author: Borden, J.

text:
    Fyber Properties Killingworth Limited Partnership v. Donna Shanoff et al.
    (14713)
    Callahan, Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Katz, Js.
    Argued November 4, 1993—
    decision released February 8, 1994

      Christopher C. Vaugh, with whom was Joseph F. McKeon, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Margery Weir Smith, town attorney, for the appellees (defendants).
   Borden, J.

The question presented in this appeal is whether, in the circumstances of this case, a subdivision should properly have been assessed for purposes of municipal taxation as individual subdivision lots rather than as unsubdivided land. The plaintiff, Fyber Properties Killingworth Limited Partnership, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its appeal from the assessment of property value by the named defendant, Donna Shanoff (defendant), the tax assessor for the town of Killingworth. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) §§ 8-25 (a) and 8-26c, its resubdivision became effective and hence taxable as individual building lots after the date the subdivision was approved but before the date on which the subdivision plan was recorded. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are undisputed. The plaintiff owns real property in the town of Killingworth. On March 7, 1989, the Killingworth planning and zoning commission (commission) approved the plaintiffs application for the subdivision of the property, subject, however, to the condition that the plaintiff and the selectmen of the town of Killingworth sign an agreement stating the terms and specifications for the improvement of Reservoir Road. No appeals were taken from the commission’s decision. On May 16, 1989, the commission approved the signed agreement for the improvement of Reservoir Road. On August 17,1989, after approval by the health director of the town, the commission delivered the approved map of the subdivision to the plaintiff. On November 13,1989, within the ninety day time limit for filing specified by § 8-25 (a), the plaintiff filed the subdivision map with the town clerk. The annual tax assessment date of October 1 fell, however, between the date of approval of the subdivision and the date of filing of the approved plan. Thereafter, the defendant assessed the plaintiffs property as a completed subdivision, subject to taxation as individual building lots as of October 1, 1989.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 12-119, the plaintiff appealed from the defendant’s assessment to the Superior Court, claiming that the assessment had been made in disregard of the relevant statutes. Focusing on §§ 8-25 (a) and 8-26c, the trial court dismissed the appeal. At the time, § 8-25 (a) provided that a subdivision plan shall be filed with the town clerk within ninety days of delivery to the applicant of the approved plan. Section 8-26c provides that all work on the subdivision must be completed within five years of the date of approval. The trial court reasoned that under these statutes, the subdivision had been approved in March, 1989, when the commission approved the plaintiffs subdivision application. The trial court further reasoned that in the absence of an appeal challenging the granting of the subdivision application, the approval remained valid until the end of the five year period specified in § 8-26c. To put it differently, the court reasoned that the filing of the subdivision plan within the ninety day period permitted by § 8-25 (a) was not a condition precedent to approval. In the court’s view, the failure to file within ninety days was a condition subsequent to approval that, had it occurred, would have revoked the already existing approval. Hence, the trial court concluded that the defendant had acted lawfully in assessing the property as a completed subdivision as of October 1, 1989. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff contends that the trial court incorrectly focused on §§ 8-25 (a) and 8-26c, and that the decisive authority is § 3.3.3 of the Killingworth planning and zoning regulations (1988). This regulation, adopted pursuant to § 8-25, provides that “[n]o work, proposed or required to carry out an approved subdivision plan shall be commenced until the Record Subdivision Map, endorsed by the Commission, has been filed in the office of the Town Clerk.” The plaintiff argues that § 3.3.3 permitted no work to commence on the property until the plan had been filed, and that other Killingworth subdivision regulations prevented the property from being marketed as a subdivision until certain work had been completed. In particular, § 3.3.2 provides that subdivision lots cannot be occupied until subdivision roads have been built, and § 3.3.4 provides that lots cannot be sold until open space has been dedicated. Thus, the plaintiff contends that the property could not have been put to any greater or enhanced use until the plan had been filed, and that the defendant therefore illegally assessed the property as individual subdivision lots prior to the date the plaintiff filed the plan. We disagree.

In reaching this decision, we confine ourselves to the facts of this case. We do not decide the date upon which a property becomes taxable as a subdivision if the approval has been appealed, or if conditions imposed upon an approval have not been fully satisfied before the assessment date. Furthermore, we do not reach the question of the defendant’s valuation of the plaintiff’s property. See footnote 9.

Neither the relevant statutes nor prior case law defines exactly when a subdivision becomes effective for purposes of municipal taxation. We therefore write on a clean slate. Furthermore, the trial court’s determination of the date upon which the plaintiffs property became taxable as a subdivision is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. Red Maple Properties v. Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 730, 740, 610 A.2d 1238 (1992).

In reviewing a statute, our objective is to discern and effectuate the legislature’s apparent intent. State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987). We look first to the language of the statute; Rhodes v. Hartford, 201 Conn. 89, 93, 513 A.2d 124 (1986); which must be read in the context of the underlying statutory scheme. Danbury v. International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 801, 221 Conn. 244, 250, 603 A.2d 393 (1992).

In this case, the language of § 8-25 (a), the primary statute regulating the subdivision of land, repeatedly refers to the date of approval rather than the date of recordation. The statute begins with the simple mandate that “[n]o subdivision of land shall be made until a plan for such subdivision has been approved by the commission.” To underscore this condition, the statute then provides penalties for subdividing land without the approval of the commission. Moreover, the filing requirement only arises “upon approval.” Thus, the filing requirement is more of a mechanism for registering the approval than an independent, substantive provision.

Furthermore, the time limitation statute, § 8-26c, measures time from the date of approval rather than from the date of filing. Under § 8-26c, the subdivision approval expires if the subdivision is not complete within five years from the date of approval. The legislature has thus indicated that in the subdivision of property, the focal point is the date of approval.

Our conclusion in this regard is reinforced by Stratford Arms Co. v. Stratford, 7 Conn. App. 496, 508 A.2d 842 (1986). Although Stratford Arms Co. appears on its face to suggest that the plaintiffs property could not have been assessed as a subdivision until after filing, an analysis of the case’s statutory setting leads to the opposite conclusion. In Stratford Arms Co., the local tax assessor had assessed a property as a condominium rather than an apartment building as of the uniform assessment date of October 1,1981, in anticipation of the property’s impending conversion from an apartment building into a condominium. The property owner filed the declaration of condominium on January 7, 1982. The property owner then appealed from the assessment pursuant to § 12-119. The trial court dismissed the property owner’s appeal, and the Appellate Court reversed. The Appellate Court reasoned that the true and actual value of the property as of October 1, 1981, was as an apartment building and thus it was improper to assess the property as a condominium.

The property in Stratford Arms Co., however, was a condominium not a subdivision, and thus it was regulated by the Condominium Act. General Statutes § 47-71 (a) provides that the owner of a property “may submit such property to the provisions of this chapter by filing or recording on the land records of the municipality ... in which the property is located condominium instruments that comply with the provisions of this chapter.” Section § 47-71 (b) provides that “[t]he declaration and all condominium instruments . . . shall not be of legal effect until filed or recorded on the land records of the municipality . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, in the condominium statute, the legislature has clearly stated that the declaration of condominium does not take effect until it is filed. For this reason, the Appellate Court in Stratford Arms Co. concluded that the property could not be assessed as a condominium until after filing.

The subdivision statute, to the contrary, states that “any plan not . . . filed or recorded within the prescribed time shall become null and void . . . .” General Statutes § 8-25 (a). This provision signifies a different kind of statutory scheme, because in order for a subdivision plan to become null and void, it must previously have existed. Thus, the condominium assessment in Stratford Arms Co. is unlike the subdivision assessment in the current case. Had the legislature intended the subdivision approval not to take effect until filing, it could have phrased the subdivision statute as it phrased the condominium statute. As the trial court correctly concluded, timely filing of the subdivision map was not a condition precedent to approval, but a condition subsequent which, if it had not been satisfied, would have nullified the previously existing approval.

The trial court’s conclusion also makes economic sense. By the assessment date of October 1,1989, the plaintiff’s property had increased in value. By that time, the commission had granted its approval and the fifteen day deadline for appealing the approval had passed. See footnote 6. The plaintiff needed only to record the map in order to complete the process. Although the question of valuation is not before us in this appeal, it is safe to conclude that as of October 1, 1989, a potential buyer would have been willing to pay more for property that had been approved for subdivision and lacked only the recording of its approved plan, than for a parcel of raw, unsubdivided land.

Indeed, the plaintiffs proposed construction of the applicable statutes would permit a property owner to delay the filing of an approved plan until after October 1, solely in order to avoid an increased tax assessment for the following year. We decline to interpret the statutes in a manner that would permit a property owner to circumvent the legislative intent of both the recordation requirement of § 8-25 and the uniform assessment date of General Statutes § 12-62a.

Moreover, contrary to the suggestion of the plaintiff, the fact that a property owner may elect to discontinue the subdivision project within the ninety day filing period does not affect this result. Under § 8-25 (a), failure to file an approved plan for a subdivision within ninety days of approval causes the plan to become null and void—that is, the approval ceases to have any legal effect whatsoever. See Caldwell v. Meskill, 164 Conn. 299, 316, 320 A.2d 788 (1973). Had the plaintiff in this case, after having had the property assessed as a subdivision, encountered difficulties that prevented timely filing, the approval would have been nullified. Nullification would have created the same situation that would have existed had the subdivision never been approved, and would have thereby prevented the defendant from properly assessing the property as a subdivision as of October 1, 1989. In this case, however, the plaintiff avoided nullification by having filed the approved plan within ninety days.

Addressing the plaintiff’s request to read § 8-25 in light of § 3.3.3 of the Killingworth subdivision regulations, we note at the outset that municipal regulations provide limited guidance for the interpretation of state statutes. Although the legislature authorizes municipalities to enact regulations in certain circumstances; Smith v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 227 Conn. 71, 81, 629 A.2d 1089 (1993); the authority flows from the legislature to the municipality, not vice versa. Thus, local regulations must be consistent with statutes, but we are not obligated to read statutes so as to be consistent with local regulations. Furthermore, the municipal regulations in this case pertain only to local zoning and planning. They are not part of a comprehensive statewide scheme that incorporates provisions concerning taxation. The legislature is entitled to a presumption that it intends to create a consistent body of law; Department of Administrative Services v. Employees’ Review Board, 226 Conn. 670, 680, 628 A.2d 957 (1993); a municipality, however, is entitled to no such presumption regarding the consistency between regulations and statutes. Thus, the plaintiff’s request to interpret the defendant’s taxing authority in light of § 3.3.3 is unpersuasive.

Even if we were to look to the municipal regulation for guidance, the plaintiff’s argument proves too much. Under that argument, many events in the development of a subdivision could plausibly establish it as complete for purposes of taxation. The plaintiff contends that, because § 3.3.3 permitted no work to commence on the property until the plan was filed, but other Killingworth regulations prevented the property from being marketed as a subdivision until certain work had been completed, the property could not have been assessed as a subdivision until after filing. The plaintiff also contends that in addition to the filing requirement of § 8-25, the Killingworth regulations pertaining to subdivision roads; see footnote 12; and open space; see footnote 13; prevented the property from increasing in value until after filing. By the plaintiffs logic, any one of these events—filing, completion of roads or dedication of open space—could be the necessary event before which the property could not legally have been assessed as a subdivision. The plaintiff has not persuaded us why, if we are to start down the path it recommends, we should conclude that the date of filing is the decisive moment.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

       In addition to the named defendant, the town of Killingworth and Ruth Patrick, tax collector for the town of Killingworth, are also defendants.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 8-25 provides in pertinent part: “subdivision of land, (a) No subdivision of land shall be made until a plan for such subdivision has been approved by the commission. Any person, firm or corporation making any subdivision of land without the approval of the commission shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars for each lot sold or offered for sale or so subdivided. Any plan for subdivision shall, upon approval, or when taken as approved by reason of the failure of the commission to act, be filed or recorded by the applicant in the office of the town clerk within ninety days of the date such plan is delivered to the applicant, but, if it is a plan for subdivision wholly or partially within a district, it shall be filed in the offices of both the district clerk and the town clerk, and any plan not so filed or recorded within the prescribed time shall become null and void, except that the commission may extend the time for such filing for two additional periods of ninety days and the plan shall remain valid until the expiration of such extended time. All such plans shall be delivered to the applicant for filing or recording promptly after the time for taking an appeal from the action of the commission has elapsed, and in the event of an appeal, promptly upon the termination of such appeal by dismissal, withdrawal or judgment in favor of the applicant. No such plan shall be recorded or filed by the town clerk or district clerk or other officer authorized to record or file plans until its approval has been endorsed thereon by the chairman or secretary of the commission, and the filing or recording of a subdivision plan without such approval shall be void. . . .”
      This statute has since been amended. Rather than filing the plan within ninety days of delivery, the applicant must now file the plan within ninety days of the “expiration of the appeal period under section 8-8, or in the case of an appeal, within ninety days of the termination of such appeal by dismissal, withdrawal or judgment in favor of the applicant.” Public Acts 1993, No. 93-29. This amendment, however, does not affect the current appeal.
      General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 8-26c provides in pertinent part: “subdivision TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN FIVE YEARS OF APPROVAL OF PLAN. (a) Any person, firm or corporation making any subdivision of land, except as provided in section 8-26g, shall complete all work in connection with such subdivision within five years after the approval of the plan for such subdivision; the commission’s endorsement of approval on the plan shall state the date on which such five-year period expires. ...”
      This statute has also been amended in ways that do not affect the current appeal. See Public Acts 1993, No. 93-19, § 2.

       The plaintiff’s property was approved as a resubdivision rather than as a subdivision, apparently because the plaintiff’s application sought to effect a change in an existing subdivision known as Blueberry Hills Subdivision. The trial court and the parties, however, have treated the case as involving the approval of a subdivision, and we, therefore, refer to the property as a subdivision.

       The defendant raises, as an alternative ground of affirmance, the question of whether the tax assessor should have the discretion to determine facts, such as the existence of a subdivision, provided that the determination is consistent with local ordinances and state statutes. Because we affirm the judgment of the trial court, we do not reach this issue.

       General Statutes § 8-8 (b) provides in pertinent part: “[A]ny person aggrieved by any decision of a board may take an appeal to the superior court . . . within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published . . . .”

       General Statutes § 12-62a provides in pertinent part: “uniform assessment date and rate. ... (a) Each municipality . . . shall establish a uniform assessment date of October first, commencing not later than October 1, 1978, for the assessment of all property other than motor vehicles if

       General Statutes § 12-119 provides in pertinent part: “remedy when property WRONGFULLY assessed. When it is claimed that ... a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof . . . may, in addition to the other remedies provided by law, make application for relief to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated.”

       The plaintiffs appeal originally included two issues: (1) whether the subdivision was complete for purposes of municipal taxation before the assessment date of October 1, 1989; and (2) whether the assessed value of the property was manifestly excessive. The parties agreed to bifurcate the issues for the appeal to the superior court. The trial court ruled against the plaintiff on the first issue and the plaintiff did not press the issue of valuation. Thus, the trial court was not required to decide whether the defendant’s valuation of the property was correct. By not pressing the second issue, the plaintiff waived the right to challenge the defendant’s valuation.

       General Statutes § 8-25 provides in pertinent part: “subdivision of land, (a) . . . . Before exercising the powers granted in this section, the commission shall adopt regulations covering the subdivision of land. ...”

       In this regulation, “work” has the same meaning it has in General Statutes § 8-26c (b). Killingworth Subdivision Regs. (1988 Amend.) § 2. Section 8-26c (b) provides in pertinent part: “ ‘Work’ for purposes of this section means all physical improvements required by the approved plan, other than the staking out of lots, and includes but is not limited to the construction of roads, storm drainage facilities and water and sewer lines, the setting aside of open space and recreation areas, installation of telephone and electric services, planting of trees or other landscaping, and installation of retaining walls or other structures.”

       Section 3.3.2 of the Killingworth subdivision regulations (1988) provides: “occupancy of lots or parts. No building upon any lot or part of a tract or parcel of land constituting the area of an approved subdivision plan shall be occupied, and no Certificate of Occupancy shall be issued therefor, unless such lot or part has frontage of at least one hundred fifty (150) feet upon, or, in the case of interior lots, an owned way or easement of access at least twenty five (25) feet in width to, either: (a) a public road or (b) a subdivision road for which all work has been performed, completed and given preliminary approval pursuant to Section 8 of these Regulations.”

       Section 3.3.4 of the Killingworth subdivision regulations (1988) provides: “open space dedication. No lot or part of a tract or parcel of land constituting the area of an approved subdivision shall be sold, or offered for sale, or used, or offered for use, for building development until all proposed or required areas therein for open space purposes have been fully dedicated by a method prescribed in Section 7.7 of these Regulations.”
      Section 7.7 of the Killingworth subdivision regulations (1988) provides that any subdivision exceeding twenty acres shall dedicate no less than 15 percent of the subdivision area to open space. The subdivision in this case exceeds twenty acres.

       By amending General Statutes § 8-25 (a) in 1993; see footnote 3; the legislature intended to link the date of filing more closely to the date of approval. In the hearings on the proposed amendment, John Pagini, director of planning and community development for the town of Enfield, stated: “A flaw in the current statutes results in no definitive linkage between the subdivision approval date and the filing of subdivision plans. Consequently, the filing of maps might occur at any time during an indefinite period following approval, and has resulted in a lack of consistency in the way that municipalities enforce the provision.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Planning and Development, Pt. 1,1993 Sess., p. 312. This statement further indicates that the legislature intended the statutory scheme to focus on the date of approval.

       Chapter 825 of the General Statutes, §§ 47-68a through 47-90c, entitled the “Condominium Act,” governs condominiums created prior to January 1, 1984. See General Statutes §§ 47-214 and 47-90c.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Peters, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Thurlow Carey
    (14751)
    Peters, C. J., Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Katz, Js.
    Argued December 2, 1993—
    decision released February 8, 1994

      Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was JohnM. Bailey, state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

      Todd D. Fernovo, for the appellee (defendant).
   Peters, C. J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is the determination of the proper remand when the outcome of a hearing for revocation of probation is tainted by the improper admission of hearsay evidence. Pursuant to a conviction of the defendant, Thurlow Carey, for assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § SSa-Gl, he was placed on probation for one year. Within the probationary period, the state sought revocation of the defendant’s probation, pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32, because he had allegedly violated a condition of his probation that required him to have no contact with his prior victim. The trial court, after a hearing, revoked the defendant’s probation. The Appellate Court concluded that, in finding a violation of probation, the trial court had improperly relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence. State v. Carey, 30 Conn. App. 346, 620 A.2d 201 (1993). The Appellate Court not only reversed the trial court’s ruling on hearsay, but also directed a judgment of acquittal. We granted the state’s petition for certification to review the Appellate Court’s remand order, and now reverse.

The opinion of the Appellate Court describes the facts upon which it relied. “During the probationary period, the defendant was arrested twice for allegedly assaulting the victim [of his prior assault]. Following the first arrest, the defendant’s probation officer, Sharon Rome, filed a motion for revocation of probation that cited as the reasons a new conviction and a violation of the special condition that the defendant have no contact with the victim. Following the second arrest, Rome filed a substitute motion, citing as the reason the defendant’s ‘subsequent arrests.’

“At the commencement of the revocation hearing, the defendant requested, ‘in the nature of an oral bill of particulars’ that he be informed of the specific manner in which he violated his probation. The state’s attorney responded orally that the ground for revocation was the violation of the ‘specific conditions of probation . . . that he keep away from the [victim]. The subsequent arrests, all three of them, were specific arrests that have to do with the victim and the person . . . whom he was ordered to stay away from and not have any contact.’ Prior to closing arguments, the state again claimed that it ‘has sought violation of probation based on the special condition of probation that [the defendant] have no contact with the victim in this case.’

“Rome was the only witness who testified at the hearing. Through Rome, the state introduced two police incident reports relating to the defendant’s arrests. Defense counsel repeatedly objected to the admission of the reports on the basis that they were hearsay. Although Rome testified that she had not personally observed the defendant’s conduct, she narrated the allegations set forth in the reports. She explained that the bases for initiating the revocation proceeding were the police reports and a telephone conversation with the victim, whom she had never met. The court sustained the defendant’s hearsay objection to the telephone call and, therefore, did not permit Rome to testify concerning the contents of her conversation with the victim.

“No further evidence was offered by either party. The [trial] court found that the defendant had violated his probation and reinstated the original sentence. As expressed in its memorandum of decision, the court appeared to have found that the defendant violated not only the no contact provision, but also the provision that he not violate any criminal law of the United States, notwithstanding that he was not charged with the latter as a probation violation. Because a defendant cannot be found in violation of probation on grounds other than those with which he is charged, we will disregard the second finding.” Id., 348-49.

The Appellate Court noted that “[i]n the present case, because the revocation was not based on a subsequent conviction, the issue is whether the state presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendant’s conduct, leading to the arrests, constituted an act sufficient to support the revocation. The standard of proof to be applied by the trial court in deciding whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation is the reasonable satisfaction standard, wherein the trial court must have a rational belief that the ‘evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation.’ State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 811, 618 A.2d 557 (1993). ‘[0]ur review is limited to reviewing whether such a finding was clearly erroneous.’ Id., 805.” State v. Carey, supra, 350.

“The only evidence offered by the state, over the defendant’s repeated hearsay objections, was the two police reports. These reports were admitted through the probation officer who had no independent knowledge of the material contained therein. She knew only that they were police reports pertaining to the defendant.

“These reports were undisputably hearsay. In its brief, the state argues that the police reports qualified as business records under General Statutes § 52-180 and were therefore admissible. This contention is invalid for two reasons. First, the reports were not offered or admitted as business records. . . . Second, the necessary foundation for admission was not provided. . . . The probation officer did not, and in all probability could not, testify to these requirements. The reports, therefore, are hearsay and do not qualify for admission as evidence under any established exception to the hearsay rule.” Id., 350-51.

The Appellate Court concluded that, as a matter of law, “hearsay testimony is admissible only if it is supported by other evidence. Hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probation revocation if it is wholly unsupported by corroborative evidence, as it was here. If, for example, the probation officer had been competent to testify from personal knowledge, it would have been a question of the trial court’s discretion as to whether there was sufficient support to allow the hearsay evidence.” Id., 354.

Summarizing its conclusions, the Appellate Court held: “In view of the fact that the police reports were wholly unsupported hearsay, they should not have been admitted into evidence. Because the state conceded that its only evidence was hearsay and we have concluded as a matter of law that it should not have been admitted, there was no evidence to support a probation violation finding. Accordingly, the trial court could not have been reasonably satisfied that the defendant had violated a term of his probation and, therefore, its finding of a violation is clearly erroneous. When the evidence adduced at a probation revocation hearing is insufficient, the defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal.” Id., 355.

In its appeal to this court, the state has challenged only the Appellate Court’s order directing the acquittal of the defendant. The state has not questioned the validity of the Appellate Court’s decision that, in a hearing for revocation of probation, hearsay evidence that is otherwise unsupported is inadmissible if the defendant raises a timely objection to its admissibility. Cf. State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 239-40, 363 A.2d 143, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S. Ct. 469, 46 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1975). The state maintains, however, that the improper admission of evidence at trial does not preclude a new revocation hearing at which it may offer probative evidence that is not hearsay in order to establish the defendant’s probation violation.

According to the state, a new hearing, rather than an acquittal, is the appropriate remedy in this case in light of State v. Gray, 200 Conn. 523, 512 A.2d 217, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986). In Gray, we held that a claim of insufficiency of the evidence must be evaluated by considering all the evidence adduced at trial, even evidence subsequently determined to have been improperly admitted. Id., 538. Otherwise, we observed, the prosecution would never be able to rely on the rulings of the trial court and would be obligated to adduce cumulative evidence to safeguard against the risk of an improper evidentiary ruling. Id. In this case, therefore, the state seeks the opportunity, at a new hearing, to present evidence from the police officers involved in the defendant’s arrests or from other potential witnesses who might testify that the defendant violated the “no contact” condition in his order of probation.

The defendant offers two rejoinders to the state’s argument. First, he contends that the state did not in fact rely, at trial, on the court’s evidentiary rulings but simply failed to adduce probative evidence to establish his probation violation. Second, he contends that the sum total of the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish his probation violation.

The defendant’s first contention requires little discussion, because it flatly contradicts our holding in State v. Gray, supra. That decision presumed that the state would ordinarily make evidentiary choices in reliance on rulings of the trial court that might subsequently be found, on appeal, to have been improper. We did not contemplate that the state would have to make an evidentiary showing of its reliance on the trial court’s rulings. In our view, it would undermine the rationale of Gray to require such an evidentiary showing, which would impose on the state the burden of making offers of proof about evidence that it was not presenting. We decline to adopt such a requirement.

The defendant’s second contention essentially restates one of the arguments that he advanced in the Appellate Court, namely, that the finding of probation violation should be set aside, not on the ground of evidentiary error in admitting hearsay, but on the ground of evidentiary insufficiency. The defendant maintains that the trial record, because it consists solely of the fact of his arrests and of unsupported or unreliable hearsay, fails to satisfy the requirement of § 53a-32 (b) that a probation violation must be “established by reliable and probative evidence.”

From the vantage point of evidentiary insufficiency, the issue is whether the state adduced sufficient reliable and probative evidence to establish the defendant’s violation of the “no contact” condition of his probation. “On appeal, the standard of review of an order revoking probation is whether the trial court abused its discretion; if it appears that the trial court was reasonably satisfied that the terms of probation had been violated and, impliedly, that the beneficial purposes of probation were no longer being served, then the order must stand. ... In reviewing the issue of discretion, we do so according it every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling. ... A defendant who seeks to reverse the exercise of judicial discretion assumes a heavy burden.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 167, 540 A.2d 679 (1988); State v. Roberson, 165 Conn. 73, 80, 327 A.2d 556 (1973).

For the purpose of our appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, the record includes the evidence that the Appellate Court held to be inadmissible hearsay. State v. Gray, supra. To the extent that the defendant suggests that hearsay evidence is inherently unreliable, the law is to the contrary.

In cases in which hearsay evidence has been admitted without objection, we have held that the trier of fact could have relied on documents that were hearsay “in proof of the matters stated therein, for whatever they were worth on their face.” Sears v. Curtis, 147 Conn. 311, 317, 160 A.2d 742 (1960); Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 518, 529 A.2d 177 (1987); Danahy v. Cuneo, 130 Conn. 213, 217, 33 A.2d 132 (1943). Hearsay evidence is reliable to the extent that it has “ ‘rational probative force.’ ” State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 663, 557 A.2d 93, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824, 110 S. Ct. 84, 107 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1989); see Marshall v. Kleinman, 186 Conn. 67, 72, 438 A.2d 1199 (1982); DeGroat v. DeGroat, 171 Conn. 363, 370 A.2d 963 (1976). As explained by Professor McCormick: “If [inadmissible] evidence is received without objection, it becomes part of the evidence in the case, and is usable as proof to the extent of the rational persuasive power it may have. The fact that it was inadmissible does not prevent its use as proof so far as it has probative value. . . . This principle is almost universally accepted. . . . The principle applies to any ground of incompetency under the exclusionary rules. It is most often invoked in respect to hearsay, but it has been applied to evidence vulnerable as secondary evidence of writings, opinions, evidence elicited from incompetent witnesses or subject to a privilege, or subject to objection because of the want of authentication of a writing, of the lack-of-knowledge qualification of a witness, or of the expertness qualification.” 1 C. McCormick, Evidence (4th Ed. 1992) § 54, pp. 219-20.

These authorities establish, therefore, that appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, pursuant to State v. Gray, supra, properly includes hearsay evidence even if such evidence was admitted despite a purportedly valid objection. Claims of evidentiary insufficiency in criminal cases are always addressed independently of claims of evidentiary error. See, e.g., State v. Sauris, 227 Conn. 389, 631 A.2d 238 (1993); State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 627 A.2d 877 (1993).

The principal evidence before the trial court was the testimony of the defendant’s probation officer, Sharon Rome, that she had seen two arrest reports, supported by sworn affidavits, that contained detailed allegations charging the defendant with a number of crimes including an assault on the victim. Although the first arrest report mentioned only an unidentified female, the second arrest report identified the victim by name and referred to the earlier incident. Rome testified to her understanding that both arrest reports related to assaults allegedly committed by the defendant on the victim. She testified, furthermore, that subsequent to reading of the first arrest report, she had taken further steps to investigate whether an assault had been committed by having a telephone conversation with the victim.

In addition to this evidence, the court noted, on the record, that it was taking judicial notice of court files indicating that other trial court judges had found probable cause to issue arrest warrants for the defendant pursuant to the arrest reports, and that, in another proceeding against the defendant, had found probable cause to issue a protective order “concerning this particular matter during [the defendant’s] period of probation.” Although the defendant contested the probative value of this evidence, we have held that a court may properly take judicial notice of relevant court files involving the same defendant. See McCarthy v. Warden, 213 Conn. 289, 293, 567 A.2d 1187 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 939, 110 S. Ct. 3220, 110 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1990); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 202 Conn. 150, 153 n.2, 520 A.2d 186 (1987); State v. Woolcock, 201 Conn. 605, 616, 518 A.2d 1377 (1986); Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 121-22, 376 A.2d 1085 (1977); Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 451, 311 A.2d 82 (1972); Guerriero v. Galasso, 144 Conn. 600, 605, 136 A.2d 497 (1957).

Viewing this record in its totality, we conclude that the trial court had before it sufficient probative evidence to exercise its discretion to revoke the defendant’s probation. The Appellate Court, having concluded that hearsay evidence had been improperly admitted, should, therefore, have ordered a new probation revocation hearing rather than directing a judgment of acquittal.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to remand the case to the trial court for a new probation revocation hearing.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-61 provides: “assault in the third degree: class a misdemeanor, (a) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.
      “(b) Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which may not be suspended or reduced.”

       General Statutes § 53a-32 provides: “violation op probation or conditional discharge: arrest; procedure, (a) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, or may issue a notice to appear to answer to a charge of such violation, which notice shall be personally served upon the defendant. Any such warrant shall authorize all officers named therein to return the defendant to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. Any probation officer may arrest any defendant on probation without a warrant or may deputize any other officer with power to arrest to do so by giving him a written statement setting forth that the defendant has, in the judgment of the probation officer, violated the conditions of his probation. Such written statement, delivered with the defendant by the arresting officer to the official in charge of any correctional center or other place of detention, shall be sufficient warrant for the detention of the defendant. After making such an arrest, such probation officer shall present to the detaining authorities a similar statement of the circumstances of violation. Provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to any defendant arrested under the provisions of this section. Upon such arrest and detention, the probation officer shall immediately so notify the court or any judge thereof. Thereupon, or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the defendant shall be informed of the manner in which he is alleged to have violated the conditions of his probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that he has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in his own behalf.
      “(b) If such violation is established, the court may continue or revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge or modify or enlarge the conditions, and, if such sentence is revoked, require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by reliable and probative evidence.”

       In State v. Carey, 225 Conn. 922, 625 A.2d 823 (1993), we granted the state’s petition for certification, limited to the following issue: “In the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court correctly order a judgment of acquittal of the charge of probation violation?”

       We note that, in light of the procedural posture of this case, we do not have before us any issue relating to the validity of the Appellate Court’s interpretation of State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 363 A.2d 143, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S. Ct. 469, 46 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1975), either as a matter of law or in the circumstances of this case. The state did not ask us to certify this issue for appeal.
      We note further that, in this appeal, neither party has raised any issue about the standard of proof that governs findings of fact in proceedings for revocation of probation. See State v. Davis, 29 Conn. App. 801, 618 A.2d 557, cert. granted, 225 Conn. 918, 623 A.2d 1024 (1993).

       The court noted that it had used this file earlier that same day in ordering the rearrest of the defendant because of his failure to appear as originally scheduled.