author: PALMER, J. BERDON, J.,

text:
    HARTFORD HOSPITAL ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER PROTECTION ET AL.
    (SC 15753)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Palmer and McDonald, Js.

    Argued October 31, 1997
    officially released March 3, 1998

      Megan J. O’Neill, assistant attorney general, with whom were Steven M. Rutstein, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellants (defendants).

      Gerald P. Stergio, with whom, on the brief, were John W. Mahoney and Henry J. Zaccardi, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

       Justice McDonald recused himself after oral argument in this case. The parties have agreed to have this appeal decided by a panel of this court consisting of the four remaining justices who heard the appeal.

   Opinion

PALMER, J.

This appeal requires us to determine whether hospital employees who perform plumbing work for the hospital are exempt from the licensure requirements of chapter 393 of the General Statutes, § 20-330 et seq. We conclude that they are not exempt.

The following facts and procedural history are undisputed. On October 7,1994, the defendant plumbing and piping work board (board) issued complaints against the plaintiffs, Hartford Hospital (hospital) and Herve Gelinas, Charles Rowe and Arnrit Kalicharen, three of the hospital’s employees. Specifically, the board alleged that the hospital had violated General Statutes §§ 20-334, 20-337 and 20-341 because certain of its employees had performed plumbing and piping work on the hospital premises without a certificate, license or registration to do so. The board further alleged that Gelinas, a foreman, had violated the licensure requirements of chapter 393 by causing plumbing work to be performed by hospital employees who were not licensed or registered to do such work. With respect to Rowe and Kalicharen, the board claimed that they had violated statutory licensure provisions by performing plumbing work at the hospital without a license.

In November, 1994, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory ruling that the statutory licensure requirements are inapplicable to them because the work performed by Rowe and Kalicharen was primarily maintenance work and not plumbing installation work. Alternatively, the plaintiffs claimed that they are exempt from the requirements of chapter 393 because the hospital is an “industrial firm” within the meaning of § 20-340 (6). After a hearing, the board issued a declaratory ruling in which it concluded that the work performed by Rowe and Kalicharen constituted plumbing and piping work under § 20-330 (3) and, further, that § 20-340 (6) does not exempt the hospital’s employees from the statutory licensure requirements.

The plaintiffs appealed from the declaratory ruling of the board to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, claiming that § 20-340 (6) exempts employees of the hospital from the licensure requirements of chapter 393. The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that the hospital is an “industrial firm” within the meaning of § 20-340 (6) and, consequently, sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal. The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). On appeal, the defendants renew their argument that the hospital is not an “industrial firm” under § 20-340 (6) and, therefore, is not exempt from the licensure requirements of chapter 393. We agree with the defendants.

“[B]ecause our resolution of the [defendants’] claim requires the application of a statutory provision, namely, [§ 20-340 (6)], to a specific factual scenario, we are . . . guided by well established tenets of statutory interpretation. It is fundamental that statutory construction requires us to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to construe the statute in a manner that effectuates that intent. . . In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 239 Conn. 124, 140-41, 680 A.2d 1329 (1996). “Furthermore, when a state agency’s determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny, as in this case, the agency’s determination is not entitled to special deference.” Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 688, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996); see Duni v. United Technologies Corp., 239 Conn. 19, 25, 682 A.2d 99 (1996). Finally, exemptions to statutes are to be strictly construed; Cannata v. Dept, of Environmental Protection, supra, 141; and “those who claim the benefit of an exception under a statute have the burden of proving that they come within the limited class for whose benefit it was established.” Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 424, 479 A.2d 187 (1984); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532, 549, 441 A.2d 30 (1981). With these principles in mind, we turn to the defendants’ claim.

Section 20-334 provides that individuals performing certain kinds of work, including plumbing and piping work, must be licensed. Since the enactment of the statutory licensure requirements in 1965, the legislature has created eleven exemptions to the licensing mandate of § 20-334, including the exemption under § 20-340 (6) for any person employed by an “industrial firm” whose main duties concern, inter aha, plumbing and piping work. The plaintiffs’ sole claim of exemption from the requirements of § 20-334 is that the hospital is an “industrial firm” under § 20-340 (6). Specifically, the plaintiffs, urging a broad construction of the term “industrial firm,” maintain that that term encompasses all commercial enterprises engaged in any industry, including the health industry. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the term applies only to business entities involved in manufacturing activities and, consequently, that the hospital, because it is not involved in such activities, does not fall within the exemption.

Where, as here, a statute does not define a term, “we refer to [its] commonly approved usage for guidance in our determination.” Williams v. Best Cleaners, Inc., 237 Conn. 490, 500, 677 A.2d 1356 (1996); see Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 794, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). The term “industrial firm” is not defined in the dictionary; see, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; and the dictionary definitions of “industrial” and “firm” provide little guidance as to whether the term “industrial firm” connotes only an enterprise that is involved in manufacturing activities, as the defendants claim, or one that is engaged in any form of business or commercial activity, as the plaintiffs contend. Moreover, we have not had previous occasion to define the precise term “industrial firm,” in this or any other context. Cf. United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 754-55, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992) (discussing term “industrial plant” as defined in regulations relating to taxing statutes); Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Commission, 150 Conn. 333, 335-36, 189 A.2d 399 (1963) (discussing term “industrial plant” as defined under statute, since repealed, creating industrial building commission).

As the plaintiffs conceded at oral argument, however, the term “industrial firm” is not one which, in common parlance, ordinarily would be deemed to include a hospital. Moreover, the plaintiffs further acknowledge that, under the expansive definition of the term they espouse, virtually any business or commercial enterprise would qualify as an “industrial firm,” including, for example, insurance companies, banks, private schools and colleges, hotels and restaurants, retail stores, apartment complexes, and the like. We do not think that the commonly approved usage of the term “industrial firm” includes these and other such business enterprises. By contrast, the term “industrial firm” more readily brings to mind commercial entities engaged in manufacturing activities.

Furthermore, several well established tenets of statutory construction provide persuasive support for the defendants’ claim regarding the intended scope of the exemption created under § 20-340 (6). First, under the interpretation of the term “industrial firm” advanced by the plaintiffs, the word “industrial” has little, if any, significance because virtually any “firm” — that is, any “business unit or enterprise” — would qualify for the exemption created under § 20-340 (6). In addition, under the plaintiffs’ interpretation of “industrial firm,” the exemption created by § 20-340 (9) for “employees of stage and theatrical companies” and the exemption under § 20-340 (10) for “employees of carnivals, circuses or similar transient amusement shows” would be unnecessary because those persons already would be exempt from the statutory licensure requirements by operation of § 20-340 (6). “It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless provisions. . . . [I]n construing statutes, we presume1 that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336, 346, 684 A.2d 1181 (1996); Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 90-91, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994). In contrast to the plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 20-340 (6), the statutory construction advanced by the defendants gives full effect both to the word “industrial” and to each of the ten other exemptions created by the legislature under § 20-340.

Second, the plaintiffs also concede that under their construction of the term “industrial firm,” only that class of persons performing plumbing services for the general public is likely to fall outside the scope of the exemption created by § 20-340 (6). If the legislature had intended to limit the statutory licensure requirement in such a manner, it easily could have done so without creating the numerous exemptions set forth under § 20-340. See, e.g., LoPresto v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 234 Conn. 424, 435, 451-52, 662 A.2d 738 (1995). The fact that the legislature eschewed that approach and, instead, crafted eleven specific exemptions to the licensure requirement suggests that it did not intend such a sweeping application of § 20-340 (6).

Finally, a primary purpose of the licensure requirement, in addition to establishing a uniform, statewide system of licensing, is to protect the public health and safety. See, e.g., 11 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1965 Spec. Sess., p. 2186, comments by Senator Charles T. Alfano (“[w]e feel that [the electrical, plumbing, steamfitting and elevator repair] trades are of such a character that they are essential to the public health and safety, and they should be regulated on the state level”). As a remedial statute, we must afford it a liberal construction in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit. Knight v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 241 Conn. 466, 474, 696 A.2d 1249 (1997); Fruin v. Colonnade One at Old Greenwich Ltd. Partnership, 237 Conn. 123, 133, 676 A.2d 369 (1996). “In furtherance of that principle, exemptions or exclusions are to be strictly construed.” Success Village Apartments, Inc. v. Local 376, 175 Conn. 165, 168, 397 A.2d 85 (1978); State Board of Labor Relations v. West Hartford Board of Education, 177 Conn. 68, 74, 411 A.2d 28 (1979). Construing the term “industrial firm” to include virtually any commercial or business enterprise would be contrary to that principle. Indeed, the plumbing and piping work performed in a hospital is critical to the health and safety of its patients; as the defendants have explained, such work includes the installation and maintenance of water and gas lines for patient rooms, operating rooms, and laboratories and, therefore, it is likely the legislature intended those performing such work to meet the highest professional standards. Moreover, the plaintiffs acknowledge that our determination regarding the scope of the exemption created under § 20-340 (6) for plumbing and piping work is equally applicable to the electrical, fire protection system, elevator repair and installation, and heating and cooling trades. Thus, under the statutory construction espoused by the plaintiffs, the hospital, and all other business or commercial entities that provide services to the public, would be allowed to employ unlicensed personnel to perform any or all of its electrical work; see General Statutes § 20-330 (2); any or all of its elevator installation, repair and maintenance work; see General Statutes § 20-330 (7); any or all of its heating, piping and cooling work; see General Statutes § 20-330 (5); and any or all of its fire protection sprinkler systems work. See General Statutes § 20-330 (9). The significant additional public health and safety implications raised by a broad application of the exemption to those occupations militates strongly in favor of the less expansive interpretation of the term “industrial firm” urged by the defendants.

This case presents a good example of why the legislature, for purposes of granting exemptions under § 20-340 (6) from the licensure requirements of § 20-334, distinguished between firms engaged in manufacturing activities and firms engaged in other business or commercial pursuits. In the case of a firm or company involved in a manufacturing activity, the general public is unlikely to be affected by the plumbing and piping work performed at the manufacturing site. By contrast, faulty plumbing and piping poses a far greater public safety risk in the case of an enterprise that, like the hospital, provides services to the public. Moreover, manufacturing firms are far more likely than most other businesses to employ persons who, due to their mechanical and engineering training and skill, may be able to rectify problems arising from substandard plumbing and piping work performed by unlicensed personnel. Consequently, the legislature reasonably concluded that the need for licensed personnel is significantly less in the case of a firm engaged in manufacturing activities than it is for other business and commercial enterprises.

We conclude, therefore, contrary to the determination of the trial court, that the hospital is not an “industrial firm” within the meaning of § 20-340 (6). Accordingly, the plaintiffs are not exempt from the licensure requirements of chapter 393.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the appeal.

In this opinion CALLAHAN, C. J., and BORDEN, J., concurred.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. The decision of the majority unfortunately will have a substantial adverse impact on hospitals and other institutions by requiring them to employ licensed plumbers and other tradesmen in order to perform trivial tasks that are performed everyday by ordinary persons in their own homes. For example, the named plaintiff, Hartford Hospital (plaintiff), which, according to the majority, does not fall within the definition of “industrial firm” in General Statutes § 20-340 (6), will now be required to employ a licensed plumber to replace a faucet in a bathroom sink or, for that matter, to replace the washer in the faucet. The court’s decision, applicable to providers of services, such as hospitals, private educational institutions, corporate complexes and the like, will not only result in increased labor costs, but also, decreased maintenance services during periods when the economy is robust and skilled labor is scarce.

The plaintiff argues that it is exempt from the statutory licensing requirements with respect to plumbing work pursuant to § 20-340 (6) because it falls within the definition of industrial firm. Section 20-340 (6) provides an exemption for “employees of industrial firms whose main duties concern the maintenance of the electrical, plumbing and piping, solar, heating, piping and cooling, or elevator installation, repair and maintenance work of such firm on its own premises or on premises leased by it for its own use . ...” In construing this exemption, we are required to look “to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment”; (internal quotation marks omitted) United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431, 692 A.2d 742 (1997); and to the legislative scheme in which the exemption is set forth. Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 663-64, 680 A.2d 242 (1996). We are also required to use our “common sense” and “assume that [the legislature intended to accomplish] a reasonable and rational result . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caltabiano v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 662, 667, 560 A.2d 975 (1989). I conclude that the majority, by narrowly defining the term industrial firm as one engaged only in manufacturing activities, does nothing to advance the legislative scheme of protecting the consuming public, but, rather, unnecessarily adds costs to vital services required by the public.

I begin my analysis with the language of the statute. The defendants, the state department of consumer protection and the state plumbing and piping work examining board do not contest that the plaintiff is clearly a “firm” under any definition of the term, and thus the inquiry is whether a hospital is “industrial” in order to satisfy the requirement for an exemption under § 20-340 (6). The majority concludes that a service provider, like a hospital, does not fit within the “commonly approved usage of the term ‘industrial firm’ ” because that term “more readily brings to mind commercial entities engaged in manufacturing activities.” The dictionary definition of industry, however, includes reference to both manufacturing concerns and providers of services. It is an established rule of construction that we not only use our common sense, but “[w]here a statute does not define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding expressed ... in dictionaries.” Doe v. Manson, 183 Conn. 183, 186, 438 A.2d 859 (1981). Moreover, service businesses, such as insurance, health care, credit and banking, are commonly referred to as industry. Thus, the term “industrial firm” is not restricted to manufacturing activities in its common usage.

I also find support for exempting the plaintiff from the licensing requirements in the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of General Statutes § 20-334. The primary purpose of the licensing requirement in § 20-334 was to protect the general consuming public from unqualified and/or unscrupulous contractors. Roswell Goodman, the executive director of Hartford Mechanical Contractors, Inc., testified before the legislative committee on General Law when it was considering the bill, which was subsequently codified as § 20-334, that “[n]ot only have we members of this industry, the people who work with the tools and the contractors to consider, but we have got to think about the people who they are serving, the public.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 1, 1965 Sess., p. 348. Robert Hartigan, appearing before the same committee on behalf of the Connecticut Light and Power Company, concurred that “the purpose [of § 20-334] is to protect the public and maintain certain minimum standards in competence to the public.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 3, 1965 Sess., pp. 1138-39. Hartigan commented further that, “of course, [the licensing requirements of § 20-334] would not be applicable to our employees who do not work for the general public, but work for companies.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 1139. Senator Paul Amenta confirmed this legislative purpose during debate on § 20-334 when he stated, “if a person works for an individual firm, [he is] not going to offer himself to the general public . . . ,” 61 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1965 Sess., p. 2187. Furthermore, a review of the specific eleven exemptions in § 20-340 demonstrates that the legislature was concerned with creating a state licensing system for plumbers, electricians and heating and cooling technicians who come into direct contact with the public. For example, employees of “any federal, state or municipal agency,” as set forth in subdivision (1), “employees of stage and theatrical companies,” as set forth in subdivision (9), and “employees of carnivals, circuses or similar transient amusement shows,” as set forth in subdivision (10), all of whom are exempt from the licensing requirements, do not hold themselves out to the public as being qualified to perform plumbing, electrical or heating and cooling services.

The majority argues that if § 20-340 (6) covers employees of the plaintiff, the exemptions created by § 20-340 (9) and (10) for employees of stage and theatrical companies and employees of carnivals, circuses or similar transient amusement shows “would be unnecessary because those persons already would be exempt from the statutory licens[ing] requirements by operation of § 20-340 (6).” According to the majority, if the legislature had wanted to limit the statutory licensing requirement to persons who perform services for the general public, “it easily could have done so without creating the numerous exemptions set forth under § 20-340,” and the “fact that [it] eschewed that approach . . . [by creating eight more exemptions] suggests that it did not intend such a sweeping application of § 20-340 (6).”

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the legislature did not intend a sweeping application of § 20-340 (6). The legislative history of No. 789, § 12, of the 1967 Public Acts, which added six licensing exemptions; now General Statutes § 20-340 (2), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (9); indicates that the exemptions were listed with specificity because the act was “merely a technical amendment” of Public Acts, Spec. Sess., February, 1965, No. 493, § 9. 12 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1967 Sess., p. 5376, remarks of Representative Edwin A. Lassman. According to Lassman, the legislature simply wanted to redefine certain “occupational provisions,” and redefine “areas [of Public Acts, Spec. Sess., February, 1965, No. 493, § 9] so that ambiguities could be cleared up in the various fields of licensing.” Id. There is no indication from this history that the legislature wanted local plumbing enforcement officers to limit § 20-340 (6) to manufacturing firms.

I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the legislature reasonably could have concluded that it was sound policy to exempt plumbers employed to work in state operated hospitals, such as the state veterans hospital, and elementary, junior high and senior high schools, while requiring employees of private service providers, such as the plaintiff, Yale New Haven Hospital, Trinity College and Wesleyan University, to be licensed before they can perform plumbing tasks. The exemption for employees of industrial firms was one of three exemptions in the original version of § 20-334. The other exemptions were those for employees of federal, state and municipal agencies (now § 20-340 [1]) and public service company employees (now § 20-340 [2]). According to the majority, the legislature determined in 1965, that it was acceptable to have unlicensed plumbers work in state operated hospitals, where the plumbing work “is critical to the health and safety of [the] patients,” and public schools, where thousands of young students in the state attend class and may use gas lines for basic laboratory work, but it would not be acceptable to have unlicensed plumbers in private hospitals and schools. This distinction does not make sense. “[Compelling principles of statutoiy construction . . . require us to construe a statute in a manner that will not . . . lead to [such] absurd results.” Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 712-13, 595 A.2d 297 (1991).

The majority points to no legislative history to justify this untenable result. Instead, the majority assumes that there is some form of assurance of safety in private manufacturing firms and federal, state and municipal agencies that does not exist in private service providing firms. The majority argues, without any basis, that hospitals and other service providers are less likely than manufacturing firms to voluntarily employ licensed supervisory employees, who “may be able to rectify problems arising from substandard plumbing and piping work performed by unlicensed personnel.” I disagree with this reasoning because private service providing firms, such as hospitals and schools, have the same incentive as manufacturing entities and public service providers to act with reasonable care and employ licensed supervisory persons — they both want to avoid any liability that could arise from allowing unlicensed plumbers to work without proper supervision. In fact, the plaintiff, like nearly every private hospital in the state, maintains a department of facilities and management, which ensures that its employees perform competent plumbing work under proper supervision.

The majority also argues that it is logical for the state to treat state agencies differently from private firms providing similar services because the legislature reasonably could have entrusted “each of those governmental entities [with] the responsibility for regulatory oversight of its public agencies.” The flaw in this analysis is simple: state agencies are equally as responsible for regulatory oversight of private service providing firms like hospitals as they are for public service providing firms. For example, pursuant to § 19-13-D3 (a) (1) and (2) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which was adopted by the department of health prior to 1965 when the “industrial firm” exception was created, hospitals are required to provide adequate equipment for patient service, “in accordance with the requirements of the slate department of health,” and “the requirements of the state fire safety code.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, hospitals have to pass inspection of the local fire marshall each year in order to file their annual applications for operating licenses. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 19-13-D3 (a) (2). Furthermore, “[a]reas in which explosive gases are used, and areas in which radioactive materials are used shall meet the requirements of the state department of health for adequate protection of patients and personnel.” (Emphasis added.) Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 19-13-D3 (a) (3). Above all else, hospitals must ensure that “[t]he management, personnel, equipment, facilities, sanitation and maintenance of the hospital shall be such as reasonably to ensure the health, comfort and safety of the patients at all times.” Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 19-13-D3 (h) (6) (now § 19-13-D3 [i] [7]). In light of the state’s regulatory oversight of hospitals, it would have been unreasonable for the legislature to have concluded that public hospital employees who perform plumbing work, as opposed to private hospital employees who perform similar work, would be better supervised.

I conclude that the plaintiff and its employees, the plaintiffs Herve Gelinas, Charles Rowe and Amrit Kalicharen, did not violate the statutory licensing provisions of § 20-334 by performing plumbing and piping work on hospital premises without a certificate.

Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

       Chapter 393 of the General Statutes sets forth a comprehensive scheme for the licensure of persons engaged in the following occupations: (1) electrical work; (2) plumbing and piping work; (3) heating, piping and cooling work, including solar installation, repair and maintenance work; (4) elevator installation, repair and maintenance work; and (5) fire protection sprinkler systems work. The licensure function for each of these occupations is performed, respectively, by the following five examining boards within the department of consumer protection: (1) the electrical work board; (2) the plumbing and piping work board; (3) the heating, piping and cooling work board; (4) the elevator installation, repair and maintenance board; and (5) the fire protection sprinkler systems board. See General Statutes § 20-331.

       The board is an agency of the named defendant, the department of consumer protection. See footnote 2 of this opinion. References hereinafter to the defendants include both the department of consumer protection and the board.

       The board alleged that each of the plaintiffs had violated certain statutory provisions from February 18, 1989, through May 9, 1994.

       General Statutes § 20-334 provides: “Certificate or card of registration. License. Suspension or revocation. No person shall engage in, practice or offer to perform the work of any occupation covered by this chapter in this state unless he has first obtained a license as provided [by the examination provisions] in section 20-333, or possesses a card of registration from the State Apprentice Training Division or the board and shall be subject to all the regulations established under this chapter for the purpose of governing apprenticeship training or has been issued a license for such particular work under this chapter prior to July 6, 1967. The Department of Consumer Protection shall furnish to each qualified applicant a license certifying that the holder thereof is entitled to engage in the work or occupation for which the person has been issued a license under this chapter, and the holder of such license shall carry it on his person while engaging in such work or occupation. Such license shall be shown to any properly interested person on request. No such license shall be transferred to or used by any person other than the person to whom the license was issued. Contractors shall display their state license number on all commercial vehicles used in their business and shall display such number in a conspicuous manner on all printed advertisements, bid proposals, contracts, invoices and on all stationery used in their business. The department shall keep a register in which shall be entered the names of all persons to whom such licenses are issued, and said register shall be at all times open to public inspection. Each board may suspend or revoke any license or certificate granted or issued by it if the holder thereof is convicted of a felony, is grossly incompetent, engages in malpractice or unethical conduct or knowingly makes false, misleading or deceptive representations regarding his work or violates the rules and regulations established under this chapter. Before any license is suspended or revoked, such holder shall be given notice and opportunity for hearing as provided in regulations established by the Commissioner of Consumer Protection. Any person whose license has been suspended or revoked may, after ninety days, apply to the board to have the same reinstated. Although § 20-334 has been amended since 1989, the time of the initial alleged violation; Public Acts 1991, No. 91-407, §§ 25, 42; there are no relevant substantive changes for the purposes of this opinion.
      General Statutes § 20-337 provides: “Ownership of businesses. Nothing in this chapter shall require that the ownership or control of a business engaged in providing the work or services licensed under the provisions of this chapter be vested in a licensed person, but all the work and services covered by the definitions set forth in section 20-330 shall be performed by persons licensed for such work or occupation under this chapter.”
      General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 20-341 provides: “Penalties for violations, (a) Any person who engages in or practices the work or occupation for which a license is required by this chapter without having first obtained an apprentice permit or a certificate and license for such work, or who wilfully employs or supplies for employment a person who does not have a certificate and license for such work or who wilfully and falsely pretends to qualify to engage in or practice such work or occupation, or who engages in or practices any of the work or occupations for which a license is required by this chapter after the expiration of his license, or who violates any other provision of this chapter, unless the penalty is otherwise specifically prescribed, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars for each such violation.
      “(b) The appropriate examining board may, after notice and hearing, impose a civil penalty on any person who engages in or practices the work or occupation for which a license or apprentice registration certificate is required by this chapter without having first obtained such a certificate or license, or who wilfully employs or supplies for employment a person who does not have such a license or certificate or who wilfully and falsely pretends to qualify to engage in or practice such work or occupation, or who engages in or practices any of the work or occupations for which a license or certificate is required by this chapter after the expiration of his license or certificate or who violates any of the provisions of this chapter or the regulations adopted pursuant thereto. Such penalty shall be in an amount not more than five hundred dollars for a first violation of this subsection, not more than seven hundred fifty dollars for a second violation and not more than one thousand five hundred dollars for each violation of this subsection occurring less than three years after a second or subsequent violation of this subsection, except that any individual employed as an apprentice but improperly registered shall not be penalized for a first offense.” Although § 20-341 has been amended since 1989, the time of the initial alleged violation; Public Acts 1989, No. 89-309; Public Acts 1991, No. 91-407, §§ 24, 42; Public Acts 1997, No. 97-263, § 6; there are no relevant substantive changes for the purposes of this opinion.

       As used in chapter 393 of the General Statutes, “ ‘[p]lumbing and piping work’ means the installation, repair, replacement, alteration or maintenance of gas, water and associated fixtures, laboratory equipment, sanitary equipment, other than subsurface sewage disposal systems, fire prevention apparatus, all water systems for human usage, sewage treatment facilities and all associated fittings within a building and shall include lateral storm and sanitary lines from buildings to the mains, swimming pools and pumping equipment, and shall include making connections to back flow prevention devices, and shall include low voltage wiring, not exceeding twenty-four volts, used within a lawn sprinkler system, but on and after July 1, 1984, shall not include solar work, except for the repair of those portions of a solar hot water heating system which include the basic domestic hot water tank and the tie-in to the potable water system and on and after April 1, 1989, shall not include the installation, repair, replacement, alteration or maintenance of fire prevention apparatus within a structure, except for standpipes which are not connected to sprinkler systems . . . .” General Statutes § 20-330 (3). Although § 20-330 (3) has been amended since 1989, the time of the initial alleged violation; Public Acts 1990, No. 90-194, § 1; there axe no relevant substantive changes for the purposes of this opinion.

       The board also alleged that Gelinas, a licensed plumber, had failed to display properly his contractor’s license number on his business cards. General Statutes § 20-334; see footnote 5 of this opinion.

       See General Statutes § 4-166.

       General Statutes § 20-340 provides: “Exemptions from licensing requirements. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to (1) persons employed by any federal, state or municipal agency; (2) employees of any public service company regulated by the state Department of Public Utility Control or of any corporate affiliate of any such company when the work performed by such affiliate is on behalf of a public service company, in either case only if the work performed is in connection with the rendition of public utility service, including the installation or maintenance of wire for community antenna television service, or is in connection with the installation or maintenance of wire or telephone sets for single-line telephone service located inside the premises of a consumer; (3) employees of any municipal corporation specially chartered by the state of Connecticut; (4) employees of any contractor while said contractor is performing electrical-line or emergency work for any public service company; (5) persons engaged in the installation, maintenance, repair and service of electrical or other appliances of a size customarily used for domestic use where such installation commences at an outlet receptacle or connection previously installed by persons licensed to do the same and maintenance, repair and service is confined to the appliance itself and its internal operation; (6) employees of industrial

        firms whose main duties concern the maintenance of the electrical, plumbing and piping, solar, heating, piping and cooling, or elevator installation, repair and maintenance work of such firm on its own premises or on premises leased by it for its own use-, (7) the fabrication of electrical, plumbing and piping, fire protection sprinkler systems, solar, heating, piping and cooling or elevator installation, repair and maintenance equipment used in the production of goods sold by industrial firms; (8) persons performing work necessary to the manufacture or repair of any apparatus, appliances, fixtures, equipment or devices produced by it for sale or lease; (9) employees of stage and theatrical companies performing the operation, installation and maintenance of electrical' equipment if such installation commences at an outlet receptacle or connection previously installed by persons licensed to make such installation; (10) employees of carnivals, circuses or similar transient amusement shows who install electrical work, provided such installation shall be subject to the approval of the State Fire Marshal prior to use as otherwise provided by law and shall comply with applicable municipal ordinances and regulations; (11) persons engaged in the installation, maintenance, repair and service of electrical, plumbing, fire protection sprinkler systems, solar, and heating, piping and cooling equipment in and about single-family residences owned and occupied or to be occupied by such persons; provided any such installation, maintenance and repair shall be subject to inspection and approval by the building official of the municipality in which such residence is located and shall conform to the requirements of the State Building Code.” (Emphasis added.) Although § 20-340 has been amended since 1989, the time of the initial alleged violation; Public Acts 1996; No. 96-21, §§ 1, 3; there are no relevant substantive changes for the purposes of this opinion.

       The plaintiffs did not pursue their claim that the statutory licensure requirements were inapplicable to them on the ground that Rowe and Kalicharen had not performed plumbing work within the meaning of § 20-330 (3).

       See Public Acts 1965, No. 493. Prior to 1965, occupational licensing of the trades regulated under chapter 393 was done pursuant to municipal ordinance.

       When the licensure requirements were first adopted, only three exemptions were created, including the exemption for any person employed by an “industrial firm.” See White Oak Corp. v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, 12 Conn. App. 251, 256, 530 A.2d 641 (1987). The original three exemptions are essentially the same as the current versions of subdivisions (1), (2) and (6) of § 20-340. Id., 256 n.8.

       Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “industrial” as “of or belonging to industry.” “Industry” is defined as follows: “[a]: a department or branch of a craft, art, business, or manufacture: a division of productive or profit-making labor; especially]: one that employs a large personnel and capital especially] in manufacturing ... [b]: a group of productive or profit-making enterprises or organizations that have a similar technological structure of production and that produce or supply technically substitutable goods, services, or sources of income . . . . [c] manufacturing activity as a whole . . . .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. “Firm” is defined as “a business unit or enterprise. . . .” Id. Because both the plaintiffs and the defendants can find support for their claims in one or more of the definitions of the word “industry,” resort to the dictionary for the purpose of resolving the statutory construction issue raised by this appeal is not particularly helpful.

       See footnote 13 of this opinion.

       See footnote 9 of this opinion.

       We note that the pertinent legislative history sheds little light on the meaning of the term “industrial firm” under § 20-340 (6). There is nothing in the relevant legislative debate, however, indicating an intent by the legislature to exempt service providers, as distinguished from firms engaged in manufacturing activities, from the licensure requirements. Indeed, the limited debate about the licensure requirements, which focuses almost exclusively on the applicability of those requirements to a firm engaged in industrial manufacturing and construction, arguably suggests a contrary conclusion. Specifically, Senator Morgan McGuire raised the following concern about the applicability of the licensure requirements to steamfitters: “[T]here are many industries in the state lhathave great numbers of electrical workers, for example, great numbers of steamfitters. ... I know that at a place like [Electric Boat], a great portion of the personnel are steamfitters .... I do not think that this act should in any way, shape or form apply to those people who are engaged in industry doing the job as a part of an ultimate and later job . . . .” 11 S. Proc., Pt. 6,1965 Spec. Sess., pp. 2187-88. In attempting to assuage Senator McGuire’s concerns, Senator Paul Amenta, a proponent of the bill, reiterated that the provisions of the act “shall not apply to . . . employees of industrial firms, which Electric Boat would be ....’’ Id., p. 2189.

       It is trae that the hospital employs licensed plumbers who are responsible for supervising unlicensed persons in the performance of plumbing and piping work. Section 20-340 (6), however, contains no such requirement. Consequently, a business or commercial enterprise that is entitled to the exemption created under § 20-340 (6) need not employ any licensed plumbers.
      The plaintiffs also maintain that there is no logical reason why the legislature would exempt persons employed by federal, state and municipal agencies from the statutory licensure requirements; see General Statutes § 20-340 (1); and not also exempt persons employed by private enterprises, like the hospital, which provide the same or similar services. We disagree. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, it was reasonable for the legislature to entrust to each of those governmental entities the responsibility for regulatory oversight of its public agencies. The dissent argues that this reasoning is flawed because the state also is responsible for the regulatory oversight of some private agencies, as illustrated by the number of regulations that apply to hospitals. The dissent fails to acknowledge, however, that its proposed broad definition of service provider encompasses other service providers who are not as heavily regulated as hospitals, such as large corporations, insurance companies, restaurants, and private colleges. The lack of strict health and safety regulations affecting these businesses is all the more reason to believe that the legislature intended, as a minimal safety requirement, that the plumbers and electricians working on those buildings at least be licensed.

       General Statutes § 20-330 (2) provides in relevant part: “ ‘Electrical world means the installation, erection, maintenance, alteration or repair of any wire, cable, conduit, busway, raceway, support, insulator, conductor, appliance, apparatus, fixture or equipment which generates, transforms, transmits or uses electrical energy for light, heat, power or other purposes . . . Although § 20-330 (2) has been amended since 1989, the time of the initial alleged violation; Public Acts 1990, No. 90-194, § 1; there are no relevant substantive changes for the purposes of this opinion.

       General Statutes § 20-330 (7) provides: “ ‘Elevator installation, repair and maintenance work’ means the installation, erection, maintenance and repair of all types of elevators, dumb waiters, escalators, and moving walks and all mechanical equipment, fittings, associated piping and wiring from a source of supply brought to the equipment room by an unlimited electrical contractor for all types of machines used to hoist or convey persons or materials but does not include temporary hoisting machines used for hoisting materials in connection with any construction job or project . . . .”

       General Statutes § 20-330 (5) provides in relevant part: “ ‘Heating, piping and cooling work’ means the installation, repair, replacement, maintenance or alteration of any apparatus for piping, appliances, devices or accessories for heating systems, excluding sheet metal work; air conditioning and refrigeration systems, boilers, including apparatus and piping for the generation or conveyance of steam and associated pumping equipment . . . .”

       General Statutes § 20-330 (9) provides in relevant part: “ ‘Fire protection sprinkler systems work’ means the layout, on-site fabrication, installation, alteration or repair of any automatic or manual sprinkler system designed for the protection of the interior or exterior of a building or structure from fire, or any piping or tubing and appurtenances and equipment pertaining to such system including overhead and underground water mains, fire hydrants and hydrant mains, standpipes and hose connections to sprinkler systems, sprinkler tank heaters excluding electrical wiring, air lines and thermal systems used in connection with sprinkler and alarm systems connected thereto, foam extinguishing systems or special hazard systems including water spray, foam, carbon dioxide or dry chemical systems, halón and other liquid or gas fire suppression systems. . . .”

       The nature of the plumbing duties that were at issue in this case is best described by reference to the declaratory ruling of the state plumbing and piping work examining board (board), which includes the following statement: “The aforesaid duties, which [the plaintiff] avers should not require a license, include:
      “(a) Maintenance of leaky sinks and drains, and packing of faucets;
      “(b) Replacement of valves to correct running toilets;
      “(c) Maintenance/replacement of shower heads, hoses and nozzles;
      “(d) Maintenance of kitchen garbage disposals;
      “(e) Replacement of vacuum breakers on sinks; and

        “(f) Maintenance and/or unplugging of plaster traps.”
      The board ruled that “[a]ll the stated plumbing-related duties involve the performance of plumbing work,” and that a license was required to perform such work.

       See footnote 5 of the majority opinion for the text of General Statutes § 20-334, which sets forth the licensing requirements.

       Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines industry in relevant part as: “3a: systematic labor especially] for the creation of value . . . b: a department or branch of a craft, art, business, or manufacture: a division of productive or profit-making labor; esp[ecially]: one that employs a large personnel and capital esp[ecially] in manufacturing . . . c: a group of productive or profit-making enterprises or organizations that have a similar technological structure of production and that produce or supply technically substitutable goods, services or sources of income . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

       The majority mistakenly argues that the plaintiffs construction of General Statutes § 20-330 (2), which defines the term “electrical work,” would allow “all commercial entities” to employ unlicensed personnel to perform its electrical work, and any or all of its elevator installations. The simple response to this argument is that by requiring that the § 20-340 (6) exemption apply only to “employees . . . whose main duties concern the maintenance of . . . [plumbing and other services] on its own premises,” the legislature insured (1) that industrial firms cannot contract for those “dangerous” services with outside unlicensed contractors who may be unqualified, and (2) that in all probability employees performing such work would be part of a properly supervised maintenance staff whose main duties include maintaining the firm’s plumbing and other services. (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, it is absurd to believe that a private service providing firm, like the plaintiff here, which must prove each year that it has systems and personnel in place to protect the health and welfare of its patients and personnel or risk losing its operating license; see Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 19-13-D3; would be more likely to allow one of its employees to install an elevator than would supervisors in a public school.

       Section 20-334 was also part of a legislative scheme to replace municipal licensing of skilled trades with a uniform statewide system of licensing. White Oak Corp. v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, 12 Conn. App. 251, 256, 530 A.2d 641 (1987). “Prior to 1965, occupational licensing of various trades in Connecticut was done by municipal ordinances promulgated under local law.” Id.; see 61 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1965 Sess., p. 2186, remarks of Senator Charles T. Alfano (statute designed “to eliminate the necessity of all these men in these trades going to every single community in the state and securing a license and paying a license fee in every town they go into”).

       The majority argues that service providing firms are not exempt under § 20-340 (6) because such an exemption would raise significant public health and safety implications. This argument is flawed because the exemption of municipal, state and federal employees, theater and carnival employees and manufacturing employees raises equally as significant public health and safety implications. Indeed, government facilities, entertainment facilities and large manufacturers serve the same number of members of the general public, if not more, than service providing firms.

       Public Acts 1967, No. 789, § 12, added the following six exemptions to § 20-340: (1) “employees of industrial firms whose main duties concern the . . . fabrication of electrical, plumbing and piping, heating, piping and cooling ... or elevator installation, repair and maintenance equipment used in the production of goods sold by [such] industrial firms”; (2) “employees of any municipal corporation specially chartered by the state of Connecticut”; (3) “employees of any contractor while said contractor is performing work for or subject to inspection by any federal, state or municipal agency or corporation other than a municipal building department, or any public service company”; (4) “persons engaged in the installation, maintenance, repair and service of electrical or other appliances of a size customarily used for domestic use where such installation commences at an outlet receptacle or connection previously installed by persons licensed to do the same and maintenance, repair and service is confined to the appliance itself and its internal operation”; (5) “persons performing work necessary to the manufacture or repair of any apparatus, appliances, fixtures, equipment or devices produced by it for sale or lease”; and (6) “employees of stage and theatrical companies performing the operation, installation and maintenance of electrical equipment if such installation commences at an outlet receptacle or connection previously installed by persons licensed to make such installation.”

       Public Acts, Spec. Sess., February, 1965, No. 493, § 9, provides: “The provisions of [§ 20-334] shall not apply to persons employed by any federal, state or municipal agency, employees of public utilities regulated by the state public utility commission, or employees of industrial firms whose main duties concern the maintenance of the electrical, plumbing, steamfitting or elevator repair work of such firm for its own premises or those leased by it or the fabrication of electrical, plumbing, steamfitting or elevator equipment used in the production of goods sold by such industrial firms.”

       It is ironic to note that the majority concludes that the legislature reasonably could have entrusted supervision of transient amusement shows and carnivals to the state fire marshall, and to the requirement that such shows “comply with applicable municipal ordinances and regulations”; General Statutes § 20-340 (10); but that it could not have intended to allow hospitals, which are subject to more stringent regulations than traveling amusements, to employ unlicensed persons to perform plumbing tasks, like replacing a faucet in a bathroom sink, because that would subject the public to higher risks.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MCDONALD, J. KATZ, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DONNA MARIE LONGO
    (SC 15792)
    Borden, Katz, Palmer, McDonald and Peters, Js.
    Argued December 10, 1997
    officially released March 3, 1998

      John R. Day, certified legal intern, with whom were Richard Emanuel, assistant public defender, and, on the brief, Charles L. Mudd, certified legal intern, for the appellant (defendant).

      Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state’s attorney, and Eva Lenczewski, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

MCDONALD, J.

The principal issue in this case is whether the police, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the federal and state constitutions, may, in some circumstances, conduct a warrantless search of a closed container found inside a car. The defendant, Donna Marie Longo, was charged with one count of conspiracy to transport a narcotic substance with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 2la-277 (a). Prior to her trial, she filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court denied. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ten years, execution suspended after five years, followed by three years of probation. The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We conclude that both the motion to suppress and the evidentiary ruling of the trial court were decided properly, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following evidence was adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress. On May 6, 1995, Lieutenant Benjamin Pagoni and Trooper Anthony Cretella of the Connecticut state police established an automobile safety check point on Route 69 between New Haven and Waterbury. At approximately 6 p.m., the officers stopped a Honda Civic that was being driven by Thomas Allegrini. They made the stop because Allegrini and Matthew Summa, his front seat passenger, were not wearing seat belts, and because the side windows of the Civic appeared to be tinted beyond the legal limit. When Pagoni approached the driver’s side of the car and spoke to AUegrini through the open window, Pagoni smelled the odor of marijuana coming from inside the car. Pagoni then proceeded to the passenger side and asked Summa to roll down his window. From there, Pagoni could see scattered throughout the car numerous green seeds that he believed were marijuana seeds and the burnt ends of several rolled marijuana cigarettes. Pagoni also observed Summa trying to push a large black bag under the front seat with his feet.

Pagoni then asked Summa to step out of the vehicle. Once Summa was outside the car, Pagoni saw several more marijuana seeds on the seat where Summa had been sitting. Allegrini told Pagoni that there were no other drugs in the car but that he had smoked some marijuana in the car the night before. The officers asked Allegrini and the defendant, who was in the back seat, to exit the car. At that point, Allegrini was arrested for possession of marijuana.

Pagoni then asked for and received Allegrini’s consent to search the car. In conducting the search, he came upon the black bag under the front seat. The defendant told Pagoni that it was her bag and that she did not want it to be searched. Nonetheless, Pagoni searched the bag, and found the following items: credit cards in Michael Greco’s name; a credit card in the defendant’s name; a driver’s license in the defendant’s name; a Connecticut state police gun permit in the defendant’s name; a handwritten note with directions to a house in New Haven; a price list for various amounts of cocaine; and in a zippered compartment in the back of the bag, a plastic bag containing cocaine.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court made the following findings. On May 6, 1995, the officers established a routine automobile safety check point on the highway. There the officers stopped a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger for automobile equipment violations. Pagoni, whose training qualified him to recognize the presence of marijuana, smelled marijuana coming from inside the car. He also could see marijuana seeds scattered on the floor of the vehicle and the burnt ends of several rolled marijuana cigarettes in the ash tray. The driver told Pagoni that he had been smoking marijuana in the car the previous night.

When the driver and the two other occupants of the vehicle had exited the car, as requested, Pagoni searched the vehicle for marijuana and weapons and found the black bag positioned partly under the front seat. The defendant told Pagoni that the black bag was hers and that she did not want it to be searched. Pagoni did search the black bag, finding the cocaine and other items inside.

At the defendant’s trial, the state presented evidence that on May 6, 1995, Summa telephoned Allegrini and asked him for a ride. After Allegrini picked up Summa, Summa received a call on his pager, which displayed the defendant’s telephone number. Summa called the defendant and spoke with her husband, Michael Greco. Greco asked if they could give the defendant a ride to New Haven and Allegrini agreed to do so. When Summa and Allegrini arrived at the defendant’s residence, the defendant entered the back seat of the car carrying a large black bag.

Following the defendant’s directions, Allegrini drove to a residential neighborhood in New Haven and the defendant told Allegrini where to park the car. The defendant left the car carrying her black bag, and returned approximately ten minutes later, still carrying her bag. During the return trip to Waterbury, the defendant asked Summa to put her bag on the floor in front of him, which he did. Thereafter, they were stopped by the officers.

On appeal, the defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of her bag, under both the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the state to introduce her gun permit into evidence. We conclude that the motion to suppress was decided correctly, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gun permit into evidence.

I

Under both the federal and the state constitutions, the police must first obtain a warrant before conducting a search, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (warrant required before every search or seizure, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 423, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986). We hold that because in this case the police had probable cause to search the automobile under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, they also could search any containers found in the vehicle that might hold the objects of their search.

A

The search of the black bag does not violate the United States constitution. This case is controlled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the search of a closed brown paper bag found in the trunk of the defendant’s automobile. “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Id. “The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile ... is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” Id., 824.

It is undisputed that Allegrini was lawfully stopped based on traffic violations. Probable cause to search the car arose when Pagoni smelled marijuana and saw marijuana seeds and cigarettes in plain view inside the car. Here, the officers were searching for marijuana and weapons. See State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 509-11, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997) (upholding, for safety reasons, limited weapons search of passenger compartment of lawfully stopped vehicle). In these circumstances, because probable cause existed to search the vehicle and any of its contents that might have concealed contraband, the automobile exception permitted the police to search the defendant’s bag. United States v. Ross, supra, 456 U.S. 798.

B

The warrantless search was also justified under our interpretation of the warrant requirement of article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10 (1988). In Dukes, a police officer stopped the defendant for speeding. Id., 100. After learning that the defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended, the officer asked him to get out of the car and arrested him. The officer immediately conducted a search of the defendant’s clothing and found a small plastic vial of crack cocaine in his jacket pocket. Id., 101. Afterward, while searching the car for additional contraband, the officer used the defendant’s keys to open a “ ‘heavy plastic security type box’ ” that was located on the rear seat. Id., 103. Inside the box, the officer discovered a loaded revolver and over ninety vials of a white substance that was later determined to be crack cocaine, cocaine and heroin. Id.

Although the search in Dukes could have been justified either as a search incident to the defendant’s arrest or under the automobile exception, we held that the “automobile exception permits a warrantless search of an automobile whenever the police have probable cause to do so.” Id., 120. We observed that the automobile exception necessarily also permits a search of any containers found in the car, such as a locked box, which might contain the contraband sought in that search. Id., 125-27.

In State v. Leonard, 14 Conn. App. 134, 136-37, 539 A.2d 1030 (1988), aff’d, 210 Conn. 480, 556 A.2d 611 (1989), the Appellate Court concluded that the police had probable cause to stop the defendant’s car, and that the resulting search of the car was proper. The defendant was a passenger in his own car when he and a Mend were stopped for speeding. Id., 135. As the police officer approached the car, he noticed that the defendant appeared to be pushing something underneath the front seat. Upon reaching the driver’s window, the officer looked in and saw white powder on the driver’s jacket and mustache. Id., 135-36. Both men were told to exit the car, and another officer reached into the car and seized the open paper bag that the defendant had been handling. Id. The bag contained a block of hard-packed white powder that was later determined to be cocaine. Id. The Appellate Court concluded that probable cause existed to stop the defendant and his friend on the basis of the traffic violation. Id., 137. Furthermore, the officer’s observation of the white powder in plain view gave him probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband, justifying a search of the car and any containers in the vehicle that could have contained such contraband. Id., 139. Therefore, the warrantless search did not violate the defendant’s federal or state constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id., 137-39. The Appellate Court’s decision was upheld in a per curiam decision by this court. State v. Leonard, 210 Conn. 480, 556 A.2d 611 (1989).

Consistent with these decisions, the Appellate Court repeatedly has upheld the warrantless searches of closed containers located in automobiles where probable cause existed to search the vehicle. State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 225, 614 A.2d 1229 (1992), aff’d, 227 Conn. 363, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993) (“[o]ur Supreme Court has recognized that article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution contains an automobile exception to its warrant requirement, under which the police may search the passenger compartment of an automobile, including closed containers therein, on the roadside, upon probable cause to believe that they contain the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime”); see State v. Glenn, 30 Conn. App. 783, 787, 622 A.2d 1024 (1993) (upholding search of black bag found inside vehicle); State v. Quinones, 21 Conn. App. 506, 509, 574 A.2d 1308, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 816, 576 A.2d 546 (1990) (upholding search of paper bag retrieved from vehicle).

Here, as in Leonard, the police had probable cause to search the vehicle. “Probable cause to search exists if: (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal activity or will assist in a particular apprehension or conviction . . . and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the items sought to be seized will be found in the place to be searched.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. DeChamplain, 179 Conn. 522, 528-29, 427 A.2d 1338 (1980). We conclude that the traces of marijuana observed in plain view provided probable cause to search the entire vehicle, and any containers, for additional marijuana. Because the black bag was a container which could have held the items that were the object of the search, under our state constitution the police did not have to obtain a warrant before searching it. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence gathered during the search of the defendant’s bag.

II

We next turn to the defendant’s argument that her gun permit should not have been admitted into evidence. She claims that the prejudicial effect of the permit outweighed its probative effect.

A trial court’s evidentiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only “ ‘where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice.’ ” State v. Alvarez, 216 Conn. 301, 306, 579 A.2d 515 (1990). Great weight is given to the trial court’s decision, and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of its correctness. State v. Beckenbach, 198 Conn. 43, 47, 501 A.2d 752 (1985).

The defendant argues that the gun permit should not have been admitted into evidence because the state had other evidence to connect her to the black bag. The test is, however, whether the evidence is relevant, not whether it is necessary. State v. Doehrer, 200 Conn. 642, 649, 513 A.2d 58 (1986) (potentially inflammatory photographs admissible even though not essential). The trial court concluded that the gun permit, in the defendant’s name, was relevant to the issue of ownership of the black bag. Ownership of the black bag was relevant to the issue of possession of the drugs found therein. “Unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, any fact may be proved which logically tends to aid the trier in the determination of the issue.” State v. Holliman, 214 Conn. 38, 50, 570 A.2d 680 (1990). “One fact is relevant to another fact whenever, according to the common course of events, the existence of the one, taken alone or in connection with other facts, renders the existence of the other either certain or more probable.” State v. McClendon, 199 Conn. 5, 8-9, 505 A.2d 685 (1986). In order to show who possessed the drugs found inside the black bag, the state needed to show who exercised control and dominion over it. See State v. Hill, 201 Conn. 505, 516, 523 A.2d 1252 (1986). As the trial court observed, “the more things [the state] show[s] connecting [the defendant to the black bag], the more the jury may conclude that she was involved with the drugs contained in [it].”

The defendant argues that the admission of her gun permit was prejudicial because it indicated a criminal propensity. The possession of a gun permit issued by the state police hardly indicates a criminal propensity. The trial court so instructed the jury, telling them it was legal to have a permit and that the permit was offered solely on the issue of possession of the black bag. The trial court’s discretion in weighing the possible prejudice against the real probative effect of this evidence will not be disturbed in these circumstances.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted into evidence the defendant’s gun permit.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion BORDEN, PALMER and PETERS, Js., concurred.

KATZ, J.,

concurring. I agree with the majority that State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10 (1988) is controlling. In Dukes, this court held that the “automobile exception permits a warrantless search of an automobile whenever the police have probable cause to do so”; id., 120; and that this exception necessarily also permits a search of any container found in the car, such as a locked box. Id., 125-27. Recognizing this hurdle, the defendant, at oral argument before this court, argued that even if Dukes is controlling, we should overrule that case and hold that pursuant to article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, a warrantless search of a closed container within an automobile is not authorized under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Although it is certainly a related issue, a decision about whether to overrule such significant precedent is not integral to the issue on appeal. Because the defendant did not brief the issue of whether to overrule Dukes, I would not decide that question in this case. I write separately, however, to highlight the issue.

We have repeatedly acknowledged the significance of stare decisis to our system of jurisprudence because it gives stability and continuity to our case law. Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 196, 676 A.2d 831 (1996). Stare decisis is “a formidable obstacle to any court seeking to change its own law.” C. Peters, “Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis,” 105 Yale L.J. 2031, 2036 (1996). It “is the most important application of a theory of decisionmaking consistency in our legal culture.” Id., 2037. Moreover, the doctrine does more than merely push courts in hard cases, “where they are not convinced about what justice requires, toward decisions that conform with decisions made by previous courts.” Id., 2090. Stare decisis is justified because it allows for predictability in the ordering of conduct, it promotes the necessary perception that the law is relatively unchanging, it saves resources and it promotes judicial efficiency. A. Kronman, “Precedent and Tradition,” 99 Yale L.J. 1029, 1038-39 (1990) (“respect for past decisions is desirable to the extent that it increases the sum of social welfare ... by enhancing the law’s predictability, economizing judicial resources, strengthening the prestige of legal institutions, etc.”).

“Whether stare decisis serves the interests of judicial efficiency, protection of expectations, maintenance of the rule of law, or preservation of judicial legitimacy, however, is not dispositive. The value of adhering to precedent is not an end in and of itself, however, if the precedent reflects substantive injustice. Consistency must also serve a justice related end. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) p. 150 (favoring rejection of precedent when it ‘has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare’). When a prior decision is ‘seen so clearly as error that its enforcement [is] for that very reason doomed’ . . . Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992); the court should seriously consider whether the goals of stare decisis are outweighed, rather than dictated, by the prudential and pragmatic considerations that inform the doctrine to enforce a clearly erroneous decision.” Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 659, 680 A.2d 242 (1996).

Indeed, this court has long believed that although “[s]tare decisis is a doctrine developed by courts to accomplish the requisite element of stability in court-made law, [it] is not an absolute impediment to change. . . . [Stability should not be confused with perpetuity. If law is to have a current relevance, courts must have and exert the capacity to change a rule of law when reason so requires. . . . [I]t is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations. Those doctrines only will eventually stand which bear the strictest examination and the test of experience.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 335-36, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990).

Since State v. Dukes, supra, 209 Conn. 98, this court has “determined in some instances that the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our own constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). In State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 386-87, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993), we noted that “[i]n light of our demonstrated constitutional preference for warrants and our concomitant obligation narrowly to circumscribe exceptions to the state constitutional warrant requirement, we conclude that a warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause, but conducted after the automobile has been impounded at the police station, violates article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution.” This court also has determined the validity of searches and seizures under the state constitution without deciding the validity of the state’s actions under the federal constitution. In State v. Joyce, 229 Conn. 10, 24-27, 639 A.2d. 1007 (1994), we held that the warrantless chemical testing of the defendant’s burnt clothing, which had been cut off by the paramedics who had treated the defendant at the scene of a fire and thereafter seized by the police pursuant to their community caretaking function, violated article first, § 7, of the state constitution because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items and the search was not otherwise justified by exigent circumstances. In State v. White, 229 Conn. 125, 147-55, 640 A.2d 572 (1994), we held that the defendant’s compelled temporary removal from a correctional center, where he was being detained on another charge, for a lineup, in the absence of compliance with the statutory requirements for an arrest warrant or search warrant, and there being no other authority under Connecticut law for such a process, constituted a violation of article first, § 9, of our state constitution. Such recent interpretation of our state constitution suggests at least that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement should not have been adopted as part of our article first, § 7 jurisprudence.

       General Statutes § 53a-48 provides in relevant part: “Conspiracy. Renunciation. (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.”
      General Statutes § 21a-277 provides in relevant part: “Penalty for illegal manufacture, distribution, sale, prescription, dispensing, (a) Any person who manufactures, distributes . . . transports with the intent to sell or dispense, possesses with the intent to sell or dispense . . . any controlled substance which is a hallucinogenic substance other than marijuana, or a narcotic substance . . . shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years and may be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars or be both fined and imprisoned . . . . ”

       The black bag has been referred to as a satchel, pocketbook, purse, briefcase and bag. Throughout this opinion we will refer to it as the black bag.

       As the trial court found, the search of the black bag, therefore, was conducted without the defendant’s consent.

       The fourth amendment to the United States constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The fourth amendment’s prohibition against the use of evidence obtained during an illegal search is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, reh. denied, 368 U.S. 871, 82 S. Ct. 23, 7 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1961).
      Article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”

       Although the defendant contested, in her brief, the presence of probable cause, she conceded, at oral argument, that probable cause existed. See State v. Izzo, 623 A.2d 1277 (Me. 1993) (probable cause to search vehicle existed after discovering marijuana in passenger’s waist bag).

       It is undisputed that the marijuana was in plain view. Furthermore, the trial court found that “[cjertainly, based on the facts and circumstances that I heard, and based on the training and experience of the lieutenant, there was probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband, specifically marijuana.” Other courts have found that the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement. See United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 874, 116 S. Ct. 199, 133 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1995); United States v. Nicholson, 17 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201, 203 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117, 102 S. Ct. 2928, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1329 (1982); United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 558 F.2d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1050, 98 S. Ct. 900, 54 L. Ed. 2d 802 (1978).

       The defendant’s petition for certification to appeal was limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court err in sustaining the conclusion of the trial court at the hearing on the motion to suppress that there was sufficient evidence of probable cause under our federal and state constitutions to justify the police in making a warrantless search of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger and in arresting him as a result of that search?” State v. Leonard, 208 Conn. 807, 545 A.2d 1104 (1988).