author: Shea, J.

text:
    William Rado, Jr. v. Board of Education of the Borough of Naugatuck
    (14057)
    Peters, C. J., Shea, Callahan, Glass and Borden, Js.

      Argued September 27—
    decision released December 4, 1990

      William J. Dolan, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Thomas N. Sullivan, for the appellee (defendant).
   Shea, J.

The plaintiff, William Rado, Jr., a tenured teacher, appealed, pursuant to General Statutes § 10-151 (f), from the decision of the defendant board of education terminating his employment as a physical education teacher and director of athletics at the Naugatuck High School. The trial court affirmed the decision of the board and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff has appealed from that judgment, claiming three grounds for reversal: (1) certain evidence of the plaintiffs misconduct was barred by General Statutes § 54-142a (a), concerning the erasure of criminal records, and was improperly relied upon by the court; (2) the remaining evidence of misconduct was insufficient to justify the discharge of a tenured teacher for cause pursuant to General Statutes § 10-151 (d); and (3) four members of the board were biased against the plaintiff and, as his motion for disqualification requested, should not have participated in the proceedings against him. We affirm the judgment.

In 1985, the plaintiff was suspended with pay from his positions as a physical education teacher and athletic director at the Naugatuck High School. This action followed his arrest on three counts of eavesdropping in violation of General Statutes § 53a-189, a class D felony, which imposes criminal liability when a person “unlawfully engages in wiretapping or mechanical overhearing of a conversation.” These charges were based upon allegations that the plaintiff had intercepted telephone calls involving other personnel employed at the high school.

The plaintiff was tried for the crimes of which he was accused and was acquitted. Following this disposition, the board on March 27, 1987, voted to consider terminating the plaintiff in accordance with the procedure set forth in § 10-151 (d). After being notified of this decision, the plaintiff filed a request for “a statement in writing of the reasons therefor.” In compliance with § 10-151 (d), the board furnished such a statement, indicating that it was relying upon “moral misconduct” and “other due and sufficient cause,” two of the reasons for termination of a tenured teacher specified by § 10-151 (d). The statement based both of these grounds upon detailed factual allegations that the plaintiff had obtained a recording of a private telephone conversation of a teacher at the high school, had intercepted private telephone conversations at the high school and had disclosed the contents of these conversations to others.

Pursuant to the plaintiffs request for a hearing, an impartial panel was appointed, which conducted the hearing and filed a report of its findings and recommendations on August 16, 1988. The panel concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a recommendation for termination of the plaintiff if certain evidence, which formed the basis for its contingent findings, could be relied upon. A majority of the panel, however, considered this evidence to be barred by the Erasure Act, § 54-142a. Without such evidence, the panel unanimously decided that there was insufficient basis for termination of the plaintiffs employment. Accordingly, a majority of the panel recommended his reinstatement.

Prior to the meeting of the board to act upon the report of the panel, the plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify four members of the board for bias or for a conflict of interests. On August 29,1988, when the board met to consider the report, the plaintiff argued his motion, which was denied. At the meeting, by a vote of eight to one, in which the four challenged members participated, the board terminated the employment of the plaintiff. In a written decision issued afterward, the board, in contrast to the panel, concluded that the findings made by the panel based upon evidence not affected by its ruling concerning the Erasure Act were sufficient to prove the grounds for termination relied upon, “moral misconduct” and “other due and sufficient cause,” as specified in § 10-151 (d). The board also concluded that a second cause for termination upon the same grounds was independently supported by the contingent findings of the panel relating to the evidence that the plaintiff had tampered with the school telephone system for the purpose of eavesdropping, which a majority of the panel had ruled should not be relied upon because of the Erasure Act.

In considering the plaintiffs appeal from the board’s decision terminating his employment, the trial court held, with respect to the claim of disqualification, that the plaintiff had “not shown the existence of personal interests that could reasonably be interpreted as having an improper influence on the board members’ duty to base their decisions on the factual findings certified by the panel.” The court also declared that the board “could reasonably have concluded that spreading a teacher’s personal conversation among other staff members was moral misconduct” and that playing a tape recording of a teacher’s telephone conversation “in the presence of other teachers, particularly those in the same department, constituted other due and sufficient cause.” The findings of the panel relating to this incident relied upon by the court did not involve any of the evidence that involved the applicability of the Erasure Act. The court concluded further that the Erasure Act did not preclude reliance upon the contingent findings of the panel relating to tampering with the telephone system and affirmed the board’s view that these findings constituted an adequate independent basis for termination.

Because we agree with the trial court that the Erasure Act did not preclude the use of the evidence that the plaintiff had tampered with the telephone system at the high school for the purpose of listening to private conversations of other school personnel, we need not decide whether the board’s decision to discharge the plaintiff would be adequately supported without such evidence. We conclude that the contingent findings of the panel, which are based upon that evidence, together with the findings made from the remaining evidence sufficiently establish the statutory grounds for termination relied upon by the board. Thus, we affirm the acceptance by both the board and the trial court of all the facts found by the panel, rejecting only the conclusion of the panel that the use of its contingent findings was barred by the Erasure Act. We also find sufficient support in the testimony before the trial court for its conclusion that none of the board members challenged were disqualified for bias or for a conflict of interests.

I

The evidence on which the panel’s contingent findings were based consisted largely of the testimony of an inspector from the office of the chief state’s attorney, Thomas Brady, who investigated the eavesdropping charges against the plaintiff, and of two telephone company employees who assisted Brady. The panel unanimously characterized this evidence as tending “to show that Mr. Rado deliberately created a system enabling him to overhear telephone conversations,” but held that the remaining evidence would not alone support such a finding.

Before testifying, Brady had refreshed his recollection from a personal notebook in which he had recorded his observations and other information acquired during his investigation at the high school. The two employees of the telephone company testified concerning their observations of alterations made on the school telephone system since it had been installed, which rendered the privacy devices ineffective. These two witnesses had not examined Brady’s notes or any police or prosecution records.

A majority of the panel concluded that the Erasure Act required exclusion or suppression of the testimony of Brady and the two telephone company employees as well as the physical evidence they had discovered, items of telephone equipment that had been altered. Nevertheless, recognizing that this ruling would be subject to review, the panel unanimously made contingent findings of fact indicating that the plaintiff had intentionally tampered with the telephone system for the purpose of overhearing conversations of others using the school telephones.

When a person is found not guilty of a criminal offense or the charge is dismissed, § 54-142a (a) of our Erasure Act requires that “all police and court records and records of any state’s attorney pertaining to such charge shall be erased . . . .’’In State v. Morowitz, 200 Conn. 440, 450, 512 A.2d 175 (1986), we indicated our disinclination “to extend the strictures of § 54-142a beyond the classes of documents and individuals denominated therein” and held that the testimony of the victim of a crime, the prosecution of which had terminated in a dismissal and resulting erasure, was not barred in a subsequent criminal proceeding. We had previously ruled that the term “records” in the Erasure Act did not include photographs obtained by the police at the time of the arrest of a person when the prosecution had later been dismissed, thus triggering erasure. State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 496-97, 472 A.2d 775 (1984). Similarly, we have refused to regard the phrase “court records” as encompassing prison records maintained by the department of correction, after a defendant had been pardoned and was thus entitled to erasure. Doe v. Manson, 183 Conn. 183, 188, 438 A.2d 859 (1981).

The panel recognized that the Erasure Act did not bar the testimony of school employees concerning their observations of events at the school. Because Brady and the two telephone company employees had been called in to investigate the crime charged against the plaintiff and had gained their knowledge wholly as a result of that endeavor, a majority of the panel decided, however, that the Erasure Act required suppression of their testimony as well as the physical evidence they had discovered. We agree with the trial court that this distinction between those whose observations concerning a crime have resulted from an investigation and other witnesses is “unsupportable.” The Erasure Act was not intended to obliterate memory or to exclude any testimony not shown to have been derived from erased records. See Rawling v. New Haven, 206 Conn. 100, 109, 537 A.2d 439 (1988); State v. Morowitz, supra, 453 (Shea, J., concurring).

The plaintiff does not claim that the two telephone company employees used any record subject to erasure in testifying before the panel. Accordingly, their testimony was plainly admissible. With respect to Brady, we conclude that his notebook, in which he had recorded certain information obtained during his investigation for later use in preparing the reports he filed, was not a police record, because he was under no duty to make or preserve this record of his field observations. Although § 54-142a (a) subjects to erasure “all police and court records and records of any state’s attorney,” its reference to police records is more precisely delineated by § 54-142a (e), which directs “any person charged with retention and control of such records in the records center of . . . any law enforcement agency having information contained in such erased records” not to “disclose to anyone information pertaining to any charge erased . . . and such . . . person charged with the retention and control of such records shall forward a notice of such erasure to any law enforcement agency to which he knows information concerning the arrest has been disseminated and such disseminated information shall be erased from the records of such law enforcement agency. . . .’’(Emphasis added.) The personal notebook of Brady was not a record of a law enforcement agency maintained in its records center, nor is there any indication that he was a “person charged with the retention and control of such records in the records center” of any such agency. We conclude, therefore, that Brady’s notebook was not subject to the erasure statute and that his use of it to refresh his recollection before he testified did not require exclusion of his testimony any more than if he had used a newspaper clipping for that purpose.

We agree with the trial court, therefore, that the contingent findings made by the panel, indicating that the plaintiff had intentionally tampered with the school telephone system, were properly relied upon by the board in deciding to terminate the plaintiff’s employment contract.

II

The claim of the plaintiff that the factual findings were insufficient to justify his discharge is based on the premise that the contingent findings of the panel regarding telephone tampering must be disregarded because of the Erasure Act. Our rejection of this premise greatly weakens the plaintiff’s argument. The panel agreed with the plaintiff that, without the evidence of tampering, the misconduct found indicated only “bad judgment, bad taste and bad manners” and “is not the kind of conduct which should lead to the forfeiture of a teaching position.” It acknowledged, however, that if the evidence developed by the criminal investigation should be considered, “the unanimous judgment of the Panel would have been to recommend termination.”

Having concluded that the contingent findings may properly be relied upon, we need not consider the propriety of the conclusion reached by the board that the remaining facts found by the panel provided an adequate basis for termination, as the trial court also decided. The issue before us is whether the board could reasonably have ordered termination in view of all the facts found by the panel, none of which are challenged as unsupported by the evidence.

Of the six grounds for termination of the employment of a tenured teacher set forth in § 10-151 (d), the board in discharging the plaintiff relied on “moral misconduct” and the catchall, “other due and sufficient cause.” We have not previously defined “moral misconduct” for the purpose of § 10-151 (d), nor do we find it necessary in this case to essay a comprehensive definition of that term. The finding of the panel that the plaintiff had tampered with the school telephone system for the purpose of overhearing conversations of other persons involves conduct proscribed by § 53a-189, which makes such eavesdropping a class D felony. A legislative determination that certain conduct should be punished as a crime is highly significant in deciding whether it constitutes “moral misconduct.” The conclusion of the board that the plaintiff’s behavior fell within this classification, therefore, cannot be characterized as arbitrary or illegal.

With respect to the additional ground relied on by the board, “other due and sufficient cause,” this court, in Tucker v. Board of Education, 177 Conn. 572, 577, 418 A.2d 933 (1979), has treated that phrase as equivalent to good cause, citing with evident approval a definition of that term taken from Rinaldo v. School Committee of Revere, 294 Mass. 167, 169, 1 N.E.2d 37 (1937): “Good cause includes any ground which is put forward by the [school] committee in good faith and which is not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, or irrelevant to the committee’s task of building up and maintaining an efficient school system.” In Tucker, we declared that “the decision to terminate must be reached after a careful examination of all pertinent factors relating to the particular situation, with due consideration of the effect the teacher’s conduct will have on the school authorities as well as on the students.” Id., 580. Thus, in deciding whether particular conduct constitutes “due and sufficient” cause for termination, the impact of that conduct upon the operation of the school is a significant consideration. In the present case there is a substantial nexus between the plaintiff’s misconduct and the school, since that is where it occurred and its ramifications would be greatest. The conclusion of the board that “[s]uch behavior must necessarily have undermined [the plaintiff’s] capacity to effectively work [sic] with fellow staff members, sets an extremely poor example for students and staff and reflects personal values inconsistent with [his] continued employment as a teacher” is supported by the findings of the panel and satisfies this statutory criterion for termination.

Our function in reviewing the action of the board pursuant to § 10-151 (f) is to determine whether the board has acted illegally and not to substitute our judgment for that of the board. Tucker v. Board of Education, supra, 583 (Cotter, J., dissenting); Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 492, 123 A.2d 747 (1956). A school board “has discretion to accept or reject a recommendation from an impartial hearing panel,” though it is bound by the panel’s findings of fact unless unsupported by the evidence. Catino v. Board of Education, 174 Conn. 414, 417-18, 389 A.2d 754 (1978). Because of our conclusion that the contingent findings of the panel could properly be relied upon, the board in this case effectually followed the recommendation of the panel that the plaintiff be discharged on the basis of those findings. The concurrence of these two bodies in viewing the plaintiff’s misconduct as warranting termination of his contract is a significant factor supporting the decision. We find no illegality in that determination.

Ill

The plaintiff claims that the denial of his motion to disqualify four members of the board deprived him of an impartial tribunal for the hearing on the termination of his employment. We have held that a tenured teacher has a property interest in his employment of which he can be deprived only through procedures complying with due process of law. Lee v. Board of Education, 181 Conn. 69, 72-73, 434 A.2d 333 (1980). The “hearing” on termination of a tenured teacher provided by § 10-151 (d) must satisfy due process standards. Id., 79. At the core of due process is the requirement for an impartial tribunal. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927). “Due process demands . . . the existence of impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities.” Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy, 199 Conn. 231, 235, 506 A.2d 139 (1986); see Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242-43, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980).

It has been generally recognized, however, that due process does not require that members of administrative agencies adhere in all respects to the exalted standards of impartiality applicable to the judiciary. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 n.11, 102 S. Ct. 1665, 72 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982). “The mere appearance of bias that might disqualify a judge will not disqualify an arbitrator.” Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1984); see Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy, supra, 237. A presumption of impartiality attends administrative determinations, and the burden of establishing a disqualifying interest on the part of an adjudicator rests upon the one seeking disqualification. Schweiker v. McClure, supra, 195-96; Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). To overcome the presumption, the plaintiff in this case must demonstrate actual bias, rather than mere potential bias, of the board members challenged, unless the circumstances indicate a probability of such bias “too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v. Larkin, supra.

The trial court allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence in support of the allegations of bias against four members of the board contained in his motion to disqualify them, which the board had denied. This evidence consisted largely of the testimony of the plaintiff and of the four members challenged, each of whom, not surprisingly, denied any bias. In his motion the plaintiff claimed that three members, Charles Anderson, Eugene Massa and Frank Klonoski, were personally biased because of various incidents that had occurred in which he had been their antagonist. With respect to a fourth member, Lorraine Dibble, the plaintiff claimed bias on the part of her deceased husband, which gave rise to a conflict of interests on her part. Because the plaintiff does not attack as unsupported by the evidence any of the subordinate facts found by the court in the memorandum of decision, his difficult burden is to show that these facts demonstrate bias as a matter of law on the part of the members challenged.

A

The plaintiff testified that in 1977, eleven years before the hearing on his termination, he and Anderson had been involved in a heated argument that had taken place in the school basement concerning the condition of an athletic field that had been the subject of unfavorable comment in the press. At that time, Anderson was a member of the “facilities” subcommittee of the board. The plaintiff maintained that he had grabbed Anderson and brought him upstairs because of Anderson’s use of profanity in the presence of students, whereupon Anderson left the building. Anderson denied being dragged upstairs, but admitted there had been an argument with some swearing. He testified that the plaintiff had pushed him against the lockers. Anderson said that he never felt in danger of being hit by the plaintiff, who, according to Anderson, had cocked his arm at one point during the argument.

Another altercation occurred in 1984 at the board of education office and concerned a telephone for the plaintiff’s office at the school, which was claimed to have been ordered without proper authorization. The plaintiff testified that the argument was heated and involved swearing and pushing. He said he would have struck Anderson but for the intervention of another person, Thomas Bradshaw. Anderson discounted the threatening aspect of the situation, but admitted that he and the plaintiff had leaned against each other while cursing. Bradshaw testified that both men had become upset and used profanity while standing close to each other. He tried to separate them to avoid the possibility of violence, but he did not recall any actual physical contact. It also appeared that Anderson had been called by the state as a potential witness at the trial of the plaintiff at which he was acquitted of the eavesdropping charge. Anderson attended the trial, but did not testify. There is no indication in the record as to the substance of the testimony he might have given.

Anderson denied any animosity toward the plaintiff, whom he had known for twenty years and even professed to like. He said he had based his vote entirely on the panel’s report.

The trial court declared that Anderson’s conduct “exceeded all bounds of propriety,” characterizing him as a man who, like the plaintiff, “feels the need to resort quickly to expletives and body language in order to express his point of view.” The court regarded the issue of Anderson’s disqualification as “much closer” than that involving the others challenged by the plaintiff, but, nevertheless, found that Anderson was not required to recuse himself. Because Anderson’s quarrels with the plaintiff had arisen in the performance of his duties as a member of the board and the subject matter of the disputes concerned the operation of the school, the court viewed the circumstances as similar to those in Simard v. Board of Education, 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1973). In that case it was held that prior encounters between board members and a teacher representing a union during “heated [contract] negotiations”; id., 993; in which the teacher had played a central role and had charged some board members with “lack of good faith and ignorance of the subject matter”; id., 995 n.10; did not require a finding of bias on the part of board members, even though the decision to deny tenure “came very shortly after the bitter contract negotiations.” Id., 995. The trial court concluded that Anderson’s conduct, “being related to the Board’s function, was [not] of such a character that the existence of animosity should be inferred.”

B

The plaintiff testified that about five years earlier he had been instrumental in causing Massa to be removed from the list of basketball referees available to officiate at Naugatuck High School games because Massa was a board of education member. He said he had told Massa of this action in a telephone conversation in which Massa sounded angry. He also claimed that Massa was “a political enemy” of the plaintiff’s father. Massa testified that he did not recall the telephone conversation referred to by the plaintiff and that he had simply transferred his affiliation to a different organization supplying referees for girls’ basketball games. He denied any “bad blood” between himself and the plaintiff’s father, but admitted that there had been some disagreements. The court found that Massa had no “recollection of the actions of the plaintiff that were asserted as cause for [his] respective [bias].”

C

The basis for the plaintiff’s charge of bias against Klonoski was his claim to have been instrumental in denying Klonoski a nomination as a Democratic party candidate for the board of education in 1977. Klonoski was not elected to the board until 1979. The plaintiff testified that “unpleasantries were exchanged” when he rejected Klonoski’s plea for his vote at the meeting of the Democratic town committee. Klonoski testified that he did not recall much about the town committee meeting in 1977 “except that he did not seek the plaintiffs help and did not lobby for votes.” He also said that he had not been aware that the plaintiff had worked against his nomination, if that had actually occurred. As in the case of Massa, the court found that Klonoski had “no knowledge of the causes asserted for [his recusal].”

D

The allegation against Lorraine Dibble was that she had “a conflict of interests . . . based in personal bias against [the plaintiff] on the part of . . . Louis Dibble,” her deceased husband. The plaintiff testified that, in 1971 and 1972, Louis Dibble, then a member of the board of education, had publicly opposed his application for a teaching position in Naugatuck. The plaintiff said that, at a meeting with Louis Dibble, he was told that he should not be hired as a teacher because of his father’s position in politics. According to the plaintiff, he became engaged in a heated discussion with Louis Dibble before the meeting ended.

Lorraine Dibble testified that she had no recollection of the events narrated by the plaintiff as the basis for his claim of bias against Louis Dibble. She had been elected to the board in 1979 after her husband had left the board. At a meeting of the athletic subcommittee of the board with the plaintiff, she, as a member of the subcommittee, had made some inquiries concerning purchases made by the plaintiff that he viewed as critical of him. She claimed to have voted to discharge the plaintiff solely on the basis of the panel’s report.

The trial court concluded that “[t]he plaintiff’s evidence, even if totally accepted, does no more than . . . cast Mrs. Dibble in the role of a pettifogger when watching out for the Board’s affairs.” As in the case of Anderson, the court refused to infer animosity against the plaintiff on Lorraine Dibble’s part, finding that her personal contact with him had related solely to her duties as a board of education member. With respect to the claim of bias based on the relationship between Dibble’s deceased husband and the plaintiff, the court found that she had no recollection of the events the plaintiff had mentioned. Because the existence of actual bias on the part of a board member presented an issue of fact on which the plaintiff had the burden of proof, the determination of the trial court that the evidence did not establish such bias cannot be overturned, unless the subordinate facts found or the admitted or undisputed facts would require a different conclusion as a matter of law. See Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). The court was not obliged to credit the plaintiff’s version of the events he relied upon in seeking disqualification. “We cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.” Johnson v. Flammia, 169 Conn. 491, 497, 363 A.2d 1048 (1975). On the basis of the facts found as well as those that are undisputed, we conclude that the court was justified in concluding that actual bias had not been proved on the part of any of the four board members challenged.

Because it is not unusual for board of education members, especially in the smaller communities of this state, to have had some acquaintance with the teachers whose performance they may be called upon to evaluate in contract termination proceedings pursuant to § 10-151 (d), not every prior interaction between a teacher and a board member can reasonably be deemed a sufficient basis for disqualification. If knowledge concerning the character or ability of a teacher gained from service on the board or other past experience were a per se ground for disqualification, such a rule would “require that decisions as to teacher competence be surrendered to a body less familiar with the relevant considerations and not responsible under state and local law for making those decisions.” Simard v. Board of Education, supra, 993. The legislature has gone far to ameliorate the appearance of impropriety arising from the possibility that board members may be influenced by their own experiences with a teacher whose dismissal is under consideration by providing in § 10-151 (d), upon request of the teacher, for an “impartial hearing panel” to “submit written findings and a recommendation to the board of education as to the disposition of the charges against the teacher.” That procedure was followed in this case and has resulted in factual findings unchallenged by the plaintiff that furnish adequate support for the statutory grounds for termination relied on by the board, as we have previously determined. The unanimous recommendation of the panel that the plaintiff should be discharged on the basis of its contingent findings coincides with the board’s decision and lends reasonable assurance that, if the plaintiff had never previously encountered any of the board members challenged, the result of his termination hearing would have been the same. We conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting the plaintiff’s claim of partiality on the part of the board.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 10-151 (f) provides as follows: “Any teacher aggrieved by the decision of a board of education after a hearing as provided in subsection (d) of this section may appeal therefrom, within thirty days of such decision, to the superior court. Such appeal shall be made returnable to said court in the same manner as is prescribed for civil action brought to said court. Any such appeal shall be a privileged case to be heard by the court as soon after the return day as is practicable. The board of education shall file with the court a copy of the complete transcript of the proceedings of the hearing held by the board of education or by an impartial hearing panel for such teacher, together with such other documents, or certified copies thereof, as shall constitute the record of the case. The court, upon such appeal, shall review the proceedings of such hearing and shall allow any party to such appeal to introduce evidence in addition to the contents of such transcript, if it appears to the court that additional testimony is necessary for the equitable disposition of the appeal. The court, upon such appeal and after a hearing thereon, may affirm or reverse the decision appealed from. Costs shall not be allowed against the board of education unless it appears to the court that it acted with gross negligence or in bad faith or with malice in making the decision appealed from.”

       General Statutes § 54-142a (a) provides as follows: “Whenever in any criminal case, on or after October 1,1969, the accused, by a final judgment, is found not guilty of the charge or the charge is dismissed, all police and court records and records of any state’s attorney pertaining to such charge shall be erased upon the expiration of the time to file a writ of error or take an appeal, if an appeal is not taken, or upon final determination of the appeal sustaining a finding of not guilty or a dismissal, if an appeal is taken. Nothing in this subsection shall require the erasure of any record pertaining to a charge for which the defendant was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect or guilty but not criminally responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.”

       General Statutes § 10-151 (d) provides as follows: “The contract of employment of a teacher who has attained tenure shall be continued from school year to school year, except that it may be terminated at any time for one or more of the following reasons: (1) Inefficiency or incompetence; (2) insubordination against reasonable rules of the board of education; (3) moral misconduct; (4) disability, as shown by competent medical evidence; (5) elimination of the position to which the teacher was appointed or loss of a position to another teacher, if no other position exists to which such teacher may be appointed if qualified, provided such teacher, if qualified, shall be appointed to a position held by a teacher who has not attained tenure, and provided further that determination of the individual contract or contracts of employment to be terminated shall be made in accordance with either (A) a provision for a layoff procedure agreed upon by the board of education and the exclusive employees’ representative organization or (B) in the absence of such agreement, a written policy of the board of education; or (6) other due and sufficient cause. Nothing in this section or in any other section of the general statutes or of any special act shall preclude a board of education from making an agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative which contains a recall provision. Prior to terminating a contract, a board of education shall vote to give the teacher concerned a written notice that termination of such teacher’s contract is under consideration and, upon written request filed by such teacher with such board within seven days after receipt of such notice, shall within the next succeeding seven days give such teacher a statement in writing of the reasons therefor. Within twenty days after receipt of written notice by the board of education the contract termination is under consideration, such teacher may file with such board a written request for a hearing. A board of education may designate a subcommittee of three or more board members to conduct hearings and submit written findings and recommendations to the board for final disposition in the case of teachers whose contracts are terminated for the reasons stated in subdivision (5) of this subsection. Such hearing shall commence within fifteen days after receipt of such request, unless the parties mutually agree to an extension, (A) before the board of education or a subcommittee of the board, (B) if indicated in such request or if designated by the board before an impartial hearing panel or, (C) if the parties mutually agree, before a single impartial hearing officer chosen by both parties. If the parties are unable to agree upon the choice of a hearing officer within five days after their decision to use a hearing officer, the hearing shall be held before the board or panel, as the case may be. The impartial hearing panel shall consist of three members appointed as follows: The board of education shall appoint one panel member, the teacher shall appoint one panel member, and those two panel members shall choose a third, who shall serve as chairperson. Within ninety days after receipt of the request for a hearing, the impartial hearing panel, subcommittee of the board or hearing officer, unless the parties mutually agree to an extension, shall submit written findings and a recommendation to the board of education as to the disposition of the charges against the teacher, and shall send a copy of such findings and recommendation to the teacher. The board of education shall give the teacher concerned its written decision within fifteen days of receipt of the written recommendation of the impartial hearing panel, subcommittee or hearing officer. Each party shall pay the fee of the panel member selected by it and shall share equally the fee of the third panel member or hearing officer and all other costs incidental to the hearing. If the hearing is before the board of education, the board shall render its decision within fifteen days after the close of such hearing, and shall send a copy of its decision to the teacher. The hearing shall be public if the teacher so requests or the board, panel or subcommittee so designates. The teacher concerned shall have the right to appear with counsel at the hearing, whether public or private. A copy of a transcript of the proceedings of the hearing shall be furnished by the board of education, upon written request by the teacher within fifteen days after the board’s decision, provided the teacher shall assume the cost of any such copy. Nothing herein contained shall deprive a board of education of the power to suspend a teacher from duty immediately when serious misconduct is charged without prejudice to the rights of the teacher as otherwise provided in this section.”

       “[General Statutes] Sec. 53a-189. eavesdropping: class d felony. (a) A person is guilty of eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in wiretapping or mechanical overhearing of a conversation.
      “(b) Eavesdropping is a class D felony.”

       The board’s statement of reasons for the projected termination of the plaintiffs contract also included allegations concerning his failure to account for money he had collected from a soda dispensing machine at Naugatuck High School and unauthorized absences from work. The impartial panel concluded that the board had failed to sustain its burden of proving any of these allegations.

       Two members of the panel took the view that the unanimous contingent findings concerning the plaintiff’s tampering with the telephone system could not be relied upon because of the Erasure Act. The third member dissented from the ruling that excluded the contingent finding from consideration and, therefore, disagreed with the recommendation for reinstatement.

       The contingent findings were as follows:
      “8. We make as a contingent Finding of fact—contingent upon a determination that the Erasure Act does not require us to disregard evidence developed by the police investigation— that the evidence which the Panel Majority deemed inadmissible under the Erasure Act does support the conclusion that Mr. Rado’s coming onto the line and listening in as noted in Finding 6 above was part of a deliberate and willful attempt by Mr. Rado to tamper with the telephone system so he could eavesdrop on persons using the Naugatuck High School telephones.
      “13. We make as a contingent Finding of fact—contingent upon a determination that the Erasure Act does not exclude evidence developed by the police investigation—that the evidence which the Panel Majority disregarded under the Erasure Act does support the conclusion that the Finding 10 above came about by a [sic] deliberate and wilful acts by Mr. Rado to overhear telephone calls.”

       General Statutes § 54-142a (e) provides as follows: “The clerk of the court or any person charged with retention and control of such records in the records center of the judicial department or any law enforcement agency having information contained in such erased records shall not disclose to anyone information pertaining to any charge erased under any provision of this section and such clerk or person charged with the retention and control of such records shall forward a notice of such erasure to any law enforcement agency to which he knows information concerning the arrest has been disseminated and such disseminated information shall be erased from the records of such law enforcement agency. Such clerk or such person, as the case may be, shall provide adequate security measures to safeguard against unauthorized access to or dissemination of such records or upon the request of the accused cause the actual physical destruction of such record. No fee shall be charged in any court with respect to any petition under this section. Any person who shall have been the subject of such an erasure shall be deemed to have never been arrested within the meaning of the general statutes with respect to the proceedings so erased and may so swear under oath.”

       In Petrino v. Board of Education, 179 Conn. 428, 426 A.2d 795 (1980), we upheld a decision of a board of education discharging a teacher who had been convicted of a class D felony of second degree larceny on the ground of “due and sufficient cause.” Because the board had relied solely on that ground of termination, we did not consider whether the behavior underlying that conviction also constituted moral misconduct. It does not appear from the opinion that such behavior in any manner involved the teacher’s school activities.

       The board’s statement of its conclusion based upon the contingent findings was as follows: “It is the judgment of the Naugatuck Board of Education that tampering with the telephone system at Naugatuck High School so as to enable you to eavesdrop on persons using the telephones at the high school constitutes moral misconduct and/or other due and sufficient cause, i.e., conduct unbecoming a teacher, warranting the termination of your contract of employment. It is the opinion of the Board that such conduct cannot be tolerated for the reasons previously stated with regard to the first stated cause for the termination of your contract.”

       We held in Tucker v. Board of Education, 177 Conn. 572, 418 A.2d 933 (1979) (Tucker I), that the single instance of disobedience by a teacher there involved was not sufficient cause for termination, although some less severe disciplinary action would have been warranted. See Tucker v. Board of Education, 190 Conn. 748, 462 A.2d 385 (1983) (Tucker II).

       On the basis of the findings of the panel not involving the telephone tampering evidence, the board concluded as follows: “It is the judgment of the Board of Education that your behavior as noted in the above referenced findings constitute^] moral misconduct and/or other due and sufficient cause, i.e., conduct unbecoming a teacher, warranting the termination of your contract of employment. Such behavior must necessarily have undermined your capacity to effectively work with fellow staff members, sets an extremely poor example for students and staff, and reflects personal values inconsistent with your continued employment as a teacher or Athletic Director in this school system.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Peters, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Sheldon G.

    (14063)
    Peters, C. J., Shea, Callahan, Glass and Covello, Js.
    Argued September 25—
    decision released December 4, 1990

      Bruce L. Levin, with whom, on the brief, was Serge G. Mihaly, for the appellant (movant).

      Barbara J. Sheedy, for the appellee (respondent).

      Paul C. Fassler, for the appellee (respondent’s father).

       In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 2026, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Supreme Court.
      Reporter of Judicial Decisions

   Peters, C. J.

This appeal concerns the scope of discretion that General Statutes § 46b-124 confers upon a trial court to order disclosure of juvenile court records to “any third party.” The movant, who was sexually assaulted by the respondent, seeks disclosure of all juvenile court records relating to the respondent, Sheldon G., to assist her in a tort action, one count of which is directed against the respondent’s father and is grounded in his allegedly negligent failure to secure recommended psychiatric treatment for his son. The trial court, Burns, J., rejected the movant’s contention that her request for disclosure fell within the bounds of § 46b-124. The movant then appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. Although we do not subscribe to the trial court’s reasoning in its entirety, we affirm its judgment.

The facts are undisputed. On September 29, 1987, the respondent, Sheldon G., then sixteen years old, broke into the movant’s home, struck her with a golf club, and then forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. On September 28, 1988, in an adult criminal proceeding in the Superior Court, he pleaded guilty to sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a), in relation to his attack on the movant. On the same date he also pleaded guilty to an unrelated burglary, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101. On April 28,1989, the trial court, Cur- ran, J., imposed on Sheldon G. an effective sentence of forty years imprisonment, to be suspended after twenty-five years with five years probation.

The movant instituted a civil suit for damages against Sheldon G. and his father in November, 1988. Counsel for Sheldon G. in the civil action subsequently provided the movant’s counsel with medical and psychological reports regarding his client. One of these reports was a psychosocial history prepared by Whiting Forensic Institute (Whiting) in March, 1989, for the youth’s sentencing in the Superior Court. That report indicated that Sheldon G. had “a history of sexual offending behaviors” and referred, in turn, to an earlier report, dated July 23,1987, from “Connections Inc.,” a counseling and treatment facility in Middletown, which recommended placement in a treatment program to prevent “more serious sexual misbehavior.” The Whiting report noted that these treatment recommendations had not been “activated in a timely manner due to numerous canceled appointments by parents according to [Department of Children and Youth Services] staff.”

The movant inferred from the Whiting report the existence of records of adjudications, in either neglect or delinquency proceedings regarding Sheldon G., in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. She thereupon moved for disclosure of any such records that might exist, arguing that she had demonstrated a “compelling need” for the records because they “[might] well disclose evidence or lead to evidence” that Sheldon G.’s father had “long had knowledge of his son’s aberrant sexual conduct.” Although counsel for Sheldon G. had provided the movant with the Whiting report and with an authorization for the release of medical records, counsel for the movant acknowledged at oral argument that he had not used the authorization to seek discovery of such records from service providers, nor had he attempted to depose either Sheldon G. or his father on the movant’s behalf. The movant instead contended that any privilege or privacy right that Sheldon G. had possessed in regard to any juvenile record was attenuated by his release of medical records and by the fact that he would be incarcerated for many years.

The movant maintained at trial, as she does here upon appeal, that § 46b-124 confers “broad discretion” upon the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters to order disclosure of juvenile records to “any third party” having an interest therein. She notes that the predecessor of this statute, General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 17-57, vested such discretion in the juvenile court, and she construes the subsequent statutory amendments as effectively specifying the circumstances in which disclosure is mandatory rather than discretionary. The trial court, to the contrary, interpreted the present statute to permit disclosure only in the circumstances enumerated in its various exception clauses or when required by overriding constitutional concerns such as the right to confront witnesses in a criminal proceeding.

We have not previously had the occasion to consider the scope of the discretionary authority vested in the trial court by § 46b-124. Our analysis of the statute is divided into two parts. First, we must decide whether the statute affords the trial court any discretion to permit disclosure of the records of juveniles in circumstances other than those either enumerated as exceptions to the rule of confidentiality or required for the protection of constitutional rights. Second, if we determine that the trial court continues to have residual discretion to order disclosure, we must decide whether that discretionary authority encompasses the request of the movant in this case. It is our conclusion that the statute’s strong presumption of confidentiality, although it allows some room for discretion, can be overcome only by a showing of compelling need, which this movant has not made. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

We turn first to the language, history and policy concerns of § 46b-124 to determine whether the statute affords the trial court discretion to disclose information from juvenile records to parties other than those to whom the statute expressly grants access. After its most recent revision, the statute provides, in relevant part: “(a) All records of cases of juvenile matters as defined in section 46b-121, or any part thereof, including studies and reports by probation officers, social agencies and clinics, shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party, including bona fide researchers commissioned by a state agency, only upon order of the superior court,” with certain exceptions that are not directly applicable to this case. On its face, the statute enjoins confidentiality without precisely delineating the scope of the disclosure that the Superior Court may nonetheless order. In light of this patent ambiguity, it is appropriate for us to consider the legislative history of the statute and the policy that it was intended to further. State v. Mattioli, 210 Conn. 573, 576, 556 A.2d 584 (1989).

In construing a statute, “our goal is to ‘ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.’ ” State v. Champagne, 206 Conn. 421, 428, 538 A.2d 193 (1988), quoting State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987). To discern the intent of the legislature, we look first to the words of the statute. State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986). We normally resolve any ambiguity in the statutory language “by turning for guidance to the legislative history and the purpose the statute is to serve.” State v. Champagne, supra; State v. Kozlowski, supra.

The history of § 46b-124 begins with the enactment of legislation in 1921 that created a separate system of juvenile courts. That legislation directed that the records generated by juvenile court proceedings be kept separately from other court records, but at the same time it implicitly conferred upon juvenile court judges broad discretion to open those records for “public inspection.” Public Acts 1921, c. 336. A legislative amendment in 1941 limited public access to juvenile records “only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court.” General Statutes (Sup. 1941) § 283f. The 1941 amendment, however, continued to authorize judicial discretion to determine precisely who might have “a proper interest” in the information contained in juvenile court records. Juvenile court judges construed this provision to authorize disclosure of juvenile records “whenever in the opinion of the court it is in the best interests of a child.” Practice Book, 1963, § 1137 (presently incorporated in amended form in Practice Book § 1061).

In 1969, the legislature significantly amended the juvenile records statute in order to strengthen its confidentiality provisions. The 1969 amendment expressly provided that records of cases brought before the juvenile courts, “including studies and reports by probation officers, social agencies, and clinics, shall be confidential and for the use of said court, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party only upon order of said court.” (Emphasis added.) Public Acts 1969, No. 794, § 3. Although the amended statute was not designed to eliminate all judicial discretion to order disclosure, it was expected to tighten the authority of the court to prevent indirect disclosure by others. The proponents of the amendment, including an experienced juvenile court judge, urged its enactment “to clarify and strengthen the present provisions with regard to confidentiality.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary and Governmental Functions, Pt. 1, 1969 Sess., p. 49, remarks of Judge Margaret C. Driscoll.

After the enactment of the 1969 amendment strengthening the presumption of confidentiality of juvenile records, the legislature in subsequent years turned its attention to countervailing interests. Some of the later amendments were directly related to the welfare of the juvenile whose records might be at issue. In 1977, for instance, as part of a separate enactment intended to make available to adult adopted persons information concerning their genetic parents, the legislature created an exception to the confidentiality bar to enable an adult to gain information about his or her own personal history. Public Acts 1977, No. 77-246, § 11. Similarly, in 1978, as part of the legislature’s adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the legislature authorized juvenile courts to release information contained in juvenile records to courts for custody proceedings in other jurisdictions. Public Acts 1978, No. 78-318, § 27. Other amendments balanced the need to protect the juvenile from reputational harm in order to facilitate rehabilitation against concerns for the safety and welfare of the public. One such amendment, in 1977, added a provision requiring the juvenile court to make records of delinquency adjudications available to judges and probation officers in the adult criminal justice system for the purposes of determining eligibility for youthful offender status and of sentencing persons under twenty-one. Public Acts 1977, No. 77-486.

The circumstances and discussion surrounding the adoption of these various amendments do not in every case reveal whether the legislature intended to limit, to expand, or merely to clarify the existence of judicial discretion to disclose information in juvenile records. In at least two instances, however, the legislative record and contemporary commentary on amendments to the statute provide direct insight into the effect of the revision on the discretionary power of the court. These instances, moreover, are highly relevant to the issue raised by the movant in this case: the amendments define the access to juvenile records available to victims of juvenile offenses who seek information for the purpose of bringing a civil suit for damages.

In 1980, in response to complaints by victims of offenses committed by juveniles, the legislature sought to amend the confidentiality statute to give victims access to certain information regarding juvenile offenders. As originally drafted, the amendment would have provided in relevant part that “[t]he court in its discretion, in any case, may permit an inspection of any papers or records and such papers and records or any part thereof shall be made available to . . . (3) the victim of the crime, if requested by him prior to the erasure of such papers and records.” Raised Committee Bill No. 5073, Feb. Sess., 1980. A representative of the victim witness assistance unit of the office of the chief state’s attorney testified before the judiciary committee in support of the amendment, observing that the state’s attorneys unanimously agreed that victims of offenses committed by juveniles should be entitled to learn the disposition of the cases in which they were involved. He noted, however, that the proposed bill, as drafted, would provide victims with access to “all the information that’s in the various court records.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary and Governmental Functions, Pt. 2, 1980 Sess., pp. 397-98, remarks of Dennis Barry. In the view of the state’s attorneys, such access was unnecessary and should not be permitted. Similarly, a spokesperson for the Connecticut Council for Victim Witness Advocates, who urged the legislature to adopt the amendment to recognize the right of victims to know “what the criminal justice system has decided is an appropriate response to their offenders,” added: “We do not request that victims have access to case files, fingerprints or records, but merely that they be informed of the court’s final disposition in their case.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary and Governmental Functions, Pt. 2, 1980 Sess., pp. 432-33, remarks of Patricia Weel. Following this testimony, the legislature revised the proposed bill to eliminate its reference to judicial discretion and to preclude a victim’s access to a juvenile’s entire record. As finally enacted, the amendment provided in relevant part: “All records of cases of juvenile matters . . . shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party . . . only upon order of the superior court, except that ... (2) information obtained from such records concerning the disposition of a criminal case shall be available to the victim of the crime provided such information shall not identify the juvenile involved.” Public Acts 1980, No. 80-165, § 1.

The judges in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters immediately perceived the effect of this amendment as a limitation on their residual discretion to order disclosure. The legislature responded in 1982 by revising the confidentiality statute to permit judicial disclosure of the identity of juvenile offenders to their victims under specified circumstances. Public Acts 1982, No. 82-140, § 1.

The legislative history of the 1982 amendment sheds further light on the scope of the residual judicial discretion to disclose, for two reasons. First, the legislators supporting the revision expressly acknowledged that the 1980 amendment had abrogated the residual discretion of the juvenile court to make information from a juvenile’s records available to a victim for the purpose of facilitating a civil suit. See, e.g., 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2,1982 Sess., p. 479, remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano (“[t]he legislation before us, in effect, tries to bring the law back to what it was a couple years ago, before we tried to clean it up”). Second, despite this express awareness that the earlier act had curtailed judicial discretion, the legislature did not simply repeal its earlier enactment. Rather, it refined-through heated debate and a number of amendments to the proposed bill—the guidelines it wished to impose upon trial courts for the release of one very specific piece of information, the name of the juvenile offender. The 1982 amendment revised the confidentiality statute, § 46b-124, to its present form.

In sum, the debate surrounding the precise nuances of the amendments enacted in 1980 and 1982 amply demonstrates the legislature’s intent to limit strictly the type of information available to victims of juvenile offenses. While the legislative history of the statute as a whole does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the legislature intended to eliminate all residual judicial discretion to permit disclosure in circumstances other than those enumerated in the various exceptions clauses, the history of these amendments does establish the boundaries for disclosure of information to victims for the purposes of civil litigation. The 1980 amendment specifically rejected a draft version that would have opened a juvenile’s records for the purposes of civil discovery. The 1982 amendment did not restore in its entirety the discretion abrogated by the 1980 changes; rather, it carefully provided two additional circumstances in which a trial court could release one specific piece of information from a juvenile’s record— the name of the juvenile—in order to facilitate a civil suit.

We conclude, accordingly, that the present statute still affords discretion to the court to disclose information in circumstances neither enumerated in the statutory exceptions nor mandated by constitutional due process. The legislature has, however, manifested its intent to narrow the scope of the trial court’s discretion insofar as the request for disclosure relates to an inquiry that directly implicates one of the statutory exceptions. It is from this perspective that we must analyze the request for disclosure in this case.

II

The statutory limitations expressly contained in § 46b-124 would have compelled denial of the motion for disclosure of Sheldon G.’s record of juvenile adjudications if Sheldon G. had been eight months younger when he committed the offense for which the movant seeks compensatory damages. Such a victim would have been limited to information about the name of the juvenile, which this movant long ago obtained. The question before us is whether the trial court has residual discretionary authority to release Sheldon G.’s record because of the circumstance that he was sixteen years old when he attacked this victim and has been sentenced as an adult offender for his acts.

The movant argues that Sheldon G.’s age at the time of his crime entirely removes him from the protection of the confidentiality statute. Her principal contention is that Sheldon G.’s adult actions have rendered any protection from the stigma of his juvenile offenses irrelevant. That contention is buttressed, she maintains, by Sheldon G.’s own authorization of the release of his residual medical records, which has, in effect, “attenuated” any remaining privacy interest he might retain in any records that might exist in the juvenile court. The respondent and his father maintain that, in light of all the circumstances, the trial court’s judgment was not an abuse of discretion. Although we have indicated our disagreement with the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion, we agree with its judgment that the movant’s request for disclosure could not properly be granted in light of the far-reaching and severe limitations imposed by the statute on the release of juvenile records to the victim of a juvenile offense.

Two considerations support our conclusion that the legislature intended to limit a victim’s access to the juvenile records of an adult. First, § 46b-124 contains a strong presumption that juvenile records should remain confidential after a juvenile has reached the age of sixteen, subject to certain mandatory exceptions for the purposes of adult sentencing, regardless of the juvenile’s subsequent criminal activity. Second, in determining whether the cloak of confidentiality should be lifted for persons who have no constitutional or statutory right to inspect a juvenile’s records, the court can appropriately consider the nature of the information that is generally contained in juvenile records and the privacy interests implicated therein.

A

A basic principle of statutory construction requires that a statute should “be considered as a whole, with a view toward reconciling its separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation.” Ganim v. Roberts, 204 Conn. 760, 763, 529 A.2d 194 (1987); see also Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 63, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985); In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 288-89, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). “Our task is to construe a statute as a whole and to harmonize its disparate sections within the bounds of reason.” State v. Gonzalez, 210 Conn. 446, 451, 556 A.2d 137 (1989). It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the language and legislative policies of related passages in § 46b-124 to determine the boundaries of the court’s discretion in this instance.

The provisions in § 46b-124 regarding use of delinquency records in adult criminal proceedings shed light on the legislature’s intent that juvenile records remain confidential even when the person whom they concern has reached an age beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Immediately following the provisions granting the court discretionary authority to permit disclosure of a juvenile’s name to the victim of his offense, § 46b-124 contains two provisions requiring the court to make the delinquency records for any person under the age of twenty-one available to the Superior Court for use in sentencing or in determining the availability of youthful offender status and to adult probation officers who must prepare presentencing investigation reports. Implicit in this legislative directive is the presumption that the general rule of confidentiality established in § 46b-124 requires an express exception to permit the potentially prejudicial use of juvenile records, even though the former juvenile has been found guilty of criminal acts after reaching the age of sixteen and thus may have an “attenuated” reputa-tional interest in the confidentiality of such records.

Nothing in these provisions suggests that the legislature intended to open juvenile records for public inspection in these circumstances; the limited purpose of the exceptions, according to the statement of purpose accompanying the bill that created them, was “[t]o provide that juvenile court records and records of youthful offenders be open to judges for sentencing of persons convicted of very serious crimes or adjudged youthful offenders so that the court may have knowledge of a history of anti-social actions.” Proposed Senate Bill No. 361, 1977 Jan. Sess., p. 1. The narrow purpose of these exceptions indicates that the legislature intended the general rule protecting the confidentiality of juvenile records to prevail despite subsequent convictions for “very serious crimes” in adult criminal proceedings.

B

In order to test the validity of the movant’s contention that no significant privacy interest survives the respondent’s authorization of the release of his medical records, we must examine the nature of the privacy interests implicated in the records that are protected by § 46b-124. By its express terms, § 46b-124 (a) protects the confidentiality of “[a]ll records of cases of juvenile matters as defined in section 46b-121, or any part thereof, including studies and reports by probation officers, social agencies and clinics.” “Juvenile matters,” as defined in General Statutes § 46b-121, include not only delinquency proceedings, but also all proceedings concerning “uncared-for, neglected or dependent children and youth,” proceedings concerning the termination of parental rights, and matters concerning families with service needs. The Superior Court for Juvenile Matters has broad authority, under General Statutes §§ 46b-121, 46b-129 (c), and 46b-134, to order not only the juvenile but also his parent or guardian to submit to extensive physical and mental examinations. Prior to the disposition of any delinquency case, the court is required to order an investigation of the “home conditions, habits and character” of the parents or guardian of an affected juvenile. General Statutes § 46b-134. The records of these investigations and examinations become part of the “records of cases of juvenile matters” and are protected from public disclosure only by the confidentiality provisions of § 46b-124.

The legislature has implicitly recognized the privacy interest of a juvenile’s family members in such records in at least one context. Section 46b-124 provides, in relevant part, that records of cases in juvenile matters “shall be available ... to an adult adopted person in accordance with the provisions of part II of chapter 778.” Part II of chapter 778, codified as General Statutes § 45-68a et seq., in turn provides a procedure that balances the desire of an adult adopted person to obtain information about his genetic parents against the privacy interests of the genetic parent whose parental rights were terminated. The statute generally requires the consent of the genetic parent in order for the court to disclose that parent’s identity. See General Statutes § 45-68j (c). The limitations thus imposed on an adult’s access to information contained in juvenile court records concerning his own infancy and his own genetic parents suggest that the legislature has considered interests other than those of the individual who is ostensibly the subject of the court’s records.

We do not suggest that the legislature intended, in § 46b-124, to create a statutory privilege against disclosure of juvenile records for family members of the child who is the subject of proceedings in juvenile matters. We do conclude, however, that it is appropriate to consider the nature of the information generally contained in juvenile records for the limited purpose of determining whether the confidentiality of such records should survive after the juvenile directly concerned has reached an age beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Such considerations persuade us that the privacy interests protected by § 46b-124 are not entirely “attenuated” by the respondent’s release of medical records.

With these statutory policy concerns in mind, we turn now to examine the particular request for disclosure that is before us. The movant in this case has sought access to any and all records concerning the respondent that might be found in records of juvenile matters. She simply argues that she should be allowed to examine the records because they “may well disclose evidence or lead to evidence that the [respondent’s] parent long had knowledge of his son’s aberrant sexual conduct.” Counsel for the movant acknowledged at oral argument in this court that the movant had not yet sought to depose any of the parties in this action or to make use of the medical authorizations provided by the respondent to secure information from the service providers who worked directly with him. Counsel for the movant contended in this court that nothing in § 46b-124 requires a litigant to exhaust other means of discovery before seeking access to information contained in court files. We disagree. The strong presumption of confidentiality of juvenile records established in § 46b-124 and the privacy interests implicated therein justify a narrow construction of the discretion afforded a trial court to release information without the express written consent of the parties concerned. The legislative policy underlying the statute requires that a litigant demonstrate far more than a “bona fide good faith interest” to obtain information from a juvenile’s files.

The present language and structure of § 46b-124 reflect the legislature’s frequent reconsideration of the competing interests involved in protecting the confidentiality of records regarding juveniles who have caused harm to others. The statute denies the victim of a juvenile offense access to any information from the juvenile records other than the disposition of the case and, in two circumstances, the identity of the juvenile. This carefully limited exception represents the legislature’s considered judgment that compilations of highly sensitive records by the order and authority of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters should not be regarded as a vehicle for civil discovery. Although the court has some residual discretion to order disclosure of records in circumstances not precisely addressed by the statute, its discretion must be informed by the policies that the statute is intended to advance. Because the legislature has limited the access of victims to juvenile records while a child is within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, and because it has implied a presumption that the confidentiality of juvenile records survives the juvenile’s attainment of majority, we conclude that only a showing of compelling need could justify nonconsensual disclosure of any information contained in juvenile records for the purposes of civil litigation involving an adult who was formerly the subject of adjudications in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. The movant in this case has conceded that alternative means of discovery are readily available. In these circumstances, therefore, we hold that, at least until other alternatives have been exhausted, it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have granted this movant access to information from juvenile files beyond that which she has already received.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       “[General Statutes] Sec. 46b-124. (Formerly Sec. 51-305) records, (a) All records of cases of juvenile matters as defined in section 46b-121, or any part thereof, including studies and reports by probation officers, social agencies and clinics, shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party, including bona fide researchers commissioned by a state agency, only upon order of the superior court, except that (1) such records shall be available to the attorney representing the child or youth, his parents or guardian and to an adult adopted person in accordance with the provisions of part II of chapter 778 and to another court under the provisions of section 46b-lll and (2) information obtained from such records concerning the disposition of a criminal case shall be available to the victim of the crime provided such information shall not identify the juvenile involved, except that (1) the identity of the child or youth may be released to the victim upon written application by such victim to the court stating intent to bring a civil action for loss or damage resulting from such act; and (2) the identity of a child or youth adjudicated a delinquent may be released to the victim upon written application by such victim to the court. The delinquency records or any part thereof of any person who has not attained the age of twenty-one shall also be available to any judge of said court for consideration in sentencing such person if he has been convicted of a felony as defined in section 53a-25 or in deciding whether or not to grant youthful offender status to such person if he has committed a felony for which youthful offender status may be granted. Such delinquency records or any part thereof of a person who has not attained the age of twenty-one shall also be available to an adult probation officer, if requested by him, for the purpose of the investigation required under section 54-76d or 54-91a with respect to the sentencing of such person or the granting of such youthful offender status. Any record
        ar any part thereof forwarded by said court or any of its employees to any persons, governmental and private agencies, and institutions, shall not be disclosed, directly or indirectly, to any third party save upon order of said court or except in the report required under section 54-76d or 54-91a.
      “(b) Any complaint or any information based on such complaint transferred from the jurisdiction of the circuit court to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court prior to October 1, 1971, shall remain in the superior court as a confidential record and shall not be disclosed except upon order of a judge of the superior court.”

       Although the respondent pleaded guilty to the criminal charges under the doctrine of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), thereby refusing to admit the factual basis of all of the state’s allegations, he subsequently admitted the conduct recounted in this summary in his responses to the movant’s request for admissions in the underlying civil action.

       We express no opinion about the extent to which particular service providers such as psychiatrists may invoke a privilege against disclosure of communications that Sheldon G. may have made to them.

       Public Acts 1921, c. 336, § 2, provided in relevant part: “[The juvenile court in each jurisdiction] shall keep separate records, which, including the records of probation officers, shall not be open to public inspection except upon the order of the court. Such records pertaining to any particular case shall be open at all times to the inspection of the child concerned and its parent or guardian.” The statute as then enacted provided no other standards to limit or guide the juvenile court judge’s exercise of discretion over public access to the records.

       This amendment was subsequently codified as General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 17-57.

       Although we usually limit our inquiry of legislative history to remarks made during the debates on the floor of the House of Representatives or the Senate; see State v. Golino, 201 Conn. 435, 445, 518 A.2d 57 (1986); we have occasionally considered committee testimony when it contains particularly compelling evidence about the problem, issue or purpose underlying a statute. Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 559 n.15, 569 A.2d 518 (1990). In this case, a particularly persuasive reason for considering this testimony exists: the omnibus bills under consideration by the committee had been proposed by the judges of the juvenile court themselves. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary and Governmental Functions, Pt. 1,1969 Sess., p. 38, remarks of Judge Thomas D. Gill. The representative who summarized the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives noted that it “embodies a concurrence among all the judges of the Juvenile Court” as to changes needed in existing laws. 13 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 1969 Sess., p. 4980, remarks of Representative James T. Healey.
      According to Judge Driscoll, who testified at length before the Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary and Governmental Functions about several pending bills designed to revise juvenile justice procedures, the juvenile court judges had a particular concern about preserving the court’s authority over the confidentiality of juvenile records. She noted that agencies or institutions that had received juvenile records pursuant to a court order had subsequently released those records to other parties without seeking another court order authorizing the second disclosure. One purpose of the amendment concerning confidentiality of records was to preclude such redisclosure, even to other service providers working with the affected juvenile, without a specific order from a juvenile court judge. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary and Governmental Functions, Pt. 1, 1969 Sess., pp. 49-50, remarks of Judge Margaret C. Driscoll.

       We note, as did the trial court, that the statutory exceptions regarding the access of victims to information in juvenile records are not directly applicable to the movant in this case. The respondent was no longer a juvenile when he attacked the movant, and the records of his arrest and conviction in relation to that crime are not “records of cases of juvenile matters” but rather public records of the Superior Court’s adult criminal proceedings.

       “Previously, the judge had total discretion in releasing information as to the identities of juveniles referred or the disposition of the cases. Many judges exercised this discretion to release information necessary to facilitate civil recovery from the child’s parents as permitted by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572. This discretion was limited by Pub. Act 80-165, which now mandages that ‘ . . . information obtained from such records concerning the disposition of a criminal case shall be available to the victim of the crime . . . .’ Unfortunately for those victims who are seeking to recover from the child’s parents, however, the new law goes on to further restrict the judge’s discretion to identify the child involved: ‘. . . provided such information shall not identify the juvenile involved.’ What this language does to the judge’s general discretion granted in the original statute may have to be resolved by judicial interpretation or legislative clarification in the future.” F.S. Brenneman, “Juvenile Law: Highlights of 1980,” 55 Conn. B.J. 82, 88 (1981).

       First, the court was granted discretion to release the name of any juvenile offender to a victim who made a written application stating his intent to bring a civil suit, and second, the court was granted discretion to reveal the identity of a juvenile who had been adjudicated a delinquent to the victim of the juvenile’s delinquent conduct, regardless of whether the victim intended to bring suit.

       The original draft of the 1982 bill provided for the release of the name of the juvenile charged with the commission of a delinquent act only if the victim made a written application stating his intention to bring a civil suit. At the recommendation of the judicial department, the bill was revised to permit disclosure only when a referred juvenile had been found guilty of the act by an adjudication of delinquency. Representative Tulisano, opposing an amendment to the 1982 bill that would have permitted a victim to obtain the referred offender’s name even if the victim did not intend to sue and even if the offender had not been adjudicated delinquent in regard to the offense, argued that strict safeguards against disclosure were required because the standards of probable cause for referring a child to the juvenile court were less stringent than those imposed in the adult criminal justice system, and the possibility of mistaken referrals was accordingly higher. 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1982 Sess., pp. 485-86, remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano. Representative Tulisano supported a subsequent amendment, however, that enabled a victim to obtain the name of a referred juvenile before adjudication only if the victim stated his intention to bring suit, and after adjudication for any purpose. In effect, Representative Tulisano characterized the two provisions as alternative distributions of the burden of proof: in the first alternative, the victim could obtain the name only if he intended to sue, in which event he would bear the burden of proving that the accused juvenile had in fact committed the offense, while in the second, the state would have borne the burden of proving the accused juvenile’s actual commission of the delinquent act. 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1982 Sess., p. 1989, remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano. This amendment was ultimately adopted.

       The movant also contends that the respondent effectively waived the protection of General Statutes § 46b-124 by failing to object to the release of his juvenile records when the motion was first argued in the court below. Counsel for Sheldon G. was not present at the hearing on the motion below, but counsel for Sheldon G.’s father was present and objected to the release of the records. At oral argument in this court, counsel for Sheldon G. indicated that Sheldon G. has never consented to the release of the juvenile records. We are not persuaded that the failure of the respondent to add his objection to that of his father constitutes a waiver of the statute’s protection. The judges of the juvenile courts have long construed the confidentiality requirements of § 46b-124 and its predecessor statutes to require the written consent of the juvenile and of his parent, if he is still a minor, to waive the protection of the statute. That requirement has been expressly stated in the Practice Book since 1963. Practice Book, 1963, § 1137 (now in amended form as Practice Book § 1061). When the legislature was considering the 1969 amendment that strengthened the confidentiality requirements, a spokesperson for the juvenile court judges informed the judiciary committee that the court would continue to require written consent from the juvenile before releasing information from juvenile records, even after the juvenile reached adulthood, in order to preserve the confidentiality of the records to the fullest extent possible. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary and Governmental Functions, Pt. 1,1969 Sess., p. 50, remarks of Judge Margaret C. Driscoll. Because Sheldon G. has never provided express written consent to the release of his juvenile court records, we conclude that he has not waived his right to assert the protection of the statute.

       General Statutes § 46b-124 (a) provides in relevant part: “The delinquency records or any part thereof of any person who has not attained the age of twenty-one shall also be available to any judge of said court for consideration in sentencing such person if he has been convicted of a felony as defined in section 53a-25 or in deciding whether or not to grant youthful offender status to such person if he has committed a felony for which youthful offender status may be granted. Such delinquency records or any part thereof of a person who has not attained the age of twenty-one shall also be available to an adult probation officer, if requested by him, for the purpose of the investigation required under section 54-76d or 54-91a with respect to the sentencing of such person or the granting of such youthful offender status.”

       General Statutes § 46b-121 provides in relevant part: “Juvenile matters include all proceedings concerning uncared-for, neglected or dependent children and youth and delinquent children within this state, termination of parental rights of children committed to a state agency, matters concerning families with service needs and contested termination of parental rights transferred from the probate court .... In such juvenile matters, the superior court shall have authority to make and enforce such orders directed to parents . . . guardians, custodians or other adult persons owing some legal duty to a child or youth therein, as it deems necessary or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of a child or youth subject to its jurisdiction or otherwise committed to or in the custody of the commissioner of children and youth services. Said court shall also have authority to grant and enforce injunctive relief, temporary or permanent in all proceedings concerning juvenile matters.”

       General Statutes § 46b-129, entitled “Commitment of child or youth. Petition for neglected, uncared-for, dependent child or youth,” provides in relevant part: “(c) When a petition is filed in said court for the commitment of a child or youth, the commissioner of children and youth services shall make a thorough investigation of the case and shall cause to be made a thorough physical and mental examination of the child or youth if requested by the court. The court after hearing on the petition and upon a finding that the physical or mental ability of a parent or guardian to care for the child or youth before the court is at issue may order a thorough physical or mental examination, or both, of the parent or guardian whose competency is in question. . . .”
      General Statutes § 46b-134 provides in relevant part: “Prior to the disposition of the case of any child found to be delinquent, investigation shall be made of the facts as herein specified by the probation officer .... Such investigation shall consist of an examination of the parentage and surroundings of the child, his age, habits, and history, and shall include also an inquiry into the home conditions, habits and character of his parents or guardians. . . . The court shall, when it is found necessary to the disposition, cause a complete physical or mental examination, or both, to be made of the child .... Such information shall include physical and psychological diagnoses and may include medical, psychiatric, neurological, learning disability diagnoses and such other diagnoses as the court deems necessary.”

       General Statutes § 45-68] (c) provides in relevant part: “Any information tending to identify the genetic parents shall not be disclosed unless written consent is obtained from each genetic parent who was party to the legal proceedings in the termination of parental rights. . . . Any information tending to identify any adult blood or adoptive relative other than a genetic parent shall not be disclosed unless written consent is obtained from such adult blood or adoptive relative . . . .”

       In an analogous context regarding the disclosure of psychiatric records also protected by a confidentiality statute, this court has observed that there are “strong policy reasons” for maintaining the confidentiality of files containing highly personal information about family members whose conditions are not at issue. State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 458, 464 A.2d 829 (1983). “Such records often will contain sensitive and private material from and about other members” of the subject’s family; id.; and such material should not be disclosed unless a compelling need is shown. In Storlazzi, the court concluded that a criminal defendant’s constitutionally protected right to cross-examine a key state’s witness required the court to conduct an in camera examination of the witness’s psychiatric records to determine whether anything in those records suggested the witness’s inability to “recall and relate the truth.” Id. In the present case, as the trial court correctly observed and the movant does not dispute, the movant’s interest in Sheldon G.’s alleged juvenile records does not implicate any constitutionally protected right. In addition, the movant has not explored alternative avenues of discovery that are readily available to her. Under these circumstances, the trial court was correct in concluding that it had no duty to conduct an in camera review of any records it might locate concerning Sheldon G.

       It is doubtful that any civil litigant pursuing a claim against a juvenile or Ms family could establish a need compelling enough to persuade a court to allow the litigant unrestricted access to all the information contained in juvenile records. At most, on a sufficient showing of exhaustion of other sources of information, the litigant might seek an in camera review by the court to determine the existence of specific evidence.