text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EMANUEL SMITH
    (SC 16336)
    McDonald, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz and Sullivan, Js.

      Argued November 29, 2000
    officially released May 1, 2001

      M. Elizabeth Reid, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      James Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Eugene Callahan, state’s attorney, and Matthew Couloute, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

       Although Chief Justice McDonald reached the mandatory age of retirement before the date that this opinion was officially released, his continued participation on this panel is authorized by General Statutes § 51-198 (c). The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

   Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the due process clause of the federal constitution requires that a defendant be afforded a court hearing with counsel before a defendant’s conditions of probation may be modified by the probation authorities. After a hearing held pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32 (a), the trial court, Rodriguez, J., found the defendant, Emanuel Smith, in violation of one of the conditions of his probation and rendered judgment imposing the defendant’s original sentence of eight years imprisonment, which had been suspended. The defendant appeals, claiming a violation of his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The following facts are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. On March 21, 1995, the defendant pleaded guilty to several offenses under two separate, unrelated cases. In the first case, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charges of burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-102 (a), and sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a (a). In the second case, the defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of probation in violation of § 53a-32, with the underlying offenses being possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 2 la-277 (a), and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a (a). In the first case, the trial court, Mints, J., imposed a sentence of ten years imprisonment, execution suspended after four years, followed by five years probation; and in the second case, a sentence of two years imprisonment to run consecutive to the first sentence. Thus, the court approved a total effective sentence of twelve years imprisonment, execution suspended after four years, followed by five years probation. The original conditions of the defendant’s probation included no contact with the victim, compliance with a standing criminal restraining order, substance abuse evaluation, and “treatment as deemed appropriate.” While the defendant was incarcerated, his probation officer, Dale Thur-ston, modified the defendant’s probation to include participation in a sex offender treatment program. A copy of the amended condition was delivered to the defendant in prison, which he signed.

Upon the defendant’s release from prison, William Anselmo, who was the probation officer now overseeing the defendant’s case, made an appointment for the defendant at the sex offender unit of special services in Norwalk, and informed him of that date. Anselmo stressed to the defendant the importance of the evaluation process. Anselmo stated that the time allotted for the defendant to meet with the therapist would be very limited, and that even being fifteen minutes late for an appointment could prevent the therapist from meeting with the defendant. The evaluation process, if the defendant were cooperative, normally could be completed in three to four visits.

After attending a few meetings on time, the defendant arrived late to a meeting on February 24, 1998, did not receive an evaluation that day, and was informed that he would be removed from the program if he were late again. On March 24, 1998, the defendant arrived late again and was told that he was expelled from the program.

Thereafter, the probation department moved to have the defendant’s probation revoked. At the revocation hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant had violated his probation because he failed to comply with the condition of probation regarding sexual offender treatment. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to the unexecuted term of his original sentence.* The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

This appeal is limited to the following issues: (1) whether the modification of the defendant’s probation by the office of adult probation without a hearing and counsel denied him due process of law under the federal constitution; and (2) if the modified condition of probation was validly imposed, did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that the defendant violated his probation and that the rehabilitative needs of probation were no longer being met?

I

The defendant, at the revocation hearing, did not claim that his probation was modified in violation of his due process rights under the federal or state constitution and, therefore, asks this court to review his unpreserved claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69-70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973). Under Golding, “a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Golding, supra, 239-40. “The first two steps in the Golding analysis address the reviewability of the claim, while the last two steps involve the merits of the claim.” State v. Beltran, 246 Conn. 268, 275, 717 A.2d 168 (1998). We review the defendant’s claim because the record is adequate for review and the claim is constitutional in nature. See State v. Henry, 253 Conn. 354, 359, 752 A.2d 40 (2000); State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 308-309, 630 A.2d 593 (1993). The defendant’s claim fails under the third prong of Golding, however, because we conclude that due process does not require a court hearing or counsel before the office of adult probation modifies a condition of probation.

A

Over the past seventy years, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the protections afforded a defendant regarding the right to counsel and the right to a court hearing in criminal proceedings. See Arger-singer v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972) (expanding right to counsel to state felony or misdemeanor cases through fourteenth amendment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (right to counsel attaches at juvenile proceedings in which institutional confinement would result); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938) (right to counsel expanded to attach to all federal cases); Powell v. Ala bama, 287 U.S. 45, 71, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932) (indigents afforded right to counsel under sixth amendment in all federal capital offense cases).

In addition, the Supreme Court also has sought to establish certain minimum procedural protections for individuals on parole and probation. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-83, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), the court held that the due process clause requires that an individual on parole be afforded a hearing before his parole is revoked. In determining whether the nature of the parolee’s interest was within the due process protection of the fourteenth amendment, the court stated: “The parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and function as a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison. He may have been on parole for a number of years and may be living a relatively normal life at the time he is faced with revocation. The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions. In many cases, the parolee faces lengthy incarceration if his parole is revoked. We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.” Id., 482.

Subsequently, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), the Supreme Court affirmed the principles set forth in Morrissey and held that, because revocation of probation results in the same loss of liberty, the same guarantee of due process applies to revocations of probation. Relying on the standard set forth in Morrissey and Gagnon, the defendant in the present case argues that modifications of probation result in a loss of liberty similar to the loss caused by revocation, and he urges this court to extend due process procedural protection to probation modifications. We disagree.

We previously have never considered whether due process requires that an individual on probation be afforded an opportunity to be heard with counsel before the office of adult probation may modify the defendant’s conditions of probation. Although the right to counsel and a hearing has been expanded over the years, particularly with regard to parole and probation revocations, we agree with the numerous federal and state courts that have held that due process does not require a court hearing or counsel before the conditions of an individual’s probation may be modified. See United States v. Silver, 83 F.3d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1996) (extension of probation period); Forgues v. United States, 636 F.2d 1125, 1127 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Cornwell, 625 F.2d 686, 688-89 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Carey, 565 F.2d 545, 546-47 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); Skipworth v. United States, 508 F.2d 598, 600-602 (3d Cir. 1975) (same); Edwards v. State, 216 Ga. App. 740, 741, 456 S.E.2d 213 (1995) (adding condition of completing sex offender treatment); People v. Britt, 202 Mich. App. 714, 716-17, 509 N.W.2d 914 (1993) (adding condition that defendant wear electronic monitor or tether); Ockel v. Riley, 541 S.W.2d 535, 544 (Mo. 1976) (extension of probation period); State v. Zeisler, 19 Ohio App. 3d 138, 141, 483 N.E.2d 493 (1984) (adding condition that defendant complete probation diversion program); Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. App. 1980) (adding condition that defendant ingest anta-buse). Accordingly, we conclude that an order of probation may be modified by the probation authorities ex parte, and that there is no requirement that the defendant be given a court hearing with the benefit of counsel before the modification properly may occur.

The key distinction regarding this issue is that a modification of an individual’s probation does not require the same procedural protections as a probation revocation. In particular, the nature of the interest and the loss resulting from a modification simply do not parallel the fundamental nature of the interest or the seriousness of the loss involved in Morrissey or Gagnon. The primary loss occasioned by a modification of a condition of probation is still only the possibility of future revocation, a loss that potentially occurs only if the condition is not met. Because a probationer is entitled to a hearing prior to revocation, the potential of loss caused by modifying a condition of probation is not considered sufficiently grievous to require a hearing. See Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. 482; see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976) (rejecting argument that “any” loss is sufficient to invoke due process, noting that “determining factor is the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight”).

Revocation proceedings often resolve a contested factual determination that requires the trial court to decide whether there was, in fact, a violation of probation. For modifications of probation, however, it is not necessary for the trial court to make a finding of a probation violation. Furthermore, an individual on probation has an opportunity at the probation revocationproceeding to contest the modified condition. State v. Cooley, 3 Conn. App. 410, 414-15, 488 A.2d 1283, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 805, 492 A.2d 1241 (1985) (defendant’s probation will not be revoked on ground that he violated condition of probation if that condition is shown at revocation hearing to have no rehabilitative purpose). Even prior to the violation of probation hearing, if an individual on probation believes that the office of adult probation imposed an unreasonable condition, he may request a hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-30 (c).

Although “[probation is the product of statute”; State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 167, 540 A.2d 679 (1988); see General Statutes § 53a-29 et seq.; modifications of probation routinely are left to the office of adult probation. When the court imposes probation, a defendant thereby accepts the possibility that the terms of probation may be modified or enlarged in the future pursuant to § 53a-30. See State v. Thorp, 57 Conn. App. 112, 117, 121, 747 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 913, 754 A.2d 162 (2000) (court approved adult probation office’s requirement of sex offender treatment for probationer where such treatment had not been explicitly included in court-ordered terms of probation; due process does not require hearing); State v. Mobley, 42 Conn. Sup. 574, 591-95, 634 A.2d 305, aff'd, 33 Conn. App. 103, 105, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 (1994) (adopting as well reasoned trial court’s “detailed and comprehensive memorandum of decision”). Thus, requiring a hearing with counsel every time a condition of probation is modified by the office of adult probation would severely impair the supervisory and rehabilitative role of the office of adult probation. We also are persuaded that the additional condition imposed on the defendant, attending sex offender treatment, was not unreasonable because the condition could have been included in the original probation conditions.

We conclude that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution does not require notice and a hearing with the benefit of counsel prior to an order modifying the terms of probation. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim fails the third prong of Golding.

B

The defendant also claims that, although § 53a-30 (b), the statute addressing modifications of probation, does not require a court hearing before the office of adult probation may modify a condition, such a procedure is required because of the accompanying provision of § 53a-30 (c). It is well settled that this court will not review statutory claims that are raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Gates, 198 Conn. 397, 401-402, 503 A.2d 163 (1986). Furthermore, statutory, nonconstitutional claims are not reviewable under Golding. Id. Based on the defendant’s admission at oral argument before this court that this statutory argument was not raised in the trial court, we find no basis in the record to consider his newly raised statutory claim, which was “never called to the attention of the trial court and upon which it necessarily could have made no ruling in the true sense of the word . . . .” State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 86, 214 A.2d 362 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921, 86 S. Ct. 1372, 16 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1966); see State v. Gates, supra, 402.

II

The defendant next claims that, even if the modified condition of probation validly had been imposed, the trial court abused its discretion and improperly revoked his probation because: (1) the defendant’s tardy arrivals at the sex offender treatment sessions did not warrant revocation of probation; and (2) the rehabilitative purposes of probation were still being served. Having reviewed the record, briefs and arguments of the parties, we conclude that the defendant’s claim is entirely without merit because the late arrivals and uncooperative attitude were sufficient grounds to revoke his probation.

“The standard of review of an order revoking probation is whether the trial court abused its discretion; if it appears that the trial court was reasonably satisfied that the terms of probation had been violated, and, impliedly, that the beneficial proposes of probation were no longer being served, then the order must stand.” State v. Roberson, 165 Conn. 73, 80, 327 A.2d 556 (1973). In making this determination, the trial court is vested with broad discretion. State v. Smith, supra, 207 Conn. 167 (defendant who seeks to reverse exercise of judicial discretion assumes heavy burden); State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 290, 641 A.2d 370 (1994); State v. Repetti, 60 Conn. App. 614, 619-20, 760 A.2d 964 (2000) , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 923, 763 A.2d 1040 (2001) ; State v. Treat, 38 Conn. App. 762, 767, 664 A.2d 785, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 920, 665 A.2d 907 (1995).

We recognize that, in the present case, sex offender treatment was a key component of the rehabilitative process because it was directly connected to one of the underlying crimes to which the defendant had pleaded guilty. Failure to comply with a condition of probation is a sufficient basis upon which to order a violation of probation. See State v. Davis, supra, 229 Conn. 302; State v. Welch, 40 Conn. App. 395, 401-402, 671 A.2d 379, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 918, 673 A.2d 1145 (1996); State v. Treat, supra, 38 Conn. App. 765-66; State v. DeMasi, 34 Conn. App. 46, 56, 640 A.2d 138, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 906, 644 A.2d 920 (1994). Here, the defendant failed to complete the conditions of his probation because he repeatedly had arrived late to the sex offender treatment sessions. Moreover, the defendant was told multiple times about the importance of the evaluation process and sex offender treatment sessions, that he must be there on time, and that if he were late, the therapist would not be able to meet with him. In fact, prior to being terminated from the sex offender treatment session in March, 1998, the defendant was told that if he were late one more time he would be removed from the treatment program. Lastly, the defendant indicated that he could not arrange to arrive on time and his actions demonstrated that the treatment sessions were not a priority in his life.

The trial court, therefore, reasonably could have found that, without the treatment, the likelihood of the defendant committing such crimes again had not decreased, and that the goals of rehabilitation were not being adequately met. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-32 (a) provides in relevant part: “At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, or may issue a notice to appear to answer to a charge of such violation, which notice shall be personally served upon the defendant. Any such warrant shall authorize all officers named therein to return the defendant to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. ...”

       The spelling of the defendant’s first name in this case is in accordance with a note in the files by the department of correction.

       The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or properly, without due process of law . . . .”

       Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or properly without due process of law . . . .”

       General Statutes § 53a-102 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein.”

       General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) provides: “A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical iryury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.”

       See footnote 1 of this opinion.

       General Statutes § 21a-277 (a) provides: “Any person who manufactures, distributes, sells, prescribes, dispenses, compounds, transports with the intent to sell or dispense, possesses with the intent to sell or dispense, offers, gives or administers to another person any controlled substance which is a hallucinogenic substance other than marijuana, or a narcotic substance, except as authorized in this chapter, for a first offense, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years and may be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars or be both fined and imprisoned; and for a second offense shall be imprisoned not more than thirty years and may be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars, or be both fined and imprisoned; and for each subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned not more than thirty years and may be fined not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, or be both fined and imprisoned.”

       General Statutes § 53a-167a (a) provides: “A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when he obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer or fireman in the performance of his duties.”

       The department of special services filed a report recommending that upon release from prison, the defendant should engage in outpatient sex offender treatment. On the basis of this recommendation, the office of adult probation modified the defendant’s probation to include sex offender treatment.

       The trial court, in making its ruling, stated: “[E]valuations were made while the defendant was still in the custody of the commissioner of correction. The defendant was informed that he would be subject to conditions to include sexual offender treatment both before and after his release. The court finds based on all of the evidence presented in this case that the defendant violated the conditions of his probation by not cooperating with the probation department and/or the individuals at the sexual offender program by arriving late, by arriving with the attitude that he was not making that part of his probationary condition a priority item by not cooperating with the probation department and the treatment organization. The defendant is found to have violated the conditions of his probation.”

       Although the defendant also claims a violation under the state due process clause, our decision is confined to the federal constitution because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of the state constitutional issue. See State v. Ellis, 232 Conn. 691, 692 n.l, 657 A.2d 1099 (1995). “We have repeatedly apprised litigants that we will not entertain a state constitutional claim unless the defendant has provided an independent analysis under the particular provisions of the state constitution at issue. . . . Without a separately briefed and analyzed state constitutional claim, we deem abandoned the defendant’s claim . . . .” (Citations omitted.) State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 721-22, 631 A.2d 288 (1993); see also State v. Williams, 231 Conn. 235, 245 n.13, 645 A.2d 999 (1994); State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 458 n.4, 625 A.2d 791 (1993); State v. Rosado, 218 Conn. 239, 251 n.12, 588 A.2d 1066 (1991).

       The Supreme Court stated: “[Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty. Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to apreliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, [408 U.S. 482].” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. 782.

       In Skipworth v. United States, supra, 508 F.2d 601-602, a case widely cited by courts addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals stated: “While we acknowledge that probation entails significant restrictions on an individual, an extension of probation is clearly not as ‘grievous’ a ‘loss’ as revocation, and here it entailed no greater restrictions than those which existed previously. In fact, the primary ‘loss’ suffered by an individual whose probation has been extended lies not in the continuing restrictions themselves, but in the possibility of future revocation. While such a loss is indeed serious, it is merely potential at the time of extension, and the due process clause clearly provides the protection of a hearing in the event that revocation proceedings should subsequently occur.”

       In Skipworth v. United, States, supra, 508 F.2d 602, the Court of Appeals highlighted this distinction: “In revocation proceedings, the trial judge must reasonably satisfy himself that the probationer has broken some law while on probation or has otherwise violated a condition of his probation. While the judge has considerable discretion as to whether to order revocation, he must at a minimum make an initial factual finding of a probation violation. A revocation hearing, therefore, provides the probationer with the crucial opportunity to contest an allegation of violation.”

       General Statutes § 53a-30 (c) provides: “At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, the court may modify or enlarge the conditions, whether originally imposed by the court under this section or otherwise, and may extend the period, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a-29. The court shall cause a copy of any such order to be delivered to the defendant and to the probation officer, if any.”

       General Statutes § 53a-29 (a)provides: “The court may sentence a person to a period of probation upon conviction of any crime, other than a class A felony, if it is of the opinion that: (1) Present or extended institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public; (2) the defendant is in need of guidance, training or assistance which, in his case, can be effectively administered through probation supervision; and (3) such disposition is not inconsistent with the ends of justice.”

       Specifically, we note that the comment to § 53a-30 by the commission to revise the criminal statutes provides: “It is contemplated that, in sentences of probation, the court will, as it does now, usually leave the conditions to be set by the probation authorities.” Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, Penal Code Comments, Connecticut General Statutes, p. 16 (1969). The comment by the commission is especially insightful because the commission was specially authorized by the legislature to propose and report a general revision to the criminal statutes. 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (6th Ed. Singer 2000) § 48.09, pp. 447-48; see State v. Kluttz, 9 Conn. App. 686, 693, 521 A.2d 178 (1987); see generally Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, Commentary on Title 53a, The Penal Code.

       General Statutes § 53a-30 provides in relevant part: “(a) When imposing sentence of probation or conditional discharge, the court may, as a condition of the sentence, order that the defendant: (1) Work faithfully at a suitable employment or faithfully pursue a course of study or of vocational training that will equip the defendant for suitable employment; (2) undergo medical or psychiatric treatment and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose; (3) support the defendant’s dependents and meet other family obligations; (4) make restitution of the fruits of the defendant’s offense or make restitution, in an amount the defendant can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby and the court may fix the amount thereof and the manner of performance; (5) if a minor, (A) reside with the minor’s parents or in a suitable foster home, (B) attend school, and (C) contribute to the minor’s own support in any home or foster home; (6) post a bond or other security for the performance of any or all conditions imposed; (7) refrain from violating any criminal law of the United States, this state or any other state; (8) if convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b, 53a-57, 53a-58 or 53a-70b or any offense for which there is a mandatory minimum sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and any sentence of imprisonment is suspended, participate in an alternate incarceration program; (9) reside in a residential community center or halfway house approved by the Commissioner of Correction, and contribute to the cost incident to such residence; (10) participate in a program of community service labor in accordance with section 53a-39c; (11) participate in a program of community service in accordance with section 51-181c; (12) if convicted of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21, section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, undergo specialized sexual offender treatment; (13) satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation. The court shall cause a copy of any such order to be delivered to the defendant and to the probation officer, if any.
      “(b) When a defendant has been sentenced to a period of probation, the Office of Adult Probation may require that the defendant comply with any or all conditions which the court could have imposed under subsection (a) which are not inconsistent with any condition actually imposed by the court. . . .”

       In a similar context, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant has no right to a hearing concerning prison transfers as long as “the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subject is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1976).

       See footnote 19 of this opinion.

       See footnote 16 of this opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. THOMAS HUGHES

      Robert J. Sullivan, Jr., in support of the petition.
    Decided November 8, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 58 Conn. App. 784 (AC 19119), is denied.


text:
    SANDRA DORFMAN v. FIRST CHOICE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

      Robert L. Trowbridge, in support of the petition.

      Christopher G. Winans, in opposition.
    Decided November 8, 2000
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 81 (AC 19165), is denied.


text:
    JULIE WAY v. BRYAN WAY

      Jeffrey W. Hill and Raymond L. Baribeault, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Mary E. Leckey, in opposition.
    Decided November 8, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 189 (AC 17974), is denied.

SULLIVAN and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    NELSON GRANGER ET AL. v. A. AIUDI AND SONS ET AL.

      James H. Throwe and Gregory P. Granger, in support of the petition.

      Peter J. Zagorsky, in opposition.
    Decided November 8, 2000
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 36 (AC 19192), is denied.


text:
    R AND R POOL AND PATIO, INC., ET AL. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16422.

      Patricia C. Sullivan, in support of the petition.

      Robert A. Fuller, in opposition.
    Decided November 8, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 82 (AC 19234), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ appeal from the zoning enforcement officer’s cease and desist order?”


text:
    RONALD JOHNSON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
   The petitioner Ronald Johnson’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 1 (AC 19394), is denied.

Adele V. Patterson, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, in opposition.

Decided November 8, 2000

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    IN RE QUANITRA M. ET AL.

      Arnold V. Amore II, in support of the petition.

      Mary K. Lenehan, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided November 8, 2000
   The respondent mother’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 96 (AC 19790), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    CONNECTICUT POST LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. SOUTH CENTRAL CONNECTICUT REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS ET AL.

       The appeal was withdrawn April 5, 2001.

   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 21 (AC 20206), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff did not establish standing pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-16?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16421.

Ronald J. Cohen and Ben A. Solnit, in support of the petition.

Thayer Baldwin, Jr., corporation counsel, and Joseph L. Rini, in opposition.

Decided November 8, 2000

MCDONALD, C. J., and KATZ and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    CITY OF NEW HAVEN v. JACQUELINE BOYLES ET AL.

      Terence S. Hawkins, in support of the petition.
    Decided November 8, 2000
   The defendant Terence S. Hawkins’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 20092) is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    WALTER J. LEWIS v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF CLINTON

      Norman J. Voog, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 20793) is denied.

KATZ and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Gregory T. D’Auria, assistant attorney general, Dean M. Cordiano and Joseph L. Hammer, in opposition.

Decided November 8, 2000


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 2663, AFL-CIO

      J. William Gagne, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Beth Z. Margulies, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided November 16, 2000
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 793 (AC 19209), is denied.

PALMER, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SAMUEL SAEZ

      Jon L. Schoenhom, in support of the petition.

      Toni M. Smith-Rosario, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 16, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 264 (AC 18069), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL BROWN
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 487 (AC 18089), is granted, limited to the following issue:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16423.

William B. Westcott, special public defender, in support of the petition.

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided November 16, 2000

“Whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that it was not necessary for the trial court to instruct the jury on the definition of a firearm under General Statutes § 53a-3 as part of the trial court’s instructions on the sentence enhancement provisions of General Statutes § 53-202k?”

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    LEROY J. YOUNG v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

      Roger Sullivan, in support of the petition.
    Decided November 16, 2000
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 107 (AC 18202), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TROY LEWIS
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 219 (AC 18635), is denied.

Pamela S. Nagy, special public defender, in support of the petition.

Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided November 16, 2000


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TOMMY HAMMOND
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16424.

      Michael S. Alevy, deputy assistant public defender, and Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Robert M. Spector, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 16, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 321 (AC 18702), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant was not illegally seized in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution?

“2. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant’s two convictions for possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a) did not violate the federal and state prohibitions against double jeopardy?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES HARRIS
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 436 (AC 19882), is denied.

Robert E. Byron, special public defender, in support of the petition.

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided November 16, 2000


text:
    MARIBEL COLON ET AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL.

      Raymond E. Epps, in support of the petition.

      William F. Gallagher, in opposition.
    Decided November 29, 2000
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 178 (AC 18738), is denied.


text:
    MARIBEL COLON ET AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL.

      William F. Gallagher, in support of the cross petition.
    Decided November 29, 2000
   The plaintiffs’ cross petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 178 (AC 18738), is denied.


text:
    ROBERT DESALLE, SR. v. GUSTAF T. APPELBERG ET AL.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 386 (AC 18774), is denied.

David M. Wallman, in support of the petition.

Stanton H. Lesser, in opposition.

Decided November 29, 2000

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    RONALD F. PETRONELLA, COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, EX REL. GLENN MAIORANO ET AL. v. VENTURE PARTNERS, LTD., ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16433.

      Robert A. Ziegler, in support of the petition.

      Glenn A. Woods, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided November 29, 2000
   The petition of the defendants Venture Partners, Ltd., Gary Laskowski and Jonathan Betts for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 205 (AC 18759), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Were the defendants employers for purposes of General Statutes § 31-72 and thereby liable for wages due employees that were earned prior to the defendants’ involvement with the employer corporation?”


text:
    DONNA L. KROLL ET AL. v. KENNETH W. STEERE
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 376 (AC 19276), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Ralph J. Monaco, in support of the petition.

William C. Kroll, in opposition.

Decided November 29, 2000


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. VAUGHN D. OUTLAW
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16432.

      Katerina M. Rohner, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Bruce R. Lockwood, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 29, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 515 (AC 19284), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant had not completed the probation portion of his April 4, 1986 sentence when the arrest warrant for violation of probation was issued on June 19, 1998?”


text:
    ANTHONY S. NOVAK, TRUSTEE v. OMEGA PLASTICS CORPORATION, INC.

      Dale H. King, in support of the petition.

      Keith R. Ainsworth, in opposition.
    Decided November 29, 2000
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 424 (AC 19604), is denied.


text:
    SCOTT DAWKINS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Raymond J. Rigat, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 29, 2000
   The petitioner Scott Dawkins’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 901 (AC 20179), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JULIE BROWN

      Norman A. Pattis, in support of the petition.

      Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 29, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 20374) is denied.


text:
    CITICORP MORTGAGE, INC. v. RICHARD M. TARRO ET AL.

      Max F. Brunswick, in support of the petition.

      Michele D. Sensale, in opposition.
    Decided November 29, 2000
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 20998) is denied.

NORCOTT, SULLIVAN and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    TOWN OF GROTON v. CATHY LEWIS ET AL.

      Eustace H. Lewis, Jr., pro se, in support of the petition.

      Raymond L. Baribeault, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided December 5, 2000
   The petition by the defendant Eustace H. Lewis, Jr., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 58 Conn. App. 359 (AC 18497), is denied.

SULLIVAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HENRY AUSTIN

      Henry Austin, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Eileen McCarthy Geel, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided December 5, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 305 (AC 18906), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JIMMY CASTRO
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 78 (AC 17410), is denied.

SULLIVAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Richard Callahan, special public defender, in support of the petition.

Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided December 5, 2000


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GLENN STEWART

    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16436.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Richard E. Condon, Jr., special deputy assistant public defender, in opposition.
    Decided December 5, 2000

       In light of the trial court’s articulation of its reasons for not having given the “no unfavorable inference” instruction, the Supreme Court, on January 25, 2001, remanded the matter to the Appellate Court for reconsideration of whether the failure to give the instruction, under the circumstances of this case, was plain error requiring reversal of the conviction.
      The appeal was withdrawn October 1, 2001.

   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 301 (AC 18813), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, under the facts of this case, the trial court’s failure to give a ‘no unfavorable inference’ instruction was plain error requiring reversal of the conviction?

“2. Is the failure to include such an instruction subject to harmless error analysis?”

It is further ordered that the trial court articulate the facts concerning discussions, if any, among the state’s attorney, defense counsel and the court during a charging conference, relative to the court’s giving a “no unfavorable inference” instruction to the jury in this matter.


text:
    SHARON BENDER v. MARK BENDER
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16434.

      Barry T. Pontolillo, in support of the petition.

      Joseph R. Galotti, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided December 5, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 252 (AC 18968), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court’s award of the defendant’s nonvested pension benefit was not impermissibly speculative?”

SULLIVAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    DANA INVESTMENT CORPORATION v. RICHARD SCHLESINGER ET AL.

      W. Bradley Morehouse, in support of the petition.

      Francis G. Pennarola and John B. Grant, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided December 5, 2000
   The petition by the substitute plaintiff Quik-Power International Corporation for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 76 (AC 19314), is denied.

SULLIVAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    EDWARD DAIGLE v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16435.

      Ronald F. Ochsner, in support of the petition.

      I). Lincoln Woodard, in opposition.
    Decided December 5, 2000
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 465 (AC 19529), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court correctly granted the defendant’s motion in limine preventing the plaintiff from introducing his income tax returns?”

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DARRIN WELLS

      Raymond J. Rigat, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided December 5, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 905 (AC 19678), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. FRANKLIN MOORE
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 901 (AC 19741), is denied.

Annacarina Del Mastro, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Joy K. Fausey, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided December 5, 2000


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ABOKOR GURREH

      Brian J. Woolf, in support of the petition.

      Joy K. Fausey, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided December 5, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 166 (AC 19846), is denied.


author: MCDONALD, C. J.,

text:
    TIMOTHY P. TAFT ET AL. v. WHEELABRATOR PUTNAM, INC., ET AL.
    (SC 16241)
    (SC 16242)
   The motion of the named defendant, filed February 22, 2000, to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal and to vacate the judgment of the Appellate Court; Taft v. Wheelabrator Putnam, Inc., 55 Conn. App. 359, 742 A.2d 366 (1999); in which motion the defendant Putnam zoning commission joined, having been presented to the court, it is hereby ordered that the appeals are dismissed. The judgment of the Appellate Court is vacated and the appeals are remanded to that court with direction to dismiss the plaintiffs’ original appeal for lack of aggrievement.

MCDONALD, C. J.,

dissenting. I dissent from the decision of the majority to vacate the judgment of the Appellate Court. Taft v. Wheelabrator Putnam, Inc., 55 Conn. App. 359, 742 A.2d 366 (1999). I believe that the actions of the named defendant-appellant, Wheelabrator Putnam, Inc. (Wheelabrator), disentitle it to vacatur of that decision.

Vacatur is equitable relief, granted in those extraordinary cases in which the public interest would be served by that relief. “ ‘Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.’ ” U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 26-27, 115 S. Ct. 386, 130 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1994).

The court must consider the actions of the parties in determining if vacatur is appropriate. The United States Supreme Court, in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., observed that the remedy of vacatur is not justified in cases in which the moving party causes mootness through its own voluntary actions, save under exceptional circumstances. The court stated: “The denial of vacatur is merely one application of the principle that [a] suitor’s conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 25.

In this case, Wheelabrator sought certification to appeal from the Appellate Court and, after its petition was granted; Taft v. Wheelabrator Putnam, Inc., 252 Conn. 918, 744 A.2d 439 (2000); moved for dismissal of the plaintiffs’ appeal to the Appellate Court and for vacatur of the Appellate Court decision. We thereafter remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs still had actual aggrievement. The trial court found that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved at the time of the Appellate Court’s judgment, since Wheelabrator had entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs before the Appellate Court’s decision was released. The Appellate Court’s decision was released in October, 1999. The settlement between the parties had been reached in March, 1999. Wheelabrator’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal and to vacate the judgment of the Appellate Court, the first time the settlement was revealed, was filed in February, 2000.

Sheila A. Huddleston and Joseph P. Williams, in support of the motion.

Ernest J. Cotnoir, in opposition.

Decided December 26, 2000

These circumstances present a classic example of when vacatur is not appropriate. Wheelabrator did not bring the settlement to the attention of the Appellate Court, thereby requiring that court to decide the issues, perhaps in Wheelabrator’s favor. Having lost, Wheela-brator now seeks to vacate the decision. We should not order vacatur of that decision rendered without knowledge of circumstances created by Wheelabrator and kept from the Appellate Court by Wheelabrator. Respect for the Appellate Court, I believe, requires that this case be remanded to that court and dismissed as moot and that the motion for vacatur be denied.

SULLIVAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    LORNA J. WENDT v. GARY C. WENDT

      William F. Gallagher, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 656 (AC 18388), is denied.

Kurt W. Hanson, Louis K. Fisher, Wesley W. Horton and John J. Keefe, Jr., in opposition.

Decided December 20, 2000


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JESUS ROMERO

      Patrick F. Caruso, in support of the petition.

      Robert M. Spector, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided December 20, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 469 (AC 18953), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    YVONNE CLOUTIER v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

      Laurence V. Pamoff in support of the petition.

      Francis H. Morrison III and Ann Grunbeck Monaghan, in opposition.
    Decided December 20, 2000
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 904 (AC 18918), is denied.

SULLIVAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD LOMAX

      Mary Anne Royle, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Bruce R. Lockwood, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided December 20, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 602 (AC 18648), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WALTER DECLAYBROOK

      Kevin A. Randolph, in support of the petition.

      Bruce R. Lockwood, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided December 20, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 480 (AC 19076), is denied.


text:
    ALISON NOLAN ET AL. v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

      Herbert Watstein and Max F. Brunswick, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 68 (AC 19213), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Deborah L. Bradley, in opposition.

Decided December 20, 2000


text:
    MARK MOSHER v. MICHAEL KOZLOWSKI, COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES, ET AL.

      C. Michael Budlong and Campbell D. Barrett, in support of the petition.
    Decided December 20, 2000
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 455 (AC 19475), is denied.

PALMER, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CALVIN BRADLEY

      Pamela S. Nagy, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided December 20, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 534 (AC 19551), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES T. WILLIAMS

      Felix Esposito, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Denise B. Smoker, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided December 20, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 575 (AC 19680), is denied.

NORCOTT and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    FIRST SELECTMAN OF THE TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD ET AL. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.

      J. Allen Kerr, Jr., in support of the petition.
    Decided December 20, 2000
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 64 (AC 19929), is denied.


text:
    NEW MILFORD SAVINGS BANK v. JOHN D. MULVILLE, JR., ET AL.
   The petition for certification by the defendants, John D. Mulville, Jr., and Anne B. Mulville, for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 901 (AC 19964/AC 19966), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the judgment of the trial court affirming the foreclosure sale?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16445.

Steven H. Levy, Jeanine M. Dumont and Richard F. Wareing, in support of the petition.

Denise M. Cloutier, William C. Franklin and Joseph P. Secóla, in opposition.

Decided December 20, 2000

SULLIVAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SCOTT REPETTI

      Sebastian O. DeSantis, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Robert J. Scheinblum, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided December 20, 2000
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 614 (AC 20168), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    NANCY BURTON v. SYLVIA W. BROWD
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 19944) is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the plaintiffs appeal?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16444.

Nancy Burton, in support of the petition.

Decided December 20, 2000

MCDONALD, C. J., and VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT MADAGOSKI

      Francis L. O’Reilly, special public defender, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 3, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 394 (AC 18789), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY JONES

      Richard W. Callahan, special public defender, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 3, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 762 (AC 19056), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DUANE LOCKHART

      Jeffrey D. Brownstein, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 119 (AC 18184), is denied.

Toni M. Smith-Rosario, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided January 3, 2001


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PETER LEGRANDE

      Pamela S. Nagy, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Nancy L. Chupak, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided January 3, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 408 (AC 18312), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY TORRES

      Avery S. Chapman, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Bruce R. Lockwood, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided January 3, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 562 (AC 18754), is denied.


text:
    RAMON SANCHEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
   The petitioner Ramon Sanchez’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 911 (AC 18999), is denied.

David B. Rozwaski, special public defender, in support of the petition.

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided January 3, 2001

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    JOHN DILUCIANO v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT MILITARY DEPARTMENT

      Robert M. Fitzgerald, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 3, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 707 (AC 19786), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL PERSON

      Lisa J. Steele, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided January 3, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 820 (AC 20189), is denied.


text:
    DONNA BOYLEN ET AL. v. GERALD LOGAN

      Peter Harvey, in support of the petition.

      Brendan T. Flynn, in opposition.
    Decided January 3, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 714 (AC 20218), is denied.

BORDEN and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    DONNA MCCORMICK v. STOP AND SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY, INC.

      Brian W. Prucker, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 3, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 910 (AC 20404), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    COALITION TO SAVE HORSEBARN HILL v. PHILIP E. AUSTIN ET AL.

      Nancy Burton, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21075) is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Karen A. Perry and Eric Lukingbeal, in opposition.

Decided January 3, 2001


text:
    CAS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. DAINTY RUBBISH SERVICE, INC.

      Lawrence G. Rosenthal and Brendan T. Flynn, in support of the petition.

      William F. Gallagher, in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 294 (AC 17943), is denied.

BORDEN and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ

      Jeremiah Donovan, in support of the petition.

      Rita M. Shair, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 398 (AC 18347), is denied.

NORCOTT, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    SALVATORE GAROFALO ET AL. v. ANGELO SQUILLANTE ET AL.

      Charles D. Houlihan, Jr., in support of the petition.

      James H. Throwe, in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 687 (AC 19241), is denied.


text:
    KEVIN STROBEL v. ROSE LI-HWA STROBEL

      Kevin Strobel, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Rose Li-Hwa Strobel, pro se, in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 908 (AC 19325), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GUY LOUISE-JULIE

      John R. Williams, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 837 (AC 19477), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANN LOUISE-JULIE

      John R. Williams, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 837 (AC 19479), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    WILLIAM H. REID v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Deborah G. Stevenson, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      John A. East III, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The petitioner William H. Reid’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 835 (AC 19628), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    DAVID POLLITT v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
   The petitioner David Polhtt’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 743 (AC 19779), is denied.

Del Atwell, special public defender, in support of the petition.

Decided January 16, 2001

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. VICTOR GARUTI

      Laila Mary Ghabrial, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 794 (AC 20116), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    ROBERT BRIAN CRIM v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ET AL.

      Robert Brian Grim, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Patrick M. Noonan and Tracey M. Lane, in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 20192) is denied.

KATZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    GINA VANASE ET AL. v. JAMES R. SMITH, CLAIMS COMMISSIONER

      Thomas P. Clifford III, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.

      Scott D. Camassar and Robert I. Reardon, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided January 16, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21009) is denied.

MCDONALD, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ORINDEL KIDD

      Frank P. Cannatelli, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 25, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 598 (AC 18593), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    AMR A. WASFI v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH ET AL.

      William F. Gallagher, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 775 (AC 19418), is denied.

Richard J. Lynch, assistant attorney general, in opposition.

Decided January 25, 2001


text:
    KLM INDUSTRIES, INC. v. PATRICK J. BERKERY

      Kenneth R. Davis, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 25, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 906 (AC 20221), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. VAUGHN LEE REED

      Mary Anne Royle, special public defender, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 25, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 73 (AC 19294), is denied.


text:
    GARY B. KELLY v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT

      Gary B. Kelly, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 25, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 9 (AC 19443), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KEVIN COUGHLIN

      James J. Ruane, in support of the petition.

      Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided January 25, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 90 (AC 19522), is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., and VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GARY CAMPBELL

      Raymond J. Rigat, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 25, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 99 (AC 19856), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    IN RE MARIAH S.

      Raymond J. Rigat, in support of the petition.
   The respondent mother’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 248 (AC 20365), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Mary K. Lenehan, assistant attorney general, in opposition.

Decided January 25, 2001


text:
    DOROTHY S. MITCHELL v. MORRIS SILVERSTEIN ET AL.

      Morris Silverstein, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 25, 2001
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21180) is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JARED W. KING

      Jared W. King, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided January 25, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 18728) is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., and KATZ and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BALBIR SINGH
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 638 (AC 19243), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant and his closing argument to the jury constitute prosecutorial misconduct in violation of the defendant’s federal constitutional right to a fair trial?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16476.

Jeremiah Donovan, in support of the petition.

Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided February 7, 2001

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GREGORY BURRUS

      Joseph B. Bums, in support of the petition.

      Rita M. Shair, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided February 7, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 369 (AC 18881), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    RICHARD PRESTON v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

      Richard Preston, pro se, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 853 (AC 19395), is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., and PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Saranne P. Murray and Sheila A. Huddleston, in opposition.

Decided February 7, 2001


text:
    ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT, ET AL. v. WILLIAM F. MOFFETT ET AL.

      Richard T. Sponzo, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.
    Decided February 7, 2001
   The intervening defendant employment security appeals division board of review’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 746 (AC 19549), is denied.

KATZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALWYN JOHNSON

      Arnold V. Amore II, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Lawrence J. Tytla, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided February 7, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 219 (AC 18986), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    ALICE SABLOSKY v. MICHAEL SABLOSKY
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16472.

      Michael Ruben Peck, in support of the petition.

      Henry B. Hurvitz, in opposition.
    Decided February 7, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 66 (AC 19261), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that: (1) the trial court’s judgment of contempt must be reversed; and (2) the trial court’s award of damages, attorney’s fees and costs must be vacated?”

VERTEFET TILLE and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    SCOTT JOHNSON v. VICTORIA DE TOLEDO ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16475.

      Anthony M. Modugno, in support of the petition.

      John M. Gasidlo, in opposition.
    Decided February 7, 2001
   The plaiutiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 156 (AC 19289), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court had used the proper standard of proof in discharging the plaintiffs mechanic’s lien?”

VERTEFET TTLLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    CURTISS EBRON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      David B. Rozwaski, special public defender, in support of the petition.
    Decided February 7, 2001
   The petitioner Curtiss Ebron’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 129 (AC 19574), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    ARTHUR SCIORTINO ET AL. v. TOWN OF TRUMBULL

      Donald A. Browne, in support of the petition.

      Warren L. Holcomb, in opposition.
    Decided February 7, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 905 (AC 20327), is denied.


text:
    DONALD D. BOWERS v. FLORENCE IRENE BOWERS
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16473.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 75 (AC 20420), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court had properly concluded that the plaintiff had wilfully violated an order of the court?”

PALMER, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Brian M. Silver, in support of the petition.

Decided February 7, 2001


text:
    LINDA J. SLACK v. RAYMOND B. SLACK

      Nicholas J. Gorra, in support of the petition.

      Edward J. Dolan, in opposition.
    Decided February 7, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 902 (AC 20686), is denied.

NORCOTT and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    CB COMMERCIAL/HAMPSHIRE, LLC v. SECURITY MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.

      Edward T. Krumeich, in support of the petition.

      Eric M. Gross, in opposition.
    Decided February 7, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 144 (AC 20986), is denied.


text:
    EDWARD J. JANIK v. BARBARA E. JANIK
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 175 (AC 19250), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Lori Welch-Rubin, in support of the petition.

William F. O’Shea, in opposition.

Decided February 15, 2001


text:
    FAIRFIELD PLUMBING AND HEATING SUPPLY CORPORATION v. JEFFERSON A. SCINTO

      Gregory M. Conte, in support of the petition.
    Decided February 15, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 903 (AC 19547), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    SALVATOR D. GIANNITTI v. EMBALMERS’ SUPPLY COMPANY

      Anthony M. Modugno, in support of the petition.

      Louis Ciccarello, in opposition.
    Decided February 15, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 904 (AC 19886), is denied.


text:
    IN RE DEANA E. ET AL.
   The respondent father Celso S.’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 197 (AC 20376), is denied.

Dale H. King, in support of the petition.

Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, in opposition.

Decided February 15, 2001

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DARIUS MILLER

      James B. Streeto, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Frederick W. Fawcett, supervisoiy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided February 28, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 59 Conn. App. 406 (AC 19027), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES JONES STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JASPER DUDLEY

      Cameron Dorman, special public defender, in support of the petition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 866 (AC 18786/ AC 19057), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Frederick W. Fawcett, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided February 28, 2001


text:
    DORINA CUTLER ET AL. v. ANTOINETTA D. GREENBERG, EXECUTRIX (ESTATE OF ANTONIO AGOSTINELLI) DORINA CUTLER ET AL. v. LAWRENCE J. GREENBERG

      Dorina Cutler, pro se, and Yolanda Jablonski, pro se, in support of the petition.

      James F. Cirillo, Jr., and Lawrence J. Greenberg, pro se, in opposition.
    Decided February 28, 2001
   The petition for certification of the plaintiffs, Dorina Cutler and Yolanda Jablonski, for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 752 (AC 20118), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CRAIG MCCONNEAUGHEY

      Raymond J. Rigat, special public defender, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 904 (AC 19339), is denied.

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided February 28, 2001


text:
    ANDREW OWENS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Del Atwell, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided February 28, 2001
   The petitioner Andrew Owens’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 347 (AC 19687), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LEROY MIMS

      Mark Diamond, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Lisa A. Riggione, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided February 28, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 406 (AC 19694), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    DOUGLAS JAYNES v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Raymond J. Rigat, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided February 28, 2001
   The petitioner Douglas Jaynes’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 404 (AC 19880), is denied.


text:
    RAMON RIVERA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      David B. Rozwaski, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Robert M. Spector, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided February 28, 2001
   The petitioner Ramon Rivera’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 905 (AC 19911), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    KELLY RENZ v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 336 (AC 20367), is denied.

Matthew Dallas Gordon, in support of the petition.

Katherine Meshako, in opposition.

Decided February 28, 2001

VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEFFREY RIDDICK

      James B. Streeto, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Robert J. Scheinblum, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided February 28, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 275 (AC 20519), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    WEBSTER BANK v. JOANNA V. ZAK ET AL.
   The defendant MFR of East Hampton, LLC’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 402 (AC 20906), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for factual findings regarding the standing of the defendant MFR of East Hampton, LLC?”

SULLIVAN, C. J., and ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16489.

Kerry M. Wisser and Nathan A. Schatz, in support of the petition.

Jeffrey T. Beatty, in opposition.

Decided February 28, 2001


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CLYDE MEIKLE

      Martin Zeldis, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Robert M. Spector, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 15, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 60 Conn. App. 802 (AC 20516), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARCUS PRICE

      Donald D. Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Eileen McCarthy Geel, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 15, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 417 (AC 18853), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    SUSAN K. HEFTI v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

      Jeffrey D. Brownstein, in support of the petition.

      Charles Krich, in opposition.
    Decided March 15, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 270 (AC 19085), is denied.

KATZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    GLORIA TRIMEL v. LAWRENCE AND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL REHABILITATION CENTER ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16493.

      Thomas J. Airone and William F. Gallagher, in support of the petition.

      Michael E. Driscoll and Jeffrey F. Buebendorf in opposition.
    Decided March 15, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 353 (AC 19675), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the trial court, in holding that all the plaintiffs claims sounded in medical malpractice rather than in ordinary negligence, usurp the function of a jury by deciding a question of fact in a summary judgment motion?”


text:
    MARY KUBISH ET AL. v. BUZZIENA ZEGA ET AL.

      Charles F. Brower, in support of the petition.

      Anthony F. DiPentima, in opposition.
    Decided March 15, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 608 (AC 19697), is denied.


text:
    STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. NITOR EGBARIN

      Nitor Egbarin, in support of the petition.

      Christopher L. Slack, assistant bar counsel, in opposition.
    Decided March 15, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 445 (AC 19801), is denied.

BORDEN and NORCOTT, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    VICTOR CIVIE ET AL. v. OAK LANE COUNTRY CLUB, INC.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 906 (AC 20094), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Victor Civie, pro se, and Richard Civie, pro se, in support of the petition.

Decided March 15, 2001


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. THOMAS CENTENO
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16494.

      Joseph Visone, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Michele C. Lukban, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 15, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 906 (AC 20184), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, with respect to the question of whether one of the jurors and the defendant knew each other from a prior, possibly criminal relationship, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not inquiring or investigating further?”


text:
    IN RE ASHLEY S. ET AL.

      Kristen S., pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided March 15, 2001
   The respondent mother’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 658 (AC 20655), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    LAWRENCE MCDONNELL v. PAUL FALCO

      James E. Coyne, in support of the petition.

      Hanon W. Russell, in opposition.
    Decided March 15, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 20178) is dismissed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES DAVIS

      Michelle M. Napoli, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 22, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 621 (AC 18619), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    PAR PAINTING, INC. v. GREENHORNE & O’MARA, INC., ET AL.

      Anthony V. Zeolla, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 317 (AC 19013), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Steven W. Varney, in opposition.

Decided March 22, 2001


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PAUL R. GUITARD

      Trida Jessica Johnson, in support of the petition.

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 22, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 531 (AC 19285), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY MONTEFUSCO

      Damon A. R. Kirschbaum, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Bruce R. Lockwood, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 22, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 909 (AC 19584), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HERMINIO SOTOMAYOR
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 364 (AC 20518), is granted, limited to the following issue:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16495.

Jeremiah Donovan, in support of the petition.

Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided March 22, 2001

“Was it harmful error for the trial court to instruct the jury that ‘[o]ne who uses a deadly weapon upon the vital parts of another will be deemed to have intended the probable result of that act,’ to repeat the instruction in response to an inquiry from the jury, and to decline to instruct the jury that use of a deadly weapon could evince an extreme indifference to human life (an element of manslaughter in the first degree) rather than an intent to kill?”

VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    ESTELLE MCNERNEY ET AL. v. CARVEL CORPORATION ET AL.

      S. Dave Vatti, in support of the petition.

      Robert A. Izard, Jr., and Edward J. Heath, in opposition.
    Decided March 22, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21344) is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT WATSON
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 50 Conn. App. 591 (AC 16892), is dismissed.

Robert Watson, pro se, in support of the petition.

Decided March 30, 2001


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RONNIE JONES

      Lisa J. Steele, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 30, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 901 (AC 17713), is denied.


author: NORCOTT, J.,

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMEL BEALL

      Susan M. Hankins, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Rita M. Shair, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 30, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 430 (AC 18469), is denied.

NORCOTT, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification for appeal.

SULLIVAN, C. J., and KATZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    ALBERT EADDY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Deborah Stevenson, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Ronald G. Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 30, 2001
   The petitioner Albert Eaddy’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 907 (AC 19532), is denied.

KATZ and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ERIKA KRINOCK

      Rosemarie Paine, in support of the petition.

      Michele C. Lukban, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 30, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 903 (AC 19696), is denied.

NORCOTT and ZARELLA, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSE LUGO
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 855 (AC 19698), is denied.

Donald D. Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided March 30, 2001


text:
    LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. PHILLIPPE RACINE ET AL.

      Eddi Z. Zyko, in support of the petition.

      Richard M. Endrelunas, in opposition.
    Decided March 30, 2001
   The intervenors’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 909 (AC 20419), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    DANIEL CLARK v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Del Atwell, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      MichaelE. O’Hare, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided March 30, 2001
   The petitioner Daniel Clark’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 61 Conn. App. 910 (AC 20459), is denied.


text:
    SUZANNE M. SEARLES v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD ET AL.

      Suzanne M. Searles, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Erik J. Ness and John B. Farley, in opposition.
    Decided March 30, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 20853) is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.