text:
    The Loomis Institute v. Town of Windsor
    (14945)
    (14946)
    Peters, C. J., and Callahan, Borden, Katz and Palmer, Js.

      Argued May 24
    decision released July 11, 1995

      Francis H. Morrison III, with whom were Joseph L. Hammer and, on the brief, Alex C. Geisinger, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).

      William H. Narwold, with whom were Laura W. Ray and, on the brief, Charles D. Ray, for the appelleeappellant (plaintiff).
   Peters, C. J.

The principal issue in this tax appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that faculty houses owned by a day and boarding school were exempt from local property taxes because, in accordance with General Statutes § 12-81 (7), the school used the property exclusively for carrying out its educational mission. The plaintiff, The Loomis Institute (taxpayer), filed an action in the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-89 and 12-119, to challenge the denial of its claimed tax exemption on certain of its real properties by the board of tax review of the defendant town of Windsor (town). After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the taxpayer. The town appealed and the taxpayer cross appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal and the cross appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We conclude that the trial court’s factual findings support its legal conclusion that the taxpayer is entitled to the statutory exemption. We also reject the taxpayer’s cross appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are undisputed. The taxpayer operates the Loomis Chaffee School (school), a coeducational day and boarding school located in Windsor. The school annually enrolls approximately 325 boarding students and 375 day students.

The property at issue in this appeal consists of twenty-five freestanding houses. The school uses and maintains the houses, which are located within walking distance of the school’s main campus area, primarily as residences for faculty members and their families. The school also uses the houses for counseling and entertaining students, and for housing students’ parents, trustees and other school visitors.

In exchange for the right to live in the houses, faculty members must perform certain duties for the school, including study hall and dormitory supervision of boarding students, weekly visitation with boarding advisees, attendance at family style dinners with boarding students, assistance at special campus events and athletic coaching. Moreover, these faculty members, unlike off campus faculty members, act in loco parentis to boarding students and must be available on a twenty-four hour basis to take care of any problems that may occur at the school.

Occasionally, the school rents out its hockey rink, swimming pool, playing fields and dormitories. Dormitories are rented to house summer camp students, when not in use by boarding school students. The school derives no profit from the rental of its dormitories and athletic facilities. The rental of these facilities allows the school to cover overhead costs, to utilize maintenance staff effectively and to present the school to prospective students. The rentals do not interfere with the school’s educational function.

On its quadrennial form filed for the tax periods at issue in this appeal; see General Statutes § 12-81 (7) (b); the taxpayer identified the school’s purpose as educational. The taxpayer also answered “yes” to a question that asked whether all of the school’s property was used exclusively for its identified purpose. The taxpayer qualified the latter response only by stating that the school leased a portion of its property for farming purposes.

On the basis of these facts, the trial court came to the following conclusions. First, it concluded that the taxpayer had used the houses exclusively for carrying out an educational purpose and that the property was therefore exempt from taxation pursuant to § 12-81 (7). Second, it concluded that the houses continued to be exempt from taxation pursuant to the school’s charter of incorporation. Third, it concluded that the taxpayer appropriately had responded “yes” to the question that asked whether all of its property was used exclusively for its identified purpose and, therefore, had filed an accurate quadrennial form. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the town to remit $134,134.99 to the taxpayer for tax payments made attributable to the exempt property. The trial court also awarded the taxpayer $608.20 in costs and $31,354.51 in interest pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a, although it refused to award the taxpayer interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a.

In its appeal, the town claims that the trial court improperly: (1) determined that the houses were tax exempt pursuant to § 12-81 (7) and pursuant to the school’s charter of incorporation; and (2) awarded the taxpayer interest pursuant to § 52-192a. In its cross appeal, the taxpayer claims that the trial court improperly denied its claim for interest pursuant to § 37-3a. We find none of these claims persuasive.

I

We first review the trial court’s conclusion that the houses were exempt from taxation pursuant to § 12-81 (7). Significantly, the town does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact. It claims, however, that those findings are insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that the houses were “used exclusively for carrying out” an educational purpose as that language is used in the statute. We disagree.

Real property is eligible for a tax exemption from local property taxes if the property meets two requirements established by § 12-81 (7). The statute conditions tax exemption on a showing that the corporation that owns or holds the property in trust: (1) is “organized exclusively for scientific, educational, literary, historical or charitable purposes or for two or more such purposes”; and (2) uses the property “exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes.” General Statutes § 12-81 (7); see Red Top, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 181 Conn. 343, 350, 435 A.2d 364 (1980); New Canaan Country School, Inc. v. New Canaan, 138 Conn. 347, 349, 84 A.2d 691 (1951).

The town does not contest that the taxpayer is a properly constituted corporation for purposes of § 12-81 (7). Accordingly, the sole issue before us is whether the houses were used exclusively for carrying out an educational purpose.

The general rule of construction in taxation cases is that provisions granting a tax exemption are to be construed strictly against the party claiming the exemption. Common Fund v. Fairfield, 228 Conn. 375, 380, 636 A.2d 795 (1994); United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 752, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992); Plastic Tooling Aids Laboratory, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 213 Conn. 365, 369, 567 A.2d 1218 (1990). As applied to educational institutions, however, § 12-81 (7) “does not grant an exemption in the technical sense. Rather it merely states a rule of nontaxability. Consequently, it does not come within the rule that tax exemption statutes must be construed strictly against the taxpayer.” Arnold College v. Milford, 144 Conn. 206, 210, 128 A.2d 537 (1957); St. Bridget Convent Corp. v. Milford, 87 Conn. 474, 478, 88 A. 881 (1913); Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 329-30, 42 A. 87 (1899); accord Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 374, 279 A.2d 561 (1971).

Furthermore, this court consistently has interpreted broadly the statutory requirement that property be “used exclusively for carrying out” an educational purpose. “It is well established that the exemption granted [under § 12-81 (7)] is not limited to the buildings used for educational purposes in the limited and restricted sense. It extends to all of the property the use of which is incidental to education, including campuses and playing fields. . . . The real test is whether the property is sequestered for educational purposes and whether the corporation, or any person, can secure any profit from its operations.” (Citations omitted.) Arnold College v. Milford, supra, 144 Conn. 210; Red Top, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 181 Conn. 352-53.

These precedents illuminate the town’s claim that the taxpayer has failed to meet the requirement of § 12-81 (7) that its property be used exclusively for carrying out an educational purpose. Our case law establishes that the statutory requirement can be satisfied by a use of the property that is incidental to education. See Red Top, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 181 Conn. 352-53; Arnold College v. Milford, supra, 144 Conn. 210.

The determination of whether property is used exclusively for carrying out an educational purpose “ ‘is necessarily governed by the specific facts in the individual case.’ ” New Canaan Country School, Inc. v. New Canaan, supra, 138 Conn. 349. In this case, the trial court had ample factual support for its conclusion that the taxpayer had met its burden of establishing that the houses were being used exclusively for carrying out an educational purpose. In light of the unchallenged factual record, we agree with this conclusion. See Red Top, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 181 Conn. 350-54 (rowing camp used as training facility for student crews and containing docks, boat houses, caretaker facilities and buildings for housing and feeding crews and support personnel exempt from taxation); Arnold College v. Milford, supra, 144 Conn. 207-10 (college-owned gymnasium, playing field, chapel and cottage used as residence for caretaker exempt from taxation).

The town urges that New Canaan Country School, Inc. v. New Canaan, supra, 138 Conn. 347, compels a different result, but we are persuaded that New Canaan is distinguishable. There we held taxable two houses owned by a day school and used solely as residences for some of the school’s teachers. Id., 348. In New Canaan, the day school provided the houses solely in response to a housing shortage and made no claim that they served any educational purpose whatsoever. Id., 352. Here, in contrast, although the houses were residences for faculty members and their families, the trial court found that the taxpayer used the houses purely to effectuate its educational purposes. Specifically, the court found that having faculty members living on campus served the educational purpose of providing counseling and other services for the school’s boarding students. Cf. Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, supra, 160 Conn. 371-72, 377-78 (apartment building that was owned by hospital, located near hospital premises, used to house hospital interns and residents and necessary for hospital to perform services effectively was used exclusively for hospital purposes and therefore exempt from taxation).

The town further claims that the taxpayer should not be allowed to claim the benefits of § 12-81 (7) because it inaccurately answered “yes” to a question on the quadrennial form that inquired whether all of the school’s property was used exclusively for its educational purposes. The trial court found, however, that the taxpayer had filed an accurate quadrennial form, and we agree. The quadrennial form required the taxpayer to disclose whether the school’s property was used exclusively for its own educational purposes. Although the school’s dormitories and athletic facilities were rented out to third parties, the court found that such rentals did not interfere with, but actually furthered, the school’s educational purpose. Cf. West Hartford v. Connecticut Fair Assn., 88 Conn. 627, 633, 92 A. 432 (1914) (land owned by agricultural society and rented to third parties found exempt from taxation where rentals furthered society’s purposes); First Unitarian Society v. Hartford, 66 Conn. 368, 375-76, 34 A. 89 (1895) (building owned by ecclesiastical society and rented to third parties found exempt from taxation as building exclusively occupied as church where revenues from rentals used to maintain religious services in building and rentals did not interrupt occupation of building as church).

In light of the trial court’s unchallenged factual findings, we affirm its conclusion that the houses were exempt from taxation pursuant to § 12-81 (7). We therefore need not address the trial court’s alternate holding that the taxpayer also was entitled to a tax exemption under the terms of its charter. The town agreed at oral argument in this court that it could not prevail on the taxability issue if we affirmed on either of the grounds on which the trial court relied.

II

We next consider the parties’ competing claims regarding the trial court’s award of interest. After the trial court rendered judgment for a tax refund for the taxpayer, the taxpayer sought offer of judgment interest pursuant to § 52-192a and overlapping prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a. Pursuant to § 52-192a (b), the trial court awarded the taxpayer interest at the statutory rate of 12 percent per year from the date that the taxpayer had filed its tax appeal in the trial court to the date of the court’s judgment. The trial court, however, denied the taxpayer additional prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a.

The town claims that the trial court lacked the authority to award the taxpayer interest pursuant to § 52-192a, because, according to the town, a tax appeal does not constitute a “civil action” under the statute. The taxpayer claims that the trial court improperly failed to award it interest pursuant to § 37-3a. We reject both claims and affirm the trial court’s award.

The following additional facts are relevant to these claims. The taxpayer filed its tax appeal with the trial court on April 22, 1992. On October 4, 1993, the taxpayer filed an offer of judgment pursuant to § 52-192a (a) in the amount of $134,134.99. On October 25,1993, the town rejected the taxpayer’s offer of judgment.

Section 52-192a (b) requires a trial court to award interest to the prevailing plaintiff from the date of the filing of a complaint to the date of judgment whenever: (1) a plaintiff files a valid offer of judgment within eighteen months of the filing of the complaint in a civil complaint for money damages; (2) the defendant rejects the offer of judgment; and (3) the plaintiff ultimately recovers an amount greater than or equal to the offer of judgment. See Lutynski v. B. B. & J. Tracking, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 806, 812, 628 A.2d 1 (1993), aff’d, 229 Conn. 525, 528, 642 A.2d 7 (1994). The town argues that the statute does not apply to a tax appeal because, according to the town, such an appeal is not a “civil action . . . seeking the recovery of money damages . . . .” General Statutes § 52-192a (a). We disagree.

Although the General Statutes contain no generic definition of the term “civil action,” the provisions of our Practice Book fill this gap. The section in the Practice Book that directly implements § 52-192a (a) mirrors the usage of “civil action” that is found in the statute. See Practice Book § 346. Practice Book § 256 expressly provides, furthermore, that, “[f]or purposes of these rules, administrative appeals are civil actions [except for purposes of General Statutes §§ 52-591, 52-592 and 52-593].” Tax appeals fall within the Practice Book’s definition of “administrative appeals.” Practice Book § 255. Accordingly, the taxpayer’s tax appeal was a “civil action” under Practice Book §§ 256 and 346, and the trial court properly awarded interest to the taxpayer pursuant to § 52-192a.

In contrast to § 52-192a, § 37-3a permits the recovery of interest in civil actions “as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.” “We have construed the statute to make the allowance of interest depend upon whether the detention of money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances. Cecio Bros., Inc. v. Feldmann, 161 Conn. 265, 275, 287 A.2d 374 (1971). The allowance of interest as an element of damages is, thus, primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court. Bertozzi v. McCarthy, 164 Conn. 463, 467, 323 A.2d 553 (1973).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Newington v. General Sanitation Service Co., 196 Conn. 81, 90, 491 A.2d 363 (1985). The decision to award interest “ ‘is one to be made in view of the demands of justice rather than through the application of any arbitrary rule.’ ” Cecio Bros., Inc. v. Feldmann, supra, 275.

The trial court did not explain why it had refused to award the taxpayer interest pursuant to § 37-3a, other than to state, in response to the taxpayer’s motion for articulation, that such interest had been denied “in [the court’s] discretion.” Several circumstances support our affirmance of the court’s exercise of discretion in this case. There is no evidence that the town acted maliciously or in bad faith toward the taxpayer. See O'Hara v. State, 218 Conn. 628, 644, 590 A.2d 948 (1991). Moreover, having already awarded the taxpayer mandatory offer of judgment interest, the trial court might reasonably have concluded that a further award of interest pursuant to § 37-3a would not have been equitable. Finally, the taxpayer did not avail itself of the opportunity to seek appellate review of the trial court’s refusal to articulate the reasons for its denial of interest pursuant to § 37-3a. In these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the taxpayer interest pursuant to § 37-3a in addition to interest awarded pursuant to § 52-192a.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 12-81 provides in relevant part: “exemptions. The following-described property shall be exempt from taxation ....
      “(7) PROPERTY USED FOR SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL, LITERARY, HISTORICAL or charitable purposes, exception. Subject to the provisions of sections 12-87 and 12-88, the real property of, or held in trust for, a corporation organized exclusively for scientific, educational, literary, historical or charitable purposes or for two or more such purposes and used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes and the personal property of, or held in trust for, any such corporation, provided (a) any officer, member or employee thereof does not receive or at any future time shall not receive any pecuniary profit from the operations thereof, except reasonable compensation for services in effecting one or more of such purposes or as proper beneficiary of its strictly charitable purposes, and provided (b) in 1965, and quadrennially thereafter, a statement on forms prepared by the secretary of the office of policy and management shall be filed on or before the last day required by law for the filing of assessment returns with the local board of assessors of any town, consolidated town and city or consolidated town and borough, in which any of its property claimed to be exempt is situated. . . .”

       As originally filed, the tax appeal challenged the validity of assessments dated October 1,1991. Subsequent amendments to the pleadings enlarged the taxpayer’s challenge to encompass the validity of assessments dated October 1, 1992, and October 1, 1993.

       The legislature incorporated the school by a charter, which it passed by special act in 1874. The charter of incorporation grants the school a property tax exemption upon the school’s compliance with the charter’s terms.

       The taxpayer also challenged the town’s tax assessment of two undeveloped parcels of land that students at the school had used for athletic events and bird watching. The trial court concluded, on the basis of these undisputed facts, that the parcels were exempt from taxation pursuant to § 12-81 (7). On appeal, the town does not challenge this conclusion.

       Other faculty members who perform similar boarding duties and who live off campus in their own houses receive approximately $10,000 per year in additional compensation from the school.

       The trial court’s judgment included the remittal of taxes assessed by the town upon the two undeveloped parcels of land. See footnote 4.

       General Statutes § 52-192a provides in relevant part: “offer of judgment BY PLAINTIFF. ACCEPTANCE BY DEFENDANT. COMPUTATION OF INTEREST. (a) After commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the plaintiff may before trial file with the clerk of the court a written ‘offer of judgment’ signed by him or his attorney, directed to the defendant or his attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action and to stipulate to a judgment for a sum certain. The plaintiff shall give notice of the offer of settlement to the defendant’s attorney, or if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, to the defendant himself. Within thirty days after being notified of the filing of the ‘offer of judgment’ and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the defendant or his attorney may file with the clerk of the court a written ‘acceptance of offer of judgment’ agreeing to a stipulation for judgment as contained in plaintiff’s ‘offer of judgment.’ Upon such filing, the clerk shall enter judgment immediately on the stipulation. If the ‘offer of judgment’ is not accepted within thirty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the ‘offer of judgment’ shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled. Any such ‘offer of judgment’ and any ‘acceptance of offer of judgment’ shall be included by the clerk in the record of the case.
      “(b) After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an ‘offer of judgment’ which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain stated in his ‘offer of judgment,’ the court shall add to the amount so recovered twelve per cent annual interest on said amount, computed from the date such offer was filed in actions commenced before October 1, 1981. In those actions commenced on or after October 1,1981, the interest shall be computed from the date the complaint in the civil action was filed with the court if the ‘offer of judgment’ was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing of such complaint. If such offer was filed later than eighteen months from the date of filing of the complaint, the interest shall be computed from the date the ‘offer of judgment’ was filed. The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars, and shall render judgment accordingly. ...”

       General Statutes § 37-3a provides in relevant part: “rate recoverable as damages. Except as provided in sections 37-3b, 37-3c and 52-192a, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions ... as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. ...”

       See footnote 3.

       Practice Book § 255 provides in relevant part: “For purposes of these rules, administrative appeals are those appeals taken pursuant to statute from decisions of . . . boards . . . of any political subdivision of the state

       The town also claims that the trial court improperly awarded interest pursuant to § 52-192a because, the town claims, the taxpayer actually sought equitable relief rather than money damages. The town, however, has^evoted only one sentence to this issue and has neither cited any authority nor provided any analysis to support it. The issue, therefore, is not sufficiently briefed to warrant our consideration. See Practice Book § 4065; Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, 228 Conn. 651, 676, 638 A.2d6(1994); Latham & Associates, Inc. v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 218 Conn. 297, 300, 589 A.2d 337 (1991); Gaynor v. Union Trust Co., 216 Conn. 458, 482, 582 A.2d 190 (1990); Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 210 Conn. 721, 732, 557 A.2d 116 (1989).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Peters, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Lyle Munroe et al. v. Great American Insurance Company et al.
    (14969)
    Peters, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Palmer, Js.

      Argued March 14
    decision released July 11, 1995

      Jessica L. Papazian-Ross, for the appellants (defendants).

      Michael T. Sullivan, with whom were Jacques J. Parenteau and, on the brief, Keith B. Kyle, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
   Peters, C. J.

The sole issue in this certified case from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island is whether, under the circumstances of this case, an insurance company that has issued a binder for liability insurance coverage in reliance on intentional and material misrepresentations by the insurance applicant can rescind the insurance contract ab initio so as to avoid liability to innocent third parties. The plaintiffs, Lyle Munroe and Shirley Munroe, brought a diversity action in the District Court, pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §§ 27-7-1 and 27-7-2, to recover damages for personal injuries that they had suffered in a collision between their car and that of Ronald R. Menard. They alleged that Menard, at the time of the accident, was insured under an insurance binder issued by the defendant, Great American Insurance Company. The defendant filed an answer and a counterclaim, in which it alleged that it had no liability to the plaintiffs because it had revoked and rescinded Menard’s insurance upon discovering intentional and material misrepresentations in Menard’s insurance application. Concluding that Connecticut law governed the validity of the defendant’s counterclaim, the District Court certified the following question to us, which we agreed to answer: “Whether intentional material misrepresentations on an application for insurance give the insurance company the right to rescind the insurance contract with the effect that it is void ab initio?” We are persuaded that the answer to the question is: No, under the circumstances of this case.

The record provided by the District Court establishes the following facts. Menard purchased his car in Connecticut on February 8,1990. In order to register the car, he needed proof of liability insurance. He knew that his motor vehicle operator license had been suspended because of his failure to pay fines arising out of his convictions, in 1988 and 1989, of reckless driving and speeding.

In order to obtain liability insurance, Menard contacted an agent at Guardian Group-Gerardi Associates, Inc. (Guardian), an authorized Connecticut agency for the defendant, to whom he intentionally made representations that were false and that were material to his eligibility for insurance coverage. Over the telephone, Menard advised the agent that he was married, that he was living at a designated address in Putnam and that he had not been convicted of a moving violation within the last five years. None of these statements was true. A woman representing herself to be Menard’s wife then went to the Guardian office, where she signed Menard’s name and her own to the insurance application and made a deposit payment of $120. The application contained incorrect driver’s license numbers for Menard and for his alleged wife. Guardian issued an insurance binder effective February 8, 1990, providing, in part, single limit liability coverage in the amount of $300,000. The binder would not have issued but for the misrepresentations made by Menard.

Guardian immediately forwarded the insurance application and the deposit to the defendant. On February 23,1990, Guardian was notified by the defendant that it had been unable to obtain a motor vehicle report concerning Menard or his alleged wife from the state of Connecticut. The defendant asked Guardian to confirm the license numbers that had been provided to it. On March 3,1990, a Guardian agent telephoned the number given on the insurance application, which was the telephone number of Menard’s mother, and left a message for Menard. On March 8, 1990, having reached Menard at his work place, a Guardian agent asked Menard to verify his license number. Menard replied that he did not have his license with him and would have to call back. He failed to do so.

On March 15, 1990, the plaintiffs were injured in a two car accident that was caused by Menard, who was driving the car listed on the binder issued by Guardian. Menard died as the result of the accident.

On March 20, 1990, five days after the accident in which the plaintiffs were injured and Menard was killed, the defendant obtained the correct driver’s license numbers for Menard and his alleged wife. The defendant then obtained accurate information about Menard’s driving record from the Connecticut department of motor vehicles. On April 5,1990, twenty-one days after the accident and fifty-six days after the binder had become effective, the defendant sent a letter to Menard’s alleged wife in which it gave her notice that Menard’s application for insurance had been “rejected” and that coverage was “rescinded.”

The question in this case is whether the legislature abrogated the insurer’s common law right of rescission when it enacted the automobile insurance statutes, General Statutes § 38a-334 et seq. While the legislature’s authority to abrogate the common law is undeniable, we will not lightly impute such an intent to the legislature. “[Cjourts must discharge their responsibility, in case-by-case adjudication, to assure that the body of the law—both common and statutory—remains coherent and consistent.” Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 513-14, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993). “Although the legislature may eliminate a common law right by statute, the presumption that the legislature does not have such a purpose can be overcome only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly expressed.” Lynn v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 226 Conn. 282, 290, 627 A.2d 1288 (1993); State v. Sanchez, 204 Conn. 472, 479, 528 A.2d 373 (1987). We conclude that the compulsory automobile insurance statutes, read as a whole, abrogate the right of an insurer to rescind automobile insurance ab initio so as to deny recovery to an innocent third party victim.

In Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, 218 Conn. 681, 692, 590 A.2d 957 (1991), we explained that at common law, an insurer has a right to rescind for material misrepresentation in an insurance application if that misrepresentation is “known by the insured to be false when made.” Our common law of automobile insurance contracts is therefore more restrictive than our common law of contracts generally. Automobile insurance, however, may be rescinded at common law on the basis of intentional material misrepresentation.

General Statutes § 38a-340, formerly § 38-175e, authorizes an automobile liability insurer to issue a temporary policy, known as a binder, pending its undertaking of permanent insurance coverage. Under § 38a-340, a binder may not be issued for a period exceeding sixty days, and its provisions must comply with the legislative mandates of General Statutes §§ 38a-334 to 38a-336, inclusive, § 38a-338, and §§ 38a-340 to 38a-345, inclusive. General Statutes § 38a-343, formerly § 38-175h, in turn, provides in relevant part: “No notice of cancellation of a policy which has been in effect for less than sixty days may be effective unless mailed or delivered by the insurer at least forty-five days before the effective date of cancellation, provided that at least ten days’ notice shall be given where cancellation is for nonpayment of premium or material misrepresentation.” (Emphasis added.)

The defendant argues that the reference in § 38a-343 to cancellation for material misrepresentation does not abrogate an insurer’s common law right of rescission for intentional material misrepresentation. In the defendant’s view, an insurer who exercises due diligence in verifying the information provided by an applicant retains the right to avoid the contract ab initio for intentional material misrepresentation. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the inclusion of a cancellation provision specifically addressing material misrepresentation indicates that the legislature intended § 38a-343 to be an insurer’s exclusive remedy for misrepresentations, whether made intentionally or not. On this construction, because the notice of cancellation was not sent until after the accident, the defendant could not avoid liability to the plaintiffs, because under the statute the cancellation necessarily became effective only after the accident had occurred. In the context of an action brought by an injured third party, we agree with the plaintiffs’ reading of the applicable statutes.

The defendant is correct that, in statutes other than § 38a-343, the legislature has undertaken, in so many words, to distinguish between cancellation on the one hand and annulment or rescission on the other. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 38a-321 (referring in disjunctive to “cancellation” or “rescission”) and 38a-567 (1) (C) (small employer health insurance plans can be “rescinded for . . . material misrepresentation” [emphasis added]). These textual clues, though not occurring in the automobile insurance subchapter itself, could suggest a legislative intent to limit the applicability of the provisions in § 38a-343 to instances of prospective termination of insurance binders. See generally Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 573, 522 A.2d 763 (1987) (meaning of term in statute determined in part by looking to related statutes in same chapter).

Such an interpretation also could find support in cases arising under § 38a-321 and its predecessors dating back to the 1930s, in which we have authorized automobile insurers to exercise their right to annul an insurance contract even when intervening third party interests may be adversely affected. We repeatedly have interpreted that statute to provide that “[a] party subrogated to the rights of an assured . . . obtains no different or greater rights against the insurer than the insured possesses and is equally subject to any defense the insurer may have against the assured under the policy. Arton v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 163 Conn. 127, 139-40, 302 A.2d 284 (1972); Commercial Contractors Corporation v. American Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 31, 40, 202 A.2d 498 (1964); Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 138 Conn. 298, 305, 84 A.2d 267 (1951); Goergen v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 89, 93, 166 A. 757 (1933); Rochon v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 114 Conn. 313, 315-16, 158 A. 815 (1932).” Brown v. Employer’s Reinsurance Corp., 206 Conn. 668, 673, 539 A.2d 138 (1988). While those cases focused on the insured’s alleged failure to cooperate, nothing in their holdings suggests that they would not have applied to an insured’s material intentional misrepresentations to the insurer.

Indeed, some courts have recognized a distinction between cancellation and rescission for purposes of insurance contracts. In Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Co., 528 Pa. 1, 7-8 n.6, 595 A.2d 1 (1991), for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that cancellation refers to prospective termination only, while rescission “is an abrogation of all rights and responsibilities of the parties towards each other from the inception of the contract. It is a form of retroactive relief.” See also United Security Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 133 Mich. App. 38, 42, 348 N.W.2d 34 (1984) (“[rescission is insufficiently similar to cancellation to support the conclusion that the Legislature’s enactment of a statute controlling cancellation of an automobile insurance policy without mentioning rescission demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to preclude rescission”); 8 J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (1973) § 5011, p. 441; R. Keeton & A. Widiss, Insurance Law (1988) § 6.10 (e), p. 739 (discussing different ramifications of cancellation and rescission).

Despite these sources of support for the defendant’s argument, however, reading the automobile insurance statutes as a whole persuades us that the defendant’s proffered interpretation is untenable. We presume that the term “cancellation” retains the same meaning throughout the automobile insurance statutes; see Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co., 223 Conn. 336, 343, 612 A.2d 1203 (1992); and neither party has suggested otherwise. In General Statutes § 38a-343a, the legislature provided that insurance companies, on a monthly basis, must notify the commissioner of motor vehicles of the “cancellation” of all previously issued automobile insurance policies which occurred during the preceding month. The commissioner is then required to use that information to determine whether the can-celled insured has maintained the legally required insurance coverage. The evident purpose of this statute is to facilitate the suspension of motor vehicle registrations for failure to maintain insurance.

If we were to follow the defendant’s reasoning, the notification procedures established in § 38a-343a would not apply when the insurer seeks to rescind an insurance binder ab initio, because the statute refers solely to “cancellation.” We have found no legislative history to support such a statutory distinction. Rather, the legislature appears to have intended, as a means of controlling insurance costs, to establish a comprehensive program that would facilitate the license revocation of all drivers who do not have proper insurance. See 36 S. Proc., Pt. 12, 1993 Sess., pp. 4468-71. The limited applicability of § 38a-343a that would follow from the defendant’s interpretation of the term “cancellation” cannot be reconciled with this manifest legislative intent.

Similar problems emerge from the application of the defendant’s interpretation to General Statutes §§ 38a-344 (valid form of notice of cancellation), 38a-345 (notification from insurer to former insured of potential eligibility for assigned risk pool), and 38a-346 (immunity from civil liability arising out of notice of cancellation). The policy arguments that might support a distinction between cancellation and rescission in the limited ambit of § 38a-343 dissipate when that distinction is tested against the statutory landscape as a whole. We conclude, accordingly, that the legislature did not intend the insurer’s common law right of rescission as against an innocent third party for intentional material misrepresentation by the insured to survive the enactment of § 38a-343.

We note that our result today is consistent with the conclusion reached by other courts that have addressed the effect of a legislative scheme of compulsory automobile insurance on the common law right of rescission. See annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1104 (1962) and supplemental sections. Although many of these cases arise out of different statutory enactments, they reflect the common policy of providing financial protection for those injured in automobile accidents.

The certified question that we agreed to answer for the District Court asked “[wjhether intentional material misrepresentations on an application for insurance give the insurance company the right to rescind the insurance contract with the effect that it is void ab initio?” The answer to the certified question is: No, under the circumstances of this case.

No costs shall be taxed in this court to either party.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       Rhode Island General Laws § 27-7-1 (1989 reenactment) provided: “provision FOR DIRECT LIABILITY OF INSURER TO PERSON INJURED.-Every policy hereafter written insuring against liability for property damage or personal injuries or both, and every policy hereinafter written indemnifying any person by reason of that liability, other than the payment of compensation under chapters 29 to 38, inclusive, of title 28, shall contain provisions to the effect that the insurer shall be directly liable to the injured party and, in the event of that party’s death, to the party entitled to sue therefor, to pay that party the amount of damages for which the insured is liable.”
      Rhode Island General Laws § 27-7-2 provides: “remedies of injured party against insurer.-An injured party, or, in the event of that party’s death, the party entitled to sue therefor, in his or her suit against the insured, shall not join the insurer as a defendant. If, however, the officer serving any process against the insured shall return that process ‘non est inventus’, or where before suit has been brought and probate proceedings have not been initiated the insured has died, or where suit is pending against an insured in his own name and the insured died prior to judgment, or where a nonresident had been involved in an automobile accident in Rhode Island as an operator or owner and died before suit has been brought, the injured party, and, in the event of that party’s death, the party entitled to sue therefor, may proceed directly against the insurer. The injured party, or, in the event of that party’s death, the party entitled to sue therefor, after having obtained judgment against the insured alone, may proceed on that judgment in a separate action against the insurer; provided, however, the payment in whole or in part of the liability by either the insured or the insurer shall, to the extent thereof, be a bar to recovery against the other of the amount so paid.”

       General Statutes § 51-199a provides in relevant part: “short title: UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT. . . .
      “(b) The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by . . . a United States district court when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court of this state.
      “(c) This section may be invoked by an order of [the United States district court] upon the court’s own motion or upon the motion of any party to the cause.
      “(d) A certification order shall set forth: (1) The questions of law to be answered; and (2) a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose.”
      See also Practice Book § 4168.

       We do not decide whether a different result would obtain in an action directly between the insured and the insurer. See, e.g., Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Clay, 248 Kan. 889, 895, 811 P.2d 1202 (1991) (permitting rescission as against insured but not injured third party).

       As a matter of common law, a party to a contract other than an automobile insurance contract may rescind that contract and avoid liability thereunder if that party’s consent to the contract was procured either by the other party’s fraudulent misrepresentations, or by the other party’s non-fraudulent material misrepresentations. State v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 136 Conn. 157, 167, 70 A.2d 109 (1949); E. & F. Construction Co. v. Stamford, 114 Conn. 250, 257-58, 158 A. 551 (1932); 1 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 162 (1981) (defining fraudulent and material), and § 164 (1), and especially comment (b) thereto. Accordingly, the party seeking to rescind need not demonstrate that the other party’s misrepresentations were made intentionally, provided that they are material to the contract. See, e.g., 1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 164, illustration 2; cf. 7 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (2d Ed. 1985) § 35:119 (collecting cases from other jurisdictions permitting rescission of automobile insurance contract on basis of innocent material misrepresentation).

       Chapter 700 is entitled “property and casualty insurance.” Section 38a-321 is located in part I of the chapter, entitled “in general,” while § 38a-343 is located in part II of the chapter, entitled “motor vehicle policies.”

         General Statutes § 38a-321, formerly § 38-175, provides in relevant part: “liability of insurer under liability policy. Each insurance company which issues a policy to any person, firm or corporation, insuring against loss or damage on account of the bodily injury or death by accident of any person, or damage to the property of any person, for which loss or damage such person, firm or corporation is legally responsible, shall, whenever a loss occurs under such policy, become absolutely liable, and the payment of such loss shall not depend upon the satisfaction by the assured of a final judgment against him for loss, damage or death occasioned by such casualty. No such contract of insurance shall be cancelled or annulled by any agreement between the insurance company and the assured after the assured has become responsible for such loss or damage, and any such cancellation or annulment shall be void. . . .”

       In United Security Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., supra, 133 Mich. App. 38, the Michigan Appellate Court affirmed an insurer’s right to rescind an automobile insurance contract, as against the insured, on the basis of intentional material misrepresentation. The court, however, distinguished the case from one in which the claim was made by a third party. Id., 43.

       We recognize that § 38a-343a became effective after the date of the accident that led to this litigation. See Public Acts 1993, No. 93-298. The term “cancellation” had already been used in General Statutes §§ 38a-344 through 38a-346, however, all of which predate the 1982 enactment of the relevant language in § 38a-343. See Public Acts 1982, No. 82-353, § 2.


author: Norcott, J.

text:
    In re Bruce R. et al.

    (14943)
    Peters, C. J., and Callahan, Berdon, Norcott and Katz, Js.
    Argued February 10
    decision released July 11, 1995

      WilliamF. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Cynthia C. Bott and Edward Giacci, for the appellant (petitioner father).

      Sean Orion LeBas, for the appellee (respondent mother).

      JoNel Newman filed a brief for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae.

       In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 4166B.2, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Supreme Court.

   Norcott, J.

The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly granted the petitioner father’s petitions to terminate his parental rights pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-715 et seq. without first considering his financial condition and the financial condition of his children’s custodial parent. The trial court granted the petitions to terminate his parental rights pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717 (f). The respondent mother, who has sole custody of the children, appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that § 45a-717 (f) required that the trial court consider the financial condition of the parents, including the parent who is seeking to terminate his or her parental rights, as a factor in determining the best interest of the children. In re Bruce R., 34 Conn. App. 176, 640 A.2d 643 (1994). Thereafter, we granted certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “In the circumstances of this case, was the financial condition of the natural parents a required consideration in determining whether termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children?” In re Bruce R., 230 Conn. 902, 644 A.2d 915 (1994). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court in its opinion narrated the following undisputed facts. “During the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent, they had two children issue of the marriage, a son born June 18,1980, and a daughter, born December 2,1987. On March 25,1988, their marriage was dissolved by the Superior Court. In the decree of dissolution, the respondent was granted custody of the two minor children and the petitioner was granted liberal rights of visitation. The decree further ordered the petitioner to pay $75 per week for the support of each minor child, [to] maintain medical and life insurance for their benefit, and to pay one-half of all their unreimbursed medical expenses. After the dissolution, problems arose between the petitioner and respondent that affected the petitioner’s rights of visitation.

“On May 14, 1991, the petitioner filed petitions in the Court of Probate for the district of Derby seeking to terminate his parental rights with respect to both children. Both petitions alleged the following reasons for seeking such termination of parental rights: ‘Since the date of dissolution, the children have been used as pawns. I have been denied visitation when requested. Allegations have been raised that I am not a fit father which led the Superior Court to enter supervised visitation. Since that order, additional problems with visitation have arisen which are now affecting the well-being of the children. In mid-winter 1990/1991, Respondent, mother of the minor [children], suggested that in the best interest of the children, that I consent to termination of my parental rights. After careful consideration and thought and after reviewing the inability of Respondent and me to discuss any difficulties that we have, including important matters in the [children’s lives], it is clear that I agree with her contention that my parental rights be terminated. The [children’s] well-being is affected adversely by the difficulties between Respondent and me which I do not believe can be cured through counseling. It is further clear that the ultimate best interest of the children will be served by the termination of my parental rights to allow Respondent to live her life without any concern for me or of me and thereby ease the pressure on the [children] emotionally.’ Along with the petitions seeking to terminate parental rights, the petitioner executed and filed the consent form required by General Statutes § 45a-715 (d). The Court of Probate appointed an attorney for the children and ordered the department of children and youth services (DCYS) to make an investigation and subsequent written report regarding the proposed termination. [See General Statutes § 45a-717 (e).] DCYS contracted with a private agency, Community Children and Family Services, to conduct the investigation and that private agency thereafter submitted a written report to the Court of Probate. The report was based on the information gathered from interviews with the petitioner, the respondent, and both children. The report recommended that the petitions for termination of parental rights be denied on the ground that ‘it does not seem to bear that inability to get along with his ex-wife relieves [the petitioner] from responsibility for providing for his children.’

“On motion of the respondent, the petitions for termination of parental rights were ordered transferred from the Court of Probate to the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-715 (g). On July 7,1992, the attorney for the children requested that the court issue an order to obtain updated evaluations of the petitioner, the respondent, and the minor children. By agreement of all counsel, Ralph S. Welsh was appointed to conduct these evaluations. The evaluations were conducted on December 8 and 29, 1992, and written reports were submitted to the trial court. The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the termination of the petitioner’s parental rights on May 21 and 24, 1993. The petitioner, the respondent, Welsh, and the son’s therapist, Annette Bonomo, testified at the hearing. The trial court granted the petitions to terminate the petitioner’s parental rights on May 24, 1993.” In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 178-80.

The respondent mother, who contested the termination of the petitioner’s parental rights in the trial court, appealed. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that when the parent whose rights are being terminated consents to the termination, General Statutes § 45a-715 et seq. “requires that the trial court consider, as one of the elements necessary to make the determination of what is in the best interests of the children, the financial condition of the natural parents.” Id., 184-85. The Appellate Court stressed: “We do not hold, nor do we imply, that the financial conditions of the parents may alone determine the best interests of a child. We do hold that the trial court must be adequately apprised of such financial condition, must give it due consideration, and must accord it as much weight in its decision as the trial court in its discretion deems appropriate in light of all the other facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed termination of parental rights.” Id., 185.

On appeal, the petitioner contends that § 45a-715 et seq. contain no mandate that the trial court consider the financial condition of the parents in determining the best interest of the child in consensual termination proceedings and, therefore, that the Appellate Court improperly construed the statutory scheme to impose such a requirement. In addition, the petitioner claims that such a requirement constitutes a constitutionally impermissible classification based on wealth.

Before turning to the petitioner’s claims, it is necessary to understand fully the significance of the issue before this court. “[T]he termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.” Anonymous v. Norton, 168 Conn. 421, 430, 362 A.2d 532, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935, 96 S. Ct. 294, 46 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1975). A judgment terminating a parent’s rights not only severs the emotional and physical ties between parent and child, but also absolves that parent of all future support obligations. General Statutes § 45a-707 (g). It would be anathema for our law to allow parents to terminate voluntarily their parental rights “solely for the purpose of evading or relieving [themselves] of responsibility to pay child support.” 3 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children (2d Ed. 1994) § 28.14, p. 45. As one court wrote, “[s]imply put, no parent may blithely walk away from his or her parental responsibilities.” In Interest of A.B., 151 Wis. 2d 312, 322, 444 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. App. 1989). Against this backdrop, we turn to the petitioner’s claims.

I

The petitioner first claims that the Appellate Court improperly required that the financial condition of the parents be considered by a trial court as one of the criteria for determining the best interest of the child in consensual termination proceedings. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the procedure and criteria for the consensual termination of parental rights are clearly set forth in General Statutes § 45a-717 (f), and therefore, the Appellate Court improperly looked to § 45a-717 (e) (1) for guidance in interpreting the phrase “best interest of the child” contained in § 45a-717 (f). We disagree.

The termination of parental rights is governed strictly by statute. General Statutes § 45a-715 et seq.; see also General Statutes § 17a-112 (termination of parental rights of children committed to commissioner of children and families). Pursuant to § 45a-715 (a), a petition to terminate parental rights can be initiated by the child’s parent, guardian or blood relative, the town selectmen, the commissioner of children and families or a child care agency authorized by the state. The petition must state the facts upon which the termination is sought and the legal grounds for authorizing termination. General Statutes § 45a-715 (b) (6). Within thirty days of filing, a hearing on the petition must be held. General Statutes § 45a-716 (a). Notice of the hearing must be served on the parents of the minor child and the commissioner of children and families. General Statutes § 45a-716 (b). At the hearing, the court may order a physical or psychiatric evaluation of the child and/or one or both parents; General Statutes § 45a-717 (d); and “may, and in any contested case shall, request the commissioner of children and families ... to make an investigation and written report ... [as to the] physical, mental and emotional status of the child and shall contain such facts as may be relevant to determine whether the proposed termination of parental rights will be for the welfare of the child, including the physical, mental, social and financial condition of the natural parents . . . .” General Statutes § 45a-717 (e) (1).

In evaluating a petition, the court employs a standard that varies depending upon whether the parent whose rights are being terminated consents to the termination. To grant a consensual petition, the court must find “upon clear and convincing evidence that the termination is in the best interest of the child and that, with respect to any consenting parent, such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of his parental rights with respect to such child . . . .” General Statutes § 45a-717 (f); see footnote 2. Thus, the consensual termination of parental rights under § 45a-717 (f) turns on two findings, both of which must be established on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. Initially, the trial court must find that the parent whose rights are being terminated has “voluntarily and knowingly” consented to the proceedings. See General Statutes § 45a-715 (d) (written consent form must be signed). Thereafter, the trial court must determine that termination would be in the child’s best interest.

Nonconsensual termination proceedings, also governed by § 45a-717 (f); see footnote 2; involve a different two step process. First, the petitioner must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, one of the specified statutory bases for termination, namely, that: (1) “[t]he child has been abandoned by the parent”; (2) “the child has been denied ... the care, guidance or control necessary for his physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being”; or (3) “there is no ongoing parent-child relationship.” General Statutes § 45a-717 (f) (1) through (3); footnote 2; see In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 517, 613 A.2d 748 (1992); see also In re Kelly S., 29 Conn. App. 600, 617-18, 616 A.2d 1161 (1992). Second, if one of the statutory bases is proven, then the court proceeds to the dispositional phase in which the petitioner must prove, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, that the termination would be in the best interest of the child. In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 355-57, 641 A.2d 378 (1994); In re Valerie D., supra, 511. “Our statutes and case law make it crystal clear that the determination of the child’s best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for [non-consensual] termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Valerie D., supra, 511. In the dispositional phase of a nonconsensual case, when the focus is on the best interest of the child, General Statutes § 45a-717 (h) requires the trial court to consider and make written findings on certain specified criteria. Among these criteria, the trial court must consider whether “the economic circumstances of the parent” have “prevented [that parent] from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child.” General Statutes § 45a-717 (h) (6).

Unlike § 45a-717 (h) which enumerates certain factors that must be considered regarding the affected child’s best interest in granting a nonconsensual petition, no statute describes the factors that must be considered in the case of a consensual petition. In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 182-83. Identification of the relevant factors in this context is a question of legislative intent. We approach this question according to well established principles of statutory construction designed to further our fundamental objective of ascertaining and giving effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986); Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 57, 480 A.2d 425 (1984). “ ‘In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . .’ ” Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431-32, 650 A.2d 557 (1994); Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 91-92, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994); State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757, 764, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993).

As discussed above, the trial court’s paramount objective, pursuant to § 45a-717 (f), is to determine what would be in the child’s best interest. This phrase is purposefully broad to enable the trial court to exercise its discretion based upon a host of considerations. What is clear, however, is that in deciding whether to grant a consensual petition to terminate parental rights, focus must be on how the child’s well-being would be affected by the loss of the consenting parent, not on the consenting parent’s desire to rid himself or herself of the unwanted obligation to support that child.

Although the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of § 45a-717 (f) are silent on the issue before the court, the legislature clearly expressed the policy that guides our determination in this case. General Statutes § 45a-706 expressly provides that § 45a-717 “shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition has been filed . . . .” See Guille v. Guille, 196 Conn. 260, 266, 492 A.2d 175 (1985) (broadly construing statutes regarding parental support of minor children); Faraday v. Dube, 175 Conn. 438, 443, 399 A.2d 1262 (1978) (same).

The petitioner argues that we must strictly construe all statutory provisions regarding the termination of parental rights, including the phrase “best interest of the child” as it is used in § 45a-717 (f). Although it is true that we have insisted upon strict compliance with the statutory criteria in the adjudicatory phase of non-consensual termination proceedings; In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 466, 586 A.2d 597 (1991); In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 672, 420 A.2d 875 (1979); such strict compliance was necessary in that context to guard against improper interference with a parent’s constitutionally protected interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child.

The present situation is different in that the petitioner has initiated this action in order to abandon his responsibility to support his children. Hence, the mandate of § 45a-706 compels the conclusion that the legislature intended that the best interest of the child be construed generously and broadly, rather than strictly and narrowly, in consensual termination proceedings. This construction is in accord with our decisions, albeit in other contexts, in which we have liberally interpreted the phrase “best interest of the child.” See, e.g., Oller v. Oller-Chiang, 230 Conn. 828, 848-49, 646 A.2d 822 (1994) (guardianship); In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 165, 554 A.2d 722 (1989) (custody); Michaud v. Wawruck, 209 Conn. 407, 414, 551 A.2d 738 (1988) (visitation); In re Kezia M., 33 Conn. App. 12, 22, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993) (foster care).

“Statutes are to be construed consistently with other relevant statutes, because we presume that the legislature intended to create a coherent body of law. Baybank Connecticut, N.A. v. Thumlert, [222 Conn. 784, 790, 610 A.2d 658 (1992)].” In re Valerie D., supra, 223 Conn. 533. Thus, we must assume that the subsections of § 45a-717 form a consistent body of law. “ ‘A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus, it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.’ 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th Ed. 1992) § 46.05, p. 103 . . . .” State v. Spears, 234 Conn. 78, 91, 662 A.2d 80 (1995); see Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 214, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984); Doe v. Institute of Living, Inc., 175 Conn. 49, 57, 392 A.2d 491 (1978).

Our analysis of what factors must be considered in evaluating the child’s best interest in a consensual termination petition is informed, therefore, by the other subsections of § 45a-717. Specifically, § 45a-717 (e) (1) requires that, in any contested case, the mandatory investigative report prepared by the department of children and families, or its designee, contain information relevant to the financial condition of the parents. The statute also provides that in a noncontested case the commissioner may request such information. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that information regarding the financial support of the minor child is considered as a factor, along with the child’s emotional, physical and educational well-being, in assessing the affected child’s best interest.

Because the present case is contested by the respondent mother, § 45a-717 (e) (1) requires the court to ensure that adequate information regarding the financial condition of the parents is before the court. It would be illogical to require a trial court to receive this material, but then not to require the trial court at least to consider the information therein contained. This requirement is particularly important in cases such as this one, where a father seeks to divest himself of responsibility for his children. Requiring that the parents’ financial condition be a consideration in determining the children’s best interest will deter the filing of a consensual petition that is no more than a ruse or a sham to avoid support obligations. Further, such information will enable the trial court to make a determination that is searching, penetrating and thorough. Although the financial condition of the parents is not dispositive, the trial court must consider it in reaching a decision as to the best interest of the child. This requirement is in accord with the state and federal policies imposing on parents the responsibility of providing for the support of their children.

Indeed, to interpret the current statutory scheme to permit a trial court to forgo consideration of the financial condition of the parents would ignore the clear federal and state policies that indisputably mandate that, in all but the most extreme cases, children should be maintained and supported by their parents. “[Bjoth state and national policy has been, and continues to be, to ensure that all parents support their children and that children who do not live with their parents benefit from adequate and enforceable orders of child support. Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 713-20, 595 A.2d 297 (1991); 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 184.

Connecticut child support enforcement legislation clearly evinces a strong state policy of ensuring that minor children receive the support to which they are entitled. See, e.g., General Statutes § 46b-37 (b) (“it shall be the joint duty of each spouse to support his or her family”); General Statutes §§ 52-362b, 52-362c and 52-362Í (child support can be withheld from paychecks of parents or from unemployment compensation); General Statutes § 52-362e (unpaid support obligations can be deducted from federal and state income tax refunds); General Statutes § 52-362d (a) (lien may be placed on “any property, real or personal” of obligor who owes $500 or more of child support); General Statutes § 52-362d (b) (delinquencies of parent-obligor in excess of $1000 may be reported to consumer reporting agencies); General Statutes § 52-362d (c) (lottery winnings of delinquent parent will be reduced by amount of child support owed); General Statutes § 52-362Í (court may order parent-obligor to provide cash deposit to be held in escrow by Connecticut child support enforcement bureau); Public Acts 1995, No. 95-310, §§ 2, 4 and 9 (driver’s license of parent-obligor may be suspended). Indeed, General Statutes § 53-304 (a), the criminal nonsupport statute, establishes that “[a]ny person who neglects or refuses to furnish reasonably necessary support to his . . . child under the age of eighteen . . . shall be deemed guilty of nonsupport and shall be imprisoned not more than one year, unless he shows to the court before which the trial is had that, owing to physical incapacity or other good cause, he is unable to furnish such support.” These statutory provisions demonstrate, without doubt, our legislature’s position regarding the duty of parents to pay child support.

In addition, we repeatedly have recognized that children must be supported adequately. See, e.g., Masters v. Masters, 201 Conn. 50, 67-68, 513 A.2d 104 (1986) (review of child support awards); Guille v. Guille, supra, 196 Conn. 266 (parent cannot, without court approval, contract away obligation of support for minor children); Burke v. Burke, 137 Conn. 74, 79, 75 A.2d 42 (1950) (common law prohibited parents from contractually restricting or defeating their children’s right to support); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (85-BC), 195 Conn. 344, 352, 488 A.2d 790 (1985) (recognizing that established public policy of state is to protect children and to make home safe for children); In re Juvenile Appeal (83-DE), 190 Conn. 310, 318-19, 460 A.2d 1277 (1983) (recognizing state’s “continuing parens patriae interest .. . in the well being of children”); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 170-71, 425 A.2d 939 (1979) (recognizing state’s “express public policy... to provide all of its children a safe, stable nurturing environment”). This commitment would be undermined if we permitted a consensual petition, which frees the petitioner from any further obligation to support his or her children, to be granted without considering the financial condition of the parents.

Likewise, current federal child support enforcement legislation clearly demonstrates a federal policy of ensuring the financial support of children by their parents. See, e.g., Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (child support can be withheld from paychecks of parents delinquent for one month); Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (federal law requires that states provide for imposition of liens against property of defaulting parent-obligor and reporting of delinquencies in excess of $1000 to credit companies); Title IV-D of Social Security Act (unpaid support obligations can be deducted from federal and state income tax refunds); 42 U.S.C. § 653 (deserting parents can be located through Parent Locator Service).

Similarly, the courts of our sister states universally have held that parents may not voluntarily terminate their parental rights simply to avoid their responsibility to support their children. See, e.g., Ex parte Brooks, 513 So. 2d 614, 616-17 (Ala. 1987), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1990) (termination of parental rights statutes not meant to be “means for a parent to avoid his obligation to support his child”); Husband (K) v. Wife (K), 343 A.2d 597, 599 (Del. Super. 1975) (father may not defeat court support order by willfully refusing to reach his reasonable earning capacity); In re K.L.S., 180 Ga. App. 688, 689, 350 S.E.2d 50 (1986) (“statutory authority of the juvenile court to entertain petitions to terminate parental rights does not extend to petitions by parents seeking judicial imprimatur of their own, voluntary abandonment of parental responsibility”); In Interest of D.W.K., 365 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Iowa 1985) (where father had expressed no interest in his child, his consensual termination petition was denied in best interest of child where termination would “ultimately . . . open a hatch for a parent to escape his or her duty to support a child”); In Interest of K.J.K., 396 N.W.2d 370, 371-72 (Iowa App. 1986) (termination not in “child’s best interest, particularly when considered with the child’s right to support from her father”); In re Welfare of Alle, 304 Minn. 254, 258, 230 N.W.2d 574 (1975) (“[t]he children wish to be able to look to their legal father for financial support; it surely cannot be in their best interests to have that avenue of support terminated”); In Interest of R.A.S., 826 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. App. 1992) (consensual termination petition denied where evidence showed that father sought to avoid his support obligation); R.H. v. M.K., 254 N.J. Super. 480, 603 A.2d 995 (1991) (parent may not voluntarily surrender his or her parental rights other than in adoption context); Commonwealth Dept. of Public Welfare ex rel. Hager v. Woolf, 276 Pa. Super. 433, 439, 419 A.2d 535 (1980) (statute “was not designed to permit a parent to avoid a support obligation by the mere filing of a petition to terminate parental rights, any more than a parent is permitted to ‘bargain away’ the obligation by any other means”); Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980) (father may not intentionally escape child support obligations by channeling money into unprofitable businesses); Curran v. Curran, 26 Wash. App. 108, 110-11, 611 P.2d 1350 (1980) (parent may not unreasonably remain in low paying job to avoid support obligation); In Interest of A.B., supra, 151 Wis. 2d 322 (support obligation of father to be considered as one of “best interest” considerations in consensual termination petition proceeding); see also note, “Child Support Properly a Factor in Determining the Best Interests of Child in Voluntary Termination of Parental Rights,” 58 Mo. L. Rev. 969, 987 (1993) (child support policy “must not be undermined by allowing absent fathers to get out of paying child support by voluntarily terminating their parental rights, in the absence of it being in the best interests of the child”).

Legislative and judicial efforts to hold parents to their financial responsibility to support their children would be eviscerated if we were to allow an unfettered legal avenue through which a parent without regard to the best interest of the child could avoid all responsibility for future support. “We must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 63-64, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985). [Turner v. Turner, supra, 219 Conn. 713]. Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 453, 627 A.2d 1329 (1993); see also State v. Johnson, [227 Conn. 534, 542, 630 A.2d 1059 (1993)]; Fairfield Plumbing & Heating Supply Corp. v. Kosa, 220 Conn. 643, 650-51, 600 A.2d 1 (1991).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Concept Associates, Ltd. v. Board of Tax Review, 229 Conn. 618, 624, 642 A.2d 1186 (1994). Surely the legislature did not intend that § 45a-717 (f) be used as a means for a parent to avoid the obligation to support his or her children. To interpret the statutory scheme as such would alter radically the parental support obligation which our laws consistently have reinforced.

Our courts are entrusted with the responsibility of determining the best interest of children who come before them. When a child’s welfare is threatened by the continuation of parental rights, the law provides a means for terminating those rights. The termination of parental rights, however, is a drastic solution; it severs all ties between parent and child, including the parent’s duty to support his or her children. As such, parental rights should not be terminated solely to advance the convenience and interests, either emotional or financial, of the parent. See In Interest of A.B., supra, 151 Wis. 2d 322. Such petitions seek judicial imprimatur on a parent’s own, voluntary abandonment of his or her parental responsibility. This court cannot condone such actions without a careful consideration of the financial condition of the parents as part of judicial review. Therefore, trial courts should grant consensual petitions only in those rare situations where, after considering the totality of the circumstances, including the financial condition of the parents, granting that petition truly would be in the best interest of the child. See In re Welfare of Alle, supra, 304 Minn. 254.

On the basis of the statutory scheme and the overwhelming public policy in support of requiring that parents be held financially responsible for their children’s support, we conclude that the trial court must consider the financial condition of the parents as one of the factors in determining the best interest of the child in contested consensual petitions to terminate parental rights.

II

The petitioner’s second claim is that requiring that the financial condition of the parents be considered in a consensual termination of parental rights proceeding would violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Connecticut and United States constitutions by creating an impermissible classification based on wealth. This claim is not reviewable because it was not adequately briefed. The petitioner has cited no case or authority which recognizes any constitutional right, under either the state or the federal constitution, to abandon his obligation to provide for his children financially. We have declined to review constitutional claims, deeming them to have been abandoned, when the petitioner has not properly briefed and analyzed them. State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 510 n.17, 594 A.2d 906 (1991); State v. Gaines, 196 Conn. 395, 397-98 n.2, 493 A.2d 209 (1985); see Latham & Associates, Inc. v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 218 Conn. 297, 300, 589 A.2d 337 (1991); Cohen v. Security Title & Guaranty Co., 212 Conn. 436, 437 n.1, 562 A.2d 510 (1989); Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 210 Conn. 721, 732, 557 A.2d 116 (1989). Because the petitioner did not adequately brief the constitutional issue, we decline to review it.

For the above reasons, we conclude that, in a consensual termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial court is required to consider the financial condition of the child’s parents in order to determine whether the termination of a parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The petitioner filed a petition to terminate his parental rights with respect to each of his minor children, Bruce R. and Jodi R.

       General Statutes § 45a-717 (f) provides: “At the adjourned hearing or at the initial hearing where no investigation and report has been requested, the court may approve the petition terminating the parental rights and may appoint a guardian of the person of the child, or if the petitioner requests, the court may appoint a statutory parent, if it finds, upon clear and convincing evidence that the termination is in the best interest of the child and that, with respect to any consenting parent, such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of his parental rights with respect to such child or that, with respect to any nonconsenting parent, over an extended period of time which, except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, shall not be less than one year: (1) The child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child; or (2) the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission, the care, guidance or control necessary for his physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. Nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights; or (3) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. If the court denies a petition for consent termination of parental rights, it may refer the matter to an agency to assess the needs of the child, the care the child is receiving, and the plan of the parent for the child.” See also General Statutes § 17a-112 (b) (similar criteria and procedure for terminating parental rights of children committed to commissioner of children and families).

       At oral argument before this court, the petitioner conceded that the trial court made no specific finding that it had considered the financial condition of the parents. Indeed, the only references in the record to the finances of the parents were: (1) the investigative report prepared by the Community Children and Family Services; (2) two brief colloquies during the hearing before the trial court that touched upon the respondent’s financial condition; and (3) the trial court’s pretrial denial of the respondent’s motion for the exchange of financial affidavits.

       “General Statutes § 45a-715 (d) provides in pertinent part: ‘[E]ach consenting parent shall acknowledge such consent on a form promulgated by the office of the chief court administrator evidencing to the satisfaction of the court that the parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of his parental rights. In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 179 n.1.

       “The department of children and youth services has since been renamed the department of children and families. Public Acts 1993, No. 93-91, § 1.” In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 179 n.2.

       General Statutes § 45a-707 (g) defines “[germination of parental rights” as “the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent or parents so that the child is free for adoption except it shall not affect the right of inheritance of the child or the religious affiliation of the child.”

       General Statutes § 45a-717 (e) (1) provides: “The court may, and in any contested case shall, request the commissioner of children and families or any child-placing agency licensed by the commissioner to make an investigation and written report to it, within ninety days from the receipt of such request. The report shall indicate the physical, mental and emotional status of the child and shall contain such facts as may be relevant to determine whether the proposed termination of parental rights will be for the welfare of the child, including the physical, mental, social and financial condition of the natural parents, and any other factors which the commissioner or such agency finds relevant to determine whether the proposed termination will be for the welfare of the child.” (Emphasis added.)

       Both the common law; 59 Am. Jur. 2d. § 51; and the statutory law; General Statutes § 46b-37; recognize that a parent has an obligation to support a minor child to the best of the parent’s ability. This obligation is deeply rooted in our law. For example, in the 1750s, Blackstone stated: “The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law .... By begetting them therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life that they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have a perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents. . . . [A]nd the manner in which this obligation shall be performed, is thus pointed out. The father, and mother, grandfather, and grandmother of poor impotent persons shall maintain them at their own charges, if of sufficient ability . . . and if a parent runs away, and leaves his children, the churchwardens and overseers of the parish shall seize his rents, goods, and chattels, and dispose of them towards their relief.” (Emphasis in original.) 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) pp. 435-36.

       General Statutes § 45a-715 (a) provides: “Any of the following persons may petition the court of probate to terminate parental rights of all persons who may have parental rights regarding any minor child or for the termination of parental rights of only one parent provided the application so states: (1) Either or both parents, including a parent who is a minor; (2) the guardian of the child; (3) the selectmen of any town having charge of any foundling child; (4) a duly authorized officer of any child care agency or child-placing agency or organization or any children’s home or similar institution approved by the commissioner of children and families; (5) a blood relative of the child, descended from a common ancestor not more than three generations removed from the child, if the parent or parents have abandoned or deserted the child; (6) the commissioner of children and families, provided the custodial parent of such minor child has consented to the termination of parental rights and the child has not been committed to the commissioner, and no application for commitment has been made; provided in any case hereunder where the minor child with respect to whom the petition is brought has attained the age of twelve, the minor child shall join in the petition.”

       A parent voluntarily may petition for the termination of his or her parental rights, even in the absence of a pending adoption or state custodial placement. General Statutes § 45a-715 (a); In re Theresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 30-31, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 180-81.

       General Statutes § 45a-716 (b) provides: “The court shall cause notice of the hearing to be given to the following persons as applicable: (1) The parent or parents of the minor child, including any parent who has been removed as guardian on or after October 1, 1973, under section 45a-606; (2) the father of any minor child bom out of wedlock, provided at the time of the filing of the petition (A) he has been adjudicated the father of such child by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (B) he has acknowledged in writing to be the father of such child, or (C) he has contributed regularly to the support of such child, or (D) his name appears on the birth certificate, or (E) he has filed a claim for paternity as provided under section 46b-172a, or (F) he has been named in the petition as the father of the minor child by the mother; (3) the guardian or any other person whom the court shall deem appropriate; (4) the commissioner of children and families. If the recipient of the notice is a person described in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection or is any other person whose parental rights are sought to be terminated in the petition, the notice shall contain a statement that the respondent has the right to be represented by counsel and that if he is unable to pay for counsel, counsel will be appointed for him. The reasonable compensation for such counsel shall be established by, and paid from funds appropriated to, the judicial department or, in the case of a probate court matter, the reasonable compensation of counsel appointed for the respondent parent or the child shall be established by the probate court administrator and paid from the Probate Court Administration Fund.”

       In the present case, it is uncontested that the petitioner voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of his parental rights.

       General Statutes § 45a-717 (h) provides: “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (3) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (4) the age of the child; (5) the efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (6) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

       For a comprehensive discussion of the issue of child support enforcement policy, see H. Krause, “Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest,” 24 Fam. L.Q., No. 1 (1990).

       Indeed, during the hearing before it, the trial court heard an exchange between the respondent and her counsel that was illustrative of the potential for abuse of the consensual termination proceeding for personal convenience:
      “[Respondent’s attorney]: Based on your own personal observation or your hearing statements made by your ex-husband, do you know, not what someone else had said, except for him, do you know why he has filed this petition?
      “[Respondent:] To get out of financially paying for the kids.
      “Q. At the time that you went to court in March of 1991 before [the trial court] at which time a restraining order was entered, did [the petitioner] make any statements to you or before anyone else as to why he would file a termination petition?
      “A. For not paying support or insurance.
      “Q. Did you hear him say that?
      “A. It’s a matter of public record.
      “Q. What did you hear?
      “A. He said I will not see, talk to, or bother with the children again. I will terminate my parental rights on the grounds that I do not pay insurance or support.”

       The amicus curiae brief of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation goes one step further. The amicus suggests that the Appellate Court interpreted § 45a-717 (e) (1) as requiring that the financial condition of the parents be considered in determining the best interest of the child in all contested petitions, whether or not based on consent. As such, the amicus argues that such a requirement in the context of nonconsensual petitions could adversely impact minority groups, the poor and the uneducated and could produce racially disparate results. This concern was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-64, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).
      We decline to consider this argument. We granted permission for an amicus brief limited solely to the issues before us which were properly raised by the parties. See Practice Book § 4067; In re Saba P., 13 Conn. App. 605, 538 A.2d 711, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 811, 541 A.2d 1241 (1988). Absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, we will not determine a constitutional question of first impression that was neither raised at trial nor relied upon by the parties on appeal. See Simons v. Canty, 195 Conn. 524, 529 n.8, 488 A.2d 1267 (1985).
      We note, however, that our holding today is limited explicitly to consensual termination proceedings and, as such, does not relate to the concerns expressed by the amicus. As discussed above, this appeal concerns our interpretation of the best interest of the child standard as enunciated in § 45a-717 (f) in consensual petitions. We are persuaded that the combination of §§ 45a-717 (e) (1) and 45a-706, and the overwhelming public policy of this state and our nation mandate that the financial condition of the parents be considered in determining the best interest of the child when terminating, pursuant to a consensual petition initiated by the parent, parental rights. As such, we do not reach the question of whether the parents’ financial condition must be considered in nonconsensual termination proceedings. Indeed, § 45a-717 (h) explicitly lists what factors must be considered in determining the best interest of the child in the nonconsensual context and subdivision (6) states that the economic circumstances of the parent can be considered only to the extent that they have prevented a meaningful relationship with the child.