author: Katz, J.

text:
    Tobias Weiss v. Statewide Grievance Committee
    (14666)
    Callahan, Borden, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.

      Argued September 24—
    decision released November 16, 1993

      Tobias Weiss, pro se, with whom was Morris Teig, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Elizabeth F. Collins, assistant bar counsel, for the appellee (defendant).
   Katz, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, the statewide grievance committee, properly reprimanded the plaintiff, attorney Tobias Weiss, for professional misconduct, after concluding that he had violated Disciplinary Rule 5-104 (A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (DR 5-104 [A]) by accepting an 18 percent interest in a hotel project as payment for legal services rendered to three clients. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the statewide grievance committee’s decision to issue the reprimand. After remanding the appeal to the statewide grievance committee for a clarification of the standard of proof used in issuing the reprimand, the trial court affirmed the statewide grievance committee’s decision and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.

The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the reprimand should be rescinded because the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the statewide grievance committee’s conclusion that the plaintiff had violated DR 5-104 (A); (2) concluded that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as applied to the settlement of the plaintiff’s civil action against his clients, did not preclude the statewide grievance committee from making a finding of attorney misconduct; (3) upheld the statewide grievance committee’s decision to sustain its reprimand in response to the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration; and (4) accepted the statewide grievance committee’s report in response to its remand request to clarify the standard of proof used in issuing the reprimand. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following facts. In 1980, the plaintiff, an attorney admitted to the Connecticut Bar and practicing in Stamford, rendered legal services to three brothers, Raymond Zebroski, Leon Zebroski and Stanton Zebroski, in connection with a project to develop a full-service hotel (hotel project) on land owned by the Zebroskis in Stamford. Specifically, the plaintiff assisted the Zebroskis in obtaining approval from the Connecticut Development Authority for a $9,300,000 state bond issue. In 1981, after obtaining approval for the bond issue, the plaintiff sought to collect his legal fees for services rendered in connection with the hotel project. At that time, because the Zebroskis were financially unable to pay the plaintiff, the parties reached an oral agreement assigning the plaintiff an 18 percent interest in the hotel project in satisfaction of his legal fees. Thereafter, in 1984, the Zebroskis entered into a joint venture with another group to develop a Super 8 Motel on the property, and excluded the plaintiff from the hotel project.

In 1985, the plaintiff filed a civil suit against the Zebroskis claiming that he was owed $350,000 in legal fees for obtaining the bond issue and $150,000 in fees for other legal services rendered in connection with the hotel project during the years 1980 through 1984. Additionally, the plaintiff sought reimbursement in the amount of $7000 for his out-of-pocket contributions to the hotel project. The Zebroskis filed a counterclaim, alleging violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., negligence, intentional interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, abuse of process and fraud.

In 1988, while the civil suit was pending, Raymond Zebroski filed a complaint with the statewide grievance committee, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff had mishandled the hotel project and had engaged in a conflict of interest. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 51-90e (a) (1) and Practice Book § 27F (a) (l), the statewide grievance committee referred the complaint to the grievance panel (panel) for the StamfordNorwalk judicial district. Subsequently, on August 5, 1988, the plaintiff filed with the panel a memorandum and exhibits in opposition to Zebroski’s complaint. On October 31, 1988, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-90f (a) and (d) and Practice Book § 27F (c) and (f), the panel concluded that there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs conduct had created a conflict of interest in violation of DR 5-104 (A). Pursuant to General Statutes § 51-90g (a) and Practice Book § 27J (a), the statewide grievance committee assigned the complaint to a reviewing subcommittee. On February 9, 1989, the reviewing subcommittee held a hearing on the matter. In its “proposed decision,” dated April 28, 1989, the reviewing subcommittee found merit in the panel’s probable cause determination regarding the conflict of interest, concluded that the plaintiff had violated DR 5-104 (A) and recommended that the statewide grievance committee reprimand the plaintiff. On May 18, 1989, the statewide grievance committee adopted the reviewing subcommittee’s proposed decision and reprimanded the plaintiff.

Thereafter, on September 7, 1989, the civil action between the plaintiff and the Zebroskis was settled, resulting in a judgment by stipulation of $18,000 in favor of the plaintiff on both his complaint and the Zebroskis’ counterclaim. Subsequently, on November 16,1989, the plaintiff requested that the statewide grievance committee reconsider its decision, claiming that newly discovered evidence relating to the settlement of the civil action in his favor warranted a reversal. On December 21,1989, the statewide grievance committee concluded that the settlement of the civil action and the alleged new evidence did not warrant a reversal of the reprimand.

On March 6,1991, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the statewide grievance committee’s final decision. In his appeal the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the factual findings of the statewide grievance committee were not supported by clear and convincing evidence as required by Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162, 171-72, 575 A.2d 210 (1990). In light of this contention, on August 22, 1991, the trial court remanded the appeal to the statewide grievance committee for “a further report indicating whether its factual findings and conclusion that the plaintiff . . . was guilty of attorney misconduct were based on clear and convincing proof.”

On September 20,1991, the statewide grievance committee reported, in response to the court’s remand directing it to review its decision to issue a reprimand, that it had employed the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. After receiving this report, the trial court, on November 20, 1992, affirmed the statewide grievance committee’s decision and denied the plaintiff’s appeal. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). Additional facts will be set forth hereinafter where pertinent.

This court established the standard of judicial review of statewide grievance committee decisions in Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228, 234-35, 578 A.2d 1075 (1990). Although the statewide grievance committee is not an administrative agency; Sobocinski v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 215 Conn. 517, 526, 576 A.2d 532 (1990); the court’s review of its conclusions is similar to the review afforded to an administrative agency decision. Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra. Practice Book § 27N (f), adopted after Pinsky to govern appeals from decisions of the statewide grievance committee to issue a reprimand, sets forth the applicable standard of review: “Upon appeal, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the statewide grievance committee as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the committee unless the court finds that substantial rights of the respondent have been prejudiced because the committee’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) [i]n violation of constitutional, Practice Book or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the authority of the committee; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. ...”

Thus, in reviewing a decision of the statewide grievance committee to issue a reprimand, neither the trial court nor this court takes on the function of a fact finder. Rather, our role is limited to reviewing “the record to determine if the facts as found are supported by the evidence contained within the record and whether the conclusions that follow are legally and logically correct.” Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 234. Additionally, in a grievance proceeding, the standard of proof applicable in determining whether an attorney has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear and convincing evidence. Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, supra, 171-72. The burden is on the statewide grievance committee to establish the occurrence of an ethics violation by clear and convincing proof. Id.

Applying these principles to the facts before us, we conclude that the statewide grievance committee’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that its conclusions are legally and logically correct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court upholding the statewide grievance committee’s decision to reprimand the plaintiff.

I

We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly determined that the record sufficiently supports the statewide grievance committee’s conclusion that he had violated DR 5-104 (A). As it existed in the years in question, DR 5-104 (A) provided: “A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure.”

Disciplinary Rule 5-104 (A) is not a per se or absolute prohibition of business transactions between lawyers and clients and does not absolutely prohibit an attorney from receiving an interest in a client’s property as a fee for legal services. The plaintiff and the statewide grievance committee agree that the rule is implicated only when a lawyer enters into a business transaction with a client and two conditions are satisfied. First, the lawyer and the client must have “differing interests” in the business transaction. Second, the client must expect the lawyer to exercise professional judgment in the business transaction for the protection of the client. When both of these conditions exist, a lawyer can avoid violating the rule only by obtaining client consent after full disclosure.

Although the plaintiff agrees that this is the correct interpretation of DR 5-104 (A), he argues that the statewide grievance committee failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that his conduct violated the rule. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that there was insufficient evidence to show that: (1) he and the Zebroskis had “differing interests” under DR 5-104 (A); and (2) the Zebroskis expected him to exercise his professional judgment for their protection with respect to the hotel project. We reject both of these contentions.

“Differing interests,” as defined in the Code of Professional Responsibility during the years in question, included “every interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest.” Additionally, this court recently described DR 5-104 (A) as encompassing “a transaction in which the [attorney] overreached his client to pursue his own self-interest.” Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 219 Conn. 473, 486, 595 A.2d 819 (1991), cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1170, 117 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1992). In view of this court’s interpretation of the rule and in light of the broad definition of “differing interests,” there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the statewide grievance committee’s conclusion that the plaintiff and the Zebroskis had differing interests in the hotel project.

At the reviewing subcommittee’s February 9, 1989 hearing, Raymond Zebroski testified that when he and his brothers decided to sell a portion of their interest in the hotel project for the purpose of raising capital, the plaintiff counseled against such a sale, urging them instead to continue their own efforts to develop the project and attempting to persuade them to purchase adjacent properties. Raymond Zebroski further testified that he was not sure in what capacity the plaintiff was acting when he offered this advice—as an attorney, a land broker, a money broker or someone “looking out for his own interests.”

On the basis of this evidence, the statewide grievance committee reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiff and the Zebroskis had “differing interests” in the hotel project because the plaintiff’s 18 percent interest in the project had “adversely affected [his] judgment or loyalty to [the Zebroskis],” thereby causing him to “[overreach] his client to pursue his own self-interest.” Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, supra, 486. We therefore sustain the trial court’s conclusion that the record sufficiently supports the existence of differing interests.

There also is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the Zebroskis expected the plaintiff to continue as counsel to protect their interests in the hotel project. At the reviewing subcommittee’s February 9, 1989 hearing, the plaintiff testified that he and the Zebroskis had a longstanding attorney-client relationship prior to 1981. The plaintiff admitted that, after accepting his 18 percent interest, he did not inform the Zebroskis that he would no longer be their lawyer with respect to the hotel project. Additionally, Raymond Zebroski testified that he and the plaintiff had based the figure of 18 percent in part on the $150,000 of legal fees claimed by the plaintiff for his performance of legal services from inception to “completion of the [hotel] project.” Viewed as a whole, the evidence permitted the statewide grievance committee to reach the reasonable conclusion that the Zebroskis envisioned that the plaintiff would continue to act as their lawyer with respect to the hotel project. Moreover, in the plaintiffs amended civil complaint, dated February 23,1987, he contended that he continued to render legal services to the Zebroskis in connection with the hotel project after 1981. The plaintiff submitted the civil complaint to the statewide grievance committee on August 5,1988, with his memorandum and exhibits in opposition to Raymond Zebroski’s grievance complaint. Thus, the civil complaint was part of the record before the statewide grievance committee from early on in the proceedings, and, at the very least, constitutes an evidentiary admission.

Based on this evidence, clear and convincing proof existed in the record to support the statewide grievance committee’s logical conclusion that the Zebroskis expected the plaintiff to continue to act as their lawyer in connection with the hotel project. We conclude that the trial court properly determined that the record before the statewide grievance committee supported its conclusion that he violated DR 5-104 (A).

II

The plaintiff next claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not preclude the statewide grievance committee from making a finding of attorney misconduct. This claim stems from the settlement of the plaintiffs civil litigation against the Zebroskis in 1988, which resulted in a stipulated judgment in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the Zebroskis’ counterclaim. According to the plaintiff, the counterclaim encompassed an allegation that the plaintiff had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. The plaintiff asserts that, because both the civil complaint and the grievance complaint involve the same claims and the same allegations between the same parties on the same issue of an ethics violation, the trial court should have concluded that the civil action had a preclusive effect on the statewide grievance committee’s decision. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the trial court should have concluded that: (1) the Zebroskis were barred from making the same claims and alleging the same facts in the grievance proceeding that they made in their counterclaim; (2) the statewide grievance committee was barred from relying on the same claims and allegations as a basis for its decision; (3) disputes of fact in the grievance proceeding should have been resolved in favor of the plaintiff as a result of the civil litigation; and (4) the stipulated civil judgment and its effect negate the existence of clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff violated DR 5-104 (A). We reject the plaintiffs arguments.

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are well established. The two doctrines “ ‘protect the finality of judicial determinations, conserve the time of the court and prevent wasteful relitigation. . . .’ ” Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 501, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988). Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is distinguishable from collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim. Slattery v. Maykut, 176 Conn. 147, 156-57, 405 A.2d 76 (1978). In contrast, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim. DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 239, 597 A.2d 807 (1991).

Although the two doctrines are distinct from each other, both operate only against the same parties or those in privity with them. “While it is commonly recognized that privity is difficult to define, the concept exists to ensure that the interests of the party against whom collateral estoppel [or res judicata] is being asserted have been adequately represented because of his purported privity with a party at the initial proceeding. ... A key consideration in determining the existence of privity is the sharing of the same legal right by the parties allegedly in privity.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 304, 596 A.2d 414 (1991).

The trial court concluded that neither doctrine applied to prevent the statewide grievance committee from issuing its reprimand because the parties to the grievance proceeding were not the same as, or in privity with, those in the civil action. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion.

We have stated that “[t]here are no adversary parties [to grievance proceedings] in the technical legal sense, although our reports contain cases which, in their titles, carry as parties not only the names of the petitioners [or respondents] but those of bar examining committees and grievance committees.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Application of Pagano, 207 Conn. 336, 340, 541 A.2d 104 (1988). Thus, in a legal sense, neither the plaintiff nor the statewide grievance committee was a “party” to the grievance proceeding against whom the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel can properly be applied.

Moreover, even were we to view the plaintiff and the statewide grievance committee as parties to the grievance proceeding, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are nonetheless inapplicable. The parties in the civil action were the plaintiff herein, Weiss, and his former clients, the Zebroskis. The statewide grievance committee was neither named as nor in privity with any party to the civil action. As a result, the statewide grievance committee’s interests were neither protected nor litigated in the civil action. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly determined that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata were inapplicable to the grievance proceeding.

III

The plaintiff next claims that the trial court improperly upheld the statewide grievance committee’s decision to sustain its reprimand in response to the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration in light of newly discovered evidence. As stated above, the statewide grievance committee issued its initial decision to reprimand the plaintiff on May 18, 1989. The civil action between the plaintiff and the Zebroskis was settled on September 7 of that same year.

Thereafter, on November 16,1989, the plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration of the statewide grievance committee’s decision, based on the existence of “newly discovered evidence” relating to the settlement of the civil action.

First, the plaintiff argued that the stipulated judgments established, for purposes of the grievance complaint, that the Zebroskis’ rights had not been affected adversely by his conduct. Additionally, the plaintiff submitted the following “new” evidence: (1) deposition testimony taken in the civil action from the Zebroskis that disclosed their educational backgrounds and business experience; and (2) deposition testimony taken in the civil action from James Farrell, an attorney, and the Zebroskis that revealed that the Zebroskis had retained Farrell as legal counsel from 1978 to at least 1984. The plaintiff argued that the new evidence established “at least in substance” that DR 5-104 (A) had not been violated because from this evidence the statewide grievance committee reasonably could have inferred that the Zebroskis, as “seasoned, knowledgeable, experienced business people,” either had spoken with Farrell about the 18 percent interest arrangement or had made a conscious decision not to do so. The plaintiff also argued that, “at the very least,” the new evidence and resulting inferences undermined the statewide grievance committee’s ability to establish a violation of DR 5-104 (A) by clear and convincing proof.

Finally, the plaintiff argued that for purposes of DR 5-104 (A), “full disclosure” did not require him expressly to caution the Zebroskis to obtain independent counsel. In support of this argument, the plaintiff relied on a Massachusetts case, Pollock v. Marshall, 391 Mass. 543, 462 N.E.2d 312 (1984).

The statewide grievance committee reviewed the plaintiffs arguments and declined to reverse its reprimand. In a letter dated December 21, 1991, the statewide grievance committee stated that it had “considered the record of the . . . grievance complaint and the . . . submission of the [plaintiff]” and had “concluded that the settlement of the civil action between the parties, and the present knowledge of the Respondent that the Complainant had access to other counsel in the early 1980s does not warrant the reversal of the Committee’s reprimand. In light of the knowledge known to the Respondent at the time of the conflict of interest, the Committee stands on its decision.”

According to the plaintiff, the statewide grievance committee’s letter reflects an unwillingness to weigh the “actual circumstances” and a refusal to consider facts that were unknown to him when he agreed to accept an 18 percent interest in the hotel project. This approach, the plaintiff argues, permitted the Zebroskis as complainants to “conceal” relevant information that, if known by the statewide grievance committee prior to its decision, would have affected its ultimate findings and conclusions. We disagree.

The plaintiffs argument incorrectly assumes that the statewide grievance committee failed even to consider the potential relevance of his proffered evidence. In its December 21 letter, however, the statewide grievance committee stated that it had “considered” the plaintiff’s submissions and was, nevertheless, upholding its original decision based on the plaintiff’s knowledge when the conflict of interest occurred. In contrast to the plaintiff’s claim, the statewide grievance committee had therefore weighed the “actual circumstances” and had concluded that those circumstances were irrelevant in light of the plaintiffs knowledge in 1981. This conclusion is logical and legally correct, and is clearly and convincingly supported by the evidence in the record.

We already have concluded that the trial court properly determined that the stipulated judgments had no preclusive effect on the grievance proceeding. Further, Farrell’s deposition testimony contained no new relevant evidence. Even with the addition of the testimony, the record before the statewide grievance committee continued to reflect that the Zebroskis expected the plaintiff to represent them in the hotel project. Finally, the deposition testimony concerning the Zebroskis’ relative sophistication and educational backgrounds had no bearing on whether the plaintiff’s conduct violated DR 5-104 (A). Because none of the plaintiff’s proffered new evidence impacted the statewide grievance committee’s initial findings, there was no persuasive reason advanced to that committee for it to withdraw from its original decision. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly upheld the statewide grievance committee’s decision to sustain its reprimand.

IV

The plaintiff’s final claim is that the trial court improperly accepted the statewide grievance committee’s report issued in response to the remand requesting that the statewide grievance committee clarify the standard of proof used in issuing the reprimand. A chronological review of events is necessary to the resolution of this claim. The statewide grievance committee issued its initial decision to reprimand the plaintiff on May 18,1989. Shortly thereafter, on May 30,1989, the Appellate Court held that the standard of proof for attorney disciplinary matters is “clear and convincing evidence.” Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 18 Conn. App. 475, 477, 559 A.2d 227 (1989); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 18 Conn. App. 316, 323, 559 A.2d 220 (1989). Subsequently, in November, 1989, the plaintiff requested that the statewide grievance committee reconsider its initial decision.

On December 21,1989, the statewide grievance committee reconsidered the plaintiffs case and issued a final decision letter stating its intention to sustain its reprimand. Thereafter, on August 22, 1991, the trial court first heard the plaintiffs appeal and issued its remand to the statewide grievance committee to clarify the standard of proof it had used in deciding to reprimand the plaintiff. In response to the trial court’s remand, the statewide grievance committee held a hearing on September 19, 1991, at the conclusion of which it submitted its report to the court. In its report, the statewide grievance committee stated that, although it had used the preponderance of the evidence standard when first considering the plaintiffs case in May, 1989, it had nevertheless applied a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof when reconsidering the matter, at the plaintiff’s request, in December, 1989. The trial court accepted the report and thereafter issued its decision to deny the plaintiff’s appeal.

The plaintiff generally asserts that the report is procedurally and substantively deficient because it is “conclusory, with no detail to demonstrate its conclusion.” Specifically, the plaintiff argues that a legitimate application of the new, more restrictive standard of proof procedurally required the convocation of a reviewing subcommittee, which did not occur. The plaintiff also advances several challenges to the credibility of the statewide grievance committee’s assertion that, in reconsidering the plaintiff’s case in December, 1989, it applied the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. First, he argues that the report is not believable because the statewide grievance committee’s letter disposing of the plaintiffs request for reconsideration makes no mention of its application of a different standard of proof. Second, the plaintiff argues that, because the statewide grievance committee disposed of his request for reconsideration on the basis that the evidence was irrelevant, it had no occasion to apply the new standard of proof. Finally, the plaintiff argues that, in the absence of minutes of the meeting or any other committee record documenting an application of the new standard, the statewide grievance committee’s report is not to be believed. We reject all of the plaintiff’s arguments.

The plaintiff’s procedural challenge regarding the failure of the statewide grievance committee to convoke a reviewing subcommittee is without merit. The plaintiff has cited neither a statutory provision nor a Practice Book section in support of his assertion that, in order legitimately to reconsider his case in light of the new standard of proof, the statewide grievance committee had to convene a reviewing subcommittee. On the contrary, under General Statutes § 51-90g (a) and Practice Book § 27J (a), convocation of a reviewing subcommittee by the statewide grievance committee is discretionary. Additionally, under the applicable statutory provisions and Practice Book sections, the statewide grievance committee and a reviewing subcommittee have parallel powers to take evidence and hold hearings. Moreover, because Practice Book § 27J (e) mandates that the reviewing subcommittee send its record to the statewide grievance committee, the statewide grievance committee had before it all relevant and available evidence when it reconsidered the plaintiffs case. For all of these reasons, we reject the plaintiff’s argument.

The plaintiffs challenges to the report’s credibility are equally without merit. In its September 20, 1991 report, the statewide grievance committee clearly represented to the trial court that it had been apprised of the new standard of proof and accordingly had applied the clear and convincing evidence standard in December, 1989, when, at the plaintiff’s request, it reconsidered his case. When making his request for reconsideration, the plaintiff argued that, “at the very least,” his submitted evidence and the resulting inferences undermined the statewide grievance committee’s ability to prove a violation of DR 5-104 (A) by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, by the plaintiff’s own request, the statewide grievance committee was alerted to the proper standard of proof.

In attacking the report’s credibility, the plaintiff has offered no supporting evidence—aside from his own suppositions—to indicate that the statewide grievance committee either was unaware of its obligations to conform to the law or had any motivation not to tell the truth. The trial court took the statewide grievance committee at its word and we see no reason why this court should not do the same. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly accepted the statewide grievance committee’s report.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The plaintiff’s conduct in question occurred during the years 1981 through 1984, prior to the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct, effective October 1,1986, which replaced the Code of Professional Responsibility. As it existed in 1981 through 1984, Disciplinary Rule 5-104 (A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provided: “A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure.”

       The plaintiff’s appeal was authorized by Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228, 232, 578 A.2d 1075 (1990), recognizing the trial court’s authority to review a committee order by virtue of its inherent authority over attorney conduct.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 51-90e provides in relevant part: “(a) Any person may file a written complaint alleging attorney misconduct. A grievance panel may, on its own motion, initiate and file a written complaint alleging attorney misconduct. A complaint against an attorney shall be filed with the statewide bar counsel. Within five days of the receipt of a complaint the statewide bar counsel shall:
      “(1) Forward the complaint to the appropriate grievance panel as determined under rules of court; and
      “(2) Notify the complainant and the respondent, by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the panel to which the complaint was forwarded. The notification to the respondent shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint.
      “(b) The respondent shall have the right to respond within ten days of receipt of notification to the grievance panel to which the complaint has been referred.
      “(c) The statewide bar counsel shall keep a record of all complaints filed with him. . . .”
      At the time in question, Practice Book § 27F provided in relevant part: “(a) Any person may file a written complaint alleging attorney misconduct. A grievance panel on its own motion may also file a complaint. Complaints against attorneys shall be filed with the statewide bar counsel. Within five days of the receipt of a complaint the statewide bar counsel shall:
      “(1) forward the complaint to a grievance panel in the judicial district in which the respondent maintains his principal office or his residence, provided that, if the respondent does not maintain such an address in this state, the statewide bar counsel shall forward the complaint to any grievance panel; and
      “(2) notify the complainant and the respondent, by certified mail with return receipt, of the panel to which the complaint was sent. The notification to the respondent shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint.
      “The respondent shall have the right to respond within ten days of receipt of notification. The response shall be sent to the grievance panel to which the complaint has been referred.”

       See footnote 3.

       See General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 51-90e (b) and Practice Book § 27F (a) (2), footnote 3.

       General Statutes § 51-90f (a) and (d) provide: “(a) Each grievance panel shall investigate with the assistance of the grievance counsel assigned to such panel any complaint referred to it by the statewide grievance committee or statewide bar counsel to determine whether probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct. . . .
      “(d) The panel shall refer the record of its investigation, together with its determination that probable cause or no probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct, to the committee for appropriate action and any such determination shall be a matter of public record.”
      Practice Book § 27F (c) and (f) provide: “(c) The grievance panel, with the assistance of the grievance counsel assigned to it, shall investigate each complaint to determine whether probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct. . . .
      “(f) The panel shall, within ninety days from the date the complaint was referred to it, file the following with the statewide grievance committee: its written determination concerning whether probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, a copy of the complaint and response, a transcript of any testimony heard by the panel, a copy of any investigatory file and copies of any documents, transcripts or other written materials which were available to the panel. These materials shall constitute the panel’s record in the case. . . .”

       The panel also concluded that there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to put his fee agreement in writing.

       General Statutes § 51-90g (a) provides in pertinent part: “The statewide grievance committee may designate at least three members of the committee, including at least one-third who are not attorneys, to serve as a reviewing subcommittee for each determination made by a panel on a complaint. . . . The statewide grievance committee or the subcommittee, if any, shall hold a hearing concerning the complaint if the panel determined that probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct. . . .”
      Practice Book § 27J (a) provides in pertinent part: “Upon receipt of the record from a grievance panel, the statewide grievance committee may assign the case to a reviewing committee which shall consist of at least three members of the statewide grievance committee, at least one third of whom are not attorneys . . . .”

       See General Statutes § 51-90g (a), footnote 8.
      General Statutes § 51-90g (b) provides: “Any hearing held by the committee or subcommittee shall be public and on the record. The complainant shall be entitled to be present at all hearings on the complaint and to have counsel present. At such hearing the respondent shall have the right to counsel, to be heard in his own defense and to present evidence and witnesses in his behalf. At the conclusion of the evidence, the complainant and the respondent shall have the opportunity to make a statement either individually or through counsel. The committee or subcommittee may request oral argument.”
      At the time in question, Practice Book § 27J (c) and (d) provided: “(c) If the grievance panel determines that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall hold a hearing on the complaint. . . .All hearings following a determination of probable cause shall be public and on the record.
      “(d) The complainant and respondent shall be entitled to be present at all hearings and other proceedings on the complaint at which testimony is given and to have counsel present. At all hearings the respondent shall have the right to be heard in his own defense and by witnesses and counsel. The complainant and the respondent shall not be entitled to examine or cross examine witnesses unless requested by the reviewing committee. At the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of a hearing, the complainant and the respondent shall have the opportunity to make a statement, either individually or through counsel. The statewide grievance committee or reviewing committee may request oral argument.”

       General Statutes § 51-90g (c) provides in pertinent part: “The subcommittee shall conclude any hearing or hearings and shall render its proposed decision not later than ninety days from the date the panel’s determination of probable cause or no probable cause was filed with the statewide grievance committee.”
      At the time in question, Practice Book § 27J (e) provided in pertinent part: “[T]he reviewing committee shall render its proposed decision and file it with the statewide grievance committee. The reviewing committee’s record in the case shall consist of a copy of all evidence it received or considered, including a transcript of any testimony heard by it, and its proposed decision. The record shall be sent to the statewide grievance committee. In its proposed decision, the reviewing committee shall recommend either dismissal of the complaint, reprimand of the respondent by the statewide grievance committee or presentment of the respondent to the superior court. The reviewing committee shall forward a copy of the proposed decision to the complainant and the respondent.”

       The reviewing subcommittee did not find probable cause that the plaintiff s oral fee agreement violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

       General Statutes § 51-90g (e) provides in relevant part: “The subcommittee may propose in its decision to . . . reprimand the attorney . . . .” See Practice Book § 27J (e), footnote 10.

       General Statutes § 51-90h (b) provides in relevant part: “[T]he statewide grievance committee shall review the record before the subcommittee and any statements filed with it, and shall issue a decision dismissing the complaint, reprimanding the respondent, directing the statewide bar counsel to file a presentment against the respondent or referring the complaint to the same or a different reviewing subcommittee for further investigation and proposed decision.”
      At the time in question, Practice Book § 27M provided in relevant part: “[T]he statewide grievance committee shall issue a written decision either dismissing the complaint, reprimanding the respondent, directing the statewide bar counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the superior court or referring the complaint to the same or a different reviewing committee for further investigation and a proposed decision. Before issuing its decision, the statewide grievance committee may, in its discretion, request oral argument. The statewide grievance committee shall forward a copy of its decision to the complainant, the respondent and the grievance panel which investigated the complaint. The decision shall be a matter of public record.”

       In making his request for reconsideration, the plaintiff argued that disposition of the Zebroskis’ counterclaim in the civil action in his favor established for purposes of the grievance complaint that the Zebroskis’ rights had not been affected adversely by his conduct. Additionally, the plaintiff submitted the following “new” evidence: (1) deposition testimony taken in the civil action from the Zebroskis that disclosed their educational backgrounds and business experience; and (2) deposition testimony taken in the civil action from attorney James Farrell and the Zebroskis that revealed the Zebroskis had retained Farrell as legal counsel from 1978 to at least 1984. The plaintiff argued that the new evidence established “at least in substance” that DR 5-104 (A) had been satisfied because from this evidence the statewide grievance committee fairly could have inferred that the Zebroskis, as “seasoned, knowledgeable, experienced business people,” either had spoken with Farrell about the 18 percent fee arrangement or had made a conscious decision not to do so. The plaintiff also argued that, “at the very least,” the new evidence and resulting inferences undermined the statewide grievance committee’s ability to establish a violation of DR 5-104 (A) by clear and convincing proof. Finally, the plaintiff argued that for purposes of DR 5-104 (A), “full disclosure” did not require him expressly to caution the Zebroskis to obtain independent counsel. In support of this argument, the plaintiff relied on a Massachusetts case, Pollock v. Marshall, 391 Mass. 543, 462 N.E.2d 312 (1984).

       See footnote 2.

       The plaintiff separately argues that his conduct did not create “differing interests” as that phrase was understood in 1981. In support of his argument, the plaintiff relies principally on an informal opinion of the Connecticut Bar Association Committee On Professional Ethics dated November 18, 1980. We reject the plaintiffs argument for several reasons. First, in light of Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 219 Conn. 473, 486, 595 A.2d 819 (1991), cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1170, 117 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1992), in which this court described DR 5-104 (A), the informal opinion and other citations offered in support of the plaintiffs argument are not controlling. Second, the plaintiffs citations merely reflect that under appropriate circumstances there is nothing inherently improper with an attorney obtaining an interest in client property to protect a fee. In this case, however, the statewide grievance committee found that such appropriate circumstances did not exist. That is, the statewide grievance committee found that the plaintiff had created differing interests, that the Zebroskis had the expectation of continued representation and that the plaintiff had failed to obtain their consent after full disclosure. Finally, by focusing on 1981, the plaintiffs argument incorrectly assumes that his acceptance of the 18 percent fee arrangement in that year was the only conduct relevant to the statewide grievance committee’s conclusion that he violated DR 5-104 (A). In fact, the plaintiff’s continued representation of the Zebroskis after 1981 in connection with the hotel project in which he then held an 18 percent interest was what the statewide grievance committee found relevant in concluding that he violated the rule. For these reasons, we reject the plaintiff’s argument.

       Paragraphs four and five of the first count of the civil complaint state: “4. At various times beginning in 1979 until and including 1984, [the Zebroskis] bought and took title to certain parcels of real estate ....
      “5. [The plaintiff] rendered the legal services to [the Zebroskis] involved in acquiring the real estate.”
      Paragraphs thirty and thirty-three of the third count state: “30. During the years 1980-1984, [the] plaintiff spent more than 2,000 hours rendering such services for [the Zebroskis]. . . .
      “33. The reasonable value of the services rendered by [the] plaintiff was $350,000 for obtaining approval for the issuance of industrial revenue bonds of the State of Connecticut in the amount of $9,300,000, and $150,000 for legal services rendered.”

       In light of In re Application of Pagano, 207 Conn. 336, 340, 541 A.2d 104 (1988), in which we held that there are no adversary parties in grievance proceedings, we recognize that the plaintiffs submission of the civil complaint to the statewide grievance committee raises the question of whether his admission in the complaint qualifies as a judicial admission. See Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 196 Conn. 242, 244, 492 A.2d 164 (1985). We, however, leave this issue for another day.

       In his brief to this court, the plaintiff states that the counterclaim contained a “claim of breach of the rules of ethics.” Examination of the counterclaim reveals that in paragraph 16, count one, the Zebroskis alleged that “[the plaintiff’s] conduct violated the lawyers [sic] Code of Professional Responsibility.” Each successive count of the counterclaim incorporated paragraph sixteen. Thus, it appears that the counterclaim alleged a general violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility in five counts. We assume that it is to this general allegation of an unspecified violation that the plaintiff refers.

       This court later upheld the clear and convincing evidence standard in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162, 171-72, 575 A.2d 210 (1990).

       See footnote 8.

       See General Statutes § 51-90g (a) and (b), footnotes 8 and 9, respectively; Practice Book § 27J (c), footnote 9. Additionally, Practice Book § 27J (b) provides; “The statewide grievance committee and the reviewing committee shall have the power to issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear before it to testify in relation to any matter deemed by the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee to be relevant to the complaint and to produce before it for examination any books or papers which, in its judgment, may be relevant to such complaint. Any such testimony shall be on the record.”

       See Practice Book $ 27J (e), footnote 10.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    IBM Credit Corporation v. Board of Tax Review of the City of Hartford
    (14672)
    Peters, C. J., Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Foti, Js.
    Argued September 22—
    decision released November 16, 1993

      Michele C. Lukban, with whom was Edwin A. Lass-man, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Michael C. Collins, assistant corporation counsel, for the appellee (defendant).
   Per Curiam.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a plaintiff taxpayer is precluded from challenging a municipal assessment valuing its property entirely on the basis of uncontradicted figures supplied to the assessor by the taxpayer. We conclude that in this instance, the taxpayer is so precluded, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, IBM Credit Corporation (IBM), leases computer equipment throughout the United States, including the city of Hartford. Hartford requires lessors, such as IBM, to pay personal property tax on all personal property located in Hartford.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 12-43, nonresident owners of personal property are required to file inventories of their personal property with the assessor’s office of the town in which the property is located. Accordingly, IBM filed an inventory of personal property it owned in 1989 and 1990 with the Hartford assessor’s office, using a form provided by the Hartford assessor. That form contains a standard depreciation schedule for personal property that IBM used when listing its property. Relying exclusively on the information provided by IBM, the Hartford assessor determined the value of IBM’s personal property located in Hartford for the 1989 and 1990 tax years to be that which had been specified by IBM in its filing.

Subsequently, IBM appealed the assessments of its personal property to the Hartford board of tax review pursuant to General Statutes § 12-111. IBM claimed that the assessments of two computer systems (hereafter, the “83B” and “84Q”) in 1989 and 1990 were excessive. The board of tax review denied IBM’s appeal with respect to the valuation of the 83B and 84Q. IBM appealed the decision of the board of tax review to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court dismissed IBM’s appeal and rendered judgment for the board of tax review. IBM appealed from the judgment of the trial court.

IBM claims that the assessor’s form (specifically the printed depreciation schedule therein) did not accurately reflect the depreciation of the 83B and 84Q. The trial court did not reach the merits of that claim. The trial court noted that IBM had not been prevented from presenting additional evidence of the fair market value of the 83B and 84Q to the assessor simply because the assessor’s office had provided a standard form for that purpose. IBM was not prevented from providing a rider or other addendum to the assessor’s form to contest or otherwise suggest an alternative depreciation schedule for the 83B and 84Q.

It is well settled that it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to provide the assessor with sufficient facts to value personal property for tax purposes. Northeast Datacom, Inc. v. Wallingford, 212 Conn. 639, 649, 563 A.2d 688 (1989); Cooley Chevrolet Co. v. West Haven, 146 Conn. 165, 169, 148 A.2d 327 (1959); Pitt v. Stamford, 117 Conn. 388, 393, 167 A. 913 (1933). “If [the taxpayer] fails to do so, the assessors are only required to act upon the best information they can obtain . . . and the taxpayer cannot justly complain if the assessors, acting in good faith, make an error in judgment in listing and valuing [its] property.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Northeast Datacom, Inc. v. Wallingford, supra.

The trial court reasonably concluded that the action of the board of tax review upholding the disputed assessments was appropriate. We have no grounds for overturning that conclusion.

The judgment is affirmed.

       General Statutes § 12-43 provides in relevant part: “property of nonresidents. All owners of real estate, or of tangible personal property located in any town for three months or more during the assessment year immediately preceding any assessment day, who are nonresidents of such town, shall file lists of such real estate and personal property with the assessors of the town in which the same is located on such assessment day, if located in such town for three months or more in such year, otherwise, in the town in which such property is located for the three months or more in such year nearest to such assessment day, under the same provisions as apply to residents, and such personal property shall not be liable to taxation in any other town in this state.”

       General Statutes § 12-111 provides in relevant part: “appeals TO BOARD of tax review. . . . [A]ny person . . . claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of the assessors of such town may appeal therefrom to such board of tax review, which shall determine all such appeals and report in writing the final determination of such appeals to each such person within one week after such determination has been made. Such board may equalize and adjust the valuations and assessment lists of such town and may increase the items of taxable property in the list of any person, or the number, quantity or amount of any such item, or add to any such list any taxable property or interest therein omitted by the assessors which should be added thereto; and may add to the assessment list the name of any person omitted by the assessors and owning taxable property in such town, and make a list for him, putting therein all property liable to taxation which it has reason to believe is owned by him, at the percentage of its actual valuation, as determined by the assessors in accordance with the provisions of sections 12-64 and 12-71, from the best information that it can obtain . . . .”

       The board of tax review did reduce IBM’s assessment on the 1989 list to reflect that certain personal property was actually located in Simsbury rather than Hartford.

       General Statutes § 12-117a provides in relevant part: “appeals from DECISIONS OF BOARDS OF TAX REVIEW CONCERNING ASSESSMENT LISTS FOR ASSESSMENT YEARS COMMENCING OCTOBER 1, 1989, TO OCTOBER 1, 1992. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 12-118,12-121aa and 12-121bb, any person, including any lessee of real property whose lease has been recorded as provided in section 47-19 and who is bound under the terms of his lease to pay real property taxes, claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review in any town or city with respect to the assessment list for the assessment year commencing October 1,1989, October 1, 1990, October 1, 1991, or October 1, 1992, may, within two months from the time of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom, to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated, which shall be accompanied by a citation to such town or city to appear before said court.”

       IBM appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).


text:
    Statewide Grievance Committee v. Norman E. Whitney
    (14594)
    Callahan, Borden, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.

      Argued September 24—
    decision released November 16, 1993

      Norman E. Whitney, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

      Daniel B. Horwitch, statewide bar counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Katz, J.

The Superior Court ordered that the defendant, Norman E. Whitney, be suspended from the practice of law for one year after he refused on several occasions to attend a pretrial conference in a criminal matter. In this appeal from the judgment of the trial court imposing suspension, the defendant claims that: (1) the practice of scheduling mandatory pretrial conferences in criminal matters is unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions; (2) General Statutes §§ 53a-172 and 53a-173 are unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions; and (3) mandatory criminal pretrial conferences are used by Connecticut courts to demoralize defendants and impair their constitutional rights. We reject these claims as bases for overturning the suspension and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The essential facts are undisputed. In January, 1990, the defendant, a member of the Connecticut bar, filed an appearance on behalf of Francisco Ramos in the Hartford judicial district of the Superior Court. Ramos had been charged by the state with the crimes of arson in violation of General Statutes § 53a-lll, risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21, and threatening in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62. Prior to the scheduling of a pretrial conference, Ramos had been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to all three charges and had elected a jury trial on all three counts.

On January 18,1990, the defendant appeared in court at a bond hearing for Ramos. The court, Norko, J., continued the case to February 2,1990, for a pretrial conference, and ordered that the defendant, Ramos and the assistant state’s attorney handling the case be present.

On January 23,1990, the defendant sent a letter to Judge Norko requesting that the court “have the case set down for a firm jury” because a pretrial conference would be “absolutely senseless, time-consuming and unfairly expense-producing” and would be “a breach of [Ramos’] . . . rights under both the constitution of Connecticut and that of the United States.” The defendant did not appear in court on February 2,1990. The court continued the case to February 16, 1990.

On February 14, 1990, the defendant sent another letter to Judge Norko, claiming that a pretrial conference would be “senseless” and a “sham performance,” and would deny Ramos “constitutional treatment.” When the defendant did not appear in court on February 16, Judge Norko questioned Ramos about his attorney’s absence. Ramos stated that the defendant had told him that the defendant did not plan to attend the pretrial conference because he was unprepared. Ramos also indicated that the defendant had failed to communicate a plea offer to him. The trial court, Norko, J., fined the defendant $100 pursuant to General Statutes § 51-84 for the failure to appear and set the case down for another pretrial conference.

On four more occasions from February 16 to April 12, 1990, the defendant failed to appear in court for pretrial conferences as ordered. The court imposed another $100 fine pursuant to § 51-84 for failing to appear and continued the case on the firm trial list.

The defendant did not appear in court until August, 1990, when the case was called for trial. At that time, the defendant conferred with Ramos, the prosecutor and the trial judge, Miaño, J., and the state offered to reduce Ramos’ charges. Ramos agreed to a disposition of his case on the reduced charges and to serve a short jail sentence followed by probation.

On April 19,1990, a week after the defendant’s final failure to appear for the pretrial conference, Judge Norko sent a letter to the plaintiff, the statewide grievance committee, that summarized the defendant’s conduct in connection with Ramos’ case. The statewide grievance committee referred Judge Norko’s letter to a grievance panel that considered the letter, the transcripts from three of the days on which the defendant had failed to appear, and copies of the letters that the defendant had sent to Judge Norko.

Thereafter, the panel filed a formal complaint against the defendant with the statewide grievance committee that was forwarded to the grievance panel for the Hartford-New Britain judicial district. On August 9, 1990, that grievance panel found probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated rules 1.3,3.4 (c), 3.5 (c) and 8.4 (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The reviewing subcommittee of the statewide grievance committee held a hearing on the complaint against the defendant, and thereafter issued its proposed deeision finding that the defendant had violated rules 1.3, 3.4 (c), 3.5 (c) and 8.4 (d), and recommending that he be presented to the Superior Court.

The grievance committee adopted the reviewing subcommittee’s proposed decision and recommendation, and filed an amended presentment of the defendant to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-90h (b) and Practice Book § 31. The presentment alleged that the defendant had violated rules 1.3, 3.4 (c), 3.5 (c) and 8.4 (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

On August 18,1992, the trial court, Maloney, J., concluded that the defendant’s repeated refusals to obey court orders to appear for pretrial conferences had violated rules 3.4 (c) and 8.4 (d). The trial court reprimanded the defendant and ordered him to pay the two $100 fines that had been imposed by Judge Norko. The court also ordered that the defendant be suspended from the practice of law for a one year period beginning September 5, 1992, if he did not pay the fines by September 4, 1992.

The defendant did not pay either of the two fines and was therefore suspended effective September 5,1992. He appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We now affirm.

I

Before turning to the defendant’s specific claims, it is appropriate to discuss attorney disciplinary proceedings and the exact nature of the claims asserted by the defendant in this appeal. We have held that “[¡judges of the Superior Court possess the inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar. . . . It is their unique position as officers and commissioners of the court . . . which casts attorneys in a special relationship with the judiciary and subjects them to its discipline. . . . [Tjhe judges have empowered the statewide grievance committee to file presentments in Superior Court seeking judicial sanctions against those claimed to be guilty of misconduct. ... In carrying out these responsibilities . . . the [statewide grievance committee] is an arm of the court . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sobocinski v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 215 Conn. 517, 525-26, 576 A.2d 532 (1990). In presentment proceedings, the statewide grievance committee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the attorney misconduct it alleges has occurred. Statewide Grievance Committee v. Friedland, 222 Conn. 131, 135, 609 A.2d 645 (1992); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162, 171-72, 575 A.2d 210 (1990) (Presnick 1); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 216 Conn. 127, 134, 577 A.2d 1054 (1990) (Presnick II). If the trial court finds that misconduct has occurred, however, an attorney’s “relation to the tribunal, and the character and purpose of the inquiry, are such, that unless it clearly appears that [the attorney’s] rights have in some substantial way been denied him, the action of the court will not be set aside upon review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 219 Conn. 473, 487, 595 A.2d 819 (1991), cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1170, 117 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1992); Presnick II, supra, 132; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 150, 67 A. 497 (1907). In presentment proceedings, the court conducts a trial de novo. Presnick I, supra, 167.

The trial court held that the defendant had violated rules 3.4 (c) and 8.4 (d) by openly disobeying Judge Norko’s repeated orders to appear in court for pretrial conferences. The defendant does not claim that the trial court abused its discretion in making those findings. His claims, rather, resemble affirmative defenses, i.e., that because criminal pretrial conferences are unconstitutional or unjust, his conduct should be excused. We therefore need not review the propriety of the trial court’s findings that the defendant violated rules 3.4 (c) and 8.4 (d).

II

The defendant first claims that the practice of scheduling mandatory pretrial conferences in criminal matters is unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions. He specifically challenges Practice Book §§ 700 through 706, which permit trial courts to schedule disposition conferences for criminal cases assigned for jury trials, and to compel the attendance of the parties and their attorneys. The defendant claims that pretrial conferences ordered pursuant to these Practice Book provisions violate a criminal defendant’s right against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment to the United States constitution, the right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, and the right to a jury trial guaranteed by article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution.

As a preliminary matter, we note that pretrial negotiations play a critical role in the criminal justice system. In Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 17, 355 A.2d 49 (1974), we recognized “the importance of plea bargaining in the administration of criminal justice.” Specifically, “ ‘[disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-752 [90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747] (1970).’ Santobello v. New York, [404 U.S. 257, 261, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971)].” Szarwak v. Warden, supra; see also Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 29 Conn. App. 773, 777, 617 A.2d 933 (1992); State v. Nelson, 23 Conn. App. 215, 218, 579 A.2d 1104, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 826, 582 A.2d 205 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922, 111 S. Ct. 1315, 113 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1991).

In Santobello, the United States Supreme Court stated that plea bargaining “is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.” Santobello v. New York, supra, 260; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62, 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, reh. denied, 435 U.S. 918, 98 S. Ct. 1477, 55 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978) (plea bargaining is an important part of the criminal justice system); D. Wright, “Plea Bargaining—A Necessary Tool,” 16 Conn. L. Rev. 1015 (1984) .

The defendant concedes that pretrial negotiations are an important and necessary part of the criminal justice system, and acknowledges that they often benefit criminal defendants. Indeed, in this case, once discussions were finally held among the defendant, Ramos and the state’s attorney’s office, the case was disposed of favorably to Ramos. Despite the conceded benefits of pretrial negotiations, the defendant nevertheless claims that it is unconstitutional for a judge to compel a criminal defendant and his or her attorney to attend a pretrial conference. The defendant has not, however, established any facts to support this claim. It does not appear that Ramos objected to having a pretrial conference, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that he was in any way prejudiced by the court’s scheduling of a conference. Nor is there anything in this record to support the defendant’s claim that criminal defendants are compelled to incriminate themselves at pretrial conferences. Similarly, there is nothing in this record to support the defendant’s claim that court ordered pretrial conferences prejudice a criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial or to a speedy trial. It is entirely possible that, had the defendant attended the February 2, 1990 pretrial conference as ordered by the court, the parties would have negotiated a disposition of the case, or Judge Norko would have set a firm jury trial date. This could have been accomplished without prejudicing Ramos’ right to a speedy trial before a jury or in any way compelling him to incriminate himself.

“This court has frequently noted the imprudence of adjudicating constitutional questions in a ‘factual vacuum.’Lehrer v.Davis, 214 Conn. 232, 234, 571 A.2d 691 (1990); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. O’Neill, 203 Conn. 63, 75, 523 A.2d 486 (1987).” State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 78, 584 A.2d 1157 (1991). “[Constitutional issues do not exist in a vacuum. . . . ‘ “The best teaching of this Court’s experience admonishes us not to entertain constitutional questions in advance of the strictest necessity.” Parker v. Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327, 333, 70 S. Ct. 161, 94 L. Ed. 144 (1949).’ Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16, 21, 513 A.2d 660 (1986).” Presnick I, supra, 166.

In Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 439 A.2d 396 (1981), the defendant appealed from two findings of contempt entered against him for interfering with the activities of a court-appointed receiver of rents. Attempting to overturn the contempt findings, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Practice Book provisions governing the appointment of rent receivers. This court would not consider his claim, however, because the record did not contain any information on what transpired at the receivership proceedings. Id., 378. We stated that “[i]n challenging the constitutionality of any enactment a party must demonstrate its adverse impact upon his own constitutionally protected rights. Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 483, 313 A.2d 53 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S. Ct. 911, 34 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1973). Without a proper record we are unable to consider these claims of the defendant concerning the constitutionality of our procedure . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, supra, 379. In this case, because the defendant has not provided a factual record to substantiate his claim that court-ordered criminal pretrial conferences are unconstitutional, we are unable to consider the merits of his claim.

Ill

The defendant’s second claim is that General Statutes §§ 53a-172 and 53a-173 as applied to criminal defendants are unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions. We note, first, that this issue was never raised before the trial court. “Only in the most exceptional circumstances will this court consider a claim that was not raised in the trial court.” Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 716, 535 A.2d 799 (1988); see also Practice Book § 4185 (this court “shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial”); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Friedland, supra, 147; Knight v. Bourbeau, 194 Conn. 702, 704, 485 A.2d 919 (1984). This general rule against considering claims not raised at trial also applies to constitutional issues. Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 828, 614 A.2d 414 (1992); Roche v. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 505, 442 A.2d 911 (1982).

Even if exceptional circumstances were present in this case, we would not consider this claim because the defendant does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of §§ 53a-172 and 53a-173. “ ‘According to well-established principles, a [party] who challenges the constitutionality of a statute must prove that the statute has adversely affected a constitutionally protected right “under the facts of his particular case and not merely under some possible or hypothetical set of facts not proven to exist.” Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 471, 217 A.2d 698 (1966) . . . .’ Weil v. Miller, 185 Conn. 495, 501, 441 A.2d 142 (1981). ‘ “[judicial power is to be exercised to strike down legislation, whether state or federal, only at the instance of one who is himself immediately harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged action.” Poe v. Ullman, [367 U.S. 497, 504, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989 (1961)] . . . .’ State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 92, 106, 503 A.2d 136 (1985).” DiBerardino v. DiBerardino, 213 Conn. 373, 383, 568 A.2d 431 (1990); see also Sassone v. Lepore, 226 Conn. 773, 779, 629 A.2d 357 (1993); Perry v. Perry, 222 Conn. 799, 804, 611 A.2d 400 (1992); Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 192, 332 A.2d 78 (1973) (to have standing, the appellant must allege “ ‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult questions’ ”).

By their terms, §§ 53a-172 and 53a-173 apply only to criminal defendants who fail to appear in court at a time when they are not incarcerated. Therefore, only criminal defendants, not their attorneys, may be penalized under the statute. Even if an attorney could somehow achieve standing to challenge the validity of these statutes based on the rights of his or her client, it is not possible in this case. Because Ramos was incarcerated on the days when the pretrial conferences were ordered to be held, §§ 53a-172 and 53a-173 could not have been applied to him. He was therefore never harmed or threatened with harm by these statutes and consequently would have no standing to challenge their constitutionality. The defendant therefore may not challenge the statutes based on his status as Ramos’ attorney. Accordingly, we do not consider the defendant’s second claim.

IV

The defendant’s third claim is that mandatory criminal pretrial conferences are used by Connecticut courts to demoralize defendants and impair their constitutional rights. Once again, a review of the record reveals that this issue was never raised in the trial court. Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that pretrial conferences were used to demoralize or otherwise prejudice Ramos in any way. We therefore will not consider this claim further.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-172 provides: “(a) A person is guilty of failure to appear in the first degree when, while charged with the commission of a felony and while out on bail or released under other procedure of law, he wilfully fails to appear when legally called according to the terms of his bail bond or promise to appear.
      “(b) Failure to appear in the first degree is a class D felony.”
      General Statutes § 53a-173 provides: “(a) A person is guilty of failure to appear in the second degree when, while charged with the commission of a misdemeanor or a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed and while out on bail or released under other procedure of law, he wilfully fails to appear when legally called according to the terms of Ms bail bond or promise to appear.
      “(b) Failure to appear in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.”

       The issues on appeal, as framed by the parties in their briefs, are as follows:
      “1. Whether there is clear and convincing evidence that coerced criminal pretrials as practiced by Connecticut criminal trial courts are unconstitutional under the constitutions of Connecticut and the United States of America?
      “2. Whether there is clear and convincing evidence that [General Statutes §§] 53a-172 and 53a-173 are applied unconstitutionally (both state and federal), relative to criminal defendants who exercise their rights in choosing whether or not they appear at pretrials?
      “8. Whether there is clear and convincing evidence that repeated, coerced criminal pretrials are blatantly used by Connecticut courts to demoralize defendants and crush their ability to defend themselves by exercising their constitutional rights?”

       General Statutes § 53a-111 provides: “(a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk of bodily injury.
      “(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.”
      General Statutes § 53-21 provides: “Any person who wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that its life or limb is endangered, or its health is likely to be injured, or its morals likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.” General Statutes § 53a-62 provides: “(a) A person is guilty of threatening when: (1) By physical threat, he intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, or (2) he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (3) he threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.
      “(b) Threatening is a class A misdemeanor.”

       Ramos was unable to post bail at the time of his arrest and remained incarcerated during the pendency of his case.

       The letter read in relevant part: “Rather than send me a notice of when that date [for the pretrial conference] might be, please merely have the case set down for a firm jury. It is absolutely senseless, time-consuming and unfairly expense-producing for both the State and Sr. Ramos for the State to coerce him to go to a hearing which is a breach of his constitutional rights under both the Constitution of Connecticut and that of the United States.”

       The alleged failure to communicate the offer is not before this court.

       General Statutes § 51-84 provides in relevant part: “[A] court may fine an attorney for transgressing its rules and orders an amount not exceeding one hundred dollars for any offense, and may suspend or displace an attorney for just cause.”

       General Statutes § 51-90e provides in relevant part: “(a) Any person may file a written complaint alleging attorney misconduct. A grievance panel may, on its own motion, initiate and file a written complaint alleging attorney misconduct. A complaint against an attorney shall be filed with the state-wide bar counsel. Within five working days of the receipt of a complaint the state-wide bar counsel shall:
      “(1) Forward the complaint to the appropriate grievance panel as determined under rules of court; and
      “(2) Notify the complainant and the respondent, by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the panel to which the complaint was forwarded. The notification to the respondent shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint.”
      Practice Book § 27F provides in relevant part: “(a) Any person, or a grievance panel on its own motion, may file a written complaint alleging attorney misconduct whether or not such alleged misconduct occurred in the actual presence of the court. Complaints against attorneys shall be filed with the statewide bar counsel. Within seven days of the receipt of a complaint the statewide bar counsel shall:
      “(1) forward the complaint to a grievance panel in the judicial district in which the respondent maintains his principal office or his residence, provided that, if the respondent does not maintain such an address in this state, the statewide bar counsel shall forward the complaint to any grievance panel; and
      “(2) notify the complainant and the respondent, by certified mail with return receipt, of the panel to which the complaint was sent. The notification to the respondent shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint.”

       Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
      Rule 3.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part: “A lawyer shall not . . . (c) Knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists . . . .”
      Rule 3.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part: “A lawyer shall not . . . (c) Engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.”
      Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”
      General Statutes § 51-90f provides in relevant part: “(a) Each grievance panel shall investigate with the assistance of the grievance counsel assigned to such panel any complaint referred to it by the state-wide grievance committee or state-wide bar counsel to determine whether probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct.”
      Practice Book § 27F provides in relevant part: “(c) The grievance panel, with the assistance of the grievance counsel assigned to it, shall investigate each complaint to determine whether probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct.”

       General Statutes § 51-90g provides in relevant part: “(a) The statewide grievance committee may designate at least three members of the committee, including at least one-third who are not attorneys, to serve as a reviewing subcommittee for each determination made by a panel on a complaint. . . .
      “(b) Any hearing held by the committee or subcommittee shall be public and on the record. ...”
      Practice Book § 27J provides in relevant part: “(a) Upon receipt of the record from a grievance panel, the statewide grievance committee may assign the case to a reviewing committee which shall consist of at least three members of the statewide grievance committee, at least one third of whom are not attorneys. . . .
      “(c) If the grievance panel determines that probable cause exists that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, the statewide grievance committee or the reviewing committee shall hold a hearing on the complaint.”

       General Statutes § 51-90g provides in relevant part: “(c) The subcommittee shall conclude any hearing or hearings and shall render its proposed decision not later than ninety days from the date the panel’s determination of probable cause or no probable cause was filed with the state-wide grievance committee. . . .
      “(e) The subcommittee may propose in its decision to dismiss the complaint, reprimand the attorney or present the attorney to the superior court for reprimand, suspension or disbarment.
      “(f) The subcommittee shall submit its proposed decision to the state-wide grievance committee, with copies to the complainant and respondent. The proposed decision shall be a matter of public record.”
      At the time in question, Practice Book § 27J provided in relevant part: “(e) Within ninety days of the date the grievance panel filed its determination of probable cause or no probable cause with the statewide grievance committee, the reviewing committee shall render its proposed decision and file it with the statewide grievance committee. ... In its proposed decision, the reviewing committee shall recommend either dismissal of the complaint, reprimand of the respondent by the statewide grievance committee or presentment of the respondent to the superior court. The reviewing committee shall forward a copy of the proposed decision to the complainant and the respondent. The proposed decision shall be a matter of public record.”

       General Statutes § 51-90h (b) provides in relevant part: “[T]he statewide grievance committee shall review the record before the subcommittee and any statements filed with it, and shall issue a decision dismissing the complaint, reprimanding the respondent, directing the state-wide bar counsel to file a presentment against the respondent or referring the complaint to the same or a different reviewing subcommittee for further investigation and proposed decision.”
      At the time in question, Practice Book § 27M provided in relevant part: “[T]he statewide grievance committee shall issue a written decision either dismissing the complaint, reprimanding the respondent, directing the statewide bar counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the superior court or referring the complaint to the same or a different reviewing committee for further investigation and a proposed decision.”
      Practice Book § 31 provides in relevant part: “(a) Presentment of attorneys for misconduct, whether or not the misconduct occurred in the actual presence of the court, shall be made by written complaint of the statewide grievance committee. Service of the complaint shall be made as in civil actions. Any interim proceedings to the contrary notwithstanding, a hearing on the merits of the complaint shall be held within sixty days of the date the complaint was filed with the court. At such hearing, the respondent shall have the right to be heard in his own defense and by witnesses and counsel. After such hearing the court shall render a judgment dismissing the complaint or imposing discipline as follows: reprimand, suspension for a period of time, disbarment or such other discipline as the court deems appropriate.”

         Although the defendant’s suspension expired prior to oral argument in this court, his appeal is not moot. Records pertaining to grievance complaints that are filed after July 1, 1986, and are not dismissed by the statewide grievance committee are available to the public. See Practice Book § 32 (b). Further, attorney suspensions are published in the Connecticut Law Journal. See Pi artice Book § 36A. In addition, General Statutes § 51-94 provides that “[i]n any proceeding for the suspension, displacement or removal of an attorney-at-law or to investigate the character, integrity or professional standing of such attorney, evidence tending to show the general character, reputation and professional standing of such attorney shall be admissible.” Prior misconduct of an attorney may, therefore, be considered in subsequent disciplinary proceedings. These collateral consequences for an attorney’s reputation and professional standing make it clear that the defendant’s appeal from his suspension is not moot. See, e.g., Housing Authority v. Lamothe, 225 Conn. 757, 765, 627 A.2d 367 (1993).

       In his closing argument before the trial court, the defendant made the following concessions. lie stated that “the evidence is pretty obvious, virtually admitted.” He conceded that he wilfully violated a court order and “annoyed, embarrassed, and whatever . . . done that to the court.” The defendant did challenge whether his conduct violated rules 3.5 (c) and 1.3. of the Rules of Professional Conduct. He did not dispute, however, the allegations that he had violated Rules 3.4 (c) and 8.4 (d).

       The defendant asks this court to reverse the trial court and “find that the Appellant acted within the purview of the law in refusing to attend coerced criminal pretrials because to have so done would have compelled him to violate his attorney’s oath and been against the Constitutions of the United States of America and Connecticut.”
      Both the defendant and the plaintiff have framed the issues in this appeal in terms of whether there is “clear and convincing evidence” that the claims asserted by the defendant are true. It is not clear, however, that the defendant in a presentment proceeding must meet this high burden of proof when he or she asserts claims resembling affirmative defenses. Because our disposition of the defendant’s claims does not require us to reach their merits, we leave this issue for another day.

       More specifically, the defendant does not claim that the letters that he sent to Judge Norko in February, 1990, constitute the “open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists” needed to excuse a refusal to comply with a court’s order under rule 3.4 (c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See footnote 9. The trial court held that the defendant’s assertion that no valid obligation existed “was without the slightest legal foundation” and did not excuse the disobedience. Because the defendant does not ask us to review this holding, we need not consider whether the defendant’s letters to Judge Norko, containing a bare assertion of unconstitutionality, constitute the kind of open refusal that the rule contemplates. Similarly, the defendant does not challenge the holding of the trial court that his conduct was “prejudicial to the administration of justice” under rule 8.4 (d). See footnote 9.

       Practice Book § 700 provides: “After conferring with the clerk, the presiding judge shall assign for disposition conferences so much of the jury trial list as he shall deem necessary for the proper conduct of the court and he shall direct the clerk to print and distribute a list of the cases so assigned to the appearing parties. The clerk shall schedule the conferences at times which will not interfere with the orderly calling of the court docket. Cases may also be assigned for a disposition conference at the time of the entry of a plea pursuant to Sec. 977.”
      Practice Book § 701 provides: “Unless an agreement has been reached in a previous plea discussion, a case will be assigned for a disposition conference. It shall be the duty of the prosecuting authority to notify the clerk if an agreement has been reached or if the case has been disposed of.”
      Practice Book § 702 provides: “The prosecuting authority, the defense counsel, and, in cases claimed for jury trial, the defendant shall appear at the time set for the disposition conference unless excused by the court. Requests for postponements shall be made only to the presiding judge and shall be granted upon good cause shown.”
      Practice Book § 704 provides: “The prosecuting authority and counsel for the defendant should attempt to reach a plea agreement pursuant to the procedures of Sec. 686.”
      Practice Book § 705 provides: “Should the parties be unable to reach an agreement as to disposition, they shall report to the presiding judge or to another judge assigned by him.”
      Practice Book § 706 provides: “If the parties reach an agreement which contemplates the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, they may advise the judicial authority in advance of the plea. The judicial authority may indicate whether he will concur in or reject the proposed disposition.”

       The fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

       The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”

       Article first, § 19 of the Connecticut constitution as amended by article four of the amendments, provides: “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, the number of such jurors, which shall not be less than six, to be established by law; but no person shall, for a capital offense, be tried by a jury of less than twelve jurors without his consent. In all civil and criminal actions tried by a jury, the parties shall have the right to challenge jurors peremptorily, the number of such challenges to be established by law. The right to question each juror individually by counsel shall be inviolate.”

       In the civil context, we have noted that “[ojvercrowded dockets have become a major problem challenging the ability of the courts of this state and elsewhere to dispense justice. It is well known that justice delayed is justice denied. In order to fulfill our responsibility of dispensing justice we in the judiciary must adopt an effective system of caseflow management.” In re Mongillo, 190 Conn. 686, 690-91, 461 A.2d 1387 (1983). The need to manage overcrowded dockets is even more important in the criminal context, where we accommodate the defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.

       The defendant does not contend that plea bargaining is unconstitutional, but does claim that any encouragement of plea bargaining by the courts is unconstitutional. In State v. Lopez, 197 Conn. 337, 350, 497 A.2d 390 (1985), however, we noted that “[bjoth federal and state cases have clearly established that plea bargaining is both desirable and, constitutional. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219, 99 S. Ct. 492, 58 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62, 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, reh. denied, 435 U.S. 918, 98 S. Ct. 1477, 55 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328, 331-33, 398 A.2d 1176 (1978).” (Emphasis added.) We fail to see how encouragement of a process that is both constitutional and desirable could be unconstitutional.

       Practice Book § 707 specifically provides that “[i]f a case is not resolved at the disposition conference or if the judicial authority rejects the plea agreement, the case shall be assigned for a trial. If an agreement is reached, a judicial authority shall be available to accept guilty pleas and other dispositions.” (Emphasis added.)

       The defendant also has failed to provide an adequate legal basis for his claim. The only authority he cites in support of his claim that court-ordered criminal pretrials violate the state and federal constitutions is a handwritten notation on an application for a writ of habeas corpus that came before the Superior Court in 1983. State v. Ringland, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 290065 (December 13, 1983).

       See footnote 1.