author: Callahan, J.

text:
    National Elevator Industry Pension, Welfare and Educational Funds v. Peter D. Scrivani
    (14825)
    Callahan, Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Palmer, Js.
    Argued March 25—
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Stuart D. Rosen, with whom were Patrick E. Gonya, Jr., and, on the brief, Ann M. Siczewicz, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Ian R. McMillan, with whom was Jean Robinow, for the appellee (defendant).
   Callahan, J.

We are required to determine in this appeal whether the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court rendered in accordance with the report of an attorney trial referee, properly ordered that the case be remanded to the original attorney trial referee with instructions to make findings of fact and to file a proper report in accordance with Practice Book § 434.

The plaintiff, National Elevator Industry Pension, Welfare and Educational Funds, brought this action under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act; General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; seeking damages and injunctive relief for certain actions taken by two companies owned by the defendant, Peter D. Scrivani. The case was referred for trial to an attorney trial referee, who tried the case on December 10, 1991. Posthearing briefs were submitted and, on April 8, 1992, the attorney trial referee issued a document entitled “Memorandum of Decision.” After the referee confirmed that the memorandum of decision was his final report, the plaintiff filed a motion to correct pursuant to Practice Book § 438, claiming that the report did not adequately set forth findings of fact as required by Practice Book § 434. After the plaintiffs motion was denied by the attorney trial referee, the plaintiff filed an objection to the acceptance of his report by the trial court. The trial court denied the objection and rendered judgment in accordance with the report.

On appeal, the Appellate Court determined that the attorney trial referee’s report did not adequately set forth his findings of fact pursuant to § 434, and reversed the judgment of the trial court, stating that the “trial court should have exercised its authority under Practice Book § 443 to ‘reject the report . . . ” National Elevator Industry Pension, Welfare & Educational Funds v. Scrivani, 31 Conn. App. 728, 733, 626 A.2d 1322 (1993). Instead of simply remanding the matter to the trial court, however, the Appellate Court purportedly exercised its supervisory powers under Practice Book § 4183 (10); id., 734; and ordered the trial court to remand the case to the same attorney trial referee for the preparation of a report consistent with the requirements of § 434. Id., 735. We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: “Having concluded that the attorney trial referee had not complied with the Practice Book by failing to find the facts, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the case should be remanded to the same attorney trial referee for a finding of facts?” National Elevator Industry Pension, Welfare & Educational Funds v. Scrivani, 227 Conn. 912, 632 A.2d 694 (1993).

The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly ordered the trial court to remand the matter to the original attorney trial referee with instructions to make findings of fact and to file a new report. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court has the authority to make appropriate orders necessary for the supervision of an appeal. Practice Book § 4183 provides in relevant part: “The supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in the court having appellate jurisdiction . . . . The court may, on its own motion, modify or vacate any order made by the trial court, or a judge thereof, in relation to the prosecution of the appeal. It may also, for example, on its own motion or upon motion of any party, (1) order a judge to take any action necessary to complete the trial court record for the proper presentation of the appeal . . . (10) remand any pending matter to the trial court for the resolution of factual issues where necessary . . . .” By its plain terms, the Practice Book section applies only to matters necessary to supervise or control “the proceedings on appeal.” See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 189 Conn. 360, 363, 456 A.2d 272 (1983) (remanding case to trial court for articulation so that Supreme Court could “properly review the claims made in [the] appeal”); State v. Ostroski, 184 Conn. 455, 460-61, 440 A.2d 166 (1981) (remanding case to trial court because articulation is necessary for proper disposition of cause); State v. Palmieri, 143 Conn. 569, 570, 124 A.2d 911 (1956) (remanding matter to trial court to make findings necessary to perfect record for appeal). The defendant has not cited, and our research has failed to disclose, a single case wherein we have invoked § 4183 to control trial court proceedings that were not necessary for the proper review or management of a pending appeal.

The Appellate Court disposed of the only issue on appeal when it determined that the trial court had improperly accepted the attorney trial referee’s report and reversed the trial court’s judgment. Rather than fashioning an order to effectuate this judgment, however, the Appellate Court invoked its supervisory authority under § 4183 and ordered the trial court to remand the matter to the attorney trial referee who originally heard the matter for findings of fact and a proper report pursuant to Practice Book § 443. Once the report of the attorney trial referee had been ordered rejected, however, § 443 vested the trial court, not the Appellate Court, with the discretion to “refer the matter to the same or another [referee] for a new trial or [to] revoke the reference and leave the case to be disposed of in court.” The conduct of future proceedings was not properly a subject of the appeal and was not reasonably necessary for the resolution, supervision or control of any aspect of the appeal. Consequently, we conclude that the Appellate Court’s remand was not a proper exercise of its supervisory authority under Practice Book § 4183.

Of course, the Appellate Court’s jurisdictional authority to make postappeal orders is not limited by § 4183. The Appellate Court, after reversing a judgment, has the authority under General Statutes § 51-197a to fashion a remand that is reasonably necessary or appropriate to facilitate its judgment. Because in this case the decision as to how to proceed after the rejection of the trial referee’s report was appropriately entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, however, the Appellate Court’s order for the trial court to remand to the attorney trial referee who originally heard the matter was not a proper exercise of its remand authority.

The decision as to who was to conduct the trial of this matter after the initial report was rejected was not a matter of law that the Appellate Court could consider de novo. That decision, rather, was entrusted, under Practice Book § 443, to the discretion of the trial court, which is the appropriate forum to decide such an issue. The trial court is in a better position than the Appellate Court to consider the needs of the parties, the state of the trial court docket, and the availability of qualified attorney trial referees. It is well established that the authority to exercise judicial discretion regarding matters within the province of the trial court “ ‘is not conferred upon this court, but upon the trial court, and ... we are not privileged to usurp that authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial court in its exercise. . . . Nothing short of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one which discloses clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.’ ” Simons v. Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 349, 374 A.2d 1040 (1977), quoting Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 491, 77 A. 1 (1910); see also Practice Book § 4061.

After deciding the appeal and reversing the trial court’s judgment, therefore, the Appellate Court should have remanded the matter to the trial court to permit the trial court to determine how the case should proceed subsequent to the rejection of the attorney trial referee’s report. See Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. Sweeney, 164 Conn. 158, 161, 318 A.2d 113 (1972); Clark v. Hughes, 139 Conn. 696, 699-700, 97 A.2d 114 (1953). Instead, the Appellate Court substituted its judgment for that of the trial court and ordered that even though one and one-half years had passed since the date of the one day trial of this matter, it must be remanded to the original attorney trial referee to make findings of fact and file a proper report. The Appellate Court’s order was not authorized by either Practice Book § 443 or Practice Book § 4183 and was not a necessary or appropriate exercise of its authority under General Statutes § 51-197a.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed in part and the case is remanded to that court with direction to vacate its order remanding the case with direction to the trial court to remand to the original attorney trial referee to file a new report.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       Practice Book § 434 provides in relevant part: “The report of a committee shall state, in separate and consecutively numbered paragraphs, the facts found and the conclusions drawn therefrom. It should not contain statements of evidence or excerpts from the evidence. The report should ordinarily state only the ultimate facts found; but if the committee has reason to believe that his conclusions as to such facts from subordinate facts will be questioned, he may also state the subordinate facts found proven; and if he has reason to believe that his rulings will be questioned, he may state them with a brief summary of such facts as are necessary to explain them; and he should state such claims as were made by the parties and which either party requests him to state.”

       Practice Book § 438 provides in relevant part: “If either party desires to have the report or the finding corrected by striking out any of the facts found, or by adding further facts, or by stating the claims of the parties made before the committee, or by setting forth rulings upon evidence or other rulings of the committee, he shall . . . file with the court a motion to correct setting forth the changes and additions desired by him.”

       When the Appellate Court determines that a speedy trial is necessary to vindicate the parties’ legal rights, the ordinary practice is for the court to make an appropriate order and retain jurisdiction to enforce its order. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (88-BC), 189 Conn. 66, 81, 454 A.2d 1262 (1983) (order for trial court to hold further proceedings on matter within sixty days accompanied by order that either party could seek further review of proceedings without necessity of filing appeal); O'Bymachow v. O’Bymachow, 10 Conn. App. 76, 78-79, 521 A.2d 599 (1987) (after finding error and remanding for new hearing, Appellate Court exercised discretion to retain case on docket and directed trial court to hear and decide motion promptly, followed by further detailed directions of what to happen thereafter). In the instant case, the Appellate Court did not purport to retain jurisdiction to enforce its order.

       We note that in Pilato v. Kapur, 22 Conn. App. 282, 285, 576 A.2d 1315, cert. granted, 216 Conn. 813, 580 A.2d 59 (1990), the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the trial court to remand the case to the same attorney trial referee for a determination of whether interest should have been included in its calculation of damages. We granted certiorari to decide, inter alia: “Should the Appellate Court have remanded the case with direction that the determination of whether interest should be allowed be made by the attorney trial referee who had heard the case and had refused to award interest upon a ground later determined to be erroneous?” The appeal, however, was subsequently withdrawn.

       Practice Book § 443 provides in relevant part: “If the [trial] court finds that the committee has materially erred in his rulings or that by reason of material corrections in his findings the basis of the report is subverted or that there are other sufficient reasons why the report should not be accepted, the court shall reject the report and refer the matter to the same or another committee for a new trial or revoke the reference and leave the case to be disposed of in court.”

       The Appellate Court’s decision in O’Neill v. O’Neill, 13 Conn. App. 300, 314-15, 536 A.2d 978, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 806, 540 A.2d 374 (1988), is not to the contrary. In that child custody case, the Appellate Court ordered that physical custody of the child would remain with the defendant until the trial court had an opportunity to address the issue at a new hearing. In the present case, the Appellate Court’s order does not address the period in between the appeal and new trial court proceedings, but reaches out and decides a question that should properly have been decided by the trial court on remand.

       General Statutes § 51-197a provides in relevant part: “appeals to APPELLATE COURT. WRITS. TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION FROM APPELLATE session, (a) Appeals from final judgments or actions of the superior court shall be taken to the appellate court in accordance with section 51-197c, except for small claims, which are not appealable, appeals within the jurisdiction of the supreme court as provided for in section 51-199, appeals as provided for in sections 8-8 and 8-9, and except as otherwise provided by statute.
      “(b) The appellate court may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. ” (Emphasis added).
      The Appellate Court’s authority to fashion a remand under § 51-197a is analogous to this court’s authority under General Statutes § 52-265 (a) (2) to “remand the action to the court below or to a judge thereof having jurisdiction, to be proceeded with by the court or judge to final judgment. ...”

       Because we answer the certified question by concluding that the Appellate Court’s order under Practice Book § 443 was an improper exercise of its authority under Practice Book § 4183 and General Statutes § 51-197a, we do not decide (1) whether that provision would permit the trial court to remand the matter to the same attorney trial referee for a new trial or (2) whether the trial court could remand to the attorney trial referee to make additional findings of fact after the trial court itself had rejected the report.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Arthur E. Jacobson
    (14837)
    Callahan, Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Katz, Js.
    Argued May 12—
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Donna Mambrino, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

      Jon L. Schoenhorn, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The defendant, Arthur E. Jacobson, was arrested on September 22, 1991, for operating a motor vehicle while his operator’s license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c). After a plea of nolo contendere, he was convicted of that charge and sentenced by the trial court to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of thirty days and fined $500. Thereafter, he appealed to the Appellate Court pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a.

The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had improperly convicted and sentenced the defendant for a violation of § 14-215 (c). State v. Jacobson, 31 Conn. App. 797, 804, 627 A.2d 474 (1993). It determined, however, that the defendant had committed the lesser included offense of violating § 14-215 (a) and that he was subject to the penalties provided by § 14-215 (b), which are less severe than those provided by § 14-215 (c). It, therefore, remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing pursuant to § 14-215 (b). Id., 806.

We granted certification to consider the issue of whether a defendant, whose motor vehicle operator’s license had been suspended originally because of a violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) was subject to the enhanced penalties of § 14-215 (c) when the period of suspension for violation of § 14-227a (a) mandated by § 14-227a (h) (1) (C) had expired, but his operator’s license had not been restored because of his failure to furnish the commissioner of motor vehicles with proof of financial responsibility pursuant to § 14-112.

The Appellate Court, after construing the relevant statutes, concluded that, although the defendant’s operator’s license was under suspension when he was arrested on September 22,1991, it was not under suspension because of his March 28, 1989 conviction of operating under the influence in violation of § 14-227a (a) for which it had been suspended initially. In arriving at its conclusion, the Appellate Court determined that the one year period of suspension mandated by § 14-227a (h) (1) (C) had expired by the time of the defendant’s arrest for operating under suspension. State v. Jacobson, supra, 31 Conn. App. 799. The court further concluded that, because the period of suspension imposed for the defendant’s violation of § 14-227a (a) had expired at the time of his arrest in 1991, he was not under suspension at that time “on account of a violation of subsection (a) of section 14-227a,” an essential element for a prosecution pursuant to § 14-215 (c). Id., 804.

The Appellate Court decided, however, that the defendant’s operator’s license was under suspension at the time of his arrest because he had failed to furnish the commissioner with proof of financial responsibility as required by § 14-112 when his suspension, because of a violation of § 14-227a, had terminated. The defendant, the court determined, was therefore in violation of § 14-215 (a) and, consequently, subject to the penalties of § 14-215 (b). Id.

After considering the briefs and arguments of the parties and examining the record on appeal, we conclude that the judgment of the Appellate Court is correct and must be affirmed. The issue on which we granted certification was properly resolved in the Appellate Court’s thoughtful and thorough unanimous opinion. It would serve no useful purpose for this court to repeat the discussion contained therein. Cf. Board of Education v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn. 433, 436, 636 A.2d 378 (1994); Stankiewicz v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 211 Conn. 76, 78, 556 A.2d 1024 (1989); State v. Leonard, 210 Conn. 480, 481, 556 A.2d 611 (1989).

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

       General Statutes § 14-215 provides in pertinent part: “operation WHILE REGISTRATION OR LICENSE IS REFUSED, SUSPENDED OR REVOKED. . . . “(c) Any person who operates any motor vehicle during the period his operator’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this state is under suspension or revocation on account of a violation of subsection (a) of section 14-227a or section 53a-56b or 53a-60d . . . shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than one year, thirty consecutive days of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner.”

       General Statutes § 54-94a provides in pertinent part: “conditional NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA. APPEAL OF DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR DISMISS. When a defendant, prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court’s denial of the defendant’s . . . motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law. ...”

       General Statutes § 14-215 (a) and (b) provides: “(a) No person to whom an operator’s license has been refused, or whose operator’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked, shall operate any motor vehicle during the period of such refusal, suspension or revocation. No person shall operate or cause to be operated any motor vehicle, the registration of which has been refused, suspended or revoked, or any motor vehicle, the right to operate which has been suspended or revoked.
      “(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not less than one hundred fifty dollars nor more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ninety days or be both fined and imprisoned for the first offense, and for any subsequent offense shall be fined not less than two hundred dollars nor more than six hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.”

       The issue as certified was inartfully worded. See State v. Jacobson, 227 Conn. 914, 632 A.2d 692 (1993).

       General Statutes § 14-227a provides in pertinent part: “operation WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR OR DRUG OR WHILE IMPAIRED BY LIQUOR, (a) OPERATION WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if he operates a motor vehicle on a public highway of this state or on any road of a district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or on any private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordanee with the provisions of section 14-218a, or in any parking area for ten or more cars or on any school property (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both or (2) while the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person is ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight.”

       General Statutes § 14-227a (h) (1) (C) provides: “(h) penalties foe operation while under the influence. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall: (1) For conviction of a first violation . . . (C) have his motor vehicle operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for one year.”

       General Statutes § 14-112 provides in pertinent part: “proof of financial responsibility on violation of certain statutes, (a) when commissioner shall require, exception. To entitle any person to receive or retain a motor vehicle operator’s license or a certificate of registration of any motor vehicle when, in the opinion of the commissioner, such person has violated . . . subsection (a) of section 14-227a . . . the commissioner shall require from such person proof of financial responsibility to satisfy any claim for damages by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, any one person, of twenty thousand dollars, or by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, more than one person on account of any accident, of at least forty thousand dollars, and for damage to property of at least ten thousand dollars .... If any person fails to furnish such proof, the commissioner shall, until such proof is furnished, suspend or revoke the license of such person to operate a motor vehicle or refuse to return any license which has been suspended or revoked in accordance with the provisions of section 14-111 .... Prior to such suspension, revocation or withdrawal, notice thereof shall be given by the commissioner by a notice forwarded by bulk certified mail to the address of such person as shown by the records of the commissioner. . . .”


author: Borden, J.

text:
    Maria Gajewski et al. v. Arthur Pavelo et al.
    (14843)
    Callahan, Borden, Berdon, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued March 31—
    decision released June 28, 1994

      Rosalind J. Koskoff with whom were Michael P. Koskoff and, on the brief, Richard A. Fuchs, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      BarbaraBrazzel-Massaro, associate city attorney, for the appellees (defendant city of Bridgeport et al.).

      James E. Coyne, with whom, on the brief was Colleen D. Fries, for the appellee (defendant Utica Radiator Corporation).
   Borden, J.

The dispositive issue of this appeal is the applicability of the general verdict rule. The jury’s handwritten verdict stated that the plaintiffs’ claims were “inconclusive,” but did not specifically mention the defendants’ special defense. On the basis of this verdict, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which applied the general verdict rule and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Gajewski v. Pavelo, 32 Conn. App. 373, 629 A.2d 465 (1993). We granted the plaintiffs’ petition for certification to appeal. We now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court recounted the following facts and procedural history: “The plaintiffs’ [Maria Gajewski, Jan Gajewski and Janusz Gajewski] amended complaint consisted of ten counts, essentially involving three causes of action, a product liability claim against Utica Radiator Corporation (Utica) arising out of its manufacture of a gas fired boiler, a negligence claim against two employees of the city of Bridgeport, Joseph Savino and Guido Vagnini, for failure to inspect or to make reasonable efforts to inspect the installation of the boiler, and an indemnification claim against the city of Bridgeport pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465. Utica denied that its gas fired boiler filled the Gajewski residence with dangerous and toxic levels of carbon monoxide that allegedly caused serious, painful and permanent injuries to the plaintiffs. Utica also denied that it introduced its boilers into the stream of commerce, that its products were expected to reach consumers without substantial change, and that one of its boilers had reached the plaintiffs’ household without substantial change. Utica denied that its boiler was a defective and unreasonably dangerous product and also denied that it had failed to provide proper instructions for installation, had failed to warn the plaintiffs adequately of various dangers arising from use of the boiler and had failed to design a safe product. Further, Utica denied that the plaintiffs’ injuries were proximately caused by its allegedly defective gas boiler. Utica’s answer also raised two special defenses, one claiming that any injuries sustained by the plaintiffs were caused by their own negligence and carelessness, and the other claiming that the amount of any verdict against Utica should be reduced by any amounts paid or agreed to be paid by any present or prior defendants to the action. Utica filed a cross claim against the Southern Connecticut Gas Company and the city of Bridgeport for indemnification and filed a cross claim against all the codefendants for contribution pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572o. Southern Connecticut Gas Company denied all cross claims by Utica.

“The plaintiffs’ negligence claim against the two city employees was based on the failure to inspect, to make provisions to inspect, to warn and to establish standards for inspection. The plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of the city employees’ negligence and carelessness, the plaintiffs sustained their injuries. The individual defendants and the city denied all allegations of negligence and denied that any failure to act was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. The individual defendants and the city of Bridgeport also raised four special defenses. The defenses claimed were sovereign immunity, contributory negligence, immunity provided by General Statutes § 52-557n, and that any verdict against them should be reduced by any amounts paid by Southern Connecticut Gas Company and Arthur Pavelo, the installer of the boiler. They also filed a counterclaim against Jan Gajewski for indemnification claiming that he was primarily liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries because he failed to clean his chimney when advised to do so, replaced a door to the furnace room when advised not to do so and failed to respond to notices calling for inspection of the furnace.

“The jury heard evidence that in the fall of 1981 the plaintiffs had a gas fired boiler manufactured by Utica installed in their residence by Pavelo. The plaintiffs had previously used an oil fired boiler, which generated a buildup of soot in the chimney flue. At the time of installation, Pavelo, a licensed plumber, cleaned the chimney sufficiently to render the furnace operational. The plaintiffs were advised by Pavelo, prior to the installation of the boiler, of the necessity of having the chimney thoroughly cleaned but were never directly warned of the necessity by Utica.

“On January 9, 1982, Maria was found unconscious in her home. Her husband, Jan, and adult son, Janusz, were found semiconscious. They were diagnosed as having carbon monoxide poisoning. The poisonous gases resulted from a buildup of soot in the chimney flue. This buildup prevented proper ventilation of the boiler. At no time prior to January 9, 1982, was the installation of the boiler inspected by the employees of the city of Bridgeport or the gas company, although they had attempted to make appointments for inspection with the plaintiffs. Jan and Janusz substantially recovered from the poisoning. Maria suffered permanent total disability of her nervous system manifested as cognitive impairment and difficulty with speech, coordination and gait. She also experiences bouts of depression due to her condition.

“Prior to jury deliberation, all parties had agreed that verdict forms and interrogatories were necessary in this case because of its complex nature, and had essentially agreed as to their wording and content. The parties, however, had not finished preparing their interrogatories and verdict forms when the court began its charge to the jury during the late morning of November 27,1991. The court stated in its charge that it anticipated that there would be interrogatories and verdict forms by the time afternoon deliberations began. Deliberations were over, however, later that same afternoon before the interrogatories or verdict forms were available. No objection was made by the plaintiffs or the defendants to the court’s allowing the jury to deliberate without them. The jury returned a handwritten verdict that read: ‘We, the jury, based upon the evidence presented to us, unanimously agree that all claims against the defendants: The Utica Radiator Corp., The City of Bridgeport et al., and Southern New England Gas Co. are inconclusive. We, therefore, find them not liable for the injuries sustained in the suit brought by the Gajewski family.’ The trial court accepted the verdict and rendered judgment ‘in favor of Utica Radiator Corporation, the city of Bridgeport, Joseph Savino, Guido Vagnini, and Southern Connecticut Gas Company, and that the plaintiffs recover no damages of said defendants.’ ” Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 32 Conn. App. 375-79.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the jury instructions were so confusing that they provided inadequate guidance to the jury. The defendants contended that the general verdict rule precluded review of the plaintiffs’ claims, and also, inter alia, that the jury instructions were proper. Id., 375.

The Appellate Court agreed that the general verdict rule applied, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The general verdict rule provides that “ ‘if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party.’ ” Curry v. Burns, 225 Conn. 782, 786, 626 A.2d 719 (1993); see, e.g., Stone v. Bastarache, 188 Conn. 201, 204, 449 A.2d 142 (1982). The Appellate Court concluded that the general verdict rule applied because the defendants had denied the plaintiffs’ cause of action and pleaded special defenses, and because the plaintiffs’ failure to object to jury deliberation without interrogatories was the functional equivalent of a failure to request interrogatories. Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 32 Conn. App. 381-82. In interpreting the verdict, the Appellate Court reasoned: “[T]he jury could have found for the defendants because it either concluded that no one of the defendants was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries or that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent in excess of 50 percent in the actions grounded in negligence or that the comparative responsibility provisions of General Statutes § 52-572o were inapplicable because the plaintiffs were totally responsible for their injuries.” Id., 383. Applying the general verdict rule, the Appellate Court concluded that the verdict for each defendant need not be disturbed and that, therefore, it was not necessary to reach the other claims of error relating to the jury charge. Id., 383. This appeal followed.

The plaintiffs claim that the general verdict rule does not apply in the circumstances of this case because the jury stated the basis for its verdict, just as if an appropriate interrogatory had been posed. We agree.

Under the general verdict rule, “ ‘if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party.’ ” Curry v. Burns, supra, 225 Conn. 786. Thus, in a case in which the general verdict rule operates, if any ground for the verdict is proper, the verdict must stand; only if every ground is improper does the verdict fall. Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 100, 544 A.2d 164 (1988); LaFleur v. Farmington River Power Co., 187 Conn. 339, 342, 445 A.2d 924 (1982); Colucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 490, 441 A.2d 574 (1981). The rule rests on the policy of the conservation of judicial resources, at both the appellate and trial levels. “On the appellate level, the rule relieves an appellate court from the necessity of adjudicating claims of error that may not arise from the actual source of the jury verdict that is under appellate review. ... In the trial court, the rule relieves the judicial system from the necessity of affording a second trial if the result of the first trial potentially did not depend upon the trial errors claimed by the appellant.” Curry v. Burns, supra, 790.

The Appellate Court correctly recognized that this case presented more than one potential basis for a verdict in favor of the defendants. A verdict for the defendants could theoretically have been reached if, for instance, the defendants had not caused the plaintiffs’ injuries, or the defendants had caused the injuries but the plaintiffs were 100 percent comparatively negligent. Nevertheless, we need not guess at the basis of the jury’s verdict because the jury specified the basis in the verdict itself. The handwritten verdict stated: “We, the jury, based upon the evidence presented to us, unanimously agree that all claims against the defendants . . . are inconclusive. We, therefore, find them not liable for the injuries sustained in the suit brought by the Gajewski family.” (Emphasis added.)

The plaintiffs correctly contend that this verdict signifies that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof. The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving their claims and that the defendants bore the burden of proving their, defenses, including contributory negligence. The trial court also charged that if the plaintiffs failed to prove their claims, then the jury was to find for the defendants without considering any further issues. It is presumed that the jury follows the instructions given by the court. Vajda v. Tusla, 214 Conn. 523, 537, 572 A.2d 998 (1990); Tomczuk v. Alvarez, 184 Conn. 182, 186-87, 439 A.2d 935 (1981). Thus, although it is not completely clear, we conclude that, in the context of this case, the jury’s statement that the claims were “inconclusive” indicated that the jury had found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof, and that it had declined to consider further issues. The jury’s use of the language, “all claims against the defendants . . . are inconclusive,” more likely signifies the failure of the plaintiffs to meet their initial burden of proof on their claims than the success of the defendants in meeting the burden of proof on their special defenses. Because the jury specified the basis of its verdict, the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the general verdict rule applied to this case.

As a result of its conclusion regarding the general verdict rule, the Appellate Court did not reach the claims of instructional error raised by the plaintiffs. In this court, however, the defendants claim, as alternative grounds for affirmance under Practice Book § 4140, that the jury charge was not harmful or prejudicial to the plaintiffs: (1) with regard to the duty to warn; and (2) viewed as a whole. The plaintiffs respond, in part, that these claims of the defendants are not adequate alternative grounds to affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment because they do not fully address all of the claims of instructional error that the plaintiffs presented to the Appellate Court. It would be impossible to determine whether the defendants’ claims here fully respond to the plaintiffs’ claims in the Appellate Court without fully parsing each of the plaintiffs’ claims in the Appellate Court. The parties’ briefs do not adequately perform this task. Rather than undertake the task ourselves, we exercise our discretion to decline to consider the defendants’ claims. We, therefore, remand the case to the Appellate Court for consideration of the merits of the plaintiffs’ appeal.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       We certified the following questions: (1) “Where the jury by the words used in its verdict indicated that it had found the plaintiffs failed to prove their case, was the Appellate Court correct in finding that the jury could have reached its conclusion based on the allegations contained in a special defense?”; (2) “Was the Appellate Court correct in finding that the special defense of contributory negligence justified the application of the general verdict rule when no evidence was presented at the trial in support of the defense?”; and (3) “Was the Appellate Court correct in applying the general verdict rule where the plaintiffs claim error in the charge on [the] defendants’ liability, the verdict is upheld on the basis of contributory negligence, and the jury, in considering contributory negligence, is required by law to compare [the] plaintiffs’ liability to [the] defendants’ liability?” Gajewski v. Pavelo, 227 Conn. 926, 632 A.2d 704 (1993). Because we answer the first certified question in the negative, concluding that the Appellate Court improperly applied the general verdict rule, we need not reach the claims of improper application of the general verdict rule contained in the remaining certified questions.

       “The plaintiffs originally sued Arthur Pavelo, doing business as Academy Plumbing and Heating, Utica Radiator Corporation, Joseph Savino, Guido Vagnini, the city of Bridgeport, Southern Connecticut Gas Company, and Ruud Water Heater Division of Rheem Manufacturing Company. The plaintiff Jan Gajewski also brought loss of consortium claims against Utica, Savino, Vagnini and the city of Bridgeport. The plaintiffs settled with the estate of Arthur Pavelo, Southern Connecticut Gas Company, and Ruud Water Heater Division of Rheem Manufacturing Company. We refer herein to Utica Radiator Corporation, Joseph Savino, Guido Vagnini and the city of Bridgeport as the defendants. Although Southern New England Gas Company was not a defendant during the trial as to the Gajewskis, it was a third party defendant as to Utica in an indemnification claim and in a contribution claim as a joint tortfeasor. In that capacity, Southern New England Gas Company actively participated in the trial. It, however, is not involved in this appeal.” Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 32 Conn. App. 375 n.1. In the current appeal, Utica, Savino, Vagnini and the city of Bridgeport are the defendants.

       “Although Utica’s answer to the plaintiffs’ complaint contained a cross claim for contribution against ‘all defendants,’ the installer of the furnace, Arthur Pavelo, doing business as Academy Plumbing and Heating, was not specifically named as a defendant by Utica, although the other defendants were so named.” Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 32 Conn. App. 376 n.2.

       “Prior to trial, the plaintiffs made a motion to sever the cross claims and counterclaims. No action was taken on this motion. After both parties rested, the plaintiffs renewed their motion to sever and it was denied.” Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 32 Conn. App. 377 n.3.

       “The defendant Utica claims that its installation manual provided Pavelo with sufficient warning of the hazards of carbon monoxide poisoning arising from the failure to clean a chimney completely.” Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 32 Conn. App. 377 n.4.

       We note, incidentally, that at that point the plaintiffs had settled their claims against Southern New England Gas Company. See footnote 2.

       In Curry v. Burns, 225 Conn. 782, 801, 626 A.2d 719 (1993), we identified five scenarios in which the general verdict rule applies: “(1) denial of separate counts of a complaint; (2) denial of separate defenses pleaded as such; (3) denial of separate legal theories of recovery or defense pleaded in one count or defense, as the case may be; (4) denial of a complaint and pleading of a special defense; and (5) denial of a specific defense, raised under a general denial, that had been asserted as the ease was tried but that should have been specially pleaded.” The Appellate Court concluded that this case fit the fourth category. Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 32 Conn. App. 382.

       In support of their claim, the plaintiffs rely on a colloquy between the judge and the jury foreperson immediately following the delivery of the verdict. The judge asked: “when you use the word ‘inconclusive’ in your verdict, you mean that the plaintiffs have failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence their claims in this case . . . ?” The jury foreperson responded, “Yes.” Utica claims that this interchange is not properly before us because the plaintiffs failed to incorporate that portion of the transcript in the record of appeal to the Appellate Court. We need not decide this question because, in the context of this case, we interpret the term “inconclusive,” even in the absence of the foreperson’s clarification, to mean that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof.

       PractieeBook§ 4140 (a) provides in relevant part: “Upon the granting of certification, the appellee may present for review alternative grounds upon which the judgment may be affirmed provided those grounds were raised and briefed in the appellate court.”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Robert J. Busque
    (14794)
    Peters, C. J., Callahan, Borden, Berdon and Norcott, Js.
    Argued June 1—
    decision released June 28, 1994

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Rosita M. Creamer, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

      Susan M. Hankins, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The certified issues in this criminal appeal concern the circumstances in which the state may properly offer evidence of prior uncharged misconduct to impeach the credibility of a defendant who has testified on his own behalf. The defendant, Robert J. Busque, was convicted, after a jury trial, of four counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), one count of attempted sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) and 53a-71 (a) (1) and five related counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment against the defendant and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Busque, 31 Conn. App. 120, 623 A.2d 532 (1993). We granted the state’s petition for certification to review the Appellate Court’s conclusion that evidence of prior uncharged misconduct had been improperly admitted and that its admission was harmful.

The opinion of the Appellate Court fully describes the underlying facts of the defendant’s alleged sexual abuse of the victim, his teenage daughter. State v. Busque, supra, 31 Conn. App. 122-23. When the defendant was cross-examined by the state after testifying on his own behalf, he denied having engaged in sexual misconduct either with the victim or with his niece. Id., 124. The trial court then permitted the state to impeach the defendant’s credibility by calling the niece as a rebuttal witness to testify, in graphic detail, to her sexual abuse by the defendant. Id., 124-25, 130. The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant had properly objected to the admissibility of evidence of this prior, uncharged misconduct with his niece; id., 128; and that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting the jury to hear this impeachment testimony, which was more prejudicial than probative. Id., 131. The Appellate Court further concluded that, especially in light of the state’s closing argument, the defendant had met his burden of showing that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was harmful. Id., 131 and n.6, 132. Accordingly, the Appellate Court remanded the case for a new trial. Id., 132.

The state contends, contrary to the conclusions of the Appellate Court, that the defendant’s claim of inadmissibility was not preserved at trial, that the evidence was properly admitted, and that the presentation of this evidence to the jury, if improper, was harmless. The Appellate Court expressly considered each of these contentions and correctly determined that, in the circumstances of this case, a new trial is required because of the highly prejudicial nature of the testimony that the trial court permitted the jury to consider. Id., 128-32. Having examined the record on appeal and having studied the briefs and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the detailed discussion contained in the Appellate Court’s opinion. State v. Johnson, 227 Conn. 611, 615, 630 A.2d 69 (1993); State v. Milton, 224 Conn. 163, 168, 617 A.2d 460 (1992).

The appeal is dismissed.

       General Statutes § 53a-71 provides in relevant part: “sexual assault IN THE SECOND DEGREE: CLASS C FELONY: NINE MONTHS NOT SUSPENDABLE. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is (1) under sixteen years of age ....
      “(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony for which nine months of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.”
      General Statutes § 53a-49 provides in relevant part: “criminal attempt: SUFFICIENCY OF CONDUCT; RENUNCIATION AS DEFENSE, (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he . . . (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
      “(b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose. . . .”
      General Statutes § 53-21 provides: “injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of, children. Any person who wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that its life or limb is endangered, or its health is likely to be injured, or its morals likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.”

       We granted the state’s petition for certification, limited to the following issues:
      “Did the Appellate Court improperly conclude:
      “1. In reviewing a nonconstitutional claim, that evidence was more prejudicial than probative, when the claim was unpreserved?
      “2. In ignoring the trial court’s narrow ruling on admissibility, and instead examining the details of testimony admitted after the ruling, in deciding whether the court abused its discretion in admitting such evidence as was relevant to the limited purpose?
      “3. In finding the limited use of the evidence harmful, when the jury was already well aware of the defendant’s misconduct?” State v. Busque, 226 Conn. 910, 628 A.2d 984 (1993).
      The phraseology of the issues mirrors the state’s view of the proceedings at trial and in the Appellate Court. In our plenary consideration of the state’s appeal, we are, of course, not bound by the state’s characterization of these events.


author: Palmer, J.

text:
    Marion Lees v. Middlesex Insurance Company
    (14670)
    Peters, C. J., Borden, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.

      Argued February 17—
    decision released June 28, 1994

      John T. Bochanis, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas J. Weihing, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      John W. Lemega, with whom was John B. Farley, for the appellee (defendant).
   Palmer, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the defendant, Middlesex Insurance Company, on the ground that the plaintiff, Marion Lees, had failed to allege valid claims under the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA); General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 38-60 et seq.; and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We have previously recited the relevant undisputed facts. Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 219 Conn. 644, 648, 594 A.2d 952 (1991). “On May 9,1982, a fire destroyed the home of the plaintiff. At the time of the loss, the plaintiffs home was insured by the defendant. On August 9, 1982, the plaintiff filed two proof of loss statements with the defendant, one for loss of the dwelling and the other for loss of the contents of the dwelling. By letter dated August 16, 1982, the defendant rejected both proofs of loss as being ‘excessive and premature.’ On November 1,1982, the defendant paid the plaintiff’s claim for loss of the dwelling but, without explanation, made no payment on the claim for loss of the contents. There was no further communication between the parties until August 23, 1983, when the plaintiff made a written inquiry requesting an explanation for the denial of her loss of contents claim.” The defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff’s inquiry.

On August 16,1985, the plaintiff filed a three count complaint alleging that the defendant had: (1) breached the insurance contract; (2) engaged in unfair insurance practices in violation of CUIPA; and (3) engaged in unfair trade practices in violation of CUTPA. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the one year suit limitation provision in the fire insurance contract. The trial court, Thompson, J., rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on all three counts, and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 23 Conn. App. 814, 581 A.2d 287 (1990). We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court had correctly concluded that the plaintiff’s CUIPA and CUTPA claims were barred by the one year limit for a suit on the policy. We reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court. Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., supra, 219 Conn. 657.

On remand, the defendant moved for summary judgment claiming, inter alia, that its alleged conduct in failing to settle the plaintiff’s loss of contents claim did not, as a matter of law, constitute an unfair or deceptive practice prohibited by CUIPA or CUTPA. The trial court, Lewis, J., rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the undisputed evidence failed to satisfy the requirement that the defendant had committed or performed unfair claim settlement practices “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice”; General Statutes § 38a-816 (6); and that absent a viable CUIPA claim, the plaintiff could not prevail under CUTPA.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court, in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, incorrectly concluded that: (1) multiple acts of misconduct by the defendant in the handling of the plaintiff’s single insurance claim were not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of General Statutes § 38a-816 (6) that the defendant had engaged in unfair settlement practices “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice”; and (2) the plaintiff could not prevail on her CUTPA count in the absence of a viable cause of action under CUIPA. We do not agree with the plaintiff’s claims.

I

The plaintiff acknowledges that a claim under CUIPA predicated upon alleged unfair claim settlement practices in violation of § 38a-816 (6) requires proof that the unfair settlement practices were committed or performed “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 509 A.2d 11 (1986). The plaintiff contends, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, that proof of an insurer’s commission of two or more unfair claim settlement practices in relation to only one insurance claim is sufficient to satisfy the “general business practice” requirement of § 38a-816 (6). Therefore, although the plaintiff has not alleged unfair settlement practices by the defendant in its handling of any other insurance claim or claims, she maintains that the defendant’s improper conduct in connection with her loss of contents claim is sufficient to establish the defendant’s liability under CUIPA. We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s interpretation of § 38a-816 (6).

In requiring proof that the insurer has engaged in unfair claim settlement practices “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice,” the legislature has manifested a clear intent to exempt from coverage under CUIPA isolated instances of insurer misconduct. Mead v. Burns, supra, 199 Conn. 666. The gravamen of the plaintiff’s claim is that the defendant unfairly failed to settle her claim, and her claim alone. We conclude that the defendant’s alleged improper conduct in the handling of a single insurance claim, without any evidence of misconduct by the defendant in the processing of any other claim, does not rise to the level of a “general business practice” as required by § 38a-816 (6).

Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 450, 627 A.2d 1329 (1993); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Carriage Lane Associates, 219 Conn. 772, 780-81, 595 A.2d 334 (1991). Because the defendant’s alleged unfair claim settlement practices, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, did not constitute a “general business practice” under § 38a-816 (6), the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the CUIPA count.

II

The plaintiff also contends that the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the CUTPA claim. The plaintiff argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the CUTPA count, based on the same alleged unfair claim settlement practices as the CUIPA count, required proof that the defendant’s conduct constituted a “general business practice.” We have previously considered and rejected this precise argument. In Mead v. Burns, supra, 199 Conn. 651, we concluded that a CUTPA claim based on an alleged unfair claim settlement practice prohibited by § 38a-816 (6) required proof, as under CUIPA, that the unfair settlement practice had been committed or performed by the defendant “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” In so holding, we observed that a CUTPA claim based on the public policy embodied in CUIPA must be consistent with the regulatory principles established therein, and that “[t]he definition of unacceptable insurer conduct in [§ 38a-816 (6)] reflects the legislative determination that isolated instances of unfair insurance settlement practices are not so violative of the public policy of this state as to warrant statutory intervention.” Id., 666. Because the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to satisfy the requirement under CUIPA that the defendant’s alleged unfair claim settlement practices constituted a “general business practice,” the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim could not survive the failure of her CUIPA claim. Accordingly, the trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the CUTPA count. The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 38-60 provides: “unfair practice prohibited. No person shall engage in this state in any trade practice which is defined in section 38-61 as, or determined pursuant to sections 38-62 and 38-63 to be, an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance, nor shall any domestic insurance company engage outside of this state in any act or practice defined in subsections (1) to (12), inclusive, of section 38-61. The commissioner shall have power to examine the affairs of every person engaged in the business of insurance in this state in order to determine whether such person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition or in any unfair or deceptive act or practice prohibited by sections 38-60 to 38-64, inclusive. When used in said sections, ‘person’ means any individual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, interinsurer, Lloyd’s insurer, fraternal benefit society, and any other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance, including agents, brokers and adjusters.” Section 38-60 has been recodified, effective January, 1991, and now is found at General Statutes § 38a-815.
      General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 38-61 provides in relevant part: “unfair practices defined. The following are defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance ....
      “(6) unfair claim settlement practices. Committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the following . . . (b) failing to acknowledge and act with reasonable promptness upon communications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies . . . (e) failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed; (f) not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear . . . (n) failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement. . . .” Section 38-61 has been recodified, effective January, 1991, and now is found at General Statutes § 38a-816. References to these provisions in this opinion are to the renumbered sections.

       General Statutes § 42-110b provides: “unfair trade practices prohibited. legislative intent, (a) No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.
      “(b) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsection (a) of this section, the commissioner and the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts to Section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (1)), as from time to time amended.
      “(c) The commissioner may, in accordance with chapter 54, establish by regulation acts, practices or methods which shall be deemed to be unfair or deceptive in violation of subsection (a) of this section. Such regulations shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the federal trade commission and the federal courts in interpreting the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
      “(d) It is the intention of the legislature that this chapter be remedial and be so construed.”
      General Statutes § 42-110g provides in relevant part: “action FOR DAMAGES. CLASS ACTIONS. COSTS AND FEES. EQUITABLE RELIEF, (a) Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b, may bring an action in the judicial district in which the plaintiff or defendant resides or has his principal place of business or is doing business, to recover actual damages. Proof of public interest or public injury shall not be required in any action brought under this section. The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper.
      “(b) Persons entitled to bring an action under subsection (a) of this section may, pursuant to rules established by the judges of the superior court, bring a class action on behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated who are residents of this state or injured in this state to recover damages. . . .
      “(d) In any action brought by a person under this section, the court may award, to the plaintiff, in addition to the relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery. In a class action in which there is no monetary recovery, but other relief is granted on behalf of a class, the court may award, to the plaintiff, in addition to other relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. In any action brought under this section, the court may, in its discretion, order, in addition to damages or in lieu of damages, injunctive or other equitable relief. . . .”

       The plaintiff did not seek certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the summary judgment rendered by the trial court on the breach of contract count.

       The defendant raises alternate grounds for affirmance of the trial court’s summary judgment on both the CUIPA and CUTPA claims. With respect to the CUIPA count, the defendant contends that CUIPA does not create a private cause of action. We decline to consider that claim because it is unnecessary for us to do so. See Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 657 n.5, 509 A.2d 11 (1986); Griswold v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 186 Conn. 507, 521 n.12, 442 A.2d 920 (1982). We similarly need not reach the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s CUTPA count must fail because she has not demonstrated an “ascertainable loss” under General Statutes § 42-110g (a).

       We note that of the sixteen categories of unfair insurance practices proscribed by General Statutes § 38a-816, only subsection (6) expressly requires proof that the unfair claim settlement practices enumerated therein were committed or performed “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.”

       The plaintiff suggests that the trial court, in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, improperly failed to consider three other suits filed against the defendant and two complaints against the defendant lodged with the insurance commissioner, all alleging CUIPA violations. The trial court correctly concluded, however, that the only misconduct alleged by the plaintiff in her complaint concerned the defendant’s handling of the plaintiff’s loss of contents claim. Furthermore, the record reflects, and the plaintiff does not dispute, that the three suits alleging CUIPA violations by the defendant were withdrawn, and the complaints were resolved on the basis of the defendant’s responses to the insurance commissioner. Because the plaintiff adduced no additional facts or information concerning any of those matters, the trial court properly determined that they were of no evidentiary value. See Dowling v. Kielak, 160 Conn. 14, 18, 273 A.2d 716 (1970).

       Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the defendant failed: (1) to acknowledge and act with reasonable promptness upon her inquiries about the claim; General Statutes § 38a-816 (6) (b); (2) to affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable time after submission of the required proof of loss statements; General Statutes § 38a-816 (6) (e); (3) to make a good faith effort to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of her claim, even though the defendant’s liability on the claim had become reasonably clear; General Statutes § 38a-816 (6) (f); and (4) to provide promptly “a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial” of the claim. General Statutes § 38a-816 (6) (n).

       The term “general business practice” is not defined in the statute, so we may look to the common understanding of the words as expressed in a dictionary. State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 809-10, 640 A.2d 986 (1994). “General” is defined as “prevalent, usual [or] widespread”; Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; and “practice” means “[performance or application habitually engaged in . . . [or] repeated or customary action.” Id.

       Our conclusion is in accord with that of the Appellate Court in Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn. App. 660, 671-72, 613 A.2d 838 (1992), where the court held that the plaintiff’s allegation of multiple unfair claim settlement practices by the defendant insurer in the handling of the plan-tiff’s workers’ compensation claim, absent an allegation of unfair settlement practices by the insurer in the handling of other claims, failed to state a cause of action under CUIPA. See also Aguilar v. United National Ins. Co., 825 F. Sup. 456 (D. Conn. 1993) (allegation of several unfair claim settlement practices by insurer in connection with a single claim does not state a claim under CUIPA).

       The plaintiff asserts, without further elaboration or substantiation, that her CUTPA claim is not based solely on the defendant’s alleged CUIPA violations. This assertion, however, is contradicted by the complaint and the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s request to revise, each of which makes plain that the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim is based on the same alleged conduct as the CUIPA claim.


text:
    Samuel Packtor v. Seppala and AHO Construction Company, Inc., et al.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14914.

      David A. Leff, in support of the petition.

      Rene G. Martineau, in opposition.
    Decided March 23, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 422 (AC 12089/12090), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“In the circumstances of this case, did the plaintiff state a cause of action under General Statutes §§ 29-389 and 29-391 even though he was not injured while attempting to escape a building during a fire or other similar emergency?”


author: Berdon, J.,

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Fernando Reis
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 521 (AC 11572), is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. This is a case where prosecutorial strategy, coupled with an unreasonable application of the hearsay rule by the trial court, effectively stripped away the defendant’s defense. A crucial witness, Antonio Gomes, refused to testify for the defense, asserting his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The state’s attorney refused to grant immunity to Gomes pursuant to General Statutes § 54-47a. I have no quarrel with the Appellate Court’s decision that the defendant was not entitled to a court order of immunity so that Gomes could testify.

I do, however, find troubling the Appellate Court’s decision that Gomes’ out-of-court statements given to the defendant’s investigator were not admissible as a declaration against penal interest. On two occasions, three months and nine months after the incident underlying the defendant’s conviction, the defendant’s investigator met with Gomes and obtained the statement that Gomes gave a gun to Steven Carloto, the alleged victim, several days before the incident. This statement would have corroborated the defendant’s defense that he did not have possession of the weapon and therefore was not guilty of violating General Statutes § 53a-217.

“[TJrustworthy third party statements against penal interest which are exculpatory to the defendant are admissible if the declarant is unavailable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boyd, 214 Conn. 132, 138, 570 A.2d 1125 (1990). This is not merely an evidential rule, but rather, it implicates the right to a fair trial under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. State v. DeFreitas, 179 Conn. 431, 449, 426 A.2d 799 (1980), citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973).

“Four considerations have been deemed relevant when examining the trustworthiness of declarations against penal interest: (1) the time of the declaration and the party to whom the declaration was made; (2) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case; (3) the extent to which the declaration is really against the declarant’s penal interest; [and] (4) the availability of the declarant as a witness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosado, 218 Conn. 239, 244-45, 588 A.2d 1066 (1991). “In determining whether the threshold level of trustworthiness [is] satisfied . . . the trial court does not have to find it to be absolutely trustworthy because if this were so, the province of the jury as the finder of fact and weigher of credibility would be entirely invaded. . . .’’(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hernandez, 204 Conn. 377, 390, 528 A.2d 794 (1987).

The state concedes that Gomes’ statements were against his penal interest and that Gomes was unavailable because of his invocation of the privilege. The Appellate Court held, however, that the statements failed to meet the first and second factors because there was a lapse of time between the occurrence and the statements; the statements were not made spontaneously, but in response to questioning; the statements were not made to a person “with whom he shared a close, confidential relationship”; and there was a lack of corroborative evidence. State v. Reis, 33 Conn. App. 521, 530, 636 A.2d 872 (1994).

The defendant points out, however, that the Appellate Court failed to consider several significant indicia of trustworthiness. First of all, three months and nine months are not particularly significant lapses of time, in view of the content of the statements. They do not relate to eyewitness testimony such as a description of a person, or the content of a conversation; memories of these types of experiences might quickly fade, distort and become unreliable. Instead, the statements address a simple transaction, the giving of a gun to Carloto several days before he was shot with the gun. Furthermore, absent some suggestion that the statements were staged or coerced, I disagree with the Appellate Court’s assertion that the statements are unreliable because they were not made spontaneously, but instead made in response to questioning by the investigator.

Second, the defendant states that the investigator was a retired Bridgeport police captain of twenty-five years experience who was neither a friend nor relative of the defendant. This neutrality weighs -in favor of, not against, the reliability of the statement. Cf. State v. Sanchez, 200 Conn. 721, 726, 513 A.2d 653 (1986) (witness’ intimate relationship with defendant was a factor “coloring” trustworthiness). In addition, a former police captain who would subject himself to testifying under oath would likely be aware of the great importance to the criminal justice process of having an accurate recording of the evidence he gathered.

Third, Gomes gave his statement on two different occasions to the investigator, despite the fact that the statement was against his penal interest. The state has identified no motive that Gomes might have had to lie to the investigator.

With regard to the second Rosado factor, the defendant points out that corroboration was provided. The defendant’s theory of defense was supported by another witness, who testified that he first saw the gun in Carloto’s hand. Carloto accurately identified the gun as a .38 caliber to hospital personnel after the incident, despite the state’s claim that the gun belonged to the defendant, was never handled by Carloto, and was only briefly viewed by Carloto during an altercation.

Finally, the defendant persuasively argues that the reasoning of the Appellate Court, particularly in regards to its requirement of a confidential relationship between the declarant and the witness, would in all practicality foreclose the admissibility of any statement by an unavailable declarant to a defendant’s investigator. Such a confidential relationship requirement could have the potential to work great injustice, as it may have in the present case.

John R. Gulash, Jr., in support of the petition.

C. Robert Satti, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided March 23, 1994

Based upon the foregoing, I believe that Gomes’ statements should have been admitted. Furthermore, in view of the state’s refusal to grant immunity to Gomes, there was an even more compelling reason for admissibility.

Fairness would dictate that when the state refuses to act in order to make available to the jury all the evidence—that is, in this case Gomes’ crucial defense testimony—this should be an important factor in tilting the scales in favor of allowing reasonably reliable out-of-court statements into evidence. Instead, in this case, we allow the state to have it both ways—the state blocks the live testimony of Gomes by not granting immunity, which we have held to be solely within the powers of the state’s attorney, and then successfully objects to Gomes’ out-of-court statement on the ground that it is not reliable. These types of tactics encourage defendants, such as Fernando Reis, to perceive that our system of justice is stacked against them. We should not permit that perception to exist.

I would certify the following question: "Whether the Appellate Court was correct in holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that exculpatory statements against the penal interest of a witness claiming the protection against self-incrimination, which statements were made to the defendant’s investigator, were not admissible?”

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

       The Appellate Court stated that the existence of a confidential relationship between the unavailable declarant and the in-court witness is a factor in determining the trustworthiness of a statement. State v. Reis, supra, 33 Conn. App. 530. This court has also repeatedly relied on this factor. State v. Hernandez, supra, 204 Conn. 392; State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 699, 523 A.2d 451 (1987); State v. Sanchez, supra, 200 Conn. 726. In fact, we stated in Hernandez that “the witness testifying as to the statement must be the one in whom the declarant would naturally confide.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Hernandez, supra, 392. This type of absolute and mechanistic reliance on a single indicia of reliability runs afoul of Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. 300, which “holds that trustworthy third party decíarations against penal interest which exculpate the accused and are critical to his defense cannot be excluded as hearsay in mechanical fashion when the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. . . .” State v. DeFreitas, supra, 179 Conn. 449.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Janet Graham

      Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 23, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 432 (AC 10501), is denied.


text:
    David A. Altschuler Trust v. Andrew Blanchette et al.

      Donald L. Altschuler, in support of the petition.

      Edward J. Dolan, in opposition.
    Decided March 23, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 570 (AC 12070), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Ronald Batson

      Todd Edgington, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 23, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 935 (AC 11928), is denied.


text:
    Connecticut Association of Child Caring Agencies et al. v. Rose Alma Senatore et al.

      Mark R. Kravitz, in support of the petition.

      Ralph E. Urban, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided March 25, 1994
   The petition of the plaintiff Connecticut Association of Child Caring Agencies for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 12986) is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petition of the plaintiff Connecticut Association of Child Caring Agencies for certification.


text:
    Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Carl Cornaglia et al.

    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14915.

      Donald C. Lunt, in support of the petition.

      Bruce A. Fontanella, in opposition.
    Decided March 25, 1994

       The defendant’s appeal was withdrawn October 17, 1994.

   The defendant Rose Marie Cornaglia’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 549 (AC 12098), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Assuming that a finding by the trial court was necessary to enable appellate review of the trial court’s decision, should the Appellate Court have remanded to the trial court for articulation of the reasons for its decision?”


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Charles Andrews

      John J. Bennett, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 25, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 590 (AC 11703), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Albert Ortiz

      Joseph A. Hourihan, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 25, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 929 (AC 11966), is denied.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification.


text:
    First National Trust Association v. William C. Hitt et al.

      Arthur M. Field, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Andrew J. McDonald, in opposition.
    Decided April 7, 1994
   Arthur M. Field’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 12918) is dismissed.


text:
    Daryl O’Rourke v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

      Patrick B. Crehan, in support of the petition.

      Robert L. Marconi, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided April 7, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 501 (AC 12118), is denied.


text:
    Stacia L. Roberto v. Honeywell, Inc., et al.

      Andrew J. O’Keefe, in support of the petition.

      Karen L. Murdoch, in opposition.
    Decided April 7, 1994
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 619 (AC 11705), is denied.


text:
    General Accident Insurance Company v. Susan McGee

      Michael J. Quinn, in support of the petition.

      Barbara E. Crowley, in opposition.
    Decided April 7, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 626 (AC 11744), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. David Adams

      David Adams, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided April 14, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 12358) is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Gary Grant

      John R. Williams, in support of the petition.

      Judith Rossi, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided April 14, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 647 (AC 11630), is denied.


text:
    Fleet Bank, N.A. v. Gianfranco Galluzzo et al.

      David C. Bloomberg, in support of the petition.

      Peter B. Rustin, in opposition.
    Decided April 14, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 662 (AC 11895), is denied.


text:
    Nancy Burton v. Planning Commission of the Town of Redding et al.
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 928 (AC 12306), is denied.

Nancy Burton, pro se, in support of the petition.

Michael N. LaVelle, in opposition.

Decided April 14, 1994


text:
    Kevin King v. Ricky Guiliani

      William F. Gallagher and Cynthia C. Bott, in support of the petition.

      John E. Tener and Linda L. Morkan, in opposition.
    Decided April 28, 1994
   Gregory Thompson’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 12988) is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Tyrone Sailor

      F. Mac Buckley, in support of the petition.

      Angela Macchiarulo, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided April 28, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 409 (AC 11681), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Steven Correia

      Francis T. Mandanici, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
    Decided April 28, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 457 (AC 12840), is denied.


text:
    Allan S. Mall v. Myrna Labow

      Myrna Labow, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided April 28, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 359 (AC 11289), is denied.


text:
    Warren P. Joblin v. Myrna Labow

      Myrna Labow, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided April 28, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 365 (AC 11875), is denied.


text:
    In re Donna M.

      Matthew J. Collins, in support of the petition.

      Helen M. Doherty, in opposition.
    Decided April 28, 1994
   The respondent father’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 632 (AC 12537), is denied.


text:
    In re Donna M.

      Maureen A. Chmielecki, in support of the petition.

      Helen M. Doherty, in opposition.
    Decided April 28, 1994
   The minor child’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 632 (AC 12537), is denied.


text:
    Forge Square Associates Limited Partnership v. Construction Services of Bristol, Inc., et al.

      Louis R. Pepe, in support of the petition.

      Raymond A. Garcia, Gregory R. Faulkner and Constantine G. Antipas, in opposition.
    Decided April 28, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 669 (AC 12127), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Michael A. Walker

      Lori Welch-Rubin, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided April 28, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 763 (AC 12841), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Lamont A. Barnes
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 603 (AC 11640), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that, in the absence of an offer of proof, the defendant failed to present an adequate record to permit review of the trial court’s limitation of his cross-examination of the victim to establish a motive to fabricate a claim of theft?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14928.

Susan M. Hankins, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

MitchellS. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided May 6, 1994


text:
    Herbert J. Stiefel et al. v. George L. Lindemann et al. Belle Terre Associates et al. v. George L. Lindemann et al.

      Steven R. Humphrey and Linda L. Morkan, in support of the petition.

      Howard B. Naylor and Douglas R. Steinmetz, in opposition.
    Decided May 6, 1994
   The petition of the defendants George L. Lindemann and Frayda Lindemann for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 799 (AC 11827/11834), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Justo Cruz

      Kenneth W. Simon, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 6, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 849 (AC 12261), is denied.


text:
    John Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation Company et al.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14927.

      Robert F. Carter, in support of the petition.

      Karen P. Blado and Kevin J. Maher, in opposition.
    Decided May 6, 1994
   The claimant John Muldoon’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 695 (AC 12112/12113), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the prior stipulation barred the claimant’s claim, as a matter of law?”


text:
    Wilson S. Kistler et al. v. Douglas Gnazzo et al.

      Jeffrey J. Mirman, in support of the petition.

      Keith E. Krusz and Robert J. Cathcart, in opposition.
    Decided May 6, 1994
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 943 (AC 12114), is denied.


text:
    Elizabeth Gallagher, Executrix (Estate of Thomas Gallagher) v. J. William Burns, Commissioner of Transportation, et al.

      Steven P. Kulas, in support of the petition.

      Edward P. Brady III, in opposition.
    Decided May 6, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 945 (AC 12315), is denied.


text:
    Roger A. Maniccia v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, et al.

      Roger A. Maniccia, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Sharon Scully, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided May 6, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 945 (AC 12433), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Pasquale Villano

      Deborah DelPrete Sullivan, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Leah Hawley, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 12, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 162 (AC 11515), is granted. It is further ordered that the matter be remanded to the Appellate Court for reconsideration in light of this court’s decision in State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285 (1994).

In view of our remand without further proceedings in this court, the provisions of Practice Book § 4138 are waived.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Eric Ash
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 782 (AC 11438), is granted, limited to the following issue:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14929.

Ramona S. Carlow, special public defender, in support of the petition.

John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided May 12, 1994

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that a misstatement of the law on the duty to retreat imposed by General Statutes § 53a-19 (b) contained in the trial court’s jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?”


text:
    F. P., Inc. v. Collegium and Wethersfield Limited Partnership et al.

      Peter B. Rustin, in support of the petition.

      Thomas R. Legenhausen and GinaM. Varano, in opposition.
    Decided May 12, 1994
   The defendant Michael C. Bellobuono’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 826 (AC 12617), is denied.


text:
    New England Mutual Life Insurance Corporation v. City of Stamford

      Elliott B. Pollack and Gregory F. Servodidio, in support of the petition.
    Decided May 12, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13085) is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Anthony Arena
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14933.

      Martin Zeldis, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 25, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 468 (AC 11564), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly hold that the defendant’s request to charge on a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree was inadequate because an appropriate instructional request had not been made in that the defendant had cited to only three specific authorities, all revolving around the requirements of State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576 (1980), in the text of his request to charge?

“2. Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the trial court’s refusal to give an instruction on robbery in the second degree to the jury?”


text:
    Elizabeth Anderson v. Douglas S. H. Anderson

      Douglas S. H. Anderson, pro se, in support of the petition.

      P. Benedict Fraser, in opposition.
    Decided May 25, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 944 (AC 12061), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Che Carter
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 14934.

      John R. Williams, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn K. Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 25, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 58 (AC 12839), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Was the Appellate Court correct in holding that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the law of self-defense?”


text:
    Douglas Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction

      Donald Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Harry Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided May 25, 1994
   The petitioner Douglas Johnson’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 153 (AC 12146), is denied.


text:
    Connecticut National Bank v. Wolcott Development Company et al.
   The petition of the defendants Wolcott Development Company, Francis J. Hubeny, Jeffrey M. Hubeny, Bruce E. Carusillo and Michael J. Giammatteo for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 12785) is denied.

Peter B. Rustin, in support of the petition.

Marc S. Edrich and Jeanine M. Dumont, in opposition.

Decided May 26, 1994


text:
    Barbara A. Bies v. Michael Bies

      Enrico Vaecaro, in support of the petition.

      John A. Corona, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 13370) is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Rodney J. Suplicki

      Leah Hawley, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 126 (AC 12053), is denied.


text:
    Charles S. Bradford et al. v. Steven Herzig

      Daniel E. Ryan III, in support of the petition.

      Miles F. McDonald, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 714 (AC 12192), is denied.


text:
    New England Savings Bank v. Steven Krijger, Administrator (Estate of Marinus Krijger)

      Steven Krijger, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Edward B. O’Connell, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 33 Conn. App. 940 (AC 12522), is denied.


text:
    Katherine Maluszewski v. Allstate Insurance Company

      Raymond T. DeMeo and Stephen E. Goldman, in support of the petition.

      William J. Sweeney, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 27 (AC 12024), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Vernon Shanks

      Brian J. Kornbrath, in support of the petition.

      Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 103 (AC 11633), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Clinton Savage

      Leah Hawley, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Sheila Huddelston, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 166 (AC 11964), is denied.


text:
    Richard P. Lawlor v. Louis S. Goldberg, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

      Thomas P. Heslin, in support of the petition.

      Alan N. Ponanski, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 189 (AC 12141), is denied.


text:
    State of Connecticut v. Tracey Turmon

      Jeffrey D. Hutcoe, in support of the petition.

      Pamela S. Meotti, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 191 (AC 12232), is denied.


text:
    Peter F. Duncan v. Louis S. Goldberg, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, et al.

      Jon L. Schoenhorn, in support of the petition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 201 (AC 12676), is denied.


text:
    Shippan Point Association, Inc., et al. v. Charles McManus et al.

      Robert W. Green, in support of the petition.

      Leo Gold, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 209 (AC 12338), is denied.


text:
    Scarsdale National Bank and Trust Company v. Robert A. Schmitz et al.

      Robert A. Schmitz, pro se, and Marion B. Schmitz, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Ellery E. Plotkin, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The petition of the defendants Robert A. Schmitz and Marion B. Schmitz for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 905 (AC 11990), is denied.


text:
    Dime Savings Bank of New York, F.S.B. v. Peter Z. Wu et al.

      Paul L. Bollo, in support of the petition.

      Robert G. Golger, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The petition of the defendants Peter Z. Wu and Judy M. Wu for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 901 (AC 12130), is denied.


text:
    Ibsen Brothers, Inc. v. David C. Goldman et al.

      Gordon R. Raynor, in support of the petition.

      David R. Schaefer, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 904 (AC 12431), is denied.


text:
    Deutsche Bank Compagnie Financiere Luxembourg, S. A., et al. v. Karl L. Hermann et al.

      Robert A. Schmitz, pro se, and Marion B. Schmitz, pro se, in support of the petition.

      John F. Lambert, in opposition.
    Decided June 9, 1994
   The petition of the defendants Robert A. Schmitz and Marion B. Schmitz for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 34 Conn. App. 907 (AC 11991), is denied.