author: Katz, J. Berdon, J.,

text:
    Robert V. Squeglia, Jr. v. Robert V. Squeglia, Sr.
    (15041)
    Callahan, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.

      Argued April 27
    decision released July 18, 1995

      David R. Babbitz, with whom, on the brief, was Vincent R. Falcone, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      David J. Crotta, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Carolyn P. Gould, for the appellee (defendant).
   Katz, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the doctrine of parental immunity bars an action by an unemancipated minor against his parent alleging strict liability pursuant to General Statutes § 22-357. We conclude that it does.

The relevant facts are few and undisputed. The defendant, Robert Y. Squeglia, Sr., owned a dog that attacked and injured the plaintiff, Robert V. Squeglia, Jr., in 1991. The plaintiff, who is the son of the defendant, was four years old at the time of the injury.

In October, 1991, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant pursuant to § 22-357, seeking damages for personal injuries. The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that the action was barred by the doctrine of parental immunity. The plaintiff argued, however, that although the doctrine of parental immunity generally bars actions in negligence, it does not bar an action in strict liability brought under § 22-357.

In its memorandum of decision on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court first noted that, with limited exceptions that have been strictly construed, the doctrine of parental immunity bars an unemancipated minor from bringing an action in tort against his or her parent. The court determined that the doctrine is not limited to actions alleging negligence and that the reasoning underlying the doctrine of parental immunity applies equally to actions alleging strict liability pursuant to § 22-357. Because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the parentage of the plaintiff or the ownership of the dog, the trial court concluded that the doctrine of parental immunity barred the plaintiff’s action and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court had improperly determined that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the doctrine of parental immunity. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Squeglia v. Squeglia, 34 Conn. App. 866, 644 A.2d 378 (1994). We granted certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court on the issue of whether the Appellate Court properly held that the doctrine of parental immunity shields a parent from an action for damages in strict liability pursuant to § 22-357 brought by that parent’s unemancipated minor child. Squeglia v. Squeglia, 231 Conn. 920, 648 A.2d 162 (1994).

Although this court, and the Connecticut General Assembly, have articulated the parameters of the doctrine of parental immunity in Connecticut in the context of claims of negligence and, to a limited extent, intentional tort, we have not heretofore determined whether the doctrine bars an action in strict liability pursuant to § 22-357. Therefore, the case presents an issue of first impression for this court.

“Initially, we note that, upon the granting of certification . . . the focus of our review is not the judgment of the trial court but the judgment of the Appellate Court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thompson & Peck, Inc. v. Harbor Marine Contracting Corp., 203 Conn. 123, 128, 523 A.2d 1266 (1987). In the present case, therefore, we must determine only whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the doctrine of parental immunity barred the plaintiffs action and affirmed the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to the defendant. Because the issue of whether the Appellate Court properly interpreted the common law doctrine of parental immunity is a question of law our review is de novo. See Andover Ltd. Partnership I v. Board of Tax Review, 232 Conn. 392, 396, 655 A.2d 759 (1995) (statutory interpretation is question of law requiring de novo review).

The plaintiff first argues, on the basis of the cases that have concluded that the doctrine of parental immunity bars a claim of parental negligence by an unemancipated child; see Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972); Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co., 157 Conn. 445, 254 A.2d 907 (1969); that, because the doctrine has never been extended to any other action in tort, it applies only to actions alleging negligence. We disagree.

The doctrine of parental immunity, first recognized in Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), overruled in part by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992), “forbid[s] to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.” Hewlett v. George, supra, 711. The doctrine was not limited to negligence in Hewlett, and was subsequently interpreted to apply to any personal injury claim by a minor child against his or her parent. See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (doctrine of parental immunity bars child’s tort action against parent for cruel and unusual treatment), overruled in part by Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983), and overruled in part by Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (doctrine of parental immunity bars child’s tort action against father for sexual assault), overruled in part by Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).

In Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929), this court first recognized the doctrine and, citing to Hewlett v. George, supra, 68 Miss. 711, stated that ‘‘[ajuthority in the parent to require obedience in the child is indispensable to the maintenance of unity in the family. Anything which undermines this authority, brings discord into the family, weakens its government and disturbs its peace, is an injury to society and to the State. New things could bring about this unhappy condition more quickly or widen the breach between parent and child further than the bringing of an action at law for personal injuries by a minor child against the parent. Such unseemly family discord is injurious to the public welfare . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Mesite v. Kirchenstein, supra, 84. The doctrine was not, therefore, initially limited in Connecticut to actions in negligence.

Because the doctrine of parental immunity is a judicially created doctrine, we may modify it. Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290, 301, 512 A.2d 130 (1986). We will create a new exception, however, only if, in light of the purpose of the doctrine, we determine that one is appropriate under the circumstances and accords with public policy considerations. Id.

We have modified the doctrine of parental immunity in several respects since Mesite. The modern doctrine in Connecticut only bars actions by minors who were unemancipated at the time of the alleged tortious conduct. See Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 281, 63 A.2d 586 (1948). Furthermore, the doctrine does not bar an action by an unemancipated child against a parent for injuries received because of: (1) the negligent conduct of the parent at a business enterprise located outside of the home; Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 300; (2) the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, aircraft or waterborne vessel; General Statutes § 52-572c; or (3) sexual abuse, sexual assault or sexual exploitation. Henderson v. Woolley, 230 Conn. 472, 486, 644 A.2d 1303 (1994). Otherwise, the doctrine, as adopted in Mesite, remains unchanged, and it has never been limited to actions in negligence. See Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 523 (parent is not liable civilly to his child for personal injury inflicted during child’s minority); Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co., supra, 157 Conn. 449-50.

The purpose of the doctrine is to preserve the integrity and unity of the family and to avoid unnecessarily injecting “the machinery of the state” into the day-today exercise of parental discretion. Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 527-28. As we noted in Mesite v. Kirchenstein, supra, 109 Conn. 84, there are few things more disruptive of familial harmony than a legal action by an unemancipated minor child against a parent. There is no reason to believe that an action in strict liability would be less disruptive to these interests than any other civil action for personal injuries brought by an unemancipated child against a parent. Therefore, as the Appellate Court noted, the purpose of the doctrine is equally applicable to an action alleging strict liability pursuant to § 22-357.

We have previously considered several factors when deciding whether to abrogate the doctrine. We have abrogated the doctrine in circumstances in which the parent had acted in a nonparental capacity; Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 300; and in which the heinous nature of the parent’s misconduct had already destroyed familial harmony. Henderson v. Woolley, supra, 230 Conn. 482. In both Dzenutis and Henderson we evaluated whether the parent had breached a duty owed to the public at large; Henderson v. Woolley, supra, 482-83; Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 300; and examined public policy considerations. Henderson v. Woolley, supra, 483. We also considered the likely availability of insurance coverage; Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 300; and whether the alleged act had occurred at the parent’s place of business outside the home. Compare id., 299-300 (permitting action arising out of business activity away from home), with Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 525 (action barred where alleged acts occurred within family home). None of the factors we have considered support abrogating the doctrine in this case.

The plaintiff also argues that the doctrine of parental immunity should not bar this action because insurance coverage is available and because § 22-357 imposes a duty owed to the public at large. At oral argument, the plaintiff contended that, as a practical matter, actions against a parent by an unemancipated child under § 22-357 will be commenced only if there is insurance coverage. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the plaintiffs factual contention is correct, his reliance on the existence of insurance as a basis for discarding the doctrine is misplaced as a matter of both law and public policy.

In Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 290, after having considered both the availability of insurance and the public nature of the duty involved, we declined to apply the parental immunity doctrine in situations involving tortious conduct by a parent arising out of business activities conducted away from home. In that case, the plaintiff had been severely burned when he tripped over a bucket of hot tar that his father, the defendant, had left unguarded on the sidewalk adjacent to the building upon which he was working. We based our decision on three factors. First, we determined that liability insurance was prevalent in the defendant’s line of business, which involved repairing buildings. We qualified this, however, by stating that the presence of insurance should not be “the touchstone of viability of an action by a child against a parent . . . .” Id., 299. Second, we determined that “in most instances family harmony will not be jeopardized by allowing suits between parents and children arising out of business activities conducted away from the home . . . .” Id., 299-300. Finally, we stated that the duty breached was owed to the public generally because “[t]he mishap might well have occurred to any other member of the public who passed that way.” Id., 300. Therefore, the potential availability of homeowner’s insurance is not dispositive of his case. Id., 299; see Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 524.

Furthermore, determining rights based upon the availability of insurance is unsound. The plaintiff has pointed only to the general availability of insurance and has provided no hard evidence that homeowner’s insurance is prevalent. Notably, there is no statutory requirement that such insurance must be maintained. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume, and the plaintiff does not argue otherwise, that many households in Connecticut are not protected by homeowner’s insurance and that insured households tend to be more affluent than households that are uninsured. The defendant cautions that, because the uninsured would be personally liable for any judgment and, in the case of the uninsured poor, the injured child would be less likely to bring an action in the first instance because any judgment would be uncollectible, abrogation of the doctrine in this type of case would likely benefit only insured persons and their unemancipated minor children. We agree with the defendant that eliminating the doctrine under circumstances present in this case could improperly result in disproportionate benefits and burdens on those who are insured and those who are not. See Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 524 (different rules of law should not be fashioned for insured and uninsured). We conclude, therefore, that the availability of insurance lends little weight to the claim that the doctrine of parental immunity should be jettisoned in this case.

Finally, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was injured at the family home. This is significant for two reasons. First, the dog was in the home and posed no menace to the general public, as did the can of hot tar on the sidewalk in Dzenutis and the alleged criminal conduct of the defendant in Henderson. Second, we have recognized that the doctrine of parental immunity is particularly applicable in the area of parental supervision and discretion with respect to the care and control of a minor child. Henderson v. Woolley, supra, 230 Conn. 480; Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 527; see also W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 122, p. 908. “Even in those jurisdictions that have, in part, abrogated parental immunity . . . the overwhelming majority of them have specifically retained the doctrine in the area of parental supervision, or have at least recognized that the doctrine may have continued validity where the negligent act involves the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the care and control of a minor child. . . . The supervision, care and instruction of one’s child involves issues of parental control, authority and discretion that are uniquely matters of a very personal type. Each parent has unique and inimitable methods and attitudes on how children should be supervised. Likewise, each child requires individualized guidance depending on intuitive concerns which only a parent can understand. Also, different cultural, educational and financial conditions affect the manner in which different parents supervise their children.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubay v. Irish, supra, 526-27.

The decision to maintain a dog in the home is an example of parental discretion, and permitting a minor child to be exposed to the dog is within the parental supervisory function. This maintenance of the home environment typifies the day-to-day exercise of parental discretion that the state would rather not disrupt. Consequently, this action by an unemancipated minor child, who had been injured as a result of his parent’s decision to keep a dog in the home and expose the child to it, falls directly within the scope of claims the doctrine is intended to bar.

In sum, we conclude that the plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of parental immunity from bringing an action in strict liability pursuant to § 22-357. Thus, because there was no genuine issue of material fact, the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion Callahan, Norcott and Palmer, Js., concurred.

Berdon, J.,

dissenting. The majority, which holds that the doctrine of parental immunity bars a child’s action against his parent that is grounded in statutory strict liability, stretches this doctrine beyond all previous limits and arrives at a result that apparently no other court has reached. In so doing, the majority deprives the plaintiff, who was four years old at the time he was attacked by his father’s dog, of any compensation for the permanent facial scars he suffered.

I

In order to understand the current status of the doctrine of parental immunity, which “bars an unemancipated minor from suing his or her parent for injuries caused by the negligence of that parent”; (emphasis added) Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 523, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); we must begin with an historical analysis. “It seems that the common law did not forbid actions for personal torts by children against their parents until the Mississippi court so held in 1891.” 2 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Torts (2d Ed. 1986) § 8.11, p. 573. As Professors Prosser and Keeton explained, “American courts adopted a general rule refusing to allow actions between parent and minor child for personal torts, whether they are intentional or negligent in character.” (Emphasis added.) W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 122, p. 904.

This court first recognized the doctrine of parental tort immunity in 1929 in Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929). In that case, the plaintiff child alleged that her mother’s husband had driven the family car negligently and had caused an accident that resulted in the child’s injuries. This court held that the doctrine of parental immunity barred such an action. “Anything which undermines this authority, brings discord into the family, weakens its government and disturbs its peace, is an injury to society and to the State. New things could bring about this unhappy condition more quickly or widen the breach between parent and child further than the bringing of an action at law for personal injuries by a minor child against the parent. Such unseemly family discord is injurious to the public welfare, to such a degree that all the courts of this country, which have had occasion to express their opinion upon the right of the minor to maintain such an action, have declared that the exercise of this right is against sound public policy.” Id., 84.

These early applications of the doctrine were based primarily on the public policy ground that a child simply should not be allowed to sue a parent for negligence, regardless of the precise theory of liability. “Although other arguments are occasionally invoked to support the orthodox rule that no such action may be maintained, the domestic harmony policy is the one most frequently offered.” 2 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, supra, § 8.11, p. 574.

In the middle of this century, however, courts began to recognize that an absolute bar was not a sound policy and narrowed the circumstances in which the doctrine should be applied. “Finally, in 1963, Wisconsin took the lead in declaring that the parent-child immunity was abrogated entirely in that jurisdiction, except as to exercises of parental control and authority, or parental discretion with respect to such matters as food and care. The decision set off something of a long-overdue landslide; and at the present writing more than half the states have now abrogated the absolute immunity, either by case law or by statute. In a few instances courts have, at least as a first step, limited family liabilities to those cases in which insurance exists or is likely [to exist] . . . .” W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra, § 122, p. 907.

Most of these courts did not choose to abrogate the doctrine entirely. Rather, they retained the doctrine of parental immunity to bar only those cases in which the child alleged that the parent had negligently supervised the child or had failed to exercise reasonable parental discretion. A child, however, was free to maintain actions based on other theories of negligence that did not involve uniquely parental responsibilities. The Michigan Supreme Court’s holding was typical of this line of cases: “A child may maintain a lawsuit against his parents for injuries suffered as a result of the alleged ordinary negligence of the parent. Like our sister states, however, we note two exceptions to this new rule of law: (1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.” Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972). Likewise, the American Law Institute made clear in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that “[i]f the conduct giving rise to an injury does not grow directly out of the family relationship, the existence of negligence may be determined as if the parties were not related.” 4 Restatement (Second), Torts § 895G, comment (k), p. 430 (1979).

This court followed this same pattern. Beginning in 1986, we began to carve out exceptions to the doctrine. In Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290, 295, 512 A.2d 130 (1986), we acknowledged that “[t]he history of the rise and decline of parent-child immunity nationwide has generally paralleled its course in this state,” and considered whether the doctrine should bar a child from suing his parent for injuries received as a result of his parent’s negligence in the conduct of a business enterprise. Concluding that “the doctrine no longer serves the purposes for which it was designed,” we proceeded to “modify the breadth of our decisions in previous cases that have unconditionally endorsed parental immunity as a defense to a negligence suit by a child.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 291. We concluded in Dzenutis that when the negligence of the parent occurs at the parent’s place of business, the doctrine of parental immunity should not apply.

Two years later, we again considered the viability of the doctrine. In Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 520-21, we weighed a claim that a mother’s negligence in keeping medications in her house had caused her daughter’s drug overdose. Although we expressly recognized that many jurisdictions had done away with the defense of parental immunity for causes of action based on ordinary negligence, “the overwhelming majority of them have specifically retained the doctrine in the area of parental supervision, or have at least recognized that the doctrine may have continued validity where the negligent act involves the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the care and control of a minor child.” Id., 526. Accordingly, we declined “to abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity in cases . . . involving allegations of the negligent exercise of parental discretion with regard to the care, supervision and instruction of a child based solely upon the existence of liability insurance. Courts should not unnecessarily involve themselves in the day-to-day exercise of parental discretion regarding the upbringing and care of children. To do so would undermine parental authority in the very personal endeavor of child rearing and inject the machinery of the state into an area where its presence might be the occasion for family discord.” Id., 527-28.

We further circumscribed the doctrine in Henderson v. Woolley, 230 Conn. 472, 644 A.2d 1303 (1994). In that case, a parent attempted to use the doctrine as a shield against his daughter’s claims that he had sexually abused her. Id., 482. We explained that the rationale for retaining parental immunity in cases of negligent parental supervision—the difficulty of determining the proper standard of care to apply to raising and supervising a child—had no application in cases of intentional sexual abuse. “When a parent perpetrates such a crime upon his or her child, that act constitutes a breach of duty owed not only to the child, but to the public at large, and there is no reason to immunize such conduct from a civil action in damages merely because of the familial relationship.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 483.

II

This history helps to bring into sharp focus the weaknesses in the reasoning of the majority. The majority not only mischaracterizes the breadth of the doctrine, but also misapplies the doctrine as it has evolved since 1986.

First, the majority fails to recognize that by holding that parental immunity does not apply to strict tort liability, it would not be creating “a new exception” to the immunity. Rather, the court merely would be refusing, quite properly, to extend beyond all previous limits a historically narrow doctrine. The majority, however, takes the position that “[t]he doctrine was not . . . initially limited in Connecticut to actions in negligence,” and that the doctrine of parental immunity applies to all tort actions by a child against his parent, regardless of the theory of liability, unless this court has created an exception. This misrepresents the history of the doctrine. We have repeatedly stated that the doctrine applies only to actions sounding in negligence. See, e.g., Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 523; Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 291. I can find no case, and the majority cites to none, in which this court applied the doctrine to bar a cause of action that was not grounded in negligence.

Indeed, by holding that the doctrine of parental immunity bars a child’s action against his parent that is grounded in strict liability, the majority stretches the doctrine beyond all previous limits and arrives at a result that apparently no other court has reached. I can find no case from any jurisdiction, and the majority again cites to none, in which the court applied the doctrine to block a cause of action grounded in strict tort liability. On the contrary, courts that have considered the issue have held that a cause of action for which the legislature has imposed strict liability is not barred by the doctrine of parental immunity.

In Thelen v. Thelen, 174 Mich. App. 380, 435 N.W.2d 495 (1989), the Michigan Court of Appeals considered a case in which the facts are virtually identical to the facts presented here. The Michigan dog bite statute, like that of Connecticut, imposed strict liability on the owner of a dog that caused injury to a person. The Michigan Court of Appeals indicated that in the absence of a statute imposing strict liability, parental immunity would clearly apply, because the “complaint is clearly based on parental maintenance of the home environment, in that defendants allowed the home to be occupied by an ‘unleashed and roaming’ dog.” Id., 385. The court, however, concluded that the statutory strict liability trumped the doctrine of parental immunity. “The statute places absolute liability on the dog owner, except when the dog bites after having been provoked. . . . [I]t appears that in enacting a dog-bite statute which imposes strict liability on the owner, the Legislature intended ‘provocation’ to be the only defense to a strict liability claim. . . . We therefore hold that parental immunity does not bar dog-bite suits based on [the statute]. In view of the Legislature’s determination that dog owners will be liable to persons injured while ‘lawfully on or in a public place, including the property of the owner of the dog,’ we see no sound reason to deny recovery on the basis of the parties’ familial relationship.” Id., 385-87. This same logic applies to this case, and we therefore ought to hold that parental immunity, which has historically been limited in this state to cases grounded in negligence, has no application to a cause of action, established by the legislature, that imposes strict liability.

Second, even if parental immunity is not limited to negligence and applies also to all other tort causes of action, the majority fails to recognize that the facts of this case do not fit the doctrine as it has evolved throughout the country and in this state since 1986. In Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 296-301, we identified three factors that are relevant to whether the doctrine should block a child’s cause of action against a parent. These factors are: (1) whether the alleged negligent conduct of the parent was a matter of parental discretion; (2) whether the duty breached was owed to the public generally or only to the child; and (3) whether insurance likely existed to cover such a loss. All of these factors counsel against applying parental immunity to bar the child’s action in this case.

Our cases since 1986 have recognized that the principal rationale for retaining parental immunity in negligence cases has to do with the difficulty in determining the proper standard of care applicable to the raising or supervision of a child. As Professors Prosser and Keeton point out, “[cjourts apparently feel that the jury should not be permitted to second-guess the parent as to the exact amount of supervision, training or freedom a child should have . . . .” W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra, § 122, p. 908. Indeed, it was for this reason that in Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 527-28, we declined to abrogate the immunity in cases “involving allegations of the negligent exercise of parental discretion with regard to the care, supervision and instruction of a child based solely upon the existence of liability insurance.”

This case, however, has absolutely nothing to do with parental discretion or the scope of the standard of care owed by the parent. Although the majority suggests that the “decision to maintain a dog in the home is an example of parental discretion, and permitting a minor child to be exposed to the dog is within the parental supervisory function,” this argument has been summarily rejected by at least one appellate court. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that “[w]hile it might fall within the immunized sphere of parental discretion to set the bounds of access to animals by one’s child, such immunity dissolves when one sets the bounds of access to children by one’s dog. The actionable breach in this case was not the failure to curb the child but the failure to curb the dog . . . .” Schleier v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 400, 767 P.2d 1187 (1989).

This is a ease in which the legislature, by enacting a statute imposing strict liability, has relieved the plaintiff of the burden of proving an applicable standard of care and a breach of that standard. General Statutes § 22-357 requires only that a dog bite a person for the dog’s owner to be liable. That is exactly what happened in this case. He should, therefore, be held to the same standard of liability as every other dog owner.

Similarly, the duty breached was not one that was owed solely to the child, but one that was owed generally to the public. Section 22-357 imposes strict liability on a person whose dog bites another person. The statute does not differentiate between classes of persons who are bitten. By holding a parent to the terms of the statute and exposing him to legal action, we are not imposing upon him any greater liability merely because that legal action is being brought by his own child. As the Arizona Supreme Court recognized in Schleier v. Alter, supra, 159 Ariz. 400, “[t]he defendants—not as parents but as dog-owners—owed the duty to the world at large to isolate that instrumentality from all children including their own. To the violation of that duty, no immunity attached.”

Finally, the existence of insurance in this case also weighs against the application of parental immunity. Here, the parent is covered by homeowner’s insurance, which will cover the loss. Thus, there is no danger that the parent will be faced with the unwelcome “prospect of greeting an adolescent judgment creditor at the dinner table each day . . . Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 296. Similarly, there is no danger that a judgment of the child would deplete the assets that the parent needs to take care of the other members of his family. Id., 296-97. Because there is liability insurance, therefore, there is no need for this court to protect the parent from these perils.

I respectfully dissent.

       General Statutes § 22-357 provides: “damage to person or property. If any dog does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper, or, if the owner or keeper is a minor, the parent or guardian of such minor, shall be liable for such damage, except when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog. If a minor, on whose behalf an action under this section is brought, was under seven years of age at the time the damage was done, it shall be presumed that such minor was not committing a trespass or other tort, or teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog, and the burden of proof thereof shall be upon the defendant in such action.”

       The action was commenced by Claudia Squeglia, the plaintiffs mother and next friend.

       “Pursuant to Practice Book § 384, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105-106, 639 A.2d 507 (1994).

       The legislature has clearly recognized the doctrine and has chosen to abrogate it, in derogation of the common law, only in the case of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, aircraft or vessel. General Statutes § 52-572c; see footnote 5. It is well established that statutes that are in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 468 n.6, 627 A.2d 1329 (1993); Copeland v. Warden, 225 Conn. 46, 53, 621 A.2d 1311 (1993); State v. Nugent, 199 Conn. 537, 548, 508 A.2d 728 (1986). “ ‘The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed can be seen to serve the same policy of continuity and stability in the legal system as the doctrine of stare decisis in relation to case law.’ ” Lynn v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 226 Conn. 282, 290, 627 A.2d 1288 (1993), quoting 3 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th Ed. Singer 1992 Rev.) § 61.01, pp. 172-73. The legislature has not abrogated the doctrine as to § 22-357 because there is no statutory exception to the general bar against actions by an unemancipated minor child against a parent for claims alleging strict liability under § 22-357.

       General Statutes § 52-572e provides: “parent-child immunity abrogated in certain negligence actions. In all actions for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and in all actions accruing on or after October 1, 1979, for negligence in the operation of an aircraft or vessel, as defined in section 15-127, resulting in personal injury, wrongful death or injury to property, the immunity between parent and child in such negligence action brought by a parent against his child or by or on behalf of a child against his parent is abrogated.”

        In Dzenutis, the defendant parent had negligently left a bucket of hot tar, which injured the plaintiff, in a public area. We determined that the defendant had breached a duty to the public at large by creating the hazard in an area with public access. Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 300. In Henderson v. Woolley, supra, 230 Conn. 482-83, we found that the perpetration of a crime by a parent upon a child is a matter of public concern.

       In Henderson v. Woolley, supra, 230 Conn. 483, we found that extending immunity from civil action to a parent who allegedly had sexually assaulted his child would be contrary to public policy.

       Our research reveals only three instances in which a state appellate court considered the doctrine of parental immunity in connection with a statute imposing strict liability. The plaintiff cites Schleier v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (1989), for the proposition that the parental immunity doctrine does not extend to a strict liability dog bite statute because the statute imposed a duty to a large protected class. We disagree with the plaintiffs interpretation of this case. The Arizona dog bite statutes provide a cause of action in strict liability to a person “lawfully in or on . . . the property of the owner of the dog.” Id., 401. The statutes further define such a person as an invitee or guest or person performing a federal, state or municipal governmental duty. Id., 402. This definition did not include family members and the court found the omission to be intentional. Therefore, because the plaintiff child had no cause of action under the statute, the court upheld the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment on that basis. Id., 401-402. Other appellate cases in which the doctrine of parental immunity has been raised as a defense to a strict liability tort claim are distinguishable from the case before us. In Thelen v. Thelen, 174 Mich. App. 380, 435 N.W.2d 495 (1989), the plaintiff was the unemancipated minor child of the defendant father and the stepchild of the defendant stepmother. The plaintiff had been bitten by the defendants’ dog and he sued the defendants under the Michigan dog bite statute, which provides for strict liability. The court determined that the doctrine of parental immunity does not bar such an action. Id., 386. Thelen is distinguishable from the case before us because the doctrine of parental immunity had been abrogated in Michigan except “(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.” (Emphasis added.) Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972). In Thelen, although the court determined that keeping a dog in the home falls squarely within “the parental maintenance of the home environment,” the court narrowly construed the Plumley exceptions and held that the doctrine was strictly limited to negligent acts. Thelen v. Thelen, supra, 385-86. In contrast, as we previously discussed, the doctrine has not been limited to negligence in Connecticut. See also Ankiewicz v. Kinder, 408 Mass. 792, 793, 563 N.E.2d 684 (1990) (after complete abrogation of doctrine, permitting landlord's third party complaint for contribution against parent in strict liability action for lead paint poisoning of child).

       Our holding in this case is intentionally narrow. In reaching our decision, we have evaluated the circumstances of this particular case according to the established criteria for evaluating whether the doctrine of parental immunity should apply. We believe that to abrogate the doctrine merely because § 22-357 imposes strict liability would, in effect, swallow the doctrine.
      We recognize that if we were to apply the criteria for determining whether the doctrine of parental immunity bars an action at law to another dog bite case, we potentially could reach a different result. For example, if an unemancipated minor were bitten by a guard dog in a public area at the parent’s place of business, our reasoning in Dzenutis could lead to a different outcome. We leave that, and other hypothetical scenarios, for another day.

       The Mississippi case is Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).

       The Wisconsin case is Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).

       The majority, in footnote 8, attempts to distinguish Thelen v. Thelen, supra, 174 Mich. App. 380, by pointing out that the Michigan courts have applied parental immunity only to actions sounding in negligence. As I demonstrate and previously stated in this dissent, however, courts in this state, like those in Michigan, also have applied parental immunity only to actions sounding in negligence.

       The Michigan statute provides in pertinent part: “If a dog bites a person, without provocation while the person is on public property, or lawfully on private property, including the property of the owner of the dog, the owner of the dog shall be liable for any damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.” Mich. Stat. Ann. § 12.544 (1) (1995).

       The Superior Court of New Jersey reached exactly the same result in Dower v. Goldstein, 143 N.J. Super. 418, 363 A.2d 373 (1976), which was cited with approval by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Thelen. The facts in Dower, too, were virtually identical to those in the present case. The court concluded that the strict liability statute established a cause of action that “was legislatively granted and entitled to liberal interpretation. . . . [W]e see no sound reason to deny that recovery on the basis of the litigants’ familial relationship.” Id., 422.

       Contrary to the assertion of the majority, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Schleier did indicate that the doctrine of parental immunity would not bar a child’s action against a parent that is grounded in strict liability. In Schleier, the child’s conservator sued the parents under both common law theories and the strict liability statute. The Arizona Court of Appeals first concluded that parental immunity did not bar the common law actions. The court then went on to consider the statutory cause of action. After determining that the statutory definition did not include family members within the classes of persons who could maintain such an action, the court declined to allow the statutory cause of action. The court, however, expressly stated that “[iff we were to accept the further assumption that [the child], a family member bitten by the family dog in the family home, came within the class of persons protected, by [the statute], we would hold parental immunity inapplicable in this case . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Schleier v. Alter, supra, 159 Ariz. 401.

       General Statutes § 22-357 provides: “damage to person or property. If any dog does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper, or, if the owner or keeper is a minor, the parent or guardian of such minor, shall be liable for such damage, except when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog. If a minor, on whose behalf an action under this section is brought, was under seven years of age at the time the damage was done, it shall be presumed that such minor was not committing a trespass or other tort, or teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog, and the burden of proof thereof shall be upon the defendant in such action.”

       The majority argues that insurance should not be a factor because “many households in Connecticut are not protected by homeowner’s insurance . . . .’’There is no basis in the record for this kind of speculation. Indeed, in Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, supra, 200 Conn. 299, we stated that we need only consider “the likely availability of insurance coverage in particular situations . . . .” (Emphasis added.) For example, in that case, the principal basis for our decision to abrogate parental immunity in situations where a child is injured at a parent’s place of business was the “general prevalence of liability insurance in the business activities setting.” Id., 297. We did not require the parties to present proof and statistics regarding how many people or businesses had actually obtained insurance, nor is there any indication from our opinion in that case that the parties did so. In rejecting the argument of the plaintiff in this case because he “has pointed only to the general availability of insurance and has provided no hard evidence that homeowner’s insurance is prevalent," the majority appears to have rejected the principal basis for our decision in Dzenutis.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Peters, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Barbara Joan Thomason et al. v. Chemical Bank
    (15148)
    Peters, C. J., and Callahan, Berdon, Norcott and Palmer, Js.

      Argued May 23
    decision released July 18, 1995

      Peter M. Ryan, with whom was Robert M. McAnerney, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Edward A. Reilly, with whom was John Wayne Fox, for the appellee (defendant).
   Peters, C. J.

The sole issue in this appeal i's whether a Connecticut court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this action, which challenges the management of a trust by a trustee bank that is incorporated in, and has its principal place of business in, New York. The plaintiffs, Barbara Joan Thomason, Jeffrey Corbett, Marjorie Biddle, Peter Corbett, James Corbett, David Biddle III, Bridget Biddle, Peter Corbett, Jr., and Reilly Corbett, are the beneficiaries of a trust created by Arthur Trowbridge. In a seven count complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, Chemical Bank (trustee bank), violated its trust obligations, was negligent, and engaged in fraud and deceit. The trustee bank filed a timely motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs’ cause of action was not sufficiently connected to the trustee bank’s activities in this state to establish long arm jurisdiction over the bank pursuant to General Statutes § 33-411 (e). It therefore granted the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment for the trustee bank. The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts. On September 15, 1941, the settlor, Arthur Trowbridge, entered into a trust agreement with the Fulton Trust Company, which was a predecessor of the trustee bank. The settlor created the trust for the benefit of his granddaughter, the named plaintiff, as life tenant, and her issue, the remaining plaintiffs, as remaindermen.

Although the settlor was a resident of Connecticut at the time the trust was established, the trust agreement was executed in New York and provided that it should be governed by New York law. The settlor also directed that all communications relative to the administration of the trust be addressed to him at his office in New York, rather than at his home in Darien. Throughout the life of the trust, the assets of the trust have been held and administered in New York.

After the settlor’s death, officers of the trustee bank held meetings in Connecticut concerning the trust on November 6, 1992, May 20, 1993, and September 10, 1993. Trustee bank officers also held meetings in Connecticut from October, 1981, to September, 1993, concerning other Trowbridge family trusts. At these meetings, the trustee bank was represented by a trust officer and an investment officer. The trustee bank represented that these meetings had been merely informational in nature.

The trustee bank is incorporated in New York, where it has its principal place of business. It has no offices in Connecticut. The trustee bank has, however, placed advertisements in national publications, including Business Week, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, that are distributed in this state. Those advertisements represented, inter alia, that the trustee bank was “number one for individuals and small and medium-sized businesses in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, with 50% more branches than our nearest competitor.” They also announced that the trustee bank had merged with the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and described the trustee bank as a “broad-based financial institution” that offered “depth and breadth of services.”

In addition to its advertisements in this state, the trustee bank has participated, as mortgagee, in a substantial number of mortgage transactions in this state and has issued credit cards to a substantial number of Connecticut residents. In connection with its credit card business, the trustee bank regularly has sent to Connecticut customers statements that included advertisements for miscellaneous merchandise. At the time the suit was filed, all of the plaintiffs were residents of Connecticut.

On the basis of this evidence, the trial court concluded that the Connecticut long arm statute did not confer jurisdiction over the case. The trial court first determined that the plaintiffs’ cause of action did not “arisje] . . . [o]ut of [a] contract . . . to be performed in this state”; General Statutes § 33-411 (c) (1); on the ground that a trust is a conveyance rather than a contract. The trial court further determined that the plaintiffs’ cause of action did not “arisje] . . . out of . . . business solicited in this state”; General Statutes § 33-411 (c) (2); because there was no connection between the trustee bank’s solicitation of business in this state and the establishment of this particular trust by the settlor.

On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge both of the trial court’s determinations. We conclude that the trial court misinterpreted the statutory phrase “arising . . . out of” and therefore construed § 33-411 (c) (2) too narrowly. Because the plaintiffs’ cause of action adequately “arisjes] . . . out of . . . business solicited in this state” for purposes of our long arm statute, and because the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the trustee bank is consistent with the constitutional requirements of due process, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I

The parties agree, as we have previously decided, that a trial court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant only if the defendant’s intrastate activities meet the requirements both of our statute and of the due process clause of the federal constitution. Frazer v. McGowan, 198 Conn. 243, 252, 502 A.2d 905 (1986); Lombard Bros., Inc. v. General Asset Management Co., 190 Conn. 245, 250, 460 A.2d 481 (1983). The principal focus of this appeal is on the first requirement. Specifically, the parties disagree about the extent to which our statutory formulation of “arising . . . out of” imposes limitations on jurisdiction that are substantially greater than those that would be constitutionally required.

Our existing precedents have addressed, on a case-by-case basis, the question of whether a plaintiff’s cause of action is sufficiently connected to “business solicited in this state” by a defendant to fall within the requirements of § 33-411 (c) (2). We have not, however, undertaken an analytic overview of the relationship between the statute and the constitution to determine how closely a cause of action must be tied to “business solicited in this state” before it may be deemed to “aris[e] . . . out of” that business for purposes of the statute.

Because the legislature’s use of the “arising out of” language may reflect, to some extent, the use of similar language in the federal cases decided under the due process clause, it is important first to examine the federal constitutional background against which the statute was enacted. Read in light of that background, the decisions of this court, which have been ratified by recent legislative action, manifest the understanding that our statute uses the term “arising out of” in a manner that is distinguishable from its constitutional origins. We are persuaded, furthermore, that a cause of action may be said to “aris[e] . . . out of . . . business solicited in this state” pursuant to § 33-411 (c) (2) even if the “business” forming the basis of the cause of action—in this case, the settlor’s trust account deposit—never was solicited in Connecticut.

A

We begin our analysis of the “arising out of” language in § 33-411 (c) (2) by reviewing the constitutional framework in which the statute operates. For our purposes, the most significant aspect of the operative constitutional principles is that, although federal constitutional law distinguishes between causes of action that “arise out of” the defendant’s forum-directed activities and cases that do not “arise out of” such activities, that distinction is not the constitutional touchstone for in personam jurisdiction. As a matter of federal constitutional law, state courts may exercise “specific” personal jurisdiction over a defendant whenever a cause of action “arises out of” the defendant’s contacts with the forum. For the purposes of defining “specific” jurisdiction, federal courts have construed the words “arising out of” to require some sort of causal connection between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s injuries. Even when the plaintiff cannot prove such a causal connection, however, a state court still may exercise “general” jurisdiction over a defendant who has had sufficiently continuous and systematic overall business contacts with the state.

The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant that has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 [66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95] (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 [61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278] (1940).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). Either “specific” jurisdiction or “general” jurisdiction can satisfy the constitutional requirement of sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum. A state court will have “specific” jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever the defendant “has ‘purposefully directed’ [its] activities at residents of the forum, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 [104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790] (1984), and the litigation [has] resulted] from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, [supra, 414].” (Emphasis added.) Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). Alternatively, “[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction” if the defendant has had “continuous and systematic general business contacts” with the state. (Emphasis added.) Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, supra, 414, 416.

In the context of “specific” jurisdiction, although the United States Supreme Court has required the plaintiff’s cause of action to “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum-directed activities, that court has not articulated a standard for what constitutes “arising out of.” See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 113 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1991) (declining to reach issue despite having certified it for review); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, supra, 466 U.S. 415-16 n.10 (declining to reach question). That court has held only that the availability of specific jurisdiction depends on the “ ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ . . . .” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, supra, 414; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977). The lower federal courts have held, however, that because of the requirement that the cause of action “arise out of” the defendant’s contacts with the forum, specific jurisdiction may not be exercised without some causal connection between the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the existence of the plaintiff’s lawsuit. See, e.g., Dobbs v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1994); United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1088-89 and n.9 (1st Cir. 1992); Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990); see also note, “Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the ‘Arise From or Relate To’ Requirement . . . What Does It Mean?” 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1265 (1993) (arguing that federal courts have employed two different standards of causation: the “but-for” test and the “substantive relevance” test); M. Twitchell, “A Rejoinder to Professor Brilmayer,” 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1465 (1988); L. Brilmayer, “Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction,” 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1444 (1988); M. Twitchell, “The Myth of General Jurisdiction,” 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1988); L. Brilmayer, “How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,” 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77. By contrast, because general jurisdiction does not require that the cause of action “arise out of” a defendant’s activities, such jurisdiction may be exercised even when there is no causal connection between the defendant’s forum-directed activities and the plaintiff’s lawsuit, as long as the defendant has had “continuous and systematic general business contacts” with the state. (Emphasis added.) Helicopteros Naciona,les de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, supra, 415-16.

B

Like the constitutional test that differentiates “specific” from “general” jurisdiction, § 33-411 distinguishes between cases that “arise out of” a defendant’s forum contacts and cases that do not arise out of such contacts. Unlike the constitution, however, our long arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over only those cases that “arise out of’ a defendant’s forum contacts. If the words “arising out of” in the statute had the same meaning as those words in the constitutional test, the statute would limit our courts to the exercise of “specific” jurisdiction and prohibit our courts from exercising any “general” jurisdiction. On the basis of our precedents and confirmatory legislative history, however, we are persuaded that the statute does not entirely preclude the exercise of “general” jurisdiction and that the phrase “arising out of” in the statute, unlike that phrase in the constitutional test, does not require a causal connection between the defendant’s forum-directed activities and the plaintiffs’ lawsuit.

Our previous cases interpreting § 33-411 (c) foreclose the argument that the statute permits only “specific,” but not “general,” jurisdiction. In Frazer v. McGowan, supra, 198 Conn. 249, for example, we concluded that the trial court, which had refused to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the analogue of § 33-411 (c) (2), had been “mistaken in requiring a causal connection between evidence of solicitation and the plaintiff’s cause of action.” We further held that § 33-411 (c) directs us to inquire “not only into the various elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action, spelled out in the various sub-parts of subsection (c), but also into the totality of contacts which the defendant may have with the forum. . . . [I]n enacting § 33-411 (c). . . the legislature intended to exercise its full constitutional power over foreign corporations in cases falling within one of the designated causes of action. Under [§ 33-411 (c)], consistent with the constitutional demands of due process, it is the totality of the defendant’s conduct and connection with this state that must be considered, on a case by case basis, to determine whether the defendant could reasonably have anticipated being haled into court here.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 248-49; accord Lombard Bros., Inc. v. General Asset Management Co., supra, 190 Conn. 254-55. Our reference to contacts unrelated to the particular cause of action would have relevance only if the statute permits the exercise not only of “specific” jurisdiction, but also of “general” jurisdiction.

These precedents establish, therefore, that the words “arising out of” have different meanings in the statutory and constitutional contexts. Although § 33-411 (c) (2) requires that the cause of action “arise out of” a defendant’s contacts with this state, it does not require that the cause of action and the contacts be causally connected. In this case, therefore, the statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction even if the trustee bank’s solicitation in this state was neither the but-for cause nor the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. Cf. Doe v. Manheimer, 212 Conn. 748, 757, 563 A.2d 699 (1989) (discussing elements of causation).

We find additional support for this interpretation of the statute in recent actions of the legislature. In 1994, the General Assembly reenacted § 33-411 (c) as part of a comprehensive revision of our corporations statutes designed to bring those statutes into conformity with the Model Business Corporation Act (Rev. to 1985). See Model Business Corporation Act Task Force, Connecticut Business Corporation Act Final Working Draft (March 3,1994). In response, however, to a comment by the secretary of the state that the long arm provision contained in the Model Act was too “narrow” and that the language of § 33-411 (c) should be substituted for it, the legislature specifically incorporated the language of § 33-411 (c) into the new act. See Public Acts 1994, No. 94-186, § 193 (e); Model Business Corporation Act Task Force, supra, § 15.10 (e) and Connecticut Commentary; Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 6, 1994 Sess., p. 2042, para. 37 (comments by office of secretary of the state); compare Substitute House Bill No. 5712, 1994 Sess., § 193 (e) with House Bill No. 5712,1994 Sess., §§ 190,192,193. Our broad statutory interpretation therefore is supported by both our presumption that the legislature is aware of our previous statutory interpretations when it reenacts a statute; C. R. Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Properties, Inc., 220 Conn. 569, 579, 600 A.2d 772 (1991); Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund, 219 Conn. 620, 626-27, 594 A.2d 464 (1991); Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co. v. Groppo, 204 Conn. 122, 134, 527 A.2d 672 (1987); Turner v. Scanlon, 146 Conn. 149, 156, 148 A.2d 334 (1959); and the express action of the legislature in rejecting a narrower long arm provision. See also Cato v. Cato, 226 Conn. 1, 5, 626 A.2d 734 (1993) (interpreting long arm statute regarding actions for dissolution of marriage broadly to effectuate legislative intent).

C

A comprehensive analysis of § 33-411 (c) (2) must, however, go further than demonstrating that the legislature did not intend to limit the jurisdiction of our state courts only to those cases in which the plaintiffs cause of action has a direct causal relationship to the defendant’s contact points with this state. Our precedents make clear that “arising out of” in the statute does not mean the same thing as the “arising out of” in the federal constitutional test for “specific” jurisdiction. Our precedents also establish, however, that the legislature did not intend to authorize Connecticut courts to exercise the full measure of “general” jurisdiction that would have been constitutionally permissible. It is this latter limitation that we now address.

If the legislature had meant to allow our courts to exercise the full extent of constitutionally permissible long arm jurisdiction, it could have done so explicitly. The California long arm statute, for example, provides simply that “[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (Deering 1991). Other states have followed the California example. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 735 § 5/2-209 (c) (Smith-Hurd 1992); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-5-33 (a) (1985); Wyo. Stat. § 5-1-107 (a) (1992). In comparison, our legislature chose to enact and then to reenact a detailed statute spelling out the various categories of cases out of which the cause of action had to “arise” before long arm jurisdiction could be exercised. In the absence of any contrary legislative history, we must assume that these enumerated requirements are purposeful. See Kaeser v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 438, 442-43, 589 A.2d 1229 (1991); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 320, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990); Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 98, 491 A.2d 368 (1985); see also 1 R. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions (2d Ed. 1991) § 4.01[1][b] (arguing that state legislatures’ use of “arising out of” language should be viewed as choice not to grant jurisdiction to full extent permissible under constitution).

Our precedents have interpreted the words “arising out of” in § 33-411 (c) (2) as imposing some constraints on the exercise of jurisdiction that exceed those constraints imposed by the constitution. In Frazer v. McGowan, supra, 198 Conn. 248-49, for example, we observed that “in enacting § 33-411 (c) . . . the legislature intended to exercise its full constitutional power over foreign corporations in cases falling within one of the designated causes of action.” (Emphasis added.) We concluded, in that case, that the plaintiffs cause of action had met the statutory requirement because there had been an “adequate connection” between the cause of action and the solicitation of business here. Id., 252. Most importantly, we always have held that the exercise of long arm jurisdiction in this state requires a two part inquiry: first, whether jurisdiction is permitted by the statute, and second, whether jurisdiction is permitted by the federal constitution. See, e.g., id., 252; Lombard Bros., Inc. v. General Asset Management Co., supra, 190 Conn. 250. If the statute allowed the exercise of all constitutionally permissible jurisdiction, the first step of this inquiry would not have been necessary. Cf. Cato v. Cato, supra, 226 Conn. 5 (long arm statute for dissolution actions reaches full extent of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction; consolidating statutory and constitutional analysis into single step); Jones v. Jones, 199 Conn. 287, 292, 507 A.2d 88 (1986) (same).

The words “arising out of” therefore must be interpreted in a manner that reconciles the legislative decision to impose some limits on constitutionally permitted jurisdiction with its decision not to require a causal connection between the defendant’s solicitation here and the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Our interpretation is as follows. For purposes of § 33-411 (c) (2), a plaintiff’s “cause of action aris[es] . . . out of . . . business solicited in this state” if, at the time the defendant engaged in solicitation in Connecticut, it was reasonably foreseeable that, as a result of that solicitation, the defendant could be sued in Connecticut by a solicited person on a cause of action similar to that now being brought by the plaintiffs.

Pursuant to our interpretation of the statute, a plaintiff need not show that, because of the acts of solicitation, the defendant was on notice that it might be sued by the plaintiff himself or herself. A plaintiff similarly need not show that the defendant solicited his or her business in Connecticut. A plaintiff need only demonstrate that the defendant could reasonably have anticipated being haled into court here by some person who had been solicited in Connecticut and that the plaintiff’s cause of action is not materially different from an action that might have resulted directly from that solicitation.

This interpretation of the statute is consistent with both of the principles we have discussed. On the one hand, because the statute does not demand proof that a particular plaintiff’s business was solicited in Connecticut, the statute does not require proof of a “causal connection” between the solicitation and the plaintiff’s injuries. On the other hand, because the statute does demand proof that a particular plaintiffs cause of action is similar to a cause of action that could have been brought here by a person whose business the defendant did solicit, the statute is more restrictive than the federal constitutional test for general jurisdiction, under which this state could have elected to exercise jurisdiction over causes of action wholly unrelated to the defendant’s conduct in this forum.

II

We now apply the relevant statutory and constitutional tests to the facts of this case. We conclude that both the statute and the constitution permit the exercise of long arm jurisdiction over the trustee bank, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

A

Section 33-411 (c) provides that “[ejvery foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state . . . on any cause of action arising ... (2) out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business . . . .’’As discussed above, for purposes of the statute, the plaintiffs’ cause of action “aris[esj . . . out of” the business solicited in this state as long as the trustee bank reasonably could have foreseen at the time of its solicitations here that it might be sued by a solicited person on a cause of action similar to that brought by the plaintiffs. The record in this case establishes both that the cause of action “aris[esj . . . out of” business solicited here, as we have defined that term, and that the corporation repeatedly has so solicited business.

The following undisputed facts of record satisfy the statutory requirement that the cause of action “arisefsj . . . out of . . . business solicited in this state. . . .” The trustee bank placed numerous print advertisements in newspapers and magazines that had substantial circulations in this state. The advertisements specifically encouraged Connecticut residents to place a wide variety of banking business with the trustee bank. For example, the advertisements represented that the bank had merged with the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, that the bank was the “number one bank” for Connecticut businesses and individuals, and that the bank was a “broad-based financial institution.” At the time the trustee bank placed the advertisements, therefore, it was foreseeable that one or more Connecticut residents would respond to the advertisements by opening a trust account with the trustee bank and thereafter would sue in Connecticut for the misadministration of that trust. Because the plaintiffs’ cause of action is similar to one that foreseeably could have been brought as a result of the trustee bank’s solicitation here, the plaintiffs’ cause of action adequately satisfies the statutory “arising out of” test.

Moreover, the trustee bank “repeatedly so solicited business” in this state. In addition to the advertisements directed here, the bank has performed a substantial number of mortgage transactions in this state and has a large credit card business here. Like the activities of the defendant hospital in Frazer, the trustee bank’s activities can be characterized as “affirmative measures designed to attract Connecticut” customers in that they constitute the creation of “an organizational network that is likely to prompt a significant number of Connecticut” residents to place business with the bank. Frazer v. McGowan, supra, 198 Conn. 251, 251-52. The trustee bank reasonably could foresee that, by advertising here, providing credit cards and taking mortgages from Connecticut residents, it would develop customer relationships that would lead to a wide range of banking business with those customers. See id.

It is of no moment that the trustee bank’s acts of solicitation in Connecticut substantially postdate the creation of the particular trust that is the subject of this lawsuit. The relevant inquiry under the statute is not whether the trustee bank could have foreseen its amenability to suit in Connecticut by the plaintiffs when it accepted the settlor’s business, but whether it could have foreseen its amenability to suit in Connecticut by persons raising claims similar to those of the plaintiffs when it solicited those persons’ business in Connecticut. Jurisdiction may be exercised pursuant to § 33-411 even though the defendant was not reasonably able to foresee the exercise of such jurisdiction at the time that it engaged in the activities that make it subject to the statute. See Carvette v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 157 Conn. 92, 98, 249 A.2d 58 (1968) (approving exercise of long arm jurisdiction pursuant to § 33-411 even though acts of defendant that made it subject to statute had occurred before statute was enacted).

B

“Once it is determined that there is an adequate connection between the [defendant’s] act of solicitation and the plaintiff’s cause of action to satisfy the requirements of § [33-411] (c) (2), the long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction if such an exercise comports with the principles of due process.” Frazer v. McGowan, supra, 198 Conn. 252. On the facts of record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court constitutionally may exercise general jurisdiction over the trustee bank.

Although the trustee bank has no offices in this state, it conducts a substantial credit card business here, regularly solicits general banking business here and holds title (as mortgagee) to a substantial amount of real property in Fairfield county. By virtue of these activities, the trustee bank “has been carrying on in [Connecticut] a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business”; Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438, 72 S. Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485 (1952); and the exercise of general jurisdiction over the trustee bank is therefore both “reasonable and just.” Id., 445, 447-48 (general jurisdiction may be exercised over corporation whose president performed multiple business activities in Ohio); see also L. Brilmayer, J. Haverkamp, B. Logan, L. Lynch, S. Neuwirth & J. O’Brien, “A General Look at General Jurisdiction,” 66 Tex. L. Rev. 723, 741-48 (1988); cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, supra, 466 U.S. 416-17 (no general jurisdiction over foreign corporation that had merely purchased goods and services in forum and received check drawn on bank in forum).

In sum, we conclude that § 33-411 permits, and that the due process clause does not preclude, the exercise of long arm jurisdiction over the trustee bank.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 33-411 provides in relevant part: “service of process on foreign corporation. . . .
      “(c) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows: (1) Out of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state; or (2) out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the state; or (3) out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be used or consumed in this state and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers; or (4) out of tortious conduct in this state, whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.”
      On January 1,1997, this section of the General Statutes will be superseded by an identical provision contained in § 193 (e) of Public Acts 1994, No. 94-186, the Connecticut Business Corporation Act. See Public Acts 1994, No. 94-186, SS 214 and 215.

       In light of our disposition of the case, we need not address the plaintiffs’ claim that the trust also should be deemed to be a “contract . . . to be performed in this state” pursuant to § 33-411 (c) (1).

       If the nonresident defendant is an individual, a state court constitutionally may exercise jurisdiction over that defendant even if he or she does not have the “minimum contacts” with a state necessary for the exercise of long arm jurisdiction, if he or she is served with process while actually within the territory of the state. Burnham, v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 618-19, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1990) (plurality opinion).

       Some courts have suggested, in dicta, that specific jurisdiction may be exercised without proof of a causal connection between the defendant’s forum-directed activities and the lawsuit. All of those courts, however, have based their conclusion on the fact that the specific jurisdiction test merely requires that the cause of action “arise out of or relate to" the defendant’s forum-directed activities. (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, supra, 466 U.S. 426-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reaching issue deferred by majority; arguing that court should distinguish between “arising out of” and “relating to” requirements); Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201,206-207 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing distinction without employing it); cf. L. Brilmayer, supra, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1444 (criticizing such distinction). Thus, even if the constitutional test for specific jurisdiction does not require a causal connection between the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the lawsuit, it is only because that test contains not only the “arising out of’ language, but also the “relating to” language. If the constitutional test employed only the “arising out of’ language, a causal connection would be required.

       All aspects of our long arm statute restrict the exercise of jurisdiction to cases that “arise out of’ a defendant’s forum contacts. For example, § 33-411 (b) provides that “[ejvery foreign corporation which transacts business in this state in violation of section 33-395 or 33-396 shall be subject to suit in this state upon any cause of action arising out o/such business.” (Emphasis added.) See also General Statutes § 33-411 (c).

       The same precedents preclude the inference that the legislature used the words “arising out of” in order to distinguish, for purposes of the constitutional test for specific jurisdiction, between cases that “arise out of” a defendant’s contacts and cases that merely “relate to” those contacts. See footnote 4. If the phrases have different purposes in the constitutional test, it is apparently because the “arising out of” phrase requires a causal connection between the lawsuit and the defendant’s contacts with the forum, but the “relating to” phrase does not require such a eausal connection. See footnote 4. As already noted, however, our statute does not require a causal connection between the lawsuit and the defendant’s forum-directed activities. Thus, the use of “arising out of” in our statute cannot have been intended to limit our courts to exercising only a portion of otherwise permissible specific jurisdiction.

       The legislative history on this point is not particularly helpful. Section 33-411 (c) originally was enacted in 1959 as part of the comprehensive revisions to the corporations code. Almost all of the other corporations code revisions enacted at that time, including the language in § 33-411 (a) and (e), were taken from recommendations made by a special legislative task force. See Connecticut Commission on Revision of the Corporation Laws, Proposed Revision of Stock and Foreign Corporation Laws (1958) § J-9. The language now contained in § 33-411 (c), however, did not appear in the commission’s recommendations. See id. We have been unable to determine how that language came to be incorporated in the bill introduced into the legislature; Substitute Senate Bill No. 329,1959 Sess., § 131; that eventually was enacted. Furthermore, we have been unable to locate any committee testimony or floor debate that sheds light on the 1959 legislative intent in using the “arising out of” language.
      The 1994 legislative history demonstrates that the legislature reenacted the language of § 33-411 (c) because it believed the long arm provision of the Model Business Corporation Act to be too narrow. See part IB of this opinion. We have been unable to locate any committee testimony or floor debate, however, that specifically discusses the meaning of the “arising out of” language or discusses whether the language of § 33-411 (c) reached the full extent of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction.

       In Frazer v. McGowan, supra, 198 Conn. 251, we concluded that the defendant hospital, which was located in Rhode Island, had “solicited business” in Connecticut in that it had granted admitting privileges to physicians, including the plaintiffs physician, who were licensed to practice in Connecticut. We further concluded that the plaintiffs cause of action had “arisen” from business solicited in Connecticut on the basis of the following analysis: “The named plaintiffs cause of action in this case arose from repeated solicitation conducted by [the defendant] Hospital through the use of such a network. [The named plaintiffs doctor] treated the named plaintiff in Connecticut and arranged for him to enter [the defendant] Hospital by exercising his admitting privileges there. It was during this hospitalization that the allegedly tortious conduct that forms the basis for the plaintiffs’ suit occurred. The hospital was aware that the named plaintiff’s doctor maintained offices in Connecticut. Indeed, it appointed him to its medical staff only after he had received his license to practice medicine in this state.” Id., 252.

       In light of our disposition of this case, we need not decide whether the trustee bank “has ‘purposefully directed’ [its] activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation [has] resulted] from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities”; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, 471 U.S. 472; such that the trial court also may exercise specific jurisdiction over the case. Cf. id., 478 (upholding exercise of specific jurisdiction over foreign franchisee of franchisor located in forum); Calder v.
        Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984) (upholding exercise of specific jurisdiction over foreign newspaper reporter and editor whose defamatory publication had been aimed at forum); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958) (reversing exercise of specific jurisdiction over foreign corporate trustee that had performed no acts in forum that were sufficiently connected to plaintiff’s injuries); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1957) (upholding exercise of specific jurisdiction over foreign insurance company that had solicited insurance policy in forum).

       We reach this determination without deciding whether the trustee bank could be deemed to be “transacting business” in this state pursuant to General Statutes §§ 33-396, 33-397 and 33-411 (b); See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 72 S. Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485 (1952) (foreign corporation may have continuous and systematic business contacts with forum for purposes of constitutional test even if, under state statute, those contacts do not constitute transacting business under state law).