author: Glass, J.

text:
    City of Danbury v. International Association of Firefighters, Local 801, et al.
    (14218)
    Shea, Callahan, Glass, Borden and Berdon, Js.
    Argued November 1, 1991
    decision released February 25, 1992

      Barbara J. Collins, for the appellant (named defendant).

      Saranne P. Murray, with whom were Greg T. D’Auria and, on the brief, Linda L. Yoder, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Glass, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, the city of Danbury, was required under General Statutes § 7-473c (a), after a negotiation impasse, to participate in mandatory and binding arbitration with the named defendant, International Association of Firefighters, Local 801 (union), concerning the establishment of a paramedic unit within the Danbury fire department. The defendant state board of mediation and arbitration determined that the city was required to participate in mandatory and binding arbitration over the controversy and issued an award favorable to the union. This is an appeal by the union from the judgment of the trial court granting the city’s application to vacate the award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts material to the disposition of this case are undisputed. Danbury is a Connecticut municipality and an employer within the meaning of the Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7-467 et seq. The union is an employee organization within the meaning of MERA, and is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the uniformed and investigatory employees of the Danbury fire department. In 1983 and 1984, the city and the union discussed how they would implement a paramedic unit within the fire department, if such a unit were created by the city. At that time, private companies provided paramedic services in Danbury and billed patients directly. On September 25,1984, the city and the union entered into a tentative memorandum of agreement concerning the employment of paramedics if and when the city decided to establish a paramedic unit within the fire department. On February 2,1988, the city and the union signed a collective bargaining agreement covering the period from July 1,1987, to June 30,1989. Article 43 of the agreement provided: “Paramedic Squad. Renegotiate the tentative agreement reached between the union and city two years ago. Negotiations to commence within 60 days of the signing of this agreement.” Appendix A, Note 3J of the agreement provided: “The City and Local 801, I.A.F.F., agree to negotiate the position of Paramedic when either party requests.”

The city and the union continued to negotiate regarding the establishment of a paramedic unit, but in May, 1988, the union decided that the negotiations had reached an impasse and requested mediation. The city participated in mediation under protest, claiming that the compulsory dispute resolution provisions of § 7-473c (a) did not apply to the controversy because the creation of a paramedic unit within the fire department was a political and managerial decision, and, therefore, not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under MERA. When the parties failed to reach an agreement following mediation, the union asked the board to impose binding arbitration. In a letter dated December 21,1988, the board notified the parties that, because the controversy had not been resolved by mediation, as permitted under § 7-473c (a), “binding and final arbitration [was] now imposed on them.” The board directed the city and the union to submit a list of names for membership on the arbitration panel. The city submitted its selection for the panel in a letter to the board dated January 9, 1989, noting that its appointment of an arbitrator was without prejudice to any jurisdictional claims it might have concerning the imposition of arbitration.

The three member arbitration panel filed its award with the board on October 11,1989, requiring that the city “test for and hire four (4) Firefighter/Paramedics to implement the program on July 1,1989.” One of the arbitrators dissented from the award, arguing that “a permissive subject cannot be converted into a mandatory one by operation of a contract reopener.” The city filed an application in the Superior Court to vacate the award. The court granted the city’s application, concluding that under § 7-473c the establishment of a paramedic unit within the Danbury fire department was not a subject of mandatory and binding arbitration. The court concluded that the mandatory arbitration requirements of § 7-473c extend only to “matter[s] affecting wages, hours, and other conditions of employment,” and that the establishment of a paramedic unit did not fall within any of these categories. The court also concluded that the record supported the arbitrators’ finding that the city had agreed to negotiate concerning the establishment of a paramedic unit by discussing it during collective bargaining sessions with the union. The court concluded further, however, that the city’s conduct in negotiating the subject of a paramedic unit with the union had not “somehow converted a non-mandatory matter to one which is the subject of mandatory arbitration.”

The union appealed the trial court’s decision to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. On appeal, the union claims that: (1) under § 7-473c (a), mandatory and binding arbitration may be imposed on negotiation of a permissive subject of bargaining held pursuant to a collectively negotiated reopener provision; (2) Article 43 and/or Appendix A, Note 3J of the 1987 collective bargaining agreement between the city and the union constituted a reopener provision under § 7-473c (a); and (3) the trial court improperly granted the city’s application to vacate the arbitration award.

Although the union raises three claims on appeal, the dispositive issue is whether the city was required under § 7-473c (a), after a negotiation impasse, to participate in mandatory and binding arbitration with the union concerning the establishment of a paramedic unit within the Danbury fire department. The union argues that Article 43 and/or Appendix A, Note 3J of the 1987 collective bargaining agreement constituted a “reopener provision” within the meaning of § 7-473c and, therefore, the issue of the proposed paramedic unit was subject to mandatory arbitration under the statute. The city contends that the agreement to negotiate further regarding the creation of a paramedic unit, embodied in Article 43 and Appendix A, Note 3J, did not constitute a reopener provision and that, in any case, mandatory arbitration under § 7-473c is restricted to matters affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment. We conclude that the trial court properly vacated the arbitration award because the establishment of a paramedic unit is not a matter affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment, and, therefore, is not a mandatory subject of bargaining under § 7-473c.

The union argues that the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement that relate to the establishment of a paramedic unit are “reopener provisions” within the meaning of § 7-473c (a). For the purposes of this appeal, the union assumes, without conceding, that the establishment of a paramedic unit is a permissive subject of bargaining. The union contends, nevertheless, that arbitration may be imposed because the language in § 7-473c (a) restricting arbitration to “any matter affecting wages, hours, and other conditions of employment” does not apply to reopener provisions. Because we conclude that mandatory arbitration under § 7-473c (a) is restricted to matters affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment, we need not decide whether the disputed provisions of the collective bargaining agreement constitute reopener provisions.

In construing any statute, we consider “its legislative history, language, purpose and the circumstances surrounding its enactment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winchester v. State Board, of Labor Relations, 175 Conn. 349, 356, 402 A.2d 332 (1978). These considerations lead us to conclude that, regardless of how we characterize the relevant provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, arbitration may be imposed under § 7-473c (a) only on matters affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment. Starting, as we must, with the language of the statute itself; United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 756, 649 A.2d 1005 (1992); we note that § 7-473c (a) does not define the term “reopener provision.” “Where particular words or sections of a statute, considered separately, are imprecise, we may look to the expressed intent of the statute as a whole.” Id. We therefore consider the expressed intent of MERA as a whole to discern whether mandatory arbitration under § 7-473c (a) is limited to matters affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment.

The phrase “wages, hours and other conditions of employment,” appears in several sections of the original statutory enactment. Public Acts 1965, No. 159. First, the statute defines an “employee organization” as “any lawful association, labor organization, federation or council having as a primary purpose the improvement of wages, hours and other conditions of employment among employees of municipal employers.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 7-467 (6). Significantly, the right of employees “to bargain collectively” is expressly limited under § 7-468 (a) to “questions of wages, hours and other conditions of employment.” In addition, § 7-474 (d) authorizes “a district, school board, housing authority or other authority established by law . . . which . . . has sole and exclusive control over the appointment of and the wages, hours and conditions of employment of its employees”; (emphasis added); to represent the municipal employer in collective bargaining. Finally, § 7-470 (c) defines the duty “to bargain collectively,” in relevant part, as the mutual obligation of the municipal employer and the representative of the employees to “confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment . . . . ” (Emphasis added.)

We have stated that “[a] legislative act must be read as a whole and construed to give effect and to harmonize all of its parts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, supra, 759. In thus construing the provisions of MERA, we conclude that the duty of the parties to negotiate is limited to the “mandatory” bargaining subjects of “wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.” Cf. West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 577, 295 A.2d 526 (1972) (duty to negotiate under Teacher Negotiation Act limited to “salaries and other conditions of employment”); see also Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 264, 579 A.2d 505 (1990). This conclusion is in accord with federal labor law precedent; see First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 69 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1981); NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg Warner Corporation, 356 U.S. 342, 349, 78 S. Ct. 718, 2 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1958); on which we have consistently relied to interpret parallel state legislation, including MERA. Stratford v. Local 134, IFPTE, 201 Conn. 577, 589, 519 A.2d 1 (1986). We are persuaded that the limitation of the duty to bargain collectively to “wages, hours, and other conditions of employment,” expressed in other provisions of the statute, supports an interpretation of § 7-473c (a) that restricts mandatory and binding arbitration to these subjects. Cf. First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, supra, 675 n.13 (parties are free to negotiate in good faith a nonmandatory subject of bargaining but may not insist on it to the point of impasse); Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 185-86, 92 S. Ct. 383, 30 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1971) (midterm unilateral modification of collective bargaining agreement prohibited under federal labor relations act only as to mandatory subjects of “wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment”).

The trial court found that the proposed paramedic unit was not a matter affecting wages, hours or other conditions of employment. We agree. We limit our analysis to the phrase “other conditions of employment,” as used in § 7-473c (a). “The significance of calling something a ‘condition of employment’ is that it then becomes a mandatory subject of collective bargaining .... The duty to negotiate is limited to mandatory subjects of bargaining. As to other matters, however, each party is free to bargain or not to bargain. . . . To the extent that such permissive bargaining results in an accord between the parties, their agreement may be incorporated into a binding contract . . . .’’(Citations omitted.) West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, supra, 576-77. The phrase conditions of employment limits the area of negotiability and excludes the sort of managerial decisions that “lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 582-83. In West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, supra, 585-87, we concluded that, while class size and teacher load were conditions of employment because they defined the amount of work expected of a teacher, whether to conduct extracurricular activities and what those activities would be were decisions uniquely within the province of the defendant board of education, and, thus, not conditions of employment. See also First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, supra, 686 (employer’s decision to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons was not a “condition of employment” and thus not a mandatory subject of bargaining under federal labor relations act); New Haven v. New Haven Police Union Local 530, 210 Conn. 597, 607-608, 557 A.2d 506 (1989) (decision of how much to appropriate for elderly housing security was “political and managerial,” thereby limiting city’s duty to negotiate); but see Fibreboard Corporation v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215, 85 S. Ct. 398, 13 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1964) (replacement of employees in existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment is a mandatory subject of bargaining under federal labor relations act). In the present case, the city alone was empowered to decide whether to establish a paramedic unit within the Danbury fire department. The establishment of a paramedic unit was thus exactly the sort of managerial decision that “lie[s] at the core of entrepreneurial control,” which is not covered by the term “conditions of employment,” and, therefore, is not subject to mandatory and binding arbitration under § 7-473c (a).

Because the establishment of a paramedic unit within the fire department was not a mandatory subject of arbitration, the parties could be compelled to arbitrate the issue only if they had agreed to do so. The union claims that the trial court improperly granted the city’s application to vacate the arbitration award because, once the court found that the city had agreed to negotiate regarding the establishment of a paramedic unit, the court was required to uphold the arbitrators’ decision. We disagree.

The union concedes that the proper standard of judicial review in a case involving statutorily mandated arbitration, such as the present one, is a de novo review of the interpretation and application of the law by the arbitrators. American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 191, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). The trial court did not disturb the arbitrators’ factual finding that the city had agreed to negotiate concerning the establishment of a paramedic unit within the fire department. Having properly conducted a de novo review of the arbitrators’ interpretation and application of the law, however, the court concluded that the city’s agreement to negotiate did not constitute an agreement to submit to binding arbitration. We agree with the trial court that, while there was factual support for the arbitrators’ finding that the city had agreed to negotiate regarding the establishment of a paramedic unit, “[ajgreeing to negotiate is not agreeing to mandatory binding arbitration.” Cf. Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., supra, 187 (“[b]y once bargaining and agreeing on a permissive subject, the parties ... do not make the subject a mandatory topic of future bargaining”). We are persuaded that the parties in the present case never agreed that upon reaching an impasse concerning the establishment of the proposed paramedic unit, the issue would be subject to mandatory and binding arbitration. We conclude that because § 7-473c (a) makes arbitration mandatory and binding only on matters affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment, and the establishment of a paramedic unit within the Dan-bury fire department is not a “condition of employment” within the meaning of the statute, the trial court properly granted the city’s application to vacate the arbitration award.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       “[General Statutes] Sec. 7-473c. mandatory binding arbitration following EXPIRATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, FOR CONTRACT REOPENER PROVISIONS OR FOR REVISIONS TO EXISTING CONTRACT; procedure; apportionment of costs, (a) If, within ninety days after the expiration of the current collective bargaining agreement, or within ninety days after the specified date for implementation of reopener provisions in an existing collective bargaining agreement, or within ninety days after the date the parties to an existing collective bargaining agreement commence negotiations to revise said agreement on any matter affecting wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, neither the municipal employer or the municipal employee organization has requested the arbitration services of the state board of mediation and arbitration, said board shall notify the municipal employer and municipal employee organization that ninety days has passed since such date or the expiration of such collective bargaining agreement and that binding and final arbitration is now imposed on them, provided written notification of such imposition shall be sent by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested, to each party. Whenever the parties waive fact finding pursuant to subsection (c) of section 7-473b, the board shall notify each party, in writing, by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested, that binding and final arbitration is now imposed on them. Within ten days of receipt of such notification, the chief executive officer of the municipal employer and the executive head of the municipal employee organization each shall select one member of the arbitration panel. Within five days of their appointment, the two members of the arbitration panel shall select a third member. Such third member shall be the chairman of the panel. In the event that the municipal employer or the municipal employee organization have not selected their respective members of the arbitration panel or the two members of the panel have not selected the third member, the state board of mediation and arbitration shall appoint such members as are needed to complete the panel, provided the member or members so appointed are residents of this state and provided further, the third member shall be a fact finder other than the fact finder who submitted the report pursuant to subsection (c) of section 7-473.”

       The first paragraph of the September 25,1984 memorandum provided:
      “The City of Danbury and Local 801,1.A.F.F. agree to the following provisions which shall not become effective until the City funds and implements a paramedic program as part of the ambulance response service of the Dan-bury Fire Department.”

       The “tentative agreement” referred to in Article 43 of the collective bargaining agreement is the tentative memorandum of agreement of September 25, 1984.

       The board also appealed the trial court’s decision; however, we dismissed its appeal due to a lack of standing.

       The union does not dispute the trial court’s finding that the city, by participating in the arbitration, did not waive its claim, which it had expressly reserved in its January 9,1989 letter to the board, that the mandatory arbitration provisions of § 7-473c (a) do not apply to the establishment of a paramedic unit.

       The union refers to the following language, added to General Statutes § 7-473c (a) by No. 82-37 of the 1982 Public Acts: “or within ninety days after the specified date for implementation of reopener provisions in an existing collective bargaining agreement . . . .” The trial court, in its memorandum of decision, did not specify whether it was treating the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement concerning the establishment of a paramedic unit as “reopener provisions” under § 7-473c. We note, however, that the union, contrary to the position it has taken on appeal, characterized these provisions as “midterm” in a complaint it filed with the state board of labor relations on April 20,1987. Although the word “midterm” does not appear in § 7-473c (a), the parties agree that the relevant language, which was added by No. 87-11 of the 1987 Public Acts, is as follows: “or within ninety days after the date the parties to an existing collective bargaining agreement commence negotiations to revise said agreement on any matter affecting wages, hours, and other conditions of employment . . . .” The union concedes that, under § 7-473e (a), “midterm” negotiations on a permissive subject of bargaining are not subject to mandatory arbitration.

       The union makes much of the fact that the legislature, in amending General Statutes § 7-473c (a) to apply to reopener provisions, did not expressly restrict arbitration to “wages, hours, and other conditions of employment,” as it did in 1987 when the statute was amended to apply to midterm negotiations. In this regard, we find significant the following discussion during House debate on the 1987 amendment (30 H.R. Proc., Pt. 3, 1987 Sess., p. 1048):
      “[Representative Richard O.] Belden: Mr. Speaker, a question if I might, to the proponent. The new language on line 12 and 13, and other conditions of employment. Does that change in any way the current positions of the parties concerning what they can and can’t negotiation [sic].
      “[Representative Joseph A.] Adamo: (116th) Through you, Mr. Speaker.
      “Speaker [Irving J.] Stolberg: Please proceed.
      “Representative Adamo: (116th) No, it does not, sir.”

       Neither the city nor the union has argued that the establishment of a paramedic unit within the Danbury fire department falls under the terms “wages” or “hours.”

       See West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 582, 295 A.2d 526 (1972), for a list of subjects that the federal courts have deemed to constitute “other conditions of employment.” See also Board of Police Commissioners v. White, 171 Conn. 553, 560, 370 A.2d 1070 (1976) (the term “other conditions of employment” includes but is not limited to seniority, grievance procedures, holiday and vacation pay, shift premiums, sick leave, jury duty, pensions and severance pay, insurance coverage of various kinds, seniority in promotions, transfers and layoffs, discipline and discharge and grievance arbitration provisions).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Covello, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Keith T. Manning et al. v. Harold J. Barenz et al.
    (14308)
    Peters, C. J., Callahan, Glass, Covello and Borden, Js.
    Argued December 3, 1991
    decision released February 25, 1992

      David W. Cooney, with whom was Kathryn Calibey, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Andrew J. O’Keefe, with whom were Denise Martino Phelan and, on the brief, Michael J. Walsh, for the appellees (defendants).
   Covello, J.

This is a suit in negligence and nuisance against a municipality and four of its employees seeking damages for personal injuries sustained at a municipal park when the lid of a metal storage box fell on the named plaintiff’s hand. At the close of the pleadings, the defendants moved for summary judgment claiming that the action is barred by the Connecticut recreational land use act, General Statutes § 52-557f et seq. The trial court granted the motion. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that § 52-557g grants immunity to both the municipality and its employees. Manning v. Barenz, 24 Conn. App. 592, 590 A.2d 980 (1991). We thereafter granted the plaintiffs’ petition for certification limited to the following issues: (1) whether the recreational land use act, § 52-557Í et seq., applies to (a) municipalities, and (b) municipal employees; and (2) if the act does apply, whether it applies to the conduct of these defendants with respect to this particular storage box. We affirm.

An examination of the pleadings and affidavit supporting the motion for summary judgment discloses the following. On August 8, 1986, the named plaintiff, Keith T. Manning, a two year old boy, was playing at Pershing Park, a municipal park owned by the town of Bloomfield and open to the public without charge. While the named plaintiff was reaching into a large metal box where the town kept toys and other recreational items, the lid of the box fell on his thumb causing serious injuries. At the time of the incident, the town was conducting a summer recreational program for residents from the ages of six to thirteen; the named plaintiff was not enrolled or participating in that program. The defendant municipal employees managed and supervised the park and the summer recreational program at the park.

I

The plaintiffs first claim that the recreational land use act, § 52-557Í et seq., and specifically § 52-557g (a), which limits the liability of an owner of land to persons using the land for recreational purposes, does not apply to municipalities. They argue that because § 52-557g (a) is ambiguous as to whether a municipality should be considered an “owner of land,” we should seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant case law interpreting the statute. The plaintiffs maintain that because the legislative history and Genco v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 7 Conn. App. 164, 168-69, 508 A.2d 58 (1986), indicate that one purpose behind the statute was to encourage private land owners to open their land to public use, it follows that the phrase, “owner of land,” should be strictly construed to include only private land owners. We disagree.

The plaintiffs have offered no reasonable explanation why the phrase, “owner of land,” should be considered ambiguous nor do we see any. “Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that the words themselves express the intent of the legislature and there is no need for statutory construction or a review of the legislative history.” All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 195, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989). The definition of “owner” in § 52-557f (3) includes “the possessor of a fee interest.” It is undisputed that the defendant municipality possesses the fee interest in the park in question. In order to fall within the purview of § 52-557g (a), the defendant municipality must establish only that it is the possessor of the fee interest in land available to the public without charge for recreational purposes. This it has done. We conclude that § 52-557g applies to all land owners—municipal and private.

II

The plaintiffs next argue that even if the recreational land use act; § 52-557f et seq.; applies to municipalities, it does not apply to municipal employees.* *** The plaintiffs claim, inter alia, that because municipal employees cannot be considered “owners of land” pursuant to § 52-557g (a) and the statute does not specifically extend immunity to them, the defendant employees should be held liable. They contend, further, that the defendant municipality should indemnify their employees, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465. We conclude that § 52-557f et seq. extends to a municipality’s employees and, therefore, we do not reach the indemnification issue.

Pursuant to § 52-557f (3), “owner” means, inter alia, a “person in control of the premises.” The persons in control of the premises here were those who managed and supervised the park, i.e., the defendant employees. The plaintiffs concede as much in their complaint in their description of the defendant employees’ duties. The named defendant, Harold Barenz, director of parks and recreations for the town of Bloomfield, is described as “charged with the care, control, and supervision of all parks and recreational facilities, including summer programs, within the . . . town.” The three remaining defendant employees are described as charged with the supervision of the summer recreational program and with the care and protection of the children participating in the program. Because the defendant employees must be considered within the definition of “owners” by reason of their being “persons in control of the premises,” they fall within the immunity created by this statute. To hold otherwise would render the statute meaningless. The plaintiffs could completely bypass this legislation by simply bringing suit against the municipal employee and then requiring the municipality to indemnify its employee pursuant to § 7-465.

Ill

The plaintiffs’ final claim is that even if the recreational land use act; General Statutes § 52-557Í et seq.; applies to municipalities and their employees, it should not apply to the conduct of these defendant employees. The plaintiffs argue that: (1) their allegations of failure to supervise are distinguishable from the immunity granted pursuant to § 52-557g (a) that refers to failures to warn of “a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on the land”; (2) the metal box was moveable and thus not “land” as required in order to qualify for the statutory immunity; and (3) the plaintiff was not at the park for a recreational purpose and, therefore, the municipality should not be protected by this statute. We disagree.

Pursuant to § 52-557g (b) (3), an owner of land who permits free access to the land for recreational purposes does not thereby “assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person . . . caused by an act or omission of the owner’ ’ except in the case of wilful or malicious acts. (Emphasis added.) Any alleged failure to supervise the named plaintiff here would clearly constitute an omission and would, therefore, be covered by this statute.

The issue whether the metal box should be considered “land” is irrelevant in light of the extension of immunity for “an act or omission of the owner” with respect to a “dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on the land.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-557g (a) and (b) (3). The metal box is clearly a structure on the land; the statute neither requires the metal box to be considered “land,” or to be affixed to the land, in order for the immunity in question to apply to the defendants.

The plaintiffs’ attempt to characterize the activity leading to the injury at issue as not being within the definition of “recreational purpose” is also without merit. While it is true that children’s play at a park is not one of the enumerated “recreational purposes” listed in § 52-557f (4), this statute clearly states that “ ‘[recreational purpose’ includes, but is not limited to, any of the following . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It is evident that the enumerated activities set forth in the statute are not exclusive.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 52-557Í provides: “landowner liability for RECREATIONAL USE OF land, definitions. As used in sections 52-557Í to 52-557Í, inclusive:
      “(1) ‘Charge’ means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land;
      “(2) ‘Land’ means land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty;
      “(3) ‘Owner’ means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises;
      “(4) ‘Recreational purpose’ includes, but is not limited to, any of the following, or any combination thereof: Hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, snow skiing, ice skating, sledding, hang gliding, sport parachuting, hot air ballooning and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites.”
      General Statutes § 52-557g provides: “liability of owner of land AVAILABLE TO PUBLIC FOR RECREATION; exceptions, (a) Except as provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who makes all or any part of the land available to the public without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service for recreational purposes owes no duty of care to keep the land, or the part thereof so made available, safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on the land to persons entering for recreational purposes.
      “(b) Except as provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who, either directly or indirectly, invites or permits without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service any person to use the land, or part thereof, for recreational purposes does not thereby: (1) Make any representation that the premises are safe for any purpose; (2) confer upon the person who enters or uses the land for recreational purposes the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act or omission of the owner.
      “(c) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision thereof for recreational purposes.”
      General Statutes § 52-557h provides: “owner liable, when. Nothing in sections 52-557Í to 52-557Í, inclusive, limits in any way the liability of any owner of land which otherwise exists: (1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity; (2) for injury suffered in any case where the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof, except that, in the case of land leased to the state or a subdivision thereof, any consideration received by the owner for the lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this section.”
      General Statutes § 52-557Í provides: “obligation of user of land. Nothing in sections 52-557Í to 52-557Í, inclusive, shall be construed to relieve any person using the land of another for recreational purposes from any obligation which he may have in the absence of said sections to exercise care in his use of such land and in his activities thereon, or from the legal consequences of failure to employ such care.”

       Keith T. Manning’s claim for personal injuries was brought through his mother, the plaintiff Michelle Cooper.

       There is no need to resort to the legislative history in this case but we do note our agreement with the Appellate Court’s analysis of Genco v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 7 Conn. App. 164, 508 A.2d 58 (1986), which does interpret the legislative history. “In Genco, we applied the statute to owners of private property who had opened Candlewood Lake to the public for recreational purposes without a fee. In discussing the legislative history and the purpose of the statute, we stated that ‘the clear purpose of [General Statutes] § 52-557g is an attempt to satisfy the public’s need for recreational and open space by encouraging private landowners, through limiting their liability, to open their land to public use.’ Id., 168-69. That the statute was intended to encourage private landowners to open their property for the use and enjoyment of their fellow citizens is not disputed. The issue presented in this case is, however, whether the statute is limited to private property owners. The purpose of making available recreational and open space is not thwarted by the application of the clear and unambiguous language of the statute to governmental property owners as well as private property owners. We, therefore, do not interpret the Genco case as limiting the application of the statute, but, rather, as applying the statute appropriately to the facts of that case, i.e., applying the statute to a private property owner.” Manning v. Barenz, 24 Conn. App. 592, 596-97 n.4, 590 A.2d 980 (1991).

       This conclusion is in accordance with the vast majority of jurisdictions that have considered the definition of “owner” within similar recreational use statutes. See, e.g., Gard v. United States, 594 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866, 100 S. Ct. 138, 62 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1979); McClain v. United States, 445 F. Sup. 770 (D. Or. 1978); Hahn v. United States, 493 F. Sup. 57 (M.D. Pa.), aff' d, 639 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1980); Smith v. United States, 383 F. Sup. 1076 (D. Wyo. 1974); Hamilton v. United States, 371 F. Sup. 230 (E.D. Va. 1974); Stone Mountain Memorial Assn. v. Herrington, 225 Ga. 746, 171 S.E.2d 521 (1969); Ostergren v. Forest Preserve District, 104 Ill. 2d 128, 471 N.E.2d 191 (1984); Page v. Louisville, 722 S.W.2d 60 (Ky. App. 1986); Rodrigue v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 1042 (La. App. 1984); McNeal v. Department of Natural Resources, 140 Mich. App. 625, 364 N.W.2d 768 (1985); Watson v. Omaha, 209 Neb. 835, 312 N.W.2d 256 (1981); Magro v. Vineland, 148 N.J. Super. 34, 371 A.2d 815 (1977); Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 183, 456 N.E.2d 1174, 469 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1983); McCord v. Ohio Division of Parks & Recreation, 54 Ohio St. 2d 72, 375 N.E.2d 50 (1978); Hogg v. Clatsop County, 46 Or. App. 129, 610 P.2d 1248 (1980); McCarver v. Manson Park & Recreation District, 92 Wash. 2d 370, 597 P.2d 1362 (1979).

       The defendants concede that, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557h, an owner of land may be held liable for “wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity . . . .” The plaintiffs have not alleged any such behavior.

       General Statutes § 7-465 (a) provides in pertinent part: “Any town, city or borough, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, general, special or local, shall pay on behalf of any employee of such municipality ... all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded ... for physical damages to person or property ... if the employee, at the time of the occurrence, accident, physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge of such duty.”

       See footnote 1, supra.