source: Caselaw Access Project

author: SULLIVAN, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    MARIA APOSPOROS ET AL. v. URBAN REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF STAMFORD
    (SC 16450)
    Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.

      Argued October 25, 2001
    officially released March 5, 2002

      John Wayne Fox, with whom were JohnLouizos and, on the brief, Patricia M. Gang, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Robert Dolían, with whom, on the brief, were Charles D. Ray and Claire E. Ryan, for the appellee (defendant).

      Andrew J. McDonald, corporation counsel, with whom, on the brief, was James V. Minor, assistant

      corporation counsel, for the appellee (intervening defendant).
   Opinion

SULLIVAN, C. J.

The plaintiffs, Maria Aposporos and Ellen Begetis, appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their request for a permanent injunction prohibiting condemnation proceedings by the defendants, the urban redevelopment commission of the city of Stamford (commission) and the city of Stamford (city). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that the defendants had complied with the time requirements of General Statutes § 8-128; (2) concluded that the defendants had complied with the conditions imposed by the local legislative body in authorizing the condemnation of the plaintiffs’ property; (3) declined to review the plaintiffs’ claim that the condemnation was invalid in the absence of sufficient findings of blighted conditions; and (4) concluded that a court order was sufficient to extend the defendants’ authority to proceed with the condemnation after the expiration of the deadline set by the local legislative body. We agree with the plaintiffs’ third claim and conclude that the defendants were required to establish that the plaintiffs’ property was in a redevelopment area before amending the redevelopment plan to provide for acquisition of the property. We further conclude that their failure to do so rendered the condemnation proceedings invalid. Accordingly, we need not consider the remaining claims.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. In March, 1963, the city’s board of representatives (board) approved an urban renewal plan entitled “Urban Renewal Plan for the Southeast Quadrant (Extended) Urban Renewal Project” (1963 plan) pursuant to General Statutes § 8-124 et seq., the Connecticut redevelopment act (act). In 1977, the plaintiffs jointly acquired the property located at 62 West Park Place in Stamford (property). Since that time, they have operated a diner, known as Curley’s Diner, on the property. At the time that the plaintiffs acquired the property, it was in the area of the city affected by the plan, but it was not identified in the plan as a property to be acquired.

In the mid-1980s, merchants located in the area of Stamford subject to the plan became concerned about the effect that the construction of a mall in another part of the city would have on their businesses. In response to those concerns, the then mayor of Stamford, Thom Serrani, appointed a citizens committee to explore ways to revitalize the area. In addition, the commission and the board’s urban redevelopment committee were asked to recommend new redevelopment goals. The commission hired an urban design development firm to conduct a study of the issue. The firm ultimately recommended that the defendants acquire four properties in addition to those already acquired pursuant to the plan, including the property owned by the plaintiffs.

On the basis of the design firm’s recommendations, the commission developed a plan for the construction of housing, including affordable housing, and retail stores in the redevelopment area. The commission also proposed amendments to the 1963 plan to authorize, among other things, the acquisition of the four properties. Public hearings were held on the amendments, after which the commission submitted the amendments to the board for approval. The board, by resolution number 1819 (1988 resolution), approved the amendments on March 7, 1988. The resolution directed the commission to “take all steps necessary to carry out the Urban Renewal Plan, as so amended, in an expeditious and timely manner . . . .’’It also provided that “no real property acquisitions as set forth in the Proposed Amendments shall be undertaken until such time as this Board approves a Land Disposition Agreement for Re-use parcels 16A, 16B, 19 and 19B.” The plaintiffs’ property is located in block 9, lot 24, of reuse parcel 19B. The resolution also required the commission “to negotiate a Land Disposition Agreement that optimizes the affordable housing component attendant to the development of the combination of Re-use parcels 16A, 16B, 19 and 19B.”

Following the adoption of the 1988 resolution, the commission solicited developers by placing advertisements in national trade journals. The commission received approximately twenty responses, from which it selected four developers to submit proposals. Ultimately, it selected the Lincoln Properties proposal for the construction of a sixteen story tower on the property and the parties negotiated a land disposition agreement. Because of a downturn in the real estate market, however, the parties were unable to obtain financing for the development, and the deal fell through.

Shortly before the 1963 plan, as amended, was due to expire, the board, on October 5, 1992, adopted a resolution extending the plan to March 4, 2000. In 1996, when the real estate market began to recover, the commission issued another request for proposals. Three developers submitted proposals, from which the commission selected Corcoran Jennison/Berkeley Partners, Inc. (Corcoran Jennison). The commission drafted a land disposition agreement (draft agreement) incorporating the proposal and submitted it to the board for approval. Various members of the board expressed concerns about certain provisions of the draft agreement and requested that the commission renegotiate those provisions. The commission negotiated modifications to the agreement and submitted them to members of the board’s urban renewal committee at a meeting on October 22,1997. At a November 5,1997 board meeting, committee chairman Alice Fortunato reported to the board that the committee had approved the agreement as modified.

On November 17, 1997, the board passed resolution number CA1197 (1997 resolution). The resolution was entitled “RESOLUTION NO. CA1197 CONCERNING APPROVAL OFA CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OFLAND IN THE SOUTHEAST QUADRANT (EXTENDED) URBAN RENEWAL PROJECT FOR PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT TO CORCORAN JENNISON/BERKELEY PARTNERS, INC.,” and referred to the land disposition agreement entitled “Contract for Sale of Land for Private Redevelopment Reuse Parcels 16A, 16B, 19 and 19B” that had been approved by the commission on August 18, 1997. On June 15, 1998, the mayor executed a contract with Park Square West LLC, a fully owned subsidiary of Corcoran Jennison. The contract included the modifications that had been negotiated by the commission and approved by the board’s urban renewal committee.

During the year following the approval of the 1997 resolution, the commission developed construction plans and obtained financing for the construction. In November, 1998, construction of phase I of the project began. In November, 1999, the commission began the process of acquiring certain property, including the plaintiffs’ property, which was required for phase II of the project. Specifically, the commission sought proposals for an appraisal report, selected an appraiser and met with property owners and their attorneys to discuss the appraisals. On December 20, 1999, the commission filed a statement of compensation for the plaintiffs’ property in the amount of $233,000.

The plaintiffs filed this action against the commission on December 28,1999, seeking a temporary restraining order preventing the commission from condemning the property, temporary and permanent injunctive relief preventing the commission from condemning the property, a declaratory ruling that the taking of the property was unconstitutional, a declaratory ruling that the actions taken by the commission were illegal, arbitrary and exceeded the scope of its condemnation authority, and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to General Statutes § 48-17a. The trial court immediately granted an ex parte temporary restraining order.

On January 12, 2000, the city filed a motion to intervene in the action, which the trial court granted on January 24, 2000. On February 25,2000, the commission moved for a stay of the March 4, 2000 expiration of the plan. The trial court granted the motion on March 3, 2000. On March 6,2000, the board approved a resolution extending the plan’s expiration date to July 5, 2000.

A trial on the plaintiffs’ claim for temporary and permanent injunctive relief was held on June 8 and 9, 2000. On October 31, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment denying the plaintiffs’ claim for an injunction against the condemnation proceedings. The plaintiffs then filed this appeal in the Appellate Court. Thereafter, this court transferred the appeal to itself pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

On appeal, the plaintiffs make four claims. First, they claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendants had complied with the time requirements of § 8-128. Specifically, they claim that the defendants did not condemn their property within a “reasonable time” from the adoption of the 1988 resolution and that the 1997 resolution did not specify the time within which the property was to be acquired. Second, they claim that the trial court improperly found that the defendants had complied with the board’s conditions, namely, that: (1) they enter into an authorized land disposition agreement before acquiring the property, because the modified land disposition agreement executed by the city was not the same agreement that was authorized in the 1997 resolution; (2) the commission implement the plan “in an expeditious and timely manner”; and (3) the defendants negotiate aland disposition agreement that “optimizes” the affordable housing in the development. Third, they claim that the trial court improperly declined to review their claim that the condemnation was invalid in the absence of a renewed finding of blight. Fourth, they claim that the trial court improperly concluded that it had authority to extend the deadline for expiration of the redevelopment plan by court order.

We address only the plaintiffs’ third claim because it is dispositive of this case. We begin by setting forth forth the standard of review pertaining to a trial court’s ruling on a request for an injunction. “A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law. ... A prayer for injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court’s ruling can be reviewed only for the purpose of determining whether the decision was based on an erroneous statement of law or an abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Walton v. New Hartford, 223 Conn. 155, 165, 612 A.2d 1153 (1992).

Under the act, “a redevelopment area is defined as one ‘which is deteriorated, [deteriorating] substandard or detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community.’ [General Statutes § 8-125 (b).] It is with reference to such an area that a local redevelopment agency is authorized to prepare a plan for redevelopment and, in the execution of the plan, take private property by condemnation. . . . Private property taken for the purpose of eradicating the conditions which obtain in such areas is taken for a public use.” (Citations omitted.) Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 142-43, 104 A.2d 365 (1954).

“The determination of what property is necessary to be taken in any given case in order to effectuate the public purpose is, under our constitution, a matter for the exercise of the legislative power. When the legislature delegates the making of that determination to another agency, the decision of that agency is conclusive; it is open to judicial review only to discover if it was unreasonable or in bad faith or was an abuse of the power conferred.” Id., 146.

“[A] redevelopment area [is] . . . expressly permitted to ‘include structures not in themselves substandard or insanitary which are found to be essential to complete an adequate unit of development, provided that the redevelopment area is deteriorated, [deteriorating] substandard or detrimental.’ [General Statutes § 8-125 (b).]” Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett, 150 Conn. 42, 51, 184 A.2d 797 (1962). “In the determination whether property which is not substandard is essential to the plan of redevelopment, it is the condition obtaining as to the entire area and not as to individual properties which is determinative.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

General Statutes § 8-127 provides in relevant part that “[b]efore approving any redevelopment plan, the redevelopment agency shall hold a public hearing thereon, notice of which shall be published at least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality, the first publication of notice to be not less than two weeks before the date set for the hearing. The redevelopment agency may approve any such redevelopment plan if, following such hearing, it finds that: (a) The area in which the proposed redevelopment is to be located is a redevelopment area ...”

“The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor, and the prescribed method of taking must be strictly pursued.” Simmons v. State, 160 Conn. 492, 500, 280 A.2d 351 (1971). “The rule applicable to the corporate authorities of municipal bodies is that when the mode in which their power is to be exercised is prescribed, that mode must be followed.” Sheehan v. Altschuler, 148 Conn. 517, 523-24, 172 A.2d 897 (1961). When essential steps are not taken as required by the statute for the adoption of a redevelopment plan, the purported plan, as well as any attempted approval of it and any action taken under it, are invalid. Id., 524.

The plaintiffs do not dispute that a valid finding of blight was made in 1963 when the redevelopment plan was adopted, but they argue that that finding is now stale and does not relate to the redevelopment area identified for acquisition in the 1988 amendment that includes their property. Accordingly, they argue that the defendants were acting outside the scope of their authority in amending the plan to provide for acquisition of the property. Indeed, in its memorandum of decision, the trial court observed that “ [d] eterminations that were made forty, twenty, and even twelve years ago seriously undermine confidence in making rehable condemnation decisions. Did the Board have substantial evidence of the most recent vintage when it came to the blight determination so as to conduct a full hearing and render an honest, reasonable and fair judgment as to Curley’s Diner?” The court concluded, nevertheless, that “a reasonable inference can be made based upon the extensions of time to complete the current plan that the point of urban blight was recently considered. If new factual findings regarding blight are needed, it is within the Board’s discretion, not that of the court.” Thus, it is not clear whether the trial court determined that a renewed finding of bhght was implicit in the 1988 and 1997 resolutions or that the commission was entitled to rely on the 1963 finding. In either case, however, we conclude that the finding was insufficient to validate the condemnation of the plaintiffs’ property.

This court previously has not considered the effect of a prolonged lapse of time after an initial finding of blight on the scope of a redevelopment agency’s authority to act pursuant to a redevelopment plan. The Supreme Court of Appeals for West Virginia, however, considered this issue in Charleston Urban Renewal v. Courtland Co., 203 W. Va. 528, 509 S.E.2d 569 (1998). The Charleston city council had declared on September 4, 1984, that an area of the city, in which the property of the condemnee was located, was a “ ‘slum and blighted’ ” area. Id., 530-31. One year later, the city and its urban redevelopment agency adopted an urban renewal plan providing for the acquisition of that property. Id., 531. The urban redevelopment agency did not formally authorize acquisition of the property, however, until May 8, 1996. Id. Condemnation proceedings were initiated on March 30, 1997. Id. The condemnee challenged the condemnation proceedings, claiming that the 1984 findings were outdated and, therefore, that (1) the proceedings were unconstitutional because acquisition of the property no longer served a “ ‘public use’ and (2) the eminent domain proceeding was ultra vires because the statutory prerequisites of blight or slum conditions were no longer present. Id., 534.

The court noted that the condemnee was not challenging the validity of the initial determination of blight and slum conditions, but was asking the court to make a factual determination that those conditions no longer existed. Id., 535. The court concluded that a request “to make such a determination de novo, as opposed to asking a court to review a city council or authority determination under an appropriate standard of review, raises substantial issues of exhaustion of remedies, separation of powers, and similar concerns.” Id. The court also noted that “the viability of an incremental, multiyear, integrated plan for the overall redevelopment of a slum or blighted area would be fatally compromised if challenges to the continued need for and legitimacy of the plan based on allegedly changed circumstances were allowed as defenses to a condemnation petition— each time an urban renewal authority seeks to acquire property to accomplish the purposes of the plan. We are not directed to nor have we found any cases or statutes suggesting that such challenges are, have been, or should be allowed.” Id. The court concluded that “absent extraordinary circumstances, the authority of an urban renewal authority acting under the provisions of [the relevant statutes] to implement an approved and ongoing redevelopment plan by using the power of eminent domain . . . may not be challenged during the period of the plan simply on the basis that the slum or blighted conditions which provided the initial basis for the adoption of the plan no longer exist.” Id.

The court in Batmasian v. Boca Raton Community Redevelopment Agency, 580 So. 2d 199 (Fla. App. 1991), also considered the issue before us in this case. It concluded that “[a] logical consequence of the implementation of a redevelopment plan in any particular area is that some conditions of blight which once existed will be eliminated. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect that the [redevelopment agency] demonstrate the existence of the same level of blight [at the time eminent domain proceedings are initiated] that was present when the redevelopment plan was initially adopted [seven years earlier].” Id., 201.

We agree with the West Virginia and Florida courts, and with the defendants, that it would be illogical and unfair to require a redevelopment agency to determine that the level of blight that existed at the time that a redevelopment plan was adopted existed at each stage of the implementation of the plan. We cannot conclude, however, that a redevelopment agency may make an initial finding of blight and rely on that finding indefinitely to amend and extend a redevelopment plan to respond to conditions that did not exist, or to accomplish objectives that were not contemplated, at the time that the original plan was adopted. To do so would confer on redevelopment agencies an unrestricted and unreviewable power to condemn properties for purposes not authorized by the enabling statute and to convert redevelopment areas into their peipetual fiefdoms. For the same reason, a renewed finding of blight cannot be implicit in an amendment to a redevelopment plan approved decades after the original plan was adopted that addresses conditions and seeks to achieve objectives that were not contemplated in that plan. Such an amendment effectively constitutes, and should be subject to the same procedural requirements as, a new redevelopment plan.

In this case, unlike the condemnees in Batmasian v. Boca Raton Community Redevelopment Agency, supra, 580 So. 2d 199, and Charleston Urban Renewals. Courtland Co., supra, 203 W. Va. 528, the plaintiffs are not seeking a factual determination that blighted conditions no longer exist in order to prevent the completion of a redevelopment plan. Rather, they claim: (1) that the initial finding of blight does not relate to the redevelopment area identified for acquisition in the 1988 amendment that includes their property or to the proposed use of that property under the amended redevelopment plan; and (2) that, in the absence of a finding relating to that area, the defendants had no statutory authority to condemn the property. We agree.

First, we note that the record in this case does not establish the existence of any “incremental, multi-year, integrated plan for the overall redevelopment of a slum or blighted area”; Charleston Urban Renewal v. Courtland Co., supra, 203 W. Va. 535; that included the acquisition of the plaintiffs’ property. The property was not targeted for acquisition by the plan until the adoption of the 1988 amendments, twenty-five years after the adoption of the original plan and at a time when, as the defendants concede and, indeed, the amendment itself acknowledges, the blight eradication objectives of the original plan largely had been achieved. Second, that amendment was a response to a discrete economic condition that did not exist at the time that the 1963 plan was adopted, namely, the construction of a mall in another area of the city, and had distinct objectives. Accordingly, we conclude that the 1988 amendments did not relate to the original finding of blight but constituted, in effect, a new redevelopment plan.

We also conclude that this case is distinguishable from Fishman v. Stamford, 159 Conn. 116, 119-20, 267 A.2d 443, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905, 90 S. Ct. 2197, 26 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1970), in which this court concluded that the adoption of a modification to a redevelopment plan—indeed, the same plan that is under consideration in this case—to provide for the acquisition of property that was not targeted for acquisition under the original plan did not constitute the adoption of a new plan subject to the procedural requirements of § 8-127. In that case, the modification was adopted only three years after the original plan, was intended to alleviate the same conditions as the original plan and had the same objectives as the original plan, with only a change in scale. Under those circumstances, this court concluded that compliance with the requirements of General Statutes § 8-136 pertaining to modifications of redevelopment plans was all that was required. Under that statute, any modification that “will substantially change the redevelopment plan as previously approved by the legislative body . . . must similarly be approved by the legislative body.” If we were to construe that statute to apply to any change in a redevelopment plan, however, no matter how belated, substantial or unrelated to the original plan, then, after an initial finding of blight, the eminent domain power of a redevelopment agency effectively would be coextensive with the state’s. Even after all of the objectives of the original plan had been achieved, the agency could continue to amend and extend the plan to achieve public purposes unrelated to the eradication of blight, subject only to the approval of the local legislative body.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court improperly determined that it was within the defendants’ discretion not to make a renewed finding of blight. We emphasize that, under the redevelopment act, it is only with reference to a redevelopment area, i.e., a blighted area, “that a local redevelopment agency is authorized to prepare a plan for redevelopment and, in the execution of the plan, take private property by condemnation.” Gohld, Realty Co. v. Hartford, supra, 141 Conn. 142-43. The legislature has mandated that before a redevelopment agency may adopt a redevelopment plan, it must hold a public hearing pursuant to § 8-127 and determine that the area in which the proposed redevelopment is to be located is a redevelopment area, as defined by § 8-125 (b). Those procedures are designed to allow interested parties to present evidence and arguments concerning the existence of blight so that the agency can make an informed and accurate finding. They also ensure that there is an adequate record for judicial review. Because the defendants failed to comply with the requirements of § 8-127, the redevelopment agency had no statutory authority to adopt the 1988 amendment that, we have concluded, constituted a new redevelopment plan, and the condemnation proceedings against the plaintiffs’ property were invalid. See Sheehan v. Altschuler, supra, 148 Conn. 523-24.

The commission argues, however, that to require a renewed finding of blight under the circumstances of this case will “derail” urban renewal projects by depriving redevelopment agencies of the “authority to complete the redevelopment project as planned.” We have two responses to that argument. First, our decision today does not require a redevelopment agency to renew a finding of blight if it is merely completing a redevelopment project as initially planned. Rather, the requirement for a renewed finding exists only when the agency, long after the original plan was adopted and at a time when the objectives of that plan have been largely achieved, has amended the original plan to address conditions and achieve objectives that did not exist at the time that the original plan was adopted. Second, to avoid being deprived of authority to address new conditions and achieve new objectives, the agency need only comply with the procedural requirements of § 8-127. Admittedly, one outcome of such proceedings could be a determination by the agency that there are no blighted conditions and, therefore, that it has no authority to proceed. The possibility of such an outcome, however, is precisely what the legislature contemplated in requiring the agency to hold such a hearing.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment granting the plaintiffs’ claim for a permanent injunction against the condemnation of their property pursuant to the 1963 redevelopment plan as amended.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 8-128 provides: “Within a reasonable time after its approval of the redevelopment plan as hereinbefore provided, the redevelopment agency may proceed with the acquisition or rental of real property by purchase, lease, exchange or gift.The redevelopment agency may acquire real property by eminent domain with the approval of the legislative body of the municipality and in accordance with the provisions of sections 8-129 to 8-133, inclusive, and this section. The legislative body in its approval of aproject under section 8-127 shall specify the time within which real property is to be acquired. The time for acquisition may be extended by the legislative body in accordance with section 48-6, upon request of the redevelopment agency, provided the owner of the real property consents to such request. Real property may be acquired previous to the adoption or approval of the project area redevelopment plan, provided the property acquired shall be located within an area designated on the general plan as an appropriate redevelopment area or within an area whose boundaries are defined by the planning commission as an appropriate area for a redevelopment project, and provided such acquisition shall be authorized by the legislative body. The redevelopment agency may clear, repair, operate or insure such property while it is in its possession or make site improvements essential to preparation for its use in accordance with the redevelopment plan.”

       We note, preliminarily, that the defendants assert that this claim was not properly preserved because it was not raised by the plaintiffs until they filed their posttrial brief in the trial court. We disagree. In their posttrial brief, the plaintiffs argued that there was no evidence that the current conditions of the property or the surrounding area met the requirements for a redevelopment area or that condemnation of the property was necessary or would serve a public purpose by eradicating blight. The defendants, in their posttrial brief, argued that because the evidence at trial showed that acquisition of the property was necessary to carry out the redevelopment plan, the plaintiffs’ claim that the property was not blighted, deteriorated or substandard was irrelevant. The defendants did not argue to the trial court that the claim was unpreserved. The (rial court addressed the issue in its memorandum of decision, concluding that, although “[determinations that were made forty, twenty, and even twelve years ago seriously undermine confidence in making reliable condemnation decisions . . . [t]he court has no discretion on factual findings regarding ‘blighted areas.’ ” On the basis of this record, we conclude that the issue was fairly before the trial court and was adequately preserved for review by this court.

       General Statutes § 8-127 provides: “The redevelopment agency may prepare, or cause to be prepared, a redevelopment plan and any redeveloper may submit a redevelopment plan to the redevelopment agency, and such agency shall immediately transmit such plan to the planning agency of the municipality for its study. The planning agency may make a comprehensive or general plan of the entire municipality as a guide in the more detailed and precise planning of redevelopment areas. Such plan and any modifications and extensions thereof shall show the location of proposed redevelopment areas and the general location and extent of use of land for housing, business, industry, communications and transportation, recreation, public buildings and such other public and private uses as are deemed by the planning agency essential to the purpose of redevelopment. Appropriations by the municipality of any amount necessary are authorized to enable the planning agency to make such comprehensive or general plan. The redevelopment agency shall request the written opinion of the planning agency on all redevelopment plans prior to approving such redevelopmentplans. Before approving any redevelopment plan, the redevelopment agency shall hold a public hearing thereon, notice of which shall be published at least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality, the first publication of notice to be not less than two weeks before the date set for the hearing. The redevelopment agency may approve any such redevelopment plan if, following such hearing, it finds that: (a) The area in which the proposed redevelopment is to be located is a redevelopment area; (b) the carrying out of the redevelopment plan will result in materially improving conditions in such area; (c) sufficient living accommodations are available within a reasonable distance of such area or are provided for in the redevelopment plan for families displaced by the proposed improvement, at prices or rentals within the financial reach of such families; and (d) the redevelopment plan is satisfactory as to site planning, relation to the comprehensive or general plan of the municipality and, except when the redevelopment agency has prepared the redevelopment plan, the construction and financial ability of the redeveloper to carry it out. No redevelopment plan for a project which consists predominantly of residential facilities shall be approved by the redevelopment agency in any municipality having a housing authority organized under the provisions of chapter 128 except with the approval of such housing authority. The approval of a redevelopment plan may be given by the legislative body or by such agency as it designates to act in its behalf.”

       We note that in its posttrial brief the commission expressly had denied that it was required to establish that the area targeted for acquisition was blighted. It argued that, because it had proven at trial that the acquisition of the plaintiffs’ property was necessary for construction of the project approved in the 1997 resolution, the issue of blight was irrelevant. In its brief to this court, the commission again argued that the plaintiffs’ property is essential to the project and that it is undisputed that the project is a public use. We conclude, however, that the fact that the plaintiffs’ property is essential for the project and the fact that the project is a public use are irrelevant if the purpose of the project was not to eradicate blight, the only public use for which the agency is authorized to acquire property.

       The introduction to the amendments states that “[a]s Stamford enters the final phase of the Urban Renewal Project, most of the goals established by our community have been achieved.” We emphasize that the fact that the goals of a redevelopment plan largely have been achieved does not automatically deprive a redevelopment agency of authority to complete the plan. The agency may not rely on the fact that the goals have not been completely achieved, however, to extend the period and scope of the plan indefinitely and to adopt new goals that were not contemplated in the original plan.

       The introduction to the amendments states that “[t]his document contains a description of Urban Renewal Plan amendments which, if approved by the Board of Representatives, will create new development goals for the section of Stamford’s Urban Renewal Project Area referred to as Blocks 8 and 9.” The introduction identified more housing in the downtown area and more nightlife and pedestrian-oriented activity as two such goals.


author: KATZ, J.

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LUIS CARRASCO
    (SC 16333)
    Sullivan, C. J., and Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
    Argued November 27, 2001
    officially released March 5, 2002

      Neal Cone, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      Robert J. Scheinblum, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Michael Gailor, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

KATZ, J.

The sole issue in this direct criminal appeal is whether the trial court’s decision sustaining the state’s exercise of a peremptoiy challenge to remove a venireperson deprived the defendant of his right to an impartial jury in violation of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. Specifically, the defendant claims that the removal of the first Hispanic male venireperson eligible to serve on the petit jury improperly deprived the defendant, who is also a Hispanic male, of a fair opportunity to select a jury composed of a representative cross section of the community. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On August 26, 1994, at approximately 8:35 p.m., the defendant, Luis Carrasco, arrived at a housing project in Hartford and attempted to sell to the victim, Jose Vasquez Molina, a bundle of napkins assembled to resemble a package of heroin. An argument over payment for the package erupted, a scuffle ensued, and the defendant fatally shot the victim once in the chest.

The record reveals the following relevant procedural history. The state charged the defendant in a substitute information with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134, and criminal use of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-216. The defendant pleaded not guilty to all of the charges and elected a trial by jury.

Jury selection commenced on September 27, 1999. Eight venire panels were drawn from the Hartford judicial district, from which twelve jurors and three alternates ultimately were selected to serve on the jury. When each panel was first brought into the courtroom, the trial court provided the venirepersons with the names of the parties, the attorneys, and the potential witnesses, and requested that any venireperson who believed that this information would compromise his or her ability to serve impartially alert the court.

On October 5,1999, in response to these instructions, a venireperson on the fifth panel, R.R., raised his hand. R.R., a Hispanic male, was the first Hispanic venireperson who was eligible to serve on the defendant’s jury. Thereafter, during individual voir dire, R.R. explained that he had raised his hand because he thought that he had read about the crime in the newspaper when the incident first occurred, that the defendant “look[ed] familiar” to him and that, although he had “never met him,” he had “seen [the defendant] most likely in the streets.” R.R. further indicated that his recollection of the crime from the newspaper would not affect his ability to be impartial and that, although he recognized the defendant “in a positive way,” “if he’s guilty, he’s guilty . . . .” Thereafter, R.R. returned to the jury room, and the state asserted that R.R. should be excused for cause. The defendant disagreed, and the court ordered that R.R. return the following day for further questioning.

When voir dire of R.R. resumed the next day, he stated that he had thought overnight about his familiarity with the defendant and thought that he may have known the defendant’s family approximately twenty-seven or twenty-eight years prior. He further elaborated that this knowledge would “make it a little bit harder” to return a guilty verdict, but that if the state proved its case, he “[didn’t] think it [would] take [him] out of [his] actual duty as a juror to convict [the defendant].”

Thereafter, R.R. again retired to the jury room. The defendant stated that R.R. was an acceptable juror, but the state exercised a peremptory challenge to remove him. The defendant challenged the state’s exercise pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), claiming that R.R. was “the first Hispanic venireperson that [the parties had] questioned and that . . . there just [hadn’t] been enough people up to [that] point ... to take a chance on letting [R.R.] go.” The state asserted that R.R.’s admission that he might have more difficulty returning a guilty verdict because he possibly had known the defendant’s family undermined R.R.’s impartiality, thereby motivating the state’s decision to remove him from the panel. The trial court concluded that the state’s peremptory challenge was race neutral, and overruled the defendant’s Batson challenge. The court then called R.R. back to the courtroom and excused him from jury service in the present case.

Jury selection concluded on October 15, 1999. The petit jury was comprised of one white male, four white females, one Hispanic male, one Hispanic female, and two males and three females of unidentified race and ethnicity. It is undisputed that the unidentified jurors were not Hispanic.

The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of felony murder, criminal use of a firearm, and the lesser included offense of attempted robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 and General Statutes § 53a-49. See footnotes 2 through 5 of this opinion. The trial court vacated the conviction of criminal use of a firearm; see footnote 5 of this opinion; and rendered a judgment of guilty of felony murder and attempted robbery in the first degree, sentencing the defendant to a total effective term of forty-eight years imprisonment. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the fair cross section requirement pursuant to article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution is broader than that under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, and that his state constitutional right to a venire panel composed of a representative cross section of the community extends to the petit jury. The defendant claims, therefore, that this court should reverse his conviction because the state’s exercise of a peremptory challenge to remove R.R., the first Hispanic male venireperson who was eligible to serve, deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to select a jury composed of a representative cross section of the community.

The defendant concedes that he did not assert this claim before the trial court and, therefore, may prevail on this claim only if he satisfies the criteria established by this court in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). We conclude that the record is inadequate for our review and, accordingly, the defendant’s claim fails under the first prong of Golding.

The defendant’s claim that the removal of R.R. improperly deprived him of a fair opportunity to select a petit jury composed of a representative cross section of the community necessarily is predicated on two legal assumptions: (1) that the defendant has a right under our state constitution to a petit jury comprised of a representative cross section of the community; and (2) that the fair cross section to which the defendant is entitled includes a certain number of Hispanic males. Therefore, before we consider the general issue of whether the fair cross section requirement under our state constitution extends to the petit jury, and, accordingly, the more specific issue of whether the removal of R.R. deprived the defendant of a petit jury composed of a fair cross section, we first must consider the narrower question of whether the defendant has established that the fair cross section to which he claims he is entitled necessarily includes a certain number of Hispanic males.

In order to establish a violation of his right to a fair cross section of the community, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the following: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979); State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn. 578, 588, 758 A.2d 327 (2000); State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 450, 680 A.2d 147 (1996). In accordance with the first prong of this test, therefore, the defendant must demonstrate that Hispanic males constitute a distinctive group for purposes of fair cross section analysis. While this court previously has held that Hispanic persons, in general, comprise a distinctive group; see State v. Gibbs, supra, 588; we have never so held with the respect to the subcategory of Hispanic males, in particular. “While there is no precise definition of the term distinctive group . . . such a group must have, first, some factor which defines and limits the group; second, a basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or experience which is present in members of the group and which cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process; and third, there must be a possibility that exclusion of the group will result in partiality or bias on the part of juries hearing cases in which group members are involved.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487, 496-97, 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207, 112 S. Ct. 3000, 120 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1992).

In the present case, the defendant fails to allege directly that Hispanic males are a distinctive group. Moreover, the record reveals no evidence, particularly no statistical or sociological data, demonstrating that Hispanic males share experiences, ideas or attitudes so distinct from Hispanic persons, in general, that their underrepresentation as jurors would tend to result in bias and partiality on the part of juries hearing cases. We conclude, therefore, that the defendant has failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden under the first prong of the Duren test.

Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the defendant had established that Hispanic males constitute a distinctive group for fair cross section purposes, the defendant has failed to meet his evidentiary burden with respect to both the second and third prongs of the Duren test. The defendant has not proffered any evidence of the size of the class of Hispanic males in the Hartford judicial district. Therefore, we have no basis upon which to conclude whether the representation of Hispanic males in this case was unfair and unreasonable in relation to their representation in the community. Compare State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 422, 481 A.2d 56 (1984) (prima facie showing of fair cross section violation successfully established through use of voter registration lists demonstrating proportions of Hispanic persons eligible to serve relative to Hispanic persons residing in relevant community) with State v. Webb, supra, 238 Conn. 452 (fair cross section claim based on lack of affluent individuals failed for lack of sufficient evidence when defendant did not present evidence of number of affluent individuals residing in relevant community) and State v. Couture, 218 Conn. 309, 316-17, 589 A.2d 343 (1991) (fair cross section claim for lack of Jewish jury members failed for lack of sufficient evidence when defendant did not present evidence of number of Jewish persons residing in particular judicial district). Similarly, the defendant has failed to allege or to provide evidence that Hispanic males have been excluded systematically in the jury selection process. See State v. Tillman, supra, 220 Conn. 498 (allegation of systematic exclusion insufficient without proof that questionable selection procedure actually followed); State v. Couture, supra, 317 (claim of systematic exclusion failed for lack of sufficient evidence when defendant could have, but failed to, offer evidence that Jewish persons, in fact, postponed jury service because of Passover).

“The defendant bears the burden of making an adequate record to support a challenge to a jury array. . . . A challenge to a jury array will fail if the defendant presents no evidence to the court.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Tillman, supra, 220 Conn. 496. Moreover, “[a] representation by counsel does not meet this evidentiary requirement.” Id. In the absence of evidence that the fair cross section to which the defendant claims he is entitled includes a requisite number of Hispanic males, we conclude that the defendant’s claim that the state’s exercise of a peremptory challenge to remove R.R., the first Hispanic male venireperson eligible to serve, deprived him of a representative cross section of the community on his petit jury in violation of our state constitution must fail under Golding for want of an adequate record.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to . . . trial by an impartial jury. . . .” See State v. Griffin, 251 Conn. 671, 697, 741 A.2d 913 (1999) (stating article first, § 8, of Connecticut constitution encompasses American tradition of trial by jury, which contemplates impartial jury drawn from cross section of community).

       General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) provides: “A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.”

       General Statutes § 53a-54c provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants . . . .”

       General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a-133 or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (1) Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (2) is armed with a deadly weapon; or (3) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument; or (4) displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm . . . .”

       General Statutes § 53a-216 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon when he commits any class A, B or C or unclassified felony as defined in section 53a-25 and in the commission of such felony he uses or threatens the use of a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm or electronic defense weapon. No person shall be convicted of criminal use of a firearm or electronic. defense weapon and the underlying felony upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.”

       None of the alternate jurors ultimately were required to serve on the petit jury.

       We refer to the venireperson by his initials in order to protect his privacy. State v. Rigual, 256 Conn. 1, 5 n.6, 771 A.2d 939 (2001).

       The fourth venire panel contained one Hispanic male, however, he was ineligible to serve on the defendant’s jury because of aprior military commitment that required him to leave the country before the completion of the defendant’s trial.

       “In Batson . . . the United States Supreme Court recognized that a claim of purposeful racial discrimination on the part of the prosecution in selecting a jury raises constitutional questions of the utmost seriousness . . . [and] concluded that [although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his [or her] view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried . . . the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race ....
      “Under Connecticut law, [o]nce a [party] asserts a Batson claim, the [opposing party] must advance a neutral explanation for the venireperson’s removal. . . . The [party asserting the Batson claim] is then afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the [opposing party’s] articulated reasons are insufficient or pretextual. . . . [T]he trial court then [has] the duty to determine if the [party asserting the Batson claim] has established purposeful discrimination. . . . The [party asserting the Batson claim] carries the ultimate burden of persuading the trial court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the jury selection process in his or her particular case was tainted by purposeful discrimination.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mukhtaar, 253 Conn. 280, 283-84, 750 A.2d 1059 (2000). The defendant in the present case does not contest the trial court’s determination that the state’s peremptory challenge was race neutral.

       Three females, one white and the other two of unidentified ethnic or racial identification, composed the three alternate jurors.

       General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.”

       The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975) (stating “the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial”).

       In the alternative, the defendant claims that he was deprived of a fair opportunity to a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community because R.R. was the only “Puerto Rican . . . male” venireperson who was eligible to serve on the petit jury. The defendant conceded at oral argument, however, that he has no evidence to substantiate that R.R. was specifically Puerto Rican, rather than, more generally, Hispanic. Consequently, we consider the defendant’s claim only as to R.R. having been the first Hispanic male venireperson eligible to serve.

       In order for a defendant to prevail on an unpreserved claim of constitutional error, the Golding test requires that the following conditions be satisfied: “(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances.” State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40.

       The defendant, does assert that Hispanic males are a “cognizable group” for jury selection purposes. In support of this contention, he states that “[t]he concurrence of ethnic and gender identity is a definite composition and membership in such composite cannot be shifted day to day nor its members arbitrarily selected.” We have stated previously, however, that “[t]here is a difference between a ‘distinctive group’ regarding the composition of the jury pool and a ‘cognizable group’ for jury selection purposes.” State v. McDougal, 241 Conn. 502, 517, 699 A.2d 872 (1997).

       There is some ambiguity with respect to the defendant’s fair cross section claim as to whether he contends that he was deprived of an impartial jury solely because of an underrepresentation of the subcategory of Hispanic males, or, as he on occasion also asserts, because of an underrepresentation of Hispanics in general. In either regard, however, his claim fails under the second and third prongs of the Duren test; see Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. 364; because he fails to establish either that Hispanics in general, or Hispanic males, in particular, are unfairly and unreasonably underrepresented in proportion to their representation in the community, or that either group is subject to systematic underrepresentation in the jury selection process.

       Because the defendant has failed to provide an adequate record demonstrating that Hispanic males constitute a distinctive group and that the fair cross section to which he claims he is entitled includes Hispanic males, we do not reach the constitutional question that he has posited, namely, whether under our state constitution the fair cross section requirement extends to the petit jury. See Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 230, 662 A.2d 1179 (1995), quoting State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 382, 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (“[ojrdinarily, [constitutional issues are not considered unless absolutely necessary to the decision of a case” [internal quotation marks omitted]). We note, however, without deciding, that the merit of the defendant’s constitutional claim is dubious.


text:
    PEQUONNOCK YACHT CLUB, INC. v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT ET AL.
    (SC 16500)
    Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.
    Argued October 25, 2001
    officially released March 5, 2002

      Thomas W. Bucci, with whom was Russell D. Liskov, for the appellants (defendants).

      Thomas J. Rosati, with whom were Robert K. Marzik and, on the brief, Robert C. Bird, for the appellee (plaintiff).

      Scott Sawyer, William H. Mellor, pro hac vice, Scott G. Bullock, pro hac vice, Dana Berliner, pro hac vice, and Ilya Somin, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the Institute for Justice as amicus cuiiae.
   Opinion

SULLIVAN, C. J.

The defendants, the city of Bridgeport (city), the Bridgeport redevelopment agency (agency) and the Bridgeport port authority (authority), appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court trial, granting a mandatory injunction ordering them to reconvey to the plaintiff, Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc., certain real property taken by eminent domain. The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In their appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that the taking of the plaintiffs property by eminent domain was not legally necessary for the accomplishment of the city’s redevelopment plan because the plan was purely speculative; (2) based that decision on evidence that a redeveloper chosen by the defendants to develop the renewal area was not able to perform its development plan and, therefore, was discharged by the defendants; and (3) found that the plaintiff was not legally required to allege and prove that it would suffer irreparable harm before the court could issue mandatory injunctive relief. The plaintiff argues, to the contrary, that the trial court appropriately concluded that the defendants improperly refused to attempt to integrate the plaintiffs property into the redevelopment plans. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on the alternate ground that the defendants’ failure to consider integration of the plaintiffs property into the redevelopment plan was unreasonable and, therefore, the taking of the plaintiff’s property by eminent domain was not necessary. Accordingly, we need not address the three issues that the defendants raise on appeal.

The trial court reasonably found the following facts. The plaintiff initially brought an action against the defendants seeking a temporary and permanent injunction preventing them from taking the plaintiffs property by eminent domain. Before any hearing in that action, the city acquired title to the plaintiffs property by eminent domain, and the plaintiff alternatively sought a mandatory injunction ordering the defendants to reconvey the plaintiffs property.

The plaintiffs property consists of two acres and has been owned and operated by the plaintiff as a 250 member private yacht club and marina for nearly ninety-five years. Located at 66 California Street in Bridgeport, the property is composed of a two-story clubhouse containing a bar, restaurant, recreation and meeting rooms, docks containing 196 boat slips, a gas dock, which is open to the public, and a storage area for those boats that are removed from the water during the winter. Open all year round, the club is chartered for 250 dues paying members. Members of the public are, however, allowed to enter the premises but not the dock area, and they may purchase food and beverage items as long as a member signs them in. The buildings and docks on the premises are in good condition. There is ample parking on the premises and in two lots across from the clubhouse.

The property in question is part of a larger fifty acre site known as Steel Point, which is the subject of the East Side NDP No. 1 Urban Renewal Plan Amendment No. 8. The plan originally was adopted in 1970 and has been revised eight times. Approximately ten acres of the Steel Point site are situated on Bridgeport Harbor comprising six separate water dependent users, one of which is the plaintiff. The remaining forty upland acres are generally in a blighted condition, and many of the buildings on those properties already have been demolished. The original renewal plan and its first seven amendments did not provide for the acquisition of the ten acres owned by the six water dependent users. In 1998, the city was negotiating with Alex Conroy, who eventually was designated as the city’s developer. Conroy and the city concluded that the scope of the project and the need for financial support made it necessary to acquire all the properties in the “East Side NDP Area No. 1,” including the waterfront properties. Accordingly, the city adopted amendment 8, which included the taking by eminent domain of all fifty acres of Steel Point, including the waterfront properties. After amendment 8 was passed, the city hired TPA Design Group (TPA) to assist the six water dependent users to find suitable relocation sites in the event of condemnation.

Upon the city’s decision to acquire the plaintiff’s property, the plaintiff commenced the injunction action underlying this appeal. During the pendency of the action and while TPA and the plaintiff were attempting to find an alternate site for the yacht club, the parties agreed to the plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction barring the taking. The trial court found that the plaintiff had made numerous efforts to discuss with the defendants the integration of its property into the Steel Point redevelopment plan. The plaintiff had clearly indicated that it was willing to invest in its property and work with the developer to assimilate the property into the overall plan. The city routinely and consistently rejected the plaintiff’s efforts to negotiate and maintained that it needed to take the plaintiffs property. The negotiations pertaining to an alternate site for the yacht club broke down in 1999. The trial court specifically found that although the defendants had made an honest effort to find a suitable substitute location for the yacht club, none was available. In March, 2000, while the action was pending, the agency formally initiated condemnation of the plaintiffs property by filing a certificate of taking in the Bridgeport land records.

The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint challenging the city’s decision to take its property and requesting that the trial court restore title to the property to it. The trial court heard evidence on August 7 and 8, 2000. After the taking of testimony had been completed but before a decision had been rendered, the trial court learned that the city had dismissed Conroy, the designated developer, from the redevelopment project and that the redevelopment project might be abandoned. The trial court then held a posttrial hearing on December 15, 2000.

The only witness to testify on December 15,2000, was Michael Freimuth, the city’s redevelopment director. Freimuth testified that Conroy and his partners had withdrawn from the redevelopment project. He stated, however, that the defendants had not abandoned the redevelopment project for Steel Point and were still pursuing it. He testified that the city currently was soliciting new proposals and that the deadline for filing proposals would be January 31, 2001. Freimuth further testified that the development now would be commercial rather than retail because it was obvious that Conroy had withdrawn from the project because it was difficult to obtain an adequate number of investors. He also indicated to the court that the defendants had not considered allowing the plaintiff to remain on its property or assimilating the property into whatever proposal might be approved. The trial court concluded at the hearing that the issue of assimilation was at the heart of the controversy and offered the parties two alternative resolutions. The first option was for the court to decide the case on the evidence presented. The second option was for the court to extend the hearing to a future date, which would necessitate granting the plaintiff continued occupancy of the premises for an agreed upon time. The parties chose to have the trial court decide the case.

The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants to reconvey the property to the plaintiff. The court based its decision on the fact that the defendants had not considered allowing the plaintiff to remain on the property. Specifically, the trial court concluded that it was unreasonable for the defendants to refuse to negotiate with the plaintiff regarding the integration of the property into the redevelopment plan.

Preliminarily, we briefly address the applicable standard of review. “The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record. . . . Torres v. Waterbury, 249 Conn. 110, 118-19, 733 A.2d 817 (1999).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp., 254 Conn. 145, 156, 757 A.2d 14 (2000); AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 557, 565-66, 775 A.2d 284 (2001).

“[T]he governing principles for our standard of review as it pertains to a trial court’s discretion to grant or deny a request for an injunction [are]: A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law. ... A prayer for injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court’s ruling can be reviewed only for the purpose of determining whether the decision was based on an erroneous statement of law or an abuse of discretion. . . . Walton v. New Hartford, 223 Conn. 155, 165, 612 A.2d 1153 (1992). Therefore, unless the trial court has abused its discretion, or failed to exercise its discretion; Wehrhane v. Peyton, 134 Conn. 486, 498, 58 A.2d 698 (1948); the trial court’s decision must stand. . . . Advest, Inc. v. Wach tel, 235 Conn. 559, 562-63, 668 A.2d 367 (1995).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Orange, supra, 256 Conn. 566.

“Where the trial court reaches a correct decision but on [alternate] grounds, this court has repeatedly sustained the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist to support it. Favorite v. Miller, 176 Conn. 310, 317, 407 A.2d 974 (1978). [W]e . . . may affirm the court’s judgment on a dispositive alternate ground for which there is support in the trial court record. Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 702, 694 A.2d 788 (1997).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Group, Inc., 252 Conn. 789, 794, 749 A.2d 1144 (2000).

“The [r]edevelopment [a]ct authorizes the taking of land in an area which has been determined by the [redevelopment] agency to be a ‘redevelopment area.’ ” Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 146, 104 A.2d 365 (1954). General Statutes § 8-125 (b) provides in relevant part that “ ‘[r]edevelopment area’ means an area within the state which is deteriorated, deteriorating, substandard or detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community. An area may consist partly or wholly of vacant or unimproved land or of land with structures and improvements thereon, and may include structures not in themselves substandard or insanitary which are found to be essential to complete an adequate unit of development, if the redevelopment area is deteriorated, deteriorating, substandard or detrimental. ...” (Emphasis added.) “Thus it is clear that the legislature has delegated to each redevelopment agency the power to determine, within certain limits, what property it is necessary to take in order to effectuate a complete redevelopment plan which the agency has adopted.” Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, supra, 146.

“The determination of what property is necessary to be taken in any given case in order to effectuate the public purpose is, under our constitution, a matter for the exercise of the legislative power. When the legislature delegates the making of that determination to another agency, the decision of that agency is conclusive . . . .’’Id. The agency’s decision, however, is “open to judicial review only to discover if it was unreasonable or in bad faith or was an abuse of the power conferred.” Id. The redevelopment agency is permitted “to determine, in good faith, what land it is necessary to appropriate in order to accomplish the public purpose. It is proper for a redevelopment agency, acting in pursuance of the act, to fix, within reasonable limits, the area of redevelopment and to include in a taking all property which is in a deteriorated area, even though certain of the properties are not in themselves substandard.” Id., 147.

Although, “[t]he determination of what constitutes a redevelopment area and what property is to be taken is primarily a matter for the redevelopment agency . . . its decision is open to judicial review ... to discover whether it has acted unreasonably or in bad faith or has exceeded its powers. . . . The inclusion within the area of certain properties which are not substandard does not constitute unreasonable or arbitrary action, because it is the condition obtaining as to the entire area and not as to individual properties which is determinative.” (Citations omitted.) Graham v. Houlihan, 147 Conn. 321, 328, 160 A.2d 745, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833, 81 S. Ct. 70, 5 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1960). The legislature, however, has prescribed in the definition of a redevelopment area that the agency “shall include [only] properties ‘which are found to be essential to complete an adequate unit of development.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, supra, 141 Conn. 149. Therefore, property that is not substandard and that is the subject of a taking within a redevelopment area must be essential to the redevelopment plan in order for the agency to justify its taking.

Further, although we have stated that, in determining whether property that is not substandard is essential to the plan of redevelopment, “it is the condition obtaining as to the entire area and not as to individual properties which is determinative”; Graham v. Houlihan, supra, 147 Conn. 328; see Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, supra, 141 Conn. J 45-46; we also have recognized that the agency must consider “whether [the property] could be successfully integrated into the overall plan for the area in order to achieve its objective. If [the property] could not be, then the acquisition of the property was essential to complete an adequate unit of development, even though the property was not, in itself, substandard.” Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett, 150 Conn. 42, 52, 184 A.2d 797 (1962). Conversely, if the property can be integrated, it is logical to conclude that the acquisition is not essential.

This court has recognized the importance of considering the condition and use of and the possibility of integrating property that is the subject of a taking and is located within a redevelopment area. These are significant factors that the agency must take into consideration when determining whether property that is not substandard is essential to complete the development.

It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust “all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires, by agreement.” New York, N. H. & H. R.R. Co. v. Long, 69 Conn. 424, 438, 37 A. 1070 (1897); West Hartford v. Talcott, 138 Conn. 82, 89, 82 A.2d 351 (1951). The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. State v. McCook, 109 Conn. 621, 630, 147 A. 126 (1929). The statute, however, “should be enforced in such a way as to effectuate the purpose for which it was enacted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) West Hartford v. Talcott, supra, 90; Crawford v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. 431, 435, 103 A. 125 (1918).

After an area is taken for redevelopment purposes some, or even all, of the land taken may be sold or leased to private individuals, referred to as redevelopers, even if they are not the original owners. Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, supra, 141 Conn. 143. “It is, of course, conceivable that the power of eminent domain granted by the [redevelopment] act may be abused in some isolated instances. There may be attempts to use it for some ulterior purpose not contemplated by the [redevelopment] act. See Farist Steel Co. v. Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278, 292, 22 A. 561 [1891]; Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Sup. 705, 716 [D.D.C. 1953].” Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, supra, 145.

In Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett, supra, 150 Conn. 48, the trial court found that the plaintiffs property was partly in substandard condition and that the redevelopment area also was substandard. The court also found that the taking of the property was essential to avoid problems that would hinder the success of the planned redevelopment if the property were not taken, including traffic congestion and insufficient parking and maneuvering areas. Id., 49, 53. Also, the boundaries of the plaintiff’s property negatively impacted the proposed street layouts and setback lines, and adversely affected the character of the buildings that the plan was designed to attract. Id., 49, 52. This court concluded that the trial court properly had found that the agency had not acted unreasonably or in excess of its powers in determining that the acquisition of the plaintiffs buildings was essential for the completion of an adequate unit of development. Id., 53. We recognized, however, that “whether [the property can] be . . . integrated into the overall plan” should be considered. Id., 52.

In Broadriver, Inc. v. Stamford, 158 Conn. 522, 534, 265 A.2d 75 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938, 90 S. Ct. 1841, 26 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1970), we also indicated that a redevelopment agency must reasonably consider integration of property that is being subjected to eminent domain powers. In that case, the record indicated that the plaintiff had attempted but failed to demonstrate to the court that the defendant had acted unreasonably when it denied the plaintiff the right to improve its property within the development plan. Id., 534-35. Although the appeal was resolved in favor of the agency, this court made it clear that “[although the plaintiffs concern is for its own parcel within the redevelopment area, the commission’s responsibility [is] to consider conditions existing in the entire area including such matters as street layouts and the relation and significance of the plaintiffs property to the entire area. Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett, [supra, 150 Conn. 52].” Broadriver, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 534.

Although in these two cases we concluded that the redevelopment agency properly had considered integration and had acted in a reasonable manner, we also established that a redevelopment agency must make reasonable efforts to negotiate and consider the integration of the property that is not substandard into the overall redevelopment plan.

In the present case, the defendants argue on appeal that East Side NDP Area No. 1 has been designated a renewal area for almost thirty years and that the parties agree that this overall area is of the type specified in General Statutes § 8-125 (b) because the location is blighted physically, economically and aesthetically and is in need of redevelopment. According to the defendants, upon designation of the area as a redevelopment area, the city had legal authority to acquire all properties within the boundaries of the redevelopment project regardless of whether the individual parcels were blighted. Additionally, the defendants argue that it is the blighted condition of the project’s locale as a whole, and not merely the condition of the plaintiffs individual parcel, that justifies the exercise of the defendants’ eminent domain powers. The defendants contend that it was necessary to exercise its eminent domain power over the plaintiffs property because: (1) the redevelopment project has languished since the 1970s because the waterfront properties had not been included in the plan; (2) the inclusion of the six waterfront properties in the plan would enhance the success of the renewal project for the whole area; (3) the waterfront properties would provide value for the upland properties; (4) without including the waterfront properties in the plan of development, the success of the plan would be doubtful because it would be difficult to maximize the needed private investment without the value of the water’s edge being leveraged to provide economic incentives; and (5) the city wanted to open up the waterfront area for public access.

The plaintiff agrees that the yacht club, which is not in a blighted condition, is surrounded by property that is deteriorating and in need of redevelopment. Further, the plaintiff agrees that under § 8-125, a property that is not blighted but is located in a blighted area may be taken by eminent domain when the property is essential to complete a development. The plaintiff argues, however, that the trial court properly ruled that the defendants had acted unreasonably by failing to negotiate with the plaintiff regarding the integration of its property into the redevelopment plan. The plaintiff argues further that because the condition of the nonblighted property and the use to which the property is devoted are significant, a nonblighted property that is not essential to the plan may not be taken for redevelopment purposes. The plaintiff claims that there is no evidence in the record that its land is essential for the redevelopment of the blighted area. The plaintiff asserts that the trial court properly granted the relief sought in ordering the defendants to reconvey the property to the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff.

The present case is distinguishable from Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett, supra, 150 Conn. 42, and Broadriver, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 158 Conn. 522, because in those cases this court concluded that the redevelopment agencies properly had considered integration and had acted in a reasonable manner. In this case, the agency provided no reasons to explain why the present condition and use of the plaintiffs property was detrimental to the development plan. The city provided no specific reasons, other than to enhance desirability of the area to investors, as to why the plaintiffs property, which both parties stipulated to be in good condition, is essential to the accomplishment of the redevelopment plan.

Further, the plaintiff had communicated on multiple occasions its desire and willingness to make changes to its property in order to have the property incorporated into the final redevelopment plan. Indeed, in order to have the property integrated properly, the plaintiff was amenable to building whatever was necessary on its property and to opening its waterfront areas for public access. We conclude that it is unreasonable for a redevelopment agency, even with broad legislative authority delegated to it, arbitrarily to reject repeated requests to negotiate some form of assimilation into the overall redevelopment plan when the subject property is in good condition and is economically viable.

As the trial court indicated, waterfront property is a shrinking commodity and in short supply. As that court noted in its memorandum of decision, “[j]ust because the property may be desirable to the defendants does not justify its taking by eminent domain.” The city has failed to establish that the taking was essential to implement the plan of redevelopment and that its refusal to negotiate with the plaintiff any assimilation of its property into the plan was reasonable and not in bad faith. Therefore, the defendants acted unreasonably.

We conclude that the trial court reasonably concluded that the defendants acted unreasonably when they failed to consider or even discuss integration of the plaintiffs property into the redevelopment plan and that the defendants had failed to establish that taking of the plaintiffs property by eminent domain was therefore necessary and essential to the redevelopment plan. We affirm the trial court’s decision granting a mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to reconvey the property to the plaintiff.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 8-129 provides in relevant part: “The redevelopment agency shall determine the compensation to be paid to the persons entitled thereto for such real property and shall file a statement of compensation, containing a description of the property to be taken and the names of all persons having a record interest therein and setting forth the amount of such compensation, and a deposit as provided in section 8-130, with the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district in which the property affected is located. Upon filing such statement of compensation and deposit, the redevelopment agency shall forthwith cause to be recorded, in the office of the town clerk of each town in which the property is located, a copy of such statement of compensation, such recording to have the same effect as and to be treated the same as the recording of a lis pendens, and shall forthwith give notice, as hereinafter provided, to each person appearing of record as an owner of property affected thereby and to each person appearing of record as a holder of any mortgage, lien, assessment or other encumbrance on such property or interest therein .... The redevelopment agency shall cause such certificate of taking to be recorded in the office of the town clerk of each town in which such property is located. Upon the recording of such certificate, title to such property in fee simple shall vest in the municipality, and the right to just compensation shall vest in the persons entitled thereto. At any time after such certificate of taking has been so recorded, the redevelopment agency may repair, operate or insure such property and enter upon such property, and take whatever action is proposed with regard to such property by the project area redevelopment plan. . . .”

       General Statutes § 8-125 (b) provides: “ ‘Redevelopment area’ means an area within the state which is deteriorated, deteriorating, substandard or detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community. An area may consist partly or wholly of vacant or unimproved land or of land with structures and improvements thereon, and may include structures not in themselves substandard or insanitary which axe found to be essential to complete an adequate unit of development, if the redevelopment area is deteriorated, deteriorating, substandard or detrimental. An area may include properties not contiguous to each other. An area may include all or part of the territorial limits of any fire district, sewer district, fire and sewer district, lighting district, village, beach or improvement association or any other district or association, wholly within a town and having the power to make appropriations or to levy taxes, whether or not such entity is chartered by the General Assembly . . . .”

       The plaintiff sent a letter to Joseph Ganim, the city’s mayor, on July 14, 1998. The letter detailed the plaintiffs desire to support the Harbour Place development and its willingness to meet with city officials. The city, by letter from Freimuth, declined to respond.