text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL MARSALA
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      C. Robert Satti, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 1 (AC 14094), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    CITY OF STAMFORD ET AL. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.
    Decided September 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15531.

      Kenneth B. Povodator, assistant coiporation counsel, in support of the petition.

      Victor R. Perpetua, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 39 (AC 15139), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff city of Stamford failed to establish that the McGuigan report was not exempt from disclosure under either General Statutes § 1-19 (b) (4) or § 1-19 (b) (1)?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES COLEMAN
    Decided September 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15515.

      Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Richard Emanuel, assistant public defender, in opposition.
   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 78 (AC 13103), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court improperly admitted certain knives into evidence?

“2. If the answer to question 1. is yes, was the error harmful?”


text:
    ADELAIDE KAGAN v. JON ALANDER, COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RESOURCES
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Joseph P. Secóla, in support of the petition.

      Nyle K. Davey, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 92 (AC 14178), is denied.


author: MCDONALD, J.,

text:
    TOWN CLOSE ASSOCIATES v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF NEW CANAAN
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Carl R. Ficks and Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Timothy S. Hollister, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 94 (AC 14959), is denied.

MCDONALD, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    JACQUES ALL TRADES CORPORATION v. LAVERNE BROWN ET AL.

    Decided September 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15530.

      Joseph C. Morelli, in support of the petition.

      George M. Purtill, in opposition.

      Superseded. See Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 240 Conn. 903, 688 A.2d 232 (1997).

   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 124 (AC 14052), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded, under the facts and circumstances of this case, that the municipal exemption contained in General Statutes § 20-428 applied to the contract in issue?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES DECABA
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Robert M. Berke, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Paul J. Ferencek, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 141 (AC 14831), is denied.


text:
    PAOLO SOARES v. MAX SERVICES, INC., ET AL.
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Joseph A. La Bella, in support of the petition.

      Loida D. John-Nicholson, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
   The petition by the defendants Max Services, Inc., and Commercial Union Insurance Companies for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 147 (AC 14663), is denied.


text:
    DAVID LIBBY v. GOODWIN PONTIAC-GMC TRUCK, INC., ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15520.

      Brian E. Prindle, in support of the petition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 200 (AC 14661), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“If an employee covered by workers’ compensation settles a personal injury claim against a third party, is the employer entitled to a credit against future compensation benefits equal to the amount of the settlement?”

Decided September 18, 1996

Robert C. Ruggiero, Jr., and Joseph S. Dobrowolski, in opposition.


text:
    ALAN SYLVESTRE v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
    Decided September 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15519.

      Peter T. Evans, in support of the petition.

      Frederick M. O’Brien, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 219 (AC 14874), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Is a motor vehicle a ‘hit and run vehicle whose operator cannot be identified’ if, after an accident, the driver stops and is permitted by the injured party to leave the scene?”


text:
    PATRICK MCMAHON v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Andrew C. Stabnick, in support of the petition.

      Roger B. Calistro, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 225 (AC 14284), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MELVIN D. BRASWELL
    Decided September 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15532.

      Todd D. Femow, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn K. Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 264 (AC 13902), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the Appellate Court properly held that the defendant’s conviction and consecutive sentence for attempted sale of narcotics in violation of General Statutes §§ 21a-278 (b) and 53a-49 (a) and attempted delivery of narcotics to an inmate of a correctional institution in violation of §§ 53a-174 (a) and 53a-49 (a) did not violate principles of double jeopardy?”


text:
    FREDERICK J. LOULIS ET AL. v. DEAN B. PARROTT ET AL.
    Decided September 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15517.

      Robert A. Fuller, in support of the petition.

      Christopher J. Smith, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 272 (AC 14890), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies?”


text:
    RUTH G. MERRELL v. TOWN OF SOUTHINGTON
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Alfred F. Morrocco, Jr., in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 292 (AC 14252), is denied.


text:
    JEFFREY DONTIGNEY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    Decided September 18, 1996

      James E. Sawine, in support of the petition.

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Jeffrey Dontigney’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 304 (AC 14294), is denied.


text:
    DELORES GRIMES ET AL. v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15518.

      David N. Rosen, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 324 (AC 14894), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the class action statute of limitations tolling rule, as articulated in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1973), and its progeny, did not apply so as to toll the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs’ class action claims?”

Decided September 18, 1996

Edward T. Krumreich and Miles F. McDonald, Jr., in opposition.


text:
    WASHINGTON TRUST COMPANY v. MARIE D. SMITH
    Decided September 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15527.

      Robert D. Tobin and Rita Provatas, in support of the petition.

      Francis J. Pavetti, in opposition.
   Thepetitionby the proposed defendant JohnHoIstein, trustee of City Discount Oil Nominee Trust, for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 330 (AC 13416), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that movants Spicer Plus, Inc., and John Holstein were not entitled to intervene because (1) they had not met their burden of proving their interests in the property, and (2) they had not filed their motion to intervene in a timely manner?”


text:
    WASHINGTON TRUST COMPANY v. MARIE D. SMITH
   The petition by the proposed defendant Spicer Plus, Inc., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 330 (AC 13416), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that movants Spicer Plus, Inc., and John Holstein were not entitled to intervene because (1) they had not met their burden of proving their interests in the property, and (2) they had not filed their motion to intervene in a timely manner?”

Decided September 18, 1996

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15529.

William F. Gallagher and Cynthia C. Bott, in support of the petition.

Francis J. Pavetti, in opposition.


author: BERDON, J.,

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CARMEN CASADO
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Donald D. Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      LeonF. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 371 (AC 15039), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAFAEL DELGADO
   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 382 (AC 14296), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly decide that the trial court had abused its discretion in the joinder of the manslaughter and risk of injury counts?”

Decided September 18, 1996

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15524.

Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

Francis J. DiScala, in opposition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LEROY GETTES
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 472 (AC 15359), is denied.


text:
    LYNNE DRAHAN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER 18 ET AL.
    Decided September 18, 1996

      John M. Gesmonde, in support of the petition.

      Dana Shaw MacKinnon, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 480 (AC 14972), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DANVOIR TEEL
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 500 (AC 14868), is denied.

Decided September 18, 1996

Howard T. Owens, Jr., in support of the petition.

Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TRAMLUS COLVIN
    Decided September 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15525.

      Robert J. Scheinblum, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Terence P. Sexton, in opposition.
   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 537 (AC 14186), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the Appellate Court, under the circumstances of this case, properly ruled that cocaine discovered in the defendant’s automobile must be suppressed?”


text:
    THOMAS P. MAZUROSKI v. JAMES A. HERNOVICH
    Decided September 18, 1996

      John K. McDonald, in support of the petition.

      Thomas A. Kaelin, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 574 (AC 14636), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES BIGGS
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      John A. East III, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 901 (AC 15438), is denied.


text:
    JAMES HARTRANFT ET AL. v. MICHAEL GALLAS ET AL.
    Decided September 18, 1996

      James F. Altham, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Michael C. Stumo, in opposition.
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 901 (AC 14657), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. VENTURA REY

      Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 903 (AC 14828), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.

Decided September 18, 1996

Denise B. Smoker, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    PAVERINI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. EDGARDO IPPOLITI ET AL.
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Paul L. Bollo, in support of the petition.

      Mark R. Carta, in opposition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 903 (AC 15381), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GABRIEL GONZALEZ
    Decided September 18, 1996

      Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 906 (AC 14245), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MELVIN CARL WASHINGTON
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 907 (AC 13665), is denied.

Decided September 18, 1996

Melvin Carl Washington, pro se, in support of the petition.

LeonF. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    ANTHONY NOVAK, TRUSTEE, ET AL. v. CHARLES SCALESSE

    Decided September 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15521.

      Traey Alan Saxe, in support of the petition.

      John R. McGrail and William C. Turney, in opposition.

       The plaintiffs’ appeal was withdrawn May 13, 1997.

   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 94 (AC 14670), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the verdict?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KENYA OMARI BROWN
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15542.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 40 Conn. App. 483 (AC 13431), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“What effect, if any, does a public defender’s unavailability to conduct a trial have on a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial?”

Decided October 1, 1996

Robert Sullivan, in support of the petition.

Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    TOWN OF SOUTH WINDSOR v. SOUTH WINDSOR POLICE UNION, LOCAL 1480, COUNCIL 15, AFSCME, AFL-CIO
    Decided October 1, 1996

      Harry B. Elliott, Jr., in support of the petition.

      David L. Metzger, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 649 (AC 14347), is denied.


text:
    BERNARD LAPUK v. ROBERT SIMONS ET AL.
    Decided October 1, 1996

      Lester Katz, in support of the petition.

      Daniel P. Scapellati, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 750 (AC 14371), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALAN M. NOKES
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 10 (AC 14355), is granted. It is further ordered that the matter be remanded to the Appellate Court for reconsideration in light of this court’s decision in State v. Gerardi, 237 Conn. 348 (1996).

Decided October 1, 1996

Stephen F. Cashman, in support of the petition.

Christopher T. Godialis, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    CITY OF STAMFORD ET AL. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.
    Decided October 1, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15531.

      Kenneth B. Povodator, assistant corporation counsel, in support of the petition.

      Victor R. Perpetua, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 39 (AC 15139), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff, the city of Stamford, failed to establish that the McGuigan report was exempt from disclosure under either General Statutes § 1-19 (b) (4) or General Statutes § l-19b (b) (1)?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARC PIEGER
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 460 (AC 13747), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court, in sentencing the defendant, could impose as part of the sentence or as a condition of probation the payment of a $2500 charitable ‘contribution’ to New Britain Hospital?”

Decided October 10, 1996

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15546.

Earle Giovanniello and Frank J. Riccio, in support of the petition.

Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GENT LEE DANIELS
    Decided October 10, 1996

      Mary Miller Haselkamp, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 445 (AC 14306), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GENT LEE DANIELS
    Decided October 10, 1996

      Mary Miller Haselkamp, assistant public defender, and James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The request by the Appellate Court panel for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 445 (AC 14306), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT L. GARRETT
   The request by the Appellate Court panel for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 507 (AC 14385), is denied.

Decided October 10, 1996

Kelly J. Goulet, deputy assistant public defender, and Ronald G. Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT L. GARRETT
    Decided October 10, 1996

      Kelly J. Goulet, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Ronald G. Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 507 (AC 14385), is denied.


text:
    FRANK LAWSON v. WHITEY’S FRAME SHOP DOROTHY CHAREST v. WHITEY’S FRAME SHOP
    Decided October 10, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15545.

      Michael D. O’Connell, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 599 (AC 14394/14833), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act by disposing of the plaintiffs’ automobiles?”


text:
    WATERBURY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMISSION ET AL.
    Decided October 10, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15543.

      Thomas G. Parisot, in support of the petition.

      William J. Dolan, in opposition.
   The petition by the defendants Marc S. Ryan, James B. Craig and the Waterbury Republican-American for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 700 (AC 14936), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the grievance hearings in this case did not constitute ‘meetings’ within the meaning of General Statutes § l-18a (b) because they constituted ‘strategy or negotiations’ within the meaning of the statute?”


text:
    WATERBURY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15544.
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 700 (AC 14938), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the grievance hearings in this case did not constitute ‘meetings’ within the meaning of General Statutes § l-18a (b) because they constituted ‘strategy or negotiations’ within the meaning of the same statute?”

Decided October 10, 1996

Joan M. Andrews, commission counsel, in support of the petition.

William J. Dolan, in opposition.


text:
    BRIAN J. FOLEY v. HUNTINGTON COMPANY ET AL.
    Decided October 10, 1996

      James T. Shearin and Dion W. Moore, in support of the petition.

      Louis R. Pepe and Thomas J. Rechen, in opposition.
   The petition by the defendants Southport Manor Convalescent Center, Inc., and Albert Garofalo for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 712 (AC 13331), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KENNETH J. JURGENSEN
    Decided October 10, 1996

      Reed D. Rubenstein and Daniel S. Blinn, in support of the petition.

      LeonF. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 751 (AC 13607), is denied.


text:
    PATRICIA B. CROSS v. PAUL HUDON, CONSERVATOR (ESTATE OF HELEN A. BENNY), ET AL.
    Decided October 17, 1996

      Vincent F. Sabatini, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 59 (AC 14730), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GREG STRICKLAND
    Decided October 17, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15550.

      Kent Drager, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Jack W. Fischer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 768 (AC 14593), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that neither the Practice Book nor the due process clause of the federal constitution provides a right of allocution during the revocation portion of a probation revocation proceeding?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SCOTT DAWKINS
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 810 (AC 13543), is denied.

Decided October 17, 1996

Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

John A. East III, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    DOUGLAS BROWN, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF GREGORY BROWN) v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF MILFORD ET AL.
    Decided October 17, 1996

      Penn Rhodeen, in support of the petition.

      Ronald D. Williams, Sr., Ronald D. Williams, Jr., and Michael C. Deakin, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 824 (AC 14310), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES D. TYSON III
    Decided October 17, 1996

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      LeonF. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 61 (AC 15283), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAYMOND MARQUIS
    Decided October 29, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15559.

      Matthew J. Collins, in support of the petition.

      James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 186 (AC 13373), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“May a trial court, in exercising its discretion under State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988), and General Statutes § 54-86g, take into account the fact that the state’s motion is supported by expert testimony and, therefore, order the child witness to be examined by the defendant’s expert?”


text:
    ALAN E. SILVER v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

    Decided October 29, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15560.

      Maureen A. Morgan, assistant bar counsel, in support of the petition.

      William F. Gallagher, in opposition.

      Superseded. See Silver v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 239 Conn. 948, 686 A.2d 125 (1996).

   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 229 (AC 15012), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that the plaintiff had no ethical duty under rules 1.15 (b) and 1.16 of the Rules of Professional Conduct to notify his client’s no-fault carrier of the settlement proceeds?”


text:
    DAVID MURPHY v. CHARLES A. BUONATO, JR., ET AL.
    Decided October 29, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15558.

      James A. Mulhall, Jr., in support of the petition.

      David G. Hill, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 239 (AC 14053), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the plaintiff was a ‘keeper’ under General Statutes § 22-327 and prohibited from recovering from the dog’s owner for injuries caused by the dog when the plaintiff was temporarily caring for the dog at the owner’s request?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALEXANDRO ROMERO
    Decided October 29, 1996

      Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 555 (AC 15437), is denied.


text:
    LESLIE SRAGER ET AL. v. KENNETH KOENIG
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 617 (AC 14859), is denied.

Decided October 29, 1996

John Timbers, in support of the petition.

Mami Smith Katz, in opposition.


text:
    LESLIE SRAGER ET AL. v. KENNETH KOENIG
    Decided October 29, 1996

      John Timbers, in support of the petition.

      Mami Smith Katz, in opposition.
   The petition of attorney John Timbers for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 617 (AC 14859), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SCOTT ELIJAH
    Decided October 29, 1996

      John R. Williams, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 687 (AC 14733), is denied.


text:
    IROQUOIS GAS TRANSMISSION SYSTEM ET AL. v. HENRY J. MILESKI
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 47 (AC 14448), is denied.

Decided October 29, 1996

Walter A. Flynn, Jr., in support of the petition.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. JOSEPH PACITTI ET AL.
    Decided October 29, 1996

      Robert T. Morrin, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.

      AnnM. Siczewicz and Patrick J. Fitzgerald, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 52 (AC 14471), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. NICHOLAS J. PANELLA, JR.
    Decided October 29, 1996

      G. Douglas Nash, public defender, in support of the petition.

      Carolyn K. Longstreth, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 76 (AC 14681), is denied.


text:
    RALPH ABED v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
   The petitioner Ralph Abed’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 176 (AC 14782), is denied.

Decided October 29, 1996

William Emmett Dwyer, in support of the petition.

Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, in opposition.


text:
    ALAN E. SILVER, P.C. v. HOWARD A. JACOBS ET AL.
    Decided October 29, 1996

      Marc P. Mercier, in support of the petition.

      Steven D. Ecker, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 184 (AC 14614), is denied.


text:
    CONNECTICUT NATURAL GAS CORPORATION ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER PROTECTION ET AL.
    Decided October 29, 1996

      John C. Yavis, Jr., and Everett E. Newton, in support of the petition.

      William M. Rubenstein, assistant attorney general, and Peter G. Boucher, in opposition.
   The petition of the plaintiffs Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation and Yankee Gas Service Company for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 196 (AC 15017), is denied.


text:
    MARTIN HEISE v. DONALD J. GRIGGS
    Decided November 7, 1996

      Stephen J. Sinatro, in support of the petition.

      Leslee B. Hitt, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 16177) is denied.


text:
    MIDDLETOWN COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ET AL. v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN ET AL.
    Decided November 7, 1996

      Dennis C. Cavanaugh and Robert M. Barrack, in support of the petition.

      Thomas W. Witherington, in opposition.
   The petition of the defendants city of Middletown and Middletown parking authority for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 426 (AC 14288), is denied.


text:
    DORIS BEACH v. REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER 13 ET AL.

      Robert P. Dutcher, in support of the petition. The Connecticut Trial Lawyers also filed a statement in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 542 (AC 14731), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal.

Decided November 7, 1996

Arthur J. Riccio, Jr., in opposition.


text:
    IN RE SONCHERAY H. ET AL.
    Decided November 7, 1996

      Sharon A. Peters, in support of the petition.

      Linda Pearce Prestley, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
   The respondent’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 664 (AC 15332), is denied.


text:
    STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL. STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.
    Decided November 7, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15565.

      Mitchell W. Pearlman, general counsel, and Victor Perpetua, appellate attorney, in support of the petition.
   The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 133 (AC 14410/14411), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that grievance arbitration proceedings before the state board of mediation and arbitration are not ‘meetings’ within the meaning of General Statutes § l-18a (b)?”


text:
    STACIA ROBERTO v. HONEYWELL, INC., ET AL.
    Decided November 7, 1996

      Paul W. Smith, in support of the petition.

      Andrew J. O’Keefe, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 161 (AC 14870), is denied.


text:
    PETER DISCUILLO v. STONE AND WEBSTER ET AL.

    Decided November 7, 1996

      Amy M. Stone, in support of the petition.

      Lucas D. Strunk, in opposition.

      Superseded. See Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 239 Conn. 953, 688 A.2d 325 (1996).

   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 224 (AC 14863), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JACOB CRUMP
    Decided November 7, 1996

      Richard Emanuel, assistant public defender, Gwen E. Murray and Kyong C. Yi, certified legal interns, in support of the petition.

      Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 252 (AC 14555), is denied.


text:
    ARTHUR FIELD v. JAMES M. KEARNS
    Decided November 7, 1996

      Michael W. Lyons, in support of the petition.

      Julie A. Harris, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 265 (AC 14689), is denied.


author: BERDON and KATZ, Js.,

text:
    GERTRUDE O. KEEGAN v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
    Decided November 7, 1996

      Robert F. Carter, in support of the petition.

      Richard S. Bartlett, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 803 (AC 14754), is denied.

BERDON and KATZ, Js.,

dissenting. We would grant the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    JEFFREY A. WALKER v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT
    Decided November 20, 1996

      Jeffrey A. Walker, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Susann E. Gill, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Jeffrey A. Walker’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 41 Conn. App. 914 (AC 15256), is denied.


text:
    DANIEL C. MACLEAN ET AL. v. TOWN OF DARIEN ET AL.
    Decided November 20, 1996

      Ridgely W. Brown, in support of the petition.

      Randolph T. Lovallo, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 169 (AC 13356), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL PIORKOWSKI
    Decided November 20, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15572.

      Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, and Joseph G. Bruckmann, public defender, in support of the petition.

      Judith Rossi, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 209 (AC 13537), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, the defendant’s waiver of counsel regarding his October 22, 1992 statement was not rendered invalid by the fact that the waiver was made without the presence of counsel?”


text:
    KAREN A. GRIMES v. CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF LITCHFIELD
   The petition of the intervening defendant, James B. Irwin, for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 227 (AC 14698), is granted, limited to the following issue:

Decided November 20, 1996

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15574.

Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., in support of the petition.

William C. Franklin, in opposition.

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff was deprived of due process of law by the conduct of the conservation commission regarding its September 14, 1993 site visit?”


text:
    KAREN A. GRIMES v. CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF LITCHFIELD
    Decided November 20, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15573.

      Gail E. McTaggart, in support of the petition.

      William C. Franklin, in opposition.
   The petition by the defendant for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 227 (AC 14698), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff was deprived of due process of law by the conduct of the conservation commission regarding its September 14, 1993 site visit?”


text:
    MARCELLA D. BORKOWSKI, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE OF ANTHONY BORKOWSKI), ET AL. v. CHANDRA SACHETI
    Decided November 20, 1996

      Andrew J. O'Keefe, in support of the petition.

      James H. Howard, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 294 (AC 14181), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KICKY KISER
    Decided November 20, 1996

      Jeremiah Donovan, in support of the petition.

      Peter A. McShane, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 339 (AC 15042), is denied.


text:
    WINSTON CLARKE v. COMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15575.
   The petitioner Winston Clarke’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 374 (AC 14760), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that a habeas corpus petitioner alleging his innocence must show that his claim of innocence is sustained by newly discovered evidence?”

Decided November 20, 1996

James A. Shanley, Jr., special public defender, in support of the petition.

Rita M. Shair, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    GUY OUTLAW v. CITY OF MERIDEN ET AL.
    Decided November 20, 1996

      Richard W. Gifford, in support of the petition.

      Megan J. Green, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 387 (AC 14794/14974), is denied.


text:
    ADRIAN GIRARD, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF SUSAN CONDON) v. JOSEPH WEIS
    Decided November 20, 1996

      Katherine C. Callahan and Karen C. Clark, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 397 (AC 14667), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN R. PLUMMER
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 901 (AC 15467), is denied.

Decided November 20, 1996

Dennis F. O’Toole, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Ronald G. Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    PEDRO LUIS TOSADO v. R. DOUGLAS RAMSEY ET AL.
    Decided November 20, 1996

      Pedro Luis Tosado, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Richard F. Jacobson, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Pedro Luis Tosado’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 903 (AC 15447), is denied.


text:
    RICHARD FANTASIA v. TONY PANTANA MASON CONTRACTORS ET AL.
    Decided December 4, 1996

      Charles J. Goddard, in support of the petition.

      David W. Schoolcraft, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 16088), is denied.


text:
    ANTHONY N. FRAULO ET AL. v. MARIO GABELLI MARIO GABELLI v. ANTHONY N. FRAULO ET AL.
   The petition by the plaintiffs Anthony N. Fraulo and CFC Greenwich Realty Corporation for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 708 (AC 12961), is denied.

Decided December 4, 1996

David P. Burke, in support of the petition.

Stuart M. Katz, in opposition.


text:
    ALAN E. SILVER v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
    Decided December 4, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15560.

      Maureen A. Horgan, assistant bar counsel, in support of the petition.

      William F. Gallagher, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 229 (AC 15012), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that the plaintiff had no ethical duty under rules 1.15 (b) and 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, to notify his client’s no-fault carrier of the settlement proceeds?”


text:
    MICHAEL MAFFUCCI v. ROYAL PARK LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ET AL.

      Superseded. See Maffucci v. Royal Park Limited Partnership, 240 Conn. 915, 692 A.2d 813 (1997).

   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 563 (AC 14586), is granted, limited to the following issues:

Decided December 4, 1996

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15577.

Brian T. Henebry and Barbara J. Sheedy, in support of the petition.

Joel M. Ellis, in opposition.

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record to create a material issue of fact as to whether the defendants had actual or constructive notice of prior trespassers?

“2. Is the rule of § 335 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding the duty of care owed a trespasser applicable to an electric utility whose operations are governed by § 16-11-102 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies?”


text:
    CHARLES S. CYBULSKI v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF ENFIELD ET AL.
    Decided December 4, 1996

      James W. Sherman, in support of the petition.

      Timothy S. Hollister, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 105 (AC 13704), is denied.


text:
    669 ATLANTIC STREET ASSOCIATES v. ATLANTIC-ROCKLAND STAMFORD ASSOCIATES
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 113 (AC 14928), is denied.

Decided December 4, 1996

James R. Fogarty and Stephanie Budlong Paul, in support of the petition.

Katherine C. Callahan, Kevin N. Reynolds and Robert R. Simpson, in opposition.


text:
    669 ATLANTIC STREET ASSOCIATES v. ATLANTIC-ROCKLAND STAMFORD ASSOCIATES
    Decided December 4, 1996

      Katherine C. Callahan and Kevin N. Reynolds, in support of the petition.

      James R. Fogarty and Stephanie Budlong Paul, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 113 (AC 14928), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIE GARVIN
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15578.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 142 (AC 15092), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the defendant’s conviction for two counts of failure to appear arising from a single act did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy?

“2. Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the defendant’s due process rights were not violated by the enforcement of an illusory plea agreement with the sentencing court?”

Decided December 4, 1996

Donald D. Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

Paul J. Ferencek, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    NICHOLAS R. DINAPOLI, JR., TRUSTEE, ET AL. v. JOHN P. COOKE ET AL.
    Decided December 4, 1996

      Paul L. Bollo, in support of the petition.
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 419 (AC 14290), is denied.


text:
    NICHOLAS R. DINAPOLI, JR., TRUSTEE, ET AL. v. JOHN P. COOKE ET AL.
    Decided December 4, 1996

      Thomas W. Beecher, in support of the petition.

      Paul L. Bollo, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs’ cross petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 419 (AC 14290), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROY GUBITOSI, JR.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 448 (AC 14690), is denied.

Decided December 4, 1996

Catherine E. Teitell, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Ronald G. Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN J. MARTINELLI, JR.
    Decided December 4, 1996

      John R. Williams, in support of the petition.

      Rita M. Shair, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 901 (AC 14855), is denied.


text:
    JOSEPH T. VALECHKO v. CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY ET AL.
    Decided December 4, 1996

      Yinixia Long, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.

      David C. Davis, in opposition.
   The petition by the defendant second injury fund for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 902 (AC 15512), is denied.


text:
    LEONARD UDOLF v. HENRY E. JACOBS
    Decided December 4, 1996

      Joel M. Ellis, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 906 (AC 14418), is denied.


text:
    PETER DISCUILLO v. STONE AND WEBSTER ET AL.
    Decided December 16, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15581.

      Amy M. Stone, in support of the petition.

      Lucas D. Strunk, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 224 (AC 14863), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“When does the statute of limitations begin to run in a workers’ compensation case in which the plaintiff suffers a work-related heart attack but does not learn that the heart attack is work-related until two years thereafter?”


text:
    ANDREW LIPKO v. ESTATE OF ANDREW LIPKO, SR., ET AL.
    Decided December 18, 1996

      Andrew Lipko, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Christine M. Gonillo, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 15898), is denied.


text:
    GTT CORPORATION, TRUSTEE v. LISE-LOTTE KNUDSEN
    Decided December 18, 1996

      Lise-Lotte Knudsen, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Craig S. Taschner, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 16252), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JONATHAN WILD
    Decided December 18, 1996

      Richard T. Miller, in support of the petition.

      Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 458 (AC 15093), is denied.


text:
    RICHARD POWERS ET AL. v. RUDOLPH FARRICELLI ET AL.
    Decided December 18, 1996

      Richard M. Franchi, in support of the petition.

      Terrence J. Molinari, in opposition.
   The named plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 475 (AC 14834), is denied.


text:
    JEFFREY D. FISI ET AL. v. HOLLY B. CYR ET AL.
    Decided December 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15583.

      Martin M. Rutchik, in support of the petition.

      Richard D. Haviland, in opposition.
   The named plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 911 (AC 14913), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“In the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the verdict based upon allegedly improper communications made by court personnel to the jury during its deliberations?”


text:
    ROHAN RUDDOCK ET AL. v. DONNETTE BURROWES ET AL.
    Decided December 18, 1996
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15584.

      Henry D. Marcus, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 913 (AC 15619), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the prior dismissal of the plaintiffs claim did not bring this action within the provisions of the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592?”


text:
    LINDA L. NAIMI ET AL. v. R. DAVID STAMM

    Decided January 8, 1997
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15592.

      Carolyn K. Querijero, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.

      Daniel S. Fabricant, in opposition.

       The appeal was withdrawn July 21, 1997.

   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 16151) is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the denial of a motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity is immediately appealable under the second prong of State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30 (1983)?”


text:
    ROBIN ZAKIA ELLIOTT v. JANET SICILLIA ROBIN ZAKIA ELLIOTT v. RICHARD WHEELER ET AL.
    Decided January 8, 1997

      Robin Zakia Elliott, pro se, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court is dismissed.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HECTOR SILVA
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 488 (AC 13935), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal.

Decided January 8, 1997

Susan F. Filan, special public defender, in support of the petition.

Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.


text:
    BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF HARTFORD v. LOCAL 566, COUNCIL 4, AFSCME
    Decided January 8, 1997

      Jason W. Cohen, in support of the petition.

      Ann F. Bird, assistant corporation counsel, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 499 (AC 15154), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL MARSALA
    Decided January 8, 1997

      Susan Brown, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Christopher T. Godialis, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 527 (AC 14952), is denied.


text:
    RONNIE HINTON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    Decided January 8, 1997

      Michael A. Fitzpatrick, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Paul J. Ferencek, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The petitioner Ronnie Hinton’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 549 (AC 15241), is denied.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. I would grant the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal.


text:
    WENDELL STOVALL v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    Decided January 8, 1997

      Max F. Brunswick, in support of the petition.
   The petitioner Wendell Stovall’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 552 (AC 14607), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY CARTER
   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 555 (AC 14993), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the Appellate Court, under the circumstances of this case, improperly concluded that the defendant’s guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily?”

Decided January 8, 1997

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15593.

Denise B. Smoker, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, in opposition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES LASKY
    Decided January 8, 1997

      Norman A. Pattis, in support of the petition.

      LeonF. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 619 (AC 14873), is denied.


text:
    TOWN OF HAMDEN ET AL. v. CHARLES FLANAGAN ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 15591.
   The petition by the defendants Warren Edward Blake and Phyllis M. Blake, executrix, for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 904 (AC 15104), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the trial court abuse its discretion and equitable powers by approving the committee sale in this foreclosure action of thirty-nine acres of property for the sum of $50,000, the value of which was appraised at $280,000?”

Decided January 8, 1997

Gordon R. Raynor, in support of the petition.

John J. Graubard, in opposition.


text:
    ROBERT FROMER ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ET AL.
    Decided January 8, 1997

      Robert Fromer, pro se, in support of the petition.

      William J. Prensky, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 915 (AC 15245), is denied.


author: Waite, C. J.

text:
    Harrison vs. Wyse and others.
    A mortgagee, who takes possession, and receives the rents and profits, of the mortgage premises, is bound to apply the net proceeds thereof to the reduction of his debt.
    Where a prior mortgagee, who had entered into possession, and received the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises, afterward purchased the equity of redemption therein; held, that he did not by such purchase, so far as the subsequent mortgagee was concerned, change his position or accountability for the rents and profits received after the time of such purchase, but was to be considered as continuing in possession in the same manner as when his occupancy commenced.
    This was a bill in chancery, brought, by the plaintiff as the assignee of a mortgage, against the défendants, as holders of prior mortgages and the equity of redemption, praying for a decree, allowing the plaintiff to redeem the prior mortgages, and foreclosing the defendants of their right of redemption.
    The case was referred to a committee, whose report embraced the following facts.

      On the first day of January, 1840, Jacob F. Huber mortgaged the premises to D. Allen & Son, to secure the payment of a note of that date, for the sum of $241.44, -which note and mortgage, on the 29th day of January, 1853, were 'assigned to the plaintiff.
    The premises, at the time of giving that mortgage, were subject to three prior mortgages, hólden by the defendants, amounting, at the time of making the report, to the sum of $1,478.99. On the first day of April, 1844, the defendants, as holders of these mortgages, entered into possession of the premises, and have ever since continued to receive the rents and profits ; the net proceeds of which, at the time of the conveyance to them of the equity of redemption, amounted to $71.31,.and, at the time of maldng the report, to the sum df. $647.
    The question how far, upon these facts, the rents and profits, received by the defendants, were to be applied in part payment of their debts, was reserved for the advice of this court.

      Tyler and Whittlesey, for Harrison.
    The only question, in the present case, is,' as to the terms on which the plaintiff shall be allowed to redeem the mortgaged premises.
    1. If a mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged premises, and receives the rents and profits to his own use, the principle is well settled as between him and the mortgagor, that he is bound to account, by applying the avails of the income thus received, after deducting the necessary expenditures, to the reduction of his debt, secured by the mortgage, as he can never receive more than his principal and interest. Gordon v. Lewis & al., 2 Sum. R., 155. 3 Powel on mortgages, Coventry & Rand’s edit., p. 949, note E. 2. 4 Kent Com., 58. Gubbins v. Creed, 2 Sch. & Lefr., 218. There can be no equitable reason given why the mortgagor should not be accountable to a subsequent mortgagee ; there are no greater equitable rights subsisting between a mortgagor, and mortgagee in possession, than there is between a prior mortgagee in possession, and a subsequent mortgagee. 1 U. S. Dig., 1850, p. 327. A mortgagee, in possession personally, is chargeable with a reasonable rent, and a subsequent mortgagee is entitled to the aid of a court of equity in having such rent ascertained and applied in reduction of the prior mortgage. Moore v. Degraw, 1 Halst. Ch. R., (New Jersey,) 346.
    2. The reason that a mortgagor, in possession, is not bound to account to the first mortgagee,' does not apply to the second mortgagee. The first mortgagee has a prior right to the possession by virtue of his superior title, and if the second' mortgagee is prevented, by the previous entry and actual occupation of the first mortgagee, the first mortgagee must account to the second mortgagee for the rents and profits. 1 Hilliard on mortgages, 301. Charles v. Dunbar, 4. Met., 502.
    3. That a prior mortgagee, in possession, is bound to account in favor of the second mortgagee for the rents and profits, is a necessary inference from the repeated decisions of the equity rule, established as the law of Massachusetts. Gibson v. Crehore, 5 Pick. R., 145. Charles v. Dunbar, 4 Met., 498. 7 Law Reporter, p. 22. Newall and others v. Wright, 7 Mass. R., 138. The case of Baldwin v. Norton, 2 Conn. R., 161, impliedly, at least, requires the first mortgagee to account to the second.
    If a prior mortgagee, in possession, is not accountable to the second mortgagee, the effect is to prevent the mortgaged estate from being applied to the payment of the debts, for which it was intended it should be. The second mortgagee might be deprived of his whole security, when the estate is not full security for the plaintiff’s debt. The defendants suffer no injury, or wrong, by compelling them to account to the plaintiff for the rents and profits, found by the committee to have been received by them to their own use, while in the actual possession of the property, after deducting from the same the expenditures. The condition of their deed would then be fulfilled by the payment of their entire debt and interest, and they are entitled to nothing more.
    4. If the defendant’s mortgage has been satisfied, the plaintiff, as second mortgagee, has- the right to claim of the defendants, the rents and profits, which have not been accounted for to the mortgagor, to apply in extinguishment of his own mortgage. 1 Hilliard on Mortgages, 300, 301. Parker v. Calcraft, 6 Madd. R., 11, 12.
    It is said that the defendants, having purchased the equity of redemption, are not accountable for the rents and profits to the plaintiff, as second mortgagee, for the reason, that they have acquired all the mortgagor’s right in the estate.
    But they acquired, by the purchase, nothing more than the right of redeeming the property from the incumbrance of the plaintiff’s mortgage. The mortgagor had nothing more to convey, and it is to be presumed that they paid only what the property was worth, over and above the incumbrances.
    5. The reason, assigned by the defendants, why they should not account to the plaintiff, might apply with force as between a mortgagee and mortgagor, but not as between the first and second mortgagees. The case of a first and second mortgagee is distinguished from the case of a mortgagor and mortgagee in an important particular. The first mortgagee, who has the equity of redemption, holds, as against the mortgagor, both the legal and equitable title to the property, and may perhaps be deemed the owner, as regards the mortgagor ; but not as against the second mortgagee, whose intervening mortgage must be extinguished before he can be regarded as the owner of the property: for he holds the equity subject to the mortgage of the second mortgagee. The defendants are not required to account as owners of the property, but as mortgagees in possession. The intervening mortgage of the plaintiff, prevented a union of the defendants’ legal and equitable title ; there was no merger of the two titles. 3 Pick. R., 475. The second mortgagee is privy, in estate, with the first mortgagee, and by force of his interest in the estate, has the right to claim that the rents and profits received, by the first mortgagee, should be applied in satisfaction of his. debt.
    6. The defendants did not enter and take possession of the property, as purchasers of the equity of redemption; they took possession under their mortgage, and by virtue of that alone, they received the rents and profits ; they held and continued in possession, as mortgagees, and not as the owners of the property, and are bound to apply the use of the property to the extinguishment of the mortgage, under which they held possession. Having occupied the premises as mortgagees, they are presumed to have received the rents and profits under their title as mortgagees, and must account for them accordingly. Gordon v. Lewis & al., 2 Sumn. R., 143, 146. Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. R., 258, 259.

      Palmer and Spencer, for the defendants.
    The defendants are not liable to account for the rents and profits after they purchased the equity of redemption, because,
    1. The rents and profits are exclusively the property of the owner of the equity of redemption. In the hands of a mortgagee, in possession, they are payments on the mortgage debt, precisely like any other payments ; and a subsequent mortgagee has simply the right to claim that they shall be so considered. If the mortgagee in possession purchases the equity of redemption, from that time they belong to him. They are as much his estate, by virtue of the purchase, as the right to redeem. There is no case where one mortgagee is made to account to another mortgagee.
    The defendants ought not to stand in any worse position than a third person, who might have purchased the equity, who would clearly not be liable to account.
    2. In equity, the owner of the equity of redemption is regarded as the real owner of the property. The first mortgagee, having purchased the equity, has united in one person both the legal and equitable title. The second mortgagee has a mere equitable lien. If the owner of the equity is not liable to account to the first mortgagee, even though he has the record-title in fee, a fortiori, he ought not to be so liable to the second mortgagee. There is no case where the owner of the land is required to account to one who has a mere lien. Such liability is inconsistent with the very nature of ownership. The reason why a mortgagor, in possession, is not required to account, is that the mortgagee ought to take the legal remedy to get possession himself. 2 Sw. Dig., 211. But this reason applies as well to the second mortgagee as to the first. All he has to do is to redeem the first mortgagee, and then he will be the first mortgagee.
    3. To hold the defendants liable to account to the plaintiff, is to hold that they are bound to manage the property for the benefit of the plaintiff. But this is inconsistent with the rights of an owner, who is at liberty to manage as he pleases. As owner, the defendants, like any other owner, may occupy the property themselves, may lease it, or may let it go unoccupied. They may give away the use of it if they please. They are not liable for waste. They are not bound to exercise their judgment, or their diligence, for the benefit of one who has a mere lien.
    4. There is no privity between the first and second mortgagees. The mortgagor still remains primarily liable to the second mortgagee. Non constat that he will not pay the debt. Why should the purchaser of the equity of redemption keep an account of the rents and profits of his own land, for the benefit of a third party who very likely may get his debt from the mortgagor ? The first mortgagee, buying the equity of redemption, may, if he sees fit, keep his two titles distinct, and afterward sell the equity, subject to both mortgages. In this case, his purchaser would not be liable to account, nor would the seller be liable to account for the money he received for it.

      5. The purchase of the equity of redemption by the defendants, though it may have extinguished the mortgage debt, as against the mortgagor, did not have that effect against the second mortgagee. Baldwin v. Norton, 2 Conn. R., 161. And the debt, being thus kept alive, continues with all its incidents, one of which is the accumulation of interest; the debt, in this case, consisting of notes drawing interest, and the interest being as much a part of the debt as the principal.
   Waite, C. J.

The principles, relating to the accountability for the rents and profits of mortgaged premises, are well settled. The only difficulty, in the present case, is, as to their application. If the mortgagor is suffered to remain-in possession, he is not accountable for them to any one. He is considered, in equity, as the owner of the property, and the mortgagee as having but a lien, for the security of his debt. If the latter wishes to appropriate them to his own use, he must, in the first place, obtain the possession of the property. Until that is done, he has no claim to the income.

On the other hand, if the mortgagee takes possession, and receives the rents and profits, he becomes accountable for them, and is bound to apply the net proceeds, in reduction of his debt. As soon as they are received, equity makes the application, and they have the same effect, as any payment made by the mortgagor.

When the latter applies to redeem, he is required to pay no more than the balance of his debt, remaining due after the application of all payments made by him, and the net proceeds of all rents and profit, received by the mortgagee, while in possession.

Whenever a second mortgagee applies to redeem a prior mortgage, he stands in the same situation as the mortgagor; is entitled to the benefit of all payments made by him, and all rents received by the prior mortgagee, and is bound to pay no greater sum, than the mortgagor would, upon an application made by him.

In this case, the defendants held the prior mortgages, and under them, entered and took possession of the premises, and thereupon became accountable for the rents and profits, in any suit, brought either by the mortgagor, or the subsequent mortgagee, for fhe redemption of their mortgages. And this is admitted by their counsel, at least so far as the mortgagor is concerned.

But after they had thus taken possession, they purchased the equity of redemption, and thus, in equity, became the owners of the whole property, subject only to the mortgage now holden by the plaintiff. They now claim that, from the time of such purchase, they stand in the situation of the mortgagor, and became no longer accountable for the rents and profits.

This question becomes important only in one event. The defendants, uppn the present application, are put to their election, either to pay the plaintiff’s debt, and take the property to themselves, or submit to be foreclosed of their equity of redemption, and permit the plaintiff to take the property upon payment of their debts secured by the prior mortgages.

In the former case, it is perfectly immaterial, whether they received the rents as mortgagees, or as assignees of the equity of redemption. In either case, they take the property upon the payment of the plaintiff’s debt.

But, on the other hand, if they elect to be foreclosed of their right to redeem, and permit the plaintiffs to redeem their 'mortgages, and take the property,' the inquiry becomes material, for the purpose of determining the amount which the plaintiff is required to pay, or in other words, the amount of their debts remaining unsatisfied.

As the defendants entered into possession of the property, in their character of mortgagees, received the rents and profits as such, and thereby became bound to apply them in part satisfaction of their debts, we are inclined to think, that, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, they have not changed their position or accountability, by the mere act of purchasing the equity of redemption, but are to be considered as continuing in possession, in the same manner as when their occupancy commenced, and, of course, as accountable for all the rents and profits by them received. Our advice therefore is, that the decree be made, in conformity with the opinion here expressed.

In this opinion the other Judges Storrs and Hinman concurred.

Decree accordingly.


author: Hinman, J.

text:
    The Maritime Bank of Bangor vs. Richard Rand & Son.
    A writ against “ R. P., doing business under the name and firm of R. R. & Son,” is not a writ against a copartnership, but against R. P. only, and can not be amended by inserting the names of A and B and C as copartners with R. P.
    This was an action on a bill of exchange.
    On the 7th day of December, 1854, the Maritime Bank of Bangor prayed out a writ of attachment against Robert P. Rand, doing business under the name and firm of “ Richard Rand & Son.” Said writ was served by the attachment of real and personal estate, and by leaving a copy with Robert P. Rand. At the term of the superior court for the county of Middlesex, holden in March, 1855, to which the writ was duly returned, the plaintiffs moved to amend said writ, alleging in their motion, that, “ having been informed since the bringing of the suit, that besides Robert P. Rand, who was served with the process .thereon, Sarah W. Rand, Rebecca G. Rand, and George Rand, of Middletown, Richard M. Rand, of Waterbmy, and Charles S. Rand, now or lately of' said Middletown, were at the time of the making of the several promises declared on by the plaintiff, secret, or dormant partners in the firm of Richard Rand & Son, and liable as such in said suit, they moved, in pursuance of the statute, in such ease provided, within the first three days of the present term of the court, to which said suit was brought, to amend their writ, by inserting the names of the said several persons, as parties defendant in said suit.”
    This amendment, being objected to by the defendant, the question of its allowance was reserved for the advice of this court.

      Baldwin and Cowdry, in support of the .motion.
    1. It being assumed, for the purpose of this motion, that the persons, whose names are proposed to be added, were in fact dormant partners of the firm of Richard Rand & Son, it was not necessary that their names should have been inserted in the writ, in order to constitute a valid attachment of the property under his control. Dormant, or secret partners, need never be made a party to the suit, either plaintiff or defendant, because they are supposed to be unknown to the dealers with the firm.
    They may be made parties, because, though unknown, they share in the profits, and therefore may justly be made liable, when discovered, to the responsibilities of the firm.
    The present suit was, of necessity, instituted against “ Robert P. Rand, doing business under the name and firm of Richard Rand & Son.” Had the suit been in form against “ Richard Rand & Son,” Richard Rand being dead, and service made only upon the son, it would have been in effect the same. The suit is commenced by the service, and of course, only against those upon whom the service is made. In either case, the property of the concern, under the control of the party using the name, and served with the process, would have been duly attached, and holden to respond to the judgment they may recover, whether the amendment be made or not.
    2. It is objected, by the defendant’s counsel, that the suit was .not “ brought against a copartnership, by the copartnership name alone,” within the meaning of the statute, but against “ Robert P. Rand, doing business under the name and firm of Richard Rand & Son,” and therefore that the amendment is not allowable.
    The plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim that the amendment is clearly within the spirit and equity of the statutes of amendments, as well as the general statute. Rev. Stat., p. 85. Act of 1837, pp. 66, 77.
    The action, as originally brought, was substantially an action against • all, whose interests were represented by the name of “ Richard Rand & Son,” whose property was attached, though service was made only on the ostensible and acting partner,' the others participating in the profits as dormant partners, being then unknown to the plaintiffs.
    The amendment is only important to hold them individually as partners, as well as jointly by their property.
    It is no more the introduction of a new party, than if the writ had commanded the officer to attach the goods, or estate, of “ Richard Rand & Son, of which firm Robert P. Rand is a member, and manager of its business,” and service made as in the present case. The Phelps Manufacturing Co. v. Steiger Enz & Co., 19 Conn. R., 58.
    In the case reported, 19 Conn. R., 58, the company name was erroneously given as above. The writ was served on Enz alone; and as a suit is commenced by the service of the writ, it was then, in strictness, a suit against Enz alone; as much so, as this suit can be regarded as a suit against Robert P. Rand alone.
    The act of 1737, (Stat., p. 77,) sec. 78, contemplates a case where the writ is against one or more persons, under a partnership name, which in fact includes persons unknown to the plaintiff.
    An amendment, inserting the names of dormant partners, can not injure the party served with the original process. The recovery will be against such of the defendants as are proved to be partners. Nor can the introduction of their names be justly complained of by the secret or dormantpartners, who have rendered it necessary, by withholding their names from the knowledge of the public, and from the plaintiff, while sharing, with the managing partner, the profits of the concern. They have all shared in the benefit of the plaintiff’s money, for which the acceptance of Richard Rand & Son was given.
    3. Independently of the statute of 1837, it is competent to the court, as was clearly intimated in the opinion given, 19 Conn. R., 59, to accomplish the same object, in analogous cases, by rule of court. The court has power, by express statute provision, “ to make such rules of practice, as shall be deemed most conducive to the administration of justice.”
    The motion, in the present case, is believed to be within the equity of this provision, as well as within that of the statutes of amendment.

      Tyler and Spencer, contra.
    1. The proposed amendment is inadmissible, because it introduces new parties. The object of the statute, authorizing amendments by inserting the names of partners, (stat. 1854, tit. 1, ch. 4, § 51,) is not to enable the plaintiff to bring in new defendants, but only to particularize those who had already been sued, under the general name of the firm. To authorize such amendment, a copartnership must be sued; it must be sued as a copartnership, and so sued that, if there is, in fact, a copartnership, the interest of all the partners in the partnership property may lawfully be attached.
    But, in this case, the suit was not brought against a co-partnership, either expressly or impliedly. It is against “ Robert P. Rand, doing business under the name and firm of Richard Rand & Son.” These words expressly exclude every one except the individual Robert P. Rand. The officer is directed to attach his property, and summon him to appear, and under it, if there was actually such a partnership as is now claimed, the interest of the other co-partners in the partnership property could not have been touched by the attachment.
    2. The plaintiffs, at the time of bringing the suit, did not intend to sue a copartnership.
    In the motion to amend, the plaintiffs say that since the bringing of the suit, they have been informed that the other persons were secret or dormant partners. Having therefore intended to sue, and having in fact sued, an individual, they can not, upon subsequent information, be permitted to call their suit, a suit against a copartnership, in order to get the benefit of this amendment.
   Hinman, J.

The plaintiffs, in the superior court, within the first three days of the term to which their writ was returned, having been informed, since the commencement of their suit, that, besides the defendant, who was served with the process, Sarah W. Rand, Rebecca G. Rand, and George Rand, of Middletown, Richard M. Rand, of Waterbury, and Charles S. Rand, late of said Middletown, were, at the time of the making of the promises declared on by the plaintiffs, secret, or dormant, partners with the defendant, and liable, as such, in this suit, moved to amend their writ by inserting therein the names of these persons as parties defendant in the suit; and whether this motion should be allowed was reserved for the advice of this court.

In the case of Peck v. Sill, 3 Conn. R., 157, it was decided that the statute of amendments did not authorize an alteration which varies the ground of action, and introduces a new party on the record; and that a writ could not be amended by erasing the name of one of the defendants. The statute, under which this decision was made, was the same in substance as our present statute, ed. 1854, p. 85, § 102; and the reason of the decision was, that such an amendment changes the ground of the action, by changing the parties, which is contrary to the express words of the statute. A debt, due from two or more, has no identity with a debt due from one, for the reason that the parties are different.

Can, then, this amendment be allowed, under the act of 1837, in relation to suits for, or against, a copartnership ? Stat. p. 66, § 51. Courts, in modern times, are very liberal in regard to amendments, but we think this application does not come within the letter or spirit of this act. This was never a suit against a copartnership, and was not intended as such. It is simply a suit against Robert P. Rand. The fact, that he is described as doing business under the name and firm of Richard Rand & Son, makes no difference. The officer was directed to summon Robert P. Rand alone, and there is no intimation that any one is in partnership with him. Where a copartnership is sued by its company name, and the names of the members of it are afterward inserted in .the writ, there is no change of parties. Before this is done, the members are all represented and included in the company name, and adding their individual names, is only pointing them out more specifically. But this application is to change a suit against one to a suit against several. This can no more be done under the act of 1837, than it could be under the statute as it existed when the decision of Peck v. Sill was made. We therefore advise the superior court to disallow the motion.

In this opinion the other Judges Waite and Storrs concurred.

Motion disallowed.