text:
    In the Matter of Christine D. Henderson, Deceased. Irvin Husin, Respondent; Catherine Alsterlund, Appellant.
    Argued October 14,1992;
    decided November 19, 1992

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Bertine, Hufnagel, Headly & Zeltner, Scarsdale (Stephen Hochhauser of counsel), for appellant.
    I. The proponent should be required to shoulder the burden of proving that the will was not tainted by undue influence. (Matter of Anna, 248 NY 421; Matter of Weinstock, 40 NY2d 1; Matter of Kaufmann, 20 AD2d 464, 15 NY2d 825; Matter of Walther, 6 NY2d 49; Matter of Smith, 95 NY 516; Matter of Guidi, 259 App Div 652, 284 NY 680; Matter of Fuller, 45 Misc 2d 353; Matter of Pascal, 309 NY 108.) II. Putnam aside, the Surrogate’s Court should be permitted to require an explanation from the proponent. (Matter of Collins, 124 AD2d 48.) III. The Second Department’s ruling on disqualification is at odds with established practice. (S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d 437.)

      Weinstein, Kaplan & Cohen, P. G, Great Neck (Robert N. Cohen of counsel), for respondent.
    I. The Court below correctly held that summary judgment be awarded to proponent-respondent since objectant-appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557; Matter of Philip, 173 AD2d 543; Matter of Witkowski, 85 AD2d 807; Matter of Betz, 63 AD2d 769; Matter of Cioffi,, 117 AD2d 860; Matter of Klitgaard, 83 AD2d 651; Matter of Putnam, 257 NY 140; Matter of Morrison, 270 App Div 552; Bradt v John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 98 AD2d 886; Rosenberg v Del-Mar Div., 56 AD2d 576.) II. The Court below correctly held that the facts in the instant case are distinguishable from those in Matter of Putnam (257 NY 140). (Matter of Guidi, 259 App Div 652; Gardiner v Gardiner, 34 NY 155; Matter of Kaufmann, 14 AD2d 411; Matter of Arnold, 78 AD2d 753; Matter of Walther, 6 NY2d 49; Matter of Hartman, 76 Misc 2d 339.) III. The Court below correctly held that disqualification of proponent-respondent’s attorneys was not required. (People v Paperno, 54 NY2d 294; Matter of Bartoli, 143 AD2d 830.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Titone, J.

The objectant in this probate proceeding, the testatrix’ sister, contends that the testatrix’ will is invalid because it was the product of fraud and undue influence on the part of the testatrix’ attorney, the will’s primary beneficiary. At this point in the litigation, the only issue is whether the objectant’s allegations are sufficient to warrant a hearing into the validity of her claim. Although the attorney-legatee was not the actual drafter of the will, the objectant argues that she is entitled to a hearing solely by virtue of his long-term professional relationship with the testatrix and his discussions with the testatrix about her testamentary plans. While we reject this aspect of the objectant’s contention, we nonetheless conclude that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the objectant should be afforded a hearing.

In July of 1987, Christine Henderson, the decedent, asked her long-time attorney and financial adviser, Irvin Husin, to prepare her will and designate himself and his family as major beneficiaries. Sensitive to the suspicion with which such a will would be viewed, Husin declined, suggesting that the decedent contact the Nassau County Bar Association’s Lawyer’s Referral Service for the name of a local attorney to prepare the will. Husin subsequently sent Henderson a four-page memo confirming his inability, for ethical reasons, to draft a will in which he and his family were to be major beneficiaries. In this memo, Husin also reviewed Henderson’s assets, discussed the likely tax and administration expenses that would ultimately be subtracted from her estate, listed her potential beneficiaries, including himself and members of his family, and suggested that she consider leaving her sister a substantial bequest despite the dispute the two women were then having. Finally, Husin recommended that Henderson show the memo to the new attorney she retained and "tell him what disposition [she] want[ed] to make of [he]r estate.”

Pursuant to Husin’s suggestion, Henderson contacted the Nassau County Bar Association and was referred to Martin Weinstein, who agreed to draft her will. According to Weinstein’s subsequently taken deposition, he prepared the will based principally upon Husin’s memo and a brief meeting he had with Henderson. Weinstein never questioned Henderson in detail about the reasons for the unusually large bequest to Husin, his family and his law partner or about the nature of the quarrel that had led her to virtually disinherit her sister.

After Henderson died, her sister, the sole potential distributee, objected to the admission of Henderson’s will to probate on grounds of fraud and undue influence. In support of her position, the objectant argued that "the legal inferences which arise under * * * Matter of Putnam [257 NY 140]” should be applied in these circumstances. The Surrogate’s Court denied in part a cross motion by the will’s proponent for summary judgment dismissing the objections. The court concluded that the facts in the case warranted a hearing on the objectant’s fraud and undue influence claim. On the proponent’s appeal, however, the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the remaining objection. Concluding that the inference derived from Matter of Putnam (supra) is not applicable in these circumstances and that there was no concrete evidence of fraud or undue influence, the Court held that the objectant’s submissions had failed to raise a triable question of fact (175 AD2d 804).

In Matter of Putnam (supra, at 143), this Court held that, in the absence of an explanation, an inference of undue influence arises when an attorney has drafted a will in which he or she is a beneficiary. The rule is premised on the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship, which places the attorney in a position to exercise undue influence over the testator (see, Turano and Radigan, New York Estate Administration, at 106-107; Groppe, The "New” Putnam Rule: Problems Facing the Attorney/Legatee/Fiduciary, 61 NY St BJ 18, 19). Indeed, the Code of Professional Responsibility suggests that an attorney who accepts a substantial gift from a client "is peculiarly susceptible to the charge that he [or she] unduly influenced or overreached the client” (Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-5).

Since Putnam was decided, the lower courts of this State have applied its theory to situations involving doctors (Matter of Satterlee, 281 App Div 251), dentists (Estate of Sackett, NYU, Mar. 28, 1988, at 55, col 3), nurses (Matter of Rudge, NYU, May 13, 1983, at 16, col 6; see also, Hazel v Sacco, 52 AD2d 1042), clergy (Matter of Jones, NYU, Dec. 16, 1986, at 12, col 6; see also, Matter of Eckert, 93 Misc 2d 677, 680) and accountants (Matter of Collins, 124 AD2d 48). However, there are no decisions of this Court applying the Putnam theory to situations such as this one, where the attorney-legatee did not actually draft the testamentary instrument.

There exist sound reasons for avoiding a per se rule that would create an inference of undue influence any time a testamentary disposition is made to an attorney who has had a professional relationship with the testator in the past. A basic tenet in our system is that "[a] person of sound mind, acting with full knowledge of her affairs, competent to understand her relations to those whom she wished to benefit, may bestow her bounty as she likes” (Loder v Whelpley, 111 NY 239, 250). A testator’s freedom to bequeath property in accordance with his or her wishes should not be diminished merely because the object of the testator’s generosity happens to be an attorney with whom the testator has enjoyed a beneficial professional relationship (see generally, Annotation, Wills: Undue Influence in Gift to Testator’s Attorney, 19 ALR3d 575, § 3). Attorneys often extend themselves on behalf of their long-time clients, and such "[a]cts of kindness and consideration” do not by themselves "constitute undue influence” when they "evok[e] reciprocal sentiments of gratitude and affection” by the client (Matter of Guidi, 259 App Div 652, 656, affd 284 NY 680 [check]). Accordingly, as the Appellate Division correctly concluded, the Putnam inference of undue influence should not automatically be applied where an attorney-legatee has had a professional relationship with the testator but was not the attorney who drafted the testamentary instrument.

However, contrary to the Appellate Division’s holding, the inapplicability of the Putnam inference does not end the inquiry here. The issue before the Surrogate’s Court on the proponent’s motion was whether the allegations in the objectant’s motion papers were sufficient to raise a triable question of fact on her claim of fraud and undue influence. While no Putnam inference automatically arises to aid the objectant in meeting her burden when an attorney-legatee has not drafted the will, other facts and circumstances in this case justified the Surrogate’s decision to grant the objectant a hearing (see, SCPA 1408 [1]; see also, Matter of Pollock, 64 NY2d 1156).

Ordinarily, most concerns which may arise from the existence of a prior confidential relationship between the testator and the attorney-legatee may be quieted when the will has been drafted by an independent attorney who consulted with the testator and provided disinterested legal advice. In this case, however, the retention of Martin Weinstein, Esq., who actually drafted the will and had been located by the testatrix through the auspices of the local Bar Association, does not alone eliminate the legitimate concerns that arise from Husin’s prior confidential relationship with the testatrix.

According to Weinstein’s deposition, he met briefly with Henderson before actually drafting the will, but never seriously inquired into the reasons for her decision to leave such a large portion of her assets to Husin and to virtually disinherit her sister, the person some might regard as the natural object of her bounty. Rather than conducting an independent review of her personal situation, Weinstein prepared Henderson’s will primarily on the basis of Husin’s four-page memo outlining Henderson’s assets and testamentary wishes, which named Husin and his family members. Consequently, it could be inferred that Henderson did not receive the benefit of counselling by an independent attorney and that her will was essentially the indirect product of her discussions and relationship with Husin.

In such circumstances, the crucial element of discrete independent representation by disinterested counsel may be lacking. Thus, even without regard to the Putnam inference, the Surrogate’s Court was justified in deciding to allow a hearing to determine whether Husin exercised undue influence over Henderson in the discussions surrounding the preparation of her will, particularly in light of the size of the bequest to Husin and the virtual exclusion of a natural object of the testatrix’ bounty (see, Matter of Putnam, supra; Matter of Anna, 248 NY 421; Post v Mason, 91 NY 539; Matter of Wharton, 270 App Div 670).

As this Court has previously observed, a question of undue influence often arises when a person in a position of trust and confidence becomes the object of the other party’s generosity (see, e.g., Ten Eyck v Whitbeck, 156 NY 341, 353). "[W]here a fiduciary relationship exists between parties, 'transactions between them are scrutinized with extreme vigilance’ ” (Matter of Gordon v Bialystoker Ctr., 45 NY2d 692, 698, quoting Ten Eyck v Whitbeck, supra, at 353). Such scrutiny is especially important when attorney-beneficiaries are involved, since the intensely personal nature of the attorney-client relationship, coupled with the specialized training and knowledge that attorneys have, places attorneys in positions that are uniquely suited to exercising a powerful influence over their clients’ decision. While most attorneys exercise that power with scrupulous honesty, the risk of undue persuasion is sufficiently substantial as to justify judicial inquiry, at least where, as here, there may have been no meaningful consultation or intervention by independent counsel.

Accordingly, objectant’s appeal, insofar as it pertains to the denial of the motion to disqualify proponent’s counsel should be dismissed for nonfinality; on the appeal from so much of the order as pertained to the objections to the will alleging fraud and undue influence, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and that branch of the proponent’s cross motion for summary judgment denied.

Acting Chief Judge Simons and Judges Kaye, Hancock, Jr., Bellacosa and Smith concur.

Objectant’s appeal, insofar as taken from that portion of the Appellate Division order which reversed so much of the order of Surrogate’s Court as granted objectant’s motion to disqualify proponent’s counsel and denied the motion, dismissed upon the ground that that portion of the order appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. On objectant’s appeal from that portion of the Appellate Division order which reversed so much of Surrogate’s Court’s order as denied that branch of proponent’s cross motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the objection to the will which alleged fraud and undue influence and granted that branch of the cross motion, order reversed, with costs, and that part of the proponent’s cross motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the objection to the will alleging fraud and undue influence denied.

      . [2] Additionally, the Appellate Division reversed that part of the order of Surrogate’s Court which granted objectant’s motion to disqualify the proponent’s counsel (175 AD2d, at 805, citing People v Papemo, 54 NY2d 294). Inasmuch as an order granting or denying a motion to disqualify counsel is one that merely administers the course of the litigation, it is nonfinal (see, Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals § 39). Accordingly, to the extent that the appeal seeks review of the Appellate Division’s order denying objectant’s disqualification motion, it should be dismissed.

      . Henderson left an estate worth approximately $1 million. Her will gave Husin, his daughters and a granddaughter a total of 40% of that amount. Additionally, Husin was named the residuary beneficiary, bringing his total percentage of the estate to some 47%.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Smith, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Iraefbey Allah, Appellant.
    Argued October 15,1992;
    decided November 24, 1992

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Barbara Zolot, New York City, and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant.
    Trial counsel’s absence from deliberations through the return of the verdict deprived appellant of the assistance of counsel; moreover, any joint representation of appellant by codefendants’ counsel during these critical stages was ineffective as a matter of law because an actual conflict of interest existed that appellant never waived. (Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400; Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45; People v Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203; People v Wicks, 76 NY2d 128; People v Davis, 75 NY2d 517; People v Blake, 35 NY2d 331; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479; People v Ciaccio, 47 NY2d 431.)

      Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn (Anthea H. Bruffee and Jay M. Cohen of counsel), for respondent.
    Defendant received full and effective assistance of counsel during the jury deliberations and verdict. (People v Recupero, 73 NY2d 877; People v Alicea, 61 NY2d 23; People v Cook, 68 NY2d 830; People v Wilson, 64 NY2d 634; People v Ortiz, 76 NY2d 652; People v Jackson, 78 NY2d 638; People v Mattison, 67 NY2d 462, 479 US 984; People v Gomberg, 38 NY2d 307; People v Gonzalez, 30 NY2d 28, 409 US 859; Holloway v Arkansas, 435 US 475.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Smith, J.

The issue here is whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney absented himself during jury deliberations and the attorneys for two codefendants assumed the defendant’s representation. Because an actual conflict existed between defendant and codefendants, defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. We, therefore, reverse and order a new trial.

Defendant Allah and codefendants Robinson and Thompson were arrested and charged with various counts of robbery, assault, criminal possession of a weapon and grand larceny. Represented by separate attorneys, they were jointly tried by a jury.

The evidence is that on December 19, 1986 about 9:30 p.m. the four complainants were accosted by a group of males, some with guns, as the complainants left 395 Fountain Avenue, a building in the Cypress Housing Project in Kings County. Two of the complainants were shot and all four had their caps taken. Attempts were also made to take the coats of the complainants. At trial all three of the defendants tried to establish that they were not present during the encounter.

The four complainants testified at trial and three of them identified defendant. Charles Washington, Dwayne Washington and Jimmy Washington testified that on January 10, 1987, they separately picked defendant Allah out of a lineup. In addition, they identified defendant in court. Jimmy Washington also testified that on the night of the incident he had returned to the area with the police and identified two persons involved in the incident. Pursuant to CPL 60.25 a housing police officer testified that it was Robinson and Thompson that Jimmy Washington had pointed out on December 19, 1986. Complainant Nicholson could not identify any of the persons on trial.

In addition to the complainants, four other eyewitnesses testified. Linda Robinson, the mother of codefendant Cory Robinson, testified on her son’s behalf. She testified that her son was home at 1230 Sutter Avenue (a building in the Cypress Housing Project) when she arrived from work at 6:00 or 6:30 p.m. on December 19, 1986. He remained there until she went to a neighbor’s apartment around 8:00 or 8:45 p.m. While she was visiting her neighbor, her son came to the apartment and asked for money to buy a hero sandwich. She went home and gave him the money and he left the apartment. It was close to 10:00 p.m. when she gave him the money. Linda Robinson also testified that she had never seen defendant in the company of her son.

Two witnesses, Charlie Mae Wilson and Curtis Collymore, were called by defendant Allah. Both testified that defendant was not present during the encounter. In addition, both testified that codefendants Robinson and Thompson were not present.

It was the testimony of Rachel Hilliard, called by codefendant Thompson, which demonstrated most clearly the conflict between the defenses of defendant Allah, on the one hand, and codefendants Thompson and Robinson on the other by placing defendant at the scene while excluding the codefendants from the encounter. She testified that after hearing gunshots, she looked out her window and saw defendant running with a gun in his hand. Hilliard also testified that she did not see codefendants Thompson or Robinson. She testified further that years ago, she and defendant had exchanged words on numerous occasions. In addition, Hilliard testified that several years ago she had been beaten by friends of defendant. No further explanation of the exchange of words or beating was given.

After the charge to the jury, counsel for codefendant Robinson stated that he had a medical emergency involving his right elbow and that he was going to visit a doctor. He stated that counsel for codefendant Thompson would assume the representation of his client with his client’s consent. During the temporary representation, the counsel for Robinson continued, "he may consent to the readback, the delivery of evidence to the jurors and do anything that I might have done if I were here.”

Immediately thereafter, counsel for defendant Allah informed the court that he would be out-of-town from 9:00 p.m. that night until the following Monday, and that counsel for Thompson, as well as counsel for Robinson when present, would also represent defendant. Specifically, counsel for defendant stated that the other two attorneys could "consent to read backs, presentation of evidence, et cetera, and my client Iraefbey Allah has also consented.” Counsel for defendant then asked his client if he consented to that on the record and defendant answered, "Yes.”

No reason for the absence of defendant’s attorney was stated on the record. Without inquiry or admonition by the court of any potential or actual conflict from the joint representation, defendant Allah consented to representation by counsel for the codefendants. During the period of joint representation by counsel for the codefendants, the jury received "clarification” of the elements of robbery and assault, as well as additional instructions from the court on the meaning of "acting in concert.”

The jury rendered a verdict acquitting the codefendants of all charges, and convicting defendant Allah of five counts of robbery in the first degree and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, holding that the absence of defendant Allah’s counsel and the joint representation did not deprive defendant of his fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel (see, 177 AD2d 490). The Chief Judge of this Court granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal.

The principal issue on this appeal is whether defendant was afforded the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant argues that defense counsel’s absence during jury deliberations through the verdict, and joint representation by counsel for Thompson and Robinson, deprived him of his fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel because there was an actual conflict of interest. We agree.

Where codefendants are represented by the same attorney, the trial court must inquire, on the record, whether each defendant has an awareness of the potential risks involved in that course and has knowingly chosen it (see, People v Macerola, 47 NY2d 257, 263; People v Gomberg, 38 NY2d 307, 313-314). Only after sufficient admonition by the trial court of the potential pitfalls of joint representation, can it be said that a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is adequately safeguarded (see, id.). If such admonition appears on the record, appellate courts can determine whether a defendant’s decision to pursue joint representation is an informed one (id.).

Where joint representation is undertaken at the crucial stage of jury deliberations, an actual conflict, such as that existing here, must be brought to the attention of a defendant so that any consent to that representation is an informed consent.

The People argue that the joint representation of defendant by counsel for the codefendants presented no conflict sufficient to violate defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel. However, the record reveals that an actual conflict existed. The key witness for codefendant Thompson, who had previously been beaten by friends of defendant, testified that she observed defendant running with a gun in his hand. The witness also testified that she did not see codefendants Thompson or Robinson at the crime scene. Thus, that witness implicated defendant while establishing a defense for codefendants Thompson and Robinson. As such, defendant’s right to receive assistance from an attorney whose undivided responsibility is to that defendant alone was impaired by joint representation by counsel for the codefendants (see, People v Macerola, 47 NY2d 257, 264, supra).

Moreover, the record reveals no explanation for defense counsel’s absence. Nor does the record indicate that the court, by proper inquiry, took the necessary precautions to ensure that the defendant perceived the potential risks inherent in joint representation by counsel for the codefendants. Thus, we cannot conclude that defendant’s decision to pursue joint representation in this case was an informed one. Respondent’s argument that defendant consented to the joint representation in open court is unavailing.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and a new trial ordered.

Acting Chief Judge Simons and Judges Kaye, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.

Order reversed, etc.


author: Titone, J.

text:
    In the Matter of Aaron J., Appellant.
    Argued October 16,1992;
    decided November 24, 1992

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Ardeth L. Houde, Rochester, for appellant.
    I. In determining the 60-day period under Family Court Act § 340.1, the Family Court and Fourth Department erred in excluding the time during which the juvenile’s case was referred to probation for possible adjustment and the five-day period the matter was adjourned for his appearance. (Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408; Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d 398; Matter of Detrece H., 78 NY2d 107; Matter of Jerome S., 157 AD2d 286; Matter of Lamb, 140 Misc 2d 502.) II. The record fails to support a finding that on November 20 there was an adjournment for good cause shown. (Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408; Matter of Detrece H., 164 AD2d 306; Matter of Vincent M., 125 AD2d 60.)

      Charles S. Turner, County Attorney of Monroe County, Rochester (Ronald A. Case of counsel), for respondent.
    I. The Family Court and the Appellate Division did not err in excluding, for the purpose of determining if there was compliance with the statutory speedy trial requirement, the time period during which appellant’s case was referred to the Probation Department for possible adjustment and the five-day period during which appellant failed to appear in court. (People v Mobil Oil Corp., 48 NY2d 192; Gaden v Gaden, 29 NY2d 80; Levine v Bornstein, 4 NY2d 241; Rozler v Franger, 61 AD2d 46, 46 NY2d 760; Matter of Reed v Reed, 63 Misc 2d 459; Matter of "Anonymous”, 40 Misc 2d 8; Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d 398.) II. Appellant may not properly claim that the adjournment granted by the Family Court on November 20, 1990 was not "for good cause shown.” (Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408; Matter of Abdul Hashim S., 140 AD2d 350; Matter of Detrece H., 164 AD2d 306.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Titone, J.

Section 340.1 of the Family Court Act provides that, in the absence of "good cause shown,” the fact-finding hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding "shall commence not more than sixty days after the conclusion of the initial appearance” where the respondent is not in detention. However, the Family Court Act also authorizes the trial courts to refer cases involving juvenile delinquency charges for "adjustment services” (Family Ct Act § 320.6) and provides for a period of up to 120 days for the completion of such services (§ 308.1 [9]). The relationship between these separate limitations periods is the subject of this appeal.

The presentment agency commenced the present proceeding with a petition charging respondent with an act which, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in the third degree (see, Penal Law § 165.05 [1]). Respondent, who was not in detention, made his initial appearance with counsel on September 24, 1990. At that time, over the objection of the presentment agency, the court granted respondent’s request for a referral to the Probation Department for possible "adjustment” pursuant to Family Court Act § 320.6, adjourning the proceeding for a period of three weeks (cf., Family Ct Act § 320.6 [2] [requiring consent of presentment agency in cases involving certain designated felonies]).

On October 16, 1990, the Probation Department reported to the Judge that respondent had agreed to seek employment with the aid of a local service agency so that the sum of $320 could be paid in restitution. The Department, however, expressed some skepticism about respondent’s ability to pay that amount within the required period (but cf., Family Ct Act § 308.1 [2] [respondent’s inability to make restitution may not be considered]). At respondent’s request, the proceeding was adjourned for another 30 days.

On the next court date, November 15, 1990, respondent failed to appear, and the case was once again adjourned. When respondent finally appeared on November 20, 1990, the court was advised that he had failed to cooperate with the Probation Department and had not obtained employment. Consequently, the adjustment effort was abandoned, and the court set the matter down for a fact-finding hearing to commence on December 6, 1990.

On that date, respondent’s counsel appeared and orally moved to dismiss the petition for failure to comply with the speedy trial requirements of Family Court Act § 340.1 (2). After considering written submissions from both sides, the court denied the motion, holding that the period during which respondent was receiving adjustment services should be ex-eluded from the time in which the fact-finding hearing had to be commenced (see, 150 Misc 2d 328). Respondent was subsequently found guilty of the charges, adjudged a juvenile delinquent and placed on probation for an 18-month period. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s dispositional order, and this Court granted respondent leave to take a further appeal.

Analysis in this case must begin with the provisions of Family Court Act § 340.1. That statute, which delineates the basic speedy trial rules applicable to respondent’s case, provides: "If the respondent is not in detention the fact-finding hearing shall commence not more than sixty days after the conclusion of the initial appearance except * * * [t]he court may adjourn a fact-finding hearing: (a) on its own motion * * * for good cause shown for * * * not more than thirty days * * * or (b) on motion by the respondent for good cause shown for not more than thirty days” (Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2], [4]). The court must state the reasons for the adjournment on the record, and successive motions to adjourn are not permitted unless "special circumstances” are shown (Family Ct Act § 340.1 [5], [6]). As the Court held in Matter of Frank C. (70 NY2d 408, 413), the goal of the statute is to "assure swift and certain adjudication.” Consequently, in contrast to the analysis that is applied in CPL 30.30 cases (see, e.g., People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201; People v Giordano, 56 NY2d 524; People v Brothers, 50 NY2d 413), the focus of the inquiry is not on whether the prosecuting agency was the source of the delay, but rather whether the statutory standards of "good cause” or "special circumstances” were satisfied (Matter of Frank C, supra; see also, Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d 398).

In respondent’s case, the fact-finding hearing was not commenced within the 60-day period specified by Family Court Act § 340.1 (2). Moreover, neither the parties nor the court invoked the special provisions of the statute authorizing "good cause” or "special circumstances” adjournments (Family Ct Act § 340.1 [4], [6]). Accordingly, even though the petitioning agency was not responsible for the adjournments that delayed respondent’s fact-finding hearing, the principles set forth in Matter of Frank C. (supra) could theoretically lead to dismissal. We conclude, however, that dismissal is not mandated under the circumstances presented here, since a total of 52 of the 72 days between respondent’s initial appearance and the date the fact-finding hearing was scheduled to commence were absorbed in the provision of judicially ordered "adjustment services” pursuant to Family Court Act § 320.6.

The "adjustment services” contemplated by the statute entail "the informal consensual resolution of a case under probation service auspices” (Sobie, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 308.1, at 320). Use of this nonadversarial dispute resolution mechanism can be highly beneficial to an accused juvenile because, if successful, it enables the juvenile to avoid the potentially harsher consequences of a formal fact-finding hearing and judicially imposed disposition (see, Family Ct Act § 320.6 [3]).

The centerpiece of the legislation authorizing "adjustment services” is Family Court Act § 308.1, which provides a detailed description of the procedures to be followed and establishes the time limits that must be obeyed. Under subdivision (9) of that statute, "[ejfforts at adjustment * * * may not extend for a period of more than two months without leave of the court, which may extend the period for an additional two months.” Thus, in contrast to section 340.1 (2)’s restrictive 60-day period for the commencement of the fact-finding hearing, the period for adjustment may extend for up to 120 days.

Despite this difference in their prescribed time periods, there is no inherent conflict between section 308.1 (9) and section 340.1. As is evident from several of section 308.1’s other subdivisions, that statute is addressed primarily to situations in which "adjustment services” are to be provided before any juvenile delinquency petition is filed (see, Family Ct Act § 308.1 [1], [2], [5], [7], [8], [12]). In such situations, section 340.1 (2)’s 60-day limitation period, which does not begin to run until the respondent’s first appearance on the petition, is not implicated. On the other hand, a question about the application of the two separate limitations periods does arise when, as here, the adjustment is undertaken pursuant to Family Court Act § 320.6, which expressly authorizes referrals for "adjustment^]” "[a]t the initial appearance.” In such cases, the running of the 60-day limitation period specified in Family Court Act § 340.1 (2) has been triggered by the respondent’s appearance, and the relationship between that period and the longer period specified in section 308.1 (9) for the adjustment may become problematic.

We do not agree with petitioner’s argument that the availability of adjustment services should be ignored and that we should hold section 340.1 (2)’s 60-day deadline controlling. Rather, we conclude that, as long as the prescriptions of Family Court Act § 308.1 (9) are respected, a judicial referral for adjustment under Family Court Act § 320.6 operates to toll the limitations period set forth in Family Court Act § 340.1.

Our conclusion is premised on both an analysis of the statutory scheme and the goals underlying the relevant statutes. Family Court Act § 320.6 (4) provides that, with one exception not pertinent here (see, Family Ct Act § 308.1 [13]), the procedural mandates of section 308.1 are to be applied when a case has been judicially referred for adjustment after the initial appearance. Thus, it is evident that the Legislature intended the timing prescriptions applicable to prepetition adjustment proceedings to be available in analogous proceedings commenced after the petition has been filed and the respondent has appeared.

Moreover, it has been noted that Family Court Act § 320.6 was enacted "to encourage the adjustment of appropriate cases even after a petition is filed” (Sobie, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 320.6, at 378). That goal would clearly be frustrated if there were no toll during the pendency of adjustment proceedings and a referral for adjustment thereby increased the risk of a dismissal for failure to comply with the timeliness requirements of Family Court Act § 340.1. Indeed, "adjustments” often entail such time-consuming ameliorative measures as multiple counselling sessions, psychological evaluations and referrals to community service agencies (see, Sobie, Practice Commentary, op. cit., at 320). It is unreasonable to expect that such measures could always be undertaken and completed within the time constraints prescribed by Family Court Act § 340.1. It is also unreasonable to assume that the Legislature intended juveniles referred for adjustment after their initial court appearances not to have the full range of services that are available to similarly situated juveniles referred in the prepetition stage. The Legislature intended both classes of juveniles to have access to the same range of services and further intended that both classes would have the benefits of the same time period for the completion of such services.

Accordingly, consistent with our obligation to harmonize the various provisions of related statutes and to construe them in a way that renders them internally compatible (see, e.g., People v Mobil Oil Corp., 48 NY2d 192, 199-200; Gaden v Gaden, 29 NY2d 80, 86; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§97, 98), we hold that a referral for "adjustment services” made pursuant to Family Court Act § 320.6 tolls the time specified in Family Court Act § 340.1 for commencing the fact-finding hearing for a period of up to 120 days, provided that section 308.1 (9)’s requirement for a judicially granted extension is observed. Since that condition was satisfied in respondent’s case, the time for commencing his fact-finding hearing was tolled during the 52-day period that his case was in the adjustment process, and the trial court properly denied his motion for dismissal of the petition.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

Acting Chief Judge Simons and Judges Kaye, Hancock, Jr., Bellacosa and Smith concur.

Order affirmed, without costs.


author: Smith, J. Titone and Hancock, Jr., J.

text:
    In the Matter of Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York, as Assignee of Adriana G., Respondent, v Ruben O., Appellant.
    Argued October 22,1992;
    decided November 24, 1992

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Franklin Weinrib Rudell & Vassallo, P. C., New York City (Richard A. Abrams and Brian D. Berk of counsel), for appellant.
    Ruben O.’s legal obligation for the support of the child cannot exceed the amount stipulated in the parties’ compromise agreement plus the amount being paid to Adriana G. for the child’s support by the Department of Social Services. (Bacon v Bacon, 46 NY2d 477; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Wilmer W., 125 Misc 2d 905; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Segarra, 78 NY2d 220.)

      O. Peter Sherwood, Corporation Counsel of New York City, New York City (A. Orli Spanier and Kristin M. Helmers of counsel), for respondent.
    The existence of a Family Court Act § 516 agreement does not bar the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services from seeking a child support order, pursuant to the formula set forth in Family Court Act § 413, from a father whose son is the recipient of public assistance benefits. Accordingly, the order appealed from should be affirmed in all respects. (Bacon v Bacon, 46 NY2d 477; Matter of Bancroft v Court of Special Sessions, 199 Misc 325, 278 App Div 141, 303 NY 728; Matter of L. Pamela P. v Frank S., 59 NY2d 1; Matter of Weinberg v Omar E., 106 AD2d 448; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Wilmer W., 125 Misc 2d 905; Matter of ABC v XYZ, 50 Misc 2d 792; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Segarra, 78 NY2d 220; Schaschlo v Taishoff, 2 NY2d 408; Evans v Matthews, 87 Misc 2d 112, 55 AD2d 1047; Seagraves v Harris, 629 F2d 385.)

      Laurie Woods, New York City, Judith M. Reichler and Linda A. Stesney for National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc., and another, amici curiae.

    I. Compromise agreements protect the father at the expense of the nonmarital child. (Matter of Storm v None, 57 Misc 2d 342; Avildsen v Prystay, 171 AD2d 13; Matter of Carmen V. v Bruce R., 115 Misc 2d 377; Mills v Habluetzel, 456 US 91; Clark v Jeter, 486 US 456.) II. Section 516 of the Family Court Act may be unconstitutional, as applied, because it denies to nonmarital children benefits that are provided to marital children. (Bacon v Bacon, 46 NY2d 477; Gomez v Perez, 409 US 535; Barber v Davis, 120 AD2d 364; Matter of Commissioner of Franklin County Dept, of Social Servs. v Clarence F., 117 AD2d 877; People v Wesley, 140 Misc 2d 306; People v Castro, 144 Misc 2d 956; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Philip De G., 59 NY2d 137; Matter of Reidy v Jeffrey K., 125 AD2d 825; Matter of Van Alstyne v David Q., 92 AD2d 971; Rivera v Minnich, 483 US 574.) III. This Court can clarify that its holding in Matter of Brescia v Fitts (56 NY2d 132) would apply to a nonmarital child whose parents had entered into a compromise agreement. To do otherwise would deny to a child born out of wedlock protections that are extended to marital children. (Avildsen v Prystay, 171 AD2d 13; Matter of Carmen V. v Bruce R., 115 Misc 2d 377; Matter of Shan F. v Francis F., 88 Misc 2d 165; Matter of Boden v Boden, 42 NY2d 210; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Segarra, 78 NY2d 220.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Smith, J.

The issue presented on this appeal is whether the Commissioner of Social Services, as assignee of the rights of a mother who has become and whose child has become a public charge, can compel a father to pay child support in accordance with the Child Support Standards Act (Family Ct Act § 413) where the father has completely complied with a court-approved compromise agreement of support (Family Ct Act § 516).

Respondent Ruben O., appeals from an order of the Appellate Division, First Department, which unanimously affirmed an order of Family Court, New York County, denying his motion to dismiss a petition by the Commissioner of Social Services. The Commissioner sought to increase the putative father’s support obligations beyond the amount the child received under a compromise agreement between respondent and the child’s mother, Adriana G., and from public assistance.

In May 1976, Adriana G. filed a petition in Family Court, New York County, alleging that she was pregnant with respondent’s child and expected to give birth in November 1976. Adriana G. sought an order declaring that respondent was the child’s father and directing him to provide for the child’s support. Respondent denied paternity. On April 28, 1977, respondent and Adriana G. entered into a court-approved compromise agreement pursuant to Family Court Act § 516. The agreement stated, among other things, that respondent had denied fathering a child born to Adriana G. on October 21, 1976, but that respondent would pay Adriana G. (1) $4,000 in satisfaction of any claims that she may have against him for past support, confinement and other expenses relating to her pregnancy, (2) $100 per week for the support and education of the child until he reaches maturity, and (3) legal fees in connection with the paternity proceeding. In exchange, Adriana G. agreed not to pursue any other remedies against respondent, including eiforts to establish paternity, and to periodically advise respondent of the child’s whereabouts. The agreement also stated that nothing contained therein should be construed to be an admission of paternity by respondent. A rider to the agreement, executed on the same day as the agreement, expressly provided that any default by respondent would allow Adriana G. to pursue other remedies against him. An additional rider allowed Adriana G. to seek payment from respondent for the child’s post-high school academic education.

On August 22, 1977, Adriana G. filed a second paternity petition, seeking an order of filiation and additional child support. Respondent successfully moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that it was precluded by the Family Court Act § 516 agreement.

In January 1988, Adriana G. commenced another proceeding in Family Court, New York County, seeking to modify the Family Court Act § 516 agreement and to direct respondent to provide health insurance and hospitalization coverage for the child, or, alternatively, to have Family Court Act § 516 declared unconstitutional. The Hearing Examiner dismissed the petition, finding that the agreement between the parties precluded Adriana G. from reopening the paternity case. Adriana G. sought to review the Hearing Examiner’s determination upon the grounds that Family Court Act § 516, as applied to her and her child, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and Family Court improperly approved the compromise agreement. Respondent made an oral motion to dismiss the January 1988 petition, arguing that the agreement was binding and precluded the petition. Family Court "denied” Adriana G.’s objections to the Hearing Examiner’s determination, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to address the objections, and, even if it had the power to modify the agreement, Adriana G. would not be entitled to the relief sought because an order of filiation is a necessary prerequisite to any court order for child support under article 5 of the Family Court Act.

Barred from seeking an order of filiation or increased support for the child, unemployed, and suffering from a chronic medical condition, Adriana G. filed for public assistance. Likewise, the child, also suffering from severe health problems, became a public charge. The Commissioner of Social Services, as assignee of Adriana G.’s right to support, commenced this proceeding seeking an order of filiation and to increase respondent’s support obligations. The Commissioner also sought an order requiring respondent to maintain health insurance coverage for the child. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that Family Court Act § 516 precluded the Department of Social Services from filing the paternity petition. The Department of Social Services argued that the section 516 agreement was not binding in this case, given the public assistance status of Adriana G. and the child.

The Hearing Examiner denied respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition, finding that the Commissioner was not bound by the agreement pursuant to Family Court Act § 516 because the child had become a public charge. The Hearing Examiner ordered the parties to submit to blood tests. Respondent then moved for an order "revising” the Hearing Examiner’s determination upon the ground that the Hearing Examiner erroneously denied him the opportunity to offer proof that Adriana G. did not qualify for public assistance. On the return date of the motion, respondent orally applied for declaratory relief limiting his child support obligation to the amount that the Department of Social Services was paying Adriana G. and, in addition, requiring him to provide health insurance and pay the unreimbursed medical expenses for the child. Respondent further requested that, upon such declaration, his support obligations be fixed as a matter of law and no further proceedings be allowed.

Family Court denied the application, finding that respondent could be compelled to pay the amounts stated in the child support guidelines of Family Court Act § 413. Respondent then waived the necessity for blood tests and agreed to "pursue his legal remedies on whatever written order [the court] renders or on the transcript.” The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Family Court’s order, holding that "the Commissioner is not bound by the 1977 child support agreement, [and] * * * may seek a child support award based on the child’s needs and the respondent’s means, without limitation referable to the child’s public assistance grant, i.e., under the guidelines set forth in Family Court Act § 413” (177 AD2d 405, 406). The Court granted respondent leave to appeal to this Court, and certified the following question: "Was the order of the Family Court, as affirmed by this Court, properly made?”

Respondent admits that upon the authority of Matter of Bancroft v Court of Special Sessions (278 App Div 141, affd 303 NY 728), the Commissioner of Social Services is not absolutely bound by the parties’ compromise agreement. Nevertheless, respondent contends that since he fully complied with the Family Court Act § 516 agreement, the Commissioner should not be allowed to bring the filiation and support proceeding. The Commissioner argues that regardless of respondent’s compliance with the Family Court Act § 516 agreement, she can properly commence a filiation and support proceeding because the child is a public charge.

The relevant sections of the Family Court Act support the Commissioner’s contentions. Section 516 (c) of the Family Court Act authorizes compromise agreements and states that "[t]he complete performance of the agreement or compromise, when so approved, bars other remedies of the mother or child for the support and education of the child.” However, section 571 of the Family Court Act authorizes a social services official, where appropriate, to bring a filiation and support proceeding and states, in part:

"1. Any inconsistent provision of this law or any other law notwithstanding, in cases where a social services official has accepted, on behalf of the state and a social services district, an assignment of support rights from a person applying for or receiving aid to dependent children in accordance with the provisions of the social services law, the social services official or an authorized representative of the state is authorized to bring a proceeding or proceedings in the family court pursuant to article four of this act to enforce such support rights and, when appropriate or necessary, to establish the paternity of a child pursuant to article five of this act.”

In this case, the Commissioner has accepted an assignment of support rights from Adriana G., who receives public assistance for her dependent child. Therefore, Family Court Act § 516 notwithstanding, the Commissioner is authorized to bring a filiation or support proceeding in Family Court.

Respondent also contends that, assuming the proceeding was properly commenced, he should be required to pay only the amount of support stipulated in the Family Court Act § 516 agreement plus any amount of public assistance that the child is receiving. The Commissioner argues that since the child receives public assistance and a filiation order has been entered by Family Court, the Commissioner can seek child support under Family Court Act § 545 (1); §§ 513 and 413 (1).

The changes in key circumstances, that is, the child becoming a public charge, the Commissioner’s right to step in at that point and the admission by the respondent that he is the father of the child born in 1976, a fact which permitted the entry of a filiation order, support the rationale and result we adopt. Once a filiation order is made, a court can direct an appropriate level of support for the child (see, Family Ct Act § 545 [1]). A court is authorized pursuant to Family Court Act § 513 to make an award in accordance with the standards set forth in Family Court Act § 413 for the support of children born out of wedlock. Section 413 obligates parents of a child under 21 years of age to support such child and, if they are possessed of or are able to earn sufficient means, to pay a fair and reasonable sum for the child as the court may determine. These sections of the Family Court Act support the conclusion that where, as here, a filiation order has been entered in these circumstances, the court can direct parents to pay support in accordance with their financial resources for a child receiving public assistance. Nothing in the act limits the amount of support to an amount stipulated in a Family Court Act § 516 agreement plus any amount of public assistance that the child is receiving. The Commissioner, as assignee of the rights of a mother of a child receiving public assistance, is entitled to seek a child support award based upon the child’s needs and the noncustodial parent’s means (Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Segarra, 78 NY2d 220, 226).

The argument that since the parties entered into a Family Court Act § 516 agreement, the court should not require him to pay more than reimbursement of the public purse, is unavailing and does not rest simply on a waiver theory as the dissent asserts. Moreover, that argument conflicts with the reasoning of Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Segarra (supra). There, the Commissioner of Social Services commenced a proceeding, on behalf of a mother and her child who were recipients of public assistance, seeking an order compelling the respondent, against whom a determination of paternity had been made, to pay child support. The Commissioner argued that the respondent should be required to pay support based on the reasonable needs of the child and the respondent’s means, rather than on the amount of public assistance that the child received. The respondent contended that his obligation to support the child should be limited to the child’s portion of the public assistance grant. This Court concluded that nothing in sections 413 and 415 of the Family Court Act limited the obligation of parents to support their children to the amount of public assistance received by the children, and held as follows:

"We hold therefore that the Commissioner, as assignee of the rights of an AFDC dependent, is entitled to seek a child support award based upon the child’s needs and the noncustodial parent’s means and that the noncustodial parent’s obligation is not limited to the child’s share of the monthly public assistance grant” (id., at 226).

The argument that because of the absence of a compromise agreement, Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Segarra (supra) is not instructive here is rejected in light of the Commissioner’s obligation to seek support for the child in accordance with the child’s needs. Any argument that respondent is deprived of the "benefit of his bargain” is belied by the fact that at the time he entered the agreement, Matter of Bancroft (supra) had made clear that the Commissioner would not be bound by the agreement in these circumstances.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the question certified answered in the affirmative.

Titone and Hancock, Jr., J.

(dissenting). The issue on this appeal is whether the Department of Social Services, in its capacity as assignee of Adriana G. under a paternity settlement agreement, may seek to increase the amount of support due from a father under that agreement (see, Family Ct Act § 516). Because we believe that the Commissioner has assumed no rights greater than those which the mother had under the section 516 settlement agreement, we conclude that the Commissioner cannot now seek to increase the father’s obligations. We therefore dissent.

There is no question that the Commissioner of Social Services has a right to recoup from fathers amounts that the State expends in public assistance for the child (see, Family Ct Act § 415; Social Services Law §§ 101, 102; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Segarra, 78 NY2d 220). There is also no question that the Commissioner has the right and power to enforce the existing terms of a settlement agreement reached pursuant to Family Court Act § 516 as assignee of a party to the agreement that has become a public charge (see, Family Ct Act § 571; Social Services Law § 111-b).

At issue in the present case, however, is the distinct issue of whether the Commissioner may seek payments from the father in addition to the amount due under the agreement and the amount of public assistance. It is not clear in what capacity the Commissioner seeks to increase the father’s support obligation under the section 516 agreement. The majority fails to articulate a theory of standing by which an assignee of an agreement may seek to alter the terms of an agreement. Like any other assignee, the Commissioner is limited to enforcing the terms of the agreement.

Assuming for present purposes that the Commissioner has standing to request a variation of the terms of the agreement, the Commissioner does so only as assignee of the assignor’s rights under the agreement. No one disputes in this case that as to the mother, the settlement agreement was conclusive as to the father’s child support obligations under Family Court Act §516. To hold, as the majority does today, that the Commissioner may request an increase in those obligations implies that as assignee, the Commissioner has somehow assumed greater rights under the agreement than enjoyed by the mother.

Finally, we cannot agree with the holding of the majority that "[o]nce a filiation order is made, a court can direct an appropriate level of support for the child” (majority opn, at 415) under Family Court Act § 545 (1) notwithstanding an existing section 516 agreement. The majority’s holding implies that the conclusive effect of a section 516 agreement is waived once paternity is admitted. Clearly, neither section 516 nor prior cases have established such a rule. Indeed, this rule undermines the very intent of section 516 to provide an incentive to settle paternity disputes amicably. Section 545 (1), moreover, authorizes the courts to set appropriate support obligations in filiation proceedings, a situation obviously not present here. We therefore cannot agree that under the facts of this case the Commissioner may now seek to increase the father’s support obligations.

Acting Chief Judge Simons and Judges Kaye and Bellacosa concur with Judge Smith; Judges Titone and Hancock, Jr., dissent and vote to reverse in a joint opinion.

Order affirmed, etc.

       On April 8, 1992, Family Court, New York County, entered an order of filiation. No issue of paternity is raised on appeal.


author: Kaye, J.

text:
    Shaunda Lovelace et al., Appellants, v George Gross et al., Respondents.
    Argued October 21,1992;
    decided November 24, 1992

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Kalkines, Arky, Zall & Bernstein, New York City (Jeffrey C. Thrope of counsel), for appellants.
    I. Denial of Medicaid based on the grandparent-deeming rule violates the Federal Medicaid statute. (Schweiker v Gray Panthers, 453 US 34.) II. The grandparent-deeming rule as applied to plaintiffs violates article XVII, § 1 of the New York Constitution. (Tucker v Toia, 43 NY2d 1; Matter of Parker v Stage, 43 NY2d 128; Matter of Phillip v Perales, 120 AD2d 597; Taylor v Dumpson, 79 Misc 2d 379, 37 NY2d 765; Matter of Lenti v Lenti, 48 Misc 2d 206; Minino v Perales, 168 AD2d 289, 79 NY2d 883.) III. Social Services Law § 131-c (2), as applied to plaintiffs, violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the New York and United States Constitutions. (Alvey v Downstate Med. Ctr., 39 NY2d 326; People v Whidden, 51 NY2d 457, 454 US 803; Matter of Fay, 44 NY2d 137, appeal dismissed sub nom. Buck v Hunter, 439 US 1059; Matter of Lalli, 43 NY2d 65, affd sub nom. Lalli v Lalli, 439 US 259; Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471; Riley v County of Monroe, 43 NY2d 144; Robert v Ford Motor Co., 100 Misc 2d 646; San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1; Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365.)

      O. Peter Sherwood, Corporation Counsel of New York City, New York City (Helen P. Brown and Larry A. Sonnenshein of counsel), for George Gross, respondent. The Court below properly affirmed the lower court order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint.

      Robert Abrams, Attorney-General, New York City (Judy E. Nathan, Jerry Boone, Andrea Green and Robert J. Schack of counsel), for Cesar Perales, respondent. I. The grandparent-deeming rule does not violate article XVII, § 1 of the New York State Constitution.

      (Tucker v Toia, 43 NY2d 1; Matter of Lee v Smith, 43 NY2d 453; Matter of Bernstein v Toia, 43 NY2d 437; Bowen v Gilliard, 483 US 587; Lyng v Castillo, 477 US 635; Termini v Califano, 611 F2d 367; Lalli v Lalli, 439 US 259; Matter of Davis, 57 NY2d 382; Matter of Torres v Perales, 121 AD2d 386.) II. The grandparent-deeming rule for home relief eligibility is rationally related to legitimate government interests in targeting public assistance to those in need. (Bowen v Gilliard, 483 US 587; Matter of Fay, 44 NY2d 137, appeal dismissed sub nom. Buck v Hunter, 439 US 1059; Labine v Vincent, 401 US 532; Levy v Louisiana, 391 US 68; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307; Diamond v Cuomo, 70 NY2d 338, 486 US 1028; Matter of Levy, 38 NY2d 653, appeal dismissed sub nom. Levy v City of New York, 429 US 805; Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471; Matter of Barie v Lavine, 40 NY2d 565; Califano v Jobst, 434 US 47.) III. The Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims about the application of Social Services Law § 131-c (2) to the Medicaid program. (Watergate II Apts, v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Kaye, J.

Plaintiffs, a putative class of infant children of minor mothers residing with the mothers’ parents, challenge the constitutionality of Social Services Law § 131-c (2) — the "grandparent-deeming” rule — which requires that a portion of the grandparents’ income be deemed available to the infants in determining their eligibility for Home Relief payments. We agree with the trial court and Appellate Division that the statute is valid under both State and Federal Constitutions.

Public Assistance Programs

New York participates in several cooperatively funded Federal-State programs to aid the needy. Among them is Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (42 USC § 601 et seq.), which provides for cash payments to children under 18 and their caretaker relatives who meet Federal statutory requirements. The State actually furnishes the AFDC assistance (Social Services Law § 349) and — so long as Federal eligibility standards are met — is then reimbursed by the Federal Government for at least 50% of its allowable costs (42 USC § 602 [a]; § 603; Social Services Law § 153). New York additionally offers cash assistance through the Home Relief program (Social Services Law §§ 157-166), which is funded entirely by the State. Home Relief is a "residual category” intended to furnish aid to needy persons not receiving assistance under other programs (Matter of Lee v Smith, 43 NY2d 453, 458).

Eligibility for both AFDC and Home Relief is determined by measuring the countable income and resources of an individual or family against the State’s defined standard of need. That standard represents the State’s "view of the amount necessary to provide for the essential needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter, of a hypothetical family having the same composition as the family in question.” (RAM v Blum, 533 F Supp 933, 937.) Persons with income and resources below that standard are "categorically needy” and are eligible for cash payments to bring them up to the specified level (Social Services Law § 131-a). Families or individuals ineligible for direct cash grants through AFDC or Home Relief may nonetheless qualify for in-kind benefits such as food stamps and Medicaid.

The Federal Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA) imposes added eligibility requirements for AFDC, including the grandparent-deeming rule: where the grandparent lives in the same household as the grandchild and minor parent under the age of 18, certain grandparent income is deemed available to the infant for purposes of determining the infant’s eligibility for AFDC payments (42 USC § 602 [a] [39]). In 1985, New York enacted Social Services Law § 131-c (2) — mirroring the Federal statute — to conform to DEFRA and assure continued Federal participation in New York’s AFDC program (1985 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 2952). Since Social Services Law § 131-c (2) applies to public assistance generally, it governs eligibility for both the AFDC and Home Relief programs. Plaintiffs challenge the grandparent-deeming rule only as applied to Home Relief.

As made clear in the Memorandum of the State Executive Department accompanying Social Services Law § 131-c (2), failure of New York to comply with the AFDC-related provisions of DEFRA risked a then-projected potential $1 billion loss of reimbursement. The Memorandum pointed out, additionally, that applying the same rule to Home Relief "would avoid inequalities in treatment among participants in the two programs and would avoid increased administrative costs for the State and local agencies which could result from the complexities of a dual system.” (1985 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 2952.) Further, if DEFRA were not extended to Home Relief, "in certain circumstances Home Relief benefits would be higher than those provided under AFDC,” threatening that the entire benefit program might become fully financed by the State and local districts. (Id., at 2953.)

Not all grandparent income is deemed available in determining the infant’s eligibility for Home Relief. In calculating the monthly grandparent income to be considered, the following are excluded: (1) the first $75 of gross earned income; (2) an amount equal to the standard of need for the grandparent and all dependents living with the grandparent other than the minor mother and her infant; (3) alimony or child support paid by the grandparent; and (4) other amounts paid by the grandparent to dependents living outside the home (Social Services Law § 131-c [2]; 18 NYCRR 352.30 [c]).

State Constitutional Provision for Aid to Needy

Plaintiffs’ primary contention is that Social Services Law § 131-c (2) violates article XVII, § 1 of the State Constitution, which declares that the "aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine.” In this State, assisting the needy is a matter of constitutional command, not legislative grace (Jiggetts v Grinker, 75 NY2d 411, 416; Tucker v Toia, 43 NY2d 1, 7).

Analysis of the constitutional requirement begins with Tucker v Toia, relied on by both parties. Tucker involved a challenge to a statute requiring public assistance petitioners under the age of 21 and not living with a parent or guardian, who otherwise qualified as "needy” for the purposes of Home Relief, to commence a support proceeding against such parent or guardian. Absent disposition of the support proceeding, which might take months, no Home Relief payments would be provided. We concluded that statute was unconstitutional because it denied public assistance to persons who were concededly "needy” according to the State’s own definition of the term. "Since [petitioners] do meet the need criteria, and are thus a fortiori unable to support themselves without public aid, one must wonder how they are to survive [the] period of waiting for an overcrowded Family Court system to process their often quite futile support petitions.” (Tucker v Toia, 43 NY2d, at 7, supra.)

While recognizing that the Legislature may not refuse to aid the needy, Tucker also made clear that the Constitution vests the Legislature with discretion "in determining the amount of aid, and in classifying recipients and defining the term 'needy.’ ” (Id., at 8.) " 'The Legislature may continue the system of relief now in operation. It may preserve the present plan of reimbursement to the localities. It may devise new ways of dealing with the problem. Its hands are untied. What it may not do is shirk its responsibility which * * * is as fundamental as any responsibility of government.’ ” (Id., at 8, quoting Revised Record of Constitutional Convention, vol III, at 2126 [1938].)

Plaintiffs urge that the grandparent-deeming rule is out- and-out avoidance of the Legislature’s constitutional responsibility. We disagree and conclude that the rule falls within the ambit of permissible legislative discretion in defining the term "needy.”

As noted in the Memorandum of the State Executive Department, conformance of the rule to the Federal statute avoids risk to reimbursement, inequalities in treatment among program participants, and increased administrative costs. Those factors were not present in Tucker, which involved the Legislature’s attempt to impose a stricter standard for Home Relief than that applied to AFDC.

But mere conformance with Federal law cannot end the inquiry because of the State’s independent constitutional commitment to aid the needy (Matter of Lee v Smith, 43 NY2d, at 461-462, supra). Here, we conclude that the reasonableness of the grandparent-deeming rule goes beyond benefits derived from consistency with Federal law.

The assumption underlying the rule — that there are economies of scale in rent, food, fuel and other expenses of a single, three-generational household — is not unreasonable (see, Bowen v Gilliard, 483 US 587, 599-600; Termini v Califano, 611 F2d 367, 370 [recognizing "the commonsense proposition that individuals living with others usually have reduced per capita costs because many of their expenses are shared”]). Nor is the assumption that grandparents residing in a family unit with their minor children will voluntarily share income with their infant grandchildren even though not legally obligated to do so. The grandparent-deeming rule, moreover, applies to cash benefits only, and is not a complete bar to public assistance in other forms, such as food stamps and Medicaid. Finally, where available income still falls below the standard of need, the infant remains eligible for assistance.

In these circumstances, we cannot say the provision contravenes the letter or spirit of article XVII, § 1 (see, Matter of Jones v Blum, 64 NY2d 918, affg on opn below 101 AD2d 330, 333; Matter of Capozzi v New York State Dept, of Social Servs., 137 Misc 2d 193, 196).

This case differs fundamentally from Tucker v Toia. In Tucker, the impermissible burden fell on minors already classified under State law as needy, who were nonetheless compelled to prosecute often lengthy, futile legal proceedings before they could receive any benefits. What is before us now, in a far different factual setting, is a challenge to the Legislature’s definition of "needy,” which Tucker itself recognized as within the discretion of the Legislature. This is not a mere technical distinction between the cases, or a road map for circumvention of the constitutional command. While statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Legislature’s discretion to ascertain and define the State standard of need is subject to judicial review and must be exercised reasonably.

Having in this case determined that the Legislature did indeed exercise its discretion reasonably, we conclude that Social Services Law § 131-c (2) does not contravene article XVII, § 1 of the State Constitution.

Equal Protection and Due Process Challenges

Plaintiffs next contend that Social Services Law § 131-c (2) as applied to Home Relief subjects the infants of minor mothers to disparate treatment in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. They argue that the distinction drawn between minor mothers under 18 and minor mothers over 18, and the presumed availability of income of a grandparent who has no legal obligation to support the grandchild, serve no important governmental objectives, are not substantially related to achievement of those objectives, and have no rational basis.

We reject plaintiffs’ threshold contention that Social Services Law § 131-c (2) should be examined under a "middle level” scrutiny since the provision threatens our most vulnerable citizens — children of indigent teenage mothers — with arbitrary classification. Because the statute involves economic and social welfare concerns, presenting no distinctions based on race, disability or other suspect classification, the rational basis test is the appropriate standard of review (Matter of Davis, 57 NY2d 382, 388; Matter of Bernstein v Toia, 43 NY2d 437). A classification that has a rational basis or relationship to a legitimate State interest will be upheld even though it " 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” (Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485; see also, Bowen v Gilliard, 483 US 587, supra; Lalli v Lalli, 439 US 259.)

As discussed above, it is entirely reasonable for the Legislature to assume that grandparents will contribute to the support of infant grandchildren residing in their household, notwithstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so (cf., Bowen v Gilliard, 483 US 587, supra [upholding similar DE-FRA provision regarding the inclusion of sibling income]; Lyng v Castillo, 477 US 635 [upholding household groupings for food stamp eligibility that assume parents and siblings are one household group]). Similarly, the fact that grandparent-deeming ceases for minor mothers between the ages of 18 and 21 parallels the reasonable assumption of Federal law that, after the mother turns 18, grandparents may be less willing to contribute to the support of their grandchildren, and will instead ask that the minor mothers assume greater responsibility for their infants.

In addition, Social Services Law § 131-c (2) furthers the State’s legitimate goal of allocating limited public assistance resources to the neediest applicants (Matter of Jones v Blum, 101 AD2d, at 334, supra; Matter of Lee v Smith, 43 NY2d, at 461, supra). Further, while DEFRA requires only that the rule be applied to AFDC, the Legislature’s application of the rule to New York State benefits is rationally related to the State’s interest in assuring consistency between the AFDC and Home Relief programs. As the Appellate Division noted, "if the Deficit Reduction Act were not extended to the Home Relief programs, Home Relief benefits would in certain circumstances be higher than those provided under AFDC, which ultimately could result 'in the complete erosion of the AFDC’ programs” (175 AD2d 914, 915 [citing 1985 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 2953]; see also, Sutter v Perales, 64 NY2d 1095, affg on opn below 103 AD2d 1029, 1030).

Thus, we agree with Supreme Court and the Appellate Division that plaintiffs have failed to overcome the presumption of the validity of Social Services Law § 131-c (2).

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

Acting Chief Judge Simons and Judges Titone, Hancock, Jr., Bellacosa and Smith concur.

Order affirmed, without costs.

      . "Grandparent” refers as well to the minor mother’s legal guardian. "Plaintiffs” in this opinion refers to the named plaintiff and nine similarly situated persons who were permitted to intervene when the motion to declare this a class action was denied.

      . Our recent decision in Minino v Perales (79 NY2d 883) is not to the contrary, as defendants in that case conceded the unconstitutionality of the sponsor-deeming statute at issue there (id., at 885).

      . Plaintiffs claim the grandparent-deeming rule was improperly applied to deny them Medicaid benefits. Defendants readily acknowledge that Social Services Law § 131-c (2) is inapplicable to Medicaid (see, 42 USC § 1396a [a] [17] [D]), but correctly point out that dismissal of the complaint was in any event proper because of plaintiffs’ failure to pursue administrative remedies for any improper denial of Medicaid benefits (see, Watergate II Apts, v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57). Plaintiffs’ contention that they have a claim under 42 USC § 1983 that did not require exhaustion of administrative remedies is unavailing, because there is no assertion or showing that application of the grandparent-deeming rule to Medicaid benefits was a policy or practice of defendants (see, Monell v New York City Dept, of Social Servs., 436 US 658). Indeed, several of the intervenors submitted documents demonstrating that they have been found Medicaid-eligible.

      . As presented, the various constitutional claims are undifferentiated and coextensive with each other.