author: CALLAHAN, C. J.

text:
    JOHN FAULKNER v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT DIVISION ET AL.
    (15475)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Katz, Js.
    Argued February 18
    officially released April 22, 1997

      Richard W. Gifford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Felix J. Springer, with whom, on the brief, was Michael K. Murray, for the appellee (named defendant).
   Opinion

CALLAHAN, C. J.

The plaintiff, John Faulkner, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Freed, J., rendered in favor of the named defendant, United Technologies Corporation, Sikorsky Aircraft Division, after the court, Corradino, J., struck the first count of the plaintiffs substitute complaint. In that count, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in their employer-employee relationship by discharging him for refusing to participate in a scheme to defraud the United States government. The plaintiff claims that his discharge for refusing to participate in the scheme violated public policy against government contract fraud as expressed in the Major Frauds Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1031. He argues that the trial court improperly struck the first count of his substitute complaint on the ground that it failed to allege a connection between the public policy expressed in the federal statute and the public policy of the state of Connecticut. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The first count of the plaintiffs substitute complaint alleged the following relevant facts. The plaintiff worked for the defendant as a supplier quality assurance representative from October 2, 1978, until April 29, 1991, when he was discharged by the defendant. The plaintiffs job involved inspecting helicopter parts provided by various suppliers to ensure that the parts met with the defendant’s engineering specifications. As part of his job, he was required to inspect parts supplied by subcontractors that were to be used in constructing United States Army Blackhawk helicopters that the defendant was producing pursuant to contracts with the federal government. On numerous occasions, the plaintiff rejected substandard and defective parts provided by suppliers despite pressure from the suppliers and from his superiors to accept the parts. The plaintiff reported the existence of the defective parts to his superiors, who did nothing constructive in response, but instead warned the plaintiff that he might be disciplined in the future for rejecting parts he deemed defective. Thereafter, the allegedly defective parts were used in the construction of various Blackhawk helicopters.

On April 29,1991, the defendant discharged the plaintiff on the ground that he had engaged in misconduct. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant actually discharged him because he refused to accept the substandard and defective helicopter parts supplied by the defendant’s subcontractors on the Blackhawk helicopter project. He alleged further that the defendant discharged him because he refused to participate in allowing the use of the defective parts in producing helicopters under the government contract. He claimed that the defendant’s action constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing existing between the parties because the discharge violated public policy against government contract fraud as expressed in the Major Frauds Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (a).

The trial court construed the first count of the plaintiffs substitute complaint as alleging a wrongful discharge claim pursuant to the public policy limitation on the at-will employment doctrine, as enunciated in Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), and its progeny. The court determined that, when a plaintiff brings such a claim charging a violation of public policy as expressed in a federal statute, the plaintiff must allege in his complaint that that violation of federal public policy also interfered with an important state interest. The court stated: “[T]here must be a substantial connection between the federal law that is violated and the state’s own public policies. The federal law must protect an interest that has a substantial impact on state concerns.” Because the plaintiff had failed to include in his complaint an allegation that his discharge implicated state public policy concerns, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to strike.

“ ‘The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest. . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff.’ ... If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.” (Citations omitted.) Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820, 825-26, 676 A.2d 357 (1996). We conclude that the allegations of the plaintiffs substitute complaint, if proved, would constitute a viable cause of action.

In Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 480, in an effort to balance the competing interests of employers and employees, we recognized a public policy limitation on the traditional employment at-will doctrine. Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 492, 642 A.2d 699 (1994). In Sheets, we sanctioned a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in situations in which the reason for the discharge involved “impropriety . . . derived from some important violation of public policy.” Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 475; see Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679, 513 A.2d 66 (1986); Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 572, 479 A.2d 781 (1984). In Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 680, we recognized the “inherent vagueness of the concept of public policy” and the difficulty encountered when attempting to define precisely the contours of the public policy exception. In evaluating claims, “[w]e look to see whether the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision ... or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antinerella v. Rioux, supra, 492, quoting Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 680.

The plaintiff, in his substitute complaint, alleged that the defendant discharged him in violation of the public policy against government contract fraud expressed in the Major Frauds Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1031. The Major Frauds Act “criminalizes the knowing execution or attempted execution of a scheme or artifice in order to defraud the [United States].” United States v. Frequency Electronics, 862 F. Sup. 834, 838 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). The act “targets schemes to defraud the United States in connection with procurement contracts executed by (1) prime contractors with the United States, or (2) subcontractors or suppliers on contracts in which there is a prime contract with the United States,” if the value of the contract upon which the fraud is based is $1,000,000 or more. United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551-52 (2d Cir. 1993). The act provides for the imposition of fines up to a maximum of $10,000,000 and for imprisonment up to a maximum of ten years. See footnote 3. Congress enacted the Major Frauds Act “to curtail the ubiquitous and rampant fraud in the defense procurement area, ‘born of greed in the private sector and inefficiency and acquiescence by the [federal [gjovernment.’ ” United States v. Frequency Electronics, supra, 838, quoting Pub. L. No. 101-123, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat. 759) 593. The Joint Committee on the Judiciary asserted that procurement fraud was the most costly type of fraud being perpetrated against the federal government. S. Rep. No. 100-503, 2d Sess., 1-2 (1988); H.R. Rep. No. 100-610, 2d Sess., 3-4 (1988). The committee also noted the evils associated with the practice of “product substitution” — in which contractors provide defective products to the federal government — asserting that defense contractors that engage in “product substitution” endanger the lives of American soldiers and threaten national security. S. Rep. No. 100-503, supra, 2; see also H.R. Rep. No. 100-610, supra, 4.

Construing the plaintiffs substitute complaint in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff; Waters v. Autu-ori, supra, 236 Conn. 825-26; we read the complaint as alleging that the defendant was involved in a scheme to defraud the federal government by providing the government with Blackhawk helicopters that were constructed using substandard and defective parts. The complaint alleged that the defendant was producing the helicopters under a government contract, and that the defendant knew that it was using defective parts in the construction of the helicopters. As alleged in the complaint, the defendant’s actions appear to constitute precisely the type of conduct that Congress intended to deter and punish by enacting the Major Frauds Act. In addition, the complaint alleged that the defendant discharged the plaintiff because he refused to approve the use of the defective parts. In sum, the complaint alleged that the defendant discharged the plaintiff because he refused to participate in violating 18 U.S.C. § 1031.

In Sheets, we stated that “an employee should not be put to an election whether to risk criminal sanction or to jeopardize his continued employment.” Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 480. This appeal requires us to determine whether that proposition applies in a situation in which the source of the criminal sanction is federal, rather than state, law. In Sheets, the plaintiff alleged he had been discharged for reporting to his superiors repeated violations by his employer of the Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id., 478. We noted that the plaintiffs position as quality control director and operations manager exposed him to the possibility of criminal prosecution under the act. Id. In allowing the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim to proceed, we stated: “We need not decide whether violation of a state statute is invariably a prerequisite to the conclusion that a challenged discharge violates public policy. Certainly when there is a relevant state statute we should not ignore the statement of public policy that it represents.” Id., 480. We did not, however, preclude the use of a federal statute to demonstrate that a discharge violated public policy. We perceive no difference between a situation in which an employee is forced to engage in conduct that may expose him to federal criminal sanctions and a situation in which an employee is forced to engage in conduct that may expose him to state criminal sanctions. The effect on the employee of being forced to choose between violating the law or facing discharge by his employer is the same regardless of which sovereign criminalizes the conduct. The plaintiff in the present case, like the plaintiff in Sheets, held aposition requiring him to ensure the quality of the defendant employer’s products. If he had followed his superiors’ orders, and had approved the use of helicopter parts that he knew to be substandard and defective, he might have exposed himself to potential criminal sanction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1031. We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs substitute complaint, in which he alleged that his employer discharged him because he refused to violate a federal criminal statute, and specifically cited the statute, adequately stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge pursuant to Sheets and its progeny.

The defendant argues that a wrongful discharge claim pursuant to the public policy limitation on the at-will employment doctrine cannot be predicated solely on a violation of federal law. The defendant cites the following cases in support of this proposition: McKenzie v. Renberg’s, Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1487-88 (10th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Oklahoma law to require plaintiffs claiming wrongful discharge to cite violations of Oklahoma statutes, constitutional provisions, or judicial decisions); Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 970 F.2d 378, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Illinois law to require plaintiffs claiming wrongful discharge in violation of public policy expressed in federal statute to articulate clearly mandated state public policy); Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Arizona law, in dicta, to require plaintiffs alleging retaliatory discharge to cite specific Arizona statutes or policies); Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 149 Ill. App. 3d 588, 591, 500 N.E.2d 1001, cert. denied, 114 Ill. 2d 556, 506 N.E.2d 959 (1987) (concluding that plaintiffs claiming retaliatory discharge pursuant to Illinois law must allege state public policy violation). The defendant contends, and the trial court agreed, that even if Sheets were to allow a plaintiff to use a federal statute as the predicate for a wrongful discharge claim, it nonetheless would require a plaintiff to allege in his complaint some connection between the federal statute and the policy of the state in order properly to state a cause of action. In addition, the defendant argues that a plaintiff relying on the statement in Sheets that employees should not be forced to choose between violating the law and losing their jobs must specifically allege this reliance in his or her complaint. The defendant contends that, in the absence of such allegations, employers will not have been given proper notice of the public policy upon which the plaintiff relies, the public policy limitation on the at-will employment doctrine will be improperly broadened, and the balance between the interests of employer and employee will be impermissibly tipped in favor of the employee. We disagree.

First, we do not agree with the defendant that Sheets requires a violation of state public policy in order for a plaintiff to state a cause of action. Rather, Sheets and its progeny refer generally to violations of public policy as expressed in explicit statutory or constitutional provisions, or judicial decisions. See Antinerella v. Rioux, supra, 229 Conn. 492. In situations such as the present case, in which the plaintiff alleged that his employer discharged him because he refused to violate a federal criminal statute, and specifically cited the federal statute in his complaint, we do not find it necessary for the plaintiff also to allege an explicit connection between the federal statute and the policy of the state. We find support for our conclusion in the decisions of the courts of many other jurisdictions that have determined that claims brought pursuant to the public policy limitation on the at-will employment doctrine can be predicated on the violation of public policy expressed in a federal statute. See Kilpatrick v. Delaware County Society, 632 F. Sup. 542, 545-46 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (jplaintiff who alleged employer discharged him for complaining to state agency about employer’s violations of Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., stated cause of action under Pennsylvania law); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Sup. 572, 577-79 (D. Md. 1982) (jplaintiff who alleged employer discharged him for refusing to violate various federal statutes stated cause of action under Maryland law); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 170, 179, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (plaintiff who alleged employer discharged him for refusing to violate Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., stated cause of action); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 110-11 (Colo. 1992) (plaintiff established prima facie case where evidence demonstrated that employer discharged him for refusing to commit fraud against federal government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 506, 510-11, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122, 106 S. Ct. 1641, 90 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1986) (plaintiff who alleged employer discharged him for refusing to work under conditions that violated Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., stated cause of action); Howard v. Zack Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1023-24, 637 N.E.2d 1183, cert. denied, 158 Ill. 2d 551, 645 N.E.2d 1358 (1994) (plaintiff who alleged employer discharged him for reporting violations of record keeping requirements of federal regulations stated cause of action); Russ v. Pension Consultants Co., 182 Ill. App. 3d 769, 772, 776-77, 538 N.E.2d 693 (1989) (plaintiff who alleged employer discharged him for refusing to violate provisions of Internal Revenue Code stated cause of action); Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc., 147 Ill. App. 3d 746, 748-49, 498 N.E.2d 575, cert. denied, 113 Ill. 2d 575, 505 N.E.2d 353 (1986) (public policy, for purposes of state common law retaliatory discharge claims, can be found in federal laws that are national in scope); Petersimes v. Crane Co., 835 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Mo. App. 1992) (plaintiff who alleged employer discharged him for refusing to commit fraud on federal government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. stated cause of action); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 876-77 (Mo. App. 1985) (plaintiff who alleged employer discharged her for refusing to violate federal regulations stated cause of action); Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Utah 1992) (Utah’s public policy exception encompasses violations of federal law and laws of other states, as well as violations of Utah law, if violations contravene clear and substantial public policy of Utah); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 234, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (plaintiff who alleged employer discharged him because he instituted certain accounting procedures in attempt to bring employer into compliance with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 stated cause of action); see also Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898-99 (3d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff who claimed discharge violated public policy expressed in constitutions of United States and Pennsylvania stated cause of action for wrongful discharge under Pennsylvania law).

Moreover, it is not necessary that the plaintiff specifically allege that his discharge violated the public policy, expressed in Sheets, against employers forcing employees to commit criminal acts. The question of whether a challenged discharge violates public policy, state or federal, by forcing the commission of criminal acts, or otherwise, is a question of law to be decided by the court, not a question of fact that a plaintiff must allege in his complaint. Practice Book § 131 requires a plaintiff to plead only the facts constituting his or her cause of action. A motion to strike “admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.” (Emphasis in original.) Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). The allegations of a complaint subject to a motion to strike “are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support ... a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail.” Id., 108-109. We simply do not agree with the defendant that Sheets imposed a pleading requirement on plaintiffs alleging wrongful discharge claims that such plaintiffs must plead conclusions of law in their complaints in addition to pleading the facts that constitute their causes of action.

Finally, we do not believe that our decision today impermissibly tips the balance between the interests of employer and employee, or creates any more uncertainty for employers than that generated by Sheets. The very nature of our decision in Sheets requires a case-by-case analysis of employee claims, which necessarily creates a certain degree of uncertainty in the law. We fail to see, however, how imposing the pleading requirements urged by the defendant would in any way put employers in a better position to respond to or anticipate potential employee claims. “ ‘The purpose of pleading is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried . . . ” Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 1, 6, 327 A.2d 583 (1973). It is clear from the record that the plaintiffs substitute complaint sufficiently alerted the defendant, as well as the trial court, that the plaintiffs claim was a claim for wrongful discharge pursuant to the public policy limitation set forth in Sheets.

“We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation. We are, however, equally mindful that the myriad of employees without the bargaining power to command employment contracts for a definite term are entitled to a modicum of judicial protection when their conduct as good citizens is punished by their employers.” Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 477. Our decision today falls squarely within the analytical framework enunciated in Sheets and its progeny.

The judgment with respect to the first count is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to deny the defendant’s motion to strike, and for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

       References to the defendant in this opinion are 1o the named defendant, United Technologies Corporation, Sikorsky Aircraft Division. The plaintiffs substitute complaint also contained two counts of slander, one against the Purdy Corporation, and the other against Robert Schmedlin, an employee of the Purdy Corporation. On June 16, 1995, the trial court rendered a judgment of dismissal for failure to prosecute on these two counts.

       Title 18, § 1031, of the United States Code provides in relevant part: "Major fraud against the United States, (a) Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, any scheme or artifice with the intent—
      “(1) to defraud the United States; or
      “(2) t.o obt ain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, in any procurement of property or services as a prime contractor with the United States or as a subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime contract with the United St ates, if the value of the contract, subcontract, or any constituent part thereof, for such property or services is $1,000,000 or more shall, subject to the applicability of subsection (c) of this section, be fined not more than $1,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
      “(b) The fine imposed for an offense under this section may exceed the maximum otherwise provided by law, if such fine does not exceed $5,000,000 and—
      “(1) the gross loss to the Government or the gross gain to a defendant is $500,000 or greater; or
      “(2) the offense involves a conscious or reckless risk of serious personal injury.
      “(c) The maximum fine imposed upon a defendant for a prosecution including a prosecution with multiple counts under this section shall not exceed $10,000,000 ....'’

       A great majority of the states have adopted a public policy limitation on the at-will employment doctrine in one form or another. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 105-106 and nn. 2 and 3 (Colo. 1992) (collecting cases); see also C. Sabey, “Scalpels and Meat Cleavers: Carving a Public Policy Limitation to the At-Will Employment Doctrine,” 1993 Utah L. Rev. 597, 602 n.41 (1993) (collecting cases).

       See footnote 3.

       Although the complaint does not allege that the value of the contract was $1,000,000 or more, that fact is necessarily implied by the averment in the complaint that the plaintiffs discharge violated the public policy against government contract fraud as enunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (a), since that provision applies only in situations in which the value of the contract is $1,000,000 or more. See Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 146, 561 A.2d 432 (1989) (facts necessarily implied from averments in complaint need not be expressly alleged); Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 500-501, 271 A.2d 84 (1970) (motion to strike “admits all facts well pleaded, including facts necessarily implied from the other averments”); see also Wexler Construction Co. v. Housing Authority, 144 Conn. 187, 193, 128 A.2d 540 (1956).

       We find the authorities cited by the defendant in support of its argument unpersuasive. We note that the factual circumstances of Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., supra, 970 F.2d 378, and Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., supra, 740 F.2d 1468, are distinguishable from the factual circumstances of the present case. In Hicks, the federal statute that the plaintiff claimed his employer had violated did not provide for criminal sanctions. The plaintiff, therefore, was never subject to the possibility of criminal prosecution. Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., supra, 382. In Olguin, the court determined that the plaintiff, in reality, had pleaded the violation of a collective bargaining agreement. The court stated: “We need not consider here whether tort law protects employees from wrongful discharge in Arizona.” Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., supra, 1474 n.7.

       Practice Book § 131 provides: “ — Contents of Complaint
      “The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint. It shall contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and, on a separate page of the complaint, a demand for relief which shall be a statement of the remedy or remedies sought. When money damages are sought in the demand for relief, the demand for relief shall include the information required by Gen. Stat., § 52-91.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BORDEN, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ALEXANDER CISLO v. CITY OF SHELTON
    (15451)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Palmer and Ment, Js.
    Argued January 21
    officially released April 29, 1997

      Lee K. Tieman, with whom were Steven J. Errante and, on the brief, Hugh F. Keefe, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Thomas J. Welch, with whom was John IT. Welch, Jr., for the appellee (defendant).
   Opinion

BORDEN, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a criminal charge has been “dismissed” within the meaning of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53-39a, which provides for the indemnification of law enforcement officers under certain circumstances, when the charge against the officer has been nolled and the pertinent records have been erased pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 54-142a (c). The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court following our grant of certifícation. A divided panel of the Appellate Court concluded that the provisions of § 54-142a (c) did not effectuate a dismissal for purposes of § 53-39a, and affirmed the summary judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant. Cislo v. Shelton, 40 Conn. App. 705, 712-14, 673 A.2d 134 (1996). We conclude, contrary to the Appellate Court, that an automatic erasure under § 54-142a (c) that occurs thirteen months following the entry of a nolle prosequi constitutes a dismissal within the meaning of § 53-39a. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. “On October 12, 1989, the plaintiff, a Shelton police officer, was arrested and charged with the sexual assault of a police informant. Subsequent to the arrest of the plaintiff, the informant disappeared. On January 24, 1991, the assistant state’s attorney entered a nolle prosequi in open court in the criminal action against the plaintiff. The assistant state’s attorney entered the nolle because of the disappearance of the informant. The plaintiffs counsel in the criminal action objected to the entry of the nolle and moved to dismiss the case. The trial court declined to dismiss the case and accepted the entry of the nolle pursuant to [General Statutes § 54-56b and] Practice Book § 726.

“On March 4, 1992, the plaintiff brought [this] action against the defendant pursuant to General Statutes § 53-39a, seeking indemnification for the economic losses he incurred in the defense of the criminal charges brought against him. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff and the defendant filed cross motions for summary judgment. On January 11, 1994, the trial court, Rush, J., denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant’s cross motion. In its memorandum of decision regarding the cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under § 53-39a. The trial court found as a matter of law that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief because § 53-39a provides for indemnification only where the criminal charges against a police officer are dismissed or where the officer is found not guilty, and that here, the underlying criminal action against the plaintiff was terminated by the entry of a nolle prosequi. On January 27,1994, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant and this appeal [to the Appellate Court] followed. In his initial appeal, the plaintiff claim[ed] that the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

“On April 16,1994, during the pendency of his appeal, the plaintiff filed a motion in the trial court seeking to dismiss the criminal charges against him that had previously been nolled. On April 27,1994, the trial court in the criminal action, Skolnick, J., granted the motion to dismiss. On May 3, 1994, the plaintiff filed a motion in the trial court to open the judgment and to set aside the summary judgment in the present action, claiming that the recent dismissal of the nolled criminal charges made him eligible for indemnification under § 53-39a. On August 19, 1994, the trial court in the civil action, Rush, J., denied the plaintiffs motion to open and found that because the criminal charges against the plaintiff had been nolled, they were no longer pending and could not have been properly dismissed for the purpose of seeking indemnification under § 53-39a. On September 7, 1994, the plaintiff filed an amendment to his appeal, adding the claim that the trial court improperly denied the plaintiffs motion to open the judgment and to set aside the summary judgment.” Cislo v. Shelton, supra, 40 Conn. App. 706-709.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that: (1) § 53-39a does not provide for indemnification when criminal charges against a police officer have been nolled; and (2) the subsequent “dismissal” of the charges was of no effect because, following the nolle, there were no criminal charges pending against the plaintiff that could have been dismissed. Id., 715-16. This certified appeal followed.

The plaintiff renews in this court the two claims that the Appellate Court rejected, namely, that: (1) under § 54-142a (c), a nolle followed by thirteen months is tantamount to a dismissal, thereby qualifying the plaintiff for indemnification under § 53-39a; and (2) in the alternative, the dismissal entered by Judge Skolnick was sufficient to qualify the plaintiff for indemnification under § 53-39a. We conclude that the entry of a nolle followed by the elapse of the statutory period of thirteen months, which results in the mandatory erasure of the pertinent records pursuant to § 54-142a (c), constitutes a dismissal for purposes of § 53-39a. We therefore need not consider the plaintiffs second claim.

Section 54-142a (c) mandates the automatic erasure of records following the entry of a nolle and the passage of thirteen months. Whether this application constitutes a dismissal for purposes of § 53-39a is a question of statutory interpretation. “The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431, 692 A.2d 742 (1997). Insofar as the language of the statute will permit, we interpret it in accordance with the purpose of the statute, because legislation is a purposive act. Id., 450.

Section 53~39a, which was originally enacted in 1973; see Public Acts 1973, No. 73-627; authorizes indemnification for economic loss, including legal fees, incurred by officers of local police departments who are prosecuted for crimes allegedly committed by them in the course of their duties when the charges against them are dismissed or they are found not guilty. See, e.g., Link v. Shelton, 186 Conn. 623, 627, 443 A.2d 902 (1982). The general puipose of the statute is to permit police officers to recoup the necessary expenses that they have incurred in defending themselves against unwarranted criminal charges arising out of their conduct in the course of their employment. Id., 628-29. Whether the charges are unwarranted, however, is determined objectively, namely, by whether an officer has been found not guilty or the charges have been dismissed. The plaintiff in the present case does not claim that he was found not guilty of the charges. The question, therefore, is whether the charges were “dismissed” within the meaning of § 53-39a.

We begin our inquiry by acknowledging the strength of the defendant’s two principal contentions. The first is that § 53-39a, as a statute that abrogates or modifies governmental immunity, must be strictly construed. Rawling v. New Haven, 206 Conn. 100, 105, 537 A.2d 439 (1988). The second is that terms such as “dismissal” and “nolle” are ordinarily used as terms of art and, as such, are to be construed in accordance with their “peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law . . . .” General Statutes § 1-1 (a); Link v. Shelton, supra, 186 Conn. 627. These two contentions appear to lead to the conclusion that a nolle — even a nolle ultimately resulting in the erasure of records pursuant to § 54-142a (c) — cannot be considered to be a dismissal under § 53-39a. We nonetheless conclude that the entry of a nolle plus the passage of thirteen months, which results in the automatic erasure of relevant records under § 54-142a (c), constitutes a dismissal for the purposes of § 53-39a.

First, although the term “dismissed” as used in § 53-39a was undoubtedly used as a term of art, the legislative history of § 54-142a (c) indicates that the legislature did not intend the term “nolle” as used in § 54-142a (c) necessarily to be restricted to its ordinary specialized meaning. Instead, the indication is that the legislature specifically designed § 54-142a (c) in order to avoid the speedy trial violations that the legislature feared otherwise might occur. That fear was based on its interpretation of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1967).

The erasure provisions of § 54-142a (c) have their origins in legislation enacted in 1963. Prior to 1963, General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 54-90, which is the statutory progenitor of § 54-142a (c), provided simply that whenever a criminal case was nolled, “the clerk of the court shall make a record of such nolle.” In 1963, § 54-90 was amended by No. 482 of the 1963 Public Acts, which required that the clerk also record not guilty findings, and provided that, upon a nolle or not guilty finding, “the court . . . upon petition of the arrested person or his heirs, may order all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney pertaining to such case to be erased, provided at least three years have elapsed from the date of arrest.” A petition to the court and court action were thus required for erasure of records in cases in which either a nolle or a not guilty finding had been entered.

In 1967, § 54-90 was amended further by No. 181 of the 1967 Public Acts in three significant respects: (1) the erasure of records was made possible when the charges had been dismissed, as well as when they had been nolled or the defendant had been found not guilty; (2) the waiting period was reduced from three years from the date of the arrest to one year from the date of nolle, dismissal or not guilty judgment; and (3) the legal effect of the erasure was specified — “[n]o person who shall have been the subject of such an erasure order shall be deemed to have been arrested ab initio within the meaning of the general statutes with respect to the proceedings so erased.” General Statutes (Rev. to 1968) § 54-90. Consequently, an individual who successfully petitioned the court for erasure legally could state that he or she had not been arrested with respect to the relevant charges.

The next significant statutory amendment took place in 1969. By virtue of No. 229, § 1, of the 1969 Public Acts, § 54-90 was divided into subsections (a) through (e). Subsection (a) dealt with findings of not guilty and dismissals, and provided that upon such a finding or dismissal “all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney pertaining to such charge shall be immediately and automatically erased.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1971) § 54-90 (a). Subsection (b) dealt with not guilty findings and dismissals prior to October 1, 1969, and provided for a petition by the individual, or his heirs, for erasure. Subsection (c) dealt with nolles, and continued to provide that a petition for erasure could be filed after the passage of one year from the date of the nolle. Subsection (d) dealt with erasure of records when an absolute pardon had been granted, and provided for a petition procedure similar to that of nolles or pre-Octo-ber 1, 1969 dismissals. Subsection (e) clarified the meaning of erasure by providing that the “clerk of the court . . . shall not disclose to anyone information pertaining to any charge erased under any provision of this section. . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 1971) § 54-90 (e).

In 1972, § 54-90 (c) was amended by No. 20, § 2, of the 1972 Public Acts, which drew a functional equivalence between nolled cases and cases in which both a continuance had been granted and “there ha[d] been no prosecution or other disposition of the matter” for a period of one year. In such continued cases, the act mandated that “the charge shall be construed to have been nolled as of the date of termination of such one-year period and a petition for erasure may thereafter be filed as provided in this subsection for nolled cases.” Public Acts 1972, No. 20, § 2.

In 1973, the legislature again amended § 54-90 (c) by No. 73-276 of the 1973 Public Acts. First, the one year period for nolled, but not for continued, cases was changed to thirteen months. Second, the petition procedure was eliminated for both types of cases, and the statute specifically provided that, with respect to nolled cases, “if at least thirteen months have elapsed since such nolle, all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney . . . pertaining to such charge shall be erased. . . .” Public Acts 1973, No. 73-276, § 1. Thus, for the first time, the notion of an automatic erasure of records, rather than erasure triggered by a petition, was inserted into the statute. The legislative debate indicates that this automatic erasure mechanism had two purposes. The first was administrative: eliminating the petition process would ease the administrative burden on the courts. The second was substantive: elimination of the petition procedure would be fairer to those who might not have known that they needed to file a petition. The legislative colloquy also indicates a general legislative view that the erasure of records of nolled cases should be treated like the erasure of records of dismissed cases.

The legislative record of the 1973 amendment, however, does not disclose the origin or purpose of the thirteen month period. The legislature revisited the erasure provisions of § 54-90 (c) the very next year, however, and the legislative history of that amendment does shed some light on this issue.

By virtue of No. 74-52 of the 1974 Public Acts, the legislature made two significant changes in § 54-90 (c). First, it changed the one year time period applicable to continued cases to thirteen months, thus rendering that procedure for erasure of records consistent with the procedure for nolled cases. Second, it specifically provided, for both types of cases, that “such records shall be deemed erased by operation of law and the clerk or chief clerk or any person charged with the retention and control of such records shall not disclose to anyone their existence or any information pertaining to any charge so erased . . . ,” Public Acts 1974, No. 74-52, § 1.

The legislative debate in 1974 demonstrates that the legislature intended the 1974 legislation to be largely a clarification of its intent in enacting the 1973 legislation. The debate indicates that the legislature primarily intended to reinforce the ability of those persons whose records had been erased after a nolle to state that, with respect to those erased charges, they had never been arrested. The 1974 legislation was also aimed at easing the administrative burden that the erasure process placed on the courts, by the simple device of expanding the automatic erasure provision for nolled cases, which had been legislated in 1973, to dismissed cases as well. This close relationship between the 1973 and 1974 amendments leads us to consider their legislative histories together.

The 1974 legislative record reveals the origin and meaning of the thirteen month period instituted for erasure of nolled cases in 1973 and continued cases in 1974. The provision was inspired by the 1967 United States Supreme Court decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 386 U.S. 213. Based on its interpretation of that case, the legislature considered the passage of a thirteen month period after a nolle to be constitutionally mandated, and thus to be the equivalent of, a dismissal.

In Klopfer, the court held that the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial applies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that this right affords “affirmative protection against an unjustified postponement of trial for an accused discharged from custody . . . .” Id., 219. The court reached this conclusion “in the context of an application of an unusual North Carolina criminal procedural device known as the ‘nolle prosequi with leave.’ ” Id., 214. Under that procedure, if the prosecutor enters a nolle prosequi with leave, the defendant is discharged but the statute of limitations is tolled, and the prosecutor may restore the case to the docket at any time in the future. Id., 214.

Although the entry of a nolle under our law does not toll the statute of limitations; see State v. Gaston, 198 Conn. 435, 441, 503 A.2d 594 (1986); the legislature in 1973 and 1974 interpreted Klopfer to mandate that, following a nolle, a defendant cannot be kept under an indefinitely overhanging cloud of subsequent prosecution. The legislature perceived that, in order to render our law consistent with Klopfer, some additional procedural protection for a defendant whose case had been nolled was necessary, namely, the automatic erasure of records of the nolled case. Moreover, the legislative history; see footnote 23; demonstrates the legislature’s belief and intention that, in order to comply with Klopfer, the erasure of records of nolled cases “by operation of law” pursuant to § 54-142a (c), following the requisite thirteen month period, should have the same practical effect as would the immediate erasure of records in dismissed cases pursuant to § 54-142a (a). Thus, the history persuades us that, although the legislature used the term “nolle” in subsection (c) of § 54-142a, and although that term is ordinarily understood to have a technical meaning different from “dismissal,” the legal and practical effect of a nolle under subsection (c) was intended by the legislature to be the same as the legal and practical effect of a dismissal under subsection (a) of § 54-142a.

We conclude that § 54-142a (c) should be construed to give it the legal and practical effect intended by its drafters, as revealed by the legislative history. That being so, we can perceive no sound reason why that construction should not also carry over to the provisions of § 53-39a. Although § 53-39a does, as we indicated previously, use the term “dismissed” in its technical sense, § 54-142a (c) does not use the term “nolle” in that sense and, instead, uses it in a context that renders the provisions of § 54-142a (c) the functional equivalent of a dismissal. Thus, given that a dismissal and erasure pursuant to § 54-142a (a) or (b) would trigger the application of § 53-39a, we conclude that the same result should follow from the erasure of records of a nolled case under § 54-142a (c). This construction is consistent with the general puipose of § 53-39a, namely, to indemnify police officers against whom criminal charges have been made but not prosecuted or of which the officer has been found not guilty.

This construction of § 54-142a (c) is also consistent with much of the general jurisprudence of nolles and dismissals. Although they have some doctrinal and procedural differences; see footnote 9; in some legal respects they are treated as fungible. See, e.g., State v. Gaston, supra, 198 Conn. 440 (nolle and dismissal treated same for purposes of speedy trial analysis); See v. Gosselin, 133 Conn. 158, 160-61, 48 A.2d 560 (1946) (nolle and dismissal treated same for purposes of subsequent action for malicious prosecution).

In addition, we note that between 1973, when § 53-39a was first enacted, and October 1, 1987, there were two forms of dismissal under Practice Book § 819: with and without prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice did not prevent the state “from subsequently charging the defendant with the same crime and [the accused was placed] in essentially the same position as he or she would have been had a nolle entered.” State v. Talton, 209 Conn. 133, 141, 547 A.2d 543 (1988); State v. Lenczyk, 11 Conn. App. 224, 225-26 n.1, 526 A.2d 554 (1987). Thus, when the legislature used the term “dismissed” in enacting § 53-39a in 1973, it must be presumed to have understood that a dismissal without prejudice — the functional equivalent of a nolle — would trigger the compensatory provisions of § 53-39a. Accordingly, in the absence of clear evidence that it intended to do so, the legislature should not be deemed to have excluded from indemnification functional equivalents of a dismissal without prejudice, such as a nolle and erasure pursuant to § 54-142a (c). In fact, even today, long after the repeal of Practice Book § 819, a case may be dismissed under Practice Book § 815 for many reasons that would leave the defendant in an essentially equivalent position as if the case had been nolled. Common sense suggests that such an equivalency must carry over to the application of § 53-39a.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53-39a provides: “Indemnification of police, including state capítol security police, when criminal charge dismissed. Whenever, in any prosecution of an officer of the division of state police within the department of public safety, or a member of the office of capítol security or any person appointed under section 29-18 as a special policeman for the state capítol building and grounds, the legislative office building and parking garage and related structures and facilities, and other areas under the supervision and control of the joint committee on legislative management, or a local police department for a crime allegedly committed by such officer in the course of his duty as such, the charge is dismissed or the officer found not guilty, such officer shall be indemnified by his employing governmental unit for economic loss sustained by him as a result of such prosecution, including the payment of any legal fees necessarily incurred.”
      Although § 53-39a has been amended by No. 96-219 of the 1996 Public Acts, the amendments are not relevant to this appeal. Hereafter, all references to § 53-39a are to the 1995 revision.

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 54-142a provides: “Erasure of criminal records, (a) Whenever in any criminal case, on or after October 1, 1969, the accused, by a final judgment, is found not guilty of the charge or the charge is dismissed, all police and court records and records of any state’s attorney pertaining to such charge shall be erased upon the expiration of the time to file a writ of error or take an appeal, if an appeal is not taken, or upon final determination of the appeal sustaining a finding of not guilty or a dismissal, if an appeal is taken. Nothing in this subsection shall require the erasure of any record pertaining to a charge for which the defendant was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect or guilty but not criminally responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.
      “(b) Whenever in any criminal case prior to October 1, 1969, the accused, by a final judgment, was found not guilty of the charge or the charge was dismissed, all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting grandjurorpertaining to such charge shall be erased by operation of law and the clerk or any person charged with the retention and control of such records shall not disclose to anyone their existence or any information pertaining to any charge so erased; provided nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the arrested person or any one of his heirs from filing a petition for erasure with the court granting such not guilty judgment or dismissal, or, where the matter had been before a municipal court, a trial justice, the circuit court or the court of common pleas with the records center of the judicial department and thereupon all police and court records and records of the state’s attorney, prosecuting attorney or prosecuting grand juror pertaining to such charge shall be erased. Nothing in this subsection shall require tire erasure of any record pertaining to a charge for which the defendant was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.
      “(c) Whenever any charge in a criminal case has been nolled in the superior court, or in the court of common pleas, if at least thirteen months have elapsed since such nolle, all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting grand juror pertaining to such charge shall be erased. However, in cases of nolles entered in the superior court, court of common pleas, circuit court, municipal court or by a justice of the peace prior to April 1, 1972, such records shall be deemed erased by opération of law and the clerk or the person charged with the retention and control of such records shall not disclose to anyone their existence or any information pertaining to any charge so erased, provided nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the arrested person or any one of his heirs from filing a petition to the court or to the records center of the judicial department, as the case may be, to have such records erased, in which case such records shall be erased. Whenever any charge in a criminal case has been continued at the request of the prosecuting attorney, and a period of thirteen months has elapsed since the granting of such continuance during which period there has been no prosecution or other disposition of the matter, the charge shall be construed to have been nolled as of the date of termination of such thirteen-month period and such erasure may thereafter be effected or a petition filed therefor, as the case may be, as provided in this subsection for nolled cases.
      “(d) Whenever prior to October 1, 1974, any person who has been convicted of an offense in any court of this state has received an absolute pardon for such offense, such person or any one of his heirs may, at any time subsequent to such pardon, file a petition with the superior court at the location in which such conviction was effected, or with the superior court at the location having custody of the records of such conviction or with the records center of the judicial department if such conviction was in the court of common pleas, circuit court, municipal court or by a trial justice court, for an order of erasure, and the superior court or records center of the judicial department shall direct all police and court records and records ol' the state’s or prosecuting attorney pertaining to such case to be erased. Whenever such absolute pardon was received on or after October 1, 1974, such records shall be erased.
      “(e) The clerk of the court or any person charged with retention and control of such records in the records center of the judicial department or any law enforcement agency having information contained in such erased records shall not disclose to anyone, except the subject of the record, upon submission pursuant to guidelines prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator of satisfactory proof of the subject’s identity, information pertaining to any charge erased under any provision of this section and such clerk or person charged with the retention and control of such records shall forward a notice of such erasure to any law enforcement agency to which he knows information concerning the arrest has been disseminated and such disseminated information shall be erased from the records of such law enforcement agency. Such clerk or such person, as the case may be, shall provide adequate; security measures to safeguard against unauthorized access to or dissemination of such records or upon the request of the accused cause the actual physical destruction of such records. No fee shall be charged in any court with respect to any petition under this section. Any person who shall have been the subject of such an erasure shall be deemed to have never been arrested within the meaning of the general statutes with respect to the proceedings so erased and may so swear under oath.
      “(f) Upon motion properly brought, the court or a judge thereof, if such court is not in session, may order disclosure of such records (1) to a defendant in an action for false arrest arising out of the proceedings so erased or (2) to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel in connection with any perjury charges which the prosecutor alleges may have arisen from the testimony elicited during the trial. Such disclosure of such records is subject also to any records destruction program pursuant to which the records may have been destroyed. The jury charge in connection with erased offenses may be ordered by the judge for use by the judiciary, provided the names of the accused and the witnesses are omitted therefrom.
      “(g) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any police or court records or the records of any state’s attorney or prosecuting attorney with respect to any count of any information or indictment which was nolled or dismissed if the accused was convicted upon one or more counts of the same information or indictment.”
      Although § 54-142a has been amended by No. 95-133 of the 1995 Public Acts, and by Nos. 96-63 and 96-79 of the 1996 Public Acts, the amendments are not relevant to this appeal. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 54-142a are to the 1995 revision.

       We granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Under the circumstances of this case, was the plaintiff entitled to indemnification under General Statutes § 53-39a?” Cislo v. Shelton, 237 Conn. 924, 677 A.2d 946 (1996).

       “Practice Book §§ 725 and 727 and General Statutes § 54-142a (c) address the entry and effect of a nolle prosequi. Concerning the entry of a nolle, Practice Book § 725 provides: ‘A prosecuting authority shall have the power to enter a nolle prosequi in a case. It shall be entered upon the record after a brief statement by the prosecuting authority in open court of the reasons therefor.’ Concerning the effect of a nolle, Practice Book § 727 provides: ‘The entry of a nolle prosequi terminates the prosecution and the defendant shall be released from custody. If subsequently the prosecuting authority decides to proceed against the defendant, a new prosecution must be initiated.’ Furthermore, General Statutes § 54-142a (c) provides in relevant part: ‘Whenever any charge in a criminal case has been nolled in the superior court, or in the court of common pleas, if at least thirteen months have elapsed since such nolle, all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting grand juror pertaining to such charge shall be erased. . . .’” Cislo v. Shelton, supra, 40 Conn. App. 706-707 n.1.

       General Statutes § 54-56b provides: “Right to dismissal or trial on nolle. A nolle prosequi may not be entered as to any count in a complaint or information if the accused objects to the nolle prosequi and demands either a trial or dismissal, except with respect to prosecutions in which a nolle prosequi is entered upon a representation to the court by the prosecuting official that a material witness has died, disappeared or become disabled or that material evidence has disappeared or has been destroyed and that a further investigation is therefore necessary.”

       “Practice Book § 726 provides: ‘Where a prosecution is initiated by complaint or information, the defendant may object to the entering of a nolle prosequi at the time it is offered by the prosecuting authority and may demand either a trial or a dismissal, except when a nolle prosequi is entered upon a representation to the judicial authority by the prosecuting authority that a material witness has died, disappeared or become disabled or that material evidence has disappeared or has been destroyed and that a further investigation is therefore necessary.’ See also General Statutes § 54-56b, which provides: ‘A nolle prosequi may not be entered as to any count in a complaint or information if the accused objects to the nolle prosequi and demands either a trial or dismissal, except with respect to the prosecutions in which a nolle prosequi is entered upon a representation to the court by the prosecuting official that a material witness has died, disappeared or become disabled or that material evidence has disappeared or has been destroyed and that a further investigation is therefore necessary.’ ” Cislo v. Shelton, supra, 40 Conn. App. 707 n.2.

       See footnote 1.

       The trial court also concluded that the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment could not be granted because there was a question of fact as to whether he had been acting in the course of his duly when the alleged sexual assault took place. That issue is not before us in this appeal and will remain at issue in this case following our remand.

       As ordinarily understood, the two terms carry certain procedural and doctrinal differences. A dismissal is an act of the court, whereas a nolle is, except when limited by statute or rule of practice; see, e.g., General Statutes § 54-56b and Practice Book § 726; a unilateral act by a prosecutor, which ends the “pending proceedings without an acquittal and without placing the defendant in jeopardy.” State v. Lloyd, 185 Conn. 199, 201, 440 A.2d 867 (1981).

       We reach this conclusion because the term “dismissed” is a specialized legal term with a particular meaning, and there is no legislative history for § 53-39a or other contextual evidence to suggest that the legislature was using the term in that statute, in a sense other than its specialized meaning.

       Until 1979, the erasure provisions at issue in the present case were contained in § 54-90. In that year, however, as part of a technical revision of the statutes, those provisions were transferred to § 54-142a (c).

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1968) § 54-90 provided: “Erasure of arrest and court records after nolles, dismissals and not guilty findings. Whenever any charge in a criminal case has been nolled or dismissed, or by a final judgment the accused has been found not guilty, of such charge in the superior court, court of common pleas or in the circuit court, or in a municipal court or by a justice of the peace, the arrested person or any one of his heirs may file a petition with the court granting the nolle, dismissal or such not guilty judgment, or the circuit court in any matter pertaining to a municipal court or a justice of the peace, for an order of erasure and if such court finds that at least one year has elapsed since such nolle, dismissal or such not guilty judgment, it shall order all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting grand juror pertaining to such charge to be erased. Such petition shall have appended thereto a summons and proposed order, and a copy of such petition and the summons and proposed order shall be served, in the manner provided in the practice book for the service of pleadings, at least fourteen days before the return day specified in such summons by mail, on each clerk, chief clerk, police official, and other person to whom such order will be directed. The clerk of the court or chief clerk of the circuit court, as the case may be, shall not disclose to anyone information pertaining to the charge so erased. No fee shall be charged in any such court with respect to such petition. No person who shall have been the subject of such an erasure order shall be deemed to have been arrested ab initio within the meaning of the general statutes with respect to the proceedings so erased.”

       Similarly, with respect to continued cases, § 54-90 (c) was amended to provide that, upon completion of the one year period, “the charge shall be construed to have been nolled as of the date of termination of such one-year period and erasure may thereafter be effected as provided in this subsection for nolled cases.” Public Acts 1973, No. 73-276, § 1.

       In the House floor debates, Representative James F. Bingham stated: “It is the expectation that this procedure will simplify the practice especially in the Circuit Courts, not requiring people to petition the court and . . . reducing motion calendar business.” 16 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8,1973 Sess., p. 4028.

       In the House floor debates, Representative William R. Ratchford stated: “The fact of the matter is that far too many people, especially young people, after their case is nolled, never take that step to petition for the erasure and then when it comes time to apply for college, apply for a job, or attempt to enter the service, find out in fact that they still do have a record.
      “This will go a long way toward correcting it and will also eliminate discrimination that now takes place between someone who may be represented and someone who isn’t. Normally the attorney will ticket his book for a year later and then petition the court. The unrepresented person frequently does not and ends up unnecessarily with a record.” 16 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1973 Sess., p. 4029.

       In the House floor debates, Representative Muriel Yacavone asked: “[I]s there any provision for dismissal of charges, is that handled in the same way that nolles are handled? Has there been any action for erasure of dismissal?” 16 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1973 Sess., p. 4031. Representative James F. Bingham responded: “When a judge enters a dismissal that’s the termination of the case. It’s erased.” Id.
      This is consistent with the then existing provisions of § 54-90 (a) that, upon a dismissal, “all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney pertaining to such charge shall be immediately and automatically erased.” General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 54-90 (a).

       Public Acts 1974, No. 74-52 provided: “AN ACT CONCERNING AUTOMATIC ERASURE OF ARREST PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 1972.
      “Section 1. Subsection (c) of section 54-90, as amended by section 1 of number 73-276 of the public acts of 1973, is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof:
      “(c) Whenever any charge in a criminal case has been nolled in the superior c.ourt[, court of common pleas] or in the circuit court,, [or in a municipal court or by a justice of the peace,] if at least thirteen months have elapsed since such nolle, all police and court records and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting grand jurorpertaining to such charge shall be erased, PROVIDED IN CASES OF NOJXES ENTERED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CIRCUIT COURT, MUNICIPAL COURT OR BY A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 1972, SUCH RECORDS SHALL BE DEEMED ERASED BY OPERATION OF LAW AND THE CLERK OR CHIEF CLERK OR ANY PERSON CHARGED WITH THE RETENTION AND CONTROL OF SUCH RECORDS SHALL NOT DISCLOSE TO ANYONE THEIR EXISTENCE OR ANY INFORMATION PERTAINING TO ANY CHARGE SO ERASED; PROVIDED NOTHING IN THIS SECTION SHALL PROHIBIT THE ARRESTED PERSON OR ANY ONE OF HIS HEIRS FROM FILING A PETITION TO THE APPROPRIATE COURT TO HAVE SUCH RECORDS PHYSICALLY ERASED, IN WHICH CASE SUCH RECORDS SHALL BE ERASED. Whenever any charge in a criminal case has been continued in the superior court, or the circuit court, and a period of [one year] THIRTEEN MONTHS has elapsed since the granting of such continuance during which period there has been no prosecution or other disposition of the matter, the charge shall be construed to have been nolled as of the date of termination of such [one-year] THIRTEEN-MONTH period and SUCH erasure may thereafter be effected OR A PETITION FILED THEREFOR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, as provided in this subsection for nolled cases.
      “Sec. 2. This act shall take effect from its passage.”

       Number 74-52 of the 1974 Public Acts also provided for a petition procedure “to have such records physically erased . . . .” (Emphasis added.) See footnote 17.

       In presenting the bill to the House, Representative Samuel S. Freedman stated: “[TJhere has been some misunderstanding about the intent of this bill, both this year, and of the bill which it intends to amend. It is my recollection that last year when this bill came to the Judiciary Committee, and that recollection has been confirmed by other members of the commit-lee, that the intent of the Judiciary Committee was that the erasure of nolles should be prospective only and not retrospective.
      "In fact, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee informs me that this House was so informed on the floor of the House.
      "There has been a great deal of confusion amongst the various jurisdictions of this state'. Some areas and some area police forces have felt that it is retrospective — some have felt that it is not retrospective. We have checked and found that there is absolutely no uniformity in the handling of this problem amongst the various towns. Because of this we received requests from police departments backed up by the chief state’s attorney and from the chief clerk of the Circuit Court on behalf of the Circuit Court clerks. . . .
      ‘'Therefore we are not really changing anything' in this bill. What we are doing is clearing up a great deal of confusion and also trying to conform the various towns around the state and help the courts because the worst thing we could have is unequal treatment of people around the state.
      "There has been some question, and I know a letter has been sent around that something is being taken away from people. Nothing has ever been given which is being taken away. We are merely trying to clarify what was the intent of the committee and which, I think, otherwise would make for an unwieldy bill.” 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1974 Sess., pp. 730-32.

       In the House floor debates, Representative Bernard L. Avcollie stated: "I do want to establish, for the record, Mr. Speaker, that the intention of this bill was clearly that any individual in the State of Connecticut, who has received a nolle as a result, of an arrest and which nolle is thirteen months old. or more, is certainly privileged to answer any questionnaire, or respond to any question . . . any application for employment for college . . . that, he has not been arrested and does not have a record of arresl that pertains to that, charge. . . . That is the intent of the bill . . . .” 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1974 Sess., p. 823.

       Representative Samuel S. Freedman stated that the bill “will also help the Court Clerks and ease the burden there.” 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1974 Sess., p. 822.

       The references in the legislative history to the case of Proctor v. North Carolina; see footnote 23; are an obvious mistake resulting from the transcription of the taped legislative debate, because Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 386 U.S. 213, is the only United States Supreme Court case that fits the description stated in the debate.

       In the House floor debates, Representative Samuel S. Freedman stated: “The period of thirteen months was placed in following the case of [Klopfer] v. North Carolina”; see footnote 22; “which indicated that a thirteen month period merits a dismissal and the committee shows the cut-off date of April 1, 1972 for very specific reasons because of the effective date of the bill thirteen months later. Anyone after that effective date indeed had a right to rely that his record had been erased. Prior to that date it is also quite obvious that no one has had any remedy taken away from them because they have always had the right to petition.
      * ** *
      “[T]he Supreme Court in the case of [Klopfer] v. North Carolina has laid down a doctrine which is mandated and states . . . that if there has been no prosecution of the case ... or disposition of the case for a thirteen month period, if it has simply been continued and continued and continued, that case must constitutionally be dismissed.” 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1974 Sess., pp. 731, 737.

       In Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 386 U.S. 217, in which the defendant had been tried in North Carolina for criminal trespass, the jury failed to reach a verdict and, in March, 1964, the trial judge declared a mistrial and ordered the case continued. Thirteen months later, in April, 1965, the trial court, in response to the prosecutor’s motion, continued the ease to the next court term. Id., 218. Ultimately, in August, 1965, the prosecutor, over the defendant’s objection, entered a nolle prosequi with leave, thus leaving the defendant at. risk of future prosecution for an indefinite period of time. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that procedure, as applied to that case, violative of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Id., 223.

       Similarly, records of cases that were dismissed prior to October 1, 1969, are deemed to have been erased “by operation of law” pursuant to § 54-142a (b).

       The additional legislative purpose behind § 54-142a as a whole is to ease the administrative burden on the courts. This puipose partially explains the absence of the use of the term “dismissal” in subsection (c). A dismissal traditionally requires action by the court; therefore, the use of such a term might have implied the necessity of court action, which would be contrary to this administrative purpose.

       Practice Book § 819, which was in effect from 1963 to October 1, 1987, provided: “If the judicial authority grants a motion to dismiss, he shall specify whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice. If the dismissal is with prejudice, the defendant shall be released, and the prosecuting authority may, where he is entitled by law, appeal the dismissal in the same manner and to the same effect as appeals from final judgments in criminal prosecutions. If the dismissal is without prejudice, the defendant shall be released, but the dismissal shall not be a bar to further prosecution for the same offense or offenses.” That section was repealed effective October 1, 1987.

       Practice Book § 815 provides: “The following defenses or objections, if capable of determination without a trial of the general issue, shall, if made prior to trial, be raised by a motion to dismiss the information:
      “(1) Defects in the institution of the prosecution including any grand jury proceedings;

        “(2) Defects in the information including failure to charge an offense;
      “(3) Statute of limitations;
      “(4) Absence of jurisdiction of the court over the defendant or the subject matter;
      “(5) Insufficiency of evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or the placing of the defendant on trial;
      “(6) Previous prosecution barring the present prosecution;
      “(7) Claim that the defendant has been denied a speedy trial;
      “(8) Claim that the law defining the offense charged is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid; or
      “(9) Any other grounds.”