author: KATZ, J.

text:
    AARON REID v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE TOWN OF LEBANON
    (15152)
    Peters, C. J., and Callahan, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued October 26, 1995
    decision released January 30, 1996

      Walter A. Twachtman, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Mary E. Driscoll, with whom was Edward B. O’Connell, for the appellee (defendant).
   KATZ, J.

The plaintiff, Aaron Reid, is the owner of property in the town of Lebanon (town) subject to a variance granted in 1975 to his predecessor in title, Florence Kastner, which gave her the right to use the property on a year-round basis for her lifetime. That variance has become the subject of this appeal, which presents three related issues of whether: (1) the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar reconsideration of the variance, where no appeal had been taken from the grant of that variance; (2) the variance was invalid from its inception because of the “life use” condition; and (3) No. 93-385 of the 1993 Public Acts (P.A. 93-385) has any bearing on the variance.

The following undisputed facts are pertinent to this appeal. Kastner, the plaintiffs predecessor in title, applied to the defendant, the zoning board of appeals of the town of Lebanon (board), in 1972 requesting a variance to allow for year-round occupancy of her home located at 257 Deepwood Drive, Amston Lake, in Lebanon (lot 120C). Kastner had requested the variance because of economic hardship following the death of her husband. This request was denied because “[granting of the variance would present danger to public health and safety” and “[t]he hardship is not unique to the applicant.” A second request, in 1973, was equally unsuccessful, based upon a finding that the hardship had been caused by the applicant. In 1975, Kastner resubmitted her request, this time asking the board to grant her the variance “for her life use of the property only.” On the basis of its finding of personal hardship, the board granted the variance for “Mrs. Kastner’s life use only, subject to the condition that Lots 149 and [120C] must be combined as one lot.” The board also stated that the variance would not be effective until Kastner recorded it in the town land records.

Although Kastner combined lots 149 and 120C by quitclaim deed on September 22,1975, the variance was not recorded until March 26,1990. No appeal was taken from the granting of the variance in 1975 and Kastner continued to occupy the premises until she sold the property to the plaintiff in 1990.

On May 19,1992, stating that the plaintiffs occupancy on a year-round basis violated Lebanon’s zoning regulations, the Lebanon zoning enforcement officer (officer) ordered the plaintiff to cease occupying the premises at 257 Deepwood Drive as a year-round dwelling. The plaintiff appealed to the board claiming that the officer had incorrectly interpreted the terms of the variance granted to Kastner in 1975, which, he argued, gave him year-round occupancy. The board upheld the action of the officer, finding the cease and desist order to be valid.

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court claiming that the board’s decision was arbitrary, illegal and an abuse of the board’s discretion. Before the trial court, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that he “is entitled to the benefit of the legal status that the variance was granted when it was passed back in 1975, to wit, it runs with the land and passes to subsequent owners (subject to the condition of Mrs. Kastner’s survival).” The plaintiff argued that the variance, delimited to the period of Kastner’s life use, is analogous to the creation of a life estate in real property so that the grantor can pass to the grantee a right to possess, use or enjoy property during the period of the grantor’s life. The board argued, inter alia, that because it had lacked the authority to grant a variance that was based on personal financial hardship, the variance was void ab initio.

The trial court determined that it was unreasonable for the board to have granted the variance with the condition that Kastner have year-round occupancy for her “life use only.” The trial court stated that because “a zoning board of appeals lacks authority to impose an unreasonable condition, the board was without jurisdiction to impose this condition when it granted the variance to Kastner in 1975.” Further, the trial court found that because the “condition was an integral part of the board’s decision,” it was not severable and the variance was void ab initio. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs appeal.

The plaintiff then filed a motion to reargue, in light of the legislature’s passage of P.A. 93-385. The trial court denied this motion without comment. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). Thereafter, the plaintiff moved the trial court to articulate its reason for denying the plaintiffs motion to reargue. The motion was granted and, in its articulation, the trial court stated that because the 1975 variance was void ab initio, there was no variance to which the amendment could apply.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly: (1) failed to apply the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to bar reconsideration of a variance granted by the board in 1975 and from which no appeal had been taken; (2) declared this variance void ab initio although the original granting of the variance had never been appealed and the plaintiff and Kastner had complied with other conditions of the variance in justifiable reliance on the validity of the variance; and (3) determined that P.A. 93-385 has no impact on this case when the facts of this case typify the problems sought to be remedied by the legislature. The board argues in response that: (1) the trial court properly concluded that the variance was invalid because (a) it contained an impermissible condition, (b) it had been based solely on personal hardship, and (c) the board “was ‘impotent to reverse’ ” its 1972 decision denying the variance; (2) if the variance is valid, the plaintiff was precluded from residing year-round on the property once Kastner had ceased to occupy the premises; and (3) P.A. 93-385 cannot be applied retroactively and, therefore, has no effect on this appeal because it changes existing case law stating that conditions that are illegal and are an integral part of the board’s decision to grant the variance render the variance void.

At the outset we note that “land use regulation embodies a clash of conflicting forces: the common law right of a property owner to use his land as he pleases, as long as that use does not create a nuisance, and the exercise of the police power to regulate the use in the interest of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare of the community.” R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (1993) § 1.2, citing Steiner, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 149 Conn. 74, 76, 175 A.2d 559 (1961), and Service Realty Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 141 Conn. 632, 635, 109 A.2d 256 (1954). Variances play an important role in land use regulation. “The existence of the variance power recognizes that zoning regulations which permit some uses of land and limit or prohibit others will adversely affect individual property rights in some cases, and variances furnish elasticity in the application of the regulations so they do not operate in an arbitrary or confiscatory and therefore, unconstitutional manner. Without authorization to a board of appeals or some similar agency to grant variances, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to keep the law ‘running on an even keel’ and to prevent attacks upon the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance.” R. Fuller, supra, § 9.1.

The passage of P.A. 93-385 reflects these strong public policy concerns regarding variances. “[I]n deference to the existing statutory scheme through which the legislature has chosen to define this field”; Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 7, 612 A.2d 742 (1992); we first address the issue of whether P.A. 93-385, as it amended § 8-6 (b), affects the variance in this case. Because we decide that P.A. 93-385 should be applied retroactively, and that, consequently, any owner of 257 Deepwood Drive is entitled to year-round occupancy, we do not address the remaining claims.

Our law governing variances is well settled. Section 8-6 (a) (3) provides in relevant part that a zoning board of appeals may “determine and vary the application of the zoning bylaws, ordinances or regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent and with due consideration for conserving the public health, safety, convenience, welfare and property values solely with respect to a parcel of land where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel but not affecting generally the district in which it is situated, a literal enforcement of such bylaws, ordinances or regulations would result in exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship . . . .” (Emphasis added.) “A variance is authority granted to the owner to use his property in a manner forbidden by the zoning regulations. . . . The power of the board to grant a variance should be used only where a situation falls fully within the specified requirements. . . . Thus, the power to grant a variance should be sparingly exercised. ... An applicant for a variance must show that, because of some peculiar characteristic of his property, the strict application of the zoning regulation produces an unusual hardship, as opposed to the general impact which the regulation has on other properties in the zone.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaeser v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 438, 445, 589 A.2d 1229 (1991).

Variances cannot be personal in nature, and may be based only upon property conditions. Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 235, 239, 303 A.2d 743 (1972); see T. Tondro, Connecticut Land Use Regulation (2d Ed. 1992) p. 124. Thus, the identity of a particular user of the land is “irrelevant to zoning. ” Dinan v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 220 Conn. 61, 66-67 n.4, 595 A.2d 864 (1991); see T. Tondro, supra, p. 88 (“zoning power may only be used to regulate the ‘use, not the user’ of the land”). In fact, we have stated that “[pjersonal hardships, regardless of how compelling or how far beyond the control of the individual applicant, do not provide sufficient grounds for the granting of a variance.” Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 239-40. “ [T]he basic zoning principle that zoning regulations must directly affect land, not the owners of land”; T. Tondro, supra, p. 137; limits the ability of zoning boards “to act for personal rather than principled reasons,” particularly in the context of variances. Id., p. 92.

Violations of the “use, not user” rule occur “most frequently in variance cases where a board of appeals has sought to condition a variance on the applicant’s continued ownership of the property.” Id., p. 89. In this case, the trial court properly found that the condition hmiting the variance to “Mrs. Kastner’s life use only” was clearly personal to the applicant. Therefore, because this condition is personal as opposed to property-related, it is invalid.

Furthermore, we have held that if a zoning board would have refused to grant a variance without a particular condition, the condition is an integral part of the variance. Vaszauskas v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 215 Conn. 58, 66, 574 A.2d 212 (1990). If an integral condition is invalid, then an otherwise valid variance is also invalid. Id. The trial court here determined that the condition was integral to the grant of the variance, and that because the condition was invalid, the variance was likewise invalid. We agree with the trial court that the condition and, therefore, the variance were invalid when granted in 1975.

The issue we must resolve is whether P.A. 93-385, as it amends § 8-6; see footnote 1; should be applied retroactively to save this otherwise invalid variance. Section 8-6 (b) provides: “Any variance granted by a zoning board of appeals shall run with the land and shall not be personal in nature to the person who applied for and received the variance. A variance shall not be extinguished solely because of the transfer of title to the property or the invalidity of any condition attached to the variance that would affect the transfer of the property from the person who initially applied for and received the variance.” The plaintiff argues alternatively that either: (1) both sentences of the act merely clarify existing law; or (2) although the second sentence may constitute a change in existing law, the legislature clearly intended that the entire act be given retroactive application. On the basis of these arguments, the plaintiff claims that we should determine that the effect of the act is to give any owner of 257 Deepwood Drive the right to year-round occupancy. The board claims that although the first sentence of the act is a codification or clarification of existing law, the second sentence of the act changes existing law and therefore should be applied prospectively only. Although we agree with the board that the second sentence of the act changes existing law, we nevertheless conclude that the act should be applied retroactively.

We begin by examining the first sentence of the P.A. 93-385. In connection with that sentence, as we have stated throughout this opinion, it is well settled that variances run with the land and are not personal in nature. Therefore, “ [consistent with prior case law, a statute now states that a variance runs with the land . . . .” R. Fuller, supra, (1995 pocket part) § 9.2. The legislative debate confirms that the legislature was well aware that this court has consistently stated that a varianee must run with the land and not with the individual property owner. Senator George Jepsen stated that “[w]hat this bill does ... is to state clearly what I think most people believe is existing law in this area, but because there’s been some confusion down in Southern Connecticut, we thought it important to state it with great clarity. What it says is that, what every young lawyer learned in property class, which is that zoning variances run with the property and not with the individual who [obtained] the change. So in other words, if you go before a local Zoning Board, receive a zoning variance, that zoning variance does not expire when you do and it makes it clear that what the Zoning Board intended was that the variance is granted to the land and not to the person.” 36 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1993 Sess., pp. 1507-1508. We agree, therefore, with the plaintiff that the first sentence merely clarifies and codifies existing case law, and has retroactive effect.

In reliance on this legislative history, the plaintiff argues that because the second sentence is also a clarification of existing law, it too has retroactive effect. The board responds, however, that if P.A. 93-385, in its entirety, simply clarifies or codifies existing case law as the plaintiff argues, then its application to this case cannot save this otherwise illegal variance. The board relies on the line of cases wherein we have held that a variance is invalid if any attached condition that is integral to the grant of the variance is itself invalid. See Vaszauskas v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 215 Conn. 66-67; Burlington v. Jencik, 168 Conn. 506, 510, 362 A.2d 1338 (1975) (“variance and the attached conditions are inextricably linked, the viability of the variance being contingent upon the satisfaction of the conditions”); Bora v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 161 Conn. 297, 302, 288 A.2d 89 (1971) (because condition was illegal, in that it exceeded board’s authority, variance was also illegal and ordered struck down). The board argues that, because the condition “for life use only,” which is attached to the 1975 variance, is both invalid and integral to the grant of the variance, the variance itself is invalid and the plaintiff has only seasonal use of the subject premises. We agree with the board that P.A. 93-385 changes the law by providing that a variance will survive despite an invalid and integral condition.

Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that even if we conclude that the second sentence of the act is a departure from existing law, in that it allows an otherwise invalid variance to survive despite an integral and invalid condition, that sentence nevertheless applies retroactively. The board contends that because P.A. 93-385 changes the law, the legislation can be given only prospective application in the absence of a clearly and unequivocally expressed legislative intent to the contrary. State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 284, 528 A.2d 760 (1987); Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16, 22, 513 A.2d 660 (1986). We conclude that P.A. 93-385 has retroactive effect.

The plaintiff argues that the plain language of the statute requires that it be given retroactive application. He points particularly to the second sentence, which is written in the past tense: “A variance shall not be extinguished solely because of the transfer of title to the property or the invalidity of any condition attached to the variance that would affect the transfer of the property from the person who initially applied for and received the variance.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 8-6 (b). Relying on our decision in Schieffelin & Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 194 Conn. 165, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984), the plaintiff claims that the use of the past tense by the legislature is a clear indication that the act is to be applied retroactively.

We have often noted the importance of the use of a particular tense. See, e.g., Connelly v. Doe, 213 Conn. 66, 72, 566 A.2d 426 (1989); Everett v. Ingraham, 150 Conn. 153, 156-57, 186 A.2d 798 (1962). The use of the past tense in P.A. 93-385 is evidence of the legislature’s intent that the act be applied retroactively. We are more persuaded, however, by other considerations.

The defendant argues that the act is prospective only. This would mean that the legislature created an act to apply only to invalid conditions not yet imposed and illegal variances not yet granted or that the legislature intended for the act to apply only to future transfers of property to which invalid variances had already attached. Neither of these positions makes sense.

First, it is nonsensical to assume that the act would apply only to conditions imposed subsequent to the act’s effective date. There can be no doubt that the act applies to a transfer of property occurring the day following the act’s effective date. In that instance, any condition attached to that property must have occurred prior to the act’s effective date. Moreover, intending the act to apply only to future conditions would presuppose that zoning boards will continue to impose invalid conditions. While it is naive to think that there will be no future invalid conditions imposed following the enactment of the act, it is nonsensical to assume that the legislature passed an act that presumes that boards will impose invalid conditions.

It is similarly nonsensical to assume that the legislature intended the act to apply only to future transfers of property. The purpose of the act was to address the situation that materializes when a property owner, to whom a variance subject to an integral and illegal condition was granted, transfers the property. The transfer is what causes the underlying problem to surface. Accordingly, the transfer is only the symptom of the problem; the problem is the invalid condition. Applying the act to transfers that occur only after its enactment focuses on the symptom, but not the underlying problem.

It is more logical to view the legislature as having intended to sever invalid personal conditions from otherwise valid variances whether such condition was in existence at the time of the act’s passage or created later. Whether the symptom surfaced before or after the act’s passage is immaterial: in either case, the act serves to sever the invalid condition from its associated variance. This view necessarily requires retroactive application of the act to a transfer that had occurred prior to the act’s enactment.

An examination of the circumstances of the act’s passage, which is an additional aid in determining legislative intent, further supports the conclusion that the act was intended to be retroactive. The progenitor of the act, Irving H. Beck, “had been the beneficiary of a variance [which ran to him personally] that was obtained perhaps twenty years previously because the board had thought, mistakenly, that it could so condition a variance. Having benefitted from the illegal condition, the proponent of the legislation now wanted to transfer title to the land including the benefit of the variance, which ran to him personally because of the illegal condition.” (Emphasis in original.) T. Tondro, supra, (1995 Cum. Sup.) p. 34. The legislature intended that Beck receive the benefit of the variance, which is only possible if the act is given retroactive effect.

Moreover, we note that “absent a contrary legislative directive, it is presumed that if any part of an act applies retroactively, all of it is retroactive.” 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th Ed. Singer 1993) § 41.04, p. 352, citing Matter of Heuermann, 90 S.D. 312, 321, 240 N.W.2d 603 (1976) (“[I]t is a basic principle of statutory construction that an enactment of the legislature is to be considered as a whole. . . . Thus, if retroactive impact is clearly intended for some of the provisions of the act, it seems logical to assume that the legislature intended retroactive impact for them all.”) The legislative history of P.A. 93-385 clearly evinces a legislative understanding that the first sentence merely codifies existing law. As such, that portion of the act is necessarily retroactive. In light of the specific language chosen, as well as the circumstances surrounding the act’s passage and the problem the legislature was attempting to address, we are persuaded that the entire act should be given retroactive effect.

Accordingly, we conclude that P.A. 93-385 is to be applied retroactively and that any prospective challenges to variances subject to otherwise invalid, integral conditions must result in the severance of the condition and the survival of the otherwise valid variance. We therefore conclude that the illegal condition of “life use only” is severed from the plaintiffs variance and that his variance survives and runs with the land, such that he is entitled to year-round occupancy of the subject premises.

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment sustaining the plaintiffs appeal in accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       Public Act 93-385 amended General Statutes § 8-6 by adding subsection (b), which provides: “Any variance granted by a zoning board of appeals shall run with the land and shall not be personal in nature to the person who applied for and received the variance. A variance shall not be extinguished solely because of the transfer of title to the property or the invalidity of any condition attached to the variance that would affect the transfer of the property from the person who initially applied for and received the variance.”

       Specifically, the plaintiff argued that because no appeal had been taken from the board’s decision granting a variance to Kastner in 1975, the board was barred from reconsidering that grant in 1992 under either the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. Therefore, the plaintiff “is entitled to the benefit of the legal status that the variance was granted when it was passed back in 1975, to wit, it runs with the land and passes to subsequent owners (subject to the condition of Mrs. Kastner’s survival).” The plaintiff also argued that the board’s claim that he did not timely appeal an alleged original cease and desist order should be denied, because no such order was made part of the record. Lastly, the plaintiff argued, by analogy to the creation of life estates in real property, that because the variance granted in 1975 did not make Kastner’s occupancy of the premises a condition, it did not terminate upon her cessation of occupancy of the premises. Pointing to the other conditions imposed on Kastner, the plaintiff stated that “[i]f the Zoning Board of Appeals wished to limit the variance to the time [during] which Mrs. Kastner occupied the property, it could have clearly done so with plain language.”

       The board also argued before the trial court that the variance, if found to be valid, was not recorded in a ümely manner and therefore the plaintiff is estopped from enforcing the variance. Because this argument was not made before this court, it is deemed abandoned. Lonergan v. Connecticut Food Store, Inc., 168 Conn. 122, 134, 357 A.2d 910 (1975); Hutensky v. Avon, 163 Conn. 433, 434, 311 A.2d 92 (1972).

       With respect to the plaintiffs first claim that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar reconsideration of the 1975 variance because of failure to appeal timely, we note that the existence of a claim is a necessary precondition to the question of whether the doctrines bar subsequent litigation. DeMilo & Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 233 Conn. 281, 292-93, 659 A.2d 162 (1995). “Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim. . . . The doctrine of res judicata . . . applies not only to claims actually made and litigated; see 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 27 (1982) (regarding collateral estoppel); but also to claims that a party could have made in the initial action.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Because P.A. 93-385 did not exist at the time the variance was granted, no claim could have been made under it. Indeed, the statute came into effect only during the pendency of this case.
      With respect to the plaintiffs second claim that the trial court improperly declared the 1975 variance void ab initio, this issue is necessarily subsumed within our discussion of P.A. 93-385 and its impact on the case. The trial court found the variance to be void ab initio due to the board’s imposition of the condition “for Mrs. Kastner’s life use only.” Because variances are granted only with respect to a particular piece of property, and not with respect to any one person; Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 235, 239, 303 A.2d 743 (1972); the trial court found the above condition to be unreasonable. The trial court reasoned that the board lacked authority to impose an unreasonable condition and therefore that it had acted without jurisdiction, such that the condition was void ab initio. Further, it found that because the condition was integral to the grant of the variance, the entire variance was void ab initio. Public Act 93-385 addresses precisely this issue.

       The general rule is that when a legislative act is intended to clarify existing law “it necessarily has retroactive effect.” State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 284, 528 A.2d 760 (1987).

       In Schaghticoke Indians of Kent, Connecticut, Inc. v. Potter, 217 Conn. 612, 616, 587 A.2d 139 (1991), we noted that “General Statutes § 1-1 (u) provides that [t]he passage or repeal of an act shall not affect any action then pending. We have construed that provision to mean that [statutes should be construed retroactively only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) More recently, we noted that “[i]t is arule of construction that legislation is to be applied prospectively unless the legislature clearly expresses an intention to the contrary. The rule is rooted in the notion that it would be unfair to impose a substantive amendment that changes the grounds upon which an action may be maintained on parties who have already transacted or who are already committed to litigation. ...” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Kirshner, 225 Conn. 185, 203, 621 A.2d 1326 (1993).

       See footnote 5.

       In Schieffelin & Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, supra, 194 Conn. 176, we concluded that legislation passed subsequent to the issuance of certain wholesale liquor permits was to be applied to those permits currently in effect that met statutory durational requirements. “The language of the act clearly refers to distributorships in existence at the time of its passage. This results from the use of the phrase ‘has had,’ in subsection (a) (2) of [No. 81-367 of the 1981 Public Acts], which is the present perfect tense of the word ‘have.’ Words and phrases are to be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language. General Statutes § 1-1 (a); Caldor, Inc. v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 566, 570, 440 A.2d 767 (1981). The use of the present perfect tense of a verb indicates an action or condition that was begun in the past and is still going on or was just completed in the present. Thus, although the act applies prospectively to terminations of distributorships, the criteria upon which such terminations are to be considered might well arise either before or after its effective date.” Schieffelin & Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, supra, 174-75.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    D.A. PINCUS AND COMPANY, INC. v. JAMES F. MEEHAN, COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE SERVICES
    (15175)
    Callahan, Borden, Berdon, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued December 7, 1995
    decision released January 30, 1996

      Paul M. Scimonelli, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).

      William H. Narwold, with whom, on the brief, was Charles D. Ray, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   KATZ, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the difference in tax treatment that General Statutes § 12-217 (a) (A) accords investments in federally tax-exempt municipal bonds and federally taxable bonds with respect to the deductibility of interest expenses incurred in holding such investments violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. We conclude that it does not.

The following pertinent facts axe undisputed. The plaintiff, D.A. Pincus and Company, Inc., is a properly registered broker-dealer that is engaged solely in the business of buying municipal obligations and selling them primarily to other broker-dealers. The plaintiff earns interest income on its inventory of municipal bonds. In order to maintain its inventory of such bonds, the plaintiff borrows money on which it pays interest.

For the fiscal years ending on October 31,1983,1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987, the plaintiff was qualified to do business in Connecticut, and consequently, was subject to the Connecticut corporation business tax. See General Statutes § 12-213 et seq. The plaintiff timely filed its tax returns for those years as required and timely paid in full all taxes and other charges as reported by the plaintiff to be due thereon. In those returns, the plaintiff included in its gross income all interest that it received from its inventory of municipal obligations. The plaintiff in turn deducted from its gross income the interest expenses on the indebtedness incurred to carry the municipal obligations.

Subsequent to October 31, 1985, the defendant, the commissioner of revenue services, examined the plaintiffs Connecticut corporation business tax returns for the fiscal years ending on October 31, 1983, 1984 and 1985. On the basis of his interpretation of § 12-217 (a) (A), the defendant concluded that the plaintiff had improperly deducted the interest expenses. Accordingly, the defendant added those amounts back into the plaintiffs gross income. Thereafter, the defendant mailed a notice to the plaintiff of an assessment of additional tax due in the amount of $24,867, plus interest for those years. Pursuant to General Statutes § 12-236, the plaintiff requested a hearing and correction of that tax assessment. The defendant subsequently examined the plaintiffs Connecticut corporation business tax returns for the fiscal years ending on October 31, 1986, and 1987 and, similarly concluding that the plaintiff had improperly deducted the interest expenses from its gross income, mailed a second notice to the plaintiff of an assessment of additional tax due in the amount of $16,342, plus interest for those years. Again, the plaintiff filed a request for a hearing and correction of the tax assessed by the defendant. After a hearing, the defendant denied both requests for correction.

Thereafter, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-237, the plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the defendant’s adverse decisions. In both appeals, the plaintiff claimed that if § 12-217 (a) (A) allows a broker-dealer carrying a portfolio of federally taxable bonds to deduct the interest expenses incurred in connection with those bonds, but does not allow a broker-dealer carrying a portfolio of federally tax-exempt bonds to deduct the interest expenses incurred in connection with those bonds, in the absence of a rational basis for the disparate treatment of such broker-dealers, both of whose earned interest is taxable for state tax purposes, the statute violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The appeals were consolidated for trial. The trial court, Blue, J., concluded that § 12-217 (a) (A) did violate the equal protection clauses and sustained the appeal. The defendant thereafter appealed to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (2). We reverse the judgments of the trial court.

The parties agree that, unlike the federal government, the state of Connecticut, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-213, does not exclude from gross income the interest earned on municipal bonds for purposes of the corporation business tax. See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Tax Commissioner, 178 Conn. 243, 423 A.2d 883 (1979). Accordingly, on its tax returns for the fiscal years 1983 to 1987, the plaintiff properly included the interest income earned on its portfolio of municipal obligations. The parties, however, disagree as to the application of § 12-217 (a) (A) to the interest paid on the indebtedness incurred to carry these municipal obligations. In order to understand the basis of their disagreement, and because § 12-217 (a) (A) partially depends on federal corporate tax law, we turn there first.

Pursuant to title 26 of the United States Code, § 103 (a), interest income on municipal obligations is excluded from gross income as that term is defined in title 26 of the United States Code, § 61 (a) (1994). Interest income on corporate obligations, in contrast, is included in gross income. Additionally, although, as a general rule, title 26 of the United States Code, § 163 (a) provides a deduction for all interest paid on corporate indebtedness, title 26 of the United States Code, § 265 (a) (2) expressly provides that no deduction shall be allowed for interest on indebtedness incurred and paid in connection with carrying federally tax-exempt municipal obligations. Put simply, under the federal tax provisions, a taxpayer does not include the interest earned on municipal bonds in income and does not deduct the interest paid on money borrowed to carry these bonds. The taxpayer, however, must include the interest earned on corporate bonds and may deduct the interest expense incurred to carry those bonds.

In contrast, under Connecticut’s corporate tax scheme, interest earned on both municipal and corporate obligations is included in the taxpayer’s gross income. Furthermore, § 12-217 (a) (A) provides that, in general, only those items deductible under federal tax law are deductible in Connecticut. The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no specific deduction provided in Connecticut’s corporation business tax law for interest expenses incurred in carrying a portfolio of municipal obligations. Therefore, broker-dealers in Connecticut who engage in the trade of federally taxable obligations, such as corporate bonds, who are also taxed in Connecticut on interest earned, receive a deduction for interest expenses incurred in connection with these obligations. On the other hand, broker-dealers in Connecticut, who engage in the sale of federally tax-exempt obligations, such as the plaintiff, who are similarly taxed in Connecticut on interest earned, do not receive a deduction on interest expenses incurred in carrying these obligations. Consequently, the type of obligation in which one deals dictates whether the related interest expenses are deductible for Connecticut corporation business tax purposes. Because the plaintiff cannot deduct the expenses incurred in maintaining its municipal obligations, it claims that it is being discriminated against in violation of the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions.

The defendant responds that § 12-217 (a) (A) does not single out broker-dealers in municipal obligations from broker-dealers in corporate bonds as a particular class to whom differing treatment is afforded. Rather, all broker-dealers are treated alike in that all interest received is included in gross income under the Connecticut corporation business tax no matter what the nature, source or purpose of such interest received. Additionally, a broker-dealer who has investments in both corporate bonds and municipal bonds would be able to deduct the interest expenses related to corporate bonds but not the interest expense related to municipal bonds. The defendant maintains that this case involves two types of investment income, and that it is simply the type of security in which the plaintiff chose to deal that brings about differing results. We agree with the defendant.

The plaintiff in this case sought a deduction from otherwise taxable income. Because deductions and exemptions from otherwise taxable income are matters of legislative grace, they must be strictly construed. Yaeger v. Dubno, 188 Conn. 206, 212, 449 A.2d 144 (1982). With that principle in mind, we turn to an examination of the plaintiffs claims.

The plaintiff chose to deal in municipal bonds. As we stated in Bolt Technology Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 213 Conn. 220, 231-32, 567 A.2d 371 (1989), there is no constitutional significance to a taxpayer’s voluntary decision to do business one way in preference to another. In Bolt Technology Corp., we upheld the constitutionality of § 12-217 (a) (D) (1) despite the different tax treatment afforded to domestic international sales companies (DISCs) operating on a commission agent basis as opposed to those DISCs operating on a buy-sell basis. Id. “The taxpayers in these cases elected to do business by way of a commission agent DISC rather than by a buy-sell DISC. The fact that one method of doing business has less beneficial tax consequences than the other does not warrant this court’s interference with the tax policies formulated by the legislature regarding DISCs. We, therefore, decline to attempt to equalize the tax consequences of the two DISCs by interpreting § 12-217 in a manner contrary to the plain words of the statute.” Id.

In the present case, the trial court acknowledged that the statute does not single out broker-dealers in municipal obligations, but concluded, nevertheless, that the statute is unconstitutional because it is underinclusive in that it confers a benefit — an interest expense deduction — upon broker-dealers in federally taxable obligations, but not upon broker-dealers in federally tax-exempt obligations. Additionally, the trial court found § 12-217 (a) (A) unconstitutional as applied on the theory that “[a tax] statute [like other statutes,] is unconstitutional, as applied, if it treats similarly situated persons differently and the different treatment does not rest upon some reasonable consideration of legislative policy.” Oxx v. Dept. of Taxes, 159 Vt. 371, 376, 618 A.2d 1321 (1992).

We disagree with the trial court’s reasoning. Section 12-217 (a) (A), in general, affords the same benefits to all corporate taxpayers. The plaintiff or any other broker-dealer can deduct expenses related to its federally taxable income and is precluded only from deducting expenses related to its federally tax-exempt income. Therefore, a taxpayer benefits from § 12-217 (a) (A) when it deducts expenses related to its federally taxable income. A classification scheme cannot be read into § 12-217 (a) (A), which treats all broker-dealers trading in municipal bonds similarly. Therefore, any classification created by the plaintiffs choice to deal only in municipal obligations is artificial and should have been rejected.

Furthermore, equal protection challenges are premised on a classification drawn by a statute that discriminates against particular persons or classes of people. Because “[t]he equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions apply only to ‘persons’ Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 473, 662 A.2d 1226 (1995); and the plaintiffs challenge relates to classifications among bonds, the plaintiff has failed to raise a claim that falls within the scope of the constitutional guarantee it seeks to invoke. Compare Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 323-25, 417 A.2d 343 (1979) (invalidating, on due process and equal protection grounds, Sunday closing law drawing distinctions between stores that may sell items), with State v. Hurliman, 143 Conn. 502, 505-508, 123 A.2d 767 (1956) (upholding Sunday closing law drawing distinctions between type of items that may be sold).

Even if we were to conclude that § 12-217 (a) (A) creates a classification to which an equal protection analysis applies, the plaintiff could not prevail on the merits of this claim. “When a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, whether under the United States constitution or the Connecticut constitution, the reviewing court must first determine the standard by which the challenged statute’s constitutional validity will be determined. If, in distinguishing between classes, the statute either intrudes on the exercise of a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class of persons, the court will apply a strict scrutiny standard wherein the state must demonstrate that the challenged statute is necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest. ... If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal protection challenge. . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Benjamin v. Bailey, supra, 234 Conn. 477.

“Under the rational basis test, [t]he court’s function ... is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harbor Ins. Co. v. Groppo, 208 Conn. 505, 509, 544 A.2d 1221 (1988). “In general, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, see United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174, 179, [101 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1980)], the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the government decisionmaker, see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 [101 S. Ct. 715, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659] (1981), and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S [432, 446, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985)].” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992).

“In the context of tax legislation, a party challenging a statute on equal protection grounds has an even greater burden than equal protection challenges to other social and economic statutes that do not infringe upon a fundamental right or affect a suspect group. In tax matters, more so than in other fields, legislatures possess considerable liberty in classification. . . . Therefore, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that the classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Meehan, 225 Conn. 528, 536-37, 626 A.2d 244 (1993).

Finally, we note that it is irrelevant whether the conceivable basis for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. “[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification. . . . This court’s review requires only that the differing financial ability between the two groups may conceivably or may reasonably have been the purpose or policy of the relevant decisionmaker. . . . The legislature, cognizant of the constitutional guarantees of equal protection, must be deemed to have sought to attain a rational and sensible result that avoids placing a statute in constitutional jeopardy.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 539-40. “[B]ecause we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. ... In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” (Citations omitted.) Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993).

The dispositive issue before this court is whether the Connecticut legislature, in devising its taxation scheme, could conceivably justify disallowing tax deductions for interest expenses incurred in connection with maintaining a municipal bond portfolio when it allows such deductions for expenses incurred in connection with maintaining corporate bonds. We agree with the defendant that there are conceivable reasons for the challenged distinction in treatment of corporate and municipal bonds.

The federal government has clearly conferred a benefit by exempting the interest income earned on municipal bonds from the federal net income tax. We assume that the Connecticut legislature has chosen to treat this type of investment differently from corporate bonds precisely because the income it generates, unlike income from corporate bonds, is not subject to federal tax. “[T]he tax laws may require tax-exempt income to pay its way.” United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U.S. 233, 247, 85 S. Ct. 1379, 14 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1965). Mindful that a corporation investing in municipal bonds is getting a federal tax advantage, the state has decided to take the opportunity to tax where the federal government has refrained and thereby gain, additional revenue.

The defendant argues as well that there is an additional rational basis for treating one category of income differently from another. The income generated from municipal bonds is generally less than that generated from corporate bonds because municipal bonds are exempt from federal tax and, generally, are a lower risk investment. Consequently, municipal bonds provide less revenue that is subject to Connecticut tax than do coiporate bonds. Although the state is likely pleased to have money invested in its municipalities, the decision to disallow a deduction for interest expenses may have been an attempt to compensate for this reduced revenue.

Two principles have guided the resolution of this case. First, “equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., supra, 508 U.S. 313. Second, it is well established that those who challenge' the constitutionality of a state statute bear the heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumption of its validity has been overcome. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Groppo, supra, 208 Conn. 510. To do this, the party attacking a tax statute has the burden of negating every conceivable basis that might support it. Johnson v. Meehan, supra, 225 Conn. 537.

Accordingly, because the plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden of proving that § 12-217 (a) (A) violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions, we reverse the trial court’s judgments and remand the case with direction to dismiss the plaintiffs appeals.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 12-217 provides in relevant part: “Deductions from gross income. Net income of S corporations, (a) In arriving at net income as defined in section 12-213, whether or not the taxpayer is taxable under the federal corporation net income tax, there shall be deducted from gross income, (A) all items deductible under the federal corporation net income tax law effective and in force on the last day of the income year . . . .”

       General Statutes § 12-236 provides: “Hearing by commissioner. Any taxpayer, aggrieved by the action of the commissioner or his authorized agent in fixing the amount of any tax, penalty or interest provided for by this part, may apply to the commissioner, in writing, within sixty days after the notice of such action is delivered or mailed to it, for a hearing and a correction of the amount of the tax, penalty or interest so fixed, setting forth the reasons why such hearing should be granted and the amount in which such tax, penalty or interest should be reduced. The commissioner shall promptly consider each such application and may grant or deny the hearing requested. If the hearing is denied, the applicant shall be notified thereof forthwith. If it is granted, the commissioner shall notify the applicant of the time and place fixed for such hearing. After such hearing the commissioner may make such order in the premises as appears to him just and lawful and shall furnish a copy of such order to the applicant. The commissioner may, by notice in writing, at any time within three years after the date when any return of any taxpayer has been due, order a hearing on his own initiative and require the taxpayer or any other individual whom he believes to be in possession of relevant information concerning the taxpayer to appear before him or his authorized agent with any specified books of account, papers or other documents, for examination under oath.”

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-237 provides: “Appeal. Any taxpayer aggrieved because of any order, decision, determination or disallowance of the commissioner of revenue services under the provisions of this part may, within one month after service upon the taxpayer of notice of such order, decision, determination or disallowance, take an appeal therefrom to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, which shall be accompanied by a citation to the commissioner of revenue services to appear before said court. Such citation shall be signed by the same authority, and such appeal shall be returnable at the same time and served and returned in the same manner, as is required in case of a summons in a civil action. The authority issuing the citation shall take from the appellant a bond or recognizance to the state of Connecticut, with surety to prosecute the appeal to effect and to comply with the orders and decrees of the court in the premises. Such appeals shall be preferred cases, to be heard, unless cause appears to the contrary, at the first session, by the court or by a committee appointed by it. Said court may grant such relief as may be equitable and, if such tax has been paid prior to the granting of such relief, may order the treasurer to pay the amount of such relief, with interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum, to the aggrieved taxpayer. If the appeal has been taken without probable cause, the court may tax double or triple costs, as the case demands; and, upon all such appeals which may be denied, costs may be taxed against the appellant at the discretion of the court, but no costs shall be taxed against the state.”
      Section 12-237 was amended by No. 94-4 of the 1994 Public Acts, decreasing the interest rate to 8 percent effective July 1, 1995.

       The plaintiff advanced two arguments to the trial court. First, the plaintiff argued for an interpretation of § 12-217 (a) (A) that would support its claim that the interest expenses were deductible. Alternatively, the plaintiff agreed that if § 12-217 (a) (A) does not allow it to deduct interest expenses incurred to maintain its municipal bond portfolio, the statute is unconstitutional. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs statutory argument. The plaintiff does not challenge that determination on appeal. Rather, the plaintiff has confined its claim in this appeal to the constitutional challenge it made to the trial court.

       Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides: “All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
      The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 20, as amended by article twenty-one of the amendments provides: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability.”

       General Statutes § 12-213 provides in relevant part: “Definitions. . . . ‘[G]ross income’ means gross income as defined in the federal coloration net income tax law in force on the last day of the income year and, in addition, means any interest received or interest paid by the taxpayer or losses of other calendar or fiscal years, retroactive to include all calendar or fiscal years beginning after January 1, 1935, incurred by the taxpayer which are excluded from gross income for purposes of assessing the federal corporation net income tax . . . .”

       In Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Tax Commissioner, supra, 178 Conn. 247-49, we held that the corporation business tax is a franchise tax upon the privilege of carrying on business in this state in corporate form measured by net income. In arriving at net income as defined in § 12-213, the starting point is gross income as defined by that statute, which is federal net income with certain additions or deletions. Among the additions is interest received. The plaintiff does not challenge the requirement that the interest it receives from its municipal bond portfolio must be included in gross income. Its only challenge is to the defendant’s application of § 12-217 (a) (A) in disallowing the plaintiff from deducting the interest expense incurred in carrying its municipal bond portfolio.

       Title 26 of the United States Code, § 103 (a) provides: “Except as provided in subsection (b), gross income does not include interest on any State or local bond.”

       Title 26 of the United States Code, § 61 (a) provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:
      “(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items;
      “(2) Gross income derived from business;

        “(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
      “(4) Interest;
      “(5) Rents;
      “(6) Royalties;
      “(7) Dividends;
      “(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
      “(9) Annuities;
      “(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
      “(11) Pensions;
      “(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
      “(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
      “(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
      “(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.”

       Title 26 of the United States Code, § 163 (a) provides: “There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness.”

       Title 26 of the United States Code, § 265 (a) provides in relevant part: “No deduction shall be allowed for ... (2) [i]nterest on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations the interest on which is wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle.”

       Cases in which reviewing courts have responded to a classification scheme include the following: Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-20, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993) (upholding law requiring local franchising of operators of satellite master antenna and television facilities, but not private or wholly internal facilities); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-17, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992) (upholding California’s real property tax system providing 1 to 2 percent ceiling on real property tax except for owners of newly purchased or newly constructed real estate); Johnson v. Meehan, 225 Conn. 528, 540-43, 626 A.2d 244 (1993) (upholding General Statutes § 12-297, which provides exemption from cigarette tax for patients and inmates residing in state hospitals, but not inmates in state correctional institutions); and Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 490-96, 313 A.2d 53 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S. Ct. 911, 34 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1973) (upholding tax on investment income from dividends but striking down exemption for unmarried widowed women).

       The trial court recognized that “[i]n appropriate circumstances, we have interpreted the equal protection provisions of the state constitution differently than that contained in the federal constitution . . . Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 513, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). It further noted, however, that “the rational basis tests of the two constitutions appear on the basis of present jurisprudence to be substantially the same.” The plaintiff does not suggest that a different test be utilized in our analysis of its claim under the state constitution.

       The plaintiff argues that this rationale is not satisfactory because the legislature did not deny the interest expense deduction to all corporations that earn interest on municipal obligations. For example, the plaintiff points out that regulated investment companies that invest in federally tax-exempt municipal bonds get the benefit of the interest expense deduction. For the reasons set forth in footnote 15, we are not persuaded by the plaintiffs argument.

       States may use their taxing power so as to encourage certain types of businesses. P. Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation (1988) p. 153. Indeed, § 12-217 was amended in 1977 in order to confer the benefit of a deduction for expenses incurred by mutual funds (regulated investment companies) investing in tax-exempt bonds. The legislative history clearly reflects deliberate consideration of the fact that the statute operates to confer different treatment to corporations investing in corporate bonds and corporations investing in municipal bonds. Rather than extend the deduction for expenses to all corporations investing in municipal bonds, however, the legislature chose to allow the deduction only to mutual funds investing in municipal bonds. This statutory amendment was to “permit creation of a municipal bond fund here in Connecticut which would attract small investors into the municipal bond area ... it is hoped that the formation of this fund will permit investments as low as $300.00 initially and $50.00 thereafter to be made which should encourage the capital market in Connecticut and help municipalities throughout the area.” 20 S. Proc., Pt. 1, 1977 Sess., p. 378, remarks of Senator Audrey P. Beck. Although, as the plaintiff points out, the amendment eradicated the unequal treatment for mutual funds only, “[t]he legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.” Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S. Ct. 461, 99 L. Ed. 563 (1955). Prior to the 1977 amendment, there had been no municipal bond funds in Connecticut. By allowing mutual funds investing in municipal bonds to deduct expenses, the legislature attempted to create a more favorable tax environment to attract such funds to Connecticut and to compete with sister states that did not tax their municipal bond funds. Additionally, it was an attempt to “bring municipal funds and all other mutual funds on a parity basis as far as taxes go.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Finance, Pt. 1, 1977 Sess., p. 167. Through this amendment, the legislature addressed the phase of the problem it thought was most acute. Id.


text:
    JAMES BARRY v. POSI-SEAL INTERNATIONAL, INC.

      Harry E. Colmar and Wesley W. Horton, in support of the petition.

      Mark R. Kravitz, Jeffrey R. Bobbin and Bonnie L. Patten, in opposition.
    Decided July 26, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 1 (AC 12101), is, on reconsideration by this court, granted. It is further ordered that this matter is remanded to the Appellate Court for further consideration in light of this court’s decision in Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1 (1995).


text:
    CYNTHIA G. GROSCH v. DOUGLAS R. GROSCH

      Joseph A. Hourihan, in support of the petition.
    Decided August 8, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 946 (AC 12496), is granted. It is further ordered that this matter is remanded to the Appellate Court for reconsideration in light of this court’s decision in Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783 (1995).


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DANIEL HENDERSON

      John R. Gulash, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Susan C. Marks, supervisoiy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 14508) is denied.


author: BERDON, J.,

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. REINALDO RAMOS

      Kent Drager, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Linda N. Howe, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 36 Conn. App. 831 (AC 12487), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification for review.


text:
    FIRST CONSTITUTION BANK v. HARBOR VILLAGE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ET AL.

      Jonathan D. Elliot, in support of the petition.

      Jonathan S. Bowman, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The plaintiff First Marine Corporation’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 698 (AC 11548), is denied.


text:
    DANBURY SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITIES, INC., ET AL.

      Jerome Kovals, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Howard K. Levine, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant Jerome Kovacs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 925 (AC 13261), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SCOTT HERMANN

      Lawrence S. Dressier, in support of the petition.

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 56 (AC 12328), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SCOTT LARKIN

      Anne Pappas Phillips, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 125 (AC 12709), is denied.


text:
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RECEIVER OF NEW CONNECTICUT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, N.A. v. JOSEPH G. VOLL ET AL.

      Leo Gold, in support of the petition.

      Thomas R. Legenhausen, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant Zoltán Guttman’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 198 (AC 13863), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petition for certification for review filed by the defendant Zoltán Guttman.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HOLLIS WILSON, SR.

      Donald Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 231 (AC 12294), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES LEROY

      Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 282 (AC 11187), is denied.


text:
    GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. POWERS, BOLLES, HOULIHAN AND HARTLINE, INC.

      Joseph T. Sweeney and Daniel P. Scapellati, in support of the petition.

      William F. Corrigan, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 290 (AC 13272), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARK TORWICH

      Mary Miller Haselkamp, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 306 (AC 13522), is denied.


text:
    ERCOLE CASSELLA v. BETH A. KLEFFKE

      Dale W. Radcliffe, in support of the petition.

      Robert J. Oliver and David J. Crotta, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 340 (AC 13199), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EDWARD R. SHERMAN

      Daniel F. Sullivan and John W. Steinmetz, in support of the petition.

      C. Robert Satti, Sr., special assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 371 (AC 13649), is denied.


text:
    CHERI L. BILODEAU v. CITY OF BRISTOL

      Nicole D. Dorman, in support of the petition.

      Kathryn Calibey, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 447 (AC 13154), is denied.


text:
    CHERI L. BILODEAU v. CITY OF BRISTOL

      Kathryn Calibey, in support of the petition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 447 (AC 13154), is denied.


text:
    CELESTINO CABASQUINI v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES

      Joanne Gibau, in support of the petition.

      Jennifer C. Jaff assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 522 (AC 13730), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES COLEMAN
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 531 (AC 12812), is denied.

Harry Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, in opposition.

Decided September 13, 1995


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CLINT PICKERING

      Joseph E. Mascaro, Kevin Majewski and M. Donald Ca,rdwell, in support of the petition.

      Michele C. Lukban, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 536 (AC 13975), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN FITZGERALD WIDEMAN

      Barry A. Butler, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 581 (AC 13207), is denied.


text:
    SOPHIE LUPOLI v. GALE S. LUPOLI ET AL.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 639 (AC 14092), is denied.

Kenneth A. Votre, in support of the petition.

Susan E. Nugent, in opposition.

Decided September 13, 1995


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SHERMAN ADAMS

      Donald Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Judith Rossi, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 643 (AC 12303), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES COOPER

      James B. Streeto, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Christopher T. Godialis, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 661 (AC 12762), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES COOPER
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 661 (AC 12762), is denied.

Christopher T. Godialis, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

James B. Streeto, special public defender, in opposition.

Decided September 13, 1995


text:
    CITY OF NEW HAVEN v. LOCAL 884, COUNCIL 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15307.

      J. William Gagne, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Steven Samalot, assistant corporation counsel, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 709 (AC 13525), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, once the arbitration board had committed misconduct under General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (3), the issue of waiver by the plaintiff was not before the court and that § 52-418 (a) (3) required the vacating of the award?”


text:
    MAURICE HANSEN ET AL. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL.

      Frank P. Cannatelli, in support of the petition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The petition of the plaintiff estate of Maurice Hansen for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 902 (AC 13380), is denied.


text:
    ESSEX SAVINGS BANK v. JOHN F. COYNE ESSEX SAVINGS BANK v. JEFFREY W. NAVIN ET AL.

      Kenneth R. Davis, in support of the petition.

      John S. Bennet, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendants John F. Coyne and Jeffrey W. Navin’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 904 (AC 13748/14169), is denied.


text:
    NEW MILFORD SAVINGS BANK v. JESSICA A. MELIEF ET AL.

      Irwin J. Hausman and Gale K. Busemeyer, in support of the petition.

      Joseph P. Secóla, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendants Jessica A. Melief and Andre Melief s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 906 (AC 13613), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MILTON KIRTON

      Earle Giovanniello, in support of the petition.

      Christopher T. Godialis, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 914 (AC 13988), is denied.


text:
    CHARLES B. MONTANO v. CATHERINE MONTANO

      Elizabeth A. Gallagher, in support of the petition.

      Lisa A. Faccadio, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 915 (AC 12919), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAMON RIVERA

      Leonard M. Crone, in support of the petition.

      Margaret G. Radionovas, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 916 (AC 13769), is denied.


text:
    AMY BOWER ET AL. v. DAVID D’ONFRO ET AL.

      Roger J. Frechette and Matthew E. Frechette, in support of the petition.

      Susan M. Cormier, Wesley W. Horton and Anthony Nuzzo, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided September 13, 1995
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 685 (AC 12161), is denied.


text:
    AMY BOWER ET AL. v. DAVID D’ONFRO ET AL.

      Susan M. Cormier, Wesley W. Horton and Anthony Nuzzo, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Roger J. Frechette and Matthew E. Frechette, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 685 (AC 12161), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANDREW OWENS

      Michael J. Isko, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn J. Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 801 (AC 13584), is denied.


text:
    IN RE MICHAEL C.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 14685) is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Does General Statutes § 46b-127, as amended by § 6 (d) of No. 94-2 of the 1994 Public Acts, July Special Session, apply to the transfer from the juvenile docket to the adult docket in this case?
“2. If the answer to the first question is yes, does that application constitute an ex post facto law in violation of either the federal or state constitution?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15318.

Grace Cavero, deputy assistant public defender, and Christine Perra Rapillo, supervisory assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Francis J. Carino, chief state’s advocate, in opposition.

Decided September 28, 1995


text:
    IN RE DANIEL H.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15314.

      F. Mac Buckley, in support of the petition.

      Francis J. Carino, chief state’s advocate, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 14912) is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Does General Statutes § 46-127, as amended by § 6 (d) of No. 94-2 of the 1994 Public Acts, July Special Session, apply to the transfer from the juvenile docket to the adult docket in this case?
“2. If the answer to the first question is yes, does that application constitute an ex post facto law in violation of either the federal or state constitution?”


text:
    IN RE JONATHAN M.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15317.

      Mark Shapera, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Francis J. Carino, chief state’s advocate, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 14693) is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Does General Statutes § 46b-127, as amended by § 6 (d) of No. 94-2 of the 1994 Public Acts, July Special Session, apply to the transfer from the juvenile docket to the adult docket in this case?
“2. If the answer to the first question is yes, does that application constitute an ex post facto law in violation of either the federal or state constitution?”


text:
    ALLEN GLUCKSMAN ET AL. v. KRIS WALTERS ET AL.

      Charles A. Deluca, in support of the petition.

      Christopher R. Bello, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The petition of the defendant Young Men’s Christian Association of Stamford for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 140 (AC 12788), is denied.


text:
    NEW MILFORD SAVINGS BANK v. R. RICHARD ROINA, TRUSTEE, ET AL.

      Peter J. Ottomano, in support of the petition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The defendants R. Richard Roina as trustee, John R. Fiore, Charles A. Flore and Pat J. Cutrone’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 240 (AC 12342), is denied.


text:
    JANE DOE v. DORIS MARSELLE ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15312.

      Susan L. Garten, in support of the petition.

      Andrew J. O’Keefe and Maureen Sullivan Dinnan, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 360 (AC 13338), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the second amended complaint did not allege a willful violation of General Statutes § 19a-583 (a)?
“2. Did the Appellate Court properly decide that the plaintiffs negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress and Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act counts had been properly stricken?”


text:
    RICHARD K. FRUIN v. COLONADE ONE AT OLD GREENWICH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15319.

      Peter M. Ryan, in support of the petition.

      Paul L. McCullough, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 420 (AC 13185), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Absent bad faith, does a violation of the Common Interest Ownership Act, per se, allow a unilateral rescission of a contract for the purchase of a unit in a common interest community?
“2. Is rescission in bad faith if a contract purchaser of a unit in a common interest community unilaterally refuses to perform the contract based on violations by the seller of the Common Interest Ownership Act that are not related to or have a nexus to the breach and the contract purchaser has received no benefit?”


text:
    CHARLES FABRIZIO v. HOWARD S. GLASER
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15315.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 458 (AC 13293), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly apply the general verdict rule under the circumstances of this case?”

Carey B. Reilly, in support of the petition.

Craig A. Fontaine and Paul T. Edwards, in opposition.

Decided September 28, 1995


text:
    BARBARA OAKLEY v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15316.

      Charles Krich, staff attorney, in support of the petition.

      A. Susan Peck, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 506 (AC 12900), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs motion for fees and expenses under General Statutes § 4-184a?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SHAWN ROBINSON
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15313.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 598 (AC 11350), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether, under the state or federal constitution, a Batson objection must be made immediately following the voir dire of the challenged venireperson lest it be waived?”

Deborah L. DeHart Cannavino, in support of the petition.

Nancy L. Gillespie, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided September 28, 1995


text:
    WILLIAM H. WILSON v. PAUL HRYNIEWICZ ET AL.

      David E. Rosengren and David F. Sherwood, in support of the petition.

      Neil F. Murphy, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 715 (AC 12467), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. REGINALD ROGERS

      Lawrence R. Pellett, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 28, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 777 (AC 13388), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HERIBERTO LOPEZ
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15320.

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 5, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 434 (AC 14042), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court’s exclusion of a third party confession?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WALTER DAVIS

      Christopher T. Godialis, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      James P. Ginocchio, assistant public defender, in opposition.
    Decided October 5, 1995
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 621 (AC 13291), is denied.


text:
    NANCY WANNAGOT v. CITY OF SHELTON

      William J. Curran, in support of the petition.

      James T. Baldwin, in opposition.
    Decided October 5, 1995
   The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 754 (AC 13733), is denied.


text:
    NANCY WANNAGOT v. CITY OF SHELTON

      James T. Baldwin, in support of the petition.
    Decided October 5, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 754 (AC 13733), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GILBERT TREAT

      Deborah DelPrete Sullivan, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 5, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 762 (AC 14069), is denied.


text:
    SHAWMUT BANK v. LISE-LOTTE KNUDSEN

      William F. Gallagher, in support of the petition.

      Thomas V. Battaglia, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided October 5, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 919 (AC 13848), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GREGORY WILLIAMS
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 18 (AC 12769), is granted, limited to the following issues:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15325.

Susann E. Gill assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

Deborah DelPrete Sullivan, assistant public defender, in opposition.

Decided October 16, 1995

“1. Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, for purposes of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a and 53a-59 (a) (1) intent to cause death and intent to cause serious physical injury are mutually exclusive states of mind?
“2. If the answer to the first question is yes, was the error of the trial court harmless?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMIE PETTWAY

      Deborah DelPrete Sullivan, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Mary H. Lesser, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 16, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 63 (AC 12386), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LUIS RIVERA

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Susann E. Gill, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 16, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 96 (AC 12565), is denied.


text:
    HELEN HAYES v. MANCHESTER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL ET AL.

      Louis B. Blumenfeld, in support of the petition.

      Louis W. Flynn, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The defendant Wells Jacobson’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 471 (AC 12453), is denied.


text:
    HELEN HAYES v. MANCHESTER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL ET AL.

      Lois B. Tanzer, in support of the petition.

      Louis W. Flynn, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 471 (AC 12453), is denied.


text:
    MIDDLESEX MUTUAL ASSURANCE COMPANY v. EDWARD CLINTON ET AL.

      Judith Clinton, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Joel J. Rottner and Jonathan Kline, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The defendant Judith Clinton’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 555 (AC 13428), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARY THERIAULT
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 815 (AC 13046), is denied.

Nancy L. Gillespie, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

G. Douglas Nash, public defender, in opposition.

Decided October 27, 1995


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROGER GODFREY

    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15329.

      Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Dennis F. O’Toole, assistant public defender, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995

       Superseded. See 236 Conn. 904.

   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 1 (AC 13749), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict?”


text:
    JACQUELINE D. ZIEMBA v. HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.

      James P. Connolly, in support of the petition.

      Gregory E. O’Brien, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 106 (AC 13658), is denied.


text:
    RACHAEL CAMERON v. JOHN ALANDER, COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RESOURCES

      Lawrence W. Berliner and Aileen M. Bell, in support of the petition.

      Peter L. Brown, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 216 (AC 13600), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KEVIN GUESS

      Donald J. Bowers, in support of the petition.

      John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 224 (AC 13321), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SHERMAN EDWARDS

      Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Harry Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 242 (AC 13223), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SHERMAN EDWARDS

      Harry Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 242 (AC 13223), is denied.


text:
    SUZANNE SANBORN v. CHARLES GREENWALD

      Gerald S. Sack and Michael B. Pollack, in support of the petition.

      Robyn L. Sondak, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 289 (AC 13372), is denied.


text:
    DONALD CHAPMAN ET AL. v. NORFOLK AND DEDHAM MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.

      Jon D. Biller and David B. Rozwaski, in support of the petition.

      Stephen E. Goldman and Patricia J. Campanella, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 306 (AC 12718), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RONELL HANKS STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSE ROQUE

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 27, 1995
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 333 (AC 13430/ 13636), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN LACCONE
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15257.

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
    Decided May 1, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 21 (AC 12667), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that trial court’s exclusion of Mosman’s letter was proper?
“2. If the answer to the first question is no, was the trial court’s error harmless?”


text:
    BELLA VISTA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BENJAMIN GYADU

      Benjamin Gyadu, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided November 6, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15022) is denied.


text:
    LOIS L. SINERT v. OLYMPIA AND YORK DEVELOPMENT COMPANY ET AL.

      John B. Farley, in support of the petition.

      Constance L. Epstein, in opposition.
    Decided November 6, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 844 (AC 13546), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    NORWICH SAVINGS SOCIETY v. JOSEPH M. CALDRELLO II

      Max Brunswick, in support of the petition.

      Elizabeth J. Stewart and Laura E. Evangelista, in opposition.
    Decided November 6, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 859 (AC 13572), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RONALD OWENS

      Ronald G. Weller, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Brigid Donohue, special public defender, in opposition.
    Decided November 6, 1995
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 45 (AC 12777), is denied.


text:
    SPEARHEAD CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. RICHARD A. BIANCO ET AL.

      Thomas E. Miogue, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Daniel W. Moger, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided November 6, 1995
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 122 (AC 13090), is denied.


text:
    CHARLOTTE STEPHEN v. RHONDA L. HOERLE ET AL.

      Hugh J. Lavery, in support of the petition.

      John W. Mills, in opposition.
    Decided November 6, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 253 (AC 13174), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN HANSEN

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 6, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 384 (AC 13002), is denied.


text:
    CARL STEVE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      L. D. McCallum, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.

      Deborah DelPrete Sullivan, assistant public defender, in opposition.
    Decided November 6, 1995
   The respondent commissioner of correction’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 455 (AC 13825), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. STANLEY GOODRUM

      James B. Streeto, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Nancy L. Gillespie, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 6, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 526 (AC 12615), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL M. HAMPDEN

      Michael M. Hampden, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Kevin Kane, state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 905 (AC 13706), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JASON MARCH

      Donald Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn K. Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 13, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 267 (AC 13019), is denied.


text:
    JOHN ANTHONY GRAHAM v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Paula Mangini Montonye, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
    Decided November 13, 1995
   The petitioner John Anthony Graham’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 473 (AC 13839), is denied.


text:
    ANTHONY JULIAN RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. MARY ELLEN DRIVE ASSOCIATES ET AL.

      Edward R. Scofield, in support of the petition.

      Thomas B. PurseU, in opposition.
    Decided November 13, 1995
   The defendant Patrick Pacelli’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 544 (AC 13244), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TIMOTHY JONES

      Robert J. Scheinblum, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Richard E. Wareing, special public defender, in opposition.
    Decided November 13, 1995
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 563 (AC 13442), is denied.


text:
    JAMES F. BRANDT v. PATTI C. BRANDT

      C. Ian McLachlan, in support of the petition.

      Cantin and Associates, in opposition.
    Decided November 28, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15005) is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MATTHEW MCNALLY IV

      Burton M. Weinstein, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn K. Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 28, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 419 (AC 13226), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissented.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVID LANIER
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 478 (AC 12776), is denied.

Donald Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

Michele C. Lukban, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided November 28, 1995


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MANUEL ROSARIO
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15331.

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.
    Decided November 28, 1995
   The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 550 (AC 13317), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court improperly conclude that the issuing magistrate could not have inferred that the references in the search warrant affidavit to ‘January 6, 1992,’ rather than ‘January 6, 1993,’ were scrivener’s errors?
“2. If the answer to the first question is no, should the Appellate Court have remanded the case for a hearing on whether those references were scrivener’s errors?”


text:
    EVELYN R. NEWTON v. TOWN OF GREENWICH

      John F. Newton, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 912 (AC 13804), is denied.

Joyce H. Young, assistant town attorney, in opposition.

Decided November 28, 1995


text:
    NELSON GRANGER ET AL. v. A. AIUDI AND SONS ET AL.

      James H. Throwe and Gregory P. Granger, in support of the petition.

      Peter J. Zagorsky, in opposition.
    Decided December 4, 1995
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15033) is denied.


text:
    CFM OF CONNECTICUT, INC. v. TAUFIQUL CHOWDHURY ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15334.

      John Timbers, in support of the petition.

      Frank G. Usseglio, in opposition.
    Decided December 4, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 745 (AC 12406), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, on March 18, 1993, the trial court, Holzberg, J., lacked jurisdiction to vacate the contempt order of the trial court, Susco, J., dated August 31, 1990?”


text:
    JONI L. MARK v. HARRY MARK

      Harry Mark, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Lori Welch-Rubin, in opposition.
    Decided December 4, 1995
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 38 Conn. App. 920 (AC 12827), is denied.


text:
    MATTHEW ANGUISH v. TLM, INC., ET AL.

      Renee Mayerson Cannella and Stewart M. Casper, in support of the petition.
    Decided December 11, 1995
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15034) is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissented.