author: PALMER, J.

text:
    NEIL JOHNSON v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
    (SC 15882)
    Callahan, C. X, and Berdon, Palmer, McDonald and Peters, Js.
    Argued September 25, 1998
    officially released March 16, 1999

      Neil Johnson, the appellant (plaintiff).

      Cathy A. Dowd, assistant bar counsel, for the appel-lee (defendant).
   Opinion

PALMER, J.

The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether an attorney against whom a grievance complaint has been filed with the statewide grievance committee (committee) must exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial recourse from an adverse ruling of the committee. The plaintiff, Neil Johnson, an attorney, sought a permanent injunction in the Superior Court prohibiting the committee from taking any further action on a grievance complaint that had been filed against him. The committee moved to dismiss the plaintiffs action, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action because the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The trial court granted the committee’s motion, and the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 47 Conn. App. 930, 705 A.2d 569 (1998). We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal limited to the following question: “Whether the Appellate Court properly affirmed the Superior Court’s decision granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss when it found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and has adequate remedies at law.” Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 244 Conn. 906, 714 A.2d 2 (1998). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal are undisputed. The plaintiff represented Joseph Willis in connection with a 1988 real estate transaction. Thereafter, on September 28, 1994, Willis filed a grievance complaint with the committee alleging that the plaintiff had engaged in professional misconduct relating to that transaction. On the same day, an attorney representing Willis filed a second complaint against the plaintiff concerning the same real estate transaction. On September 29,1994, the committee forwarded these complaints to the grievance panel for the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, geographical areas thirteen and fourteen (local panel). The local panel found that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that the plaintiff had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Consequently, the two complaints were dismissed on March 16, 1995.

On August 11, 1995, Willis filed his second grievance complaint against the plaintiff (grievance complaint no. 95-0107), alleging-a violation of rules 1.7 (b) and 1.8 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Like the two previous grievance complaints filed against the plaintiff by Willis and his attorney, this complaint alleged misconduct arising out of the plaintiffs representation of Willis in connection with the 1988 real estate transaction. The local panel, noting that “[t]he current grievance [complaint no. 95-0107] contains much more in the way of evidence [than had Willis’ earlier complaint], including affidavits from several allegedly disinterested persons,” found probable cause that the plaintiff had violated rules 1.7 (b) and 1.8 (a). On November 27,1995, the local panel forwarded its findings to the committee pursuant to what is now Practice Book § 2-32 (i) and General Statutes § 51-90f (d), and the committee, in accordance with what is now Practice Book § 2-35 (a) and General Statutes § 51-90g (a), referred the case to a reviewing subcommittee for a hearing pursuant to what is now Practice Book § 2-35 (c) and General Statutes § 51-90g (a).

The hearing was held on July 11, 1996, at which the plaintiff filed a motion with the reviewing subcommittee seeking dismissal of grievance complaint no. 95-0107 pursuant to what is now Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (D) on the ground that the complaint was duplicative of the two prior complaints that had been dismissed for lack of probable cause. The reviewing subcommittee denied the plaintiffs motion. On July 15, 1996, the plaintiff filed a motion with the committee to dismiss grievance complaint no. 95-0107, again claiming that, under Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (D), it was duplicative of the two earlier complaints. The committee declined to review the plaintiffs motion.

Before the reviewing subcommittee had conducted the scheduled hearing on the merits of grievance complaint no. 95-0107, the plaintiff, on August 28, 1996, filed an action in the Superior Court seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the committee and any of its reviewing subcommittees and local panels from taking any further action on that complaint. The committee moved to dismiss the plaintiffs claim on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The trial court agreed with the committee and, on November 25, 1996, granted its motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 47 Conn. App. 930.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable to attorney grievance complaints. The plaintiff further claims that, even if the doctrine generally is applicable to such complaints, he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement or, alternatively, that his case falls under an exception to the exhaustion doctrine. We disagree with each of these claims and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

The plaintiff first claims that because the committee is not an “agency” within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to complaints filed with the committee. The committee does not dispute that it is not an “agency” for purposes of UAPA, but nevertheless contends that the exhaustion doctrine is applicable to cases pending before it. We agree with the committee.

“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law. . . . The doctrine provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. . . . The doctrine is applied in a number of different situations and is, like most judicial doctrines, subject to . . . exceptions. Application of the doctrine to specific cases requires an understanding of its purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1969).

“The doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency’s findings and conclusions. . . . The doctrine . . . furthers the salutary goals of relieving the courts of the burden of deciding questions entrusted to an agency ... in advance of possible judicial review. . . . Most important, a favorable outcome will render review by the court unnecessary [because] as the United States Supreme Court has noted: A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene. McKart v. United States, [supra, 395 U.S. 195] . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346, 351-52, 542 A.2d 672 (1988). Thus, “[t]he two part rationale for the exhaustion doctrine is: (1) to effectuate the legislative intent that the issue in question be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief, and to give the reviewing court the benefit of the local board’s judgment . . . and (2) to relieve courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions that may be resolved satisfactorily through the administrative process.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Loulis v. Parrott, 241 Conn. 180, 191, 695 A.2d 1040 (1997); see also Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 202 Conn. 150,155, 520 A.2d 186 (1987) (doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is “designed to prevent piecemeal appeals of a litigant’s claims before an administrative agency” [internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, “judicial review may be hindered by the failure of the litigant to allow the agency to make a factual record, or to exercise discretion or apply its expertise. . . . [N]otions of administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors. . . . [I]t is possible that frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 215 Conn. 616, 625, 577 A.2d 1017 (1990).

“Where a statutory requirement of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by [legislative] intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consistent with the statutory scheme. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502 n.4 [102 S. Ct. 2557, 73 L. Ed. 2d 172] (1982).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 579-80, 109 S. Ct. 1361, 103 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1989). Consequently, “[t]he requirement of exhaustion may arise from explicit statutory language or from an administrative scheme providing for agency relief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Howell v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1995); accord Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1993). Although the grievance procedures enumerated in General Statutes §§ 51-90 through 51-94 and Practice Book § 2-29 et seq. do not expressly require the exhaustion of administrative remedies before a judicial remedy may be sought, we nevertheless conclude that, in light of the comprehensive nature of the administrative scheme, exhaustion of the remedies available thereunder is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial relief.

A review of the administrative procedures applicable to attorney grievance complaints reflects the intricate nature of the scheme. When a grievant files a complaint alleging attorney misconduct, the complaint is first directed to the statewide bar counsel. The statewide bar counsel then either forwards the complaint to a local grievance panel for investigation or refers the complaint to the chair of the committee, or an attorney designee of the chair, and to a nonattorney member of the committee. Practice Book § 2-32 (a). If the latter action is taken, the statewide bar counsel, in conjunction with the chair or the chair’s attorney designee and the nonattomey member, shall, if deemed appropriate, dismiss the complaint on any one or more of eight enumerated grounds. If the complaint is not dismissed, the local grievance panel must determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the attorney has engaged in professional misconduct. General Statutes § 51-90f (a); Practice Book § 2-32 (f). The committee itself, or a reviewing subcommittee, then reviews the local grievance panel’s determination. General Statutes § 51-90g (a); Practice Book § 2-35 (c). If the reviewing subcommittee agrees with a local grievance panel’s no probable cause determination, the reviewing subcommittee is authorized to dismiss the complaint. General Statutes § 51-90g (g); Practice Book § 2-35 (h).

Whenever probable cause for attorney misconduct is found, either the committee or a reviewing subcommittee conducts a public hearing on the complaint. General Statutes § 51-90g (a) and (b); Practice Book § 2-35 (c). The complainant and the respondent may be represented by counsel at the hearing and the respondent may present evidence and witnesses. General Statutes § 51-90g (b); Practice Book § 2-35 (d). If the reviewing subcommittee has conducted the hearing, it “may propose in its decision that the complaint be dismissed, that conditions be imposed in accordance with the rules established by the judges of the Superior Court, that the attorney be reprimanded or that the attorney be presented to the Superior Court for reprimand, suspension or disbarment.” General Statutes § 51-90g (e); see also Practice Book § 2-35 (e). The complainant and the respondent may submit a statement to the committee in support of, or in opposition to, the reviewing subcommittee’s proposed decision, and the committee may, in its discretion, request oral argument. General Statutes § 51-90h (a); see also Practice Book §§ 2-35 (g) and 2-36. Thereafter, the committee must “issue a decision dismissing the complaint, reprimanding the respondent, imposing conditions in accordance with the rules established by the judges of the Superior Court, directing the State-Wide Bar Counsel to file a presentment against the respondent or referring the complaint to the same or a different reviewing subcommittee for further investigation and proposed decision.” General Statutes § 51-90h (b); see also Practice Book § 2-36.

These statutory and practice book provisions establish a comprehensive administrative mechanism for the investigation and resolution of attorney grievance complaints. See Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 554, 663 A.2d 317 (1995) (General Statutes § 51-90 et seq. and parallel rules of practice constitute comprehensive disciplinary scheme designed to safeguard administration of justice). Under this approach, fact-finding is undertaken at the administrative level and grievance complaints often are resolved or narrowed at that stage, thereby fostering judicial efficiency by delegating the responsibility for administering the grievance process in the first instance to the committee, and its reviewing subcommittees and local panels. Allowing parties to circumvent the established grievance procedures, at least in the absence of a compelling justification for doing so, would so undermine the process as to render it ineffectual. Such a result reasonably could not have been contemplated by the framers of the administrative scheme, who created the committee and its subcommittees to act as an arm of the court in safeguarding the administration of justice, preserving public confidence in the system, and protecting the public and the court from unfit practitioners. Id.

Further support for the committee’s contention regarding the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine to attorney grievance complaints may be found in the deference accorded committee decisions under the rules governing such complaints. For example, judicial review of a committee decision to reprimand an attorney, like judicial review of an agency determination under UAPA, is limited, both with respect to the committee’s factual findings and its determination regarding the suitability of a reprimand as the sanction to be imposed. See Practice Book § 2-38 (f); see also Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228, 235, 578 A.2d 1075 (1990) (no reason why attorney’s right to judicial review in disciplinary matter should be different than process accorded other professionals in disciplinary matters before licensing or disciplinary boards). Such deferential judicial review reflects the view of the rulemaking authorities that the committee and its subcommittees are to play an integral role in the attorney grievance process.

In sum, the sweeping nature of the grievance procedures adopted by the legislature and the judges of the Superior Court, the sound policy reasons for adopting such procedures, and the deference accorded certain committee determinations, indicate a clear intent on the part of the legislature and the judiciary that attorney grievance complaints shall be adjudicated administratively in advance of any judicial review. We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable to the attorney grievance process.

II

Having determined that the plaintiff was obligated to exhaust the remedies available to him under our statutory and practice book provisions governing attorney grievance complaints, we now turn to the plaintiffs claim that he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement. We conclude that he has not.

The plaintiff contends that he had exhausted his administrative remedies because the committee refused to examine the reviewing subcommittee’s decision rejecting his motion to dismiss made pursuant to Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (D) on the ground that grievance complaint no. 95-0107 was duplicative of the earlier complaints filed against the plaintiff and later dismissed. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that because the committee characterized the reviewing subcommittee’s determination of that issue as “final”; see footnote 15 of this opinion; he had no further administrative remedies available to him.

This argument merits little discussion. The reviewing subcommittee never conducted a hearing on the merits of grievance complaint no. 95-0107. If, after such a hearing, the reviewing subcommittee had concluded that, as the plaintiff claims, he did not engage in professional misconduct as alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff will have achieved the result that he seeks, namely, a determination that the charges should be dismissed. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. Although the plaintiff might prefer to have had grievance complaint no. 95-0107 dismissed as duplicative rather than defend the complaint on its merits, his preference for a remedy at that earlier stage of the proceedings is of no moment when he has not exhausted other available administrative remedies. See Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 434, 673 A.2d 514 (1996). Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs argument that he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement.

III

The plaintiffs final claim is that he should be excused from exhausting his administrative remedies because his case falls within several recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. We are not persuaded.

“Despite the important public policy considerations underlying the exhaustion requirement, we have grudgingly carved several exceptions from the exhaustion doctrine. . . . We have recognized such exceptions, however, only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 432. “We have recognized that a party aggrieved by a decision of an administrative agency may be excused from exhaustion of administrative remedies if: recourse to the administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate; Greenwich v. Liquor Control Commission, 191 Conn. 528, 541-42, 469 A.2d 382 (1983); the procedures followed by the administrative agency are constitutionally infirm; LaCroix v. Board of Education, [199 Conn. 70, 79, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986)]; or injunctive relief from an agency decision is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm. Pet v. Department of Health Services, supra, [207 Conn.] 370.” Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 561, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993). The plaintiff asserts that he has satisfied the requirements of each of these three exceptions. We address, and reject, each of these claims in turn.

The plaintiff first contends that he need not comply with the exhaustion doctrine because both the reviewing subcommittee and the committee rejected his motion to dismiss for duplicative complaints, thereby rendering any further administrative remedies futile or inadequate. As we already have indicated, however, the plaintiff can obtain the remedy he seeks — dismissal of grievance complaint no. 95-0107 — if, after a hearing on the merits of the complaint, it is not established, by clear and convincing evidence, that he engaged in professional misconduct in connection with his representation of Willis in 1988. “It is not the plaintiffs preference for a particular remedy that determines whether the remedy ... is adequate . . . and an administrative remedy, in order to be ‘adequate,’ need not comport with the plaintiffs opinion of what a perfect remedy would be.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, supra, 236 Conn. 434; see also O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 419, 426, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995) (“an administrative remedy is adequate when it could provide the plaintiff with the relief that it seeks and provide a mechanism for judicial review”). Moreover, “[f]utility is more than a mere allegation that the administrative agency might not grant the relief requested. In most instances, [this court has] held that the failure to exhaust an administrative remedy is permissible only when the administrative remedy would be useless.” Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, 204 Conn. 551, 560, 529 A.2d 666 (1987). In light of the fact that it ultimately may be determined that the allegations of misconduct contained in grievance complaint no. 95-0107 lack merit, the plaintiff has failed to establish that the administrative remedies still available to him necessarily are futile or inadequate.

The plaintiff next claims that his constitutional due process rights were violated because the statewide bar counsel failed to follow the procedural mies governing attorney grievance complaints. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the statewide bar counsel improperly failed to forward the grievance complaint to the chair of the committee, or to an attorney designee of the chair, and to a nonattomey member of the committee for preliminary screening and possible dismissal as provided by Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (D). This claim also is without merit. Under Practice Book § 2-32 (a); see footnote 13 of this opinion; the statewide bar counsel has the discretion either to forward the complaint to a local grievance panel for investigation and review; Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (1); or to refer the complaint to the chair of the committee, or to the chair’s attorney designee, and to a nonattorney member of the committee for screening and possible dismissal. Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2). In this case, the statewide bar counsel opted to forward the complaint to the local panel in accordance with the express provisions of the rule. Contraiy to the plaintiffs claim, nothing in Practice Book § 2-32 mandates that the statewide bar counsel refer an allegedly duplicative complaint for preliminary screening under Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2). Furthermore, an attorney who is the subject of a duplicative complaint does not have an absolute right, under Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (D), to dismissal of that complaint. On the contraiy, Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) provides that a complaint shall be dismissed only “if deemed appropriate(emphasis added); by the chair of the committee, or the chair’s attorney designee, and the nonattomey member acting in conjunction with the statewide bar counsel. Because the statewide bar counsel acted properly in referring the matter to a grievance panel under what is now Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (D), the plaintiffs due process claim must fail.

Finally, the plaintiff contends that he should be excused from failing to exhaust his administrative remedies because injunctive relief is necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to his practice and reputation. He claims, in conclusory terms, that a public hearing on the allegedly duplicative complaint would irreparably damage his professional standing and reputation and also cause him unnecessary expense. We rejected a similar claim in Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, supra, 207 Conn. 370-73, wherein we concluded that any harm to the plaintiff physician that might arise from further disciplinary proceedings before the department of health services did not excuse the plaintiff from exhausting his administrative remedies. As we stated in Pet, “[t]he administrative framework was not designed for instant resolution despite the foreseeability of physicians suffering temporary problems due to the pendency of serious charges against them.” Id., 373; see also Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162, 170-71, 575 A.2d 210 (1990) (any damage to attorney’s reputation arising from committee’s public dissemination of probable cause determination was neither irreparable nor violative of attorney’s due process rights because attorney had opportunity to refute charges at subsequent hearing). Although we acknowledge that an attorney who is the subject of a grievance complaint may suffer some harm merely by virtue of a probable cause determination, “[a] party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel, 235 Conn. 559, 562-63, 668 A.2d 367 (1995). The plaintiff has failed to establish that any conceivable harm he might suffer as a result of a public hearing on grievance complaint no. 95-0107 would rise to a level warranting equitable intervention by the Superior Court. In such circumstances, the very hearing that the plaintiff seeks to avoid affords him an adequate legal remedy. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot bypass available administrative remedies simply because of his desire to avoid a public hearing before the reviewing subcommittee.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The grievance procedures applicable to complaints against attorneys are set forth in General Statutes §§ 51-90 through 51-94, and Practice Book § 2-29 et seq. The statutory and practice book provisions governing the discipline of attorneys parallel each another in all material respects.

       Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that the allegations contained in the second grievance complaint against the plaintiff were the same as, or substantially similar to, the allegations contained in Willis’ grievance complaint.

       “Each judicial district has one or more grievance panels. A grievance panel consists of two members of the bar and one layperson, all of whom are appointed by the Superior Court. General Statutes § 51-90b. A grievance panel investigates and determines whether probable cause exists for all complaints referred to it by the statewide grievance committee or the statewide bar counsel. General Statutes § 51-90Í.” Lewis v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 235 Conn. 693, 696 n.5, 669 A.2d 1202 (1996); see also Practice Book § 2-29.

       “The professional rights and obligations of attorneys practicing within Connecticut are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct, which were adopted in 1986 by the judges of the Superior Court.” Kucej v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 239 Conn. 449, 451 n.2, 686 A.2d 110 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1276, 117 S. Ct. 2457, 138 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1997). The record does not reflect what specific violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct were alleged in the two complaints.

       At all times relevant to this appeal, rule 1.7 (b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provided: “A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless:
      “(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
      “(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.”

       At all times relevant to this appeal, rule 1.8 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provided: “A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
      “(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
      “(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and
      “(3) The client consents in writing thereto.”
      This rule has since been amended to address, inter alia, transactions with former clients, investment services and the need to advise the client about seeking the advice of independent counsel.

       Practice Book § 2-32 (i), formerly § 27F (g), provides: “The panel shall, within one hundred and ten days from the date the complaint was referred to it, file the following with the statewide grievance committee: its written determination concerning whether probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, a copy of the complaint and response, a transcript of any testimony heard by the panel, a copy of any investigatory file and copies of any documents, transcripts or other written materials which were available to the panel. These materials shall constitute the panel’s record in the case. The panel may file a motion for extension of time not to exceed thirty days with the statewide grievance committee which may grant the motion only upon a finding of good cause. If the panel does not complete its action on a complaint within the time provided in this section, the statewide committee shall inquire into the delay and shall order that the panel take action on the complaint forthwith, or order that the complaint be forwarded to and heard by another panel or a reviewing committee designated by the statewide grievance committee.”
      Practice Book § 27F (g), which was in effect at the relevant time in question, is identical except that the 110 day filing period was a ninety day filing period.

       General Statutes § 51-90f (d) provides: “The panel shall refer the record of its investigation, together with its determination that probable cause or no probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct, to the committee for appropriate action and any such determination shall be a matter of public record.”

       Practice Book § 2-35 (a), formerly § 27J (a), provides in relevant part: “Upon receipt of the record from a grievance panel, the statewide grievance committee may assign the case to a reviewing committee which shall consist of at least three members of the statewide grievance committee, at least one third of whom are not attorneys. ...”

       General Statutes § 51-90g (a) provides in relevant part: “The State-Wide Grievance Committee may designate at least three members of the committee, including at least one-third who are not attorneys, to serve as a reviewing subcommittee for each determination made by a panel on a complaint. . .

       Practice Book § 2-35 (c), formerly § 27J (c), provides: “If the grievance panel determines that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall hold a hearing on the complaint. If the grievance panel determines that probable cause does not exist, the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall review the determination of no probable cause, take evidence if it deems it appropriate and, if it determines that probable cause does exist, shall take the following action: (1) if the statewide grievance committee reviewed the grievance panel’s determination, it shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint or assign the matter to a reviewing committee to hold the hearing; or (2) if a reviewing committee reviewed the grievance panel’s determination, it shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint or refer the matter to the statewide grievance committee which shall assign it to another reviewing committee to hold the hearing. All hearings following a determination of probable cause shall be public and on the record.”

       General Statutes § 51-90g (a) provides in relevant part: “The State-Wide Grievance Committee or the [reviewing] subcommittee, if any, shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint if the panel determined that probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct. If the grievance panel determined that probable cause does not exist that the attorney is guilty of misconduct, the committee or subcommittee shall review the determination of no probable cause, take evidence if it deems it appropriate and, if it determines that probable cause does exist that the attorney is guilty of misconduct, shall taire the following action: (I) If the State-Wide Grievance Committee reviewed the determination of the grievance panel it shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint or assign the matter to a subcommittee to hold the hearing; or (2) if a subcommittee reviewed the determination of the grievance panel it shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint or refer the matter to the State-Wide Grievance Committee which shall assign it to another subcommittee to hold the hearing. . . .”

       Practice Book § 2-32, formerly § 27F, covers the procedure for filing a grievance complaint. Section 2-32 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any person, or a grievance panel on its own motion, may file a written complaint alleging attorney misconduct whether or not such alleged misconduct occurred in the actual presence of the court. Complaints against attorneys shall be filed with the statewide bar counsel. Within seven days of the receipt of a complaint the statewide bar counsel shall review the complaint and process it in accordance with subdivisions (1) or (2) of this subsection as follows:
      “(1) forward the complaint to a grievance panel in the judicial district in which the respondent maintains his or her principal office or residence, provided that, if the respondent does not maintain such an address in this state, the st atewide bar counsel shall forward the complaint to any grievance panel; and notify the complainant and the respondent, by certified mail with return receipt, of the panel to which the complaint was sent. The notification to the respondent shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint. The respondent shall respond within thirty days of the date notification is mailed to the respondent unless for good cause shown such time is extended by the grievance panel. The response shall be sent to the grievance panel to which the complaint has been referred. The failure to file a timely response shall constitute misconduct unless the respondent establishes that the failure to respond timely was for good cause shown;
      “(2) refer the complaint to the chair of the statewide grievance committee or an attorney designee of the chair and to a nonattorney member of the committee, and the statewide bar counsel in conjunction with the chair or attorney designee and the nonattorney member, shall if deemed appropriate, dismiss the complaint on one or more of the following grounds . . .

        “(D) the complaint as duplicative of a previously dismissed complaint. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

       At the hearing on the plaintiffs motion, the assistant bar counsel, speaking on behalf of the reviewing subcommittee, indicated that the reviewing subcommittee lacked the authority to dismiss a duplicative grievance complaint at that stage of the proceedings because, under Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (D), the screening of duplicative grievance complaints is done prior to the committee’s referral of the case to a local grievance panel. See footnote 13 of this opinion.

         In an August 2,1996 letter to the plaintiff notifying him of the committee’s decision on his motion to dismiss, the statewide bar counsel stated that the committee had “declined to review your request [for dismissal], determining that the decision of the reviewing committee denying your [motion] was final.”

       The reviewing subcommittee had stayed the hearing on the merits of grievance complaint no. 95-0107 at the plaintiffs request.

       Under UAPA, a person who claims to be aggrieved by an action or decision of a state agency is required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before seeking recourse in the Superior Court. See General Statutes § 4-183 (a).

       See Weiss v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 227 Conn. 802, 811, 633 A.2d 282 (1993) (statewide grievance committee not agency for purposes of UAPA); Sobocinski v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 215 Conn. 517, 526, 576 A.2d 532 (1990) (same).

       Both General Statutes § 51-90e (a) and Practice Book § 2-32 (a) provide that a complaint against an attorney shall be filed with the statewide bar counsel.

       These grounds are enumerated in Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) as follows:
      “(A) [T]he complaint only alleges a fee dispute and not a clearly excessive or improper fee;
      “(B) the complaint does not contain a claim of misconduct; “(C) the complaint does not contain sufficient specific allegations on which to conduct an investigation;
      “(D) the complaint is duplicative of a previously dismissed complaint;
      “(E) the complaint alleges conduct occurring more than ten years prior to its filing;
      “(F) the complaint alleges misconduct occurring in a pending superior court, appellate court or supreme court action and the court has not been made aware of the allegations or in which the court has been made aware of the allegations of misconduct and has not referred the matter to the statewide bar counsel or statewide grievance committee;
      “(G) the complaint alleges personal behavior outside the practice of law which does not constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct;
      “(H) the complaint alleges the nonpayment of incurred indebtedness.”

       The committee deals with numerous attorney grievance complaints each year. According to the office of the statewide bar counsel, 1185 attorney grievance complaints were filed with the committee in fiscal year 1993. In fiscal year 1994, 1186 such complaints were filed, and in fiscal year 1995, 1156 were filed. K. Knox, “Understand the Grievance Process: It Could Happen To You,” Conn. Law., March 1996, p. 8 n.l.

       Practice Book § 2-38 provides in relevant part: “Appeal from Decision of Statewide Grievance Committee or Reviewing Committee to Reprimand. ...(f) Upon appeal, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the committee unless the court finds that substantial rights of the respondent have been prejudiced because the committee’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional, rules of practice or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the authority of the committee; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, rescind the action of the statewide grievance committee or take such other action as may be necessary. . . .”

       We also note that our conclusion is consistent with the Superior Court decisions that we have found to address this issue. See Brignole v. Statewide Grievance Committee, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 97 0572335S (December 29,1997) (Aurigernma,./.) (doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in attorney grievance context); Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 96 389085 (December 18, 1996) (Sullivan, </.) (same); Melnick v. Statewide Grievance Committee, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 3195 11 (June 26,1995) (Levin,,/.) (same); Maco v. Statewide Grievance Committee, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 94 546500S (June 14,1995) (Norko, J.) (14 Conn. L. Rptr. 374) (same).

       Of course, a proposed decision of the reviewing subcommittee dismissing the complaint is subject to review by the committee. See General Statutes § 51-90h (a) and (b); Practice Book §§ 2-35 (g) and 2-36.

       The committee also contends that the plaintiffs exhaustion claim must fail because the committee retained the authority to revisit the issue of duplicative complaints once the reviewing subcommittee had conducted a hearing on grievance complaint no. 95-0107 and forwarded its findings to the committee. We agree with the committee. At any hearing before the committee, the plaintiff will have the opportunity to present evidence regarding the duplicative nature of the complaint, and the committee will be required to consider the plaintiffs claim of duplicative complaints at that time. We acknowledge, however, that the committee’s use of the word “final” in characterizing the decision of the reviewing subcommittee rejecting the plaintiffs claim; see footnote 15 ol' this opinion; reasonably may have caused the plaintiff to believe that his claim concerning duplicative complaints had been definitively and finally resolved against him. Consequently, we do not base our conclusion rejecting the plaintiffs exhaustion claim on the fact that the committee has the authority to reconsider the plaintiffs claim of duplicative complaints after it has received the reviewing subcommittee’s findings and recommendations.

       In addition, after the reviewing subcommittee conducts its hearing on the merits of grievance complaint no. 95-0107, the committee may be persuaded to reconsider the reviewing subcommittee’s decision on the plaintiffs claim of duplicative complaints. See footnote 25 of this opinion; see also Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, supra, 227 Conn. 562 (“mere conclusory assertion that an agency will not reconsider its decision does not excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement”).

       We note that the plaintiff has not challenged the constitutionality of the administrative scheme, either as applied to duplicative complaints generally or to grievance complaint no. 95-0107.

       In accordance with committee procedures, “[a]II hearings following a determination of probable cause shall be public and on the record.” Practice Book § 2-35 (c); see also General Statutes § 51-90g (b).

       In Pet, “[t]he plaintiff offered considerable evidence that he claims demonstrates that he has suffered irreparable injury .... The plaintiff claim[ed] that he [was] subject to being disqualified from a prepaid health insurance program; his malpractice insurance was not renewed for a time and it took a lengthy resubmission and reconsideration process to do so; his name was excluded from a referral list of physicians; his practice . . . suffered a decrease in referrals from other physicians and a decrease in new patients. The plaintiff contended] that the negative impact on his practice [would] continue until the pending charges [were] resolved and that this call[ed] for injunctive relief.” Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, supra, 207 Conn. 372-73.

       We noted in Pet that “[i]t is possible that a hearing that has dragged on without resolution because of inexcusable actions by the [agency] could rise to the level of irreparable injury . . . .” Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, supra, 207 Conn. 373. No such claim has been made in this case. Indeed, the hearing on the merits of grievance complaint no. 95-0107 was stayed at the request of the plaintiff. See footnote 10 of this opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KATZ, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    TOWN OF STRATFORD v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 998
    (SC 15966)
    Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued January 20
    officially released March 23, 1999

      Richard J. Bulurla, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      J. William Gagne, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

KATZ, J.

The principal issue in this certified appeal involves the extent to which an arbitrator is bound, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, by a prior arbitration award involving the interpretation of the same provision of a contract between the same parties. We conclude that, as a matter of public policy, arbitrators are not required to give collateral estoppel effect to prior arbitral awards.

The following facts, which appear in the Appellate Court opinion, are pertinent to this appeal. “The plaintiff, the town of Stratford [town], and the [defendant, the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998 (union)] at all relevant times were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (agreement) that contained an arbitration clause. Under the arbitration clause, the parties agreed to submit unresolved grievances to the state board of mediation and arbitration (board). The parties further agreed that an arbitration decision by the board would be final.

“On December 12, 1991, the date on which the grievances involved in this appeal were filed, article I of the agreement provided that ‘the positions of assistant fire prevention chief, assistant fire chief, deputy fire chief and chief are not members of the union bargaining unit.’ Article XXII, § 1, of the agreement, however, provided that ‘all promotions in the Fire Department shall be made from eligibility hsts for each promotional classification, which fists shall be established through competitive merit examinations . . . The agreement also provided that when a vacancy occurred, it was to be filled by one of the three highest ranking candidates and that subsequent appointments were to be generated in the order of standing on the fist. Moreover, the agreement provided that when an eligibility fist expired, a new fist had to be established within ninety days.

“In 1991, the eligibility fists for the positions of assistant fire chief and lieutenant in the fire prevention bureau expired, and replacement fists were not created within ninety days. On December 12, 1991, the union filed a class action grievance against the town, no. 91-04, on behalf of the firefighters seeking positions in the fire prevention bureau. The grievance alleged that the town had violated the agreement because it had failed to establish new examinations and eligibility fists for the positions of assistant fire chief and lieutenant for the fire prevention bureau.

“On December 12,1991, the union also filed grievance no. 91-03, which was submitted to the board to determine if it was arbitrable. As did grievance no. 91-04, which was filed on the same day, no. 91-03 alleged that the town had violated article XXII, § 1, of the agreement. This grievance concerned the following events, which had occurred earlier in 1991. In April, 1991, the town administered a promotional examination for the position of assistant fire chief in the fire suppression division. On May 30, 1991, the results of the examination were posted and a list was established with eight individuals, ranked one through eight, with the candidate receiving the highest score ranked as number one. On or about June 3, 1991, the town interviewed the first three candidates on the eligibility list for a vacancy for the position of assistant fire chief in the fire suppression division. This vacancy was filled by the candidate who was ranked first. On or about December 11, 1991, the town interviewed the candidates ranked two through four for the assistant fire chief position, and the town selected the third ranked candidate over the second ranked candidate. On or about January 4, 1993, the town interviewed the remaining candidates for the assistant fire chief position for two additional vacancies in the fire suppression division. The town again selected lower ranked candidates over individuals with higher ranks. The union’s ground for grievance no. 91-03 was that the town had failed to promote employees on the eligibility list to assistant fire chief vacancies in the fire suppression division in the manner in which firefighters are to be selected from such lists as provided by § 1 of article XXII.

“On December 28, 1993, a panel of arbitrators of the board issued an award in grievance no. 91-04 [first award], holding that article XXII of the agreement did not apply. The board found that the grievance was not arbitrable because the promotions clause of the agreement did not apply to promotions to jobs outside of the bargaining unit, including promotions to the position of assistant fire prevention chief. A unanimous panel rejected the union’s contention that the parties had agreed orally in the 1987 negotiations to continue to apply article XXII to the assistant fire chief position.

“On March 17, 1994, a different panel of arbitrators issued an award holding that grievance no. 91-03 was arbitrable, which was inconsistent with the earlier decision. This second panel also decided that the issue to be decided was whether article XXII applies to employee promotions to the assistant fire chief position. The subject matter of this grievance thereafter proceeded on the merits before a third panel of arbitrators.

“On May 25, 1995, the third panel of arbitrators addressed the merits of no. 91-03 and issued an award [second award] holding that article XXII, § 1, did apply to promotions to the position of assistant fire chief and that the town had violated this provision. The two panels of arbitrators deciding aspects of grievance no. 91-03, therefore, reached conclusions on the issue of arbitrability that were at odds with the prior arbitration award, namely, that article XXII applies to promotions to the assistant fire chief position.

“On February 22, 1996, the town filed an application to vacate the [second award] pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4). The town argued that the arbitrators in no. 91-03 had incorrectly decided the award by failing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the interpretation of the agreement. The town argued that the decision of the panel in no. 91-04 controlled the contractual interpretation issue regarding the applicability of art icle XXII, § 1. A hearing was held on August 19, 1996, and on August 27, 1996, the Superior Court vacated the [second award]. The union filed [an] appeal challenging the trial court’s decision to vacate the [second award].” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 48 Conn. App. 849, 850-53, 713 A.2d 269 (1998).

In the Appellate Court, the union claimed that “the trial court improperly vacated the [second award] on two grounds. The union contended] that because the submission of the parties pertaining to grievance no. 91-03 was unrestricted, the award in that case was final and binding and [could not] be reviewed for errors of law or fact. The union contended], moreover, that even if the submission of an unrestricted arbitration award is reviewable for errors of law or fact, arbitrators in general are not bound by the decisions of other arbitrators. In this respect, the union argue [d] that the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to vacate the [second award]. The town claim[ed] that the trial court correctly vacated the arbitration award because the arbitrators exceeded their powers under § 52-418 (a) (4) and because the award violatefd] clear public policy in that the arbitration board did not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Id., 853-54.

The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that: (1) the arbitrators had not exceeded their powers under § 52-418 (a) (4); id., 858; and (2) “the trial court improperly [had] interpreted the public policy exception as a basis for vacating the arbitration award as to [the second award].” Id., 860.

We granted the town’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) “Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court improperly [had] vacated the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel [had] failed to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel with respect to a prior arbitration award on the same issue?”; (2) “Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court improperly [had] interpreted the public policy exception as a basis for vacating the arbitration award as to the grievance no. 91-03?”; and (3) “Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the arbitrators did not exceed their powers under General Statutes § 52-418 (a).” Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 245 Conn. 918, 717 A.2d 236 (1998). This appeal followed.

As to the first issue, we hold that arbitrators are not required to give preclusive effect to the decisions of prior arbitrators. We resolve the second issue in favor of the union, concluding that the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court improperly had interpreted the public policy exception to arbitral authority. Finally, as to the third issue, we conclude that the arbitrators did not exceed their authority under § 52-418 (a) (4).

I

Our analysis of this issue begins with a restatement of familiar principles. Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined. “When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties’ agreement. American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 185, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission. Hartford v. Board of Mediation & Arbitration, 211 Conn. 7, 14, 557 A.2d 1236 (1989); New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, 208 Conn. 411, 415-16, 544 A.2d 186 (1988). Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution. Middletown v. Police Local, No. 1361, 187 Conn. 228, 230, 445 A.2d 322 (1982); State v. Connecticut Employees Union Independent, 184 Conn. 578, 579, 440 A.2d 229 (1981).” Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 4-5, 612 A.2d 742 (1992). “Where the submission does not otheiwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators’ decision of the legal questions involved.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 340-41, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff d, 472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914, 86 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1985).

One of the principal reasons for this deference is that the scope of our review is expressly limited by § 52-418; Metropolitan District Commission v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 184, 237 Conn. 114, 118, 676 A.2d 825 (1996); and, sometimes, by the terms of the parties’ agreement. Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 5 (“[t]he authority of an arbitrator to adjudicate the controversy is limited only if the agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review”). We have stated on numerous occasions that arbitration is a creature of contract. See, e.g., American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, supra, 205 Conn. 185; O & G/O’Connell Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partnership No. 3, 203 Conn. 133, 145, 523 A.2d 1271 (1987); Board of Education v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 287, 195 Conn. 266, 269, 487 A.2d 553 (1985). Therefore, it is the arbitrator’s judgment that was bargained for and contracted for by the parties, and we do not substitute our own judgment merely because our interpretation of the agreement or contract at issue might differ from that of the arbitrator.

These well established principles governing consensual arbitration are subject to certain exceptions. “Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, we have, however, recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute; Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, [supra, 191 Conn. 344]; (2) the award violates clear public policy; Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown, 210 Conn. 333, 339, 555 A.2d 406 (1989); or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418. Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., [189 Conn. 16, 22-23, 453 A.2d 1158 (1983)].” Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 6.

With these well established principles forming the topography of our legal landscape, we begin our analysis of the first issue — whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court improperly had vacated the second award on the ground that the arbitration panel had failed to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel with respect to the first award, which involved the same issue. We conclude that the Appellate Court’s conclusion was proper.

“The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality. State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 466, 497 A.2d 974 (1985), on appeal after remand sub nom. State v. Paradise, 213 Conn. 388, 567 A.2d 1221 (1990). Collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970). Issue preclusion arises when an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and that determination is essential to the judgment. Scalzo v. Danbury, 224 Conn. 124, 128, 617 A.2d 440 (1992). Also, the issue must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 501, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McDowell, 242 Conn. 648, 655, 699 A.2d 987 (1997). Collateral estoppel “ ‘expresses] no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest.’ ” Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 813, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997), quoting State v. Ellis, supra, 465. It should be noted, however, that although collateral estoppel precludes subsequent litigation in our courts of issues meeting the above requirements, we have never addressed whether the doctrine properly applies in the context of arbitration. Therefore, at the core of this issue is a conflict between two competing policy considerations: (1) the desire to promote stability and finality of judgments, and the closely related interest of judicial economy; and (2) the desire to maintain the flexibility of the arbitral process.

The town asserts that “there is no satisfactory reason not to apply the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata to a prior arbitration in a subsequent arbitration.” Therefore, according to the town, the Appellate Court acted improperly in failing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude rearbitration of the issue of whether article XXII of the agreement applied to the position of assistant fire chief. In contrast, the union argues that, because arbitration is a creature of contract, an arbitrator need not grant precedential effect to a prior arbitration award unless the parties’ agreement specifically requires it to do so. Moreover, even if the agreement does contain such a requirement, the interpretation of that provision is properly left to an arbitrator in the first instance. We agree with the union.

Although the general principles of arbitration are well established in our case law, the precise issue before us is one of first impression in this court. We find illuminating, therefore, the opinions of federal courts that have considered the issue.

“It is black letter law that arbitration awards are not entitled to the precedential effect accorded to judicial decisions. Indeed, an arbitration award is not considered conclusive or binding in subsequent cases involving the same contract language but different incidents or grievances. . . . [A]n arbitrator’s refusal to follow a previous arbitrator’s inteipretation of a specific contractual provision does not expose an ensuing award to judicial tinkering . . . .” (Citations omitted.) El Dorado Technical Services, Inc. v. Union General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 961 F.2d 317, 321 (1st Cir. 1992). “Courts reviewing inconsistent arbitration awards have generally concluded that arbitrators are not bound by the rationale of earlier decisions and that inconsistency with another award is not enough by itself to justify vacating an award. Westinghouse Elevators of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, 583 F.2d 1184, 1186-87 (1st Cir. 1978). Principles of stare decisis and res judicata do not have the same doctrinal force in arbitration proceedings as they do injudicial proceedings . . . .” (Citations omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Local 420, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, 718 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1983) .

The overwhelming majority of federal jurisdictions that have considered this issue have held that arbitrators are not bound by the decisions of prior arbitrators. See, e.g., IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1998) (“arbitrators’ decisions are not intended to have precedential effect even in arbitration [unless given that effect by contract]”); Hotel Assn. of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25, AFL-CIO, 963 F.2d 388, 390-91 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[W]here the agreement is silent, the arbitrator may decline to follow arbitral precedent when his judgment is that earlier decisions are erroneous. . . . [T]he question whether a prior arbitral decision binds a subsequent arbitrator can be determined only by reference to the agreement itself. It falls to the second arbitrator, therefore, to answer that question in the first instance.” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); El Dorado Technical Services, Inc. v. Union General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, supra, 961 F.2d 321 (“an arbitration award is not considered conclusive or binding in subsequent cases involving the same contract language but different incidents or grievances”); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 199 v. United Telephone Co. of Florida, 738 F.2d 1564, 1571 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[the] severely circumscribed judicial role [in the arbitral process] does not allow courts to impose rules of precedent or to deprive arbitrators of jurisdiction to decide matters of contract interpretation”); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Local 420, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, supra, 718 F.2d 20-21 (recognizing that if different arbitrators decide identical issues, neither award will be set aside if each draws its essence from contract); Butler Armco Independent Union v. Armco, Inc., 701 F.2d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 1983) (“absent contractual language to the contrary, one arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not binding on a subsequent arbitrator”); Little Six Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local Union No. 8332, 701 F.2d 26, 29 (4th Cir. 1983) (agreeing with “solid, well-reasoned case law holding that the preclusive effect of a prior arbitral award is itself a question for arbitration”); New Orleans Steamship Assn. v. General Longshore Workers, ILA Local Union No. 1418, 626 F.2d 455, 468 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that issue of “[w]hether [an arbitration] award can be given an effect akin to res judicata or stare decisis with regard to future disputes that may arise between the parties . . . itself is a proper subject for arbitration”); Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas, 578 F.2d 250, 251 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting argument that arbitrator was bound by prior award); cf. American National Can Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 3628, 120 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding arbitrator not bound by two prior awards, because of factual distinctions, despite fact that awards involved same contract provision and similar issues); but see Action Distributing Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 1038, 977 F.2d 1021, 1026 (6th Cir. 1992) (implying that if issue in arbitration proceeding had been identical to that in prior award, collateral estoppel principles would apply). In light of the considerable amount of experience the federal courts have in deciding cases involving labor arbitration, we find their words instructive.

As we have noted, arbitration is a creature of contract. See American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, supra, 205 Conn. 185; O & G/O’Connell Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partnership No. 3, supra, 203 Conn. 145; Board of Education v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 287, supra, 195 Conn. 269. By including an arbitration clause in their contract, the parties bargain for a decision maker that is not constrained by formalistic rules governing courtroom proceedings and dictating judicial results. Rather, the arbitrator is governed by the terms of the parties’ contract — in this case, the collective bargaining agreement. It is also that agreement that sets limits on the arbitrator’s authority. In negotiating the agreement, the parties are free to bargain for whatever terms they choose, including a provision establishing a system of arbitral precedent. If, however, the parties elect not to include such a provision, or if one party’s attempts to negotiate for the inclusion of such a provision are unsuccessful, arbitrators are free to attach to prior awards whatever precedential value they deem appropriate. Put simply, the parties bargain for the arbitrator’s independent judgment and sense of justice, unfettered by the opinions of other arbitrators.

Moreover, even when the parties elect to include in their contract a provision conferring precedential effect upon prior awards, the interpretation of such a provision itself is properly left to an arbitrator, initially, rather than to the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated: “Because the authority of arbitrators is a subject of collective bargaining, just as is any other contractual provision, the scope of the arbitrator’s authority is itself a question of contract interpretation that the parties have delegated to the arbitrator.” (Emphasis added.) W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757, 765, 103 S. Ct. 2177, 76 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1983); see also Butler Armco Independent Union v. Armco, Inc., supra, 701 F.2d 255-56 (“the question whether the re-arbitration provision covered the dispute between the parties was itself a matter of interpretation which the collective bargaining agreement required the arbitrator, rather than the court, to resolve,” citing Local 1 OS of the International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO v. RCA Corp., 516 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 [3d Cir. 1975]). Therefore, the extent to which an arbitrator is bound by the decision of a previous arbitrator is an issue that falls to the second arbitrator to resolve in the first instance.

The town responds to the argument that collateral estoppel should not apply in the arbitration context because arbitration is a creature of contract, by stating: “[T]he fact that arbitration is a creature of contract [should not] preclude the application of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, especially where, as here, the parties have expressly agreed that arbitration awards shall be ‘final and binding.’ ” Additionally, throughout its brief, the town asserts that the “final and binding” language of the agreement at issue in this case mandates that prior arbitration awards be given precedential effect on later ones. We disagree.

The defendant’s assertion disregards the fact that it is within the province of the arbitrator to interpret every provision in the agreement before him or her, including the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase “final and binding.” Accord Hotel Assn. of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25, AFL-CIO, supra, 963 F.2d 390 (“[t]he ‘final and binding’ clause does not so unequivocally import the principle of precedent into arbitral decisionmaking that [the second arbitrator is] obliged expressly to consider [the first award]”); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 199 v. United Telephone Co. of Florida, supra, 738 F.2d 1572 (“whether [the ‘final and binding’ clause] establishes arbitration as binding precedent is a matter of contract interpretation for the arbitrator”; “whether or not the award is ‘final’ in a stare decisis sense is an issue for further arbitration”). Although one arbitrator might interpret such a phrase so as to require the application of collateral estoppel or res judicata principles, a subsequent arbitrator is free to construe that language as applicable only to subsequent arbitrations between the exact same parties, on the same contract provision, on precisely the same facts. In other words, the scope of such a phrase is determined by each arbitrator in turn.

Finally, our conclusion on this issue finds additional support in the single tiered nature of most arbitration proceedings. Unless parties have contracted for one, there is no appellate level in the arbitral process, that is, no opportunity for second review outside of those provided by statute and the limited exceptions set forth in Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 6. This fact, in conjunction with the exceedingly narrow scope of judicial review of arbitrators’ awards, makes it all the more important that arbitrators be afforded the greatest opportunity to render correct decisions. Allowing arbitrators the flexibility to follow arbitral precedent where they deem appropriate, but disregard it when they conclude otherwise, creates an informal system of checks and balances in the arbitral process and thus helps to ensure that arbitration proceedings result in just dispositions.

On the basis of the foregoing, we believe that rigid adherence to the doctrine of collateral estoppel would impair the flexibility and discretion that lies at the core of the arbitral process. Therefore, we hold that, in the absence of a specific contract provision to the contrary, an arbitrator is not bound to follow prior arbitration decisions, even in cases in which the grievances at issue involve the same parties and interpretation of the same contract provisions. Although an arbitrator may find well reasoned prior awards to be a compelling influence on his or her decision-making process, the arbitrator need not give such awards preclusive effect. Rather, the arbitrator should bring his or her own independent judgment to bear- on the issue to be decided, using prior awards as the arbitrator sees fit, as it is the arbitrator’s judgment for which the parties had bargained.

II

As previously noted, a court may vacate an arbitration award on the ground that it rules on the constitutionality of a statute, violates a clear public policy or contravenes any of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418 (a). Gar-rity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 6. The town challenges the second award on the second and third grounds. We address, and reject, both arguments in turn.

A

The town contends that the award violates clear public policy in favor of the application, where appropriate, of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We disagree. Our decision that the very nature of arbitration makes the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable to the arbi-tral process implicitly resolves, in the union’s favor, the question of whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court improperly had interpreted the public policy exception in vacating the second award. We will nevertheless discuss the issue briefly in the interest of providing more thorough guidance.

The public policy challenge to arbitration awards “is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award approving conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a contract between them. . . . When a challenge to the arbitrator’s authority is made on public policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator’s decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award. . . . Accordingly, the public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed and [a] court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s interpretation of [collective bargaining agreements] is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. [United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43, 108 S. Ct. 364, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1987)] . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown, supra, 210 Conn. 339-40; see also Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 7 (“[t]he public policy exception applies only when the award is clearly illegal or clearly violative of a strong public policy”). Therefore, in light of the exceedingly narrow scope of the public policy limitation on an arbitrator’s authority, for the town to prevail on this claim it must demonstrate that the second award clearly contravenes an established public policy.

The town argues that the arbitration panel that issued the second award failed to adhere to the public policy mandating that the doctrine of collateral estoppel be applied to prior arbitrations. The town asserts that “[n]ot giving res judicata and collateral estoppel effect to prior arbitration awards defeats the whole purpose of arbitration by perpetuating repeated litigation of the same issue, thereby rendering the arbitration system inefficient and uneconomical.” Our discussion in part I of this opinion demonstrates our disagreement with the town’s assertion. We reiterate that one of the fundamental principles of arbitration is that the process must be flexible enough to allow parties to negotiate their contracts as they choose, and they must be free in the first instance to decide for themselves whether arbitrators should give collateral estoppel effect to prior awards. We reiterate, however, that any such contract provision purportedly determining the precedential effect of prior arbitral awards is itself subject to an arbitrator’s interpretation.

We acknowledge that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is enforced on public policy grounds; see, e.g., Connecticut Natural Gas Corp. v. Miller, 239 Conn. 313, 324, 684 A.2d 1173 (1996); as it “embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality.” State v. McDowell, supra, 242 Conn. 655, citing State v. Ellis, supra, 197 Conn. 466. Implicit in our conclusion that arbitrators are free to apply the principles of collateral estoppel as they deem appropriate, however, is the notion that the public policy in favor of maintaining the flexibility that is central to the arbitral process outweighs any public policy in favor of the rigid application of collateral estoppel principles to arbitration proceedings. We recognize the town’s argument that the public policy favoring application of the doctrine carries particular force in public sector arbitration because the cost of multiple grievances to resolve inconsistent awards might be borne, ultimately, by the taxpaying public. Nevertheless, in light of the strong public policy favoring arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution; Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 4; and our desire to maintain the flexibility of the process and to remain true to its contractual nature, we conclude that the public policy favoring application of the doctrine of collateral estop-pel must yield. Consequently, we conclude that there is no merit to the town’s argument that the second arbitration panel’s failure to apply the doctrine violated public policy and, accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court improperly had interpreted the public policy exception to arbitral authority.

B

We turn now to the final certified issue — whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the arbitrators did not exceed their powers under § 52-418 (a) (4). As previously noted, “[j]udicial review of unrestricted submissions is limited to a comparison between the submission and the award to see whether, in accordance with the powers conferred upon the arbitrators, their award conforms to the submission.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford v. Board of Mediation & Arbitration, supra, 211 Conn. 14; see also, e.g., Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 4 (“[w]hen the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission”).

The town argues “that this general standard of review is not appropriate to determine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied to preclude an arbitration panel in a second arbitration from deciding the same contractual interpretation issue already decided in a prior arbitration award.” The town asserts that the contractual interpretation rendered in the first award became part of the agreement between the parties, at least during the balance of the agreement’s term, and that, therefore, the second arbitration panel was barred from rearbitrating the issue of the proper interpretation of the same contractual provision. According to the town, therefore, the second panel exceeded its powers by failing to give collateral estoppel effect to the first award. We are not persuaded.

The town maintains that “[i]t is a well established principle of arbitral law that the interpretation of a contractual provision in an arbitration award becomes incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement . . . .” We question how well established this principle truly is. The town has cited no Connecticut case law for the proposition, nor has our research discovered any. In support of its argument, the town relies upon a widely cited treatise, which provides that “[a]n award interpreting a collective bargaining agreement usually becomes a binding part of the agreement and will be applied by arbitrators thereafter.” (Emphasis added.) F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (3d Ed. 1973) p. 377. This treatise also provides, however, that “the refusal to apply an award to cases of the same nature is justified where it is shown that any one of the following elements is present: (1) the previous decision was clearly an instance of bad judgment; (2) the decision was made without the benefit of some important and relevant facts or considerations; or (3) new conditions have arisen questioning the reasonableness of the continued application of the decision.” Id., p. 379. Therefore, the authors recognize that an arbitrator is not necessarily bound by arbitral precedent in all circumstances.

Moreover, the point for which the town cites the treatise is contrary to the clear weight of judicial authority established since the time the treatise was published more than twenty years ago. See part I of this opinion. In fact, in the most recent edition of the treatise, published in 1997, the authors expressly state that although an award usually becomes a binding part of the agreement, “[i]t appears clear from court decisions that an arbitrator is not required to follow a prior award construing the same agreement.” (Emphasis in original.) F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (5th Ed. 1997) p. 613 n.52, citing Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Local 420, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, supra, 718 F.2d 20; Little Six Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local Union No. 8332, supra, 701 F.2d 29; Fournelle v. National Labor Relations Board, 670 F.2d 331, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1982); New Orleans Steamship Assn. v. General Longshore Workers, ILA Local Union No. 1418, supra, 626 F.2d 468; Westinghouse Elevators of Puerto Rico v. S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, supra, 583 F.2d 1186-87; Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas, supra, 578 F.2d 251.

As additional support for its claim that arbitrators’ contractual interpretations are incorporated into the contract during the life of the contract, the town cites several arbitration decisions in which arbitrators have given collateral estoppel or res judicata effect to prior awards, or in which they specifically have stated that a prior award has become part of the contract. We recognize that many arbitrators have given preclusive effect to prior awards. Additionally, many have followed the incorporation “rule” that the town urges us to recognize. As the union notes correctly, however, these decisions reveal only that some arbitrators have chosen to give such effect to prior awards. It does not lead to the conclusion that all arbitrators must do so.

We hold, therefore, that an arbitrator’s decision does not become a binding part of the parties’ agreement unless the parties have included a provision in their agreement mandating such a result. We reiterate that even when the parties have included such a provision in the agreement, however, the interpretation of such a provision is itself a proper subject of arbitration.

The linchpin of the town’s argument that the arbitration panel that issued the second award exceeded its authority under § 52-418 (a) (4) is that the first award became incorporated into the agreement and that, by reaching a conclusion inconsistent with that of the arbitration panel that issued the first award, the second panel failed to give effect to the parties’ agreement. Having already held, however, that an arbitration award does not become a binding part of the agreement in the absence of a specific provision requiring such a result, and having held that collateral estoppel principles are not binding on arbitrators, we have considered and rejected the town’s statutory claim. We conclude, therefore, that the arbitrators did not exceed their powers under § 52-418 (a) (4).

Ill

In summary, we hold that arbitrators are not required to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prior arbitration awards. Rather, they are entitled to use then-own independent judgment, for which the parties bargained, to decide the issues properly before them. Additionally, we conclude that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the trial court improperly interpreted the public policy exception to the authority of arbitrators. Finally, we conclude that the arbitrators in this case did not exceed their powers under § 52-418 (a) (4).

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       Although there were two awards issued as to grievance no. 91-03, it is the award issued May 25, 1995, that the town sought to vacate. Therefore, although this award was actually the third award relevant to this appeal to be issued, we refer to it as the second award throughout this opinion.

       General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides: “Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”

       The union also made other claims, which the Appellate Court did not address “in view of [its] determination on the inapplicability of collateral estoppel.” Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, supra, 48 Conn. App. 853 n.3.

       The town contends that support for the principle that arbitrators must give collateral estoppel effect to prior arbitration awards can be found in Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 318, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903, 34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973), in which this court held that a prior arbitration award was binding and conclusive on a hearing tribunal of the commission on human rights and opportunities. For the reasons discussed in footnote 7 of this opinion, we disagree.

       This issue is still very unsettled among state courts. Some courts hold that res judicata and collateral estoppel principles apply in the arbitral process; see, e.g., International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 1285 v. Las Vegas, 107 Nev. 906, 911, 823 P.2d 877 (1991); School District of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Local 3, 168 Pa. Commw. 671, 651 A.2d 1152, 1156 (1994); Dane County v. Dane County Union Local 65, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 210 Wis. 2d 267, 279, 565 N.W.2d 540 (App. 1997); and others hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Local 786, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Glenview Material Co., 204 Ill. App. 3d 447, 452-53, 562 N.E.2d 289 (1990); Pike-Delta-York Board of Education v. Pike-Delta-York Education Assn., 508 N.E.2d 678, 683 (Ohio Common Pleas 1987).

       For example, parties could choose to include a provision expressly requiring all arbitrators to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and even res judicata or stare decisis, to prior arbitral awards involving that same contract, to the same extent that a court of law would apply those doctrines to prior judicial decisions. Such a provision is distinct from a “final and binding” clause, which, arguably, could be interpreted as having a more restricted scope, applying only to the particular grievant, when the same facts and the identical issue are involved. We note, however, that in a case involving either type of provision, it properly is left to the arbitrator to determine the effect of such a provision. See our discussion in the text above.

         In support of its contentions, the town quotes from this court’s decision in Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 318, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903, 34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973). In Corey, the court stated that “[n]o satisfactory reason can be assigned why an [arbitration] award, which the parties have expressly stipulated should be final as to the subject submitted, should not be as conclusive as a court-rendered judgment.” Id. We subsequently concluded that a prior arbitration award was binding and conclusive on a hearing tribunal of the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission). Id., 318-19. There are fundamental differences between an arbitration proceeding and a hearing before the commission, however, that render Corey materially distinguishable from the present case. As we have noted in the text of this opinion, the parties to a consensual arbitration have agreed upon that method of resolving their dispute. By the terms of their agreement, they determine the limits, if any, of the arbitrators’ power and authority, and if they want to limit that power and authority by binding the arbitrators to the decisions of prior arbitrators, they are free to do so. In contrast, parties have no control over a hearing tribunal of the commission, which is a statutorily created body with regulations promulgated governing proceedings before it. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46a-54-l et seq. Because parties before a commission hearing tribunal are unable to decide for themselves whether collateral estoppel should apply to a prior arbitration in a given proceeding, in Corey, we decided that issue. Essentially, the flexible nature of arbitration, which is lacking in commission proceedings, significantly limits Corey’s applicability in the present appeal.

       Article V, § 1 C, of the agreement provides that an arbitration decision rendered by the state board of mediation and arbitration “shall be final and binding on all parties.”

       In further support of its argument, the town cites Fournelle v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 670 F.2d 344, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia cited the Elkouri treatise for the proposition that an award interpreting a contract provision becomes a binding part of the agreement. The town fails to note, however, that a decade after deciding Foumelle, the same court decided Hotel Assn. of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25, AFL-CIO, supra, 963 F.2d 390, in which it concluded that, in the absence of a specific provision in the collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, an arbitrator is not bound by arbitral precedent. In fact, the court in that case quoted Foumelle, stating that “[a]s we have noted before, where the agreement is silent, the ‘arbitrator may decline to follow arbitral precedent when his judgment is that earlier decisions are erroneous.’ ” Id., 390, quoting Fournelle v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 343-44 n.22.
      Additionally, the town relies on International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 1285 v. Las Vegas, 107 Nev. 906, 911-12, 823 P.2d 877 (1991), in which the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded an arbitrator from not following a prior arbitrator’s interpretation of a provision of a collective bargaining agreement, and implied that arbitral decisions become part of the collective bargaining agreement. Although we believe that the factual scenario of that case is distinguishable from that of the present case, we recognize that the holding of the Supreme Court of Nevada did not rely on the essence of such distinctions. In light of the uncertainty in state courts surrounding this issue, however, we find the ample federal precedent more persuasive than the limited case law from other states. Therefore, we decline to follow the example set by the Supreme Court of Nevada.

       The town actually makes no claim, independent of those aforementioned, that the arbitrators exceeded their authority. We note, however, that a careful comparison of the second award with the submissions leads us to conclude that the award did not exceed the scope of the submissions. Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 4; Hartford v. Board of Mediation & Arbitration, supra, 211 Conn. 14.

        The parties’ unrestricted submission in the first phase of the bifurcated grievance — that is, the grievance that resulted in the second award — simply asked, “Is the above-captioned case arbitrable?” The award answered the question in the affirmative. The unrestricted submission in the second phase of that grievance queried, “Did the Town of Stratford violate the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement as alleged in grievance #91-03? If so, what shall the remedy be?” The award answered the first question affirmatively, and set forth an appropriate remedy. This comparison reveals nothing to demonstrate that the awards in either phase of the grievance exceeded the scope of the respective submissions.