source: Caselaw Access Project

author: NORCOTT, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    MALCOLM ROBERTSON v. TOWN OF STONINGTON
    (SC 16219)
    McDonald, C. X, and Borden, Norcott, Palmer and Sullivan, Js.
    Argued January 18
    officially released May 16, 2000

      Thomas J. Londregan, with whom, on the brief, was Jeffrey T Londregan, for the appellant (defendant).

      Jeremiah Donovan, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The defendant, the town of Stonington, appeals from the judgment of the trial court reducing the tax assessments levied by its board of tax review upon the real property of the plaintiff, Malcolm Robertson. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a property owner is barred from bringing a property tax appeal under General Statutes § 12-117a if the property owner has entered into an agreement in violation of the public policy of this state as expressed in General Statutes § 51-86. We conclude that there is no such bar. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff is the owner of a property known as Seaport Marina located on the Mystic River near the center of the town of Mystic. Seaport Marina is a boatyard containing 11.2 acres of land. In 1994, the defendant commissioned the Cole-Layer-Trumbull Company (Cole-Layer) to conduct a revaluation of all real property within its jurisdiction. Cole-Layer established a fair market value of $1,365,000 for the plaintiffs land and $1,092,200 for the plaintiffs building, for a total of $2,457,200.

Thomas Merola operates a business known as Valuation Services. He is not now, nor has he ever been, a party to the plaintiffs tax appeal. Merola solicits property owners to challenge the valuation of their properties by municipal assessors, and he uses brochures to advertise his services. Merola’s claimed expertise is property appraisal, but he is not an attorney. Merola’s service consists of representing property owners before the municipal board of assessment appeals. If unsuccessful, Merola hires an attorney to prosecute an appeal from the municipal board of tax review to the trial court. Merola pays all costs from the time he appears before the board of assessment appeals through the trial court proceedings. Merola’s fee is contingent: he receives one-third of any tax savings over a three year period of overvaluation. Thus, taxpayers who hire Mer-ola bear no economic risk. When Merola determines that a property has not been overassessed, he does not agree to represent the property owner. It is undisputed that this type of business has been practiced openly, for a long time, by many firms.

The plaintiff met Merola through a mutual friend who was familiar with Merola’s business. Although the plaintiff had appealed from an assessment on his own in the past, he sought Merola’s assistance following the 1994 assessment. Merola examined the property and told the plaintiff that he believed that it had been substantially overassessed. The plaintiff then hired Merola to challenge the assessment and, if necessary, to engage an attorney for the plaintiff to pursue the tax appeal to the trial corut. Subsequently, the plaintiff asked the defendant to adjust its determination of the fair market value and the resulting assessment. As a result, the fair market value was adjusted to $1,228,500 for the plaintiffs land and $912,343 for the plaintiffs building, for a total of $2,140,843. Thereafter, the plaintiff further appealed to the board of tax review. No additional change was made in the assessment. Merola then hired an attorney for the plaintiff to pursue this appeal to the trial court.

In the trial court, the plaintiffs expert appraiser, not Merola, testified that the fair market value of the plaintiffs property was $1,280,000 on October 1, 1994. The defendant’s appraiser testified that the fair market value of the plaintiffs property was $1,870,000 on October 1, 1994. After giving selective credibility to the various expert computations and analyses, the trial court concluded that the fair market value was $1,676,448 on October 1, 1994.

As a special defense, the defendant had claimed that, because of the plaintiffs contingent fee arrangement with Merola, the plaintiffs action violated public policy as expressed in § 51-86, which prohibits the unauthorized practice of law, and, therefore, was barred. The trial court disagreed, and concluded that the plaintiffs action was not barred because Merola was not a party to the action before the court and, therefore, any public policy violations that may have been committed by Mer-ola were not relevant to the plaintiffs right to bring a tax appeal. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that in order to effectuate the public policy of § 51-86, this court must bar the plaintiffs cause of action under § 12-117a because the plaintiff is a party to an illegal contract for the prosecution of the cause of action. We disagree.

We begin our analysis with an examination of the relationship between the enforceability of a contract against public policy and the underlying cause of action. “[I]t is unquestionably the general rule, upheld by the great weight of authority, that no court will lend its assistance in any way toward carrying out the terms of a contract, the inherent purpose of which is to violate the law. In case any action is brought in which it is necessary to prove the illegal contract in order to maintain the action, courts will not enforce it, nor will they enforce any alleged right directly springing from such contract . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Solomon v. Gilmore, 248 Conn. 769, 785, 731 A.2d 280 (1999). The only contract that has ever been in question in the present case is that between the plaintiff and Merola. In challenging the validity of this contract, the defendant does not seek to extinguish the contractual obligations between the plaintiff and Merola, but, rather, to deny the plaintiff his statutory right to a property tax appeal. We conclude that the alleged validity of the contract is irrelevant to the plaintiffs right to appeal.

Furthermore, we conclude that the plaintiffs property tax appeal is not barred by the common law of champerty. “Ordinarily an agreement against public policy in the nature of maintenance or champerty is of no avail to a defendant. . . . The right, to enforce which the action is brought, does not originate in the illegal agreement nor is proof of that agreement necessary to its establishment and the agreement is therefore not so related to the action that the court will regard it.” (Citations omitted.) Rice v. Farrell, 129 Conn. 362, 367, 28 A.2d 7 (1942); see also Perry v. Puklin Co., 100 Conn. 104, 110, 123 A. 28 (1923) (“[c]hamperty is not a defense to the obligation sued upon, since it is the champertous contract and not the right of action, which is voidable at common law”).

We also consider the public policy concerns that are implicated in the present case, namely: the public policy against the unauthorized practice of law, and the public policy in favor of fair and accurate taxation. There is no public policy that discourages bringing valid tax appeals, and there is no evidence that Merola promotes frivolous tax appeals. Indeed, the evidence indicates that Merola screens out what he believes to be accurately assessed properties and aids only those owners whose properties he believes have been overassessed. Thus, it reasonably may be maintained that Merola’s business, although it is run for profit, promotes fair and accurate taxation by facilitating the correction of errors by municipal assessors. If this tax appeal were barred on account of Merola’s activities, the defendant would be allowed to withhold from the plaintiff an otherwise valid tax refund and to collect from the plaintiff excessive taxes each year until the next revaluation. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s special defense in light of our overriding concern for the proper redress of unfair and inaccurate taxation.

The defendant argues that barring the plaintiffs tax appeal is necessary to deter the types of contractual arrangements that the plaintiff and Merola share. We disagree. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Merola’s activities should be deterred, barring the plaintiffs tax appeal is an inappropriate means to that end. We conclude that Merola’s conduct is not relevant to the plaintiffs tax appeal and, therefore, is not an appropriate bar to the plaintiffs action. Instead, a careful, thorough inquiry by a fact finder is required to determine — as a primary and not an ancillary issue — whether Merola’s activities constitute the unauthorized practice of law. It would be inappropriate for us to make such a determination about Merola’s actions because he is not a party to the action before this court, and is not in any position to defend himself against the defendant’s accusations. Although the judiciary certainly has a role regarding the unauthorized practice of law, the concerns that the defendant raises about Merola’s business practices are best addressed, if at all, by the statewide grievance committee, the arm of the judicial system that handles such matters. See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Harris, 239 Conn. 256, 683 A.2d 1363 (1996); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Patton, 239 Conn. 251, 254, 683 A.2d 1359 (1996); Grievance Committee v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 136, 222 A.2d 339 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683, 87 S. Ct. 1325, 18 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1967); State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 232, 140 A.2d 863 (1958). “Attempts to define the practice of law have not been particularly successful. The reason for this is the broad field covered. The more practical approach is to consider each state of facts and determine whether it falls within the fair intendment of the term.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Patton, supra, 254, quoting Grievance Committee v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 329, 22 A.2d 623 (1941). Before the statewide grievance committee, Merola would have the opportunity and the incentive to make his defense because the matter before the fact finder would be the issue regarding Merola’s practice. In that venue, Merola’s business practices would be the focal concern of the decision-making body.

The defendant also argues that the public policy against the unauthorized practice of law and the financing of lawsuits is so strong that the windfall it stands to gain at the plaintiffs expense if the tax: appeal were barred is irrelevant. We disagree.

The defendant relies on Barrett Builders v. Miller, 215 Conn. 316, 576 A.2d 455 (1990), for the proposition that the enforcement of important public policies can outweigh inequities. In that case, we determined that a contractor could not recover from a homeowner on an unjust enrichment or quasi-contract theory for work done under a contract that violated the Home Improvement Act. Id., 322-23. The windfall in Barrett Builders resulted because, under the void contract, one party no longer had to fulfill obligations to the other party. We determined that the violation of the Home Improvement Act trumped the unjust enrichment of the homeowner. Id., 325. Also, in Barrett Builders, there was no perfectly equitable solution: either the homeowner had to pay for noncompliant work; or the contractor received no compensation for his efforts. Id., 327-28.

Barrett Builders is inapposite to the present case. Here, the defendant was not a party to the contract between the plaintiff and Merola. Whatever may have become of the plaintiffs contract with Merola, the defendant has not been discharged of the obligation to tax the plaintiff lawfully. Furthermore, in Barrett Builders, we were confronted with the conflict between the unjust enrichment of the homeowner versus the violation of the Home Improvement Act. Conversely, here, we are asked to balance unjust taxation, on the one hand, against an unresolved claim of the unauthorized practice of law, on the other. We already have concluded that the issue of the unauthorized practice of law is best addressed in another forum.

Having concluded that the plaintiffs tax appeal was not barred, we need not consider whether § 51-86 is applicable to the conduct that has been alleged.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

       General Statutes § 12-117a provides: “Any person, including any lessee of real property whose lease has been recorded as provided in section 47-19 and who is bound under the terms of his lease to pay real property taxes, claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review or the board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, in any town or city may, within two months from the date of the mailing of notice of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom, with respect to the assessment list for the assessment year commencing October 1, 1989, October 1,1990, October 1,1991, October 1,1992, October 1,1993, October 1, 1994, or October 1, 1995, and with respect to the assessment list for assessment years thereafter, to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated, which shall be accompanied by a citation to such town or city to appear before said court. Such citation shall be signed by the same authority and such appeal shall be returnable at the same time and served and returned in the same manner as is required in case of a summons in a civil action. The authority issuing the citation shall take from the applicant a bond or recognizance to such town or city, with surety, to prosecute the application to effect and to comply with and conform to the orders and decrees of the court in the premises. Any such application shall be a preferred case, to be heard, unless good cause appears to the contrary, at the first session, by the court or by a committee appointed by the court. The pendency of such application shall not suspend an action by such town or city to collect not more than seventy-five per cent of the tax so assessed or not more than ninety per cent of such tax with respect to any real property for which the assessed value is five hundred thousand dollars or more, and upon which such appeal is taken. If, during the pendency of such appeal, a new assessment year begins, the applicant may amend his application as to any matter therein, including an appeal for such new year, which is affected by the inception of such new year and such applicant need not appear before the board of tax review or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, to make such amendment effective. The court shall have power to grant such relief as to justice and equity appertains, upon such terms and in such manner and form as appear equitable, and, if the application appears to have been made without probable cause, may tax double or triple costs, as the case appears to demand; and, upon all such applications, costs may be taxed at the discretion of the court. If the assessment made by the board of tax review or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, is reduced by said court, the applicant shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any overpayment of taxes, together with interest and any costs awarded by the court, or, at the applicant’s option, shall be granted a tax credit for such overpayment, interest and any costs awarded by the court. Upon motion, said court shall, in event of such overpayment, enter judgment in favor of such applicant and against such city or town for the whole amount of such overpayment, together with interest and any costs awarded by the court. The amount to which the assessment is so reduced shall be the assessed value of such property on 1 he grand lists for succeeding years until the tax assessor finds that the value of the applicant’s property has increased or decreased.”

       General Statutes § 51-86 provides: “(a) Aperson who has not been admitted as an attorney in this state under the provisions of section 51-80 shall not solicit, advise, request or induce another person to cause an action for damages to be instituted, from which action or from which person the person soliciting, advising, requesting or inducing the action may, by agreement or otherwise, directly or indirectly, receive compensation from such other person or such person's attorney, or in which action the compensation of the attorney instituting or prosecuting the action, directly or indirectly, depends upon the amount of the recovery therein.
      “(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months or both.”

       See footnote 3 of this opinion for the text of § 51-86.

       See, e.g., General Statutes § 12-117a; see footnote 2 of this opinion; providing property owners with the right to appeal from tax assessments.

       General Statutes § 51-88 (c) provides: “Any person who violates any provision of this section [regarding the practice of law by persons not attorneys] shall be deemed in contempt of court, and the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction in equity upon the petition of any member of the bar of this state in good standing or upon its own motion to restrain such violation.” (Emphasis added.)


author: KATZ, J.

text:
    RUTH A. KENDALL v. MICHAEL PILKINGTON
    (SC 16082)
    Borden, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Peck, Js.
    Argued March 21
    officially released May 23, 2000

      Richard L. Albrecht, with whom were Richard G. Kent and, on the brief, Vincent M. Marino, Edward, Nusbaum and Thomas P. Parrino, for the appellant (defendant).

      C. Michael Budlong, with whom were Campbell D. Barrett and David S. Allen, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

KATZ, J.

The issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly dismissed the defendant’s appeal from various contempt and pendente lite orders based upon his alleged contemptuous conduct. We reverse the judgment of dismissal.

This case has a brief but complicated history. On March 23, 1998, the plaintiff, Ruth A. Kendall, commenced this action for the dissolution of her marriage to the defendant, Michael Pilkington. Although the writ, summons and complaint were served by abode service on March 24,1998, an order for notice and hearing and a subpoena duces tecum seeking voluminous documents for a court appearance on April 3, 1998, were served in hand on the defendant on March 31, 1998. Nevertheless, the defendant, a British national, left the United States and drove to Canada where he boarded a plane for Great Britain, remaining there for approximately five months.

On April 3, 1998, the court, Sferrazza, J., issued a capias with a $5,000,000 cash appearance bond against the defendant for having failed to appear pursuant to the subpoena, and ordered him to pay the plaintiff $50,000 per month alimony pendente lite and $20,000 in counsel fees. The order of counsel fees was without prejudice. Additionally, the trial court granted the plaintiff exclusive use and possession of the family dwelling and entered other orders ancillary to this appeal.

Days later, the plaintiff filed a series of motions, specifically: a motion for contempt for the defendant’s failure to comply with the alimony and counsel fees orders; a motion to encumber the marital real property; a motion for a turnover order of tax refunds; and a motion to liquidate the defendant’s personal property to satisfy the earlier court orders. On April 20,1998, the trial court, Booth, J., based upon the defendant’s wilful violation of the April 3 orders, granted the plaintiffs motion for contempt, sanctions and counsel fees and awarded her $1000 (first contempt). The court also granted the plaintiffs motion to liquidate the defendant’s personal property, her motion for a turnover order of tax refunds and her motion to sell the marital real property, with the money from the sale of the property to be held in escrow.

On May 4,1998, Judge Booth, acting on motions filed by the plaintiff, entered additional orders, one of which pertained to loan repayment proceeds and another to an award of additional counsel fees of $500 generated in connection with these additional motions. On May 18, 1998, Judge Booth granted the plaintiffs motion for sanctions in the amount of $2000 per day based upon the defendant’s failure to comply with the various earlier financial orders. The court also ordered the liquidation of the defendant’s securities portfolio in the amount of $100,000, without prejudice, and ordered the payment of counsel fees in the amount of $1000.

On June 15,1998, in response to the plaintiffs motion for partial release of the funds from the sale of marital real property in which she outlined the alimony arrear-age of $140,450, the counsel fees arrearage of $22,500, the costs of the recovery of the defendant’s automobile and the $56,000 owed based upon twenty-eight days of sanctions at $2000 per day ($220,565.70 in total), the trial court granted the partial release of funds as requested, “reduced by [the] $58,000 fee.”

Thereafter, on July 20, 1998, pursuant to a request by the defendant, Judge Booth reduced the capias to $500,000, but denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the contempt order, the monetary sanctions and the counsel fees order of April 20, 1998. The defendant also unsuccessfully requested that the court vacate the alimony and counsel fees ordered on April 3,1998. The court did, however, reduce the daily sanction amount to $500. Finally, on the same day, the court granted the plaintiffs motion to compel the defendant’s compliance with outstanding discovery requests.

On August 6,1998, the defendant filed an appeal with the Appellate Court from the July 20, 1998 orders. On August 10, 1998, he filed a motion with that court requesting permission to file a late appeal from the April 3 and 20, 1998 orders. That motion was denied on November 18, 1998.

On August 17, 1998, based upon the defendant’s failure to pay periodic monthly alimony, the trial court, Sferrazza, J., granted the plaintiffs motion for contempt and imposed counsel fees of $1000 in connection with that motion (second contempt). Additionally, the court granted the plaintiffs motion for release of $111,025 being held in escrow to satisfy the court-ordered monthly alimony and sanctions. On August 24, 1998, the court vacated the $500 daily sanction penalty order of July 20, 1998, effective as of that date.

On September 3, 1998, the trial court, Kocay, J., denied the defendant’s motion for a protective order, dated August 5, 1998, regarding the disclosure of information requested in the plaintiffs first set of interrogatories and request for production. On that same date, the court also granted the plaintiffs motion for counsel fees of $2400 to defend the aforementioned appeal of the July 20, 1998 orders.

On September 8, 1998, the court, Kocay, J., granted the plaintiffs motion for contempt for failure to comply with the July 20, 1998 discovery order, and gave the defendant twenty days within which to comply (third contempt). Additionally, the court awarded the plaintiff $3000 in counsel fees in connection with that motion. The court also granted the plaintiffs motion for the additional release of $3500 in escrow funds to satisfy the monetary sanctions that were still outstanding as of August 24,1998, the date on which the court vacated the daily sanction penalty order. Finally, the court granted the plaintiffs motion for a protective order, staying certain activity in the case until such time as the defendant had complied with the plaintiffs discovery requests.

On September 14, 1998, the defendant filed an amended appeal from the two orders of September 3, 1998, and the orders from September 8, 1998, granting the plaintiffs motion for a protective order and motion for contempt/ On September 21, 1998, the trial court, Sferrazza, J., vacated the $50,000 weekly alimony order, having “heard evidence . . . [that] casts doubt and uncertainty on the true status and amount of the defendant’s trust income.” Following motions for articulation filed by both parties, in a revised memorandum dated September 28, 1998, the court clearly stated that no other orders were being vacated and that no sums already disbursed were to be returned. “The order vacating] the alimony order is retroactive to April 3, 1998, however, the plaintiff need not return any sums received but rather the defendant shall be credited with such sums against any [pendente lite] or permanent alimony order issued upon rehearing.”

On October 29,1998, the trial court, Kocay, J., granted the plaintiffs motion for counsel fees in the amount of $25,000, from which the defendant filed an amended appeal on November 12, 1998. Then, on November 23, 1998, Judge Kocay ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $4000 per week as alimony pendente lite. The court added that “[a]ll credits for prior payments are deferred until the final awards at trial. This order is retroactive to the date of the initial award.” The defendant filed an amended appeal from this order on December 3, 1998.

According to counsel for the defendant, on December 7,1998, Judge Kocay indicated that he had not intended to create an immediate arrearage owing for the period from April 3,1998, to September 30,1998. Nevertheless, the court found that the defendant owed an alimony arrearage of $38,857 for the period from October 1, 1998, to that date, ordered that he pay $19,000 by December 17, 1998, found the defendant in contempt for nonpayment of alimony, and awarded $7000 to the plaintiff for attorney’s fees (fourth contempt). Finally, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a stay of the December 3, 1998 alimony order. The defendant complied by depositing the $19,000 with the plaintiffs counsel, and on December 15,1998, the defendant filed an amended appeal from the orders of December 7, 1998. All together, the defendant filed one appeal, which he amended four times, incorporating the aforementioned challenges.

On December 11,1998, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal on the basis that the defendant had not complied with the trial court’s order of November 23, 1998, nor purged himself of the contempt order of December 7, 1998, at which time it was determined that there was an alimony arrearage from October 1 through December 7, 1998, of $38,857.14. Citing to the lengthy procedural history of the case and the three other occasions on which the defendant had been held in contempt by the court, the plaintiff argued that the defendant was not entitled to obtain appellate relief because he had failed to comply with the various trial court orders.

On December 24, 1998, the plaintiff filed a second motion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal, adding new facts in support of the motion. Specifically, the plaintiff related that, despite being served in hand with the plaintiffs subpoena duces tecum on December 19, 1998, for a scheduled court appearance on December 21, 1998, the defendant failed to appear. His counsel, however, did appear, and reported to the court that the defendant had attempted suicide by ingesting cyanide the previous weekend and that, although he had refused to surrender a bottle of cyanide to him or the defendant’s psychiatrist, the defendant had promised not to kill himself for seven days. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant merely had ignored the subpoena to avoid incarceration.

The defendant objected to the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, asserting various considerations, several of which raise issues underlying this appeal: specifically, that the April 3, 1998 orders had been issued eighteen days prior to the return date of the writ, summons and complaint; that the trial court order of September 28, 1998, vacating the April 3 alimony order, and the November 23, 1998 order, awarding alimony pendente lite, were inconsistent; that on December 7, 1998, in apparent recognition of the inconsistency, the trial court orally recited that, although its orders were retroactive to April 3,1998, it did not intend to create an immediate alimony obligation for the period from April 3 to September 30, 1998; that resolution of issues pertaining to credits and arrearages for that period would be reserved for the trial court; and that the defendant’s alimony obligations became effective October 1, 1998. The defendant also stated that, after receiving notice on December 19,1998, that his motion for a stay had been denied, he paid the plaintiff $19,000 in satisfaction of the December 7, 1998 order by forwarding that sum to the plaintiffs counsel. Additionally, the defendant pointed out that the orders of September 21 and 28, 1998, effectively vacated the orders underlying the con-tempts of April 3, 1998, and August 17, 1998. Finally, he asserted that all contempts had been purged via the distribution of escrow funds to the plaintiff as well as by the transfer by wire of $4000 per month between April and October, 1998.

On January 8, 1999, the plaintiff sought permission to respond to the defendant’s objection in order to assert that, despite the $19,000 payment on December 19, 1998, there remained a significant alimony arrear-age. Thereafter, on January 21, 1999, the defendant sought permission to respond in order to reiterate that although the vacating of the April 3,1998 order rendered two of the contempt orders inoperative, he had, in any event, purged himself of those orders, and that he also had purged himself of the December 8, 1998 contempt by depositing $19,000 with the plaintiffs counsel. He claimed that he had demonstrated overall a willingness to comply with the court orders. Finally, so as to have the last word, on January 23, 1999, the plaintiff requested permission to file a reply memorandum. Based upon our review of the record, it is apparent that these last motions were not acted upon.

Before the Appellate Court had the opportunity to rule on the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff advised the court that the trial court had entered new orders on January 29, 1999, not yet available in written form, which likely eliminated the need to act on the motion. The plaintiff wrote to the Appellate Court as follows: “Accordingly, in fairness to [the] Defendant-Appellant, please await receipt of such Orders from the trial court before proceeding with further consideration of [the] Plaintiff-Appell[ee]’s various motions.” This request was filed in the Appellate Court on February 3,1999. Despite this request, the Appellate Court nevertheless dismissed the defendant’s appeal on February 10, 1999.

On February 17,1999, the pertinent trial court order, dated January 21, 1999, was faxed to the Appellate Court. It provided as follows:

“ORDER

“The court orders the following in the above entitled matter:

“1. Motion to Vacate Alimony, Pendente Lite (278): The alimony order for $4000.00 per week shall be vacated. The defendant shall pay alimony of $1000.00 per week to the plaintiff. Said order shall be retroactive to October 23, 1998. The previous contempt order against the defendant shall be vacated.

“2. Plaintiffs Objection to Motion to Vacate Alimony Order, Pendente Lite (282): Overruled.

“3. Plaintiffs Motion to Preclude Testimony of Defendant’s Expert Witness, Pendente Lite (280): Overruled.

“4. Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant’s Inadequate Disclosure of Expert Witness, Pendente Lite (284): Overruled.

“5. Defendant’s Motion for Modification of Alimony, Pendente Lite (279) and Plaintiffs Objection to the Motion for Modification of Alimony, Pendente Lite (281): Both motions shall be continued to March 1,1999, pending a court-ordered psychological evaluation of the defendant by an independent third party who has not treated either party before. Selection of said person shall be made between the attorneys. If the attorneys are unable to agree, the court will chose a third party from a list submitted by the attorneys. The defendant shall be examined within two weeks. A report to the court of the examination shall be made within four weeks.

“Defendant’s counsel shall hold the 400 grams of Potassium Cyanide that the defendant currently has in his possession to discourage another suicide attempt. The defendant shall deliver the Potassium Cyanide to his counsel by Saturday, January 30, 1999, at 10:00 a.m.

“6. Defendant’s Motions for Order Regarding Accounting (191) and (261): Granted by agreement of the parties.

“7. Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant’s Motion for Accounting (264): Overruled.

“8. Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time, Pen-dente Lite (258): Granted to March 26, 1999.

“9. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant to Update Discovery Responses, Pendente Lite (276): Granted. The defendant shall update discovery responses by March 26, 1999.

“10. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant to Pay Automobile Expenses, Pendente Lite (257): Granted. The payment book shall be delivered from the plaintiffs attorney to the defendant’s attorney by agreement of the parties by February 15, 1999. The defendant shall assume all expenses for the automobile. The plaintiff shall return to the defendant two wheel rims, if they can be located by the plaintiff.

“11. Plaintiffs Motion for Release of Special Escrow Account Funds (287): Granted. $4000.00 from the plaintiffs attorney’s escrow account shall be released to pay the English financial consultant and English attorney. The plaintiffs request to release the full $6000.00 from the escrow fund was denied. However, if Mr. [Steven] Jackson [the English attorney who, acting for the plaintiff, conducted the depositions of the defendant and his financial advisor in England] provides this court with a written estimate, the court will reconsider the release of additional funds.

“12. Motion for Contempt and to Compel the Restoration of Marital Assets, Pendente Lite (286 and 286.01): The motion to compel the restoration of marital assets, specifically the $90,000.00 retainer to the defendant’s attorney, was denied. The motion for contempt was not addressed.

“13. Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt and Counsel Fees, Pendente Lite (re: Accounting) (274): Granted. A legible, understandable accounting shall be provided by February 26, 1999, and should go through February 26, 1999.

“14. Plaintiffs Motion for Turnover Order, Pendente Lite (re: Defendant’s 1997 State and Federal Tax Refunds) (252): Continued to March 1, 1999. Defendant’s attorney shall determine if an amended return is needed and shall report back to the court within fifteen days.

“15. Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt for Violation of Automatic Orders (re: No. 7 health insurance) (268): Continued to March 1, 1999. The parties shall attempt to find health insurance paperwork.

“By the Court, (Kocay, J.)”

The defendant then petitioned this court for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court’s dismissal of his appeal. We granted the defendant’s petition, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly grant the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, which asserted that the defendant was in contempt of court, notwithstanding that the defendant appealed from one of the trial court’s findings of contempt, had purged himself of the other findings of contempt and despite the fact that the trial court vacated its last finding of contempt thereby mooting the issues raised in the motion to dismiss?” Kendall v. Pilkington, 248 Conn. 909, 731 A.2d 307 (1999). We conclude that the Appellate Court abused its discretion in dismissing the defendant’s appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.

We begin with a discussion of two principle^ that govern our resolution of this certified appeal; the first is the authority of a reviewing court to dismiss an appeal based upon the conduct of a litigant; the second is our standard of review in deciding whether that authority was exercised properly. We treat them respectively.

It is well established that a litigant who displays a calculated and continued pattern of contemptuous conduct in defiance of the authority of the courts of this state should not be afforded the opportunity to seek our intercession to disturb an adjudication rendered by the trial court. We will not treat a litigant who displays such defiance to court authority with the deference generally accorded to others. Consequently, on occasion, our appellate courts have “dismissed appeals for contemptuous conduct of an appellant not necessarily related to the merits of the appeal.” Greenwood v. Greenwood, 191 Conn. 309, 313, 464 A.2d 771 (1983); see Broderick v. Broderick, 20 Conn. App. 145, 146, 565 A.2d 3 (1989); Croke v. Croke, 4 Conn. App. 663, 665 n.3, 496 A.2d 235 (1985); see also Practice Book § 60-2. It has been stated expressly that “[w]hen a party seeks appellate intervention to overturn an adjudication of contempt while simultaneously isolating himself or herself from the consequences of an adverse ruling on appeal or from further orders of the trial court, appellate review may be withheld and the case dismissed unless the appellant demonstrates a willingness to comply with the trial court’s order.” Mark v. Mark, 40 Conn. App. 171, 172, 669 A.2d 579 (1995), citing Greenwood v. Greenwood, supra, 313.

We consider a number of factors in determining whether an appeal should be dismissed based upon the contemptuous conduct of the appellant. “Some of those factors include the number of times the appellant was held in contempt, whether it is likely the appellant will continue to frustrate any order of the court that may be issued in connection with the same matter, whether the appellant has appeared when summoned to court, and whether the appellant has ever purged himself of the contempt. See Greenwood v. Greenwood, supra, [191 Conn.] 313; Broderick v. Broderick, supra, [20 Conn. App.] 146.” Mark v. Mark, supra, 40 Conn. App. 176-77.

In light of this authority, the parties agree that the Appellate Court has discretion to decide that a party, based on a pattern of contemptuous behavior, should not be afforded an opportunity for appellate review. They further agree that the question before us is whether that court abused its discretion in dismissing the defendant’s appeal. See Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction, 248 Conn. 52, 61-63, 727 A.2d 213 (1999).

The plaintiff argues that the defendant’s contemptuous conduct fell squarely within the Greenwood line of cases. The defendant raises two arguments, inter alia, to support his claim that the Appellate Court abused its discretion. He explicitly recognizes that he might not be entitled to appellate review if he had displayed defiance of court orders and that it is within the Appellate Court’s discretion to dismiss his appeal under such circumstances. Nevertheless, the defendant argues that this case does not fall within the category of cases deserving of that treatment. Additionally, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court acted prematurely and precipitously by proceeding on the plaintiffs motion without the benefit of the trial court’s orders of January 21, 1999.

Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with the defendant’s secondary claim, namely, that it was an abuse of discretion for the Appellate Court to dismiss the defendant’s appeal before receiving a written copy of the court’s order of January 29, 1999. We therefore need not decide whether the plaintiffs primary claim has merit.

In dismissing the appeal when it did, despite the plaintiffs request to defer acting on her motion to dismiss because a recent decision by the trial court would likely eliminate the need for a ruling, the Appellate Court acted precipitously and prematurely. Had the Appellate Court waited to receive the January 21 order, it would have had the benefit of a trial court decision that, inter alia, modified the plaintiffs alimony to $1000 per week, retroactive to October 23, 1998, vacated the last contempt, and recognized the legitimacy of the claims regarding the defendant’s frail mental state that contributed to some of his aberrant behavior. After review of the January 29, 1999 order, the Appellate Court might have found that this case did not involve a party who was likely to continue intentionally to frustrate orders of the court. In its haste to act on the plaintiffs motion, the Appellate Court extinguished the defendant’s ability to have a court review trial court orders, including contempt orders, that could plague him for years to come. We conclude, therefore, that the Appellate Court abused its discretion when it dismissed the defendant’s appeal.

Although we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court, we add, however, a note of admonishment. It will be a rare case that does not fall within the broad scope of the discretion conferred upon the Appellate Court. This is such a case.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Appellate Court with direction first to decide the plaintiffs motion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal on the basis of the entire current record. If the Appellate Court concludes not to dismiss the appeal, that court should then decide the appeal on the merits.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       Because the only transcript filed with this court pertains to a July 20, 1998 hearing before Booth, J., on the defendant’s motions to vacate certain orders entered against him, our recitation of the facts and procedural history derives from our review of the copious pleadings and undisputed representa-1ions of counsel.

       The defendant claims that he ultimately purged himself of this contempt by producing the requisite documents within sixty days of September 8, 1998. The defendant relied on this fact as one basis for his opposition to the plaintiffs motion to dismiss the appeal.

       The file reflects that on September 14, 1998, the trial court, again held the defendant in contempt and ordered him to turn over his passport to the court. On that date, the defendant filed an appeal from that order. All subsequent pleadings by both parties, however, omit any reference to this order. We therefore treat it as abandoned.

         The plaintiff, in her objection to the defendant’s petition for review from the Appellate Court, acknowledged that “[a]s of the date of the Appellate Court’s dismissals on February 10, 1999, no written trial court orders had yet been issued concerning the January 29, 1999 trial court proceedings. On information and belief, no written trial court Order (Kocay, J.) issued until February 17, 1999, or one (1) week after the dismissals.”

       For purposes of our review of the Appellate Court’s dismissal of the defendant’s appeal, we assume that the Appellate Court based its dismissal on the only ground alleged in the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, i.e., that the defendant’s conduct demonstrated an abuse of the judicial process.

       The defendant recites 1he pertinent history of this case in support, of his claim that our holding in Greenwood v. Greenwood, supra, 191 Conn.313-14, should not be extended to allow an unconditional dismissal of his appeal because of his conduct. In specific, even before the hearing on January 29, 1999, the trial court, Sferrazza, J., on September 21, 1998, had vacated its order of $50,000 per month alimony that had been awarded on April 3,1998, eighteen days before the return date. Although the court did not vacate the contempt orders of April 20,1998, or August, 17,1998, it recognized that there would likely be a credit owed to the defendant. Thereafter, on November 23, 1998, the trial court, Kocay, J., set a new alimony award of $4000 per week, and, on December 8,1998, clarified its earlier statement regarding arrearages, concluding that any arrearage would be calculated retroactive to October 1, 1998. The defendant paid $19,000 on December 21, 1998, as ordered, following the decision by the court denying his motion for a stay. Additionally, there had been several distributions of funds that had been held in escrow, totaling nearly $300,000, as well as monthly transfers by wire of approximately $4000 each month between April, 1998, and October, 1998.

       The defendant also suggests that the contempt findings “became void” as a consequence of the trial court decision vacating the earlier $50,000 alimony award. Additionally, he also argues that because he essentially purged himself of the contempt, the contempt order was no longer valid. We disagree. First, the trial court expressly stated that it was not vacating any other orders. Second, a finding of contempt is not necessarily vacated because the violator has purged himself. On the contrary, a contempt finding has collateral consequences, even when no longer “active,” unless or until it is vacated or rendered invalid. See Scalo v. Mandanici, 179 Conn. 140, 146-47, 425 A.2d 1272 (1979); Sgarellino v. Hightower, 13 Conn. App. 591, 594-95, 538 A.2d 1065 (1988). Moreover, as we have stated, even when a trial court improperly holds a party in contempt, that party may not disregard the underlying order. See Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 527, 710 A.2d 757 (1998).

       The defendant asks this court to decide: whether the Appellate Court, with the orders from January 29, 1999, in hand, could properly dismiss the appeal; and whether the trial court acted properly in issuing the various orders that are the subject of the underlying appeal. We decline the invitation. The decisions in the Greenwood line of cases were extraordinary because they deprived the parties therein of their right to challenge allegedly improper trial court decisions, leaving in place orders of support, alimony and visitation, significant in and of themselves, as benchmarks for future court orders. Whether this case is worthy of such treatment by a reviewing court is an issue we are more comfortable leaving to the Appellate Court to consider. If the Appellate Court determines that dismissal of the appeal is not appropriate, it will thereafter consider the merits of the underlying appeal.