author: BORDEN, J. VERTEFEUILLE, J., with whom SULLIVAN, J., joins,

text:
    LEVEY MILLER MARETZ v. 595 CORPORATE CIRCLE ET AL.
    (SC 16304)
    Borden, Norcott, Katz, Sullivan and Vertefeuille, Js.

    Argued January 11
    officially released September 18, 2001

      Edwin L. Doemberger, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      James C. Graham, for the appellees (defendants).

      The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

   Opinion

BORDEN, J.

The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether, under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 20-325a (b) (5), a listing agreement for real property owned by a partnership that is signed by all of the general partners as agents of the partnership is rendered unenforceable because the partners were not “authorized to act on behalf of the [partnership] ... by a written document executed in the manner provided for conveyances in [General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) §] 47-5 ... .” 3Following our grant of certification to appeal, the plaintiff, Levey Miller Maretz, appealed from the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the trial court’s summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, 595 Corporate Circle, a Connecticut general partnership, and Charles E. Weber, Jr., and Alfred J. Secondino, Jr., its general partners. Levey Miller Maretz v. 595 Corporate Circle, 56 Conn. App. 815, 825, 746 A.2d 803 (2000). We conclude that § 20-325a (b) (5) does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The plaintiff, a licensed real estate brokerage firm, brought this action against the defendants for breach of a listing agreement regarding the sale or lease of certain real property located in Branford. The defendants answered the complaint and raised six special defenses, three of which claimed that the listing agreement did not comply with § 20-325a. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. This appeal followed.

The following facts are undisputed. The property involved is owned by 595 Corporate Circle, whose only general partners are Weber and Secondino. Id., 816. On April 23, 1991, the plaintiff entered into the listing agreement to sell or lease the property. Id., 817. The listing agreement: (1) identified “595 Corporate Circle” as the “[owner] of the property”; (2) identified the plaintiff as the exclusive agent to sell or lease the property; (3) referred to a certain exclusion contained in an attached letter “to Charles E. Weber, Jr., Partner”; (4) was signed by the plaintiff; and (5) was signed by Weber and Secondino on separate lines under each of which was the legend, “OWNER’S signature . . . .”

The Appellate Court first noted that, under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 34-46 (3), the property, which was owned “ ‘in the partnership name,’ ” could “ ‘be conveyed only in the partnership name.’ ” Id., 819. The court stated: “The listing agreement does not reflect that anyone signed it on behalf of 595 Corporate Circle. Although the general partners signed the listing agreement, they could do so only as agents because they were not the owners of the property interest. Accordingly, for the listing agreement to be enforceable, it must be signed by ‘an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner only by a written document executed in the manner provided for conveyances in section 47-5 . . . .’ General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 20-325a (b) (5). The listing agreement does not reflect any authorization for Weber and Secondino to sign as agents for 595 Corporate Circle. Furthermore, it is undisputed that there is no document witnessed and acknowledged pursuant to § 47-5 authorizing Weber or Secondino to enter into the agreement on behalf of 595 Corporate Circle.” Levey Miller Maretz v. 595 Corporate Circle, supra, 56 Conn. App. 819-20. The Appellate Court therefore held “that the listing agreement [was] unenforceable because it was not in strict compliance with § 20-325a (b).” Id., 820.

The Appellate Court also reasoned that, “unless the general partners were authorized in accordance with § 20-325a (b) and § 47-5 to execute the [listing] agreement on behalf of 595 Corporate Circle, the strict provisions of § 20-325a (b) were not met, and the partnership was not bound by the agreement.” Id., 822. The court “conclude[d] that the listing agreement in this case was signed by the general partners in their individual capacities] and not on behalf of 595 Corporate Circle.” Id. Therefore, the court determined that because the agreement was not signed by the owner of the property, “the listing agreement was unenforceable under § 20-325a (b) . . . .” Id.

Thus, there were two related strands to the reasoning of the Appellate Court. First, it reasoned that, because Weber and Secondino could sign only as agents of the partnership, their signatures were ineffective to bind the owner of the property because: (1) the listing agreement did “not reflect any authorization for Weber and Seeondino to sign as agents for 595 Corporate Circle”; and (2) there was “no document witnessed and acknowledged pursuant to § 47-5 authorizing Weber or Seeondino to enter into the agreement on behalf of 595 Coiporate Circle.” Id., 820. Second, it reasoned that because the general partners were not authorized to sign the agreement by such a deed-like document, “the listing agreement in this case was signed by the general partners in their individual capacities] . . . .” Id., 822.

The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the listing agreement in the present case was unenforceable under § 20-325a (b) (5) because the agency authority of Weber and Seeondino was not evidenced by a deed-like document, as required by §§ 20-325a (b) (5) and 47-5. The defendants claim, to the contrary, that, under § 20-325a (b) (5), unless the signatures of Weber and Seeondino were authorized by such a document—which they admittedly were not— their signatures were ineffective to constitute compliance with § 20-325a. We agree with the plaintiff.

We first address a subsidiary issue that, although not raised by the defendants in their response to the plaintiffs arguments before this court, was nonetheless injected into the case by the reasoning of the Appellate Court, namely, the conclusion of that court that “the listing agreement in this case was signed by the general partners in their individual capacities] . . . .’’Id. We address this issue because it undermines the factual predicate of the first certified issue in the case, namely: “Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that a real estate listing agreement was unenforceable under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 20-325a on the ground that the signatures of the general partners of the partnership ownership of the property were not acknowledged and witnessed?” Levey Miller Maretz v. 595 Corporate Circle, 253 Conn. 906, 753 A.2d 940 (2000).

The record conclusively demonstrates that, contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Court, Weber and Secondino signed the listing agreement, not as individuals, but as agents of the owner of the property, namely, the partnership of which they were the sole general partners. First, the listing agreement itself cannot rationally be viewed any other way. The very first paragraph of the listing agreement provides: “595 CORPORATE CIRCLE, [owner] of the property located at 595 East Main Street in Branford, Connecticut hereby appoints LEVEY MILLER MARETZ, REALTORS exclusive agent and grants AGENT the sole and exclusive right to SELL the property known as ORCHARD HILLS PLAZA.” (Emphasis added.) On the first page of the listing agreement the word “OWNER” appears four more times, each time obviously referring to the entity previously referred to as 595 Corporate Circle. Furthermore, on that first page the following paragraph appears: “Exclusions: The only exclusions are listed on the attached addendum which is a letter dated March 18, 1991 from First Whitney, Inc. to Charles E. Weber, Jr., Partner.” (Emphasis added.) The attached addendum, which also is part of the record in this case, is a letter from a prior listing agent, dated March 18, 1991, regarding “595 Corporate Circle,” addressed to “Mr. Charles E. Weber, Jr., Partnerreferring to “the listing between 595 Corporate Circle as owner and First Whitney Realty as broker . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Finally, in the listing agreement, underneath the signatures of both Weber and Secondino is the following legend: “OWNER’S signature.” Indeed, because the documents specifically and repeatedly identify 595 Corporate Circle as the owner, it would have been nonsensical for them as individuals to be listing property for sale that they did not own as individuals. Thus, the only rational inference is that they were doing so as partners of the partnership that owned the property.

Second, this record makes clear that, throughout the case, the defendants repeatedly and emphatically have asserted that to be the case. In their summary judgment papers in the trial court, the defendants stated: “Since one purpose, if not the only purpose, of the 595 Partnership was ownership and development of the Property, Messrs. Weber and Secondino were, necessarily, acting in their capacities as agents of595 Partnership when they signed the Agreement.” (Emphasis in original.) Also, in their brief in this court, they have repeated that assertion essentially verbatim, even with much of the same italicization. Indeed, it is precisely this factual matrix—that Weber and Secondino were acting as agents of the partnership that was the owner of the property—that: is the basis of the defendants’ legal claim that such an agency is required by § 20-325a (b) (5) to be evidenced by a deed-like document.

Thus, legally, Weber and Secondino could not be personally liable on the listing agreement, and only 595 Corporate Circle could be liable, because they were acting as agents for a disclosed principal. Rich-Taubman Associates v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 236 Conn. 613, 619, 674 A.2d 805 (1996) (agent not liable if principal disclosed); 2 Restatement (Second), Agency § 320 (1958) (“[ujnless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract”).

We turn, therefore, to the merits of the first certified question: “Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that a real estate listing agreement was unenforceable under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 20-325a on the ground that the signatures of the general partners of the partnership ownership of the property were not acknowledged and witnessed?” Levey Miller Maretz v. 595 Corporate Circle, supra, 253 Conn. 906. We conclude that where, as in the present case, the owner of the property is an entity that can act only through its agents, the requirement of § 20-325a (b) (5) that an agent signatory to a listing agreement be “authorized to act on behalf of the owner only by a written document executed in the manner provided for conveyances in section 47-5,” does not apply. Put another way, that requirement applies where the owner may act either individually or through an agent, and chooses to act through an agent.

We begin with the undisputed proposition that, in signing the listing agreement as agents of 595 Corporate Circle, Weber and Secondino were, as a matter of partnership law, authorized to bind the owner. Under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 34-47 (l), they had the authority to sign the listing agreement and bind 595 Corporate Circle to it, without an additional document that had been witnessed and acknowledged pursuant to § 47-5.

We previously have stated that the requirements of § 20-325a (b) are mandatory rather than permissive, and that the statute must be strictly construed. McCutcheon & Burr, Inc. v. Berman, 218 Conn. 512, 520, 590 A.2d 438 (1991); Thornton Real Estate, Inc. v. Lobdell, 184 Conn. 228, 230, 439 A.2d 946 (1981); see also Real Estate Auctions, Inc. v. Senie, 28 Conn. App. 563, 568, 611 A.2d 452 (1992); Rostenberg-Doern Co. v. Weiner, 17 Conn. App. 294, 305, 552 A.2d 827 (1989).

More recently, however, we have articulated a somewhat different view of the statute. In M.R. Wachob Co. v. MBM Partnership, 232 Conn. 645, 658-63, 656 A.2d 1036 (1995), we reviewed the history of § 20-325a, including several legislative responses to our judicial constructions of the statute. In so doing, we stated: “In 1984 . . . the legislature amended the statute, partly in response to the decision of this court in Thornton Real Estate, Inc. v. Lobdell, [supra, 184 Conn. 228]. In Thornton Real Estate, Inc., this court had held unenforceable a listing agreement signed by an agent of the owner, rather than by the owner himself. Reasoning that the statute required the signatures of ‘the parties thereto,’ this court had concluded that the real estate broker could not recover his commission because a ‘broker who does not follow the mandate of the statute does so at his peril.’ Id., 230-31.

“As a result of this court’s decision in Thornton Real Eslate, Inc., the legislature changed the language of the statute to require only that the listing agreement ‘be signed by the seller or his agent . . . and by the real estate broker or his authorized agent.’ General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 20-325a (b). The legislature made this change in order to ‘increase the number of persons who may legally sign a real estate listing agreement. . . . [T]he problem with our current law is that courts have interpreted it so literally, that any listing agreement that doesn’t contain the personal signatures of all parties may be ruled invalid . . . .’ 27 S. Proc., Pt. 4,1984 Sess., pp. 1413-14, remarks of Senator Wayne A. Baker; see Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Insurance and Real Estate, 1984 Sess., pp. 63-64, remarks of Timothy Calnen, Connecticut association of realtors.” M.R. Wachob Co. v. MBM Partnership, supra, 232 Conn. 660.

We also stated that “the legislative history of the 1984 amendment reveals that the legislature has attempted to avoid narrow judicial constructions of the language of the statute. Indeed, the legislature altered the language of the statute in direct response to this court’s decision in Thornton Real Estate, Inc. v. Lobdell, supra, 184 Conn. 228, in which this court had held unenforceable a listing agreement that failed to satisfy the literal language of the statute. In so doing, the legislature clearly expressed its position that it did not intend the literal language of the statute necessarily to erect barriers to the recovery of otherwise valid real estate commissions. Finally, the legislature has stated repeatedly that the statutory requirements for listing agreements are designed to simplify and clarify the process of hiring real estate brokers.” M.R. Wachob Co. v. MBM Partnership, supra, 232 Conn. 661-62.

This recent inteipretation, elucidating the purposes and history of § 20-325a (b), is significant for at least two reasons. First, it reminds us that, despite our judicial insistence on a strict interpretation of the requirements of the statute, “the legislature has attempted to avoid narrow judicial constructions of the language of the statute.” Id., 661. Second, it emphasizes that one purpose of the statute is to simplify and clarify the process of entering into a listing agreement.

We need not decide in this case whether we should continue to interpret § 20-325a strictly, as suggested by the earlier cases, or more practically, as suggested by M.R. Wachob Co. Under either approach, we conclude that the signatures of Weber and Secondino on the listing agreement complied with the statute.

It is true that, read literally, the statute could be understood to require that, even when both general partners of a partnership sign a listing agreement as agents of the partnership, their agency must be authorized by a deed-like document. We decline, however, to engage in such a literal interpretation. The evident principal purpose of § 20-325a (b) (5), requiring the formalities of a deed for the authority of an agent to act for the principal in signing a listing agreement, is to impress upon the principal the need for caution and prudence in granting such authority. That purpose simply does not apply where the principal can act only through its agents. Furthermore, such a literal interpretation would, in our view, lead to bizarre results. It would mean, for example, that if the president of a corporation signed a listing agreement on behalf of the corporation, in order for the agreement to bind the principal, the corporation would have had to have executed a separate document, witnessed and acknowledged, giving the president the authority to do so. We ordinarily decline to interpret statutes so as to yield bizarre results; Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Associates, 250 Conn. 763, 778, 739 A.2d 238 (1999); and we see no reason to depart from that commonsensical practice in the present case. Thus, we read § 20-325a (b) (5) as intended to apply where the owner has an option to act either through an agent or individually, and the owner chooses to act through an agent. The statute does not apply, however, where, as in the present case, the owner, as an entity, can act only through its agents.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court, and to remand the case to that court for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion NORCOTT and KATZ, Js., concurred.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., with whom SULLIVAN, J., joins,

concurring. I agree with and join the majority’s conclusion that under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 34-47, a general partner of a partnership can bind the partnership to a listing agreement without an additional document that is acknowledged and witnessed pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 47-5.1 therefore agree with the majority that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the decision of the trial court to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the listing agreement in this case did not satisfy General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 20-325a (b) (5).1 disagree, however, with the majority’s decision to address an issue that it maintains is “subsidiary” to the dispositive issue before us, namely, the Appellate Court’s conclusion that “the listing agreement in this case was signed by the general partners in their individual capacitfiesj . . . Levey Miller Maretz v. 595 Corporate Circle, 56 Conn. App. 815, 822, 746 A.2d 803 (2000). I would not reach beyond the certified question before us to address this issue. There are several reasons why I would not reach this issue.

First, as the majority correctly acknowledges, the defendants never made the argument on appeal that the individual defendants, Charles E. Weber, Jr., and Alfred J. Secondino, Jr., the general partners of the named defendant partnership, 595 Corporate Circle, had signed the listing agreement in their individual capacities. The majority addresses this issue despite its not having been raised by the parties. Because we decide cases based upon the issues that are briefed and argued before this court and, generally, do not independently

reach for issues beyond that scope, we should not reach the issue. See, e.g., King v. Sultar, 253 Conn. 429, 444 n.6, 754 A.2d 782 (2000); State v. Colvin, 241 Conn. 650, 661 n.8, 697 A.2d 1122 (1997); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Union Trust Co., 230 Conn. 779, 788 n.5, 646 A.2d 799 (1994).

Second, I disagree with the majority’s contention that we must reach the issue because it was “injected into the case by the reasoning of the Appellate Court” and, therefore, “undermines the factual predicate of the first certified issue in the case . . . .” See footnote 4 of this concurrence. The Appellate Court’s conclusion that “the listing agreement in this case was signed by the general partners in their individual capacities]”; Levey Miller Maretz v. 595 Corporate Circle, supra, 56 Conn. App. 822; in part because “[t]he listing agreement does not reflect that anyone signed it on behalf of 595 Corporate Circle”; id., 819-20; was not essential to its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court. The crux of the Appellate Court’s decision was that Weber and Secondino could not, pursuant to § 20-325 (b) (5), bind the partnership to the listing agreement without an additional document that had been acknowledged and witnessed pursuant to § 47-5. Although I agree with the majority that this conclusion is incorrect, it is clear to me that we can resolve the question of law before us without deciding, as the Appellate Court did, the capacity in which the partners signed the listing agreement. See id., 821-22.

Finally, by resolving the issue of whether Weber and Secondino signed the hsting agreement in their individual capacities, a question of fact, the majority trespasses upon the province of the trial court by engaging in fact finding. “It is the function of the trial court, not this court, to find facts.” State v. Lafferty, 189 Conn. 360, 363, 456 A.2d 272 (1983); State v. Tate, 256 Conn. 262, 287-88 n.17, 773 A.2d 308 (2001); see also Miller v. Kirshner, 225 Conn. 185, 199, 621 A.2d 1326 (1993).

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that a general partner of a partnership can bind the partnership to a listing agreement without an additional document that is acknowledged and witnessed pursuant to § 47-5. I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings without reaching any other issue.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 20-325a (b) provides in relevant part: “No person, licensed under the provisions of this chapter, shall commence or bring any action in respect of any acts done or services rendered after October 1, 1971, as set forth in subsection (a), unless such acts or services were rendered pursuant to a contract or authorization from the person for whom such acts were done or services rendered. To satisfy the requirements of this subsection any such contract or authorization shall... (5) be signed by the owner or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner only by a written document executed in the manner provided for conveyances in section 47-5, and by the real estate broker or his authorized agent.”
      Since 1991, § 20-325a has been amended several times. In 1994, it was amended by No. 94-240 of the 1994 Public Acts. Although the potential effect of Public Act 94-240 was an issue before the Appellate Court, as we indicate later in this opinion, under our view of the case, it is not necessary to consider that legislation.
      All references herein to § 20-325a are to the 1991 revision, which was in effect at the time of the listing agreement in the present case.

       General Statutes (Kev. to 1991) § 47-5 provides: “(a) All conveyances of land shall be: (1) In writing; (2) if the grantor is a natural person, subscribed, with or without a seal, by the grantor with his own hand or with his mark with his name annexed to it or by his attorney authorized for that purpose by a power executed, acknowledged and witnessed in the manner provided for conveyances or, if the grantor is a corporation or partnership, subscribed by a duly authorized person; (3) acknowledged by the grantor, his attorney or such duly authorized person to be his free act and deed; and (4) attested to by two witnesses with their own hands.
      “(b) In addition to the requirements of subsection (a), the execution of a deed or other conveyance of real property pursuant to a power of attorney shall be deemed sufficient if done in substantially the following form:
      Name of Owner of Record
      By: (Signature of Attorney-in-Fact) L.S.
      Name of Signatory
      His/Her Attorney-in-Fact
      “(c.) Nothing in subsection (b) precludes the use of any other legal form of execution of deed or other conveyance of real property.”

       We granted the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issues: (1) “Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that a real estate listing agreement was unenforceable under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 20-325a on the ground that the signatures of the general partners of the partnership ownership of the property were not acknowledged and witnessed?” and (2) “Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that, the amendments to General Statutes § 20-325a, enacted by No. 94-240 of the 1994 Public Acts, did not apply to real estate listing agreements signed prior to the effective date?” Levey Miller Maretz v. 595 Corporate Circle, 253 Conn. 906, 906-907, 753 A.2d 940 (2000).
      Because we conclude, under the first question, that § 20-325a (b) (5) did not apply to the general partners in the present case, we need not address the second certified issue.

       The attached letter, dated March 18, 1991, was from a prior listing agent to “Mr. Charles E. Weber, Jr., Partner,” and concerned the same owner and property, namely, “595 Corporate Circle.”

       The listing agreement provided as follows:
      “Date: April 23, 1991
      595 CORPORATE CIRCLE, owners of the property located at 595 East Main Street in Branford, Connecticut hereby appoints LEVEY MILLER MARETZ, REALTORS exclusive agent and grants AGENT the sole and exclusive right to SELL the properly known as ORCHARD HILLS PLAZA.
      This agreement shall remain in full force effective April 1, 1991 and until April 1, 1993, unless the property has been SOLD/LEASED or withdrawn from the market.
      OWNER authorizes AGENT to quote a SALE PRICE of $8,500,000.
      OWNER authorizes AGENT to quote a LAND LEASE of $750,000 absolute net annually.
      ‘Notice: The amount of Real Estate Commissions is not fixed by law. They are set by each broker individually and may be negotiable between the seller and broker.’

        OWNER agrees that whenever during the term of this agreement the Property shall have been SOLD or a customer procured, ready, able and willing to BUY the Property for the price as shown above or for any other price or upon such terms as may be agreed to by the OWNER, the OWNER will pay the AGENT a commission, as follows:
      Sale of Property: Five (5%) percent of sales price.
      Land Lease: Five (5%) percent of initial lease term paid annually.
      Two (2%) percent of optional renewal periods paid annually.
      Exclusions: The only exclusions are listed on the attached addendum which is a letter dated March 18,1991 from First Whitney, Inc. to Charles E. Weber, Jr., Partner.
      OWNER agrees to pay AGENT reasonable legal fees for collection of any commissions that shall become due and payable under the terms and conditions of this agreement.
      OWNER and AGENT agree that this agreement shall be binding upon their respective heirs, successors, assigns, executors, and administrators. OWNER(S) hereby acknowledge(s) agreement to all the terms as set forth above. Receipt of a copy of this contract by the OWNER(S) is hereby acknowledged.
      /s/ Stephen Miller
      Listing Agent
      Levey Miller Maretz
      Authorized Agent
      1308 Whalley Ave.
      Street Address
      New Haven, CT 06525
      City State Zip
      /s/ Charles Weber
      OWNER’S signature
      31 Business Park Rd.
      OWNER’S Street Address
      Branford, CT 06405
      City State Zip
      /s/ Alfred J. Secondino
      OWNER’S signature
      21 Rice Ridge Road
      OWNER’S Street Address
      KHlingworth, CT 06417
      City State Zip”

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 34-46 (3) provides: “Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.”

       It is true that, although Weber is referred to as a partner, nowhere in these documents is Secondino specifically referred to as a partner. The plaintiff has never suggested, however, that they somehow stand in different relationships to the owner—namely, 595 Corporate Circle.

       General Statutes (Eev. to 1991) § 34-47 (1) provides: “Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.”

       To the extent that the certified question suggests that § 20-325a (b) (5) might require, not only that an agent’s authority be granted by a deed-like document, but that the agent’s signature on the listing agreement itself be witnessed by two witnesses and acknowledged, we reject such a suggestion. Section 20-325a (b) (5) simply states that the agent be “authorized ... by a written document” executed with the formalities of a deed of conveyance. It does not say that those formalities must also appear on the listing agreement itself. To impose such a requirement would be to go beyond even a strict construction of the statute, and to add a requirement that neither its language nor its purpose contemplates.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 34-47 (1) provides: “Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.”
      Section 34^47 was repealed by No. 95-341, § 57, of the 1995 Public Acts, effective July 1, 1997, however, it was in effect at the time that the listing agreement in the present case was executed in 1991. See General Statutes § 1-1 (t) and (u).

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 47-5 (a) provides: “All conveyances of land shall be: (1) In writing; (2) if the grantor is a natural person, subscribed, with or without a seal, by the grantor with his own hand or with his mark with his name annexed to it or by his attorney authorized for that purpose by a power executed, acknowledged and witnessed in the manner provided for conveyances or, if the grantor is a corporation or partnership, subscribed by a duly authorized person; (3) acknowledged by the grantor, his attorney or such duly authorized person to be his free act and deed; and (4) attested to by two witnesses with their own hands.”

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 20-325a provides in relevant part: “(a) No person who is not licensed under the provisions of this chapter, and who was not so licensed at the time he performed the acts or rendered the services for which recovery is sought, shall commence or bring any action in any court of this state ... to recover any commission, compensation or other payment in respect of any act done or service rendered by him, the doing or rendering of which is prohibited under the provisions of this chapter except by persons duly licensed under this chapter.
      “(b) No person, licensed under the provisions of this chapter, shall commence or bring any action ... as set forth in subsection (a), unless such acts or services were rendered pursuant to a contract or authorization from the person for whom such acts were done or services rendered. To satisfy the requirements of this subsection any such contract or authorization shall (1) be in writing, (2) contain the names and addresses of all the parties thereto, (3) show the date on which such contract was entered into or such authorization given, (4) contain the conditions of such contract or authorization and (5) be signed by the owner or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner only by a written document executed in the manner provided for conveyances in section 47-5, and by the real estate broker or his authorized agent. . . .”

       The first of two certified questions was limited to the following: “Did Ihe Appellate Court correctly determine that a real estate listing agreement was unenforceable under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 20-325a on the ground that the signatures of the general partners of the partnership ownership of the property were not acknowledged and witnessed?” Levey Miller Maretz v. 595 Corporate Circle, 253 Conn. 906, 753 A.2d 940 (2000).

       It appears to me that the majority not only exceeds its appropriate appellate function by reaching this factual issue, but its findings are antithetical to both the findings of the trial court and the stipulation made by the parties. I note that the trial court stated the following in its memorandum of decision on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment: “The court finds, and the parties agree, that there are no genuine issues of material fact. For [the] purposes of this motion, the parties stipulate that there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the listing agreement. Both parties agree that the listing agreement was signed by [the plaintiff], Weber and Secondino, but that no signature appears on the listing agreement on behalf of 595 [Corporate Circle], Additionally, there is no dispute that Weber and Secondino have not executed any separate writing in accordance with ... § 47-5, which would expressly evidence their authority to act as agents on behalf of the partnership. The only issue to be determined is one of law, whether the listing agreement, on its face, satisfies the applicable statutory requirement that listing agreements be signed by the ‘owner’ of the subject property in order to be enforceable.” (Emphasis added.)


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PALMER, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    DERRICK GARTRELL v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

    (SC 16467)
    Sullivan, C. J., and Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

      Argued March 22
    officially released September 25, 2001

      Karla A. Turekian, assistant attorney general, with whom were William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Gregory T. DAuria, associate attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).

      Morris R. Borea, for the appellee (plaintiff).

       A motion for reconsideration was granted December 17, 2001. This opinion has been superseded by Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 259 Conn. 29, 787 A.2d 541 (2002).

   Opinion

PALMER, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Derrick Gartrell, who suffered from a preexisting, nonwork-related psychiatric condition that was aggravated by a work-related physical injury, is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for the aggravation of that psychiatric condition notwithstanding General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), which limits compensation for mental or emotional impairments to those that “[arise] from” a work-related physical injury. We conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits to the extent that his work-related physical injury exacerbated his preexisting psychiatric condition.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On February 10, 1983, the plaintiff commenced employment with the defendant, the department of correction, as a correctional officer at what is now known as the Willard-Cybulski Correctional Institution in Enfield. As a result of several nonwork-related traumatic events in the plaintiffs personal life, the plaintiff developed mental health problems and, in June, 1994, was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, for which he subsequently received therapy.

On October 3, 1996, the plaintiff, who had had no prior history of cardiovascular disorders, began to experience intense pain in his chest and left arm, a feeling of tightness in his chest and difficulty breathing. Consequently, the plaintiff sought and received medical care. The plaintiff continued to experience periodic recurrence of these symptoms and, after a variety of tests were performed, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a cardiovascular disorder known as vasospastic angina and treated with various medications. After his medical condition began to affect his work performance, the plaintiff was placed on indefinite medical leave beginning October 21,1997, and, thereafter, sought workers’ compensation benefits.

The workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) held a formal hearing on the compensability of the plaintiffs claim and, on the basis of the evidence presented, concluded, inter alia, that: (1) the plaintiff had sustained a compensable injury, namely, vasospastic angina, on October 3, 1996, that arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant; (2) that injury qualified as a “condition of impairment of health” under General Statutes § 5-145a; (3) the plaintiffs work-related cardiovascular disorder had exacerbated his preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder; and (4) as a result of the foregoing conclusions, the post-traumatic stress disorder also constituted a compensable injury. The commissioner thereupon ordered the defendant to pay ihe plaintiff temporary total disability benefits in accordance with § 5-145a, along with all reasonable and necessary medical costs incurred in connection with both injuries.

In concluding that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition had been exacerbated by his work-related physical injuiy, the commissioner relied primarily on two pieces of evidence, the first of which was an April 21, 1998 letter prepared by Jeryl Brown, the plaintiffs therapist and a licensed clinical social worker. Brown stated in the letter that the plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, that he exhibits symptoms of depression, anxiety and panic, and that those symptoms were exacerbated by the physical symptoms associated with his cardiovascular disorder. Brown recommended therapy sessions twice weekly as treatment. The second piece of evidence was a signed note, dated April 23, 1998, that accompanied Brown’s letter, from Brown’s colleague, Eliot Barron, a psychiatrist. The note stated in its entirety: “I completely concur with Mrs. Brown’s letter of [April 21, 1998 and] fully support her treatment plan.”

The defendant appealed from the decision of the commissioner to the compensation review board (board). On appeal to the board, the defendant did not contest the compensability of the plaintiffs work-related physical injury, namely, the cardiovascular disorder. Rather, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition, namely, the post-traumatic stress disorder, did not arise from a physical injury and, therefore, that, in accordance with § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), the preexisting psychiatric condition was not compensable. The board affirmed the commissioner’s decision, concluding that the commissioner properly had determined that the symptoms of the plaintiffs cardiovascular disorder exacerbated his preexisting psychiatric condition, and, therefore, that the preexisting condition also was compensable. The defendant appealed from the decision of the board to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

On appeal, the defendant renews its claims that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder was exacerbated by his work-related cardiovascular disorder; and (2) the exacerbation of the plaintiffs psychiatric condition did not “[arise] from” his cardiovascular disorder within the meaning of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii). The defendant further contends that, even if we conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the aggravation of his preexisting psychiatric condition by a compensable, work-related physical injury, his right to such compensation is limited, under § 31-275 (1) (D), to “that proportion of the disability . . . due to the aggravation of the preexisting [psychiatric condition] as may be reasonably attributed to the injury upon which the claim is based . . . ,” General Statutes § 31-275 (1) (D). We disagree with the defendant’s first two claims, but agree with its third contention.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the evidence adduced at the hearing before the commissioner was insufficient to support a finding that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition was aggravated by his work-related cardiovascular disorder. We reject the defendant’s claim.

Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s claim, we set forth the standards governing our review of decisions by the board. “[W]hen a decision of a commissioner is appealed to the [board], the [board] is obligated to hear the appeal on the record of the hearing before the commissioner and not to retry the facts. . . . The commissioner has the power and duty, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts. . . . The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . Our scope of review of the actions of the . . . [board] is similarly limited.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Biasetti v. Stamford, 250 Conn. 65, 70-71, 735 A.2d 321 (1999). Furthermore, “[i]t matters not that the basic facts from which the [commissioner] draws this inference are undisputed rather than controverted. . . . It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The [commissioner] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and [the commissioner’s] choice, if otherwise sustainable, maynotbe disturbed by areviewing court.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Six v. Thomas O'Connor & Co., 235 Conn. 790, 799, 669 A.2d 1214 (1996).

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record from which the commissioner reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition was aggravated by his cardiovascular disorder. The plaintiffs therapist, Brown, stated in her letter that she had treated the plaintiff for post-traumatic stress disorder since 1994. She also indicated that the plaintiff suffers from depression, anxiety and panic. Although Brown did not expressly link those symptoms to the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder, it was reasonable for the commissioner to have inferred that those are the symptoms for which the plaintiff had sought treatment. Moreover, the reasonableness of this inference is buttressed by the fact that the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder include, inter alia, despair or hopelessness and increased risk of panic disorder. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Ed. 1994) p. 425. Brown also stated that the plaintiffs symptoms had been exacerbated by, among other things, his “cardiac spasms,” which resulted from his work-related cardiovascular disorder. Furthermore, the commissioner reasonably could have found that the note from Barron, a psychiatrist, in which Barron “completely concur [red]” with Brown’s diagnosis and treatment plan, provided adequate medical confirmation of that diagnosis. In view of the substantial deference that must be accorded the fact-finding role of the commissioner, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to permit a finding that the plaintiffs preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder was exacerbated by his work-related cardiovascular disorder.

II

We next consider the defendant’s claim that § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), which bars compensation for a mental or emotional impairment “unless [that] impairment arises from a physical injury or occupational disease”; (emphasis added) General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii); precludes compensation for the aggravation of a preexisting, nonwork-related psychiatric condition. Specifically, the defendant maintains that a mental impairment does not arise from a physical injury unless that mental impairment originates from the work-related physical injury. Under the defendant’s interpretation of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation for the exacerbation of his post-traumatic stress disorder because that mental impairment did not originate from his work-related cardiovascular disorder. The plaintiff contends that when the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition is a direct consequence of a work-related physical injury, as in the present case, the aggravation of the psychiatric condition is, itself, a sufficiently distinct and identifiable injury to constitute an “impairment” that “arises from” the compensable work-related physical injury. General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii). We agree with the plaintiff.

“The dispute between the parties [regarding compensability of the exacerbation of the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition] raises an issue of statutory construction. Statutory construction . . . presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. . . . According to our long-standing principles of statutory [interpretation], our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. . . . In determining the intent of a statute, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Polizos v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 255 Conn. 601, 607, 767 A.2d 1202 (2001).

Our starting point is the pertinent statutory language. Under § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), a mental impairment is compensable if it “arises from” a work-related physical injury, in this case, the plaintiffs cardiovascular disorder. As the defendant asserts, the term “arises from” is synonymous with “originates from,” or “caused by.” See Biasetti v. Stamford, supra, 250 Conn. 79. The crux of the issue, however, is not the precise meaning of the term “arises from,” but whether, for purposes of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), the term “mental or emotional impairment” includes the aggravation or exacerbation of a preexisting psychiatric condition. Although a strict reading of the statute arguably favors the interpretation advanced by the defendant, we believe that the plaintiffs construction also is entirely plausible. We are persuaded, moreover, that the plaintiffs construction is more consistent with the underlying purpose and intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act and, therefore, the better construction.

Under the plaintiff s interpretation of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition, in order to be compensable, must have been the result of a work-related physical injury. In other words, the work-related physical injury must be a “but for” cause of the aggravation of the preexisting psychiatric condition. Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the exacerbation of a preexisting condition generally is compensable to the extent that the exacerbation “may be reasonably attributed” to a work-related injury. General Statutes § 31-275 (1) (D). Moreover, it long has been a “fundamental tenet of workers’ compensation law . . . that an employer takes the employee in the state of health in which it finds the employee.” Epps v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 41 Conn. App. 430, 435, 675 A.2d 1377 (1996), citing Cashman v. McTernan School, Inc., 130 Conn. 401, 409, 34 A.2d 874 (1943). We agree with the plaintiff that the burden falls upon the employer to establish a departure from this general rule of compensability, especially because we eschew a narrow and technical reading of our workers’ compensation statutes in favor of one that promotes compensability. See, e.g., Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation Co., 231 Conn. 469, 483, 650 A.2d 1240 (1994) (remedial purpose of Workers’ Compensation Act should not be defeated by narrow and technical construction); Szudora v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 552, 557, 573 A.2d 1 (1990) (“workers’ compensation legislation . . . should be broadly construed in favor of disabled employees”).

In addition, the legislature’s use of the term “impairment” supports the conclusion that § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) does not preclude compensability insofar as a preexisting psychiatric condition has been exacerbated by a work-related physical injury. “Impairment” is defined as “the act of impairing or the state of being impaired”; Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; and “impair” means “to make worse: dimmish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength: do harm to . . . .” Id. To the extent that the term “impairment” suggests a condition that has worsened or deteriorated, that connotation is consistent with a reading of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) that does not exclude from its purview the deterioration, or exacerbation, of a preexisting condition.

Finally, our interpretation of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) is guided by the “principles underlying Connecticut practice in [workers’] compensation cases: that the legislation is remedial in nature . . . and that it should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 604-605, 748 A.2d 278 (2000); see also Luce v. United Technologies Corp., 247 Conn. 126, 137 n.16, 717 A.2d 747 (1998) (Workers’ Compensation Act “must be construed liberally to effectuate its beneficentpurpose”). The “humanitarian and remedial purposes of the act counsel against an overly narrow construction that unduly limits eligibility for workers’ compensation.” Herman v. Sherwood Industries, Inc., 244 Conn. 502, 511, 710 A.2d 1338 (1998). We, therefore, “do not construe the act to impose limitations on benefits that the act itself does not specify clearly.” Id., 512; accord Gil v. Courthouse One, 239 Conn. 676, 703 n.13, 687 A.2d 146 (1997). Finally, “[i]n appeals arising under workers’ compensation law, we must resolve statutory ambiguities or lacunae in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of the act.” Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692, 698, 699 A.2d 52 (1997); accord Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215, 221, 752 A.2d 1069 (2000). In light of these well established and oft repeated principles, and particularly because § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) does not clearly purport to bar compensation for the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition by a work-related physical injury, we conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to such compensation.

The defendant asserts that the pertinent legislative history supports its position that the plaintiff is not entitled to benefits based on the provisions of § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii). As the defendant notes, the legislature reformed the workers’ compensation laws in 1993 with a fundamental purpose of “effecting] a dramatic decrease in the cost of workers’ compensation in Connecticut.” 36 H.R. Proc., Pt. 18, 1993 Sess., p. 6145, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor. To reduce the cost of workers’ compensation, the legislature introduced a number of systemic changes, including a reduction in the rate of compensation, the elimination of certain cost-of-living adjustments and a reduction in the number of compensable injuries. See generally Public Acts 1993, No. 93-228. In particular, the provisions of § 31-275 (16) (B) were enacted to limit, inter alia, the number of compensable claims for mental or emotional impairments. Cf. Biasetti v. Stamford, supra, 250 Conn. 75. Benefits for such impairments, however, were not eliminated entirely. Under § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii), an employee who suffers from a mental or emotional impairment that “arises from a physical injury or occupational disease” still is entitled to compensation for that impairment. General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii). The question, therefore, is how far did the legislature intend to go in eliminating compensation for mental and emotional impairments.

We are not persuaded that the legislative goal of reducing the cost of workers’ compensation militates strongly in favor of the statutoiy interpretation that the defendant would have us adopt. It is doubtful that requiring coverage for claims like the one at issue in this case will place an unreasonable financial burden on employers because such claims are not likely to be especially large in number or in cost. Thus, compensating an employee for the exacerbation of a preexisting mental or emotional condition that was caused by a work-related physical injury furthers the beneficent purposes of the workers’ compensation act—claimants will receive benefits for work-related injuries that traditionally have been compensable under our statutory scheme—without undermining the legislature’s effort to reduce workers’ compensation costs. Mindful of the liberality with which we are to construe our Workers’ Compensation Act to accomplish its remedial purpose, we conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the aggravation of his post-traumatic stress disorder arising from his work-related cardiovascular disorder.

Ill

Finally, we agree with the defendant’s claim that it must pay workers’ compensation benefits to the plaintiff only for that proportion of the disability from the post-traumatic stress disorder that reasonably may be attributed to aggravation by his work-related cardiovascular disorder. General Statutes § 31-275 (1) (D) expressly provides that “for aggravation of a preexisting disease, compensation shall be allowed only for that proportion of the disability . . . due to the aggravation of the preexisting disease as may be reasonably attributed to the injury upon which the claim is based . . . .” The plaintiffs entitlement to benefits for his preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder is subject to this limitation; indeed, the plaintiff acknowledged this limitation at oral argument before this court. The board, however, affirmed the decision of the commissioner awarding compensation to the plaintiff for his preexisting psychiatric condition without reference to any such limitation. Consequently, the case must be remanded so that the award of the commissioner may be modified according to the requirements of § 31-275 (1) (D).

The decision of the board is affirmed with respect to the compensability of the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder under § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii). The decision of the board is reversed with respect to the affirmance of the commissioner’s award insofar as the commissioner failed to limit the plaintiffs compensation for his post-traumatic stress disorder according to § 31-275 (1) (D) and the case is remanded to the board with direction to remand the case to the commissioner with direction to modify the award according to the preceding paragraph.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 31-275 provides in relevant part: “As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise provides:
      “(1) ‘Arising out of and in the course of his employment’ means an accidental injury happening to an employee or an occupational disease of an employee originating while he has been engaged in the line of his duty in the business or affairs of the employer upon the employer’s premises, or while engaged elsewhere upon the employer’s business or affairs by the direction, express or implied, of the employer, provided . . . (D) for aggravation of a preexisting disease, compensation shall be allowed only for that proportion of the disability or death due to the aggravation of the preexisting disease as may be reasonably attributed to the injury upon which the claim is based ....
      “(16) (A) ‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ includes, in addition to accidental injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee which is causally connected with his employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease.
      “(B) ‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ shall not be construed to include . . .
      “(ii) A mental or emotional impairment, unless such impairment arises from a physical injury or occupational disease . . . .”

       Vasospastic angina, also known as Prinzmetal’s angina, is characterized by severe pain resulting from intermittent spasms in the coronary arteries that interrupt the blood supply to the heart. See T. Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine (14th Ed. 1998) p. 1374.

       The evidence indicated that the plaintiffs cardiovascular disorder had been caused by work-related stress.

       General Statutes § 5-145a provides: “Any condition of impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in total or partial disability or death to a member of the security force or fire department of The University of Connecticut or the aeronautics operations of the Department of Transportation, or to a member of the Office of State Capitol Police or any person appointed under section 29-18 as a special policeman for the State Capitol building and grounds, the Legislative Office Building and parking garage and related structures and facilities, and other areas under the supervision and control of the Joint Committee on Legislative Management, or to state personnel engaged in guard or instructional duties in the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Medium, the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution, Enfield, John R. Manson Youth Institution, Cheshire, the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Niantic, the Connecticut Correctional Center, Cheshire, or the community correctional centers, or to any employee of the Whiting Forensic Division with direct and substantial patient contact, or to any detective, chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice or chief detective, or to any state employee designated as a hazardous duty employee pursuant to an applicable collective bargaining agreement who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of such condition, shall be presumed to have been suffered in the performance of his duty and shall be compensable in accordance with the provisions of chapter 5C8, except that for the first three months of compensability the employee shall continue to receive the full salary which he was receiving at the time of injury in the manner provided by the provisions of section 5-142. Any such employee who began such service prior to June 28, 1985, and was not covered by the provisions of this section prior to said date shall not be required, for purposes of this section, to show proof that he successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service.”

       The commissioner ordered the defendant to pay such benefits to the plaintiff for the period commencing October 21,1997, and ending September 8, 1998, excluding a two week period between November 7 and November 21, 1997. These dates are not at issue on appeal. The commissioner also ordered further hearings “to determine whether the [plaintiffs] temporary total disability extends beyond September 8, 1998.” That issue also is not the subject of this appeal.

       Brown’s letter provides in relevant part: “[The plaintiff] has been a client of mine since [October, 1994], when he entered treatment for symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder following a serious incident of police harassment. During the course of treatment and related legal ordeal, [the plaintiff] was subjected to significant and repeated incidents of racial harassment by supervisors at his place of employment. He has met with repeated obstacles in his attempts to pursue his legitimate complaints through the appropriate channels.
      “As a result of the chronic stress, [the plaintiffs] physical and emotional well-being [has] been seriously compromised. He suffers from symptoms of depression, anxiety, and panic, which have been further exacerbated by the physical symptoms related to migraines, seizures, and cardiac spasms. Additionally, insomnia, nightmares, feelings of helplessness and victimization have interfered with his ability to live with a sense of personal safety and well-being.
      “The racial harassment at work, coupled with extreme disregard for his physical well-being, directly contributed to a retriggering of the symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. [The plaintiff] continually felt that his personal safety was compromised when he was repeatedly assigned to direct inmate contact after being undermined by his supervisors in front of the inmate population.
      “At this point, my recommendation for treatment is that [the plaintiff] attend two sessions weekly with me, to be reviewed in three months for reassessment purposes with the goal of regaining his former level of functioning. . . .”

       Commissioner Jesse M. Frankl dissented from the majority opinion of the board. In his view, the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to link the aggravation of the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder to his cardiovascular disorder. Specifically, he concluded that Barron’s one sentence note did not provide an adequate medical basis upon which to support a conclusion that the plaintiffs preexisting psychiatric condition had been aggravated by his work-related physical injury.

       On appeal, the defendant does not dispute the fact that the plaintiffs cardiovascular disorder is a compensable, work-related physical injury. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that the plaintiff is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for the exacerbation of his preexisting psychiatric condition if: (1) the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that that condition was aggravated by his cardiovascular disorder; and (2) the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition by a work-related physical iiyury is compensable notwithstanding § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii).

       Brown is licensed to practice clinical social work in accordance with the requirements of General Statutes § 20-195n. “Clinical social work” is defined as “the application, by persons trained in social work, of established principles of psychosocial development, behavior, psychopathology, unconscious motivation, interpersonal relationships and environmental stress to the evaluation, assessment, diagnosis and treatment of biopsychosocial dysfunction, disability and impairment, including mental, emotional, behavioral, developmental and addictive disorders, of individuals, couples, families or groups. Clinical social work includes, but is not limited to, counseling, psychotherapy, behavior modification and mental health consultation. ” General Statutes § 20-195m (4).

       It reasonably can be inferred that, when Brown was referring to “cardiac spasms,” she was referring to the spasms in the coronary arteries that resulted in the plaintiff’s angina. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

       We acknowledge that the evidence presented by the plaintiff with respect to the causal link between the exacerbation of his preexisting psychiatric condition and his work-related cardiovascular disorder is not strong. We nevertheless are persuaded, for the reasons set forth in the text of this opinion, that the evidence is minimally sufficient to warrant the commissioner’s factual finding in regard to that causal relationship.

       We recently had occasion to construe § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) in Biasetti v. Stamford, supra, 250 Conn. 65. In Biasetti, we concluded that the plaintiff, a police officer who suffered from work-related post-traumatic stress disorder, was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for that psychiatric condition. Id., 67. The plaintiff in Biasetti had been involved in a work-related high speed chase and gun battle. As a result of these events, he developed post-traumatic stress disorder, the physical symptomatology of which included dizzy spells and headaches. See id., 68-69. Although we held that the specific type of post-traumatic stress disorder with which the plaintiff was diagnosed is an occupational disease within the meaning of § 31-275 (15); id., 74; we concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because the physical sequelae of the plaintiffs post-traumatic stress disorder were a consequence of that impairment rather than a separate and distinct personal injury or occupational disease. See id., 79-80,82. We explained: “Section 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) includes within the definition of ‘personal injury’ an emotional impairment that arises from
        or is caused by a physical injury or occupational disease. It does not, however, extend coverage to an emotional impairment which itself is an occupational disease. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the causation requirement encompassed within the term ‘arises.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 79. The present case presents an entirely different issue, namely, whether § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) precludes an award of compensation to a plaintiff whose preexisting psychiatric condition has been aggravated by a work-related physical injury.

       “In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language . . . .” General Statutes § 1-1 (a). “To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition of the term.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188, 200 n.12, 786 A.2d 790 (1999).

       As we explain in part III of this opinion, the cost of any such claim will be minimized by virtue of the fact that a claimant who successfully can establish that his work-related physical injury aggravated a preexisting mental or emotional impairment will be entitled to compensation only for that proportion of the disability from the mental or emotional impairment that reasonably may be attributed to aggravation by the work-related physical injury.