author: BORDEN, J.

text:
    ROBERT CARRIERO v. BOROUGH OF NAUGATUCK ET AL.
    (SC 15610)
    Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued November 5, 1997
    officially released March 3, 1998

      Carlos A. Santos, with whom, on the brief, was Peter E. Mariano, for the appellant (named defendant).

      David J. Morrissey, for the appellee (plaintiff).

      Frank A. May filed a brief for the city of Hartford et al. as amici curiae.
   Opinion

BORDEN, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the “ceiling” imposed by General Statutes § 7-433b (b) upon benefits awarded under what is commonly referred to as the Heart and Hypertension Act, General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 7-433c, applies to cumulative payments to a retired police officer composed of permanent partial disability compensation awarded under § 7-433c and a retirement pension based solely on the number of years of service. Following our grant of certification, the named defendant, the borough of Naugatuck, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the decision of the compensation review board (board). Carriero v. Nauga tuck, 43 Conn. App. 773, 778, 685 A.2d 1141 (1996). The board had affirmed the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner for the fifth district (commissioner) ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff, Robert Camero, a retired police officer who previously had been employed by the defendant, the full measure of permanent partial disability benefits that he had been awarded pursuant to § 7-433c, notwithstanding that he had already retired and had begun collecting a retirement pension based on the number of years of his service, and notwithstanding that the total cumulative payments from these two sources exceeded the ceiling imposed by § 7-433b (b).

The ceiling on benefits imposed by § 7-433b (b) provides that “the cumulative payments . . . for compensation and retirement or survivors benefits under section 7-433c shall be adjusted so that the total of such cumulative payments received by such member or his dependents or survivors shall not exceed one hundred per cent of the weekly compensation being paid, during their compensable period, to members of such department in the same position which was held by such member at the time of his death or retirement . . . .” The Appellate Court reasoned that this ceiling applies only when both the disability compensation benefits and the retirement benefits have been awarded pursuant to § 7-433c. The defendant claims that the ceiling applies whenever any portion of the retiree’s compensation has been awarded under § 7-433c. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed and are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. “The commissioner found the following facts. The plaintiff is a retired Naugatuck police officer. In January, 1991, in accordance with its contract with the police union, [the defendant] awarded the plaintiff a pension based solely on his thirty years of service with its police department. This pension was unrelated to his [subsequent heart and] hypertension claim under § 7-433c, and his disability was not an issue or a consideration in [the defendant’s] decision to grant the pension.

“[Through a voluntary agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant] on March 1, 1991, the plaintiff was awarded permanent partial disability benefits because of a 42.5 percent disability of his heart. These disability benefits were awarded pursuant to § 7-433c.” Carriero v. Naugatuck, supra, 43 Conn. App. 774-75.

Accounting for the full measure of both the pension and the disability compensation, the cumulative weekly payments from the defendant to the plaintiff would have exceeded the ceiling provided by § 7-433b (b) to cumulative retirement and disability compensation benefits to which it applies. Because the defendant considered the ceiling to apply to the payments that it was making to the plaintiff, the defendant limited its disability and retirement payments accordingly.

The plaintiff sought an order from the commissioner requiring the full payment of both his § 7-433c disability benefits and his retirement pension. The commissioner granted that order. The defendant appealed to the board, which affirmed the commissioner’s decision. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the board’s decision. This certified appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the § 7-433b (b) ceiling does not apply in this case. The defendant argues that the language of § 7-433b (b) delineating precisely the payments that the subsection limits, namely, “cumulative payments . . . for compensation and retirement . . . benefits under section 7-433c,” applies to cumulative payments of disability compensation and retirement pension benefits when any portion of those payments has been awarded under § 7-433c. We agree.

We first note that, in Lambert v. Bridgeport, 204 Conn. 563, 567-68, 529 A.2d 184 (1987), we addressed the precise question involved in this appeal, albeit in dictum. The facts in Lambert were virtually identical to the facts here. The plaintiff, a retired Bridgeport police officer, had suffered an off-duty heart attack. Subsequently, he retired and began to collect retirement benefits through a contributory pension plan established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the city and the police union. The pension benefits were not paid pursuant to § 7-433c. Several months after his retirement, he submitted a claim with the workers’ compensation commissioner for disability compensation benefits under § 7-433c. The commissioner awarded those benefits, which, in combination with the plaintiffs nondisability retirement pension, exceeded the salary paid to working officers in comparable positions. Citing the then newly adopted § 7-433b (b), the city refused to pay combined benefits beyond the salary being paid to active officers, and the plaintiff brought an action for full payment of the combined benefits. Id., 565-69.

On appeal, this court ruled that § 7-433b (b) did not apply to the case because the plaintiffs rights to both the pension and the heart and hypertension compensation payments had accrued prior to July, 1977, the effective date of No. 77-520 of the 1977 Public Acts, which had created § 7-433b (b). Id., 568-69. Before reaching that conclusion, however, we stated that “[ajceording to [§ 7-433b (b)J the benefits paid under the private pension agreement must be reduced so as not to exceed the 100 percent limit”; (emphasis added) id., 567-68; suggesting that § 7-433b (b) applied to the cumulative payments of disability benefits paid pursuant to § 7-433c, and a retirement pension not paid pursuant to § 7-433c. We now conclude that, as the dictum in Lambert indicated, the § 7-433b (b) ceiling applies to the total payments composed of heart and hypertension disability payments and retirement pension payments not related to § 7-433c, and we hold accordingly.

With this background in mind, we turn to the interpretation of § 7-433b (b). “The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case .... In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431, 692 A.2d 742 (1997).

Before scrutinizing the language of § 7-433b (b), it is helpful to review § 7-433c. Section 7-433c (a) provides in relevant part that “in the event a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department or a regular member of a paid municipal police department . . . suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents, as the case may be, shall” be eligible to receive two categories of “heart and hypertension” benefits. Specifically, (1) “from his municipal employer [he shall be eligible to receive] compensation and medical care in the same amount and [in] the same manner as that provided under chapter 568 if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment, and [2] from the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered, he or his dependents, as the case may be, shall [be eligible to] receive the same retirement or survivor benefits which would be paid under said system if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment, and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment. . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 7-433c (a).

These § 7-433c payments constitute “special compensation, or even an outright bonus, to qualifying policemen and firemen.” Grover v. Manchester, 168 Conn. 84, 88, 357 A.2d 922, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805, 96 S. Ct. 14, 46 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975). “[T]he outright bonus provided by the statute is that the claimant is not required to prove that the heart disease is causally connected to his employment, which he would ordinarily have to establish in order to receive benefits pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Revoir v. New Britain, 2 Conn. App. 255, 260, 477 A.2d 161 (1984). Thus, although “[the Workers’ Compensation Act] is used ... as a ‘procedural avenue’ for administration of the benefits under § 7-433c”; Morgan v. East Haven, 208 Conn. 576, 581, 546 A.2d 243 (1988); an award under § 7-433c is not a workers’ compensation award. Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 673-74, 425 A.2d 131 (1979).

Section 7-433b (b) imposes a ceiling on cumulative payments “under section 7-433c . . . .” The language expressing the limitation provides that “cumulative payments . . . for compensation and retirement or survivors benefits under section 7-433c shall be adjusted so that the total of such cumulative payments . . . shall not exceed one hundred per cent of the weekly compensation being paid, during their compensable period, to members of such department in the same position which was held by [the retired or deceased police officer or firefighter] at the time of his death or retirement. . . .” General Statutes § 7-433b (b). When this language is examined in isolation, the plaintiffs argument, namely, that the ceiling should apply only when both categories constituting the cumulative payments — disability compensation and retirement or survivors benefits — consist of awards under § 7-433c, “has a superficial textual appeal . . . .” United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, supra, 240 Conn. 455. When that language is read in the context of § 7-433b (b) as a whole, however, strong indications emerge that the legislature intended a broader application of the ceiling.

First, if the ceiling applied only when both disability compensation and retirement or survivors benefits were paid pursuant to § 7-433c, then the portions of the text of § 7-433b (b) that immediately precede and immediately follow the language of limitation would be superfluous. Immediately preceding the language of limitation in § 7-433b (b) is the following sentence: “Notwithstanding the provisions of any general statute, charter or special act to the contrary affecting the noncontributory or contributory retirement systems of any municipality of the state, or any special act providing for a police or firemen benefit fund or other retirement system . . . .” Immediately following the language of limitation in § 7-433b (b) is the following sentence: “Nothing contained herein shall prevent any town, city or borough from paying money from its general fund to any such member or his dependents or survivors, provided the total of such cumulative payments shall not exceed said one hundred per cent of the weekly compensation.” These passages clarify the scope of the limitation imposed by the section. If the ceiling applied only to cumulative payments composed of disability compensation benefits and retirement benefits that had been awarded under § 7-433c, these passages would be superfluous, because the complete mandate of § 7-433b (b) would be expressed in the plain words of the phrase, “the cumulative payments . . . for compensation and retirement or survivors benefits under section 7-433c shall be adjusted . . . .” There would be no reason for § 7-433b (b) to indicate that the ceiling applies “[n]otwithstanding the provisions” of certain other potential sources of retirement benefits, and the statute’s indication that the ceiling applies when part of the cumulative payments consists of money paid out of a municipality’s general fund, unconnected to any claim under § 7-433c, would be meaningless.

In general, “[w]e do not . . . read legislative language in such a way as to render it superfluous.” United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, supra, 240 Conn. 439. We have emphasized this point in particular with regard to § 7-433b (b), stating, “[i]n our construction of § 7-433b (b), we strive to attach independent meaning to every phrase contained in [the] legislative enactment.” Costello v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 189, 193, 571 A.2d 93 (1990). Therefore, the fact that these passages would be rendered meaningless if the ceiling was interpreted to apply only when both disability compensation and retirement or survivors benefits were paid pursuant to § 7-433c, as the plaintiff urges, suggests that such an interpretation would be incorrect. In contrast, the passages clarify the scope of the statutory ceiling if the defendant’s interpretation, namely, that the statutory ceiling applies to the cumulation of any § 7-433c benefits and other, unrelated retirement benefits, is adopted.

The purpose underlying § 7-433b (b) points in the same direction. The general purpose of § 7-433b (b) is “to limit the total payments to a retired municipal police officer to the amount that was being paid to his working counterpart.” Id. Our conclusion regarding the meaning of the ceiling is consistent with that purpose. By contrast, however, the construction of the ceiling advocated by the plaintiff, which would allow a retiring police officer or firefighter collecting § 7-433c benefits to avoid the ceiling whenever he also qualifies for a nondisability pension, is inconsistent with that general purpose.

The legislative history of § 7-433b (b) further buttresses our conclusion that the ceiling applies to the facts of the present case. For example, Senator James J. Murphy, Jr., the sponsor of the amendment that ultimately became No. 77-520 of the 1977 Public Acts, which included the provision that currently is codified at § 7-433b (b), commented: “Basically, what this [a]mendment does, Mr. President, the [a]mendment [that] would become the [b]ill, is put a cap of 100 percent on the benefits that would be available. Under some plans, between Workers’] Compensation and other programs that are available to these employees in municipalities, they receive, if they’re out on disability, more than 100 percent. This puts a cap on it . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 20 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1977 Sess., p. 3363. likewise, Representative Samuel Gejdenson, the primary sponsor of the legislation in the House, commented: “What the bill does is put a cap on [the] amount of money an individual can seek through Heart and Hypertension, so that it does not exceed over 100 percent. ... In some cases it was found that through Heart and Hypertension and [a] retirement plan, an individual could receive more money going out on Heart and Hypertension than when he was actually working.” (Emphasis added.) 20 H.R. Proc., Pt. 5, 1977 Sess., p. 1816. These statements suggest that the legislators intended the statutory ceiling to apply to the cumulation of any § 7-433c benefits and other, unrelated retirement benefits.

The plaintiff claims that, if the ceiling is applied to the present case, there would be an inconsistency between § 7-433c and the Workers’ Compensation Act. Specifically, he argues that a retiree may collect in excess of 100 percent of his former salary in the form of a combination of workers’ compensation benefits and a nondisability pension, and that we should construe the § 7-433b (b) ceiling to be consistent with that statutorily permissible combination. We are unpersuaded.

The defendant does not challenge the plaintiffs assertion that there is no analogous ceiling applicable to workers’ compensation benefits and service related pension payments, and we, therefore, assume that to be the case. That does not, however, undermine our conclusion that the statutory ceiling applies to the present matter.

Although we ordinarily read related statutes so as to form a coherent and rational whole, avoiding irrational distinctions; see, e.g., In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 524, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) (“ ‘[statutes are to be interpreted with regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law’ ”); Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145, 149, 440 A.2d 885 (1981) (“[w]emake every effort to construe a statutory scheme as a consistent whole”); that principle does not apply in the present matter in the fashion that the plaintiff urges. First, whether to impose a ceiling on a combination of benefits consisting of § 7-433c benefits and ordinary pension benefits, but not on a combination of benefits consisting of workers’ compensation benefits and ordinary pension benefits, is a policy choice properly addressed by the legislature. Second, there are significant differences between workers’ compensation benefits and § 7-433c benefits that may well have animated such a legislative distinction.

Although the Heart and Hypertension Act shares certain commonalities with the Workers’ Compensation Act, the two statutes differ in important respects. As the Appellate Court has stated, “[an award pursuant to] General Statutes § 7-433c . . .is a workers’] compensation award in the sense that its benefits are payable and procedurally administered under the Workers’] Compensation Act”; (emphasis in original) Middletown v. Local 1073, 1 Conn. App. 58, 65-66, 467 A.2d 1258 (1983) , cert. dismissed, 192 Conn. 803, 471 A.2d 244 (1984); but, “[it] is not a workers’] compensation award because it requires no proof of eligibility or liability under the Workers’] Compensation Act.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 65. The proof of eligibility that a claimant must make under the Workers’ Compensation Act is that he has sustained “injur[ies] . . . arising out of and in the course of his employment . . . .” General Statutes § 31-284 (a); see also Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 279, 240 A.2d 886 (1968) (“purpose of the workers’] compensation law has always been to provide compensation for an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment regardless of fault”). In contrast, the essential characteristic of § 7-433c is that it awards benefits to police or fire department personnel for certain cardiovascular ailments without requiring proof that such ailments “arose out of and in the course of . . . employment . . . .”

This fundamental distinction between the benefits payable under the two statutes provides a rational justification for the legislative choice to permit claimants to collect workers’ compensation benefits, but not heart and hypertension benefits, and nondisability pension benefits, in excess of 100 percent of their salary. Workers’ compensation benefits are workers’compensation; that is, because such benefits constitute payment for proven work related injuries or illness, they have, in effect, been earned by the beneficiary through work. The legislature may well have considered, therefore, that it is reasonable to permit a workers’ compensation claimant to collect such benefits in full, even if the claimant is no longer an active employee, and even if such benefits, in addition to the claimant’s retirement pension, exceed 100 percent of salary. Heart and hypertension benefits, however, cannot be said to constitute compensation in the same manner, because they are awarded without respect to causation by the claimant’s employment. They constitute a legislative bonus to police and fire department personnel. Grover v. Manchester, supra, 168 Conn. 88-89. Thus, the legislature may have considered it to be justified to limit those benefits, in combination with the claimant’s pension, to no more than 100 percent of his salary.

Finally, the plaintiff argues that our determination of the present case should be controlled by application of the interpretive axiom that, in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the objectives of remedial legislation, the limitations on that legislation should be interpreted narrowly. It is true that this court has, in the past, found that axiom helpful in construing aspects of the Heart and Hypertension Act. See Szudora v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 552, 559, 573 A.2d 1 (1990) (“[i]n light of the remedial nature of the Heart and Hypertension Act, this court should not impose greater constraints on the benefits afforded to disabled police officers and firefighters than the legislature has chosen to adopt”); Costello v. Fairfield, supra, 214 Conn. 194 (“[b]ecause the Heart and Hypertension Act is remedial legislation, we should not ourselves enlarge upon the limitations it imposes on recovery”). Axioms such as this, “however, cannot displace the need for careful and thoughtful interpretation of [the statutory provisions at issue], nor can they displace the firm conclusions that such a process of interpretation yields. [Such] axioms, like all rules or canons of statutory construction, serve as important guidelines to the determination of legislative meaning. To permit them to displace the conclusions that careful interpretation yields, however, would be a disservice to the legislative process, as well as to the judicial exercise of interpreting legislative language based upon the premise that the legislature intends to enact reasonable public policies.” United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, supra, 240 Conn. 454-55. We therefore decline to allow the application of this interpretive principle in the present case to displace our conclusion, based upon careful interpretation of § 7-433b (b), that the ceiling therein is applicable to cumulative payments of disability compensation and retirement pension benefits when any portion of those payments has been awarded under § 7-433c.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the decision of the board and to remand the case to the board with direction to render a decision in favor of the defendant.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 7-433b (b) provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of any general statute, charter or special act to the contrary affecting the noncontributory or contributory retirement systems of any municipality of the state, or any special act providing for a police or firemen benefit fund or other retirement system, the cumulative payments, not including payments for medical care, for compensation and retirement or survivors benefits under section 7-433c shall be adjusted so that the total of such cumulative payments received by such member or his dependents or survivors shall not exceed one hundred per cent of the weekly compensation being paid, during their compensable period, to members of such department in the same position which was held by such member at the time of his death or retirement. Nothing contained herein shall prevent any town, city or borough from paying money from its general fund to any such member or his dependents or survivors, provided the total of such cumulative payments shall not exceed said one hundred per cent of the weekly compensation.”

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 7-433c provides in relevant part: “Benefits for policemen or firemen disabled or dead as a result of hypertension or heart disease, (a) In recognition of the peculiar problems of uniformed members of paid fire departments and regular members of paid police departments, and in recognition of the unusual risks attendant upon these occupations, including an unusually high degree of susceptibility to heart disease and hypertension, and in recognition that the enactment of a statute which protects such fire department and police department members against economic loss resulting from disability or death caused by hypertension or heart disease would act as an inducement in attracting and seeming persons for such employment, and in recognition, that the public interest and welfare will be promoted by providing such protection for such fire department and police department members, municipal employers shall provide compensation as follows: Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 568 or any other general statute, charter, special act or ordinance to the contrary, in the event a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department or a regular member of a paid municipal police department who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease, suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents, as the case may be, shall receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided under chapter 568 if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment, and from the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered, he or his dependents, as the case may be, shall receive the same retirement or survivor benefits which would be paid under said system if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment, and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment. If successful passage of such a physical examination was, at the time of his employment, required as a condition for such employment, no proof or record of such examination shall be required as evidence in the maintenance of a claim under this section or under such municipal or state retirement systems. The benefits provided by this section shall be in lieu of any other benefits which such policeman or fireman or his dependents may be entitled to receive from his municipal employer under the provisions of chapter 568 or the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered, except as provided by this section, as a result of any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability. As used in this section, the term ‘municipal employer’ shall have the same meaning and shall be defined as said term is defined in section 7-467.”
      Although the legislature amended subsection (a) of § 7-433c in 1996; see Public Acts 1996, No. 96-231, § 1 (a); the changes are not relevant to this appeal.

       We granted the named defendant’s petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the provisions of General Statutes § 7-433b (b) did not apply to the plaintiffs pension benefits?” Carriero v. Naugatuck, 240 Conn. 907, 688 A.2d 334 (1997).

       The second injury fund, which was also named as a defendant, has not participated in this appeal. Hereafter, we refer to the borough of Naugatuck as the defendant.

       In reaching tíre conclusion that the ceiling provided by § 7-433b (b) does not apply to the payments involved in this case, the Appellate Court gave substantial deference to the decision of the board, reasoning that it owed such “deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carriero v. Naugatuck, supra, 43 Conn. App. 777. This reliance upon the interpretation of the board was misplaced.
      Although “[ojrdinarily, [a] court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute’s purposes . . . [c]ases that present pure questions of law . . . invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in [reviewing agency decisions] .... Furthermore, when a state agency’s determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled to special deference.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. State Employees’ Review Board, 239 Conn. 638, 645, 687 A.2d 134 (1997). Because review of the board’s decision in the present case involved solely the question of the proper construction of § 7-433b (b), a pure question of law, and because the board’s construction of that section has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny, the board’s decision was not entitled to any special deference.

       In Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra, 178 Conn. 674, we concluded that “§ 7-433e is neither a ‘workers’] compensation law’ nor ‘occupational disease law’ within the meaning of the policy provisions of the insurance contract” at issue in that case. We reached that conclusion because of the “absence of a requirement that a heart ailment must be causally connected to the claimant’s employment. . . Id., 673. Although that case involved construction of a contract, it analyzed § 7-433c as a matter of statutory interpretation and, therefore, its holding is appropriately applied in the present case.

       We recognize that the Heart and Hypertension Act is predicated upon the notion that cardiovascular risks, in general, are accentuated for fire and police department personnel. In this sense, although awards pursuant to the act cannot be characterized as compensation, as workers’ compensation benefits can, we recognize that they are work related.

       The plaintiff also argues that applying the statutory ceiling of § 7-433b (b) in the circumstances of the present case would be inconsistent with our decision in LaProvidenza v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 178 Conn. 23, 420 A.2d 905 (1979), construing General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 7-436 (a), which provided for a deduction from an employee’s retirement allowance under the Connecticut Municipal Employees’ Retirement Fund of workers’ compensation benefits. In LaProvidenza v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, supra, 26, we were called upon to decide whether the phrase “ ‘such allowance’ ” in the sentence “ ‘[a]ny amount or amounts received under the workers’] compensation act shall be deducted from such allowance,’ ” referred to any retirement allowance or only a disability retirement allowance. We concluded that the provision required deduction of workers’ compensation payments only from disability pensions, remarking that “[it would be] entirely another matter ... to construe the statute as authorizing the deduction of workers’] compensation benefits from normal and voluntary age and service retirement payments when the workers’] compensation benefits are wholly unrelated to the cause of retirement.” Id., 28. Because that case involved the question of whether to limit payments composed of a pension based upon age and years of service and workers’ compensation benefits, the plaintiffs attempt to analogize from it to the present case, involving heart and hypertension benefits, is inapt.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BORDEN, J. BERDON, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    IRMA WILLIAMS ET AL. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN
    (SC 15700)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued December 11, 1997
    officially released March 3, 1998

      Thomas W. Ude, Jr., assistant corporation counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

      Jerald S. Barber, with whom was Earl I. Williams, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
   Opinion

BORDEN, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs may maintain a negligence action against the defendant, the city of New Haven, in the absence of a statute expressly providing for such municipal liability. The named plaintiff, Irma Williams, brought this action, as parent and next friend of her minor son, James L. Williams, and on her own behalf for his medical expenses, against the defendant for injuries that James sustained when he was struck by a high velocity stream of water from a fire hydrant that had been opened by an unauthorized person. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in accordance with the jury’s verdict for the plaintiffs, following the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to set the verdict aside. The defendant claims that governmental immunity barred the plaintiffs’ negligence action against it because they did not rely on any statute granting an exception to the governmental immunity provided by the common law to a municipality. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The material facts and procedural history are undisputed. On July 6, 1991, Irma Williams called the fire department on two separate occasions to report that the fire hydrant near her home, which was located on Orchard Street in New Haven, had been opened, and to request that the water be shut off. During the second call, she also requested that a locking device be placed on the hydrant to prevent unauthorized openings from occurring. On July 8,1991, James Williams was crossing Orchard Street when a stream of water from the open fire hydrant caused him to fall and hit his face on the pavement. As of that date, the defendant had not placed a locking or antivandalism device on the hydrant.

The plaintiffs did not name any agent, employee or officer of the municipality as a defendant, and brought this action against only the city of New Haven. The three count complaint alleged: (1) negligence on the part of the defendant for having allowed unauthorized persons to open the hydrant and for not having installed a locking device on it; (2) nuisance; and (3) reimbursement to Irma Williams for her son’s medical expenses. The defendant filed three special defenses asserting: (1) governmental immunity in the absence of a claimed statutory exception; (2) municipal exemption from liability for nuisance, unless the nuisance was created by a positive act of the municipality; and (3) contributory negligence by James Williams. The plaintiffs subsequently withdrew the count alleging nuisance on the part of the defendant. Thus, the case was presented to the jury solely on the theory of common-law negligence of the defendant.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs awarding $7000 in economic damages to Irma Williams, and $8000 in noneconomic damages to James Williams, which amount was reduced by 30 percent for his comparative negligence to $5600. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs in accordance with the jury verdict and denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that it has governmental immunity from liability for common-law negligence and that the plaintiffs cannot prevail as a matter of law because they did not rely on any statute to abrogate that immunity. We agree.

We first note that, throughout the entire course of this litigation, including the allegations of the complaint, the trial and this appeal, the plaintiffs have relied solely on their claim of common-law negligence on the part of the defendant. At no time have they advanced any statute as a basis for the liability of the defendant in this case. Accordingly, on appeal, we consider this case as it was litigated in the trial court and briefed and argued in this court. Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 193, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996).

“[I]t is the settled law of this state that a municipal corporation is not liable for negligence in the performance of a governmental function.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wysocki v. Derby, 140 Conn. 173, 175, 98 A.2d 659 (1953); Lambert v. New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 649, 30 A.2d 923 (1943); Hannon v. Waterbury, 106 Conn. 13, 16, 136 A. 876 (1927). This court has previously stated that “[a] municipality itself was generally immune from liability for its tortious acts at common law; Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 593, 479 A.2d 793 (1984) . . . .” Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 165, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). We have also long recognized that, “[u]nder our rule, the principle of governmental immunity extends to the construction and maintenance of fire equipment as well as to its use for fire protection.” Brock-Hall Dairy Co. v. New Haven, 122 Conn. 321, 324, 189 A. 182 (1937); 18 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 1993) § 53.52. We have also recognized, however, that governmental immunity may be abrogated by statute. Wysocki v. Derby, supra, 175 (“[liability for the negligent performance of a purely public governmental duty may occur only when a statute so provides”); Epstein v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 283, 284, 132 A. 467 (1926) (same). Thus, the general rule developed in our case law is that a municipality is immune from liability for negligence unless the legislature has enacted a statute abrogating that immunity.

The legislature has acted to limit governmental immunity in certain circumstances. For example, in General Statutes § 13a-149, the legislature has provided for municipal liability for property damage or personal injuries caused by defective roads and bridges. The legislature also has set forth general principles of municipal liability and immunity in General Statutes § 52-557n. The plaintiffs have not relied on either of these two statutes, nor have they cited to any other statute as a means of abrogating the defendant’s governmental immunity.

In addition, the legislature has provided for indemnification by municipalities of municipal officers, agents or employees who incur liability for certain of their official conduct. See General Statutes §§ 7-465 and 7-308. The plaintiffs, however, have not sought to avail themselves of these statutory remedies by bringing an action against any individuals and then claiming municipal indemnification.

Because it is clear that a municipality enjoys governmental immunity for common-law negligence unless a statute has limited or abrogated that immunity, the plaintiffs cannot prevail. The plaintiffs do not rely on any such statute, and they have failed to name an agent, officer or employee of the municipality and to invoke indemnification pursuant to § 7-465. The doctrine of governmental immunity, therefore, is fatal to their cause of action against the defendant.

At oral argument before this court, the plaintiffs claimed that governmental immunity is not applicable under the circumstances of the present case because the defendant is a corporation and can be held liable for negligence just as any other person or entity could be held liable. We are not persuaded. The plaintiffs cite no authority for this broad proposition, which would be inconsistent with the well established doctrine of governmental immunity and the statutory exceptions thereto.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment for the defendant.

In this opinion CALLAHAN, C. J., and KATZ and PALMER, Js., concurred.

BERDON, J.,

concurring. The majority is correct that based upon cases such as Wysocki v. Derby, 140 Conn. 173, 175, 98 A.2d 659 (1953), a municipal corporation is immune from liability when it performs a governmental function. The jurisprudential underpinnings of this immunity, however, is as antiquated as the roots of the doctrine. It had its beginning with the 1788 case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). Russell was decided “at a time when the idea of the governmental corporate entity was still in a nebulous state, so that the action was brought in effect against the entire population of a county. In addition to lack of precedent and fear of a multiplicity of actions, the decision was based on the fact that there were no corporate funds out of which satisfaction of a judgment could be obtained, so that individual citizens would be required to pay.” 4 Restatement (Second), Torts § 895C, comment (c) (1979).

The landscape of municipal liability, corporate and employee, has obviously changed with the adoption of General Statutes § 52-557n, which codified § 13 of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, Public Acts 1986, No. 86-338. Section 52-557n provides in relevant part: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . [t]he negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties . . . -”

Although the legislative history of § 52-557n is murky; see Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 188, 592 A.2d 912 (1991); whether the light will eventually shine on the law with respect to municipal and municipal employee liability in Connecticut remains to be seen. In his treatise, Professor Keeton points out that most states have abolished municipal immunity. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 131, p. 1052. Indeed, “the American Law Institute now recognizes the rule to be that municipalities have no general immunity at all.” Id., citing 4 Restatement (Second), supra, § 895C. In adopting § 895C, the American Law Institute recognized “[t]he current of criticism. . . that it is better that the losses due to the tortious conduct of officers and employees should fall upon the municipality rather than upon the injured person and that the torts of public employees are properly to be regarded, as in other cases of vicarious liability, as a cost of the administration of government and should be borne by the public.” 4 Restatement (Second), supra, § 895C, comment (d).

The problem in this case is that the plaintiffs have neither argued before the trial court nor this court that § 52-557n has changed the law on immunity and/or that we should adopt § 895C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Accordingly, these issues must be left to another day.

I concur in the result.

       The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

       Our conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the defendant’s other claims, namely, that the trial court improperly: (1) refused to direct a verdict for the defendant in the absence of expert testimony; (2) instructed the jury as to the applicable standard of care due to the presence of children; and (3) instructed the jury regarding the “public duty” doctrine.

       General Statutes § 13a-149 provides in relevant part: “Damages for injuries by means of defective roads and bridges. Any person injured in person or property by means of a defective road or bridge may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair. ... No action for any such injury shall be maintained against any town, city, corporation or borough, unless written notice of such injury and a general description of the same, and of the cause thereof and of the time and place of its occurrence, shall, within ninety days thereafter be given to a selectman or the clerk of such town, or to the clerk of such city or borough, or to the secretary or treasurer of such corporation. . . .”

       General Statutes § 52-557n provides in relevant part: “Liability of political subdivision and its employees, officers and agents. Liability of members of local boards and commissions, (a) (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties; (B) negligence in the performance of functions from which the political subdivision derives a special corporate profit or pecuniary benefit; and (C) acts of the political subdivision which constitute the creation or participation in the creation of a nuisance; provided, no cause of action shall be maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road or bridge except pursuant to section 13a-149. (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct; or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.
      “(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a political subdivision of the state or any employee, officer or agent acting within the scope of his employment or official duties shall not be liable for damages to person or property resulting from: (1) The condition of natural land or unimproved property; (2) the condition of a reservoir, dam, canal, conduit, drain or similar structure when used by a person in a manner which is not reasonably foreseeable; (3) the temporary condition of a road or bridge which results from weather, if the political subdivision has not received notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the condition safe; (4) the condition of an unpaved road, trail or footpath, the purpose of which is to provide access to a recreational or scenic area, if the political subdivision has not received notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the condition safe; (5) the initiation of a judicial or administrative proceeding, provided that such action is not determined to have been commenced or prosecuted without probable cause or with a malicious intent to vex or trouble, as provided in section 52-568; (6) the act or omission of someone other than an employee, officer or agent of the political subdivision; (7) the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization, when such authority is a discretionary function by law, unless such issuance, denial, suspension or revocation or such failure or refusal constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety; (8) failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, other than property owned or leased by or leased to such political subdivision, to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety, unless the political subdivision had notice of such a violation of law or such a hazard or unless such failure to inspect or such inadequate or negligent inspection constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances; (9) failure to detect or prevent pollution of the environment, including groundwater, watercourses and wells, by individuals or entities other than the political subdivision; or (10) conditions on land sold or transferred to the political subdivision by the state when such conditions existed at the time the land was sold or transferred to the political subdivision. ...”

       General Statutes § 7-465 provides in relevant part: “Assumption of liability for damage caused by employees or members of local emergency planning districts. Joint liability of municipalities in district department of health or regional planning agency, (a) Any town, city or borough, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, general, special or local, shall pay on behalf of any employee of such municipality ... all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for infringement of any person’s civil rights or for physical damages to person or property, except as hereinafter set forth, if the employee, at the time of the occurrence, accident, physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge of such duty. . . .”
      General Statutes § 7-308 provides in relevant part: “Assumption of liability for damages caused by firemen. . . . Each municipality of this state, notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of law, general, special or local, or any limitation contained in the provisions of any charter, shall pay on behalf of any paid or volunteer fireman of such municipality all sums which such fireman becomes obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed upon such fireman by law for damages to person or property, if the fireman, at the time of the occurrence, accident, injury or damages complained of, was performing fire duties and if such occurrence, accident, injury or damage was not the result of any wilful or wanton act of such fireman in the discharge of such duties. . . .”

       In Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 192, 592 A.2d 912 (1991), this court held that the savings clause language “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law” refers to state and federal statutes.

       Section 895C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: “(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a local government entity is not immune from tort liability.
      “(2) A local government entity is immune from tort liability for acts and omissions constituting
      “(a) the exercise of a legislative or judicial function, and
      “(b) the exercise of an administrative function involving the determination of fundamental governmental policy.
      “(3) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission that is otherwise privileged or is not tortious.”


author: MCDONALD, J. BORDEN, J., BERDON, J.,

text:
    BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF STAFFORD v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.
    (SC 15656)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Palmer and McDonald, Js.

      Argued October 31, 1997
    officially released March 3, 1998

      Michael P. McKeon, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Edward Muska, for the appellees (defendant Anthony Armelin et al.).

      Joan G. Libby filed a brief for the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education as amicus curiae.
   Opinion

MCDONALD, J.

The principal issue in this administrative appeal is whether the defendant, the state board of education (state board), properly decided that the plaintiff, the board of education of the town of Stafford (Stafford board), improperly had denied transportation to students of the St. Edward School, a private, nonprofit, parochial school, for four days when the Stafford public schools were closed. The Stafford board appealed from the state board’s decision to the Superior Court, which affirmed the decision of the state board that, pursuant to General Statutes § 10-281, the Stafford board must provide transportation for St. Edward School students on days St. Edward School is in session. The Stafford board appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are not in dispute. Saint Edward School has followed the same school calendar as the Stafford public schools since at least 1984. The Stafford board provides school bus transportation for children attending both public and private schools. Saint Edward School students ride on the same buses as the public school students and are subject to the same distance regulations as set forth by the Stafford board.

The Stafford board normally announces its public school calendar before St. Edward School, and St. Edward School generally follows the public school calendar. After releasing the 1992-93 school year calendar, the Stafford board amended it to delay the opening day of school from August 31, 1992, to September 8, 1992, due to building construction problems at several Stafford schools. Saint Edward School was scheduled to open, however, on August 31, 1992, and objected to the denial of bus transportation for its students. A temporary injunction requiring the Stafford board to provide transportation services for September 1 through September 8, 1992, was obtained in Superior Court by the parents. The Stafford board did not provide transportation for St. Edward School students on August 31, 1992, but did so for the remaining days.

In the 1993-94 school year, both the Stafford public schools and the St. Edward School planned a spring vacation for April 18 through April 22, 1994. In order to make up school days cancelled due to snow, however, St. Edward School later rescheduled classes for April 18 through April 20. The Stafford public schools remained closed for the entire spring vacation and the Stafford board denied transportation to St. Edward School students during that three day period.

Thereafter, on September 30, 1994, the parents requested a hearing, alleging a failure to provide school accommodations as required by General Statutes § 10-186 and transportation services as required by § 10-281. At the October 25,1994 hearing, the Stafford board dismissed the complaints as moot because the dates under dispute already had passed. The parents appealed to the state board, which held a hearing before an impartial hearing board. The hearing officer found that the Stafford board is required to provide transportation services to St. Edward School students on all days when the private school is in session, regardless of whether tihe Stafford public schools axe closed. The state board issued a decision in accordance with the hearing officer’s findings.

The Stafford board makes several arguments on appeal. It claims that, in affirming the state board’s decision, the trial court ruled improperly because: (1) the underlying request for transportation was moot; (2) the state board exceeded its authority in considering the merits of the case rather than limiting its review to the mootness question; (3) the state board’s decision constituted a declaratory ruling, which it lacked the authority to issue absent compliance with the applicable statutory procedures; and (4) the plain language of § 10-281 does not support the state board’s interpretation. The Stafford board also argues that the state board’s interpretation of § 10-281 constitutes aviolation of both the first amendment to the United States constitution and article seventh of the Connecticut constitution. We disagree with these claims and, consequently, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

We first address the Stafford board’s argument that the trial court improperly determined that the dispute over the denial of transportation was not moot or, alternatively, that even if it was moot, it nonetheless was entitled to review under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. We conclude that this case involved an active controversy and, therefore, was not moot.

A

We first consider whether this case was moot at the time of the October 25,1994 hearing before the Stafford board. Our mootness law is well settled. “Justiciability requires ... that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute: Courts exist for determination of actual and existing controversies .... [W]here the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hallas v. Windsor, 212 Conn. 338, 347, 562 A.2d 499 (1989). “A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 347-48.

We conclude that an actual controversy existed in this case. For two consecutive school years, the Stafford board denied transportation to St. Edward School students on days when Stafford public schools were closed. Members of the Stafford board indicated a disposition to continue denying transportation to St. Edward School students when the public schools were not in session. The counsel for the Stafford public school administration argued at all levels that the Stafford board was not obligated to provide transportation to St. Edward School students on those days when Stafford public schools are closed. The parents repeatedly have contended that the Stafford board does have an obligation to provide transportation, regardless of whether Stafford public schools are open. The state board thus addressed an active controversy between the parties. We conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the state board’s decision that the case was not moot.

We conclude that this case also meets the requirements of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. “ [F] or an otherwise moot question to qualify for review under the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception, it must meet three requirements. First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its veiy nature must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public importance.” Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382, 660 A.2d 323 (1995).

Here, although the parents successfully obtained a temporary injunction requiring the Stafford board to provide transportation for all days except August 31, 1992, there was no time to do so for that date. Saint Edward School’s request for transportation services for April 18,19 and 20,1994, was not denied by the Stafford board until March 16, 1994. One month was too short a time for the issues raised by the denial to have been fully litigated in the courts. Because the Stafford board contends that it is not obligated to provide such transportation in the future, this controversy is likely to arise again. Because one of the parents, Anthony Armelin, has children who still attend St. Edward School, he may be affected by the denial of transportation in the future, and the parents are reasonable surrogates for other parents who might be so affected in the future. Finally, children are required by law to attend school and whether they have transportation is a matter of public importance. See Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S. Ct. 692, 5 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1960). For these reasons, we conclude that this case meets the requirements of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine.

B

We next turn to the question of whether, because the Stafford board found that the case was moot, the state board was limited to reviewing only the mootness decision, and thus was precluded from addressing the merits. We conclude that the state board properly ruled on the merits of the case.

The Stafford board argues that the state board, as an administrative agency conducting an appellate review, was limited to reviewing only the matters in the record and the questions specifically ruled upon by the Stafford board, the initial administrative fact finder. The Stafford board argues that because it found that the case was moot and therefore had failed to rule on the merits, the state board also could rule only on the question of mootness.

The question presented to both the Stafford board and the state board was whether St. Edward School students were entitled to transportation on those days when the Stafford public schools were not in session. The state board was correct in ruling on the merits, even though the Stafford board failed to do so, because § 10-186 empowers the state board to hear appeals de novo. Waterford v. State Board of Education, 148 Conn. 238, 248, 169 A.2d 891 (1961) (“The defendant [state board] was not confined to a consideration of the transcript of the hearing before the local board. Section 10-186 authorizes . . . the defendant to conduct a hearing de novo, examine witnesses, and develop facts in addition to those which were before the local board.”).

II

The Stafford board next argues that: (1) the state board’s decision constituted a declaratory ruling; (2) the statutory requirements for obtaining a declaratory ruling were not met; and (3) the state board lacked the authority to issue such a ruling. We conclude that the state board decision resolved a contested case, and was not merely a declaratory ruling.

A declaratory ruling is a “ruling as to the validity of any regulation, or the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency.” General Statutes § 4-176 (a). A contested case, on the other hand, is “a proceeding ... in which legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for a hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held. . . .” General Statutes § 4-166 (2). Three criteria are considered in determining contested case status: “(1) whether a legal right, duty or privilege is at issue, (2) [which] is statutorily required to be determined by [an] agency, (3) through an opportunity for a hearing . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 226 Conn. 792, 800-801, 629 A.2d 367 (1993); Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 382, 477 A.2d 119 (1984). Here, § 10-186 required that the transportation rights of St. Edward School students be determined by the state board, after an opportunity for a hearing. The state board’s decision regarding the rights of the parties, therefore, was a final decision in a contested case, not a declaratory ruling.

Ill

We now reach the principal issue on appeal: the proper construction of the phrase “same kind of transportation services” in § 10-281. See footnote 2 of this opinion. The Stafford board contends that this phrase limits its obligation to provide bus services on those days when only the public schools are in session. We disagree.

We begin with basic principles of statutory construction. When interpreting statutes, “[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonsalves v. West Haven, 232 Conn. 17, 21, 653 A.2d 156 (1995).

We conclude that the “same kind of transportation services” means that the children attending nonpublic schools will ride to and from school under the same safe and reliable conditions as students transported to public schools. It does not mean that they shall be transported on days when only the public schools are in session. Though this seems clear from the language of the legislation itself, further support is garnered from the legislative history.

The present version of § 10-281 was introduced in 1971 by Senator Romeo G. Petroni. He commented at the time: “This is a bill that will equalize the problem that confronts many school systems in the state. It’s basically a question of getting all the children to school by public transportation. The bill deals with the safety of the young people whether they go to a public or private school.” 14 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1971 Sess., p. 2780. Further, Senator Lawrence DeNardis remarked: “I think the parents have a right to all the supportive services necessary for their children to attain an education, whether it be in private or public schools.” Id., p. 2783. In the House of Representatives debate, Representative Lucien DiMeo endorsed the bill as follows: “I believe that the advantages of education and the advantages that the state provide [s] whether it is in busing or other assistance, should be uniform. . . . What I am speaking for is uniformity and education .... I believe that the children that do attend private schools do have a right to be bused the same as the children in the rest of the school system within that community.” (Emphasis added.) 14 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 1971 Sess., p. 5664.

This history reveals that the purpose behind this statute is: (1) to ensure the safety of children traveling to and from school; and (2) to provide equal transportation services to students, regardless of whether they attend private or public schools. See Snyder v. Newtown, supra, 147 Conn. 391.

If a statute can be construed in several ways, we will adopt the construction that is most reasonable. Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 713, 595 A.2d 297 (1991). To provide transportation for private school students on days when only the public schools are in session does not reasonably meet either of the statute’s objectives. It is not reasonable to assume the legislature was concerned with children’s safety only on the days that both public and private schools were in session. It also is not reasonable to conclude that providing bus service to public school students for 180 days and to private school students for less is “equal” or “uniform.” Reasonable equality would also limit the town’s transportation obligation to no more than the 180 days mandated by law.

We also note that the legislature sought to protect school districts from incurring excessive costs in transporting nonpublic school students. Section 10-281 provides in relevant part: “In no case shall a . . . school district be required to expend for transportation to any nonpublic school, in any one school year, a per pupil transportation expenditure greater than an amount double the local per pupil expenditure for public school transportation. . . .’’As the trial court properly found, “[t]he implication of the limitation is that the obligation is not in all aspects coextensive with the public school schedule.” Board of Education v. State Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. TTDCV950057771S (November 13,1996). This reading of the term “same kind of transportation services” recognizes the inherent differences in transportation for public and private schools with respect to holiday, vacation or emergency recesses, location and teacher availability by contract.

IV

Finally, we address the Stafford board’s argument that the state board’s interpretation of § 10-281 violates the first amendment to the United States constitution and article seventh of the Connecticut constitution. The Stafford board asserts that this policy forces it, and therefore the taxpayers of the town of Stafford, to assist and subsidize St. Edward School, which is a religious school. Moreover, the Stafford board argues that this interpretation renders it dependent on a school schedule determined by the religious school, constituting a constitutionally impermissible entanglement. We are not persuaded.

The first amendment prohibits the excessive entanglement of government and religion. In order for a statute to conform to this mandate, it “must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [and; third] the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971). The United States Supreme Court has upheld a New Jersey statute providing for direct reimbursements for the transportation costs incurred by parents of children attending a private, religious school; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947); and a Minnesota statute permitting such parents to take tax deductions for certain educational expenses, including transportation to private schools. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 77 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1983).

In determining that the New Jersey legislation did not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States constitution, the United States Supreme Court focused on the relevant statute’s secular purpose: the “legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.” Everson v. Board of Education, supra, 330 U.S. 18. In Mueller v. Allen, supra, 463 U.S. 397, the fact that the tax deduction was available for parents of all children attending both private and public schools supported the conclusion that the law did not “ ‘confer any imprimatur of state approval.’ ” Further indicators of the law’s secular purpose and effect were that benefits were provided to a large spectrum of people; id.; and the benefits were given to the individual parents, rather than directly to the schools. Id., 399. Furthermore, the court concluded that the legislation did not “excessively entangle the State in religion” in part because the legislation did not require “comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 403.

Applying these standards, we conclude that the state board’s interpretation of § 10-281 does not violate the establishment clause. First, the secular purpose of § 10-281 is to provide safe and dependable transportation to all school children. The bright yellow school bus with its flashing red lights is a symbol of safe and reliable transportation. It represents no more state involvement on behalf of its passengers than that of the ambulance, police and fire services offered to all schools, religious or secular, private or public. Second, § 10-281 does not advance or inhibit religion because its transportation provision directly helps the parents and students of St. Edward School, as well as the parents and students of any other private, nonprofit school, rather than the school itself. Third, § 10-281 does not foster excessive government entanglement in religion. Merely because the schools may attempt to coordinate their school calendars does not constitute “comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mueller v. Allen, supra, 463 U.S. 403, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 619. In this case we have no continuing cash subsidies or any situation creating “an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 622.

The Stafford board also cannot prevail under the Connecticut constitution. The first amendment to the United States constitution and article seventh of the Connecticut constitution serve similar purposes. Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State, 183 Conn. 552, 558-59, 441 A.2d 116 (1981). This court already has held that a prior version of § 10-281, which provided that school districts may provide such transportation services, did not violate article seventh of our 1955 constitution. Snyder v. Newtown, supra, 147 Conn. 391. Although article seventh was amended in 1965, the court made clear in Snyder that article seventh of the 1955 constitution prohibits laws which “ ‘aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.’ ” Id., 390. We concluded that § 10-281 “primarily serves the public health, safety and welfare and fosters education. In the light of our history and policy, it cannot be said to compel support of any church. It therefore does not come within the proscription of article seventh.” Id., 391. Requiring the Stafford board to provide transportation on days when the public schools are closed serves the vital health, safety and welfare of all students and fosters education. Accordingly, we reject the Stafford board’s claim that the state board’s interpretation of § 10-281 violates the Connecticut constitution.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion CALLAHAN, C. J., and PALMER, J., concurred.

BORDEN, J.,

concurring. I agree fully with the majority opinion. I write separately only to emphasize several points that are implicit in that opinion.

First, General Statutes § 10-281 must be read in light of two overarching principles that it embodies: (1) a general principle of equality between public and private school students regarding transportation; and (2) a general principle of safety for those students. These two principles are evident from both the language and the legislative history of the statute. See, e.g., 14 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1971 Sess., pp. 2780-83, remarks of Senators Romeo G. Petroni, Lawrence J. DeNardis and Thomas P. Mondani; 14 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 1971 Sess., pp. 5661-62, 5664-65, remarks of Representatives Thomas J. McNellis, Lucien A. DiMeo and E. Ronald Bard.

Second, the statute, and the two principles that it embodies, are animated by an overall rule of reason. That is, the statute requires reasonable equality, as opposed to strict or literal equality, between public and private school students regarding transportation, and a reasonable degree of safety for them. This rule of reason is implied by the statute’s legislative history, and is consistent with the only other case that we have decided under analogous statutes, namely, Waterford v. State Board of Education, 148 Conn. 238, 243, 169 A.2d 891 (1961).

Third, the parents in the present case send their children to the St. Edward School in satisfaction of the statutory mandate for education of their children. See General Statutes §§ 10-184 and 10-188. That mandate requires 180 days of school per year. See General Statutes § 10-16. Therefore, any claim under § 10-281 for public transportation on days that the public schools are closed must be limited to a 180 day school year.

The parents’ claim for transportation on the four days in question here, and for similar days in the future, is valid in light of these three points. Requiring the town to transport private school students on limited days on which the public schools are closed is a reasonable accommodation of the private school students’ entitlement to a reasonable degree of safety; it meets their entitlement to a reasonable degree of equality; and it is within the limits of the 180 day school year that our statutes permit parents to satisfy by sending their children to private schools.

I also agree with the majority’s rejection of the town’s constitutional claim. Having concluded that § 10-281 requires the town to supply transportation to private school students on a limited number of days on which the public schools are closed, I agree that this additional obligation of transportation does not violate either the federal or state constitution.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. This case raises very thorny and difficult questions concerning article seventh of the constitution of Connecticut that forbids the state from giving preference “by law to any religious society or denomination in the state” with respect to what transportation the plaintiff, the board of education of the town of Stafford (school board), is required to furnish at taxpayers’ expense to a religious school.

The majority, however, purposefully reaches out to decide the issues in this case even though they are moot; that is, the days that transportation was not provided have long since passed and no practical relief can be granted by this court. “It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. ... An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 230, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S. Ct. 1106, 137 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1997).

Moreover, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this appeal falls within the doctrine that an otherwise moot case is justiciable if it presents an issue of public importance that is capable of repetition but likely to evade review. Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382-88, 660 A.2d 323 (1995). The majority concludes that this case meets the first prong of the Loisel test because “[o]ne month was too short a time for the issues raised by the denial [of transportation] to have been fully litigated in the courts.” First, I am unaware of any argument in the briefs or any evidence in the record that the school board’s decision not to transport nonpublic school students on certain days is “strongly likely to become moot in the substantial majority of cases in which it arises . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Loisel v. Rowe, supra, 384. Consequently, the “urgency of deciding [this case] is significantly reduced.” Id. Second, the record in this case belies that claim. The parents who initiated the complaint in this case, Anthony Armelin and Lynda Schold (parents), together with all the other parents, were notified on January 26, 1993, when the school board provided St. Edward School with the public school calendar for the 1993-94 school year, that April 18, 19 and 20, 1994, would be vacation days for the school system and that transportation would not be provided on those days. Subsequently, because of cancellations due to inclement weather, sometime prior to March 14,1994, St. Edward School rescheduled three additional school days on April 18,19 and 20. On March 14,1994, the superintendent of schools for the Norwich diocese (the diocese that includes St. Edward School) and the parents were put on notice that no transportation would be provided when the superintendent’s request for such transportation was denied by the school board.

Notwithstanding the fact that the timely notice allowed the parents to appeal, at least, to the school board, if not further, before April 18, 1994, the parents took no action until September 30,1994, more than five months after the days in question. Furthermore, the school board’s contention that it is not obligated pursuant to General Statutes § 10-281 to provide transportation to St. Edward School students when public schools are closed does not make it likely that it will deny such transportation in the future. Indeed, since the 1984-85 school year through September 19, 1996 — a period including approximately 2174 school days — there had been only one other day on which transportation was not furnished to St. Edward School students. Accordingly, this case does not come within the exception to the mootness doctrine for issues of public importance that are capable of repetition but likely to evade review. Id., 370.

Because the majority reaches the constitutional issues in this case, and because I find fault in its state constitutional analysis and its reliance on Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 390-91, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S. Ct. 692, 5 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1961), I am compelled to comment on these issues. This court has come a long way since 1960 when Snyder was decided in recognizing that our state constitution has independent vitality and that it requires an independent analysis of several factors to determine the contours of its provisions. In State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we enumerated the following six factors to consider when construing the contours of our state constitution: (1) the textual approach; (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; (3) federal precedent; (4) the sibling approach; (5) the historical approach; and (6) economic/sociologica! considerations.

The majority opinion incorrectly relies on Snyder v. Newtown, supra, 147 Conn. 374, which, not only provides an incomplete independent analysis of article seventh of our state constitution, but also, interprets a superseded state constitution. The Snyder decision, which held that payment by a town for transportation of schoolchildren to a religious school did not constitute support of the school within the proscription of article seventh of the constitution of the state of Connecticut, was based on the 1955 version of article seventh. This state subsequently adopted the 1965 constitution, which includes a revised article seventh on establishment of religion.

Article seventh of the Connecticut constitution of 1965 provides: “It being the right of all men to worship the Supreme Being, the Great Creator and Preserver of the Universe, and to render that worship in a mode consistent with the dictates of their consciences, no person shall by law be compelled to join or support, nor be classed or associated with, any congregation, church or religious association. No preference shall be given by law to any religious society or denomination in the state. Each shall have and enjoy the same and equal powers, rights and privileges, and may support and maintain the ministers or teachers of its society or denomination, and may build and repair houses for public worship.” (Emphasis added.) There are significant differences between the 1955 and 1965 constitutions. For example, the 1965 constitution not only removes all references to Christian denominations, but, more importantly, guarantees that “[n]o preference shall be given by law to any religious society or denomination in the state.” This court concluded in Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State, 183 Conn. 552, 559 n.2, 441 A.2d 116 (1981), that the 1955 constitutional provision did not show as great an “awareness of religious freedom, and of the separation of church and state” as the 1965 version of article seventh.

Furthermore, Snyder ignores the textual differences between article seventh of our state constitution and the first amendment to the United States constitution. This court correctly pointed out in Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State, supra, 183 Conn. 559 n.3, that even though the first amendment to the United States constitution and article seventh of our state constitution serve a similar purpose, “[t]he state provision is . . . more comprehensive than the federal provision.” The court further noted that “[a]rticle seventh’s language even more than the federal provision condemns any law which gives ‘preference’ to one religious society and assures that no person ‘shall ... be compelled to . . . support . . . or be associated with’ any religious group but can ‘worship in a mode consistent with the dictates of their consciences.’ ” Id. Therefore, if Snyder was relevant, it ignored the fact that the language used by the framers of article seventh demonstrates their intent to more positively enunciate this separation between church and state than did the framers of the first amendment prohibition of laws “respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. Const., amend. I.

Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that because the primary purpose of § 10-281 is to protect the welfare and safety of children who must use the highways in attending school in accordance with the mandatory schooling law, that necessarily makes it a permissible form of support under the provision of article seventh. Indeed, Justice Samuel Mellitz cogently pointed out in dissent in Snyder with respect to the 1955 constitution, “[t]he law leaves to every man the right to entertain such religious views as appeal to his individual conscience and to provide for the religious instruction and training of his own children to the extent and in the manner he deems essential or desirable. When he chooses to seek for them educational facilities which combine secular and religious instruction, he is faced with the necessity of assuming the financial burden which that choice entails.” Snyder v. Newtown, supra, 147 Conn. 396. Thus, “all compulsory support is proscribed [by article seventh], and the only questions to be resolved are whether the expenditure involved constitutes ‘support’ and, if it does, whether the beneficiary of the support is a ‘congregation, church or religious association’ within the meaning of article seventh . . . .” Id., 395 (Mellitz, J., dissenting).

Justice Mellitz concluded in his dissent that General Statutes (Rev. to 1958) § 10-281 was unconstitutional because “where transportation is required to enable a child to attend [religious] school, it is an integral part of the operation of the school, and that payment of the expense of transportation is an expenditure in support of the [religious] school.” (Emphasis added.) Id.; see Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932, 940-41 (Alaska 1961) (transportation of children to nonpublic schools on public school buses is direct benefit to school as well as to child); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District No. 506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 708, 207 P.2d 198 (1949) (“[transportation to . . . school differs, in both degree and nature, from those indirect, incipient, and incidental benefits which accrue to schools, as buildings, or to its pupils, as citizens under normal health, welfare, and safety laws of the state”); State v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 157, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962) (financial benefit that parochial schools receive from state provided transportation is distinguishable from provision of fire, police, water and sewer services, “whereby no classification is made as to religious” status). In this case, it cannot be denied that public transportation for all nonpublic schools is a benefit to St. Edward School as well as its students, and that such a benefit “supports” the school and its religious mission.

As can be seen from this preceding discussion, the issue of the constitutionality of the provision of transportation for students who attend religious schools is not quite as simplistic as the majority makes it out to be. The complex nature of the constitutional issue counsels us to address it in a case that presents a live controversy and not in a case in which the issues are moot.

The implication of the majority’s opinion not only raises serious constitutional questions, but could be financially devastating for the town of Stafford and all the other public school districts in Connecticut. As I interpret the majority opinion, the school board is required to provide transportation to the students attending nonpublic schools on any day, regardless of whether the public schools are in session, provided that it does not exceed the 180 days mandated by law, that it is not unreasonable in kind and duration, and that it does not cost more than “double the local per pupil expenditure for public school transportation . . . .” General Statutes § 10-281. It is inappropriate to decide such a broad based issue on the record of a case such as this.

I would, therefore, dismiss the case as being moot.

       The individual defendants, Anthony Armelin and Lynda Schold, are the parents of children who were attending St. Edward School, a private, nonprofit school, at the time of the original request for transportation for St. Edward School students. Although Schold’s child no longer attends St. Edward School, we will refer to Armelin and Schold as the parents throughout this opinion.

       General Statutes § 10-281 provides in relevant part: “Any . . . school district shall provide, for its children . . . attending nonpublic nonprofit schools therein, the same kind of transportation services provided for its children . . . attending public schools . . . . ”

       General Statutes § 10-186 (a) provides in relevant part: “Each local or regional board of education shall furnish, by transportation or otherwise, school accommodations so that each child . . . may attend public school .... Any board of education which denies school accommodations . . . shall inform the parent ... of such child ... of his right to request a hearing by the board of education . "

       The parents appealed under General Statutes § 10-186 (b) (2), which provides in relevant part: “Any such parent . . . aggrieved by the finding . . . may take an appeal from the finding to the State Board of Education. . . . The State Board of Education shall . . . hold a public hearing in the local . . . school district in which the cause of the complaint arises. ...”

       We share Justice Berdon’s concern about the cost of school transportation to nonpublic schools. In this respect we have made clear that equality for public school transportation is that which is reasonable in kind and duration to ensure safe and reliable transportation. We also note, as Justice Powell did, that the parents of nonpublic school students support institutions “which afford wholesome competition with our public schools” and “relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools.” Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 53 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

       The first amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”

       Article seventh of the Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part: “No preference shall be given by law to any religious society or denomination in the state. . . .”

       Our statutes prohibit passing a standing school bus displaying flashing red signal lights. General Statutes § 14-279.

       As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 621, “[t]he history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that such programs have almost always been accomplished by varying measures of control and surveillance.”

       At the time Snyder was decided, § 10-281 provided in relevant part: “Any . . . school district may provide, for its children attending private schools therein . . . any transportation services provided for its children attending public schools. . . This discretionary, rather than mandatory, language, however, does not affect our analysis. The primary purpose of the law remains the same: “It aids the parents in sending their children to a school of their choice, as is their right. It protects the children from the dangers of modem traffic and reduces the hazard of contracting illness in bad weather. ... It primarily serves the public health . . . Snyder v. Newtown, supra, 147 Conn. 391.

       Article seventh, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution of 1955 provided in relevant part: “And each and every society or denomination of Christians in this state, shall have and enjoy the same and equal powers, rights and privileges . . . .”

       The prohibition of such a preference is set forth explicitly for the first time in article seventh of the 1965 constitution. See footnote 7. The 1965 change “shows a greater awareness of religious freedom, and of the separation of church and state.” Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State, supra, 183 Conn. 559 n.2.

       General Statutes § 10-184 provides: “Duties of parents. All parents and those who have the care of children shall bring them up in some lawful and honest employment and instruct them or cause them to be instructed in reading, writing, spelling, English grammar, geography, arithmetic and United States history and in citizenship, including a study of the town, state and federal governments. Each parent or other person having control of a child seven years of age and over and under sixteen years of age shall cause such child to attend a public day school regularly during the hours and terms the public school in the district wherein such child resides is in session, or while the school is in session in which provision for the instruction of such child is made according to law, unless the parent or person having control of such child is able to show that the child is elsewhere receiving equivalent instruction in the studies taught in the public schools.”
      General Statutes § 10-188 provides: “Private schools and instruction. Attendance of children at a school other than a public school shall not be regarded as compliance with the laws of the state requiring parents and other persons having control of children to cause them to attend school, unless the teachers or persons having control of such school file with the Commissioner of Education student attendance reports at such times and in such forms as the commissioner prescribes, and make such reports and returns concerning the school under their charge to the Commissioner of Education as are required from boards of education concerning the public schools, except that no report concerning finances shall be required. The Commissioner of Education shall furnish to the teachers or persons having charge of any school such forms as may be necessary for compliance with the provisions of this section.”

       General Statutes § 10-16 provides: “Length of school year. Each school district shall provide in each school year no less than one hundred and eighty days of actual school sessions for grades kindergarten to twelve, inclusive, nine hundred hours of actual school work for grades one to twelve, inclusive, and four hundred and fifty hours of kindergarten, provided school districts shall not count more than seven hours of actual school work in any school day towards the total required for the school year. If weather conditions result in an early dismissal or a delayed opening of school, a school district which maintains separate morning and afternoon kindergarten sessions may provide either a morning or afternoon kindergarten session on such day.”

       Indeed, at no time during which the litigation has been pending — either before the school board, during the administrative hearing before the defendant state board of education, or during the appeal before this court — has this been a live controversy. The complaining party did not file the request for a hearing until September 30, 1994, six and one-half months after the school board had denied the transportation request, five and one-half months after the days for which transportation had been requested, and three months after the close of the academic year.

       The parents, through this action, sought declaratory relief that the defendant state board of education had no jurisdiction to determine under General Statutes § 10-186. The state board’s authority under § 10-186 was limited to providing relief for the denial of transportation on the three specific days in April, 1994. Since the three days on which transportation was not provided had long since passed, the state board could not order the school board to render transportation services for those days.

       Article seventh, § X, of the Connecticut constitution of X955 provided: “It being the duly of all men to worship the Supreme Being, the Great Creator and Preserver of the Universe, and their right to render that worship, in the mode most consistent with the dictates of their consciences; no person shall by law be compelled to join or support, nor be classed with, or associated to, any congregation, church or religious association. But every person now belonging to such congregation, church, or religious association shall remain a member thereof until he shall have separated himself therefrom, in the manner hereinafter provided. And each and every society or denomination of Christians in this state, shall have and enjoy the same and equal powers, rights and privileges; and shall have power and authority to support and maintain the ministers or teachers of their respective denominations, and to build and repair houses for public worship, by a tax on the members of any such society only, to be laid by a major vote of the legal voters assembled at any society meeting, warned and held according to law, or in any other manner.”

        Nusbaum was subsequently overruled by a 1967 constitutional amendment permitting state funded transportation of private schoolchildren. See Cartwright v. Sharpe, 40 Wis. 2d 494, 501, 162 N.W.2d 5 (1969).

       See footnote 5 of the majority opinion.

       General Statutes § 10-281 provides in relevant part: “In no case shall a municipality or school district be required to expend for transportation to any nonpublic school, in any one school year, a per pupil transportation expenditure greater than an amount double the local per pupil expenditure for public school transportation during the last completed school year. . . . .”