text:
    CHONG CHUNG v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (SC 15867)
    Borden, Berdon, Palmer, McDonald and Peters, Js.

      Argued April 23
    officially released July 21, 1998

      Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, andL. D. McCallum, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (respondent).

      Todd A. Edgington, assistant public defender, for the appellee (petitioner).
   Opinion

BORDEN, J.

In this habeas corpus action, the respondent, the commissioner of correction, appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering amendment of the time sheet of the petitioner, Chong Chung, so as to give the petitioner the benefit of an additional thirty days of posted statutory good time credit pursuant to General Statutes § 18-7a (b). The respondent claims that the trial court’s award of the additional statutory good time credit resulted from the court’s improper construction of § 18-7a (b). Because the trial court — understandably and properly — followed certain language in Seno v. Commissioner of Correction, 219 Conn. 269, 593 A.2d 111 (1991), and because we are now constrained to disavow that language as incorrect, we agree with the respondent and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner brought this habeas corpus action seeking a recalculation of the amount of his statutory good time credit in accordance with Seno v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 219 Conn. 269. The trial court agreed with the petitioner’s interpretation of Seno, and ordered the respondent to amend the petitioner’s time sheet by posting an additional thirty days thereto. This appeal followed.

The facts are undisputed. On March 23, 1982, the petitioner committed murder. On June 16,1983, he was sentenced to incarceration for a period of thirty years and he was committed to the respondent’s custody pursuant to a mittimus issued by the Superior Court. Prior to his sentencing, the petitioner had been held in pretrial custody for a period of 358 days and had been awarded 120 days of presentence good time credit. Upon the petitioner’s commitment to custody under the mittimus, the respondent posted his time sheet with 4200 days of statutory good time credit, 358 days of presentence confinement time, and 120 days of presentence good time credit, for a total of 4678 days. The respondent arrived at the 4200 days of statutory good time credit by the following calculation: ten days per month for the first five years (10 days per month x 60 months) of the petitioner’s thirty year sentence, or 600 days; plus twelve days per month for the next twenty-five years (12 days per month x 300 months) of the petitioner’s thirty year sentence, or 3600 days.

This calculation was in accordance with the respondent’s construction of § 18-7a (b), which provides for the calculation of statutory good time credit for persons who, like the petitioner, have been sentenced for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1981, but before July 1,1983. Section 18-7a (b) provides in pertinent part: “[A]ny person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1981, [but before July 1, 1983] may, while held in default of bond or while serving such sentence, by good conduct and obedience to the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence, earn a reduction of his sentence in the amount of ten days for each month and pro rata for a part of a month of a sentence up to five years, and twelve days for each month and pro rata for a part of a month for the sixth and each subsequent ytear of a sentence which is more than five years. . . .” See footnote 2 of this opinion. Thus, according to the respondent’s construction of § 18-7a (b), a prisoner earns statutory good time credit at the rate of ten days per month for the first five years of his sentence, and at the enhanced rate of twelve days per month for the balance of his sentence.

Furthermore, under this provision, this statutory good time credit was awarded to the prisoner under the “posting” method, whereby “for purposes of administrative efficiency statutory good time was calculated and credited at the outset of a prisoner’s sentence on the basis of the sentence imposed by the sentencing court.” Seno v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 219 Conn. 275. Therefore, when the petitioner in the present case was sentenced to thirty years incarceration for the crime that he had committed, he was posted with: (1) 600 days for the first five years of his sentence; (2) 3600 days for the next twenty-five years of his sentence; and (3) 478 days of presentence confinement time, consisting of 358 days of actual time of confinement plus 120 days of presentence good time. The petitioner’s release date was calculated accordingly. Thus, the petitioner was posted with credit for all of the time he had spent in presentence confinement augmented by good time attributable to that time, with his enhanced rate of twelve days per month of statutory good time credit for the last twenty-five years of his sentence, and with his unenhanced rate of ten days per month for the first five years of his sentence.

Finally, it is essential to note that under this posting method employed by the respondent, the enhanced rate of twelve days per month was calculated to begin at the sixth year of the petitioner’s confinement under his sentence as imposed by the sentencing court, without regard to his presentence confinement time augmented by his presentence good time. In other words, in determining when to begin the petitioner’s posting of the enhanced rate of twelve days per month statutory good time credit — that is, in determining when for purposes of § 18-7a (b) the prisoner may earn “a reduction of his sentence in the amount of . . . twelve days for each month ... for the sixth and each subsequent year of a sentence which is more than five years”— the respondent calculated the first five years of the sentence imposed by the sentencing court, and began the enhanced rate at the commencement of the sixth year of that sentence. The respondent did not, however, calculate the “sixth and each subsequent year of a sentence which is more than five years”; General Statutes § 18-7a (b); by giving the petitioner credit for his presen-tence confinement time. Thus, under this calculation and posting system, the prisoner received credit for his presentence confinement time once — by having it posted as an additional credit toward his ultimate release date — but not twice by having it posted as such an additional credit and credited toward the calculation of when the sixth year began for purposes of determining when the enhanced monthly statutory good time would begin. Furthermore, as the petitioner conceded in oral argument before this court, before § 18-7a was amended in 1982, the respondent employed this system of calculation and posting for prisoners who, like the petitioner, had committed their crimes on or after July 1, 1981, but before July 1, 1983. All of this would have been relatively straightforward and uncontroversial, except for Public Acts 1982, No. 82-379 (P.A. 82-379), and confusion wrought by certain language in Seno interpreting that legislation.

In 1982, the legislature enacted P.A. 82-379, which amended § 18-7ato include subsection (c). See footnote 2 of this opinion. Under P.A. 82-379, prisoners who, like the petitioner in this case, were sentenced for crimes committed on or after July 1, 1981, but before July 1, 1983, continued to receive statutory good time credit according to § 18-7a (b), and prisoners who, like the petitioner in Seno, were sentenced for crimes committed after July 1, 1983, received statutory good time credit according to § 18-7a (c). Seno v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 219 Conn. 276. In enacting subsection (c), the legislature had two related objectives: (1) “to return to the original concept behind good time, that is, the concept of reward for good behavior”; id., 277; and (2) to eradicate the irrational consequence of the posting system, whereby prisoners could earn statutory “good time for a time that they, in fact, never serve.” Id., 278. These objectives were accomplished by the “[elimination of the posting system and adoption of a system that awards statutory good time on a monthly basis . . . .” Id., 279. We noted, accordingly, that under § 18-7a (c), “by adding the phrase ‘as such sentence is served’ and the word ‘served’ to language virtually identical to § 18-7a (b), the legislature dispensed with the posting method and adopted, in its place, a system of calculating statutory good time on a monthly basis.” Id., 280.

In Seno, we considered for the first time “whether a person sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding five years must be incarcerated for five calendar years in order to earn statutory good time at the rate of twelve days per month pursuant to General Statutes § 18-7a (c).” Id., 270. The petitioner in Seno, whose crimes were committed after July 1, 1983, had spent 197 days in presentence confinement, aftd had received an effective sentence of twelve years incarceration. Id., 271-72 and n.4. The commissioner calculated when the petitioner would be entitled to twelve days enhanced statutory good time credit by adding five years to the day he had been sentenced, and then subtracting from that date the 197 days in which he had been confined before being sentenced. Id., 272 n.4. Thus, in calculating when the petitioner’s enhanced twelve days per month statutory good time credit would commence, the commissioner took into account the number of days in which the petitioner had been in presentence confinement, but did not take into account either the petitioner’s presentence good time, or the statutory good time that he had earned monthly as he served his sentence.

The petitioner in Seno claimed that under § 18-7a (c), the commissioner “should have calculated the petitioner’s statutory good time at the rate of twelve days per month when his confinement time and credit time from all sources totaled five years.” Id., 272. “The [trial] court dismissed the petition, concluding that, under § 18-7a (c), only confinement time and credit time for presentence confinement; General Statutes § 18-98d (a); are properly considered in determining when the enhanced rate of statutory good time commences.” Seno v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 219 Conn. 272.

Thus, in Seno, we considered the question of when, under § 18-7a (c), a prisoner starts to earn statutory good time credit at the enhanced rate of twelve days per month. Id., 270. We concluded that in “light of its language and legislative history ... § 18-7a (c) requires that the [commissioner] calculate a prisoner’s sentence at the rate of twelve days per month once his confinement time and statutory good time total five years.” Id., 282. This meant that for prisoners whose crimes had been committed on or after July 1, 1983, the commissioner was required to calculate the date on which the enhanced rate of statutory good time was to commence by giving the prisoner credit for: (1) all of his confinement time, both presentence and postsen-tence; and (2) all of his statutory good time, both presen-tence and the postsentence statutory good time that he earned monthly. Moreover, because under § 18-7a (c) postsentence statutory good time credit is earned in effect at the end of each month of good behavior, this calculation is made by the commissioner on a monthly basis. Under § 18-7a (c), once those two categories total five years, the prisoner is entitled to earn statutory good time credit at a rate of twelve, rather than ten, days per month.

In reaching that conclusion in Seno, however, we made two related statements that we now are constrained to conclude were factually and legally inaccurate. First, in discussing the hypothetical case of a prisoner whose crime had been committed prior to July 1,1983, and who had received a seven year sentence, we stated that “[essentially, the enhanced rate of statutory good time had commenced when his confinement time, approximately forty months, and statutory good time, twenty months, totaled five years.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 276. That statement was incorrect because there was no indication that in applying § 18-7a (b), which applied to such a prisoner, statutory good time was used in properly calculating when the enhanced rate of twelve days per month would commence.

Indeed, that statement was inconsistent with the immediately preceding paragraph in Seno, in which we indicated the proper calculation for such a prisoner: ten days per month for the first sixty months, totaling 600 days; and twelve days per month for the remaining twenty-four months, totaling 288 days; yielding a total of 888 days posted credit. Id., 275. Under that proper calculation, the commissioner calculated when the enhanced rate of posted statutory good time commenced by calculating when the sixth year of the sentence imposed by the court began, without regard to any statutory good time earned or to be earned during that first five years.

The second misstatement in Seno was that “the [commissioner] necessarily concedes that had the petitioner been sentenced for an offense committed before July 1, 1983, he would have earned statutory good time at the rate of twelve days per month once his confinement time and statutory good time totaled five years.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 277. This was incorrect because the commissioner had made no such concession, nor was any such concession necessarily implied by the commissioner’s proffered interpretation of § 18-7a (c), the statute at issue in that case, and because, as the petitioner concedes in the present case, under § 18-7a (b), as a matter of prior interpretation by the commissioner, statutory good time credit had not been included in the calculation of when a prisoner’s enhanced statutory good time began.

The effect of these misstatements, however, was to mislead the trial court in the present case into an erroneous conclusion. Although Seno involved only the interpretation of § 18-7a (c), and the present case involves only the interpretation of § 18-7a (b), the trial court properly took the misstatements in Seno about § 18-7a (b) as a “mandate . . . that enhanced statutory good time starts after all confinement time and statutory good time equals five years.” Thus, in calculating the first five years of the petitioner’s sentence, during which he was to receive ten days per month statutory good time credit, as opposed to the balance of the sentence, during which he was to receive twelve days per month statutory good time credit, the trial court eschewed using the sixty month figure employed by the respondent.

Instead, the trial court calculated that the first five years meant 1825 days (365 days x 5 years), reduced by the 478 days of presentence confinement and presen-tence good time credit, or a total of 1347 days. The trial court then rounded off that 1347 days to 45 months (45 months x 30 days = 1350 days). The court therefore ruled that the respondent was required to calculate the petitioner’s statutory good time credit at the rate of ten days per month for forty-five months, for a total of 450 days, and at the enhanced rate of twelve days per month for the balance of his thirty year sentence of 315 months, or 3780 days, for a total posting of 4230 days. Thus, the court ordered the respondent “to amend the petitioner’s time sheet to reflect posting at the commencement of his sentence of four thousand two hundred thirty (4230) days of statutory good time in addition to [presentence commitment] time of three hundred fifty eight (358) days and [presentence] good time of one hundred and twenty (120) days.” The net effect of this order was as follows: whereas under the respondent’s calculation the petitioner was posted at the commencement of his sentence with a total of 4678 days (4200 + 358 + 120), under the trial court’s order the respondent must post the petitioner at the commencement of his sentence with 4708 days (4230 + 358 + 120), or thirty days more than the respondent has calculated.

The respondent does not urge us to revisit our conclusions in Seno regarding the proper interpretation of § 18-7a (c). Although he disagrees with it, he accepts it as the prevailing interpretation of § 18-7a (c). He does urge us, however, not to convert the erroneous dictum in Seno regarding the interpretation of § 18-7a (b) into a holding of this court. We agree with the respondent, and we conclude that under § 18-7a (b), a prisoner’s enhanced statutory good time commences at the sixth year of his sentence as imposed by the court, without regard to any presentence confinement time or presen-tence good time. Under this interpretation, therefore, the respondent’s calculation was correct.

First, the respondent’s interpretation of § 18-7a (b) is consistent with its language. That statute provides for good conduct credit of ten days per month “of a sentence up to five years,” and twelve days per month “for the sixth and subsequent year of a sentence which is more than five years.” This language strongly suggests that the phrases “sentence up to five years,” and “sentence which is more than five years,” refer to the sentence imposed by the sentencing court. There is no indication in this language to suggest that it also includes any presentence confinement time or presen-tence good time.

Second, this interpretation is consistent with the history of § 18-7a (b). The posting method of calculating statutory good time credit was first instituted prior to 1911. See Nichols v. Warren, 209 Conn. 191, 199, 550 A.2d 309 (1988). From that time until the amendment of § 18-7a in 1982 by P.A. 82-379, as the respondent urges us to recognize, the posting method did not take into account any presentence confinement or good time. Indeed, until 1967 a prisoner was not credited at all for presentence confinement time; see Public Acts 1967, No. 549, § 15, as amended by Public Acts 1969, No. 735, § 1, Public Acts 1975, No. 75-355, §§ 2, 3, and Public Acts 1980, No. 80-442, §§ 5, 28, and now codified as General Statutes § 18-97; and until 1975 there was no credit for presentence good time. See Public Acts 1975, No. 75-222, as amended by Public Acts 1976, No. 76-358, § 3, and Public Acts 1980, No. 80-442, §§ 7, 28, and now codified as General Statutes § 18-98c.

Third, given this history, it would be incongruous to conclude that, as a result of P.A. 82-379, the petitioner gained additional credit to which he would not have been entitled in the absence of that legislation. Public Act 82-379, which created § 18-7a (c) to apply to prisoners whose crimes were committed on or after July 1, 1983, was animated by a legislative desire to reduce credits that theretofore had been available. Before P.A. 82-379, under the respondent’s then prevailing interpretation of § 18-7a (b), as the petitioner acknowledges, a prisoner in the petitioner’s situation would have received credit for his presentence confinement time and presentence good time but once, namely, as credits toward his ultimate release date, but not also as credits toward the date upon which he would begin to earn statutory good time at the enhanced rate. Under the petitioner’s interpretation of § 18-7a (b), however, he would receive credit for those times twice. We decline to construe § 18-7a (b) to yield such a result.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the writ of habeas corpus.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       After the trial court granted certification to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470. (b), the respondent appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 65-1, and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

       General Statutes § 18-7a provides: “Good conduct credit for prisoners, (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment, on and after October 1,1976, and while still serving such sentence whether such sentence is for a definite, indefinite or indeterminate term, and regardless of the institution wherein the prisoner is confined may, by good conduct and obedience to the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence, earn a commutation or diminution of his sentence in the amount of ten days for each month, and pro rata for a part of a month, of a sentence which is for not more than five years, and fifteen days for each month, and pro rata for a part of a month, for the sixth and each subsequent year of a sentence of more than five years. In the case of an indeterminate sentence, such credit shall apply to both the minimum and maximum term. In the case of an indefinite sentence, such credit shall apply to the maximum term only. Any act of misconduct or refusal to obey the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence shall subject the prisoner to the loss of all or any portion of such credit by the commissioner or his designee.
      “(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1981, may, while held in default of bond or while serving such sentence, by good conduct and obedience to the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence, earn a reduction of his sentence in the amount of ten days for each month and pro rata for a part of a month of a sentence up to five years, and twelve days for each month and pro rata for a part of a month for the sixth and each subsequent year of a sentence which is more than five years. Misconduct or refusal to obey the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence shall subject the prisoner to the loss of all or any portion of such reduction by the commissioner or his designee.
      “(c) Any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1983, may, while held in default of bond or while serving such sentence, by good conduct and obedience to the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence, earn a reduction of his sentence as such sentence is served in the amount of ten days for each month served and pro rata for a part of a month served of a sentence up to five years, and twelve days for each month served and pro rata for a part of a month served for the sixth and each subsequent year of a sentence which is more than five years. Misconduct or refusal to obey the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence shall subject the prisoner to the loss of all or any portion of such reduction by the commissioner or his designee.”

       The petitioner in Seno had received credit for 197 days of presentence confinement. In addition, he had earned credit for sixty-three days of presentence statutory good time, sixty days of outstandingly meritorious good time, and 103 days of employment time. Seno v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 219 Conn. 272 n.5.

       General Statutes § 18-98d provides in relevant part: “Presentence confinement credit for confinement resulting from an offense committed on or after July 1, 1981. (a) Any person who is confined to a community correctional center or a correctional institution for an offense committed on or after July 1,1981, under a mittimus or because such person is unable to obtain bail or is denied bail shall, if subsequently imprisoned, earn a reduction of his sentence equal to the number of days which he spent in such facility from the time he was placed in presentence confinement to the time he began serving the term of imprisonment imposed; provided (1) each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement; and (2) the provisions of this section shall only apply to a person for whom the existence of a mittimus, an inability to obtain bail or the denial of bail is the sole reason for his presentence confinement, except that if a person is serving a term of imprisonment at the same time he is in presentence confinement on another charge and the conviction for such imprisonment is reversed on appeal, such person shall be entitled, in any sentence subsequently imposed, to a reduction based on such presentence confinement in accordance with the provisions of this section. In the case of a fine each day spent in such confinement prior to sentencing shall be credited against the sentence at the rate of ten dollars. . . .”

       We declined to address, however, the petitioner’s additional claims that he was also entitled to inclusion of his credit time for employment and for outstandingly meritorious good time in the commissioner’s calculation of when his enhanced rate of twelve days per month began. Seno v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 219 Conn. 282-82B.

       As the respondent has reminded us in this appeal, although he moved for reargument or reconsideration after Seno was decided, and brought these two inaccuracies to this court’s attention, we did not amend that opinion accordingly.

       The author of this opinion acknowledges that this is the second time in recent years that he has been required to disavow explicit language in a prior opinion authored by him for this court. Compare Ross v. Giardi, 237 Conn. 550, 680 A.2d 113 (1996), and Matarazzo v. Rowe, 225 Conn. 314, 623 A.2d 470 (1993). The author’s only response is to quote United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson when he concurred in the court’s opinion in McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 71 S. Ct. 224, 95 L. Ed. 173 (1950), despite the fact that it was contrary to an opinion he had issued as Attorney General of the United States. Justice Jackson explained: “Precedent, however, is not lacking for ways by which a judge may recede from a prior opinion that has proven untenable and perhaps misled others. See Chief Justice Taney, License Cases, [46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 575, 12 L. Ed. 256 (1847)], recanting views he had pressed upon the Court as Attorney General of Maryland in Brown v. Maryland, [25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 6 L. Ed. 678 (1827)]. Baron Bramwell extricated himself from a somewhat similar embarrassment by saying, ‘The matter does not appear to me now as it appears to have appeared to me then.’ Andrews v. Styrap, 26 L. T. R. (N.S.) 704, 706. And Mr. Justice Story, accounting for his contradiction of his own former opinion, quite properly put the matter: ‘My own error, however, can furnish no ground for its being adopted by this Court . . . .’ United States v. Gooding, [25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 478, 6 L. Ed. 693 (1827)]. Perhaps Dr. Johnson really went to the heart of the matter when he explained a blunder in his dictionary — ‘Ignorance, sir, ignorance.’ But an escape less self-depreciating was taken by Lord Westbury, who, it is said, rebuffed a barrister’s reliance upon an earlier opinion of his Lordship: T can only say that I am amazed that a man of my intelligence should have been guilty of giving such an opinion.’ If there are other ways of gracefully and good-naturedly surrendering former views to a better considered position, I invoke them all.” McGrath v. Kristensen, supra, 177-78 (Jackson, J., concurring).

       General Statutes § 18-97 provides: “Confinement under a mittimus: Presentence confinement credit prior to July 1, 1981. Any person receiving a fine or a sentence to a correctional institution or a community correctional center for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1981, shall receive credit towards any portion of such fine as is not remitted or any portion of such sentence as to which execution is not suspended for any days spent in custody under a mittimus as a result of any court proceeding for the offense or acts for which such fine or sentence is imposed, provided he shall conform to the rules of the institution. Upon notification from the Commissioner of Correction, the clerk of the court shall enter such credit upon the order in the case of a fine, and upon the mittimus in the case of a sentence and it shall be the duty of the agency or person that held such person under such mittimus to inform the clerk of the court of the proper amount of such credit. In the case of a fine each credit day shall be computed at the rate of ten dollars. In no event shall credit be allowed in excess of the fine or sentence actually imposed.”

       General Statutes § 18-98c provides: “Good conduct credit for presentence confinement prior to July 1, 1981. In addition to the time credits provided for in sections 18-97 and 18-98, any person who has been denied bail or who has been unable to obtain bail and who subsequently is fined or sentenced to a correctional institution or a community correctional center shall receive a good conduct credit towards any portion of such fine as is not remitted or any portion of such sentence as to which execution is not suspended, such credit to be at the rate of ten days for each month of presentence confinement and such credits to be awarded only for prompt obedience to the rules of the correctional institution or community correctional center wherein the person is confined. The provisions of this section allowing credit at the rate of ten days for each month of presentence confinement shall apply to those periods of time spent in presentence confinement pursuant to sections 18-97 and 18-98, which occur after October 1, 1976, for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1981.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BERDON, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    JAMES DAY v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN ET AL.
    (SC 15800)
    Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Palmer and Peters, Js.
    Argued April 30
    officially released July 21, 1998

      James F. Aspell, for the appellant (defendant Fumiss and Quinn, P.C.).
   Opinion

BERDON, J.

The sole issue in this case is whether the Appellate Court possesses jurisdiction to hear an appeal asserted by a law firm claiming it was aggrieved by a judgment in which the compensation review board (review board) of the workers’ compensation commission (commission) reduced the firm’s fee for services rendered. The Appellate Court concluded that it did not possess the authority to hear the appeal. We conclude, to the contrary, that the Appellate Court does have jurisdiction over the appeal from the review board, and remand this appeal to the Appellate Court for a hearing on the merits.

The material facts are not in dispute. In 1993, the plaintiff, James Day, retained the defendant law firm, Fumiss and Quinn, P.C. (defendant), to represent him in the prosecution of a workers’ compensation claim. The plaintiff agreed to pay the defendant 20 percent of his gross recovery. Two years later, the plaintiff discharged the defendant, retained attorney Kenneth Bartlett in its stead, and settled his claim shortly thereafter.

In a subsequent fee approval hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 31-327 (b), the workers’ compensation commissioner awarded $30,000 in attorneys’ fees, to be shared by the defendant and Bartlett. The plaintiff appealed to the review board, which found that the award was contrary to fee guidelines promulgated by the chairman of the commission pursuant to General Statutes § 31-280 (b) (11) (C). Accordingly, the review board reduced the award to $20,000, and the defendant appealed this ruling to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal sua sponte, claiming lack of jurisdiction. We then granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal. Day v. Middletown, 243 Conn. 939, 702 A.2d 643 (1997).

The jurisdiction established by General Statutes § 31-301b is straightforward: “Any party aggrieved by the decision of the Compensation Review Board upon any question or questions of law arising in the proceedings may appeal the decision of the Compensation Review Board to the Appellate Court.” Accordingly, the two issues presented by this appeal are (1) whether the defendant was a party to the review board’s decision to reduce its fee and (2) if so, whether the defendant was aggrieved by this ruling. We resolve both of these issues in the affirmative.

In order to be deemed a party and maintain an appeal, a litigant must satisfy each of three criteria. The litigant must “(1) have a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the appeal ... (2) sustain that interest throughout the course of the appeal . . . and (3) be able to obtain some practical benefit or relief.” (Citations omitted.) Craig v. Maher, 174 Conn. 8, 9-10, 381 A.2d 531 (1977). In short, a party is a litigant with a “ ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’ ” Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 223, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992).

That the defendant satisfies each of the three Craig criteria verges upon truism. The sole issue before the review board was the amount of attorney’s fees to which the defendant and Bartlett were entitled. In other words, the defendant personally sought the fee that it purports to have earned for specific services rendered during a specific course of representation before the commission. Because this claim sounds in breach of contract, the defendant’s interest in the hearing before the review board was a legal one. Moreover, this interest was not extinguished before the close of the fee approval hearing; instead, the hearing was conducted for no other purpose than to determine the amount of the defendant’s fee pursuant to § 31-327 (b). Finally, the defendant sought practical relief in the form of payment of its legal fee. For these reasons, the defendant possessed a “personal stake” in the review board’s determination of its fee; accordingly, we deem it a party for purposes of § 31-301b.

Furthermore, the defendant is clearly aggrieved. Aggrievement consists of two elements: “ ‘[FJirst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision .... Second, the party . . . must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.’ ” Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 221 Conn. 230.

The pertinent portion of the first element of aggrievement — “a specific, personal and legal interest” — recites verbatim the first prong of the Craig test. For the reasons previously discussed, the defendant possesses the requisite interest. As for the second element of aggrievement, it is apparent that the review board’s decision “specially and injuriously” affected the defendant’s interest by substantially reducing its fee. Accordingly, the defendant was aggrieved for proposes of § 31-301b.

It bears emphasis that the Appellate Court cited no authority in its order dismissing the appeal. In a prior order summoning the parties to appear for oral argument “to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,” the Appellate Court, however, cited Conte v. Conte, 45 Conn. App. 235, 695 A.2d 32 (1997). In Conte, the Appellate Court dismissed an appeal on the ground that the nonparty litigant could pursue a remedy only by writ of error to this court. Id., 236 and n.1. The Appellate Court’s tacit reliance upon Conte is misplaced. First, Conte involved appeals asserted by nonparties and, as we previously have concluded, the defendant was a de facto party with respect to the ruling of the review board. More importantly, Conte contemplated that a litigant who cannot assert an appeal to the Appellate Court will be able to pursue a remedy through a writ of error to this court. In the present case, the defendant cannot avail itself of this procedural device. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4143 (a), now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 72-1 (a), a writ of error “only may be brought from a final judgment of the superior court . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Because the defendant did not seek review of a judgment of the Superior Court, it cannot pursue its remedy through a writ of error to this court.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reinstate the defendant’s appeal.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The named defendant, the city of Middletown, which was the plaintiffs employer, and the city’s insurer, the defendant Alexsis, Inc., are not parties to this appeal.

       Pursuant to the settlement agreement reached with his former employer, the plaintiff received $100,000 for disability and disfigurement, $33,340.43 for outstanding medical bills, and coverage through his former employer’s group medical insurance plan for the duration of his life. Under the terms of this health plan, the plaintiffs former employer agreed to pay 80 percent of the plaintiffs annual medical bills, while the plaintiff remained liable for up to $1000 of the remaining sum.

       General Statutes § 31-327 (b) provides in pertinent part: “All fees of attorneys . . . for services under this chapter shall be subject to the approval of the commissioner.”

       The record does not disclose the allocation of fees between the plaintiffs two attorneys.

       General Statutes § 31-280 (b) (11) provides in pertinent part: “The chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission shall . . . (C) Issue . . . and publish . . . guidelines for the maximum fees payable by a claimant for any legal services rendered by an attorney in connection with the provisions of this chapter, which fees shall be approved in accordance with the standards established by the chairman . . .

       The record does not disclose the allocation of this reduction between the plaintiffs two attorneys.

       Only the defendant Fumiss and Quinn, P.C., elected to appeal. For this reason, we refer herein to the defendant Fumiss and Quinn, P.C., as if it were the sole defendant in the proceedings below.

       Section 31-301b provides the requisite statutory authorization for this administrative appeal. See Farricielli v. Personnel Appeal Board, 186 Conn. 198, 201, 440 A.2d 286 (1982); Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 53, 347 A.2d 89 (1974).


author: NORCOTT, J. CALLAHAN, C. J.,

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. AMELIA F. SWAIN
    (SC 15744)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz and McDonald, Js.

      Argued March 18
    officially released July 21, 1998

      Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John T. Redway, state’s attorney, and John Cashmon, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether knowledge that one’s license has been suspended is an essential element of the crime of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license in violation of General Statutes § 14-215. We conclude that it is not.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On June 7, 1995, the defendant, Amelia F. Swain, was driving on Route 1 in Old Saybrook when she was stopped by patrol officer Charles Bellarocco because one of the headlights on her vehicle was out. After the defendant was unable to produce her operator’s license, Bellarocco learned, based on her name and birth date, that her license had been suspended. Bellarocco gave the defendant a warning for the inoperable headlight and a summons for driving with a suspended license, and he informed the defendant that she could not drive her vehicle. The defendant was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 (a).

During the jury portion of the defendant’s bifurcated trial, testimony revealed that prior to May 11, 1995, the defendant had been stopped while operating a motor vehicle and had failed a subsequent chemical alcohol test that had been administered pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b. On or about May 11, 1995, the department of motor vehicles (department) mailed a license suspension notice to the defendant. The notice informed the defendant, inter alia, that: (1) she had failed a chemical alcohol test; (2) she was entitled to a hearing, which she must request within seven days; (3) her Connecticut driver’s license would be suspended as of June 5, 1995; (4) the suspension would last for ninety days; and (5) if she operated a motor vehicle during the term of her suspension, she would be “subject to a minimum mandatory jail sentence of thirty days.”

The notice was mailed by “bulk certified mail to the address of the [defendant] ... as shown by the records of the commissioner” of motor vehicles in accordance with General Statutes § 14-111 (a), which provides the method for notifying an operator of a license suspension. A representative from the department testified at trial that bulk certified mailing “acknowledges that the [department] sent an item to the United States Postal Service.” A “bulk certified mailing list is sent with a bulk of mail to the post office which in turn acknowledges, signs the receipt and turns it over to our department to acknowledge that they have received that mail.” It does not acknowledge, however, that a particular individual on that list received his or her mail. The department does not know whether each notice sent by bulk certified mail actually was received, but if a notice was returned to the department, it would be placed in the department’s files. The notice sent to the defendant was not found in the department’s files.

The defendant testified at trial that she had not received the notice and was not aware that her license had been suspended. She also testified that her mail delivery was unreliable because her mailbox was one of fifteen mailboxes grouped together and that “you sometimes don’t get certain things that should be coming in and many, many times, at least a couple of times a week, I’m getting things that belong to somebody else.”

Following the close of testimony, the defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury that knowledge of the suspension of her license is an essential element of § 14-215 (a). The trial court, Miano, J., relying on State v. Torma, 21 Conn. App. 496, 574 A.2d 828 (1990), denied the defendant’s request and, instead, instructed the jury that knowledge of the suspension is not required. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury that the elements of § 14-215 (a) are: “One, that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle at the time and place alleged, two, that she was operating this motor vehicle on a public highway of this state and, three, that the defendant was operating the motor vehicle at this location while her license was under suspension. . . .

“The third element is that the operation occurred while her license was under suspension by the commissioner of motor vehicles. The third element of operating while under suspension requires proof of compliance with [§ 14-111 (a)].

“[Section 14-111 (a)] does not require personal service of a notice of suspension but provides that if . . . a notice is forwarded by bulk certified mail to the address of the person registered as owner or operator of any motor vehicle as shown by the records of the commissioner shall be sufficient notice to such person ....

“The statute does not require that a defendant actually receive notice or that the [department] receive a return receipt. Constructive notice by the [department] is all that is required.

“Constructive notice is information or knowledge of a fact imputed by law to a person although she may not . . . actually have it because she could have discovered the fact by proper diligence. That’s what the definition of constructive notice is.”

The defendant took exception to the trial court’s instructions, arguing that § 14-215 (a) requires that she possess actual knowledge that her license was under suspension. The jury found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license in violation of § 14-215 (a).

Thereafter, a court trial was held to determine whether the underlying reason for the defendant’s license suspension was her failure of a chemical alcohol test administered pursuant to § 14-227b. A defendant convicted for driving with a suspended license is subject to enhanced penalties if the underlying reason for the license suspension is a violation of § 14-227b. These penalties are “[a fine of] not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars and [imprisonment of] not more than one year, thirty consecutive days of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner.”* General Statutes § 14-215 (c). Following the court’s denial of the defendant’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial, the court found that on June 7, 1995, the defendant’s license was under suspension for having failed a chemical alcohol test pursuant to § 14-227b. On September 19, 1995, pursuant to § 14-215 (c), the trial court sentenced the defendant to one year imprisonment, execution suspended after forty-five days, a $500 mandatory minimum fine, court costs and one year probation. This appeal followed.

The dispositive issue is whether § 14-215 (a) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual knowledge of the suspension, or if proof of delivery by bulk certified mail is sufficient. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that a violation of § 14-215 (a) requires actual knowledge of a license suspension. The state on the other hand maintains that neither the statutory scheme nor the legislative history evinces an intent by the legislature to include actual knowledge of suspension as an element of the crime of operating under suspension. We agree with the state and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

It is undisputed that the defendant properly preserved her claim for appellate review. Because the defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to instruct on an essential element of the crime charged raises a question of law requiring our construction of § 14-215, our review is plenary. State v. Dash, 242 Conn. 143, 146-47, 698 A.2d 297 (1997).

“The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case .... In seeking to determine that meaning, ‘we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, [and] to the legislative policy it was designed to implement . . . United Eluminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431, 692 A.2d 742 (1997). Based on the language of § 14-215, its legislative history and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, and the policy it was designed to implement, we conclude that actual knowledge of a license suspension is not an essential element of the crime of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license.

We begin with the language of the statute itself. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 102, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). Section 14-215 (a) provides that “[n]o person . . . whose operator’s license . . . has been suspended . . . shall operate any motor vehicle during the period of such . . . suspension . . . .” Section 14-111 (a) provides that a suspension notice will be sent “by bulk certified mail to the address of the person registered as owner or operator of any motor vehicle as shown by the records of the commissioner . . . .” The language of § 14-111 (a) plainly provides that this method “shall be sufficient notice to such person that the . . . operator’s license is .. . under suspension.” (Emphasis added.) Nowhere in §§ 14-215 or 14-111 do the words “knowledge” or “actual notice” appear, which the defendant wishes to find. Although the statute does not expressly require knowledge, the absence of the term is not dispositive, however, because we previously have reasoned that “[t]he omission of the word ‘knowingly’ is not conclusive upon the question whether, to secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew that [her license was suspended]. Many statutes defining crimes do not contain the word ‘knowingly’ or its equivalent. . . . Whether knowledge is a necessary element in proving that a prohibited act is a crime is a matter of legislative intention.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Sul, 146 Conn. 78, 86, 147 A.2d 686 (1958). The absence of any specific language regarding knowledge, coupled with the presence of language tending to equate bulk mailing with notice, strongly suggests that knowledge of suspension is not an essential element of the offense.

We next turn to legislative history and policy. “While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes, even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it . . . [t]he legislature may, if it so chooses, ignore the common-law concept that criminal acts require the coupling of the evil-meaning mind with the evil-doing hand and may define crimes which depend on no mental element, but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions. State v. Husser, 161 Conn. 513, 515, 290 A.2d 336 (1971). Whether or not a statutory crime requires mens rea or scienter as an element of the offense is largely a question of legislative intent to be determined from the general scope of the act and from the nature of the evils to be avoided. [Id.]; State v. Gaetano, 96 Conn. 306, 316, 114 A. 82 (1921).” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kreminski, 178 Conn. 145, 148-49, 422 A.2d 294 (1979).

“[T]here are many instances where the requirement of criminal intent has been omitted from police regulatory or public welfare statutes.” Id., 149. “There are many statutes in the nature of police regulations for the protection of the morals of the community . . . under which, either because it is impracticable to . . . prove knowledge, or because it is regarded as reasonable under the circumstances that the doer of the act should take the risk of knowing the facts, it is generally held that the prohibited act is criminal, notwithstanding the ignorance of the accused.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gaetano, supra, 96 Conn. 316; see State v. Kreminski, supra, 178 Conn. 149 (“there is a growing recognition that regulatory legislation may exclude the conventional requirement of awareness of wrongdoing for criminal conduct by placing the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger” [internal quotation marks omitted]). “Intent to do the prohibited act, not intent to violate the criminal law, is the only intent requisite for conviction in the case of many crimes constituting violations of statutes in the nature of police regulations. State v. Gaetano, [supra, 316], and cases cited; State v. Sul, [supra, 146 Conn. 86].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hus-ser, supra, 161 Conn. 516.

“The touchstone is not the reprehensibility of the offender but the nature of the evils to be avoided, and the extent of the probable frustration of the regulatory scheme which a requirement of scienter would create. . . . Personal blame on the part of the actor, except in the general sense that he should have known better or exercised a greater degree of care, is not a necessary element of many offenses where protection of the public against the harm which would result in the absence of regulation is the principal legislative concern. . . . [P]ublic policy may require that in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts it may be provided that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril, and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kreminski, supra, 178 Conn. 150-51.

“There is a suggestion in some of the early cases dealing with police regulatory legislation not requiring any criminal intent that the penalties must be ‘petty’ and not involve imprisonment. . . . The question left undecided in those cases, whether a provision for imprisonment necessarily implied a requirement of mens rea, has long been resolved in favor of the view that the abandonment of the element of intent depends upon the ‘peculiar nature and quality of the offense’ and whether the penalty serves as an effective means of regulation.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 152.

In Connecticut, the legislature has promulgated “an unambiguous policy aimed at ensuring that our highways are safe from the carnage associated with drunken drivers.” State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 739, 620 A.2d 789 (1993); see State v. Hickam, 235 Conn. 614, 624-25, 668 A.2d 1321 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221, 116 S. Ct. 1851, 134 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1996); State v. Boisvert, 40 Conn. App. 420, 428, 671 A.2d 834, cert. denied, 237 Conn. 903, 674 A.2d 1332 (1996). “The legislature enacted the statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles, including § 14-111, for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens of this state. In matters concerning public safety, the legislative department in the use of its police power is the judge, within reasonable limits, of what the public welfare requires.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hickey v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 170 Conn. 136, 139, 365 A.2d 403 (1976).

It is clear that, when enacting § 14-215, the legislature was concerned with “the amount of casualties, fatalities, and injuries that are occurring repeatedly in the State. Many of these [drivers], when they are under the influence, are nothing but killers, legalized killers.” 26 H.R. Proc., Pt. 19,1983 Sess., p. 6685, remarks of Representative Eugene A. Migliaro, Jr. The medical community shared similar concerns. “They voted unanimously to support effective legislation aimed at control of drivers operating vehicles while intoxicated. They are urging this Legislature to view such behavior as a serious threat to public health and safety and in so doing to take decisive steps to control and eradicate it.” Id., p. 6688, remarks of Representative Martha D. Rothman. Representative Robert C. Sorensen indicated a need “to counteract the carnage that we’re seeing on the highways caused by drunk driving. ... I think it’s time that we take a very strong stand in that area.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 1, 1983 Sess., pp. 194-95.

In discussing an amendment to § 14-215 to institute a five day mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, Senator James J. Murphy stated that “[o]ne of the problems that we have had through the years in addressing the drunk driving statute is that every time we kind of toughen it out, toughen it up or do something that’s necessary, we find that there are people who continue to drive with impunity and, in fact, go into the courtrooms, they drive while they’re under suspension, pay a hundred and a hundred and fifty dollar fine and keep going back out. ... So that we have these drivers who are charged, convicted of serious motor vehicle offenses, i.e., driving while intoxicated, manslaughter in the second degree or with underlying circumstances of drunk driving convictions or involved with the excessive use of alcohol that has resulted in the death of another, they take the suspension and just continue on out driving with impunity . . . .” 26 S. Proc., Pt. 13, 1983 Sess., p. 4421. In 1985, during a proposed amendment to increase the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for driving with a suspended license to thirty days, Representative Thomas Dudchik stated that this bill “[gets] the message out that this legislature means business when it comes to drunk driving. . . . It is clear that drank driving is one of the most serious hazards of our age, and it is largely preventable. This legislation . . . will make the punishment fit the crime of jeopardizing the lives of others . . . .” 28 H.R. Proc., Pt. 19, 1985 Sess., pp. 7030-31.

A principal purpose for the enactment of § 14-215 was to protect the safety of the public by eliminating the threat of drunk drivers. The legislature was gravely concerned with enforcing license suspensions in order to prevent those individuals who have had their licenses suspended from “driving with impunity.” The legislature has constructed two levels of sanctions that correspond to the severity of the underlying reason for a license suspension. Those reasons that are more threatening to the safety of the public, such as failing a chemical alcohol test, result in more severe sanctions, namely, a mandatory minimum of thirty days imprisonment and a $500 fine. It is axiomatic that driving while intoxicated is a dangerous activity and is harmful to the welfare of the public. Because this is a public welfare statute aimed at regulating drunk drivers and protecting the safety of the public, it is reasonable to impose upon a driver who has previously failed a chemical alcohol test the burden of knowing the facts and limitations associated wdth that failure. See State v. Gaetano, supra, 96 Conn. 316. Such a driver bears the risk of acting in a responsible manner. See State v. Kreminski, supra, 178 Conn. 149.

In 1979, § 14-111 (a) was amended to change the notice requirement for license suspensions from registered or certified mail to bulk certified mail. There is no indication in the legislative history that, following this amendment, actual knowledge of a license suspension would be required. When asked “how important is it to your department to have knowledge that these are actually received,” the commissioner of the department of motor vehicles, Benjamin Muzio, responded, “[i]f it’s a suspension notice, we indicate that they will be suspended within a certain period of time if they failed to file an accident report. Normally we send out one letter and then we send out a second letter of suspension. It’s important to that individual that he receive it, but based on the number of refusals to pick up certified mail, I don’t think it’s going to make a great deal of difference.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Transportation, Pt. 1, 1979 Sess., p. 99. We do not find Muzio’s comment that it is important to an individual that he or she receive a letter of suspension tantamount to a requirement of actual knowledge. We do not dispute that it is important to have notice. We conclude, however, that the defendant bears the burden of knowing the limitations associated with having failed a chemical alcohol test, and that, once the bulk mailing requirement has been satisfied, it is therefore reasonable to presume that the defendant had notice of her license suspension. See State v. Kreminski, supra, 178 Conn. 150-51.

The defendant argues that a violation of § 14-215 (a) requires actual knowledge of the suspension because of the severe penalties imposed. She cites as support the concurring opinion in Yanni v. DelPonte, 31 Conn. App. 350, 357-58, 624 A.2d 1175 (1993), wherein Judge Lavery stated that “the notice requirement of General Statutes § 14-227b (g) could be crucial in a criminal procedure context. . . . Whether and when a person received notice of suspension would be crucial to that person’s defense were that person to face the severe sanctions provided by § 14-215.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) We conclude that the penalty for a violation of § 14-215 (a), where the underlying reason for the suspension was a violation of § 14-227b, is not unreasonable. See State v. Kreminski, supra, 178 Conn. 153 (sentence imposed of 150 days imprisonment with execution suspended, probation for one year and fine of $5000 was not disproportionate to crime involved). We view this penalty of a mandatory minimum period of thirty days imprisonment as an effective method to shield the public from individuals who continue to drive, possibly while intoxicated or impaired, in spite of license suspensions and fines, and to deter those individuals from driving. See id., 152.

There are other instances in which a criminal conviction does not require proof of actual knowledge. In State v. Gaetano, supra, 96 Conn. 306, we reasoned that actual knowledge is not an essential element of the offense of keeping a house of ill fame in violation of General Statutes (1918 Rev.) § 6384. Id., 316. We concluded that because this act was “a police regulation for the protection of the morals of the community . . . it [was] reasonable to require that whoever . . . keeps a house which is a house of ill fame should take the risk of knowing the facts.” Id., 316-17. Similarly, we determine that § 14-215 is a statute in the nature of a police regulation whose purpose is to protect the safety of the public. It is therefore reasonable to require that whoever chooses to drive after an arrest for driving under the influence and failure of a chemical alcohol test, and who has been sent notice of suspension by bulk certified mail, should take the risk of knowing the facts and circumstances of his or her driving status.

In State v. Kreminski, supra, 178 Conn. 148, we concluded that scienter or knowledge of a licensing requirement is not required in a conviction for violating General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 36-334, which prohibits the sale of securities by unlicensed persons. We reasoned that “[although protection of the financial interest of the public may not be as paramount as safeguarding its health and morals by suppressing activities which endanger those interests, nevertheless, it is a matter of serious concern and the legislature might reasonably have concluded that strict criminal liability was appropriate.” Id., 151-52. The present case entails those paramount public health and safety interests that call for omitting proof of actual knowledge for conviction.

In State v. Denby, 235 Conn. 477, 482, 668 A.2d 682 (1995), we concluded that specific intent to sell narcotics at a location within 1000 feet of a school is an essential element of the crime of possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 21a-278a (b), but that knowledge that the particular location is within 1000 feet of a school is not required. We reasoned that “[§] 21a-278a (b) specifically requires a mental state of ‘intent,’ which must be applied to every element of that statute. The mental state of knowledge that the location is within the 1000 foot zone is not set forth in § 21a-278a (b). An ‘intent’ element is not synonymous with a ‘knowledge’ element, each of which is specifically defined in the penal code. The absence of any statutory requirement that the defendant knowingly sell within the prohibited school zone demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to make knowledge an element of the crime. If the legislature had wanted to make actual knowledge as to location of a school an element of the offense, it would have done so by specifically stating that the defendant possessed the narcotics with the intent to sell or dispense at a location that the defendant knew was in, or on, or within 1000 feet of a school.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 482-83. Similarly, if the legislature had wanted to make actual knowledge of a license suspension an element of the offense of driving with a suspended license, it clearly could have done so.

We conclude that the language of the statute, the legislative history and the legislative purpose evince a legislative intent not to require actual knowledge of a license suspension for a violation of § 14-215 (a). Proof of mailing in accordance with § 14-111 (a), along with proof that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in Connecticut while her operator’s license was suspended, is sufficient for a conviction under § 14-215 (a).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion BORDEN, KATZ and MCDONALD, Js., concurred.

CALLAHAN, C. J.,

concurring. Although I agree with the result of the majority opinion, I do not agree that the legislative history of Public Acts 1983, No. 83-534, which involved the overhaul of Connecticut’s drunk driving laws, is relevant to the issue of whether General Statutes § 14-215 (a) requires that one have actual knowledge that her license has been suspended before she may be prosecuted for driving with a suspended license. The language of § 14-215 (a) has been on the books in essentially its present form since at least 1930. See General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 1591. I therefore disagree with the majority’s assertion that the meaning of that provision, which applies to all license suspensions rather than only to those related to drunk driving, somehow can be informed by the 1983 legislative history of a statute designed to reduce drunk driving. Moreover, General Statutes § 14-111 (a), which directly addresses the notice to be provided in the event of a license suspension and which was amended in 1979 to require only notice by bulk certified mail, has nothing to do with the drunk driving legislation enacted by the legislature in 1983.

I concur in the result.

       General Statutes § 14-215 provides: “Operation while registration or license is refused, suspended or revoked, (a) No person to whom an operator’s license has been refused, or whose operator’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked, shall operate any motor vehicle during the period of such refusal, suspension or revocation. No person shall operate or cause to be operated any motor vehicle, the registration of which has been refused, suspended or revoked, or any motor vehicle, the right to operate which has been suspended or revoked.
      “(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not less than one hundred fifty dollars nor more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ninety days or be both fined and imprisoned for the first offense, and for any subsequent offense shall be fined not less than two hundred dollars nor more than six hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.
      “(c) Any person who operates any motor vehicle during the period his operator’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this state is under suspension or revocation on account of a violation of subsection (a) of section 14-227a or section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or pursuant to section 14-227b, shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than one year, thirty consecutive days of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner.”

       Bellarocco testified at trial that the defendant did not produce her operator’s license when she had been stopped. In contrast, the defendant testified that she did in fact possess her license at that time and that she produced it for Bellarocco. In light of the fact that the defendant’s license had been suspended, the jury reasonably could have found that she was unable to produce her license.

       See footnote 1 of this opinion.

       The defendant was charged in a two part information. The first part of the information, namely, the charge of driving with a suspended license in violation of § 14-215 (a), was tried to a jury. With respect to the second part of the information, namely, whether the defendant’s license previously had been suspended in accordance with § 14-227b, the defendant waived her right to a jury and submitted to a court trial.

       It is not clear from the record or trial testimony when the defendant had failed the chemical alcohol test.

       General Statutes § 14-227b provides in pertinent part: “Implied consent to test. Suspension of license for refusing to submit to test or having elevated blood alcohol content. Hearing, (a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical analysis of his blood, breath or urine and, if said person is a minor, his parent or parents or guardian shall also be deemed to have given his consent.
      “(b) If any such person, having been placed under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor, and thereafter, after being apprised of his constitutional rights, having been requested to submit to a blood, breath or urine test at the option of the police officer, having been afforded a reasonable opportunity to telephone an attorney prior to the performance of such test and having been informed that his license or nonresident operating privilege may be suspended in accordance with the provisions of this section if he refuses to submit to such test or if he submits to such test and the results of such test indicate that the ratio of alcohol in his blood was ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight, and that evidence of any such refusal shall be admissible in accordance with subsection (f) of section 14-227a and may be used against him in any criminal prosecution, refuses to submit to the designated test, the test shall not be given; provided, if the person refuses or is unable to submit to a blood test, the police officer shall designate the breath or urine test as the test to be taken. The police officer shall make a notation upon the records of the police department that he informed the person that his license or nonresident operating privilege may be suspended if he refused to submit to such test or if he submitted to such test and the results of such test indicated that the ratio of alcohol in his blood was ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight
      “(c) If the person arrested refuses to submit to such test or analysis or submits to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicate that the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person is ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight, the police officer, acting on behalf of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, shall immediately revoke and take possession of the motor vehicle operator’s license or, if such person is a nonresident, suspend the nonresident operating privilege of such person, for a twenty-four-hour period and shall issue a temporary operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege to such person valid for the period commencing twenty-four hours after issuance and ending thirty days after the date such person received notice of his arrest by the police officer. The police officer shall prepare a written report of the incident and shall mail the report together with a copy of the completed temporary license form, any operator’s license taken into possession and a copy of the results of any chemical test or analysis to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days. . . .
      “(d) Upon receipt of such report, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may suspend any license or nonresident operating privilege of such person effective as of a date certain, which date shall be not later than thirty days after the date such person received notice of his arrest by the police officer. Any person whose license or operating privilege has been suspended in accordance with this subsection shall automatically be entitled to a hearing before the commissioner to be held prior to the effective date of the suspension. The commissioner shall send a suspension notice to such person informing such person that his operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege is suspended as of a date certain and that he is entitled to a hearing prior to the effective date of the suspension and may schedule such hearing by contacting the Department of Motor Vehicles not later than seven days after the date of mailing of such suspension notice.
      “(e) If such person does not contact the department to schedule a hearing, the commissioner shall affirm the suspension contained in the suspension notice for the appropriate period specified in subsection (h) of this section.
      “(f) If such person contacts the department to schedule a hearing, the department shall assign a date, time and place for the hearing, which date shall be prior to the effective date of the suspension. . . .
      “(h) The commissioner shall suspend the operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege, and revoke the temporary operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege issued pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, of a person who did not contact the department to schedule a hearing . . . .”

       There is no evidence in the record that the defendant ever had requested a hearing.

       General Statutes § 14-111 (a) provides: “No provision of this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the commissioner from suspending or revoking any registration or any operator’s license issued under the provisions of any statute relating to motor vehicles, or from suspending the right of any person to operate a motor vehicle in this state, or from suspending or revoking the right of any nonresident to operate, or the right to any operation of, any motor vehicle within this state, for any cause that he deems sufficient, with or without a hearing. Whenever any certificate of registration or any operator’s license or both are suspended or revoked, all evidence of the same shall be delivered forthwith to the commissioner or to any person authorized by him to receive the same, and the commissioner or any person authorized by him may seize such certificate of registration or operator’s license and all evidence of the same. Except as otherwise provided by law, the commissioner may cancel any such suspension or revocation and may return such certificate of registration or the operator’s license either with or without an additional fee, provided no certificate of registration or operator’s license which has been suspended for any definite term, except as provided in subsection (k) of this section, shall be returned until the term of suspension has been completed. Any appeal taken from the action of the commissioner shall not act as a stay of suspension or revocation except with his consent. No service of process shall be necessary in connection with any of the prescribed activities of the commissioner, but a notice forwarded by bulk certified mail to the address of the person registered as owner or operator of any motor vehicle as shown by the records of the commissioner shall be sufficient notice to such person that the certificate of registration or operator’s license is revoked or under suspension.’’ (Emphasis added.)

       The defendant submitted to the trial court the following written request to charge the jury:
      “For the defendant to be convicted of operating a motor vehicle while her motor vehicle license is under suspension, it would be necessary for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that her motor vehicle license was under suspension.
      “Legal Authority: Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, [91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90] (1971); Commonwealth v. Horney, [365 Pa. Super. 152] 529 A.2d 18 (1987); State v. Counts, 783 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Mo. 1990); State v. Aldrich, 83 Or. App. 643, 732 P.2d 943 (1987) [rev’d on other grounds, 305 Or. 466, 752 P.2d 311 (1988)].
      “To the contrary: State v. [Torma], 21 Conn. App. 496 [574 A.2d 828] (1990).”

       During the court trial, much of the same evidence regarding the notice of suspension was presented as during the jury trial. A representative from the department testified that the defendant’s license had been suspended because she had failed a chemical alcohol test, that a suspension notice had been mailed to the defendant by bulk certified mail, and that the notice informed the defendant of her right to a hearing and the effective date and length of the suspension. Additionally, the state introduced the defendant’s driving history record, which showed that her license had been suspended for failing a chemical alcohol test pursuant to § 14-227b.

       Section 14-215 (b) describes the penalties for driving with a suspended license when the underlying cause of the suspension is a reason other than operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug; General Statutes § 14-227a (a); manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle; General Statutes § 53a-56b; assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle; General Statutes § 53a-60d; or refusing to submit to a chemical alcohol analysis or having elevated blood alcohol content. General Statutes § 14^227b.

       The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 65-1, and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

       The state argues, in the alternative, that the defendant had actual knowledge of her license suspension as a result of having received a temporary operator's license pursuant to § 14-227b (c). Because we conclude that actual knowledge is not required, and because no evidence of a temporary license was introduced at trial, we do not address the state’s alternate argument.

       On September 13, 1996, the defendant filed a written request to charge requesting that the trial court include the element of knowledge of suspension in its instructions. See footnote 9 of this opinion. The request was denied on the same day. The defendant also excepted to the jury charge immediately after it was given. Thereafter, during the court trial on the issue of the enhanced penalty, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial based on the court’s refusal to instruct on knowledge as an element of the crime. These motions wore denied. Moreover, during the sentencing hearing, the defendant further elaborated on her claim that knowledge is a required element for a violation of § 14-215 (a).

       “There is a wide split of authority on the question whether driving with a suspended license requires proof of intent.” State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 455, 583 A.2d 250 (1991), quoting Zamarripa v. First Judicial District Court, 103 Nev. 638, 641, 747 P.2d 1386 (1987). We join those jurisdictions that do not require criminal intent or knowledge for a conviction for driving with a suspended license. See People v. Morrison, 149 Ill. App. 3d 282, 284, 500 N.E.2d 442 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915, 107 S. Ct. 3187, 96 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1987) (elements of driving while driver’s license is revoked are act of driving motor vehicle and fact that driver’s license was revoked); State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa App. 1990) (knowledge is not element of driving while license is suspended); State v. Jones, 231 Kan. 366, 368, 644 P.2d 464 (1982) (for conviction of misdemeanor of driving with suspended license, state must send copy of order of suspension but need not prove actual receipt of notice or actual knowledge of suspension; nonreceipt may be mitigating factor at sentencing); State v. Pickering, 432 So. 2d 1067, 1071 (La. App. 1983) (scienter not required for conviction for driving without license; state need only demonstrate that defendant drove vehicle on highway without proper license); State v. Coady, 412 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. App. 1987) (offense of driving after license revocation does not require actual receipt of notice); State v. Grotzky, 222 Neb. 39, 42, 382 N.W.2d 20 (1986) (felony of operating motor vehicle after license revoked does not require intent); States v. Buttrey, 293 Or. 575, 582-84, 651 P.2d 1075 (1982) (defendant sentenced to one year imprisonment for driving with suspended license; state not required to prove knowledge by defendant of license suspension; defendant has statutory affirmative defense of nonreceipt); State v. Chicoine, 154 Vt. 653, 580 A.2d 970 (1990) (actual notice of suspension not required; state must only send notice of suspension by registered or certified mail); but see Jeffcoat v. State, 639 P.2d 308, 313 & n.4 (Alaska App. 1982) (state must show actual knowledge or deliberate conduct calculated to avoid receipt of notice on part of defendant); People v. Lesh, 668 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Colo. 1983) (under statute proof of mailing is only prima facie proof and does not create conclusive presumption; state must prove knowledge of license revocation); State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963, 968 (Ind. 1989) (state must prove defendant’s knowledge of license suspension in prosecution for driving with suspended license even though statute is silent on whether knowledge is required; proof of mailing of notice gives inference of knowledge); State v. Lewis, Kansas Supreme Court, Docket No. 75375 (January 30, 1998) (knowledge of status is essential element of felony of driving while habitual offender); State v. McCallum, supra, 457 (driving with suspended license is not public welfare offense; mens rea required); State v. Collova, 79 Wis. 2d 473, 485-86, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977) (severity of penalty led court to conclude state must prove defendant knew or had reason to know driver’s license was revoked).

       There is a presumption of mens rea in those crimes having their origin in the common law. United, States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1978). “[M]ere omission ... of intent [in the statute] will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced; instead Congress will be presumed to have legislated against the background of our traditional legal concepts which render intent a critical factor, and absence of contrary direction [will] be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Because the crime of driving with a suspended license does not have its origins in the common law, the defendant is not entitled to this presumption.

       See 32 S. Proc., Pt. 12, 1989 Sess., p. 3979, remarks of Senator Anthony V. Avallone (“[W]e will not tolerate drunken drivers on our roads. . . . [W]e will not tolerate the carnage, the loss of life and property on our roads as a result of drunken drivers.”).

       Other reasons that are more threatening to the safety of the public include driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle, and assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle. See General Statutes § 14-215 (c).

       The primary reason for the amendment was the fiscal savings to the state that would result by changing the method of notice delivery. See 22 S. Proc., Pt. 1, 1979 Sess., p. 268; 22 H.R. Proc., Pt. 17, 1979 Sess., p. 5873; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Transportation, Pt. 1, 1979 Sess., pp. 88, 97-98.

       The United States Supreme Court has determined that actual knowledge is not required in certain instances. In United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253, 42 S. Ct. 301, 66 L. Ed. 604 (1922), the court concluded that knowledge of the character of a drug is not a required element in a violation of the Narcotic Act. The court found that the purpose of this act was to protect innocent purchasers from the danger of certain drugs and thus “require[d] every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him.” Id., 254; see State v. Kreminski, supra, 178 Conn. 150-51.

       In State v. Denby, supra, 235 Conn. 482, we determined that “the plain language of § 21a-278a (b) requires as an element of the offense an intent to sell or dispense the narcotics at a location that is within 1000 feet of a school.”

       In contrast, in State v. Sul, supra, 146 Conn. 78, this court concluded that knowledge that the material is obscene or indecent is an essential element of the crime of “[possessing] with intent to sell . . . offer or show, any book [or] pamphlet . . . containing obscene, indecent or impure language, or any picture . . . of like character . . . .” Id., 80 n.1. This court reasoned that although the statutory definition of the crime does not contain the word “knowingly,” because the “purpose of the statute is to prevent the selling, showing or offering of obscene or indecent material falling within the description stated . . . [i]t must be assumed that the legislature was aware that such material was likely to be sold, offered or shown by one who knew from its nature that it would have an appeal to prurient interests.” Id., 87. The court further reasoned that because this statute requires proof of intent, “it is the obvious intendment of the legislature that the word ‘intent’ should imply knowledge that the material is, in fact, obscene or indecent.” Id. Section 14-215, in contrast, does not contain an element of intent, nor is it necessary to assume that the legislature wanted to impose the element of knowledge in light the legislature’s public policy goals.

       The state produced at trial evidence of conformity with § 14-111 (a) in the form of two documents. The jury reasonably could have found that these documents, a copy of the suspension notice and the certificate of mailing, sufficiently proved compliance with § 14-111 (a). See State v. Torma, supra, 21 Conn. App. 502-504.

       General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 1591 provided: “Operation while registration or license is suspended. No person to whom an operator’s license shall have been refused, or whose operator’s license or whose right to operate a motor vehicle in this state shall have been suspended or revoked, shall operate any motor vehicle during the period of such refusal, suspension or revocation. No person shall operate or cause to be operated any motor vehicle, the registration of which shall have been refused, suspended or revoked, or any motor vehicle, the right to operate which shall have been suspended or revoked. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ninety days or be both fined and imprisoned.”

       Public Acts 1983, No. 83-534, amended § 14-215 only by adding subsection (c), which provided for enhanced penalties when the reason for the initial suspension was driving under the influence. It in no way had any effect on any notice requirements.