author: Norcott, J.

text:
    Commissioner of Correction v. Horatio Gordon
    (14623)
    Peters, C. J., Callahan, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued November 3, 1993
    —decision released January 25, 1994

      Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, and Gerard P. Eisenman, assistant state’s attorney, for the plaintiff in error.

      Paula Mangini Montonye, for the defendant in error.
   Norcott, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the intended aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court or the mittimus controls an incarcerated person’s total effective sentence. The plaintiff in error, the commissioner of correction (commissioner), brings a writ of error challenging the decision of the habeas court, Sferrazza, J., that reduced the total aggregate sentence of the defendant in error, Horatio Gordon (petitioner), from fifteen to thirteen years imprisonment. We reverse the decision of the habeas court.

It is undisputed that, on February 3,1986, the state and the petitioner reached a plea agreement whereby the petitioner pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine to separate counts of attempted murder, robbery in the first degree and criminal possession of a revolver in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a (a), 53a-134 (a) (2) and 53a-217 (a), respectively. The parties agreed upon a total aggregate sentence of fifteen years imprisonment.

On March 14,1986, the date of sentencing, the trial court, Landau, J., accepted the state’s recommendation and imposed the agreed upon sentence. The petitioner concurred in the recommendation. The trial court thereupon sentenced the petitioner as follows: (1) on the charge of attempted murder, thirteen years imprisonment; (2) on the charge of criminal possession of a revolver, two years imprisonment consecutive to the attempted murder count; and (3) on the charge of robbery in the first degree, ten years imprisonment “concurrent with the other counts.” (Emphasis added.) During the plea canvass, the trial court stated to the petitioner: “Mr. Gordon, having entered your plea of guilty to the charge(s), you understand there is an agreed stipulated sentence of fifteen years as a total effective sentence.” The petitioner responded: “Yes.” The petitioner did not challenge any aspect of this sentence on direct appeal.

The petitioner thereafter was committed to the custody of the commissioner under the authority of a judgment mittimus. Unfortunately, the mittimus listed the counts in an order reverse to that stated by the trial court in its imposition of sentence. Apparently as a result, and notwithstanding the unambiguous sentence imposed by the trial court, the mittimus stated the following: “On 1st count—5 yrs. may not be suspended or reduced On 2nd count—sentence may not be suspended or reduced 1st count to run concurrent with other counts; 2nd count to run concurrent with 1st count and consecutive with 3rd count 3rd count to run concurrent to 1st count and consecutive to 2nd count.” (Emphasis added.)

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the judicial district of Tolland challenging the legality of his sentence. On the basis of the defective mittimus, the petitioner argued to the habeas court that he had received both a concurrent and a consecutive sentence for the count of criminal possession of a revolver. The effect, the petitioner claimed, was that he had been sentenced to four years for that charge rather than the two years for which he had plea bargained.

After a hearing, the habeas court acknowledged that the trial court had intended to impose an aggregate sentence of fifteen years, but nonetheless concluded that “[t]he aggregate of the individual sentences actually imposed conflicted with that intent.” The habeas court agreed with the petitioner that the aggregate sentence was a “mathematical impossibility” because, in its interpretation of the sentence, “the two year term [ran] both consecutive to the thirteen year term and concurrent to the ten year term which is itself concurrent to the thirteen year term.” The habeas court reasoned that the ten year term, as imposed, was concurrent with both the thirteen and two year terms individually. As a result, it held that, pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-38 (b) (l), the two year sentence was absorbed within the ten year sentence making the total effective sentence thirteen instead of fifteen years. The habeas court then ordered the aggregate sentence reduced accordingly.

Thereafter, on September 17,1992, the habeas court denied the commissioner’s petition for certification from its ruling, and on September 24, 1992, the commissioner filed the present writ of error pursuant to Practice Book § 4143. On November 10,1992, the commissioner filed a motion for articulation of the habeas court’s decision. After the habeas court denied that motion, we granted the commissioner’s motion for review. The habeas court filed its memorandum of articulation in support of its judgment on January 11,1993. We now reverse the order of the habeas court.

Habeas corpus relief is generally reserved for those cases in which the petitioner has satisfied the heavy burden of proving that there has been a great miscarriage of justice or other prejudice. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1986); Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 840, 613 A.2d 818 (1992); Safford v. Warden, 223 Conn. 180, 191 n.13, 612 A.2d 1161 (1992); Lubesky v. Bronson, 213 Conn. 97, 110, 566 A.2d 688 (1989); D’Amico v. Warden, 193 Conn. 144, 156-57, 476 A.2d 543 (1984). While states commonly recognize habeas corpus as a means to obtain relief from an illegal sentence; see, e.g., People v. Craft, 41 Cal. 3d 554, 715 P.2d 585, 224 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1986); People ex rel. Harper v. Brantley, 34 Ill. App. 3d 807, 341 N.E.2d 126 (1975); Hern v. State, 849 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App. 1993); “a collateral attack is not a vehicle by which the . . . judge may for other reasons reduce a sentence.” 3 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 25.2, p. 133; see also United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979).

In the present case there was no illegal sentence or other miscarriage of justice for the habeas court to correct. The trial court properly sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of fifteen years. It is clear from the record, as the habeas court acknowledged, that the trial court unambiguously intended an aggregate sentence of fifteen years. After careful review of the transcript of the trial court’s sentence, we discern no impropriety in the manner by which that total effective sentence was either determined or imposed.

Multiple sentences imposed on a person run consecutively or concurrently with respect to each other in the manner directed by the court at the time of sentencing. General Statutes § 53a-37. In the present case, the trial court first sentenced the petitioner to thirteen years imprisonment for the crime of attempted murder. The trial court then sentenced the petitioner to two years imprisonment for the crime of criminal possession of a revolver. At this point, the trial court stated that the two year sentence was to be served consecutively to the thirteen year sentence resulting in an aggregate term of fifteen years. The trial court then sentenced the petitioner to ten years imprisonment for the crime of robbery in the first degree to be served concurrently to the sentence imposed for the first two counts thereby merging the ten year term into the fifteen year term. It was the trial court’s clear intention, therefore, that the ten year term was to be served concurrently to the fifteen year aggregate term to which the petitioner had already been sentenced resulting in a total effective sentence of fifteen years in the state prison. It is that intention that controls. State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 712-14, 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S. Ct. 2898, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1002 (1991).

The confusion, therefore, is caused by the judgment mittimus, which failed to reflect the sentencing court’s order, language and intent. As a result, the petitioner argued to the habeas court that the sentence expressed in the mittimus would cause him to serve the two year term for criminal possession of a revolver, and on that basis the habeas court reduced the total effective sentence to thirteen years. It is noteworthy that, in this case, all of the parties including the habeas court conceded that the mittimus was defective. The defect, however, is of little import because where the unambiguous intention of a sentencing court’s legal sentence conflicts with the wording of the judgment mittimus we conclude that the latter is preempted by the former. Id.

Historically, in English criminal practice a mittimus was a written order issued from a court or magistrate that directed a sheriff to deliver a person named therein to a specific jailer to be safely held until such time as a court of general or limited jurisdiction permitted the person to be released. See State v. Maier, 13 N. J. 235, 248-49, 99 A.2d 21 (1953); see also Tuttle v. Lang, 100 Me. 123, 127, 60 A. 892 (1905). A mittimus, then, was in a true sense a judicial warrant. See 1 J. Archbold, Criminal Procedure, Pleading and Practice (8th Ed. 1877) pp. 149-52; see also Saunders v. United States, 73 F. 782, 786 (C.C.D. Me. 1896).

Today, the mittimus has come to be regarded only as a clerical document that is certified by the clerk of the court. United States ex rel. Chasteen v. Denemark, 138 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1943). In an early case, the Hawaii Supreme Court succinctly asserted that the mittimus was but a “process” and that “[i]n cases where full light is not afforded by the mittimus . . . resort may be had to the record itself to ascertain what the sentence of the Court was.” In re Rhodus, 6 Haw. 343, 344 (1882). More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that “[a] mittimus is only a transcript of the minutes of the conviction and sentence duly certified by the clerk. The clerk has no power to control the effect of the sentence of the court by changing the time of the issuing of the mittimus. To determine which sentence shall be served first and whether one shall succeed the other is clearly a judicial act, which neither the clerk nor sheriff has power to perform.” People ex rel. Clancy v. Graydon, 329 Ill. 398, 401,160 N.E. 748 (1928).

Connecticut, as well, has long regarded the mittimus merely as a clerical document by virtue of which a person is transported to and rightly held in prison. See Payton v. Albert, 209 Conn. 23, 30 n.7, 547 A.2d 1 (1988); State v. Lenihan, 151 Conn. 552, 554-55, 200 A.2d 476 (1964); Redway v. Walker, 132 Conn. 300, 303, 43 A.2d 748 (1945). “We have observed that a mittimus after conviction in a criminal case is similar to an execution after judgment in a civil case; it is final process and carries into effect the judgment of the court.” Alexander v. Robinson, 185 Conn. 540, 547, 441 A.2d 166 (1981). If the judgment of the court and the language of the mittimus conflict, the judgment prevails because the prisoner is not detained by virtue of the warrant of commitment, but on account of the judgment and sentence. Hill v. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460, 465, 56 S. Ct. 760, 80 L. Ed. 1283 (1936); see also Reed v. Reincke, 158 Conn. 45, 47, 255 A.2d 850 (1969). We conclude, therefore, that if the judgment is valid, the confinement of the prisoner in accordance with the judgment cures any defect in the mittimus. See United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ragen, 150 F.2d 190, 191 (7th Cir. 1945).

A court on appeal has the inherent authority to remand a case to the trial court for a corrective resentence. See State v. Hanson, 210 Conn. 519, 531, 556 A.2d 1007 (1989) (remand for resentencing where the trial court was unaware that it had discretion to impose a suspended sentence); see also State v. Dennis, 30 Conn. App. 416, 426, 621 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 226 Conn. 901, 625 A.2d 1376 (1993) (remand to trial court to correct several defects regarding the imposition of certain consecutive and concurrent sentences). In the present case, although we conclude that there is no illegality or other impropriety apparent in the sentence imposed by the trial court, we must direct correction of the mittimus so that it comports with the trial court’s unambiguous judgment of conviction.

The judgment of the habeas court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and to order that the mittimus be corrected to reflect accurately the sentence imposed by the trial court.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit Ms gmlt, but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial.

       In exchange for the defendant’s plea, the state withdrew the remainder of a multicount information originally lodged against the defendant.

       The exact wording of the trial court’s oral imposition of sentence was as follows: “Okay. File 31577, on the charge of attempted murder it is the sentence of the court that you be committed to the custody of the commissioner of corrections of the state of Connecticut for a period of thirteen years in state’s prison.
      “On criminal possession of a revolver it is the sentence of the court that you be committed to the custody of the commissioner of corrections of the state of Connecticut for a period of two years, which may not be suspended or reduced, and that is consecutive to the charge of attempted murder.
      “On the charge of robbery in the first degree under [General Statutes §] 53a-134 (a) (2) it is the sentence of the court you be committed to the custody of the commissioner of corrections of the state of Connecticut for a period of ten years of which five years may not be suspended or reduced by any court, that to be concurrent with the other counts.
      “The [effective] sentence, sir, is fifteen years state’s prison.”

       At the habeas hearing, the defendant claimed that he did not understand the meaning or effect of the trial court’s statement and that he merely went along with his attorney’s urging that he answer “Yes” to this and other questions put to him during the plea canvass.

       The mittimus listed the first count as robbery in the first degree, the second count as criminal possession of a revolver and the third count as attempted murder.

       The defendant contends that his failure to appeal his sentence was understandable since the habeas court found that the trial court’s sentence was not “illegal” but “illogical,” and suggests that he could not appeal an “illogical” sentence. We regard the defendant’s challenge to his sentence as an attack on an illegal sentence and the habeas court’s treatment of the issue before it as a question of the legality of a sentence of imprisonment.

       The habeas court issued its oral decision at the hearing on September 1, 1992.

       General Statutes § 53a-38 (b) provides in relevant part: “A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run . . . .”

       Judge Sferrazza explained that, “[b]y [the trial court] stating that the ten year sentence was concurrent to both the thirteen year term and the two year term . . . the two year term [is] to be discharged upon satisfaction of the ten year term, which in turn, is satisfied when the thirteen year term expires.”

       General Statutes § 53a-38 (b) (2) provides: “If the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.”

       General Statutes § 53a-38 (b) (1) provides: “If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run.”

       This conclusion is buttressed by the trial court’s clear statement to the defendant that “[t]he [effective] sentence, sir, is fifteen years state’s prison,” as well as the fact that the petitioner had plea bargained for a fifteen year total sentence.

       The record reflects that the defendant’s habeas attorney, the same person who argued the instant appeal, herself conceded at the habeas hearing that “[t]here is a problem with the mittimus in that it imposes concurrent and consecutive sentences on each count. It's very—it’s ridiculously set up.” Later, the defendant’s counsel added: “The way this mittimus is set up is backwards, and it allows for particular counts and particular sentences to be both [consecutive and concurrent]. . . . The mittimus itself incorrectly lays out what the sentence is and should be.”
      The transcript of the habeas hearing further reflects that the state also conceded that the mittimus was in error.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Berdon, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Martin Crowell
    (14778)
    Callahan, Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Landau, Js.
    Argued November 4, 1993—
    decision released January 25, 1994

      Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and ElpedioN. Vitale, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

      Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
   Berdon, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the seven year limitation period in General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a may be applied to the child sex abuse offenses that were allegedly committed by the defendant, Martin Crowell. Section 54-193a took effect after the offenses were allegedly committed, but before the expiration of the five year limitation period of General Statutes § 54-193 (b), which originally had applied to such offenses. The trial court, Ronan, J., held that § 54-193a could not be applied retrospectively to the alleged offenses in light of this court’s decision in State v. Paradise, 189 Conn. 346, 456 A.2d 305 (1983). Because the original five year limitation period had expired before the initiation of the prosecution of the defendant for the alleged offenses, the trial court dismissed the charges against the defendant. We affirm.

The essential facts are undisputed. The defendant was arrested on November 18, 1991, on charges that he had sexually abused a young boy. The information filed by the state charged the defendant with: two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (l); one count of criminal attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (1) and General Statutes § 53a-49; two counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-71 (a) (l); one count of criminal attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree in violation of §§ 53a-71 (a) (1) and 53a-49; and three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. The state alleged that all of the offenses were committed between April and June, 1986, when the victim was five years old. The victim did not reveal that the alleged offenses had occurred until October, 1991.

The statute in effect at the time the alleged offenses were committed, § 54-193 (b), provided for a five year limitation period. That period expired even before the alleged victim came forward. Prior to the five year period expiring, however, the legislature enacted § 54-193a, which took effect on October 1, 1990. Section 54-193a provides a seven year limitation period for child sexual abuse offenses that are committed under circumstances like those of the present case.

On July 29,1992, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him claiming that the prosecution was time barred because: (1) the original five year statute of limitations expired before prosecution of the alleged offenses commenced; and (2) the newer seven year statute of limitations could not be applied in view of State v. Paradise, supra. The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted the motion to dismiss. The state appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We now affirm.

In State v. Paradise, supra, 352-53, we held that “statutes of limitation in criminal cases are to be construed liberally in favor of the accused . . . [and] are not to be accorded retrospective effect absent language clearly necessitating such a construction . . . .’’The defendants in Paradise were arrested in 1981 on charges that they had committed a murder in 1974. The statute of limitations in effect at the time of the murder was five years. The legislature amended the statute in 1976 to eliminate the limitation period for the prosecution of murder and certain other felonies. Id., 347-48. These facts make clear that in Paradise, we considered the identical issue raised in this appeal, that is, whether a new statute of limitations may be applied to an offense committed prior to its effective date, where the new statute takes effect before the original statute of limitations expires.

The state concedes that the trial court was required, under Paradise, to dismiss the charges against the defendant because neither the language nor the legislative history of § 54-193a indicates that the legislature intended the statute to have a retrospective effect. The state claims, however, that Paradise was “based on the faulty premise that the newer statute of limitations was sought to be applied ‘retroactively’ ” and therefore should be overruled. The state claims alternatively that “the rules of statutory construction that underlie the holding in Paradise are inapplicable” because “§ 54-193a is a remedial statute that must be construed in favor of child sex abuse victims.” We reject both of these arguments.

I

The state first claims that Paradise was based on the faulty premise that a statute of limitations that extends a previous limitation period before that previous period has expired is “retroactive.” The state claims that the application of an extended statute of limitations is not retroactive as long as the original limitation period has not expired. The state claims that to be “retroactive,” a statute must affect a “vested right” that existed on the date it took effect. Because a defendant has no right to a statute of limitations defense while the original limitation period remains unexpired, a new statute of limitations that takes effect before the original limitations period has expired does not affect a vested right and therefore cannot be retroactive. Therefore, the state argues, the Paradise court’s “reliance on rules of statutory construction pertaining to retroactivity is misplaced and should be reconsidered.” We disagree.

We note, first, that this same “vested right” argument was made by the state in Paradise and rejected by this court. See State v. Paradise, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, Dec. Term, 1982, Pt. 2, State’s Brief pp. 5-8,13-14. Therefore, this is not a case like State v. Welch, 224 Conn. 1, 615 A.2d 505 (1992), in which we overruled part of the holding of an earlier case. In Welch, we reviewed the briefs submitted in the earlier case and discovered that an issue underlying part of the holding in the case had not been independently briefed by the parties and considered by the court. Id., 5-6. We concluded, therefore, that this part of the holding had not “resulted from a careful judicial consideration of competing values, honed by the thoughtful arguments of the litigants then before the court.” Id., 5.

Unlike the situation in Welch, in State v. Paradise, supra, the state briefed the same argument it relies on in the present appeal. Further, we disagree with the state’s claim that in Paradise, this court mistakenly relied on rules of statutory construction pertaining to retroactivity. In Paradise, we relied principally on the case of State v. Jones, 132 Conn. 682, 47 A.2d 185 (1946). The statute at issue in Jones required the court before which any case involving a certain type of offense was pending to order an examination of the defendant for venereal disease. Id., 684. The statute took effect one month after the defendant allegedly committed the offense, but nine months before he was arrested. Id., 683-84. Under the state’s analysis, the statute in Jones would not be “retroactive” because the defendant did not acquire any “vested right” not to be examined before the statute took effect. Nevertheless, the court in Jones held that the statute could not be applied to a defendant whose offense was committed prior to the effective date of the statute, based on the principle that “in a criminal case a retrospective construction of a statute should not be adopted unless its language clearly makes such a construction necessary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 685.

After a thorough consideration of the parties’ arguments in State v. Paradise, supra, and the reasoning behind that decision, we conclude that it should not be overruled. The holding in Paradise was based firmly on the principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed; id., 352; not, as the state claims, on a technical misunderstanding of the nature of retroactivity. For this reason, we also reject the state’s suggestion that our recent decision in Roberts v. Caton, 224 Conn. 483, 619 A.2d 844 (1993), undermines our holding in Paradise. In Roberts, we held that an extended civil statute of limitations could be applied to the plaintiff’s suit even though the original limitations period expired before the extended statute took effect, rejecting the defendant’s claim that he had a vested right in the lapsing of the original statute. Id., 492. Roberts is not inconsistent with Paradise. In Paradise, we specifically stated that “[wjhile we affirm the continued vitality and utility of the principle that procedural statutes will be applied retrospectively absent a contrary legislative intent in the civil field, we recognize that the principle’s application in the criminal realm is limited.” State v. Paradise, supra, 351. Therefore, Roberts v. Caton, supra, is inapposite.

II

We next consider the state’s claim that the rules of statutory construction that underlie the holding in Paradise should not be applied to § 54-193a because this statute is remedial and must be construed in favor of child sex abuse victims. The state claims that § 54-193a is remedial in that “it seeks to correct a deficiency in the prior law—i.e., a limitation period that was not sufficiently long enough to enable society to redress certain wrongs perpetrated on its children.”

We have long held that “ ‘[cjriminal statutes are not to be read more broadly than their language plainly requires . . . .’ State v. McGann, 199 Conn. 163, 177, 506 A.2d 109 (1986); see also State v. White, 204 Conn. 410, 424, 528 A.2d 811 (1987); State v. Dolphin, 203 Conn. 506, 523, 525 A.2d 509 (1987). Moreover, ‘[a] penal statute must be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. State v. Paradise, 189 Conn. 346, 352, 456 A.2d 305 (1983).’ State v. Torres, 206 Conn. 346, 355, 538 A.2d 185 (1988); see also State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 641, 522 A.2d 795 (1987).” State v. Russell, 218 Conn. 273, 277-78, 588 A.2d 1376 (1991). “ ‘[A]mbiguities are ordinarily to be resolved in favor of the defendant.’ State v. McGann, [supra, 177]; State v. Russell, [supra, 277-78]; State v. Whiteman, 204 Conn. 98, 101, 526 A.2d 869 (1987) (penal statutes should be strictly construed in favor of the accused).” State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 317, 630 A.2d 593 (1993).

These general rules of construction for criminal statutes are further reinforced by the specific command of State v. Paradise, supra, that “criminal statutes [of limitations] are not to be accorded retrospective effect absent language clearly necessitating such a construction . . . .” Id., 353. We presume that the legislature is aware of the judicial construction placed upon its enactments. Cappellino v. Cheshire, 226 Conn. 569, 576, 628 A.2d 595 (1993); Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Huntley, 223 Conn. 22, 30, 610 A.2d 1292 (1992). State v. Paradise, supra, put the legislature on notice that if it intends that a new criminal statute of limitations should apply retrospectively, it must make that intent clear. The state cannot point to anything in the language of the statute or in its legislative history that expresses such an intent. Therefore, we must interpret the legislature’s silence to mean that § 54-193a was not intended to be applied retrospectively. The liberal construction urged by the state is therefore unwarranted.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 54-193, no person may be prosecuted for any offense involving sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault of a minor except within two years from the date the victim attains the age of majority or seven years after the commission of the offense, whichever is less, provided in no event shall such period of time be less than five years after the commission of the offense.”
      Number 93-340, § 11, of the 1993 Public Acts, which took effect October 1, 1993, amended § 54-193a to provide: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 54-193, no person may be prosecuted for any offense involving sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault of a minor except within two years from the date the victim attains the age of majority or within five years from the date the victim notifies any police officer or state’s attorney acting in his official capacity of the commission of the offense, whichever is earlier, provided in no event shall such period of time be less than five years after the commission of the offense.”

       General Statutes § 54-193 (b) provides in relevant part: “No person may be prosecuted for any offense, except a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-54d, for which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in excess of one year, except within five years next after the offense has been committed. ...”

       Because of this disposition, we need not consider the defendant’s alternative grounds for affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. The defendant claims that the application of General Statutes § 54-193a to him would violate article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution, and also the equal protection provisions of both the state and federal constitutions.

       General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1) provides: “A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person . . . .”

       General Statutes § 53a-49 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.”

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-71 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is (1) under sixteen years of age . . . .”
      Section 53a-71 was amended by No. 93-340, § 2, of the 1993 Public Acts, which took effect October 1, 1993.

       General Statutes § 53-21 provides: “Any person who wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that its life or limb is endangered, or its health is likely to be injured, or its morals likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.”


author: Peters, C. J. Palmer, J.,

text:
    Charles Lee Kluttz v. Glenn Howard et al.
    (14680)
    Peters, C. J., Borden, Berdon, Palmer and F. X. Hennessy, Js.

      Argued December 1, 1993—
    decision released February 1, 1994

      Michael J. Belzer, assistant attorney general, with whom were William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant Second Injury and Compensation Assurance Fund).

      Robert M. Fitzgerald, for the appellee (plaintiff).

      Clifford Davis filed a brief as amicus curiae.
   Peters, C. J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether our Workers’ Compensation Act (act) applies to an out-of-state nonresident employee of an out-of-state employer who sustains an employment-related injury as a result of an accident in Connecticut. In considering this issue, we must decide whether to revisit and overrule our recent decision in Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181, 588 A.2d 194 (1991). The defendant Second Injury and Compensation Assurance Fund (Fund) appealed to the Appellate Court from the decision of the compensation review division (review division) that affirmed the finding and award of the workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) on the plaintiff’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We affirm the decision of the review division.

The relevant facts are as follows. The plaintiff was a truck driver whose residence was in North Carolina. He was employed by the defendant Glenn Howard, doing business as Southland Distributors, a North Carolina company having an office in North Carolina but not in Connecticut. The plaintiff’s duties as a truck operator required him to pick up and deliver produce in numerous states and Canada. The employer did not carry workers’ compensation insurance.

In January, 1983, while in the course of his employment and operating a truck owned by his employer, the plaintiff was involved in an accident on Route 1-95 in Stratford as he was approaching a toll booth. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries and was hospitalized, first in Bridgeport and then in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

The plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim in Connecticut. The commissioner found that the plaintiff had suffered a total temporary disability for more than one year, had permanent significant scarring of his body, and had sustained some permanent partial disability. The commissioner, thus, ordered the Fund to pay various allowed medical bills, temporary total disability benefits, specific benefits for various scars on the plaintiff’s body and specific permanent disability benefits for injuries causally connected to the motor vehicle accident as determined at a future hearing upon the request of either party. Implicit within the commissioner’s finding and award was the conclusion that the commissioner had jurisdiction over the claim of the plaintiff for his injuries while in Connecticut.

The Fund appealed the finding and award to the review division, asserting that the commissioner had improperly determined that he had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim and had improperly denied the Fund’s motion to correct various paragraphs of the finding and award. The review division affirmed the finding and award of the commissioner, stating that, “[i]n the instant matter there is no question that Connecticut is the place where the injury occurred. Thus, under the principles of stare decisis we are bound to follow Cleveland.” Under Cleveland, the commissioner had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim because the plaintiff’s injury had occurred in this state.

On appeal, the Fund contends that the review division improperly affirmed the commissioner’s conclusion that he had jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case. The Fund emphasizes that the plaintiff was a North Carolina truck driver, who simply happened to be injured in Connecticut although he worked for a North Carolina employer, who did not carry workers’ compensation insurance. We disagree with the Fund’s contention.

In Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., supra, we directly addressed the question of the applicability of Connecticut’s act to an out-of-state nonresident employee of an out-of-state employer who is injured in the course of employment while in Connecticut. After full briefing and argument, this court, en banc, held that “[tjhe remedial purpose of our Workers’ Compensation Act supports application of its provisions in cases where an injured employee seeks an award of benefits and Connecticut is the place of the injury, the place of the employment contract or the place of the employment relation.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 195. We see no reason to revisit this determination. Stare decisis, although not an end in itself, serves the important function of preserving stability and certainty in the law. Accordingly, “a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it. Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc., p. 226.” Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); see also State v. Somerville, 214 Conn. 378, 384-85, 572 A.2d 944 (1990); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 335-36, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990). This is not such a case.

Our decision not to reexamine Cleveland is reinforced by legislative changes that will limit its precedential value in future cases. In its January, 1993 session, the General Assembly amended the act to exclude from the definition of employee “any person who is not a resident of this state but is injured in this state during the course of his employment, unless such person (I) works for an employer who has a place of employment or a business facility located in this state at which such person spends at least fifty per cent of his employment time, or (II) works for an employer pursuant to an employment contract to be performed primarily in this state.” Public Acts 1993, No. 93-228, § 1 (9) (B) (vi). Jesse M. Frankl, commissioner and chairman of the workers’ compensation commission, commented in legislative hearings on the significance of this change in the governor’s proposal to amend the act. He informed the labor and public employees committee of the General Assembly that the proposal added “a new provision that restricts nonresidents from receiving workers’ compensation benefits if they are employed by an out-of-state employer, or if the contract of employment is out-of-state, and that the only thing that occurs within the state is that they had an accident in the state. This would be an adoption of the minority opinion in the decision of Cleveland vs. the United States Printing, which is 218 Connecticut 181, also the decision known as the Clerk’s decision. That was a 4 to 3 decision, and this provision would adopt the minority position which would enable us to exclude a mere passing through the state as a provision of receiving workers’ compensation benefits.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor and Public Employees, 1993 Sess., pp. 1210-11. During the debate on the floor of the Senate, Senator Michael P. Meotti, explaining the provisions of the bill, stated that “[t]he [workers’ compensation] bill narrows compensability standards for . . . nonresidents.” 36 S. Proc., Pt. 11,1993 Sess., p. 3934.

“[0]ur usual presumption [is] that, in enacting a statute, the legislature intended a change in existing law. . . . This presumption, like any other, may be rebutted by contrary evidence of the legislative intent in the particular case. An amendment which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shelton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 193 Conn. 506, 513-14, 479 A.2d 208 (1984); Shortt v. New Milford Police Department, 212 Conn. 294, 303, 562 A.2d 7 (1989); Vartuli v. Sotire, 192 Conn. 353, 364 n.12, 472 A.2d 336 (1984). The statutory amendment of the definition of “employee” and the pertinent legislative history, however, are not sufficient to rebut the usual presumption and to evince a clear intent on the part of the legislature to enact a clarification of, rather than a change in, Connecticut’s workers’ compensation law. See Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 66, 566 A.2d 670 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 898, 111 S. Ct. 251, 112 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1990).

We conclude, therefore, that, until the 1993 amendment of the definition of “employee” in the act to exclude out-of-state nonresident employees of out-of-state employers who are injured in the state, the interpretation of the act that we announced in Cleveland was proper.

The judgment of the review board is affirmed.

In this opinion Borden and F.X. Hennessy, Js., concurred.

Berdon, J., concurring. I concur in the result.

Palmer, J.,

concurring.

I concur in the result. I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with the choice of laws principle adopted in Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181, 588 A.2d 194 (1991).

I do not believe that the legislature intended that the Second Injury and Compensation Assurance Fund (Fund) be available to compensate an out-of-state nonresident employee of an out-of-state trucking company for injuries to the employee resulting from a motor vehicle accident in Connecticut. In such circumstances, the only basis for compensating the plaintiff from the Fund is the happenstance that the accident occurred in this state. Application of the sensible choice of laws approach suggested for workers’ compensation cases by Justice Shea in his dissent in Cleveland, whereby we would apply the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the contract of employment rather than the law of the state in which the accident happened to occur; id., 195-97 (Shea, J., dissenting); would have avoided the unintended result reached in Cleveland. Applying the choice of laws principle espoused by Justice Shea to this case, the plaintiff, a North Carolina resident employed by a North Carolina company, would be entitled to compensation in North Carolina, where he has also filed a workers’ compensation claim, to the extent allowed by the laws of that state. He would not be eligible for compensation from this state’s Second Injury and Compensation Assurance Fund—a fund maintained through mandatory contributions from Connecticut employers—because Connecticut is not the state with the greatest interest in the plaintiff’s employment relationship.

It is not clear to me, moreover, that the scant legislative history of the 1993 amendment to the definition of the term “employee” reflects the intent of the legislature to change, rather than to clarify, the statutory scheme. That definitional revision, part of a major overhaul of the workers’ compensation statutes, drew only brief comment from two speakers, Senator Michael P. Meotti and Commissioner Jesse M. Frankl, chairman of the workers’ compensation commission. Meotti’s remarks on the proposed 1993 amendments included a single reference to the issue of recovery by nonresidents, without elaboration or discussion. See 36 S. Proc., Pt. 11,1993 Sess., p. 3934. Frankl, however, specifically noted that the proposed legislation adopted the position of the dissent in Cleveland, which, he concluded, more accurately reflected the legislative purpose underlying the Fund: “What occurs in a situation like this is that individuals, the employer in these cases are out of state, and therefore the second injury fund would have to come into being. And that’s not the purpose of the second injury fund. It’s to help pay for claims of Connecticut residents where the employer, for one reason or another, doesn’t have workers’ compensation insurance. ” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor and Public Employees, 1993 Sess., p. 1211. In my view, these comments, and the prompt legislative response to Cleveland in connection with the major revisions to the workers’ compensation statutes, suggest that the legislature may well have disapproved our holding in that case.

I agree with the majority, however, that stare decisis serves “the cause of stability and certainty in the law—a condition indispensable to any well-ordered system of jurisprudence . . Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 61-62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); and that “[t]he doctrine requires a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful before it is abandoned.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 335, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990). Subsequent to the effective date of the 1993 amendment, an out-of-state nonresident employee of an out-of-state employer will not be eligible for compensation from the Fund, so that, as the majority points out, the precedential value of Cleveland has been severely limited. Moreover, consideration must be given to the fact that Cleveland was decided by this court sitting en banc. I concur, therefore, notwithstanding my disagreement with our holding in Cleveland.

       The Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act can be found at chapter 568 of the General Statutes, §§ 31-275 through 31-355a.

         General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 31-30lb provides: “appeal of decision of compensation review division. Any party aggrieved by the decision of the compensation review division upon any question or questions of law arising in the proceedings may appeal the decision of the compensation review division to the appellate court.”

       The injury in this case occurred in January, 1983. We adhere to the date of injury rule as the applicable date for determining the rights and obligations as between parties in workers’ compensation cases. Iacomacci v. Trumbull, 209 Conn. 219, 222-23, 550 A.2d 640 (1988). Thus, the applicable statutes are those in effect at the time of the plaintiff’s date of injury. Cf. Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., 169 Conn. 646, 649-50, 363 A.2d 1085 (1975) (date of injury rule not applicable to changes in appellate procedure).

       The commissioner granted in part and denied in part the Fund’s motion to correct the finding and award.

       The Fund also asks this court to modify the commissioner’s ruling with regard to the commissioner’s denial of its motion to correct. The review division explicitly ruled on this issue. The relevant paragraphs in his decision that the commissioner refused to correct related to the plaintiff’s contacts with Connecticut, the reason that he brought a claim in Connecticut, the custom and practice of the Connecticut treasurer’s office in treating out-of-state employers with regard to the act, the mode of contribution to the Fund and the fact that the North Carolina workers’ compensation act does not have an assurance component. Each of these paragraphs is important to the Fund’s legal claim regarding jurisdiction. Since we decline to overrule our decision in Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181, 588 A.2d 194 (1991), the changes that the Fund seeks in its motion to correct would have no impact on the final disposition of this case. Therefore, the commissioner’s ruling on the motion to correct must be upheld.
      Furthermore, we have stated that “the power and duty of determining the facts [in workers’ compensation cases] rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . .The conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539, 542 A.2d 1118 (1988). Under this strict standard of review, we find no reason to overturn the commissioner’s findings.

       “Employee,” as of the date of the plaintiffs injury, was defined as “any person who has entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether such contract contemplated the performance of duties within or without the state or a sole proprietor or business partner who accepts the provisions of this chapter in accordance with subdivision (5) of this section, and shall include any person elected to serve as a member of the general assembly of this state and shall also include any salaried officer or paid member of any police department or fire department and any elected or appointed official or agent of any city, town or borough, upon vote of the proper authority of such city, town or borough, including such elected or appointed official or agent, in the state, irrespective of the manner in which he is appointed or employed, which provision shall not be construed as affecting any existing rights as to pensions which such persons or their dependents had on July 1,1927, or as preventing any existing custom of paying the full salary of any such person during disability due to injury arising in the course of and out of his employment or any volunteer police officer, whether such officer is designated as special or auxiliary, upon vote of the legislative body of the city, town or borough in which such officer serves; but said term shall not be construed to include: (A) An outworker; (B) one whose employment is of a casual nature, and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer’s trade or business; (C) a member of the employer’s family dwelling in his house; but, if in any contract of insurance the wages or salary of a member of the employer’s family dwelling in his house is included in the payroll on which the premium is based, then such person shall, in the event of his sustaining an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, be deemed an employee and compensated accordingly; (D) any person engaged in any type of service in or about a private dwelling provided he is not regularly employed by the owner or occupier over twenty-six hours per week; or (E) an employee of a corporation who is a corporate officer and who elects to be excluded from coverage under this chapter by notice in writing to his employer and to the commissioner having jurisdiction. For the purpose of determination of benefits payable under this chapter for death, disability or injury incurred by volunteer police officers, the average weekly wage of such officers shall be the average production wage in the state as determined by the labor commissioner under the provisions of section 31-309.” General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 31-275 (5).
      The definition was most recently amended in 1993 to provide “(A) ‘Employee’ means any person who:
      “(i) Has entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether the contract contemplated the performance of duties within or without the state;
      “(ii) Is a sole proprietor or business partner who accepts the provisions of this chapter in accordance with subsection (10) [the definition of employer] of this section;
      “(iii) Is elected to serve as a member of the general assembly of this state; “(iv) Is a salaried officer or paid member of any police department or fire department;
      “(v) Is a volunteer police officer, whether the officer is designated as special or auxiliary, upon vote of the legislative body of the town, city or borough in which the officer serves; or
      “(vi) Is an elected or appointed official or agent of any town, city or borough in the state, upon vote of the proper authority of the town, city or borough, including the elected or appointed official or agent, irrespective of the manner in which he is appointed or employed. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as affecting any existing rights as to pensions which such persons or their dependents had on July 1,1927, or as preventing any existing custom of paying the full salary of any such person during disability due to injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.
      “(B) ‘Employee’ shall not be construed to include:
      “(i) Any person to whom articles or material are given to be treated in any way on premises not under the control or management of the person who gave them out;
      “(ii) One whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer’s trade or business;
      “(iii) A member of the employer’s family dwelling in his house; but, if, in any contract of insurance, the wages or salary of a member of the employer’s family dwelling in his house is included in the payroll on which the premium is based, then that person shall, if he sustains an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, be deemed an employee and compensated in accordance with the provisions of this chapter;
      “(iv) Any person engaged in any type of service in or about a private dwelling provided he is not regularly employed by the owner or occupier over twenty-six hours per week;
      “(v) An employee of a corporation who is a corporate officer and who elects to be excluded from coverage under this chapter by notice in writing to his employer and to the commissioner; or
      “(vi) Any person who is not a resident of this state but is injured in this state during the course of his employment, unless such person (I) works for an employer who has a place of employment or a business facility located in this state at which such person spends at least fifty per cent of his employment time, or (II) works for an employer pursuant to an employment contract to be performed primarily in this state.” Public Acts 1993, No. 93-228, §1(9).

       The language concerning this subsection in the governor’s proposal was only slightly different from the language in the subsection that was eventually enacted in No. 93-228 of the 1993 Public Acts. The language in the governor’s proposal is as follows: “ ‘Employee’ shall not be construed to include . . . (vi) A person who is not a resident of the state of Connecticut, and who works for an employer that is not based in the state under an employment contract which is not based in the state, even if the injury occurs in Connecticut.” House Bill No. 6939, § 11, pp. 21-22 (1993).


author: Palmer, J.

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Henry Carter
    (14508)
    Peters, C. J., Callahan, Borden, Norcott and Palmer, Js.

      Argued September 21, 3993—
    decision released February 1, 1994

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, state’s attorney, and Robert A. Lacobelle, former assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Palmer, J.

A jury found the defendant, Henry Carter, guilty of the crime of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. The defendant has appealed from the judgment of the trial court sentencing him to a term of imprisonment of forty-five years. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) denied the defendant’s request to open his case, after he had rested, to introduce evidence of the victim’s criminal record; (2) excluded evidence of the prior criminal record of a state’s witness; and (3) instructed the jury on the issues of intent and motive. We agree with the defendant on the first issue and, on that basis, reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On the afternoon of May 31, 1990, the Bridgeport police received a report of a shooting at Lugo’s Market, a grocery store located on the east side of the city. When a police officer arrived at the market, he found the victim, Angel Diaz, lying face up on the floor, suffering from multiple gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen. The victim was transported by ambulance to an area hospital where he later died from those wounds.

Salvador Lngo, the owner of the market, had been alone in his store late that afternoon when he observed the victim enter the market, select a can of beer, and proceed into a shopping aisle near the front of the market. Lugo next observed the defendant enter the store and turn into the same shopping aisle as the victim. Due to the height of the market’s display shelves, Lugo could not see into the aisle occupied by the victim and the defendant, and he heard no conversation between them. Moments after the defendant had entered the shopping aisle, however, Lugo heard three gunshots from the vicinity of the aisle and immediately thereafter observed the defendant walk slowly out of the store. Lugo then proceeded to the aisle from which the shots had been fired and found the victim lying on the floor. The victim’s breathing was labored and he was bleeding from the chest.

Lugo, who was acquainted with the defendant, provided the police with the defendant’s description and directions to the defendant’s home, which was located near the market. When the police arrived at the defendant’s home, they were met at the door by the defendant’s mother, Patricia Lindsay. She told the police that she resided there with her husband, Forrest Lindsay, and the defendant. In response to questioning by the police, Patricia Lindsay stated that her husband kept a handgun at their residence. She voluntarily produced the handgun, a .38 caliber Rossi revolver, for the police, who noted the model and serial number of the handgun and returned it to her. The police also obtained Patricia Lindsay’s consent to search her home for the defendant, whom the police wanted to question, but they did not find him there.

The following day, while searching for additional evidence at the market, the police discovered a bullet lodged behind an empty beer can in the area of the store where the victim had been shot. The police returned to the defendant’s home and, with Forrest Lindsay’s permission, took possession of the .38 caliber Rossi revolver. An autopsy of the victim’s body revealed that his death had resulted from three gunshot wounds, including a wound caused by a bullet that had entered the victim’s back and pierced his aorta. Subsequent investigation determined that one of the two bullets extracted from the victim’s body and the bullet recovered from the market had been fired from the .38 caliber Rossi revolver obtained by the police from Forrest Lindsay.

The defendant was arrested for murder late in the evening of May 31, 1990. After he had been advised of his Miranda rights, the defendant gave the police a written, signed statement in which he acknowledged that he had been in Lugo’s Market at the time the victim had been shot. He denied, however, that he had been involved in the shooting, and instead described the perpetrator as a "white or Hispanic” male whom he could not identify. At trial, the defendant testified that he had, in fact, shot the victim, but that he had done so in self-defense. The jury found the defendant guilty of the crime of murder.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court’s refusal to allow him to present additional evidence immediately after he had rested his case and prior to the closing arguments of counsel constituted an abuse of discretion and deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. Specifically, the defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly excluded evidence of the victim’s convictions for crimes material to the defendant’s claim of self-defense. We agree.

The following background is relevant to this claim. The defendant testified at trial that the victim was a drug dealer who had operated his narcotics trafficking business across the street from the defendant’s home. The defendant also testified that in August, 1989, he had been shot in the back by the victim, not far from the defendant’s residence, that he had witnessed the victim’s participation in several other “shootouts,” including one in which a bullet had been fired into the defendant’s home, and that he had been aware that the victim had been convicted of assault and drug dealing. According to the defendant, he had become so fearful of the victim and so apprehensive of the drug related violence for which the victim and his associates were responsible that, in September, 1989, he had moved to Georgia, returning to Bridgeport in February, 1990, only after having been informed that the victim had been jailed on drug trafficking charges. The defendant further testified that, on May 30, 1990, the day before he fatally shot the victim, he had observed the victim and several associates selling drugs in front of the defendant’s home. The defendant noted that the victim had been in possession of a handgun at that time. The next afternoon, while the defendant waited for a bus near his home, he had been approached by several of the victim’s associates who had demanded to know why the defendant had been watching the victim’s activities the day before. According to the defendant, he had assured them that he had no interest in the victim or the victim’s activities. Shortly after that confrontation, the defendant had left the bus stop and had started to walk home. On his way home, the defendant stopped to purchase some items at Lugo’s Market, where he happened upon the victim in one of the store’s shopping aisles. The defendant claimed to have been so frightened of the victim that he had decided to leave the store immediately upon having seen the victim. As the defendant walked past the victim on his way out of the market, however, the victim struck him on the back of the head with a hard object, causing the defendant to lose his balance. The defendant testified that as he was falling, he had observed the victim reach toward his waistline as if to retrieve a gun. Believing that the victim intended to shoot him, the defendant drew a gun and shot the victim several times.

The defense rested its case in the late morning of August 23, 1991, after having presented the testimony of the defendant and several other witnesses. The state’s brief rebuttal case, which lasted until 11:45 a.m., consisted of the testimony of Bridgeport police detective Joseph Sherbo, who had already testified during the state’s case-in-chief. Upon the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the court announced a luncheon recess until 1 p.m., at which time counsel were to proceed with closing arguments to the jury. Immediately after the recess and before the court summoned the jury to return to the courtroom for closing arguments, however, the defendant moved for permission to introduce three criminal convictions of the victim: a January 20, 1989 conviction of assault in the third degree; a March 7, 1990 conviction, also of assault in the third degree; and a March 7,1990 conviction of possession of narcotics with intent to sell. The defendant argued that these convictions corroborated the defense testimony concerning the victim’s criminal history. The state objected to the defendant’s request to introduce the victim’s convictions solely on the ground that the defendant’s proffer was untimely, and the trial court denied the defendant’s request for that reason, concluding that the defendant’s request was simply “too late.”

We have recently had occasion to review the responsibilities of trial and reviewing courts with respect to a motion to introduce additional evidence after the moving party has rested. “[T]he reopening of a criminal case either to present omitted evidence or to add further testimony after either of the parties has rested is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court. State v. Brigandi, 186 Conn. 521, 545, 442 A.2d 927 (1982); see also State v. Zayas, 195 Conn. 611, 622-23, 490 A.2d 68 (1985) (Healey, J., dissenting); State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564, 580, 469 A.2d 397 (1983); State v. Holmquist, 173 Conn. 140, 152, 376 A.2d 1111, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 306, 54 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1977). If the trial court finds that inadvertence or some other compelling circumstance . . . justifies a reopening and no substantial prejudice will occur, it is vested with the discretion to reopen the case. State v. Brigandi, supra, 546; see also State v. McKnight, supra; State v. Holmquist, supra.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, 209 Conn. 622, 634-35, 553 A.2d 589 (1989). In order for the trial court’s exclusion of the proffered evidence to constitute a sixth amendment violation, however, “[i]t must be shown . . . that the . . . evidence was of such importance to the achievement of a just result that the need for admitting it overrides the presumption favoring enforcement of the state’s usual trial procedures. State v. McKnight, supra. A greater prejudice must be shown by the omission of the evidence in question than in refusals to receive evidence offered in the regular course of a trial. . . .Id.; Blaikie v. Callahan, 691 F.2d 64, 67-68 (1st Cir. 1982). If the motion to reopen is denied, we must, in determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, look to see if an injustice has occurred by the omission of the evidence. State v. McKnight, supra; State v. Holmquist, supra. However, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. . . . State v. Holmquist, supra; DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 298, 303 A.2d 709 (1972).” (Internal quotations marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, supra, 635.

The discretion accorded the trial court in such circumstances, therefore, though necessarily broad, is not unlimited. “The trial judge’s discretion, which is a legal discretion, should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McKnight, supra, 576-77. Consistent with this responsibility, the trial court may not, in light of all the relevant factors, arbitrarily or unreasonably reject a motion to introduce additional evidence after the moving party has rested.

In order to determine whether the trial court acted reasonably in denying the defendant’s request to open his case, we must first determine whether the victim’s criminal record would have been admissible had the defendant sought to introduce that evidence during the presentation of his case. If the proffered evidence would have been admissible had it been offered at that time, then we must determine whether the trial court could reasonably have excluded the evidence because it had not been tendered until after the defendant had rested his case.

The “sixth amendment right to compulsory process includes the ‘right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, [and] is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so that it may decide where the truth lies.’ ” State v. Genotti, 220 Conn. 796, 803-804, 601 A.2d 1013 (1992), quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967). Consistent with the defendant’s right fairly to inform the jury of facts material to the defense, “[i]t has long been the law in this state that, in a homicide prosecution, an accused may introduce evidence of the violent, dangerous or turbulent character of the victim to show that the accused had reason to fear serious harm, after laying a proper foundation by adducing evidence that he acted in self-defense and that he was aware of the victim’s violent character. State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107, 109, 405 A.2d 622 (1978), citing State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 456-57,138 A. 456 (1927). More recently, we joined a majority of courts when we expanded this rule to allow the accused to introduce evidence of the victim’s violent character to prove that the victim was the aggressor, regardless of whether such character evidence had been communicated to the accused prior to the homicide. State v. Miranda, supra. In Miranda, we determined that the victim’s violent character could be proved by reputation testimony, by opinion testimony, or by evidence of the deceased’s convictions for crimes of violence, irrespective of whether the accused knew of the deceased’s violent character or of the particular evidence adduced at the time of the death-dealing encounter. Id., 114.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 222 Conn. 1, 17-18, 608 A.2d 63, cert. denied, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 383, 121 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1992). Notwithstanding this general rule of admissibility, we have held that the defendant is not “authorized to introduce any and all convictions of crimes involving violence, no matter how petty, how remote in time, or how dissimilar in their nature to the facts of the alleged aggression. In each case the probative value of the evidence of certain convictions rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Miranda, supra.

The defendant contends that the victim’s convictions of assault and of possession of narcotics with intent to sell were material to his claim that he shot the victim in response to the victim’s initial aggression and with the reasonable belief that the victim intended to kill him or cause him serious physical harm. We agree.

The victim had been convicted of the earlier assault charge less than eighteen months prior to the fatal shooting, and his other two convictions preceded the shooting by less than three months. The convictions, therefore, were close in time to the deadly encounter between the victim and the defendant. The victim’s offenses were sufficiently serious, moreover, to warrant prison terms, including a one year term for the second assault and a seven year period of incarceration, suspended after three years, for the drug trafficking offense. Furthermore, the state objected to the introduction of the victim’s convictions not on the grounds that the offenses were too old, too insignificant or not sufficiently related to the defendant’s claim of self-defense, but solely because the defendant had not offered the evidence of the victim’s convictions until after he had rested his case. Finally, the trial court did not exclude the victim’s convictions for lack of probative value; the sole basis for the court’s ruling was the defendant’s failure to have presented the evidence during his case. In these circumstances, we conclude that evidence of the victim’s convictions was material to the defendant’s claim of self-defense and, therefore, that the convictions would have been admissible had they been offered during the presentation of the defense.

We next turn to whether the trial court acted within its broad discretion in rejecting the defendant’s request for permission to introduce the victim’s criminal record after the defendant had rested his case. In so doing, we are obligated to consider the specific circumstances of the defendant’s request, including the state’s interest in an orderly trial process, the potential for jurors to have placed undue emphasis on the evidence had it been admitted, and the nature of the evidence. See State v. McKnight, supra, 581. We conclude that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request was unreasonable and, therefore, an abuse of its discretion.

The defendant, who had rested his case shortly before the luncheon recess, sought permission to introduce the victim’s criminal record immediately after the recess and prior to the jury having been summoned back into the courtroom for counsels’ closing arguments. Therefore, the only proceedings to have taken place during the short interval between the conclusion of the defendant’s case and his request to introduce the victim’s convictions had been the brief rebuttal testimony of Detective Joseph Sherbo. In addition, the accuracy of the victim’s criminal record was not contested by the state, which had made that record available to the defendant. In view of the timing of the defendant’s motion and the undisputed accuracy of the proffered evidence, the introduction of the victim’s convictions, by way of stipulation or otherwise, would not have caused any delay or undue interruption of the trial proceedings. Likewise, the admission of the proffered evidence so soon after the defendant rested his case, and before the commencement of any other proceedings before the jury, would not have subjected the state to any risk that the jury might have placed unfair emphasis upon the evidence. Admission of the victim’s convictions, therefore, would not have disrupted the orderly trial process or prejudiced the state.

Furthermore, the evidence of the victim’s criminal record was central to the only contested issue in this case: whether the defendant’s shooting of the victim had been justified on the grounds of self-defense. The proffered evidence was especially critical because the defendant was the only eyewitness to the fatal altercation, and evidence of the victim’s convictions would have provided objective corroboration of the defendant’s claim that the victim was a person of violent character who had acted as the initial aggressor. In these circumstances, we can ascertain no valid reason why the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to introduce the victim’s convictions.

A trial court is vested with the discretion to allow a party to open its case after that party has rested in order to preserve the fundamental integrity of the trial’s truth-finding function. Therefore, unyielding adherence to considerations of procedure, without regard to other factors bearing upon the moving party’s request to open its case, is not consistent with the responsibility of the trial court to exercise its discretion in a manner that enhances the likelihood of a fair and informed verdict. Although we recognize that the right of a defendant to present a defense is subject to appropriate supervision by the trial court in accordance with established rules of procedure and evidence; see, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-11, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988) (trial court may exclude testimony of alibi witness as sanction for defense counsel’s violation of local discovery rules); State v. McKnight, supra (testimony of additional alibi witness may be excluded where jury had already begun deliberations); State v. Mason, 186 Conn. 574, 581, 442 A.2d 1335 (1982) (trial court may exclude evidence relating to homicide victim’s violent character where such evidence is merely cumulative); we are also mindful that the fair opportunity to establish a defense “is a fundamental element of due process of law”; Washington v. Texas, supra, 19; and that our rules should not be applied mechanistically so as to restrict unreasonably that important right. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973); State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 376, 545 A.2d 1048 (1988). The trial court’s exclusion of the evidence proffered by the defendant, solely because that evidence had been tendered just after, rather than just before, the brief luncheon recess, significantly impaired the defendant’s ability to present his defense to the jury, and furthered no legitimate interest of the court or of the state. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request to open his case to allow the introduction of the victim’s criminal record constituted an abuse of discretion.

We must now determine whether the improper exclusion of the victim’s criminal record entitles the defendant to a new trial. In the circumstances of this case, evidence of the victim’s convictions was of such importance to the defendant’s claim of self-defense that its exclusion deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment right fairly to present to the jury his version of the facts. Because the trial court’s rejection of the defendant’s motion implicated the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, the burden falls on the state to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 253-54, 630 A.2d 577 (1993); State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 332-33, 618 A.2d 32 (1992); State v. Truppi, 182 Conn. 449, 465, 438 A.2d 712 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941,101 S. Ct. 2024, 68 L. Ed. 2d 329 (1981). “If the evidence may have had a tendency to influence the judgment of the jury, it cannot be considered harmless.” State v. Colton, supra, 254; see also State v. Miranda, supra, 115.

As we have discussed, admission of the victim’s convictions would have tended to corroborate the defendant’s testimony that the victim was a violent person who had shot and wounded the defendant in the past and who had acted as the initial aggressor when he encountered the defendant at Lugo’s Market. In addition, because the defendant was the only eyewitness to the fatal shooting, his credibility on the issue of the victim’s aggressive behavior was critical to his claim of self-defense, the only contested issue in the case. Because evidence of the victim’s criminal record would have been “highly relevant in helping the jury to determine whether the victim had a violent disposition and whether the defendant’s story of self-defense [was] truthful”; State v. Miranda, supra, 113-14; that evidence might well have influenced the jury’s decision.

Moreover, the harm to the defendant’s claim of self-defense resulting from the exclusion of the victim’s criminal record was compounded when the assistant state’s attorney, in his rebuttal to the defendant’s closing argument, commented: “Ladies and Gentlemen, in rebuttal, let me say this. You heard what a bad person Mr. Angel Diaz was. We weren’t here to try that. That’s not what the state had to either prove or disprove. The elements of the crime charged are what the state had to prove. In fact, [there] wasn’t even a whole lot of cross-examination on that because the only people that said he was a bad person was the defendant and his mother. ” (Emphasis added.) The state, therefore, taking advantage of the trial court’s exclusion of the victim’s convictions, highlighted the fact that the jury had before it no independent or objective evidence of the victim’s violent character.

In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the exclusion of the victim’s criminal record was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant, therefore, is entitled to a new trial, and we remand the case to the trial court for that purpose.

II

Although our resolution of the first issue is dispositive of this appeal, we address two other issues raised by the defendant that are likely to arise at a new trial. The defendant contends that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the criminal convictions of a state’s witness, thereby improperly limiting the defendant’s right to cross-examine that witness, and (2) the trial court’s instructions to the jury on intent and motive were improper. We disagree with both of these claims.

A

The defendant contends that he should have been allowed to impeach the state’s witness, the shopkeeper, Salvador Lugo, with two of Lugo’s prior convictions, and that the trial court’s exclusion of those convictions improperly abridged the defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. The trial court ruled that the witness’ 1979 convictions of manslaughter in the first degree and of carrying a pistol without a permit were too remote in time and, in addition, that those offenses did not bear directly upon the witness’ veracity.

“The credibility of a witness may be attacked by introducing the witness’ conviction of a crime if the maximum penalty for that conviction is imprisonment exceeding one year. See General Statutes § 52-145 (b); State v. Braswell, 194 Conn. 297, 307, 481 A.2d 413 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1112, 105 S. Ct. 793, 83 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1985).” State v. Sauris, 227 Conn. 389, 409, 631 A.2d 238 (1993). “Three factors have usually been identified as of primary importance in considering whether a former criminal conviction is to be admitted: (1) the extent of the prejudice likely to arise; (2) the significance of the commission of the particular crime in indicating untruthfulness; and (3) its remoteness in time.” State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513, 522, 447 A.2d 396 (1982). We will not disturb the trial court’s determination as to the admissibility of a prior conviction to impeach a witness absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Braswell, supra; State v. Nardini, supra, 521-22.

We are satisfied that the trial court acted within its discretion in precluding the introduction of the witness’ two convictions for impeachment purposes. Although we have left to the trial court the responsibility for determining whether, in a particular case, a witness’ criminal conviction may be excluded on the grounds that it is too old, “we have sanctioned a general guideline for the determination of remoteness that parallels rule 609 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 609 (b) establishes a ten year limitation from conviction or release from resulting confinement upon the use of the conviction for impeachment purposes unless the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” State v. Sauris, supra, 409-10; State v. Nardini, supra, 522. Here, the witness’ two convictions fell outside that general ten year guideline. Although “convictions having some special significance upon the issue of veracity may surmount the standard ten year bar”; State v. Sauris, supra, 410; State v. Nardini, supra, 525-26; there is no claim that the crimes of manslaughter or carrying a pistol without a permit bear any such special relationship to credibility. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in excluding the witness’ two convictions for impeachment purposes. Because the defendant was not entitled to use those convictions to impeach the witness, the defendant’s claim under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the federal constitution must also fail. See State v. Sauris, supra, 413; State v. Moye, 214 Conn. 89, 95, 570 A.2d 209 (1990).

B

Finally, the defendant asserts that the trial court’s charge on motive and intent was improper because it placed undue emphasis on the fact that evidence of motive may be strong evidence of guilt, and thereby diminished the state’s burden of proof on the element of intent. We are unpersuaded. The trial court’s well balanced jury instructions repeatedly stressed the state’s burden of proving the defendant’s intent beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court fully explained and carefully distinguished the concepts of intent and motive. Although the trial court charged the jury that the existence of a motive may be evidence of guilt, the court also informed the jury that it might reasonably consider the absence of a motive in determining whether the state had proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In the context of the overall charge, therefore; see State v. Cooper, 227 Conn. 417, 444, 630 A.2d 1043 (1993); State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 249, 627 A.2d 877 (1993); the trial court’s instructions on intent and motive provided the jury with appropriate guidance on those issues, and did not dilute the state’s burden on the element of intent.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “murder, (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person ....
      “(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony . . . .”

       The defendant appeals directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b), which provides in relevant part: “The following matters shall be taken directly to the supreme court ... (3) an appeal in any criminal action involving a conviction for a capital felony, class A felony, or other felony ... for which the maximum sentence which may be imposed exceeds twenty years . . . .”

       The defendant also claims that certain comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument were improper, and that the combined effect of the alleged trial errors requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction. It is not necessary for us to reach these issues. We do consider, however, the defendant’s claims concerning the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of the witness’ criminal record, and the trial court’s instructions on motive and intent, because these issues are likely to arise at a new trial.

       As a result of substantial surface damage to a second .38 caliber bullet recovered from the victim’s body, the state’s ballistics expert could not determine whether it also had been fired from the revolver turned over to the police by Forrest Lindsay.

        Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

       The defendant also claims a violation of his rights under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. Because he has failed to provide an independent analysis of his claim under the state constitution, we shall limit our review of this issue to the defendant’s claim under the United States constitution. See State v. Walton. 227 Conn. 32,62 n.24, 630 A.2d 990 (1993); State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 328 n.4, 618 A.2d 32 (1992).

       Our review of the record indicates that the defendant’s federal constitutional claim that the trial court improperly limited his right to present a defense was not specifically raised by the defendant at trial. Therefore, this claim is reviewable only under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). We conclude that the defendant has satisfied all of the conditions set forth in Golding concerning unpreserved constitutional claims; id., 239-40; and, therefore, that he is entitled to full appellate review of his claim.

       The defendant testified that he had been treated for the gunshot wounds inflicted by the victim in that incident and that he had reported the assault to the police.

       The defendant’s mother, Patricia Lindsay, also testified about the constant drug dealing and gunplay in the neighborhood, and she identified the victim as a regular participant in those activities. In addition, she corroborated the defendant’s testimony that he had not returned to Connecticut from Georgia until she and the defendant had believed that it was safe for him to do so.

       The trial had commenced on August 6, 1991.

       Defense counsel had received a copy of the victim’s criminal record several months prior to trial; see footnote 12; and had inadvertently failed to introduce the victim’s convictions during the presentation of the defense case. There is no suggestion that defense counsel delayed his tender of the victim’s convictions for any strategic or dilatory reason.

       The following colloquy took place between the trial court and defense counsel concerning the defendant’s request for permission to introduce evidence of the victim’s convictions.
      “[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I would ask—Your Honor, in the disclosure of April 3rd, 1991, there is a document contained therein which appears to be a copy of the computer record of Angel Diaz. Your Honor, I would ask the court to allow the defense to present that item or the court take judicial notice of that item, showing that Angel Diaz, in fact, was convicted of two assaults and a narcotics conviction, ‘WITS’ is apparently with intent to sell. This would corroborate the testimony of my client who indicated that he had firm knowledge that—that he had heard of the victim in this case having been to jail and having a record. There was a cross-examination on that point by Mr. Lacobelle, or there was objection at the time.
      “The Court: The parties are at rest, Mr. Schipul.
      “[Defense Counsel]: What was that, Your Honor?
      “The Court: The parties are at rest. We’re not at final argument.
      “[Defense Counsel]: I’m asking Your Honor to allow the defendant to enter that item into evidence at this time.
      “The Court: Mr. Lacobelle?
      “[Assistant State’s Attorney]: We’re done with the case. If we could just put in evidence after we’re at rest from the court file, I guess then the state could put in the fact that he requested to have the bullets examined by his own expert.
      “The Court: No, I’ll deny that request. I think it’s too late.
      “[Defense Counsel]: I’ll take an exception.
      “The Court: May be noted.
      “[Defense Counsel]: I think it would serve the end of justice—
      “The Court: You got your argument and I’ve got your exception. I’ll deny it.”
      The state argues that the defendant’s proffer failed properly to alert the trial court as to the nexus between the victim’s convictions and his alleged violent character. We agree that defense counsel's comments on that issue were not a model of clarity insofar as they tended to emphasize the corroborative nature of the proffered evidence rather than its relevancy to the witness’ propensity for violence. We are persuaded, however, upon a careful review of the defendant’s testimony concerning the victim’s violent character and related criminal record, that defense counsel’s argument was sufficient, in the circumstances, to have apprised the trial court of the relevance of the victim’s violent criminal history to the defendant’s claim of self-defense.

       The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .” This right is applied to state prosecutions through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967); State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564, 581, 469 A.2d 397 (1983).

       The victim received a sentence of one year imprisonment, suspended, and three years probation, for the earlier of the two assault convictions.

       On appeal, the state has not pressed the claim that the defendant’s convictions for assault and narcotics trafficking were too remote in time, too petty or too dissimilar in nature to the facts of the victim’s alleged aggression toward the defendant. Moreover, in view of the defendant’s testimony concerning the repeated assaultive behavior of the victim, the relationship between the victim’s violent conduct and his drug trafficking activities, the proximity in time of the victim’s assault and drug dealing offenses to the incident in question, the defendant’s knowledge of those convictions, and the defendant’s fear of the victim stemming from the victim’s drug related violence, we are satisfied that all three of the victim’s convictions were material to the defense. A homicide victim’s recent, sufficiently serious assault conviction generally will be relevant to the defendant’s claim of self-defense, subject to a case-by-case determination by the trial court; see, e.g., State v. Mason, 186 Conn. 574, 581 n.5, 442 A.2d 1335 (1982); State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107,114-15,405 A.2d 622 (1978); and there is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that the victim’s assault convictions were not material to the victim’s violent nature. Although a drug trafficking conviction, without more, is not likely to be probative of a homicide victim’s propensity for violence, notwithstanding the “well established correlation between drug dealing and firearms”; State v. Cooper, 227 Conn. 417, 426 n.5, 630 A.2d 1043 (1993); see also United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d 916, 926 (2d Cir. 1988) (weapons are tools of the narcotics trade); United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1987) (for narcotics traffickers, possession of firearms is as common as possession of drug paraphernalia); such a conviction may be relevant to the victim’s violent character, and therefore to the defendant’s claim of self-defense, depending upon the specific facts and circumstances of the case and the conviction. Here, the victim’s drug dealing activities were so closely linked to the victim's alleged violent conduct and use of firearms, and to the defendant’s alleged fear of the victim, that the victim’s recent conviction for possession of narcotics with intent to sell had a direct bearing on the defendant’s claim that the victim was a violent drug dealer whom the defendant had shot and killed in self-defense.

       The trial court also prohibited the defendant from impeaching Lugo with a 1962 conviction of seduction of a minor female. The defendant has not challenged that ruling.

       The pertinent provision of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); State v. Oehman, 212 Conn. 325, 329 n.3, 562 A.2d 493 (1989).
      The defendant also alleges a violation of his rights under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. He has not, however, provided any independent analysis of this claim. We therefore consider only the the defendant’s federal constitutional claim. See footnote 6.

       The record indicates that the witness entered guilty pleas to each of the two charges on December 6,1979, and that he was sentenced for both offenses on January 16,1980. The witness received a sentence of three to seven years imprisonment, execution suspended, and two years probation, for the manslaughter conviction, and a term of imprisonment of one year and a $1000 fine for the weapons offense.

       Rule 609 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part: “Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”
      We have noted that “this federal standard is not our own, but rather serves ‘as a rough bench mark in deciding whether trial court discretion has been abused . . . .’ State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513, 526, 447 A.2d 396 (1982).” State v. Sauris, 227 Conn. 389, 409 n.14, 631 A.2d 238 (1993).

       Unlike convictions for crimes involving fraud or dishonesty, crimes of violence generally have no direct bearing upon a witness’ truthfulness; State
        v. Pinnock, 220 Conn. 765, 782, 601 A.2d 521 (1992); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 631, 644, 458 A.2d 379 (1983); and neither the crime of manslaughter; State v. Wright, 198 Conn. 273, 278, 502 A.2d 911 (1986); nor that of carrying a pistol without a permit; State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513, 526-30, 447 A.2d 396 (1982); has any such special or direct relevancy to credibility.

       Although the danger of unfair prejudice posed by the use of a conviction to impeach a criminal defendant is considerably greater than the risk of undue prejudice resulting from the use of such a conviction against a witness other than the defendant; State v. Binet, 192 Conn. 618, 623, 473 A.2d 1200 (1984); “the trial court always has the responsibility to consider the potential prejudice stemming from the impeachment of any witness with evidence of conviction of a crime State v. Cooper, 227 Conn. 417, 435, 630 A.2d 1043 (1993); State v. Pinnock, 220 Conn. 765, 782, 601 A.2d 521 (1992).

       We note that the defendant was otherwise allowed wide latitude in his cross-examination of the witness.