author: BORDEN, J. BERDON, J.,

text:
    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RUSSELL C. HUNTER
    (SC 15364)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and McDonald, Js.
    Argued September 24, 1996
    officially released May 20, 1997

      Richard M. Maraño, for the appellant (defendant).

      Lisa Herskowitz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom were Kevin T. Kane, state’s attorney, and, on the brief, John Connelly, state’s attorney, and Maureen Keegan, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Opinion

BORDEN, J.

This appeal is a companion to the appeal in State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997). The issues in this certified appeal are: (1) whether Connecticut should adopt as the standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); and (2) whether Connecticut should abandon its traditional per se rule that polygraph evidence is inadmissible at trial. The defendant, Russell C. Hunter, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his conviction for robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4). Prior to trial, the defendant had moved to admit the results of an exculpatory polygraph examination. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion and, on the defendant’s postconviction appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Hunter, 37 Conn. App. 907, 655 A.2d 291 (1995). This certified appeal followed.

The defendant claims that: (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court properly denied his request for an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of polygraph evidence; and (2) in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579, this court should reconsider its test for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, which is currently based on Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and should conclude that polygraph evidence is admissible under the Daubert test. We address these precise claims in State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 57, and for the reasons explained therein, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion CALLAHAN, C. J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and MCDONALD, Js., concurred.

BERDON, J.,

concurring and dissenting. This appeal presents the same issue that was decided today in the companion case of State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), pertaining to the standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence and the right to a hearing in order for a trial court to determine the admissibility of polygraph evidence. The defendant, Russell Hunter, an. African-American, was convicted of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4). He was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment, execution suspended after nine years.

The sole issue at trial was the identification of the defendant as the person who committed the robbery. On April 14, 1993, the defendant submitted to a polygraph test administered by Victor C. Kaufman, a polygraphist and chief examiner with New York Lie Detection Laboratories. Kaufman is a charter member of the American Polygraph Examiners of New York State, the Empire State Polygraphy Society, the Virginia Polygraph Association, the Association of Police Polygraphists and the American Polygraph Association, and he has conducted more than 10,000 polygraph examinations since 1958. Kaufman administered a “four pen Lafayette polygraph procedure” to register changes in the blood pressure, rate and strength of pulse beat, galvanic skin response, and respiratory pattern of the defendant.

The pertinent questions asked during the defendant’s polygraph examination, and the indicated answers, were as follows:

“On December 6, 1992 [the day of the robbery], did you take any money out of Morcey’s Restaurant, 572 Watertown Avenue [the place of the robbery]?

“No.

“On December 6, 1992, did you rob Morcey’s Restaurant, 572 Watertown Avenue?

“No.

“On December 6, 1992, were you inside Morcey’s Restaurant, 572 Watertown Avenue?

“No.”

In his report, based upon the polygraph examination, Kaufman concluded: “No deception was indicated in this examinee’s recorded responses to the above relevant questions and it is this polygraphist’s opinion that Russell Hunter answered all these questions truthfully.”

Several days before the defendant’s trial, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to admit the polygraph results into evidence and held that the defendant was not entitled to a full hearing on the motion. The defendant subsequently testified at his trial that he did not participate in the robbery.

As I indicated in my concurring and dissenting opinion in State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 145-47, upon adopting the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), for the admissibility of scientific evidence, the trial court should be the court to determine whether the polygraph evidence is admissible.

In my view, the majority, by adopting its per se rule, which denies the defendant a right to a hearing on the admissibility of exculpatory polygraph evidence, violates his due process rights and his right to present a defense under the federal and state constitutions. See State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 161 (Berdon, J., concurring and dissenting).

Accordingly, I dissent with respect to the issue of the admissibility of polygraph evidence.

       General Statutes § 53a-134 provides in pertinent part: “Robbery in the first degree: Class B felony, (a) A person is guilty of robbery in tire first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a-133 or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime ... (4) displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm . . . .”

       We granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, limited to the following issues: “Under the circumstances of this case: 1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing regarding 1he admissibility of the defendant’s polygraph evidence?
      “2. Should this court reconsider the applicability of the test for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), in light of the United States Supreme Court,’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)?” State v. Hunter, 236 Conn. 907, 670 A.2d 1307 (1996).

       See footnote 4 of my concurring and dissenting opinion in State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 138-39 n.4, with respect to the inherent unreliability of cross-racial identification.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BERDON, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    DAVID LIBBY v. GOODWIN PONTIAC-GMC TRUCK, INC., ET AL.
    (SC 15520)
    Callahan, C. J., and Berdon, Katz, Palmer and Peters, Js.
    Argued March 21
    officially released May 20, 1997

      Brian E. Prindle, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

      Robert C. Ruggiero, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph S. Dobrowolski, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Opinion

BERDON, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether, under the workers’ compensation act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., the defendants were entitled to a credit against future workers’ compensation liability measured by the amount of a settlement that the plaintiff, David Libby, reached with respect to a personal injury claim against a third party tortfeasor. Because the defendants failed to perfect their statutory rights under General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 31-293 (a), we conclude that the defendants are not entitled to a credit against their workers’ compensation liability in the amount of the plaintiffs recovery from the third party tortfeasor.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the relevant undisputed facts. “The plaintiff, David Libby, was an employee of the named defendant, Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., on February 1, 1987, when he was injured in a work-related automobile accident involving a third party. The plaintiff did not file an action against the third party, but, in September, 1989, the plaintiff received a $37,365 settlement from the third party. The defendants were not involved in the settlement, and neither the plaintiff nor the third party paid or promised to pay the defendants any settlement proceeds. The defendants did not file an action against the third party. On July 20, 1990, the plaintiff received treatment for his injury at John Dempsey Hospital and incurred a bill of $2058. The defendants declined to pay the bill, claiming that they were entitled to a credit against their workers’ compensation liability in the amount of the plaintiffs settlement with the third party.” Libby v. Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 42 Conn. App. 200, 202-203, 678 A.2d 995 (1996).

The workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) determined that the defendants were not entitled to a credit in the amount of the plaintiffs settlement, and that the defendants were required to pay the plaintiffs hospital bill. In making his determination, the commissioner found that the defendants’ rights were governed by § 31-293 (a), which entitled the defendants to bring an independent action against the third party tortfeasor, and that the defendants’ failure to bring such an action precluded them from claiming a credit in the amount of the plaintiffs settlement. The workers’ compensation review board (board) affirmed the determination of the commissioner.

The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the board, concluding that the defendants had failed to protect their statutory right to reimbursement by filing their own action against the third party tortfeasor and, therefore, that they were not entitled to credit the plaintiffs settlement against their workers’ compensation liability. Id., 209. We granted the defendants’ petition for certification, and now affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

We begin our analysis with some overriding principles embodied in the act. “First, the [act] protects an injured employee by allowing the employee to sue a third party tortfeasor in a private cause of action for damages, such as pain and suffering, that are uncompensated by a workers’ compensation award. . . . Second, the [act] protects an employer by allowing the employer to obtain reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits from a third party tortfeasor, either by becoming an intervening plaintiff in the employee’s cause of action or by bringing a separate action derivative of the employee’s cause of action. . . . Third, the employer’s statutory right to subrogation of the proceeds of the employee’s claim against the tortfeasor implements the public policy of preventing double recovery by an injured employee. . . . Fourth, the employer’s statutory right to reimbursement reenforces the public policy that, between the employer and the employee, workers’ compensation provides the exclusive remedy for personal injury to the employee. . . .” (Citations omitted.) Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 779-80, 610 A.2d 1277 (1992). Furthermore, “[w]e have repeatedly observed that our act represents a complex and comprehensive statutory scheme balancing the rights and claims of the employer and the employee arising out of work-related personal injuries. Because of the comprehensive nature of the act, the responsibility for carving out exceptions from any one of its provisions belongs to the legislature and not to the courts.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 781.

Relying principally on Rosenbaum v. Hartford News Co., 92 Conn. 398, 103 A. 120 (1918), the defendants argue that they are entitled to a credit against their workers’ compensation liability in the amount of the plaintiffs settlement with the third party tortfeasor, even though they did not bring an independent action pursuant to § 31-293 (a). We disagree.

In Rosenbaum, an employee recovered a monetary settlement from a third party tortfeasor and subsequently sought workers’ compensation benefits from his employer. Id., 399. This court concluded that the predecessor of § 31-293 (a) required that “if the employer has become obligated to pay compensation, but has not paid it, and the damages recovered [from the third party action] are greater than the amount of compensation the employer has become obligated to pay . . . the entire excess is directed to be assessed in favor of the injured employee, with the consequence of discharging the employer from his ascertained liability under the award. . . . [Section 31-293 (a)] either reimburses or discharges the employer out of the first moneys available for the payment of damages.” Id., 401-402.

Since this court decided Rosenbaum, the road has been well traveled with respect to an employer’s right to reimbursement for an employee’s recovery from a third party under § 31-293 (a). Indeed, we have stated that Rosenbaum and its progeny “establish only that an employer has a general right to be reimbursed from a third party tortfeasor for benefits paid to an employee for injuries caused by the third party. This right is established by ... § 31-293, which allows both employers and employees to bring an action against a third party who is allegedly responsible for the employee’s injury. By allowing either an employer or an employee to bring an action, the law seeks to vindicate both the employee’s interest in receiving the full scope of tort damages that remain uncompensated by a workers’ compensation award and the employer’s interest in being reimbursed for payments made because of the third party’s malfeasance.” (Emphasis added.) Skitromo v. Meriden Yellow Cab Co., 204 Conn. 485, 488, 528 A.2d 826 (1987).

In Skitromo, an injured employee who had received workers’ compensation benefits sought to compel the defendants, his employer and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier, to continue providing such benefits even after he had reached a settlement with a third party involved in the accident. The defendants conceded that because they had failed to intervene in a timely fashion in the third party action, they had no right to reimbursement of the amounts that they had already paid to the employee in benefits. Id., 487-88. The defendants argued, however, that they were entitled to credit the amount received by the employee in the third party settlement against their future workers’ compensation liability. Id., 488.

Concluding that the defendants were not entitled to a credit for the third party payments, this court stated: “The defendants attempt to circumvent the requirements of . . . § 31-293 by characterizing their claim not as a right to reimbursement from the third party tortfeasor, but as a right to reduce their future payments owed to the injured employee. The defendants, however, have no such right against an employee either by statute or common law. Norwalk v. Van Dyke, 33 Conn. Sup. 661, 666, 366 A.2d 554, cert. denied, 172 Conn. 681, 364 A.2d 864 (1976). Their sole means to assert any right against the plaintiffs third party recovery was by way of the procedure set forth in § 31-293. By failing to comply with the statutory procedure, any right of the defendants to the plaintiffs third party recovery, including the alleged right to credit that recovery against its future liability, was extinguished.” (Emphasis added.) Skitromo v. Meriden Yellow Cab Co., supra, 204 Conn. 489-90.

Furthermore, this court has stated repeatedly that “an employer’s right to obtain reimbursement from a third party tortfeasor is a statutory claim that is derived in its entirety from § 31-293 (a).” Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., supra, 222 Conn. 782; see also Skitromo v. Meriden Yellow Cab Co., supra, 204 Conn. 489; Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 377-78, 306 A.2d 857 (1972).

The defendants argue that cases such as Skitromo must be distinguished from the present case because, in those cases, the employee brought an action against the third party tortfeasor, notice of which was given to the employer pursuant to § 31-293, and the employer failed to intervene. We are not persuaded, however, that the absence of such notice to the employer is dispositive because, at any time within the statute of limitations period, the defendants in the present case could have brought an independent action against the third party tortfeasor pursuant to § 31-293 (a). See General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 31-293 (a) (“any employer having paid, or having become obligated to pay, compensation under the provisions of this chapter may bring an action against such other person to recover any amount that he has paid or has become obligated to pay as compensation to such injured employee”). The defendants’ failure to bring an action against the third party tortfeasor is just as much a waiver of their reimbur sement rights as if they had failed to intervene after notice of the action brought by the plaintiff. See Skitromo v. Meriden Yellow Cab Co., supra, 204 Conn. 489 (“an employer forfeits his right to reimbursement when he fails to act to enforce those rights in the manner prescribed by statute”).

With these principles in mind, we conclude that an employer is not entitled to a credit in the amount of the employee’s settlement proceeds against the employer’s future workers’ compensation liability for work-related injuries that the employee incurred prior to the July 1, 1993 effective date of the revision of § 31-293 (a), unless the employer has either intervened in the employee’s action against the third party tortfeasor or has brought a direct action against the third party tortfeasor. In this case, the defendants were unable to intervene because the plaintiff and the third party had reached a settlement before the plaintiff filed an action against the third party. Nevertheless, the defendants could have preserved their right to reimbursement had they filed an action against the third party pursuant to § 31-293 (a). Having failed to comply with this statutory requirement, “any right of the defendants to the plaintiffs third party recovery, including the alleged right to credit that recovery against its future liability, was extinguished.” Skitromo v. Meriden Yellow Cab Co., supra, 204 Conn. 489-90. We therefore conclude that because the defendants failed to bring an action pursuant to § 31-293 (a), they are not entitled to a credit in the amount of the plaintiffs settlement and, therefore, that the defendants must pay the plaintiffs hospital bill.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       References in this opinion to the defendants are to Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., the plaintiffs employer, and Helmsman Management Services, Inc., the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier. John Dempsey Hospital, also a defendant in the administrative proceedings, is not a party to this appeal.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 31-293 (a) provides: “When any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the employer a legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured employee may claim compensation under the provisions of this chapter, but the payment or award of compensation shall not affect the claim or right of action of such injured employee against such other person, but such injured employee may proceed at law against such person to recover damages for such injury; and any employer having paid, or having become obligated to pay, compensation under the provisions of this chapter may bring an action against such other person to recover any amount that he has paid or has become obligated to pay as compensation to such injured employee. If either such employee or such employer brings such action against such third person, he shall forthwith notify the other, in writing, by personal presentation or by registered or certified mail, of such fact and of the name of the court to which the writ is returnable, and such other may join as a party plaintiff in such action within thirty days after such notification, and, if such other fails to join as a party plaintiff, his right of action against such third person shall abate. In any case in which an employee brings an action against a third party in accordance with the provisions of this section, and the employer is a party defendant in such action, the employer may join as a party plaintiff in such action. The bringing of any such action against an employer shall not constitute notice to such employer within the meaning of this section. If such employer and employee join as parties plaintiff in such action and any damages are recovered, such damages shall be so apportioned that the claim of the employer, as defined in this section, shall take precedence over that of the injured employee in the proceeds of such recovery, after the deduction of reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorneys’ fees, incurred by the employee in effecting such recovery. The rendition of a judgment in favor of the employee or the employer against such party shall not terminate the employer’s obligation to make further compensation, including medical expenses, which the compensation commissioner thereafter deems payable to such injured employee. If the damages, after deducting the employee’s expenses as provided above, are more than sufficient to reimburse the employer, damages shall be assessed in his favor in a sum sufficient to reimburse him for his claim, and the excess shall be assessed in favor of the iryured employee. No compromise with such third person by either employer or employee shall be binding upon or affect the rights of the other, unless assented to by him. Por the purposes of this section the employer’s claim shall consist of (1) the amount of any compensation which he has paid on account of the ipjury which is the subject of the suit and (2) an amount equal to the present worth of any probable future payments which he has by award become obligated to pay on account of such injury. The word ‘compensation’, as used in this section, shall be construed to include not only incapacity payments to an injured employee and payments to the dependents of a deceased employee, but also sums paid out for surgical, medical and hospital services to an irqured employee, the one-thousand-dollar burial fee provided by law and payments made under the provisions of sections 31-312 and 31-313.” See footnote 7 of this opinion.

       “The named defendant’s insurance carrier accepted the injury as a compensable work-related injury.” Libby v. Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 42 Conn. App. 200, 203 n.3, 678 A.2d 995 (1996).

         We granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “If an employee covered by workers’ compensation settles a personal injury claim against a third party, is the employer entitled to a credit against future compensation benefits equal to the amount of the settlement?” Libby v. Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 239 Conn. 915, 682 A.2d 1002 (1996).

       Although we believe that Skitromo implicitly overruled Rosenbaum to the extent that Rosenbaum provides that an employer may have a right to receive a credit against future compensation liability from any settlement obtained by the employee from a third party tortfeasor even though the employer failed to perfect its right under § 31-293 (a), if there is any doubt, we expressly overrule that aspect of Rosenbaum, today.

       Furthermore, the defendants’ reliance upon Enquist v. General Datacom, 218 Conn. 19, 587 A.2d 1029 (1991), and Love v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 218 Conn. 46, 587 A.2d 1042 (1991), is equally unavailing.
      In contrast to the present case, the employers in question in Enquist and Love had complied fully with the procedures set forth in § 31-293 (a). Indeed, the court in Enquist framed the issue as follows: “The sole issue presented is whether an employer, who has properly intervened, in an action by an injured employee against a third party, may set off future compensation claims against the net proceeds that the employee thereafter recovers from the third party tortfeasor.” (Emphasis added.) Enquist v. General Datacom, supra, 218 Conn. 20-21. Similarly, in Love, this court stated: “The sole issue presented is whether an employer, who has properly intervened in an action by an injured employee against a third party, may set off a claim for future medical compensation against the net proceeds that the employee recovered from the third party tortfeasor.” (Emphasis added.) Love v. J. P. Stevens & Co., supra, 218 Conn. 47.
      Accordingly, in both Enquist and Love, this court concluded that, in those circumstances in which an employer fully complies with § 31-293 (a), that statute “allows an employer to obtain a credit against unknown future compensation payments to the extent of a third party recovery less expenses and attorney’s fees.” Id., 50; Enquist v. General Datacom, supra, 218 Conn. 26.

       We note that § 31-293 (a) was amended by No. 93-228, § 7, of tire 1993 Public Acts, which provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, when any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages for the iryury and the injured employee has received compensation for the injury from his employer or its workers’ compensation insurance carrier pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the employer or insurance carrier shall have a lien upon any judgment received by the employee against the third party or any settlement received by the employee from the third party, provided the employer or insurance carrier shall give written notice of the lien to the third party prior to such judgment or settlement.” We also note that additional changes were made by No. 96-65, § 2, of the 1996 Public Acts. These changes are reflected in the present revision of § 31-293 (a).
      “We look to the statute in effect at the date of injury to determine the rights and obligations between the parties.” Dos Santos v. F. D. Rich Construction Co., 233 Conn. 14,16 n. 1, 658 A.2d 83 (1995). Because the plaintiffs injury occurred in 1987, prior to the enactment of these amendments, the amendments to § 31-293 (a) do not apply in the present case.


author: BORDEN, J.

text:
    FREDERICK J. LOULIS ET AL. v. DEAN B. PARROTT ET AL.
    (SC 15517)
    Borden, Berdon, Katz, Palmer and Peters, Js.
    Argued February 19
    officially released May 20, 1997

      Robert A. Fuller, with whom, on the brief, was George W. Ganim, Sr., for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Christopher J. Smith, with whom were Marci J. Silverman and, on the brief, Alice Ann Carey, for the appellees (defendant Bart Center, Inc., et al.).
   Opinion

BORDEN, J.

This appeal presents issues regarding the applicability of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to an action for an injunction against an alleged prospective zoning violation. The plaintiffs, Frederick J. Loulis and Margaret, Loulis, appeal, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s judgment of dismissal of their action on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the defendants, Bart Center, Inc., and Vernon Bartosik and Dean B. Parrott, barring the use of certain property as a package store in the town of Monroe. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the proposed use of the property would violate the Monroe zoning regulations. On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claim that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to the circumstances of this case and that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. We agree and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The facts and procedural history relevant to this appeai are undisputed. The plaintiffs initially brought an action by way of an application for a temporary and permanent injunction, and an order to show cause, dated February 13, 1995, and returnable on March 28, 1995. In their amended complaint, the factual allegations of which must be taken as true for the purpose of review of the judgment of dismissal; Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 489, 493, 642 A.2d 699 (1994); the plaintiffs alleged the following. The plaintiffs are residents and taxpayers of Monroe. Bart Center, Inc., owns the property in question, which is located at 600 Main Street, Monroe. The property is located in a design business No. 1 zoning district under the Monroe zoning regulations. There was a permitted package store on that property, encompassing 1200 square feet within a larger building and operated by a tenant. On February 11, 1979, the zoning regulations were amended to permit package stores in design business No. 2 zoning districts only. Any package store operating in a design business No. 1 zoning district as of that date was a nonconforming use. By virtue of this amendment of the zoning regulations, the package store at that location became a nonconforming use.

The plaintiffs’ complaint further alleged that in February, 1980, the defendants entered into a new lease with the package store tenant under which the tenant relinquished occupancy of the original 1200 square feet and occupied 2380 square feet located in another part of the building. The defendants entered into this new lease without the town’s zoning approval and without obtaining a certificate of zoning compliance. The plaintiffs alleged that the relocation of the package store violated the zoning regulations because the operation of a package store in a different location was neither a permitted nor a nonconforming use. In their complaint, the plaintiffs further alleged that pursuant to the applicable zoning regulations, the right to a nonconforming use of the original 1200 square foot portion of the premises expired one year after the use had been abandoned.

In June, 1984, the plaintiffs, unaware of the ongoing zoning violations, leased the relocated package store from the defendants. Upon the expiration of the lease, the defendants evicted the plaintiffs from the property. Thereafter, the plaintiffs obtained approval from the state liquor control commission to move their package store permit to a new location at 630 Main Street, where they are presently operating a package store.

In 1987, the defendants enlarged the package store on the property from 2380 square feet to 3600 square feet, which included the original 1200 square feet. The enlargement itself was allegedly another violation of the zoning regulations because no certificate of zoning compliance had been obtained.

In May, 1994, the defendants leased the 3600 square foot package store to Parrott. The lease was conditioned on Parrott’s obtaining a package store permit from the liquor control commission. On May 4, 1994, Parrott, as required by General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 30-39, requested certification from the town that the location of the proposed 3600 square foot package store complied with the Monroe zoning regulations. The town planning administrator certified Parrott’s application (May, 1994 zoning certificate), which Parrott had submitted to the liquor control commission. The plaintiffs alleged that the May, 1994 zoning certificate was erroneously issued because: (1) the nonconforming use that would have allowed part of the property to be used as a package store had been abandoned; (2) the remainder of the premises had never been approved for the sale of liquor; and (3) the location is within 1500 feet of another package store, namely, the plaintiffs’ store, in violation of applicable zoning regulations.

The plaintiffs further alleged that, on January 12, 1995, the liquor control commission, relying on the erroneously issued May, 1994 zoning certificate, approved Parrott’s package store permit. Although the plaintiffs appealed from the approval by the liquor control commission to the Superior Court, the plaintiffs alleged that Parrott could nonetheless commence business under the permit before the appeal is decided. Thus, in summary, the plaintiffs alleged that the town failed and refused to enforce its zoning regulations against the proposed illegal use of the property, and that unless the zoning regulations were enforced by way of an injunction, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ injunction action on the ground, among others, that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Specifically, the defendants pointed to the plaintiffs’ failure to appeal, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-6 and 8-7, to the Monroe zoning board of appeals (board) from the certification by the planning administrator that Parrott’s proposed use of the property would be in compliance with zoning regulations. At the evidentiary portion of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, held on May 15, 1995, it was established that while this action was pending Parrott had applied to the town zoning enforcement officer for a permanent certificate of zoning compliance in order to obtain a building permit. It was also established that on March 27, 1995, the zoning enforcement officer had issued Parrott a permanent certificate (March, 1995 zoning certificate), that on April 26, 1995, the plaintiffs had appealed from that action to the board, and that the appeal to the board was pending at the time of the May, 1995 hearing. It was fuither established that in May, 1994, the then zoning enforcement officer had issued a certificate of zoning compliance regarding the property for purposes of certifying such compliance to the liquor control commission, and that with regard to both the May, 1994 and the March, 1995 certificates of zoning compliance, no notice by publication was required or made, and no actual notice was required or given to the plaintiffs.

Thereafter, the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the injunction action, claiming that the plaintiffs’ pending appeal to the board from the March, 1995 zoning certificate afforded them access to an administrative remedy that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, based on the pendency of the plaintiffs’ April 26, 1995 appeal from the March 27, 1995 action of the zoning enforcement officer.

The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of dismissal to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, but on grounds different from those on which the trial court had relied. The Appellate Court held that the plaintiffs’ failure to appeal, pursuant to §§ 8-6 and 8-7, to the board from the issuance of the May, 1994 zoning certificate constituted a failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. Loulis v. Parrott, 42 Conn. App. 272, 283, 679 A.2d 967 (1996). This certified appeal followed.

I

We first consider the reasoning of the Appellate Court, which is endorsed by the defendants, that the plaintiffs’ failure to appeal to the board from the May, 1994 certification by the zoning enforcement officer deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over this injunction action, because such an appeal was an available administrative remedy that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust. We disagree with the Appellate Court and the defendants.

There is no dispute that, as a general matter, the failure of a party to exhaust an available administrative remedy is a subject matter jurisdictional bar to a plenary action in court to test the same issue that the administralive remedy was designed to test. Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 231, 662 A.2d 1179 (1995); Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33-34, 193 A.2d 483 (1963). The two part rationale for the exhaustion doctrine is: (1) to effectuate the legislative intent that the issue in question “ ‘be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief, and to give the reviewing court the benefit of the local board’s judgment’ ”; Simko v. Ervin, 234 Conn. 498, 504, 661 A.2d 1018 (1995); and (2) to relieve “ ‘courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions’ ” that may be resolved satisfactorily through the administrative process. Id.

It is also beyond dispute, however, that “[t]he right of appeal, if it is to have any value, must necessarily contemplate that the person who is to exercise the right be given the opportunity of knowing that there is a decision to appeal from and of forming an opinion as to whether that decision presents an appealable issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keeney v. Old Saybrook, 237 Conn. 135, 155-56, 676 A.2d 795 (1996). “Until the prospective appellant has either actual or constructive notice that a decision has been reached, the right of appeal is meaningless.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Bowl-O-Rama, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 195 Conn. 276, 281, 487 A.2d 559 (1985); Hubbard v. Planning Commission, 151 Conn. 269, 272, 196 A.2d 760 (1963). The Appellate Court’s reasoning founders on this principle.

In the present case, the plaintiffs had no actual or constructive notice of the issuance of the May, 1994 zoning certificate to Parrott by the zoning enforcement officer, and there was no provision in the zoning regulations for such notice. For this reason alone, the plaintiffs cannot be deemed to have failed to exhaust the administrative appellate process by which that issuance might have been challenged. The legislature could not possibly have intended that the plaintiffs be required to exhaust an administrative process of which they neither had notice nor even had any right to notice. We see no justification in our zoning statutes for inferring such an intent.

The defendants rely on Astarita v. Liquor Control Commission, 165 Conn. 185, 190, 332 A.2d 106 (1973), for the proposition that the plaintiffs’ failure to appeal to the board constituted a failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. That reliance is misplaced. In Astarita, the local zoning enforcement officer denied the plaintiffs application for a certification that the local zoning regulations did not prohibit a grocery store beer permit at the plaintiffs grocery store premises. Id., 186-87. The plaintiff, instead of appealing that decision to the zoning board of appeals, as provided in the local zoning regulations and § 8-6, filed an application for a permit with the liquor control commission. Id., 187. The commission denied the plaintiffs application on the ground that it would be in violation of the local zoning regulations, and the plaintiff appealed from that decision to the trial court. Id. This court held that the plaintiffs failure, in those circumstances, to appeal from the zoning enforcement officer’s decision to the zoning board of appeals constituted a failure to exhaust an available administrative remedy, depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs subsequent administrative appeal. Id., 190.

Astarita does not support the defendants’ position in the present case. The plaintiff in Astarita had full notice of the denial of his application by the zoning enforcement officer and, therefore, of the availability of a timely appeal to the zoning board of appeals. Thus, it was wholly consistent with the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine to require the plaintiff to exhaust the administrative process that he had initiated. It would be wholly inconsistent with that rationale, however, to apply it to a third party to that process who had no notice of it.

The defendants also rely on the Appellate Court’s decision in Koepke v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 30 Conn. App. 395, 620 A.2d 811 (1993), rev’d on other grounds, 230 Conn. 452, 645 A.2d 983 (1994), for the proposition that the plaintiffs’ lack of notice of the issuance of the May, 1994 zoning certificate in the present case does not excuse their failure to appeal to the board from that certification. We agree that the Appellate Court has so held. In Koepke, the court stated: “While it is true that an aggrieved person has the right to take issue with the granting of a zoning permit, the legislature has not required that notice of the granting of a permit be given nor would it seem practical to give such notice for the literally thousands of such zoning and building permits that are issued on an almost daily basis across the state. We therefore conclude that [the abutting defendant’s thirty day] time to appeal began to ran at the time of the initial issuance of the permit; whether she received actual or constructive notice is irrelevant.” Id., 402-403; see also Bosley v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 30 Conn. App. 797, 800, 622 A.2d 1020 (1993).

We disagree with that reasoning, however, and disavow it as a valid statement of the law. It is trae that the legislature has not required notice to be given regarding an administrative action such as a zoning or building permit. That does not necessarily mean, however, that the legislature also intended to bar aggrieved persons from the courts based on their failure to exhaust an administrative remedy when they seek to challenge the issuance of a permit of which they had no notice. Inferring such an intent would be contrary to the fundamental principle that, without notice that a decision has been reached, the right to appeal from that decision is meaningless. Bridgeport Bowl-O-Rama, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 195 Conn. 281. We will not infer legislative intent to dispense with such a fundamental principle in the absence of a clear indication of such an intent. Cf. In re Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 376, 678 A.2d 462 (1996). There is no such indication in §§ 8-6 and 8-7.

Furthermore, the fact that many such permits may be issued does not mean that such a permit is free from subsequent challenge by a party who is aggrieved by it but was ignorant of, and not entitled to notice of, its issuance. The legal benefits of such a permit, however many are issued, do not include a fundamentally unfair immunity from challenge by a party who is so aggrieved. Indeed, it is only proper to allow such an aggrieved party to challenge the permit’s validity in an appropriate judicial forum, given the lack of notice and consequent lack of meaningful opportunity to pursue an administrative appeal.

The defendants also claim that the plaintiffs’ lack of notice of the issuance of the May, 1994 zoning certificate was cured by the notice that Parrott was required to give, pursuant to § 30-39 (b) (3), in connection with his subsequent application to the liquor control commission. See footnote 5 of this opinion. Thus, the defendants argue that, although the plaintiffs did not have actual notice of the zoning certification, “they had constructive notice of the certification of zoning compliance by virtue of the newspaper publication of the notice of the application for the liquor permit, and the physical posting of notice at the site, required of the defendant Parrott.” This argument is without merit.

Even if we were to assume without deciding that constructive, rather than actual, notice of the type provided by § 30-39 (b) (3) would be sufficient to satisfy the principle that the right to appeal must be preceded by adequate notice; Keeney v. Old Saybrook, supra, 237 Conn. 155-56; the notice provided for under § 30-39 (b) (3) is insufficient to invoke the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies so as to bar the plaintiffs in the present case. First, that notice is given pursuant to a different statutory scheme from the zoning statutes. The plaintiffs’ purported appeal rights, on which the defendants rely, arose, if at all, under § 8-7. See footnote 7 of this opinion. Under that statute, the appeal is to be taken “within thirty days” of the action appealed from. The record does not disclose that the constructive notice afforded by § 30-39 (b) (3), posted with regard to Parrott’s application for a liquor permit, was given within thirty days of the granting of the certification of zoning compliance so as to afford the plaintiffs a realistic opportunity to appeal to the board under § 8-7. Second, the constructive notice afforded by § 30-39 (b) (3), by newspaper publication and by posting of a placard, extends only to the name and residence of the proposed permittee, the type of permit applied for, the location of lire place of business, and the type of live entertainment to be provided. Thus, it does not, except by implication, give constructive notice that the local zoning official has certified that the premises are approved for a liquor license under the local zoning regulations. Such an implication, drawn from a constructive notice to begin with, would have been insufficient to notify the plaintiffs of the May, 1994 zoning certificate by the zoning enforcement officer so as to invoke the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.

II

Having concluded that the Appellate Court’s reasoning was flawed, we turn to the defendants’ proposed alternate ground on which to affirm that judgment. The defendants claim that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine bars the plaintiffs from bringing this action because of the March and April, 1995 proceedings, in which the defendants, while this action was pending, had successfully applied to the zoning enforcement officer for a permanent certificate of compliance. The plaintiffs, upon learning of the March, 1995 zoning certificate, had appealed to the board from the zoning enforcement officer’s grant of the certificate. The defendants assert that this action, which the plaintiffs had instituted before those administrative proceedings, “improperly preempted” the defendants’ application for a permanent certificate of zoning compliance from the local zoning enforcement officer. Thus, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs “cannot avoid a required zoning procedure by prematurely filing a civil suit and requesting injunctive relief under the guise of a ‘private zoning enforcement action’ prior to [the defendants’] requesting necessary zoning or planning approvals.”

In effect, then, the defendants claim that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine prevents “improper” preemptive strikes: it precludes one party from bringing a civil action to challenge an alleged zoning violation by another party, where that other party will be required to undertake, but has not yet undertaken, administrative proceedings concerning the conduct underlying the alleged violation, and it thus operates as an absolute shield against such an action. Under the defendants’ view, if one party brings such an action, administrative proceedings subsequently initiated by the other party divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action. We disagree with this application of the exhaustion doctrine in the circumstances of this case.

First, we have never applied the doctrine in such a manner, and the defendants cite no cases in support of such an application. Traditionally, the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine has been applied where the administrative proceedings were available to be invoked before the institution of the action, and the decision to invoke or forgo the administrative remedy at issue was within the control of the party against whom the doctrine was applied. See, e.g., Simko v. Ervin, supra, 234 Conn. 503 (plaintiff whose request for cease and desist order was denied barred from bringing subsequent injunction action because of failure to appeal from such denial to zoning board of appeals); Greenwich v. Kristoff, 180 Conn. 575, 578, 430 A.2d 1294 (1980) (defendant who had not appealed from cease and desist order against him barred, in subsequent zoning enforcement action by zoning enforcement officer, from raising defense of nonconforming use). In the present case, however, the defendants seek the application of the exhaustion doctrine where the administrative proceedings postdate the institution of the action and the decision to invoke or forgo the administrative process lay, not in the control of the plaintiffs, against whom the doctrine is sought to be applied, but in the control of the defendants, who seek to benefit from its application.

We see no sound reason to extend the exhaustion doctrine to this situation. It is one thing to require a party, who has the power to invoke or forgo the administrative process, to invoke it before resorting to the courts. It is quite another to require a third party to refrain from invoking his or her right to proceed to court simply because a party has an administrative process available to him or her, over which the third party has no control and with regard to which that third party may or may not be an actual party.

Furthermore, to the extent that the defendants seek to invoke the exhaustion doctrine based on the administrative proceedings that they initiated subsequent to the bringing of this action, their position must fail. In effect, the defendants argue that those subsequently initiated proceedings divested the court of its subject matter jurisdiction over this action. That argument is simply contrary to settled law. “As a general rule, jurisdiction once acquired is not lost or divested by subsequent events.” Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 601, 87 A.2d 388 (1952); States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Van, 19 Conn. App. 195, 199, 562 A.2d 62 (1989). Thus, just as the exhaustion doctrine does not bar the plaintiffs from bringing this action, the exhaustion doctrine does not serve to divest the court of its jurisdiction over the action itself.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the case to that court for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       Initially, there were four additional plaintiffs in the action for an injunction, including Mary Riga, Seraphina Cascella, Robert Riga and Corrine Riga. Subsequently, these plaintiffs withdrew their claims.

       We granted certification to appeal limited to the following issue: “Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies?” Loulis v. Parrott, 239 Conn. 917, 682 A.2d 1003 (1996).

       Parrott has not participated in this appeal. We refer herein to Bart Center, Inc., and Vernon Bartosik as the defendants.

       In 1994, the liquor control commission was a legislatively created agency that directed the department of liquor control in its enforcement of the liquor control act. Subsequently, in 1995, the responsibilities of the department of liquor control were transferred to the department of consumer protection. See Public Acts 1995, No. 95-195, §§ 13 and 83. The liquor control commission, however, continues to direct enforcement of the liquor control act.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 30-39 provides: “Applications for permits, renewals. Fees. Publication, remonstrance, hearing, (a) For the purposes of this section, the ‘filing date’ of an application means the date upon which the department, after approving the application for processing, mails or otherwise delivers to the applicant a placard containing such date.
      “(b) (1) Any person desiring a liquor permit or a renewal of such a permit shall make a sworn application therefor to the department of liquor control upon forms to be furnished by the department, showing the name and address of the applicant and of his backer, if any, the location of the club or place of business which is to be operated under such permit and a financial statement setting forth all elements and details of any business transactions connected with the application. Such application shall include a detailed description of the type of live entertainment that is to be provided. A club or place of business shall be exempt from providing such detailed description if the club or place of business (A) was issued a liquor permit prior to October 1, 1993, and (B) has not altered the type of entertainment provided. The application shall also indicate any crimes of which the applicant or his backer may have been convicted. Applicants shall submit documents sufficient to establish that state and local building, fire and zoning requirements and local ordinances concerning hours and days of sale will be met, except that local building and zoning requirements and local ordinances concerning hours and days of sale shall not apply to any class of airport permit. The state fire marshal or his certified designee shallbe responsible for approving compliance with the state fire code at Bradley International Airport. Any person desiring apermit provided for in section 30-33b shall file a copy of his license from the division of special revenue or the Gaming Policy Board with such application. The department may, at its discretion, conduct an investigation to determine whether apermit shall be issued to an applicant.
      "(2) The applicant shall pay to the department a nonrefundable application fee, which fee shall be in addition to the fees prescribed in this chapter for the permit sought. An application fee shall not be charged for an application to renew a permit. The application fee shall be in the amount of ten dollars for the filing of each application for a permit by a charitable organization, including a nonprofit public television corporation, a nonprofit golf tournament permit, a temporary permit or a special club permit; and for all other permits in the amount of one hundred dollars for the filing of an initial application. Any permit issued shall be valid only for the purposes and activities described in the application.
      “(3) The applicant, immediately after filing an application, shall give notice thereof, with the name and residence of the permittee, the type of permit applied for and the location of the place of business for which such permit is to be issued and the type of live entertainment to be provided, all in a form prescribed by the department, by publishing the same in a newspaper having a circulation in the town in which the place of business to be operated under such permit is to be located, at least once a week for two successive weeks, the first publication to be not more than seven days after the filing date of the application and the last publication not more than fourteen days after the filing date of the application. The applicant shall affix, and maintain in a legible condition upon the outer door of the building wherein such place of business is to be located and clearly visible from the public highway, the placard provided by the department, not later than the day following the receipt of the placard by the applicant. If such outer door of such premises is so far from the public highway that such placard is not clearly visible as provided, the department shall direct a suitable method to notify the public of such application. When an application is filed for any type of permit for a building that has not been constructed, such applicant shall erect and maintain in a legible condition a sign not less than six feet by four feet upon the site where such place of business is to be located, instead of such placard upon the outer door of the building. The sign shall set forth the type of permit applied for and the name of the proposed permittee, shall be clearly visible from the public highway and shall be so erected not later than the day following the receipt of the placard. Such applicant shall make aretum to the department, under oath, of compliance with the foregoing requirements, in such form as the department may determine, but the department may require any additional proof of such compliance. Upon receipt of evidence of such compliance, the department may hold a hearing as to the suitability of the proposed location. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to applications for airline permits, charitable organization permits, temporary permits, special club permits, concession permits, military permits, railroad permits, boat permits, warehouse permits, brokers’ permits, out-of-state shippers’ permits for alcoholic liquor and out-of-state shippers’ permits for beer, coliseum permits, coliseum concession permits, special sporting facility restaurant permits, special sporting facility employee recreationalpermits,specialsportingfacilityguestpermits, special sportingfacility concession permits, special sporting facility bar permits and renewals.
      “(4) In any case in which a permit has been issued to a partnership, if one or more of the partners dies or retires, the remaining partner or partners need not file a new application for the unexpired portion of the current permit, and no additional fee for such unexpired portion shall be required. Notice of any such change shall be given to the department and the permit shall be endorsed to show correct ownership. When any partnership changes by reason of the addition of one or more persons, a new application with new fees shall be required.
      “(c) Any ten residents of the town within which is intended to be operated the business for which the permit or renewal thereof has been applied lor, or, in the case of a manufacturer’s or a wholesaler’s permit, any ten residents

        of the state, may file with the department, within three weeks from the filing date of the application for an initial permit, and in the case of renewal of an existing permit, at least twenty-one days before the renewal date of such permit, a remonstrance containing any objection to the suitability of such applicant or proposed place of business. Upon the filing of such remonstrance, the department, upon written application, shall hold a hearing and shall give such notice as it deems reasonable of the time and place at least five days before such hearing is had. The decision of the department on such application shall be final with respect to the remonstrance.
      “(d) No new permit shall be issued until the foregoing provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section have been complied with. Six months’ or seasonal permits may be renewed, provided the renewal application and fee shall be filed at least twenty-one days before the reopening of the business, there is no change in the permittee, ownership or type of permit, and the permittee or backer did not receive a rebate of the permit fee with respect to the permit issued for the previous year.
      “(e) The department may renew a permit that has expired if the applicant pays to the department a nonrefundable late fee of one hundred dollars, which fee shall be in addition to the fees prescribed in this chapter for the permit applied for. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to one-day permits, to any permit which is the subject of administrative or court proceedings, or where otherwise provided by law.”

       The plaintiffs also alleged that, as holders of a competing package store permit within 725 feet of another package store, they would suffer special damage and financial loss as a result of the use proposed by Parrott.

       General Statutes § 8-6 provides: “Powers and duties of board of appeals, (a) The zoning board of appeals shall have the following powers and duties: (1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is an error in any order, requirement or decision made by the official charged with the enforcement of this chapter or any bylaw, ordinance or regulation adopted under the provisions of this chapter; (2) to hear and decide all matters including special exceptions and special exemptions under section 8-2g upon which it is required to pass by the specific terms of the zoning bylaw, ordinance or regulation; and (3) to determine and vary the application of the zoning bylaws, ordinances or regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent and with due consideration for conserving the public health, safety, convenience, welfare and property values solely with respect to a parcel of land where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel but not affecting generally the district in which it is situated, a literal enforcement of such bylaws, ordinances or regulations would result in exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship so that substantial justice will be done and the public safety and welfare secured, provided that the zoning regulations may specify (he extent to which uses shall not be permitted by variance in districts in which such uses are not otherwise allowed. No such board shall be required to hear any application for the same variance or substantially the same variance for a period of six months after a decision by the board or by a court on an earlier such application.
      “(b) Any variance granted by a zoning board of appeals shall run with the land and shall not be personal in nature to the person who applied for and received the variance. A variance shall not be extinguished solely because of the transfer of title to the property or the invalidity of any condition attached to the variance that would affect the transfer of the property from the person who initially applied for and received the variance.”
      General Statutes § 8-7 provides: “Appeals to board. Hearings. Effective date of exceptions or variances; filing requirements. The concurring vote of four members of the zoning board of appeals shall be necessary to reverse any order, requirement or decision of the official charged with the enforcement of the zoning regulations or to decide in favor of the applicant any matter upon which it is required to pass under any bylaw, ordinance, rule or regulation or to vary the application of the zoning bylaw, ordinance, rule or regulation. An appeal may be taken to the zoning board of appeals by any person aggrieved or by any officer, department, board or bureau of any municipality aggrieved and shall be taken within such time as is prescribed by a rule adopted by said board, or, if no such rule is adopted by the board, within thirty days, by filing with the zoning commission or the officer from whom the appeal has been taken and with said board a notice of appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal has been taken shall forthwith transmit to said board all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken. An appeal shall not stay any such order, requirement or decision which prohibits further construction or expansion of a use in violation of such zoning regulations except to such extent that the board grants a stay thereof. An appeal from any other order, requirement or decision shall stay all proceedings in the action appealed from unless the zoning commission or the officer from whom the appeal has been taken certifies to the zoning board of appeals after the notice of appeal has been filed that by reason of facts stated in the certificate a stay would cause imminent peril to life or property, in which case proceedings shall not be stayed, except by a restraining order which may be granted by a court of record on application, on notice to the zoning commission or the officer from whom the appeal has been taken and on due cause shown. Such board shall, within the period of time permitted under section 8-7d, hear such appeal and give due notice thereof to the parties. Notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be published in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in such municipality at least twice at intervals of not less than two days, the first not more than fifteen days, nor less than ten days, and the last not less than two days before such hearing. In addition to such notice, such board may, by regulation, provide for notice by mail to persons who are owners of land which is adjacent to the land which is the subject of the hearing. At such hearing any party may appear in person and may be represented by agent or by attorney. Such board may reverse or affirm wholly or partly or may modify any order, requirement or decision appealed from and shall make such order, requirement or decision as in its opinion should be made in the premises and shall have all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal has been taken but only in accordance with the provisions of this section. Whenever a zoning board of appeals grants or denies any special exception or variance in the zoning regulations applicable to any property or sustains or reverses wholly or partly any order, requirement or decision appealed from, it shall state upon its records the reason for its decision and the zoning bylaw, ordinance or regulation which is varied in its application or to which an exception is granted and, when a variance is granted, describe specifically the exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship on which its decision is based. Notice of the decision of the board shall be published in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in the municipality and addressed by certified mail to any person who appeals to the board, by its secretary or clerk, under his signature in any written, printed, typewritten or stamped form, within fifteen days after such decision has been rendered. In any case in which such notice is not published within such fifteen-day period, the person who requested or applied for such special exception or variance or took such appeal may provide for the publication of such notice within ten days thereafter. Such exception or variance shall become effective upon the filing of a copy thereof (1) in the office of the town, city or borough clerk, as the case may be, but, in the case of a district, in the offices of both the district clerk and the town clerk of the town in which such district is located and (2) in the land records of the town in which the affected premises are located, in accordance with the provisions of section 8-3d.”

       Although no notice of the March 27, 1995 action of the zoning enforcement officer had been given to the plaintiffs, they assert that they learned of the action while taking the defendants’ deposition in this case. The defendants do not contest this assertion.

       The implication would arise from the fact that, under § 30-39 (b) (1); see footnote 5 of this opinion; the application must establish that the local zoning regulations do not prohibit the liquor license that is the subject of the application. The notice required by § 30-39 (b) (3), however, does not include that information.

       Indeed, in this case the plaintiffs were not involved in or given notice of the defendants’ March, 1995 application for apermanent zoning certificate, and only learned of it when they took the defendants’ deposition in this case.

       An exception to this rule, however, is that subsequent events that render a case moot will result in a loss of subject matter jurisdiction. Ayala v. Smith, 236 Conn. 89, 93-94, 671 A.2d 345 (1996).

       The plaintiffs also contend that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply in this case because “[u]nder a long line of cases, neighbors and opponents do not have to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing zoning permits and certificates of compliance issued to the property owner, and can bring directly an injunction action for private zoning enforcement to eliminate a zoning violation.” See, e.g., Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 75, 527 A.2d 230 (1987); Reynolds v. Soffer, 183 Conn. 67, 69-72, 438 A.2d 1163 (1981); Blum v. Lisbon Leasing Corp., Inc., 173 Conn. 175, 179-80, 377 A.2d 280 (1977); Scoville v. Ronalter, 162 Conn. 67, 74, 291 A.2d 222 (1971). The defendants contend, to the contrary, that the line of cases on which the plaintiffs rely has a narrower scope than the plaintiffs’ formulation, and that the “cases relied upon by [the] plaintiffs for this proposition are, in fact, cases of nuisance, or claims that the plaintiffs suffered special and peculiar injuries.” The defendants contend, accordingly, that the plaintiffs’ complaint does not fall within this line of cases.
      We need not decide this issue in this appeal. The cases cited by the plaintiffs and sought to be distinguished by the defendants involved a determination by this court that the exhaustion doctrine did not bar the particular injunctive and other relief sought therein. We have decided in the present case that there was no administrative remedy that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust before bringing their complaint. Our task is therefore at an end. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief on the allegations of their complaint and the proof adduced thereunder has never been addressed, either by the trial court or the Appellate Court, and is thus beyond the scope of this appeal.