed that by sustaining the grievance and directing the director of personnel to take into account only prior service to cities of comparable size, the mayor had acted illegally. On September 1, 1992, the commission heard and rejected the plaintiffs’ appeals by a vote of three to two.

The plaintiffs then appealed from the decision of the commission to the trial court claiming that the commission had acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion. The trial court determined that the involvement of the mayor and the union in the grievance proceeding had not rendered the commission’s decision illegal for three reasons. First, the trial court determined that the union had challenged, and the mayor had ruled on, the “eligibility qualifications” of certain individuals to sit for the exam, and not on the conduct and the rating of a merit examination. The court concluded that such a determination regarding eligibility qualifications is a proper subject of the union grievance procedure because it is outside the scope of § 7-474 (g).

Second, the court determined that the union’s action did not violate § 7-474 (g) because “[wjhere . . . the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint concerns the fairness of the [defendants’] subsequent changes to the established qualifications necessary to proceed with the promotional process the grievance procedure must be followed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Although the court did not explain the factual foundation for this holding, it is reasonable to assume that it was in response to the defendants’ contention that there had been a change in the initial procedure to determine the necessary qualifications for the position of fire lieutenant, and that therefore the personnel director’s determination of the plaintiffs’ eligibility was within the exception to the statutory exemption from collective bargaining.

Finally, the trial court stated that, even if the grievance procedure should not have been followed, the commission had the ultimate authority regarding matters relating to the eligibility of candidates for promotion, and the court determined that the commission had decided, on the basis of the evidence before it, that fire service to New Britain or Ridgefield is not comparable in a qualitative and quantitative sense to Waterbury fire service. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the commission had not acted illegally, arbitrarily or in abuse of discretion in refusing to sustain the plaintiffs’ appeals. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal.

The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and the appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). The plaintiffs make several claims on appeal but essentially their argument is twofold. The plaintiffs first contend that under § 7-474 (g), the issue of whether the plaintiffs were qualified to take the examination and receive a promotion is not subject to collective bargaining. Furthermore, the plaintiffs claim that there was no change in the necessary qualifications for the position of fire lieutenant that would permit this dispute to be resolved through the grievance procedure under the statutory exceptions that permit collective bargaining. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly determined that the dispute regarding their eligibility was properly a subject for the grievance procedure. Second, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly determined that the commission reviewed the issue of whether the plaintiffs were entitled to credit for their service to other fire departments on its merits and properly rejected the appeal. We agree with the plaintiffs on both claims.

I

We first address the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that this dispute was the proper subject of a union grievance to the mayor, and that the mayor’s decision to deny the plaintiffs credit for their previous service had been valid. Because the determination of this issue requires us to interpret the scope of § 7-474 (g) and statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo. Andover Limited Partnership I v. Board of Tax Review, 232 Conn. 392, 396, 655 A.2d 759 (1995). Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the pertinent regulations of the town of Waterbury and with § 7-474 (g).

According to the civil service rules and regulations for Waterbury, the director of personnel is responsible for determining whether a candidate meets the minimum qualifications to sit for promotional examinations as well as for establishing “eligible lists.” Waterbury Civil Service Rules and Regs., c. V, §§ 7-8. Any action of the director of personnel may be appealed to the commission “whose decision . . . shall be final unless otherwise specified in these regulations or the Charter Amendment.” Id., c. I, § 6.

Section 7-474 (g) provides that nothing under the statutory scheme that governs negotiations and agreements between municipalities and unions “shall diminish the authority and power of any municipal civil service commission, personnel board, personnel agency or its agents established by statute, charter or special act to conduct and grade merit examinations and to rate candidates in the order of their relative excellence from which appointments or promotions may be made to positions in the competitive division of the classified service of the municipal employer served by such civil service commission or personnel board. The conduct and the grading of merit examinations, the rating of candidates and the establishment of lists from such examinations and the initial appointments from such lists and any provision of any municipal charter concerning political activity of municipal employees shall not be subject to collective bargaining, provided once the procedures for the promotional process have been established by the municipality, any changes to the process proposed by the municipality concerning the following issues shall be subject to collective bargaining: (1) The necessary qualifications for taking a promotional examination; (2) the relative weight to be attached to each method of examination; and (3) the use and determination of monitors for written, oral and performance examinations. In no event shall the content of any promotional examination be subject to collective bargaining.”

A

We must first decide whether the determination that a candidate is qualified to take a promotional examination and receive a promotion based on comparable fire department service is subject to collective bargaining. This inquiry requires us to determine whether conditions relating to the eligibility of a candidate to take a merit examination fall within the intended scope of the “conduct and the grading of merit examinations” for the purposes of § 7-474 (g). The defendants argue that the dispute was properly resolved by the mayor through the grievance procedure because issues relating to the eligibility of candidates to take an examination are not part of the “conduct and the grading” of such examinations and therefore are not exempted from collective bargaining under the labor contract or § 7-474 (g). We disagree.

In order to determine what the conduct of a merit examination is intended to encompass, we look to the well established principles of statutory interpretation. “It is fundamental that statutory construction requires us to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to construe the statute in a manner that effectuates that intent. . . . In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation . . . .’’(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Petco Insulation Co. v. Crystal, 231 Conn. 315, 321, 649 A.2d 790 (1994). In order to determine the meaning of a statute, we must consider the statute as a whole when reconciling its separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation. Broadley v. Board of Education, 229 Conn. 1, 6, 639 A.2d 502 (1994); Ganim v. Roberts, 204 Conn. 760, 763, 529 A.2d 194 (1987).

As it was originally enacted, § 7-474 (g) exempted from collective bargaining, without exception, all matters pertaining to the conduct and the grading of merit examinations and the subsequent rating of candidates. In 1982, the legislature adopted No. 82-212, § 1, of the 1982 Public Acts (P.A. 82-212) which amended § 7-474 (g) to specify that proposed changes for the necessary qualifications for taking the promotional examinations would be subject to collective bargaining. Because P.A. 82-212 adopted an exception for proposed changes to the necessary qualifications for taking a promotional examination, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended qualifications for taking promotional examinations to be within the scope of the “conduct . . . of merit examinations.” Therefore, we conclude that the method of determining the necessary qualifications for taking the examination that was in effect when P.A. 82-212 was adopted is implicitly within the scope of the conduct of the examination and is not subject to collective bargaining.

The legislative history of P. A. 82-212 reinforces our interpretation. Statements made during public hearings, and during debates in the House of Representatives and the Senate, indicate that § 7-474 (g) as amended by P.A. 82-212, § 1, was generally intended to exempt the entire promotional examination process from collective bargaining and that the exceptions should be strictly construed. It was noted at the public hearing that, prior to the adoption of the amendment, § 7-474 (g) excluded any determination of “who qualifies to take the exam” from collective bargaining. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor and Public Employees, Pt. 1,1982 Sess., p. 95, remarks of Greg Berg, director of management services for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities. Municipalities were vehemently opposed to this change because they feared that requiring any part of the promotional examination process to be collectively bargained “would sharply diminish the authority of the civil service commissions and personnel boards.” Id.; see 25 S. Proc., Pt. 9, 1982 Sess., pp. 2761-62, remarks of Senator John G. Matthews.

The unions and legislative proponents of the act argued, however, that the promotional examination process had been abused, and that arbitrary changes in promotional policy had often been unilaterally enacted by the municipalities in order to promote certain individuals over others. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor and Public Employees, Pt. 1,1982 Sess., pp. 105-106,134-35; 25 S. Proc., Pt. 9, 1982 Sess., pp. 2763-64. The proponents emphasized that the only redress for such abuses was through the court system, which was prohibitively expensive and time consuming. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor and Public Employees, Pt. 1, 1982 Sess., p. 127, remarks of Jerry Herskowitz, president of the Connecticut State Police Union.

The General Assembly addressed the concerns of both the proponents and the opponents during discussions regarding the merits of the proposed amendment, and set forth the intended function of the act. Section 7-474 (g) provides municipalities with the right to establish the promotional examination process of their choice without being subject to collective bargaining but requires collective bargaining for “changes to the process” regarding the qualifications for an examination. See 25 S. Proc., Pt. 9, 1982 Sess., pp. 2758-59; 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10,1982 Sess., pp. 3082-83. In limiting collective bargaining to changes in the promotional examination process that altered the initial determination of qualifications to take merit examinations, the legislature must have considered the initial determination of the necessary qualifications to be within the promotional examination process and, therefore, within the scope of the conduct of merit examinations for the purposes of § 7-474 (g).

In this case, the initial determination of the necessary qualifications for a candidate with prior service was made when the commission executed the St. John agreement in 1980. The agreement provides that an applicant who claims credit for service to a fire department other than Waterbury’s in order to qualify for a promotional examination will receive such credit if the other fire department service is deemed to be qualitatively and quantitatively comparable to the equivalent position or rank in the Waterbury fire department. This is precisely the standard set forth in the announcement of the examination for fire lieutenant that prompted the plaintiffs to seek promotions. It is also the standard that the director of personnel employed when he determined that the plaintiffs properly qualified to take the examination and were entitled to the resulting promotions by virtue of their other service. The director’s decision, therefore, was not a change in the process regarding qualifications necessary to sit for the examination, but was merely an application of preexisting qualifications under § 7-474 (g). We conclude that the decision to grant the plaintiffs credit for their service to the fire departments of other cities was not subject to collective bargaining and was therefore not subject to the union’s grievance procedure.

B

The defendants argue, however, that even if the particular decision of the director at issue here did not constitute a “change” in the process, collective bargaining was required because the process itself had been changed in 1983, after the 1982 amendment of § 7-474 (g). The defendants point to the civil service job description for fire lieutenant that includes a general statement of duties and distinguishing features of the position. It requires that the candidate have “[fjour years firefighting experience [cjomparable to Waterbury Fire Service in a qualitative and quantitative sense.” In the upper right hand corner of the document appears: “Revised C.S.C. 9/6/83; Appvd. Bd. of Aid. 9/19/83.” The defendants argue that this indicates the city changed the eligibility requirements for the merit examination pursuant to the St. John agreement. This argument is without merit.

The defendants have been unable to point to any change in the necessary qualifications for the position of fire lieutenant that was made subsequent to the enactment of P.A. 82-212, § 1. Although a 1983 revision is indicated, there is nothing in the record that shows any alteration in the necessary qualifications for taking the examination for fire lieutenant. On the contrary, the job description includes the same qualification criteria that were articulated in the St. John agreement of 1980, which memorialized the method for determining whether credit would be granted for service to other fire departments. We conclude that, insofar as this record indicates, there have been no changes in the necessary qualifications for taking the promotional examination for fire lieutenant that would require collective bargaining under § 7-474 (g).

II

Our conclusion that the grievance procedure should not have been used does not necessarily vindicate the plaintiffs’ claim. The trial court determined that even if the grievance procedure was improper in this case, the plaintiffs’ appeal had to be dismissed because the commission had made a determination on the merits that the plaintiffs were not eligible to take the examination. We disagree with the trial court that the commission ever made such a finding.

The only issue before the commission was whether this dispute was properly submitted to the grievance procedure. The plaintiffs did not appeal the merits of the personnel director’s decision which, without the illegal directive of the mayor, would have favored the plaintiffs. The reversal by the director of personnel of his initial determination favoring the plaintiffs was not based upon the established method for determining qualifications, but was precipitated solely by the order of the mayor pursuant to the union’s grievance. The issue before the commission, therefore, was whether a dispute regarding the eligibility for a promotional examination based on prior service credit may be submitted to the grievance procedure included in the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Waterbury, and not whether the plaintiffs were in fact eligible for credit.

Furthermore, the commission did not make a finding as to whether the plaintiffs’ service was “comparable . . . in a qualitative or quantitative sense” to the Waterbury fire department service. According to the minutes of the commission meeting on September 1, 1992, the issue of whether the plaintiffs were entitled to service credit was discussed. One of the commissioners repeatedly reminded the commission, however, that the issue before it was whether the matter was grievable and not whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the credit. Furthermore, the commission voted solely on the issue raised in the plaintiffs’ appeals.

The decision of an administrative agency is reversible on appeal if the court determines that the agency acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. Smith v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 227 Conn. 71, 80, 629 A.2d 1089 (1993), cert. denied, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1190, 127 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1994). We conclude that the commission acted illegally by affirming the actions of the director, as mandated by the mayor, because, under § 7-474 (g), the dispute was not subject to collective bargaining and that the trial court improperly determined that the commission had evaluated the case on its merits.

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with direction to sustain the appeal and to reinstate the original decision of the director of personnel determining the plaintiffs’ immediate eligibility for promotion.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 7-474 (g) provides in pertinent part: “Nothing herein shall diminish the authority and power of any municipal civil service commission, personnel board, personnel agency or its agents ... to conduct and grade merit examinations and to rate candidates in the order of their relative excellence from which appointments or promotions may be made to positions .... The conduct and the grading of merit examinations . . . shall not be subject to collective bargaining, provided once the procedures for the promotional process have been established by the municipality, any changes to the process proposed by the municipality concerning the following issues shall be subject to collective bargaining: (1) The necessary qualifications for taking a promotional examination . . . .”

       The St. John agreement resulted from a dispute regarding the credit given for previous service with other fire departments to Edward St. John when he was appointed fire marshall of Waterbury. See Beccia v. Waterbury, 185 Conn. 445, 441 A.2d 131 (1981).
      The St. John agreement purports to make no changes in the preexisting procedure for considering previous firefighting service in determining whether a candidate is qualified to take a promotional examination. Part (3) of the St. John agreement provides that “the [civil service] Commission agrees to continue the following policy concerning the qualifications of applicants to take promotional exams . . . [a]ny City employee-applicant who claims credit for experience and training as a member of a volunteer fire department ... or as a permanent paid member of a paid fire department other than the Waterbury Fire Department ... in order to qualify to take a promotional exam or as a basis for [experience and training] credit on such exam . . . [shall receive credit] if, and only if, it is found that after a functional comparison of work related experiences in a qualitative and quantitative sense that the position/rank in question in the volunteer or non-Waterbury [f]ire department is comparable to the same position or rank in the Waterbury Fire Department. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

       The civil service conducts and grades merit examinations. The Waterbury civil service regulations make the director of personnel responsible for conducting the examinations and determining who is qualified to take them. Waterbury Civil Service Rules and Regs., c. VIII, § 3. The initial determination of eligibility for promotion based on the results of the merit examinations is also made by the director of personnel as agent for the commission.

       The mayor’s letter of June 29,1992, to Patrick J. Reilly, vice president of the Waterbury Fire Fighters Association, provides in pertinent part: “After reviewing the agreement of Waterbury Fire Fighters Association, specifically those sections dealing with quantitative and qualitative [service], I sustain the union’s grievance and further direct the [director of personnel] to only certify those candidates that have comparable service in cities of comparable size.”

       Both plaintiffs received identical letters from the director of personnel which provide in pertinent part: “[P]rior to establishing the eligibility list for the position of Fire Lieutenant ... a thorough review was conducted of all your experience as a firefighter, both within and outside of the Waterbury Fire Department, and it was determined that you met the following minimum requirements on June 26, 1992, the day the eligibility list was established: ‘Four years firefighting experience comparable to Waterbury Fire Service in a qualitative and quantitative sense. . . .’
      “On June 29,1992, the Fire Union filed a grievance which requested that the firefighting experience you gained outside the Waterbury Fire Department be deemed incomparable to Waterbury firefighting experience, thus postponing your eligibility for certification to the position of Fire Lieutenant until July 11, 1992. This grievance was sustained at Step 2 of the grievance procedure prescribed by the Fire Contract. . . .”

       The plaintiffs also claimed that the mayor’s intervention violated the collective bargaining agreement and the St. John agreement. Because we decide this case under § 7-474 (g), we do not discuss these claims.

       The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the trial court improperly determined that: (1) the mayor’s decision to sustain the grievance filed by the union was consistent with the labor contract; (2) there had been changes in the promotional process that were sufficient to bring the determination of eligibility within the exception of § 7-474 (g) for purposes of collective bargaining; (3) the mayor’s decision to sustain the union’s grievance did not violate § 7-474 (g); (4) the evidence before the commission supported its decision that the fire service in New Britain and Ridgefield is not comparable in a qualitative and quantitative sense to Waterbury fire service; and (5) the commission did not act illegally, arbitrarily or in abuse of its discretion when it rejected the plaintiffs’ appeals.

       An eligible list constitutes the ranking of candidates pursuant to the results of a competitive merit examination.

       Raymond Shea, president of the Uniformed Fire Fighters Association, testified that “there are some inequities, obviously, developed in promotional examinations and that unilateral changes by the employer [have] caused unrest among the work force in disputes with the employer. The difficulty comes over the fact that we have no redress to the grievance procedure when improprieties, alleged or certain, are found in the examination process.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor and Public Employees, Pt. 1, 1982 Sess., pp. 105-106.
      Michael Ferrucci, council member of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, testified that merit systems “are nothing more than either a system which involves favoritism, discrimination, nepotism, the whole host of matters that generally come about when the merit system results in some of the atrocious situations that have developed.” Id., pp. 134-35.

       Senator Clifton A. Leonhardt spoke in support of the act stating: “What this bill would do, in effect, is protect municipal employees against politics, against political intrusion in the sense that unilateral changes in these qualifications and relative weights could occur at a time of change of administration. So that by putting these factors into the collective bargaining process, we are guaranteeing, in effect, a nonpolitical resolution, taking it out of the purely political process . . . .” 25 S. Proc., Pt. 9, 1982 Sess., p. 2763.

       Senator Michael J. Skelley explained, as an example, how the amendment would impact the relative weight of each examination method—the second exception permitting collective bargaining. “What the bill does is it allows the municipality at the current time to establish any weight that will be given to a municipal exam. For instance, the municipality, may, in fact, give certain weights for oral, written and work experience. The municipality has the right to establish exactly what weight each situation under the exam will determine who, in fact, will receive the promotion. If, in fact, they change the procedure, either during or after a period of time, then you could collectively bargain the issue.” 25 S. Proc., Pt. 9, 1982 Sess., pp. 2758-59.

       Representative William A. Kiner explained the amendment when he moved for its adoption: “Mr. Speaker, once the procedures for an examination have been established, this amendment would prevent the towns from unilaterally changing only those 3 procedures that were listed in the amendment.” 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10, 1982 Sess., pp. 3082-83.

       See footnote 2.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Kevin Jon Weidenbacher v. Donna J. Duclos et al.
    (14942)
    Peters, C. J., and Callahan, Berdon, Norcott and Katz, Js.

      Argued February 10
    decision released July 4, 1995

      Richard G. Kent, with whom, on the brief, was Stuart M. Katz, for the appellant (petitioner).

      Louis RisCassi, for the appellees (respondents).
   Berdon, J.

This appeal raises an issue of first impression for this court: Whether a man who alleges that he is the biological father of a minor child has standing to establish his paternity when the mother, at the time of the child’s birth, was married to another man.

In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner, Kevin Jon Weidenbacher, seeks custody of, or, in the alternative, visitation with, a minor child, Grant Duelos. In his application for the writ, the petitioner alleges that he is Grant’s biological father. The respondents, Grant’s mother, Donna Duelos, and her former husband, Edward Duelos, deny that the petitioner is Grant’s biological father. The matter was referred to a state trial referee, Spallone, J., who appointed an attorney for the minor child. The trial court then raised, sua sponte, the question of whether the petitioner had standing to pursue his claim, and the respondents subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on this ground. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on the issue, the trial court concluded that the petitioner lacked standing and dismissed the action. The petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and we granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

For the sole purpose of determining whether the petitioner had standing, the following evidence was submitted to the trial court. In 1988, the petitioner and Donna (Antonson) Duelos were living together in New York City. In January or February of that year, Donna became pregnant. She was not dating anyone other than the petitioner at the time. In March or April, Donna told the petitioner that she was pregnant, and that he was the father of her unborn child.

That summer, in August, 1988, the petitioner and Donna ceased living together, although they continued to talk on the phone virtually every day. On October 14,1988, unbeknown to the petitioner, Donna married Edward Duelos. Two weeks later, on October 31,1988, Donna gave birth to Grant. Donna informed the petitioner a few days later that she had had the baby. She did not tell him, however, that she had gotten married.

Although Donna moved to Connecticut from New York, she and the petitioner kept in contact during the next few months. At some point, she told him that she had married Edward Duelos. In February, 1989, when Grant was four months old, Donna telephoned the petitioner and arranged a visit. Shortly thereafter, Donna and Grant traveled to New York to meet the petitioner. It was the first time that the petitioner met Grant.

Donna and Grant continued to visit the petitioner an average of twice a month, staying for “long weekends,” or three days at a time. They also talked on the phone almost daily. At some point, Donna told the petitioner that she had gotten divorced. In fact, however, she and Edward Duelos were only separated. The petitioner thereafter asked Donna on several occasions to marry him, but each time she refused. In June, 1990, Edward Duelos filed for divorce, and the petitioner became aware that the dissolution of the Duelos marriage had not yet taken place. On November 14, 1990, the marriage was dissolved. The decree of dissolution found that the couple “have one minor child, issue of the marriage of the parties, Grant E. Duelos,” and ordered Edward Duelos to pay $135 weekly in child support and to maintain health insurance for the child.

Beginning in early 1989, when Donna first visited the petitioner in New York after Grant’s birth, the relationship between the petitioner, Donna and Grant became more involved. The three took several vacations together, traveling to Montauk, New York; Newport, Rhode Island; Tucson, Arizona; Mexico; and Hawaii. Grant called the petitioner “Dad” and “Kevin,” and Donna told everyone they knew that the petitioner was Grant’s father. The petitioner paid more than $20,000 for day care, schooling and support of Grant. He also added Grant’s name to his own $6500 certificate of deposit.

On July 14,1992, however, the relationship between the petitioner and Donna broke down, and she terminated his visitation with Grant. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a paternity action in Probate Court, seeking to be declared Grant’s father. The Probate Court, however, determined that it had no jurisdiction over the matter. Concluding that General Statutes § 46b-172a limited the class of people who could file a paternity claim to “ ‘any person claiming to be the father of a child born out of wedlock,’ ” and further concluding that Grant “was not born out of wedlock” (emphasis in original), the Probate Court dismissed the petitioner’s claim on October 14, 1992.

The petitioner thereafter brought this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. The trial court, however, concluded that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue his claim. Citing that section of the second edition of American Jurisprudence entitled “Bastards,” the trial court concluded that allowing the petitioner “to bring the present action would be contrary to the strong public policy interest in protecting a minor child from the effects of illegitimacy, and in protecting the integrity of family relationships.” The trial court consequently dismissed the action, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, but on different grounds. Rather than focusing on the public policy ramifications of allowing the petitioner to contest the paternity of the child, as the trial court had done, the Appellate Court looked to the statutory scheme pertaining to paternity claims. After surveying these statutes, the Appellate Court determined that “[t]his state does not have a statute that authorizes an outsider to a marriage to initiate proceedings to establish his paternity of a child born during that marriage.” Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 34 Conn. App. 129, 137, 640 A.2d 147 (1994). Apparently deciding that the absence of such a statute was dispositive of the petitioner’s claim, the Appellate Court concluded that “[t]he petitioner’s interest in establishing his paternity of a child born during wedlock is not one that is protected by the statutes or case law of this state.” Id. The court held, therefore, that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue his claim. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

It is well settled in Connecticut law that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a proper procedural vehicle with which to challenge the custody of a child. As early as 1796, this court considered the merits of a habeas corpus petition brought by a father who sought custody of his daughter, who was living with her mother and grandfather. See Nickols v. Giles, 2 Root (Conn.) 461, 461-62 (1796). In 1822, Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift wrote that “[wjhere a wife is wrongfully detained from her husband, children from their parents, wards from their guardians, and servants from their masters, their restoration may be obtained by this writ . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 1 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1822) p. 568. This court continues to sanction the use of habeas corpus petitions in child custody cases. See, e.g., Nye v. Marcus, 198 Conn. 138, 141, 502 A.2d 869 (1985); McGaffin v. Roberts, 193 Conn. 393, 403, 479 A.2d 176 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S. Ct. 1747, 84 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1985); Pi v. Delta, 175 Conn. 527, 530, 400 A.2d 709 (1978); Kearney v. State, 174 Conn. 244, 249, 386 A.2d 223 (1978). “A habeas corpus petition concerning a minor child’s custody is an equitable proceeding in which the trial court is called upon to decide, in the exercise of its sound discretion, the custodial placement which will be best for the child. Nye v. Marcus, [supra, 141]; McGaffin v. Roberts, [supra, 403].” Evans v. Santoro, 6 Conn. App. 707, 709, 507 A.2d 1007 (1986); see Doe v. Doe, 163 Conn. 340, 342, 307 A.2d 166 (1972) (habeas relief provides “a means by which the Superior Court may determine what is best for the welfare of the child”).

Nevertheless, although the best interests of the child are paramount, we are required, in the first instance, to determine whether the person seeking the equitable remedy of habeas corpus has standing to initiate the action. “Standing focuses on whether a party is the proper party to request adjudication of the issues, rather than on the substantive rights of the aggrieved parties.” Nye v. Marcus, supra, 198 Conn. 141. “It is a basic principle of law that a plaintiff must have standing for the court to have jurisdiction. Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 501, 467 A.2d 674 (1983), quoting Hiland v. Ives, 28 Conn. Sup. 243, 245, 257 A.2d 822 (1966). Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 693, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991).

This court, recognizing that courts must be ever mindful of what is in the best interests of a child and of who should be allowed to intrude in the life of a child, has placed limits on the class of persons who have standing to bring a habeas petition for custody. In Doe v. Doe, supra, 163 Conn. 345, the court held that a person must allege parenthood or legal guardianship of a child born out of wedlock in order to have standing. In Nye v. Marcus, supra, 198 Conn. 143-44, where foster parents sought custody of their foster child, the court reiterated that “only parents or legal guardians of a child have standing to seek habeas corpus relief,” and explained that “parents” could include either biological or adoptive parents, but not foster parents. The petitioner in this case concedes, in accordance with these precedents, that in order to gain standing to pursue his habeas petition he must allege and prove that he is the biological father of Grant.

The respondents, however, contend that the petitioner cannot prove that he is the father of the child, and therefore cannot satisfy the standing requirements of Doe and Nye. Adopting the independent rationales of the Appellate Court and the trial court, the respondents contend that two barriers prevent the petitioner from proving his paternity for the purpose of acquiring standing in this case: (1) no Connecticut statute authorizes a putative father to bring an action to establish his paternity of a child who was born in wedlock; and (2) our common law “presumption of legitimacy,” which provides that a child born in wedlock is presumed to be the issue of the mother and her husband, cannot be rebutted by another man who claims to be the child’s biological father. Both of these arguments must be rejected.

A

The respondents initially claim that a putative father can only acquire standing to bring a habeas petition for custody of a child if there is a statutory basis for an action allowing him to prove paternity. Paternity matters are governed by chapter 815y of the General Statutes. The respondents first contend that § 46b-172a is the only statute within that chapter that might allow a putative father to bring such an action, and, unless the petitioner qualifies under that statute, he cannot prove paternity. The respondents-further contend that the petitioner fails to qualify under the terms of that statute. Therefore, according to the respondents, the petitioner cannot establish standing in this case.

We disagree with this analysis. It is true, of course, that chapter 815y sets forth classifications of persons who may bring a statutory cause of action for paternity. It also is true that § 46b-172a sets forth a statutory procedure that enables a putative father to challenge a child’s paternity. It does not necessarily follow, however, that unless the petitioner qualifies under the terms of that statute, he cannot demonstrate paternity for purposes of petitioning a court for a common law writ of habeas corpus for custody of a child. Indeed, several considerations convince us otherwise.

First, § 46b-172a (a) provides only that a putative father “may . . . file a claim for paternity with the court of probate for the district in which either the mother or the child resides, on forms provided by such court.” (Emphasis added.) It does not require him to undertake this procedure, at the exclusion of all other procedures, in order to establish his paternity. The legislature has demonstrated on several occasions that it knows how to construct such exclusive statutory schemes. See, e.g., General Statutes § 31-284 (a)(“[a]ll rights and claims between employer and employees . . . are abolished other than rights and claims given by [the Workers’ Compensation Act]”); General Statutes § 7-474 (e) (“ft]he procedure for the making of an agreement between the municipal employer and an employee organization provided by said sections shall be the exclusive method for making a valid agreement”); General Statutes § 33-454a (g) (“[t]he rights and remedies provided in this section [for indemnification of corporation members] shall be exclusive”). We deem the legislature’s failure to do so in this instance, therefore, to be the product of a conscious and deliberate choice not to create an exclusive statutory means of proving paternity.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the language of § 46b-172a expressly contemplates that a putative father may use different procedural vehicles to establish his paternity of a child. Subsection (h) states: “Failing perfection of parental rights as prescribed by this section, any person claiming to be the father of a child born out of wedlock (1) who has not been adjudicated the father of such child by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . shall cease to be a legal party in interest in any proceeding concerning the custody or welfare of the child, including but not limited to guardianship and adoption, unless he has shown a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child’s welfare.” (Emphasis added.)

The reference in subsection (h) to a failure to perfect a father’s parental rights “as prescribed by[§ U6b-172a]” clearly recognizes that there may be additional means that a putative father can utilize to prove his paternity of a child without resort to the statutory means for doing so. Indeed, the first nonstatutory method enumerated by this subsection is an adjudication of paternity by a court of competent jurisdiction. Furthermore, the final clause of the section—“unless he has shown a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child’s welfare”—indicates that the failure of a person to prove paternity under the terms of the statute is not conclusive of that person’s parental rights. See 22 S. Proc., Pt. 16, 1979 Sess., p. 5217, remarks of Senator Nancy L. Johnson (“a man who wishes to establish paternity rights after the [time limit allowed by § 46b-172a has expired] may do so but he must also demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child’s welfare” [emphasis added]).

Third, the legislative history of § 46b-172a is clear that the legislature did not intend this statutory procedure to supplant every other procedural vehicle that a putative father could employ to establish paternity. Representative Richard D. Tulisano, who reported the paternity bill out of the judiciary committee, informed the House of Representatives “that nothing in the act [subsequently codified as § 46b-172a] will preclude the establishment of paternity or parental rights [by] any other laws available [in] the State of Connecticut. That is to make sure that this is not thought to be the sole way that m individual can claim paternity in the State of Connecticut.” 22 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23, 1979 Sess., p. 8114. Likewise, Senator Alfred Santaniello, Jr., informed the Senate that the statute “would further establish the proceedings of paternity claims,” rather than replacing existing methods. (Emphasis added.) 22 S. Proc., Pt. 16, 1979 Sess., p. 5217.

Finally, a conclusion that the paternity statutes exclusively determine who may seek a writ of habeas corpus for custody of a child could serve to undermine the peculiarly equitable nature of that writ. In a habeas action for child custody, “[t]he jurisdiction exercised by the court rests on its inherent equitable powers and exerts the force of the state, as parens patria[e], for the protection of its infant ward. LaBella v. LaBella, 134 Conn. 312, 316, 57 A.2d 627 [1948]. Howarth v. Northcott, [152 Conn. 460, 464-65, 208 A.2d 540 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 182 Conn. 545, 438 A.2d 755 (1980)]; Doe v. Doe, supra, [163 Conn.] 342-43.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pi v. Delta, supra, 175 Conn. 530. The remedial scope and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus, which has historically been used as a means of litigating custody issues, would not be served by requiring compliance with the formalities embodied in the statutory method of proving paternity.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reached a similar result in C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. 679, 550 N.E.2d 365 (1990). In that case, the putative father brought an action in the Probate Court to adjudicate his paternity and to maintain a relationship with his child. Id., 680-81. The child’s mother moved to dismiss the action, contending that because the child had been born in wedlock, the putative father did not meet the statutory qualifications for bringing such an action. Id., 680. The Supreme Judicial Court pointed out, however, that the Probate Court always retained “general equity jurisdiction,” and that, “[i]n our view, [the statute] does not abrogate or modify a putative father’s right, as established by prior cases of this court, to bring a complaint to establish paternity under the general equity jurisdiction of the Probate Court.” Id., 682.

Like the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, we conclude that the statutory scheme pertaining to paternity actions, and specifically § 46b-172a, does not foreclose the Superior Court’s jurisdiction to determine whether a putative father is, in fact, the biological father of a child. Accordingly, we conclude that the statutory procedures do not pose a barrier to the petitioner’s habeas corpus action for the custody of the child.

B

The respondents argue in the alternative, however, that even if the statutory scheme is not a barrier to the petitioner’s action, longstanding precedent of this court prevents the petitioner from taking steps to establish his paternity of the child. They contend that Connecticut has long adhered to a “presumption of legitimacy,” which postulates that a child bom in wedlock is presumed to be a legitimate child of the mother and her husband. As against a claim of paternity brought by a putative father of a child born in wedlock, the respondents argue, this presumption becomes irrebuttable and functions as a substantive and conclusive rule of law. We disagree.

It is true, as the respondents point out, that Connecticut law has long provided that a child born in wedlock is presumed to be the legitimate child of the mother and her husband, even if conceived prior to the marriage. This court has applied this principle in cases dating back to at least the beginning of this century. See Grant v. Stimpson, 79 Conn. 617, 623, 66 A. 166 (1907) (“the law presumes that having been born in lawful wedlock she is his child”). More recent cases have continued to apply this rule. See, e.g., Holland v. Holland, 188 Conn. 354, 357, 449 A.2d 1010 (1982); Schaffer v. Schaffer, 187 Conn. 224, 226, 445 A.2d 589 (1982).

We have never held, however, that this presumption is irrebuttable and conclusive against a person claiming to be the biological father of the child. On the contrary, we have held that this presumption may be rebutted by a person who presents clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence that the mother’s husband is not the child’s natural father. See, e.g., Holland v. Holland, supra, 188 Conn. 357 (husband challenged own paternity); Schaffer v. Schaffer, supra, 187 Conn. 226 (same). Indeed, we have not limited or restricted in any way the class of persons who may present such proof and thereby overcome the presumption.

Nevertheless, the respondents contend that the trial court was correct in concluding that this presumption of legitimacy cannot be rebutted by one who claims to be the child’s biological father. The respondents argue that important public policy considerations, such as the “strong state interest in protecting the integrity of the family” and protection of the child’s status and reputation, compel this conclusion. We recognize that courts in other jurisdictions historically have taken this approach, which “mechanically den[ies] biological fathers standing to assert paternity whenever a marital presumption of paternity already exists.” Note, “Sex, Lies and Genetic Tests: Challenging the Marital Presumption of Paternity Under the Minnesota Parentage Act,” 78 Minn. L. Rev. 1013, 1020 (1994); see, e.g., Ex Parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406, 411 (Ala. 1989); B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368, 375 (N.D. 1993). In effect, however, the respondents invite this court to take this position for the first time, thereby establishing a new rule of law in Connecticut. For several reasons, we decline to do so.

The reasons for which the irrebuttable quality of this presumption originally sprang into existence do not justify its application today. “Primarily, two factors motivated its adoption. First, the harsh treatment of illegitimate children motivated the state to avoid attaching illegitimate status to children. Second, the lack of a scientifically reliable method of determining paternity was a logical reason for presuming the husband’s paternity.” Note, “The Substantial Relationship Test: The Putative Father Gains Standing to Rebut the Presumption of Legitimacy—C.C. v. A.B.,” 14 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 79, 80-81 (1992). Today, however, “[society has come to recognize that discrimination against illegitimate children is not justified.” C.C. v. A.B., supra, 406 Mass. 685. The social stigma of being branded illegitimate, if indeed it remains at all, no longer carries the same sting that it once did. The United States Supreme Court, moreover, has held that illegitimate children cannot be denied equal protection of the law. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1977) (holding unconstitutional intestacy statute that permitted child born out of wedlock to inherit only from his or her mother). Furthermore, modern scientific tests can determine, with nearly perfect accuracy, who is the true biological father of a child. Palomba v. Gray, 208 Conn. 21, 36-37, 543 A.2d 1331 (1988) (Shea, J., concurring) (“[t]he use of these new techniques has raised to such a high level the ability of the scientific community to identify the father of a child whose paternity is disputed that the resolution of such an important issue should no longer be had without such scientific testimony”). The original reasons which justified the adoption of the rule are no longer valid.

Moreover, although the respondents also contend that the integrity of the family unit requires that a putative father not be allowed to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, we cannot say that in all circumstances this interest inevitably will outweigh the right of a biological father to maintain a relationship with his child. This case presents the perfect example. The mother, Donna, was living with the petitioner at the time she became pregnant with Grant. She was nine months pregnant at the time she married Edward Duelos. We may assume that Edward Duelos knew at the time he married Donna that he was not the biological father of her child. The marriage of Edward and Donna Duelos is now dissolved. In regard to the relationship between these two individuals, therefore, there is no “family integrity” left to be maintained. On the other side of the coin, however, the petitioner alleges that he is the natural father of Grant, has spent vacations and long weekends with Grant, and has expended a significant amount of his resources for Grant’s support. Obviously, cases do exist in which the interest in “family integrity” must yield to a man’s interest in maintaining a relationship with the person he believes to be his child. A blanket rule that holds that in all cases the interest of the former must defeat the interest of the latter, therefore, is untenable. More importantly, such an irrebuttable presumption may in any given case be contrary to the well-being of the child, whose best interests might be served by allowing him to experience the love and companionship of his biological father.

Furthermore, in a case such as this, a biological father has a cognizable constitutional right to maintain a relationship with his child. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1983) (holding that unwed father who demonstrates “a full commitment to the responsibility of parenthood,” by coming forward to participate in child’s rearing, has substantive due process interest in personal contact with child). Although the United States Supreme Court also has held that an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy does not offend the United States constitution; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1989); our respect for this constitutional right discourages us from adopting a rule that precludes a putative father, in any and all circumstances, from proving his paternity of a child. Indeed, to hold that a putative father’s right to maintain a relationship with his child must hinge solely on the mother’s marital status would be to “differentiate solely on the basis of formal ties.” Note, “Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test,” 88 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 375 (1988).

Finally, other jurisdictions have moved away from the irrebuttable presumption of paternity. Approximately two-thirds of the states, either by statute or by judicial interpretation, now give putative fathers a right to rebut the presumption that a child born in wedlock is the issue of the marriage. Id., pp. 373-74; see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-126 (1) (e) (IV) (Cum. Sup. 1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 805 (a) (Sup. 1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-6-107 (1) (1993); Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 199, 812 P.2d 1014 (1990), rev. dismissed, 169 Ariz. 477, 820 P.2d 643 (1991); C.C. v. A.B., supra, 406 Mass. 686; McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 312, 738 P.2d 254 (1987).

In sum, there is no persuasive reason today to deny the putative father of a child bom in wedlock the opportunity to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. Accordingly, we hold that the mere fact that a child was born while the mother was married is not a per se bar that prevents a man other than her husband from establishing standing to bring an action for a writ of habeas corpus for custody of or visitation with a minor child.

II

Our holding that the presumption of legitimacy may in certain instances be rebutted by a putative father does not end our analysis of the standing issue. Ordinarily, a person establishes standing merely by alleging that he has been injured or that he possesses “arguably” protected interests. Connecticut Assn. of Boards of Education, Inc. v. Shedd, 197 Conn. 554, 557 n.1, 499 A.2d 797 (1985). In actions that call into question the paternity of a child born in wedlock, however, this minimal threshold is inappropriate. Such a standard “could become a blanket license for any person to disrupt long-fostered family relationships by claiming to be the parent of a child.” McDaniels v. Carlson, supra, 108 Wash. 2d 310. A putative father, therefore, must demonstrate something more before he can acquire standing to rebut the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock.

Courts in other states that have considered this issue have taken two approaches. Under the first approach, which has been embraced most notably by courts in Washington, Kansas and Arizona, the trial court focuses primarily on the child and the child’s best interests in determining whether to allow the action to proceed. “[T]he court must balance the interests of all parties involved, while keeping in mind that the child’s interests are paramount.” Id., 312; see Ban v. Quigley, supra, 168 Ariz. 199; In re Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 602, 783 P.2d 331 (1989). “In determining whether it is in the child’s best interests to allow a paternity action by one outside the present family, the trial court should consider the stability of the present home environment, the existence or lack thereof of an ongoing family unit, the extent to which uncertainty of parentage already exists in the child’s mind, and any other factors which may be relevant in assessing the potential benefit or detriment to the child. ... A court must reach this conclusion independently based on the facts in the record and the recommendations of the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of the child.” McDaniels v. Carlson, supra, 108 Wash. 2d 312-13.

Under the second approach, which has been embraced most notably by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the court must focus primarily on the putative father and whether he has developed a “substantial parent-child relationship” with the child. “The court must look at the relationship as a whole and consider emotional bonds, economic support, custody of the child, the extent of personal association, the commitment of the putative father to attending the child’s needs, the consistency of the putative father’s expressed interest, the child’s name, the names listed on the birth certificate, and any other factors which bear on the nature of the alleged parent-child relationship.” C.C. v. A.B., supra, 406 Mass. 690.

We recognize that each of these tests reflects a judicial attempt to strike a careful balance between the significant, and sometimes competing, interests of the child, the child’s family and the putative father. We are mindful, for example, of the strong interests that remain even today in preserving the legitimacy of the child. Similarly, we acknowledge the importance of preserving the integrity of the family unit and the right of privacy of both the child and other family members. Further, we are respectful of the biological father’s right to have contact with his child.

Nevertheless, we are reluctant to adopt either of these approaches to the exclusion of the other, or to attempt to formulate our own definitive list of the elements that will establish legal standing in such a case. Every paternity action revolves around its own unique set of facts and personal relationships, and a trial court must have flexibility to weigh the multiplicity of competing interests that may hang in the balance. This is particularly true in paternity actions that call into question the paternity of a child who was born in wedlock. Such sensitive and personal affairs are no place for an immutable legal standard that is bordered by bright lines. Indeed, we have recognized that it is preferable to leave “the delicate and difficult process of fact-finding in family matters to flexible, individualized adjudication of the particular facts of each case without the constraint of objective guidelines.” Seymour v. Seymour, 180 Conn. 705, 710, 433 A.2d 1005 (1980). Whether a putative father has a special interest sufficient to enable him to bring a paternity action “is, in its nature, a fact-based question.” C.C. v. A.B., supra, 406 Mass. 690. “Not all putative fathers and not all families are similarly situated; thus their . . . interests cannot be protected by a blanket [rule of law] that treats all putative fathers alike.” Note, supra, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 375.

Accordingly, we conclude that a man’s mere assertion that he is the biological father, without more, is insufficient to confer standing to challenge the paternity of a child born in wedlock. Rather, we hold that a putative father of such a child must offer proof, at a preliminary evidentiary hearing devoted to standing, that he is entitled to set in motion the judicial machinery to determine whether he is the biological father of the child. This proof may include evidence of any of the factors enumerated in the two approaches discussed above, or of any other factors not so enumerated that are nevertheless relevant to his claim. In deciding whether the putative father has standing, the trial court, on the basis of all the evidence before it, must determine whether the putative father has established that his interests and the best interests of the child outweigh those of the marital family unit.

We conclude that under this test, the petitioner in this case has established standing to proceed. According to uncontroverted evidence introduced before the trial court, the petitioner was living with Donna Duelos at the time the child, Grant, was conceived. Donna was not married to Edward Duelos at this time, and in fact only married him two weeks before she gave birth. Donna, Grant and the petitioner maintained a significant relationship beginning shortly after Grant’s birth and continuing for several years, and including several vacations in which the three traveled together, until Donna unilaterally terminated the petitioner’s visitation rights. Grant apparently knows the petitioner in the role of a parent, calling him “Dad,” and the petitioner has expended substantial amounts of money on Grant. Finally, the marriage of Donna and Edward Duelos is now dissolved. This evidence is more than sufficient to confer standing on the petitioner to pursue his habeas claim.

III

We emphasize that we do not take any position with respect to the fitness of the petitioner to gain custody of, or to obtain visitation with, the child. We hold only that the petitioner has standing to pursue his habeas corpus action for this purpose. In accordance with our precedents, the petitioner has a twofold task ahead. First, he must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is the biological father of Grant. Second, the petitioner must prove to the trial court that it is in the best interests of Grant that he be awarded custody or visitation. “The trial court’s ultimate decision whether to grant relief sought by the [petitioner] must be made only after a careful evaluation of all the relevant evidence presented and with primary concern for the welfare of the [child] involved.” Pi v. Delta, supra, 175 Conn. 534. “What is best for the welfare of the child is still the ultimate question to be decided by the trial court.” Doe v. Doe, supra, 163 Conn. 345.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with direction to remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the previous paragraph of this opinion.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       For purposes of this opinion only, when we refer to a child born in wedlock, we refer to a child who was born during the time that the mother was married, regardless of whether her husband was the biological father of the child. Likewise, when we refer to a child born out of wedlock, we mean a child whose mother was unmarried at the time of the child’s birth. We emphasize that in using these phrases, we are not interpreting the meaning of the phrase “child born out of wedlock” as it appears in General Statutes § 46b-172a or in any other Connecticut statute. See footnotes 10 and 11.

       In order to protect the privacy of Grant, we ordinarily would use fictitious names in referring to the parties in this child custody ease. Because the parties have not requested us to do so, and because the Appellate Court’s published opinion disclosed their names, we do not do so in this case.

       We agree with the trial court’s decision to appoint an independent attorney to represent the minor child in this case. In Nye v. Marcus, 198 Conn. 138, 146, 502 A.2d 869 (1985), this court indicated that during a hearing on the issue of standing the appointment of an attorney for the child is discretionary. We believe that in a case such as this, which would inevitably require an evidentiary hearing on standing that would implicate the integrity of the marital family unit and the privacy rights of the individuals involved, “the better course is to appoint independent counsel” for the child. Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 284, 440 A.2d 899 (1981). In this case, for example, the relationship between the child and the petitioner, who claims to be the child’s biological father, may be of particular importance.

       The question of standing implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, as such, may be raised at any time during the proceedings. “If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause. Housing Authority v. Local 1161, 1 Conn. App. 154, 157, 468 A.2d 1251, cert. denied, 192 Conn. 802, 471 A.2d 244 (1984). Further, the court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any [portion of the] appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear. Sasso v. Aleshin, 197 Conn. 87, 89, 495 A.2d 1066 (1985).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 717-18, 629 A.2d 333 (1993); see Daley v. Hartford, 215 Conn. 14, 27-28, 574 A.2d 194, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982, 111 S. Ct. 573, 112 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1990) (“the question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time”).

        “When issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court’s jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 695-96, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991).

        Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 34 Conn. App. 129, 640 A.2d 147 (1994).

       We certified the following issue: “Does a putative father have standing to bring a habeas corpus action to establish his paternity of a minor child that is born in wedlock?” Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 230 Conn. 901, 644 A.2d 917 (1994).

       Photographs of the petitioner, Donna and Grant on some of the trips were introduced into evidence in the trial court.

       Earlier, the petitioner had filed a similar action in Superior Court. Apparently concluding, however, that General Statutes § 46b-172a allowed him to file such an action only in the Probate Court, the petitioner withdrew his Superior Court action on July 13, 1992. See Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 34 Conn. App. 129, 131, 640 A.2d 147 (1994). The petitioner also moved to intervene as a third party in the Duclos dissolution action, which had gone to judgment two years earlier, on November 14,1990. The petitioner withdrew that motion to intervene on November 30, 1992.

       General Statutes § 46b-172a provides: “(a) Any person claiming to be the father of a child born out of wedlock may at any time but no later than sixty days after the date of notice under section 45a-716, file a claim for paternity with the court of probate for the district in which either the mother or the child resides, on forms provided by such court. The claim shall contain the claimant’s name and address, the name and last-known address of the mother and the month and year of the birth or expected birth of the child. Within five days after the filing of a claim for paternity, the judge of the court of probate shall cause a certified copy of such claim to be mailed by certified mail to (1) the vital records section of the department of public health and addiction services and (2) to the mother or prospective mother of such child at the last-known address shown on the claim for paternity. The claim for paternity shall be admissible in any action for paternity under section 46b-160, and shall estop the claimant from denying his paternity of such child and shall contain language that he acknowledges liability for contribution to the support and education of the child after its birth and for contribution to the pregnancy-related medical expenses of the mother.
      “(b) If a claim for paternity is filed by the father of any minor child born out of wedlock, the court of probate shall schedule a hearing on such claim, send notice of the hearing to all parties involved and proceed accordingly.
      “(c) The child shall be made a party to the action. Said child shall be represented by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court in accordance with section 45a-708. Payment shall be made in accordance with such section from the Probate Court Administration Fund.
      “(d) In the event that the mother or the claimant father is a minor, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent him or her in accordance with the provisions of section 45a-708. Payment shall be made in accordance with said section from the Probate Court Administration Fund.
      “(e) Upon the motion of the putative father, the mother, or his or her counsel, or the judge of probate having jurisdiction over such application, filed not later than three days prior to any hearing scheduled on such claim, the probate court administrator shall appoint a three-judge court from among the several judges of probate to hear such claim. Such three-judge court shall consist of at least one judge who is an attorney-at-law admitted to practice in this state. The judge of the court of probate having jurisdiction over such application under the provisions of this section shall be a member, provided such judge may disqualify himself in which case all three members of such court shall be appointed by the probate court administrator. Such three-judge court when convened shall have all the powers and duties set forth under sections 17a-75 to 17a-83, inclusive, 17a-450 to 17a-484, inclusive, 17a-495 to 17a-528, inclusive, 17a-540 to 17a-550, inclusive, 17a-560 to 17a-576, inclusive, and 17a-615 to 17a-618, inclusive, and shall be subject to all of the provisions of law as if it were a single-judge court. The judges of such court shall designate a chief judge from among their members. All records for any case before the three-judge court shall be maintained in the court of probate having jurisdiction over the matter as if the three-judge court had not been appointed.
      “(f) By filing a claim under this section, the putative father submits to the jurisdiction of the court of probate, and waives his right to a jury trial.
      “(g) Once alleged parental rights of the father have been adjudicated in his favor under subsection (b) of this section, or acknowledged as provided for under section 46b-172, his rights and responsibilities shall be equivalent to those of the mother, including those rights defined under section 45a-606. Thereafter, disputes involving custody, visitation or support shall be transferred to the superior court under chapter 815j, except that the probate court may enter a temporary order for custody, visitation or support until an order is entered by the superior court.
      “(h) Failing perfection of parental rights as prescribed by this section, any person claiming to be the father of a child bom out of wedlock (1) who has not been adjudicated the father of such child by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (2) who has not acknowledged in writing that he is the father of such child, or (3) who has not contributed regularly to the support of such child or (4) whose name does not appear on the birth certificate shall cease to be a legal party in interest in any proceeding concerning the custody or welfare of the child, including but not limited to guardianship and adoption, unless he has shown a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child’s welfare.
      “(i) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, after the death of the father of a child bom out of wedlock, a party deemed by the court to have a sufficient interest may file a claim for paternity on behalf of such father with the probate court for the district in which either the putative father resided or the party filing the claim resides. If a claim for paternity is filed pursuant to this subsection, the court of probate shall schedule a hearing on such claim, send notice of the hearing to all parties involved and proceed accordingly.”

       We do not decide in this appeal whether the Probate Court was correct in concluding that Grant was not “a child bom out of wedlock” for purposes of § 46b-172a. We therefore express no opinion as to whether “bom out of wedlock,” as that phrase appears in § 46b-172a, means only that the child’s mother and biological father were not married to each other. See 22 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23,1979 Sess., p. 8117, remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano (noting that bill would primarily protect “rights of the unwed father”); Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 5,1979 Sess., p. 1517, remarks of Angela Grant, staff attorney for the Connecticut law revision commission (noting that when a child is bom “in wedlock,” “it’s much simpler to know who the parents are”); id., p. 1522, remarks of Probate Court administrator Glenn Knierim (indicating that this bill addressed “[putative] father’s rights”); see also Johnson v. Studley-Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 1058, 812 P.2d 1216 (1991) (“[m]any jurisdictions have interpreted the phrase ‘child bom out of wedlock’ to mean either a child bom to an unmarried mother or a child bom to a married woman but fathered by a man other than the mother’s husband” [emphasis in original]); In re Legitimation of Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 418, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985) (“Our research indicates that the phrase, ‘bom out of wedlock,’ should refer ‘to the status of the parents of the child in relation to each other.’ ... A child born to a married woman, but begotten by one other than her husband, is a child bom out of wedlock’. . . .’’[Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).

       See 10 Am. Jur. 2d 850, Bastards § 10 (1963).

       The trial court relied on a Superior Court case, Forestiere v. Doyle, 30 Conn. Sup. 284, 286, 310 A.2d 607 (1973), for the proposition that, to have standing, the petitioner needed to have “a special interest” and “that the essential elements of such interest are parenthood, cohabitation and support.” The trial court did not consider whether Pi v. Delta, 175 Conn. 527, 400 A.2d 709 (1978), cast doubt on the holding in Forestiere. See Pi v. Delta, supra, 531 (noting that recent trends in the law do “not compel us to affirm the action of the trial court in the present case by concluding that standing is acquired only when a period of cohabitation and support is alleged in conjunction with the allegation of fatherhood”).

       The trial court noted that the petitioner could seek visitation rights with Grant pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-59, which allows “any person” to seek visitation. The petitioner filed such an action on May 19,1993, and that action is pending in the Superior Court.

       The Appellate Court also noted that the petitioner had failed to allege that he had played a significant part in the raising of the child or that the present custodian, Donna Duclos, was unfit. Weidenbacher v. Duclos, supra, 34 Conn. App. 135. As we indicate in the text of this opinion, we do not consider any of these factors to be dispositive of the petitioner’s claim.

       General Statutes § 52-466 (f), which furnishes the procedural mechanism for a party to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, provides: “A foster parent or an approved adoptive parent shall have standing to make application for a writ of habeas corpus regarding the custody of a child currently or recently in his care for a continuous period of not less than ninety days in the case of a child under three years of age at the time of such application and not less than one hundred eighty days in the case of any other child.”

       Although not all of these examples hold true today, our current statutes, at least implicitly, recognize the availability of'a petition for habeas corpus in child custody matters. General Statutes § 46b-l, which defines “family relations matters,” provides that “[m]atters within the jurisdiction of the superior court deemed to be family relations matters shall be matters affecting or involving ... (8) habeas corpus and other proceedings to determine the custody and visitation of children . . . See also General Statutes § 52-466 (f); footnote 16.

       The legislature, in response to this court’s holding in Nye, has since enacted a statute that provides certain qualifying foster parents with standing to bring a habeas corpus petition for custody. See General Statutes § 52-466 (f); footnote 16.

       See generally note, “The Substantial Relationship Test: The Putative Father Gains Standing to Rebut the Presumption of Legitimacy—C.C. v. A.B.,” 14 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 79 (1992). This presumption also has been referred to as the marital presumption. See generally note, “Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test,” 88 Colum. L. Rev. 369 (1988).

       Although we refer to this argument as that of the respondents, our comments apply equally to the holding of the Appellate Court, since the respondents have essentially adopted that court’s analysis of the issue.

       General Statutes § 46b-160 (a), for example, allows the mother of the child to bring such an action. That statute provides in pertinent part: “Proceedings to establish paternity of a child born or conceived out of lawful wedlock, including one bom to, or conceived by, a married woman but begotten by a man other than her husband, shall be commenced by the service on the putative father of a verified petition of the mother or expectant mother . . . .” In addition, General Statutes § 46b-162 provides that “[t]he state or any town interested in the support of a child born out of wedlock may, if the mother neglects to bring such petition, institute such proceedings against the person accused of begetting the child, and may take up and pursue any petition commenced by the mother for the maintenance of the child, if she fails to prosecute to final judgment.”
      A child may also bring such an action. General Statutes § 46b-55 (b) provides: “If any child bom during a marriage, which is terminated by a divorce decree or decree of dissolution of marriage, is found not to be issue of such marriage, the child or his representative may bring an action in the superior court to establish the paternity of the child within one year after the date of the judgment of divorce or decree of dissolution of the marriage of his natural mother, notwithstanding the provisions of section 46b-160.”
      Finally, a husband may disavow paternity of a child during dissolution or divorce proceedings. See General Statutes § 46b-45a.

       Because we find fault with the first contention of the respondents, we do not decide whether the petitioner could assert a statutory claim for paternity under § 46b-172a. See footnotes 10 and 11.

       Representative Tulisano was referring specifically to a proposed amendment to the bill that read: “Nothing in this act shall preclude the establishment of paternity or parental rights through other means available under the laws of this state.” 22 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23, 1979 Sess., p. 8116. This amendment was passed unanimously by the House of Representatives. Id., p. 8122. The language of the amendment ultimately was replaced by the language that now appears in § 46b-172a (h), which we have quoted in the text of this opinion. Representative Tulisano explained that the addition of the new subsection, which specifically refers to other, nonstatutory means of ascertaining paternity, including adjudications by courts of competent jurisdiction, made the previous amendment “somewhat superfluous and not needed.” 22 H.R. Proc., Pt. 35, 1979 Sess., pp. 12453-54. We interpret these remarks as indicating that the new subsection (h) embodies the intention of the legislature that § 46b-172a is not the sole means of proving paternity.

       Connecticut intestacy statutes do not discriminate between children bom in wedlock or out of wedlock. General Statutes § 45a-438 (b) (2) provides in pertinent part: “A child bom out of wedlock shall inherit from (A) his or her mother and (B) his or her father, provided (i) such father has been adjudicated the father of such child by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (ii) the father has acknowledged under oath in writing to be the father of such child, or (iii) paternity is established by the probate court, after the death of either the father or the child, by clear and convincing evidence that the father has acknowledged in writing that he is the father of the child and has openly treated the child as his.” Section 45a-438 (c) further provides that “[flor the purposes of this section (1) issue shall include children bom out of wedlock and the issue of such children provided both the child bom out of wedlock and any of such issue qualify for inheritance under this section; (2) legal representatives shall include legal representatives of children bpm out of wedlock, provided both the child bom out of wedlock through whom such legal representatives inherit and the legal representatives qualify for inheritance under this section.”

       One type of blood test, the human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing test, can determine paternity with a rate of 98 percent probability. Fingerprinting with deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, can positively identify a person’s father. Note, supra, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1015 n.12. Several Connecticut paternity cases have focused on the accuracy of these tests. See generally State v. Skipper, 228 Conn. 610, 637 A.2d 1101 (1994) (HLA and DNA tests); Miller v. Kirshner, 225 Conn.185, 621 A.2d 1326 (1993) (HLA tests); Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16, 513 A.2d 660 (1986) (HLA tests). General Statutes § 46b-168 (a) allows a court or family support magistrate to order DNA tests when the paternity of a child is in issue.

       The respondents also argue that because the petitioner was aware of the dissolution action between the respondents, and because the dissolution decree included a finding that Grant was the issue of the marriage, the petitioner now is collaterally estopped from claiming that he is Grant’s biological father. The Washington Supreme Court rejected such a claim on the basis of similar facts in McDaniels v. Carlson, supra, 108 Wash. 2d 299. “The issue of paternity was never actually litigated in the dissolution proceedings; it was merely presumed upon the parties’ stipulations. Moreover, paternity was only collateral to the real issues in controversy: custody, support, and visitation rights. Therefore, there was no identity of issues between the paternity finding in the prior dissolution case and the present cause of action. . . . [The putative father] did not testify as a witness or participate whatsoever in the dissolution case. Furthermore, the facts do not establish that [the] appellant was fully aware of the character of the dissolution proceeding, i.e., that it would result in a conclusive paternity determination.” Id., 306-307. For these same reasons, we find that this claim of the respondents is without merit.

       We stress, however, that not every putative father must present this quantity or type of evidence in order for the trial court to conclude that he has standing to pursue his paternity claim.