text:
    ANTHONY R. MARTIN v. JAMES BRADY ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16583.

      Norman A. Pattis, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 433 (AC 20808), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 710 A.2d 688 (1998), does not permit the plaintiffs tort action because (1) the defendants are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and (2) the facts are not sufficiently egregious?”

Robert F. Vacchelli, assistant attorney general, in opposition.

Decided September 20, 2001


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    MILFORD BEACH ASSOCIATES v. ROBERT HEYER ET AL.

      Abram Heisler, in support of the petition.

      Eric T. Dean, Jr., in opposition.
    Decided September 20, 2001
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 901 (AC 20868), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALKEITH GAYLE

      James B. Streeto, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 20, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 596 (AC 20881), is denied.


text:
    DANIEL DUMONT v. UBC, INC.

      Daniel Dumont, pro se, in support of the petition.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 903 (AC 20912), is denied.

A. Jeffrey Somers, in opposition.

Decided September 20, 2001


text:
    SHAWN NEWSOME v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Raymond J. Rigat, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Frederick W. Fawcett, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 20, 2001
   The petitioner Shawn Newsome’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 904 (AC 20915), is denied.


text:
    SHIRLEY WILLIAMS v. KRISTINE D. RAGAGLIA, COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16587.

      Stephen G. Vitelli, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.
    Decided September 20, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 171 (AC 21158), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that this administrative appeal regarding the revocation of the plaintiffs special study foster care license was not moot?”


text:
    SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITY CONTROL
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16582.

      Ralph G. Elliot, in support of the petition.
    Decided September 20, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 134 (AC 21212), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs administrative appeal?”


text:
    SUFFIELD DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. NATIONAL LOAN INVESTORS, L.P., ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16586.

      Richard P. Weinstein and Nathan A. Schatz, in support of the petition.

      Kerry R. Callahan and Donald C. Mahoney, in opposition.
    Decided September 20, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 192 (AC 21253), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged facts constituting causes of action for: (1) abuse of process; (2) fraudulent misrepresentation; or (3) violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act?”

SULLIVAN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALSTON WILLIAMS

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 20, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 59 (AC 21243), is denied.

NORCOTT and KATZ, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    AMITY REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5 v. ATLAS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY ET AL.

      Ralph G. Elliot, in support of the petition.

      Thomas G. Librizzi, Jennifer A. Osowiecki, Steven D. Ecker, Thomas J. Murphy and James R. Smart, in opposition.
    Decided September 20, 2001
   The petition of Carole W. Briggs for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21808) is denied, as a writ of error is the proper vehicle by which this court may consider the nonparty attorney’s claim.

SULLIVAN, C. J., and KATZ and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSEPH J. MINCEWICZ

      Lisa J. Steele, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided September 26, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 687 (AC 19210), is denied.


text:
    IN RE JEFFREY C.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16595.

      Mary K. Lenehan, assistant attorney general, in support of the petition.
    Decided September 26, 2001
   The petition by the commissioner of children and families for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 55 (AC 20767), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Are ‘specific steps’ ordered by a court, following a hearing at which the parent is present and represented by counsel, court orders from which a finding of contempt may issue?”


text:
    ROSE LAFLAMME v. JOSEPH DALLESSIO, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF DOMINIC DALLESSIO)
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 1 (AC 20554), is granted, limited to the following issue:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16594.

Michael W. Levy, in support of the petition.

John P. Calabrese, in opposition.

Decided September 26, 2001

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that there was no material question of fact regarding whether the defendant executor owed a duty of care to the plaintiff?”


text:
    KATHLEEN M. CORCORAN v. JESSE MCCOY TAYLOR

      Frank J. Kolb, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Kerry R. Callahan and SheaS. Kinney, in opposition.
    Decided September 26, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 340 (AC 20571), is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALEXANDER BARBER

      Damon A. R. Kirschbaum, in support of the petition.

      John A. East III, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 659 (AC 18763), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    DAVID JOHNSON ET AL. v. TOWN OF NORTH BRANFORD ET AL.

      William S. Palmieri, in support of the petition.

      Stephen J. Courtney, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 643 (AC 19891), is denied.


text:
    CARISSA BONITO v. CAMBRIDGE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY

      Jon D. Biller, in support of the petition.

      Justin J. Donnelly, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 487 (AC 20930), is denied.


text:
    WILLIAM P. GELINAS v. TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD ET AL.

      Timothy J. Fitzgerald, in support of the petition.

      Elizabeth Dee Bailey, assistant corporation counsel, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 265 (AC 13774), is denied.


text:
    MOEY SEGAL v. LEONOR MIDVIDY SEGAL

      William C. Franklin, in support of the petition.

      Brian McCormick, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 17 (AC 19485), is denied.


text:
    MOEY SEGAL v. LEONOR MIDVIDY SEGAL
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16604.

      Brian McCormick, in support of the cross petition.

      William C. Franklin, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The defendant’s cross petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 17 (AC 19485), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the money judgment rendered in the defendant’s favor in Nevada is unenforceable in this state, despite the plaintiff debtor’s failure to comply with General Statutes § 52-606 (a), which requires proof that he has furnished security for the satisfaction of the Nevada judgment on appeal as required by Nevada law?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN WILLIAMS
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 449 (AC 19526), is denied.

NORCOTT and KATZ, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Pamela S. Nagy, special public defender, in support of the petition.

John A. East III, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided October 10, 2001


text:
    PAUL MURRAY v. RODERICK G. TAYLOR ET AL.

      William C. Franklin, in support of the petition.

      Edward F. Hennessey, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 300 (AC 19569), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    KRISTINE PINCHBECK v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH ET AL.

      Thomas E. Crosby, in support of the petition.

      Marjorie Shansky and Marianne I. Horn, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 201 (AC 20125), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DEOWRAJ BUDDHU
   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 104 (AC 20212), is granted, limited to the following issues:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16605.

Robert J. Scheinblum, assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

Decided October 10, 2001

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the search warrant in question did not satisfy the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution?

“2. If the answer to the first question is ’no,’ did the trial court properly conclude that (a) the warrant was not supported by probable cause and (b) the search exceeded the scope of the warrant?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES R. SILVA JAMES R. SILVA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Deborah G. Stevenson, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Lawrence J. Tytla, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The petition by James R. Silva for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 234 (AC 20951/AC 20317), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    DANIEL PANTANELLA v. ENFIELD FORD, INC., ET AL.

      David A. Kelly, in support of the petition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The petition by the defendant Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 46 (AC 20453), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GREGORY JOHNSON

      Suzanne Zitser, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Christopher T. Godialis, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 470 (AC 20635), is denied.

NORCOTT and KATZ, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SCOTT SMITH
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16606.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 126 (AC 20829), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree?”

James B. Streeto, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided October 10, 2001


text:
    JANICE MURRAY v. PAUL MURRAY

      Lori Welch-Rubin and Christine M. Whitehead, in support of the petition.

      Michael S. Taylor and Wesley W. Horton, in opposition.
    Decided October 10, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 90 (AC 20847), is denied.


text:
    VALERIE P. CRAIG ET AL. v. STEVEN P. DRISCOLL ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16608.
   The petition for certification of the defendants, David L. Davis and Hawk’s Nest, Inc., for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 699 (AC 19299), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint stated a cause of action for (1) negligent infliction of emotional distress on a bystander and (2) reckless infliction of emotional distress on a bystander?”

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Patrick J. Walsh and Richard P. Hastings, in support of the petition.

Decided October 16, 2001


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CAESAR O’NEIL
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16607.

      Frederick W. Fawcett, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition.

      Neal Cone, assistant public defender, in opposition.
    Decided October 16, 2001
   The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 145 (AC 19710), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction for attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) and 53a-54a?”


text:
    ROBERT M. CHEVERIE v. ASHCRAFT & GEREL

      William J. Sweeney, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Joseph D. Garrison, in opposition.
    Decided October 16, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 425 (AC 20858), is denied.


text:
    EUGENE CHIMBLO v. GERHARD HUTTER ET AL.

      Gerhard flutter, pro se, Nance ffutter, pro se, Maximilian flutter, pro se, and Rudolf flutter, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided October 16, 2001
   The petition for certification of the defendants, Ger-hard Hutter, Nance Hutter, Maximilian Hutter and Rudolph Hutter, for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21858) is denied.


text:
    DAVID ABRAMCZYK v. STEPHANIE ABBEY

      Thomas P. Willcutts, in support of the petition.

      Deborah L. Bradley, in opposition.
    Decided October 25, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 442 (AC 20246), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DIANA LISEVICK

      Moira L. Buckley, deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

      Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 25, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 493 (AC 19472), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAYMOND BRIDGES

      Damon A. R. Kirschbaum, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Ronald G. WeUer, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 25, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 517 (AC 19589), is denied.


text:
    HEIDI SCHIMMELPFENNIG v. JARRED CUTLER ET AL.

      Christopher P. Anderson, in support of the petition.

      Patty G. Swan, in opposition.
    Decided October 25, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 388 (AC 20711), is denied.


text:
    ADIL MULLA v. JAMES P. MAGUIRE, JR., ET AL.

      Marcus G. Organschi, in support of the petition.

      Stephen R. Griffin, in opposition.
    Decided October 25, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 525 (AC 20861), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRENT MCCALL

      Michael T. Wade, in support of the petition.

      Denise B. Smoker, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 31, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 62 Conn. App. 161 (AC 18073), is dismissed.

NORCOTT and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRENT MCCALL

      Michael T. Wade, in support of the petition.
    Decided October 31, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 62 Conn. App. 161 (AC 18073), is denied.

NORCOTT and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PATRICIA STERN

      Peter R. Stark, in support of the petition.

      Bruce R. Lockwood, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 31, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 634 (AC 20664), is denied.


text:
    GREGORY FIELDS v. WILFREDO GIRON

      Salvatore C. DePiano, in support of the petition.

      Steven J. Barber, in opposition.
    Decided October 31, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 771 (AC 20680), is denied.


text:
    ELIAS KALIMIAN, TRUSTEE v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF NORWICH ET AL.

      Adam A. Ldben, in support of the petition.

      Bruce G. MacDermid, in opposition.
    Decided October 31, 2001
   The petition by the defendant Steven Brenneisen for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 628 (AC 20882), is denied.


text:
    CHRISTINE LATHURAS v. SHORELINE DENTAL CARE, LLC, ET AL.

      William F. Gallagher and Hugh D. Hughes, in support of the petition.

      Scott S. Centrella, in opposition.
    Decided October 31, 2001
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 509 (AC 21025), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    EDGAR TATUM v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Felix Esposito, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Marjorie AUen Dauster, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided October 31, 2001
   The petitioner Edgar Tatum’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 61 (AC 20432), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    TOWN OF GROTON v. CATHY LEWIS ET AL.

      Eustace H. Lewis, Jr., pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided October 31, 2001
   The petition by the defendant Eustace H. Lewis, Jr., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21933) is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    KEVIN STROBEL v. ROSE LI-HWA STROBEL

      Rose Li-Hwa Strobel, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided November 7, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 614 (AC 20269/ AC 20276), is denied.


text:
    ROCCO MUSOROFITI ET AL. v. JUDITH A. VLCEK ET AL.

      James E. Mattem, in support of the petition.

      Keith S. McCabe, in opposition.
    Decided November 7, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 365 (AC 19677), is denied.


text:
    KAILA MARSHALL v. HARTFORD HOSPITAL ET AL.

      William J. Sweeney, Jr., in support of the petition.

      Donna R. Zito, in opposition.
    Decided November 7, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 738 (AC 20345), is denied.


text:
    MICHAEL AMMIRATA ET AL. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE TOWN OF REDDING ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16614.

      Paul L. Bollo, in support of the petition.

      Peter S. Olson, in opposition.
    Decided November 7, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 606 (AC 20640), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly decline to review, on the basis of an inadequate record, the plaintiffs’ claim regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel?”


text:
    PELAGIA KITMIRIDES ET AL. v. MIDDLESEX MUTUAL ASSURANCE COMPANY
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16615.

      Brenden P. Leydon, in support of the petition.

      John W. Mills, in opposition.
    Decided November 7, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 729 (AC 21113), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the named plaintiff, listed as a driver of a covered vehicle on the declaration page of the automobile policy issued by the defendant, but not listed as a named insured, was not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the policy?”

KATZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    JOSEPH R. KREVIS ET AL. v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16624.

      John R. Mitola, associate city attorney, in support of the petition.
    Decided November 14, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 176 (AC 19438), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that it was procedurally improper for the trial court to have rendered summary judgment?”


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. STEVEN EDELMAN
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16623.

      David K. Jaffe, in support of the petition.

      Denise B. Smoker, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 14, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 480 (AC 20145), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Under the plain error doctrine, should the defendant’s conviction be reversed and judgment be directed in his favor, on the ground that there was no evidence that the defendant unlawfully continued to work under § 118.2 of the state building code?”

NORCOTT, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CAINE COOPER

      Deborah G. Stevenson, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 14, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 551 (AC 19850), is denied.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GEORGE MOORE
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 717 (AC 20037), is denied.

Martin Zeldis, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.

Ronald G. Weller, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided November 14, 2001


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LUIS VASQUEZ

      Donald D. Dakers, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Joy K. Fausey, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 14, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 118 (AC 19885), is denied.

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TIMOTHY J. SOLEK

      Lisa J. Steele, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 14, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 72 (AC 20828), is denied.


text:
    NEW HAVEN SAVINGS BANK, SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE v. SIMON R. LAPLACE ET AL.

      William H. Clendenen, Jr., in support of the petition.

      John J. Resnik, in opposition.
    Decided November 14, 2001
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 1 (AC 21388), is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    WILLIAM H. HONAN ET AL. v. JOSEPH DIMYAN ET AL.

      Nancy Burton, in support of the petition.
    Decided November 27, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ amended petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 63 Conn. App. 702 (AC 20340), is denied.

No action will be taken on the original petition for certification.


text:
    BRENDA ARDITO v. CHARLES E. OLINGER

      Thomas F. Brown, in support of the petition.
    Decided November 27, 2001
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 295 (AC 19590), is denied.


text:
    RONALD LABOW v. MYRNA LABOW

      John R. Williams, in support of the petition.

      Daniel D. Portanova and GwenE. Adamson, in opposition.
    Decided November 27, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 210 (AC 19762), is denied.


text:
    FERMIN ADORNO v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

      Mary Anne Royle, special public defender, in support of the petition.

      Bruce R. Lockwood, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
    Decided November 27, 2001
   The petitioner Fermin Adorno’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 179 (AC 20297), is denied.

VERTEFEUILLE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES DILLARD

      Felix Esposito, special public defender, in support of the petition.
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 238 (AC 20384), is denied.

Michael E. O’Hare, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided November 27, 2001


text:
    M.J. DALY & SONS, INC. v. CITY OF WEST HAVEN

      William J. Egan and Barbara E. Crowley, in support of the petition.

      JohnB. Farley and Robert M. Barrack, in opposition.
    Decided November 27, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 41 (AC 20542), is denied.


text:
    PATRICIA GARRISON v. PLANNING BOARD OF THE CITY OF STAMFORD ET AL.

      James V. Minor, assistant corporation counsel, in support of the petition.

      Brenden P. Leydon, in opposition.
    Decided November 27, 2001
   The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 317 (AC 20900), is denied.


text:
    PAUL D. SHAPERO v. FRANK MERCEDE, JR.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 343 (AC 21230), is granted, limited to the following issues:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16628.

Brenden P. Leydon, in support of the petition.

Neal L. Moskow, in opposition.

Decided November 27, 2001

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly reverse the trial court’s adoption of the referee’s report on the amount of attorney’s fees due the plaintiff?

“2. If the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court’s adoption of the referee’s report, should the matter be remanded for a new trial?”


text:
    EUGENE CHIMBLO v. GERHARD HUTTER ET AL.

      Gerhard Hutter, pro se, Nance Hutter, pro se, Maximilian Hutter, pro se, and Rudolf Hutter, pro se, in support of the amended petition.
    Decided November 27, 2001
   The amended petition by the defendants, Gerhard Hutter, Nance Hutter, Maximilian Hutter and Rudolf Hutter, for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21858) is denied.


text:
    CHARLES D. GIANETTI v. NORWALK HOSPITAL ET AL.
   The petition of the named defendant for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 218 (AC 20197), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff was a ‘lost volume seller?’

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16640.

Robert A. Lacobelle, in support of the petition.

William F. Gallagher, in opposition.

Decided December 4, 2001

“2. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff was not required to mitigate damages, and that he was entitled to more than nominal damages?”

KATZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    CHARLES D. GIANETTI v. NORWALK HOSPITAL ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16640X01.

      William F. Gallagher and Hugh D. Hughes, in support of the petition.
    Decided December 4, 2001

   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 64 Conn. App. 218 (AC 20197), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, on the remand, the plaintiff was entitled to prove damages for only one year?”

KATZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    JAMES GIULIETTI ET AL. v. JOHN L. GIULIETTI ET AL.
   The petition of the named defendant, John L. Giulietti, for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 813 (AC 20391), is denied.

John L. Giulietti, pro se, in support of the petition.

Michael J. Kopsick, in opposition.

Decided December 4, 2001


text:
    VERNON VILLAGE, INC. v. JOHN L. GIULIETTI ET AL.

      John L. Giulietti, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Michael J. Kopsick, in opposition.
    Decided December 4, 2001
   The petition of the named defendant, John L. Giulietti, for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 813 (AC 20392), is denied.


text:
    JOHN J. GIULIETTI ET AL. v. JOHN L. GIULIETTI ET AL.

      John L. Giulietti, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Michael J. Kopsick, in opposition.
    Decided December 4, 2001
   The petition of the named defendant, John L. Giulietti, for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 813 (AC 20393), is denied.


text:
    JAMES GIULIETTI v. VERNON VILLAGE, INC., ET AL.

      John L. Giulietti, pro se, in support of the petition.

      Michael J. Kopsick, in opposition.
    Decided December 4, 2001
   The petition of the defendant John L. Giulietti for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 813 (AC 20394), is denied.


text:
    ANN MODZELEWSKI ET AL. v. WILLIAM RAVEIS REAL ESTATE, INC.

      Robert L. Albrecht, in support of the petition.

      Patrick W. Finn, in opposition.
    Decided December 4, 2001
   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 65 Conn. App. 708 (AC 20580/ AC 21150), is denied.

KATZ, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    IN RE SHAWN S. ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16639.

      Douglas M. Crockett, in support of the petition.

      Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, in opposition.
    Decided December 4, 2001
   The respondents’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 305 (AC 21192/ AC 21193), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss this appeal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies?”


text:
    KAREN A. MURPHY ET AL. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF STAMFORD ET AL.
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 22161) is denied.

Karen A. Murphy, pro se, and Kathleen A. Murphy, pro se, in support of the petition.

John W. Mullin, assistant corporation counsel, in opposition.

Decided December 4, 2001


text:
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. MUTUAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL.
    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16645.

      Michael S. Lynch, in support of the petition.

      Michael J. Mannion, in opposition.
    Decided December 10, 2001
   The petition of the defendants Guardian Systems, Inc., and Jerome G. Terracino for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 397 (AC 20525), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, under the applicable equitable principles, the plaintiff was entitled to the full amount of the deficiency judgment in this case?”

SULLIVAN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    THOMAS J. NIEHAUS v. COWLES BUSINESS MEDIA, INC.
   The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 314 (AC 20660), is granted, limited to the following issue:

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16644.

Thomas E. Minogue, Jr., in support of the petition.

Decided December 10, 2001

“Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss this appeal on the ground that the plaintiff had not provided an adequate record for review?”

ZARELLA, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    HELEN WITTY, TRUSTEE, ET AL. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF HARTLAND ET AL.

      Timothy Brignole, in support of the petition.

      Mary E. R. Bartholic and Thomas W. Witherington, in opposition.
    Decided December 10, 2001
   The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 66 Conn. App. 387 (AC 20923), is denied.


text:
    IMC MORTGAGE COMPANY v. JOHN DOE I

      Jerome T. Dunbar, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided December 10, 2001
   The petition of the defendant Jerome T. Dunbar for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21795) is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    MARILYN C. TSAI v. GERALD TSAI

    The Supreme Court docket number is SC 16643.

      Kenneth J. Bartschi, Wesley W. Horton and Samuel V. Schoonmaker TV, in support of the petition.
    Decided December 10, 2001

       The appeal was withdrawn December 6, 2002.

   The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 21840) is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss this appeal on the ground that the postjudgment order unsealing the file was not a final judgment?”


text:
    IMC MORTGAGE COMPANY v. JOHN DOE I

      Jerome T. Dunbar, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided December 10, 2001
   The petition of the defendant Jerome T. Dunbar for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 22097) is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    IMC MORTGAGE COMPANY v. JOHN DOE I

      Jerome T. Dunbar, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided December 10, 2001
   The petition of the defendant Jerome T. Dunbar for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 22301) is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    IMC MORTGAGE COMPANY v. JOHN DOE I

      Jerome T. Dunbar, pro se, in support of the petition.
    Decided December 10, 2001
   The petition of the defendant Jerome T. Dunbar for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 22097/AC 21795/AC 22301) is denied.

SULLIVAN, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MITCHELL HENDERSON
    (SC 16463)
    Sullivan, C. J., and Katz, Palmer, Mihalakos and Ronan, Js.
    Argued October 23, 2001
    officially released January 8, 2002

      Michael Stone, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Victor J. Carlucci, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Mitchell Henderson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Clifford, J., claiming that the trial court improperly denied his writ of error coram nobis. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The record discloses the following relevant facts and procedural history. In 1993, the defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (3), assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1), threatening in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (1) and attempt to escape from custody in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-171, 53a-168 (2) and 53a-49. In addition, the defendant pleaded guilty to criminal mischief in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117 (a) (1) (A), to being a persistent dangerous felony offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40 (a) and to being a persistent dangerous felony offender in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-40 (b) and (g). Thereafter, the defendant directly appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v. Henderson, 37 Conn. App. 733, 658 A.2d 585 (1995). The defendant then filed an unsuccessful petition for certification to appeal to this court. State v. Henderson, 234 Conn. 912, 660 A.2d 355 (1995).

On November 15, 1999, the defendant, acting pro se, filed with the Superior Court a writ of error coram nobis, wherein he claimed that the canvass of him by the trial court, Espinosa, J., on the subject of his self-representation at his criminal trial was deficient and, therefore, violated his right to due process. Specifically, the defendant alleged that his trial counsel had been unprepared for trial, necessitating his decision to proceed pro se at his criminal trial and that Judge Espinosa’s canvass of him on the subject of that decision was inadequate. The writ was heard by Judge Clifford who, relying on State v. Grisgraber, 183 Conn. 383, 439 A.2d 377 (1981), ultimately denied the writ. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that Judge Clifford improperly: (1) denied the writ of error coram nobis on the basis that it had been filed before the improper judge, specifically, a judge other than the judge who presided over the defendant’s criminal trial; (2) denied the wtit on the basis that it had been filed beyond the three year time limit; see id., 385; and (3) denied the writ on the basis that the defendant had not exhausted all of his remedies, specifically, that the habeas corpus petitions being pursued by the defendant provided adequate remedies. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

As a preliminary matter, we conclude that we have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. This court has in the past entertained an appeal from an order denying a writ of error coram nobis. See id., 384. We therefore conclude that such an order is an appealable final judgment over which we have jurisdiction.

“A writ of error coram nobis is an ancient common-law remedy which authorized the trial judge, within three years, to vacate the judgment of the same court if the party aggrieved by the judgment could present facts, not appearing in the record, which, if true, would show that such judgment was void or voidable. Montville v. Alpha Mills Co., 86 Conn. 229, 233, 84 A. 933 (1912). . . . The facts must be unknown at the time of the trial without fault of the party seeking relief. State v. Becker, 263 Minn. 168, 115 N.W.2d 920 (1962).” (Citations omitted.) Stale v. Grisgraber, supra, 183 Conn. 385. “A writ of error coram nobis lies only in the unusual situation where no adequate remedy is provided by law. . . . Moreover, when habeas corpus affords a proper and complete remedy the writ of error coram nobis will not lie.” (Citations omitted.) Id.

The defendant first claims that Judge Clifford improperly denied his writ on the basis that it was heard by Judge Clifford, rather than by Judge Espinosa. In particular, the defendant claims that the specific judge who considers the writ is “immaterial.” Although we do not agree with the defendant’s claim that Judge Clifford denied the writ on that basis, we do agree that the specific judge before whom the writ is heard is immaterial.

In Grisgraber, we stated that a writ of error coram nobis “authorize[s] the trial judge, within three years, to vacate the judgment of the same court . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Id., 385. To interpret this to mean that the same judge who presided over the trial of the defendant is the only judge with the authority to entertain a writ of error coram nobis filed by this particular defendant would be, in many cases, impracticable. Moreover, if the particular judge who presided over a case was not available to entertain a writ for any number of reasons, such as retirement or reassignment, such an interpretation effectively could deprive a party of the remedy of a writ of error coram nobis, because no other judge would have subject matter jurisdiction over the writ. We conclude, therefore, that the language cited in Grisgraber authorizing “the trial judge ... to vacate the judgment of the same court”; id.; should be interpreted to mean not only the same judge who presided over the trial, but any judge of the same court, namely, the Superior Court. Accordingly, in the present case, the writ of error coram nobis was properly before Judge Clifford, a judge of the Superior Court.

With respect to the remaining two issues, we conclude that Judge Clifford properly denied the writ because it was filed well beyond the three year limitation period recognized in Grisgraber. The underlying judgment of conviction was rendered by the trial court, Espinosa, J., on September 15, 1993; the defendant, however, did not file the writ until November 15, 1999, more than six years after the judgment of conviction.

Finally, Judge Clifford properly concluded that not only did the defendant have adequate remedies provided by law available to him, namely, habeas corpus actions, but that the defendant was actually pursuing such remedies at that time. See id.

Therefore, after careful review of the records, briefs and oral arguments, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s writ.

The judgment is affirmed.

       In addition, the defendant had appealed from the denial of a habeas corpus petition to the Appellate Court. Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, Appellate Court, Docket No. AC 21756. That appeal subsequently was dismissed on December 10, 2001.

       At the conclusion of the March 1, 2000 hearing on the writ of error coram nobis, Judge Clifford stated: “But in looking at the case Grisgraber, it indicates that it authorizes a trial judge within three years to vacate [the] judgment of the same court if the party aggrieved could demonstrate by facts not appearing on the record that the judgment was void or voidable. I understand, as [Assistant State’s] Attorney [Victor] Carlucci is indicating, I’m not really the same court. It really is Judge Espinosa. But there also appears on the language a requirement that it be done within three years.”

       Indeed, in Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, Appellate Court, Docket No. AC 21756, the defendant, as a petitioner for habeas corpus, claimed, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal for failure to raise the issue of Judge Espinosa’s alleged constitutionally defective canvass. In Henderson v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV94-0544836S, the defendant, as a petitioner for habeas corpus, raised the same claim with respect to his standby counsel at his criminal trial.


author: ZARELLA, J.

text:
    EDUCATION ASSOCIATION OF CLINTON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF CLINTON
    (SC 16537)
    Borden, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

      Argued September 10, 2001
    officially released January 8, 2002

      William J. Dolan, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Sheila A. Huddleston, with whom were Karen T. Staib and, on the brief, Saranne P. Murray, for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

ZARELLA, J.

This appeal requires us to determine the standard under which a review panel, pursuant to the compulsory arbitration provisions of the Teacher Negotiation Act, General Statutes § 10-153a et seq., reviews an arbitration award that the legislative body of a local school district has rejected. The plaintiff, Education Association of Clinton (association),* and the defendant, the Clinton board of education (board), entered into binding arbitration after failing to reach a negotiated settlement on several issues relating to the employment of public school teachers in the town of Clinton. After holding a hearing on the issues, the arbitration panel issued an award that the Clinton board of selectmen (town) subsequently rejected unanimously. Thereafter, pursuant to General Statutes § 10-153Í (c) (7) (A), the commissioner of education (commissioner) selected a review panel of three neutral arbitrators, which, after reviewing the record, the town’s written explanation of its vote to reject the arbitration panel’s award and the parties’ written responses, issued a final and binding arbitration award. Subsequently, the association filed with the Superior Court a motion to modify the review panel’s award, arguing that, because the review panel had failed to give deference to the decision of the arbitration panel, the award was, inter alia, procedurally unlawful and made in excess of the review panel’s statutory authority. The trial court rejected the association’s argument, denied the association’s motion to modify the award and rendered judgment thereon, from which the association appealed to the Appellate Court. Pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2, we granted the parties’ joint request to transfer the appeal to this court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following relevant facts and procedural history. The parties commenced contract negotiations in July, 1998. Notwithstanding the intervention of a mediator on September 17,1998, the parties were unable to reach a negotiated settlement on eleven issues, including whether science laboratory instruction should be considered a teaching period for purposes of calculating daily teaching periods and whether, under limited circumstances, a teacher should be required to perform physical restraint procedures on certain special education students. Pursuant to § 10-153f (c), the parties entered into binding arbitration to resolve those issues, and, on December 3, 1998, the arbitration panel issued its award. The arbitration panel accepted the association’s last best offer on six issues, including the issues of science laboratory classification and the use of physical restraint procedures,* ***** and the board’s last best offer on five issues.

On December 28, 1998, the town unanimously voted to reject the arbitration award. In a written explanation of the vote, the town explained that the implementation of the arbitration panel’s award regarding the use of physical restraint procedures “would be in direct conflict with the school district’s legal obligations” under General Statutes § 10-76d and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The town also stated that, with respect to the physical restraint procedure issue, the award was not based on the evidence and was contrary to the statutory factor relating to existing employment conditions of similarly situated employee groups. See General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (4) (D). With respect to the science laboratory classification issue, the town stated that the majority of the arbitration panel did not give priority to the financial implications of the award, as § 10-153f (c) (4) requires, and that, as uncontroverted testimony had demonstrated, the award would require the board to hire additional science teachers at a substantial cost. The town urged the review panel not to give deference to the “arbitration panel’s awards on the issues that form[ed] the basis for the [t]own’s rejection . . . .”

In its response to the town’s rejection of the arbitration panel’s award, the association urged the review panel not to conduct a de novo review. The association suggested that the review panel should review the decisions of the arbitration panel to determine whether there was error or an abuse of discretion. The association contended that the review panel was bound to uphold the initial award if it found evidence in support thereof. The association ultimately contended that the evidence supported modification of the award with respect to only those issues on which the arbitration panel had adopted the board’s last best offer.

After reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, the town’s written explanation for its rejection of the arbitration panel’s award and the parties’ respective responses thereto, the review panel issued a final and binding arbitration award. The review panel accepted the last best offer of the association on four issues and the last best offer of the board on seven issues, including the issues of science laboratory classification and the use of physical restraint procedures. With respect to the classification of science laboratory instruction as a teaching period, the review panel concluded that the evidence in the record did not support the arbitration panel’s award. The review panel determined that the award was not in the public’s best interest. Specifically, the review panel concluded that the financial impact of the award was “unknown and could be substantial,” owing in part to the ambiguity of the association’s last best offer, which could apply to other teachers who teach nonscience laboratories. The review panel further determined that the board’s last best offer adequately had addressed the association’s concerns about parity of duties between science teachers and other teachers. With respect to the issue of the use of physical restraint procedures, the review panel concluded that the evidence in the record did not support the arbitration panel’s award. Specifically, the review panel determined, inter alia, that the association’s last best offer did not serve the public interest and that the board’s offer adequately had addressed the concerns of the association.

The association filed a motion in the trial court seeking to modify the review panel’s final arbitration award. The association argued that § 10-153Í (c) (7) authorizes the review panel to “conduct a review of the [arbitration] panel’s decision, not [to] hear the matter de novo. Such a review requires the [review] panel to defer to the [arbitration] panel’s decision unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence ... or affected by legal error.” (Emphasis in original.) The association also argued that, because the review panel, sitting as an “ ‘appellate body,’ ” improperly reviewed the issues de novo, it exceeded its statutory authority, and, thus, its decision with respect to the issues of science laboratory classification and the use of physical restraint procedures was based upon unlawful procedure. In contrast, the board argued that the language of § 10-153Í (c) (7) clearly and unambiguously required the review panel to conduct its review de novo, and that the legislative history suggests that the legislature did not intend for the review panel to apply a deferential standard of review.

The trial court rejected the association’s argument and concluded that, according to the plain language and the legislative history of § 10-153Í (c) (7), “the legislature directed that the review panel take a fresh look at the evidence and analyze it independently against the backdrop of the statutory criteria provided.” The trial court further concluded that, “[e]ven if one were to go behind the plain statutory language, the intent of the statute was to return to towns some power in the arbitration process, when a town could muster the super-majority vote. Any interpretation other than a de novo review would undercut the statutory scheme. ” The trial court thereafter denied the association’s motion to modify the arbitration award and rendered judgment thereon. This appeal followed.

I

On appeal to this court, the association argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that the review panel properly reviewed the arbitration panel’s award under a de novo standard of review. The statutory language and legislative histoiy of § 10-1531’ lead us to conclude, as did the trial court, that the review panel properly conducted a de novo review. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the association’s claim raises an issue of statutory construction over which our review is plenary. E.g., Connelly v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 394, 403, 780 A.2d 903 (2001). We approach the issue “according to well established principles of statutory construction designed to further our fundamental objective of ascertaining and giving effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 270, 777 A.2d 645 (2001). “In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case .... In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nunno v. Wixner, 257 Conn. 671, 677, 778 A.2d 145 (2001).

A

As with all issues of statutory construction, we first turn to the relevant statutory language. E.g., In re Michaela Lee R., 253 Conn. 570, 583, 756 A.2d 214 (2000). “Section 10-153f sets forth the mechanics of the mediation and arbitration procedures under the Teacher Negotiation Act.” Hartford Principals ’ & Supervisors’ Assn. v. Shedd, 202 Conn. 492, 504, 522 A.2d 264 (1987). Section 10-153f (c) (1) mandates binding arbitration of issues that a school board and the representative of the teachers’ unit cannot resolve through negotiation or mediation. See Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 217 Conn. 110, 118, 584 A.2d 1172 (1991).

Additionally, General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (4) provides in relevant part: “After hearing all the issues, the arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall, within twenty days, render a decision in writing, signed by a majority of the arbitrators or the single arbitrator, which states in detail the nature of the decision and the disposition of the issues by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator. The written decision shall include a narrative explaining the evaluation by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator of the evidence presented for each item upon which a decision was rendered by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator and shall state with particularity the basis for the decision as to each disputed issue and the manner in which the factors enumerated in this subdivision were considered in arriving at such decision, including, where applicable, the specific similar groups and conditions of employment presented for comparison and accepted by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator and the reason for such acceptance. . . . The decision of the arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute unless a rejection is filed in accordance with subdivision (7) of this subsection. ... In arriving at a, decision, the arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall give priority to the public interest and the financial capability of the town or towns in the school district, including consideration of other demands on the financial capability of the town or towns in the school district. . . . The arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall further consider, in light of such financial capability, the following factors: (A) The negotiations between the parties prior to arbitration, including the offers and the range of discussion of the issues; (B) the interests and welfare of the employee group; (C) changes in the cost of living averaged over the preceding three years; (D) the existing conditions of employment of the employee group and those of similar groups; and (E) the salaries, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment prevailing in the state labor market, including the terms of recent contract settlements or awards in collective bargaining for other municipal employee organizations and developments in private sector wages and benefits. . . . The arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall resolve separately each individual disputed issue by accepting the last best offer thereon of either of the parties, and shall incorporate in a decision each such accepted individual last best offer and an explanation of how the total cost of all offers accepted was considered. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, pursuant to General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (7), the legislative body of the school district may reject the award of the arbitration panel or the single arbitrator. When the legislative body rejects an award, however, it must provide notice and a written explanation of the reasons for the rejection to the commissioner and the exclusive representative for the teachers’ unit. Thereafter, “the exclusive representative of the teachers’ . . . unit shall prepare, and the board of education may prepare, a written response to such rejection and shall submit it to such legislative body . . . and the commissioner. Within ten days after the commissioner has been notified of the vote to reject, (A) the commissioner shall select a review panel of three arbitrators or, if the parties agree, a single arbitrator, who are residents of Connecticut and labor relations arbitrators approved by the American Arbitration Association and not members of the panel who issued the rejected award, and (B) such arbitrators or single arbitrator shall review the decision on each rejected issue. [Such] review . . . shall be limited to the record and briefs of the hearing pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection, the written explanation of the reasons for the vote and a written response by either party. In conducting such review, the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall be limited to consideration of the criteria set forth in subdivision (4) of this subsection. . . . The arbitrators or single arbitrator shall accept the last best offer of either of the parties. Within five days after the completion of such review, the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall render a final and binding award with respect to each rejected issue. The decision of the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall be in writing and shall include the specific reasons and standards used by each arbitrator in making his decision on each issue. ...” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (7). Thereafter, any party to the arbitration may move to modify or vacate the final and binding award in the Superior Court pursuant to § 10-1531' (c) (8).

The foregoing statutory language demonstrates that the review panel is part and parcel of an integrated arbitration scheme under which only one final and binding arbitration award may result. Pursuant to § 10-153f (c) (7), if the legislative body of the school district rejects the award of the arbitration panel or the single arbitrator by a super majority vote, a second round of proceedings commences. In this scenario, the review panel is charged with the same task as the arbitration panel, namely, evaluating the evidence presented and making an independent determination with respect to the disputed issues in light of the statutory factors, of which consideration of the public interest and the town’s financial capability is paramount. Thus, notwithstanding the association’s claim that the review panel’s authority is limited to a determination whether the arbitration panel’s award was based on substantial evidence or affected by legal error, § 10-153Í (c) (7) requires the review panel to take a “second look” at the evidence in light of the same statutory criteria that the arbitration panel or single arbitrator is required to consider. This is the essence of a de novo standard of review. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly determined that the review panel was required to conduct a de novo review of the arbitration panel’s award.

B

We further reject the association’s claim that the review panel sits as an “appellate body.” We find support for our conclusion in the construction of the statute as a whole. Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 217 Conn. 116 (“[w]e construe a statute as a whole and read its subsections concurrently in order to reach a reasonable overall interpretation”). We first note the absence of any statutory language that would allow either party before the arbitration panel or the legislative body of the school district to appeal from the decision of the arbitration panel to the review panel. Second, the language of subdivisions (7) and (8) of § 10-153f (c), when read together, demonstrates that there is only one appeal as of right under the statute and that appeal may be brought solely in the Superior Court.

Pursuant to § 10-153Í (c) (7), the review panel, in rendering a final and binding award, must consider, in addition to the record, the town’s reasons for rejecting the award of the arbitration panel or the single arbitrator. General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (7) also requires that “the [review panel] shall be limited to consideration of the criteria set forth in subdivision (4) of this subsection.” In contrast, General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (8) provides that the Superior Court “may vacate or modify” the review panel’s final and binding arbitration award. As an appellate body, the Superior Court’s authority to vacate or modify the award is limited to six narrow grounds. See General Statutes § 10-153Í (c) (8) (A) through (F). Specifically, General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (8) provides in relevant part that “[t]he superior court, after hearing, may vacate or modify the decision if substantial rights of a party have been prejudiced because such decision is: (A) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (B) in excess of the statutory authority of the panel; (C) made upon unlawful procedure; (D) affected by other error of law; (E) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” The difference between subdivisions (7) and (8) of § 10-153Í (c) buttresses our conclusion that an appellate scope of review applies at the trial court level, but not to the work of the review panel.

C

We also disagree with the association’s claim that the role of the review panel is analogous to that of the compensation review board under the Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. Although the association correctly notes that, in Williams v. Best Cleaners, Inc., 237 Conn. 490, 677 A.2d 1356 (1996), we explained that the compensation review board’s “hearing of an appeal from the [compensation] commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts”; id., 500; the association does not sufficiently appreciate the distinct schemes that distinguish the Workers’ Compensation Act from the Teacher Negotiation Act. As we previously have discussed, the Teacher Negotiation Act provides for a two-tiered arbitration procedure under which the legislative body for the school district, which is not a direct party to the arbitration, may reject the award of the arbitration panel or the single arbitrator. General Statutes § 10-153Í (c) (4) and (7). Such a rejection triggers a review of the award on each rejected issue by a review panel composed of three arbitrators or a single arbitrator whose duty it is to issue a final and binding award in light of the statutory criteria enumerated in § 10-153Í (c) (4). Thus, under the Teacher Negotiation Act, the second tier of arbitration automatically commences following the rejection of the award of the arbitration panel or the single arbitrator. By contrast, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, a party dissatisfied with the compensation commissioner’s award must “appeal” from the award to the compensation review board. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-301 (a).

More importantly, the manner in which a workers’ compensation award is issued precludes the conclusion that the review panel’s role is the same as that of the compensation review board. At the hearing level, the compensation commissioner must make specific findings of fact in a workers’ compensation award. See General Statutes § 31-300 (“after the conclusion of any hearing . . . the commissioner shall send to each party a written copy of his findings and award”). Following an appeal from the compensation commissioner’s award to the compensation review board, the compensation review board’s decision “shall include its findings, conclusions of law and award.” General Statutes § 31-301 (c). We also note that the authority of the compensation review board is limited to “affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the [compensation] commissioner.” General Statutes § 31-301 (c). If any comparison can be drawn, it is the similarity between the role of the compensation review board under the Workers’ Compensation Act and the role of the Superior Court under the Teacher Negotiation Act. Compare General Statutes § 10-153f (e) (8) (“[t]he superior court, after hearing, may vacate or modify the decision”) with General Statutes § 31-301 (c) (compensation review board “shall issue its decision, affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the [compensation] commissioner”); cf. also General Statutes § 31-301b (“[a]ny party aggrieved by the decision of the Compensation Review Board upon any question or questions of law arising in the proceedings may appeal ... to the Appellate Court”).

In contrast, General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (4) requires the arbitration panel or single arbitrator, in rendering a decision, to provide a written statement “explaining the evaluation ... of the evidence presented for each item upon which a decision was rendered . . . and . . . stat[ing] with particularity the basis for the decision as to each disputed issue and the manner in which the factors enumerated in this subdivision were considered in arriving at such decision . . . .” The review panel’s decision also “shall be in writing and shall include the specific reasons and standards used by each arbitrator in making his decision on each issue.” General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (7). Therefore, under the Teacher Negotiation Act, neither the arbitration panel nor the review panel—unlike the compensation review board under the Workers’ Compensation Act—must provide specific factual findings or conclusions of law in rendering a decision. We, therefore, conclude that the review panel properly conducted a de novo review of the arbitration panel’s award.

D

We find support for our conclusion in the statute’s legislative history. “In 1965, the legislature adopted the Teacher Negotiation Act . . . .” West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 575, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); Public Acts, Spec. Sess., February, 1965, No. 298 (Spec. Sess. P.A. 298). “The mediation and arbitration procedure provided in § 10-153f applies only when any local or regional board of education ‘cannot agree with the exclusive representatives of a teachers’ or administrators’ unit after negotiation concerning the terms and conditions of employment applicable to the employees in such unit.’ ” Hartford Principals’ & Supervisors’ Assn. v. Shedd, supra, 202 Conn. 508, quoting General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 10-153f (b). Although § 10-153f initially provided for mediation and nonbinding arbitration; West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, supra, 576; see Spec. Sess. P.A. 298, § 5; the statute subsequently was amended to provide for binding arbitration of disputes. Public Acts 1979, No. 79-405, § 1 (P.A. 79-405); see Hartford Principals’ & Supervisors’ Assn. v. Shedd, supra, 507. By 1979, § 10-153f (c) provided for “last best offer interest arbitration” of contract disputes between local boards of education and representatives of teachers’ associations. P.A. 79-405, § 1, codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 10-153f (c) (4); see Hartford Principals’ & Supervisors’ Assn. v. Shedd, supra, 508 (“binding arbitration in lieu of the right to strike”). In 1992, the legislature again amended § 10-153Í (c); Public Acts 1992, No. 92-84, §§ 3 and 6 (P.A. 92-84); “in response to apparently widespread perceptions on the part of municipal officials that the binding arbitration process had yielded results that did not sufficiently take into account local financial conditions. A principal purpose of the 1992 amendments was to give a say in the ultimate result of the process to the local officials who were accountable for local finances.” Stratford v. State Board of Mediation & Arbitration, 239 Conn. 32, 49, 681 A.2d 281 (1996); see also id., 49 n.14 (discussing how P.A. 92-84 was designed to address perceived problems under Municipal Employees Relations Act, General Statutes § 7-467 et seq., and Teacher Negotiation Act). As Representative Robert A. Maddox, Jr., stated in a floor debate on the proposed amendment to § 10-153f (c), “this amendment . . . brings back some control to the municipalities over the process.” 35 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1992 Sess., p. 1902; see also 35 S. Proc., Pt. 7, 1992 Sess., pp. 2313-16, remarks of Senator Robert L. Genuario (acknowledging that concept behind bill was to give some voice in arbitration process to elected officials).

Accordingly, P.A. 92-84, § 3, amended § 10-153f (c) (4) to require the arbitration panel or single arbitrator, in arriving at a decision, to “give priority to the public interest and the financial capability of the town or towns in the school district . . . .’’In addition, P.A. 92-84, § 6, amended § 10-153f (c) (7) by authorizing the legislative body of the local or regional school district to reject, by a two-thirds vote, any issue in the decision of the arbitration panel or single arbitrator and by adding the provisions regarding the review panel that are at issue in this appeal. Representative Brian J. Flaherty, a principal supporter of the legislation, summarized the amendments to § 10-153Í (c) as follows: “[I]f a [s]tate employee contract goes to binding arbitration, there are provisions for the [sjtate’s legislative [b]ody, namely, us, to overturn that award by a two-thirds vote of both [c]hambers. . . .

“This amendment would give [municipalities] that power by a two-thirds override within [thirty] days after an arbitration award is issued. After that is issued, the legislative body will notify in the case of a teacher award, the [commissioner . . . and one or three arbitrators will be appointed to serve as a review panel.

“Now we had a two-thirds override that was presented to us by the Governor earlier this year, which would have kicked out a whole new arbitration process. The word we got back from many of our towns is that this is too long and it is too costly.

“Our proposal . . . will provide that this panel reviews the first arbitration. . . .

“The [panel] will review the prior arbitration, the rejection and ... a written reply given from the other party and then [it] will have [twenty] days to make [its] review and [five] after that to issue an award. This award that [it] issue [s] will be final and binding. This is shorter than blowing it out for a whole new arbitration process.” (Emphasis added.) 35 H.R. Proc., supra, pp. 1864-65.

Later in the 1992 legislative session, the legislature further amended § 10-153f (c) (7) to specify that, in performing its review of the decision of the arbitration panel or single arbitrator, the review panel shall be “limited to consideration” of the same criteria that the arbitration panel or single arbitrator is required to consider under § 10-153f (c) (4) in rendering a decision. Public Acts 1992, No. 92-170, § 23. As Representative Flaherty explained: “[T]here were some questions as to the standard of review [during the debate on the proposed legislation], [It] will now, the review panel in conducting the review have to keep it along the lines of the six statutory criteria [enumerated in § 10-153f (c) (4)].” 35 H.R. Proc., Pt. 20, 1992 Sess., pp. 6627-28.

In sum, the legislative history of § 10-153f further demonstrates that the legislature intended that the review panel would conduct a de novo review on the basis of the same criteria that the arbitration panel or single arbitrator must use in arriving at a decision. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly rej ected the association’s claim that the review panel was required to apply a deferential standard of review in reviewing the arbitration panel’s decision.

II

The association also claims that the trial court improperly declined to decide whether the review panel was required to uphold the arbitration panel’s award because substantial evidence supported the arbitration panel’s decisions with respect to the classification of science laboratory instruction and the use of physical restraint procedures. It is important to note that the association does not argue that the trial court improperly upheld the decision of the review panel because its decision was not based on substantial evidence. Rather, the association argues that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the award of the arbitration panel, the existence of which should have precluded the review panel from deciding as it did. This claim merely restates the dispositive issue on appeal. In light of our conclusion in part I of this opinion, we need not address the merits of this claim.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The compulsory arbitration provisions are codified at General Statutes § 10-153Í (c), which provides in relevant part: “(1) On the fourth day next following the end of the mediation session or on the one hundred thirty-fifth day prior to the budget submission date, whichever is sooner, the commissioner [of education (commissioner)] shall order the parties to report their settlement of the dispute or, if there is no settlement, to notify the commissioner of either their agreement to submit their dispute to a single arbitrator or the name of the arbitrator selected by each of them. Within five days of providing such notice, the parties shall notify the commissioner of the name of the arbitrator if there is an agreement on a single arbitrator appointed to the panel pursuant to subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section or agreement on the third arbitrator appointed to the panel pursuant to said subdivision. ... If the parties have notified the commissioner of their agreement to submit their dispute to a single arbitrator and they have not agreed on such arbitrator . . . the commissioner shall select such single arbitrator who shall be an impartial representative of the interests of the public in general. If each party has notified the commissioner of the name of the arbitrator it has selected and the parties have not agreed on the third arbitrator . . . the commissioner shall select a third arbitrator, who shall be an impartial representative of the interests of the public in general. If either party fails to notify the commissioner of the name of an arbitrator, the commissioner shall select an arbitrator to serve and the commissioner shall also select a third arbitrator who shall be an impartial representative of the interests of the public in general. Any selection pursuant to this section by the commissioner of an impartial arbitrator shall be made at random from among the members appointed under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section. Arbitrators shall be selected from the panel appointed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section .... Whenever a panel of three arbitrators is selected, the chairperson of such panel shall be the impartial representative of the interests of the public in general.
      “(4) After hearing all the issues, the arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall, within twenty days, render a decision in writing, signed by a majority of the arbitrators or the single arbitrator, which states in detail the nature of the decision and the disposition of the issues by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator. The written decision shall include a narrative explaining the evaluation by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator of the evidence presented for each item upon which a decision was rendered by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator and shall state with particularity the basis for the decision as to each disputed issue and the manner in which the factors enumerated in this subdivision were considered in arriving at such decision, including, where applicable, the specific similar groups and conditions of employment presented for comparison and accepted by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator and the reason for such acceptance. . . . The decision of the arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute unless a rejection is filed in accordance with subdivision (7) of this subsection. The decision of the arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall incorporate those items of agreement the parties have reached prior to its issuance. ... In arriving at a decision, the arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall give priority to the public interest and the financial capability of the town or towns in the school district, including consideration of other demands on the financial capability of the town or towns in the school district. In assessing the financial capability of the town or towns, there shall be an irrebuttable presumption that a budget reserve of five per cent or less is not available for payment of the cost of any item subject to arbitration under this chapter. The arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall further consider, in light of such financial capability, the following factors: (A) The negotiations between the parties prior to arbitration, including the offers and the range of discussion of the issues; (B) the interests and welfare of the employee group; (C) changes in the cost of living averaged over the preceding three years; (D) the existing conditions of employment of the employee group and those of similar groups; and (E) the salaries, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment prevailing in the state labor market, including the terms of recent contract settlements or awards in collective bargaining for other municipal employee organizations and developments in private sector wages and benefits. The parties shall submit to the arbitrators or the single arbitrator their respective positions on each individual issue in dispute between them in the form of a last best offer. The arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall resolve separately each individual disputed issue by accepting the last best offer thereon of either of the parties, and shall incorporate in a decision each such accepted individual last best offer and an explanation of how the total cost of all offers accepted was considered. The award of the arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall not be subject to rejection by referendum. . . .
      * * *
      “(7) The award of the arbitrators or single arbitrator may be rejected by the legislative body of the local school district or, in the case of a regional school district, by the legislative bodies of the participating towns. Such rejection shall be by a two-thirds majority vote of the members of such legislative body or, in the case of a regional school district, the legislative body of each participating town, present at a regular or special meeting called and convened for such purpose within twenty-live days of the receipt of the award. If the legislative body or legislative bodies, as appropriate, reject any such award, they shall notify, within ten days after the vote to reject, the commissioner and the exclusive representative for the teachers’ or administrators’ unit of such vote and submit to them a written explanation of the reasons for the vote. Within ten days after receipt of such notice, the exclusive representative of the teachers’ or administrators’ unit shall prepare, and the board of education may prepare, a written response to such rejection and shall submit it to such legislative body or legislative bodies, as appropriate, and the commissioner. Within ten days after the commissioner has been notified of the vote to reject, (A) the commissioner shall select a review panel of three arbitrators or, if the parties agree, a single arbitrator, who are residents of Connecticut and labor relations arbitrators approved by the American Arbitration Association and not members of the panel who issued the rejected award, and (B) such arbitrators or single arbitrator shall review the decision on each rejected issue. The review conducted pursuant to this subdivision shall be limited to the record and briefs of the hearing pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection, the written explanation of the reasons for the vote and a written response by either party. In conducting such review, the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall be limited to consideration of the criteria set forth in subdivision (4) of this subsection. . . . The arbitrators or single arbitrator shall accept the last best offer of either of the parties. Within five days after the completion of such review, the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall render a final and binding award with respect to each rejected issue. The decision of the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall be in writing and shall include the specific reasons and standards used by each arbitrator in making his decision on each issue. . . .
      “(8) The decision of the arbitrators or a single arbitrator shall be subject to judicial review upon the filing by a parly to the arbitration, within thirty days following receipt of a final decision pursuant to subdivision (4) or (7), as appropriate, of a motion to vacate or modify such decision in the superior court for the judicial district wherein the school district involved is located. The superior court, after hearing, may vacate or modify the decision if substantial rights of a party have been prejudiced because such decision is: (A) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (B) in excess of the statutory authority of the panel; (C) made upon unlawful procedure; (D) affected by other error of law; (E) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (F) arbitrary and capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. . . .”
      Although § 10-153Í (c) has been the subject of recent legislative amendments, those amendments are not relevant to the merits of this appeal. For convenience, we refer to the current revision of § 10-153Í (c).

       The association is the exclusive bargaining representative for certified public school teachers employed by the defendant, the Clinton board of education.

       The Clinton board of selectmen is the legislative body of the town of Clinton and the Clinton school district.

       See footnote 1 of this opinion.

       The issues of science laboratoiy classification and the use of physical restraint procedures are the only two arbitral issues relevant to this appeal.

       Subdivisions (4) and (7) of § 10-153f (c) provide for last best offer interest arbitration. Under the statutory scheme, the parties are required to submit their respective last best offers on each disputed issue to the arbitration panel or single arbitrator. The panel or single arbitrator, in turn, must select from those submitted offers in rendering a decision.
      “In last best offer interest arbitration, parties to a dispute submit their proposals as contract language and present evidence of past practice, comparability with surrounding towns, the cost of living, and the employer’s ability to pay for proposed wage and benefits improvements. A single arbitrator or a tripartite panel then decides which party’s proposal will become part of the contract. The arbitrator’s decision is final. Appeal is available only on very narrow grounds. L. Bingham, ‘Mid-term Bargaining Disputes and Binding Interest Arbitration for Public Sector Employees,’ 17 Conn. L. Rev. 365, 366 n.11 (1985).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Principals’ & Supervisors’ Assn. v. Shedd, 202 Conn. 492, 508 n.3, 522 A.2d 264 (1987).

       The association’s last best offer, which the arbitration panel accepted, was as follows: “Teaching Periods—The normal schedule for secondary teachers shall be five . . . teaching periods per day, including laboratories.
      “In any event, no more than three . . . teachers in any one department may be assigned to six . . . teaching periods per day. When said teachers are assigned to six . . . teaching periods per day they shall be relieved of all other non-teaching duties and shall only be assigned to homeroom duty when all other teachers are assigned to a homeroom duty.”
      The arbitration panel rejected the board’s last best offer, which provided that “[t]he normal schedule for secondary teachers shall be five . . . teaching periods per day.
      “In any event, no more than three . . . teachers in any one department may be assigned to six . . . teaching periods per day. When said teachers are assigned to six . . . teaching periods per day they shall be relieved of all other non-teaching duties and shall only be assigned to homeroom duty when all other teachers are assigned to a homeroom duty. When a science [teacher] is assigned to a laboratory, in addition to five . . . teaching periods in a day, said teacher shall be relieved of all other nonteaching duties and shall only be assigned to homeroom duty when all other teachers are assigned to a homeroom duty.”

       The arbitration panel accepted the association’s last best offer on the issue of the use of physical restraint procedures, which provided: “At no time shall any teacher be compelled to provide physical restraint procedures.” The arbitration panel rejected the board’s position that “[a] teacher who has a special education student with an [individual education plan] providing for physical restraint shall be provided with training in proper techniques for physical restraint. The Superintendent shall convene a committee of teachers and administrators to discuss safety issues related to physical restraint and means of addressing staff concerns regarding such.”

       The association further argued that had the review panel applied the proper standard of review, it would have upheld the arbitration panel’s decisions regarding the two disputed issues because they were “supported by substantial evidence and not affected by legal error . . . .”

       The Teacher Negotiation Act provides for three interrelated levels of dispute resolution. Under General Statutes § 10-153d (b), the parties initially must negotiate the terms and conditions of employment. General Statutes § 10-153d (b) provides in relevant part that “[t]he local or regional board of education and the organization designated or elected as the exclusive representative for the appropriate unit, through designated officials or their representatives, shall have the duty to negotiate with respect to salaries, hours and other conditions of employment about which either party wishes to negotiate. . . .”
      If the parties cannot agree on all disputed issues through negotiation, they ultimately are required to submit the outstanding issues to a mediator pursuant to § 10-153Í (b). General Statutes § 10-153Í (b) provides in relevant part: “If any local or regional board of education cannot agree with the exclusive representatives of a teachers’ or administrators’ unit after negotiation concerning the terms and conditions of employment applicable to the employees in such unit, either party may submit the issues to the commissioner for mediation. . . . If . . . the parties have not reached agreement and have failed to initiate mediation, the commissioner shall order the parties to notify the commissioner of the name of a mutually selected mediator and to commence mediation. . . .”
      Thereafter, if the parties still cannot resolve the remaining disputed issues, they must enter into binding arbitration pursuant to § 10-153f (c). The issues are submitted to either a single arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators selected in accordance with § 10-153f (c) (1). See footnote 1 of this opinion.

       The association’s claim appears to rest on the untenable assumption that the term “review” precludes any kind of review other than one in which a deferential standard applies. The association neither provides, nor can we find, any legal authority on which to base such a restrictive interpretation. Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) defines “review” as, among other things, “[a] reconsideration; second view or examination; revision; consideration for purposes of correction.” This definition is consistent with our conclusion that the clear language of § 10-153f (c) requires the review panel to issue an award on each rejected issue after independently applying the statutory criteria and conducting a de novo review of the record and the town’s reasons for rejecting the award of the arbitration panel or the single arbitrator.

       During 1992 public hearings before the joint standing committee on labor and public employees, numerous municipal officials and their representatives lined up to express their displeasure with the binding arbitration system. Alan J. Chapin, then first selectman of the town of Washington, “represent[ed] the consensus of the First Selectmen of the towns of Canaan, Cornwall, Kent, North Canaan, Roxbury, Salisbury, Sharon, Warren and Washington [before the committee].” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor and Public Employees, Pt. 2, 1992 Sess., p. 459. Chapin commented that “[t]he financial impact of the Teacher Binding Arbitration awards lias been a frequent topic at public meetings for several years .... Unfortunately, it has often become a bitter dispute, sometimes alienating voter groups and other municipal employees against our own teachers. Binding arbitration, in our case, has driven a wedge between professionals and the voting majority. . . .
      “We clearly recognize the priority of public education, but we are unwilling to accept this outdated legislative mandate affecting a binding settlement for any employee group that even if rejected at the polls by the voters, becomes the final contract. . . .
      “We thank the Governor for his proposals, but the measures in [the proposed legislation] will not address the cost concerns of a second arbitration in the northwestern towns, nor the damaged incurred from awards.” Id., pp. 459-60.
      Michael Dolan, a representative of Francis A. Burke, Jr., then mayor and chairman of the town council of the town of Enfield, expressed similar views before the committee: “Compulsory binding arbitration as it currently stands is a state mandate municipalities cannot afford ....
      “Capital improvement programs, essential to maintaining a municipal infrastructure, are being reduced or being cut entirely by towns no longer able to fund such programs. [These cuts are] [a]ttributable in part to compulsory binding arbitration and other mandates. Good faith bargaining cannot be accomplished when labor unions have as recourse a method for winning at least some of their issues in the binding arbitration process.
      “Binding arbitration is perceived, with good reason, as a no [lose] situation [for] municipal labor unions particularly when economic issues are involved, [notwithstanding] how persuasive a town or city might be relative to its inability to pay. . . .
      “The local taxpayers are demanding fairness and accountability, they will find none as long as a third party who is not elected by the people and is not accountable to elected officials is empowered to make decisions with such far reaching fiscal impact. The cost of so called labor peace in the name of binding arbitration has taken its toll.” Id., pp. 494-95.

       Of those legislators who opposed changes to the binding arbitration system, Representative Ronald L. Smoko keenly identified the impact that the proposed legislation would have on the scheme of last best offer binding arbitration. Smoko stated that certain proposed amendments to § 10-153f (c) eliminate “for all practical purposes . . . the notion of last best offer binding arbitration ....
      “The system as it exists . . . and that is maintained in the file is one of fairness in my estimation. It’s based on mutually accepted levels of fear, fear on both sides of the negotiating table that will push people together. Fear that one side or the other will prevail. That’s what pushes people together, the all or nothing provision of last best offer binding arbitration.
      “What does this amendment do by the elimination of last best offer binding arbitration? It maintains the fear on the part of the teachers, without question. They have to come to the table with a reasonable offer because there’s nothing else that they can offer. But how about the municipal bargaining agent? Where is the element of fear perpetuated to keep the table balanced, to keep this whole process in balance? It’s gone. It’s gone.” 35 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1992 Sess., p. 1919.