source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Palmer, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    State of Connecticut v. Cedric Edwards
    (14756)
    Peters, C. J., and Callahan, Berdon, Norcott and Palmer, Js.
    Argued May 23
    decision released July 25, 1995

      Susan M. Hankins, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

      John A. East III, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Mary Elizabeth Baran, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
   Palmer, J.

The defendant, Cedric Edwards, was convicted by a jury of murder in violation of General Statutes § ñSsi-Ma. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury on his claim of self-defense. We agree and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are undisputed. At approximately 1 p.m. on February 25,1991, as the defendant, Quincy Hough and Shannon Lee were walking down Eastern Street in New Haven, they observed an automobile moving slowly toward them. The car, which was operated by Todd Reynolds and contained a lone passenger, Devlin Prescott, continued past the three men and disappeared from their view. Several minutes later, however, the car returned, this time with two additional occupants, Tracey Rumley and Raymond Barrows (victim).

As the car approached the three men, the victim, who was seated in the back seat of the vehicle, told Reynolds to pull over because he wanted to speak to the defendant. Reynolds did so, and the victim exited from the rear passenger seat, walked behind the car and proceeded across the street toward the defendant. The victim had both hands in his jacket pockets as he approached the defendant. After a brief verbal confrontation with the victim, the defendant withdrew a handgun from his pocket and fired five shots into the victim, fatally wounding him.

The defendant fled on foot, but was soon apprehended and detained by the police in the parking lot of the Ailing municipal golf course, about one mile from the scene of the shooting. Following the defendant’s capture, the police transported Lee, Rumley and Hough to the golf course parking lot, where they identified the defendant as the shooter. The police subsequently arrested the defendant for murder.

The defendant testified at trial and admitted that he had shot and killed the victim. He claimed, however, that he had done so in self-defense. In support of his defense, the defendant testified to a series of events that, he claimed, caused him to believe that he was in serious and imminent danger when the victim approached him moments before the shooting. According to the defendant, he and Rumley, a close friend of the victim’s, had had a fistfight on or about Thanksgiving Day in 1990, over Rumley’s failure to pay the defendant for some marijuana that Rumley had obtained from the defendant. Several days thereafter, the defendant was informed by his sister, Vicki Joyner, that she had been attacked and badly beaten by a group of people, including Rumley, Rumley’s sister, and the victim, in retribution for the defendant’s altercation with Rumley. Joyner also told the defendant that, immediately after the beating, she had been instructed by the victim to tell the defendant “when we see him, he’s through.” Joyner testified as a witness for the defendant and corroborated the defendant’s version of the events.

The defendant further testified that he had attended a birthday party at the home of his girlfriend, Denise Moye, on January 16, 1991. The victim’s brother arrived at the party and instructed Moye to tell the defendant that he wished to speak to him. The defendant, fearful of a confrontation with the victim’s brother because of the threat that had been made against him by the victim, ran to an upstairs bedroom. When he heard Moye yelling that the victim’s brother had a gun, the defendant jumped from a second floor window and departed the area. The defendant claimed to have obtained a gun and bullets after this incident for protection against the victim and the victim’s family and friends.

Moye testified concerning her knowledge of what had occurred at the party on January 16, providing detailed corroboration of the defendant’s account. Moye further stated that she had also received a visit from the victim not long after her confrontation with the victim’s brother. According to Moye, the victim, who was brandishing a handgun, told her that he would “kill all of ya” if Moye did not disclose the defendant’s whereabouts. Later that evening, Moye informed the defendant of the victim’s visit and that the victim had been armed and had threatened to kill Moye and her guests. She also told the defendant that the victim “was after him to kill him.” Raquel Reed, a friend of Moye’s who was also present at the party, testified that she, too, had witnessed the victim point a gun at Moye and her guests, and that he had threatened to kill them. Reed further testified that she had heard Moye report to the defendant that the victim, armed with a handgun, had directed Moye to “[t]ell Cedric when [I] see him, [I’m] going to kill him.”

The defendant also testified concerning the events immediately preceding the shooting. He stated that when he observed Reynolds’ car return to the area with the victim as a passenger, he thought that Reynolds had sought the victim out to tell him of the defendant’s whereabouts because he knew that the victim had been looking for him. The defendant also indicated that he was extremely frightened when he saw the victim exit Reynolds’ car and walk toward him. According to the defendant, the victim confronted him and demanded to know “what’s all this shit I hear you have been talking?” The defendant replied that there was no problem and that he, the defendant, did not want any trouble. The victim rejected the defendant’s overture to resolve their dispute peaceably, however, and instead raised the subject of the defendant’s fight with Rumley, claiming that the defendant had “jumped my man.” The defendant testified that although he had backed away as the victim moved toward him, the victim continued to close in on him until the two men were less than three feet apart. The defendant claimed that the victim had then appeared to turn and reach for something in his jacket pocket. The defendant stated that he had believed that the victim was reaching for his gun and that he had intended to shoot him. The defendant further testified that he was overcome with fear and, as a result, had lost control of himself and had shot the victim. According to the defendant, he fled immediately after the shooting because he was afraid of retaliation by the victim’s friends.

The defendant also elicited testimony from two eyewitnesses who purported to have seen the victim in possession of a gun when he exited Reynolds’ car and approached the defendant on Eastern Street. Reynolds testified that he had witnessed the victim place a pistol in one of the pockets of his leather jacket prior to exiting the car. Prescott, a passenger in Reynolds’ car, also testified that the victim had a black handgun concealed in his jacket pocket when he encountered the defendant.

Notwithstanding the testimony presented by the defendant, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for a jury instruction on the elements of self-defense, concluding that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to warrant such an instruction. The jury thereafter returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of sixty years.

On appeal, the defendant contends that he had adduced sufficient evidence at trial to raise a plausible claim of self-defense and, consequently, that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on self-defense violated his federal constitutional right to due process of law. We agree.

The legal principles applicable to the defendant’s claim are well established. “[T]he fair opportunity to establish a defense ‘is a fundamental element of due process of law’ . . . .” State v. Carter, 228 Conn. 412, 427, 636 A.2d 821 (1994), quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967). “This fundamental constitutional right includes properjury instructions on the elements of self-defense so that the jury may ascertain whether the state has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault was not justified. See General Statutes § 53a-12 (a).” State v. Miller, 186 Conn. 654, 660-61, 443 A.2d 906 (1982); see also State v. Carter, 232 Conn. 537, 545, 656 A.2d 657 (1995). Thus, “[i]f the defendant asserts [self-defense] and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to [an] . . . instruction [on self-defense].” State v. Fuller, 199 Conn. 273, 278, 506 A.2d 556 (1986). “Before an instruction is warranted, however, [a] defendant bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to inject self-defense into the case. . . . To meet that burden, the evidence adduced at trial, whether by the state or the defense, must be sufficient [if credited by the jury] to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a rational juror as to whether the defendant acted in self-defense.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, supra, 545. This burden is slight, however, and may be satisfied if there is “any foundation in the evidence [for the defendant’s claim], no matter how weak or incredible . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 546; State v. Fuller, supra, 278. Furthermore, in reviewing the trial court’s rejection of the defendant’s request for a jury charge on self-defense, “we must adopt the version of the facts most favorable to the defendant which the evidence would reasonably support.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, 220 Conn. 602, 619, 600 A.2d 1330 (1991).

Finally, “[i]n order sufficiently to raise self-defense, a defendant must introduce evidence that the defendant reasonably believed his adversary’s unlawful violence to be ‘imminent’ or ‘immediate.’ W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law (1972) § 53, p. 394. Under General Statutes § 53a-19 (a), a person can, under appropriate circumstances, justifiably exercise repeated deadly force if he reasonably believes both that his attacker is using or about to use deadly force against him and that deadly force is necessary to repel such attack. . . . The Connecticut test for the degree of force in self-defense is a subjective-objective one. The jury must view the situation from the perspective of the defendant. Section 53a-19 (a) requires, however, that the defendant’s belief ultimately must be found to be reasonable.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, supra, 232 Conn. 545-46.

Adopting the version of the facts most favorable to the defendant, the jury could have concluded that bad blood existed between the victim and the defendant, and that the victim, a violent person who carried a handgun, had threatened to kill the defendant on at least two occasions. Although the victim did not himself communicate these threats to the defendant, the jury could have credited the defense testimony that Joyner and Moye had, at the victim’s direction, informed the defendant of the victim’s hostile intentions. Given the defendant’s explanation of the manner in which he was approached by the victim and the victim’s alleged furtive movements as he proceeded to within a few feet of the defendant, we cannot, in the context of the other defense testimony, conclude that the evidence introduced at trial was of “such a nature that the jury needed to resort to speculation that the defendant reasonably believed that [he] had to act in self-defense.” Id., 549; State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 275, 576 A.2d 139 (1990). Because the evidence, if believed, may have been sufficient to have raised a reasonable doubt in the mind of a rational juror as to whether the defendant had shot and killed the victim in self-defense, the defendant was entitled to a jury determination of his claim. The trial court, therefore, improperly rejected the defendant’s request for an instruction on self-defense.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “murder, (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person . . . except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime. . . .
      “(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony . . . .”

       The defendant appealed directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b), which provides in relevant part: “The following matters shall be taken directly to the supreme court . . . (3) an appeal in any criminal action involving a conviction for a capital felony, class A felony, or other felony ... for which the maximum sentence which may be imposed exceeds twenty years . . . .”

       The police found five empty .25 caliber shell casings at the scene of the shooting, but never recovered the gun used by the defendant to kill the victim.

       Self-defense is defined in General Statutes § 53a-19, which provides: “use of physical force in defense of person, (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm.
      “(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating, except that the actor shall not be required to retreat if he is in his dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work and was not the initial aggressor, or if he is a peace officer or a private person assisting such peace officer at his direction, and acting pursuant to section 53a-22, or (2) by surrendering possession of property to a person asserting a claim of right thereto, or (3) by complying with a demand that he abstain from performing an act which he is not obliged to perform.
      “(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force when (1) with intent to cause physical injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of physical force by such other person, or (2) he is the initial aggressor, except that his use of physical force upon another person under such circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so, but such other person notwithstanding continues or threatens the use of physical force, or (3) the physical force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law.”

       The defendant testified that he had known the victim for ten to twelve years.

       The defendant claimed that he had decided to stay at a friend’s house after his altercation with Rumley because the defendant thought that it would be unsafe to remain at his own home.

       Joyner testified that she had given the police a statement about the assault. On rebuttal, however, the state introduced evidence indicating that the police had no record of Joyner’s complaint.

       Moye also testified that she had reported the incident to the police. Although a police officer testified at trial that he had interviewed Moye in connection with the incident, the officer also indicated that Moye had been unable to make a positive identification of the individuals who had threatened her.

       The defendant stated that he had stayed away from the vicinity of the Eastern Circle housing complex from January 16, 1991, until the day of the shooting on February 25, 1991, because he was afraid that he might run into the victim in that neighborhood. This testimony was corroborated by Shannon Lee, who was called as a witness by the state.

       The defendant stated that he told the victim “QJust chill, just ice it, man. There’s no beef. I don’t want no beef.”

       The defendant also called Tamara Lee, Shannon Lee’s sister, who testified that her brother had told her that the victim appeared to be reaching for something just before he was shot by the defendant.

       The defendant, who admitted to shooting the victim shortly after he was apprehended by the police, maintained then, as he did at trial, that he had shot the victim in self-defense.

       At trial, the state introduced Reynolds’ tape-recorded statement, given to the police two days after the shooting, in which Reynolds indicated that he had not known whether the victim was armed when he approached the defendant. The state also produced a tape-recorded statement by Prescott in which he told the police shortly after the shooting that the victim had not possessed a gun on the day he had been killed. The police did not find a gun in the victim’s possession when they arrived at the scene.

       The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly: (1) precluded the testimony of a defense witness because the defendant had not provided the state with that witness’ psychiatric records; (2) refused to allow the defendant to present evidence of the victim’s criminal record in support of his claim of self-defense; (3) charged the jury on the element of intent to commit murder; (4) refused to instruct the jury on the defendant’s affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance; and (5) instructed the jury on reasonable doubt. Because we reverse the judgment of conviction due to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defendant’s claim of self-defense, we do not address these issues.

       General Statutes § 53a-12 provides in relevant part: “defenses; burden of proof, (a) When a defense other than an affirmative defense, is raised at a trial, the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”


author: Norcott, J.

text:
    Stanley J. Drabik et al. v. Town of East Lyme et al.
    (15095)
    Callahan, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.

      Argued April 27
    decision released July 25, 1995

      Joseph E. Moukawsher, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Maryann Diaz, for the appellees (named defendant et ah).

      RitaProvatas, with whom was Thomas J. Riley, for the appellees (defendant Ferdinand Drabik et al.).
   Norcott, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the unpaved shoulder area of Drabik Road in East Lyme is a public highway for the purposes of General Statutes § 13a-103. The plaintiffs, Stanley J. Drabik, Helen M. Drabik, John H. Drabik, John J. Herbert and Willard Collins, instituted this action against the defendants, the town of East Lyme (town), Ferdinand L. Drabik and Bertha Drabik (the defendant Drabiks), to compel the town to remove a hay bale fence that the defendant Drabiks had constructed within a few feet of the paved portion of Drabik Road. The plaintiffs alleged that the fence constituted an obstruction or encroachment that the town was required to remove, pursuant to § 13a-103. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the particular area upon which the fence was situated was not a public highway for the purposes of § 13a-103, and, therefore, the town was not required to remove the fence. The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiffs owned and operated a golf course on the west side of Drabik Road, directly across the road from property owned by the defendant Drabiks. Patrons of the golf course frequently used the east side of Drabik Road for parking. The defendant Drabiks, in order to prevent such parking, constructed the fence on the eastern shoulder of Drabik Road. The issue on appeal, arising out of the underlying dispute over the use of the eastern shoulder of Drabik Road, is whether the town, which admittedly exercised control over and maintained the paved area of Drabik Road, similarly had exerted control over and maintained the shoulder portion of the road such that it should have been deemed a public highway for the purposes of § 13a-103.

The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly: (1) found that the unpaved portion of Drabik Road had not been accepted by the town and, therefore, that it was not a public highway; (2) concluded that the plaintiffs had the burden to prove that the unpaved portion of Drabik Road had been accepted; and (3) refused to take judicial notice of the contents of the file of a prior action between the same parties in the same court on the same issue. The plaintiffs also claim that the trial court improperly subjected them to a full civil trial rather than a statutory hearing and that principles of equitable estoppel or judicial estoppel should have been applied in this case.

I

The plaintiffs initially claim that the trial court’s factual finding that the town had not accepted the shoulder portion of Drabik Road is clearly erroneous and contrary to law. We disagree.

“From early times, trader the common law, highways have been established in this state by dedication and acceptance by the public.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ventres v. Farmington, 192 Conn. 663, 666, 473 A.2d 1216 (1984). “Dedication is an appropriation of land to some public use, made by the owner of the fee, and accepted for such use by and in behalf of the public. . . . Both the owner’s intention to dedicate the way to public use and acceptance by the public must exist, but the intention to dedicate the way to public use may be implied from the acts and conduct of the owner, and public acceptance may be shown by proof of the actual use of the way by the public. . . . Thus, two elements are essential to a valid dedication: (1) a manifested intent by the owner to dedicate the land involved for the use of the public; and (2) an acceptance by the proper authorities or by the general public. ... No particular formality is required in order to dedicate a parcel of land to a public use; dedication may be express or implied. . . . Whether there has been a dedication and whether there has been an acceptance present questions of fact.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Meshberg v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 180 Conn. 274, 279, 429 A.2d 865 (1980).

“Our review of the factual findings of the trial court is limited to a determination of whether they are clearly erroneous. Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 228 Conn. 545, 548, 636 A.2d 1360 (1994); see also Practice Book § 4061. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. Dalia v. Lawrence, 226 Conn. 51, 71, 627 A.2d 392 (1993), quoting Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency v. Landmark Investment Group, Inc., 218 Conn. 703, 708, 590 A.2d 968 (1991); State Medical Society v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 223 Conn. 450, 458, 612 A.2d 1217 (1992). . . . Water Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Innopak Plastics Corp., 230 Conn. 764, 772, 646 A.2d 790 (1994).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ellis, 232 Conn. 691, 700-701, 657 A.2d 1099 (1995).

The parties do not controvert that the town had not formally accepted the disputed portion of Drabik Road. Rather, the question in this appeal is whether the facts found by the trial court support the conclusion that the town had not accepted, by its conduct, the shoulder portion of Drabik Road. The trial court found that “[t]he exhibits . . . make it clear . . . that the street as shown on the [town] street line survey for Drabik Road . . . has been dedicated in its entire width.” The trial court also found, however, that the plaintiffs had not sustained their burden of proving that the town had accepted the shoulder portion of Drabik Road. The plaintiffs’ challenge to this factual finding is essentially an attempt to relitigate the facts on appeal. “This court cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, [181 Conn. 217, 220, 435 A.2d 24 (1980)].” Carol Management Corp. v. Board of Tax Review, 228 Conn. 23, 41, 633 A.2d 1368 (1993).

The record indicates that David Cini, first selectman for the town, testified that the town had plowed and maintained only the paved surface of Drabik Road and thus considered only that portion of the road to be a public highway. Further, Warren Tarr, an employee of the town’s department of public works, testified that in his twenty-five years of service, he had worked on the paved area of Drabik Road, but not on the unpaved shoulder area. Tarr also testified that removal of brush and overgrowth took place only to the edge of the paved area of Drabik Road. Thus, there was substantial evidence on the record to support the trial court’s finding that the town had not accepted the unpaved shoulder portion of Drabik Road.

Although the plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have credited other evidence, a review of their specific claims is not necessary. “In a case in which the evidence is conflicting, it is the quintessential . . . function [of the fact finder] to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony .... [T]he trial court is not required to accept uncontradicted expert testimony. The court might reject it entirely as not worthy of belief or find that the opinion was based on subordinate facts that were not proven.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609, 629, 626 A.2d 273 (1993). Because there was substantial evidence upon which the trial court could base its finding that the town had not accepted the unpaved portion of Drabik Road, we reject the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous.

II

The plaintiffs also’claim that the trial court improperly placed on the plaintiffs the burden of proving that the town had accepted the shoulder portion of Drabik Road. The plaintiffs argue that, because they “have attempted to remedy a flagrant violation of our laws,” the burden of proof should be on the defendants. The plaintiffs further argue that the court “should not assist [the defendants] by placing impossible burdens upon all other citizens seeking to vindicate the public right, in the form of an unreasonable burden of proof.” This claim merits little discussion.

“Whether there has been a dedication and whether there has been an acceptance are questions of fact; Ruggiero v. East Hartford, 2 Conn. App. 89, 94, 477 A.2d 668 (1984); for which the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiffs. Miller v. Grossman Shoes, Inc., 186 Conn. 229, 236, 440 A.2d 302 (1982).” Goodrich v. Dwyer, 17 Conn. App. 111, 113, 550 A.2d 318 (1988); see also 2 C. McCormick, Evidence (4th Ed. 1992) § 337, p. 428. The plaintiffs have provided no compelling reason why we should depart from this established principle, and we decline to do so.

Ill

The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court improperly refused to take judicial notice of the contents of the file of Drabik v. East Lyme, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 500974 (June 16, 1986), a prior court action involving the same parties, in which, the plaintiffs claim, the town had admitted its prior acceptance of the disputed shoulder portion of Drabik Road. The plaintiffs argue that although the trial court took judicial notice of the existence of the case, it improperly declined to take judicial notice of the contents of the file in that case. We disagree.

At trial, the plaintiffs requested that the trial court take judicial notice of “admissions in [this case], admissions as to the map, admissions as to Drabik Road being a public highway.” The trial court denied the request “except to the extent that the Court will note in effect by agreement of Counsel that there was a prior case of Drabik v. East Lyme, pending in this court with Docket No. 500974.” The trial court reserved the issue of whether it would take judicial notice of any portion of the record in the prior case until “[cjounsel points out the specific matters in the course of the hearing today and subsequently.”

“There is no question that the trial court may take judicial notice of the file in another case, whether or not the other case is between the same parties. Karp v. Urban Development Commission, 162 Conn. 525, 527, 294 A.2d 633 (1972); Guerriero v. Golasso, 144 Conn. 600, 605, 136 A.2d 497 (1957). [I]t is understood that matter[s] which it is claimed the eourt should judicially notice should ordinarily be called to its attention by a party seeking to take advantage of it in the course of presenting evidence in the case so that, if there is ground upon which it may be contradicted or explained, the adverse party will be afforded an opportunity to do so .... Nichols v. Nichols, 126 Conn. 614, 622, 13 A.2d 591 (1940). Caccavale v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 14 Conn. App. 504, 509, 541 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 812, 545 A.2d 1107 (1988). Judicial notice may, however, be taken at any stage of the proceedings including on appeal. State v. Allen, 205 Conn. 370, 382, 533 A.2d 559 (1987).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re David M., 29 Conn. App. 499, 507, 615 A.2d 1082 (1992).

“Judicial notice . . . meets the objective of establishing facts to which the offer of evidence would normally be directed.” State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 368, 216 A.2d 625 (1966). Thus, a trial court’s determination not to take judicial notice is essentially an evidentiary ruling. See C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) § 6.1.3, p. 119; 1 B. Holden & J. Daly, Connecticut Evidence (1988) § 22. Our role in reviewing evidentiary rulings of the trial court is settled. “The trial court has wide discretion in its rulings on evidence and its rulings will be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion or an injustice appears to have been done.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 258, 630 A.2d 577 (1993); Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 231 Conn. 168, 184-85, 646 A.2d 195 (1994); State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 732, 631 A.2d 288 (1993); State v. Boles, 223 Conn. 535, 549, 613 A.2d 770 (1992); Holy Trinity Church of God in Christ v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 214 Conn. 216, 222, 571 A.2d 107 (1990).

With regard to a trial court’s control over the quantity of or manner in which it will consider material from a previous case, we have noted: “A trial court may, in the proper exercise of its discretion, admit a voluminous mass of documentary material where it would be extremely difficult to separate the relevant from the irrelevant, or in like circumstances . . . but it should do so only in cases where peculiar facts justify its action. The introduction of an indiscriminate mass of material leaves opposing counsel in a position where they cannot know what particular evidence is claimed to be relevant, and so deprives them of a fair opportunity to make objection; and it may not be possible to determine what evidence the court considered in reaching its decision. In such a situation as the one before us, a trial court should require the plaintiffs to offer such excerpts from the testimony in the earlier trial as they claim to be relevant and material.” (Citation omitted.) Fox v. Schaeffer, 131 Conn. 439, 448-49, 41 A.2d 46 (1944). The plaintiffs have failed to direct our attention to, nor could we find, a single instance where they attempted to introduce, either as direct evidence or for impeachment purposes, specific portions of the previous court file in the manner specified by the trial court. In light of Fox and the inherent authority of a trial court to supervise and manage the orderly presentation of evidence, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ request to take judicial notice of the entire file of the previous action.

IY

The plaintiffs’ final claims are that: (1) the statutory proceedings under § 13a-103 were not civil actions and, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to a hearing under the statute “without all the dilatory pleadings, discovery, depositions and the like”; and (2) “principles of equitable or judicial estoppel should be applied in this case because of the prior action.” We decline to review these claims because they have not been adequately briefed.

“Claimed errors not adequately briefed and not fully developed will not be considered by this court. See Practice Book § 4065; Liscio v. Liscio, 204 Conn. 502, 507, 528 A.2d 1143 (1987); Petrizzo v. Commercial Contractors Corporation, 152 Conn. 491, 496, 208 A.2d 748 (1965).” State v. Tatum, 219 Conn. 721, 742, 595 A.2d 322 (1991). “We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed.” Latham & Associates, Inc. v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 218 Conn. 297, 300, 589 A.2d 337 (1991); Gorra Realty, Inc. v. Jetmore, 200 Conn. 151, 170-71, 510 A.2d 440 (1986).

With regard to the first claim, the plaintiffs have cited no relevant authority for the proposition that they were entitled to a statutory hearing rather than a civil trial. Moreover, the plaintiffs have failed to provide any indication that they were prejudiced in any way by the conduct of the hearing. Likewise, the plaintiffs’ claim that judicial or equitable estoppel precludes the defendants from making certain claims is inadequately briefed in that it does not cite to the applicable case law, the record or the transcripts. Thus, we decline to consider these claims.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes $ 13a-103 provides in relevant part: “Whenever any town fails to keep any highway within such town in good and sufficient repair or whenever the selectmen of any town fail to remove or cause to be removed any encroachments upon any highway in such town or to make such alterations or improvements therein as may be required by common convenience or necessity, the superior court for the judicial district in which such highway is located, upon the written complaint of six or more citizens of this state under oath, after due inquiry made by it, shall appoint a time and place when and where all persons interested may appear and be heard upon the propriety of such repairs, or of the removal of such encroachments, or of the making of such alterations and improvements, and shall give notice thereof to the first selectman of such town and to the person or persons maintaining such encroachments by causing a true and attested copy of such complaint .... If the court finds that such highway should be repaired or that such encroachments should be removed or that such alterations and improvements should be made, it shall order the selectmen of such town to cause such highway to be repaired and such encroachments to be removed and such alterations and improvements to be made, and shall prescribe the manner and extent of such repairs and of the removal of such encroachments and of the making of such alterations and improvements and the time within which the work shall be done, and may, for reasonable cause, extend such time. . . .”

       The plaintiffs also named the first selectman for the town, David Gini, and other members of the board of selectmen as defendants. The parties stipulated that any judgment would apply to the current board of selectmen even if new members were elected subsequent to the date of the original summons. We therefore refer to the town, the first selectman and the board of selectmen as the town.

       The plaintiffs also claim that the fence constituted an encroachment within the meaning of § 13a-103. Because we conclude that the place upon which the fence was erected is not a public highway, we need not address this claim.

       The plaintiffs also argue that, as a matter of law, the town could not have accepted the paved portion of Drabik Road without also accepting the shoulder portion. This position is contrary to our precedent. As the trial court properly noted, “the [t]own may accept some portion of a road which has been dedicated and not other portions. A & H Corp. v. Bridgeport, 180 Conn. 435, 443 [430 A.2d 25] (1980).” See Ventres v. Farmington, supra, 192 Conn. 667.

       In their reply brief, the plaintiffs claim that they had made specific requests for the court to take judicial notice of the previous file. Our review of these transcript references reveals that, although the plaintiffs stated with specificity what they claimed the previous file would show, with one exception, they did not state with specificity, what documents or other materials in the file the trial court should judicially notice. In that instance, the plaintiffs had requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the town’s admission that a map represented the correct boundaries of Drabik Road. Although the trial court did not take judicial notice of the admission, it did admit the map as a full exhibit. Thus, even if the trial court improperly failed to take judicial notice of the town’s admission, the error was harmless because the substance of the alleged admission was admitted into evidence.

       Although the plaintiffs cite Rogers Investment Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 161 Conn. 6, 282 A.2d 882 (1971), to the extent that this case applies at all, it militates against the plaintiffs’ claim. In Rogers Investment Co., we stated that “it is clear that a prior judicial claim by a party is admissible in order to attack the credibility of a present claim. A party whose claim is under attack may, however, explain the prior claim. Thus, the prior claim is admissible, but not as proof of the fact contained therein. The prior claim does not estop the attacked party from showing the true fact.” Id., 11.


text:
    Eugene J. Wrinn v. State of Connecticut et al.
    (15085)
    Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.

      Argued May 26
    decision released July 25, 1995

      Karen L. Murdoch, with whom was Christy Scott, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Philip F. von Kuhn, for the appellee (named defendant).
   Norcott, J.

The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury regarding General Statutes § 14-240, which prohibits vehicles from following too closely. The plaintiff, Eugene Wrinn, instituted this action against the defendant, the state of Connecticut, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when the defendant’s vehicle collided with the rear end of the plaintiffs vehicle while it was stopped at a traffic signal at the end of a highway off ramp. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in following his vehicle too closely in violation of § 14-240. At trial, the plaintiff requested that the trial court instruct the jury on that allegation. The trial court denied this request. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Wrinn v. State, 35 Conn. App. 464, 646 A.2d 869 (1994). We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification, and now affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

As reported in the Appellate Court’s opinion, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. “On May 20, 1986, the plaintiff had been driving south on the Connecticut Turnpike, Interstate 95. He exited the highway in Norwalk at exit sixteen and stopped his vehicle behind another vehicle at a traffic signal at the end of the exit ramp. The weather was rainy and misty, and the road was wet. Vallerie Tyson, an employee of the state department of mental retardation, was operating a motor vehicle owned by the state in the ordinary course of her employment. Tyson entered the turnpike at exit fifteen and proceeded at a speed no greater than forty-five miles per hour between exits fifteen and sixteen. At exit sixteen, Tyson turned onto the exit ramp, and saw two vehicles ahead of her stopped at the traffic signal at the end of the ramp. As she slowed her vehicle it began to slide. Although Tyson attempted to avoid a collision, the vehicle collided with the rear of the plaintiffs vehicle. The tires on Tyson’s vehicle were in good condition, the brakes were in good working order, and the vehicle had not skidded at any time prior to the collision.” Wrinn v. State, supra, 35 Conn. App. 465-66.

The plaintiff instituted this negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the accident. At trial, “[t]he plaintiff filed a written request to charge, in accordance with Practice Book § 318, which included a request as to the applicability of General Statutes § 14-240. The trial court refused to charge the jury on this statute stating, ‘one of the considerations in application of the statute involves the speed of such vehicles’ and ruling, ‘there is no evidence that [Tyson] saw the plaintiff’s vehicle at any time while it was moving or other than in a stopped condition at the light.’ ” Id., 468.

Our resolution of the plaintiff’s claim hinges on the meaning of § 14-240. Section 14-240 (a) provides in relevant part: “No driver of a motor vehicle shall follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Neither our statutes nor our case law have defined the phrase “follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent.” The plaintiff argues that this phrase should be interpreted broadly to mean “going or coming after. The plaintiff asserts that the occurrence of a rear end collision entitles the victim to have the jury instructed on § 14-240, thereby allowing the jury the opportunity to determine whether the defendant is per se negligent if the statute is violated. Therefore, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly denied his request to instruct the jury regarding § 14-240. We disagree.

“The objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the intended purpose of the legislature. State v. Delafose, 185 Conn. 517, 521, 441 A.2d 158 (1981). . . . Forsyth v. Rowe, 226 Conn. 818, 828, 629 A.2d 379 (1993). [Ordinarily, where] the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that the words themselves express the intent of the legislature and there is no need for statutory construction . . . . All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 195, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989). . . . Haesche v. Kissner, 229 Conn. 213, 223, 640 A.2d 89 (1994).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First Bethel Associates v. Bethel, 231 Conn. 731, 739, 651 A.2d 1279 (1995).

“In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language . . . .” General Statutes § 1-1 (a); see Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 231 Conn. 355, 362, 650 A.2d 147 (1994); State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 809, 640 A.2d 986 (1994); State v. Jimenez, 228 Conn. 335, 341, 636 A.2d 782 (1994); Carr v. Bridgewater, 224 Conn. 44, 56-57, 616 A.2d 257 (1992); Caldor, Inc. v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 566, 570, 440 A.2d 767 (1981). In order to ascertain the plain meaning of the word “follow,” it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition. See State v. Indrisano, supra, 809 (employing dictionary definition); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Bulaong, 218 Conn. 51, 61-62, 588 A.2d 138 (1991) (same); Robert S. Weiss & Associates, Inc. v. Wiederlight, 208 Conn. 525, 534-35, 546 A.2d 216 (1988) (same). “Follow” has been defined as: “to move behind in the same path or direction.” Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d Ed. 1941). More specifically, in the context of a motor vehicle statute, the term “follow” implies movement of two vehicles: a leader and a follower. Thus, § 14-240, read in light of the plain meaning of the word “follow,” requires that in order to prove a violation the plaintiff must show that: (1) the rear vehicle “followed” the front vehicle; and (2) the distance between the vehicles was closer than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. Accordingly, we agree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion that “§ 14-240 is applicable to situations in which one motor vehicle is [traveling] behind another in the same lane of traffic, and there is evidence that the operator of the rear vehicle failed to maintain a reasonably safe distance between the vehicles, and that failure had a causal connection to a resulting collision.” (Emphasis added.) Wrinn v. State, supra, 35 Conn. App. 473.

Case law from other jurisdictions supports this interpretation of § 14-240. See Gallacher v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 221 Conn. 166, 172, 602 A.2d 996 (1992). For example, in interpreting a substantially similar statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-eluded that the statute was inapplicable in a case where the driver of a tractor trailer, desiring to pass the plaintiff s stopped vehicle, turned his attention to possible traffic behind his vehicle. As he looked forward again, he collided into the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp. v. Royal Transit Co., 29 Wis. 2d 620, 629-30, 139 N.W.2d 595 (1966). “True, the outcome was a violent meeting that can only be described as too close for comfort or safety, but clearly the factor resulting in the impact was failure to keep a proper and reasonably constant lookout. . . . It is perfectly clear that the legislature did not intend the provisions of [the statute] to apply in all rear-end collisions. The statute is directed against the dangerous and pernicious practice of ‘tailgating.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id., 630; see also Cosse v. Bruley, 445 So. 2d 41, 42-43 (La. App. 1984); Houck v. Snyder, 375 Mich. 392, 402-403, 134 N.W.2d 689 (1965); La Mandri v. Carr, 148 N.J. Super. 566, 571-72, 372 A.2d 1327 (1977).

We reject, therefore, the plaintiff’s assertion that a rear end collision, regardless of the manner in which the accident occurs, requires instruction on § 14-240. Such an interpretation would render meaningless the statute’s first condition, namely, that the rear vehicle was “following” the front vehicle.

“ ‘The court has a duty to submit to the jury no issue upon which the evidence would not reasonably support a finding. . . ” (Citations omitted.) Goodmaster v. Houser, 225 Conn. 637, 648, 625 A.2d 1366 (1993). At trial, the plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant had breached its duty not to “follow” too closely. Indeed, there was no evidence that the two vehicles were simultaneously in motion, one traveling behind the other in the same lane. As discussed above, a rear end collision, in and of itself, is not sufficient evidence of such a breach. Because there is no evidence that the defendant’s vehicle ever “followed” the plaintiff’s vehicle, we conclude that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury with respect to § 14-240.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes § 14-240 provides: “(a) No driver of a motor vehicle shall follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway and weather conditions.
      “(b) No person shall drive a vehicle in such proximity to another vehicle as to obstruct or impede traffic.

        “(c) Motor vehicles being driven upon any highway in a caravan shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between such vehicles or combination of vehicles to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy such space without danger. This provision shall not apply to funeral processions or to motor vehicles under official escort or travelling under a special permit.
      “(d) Violation of any of the provisions of this section shall be an infraction, provided any person operating a commercial vehicle combination in violation of any such provision shall have committed a violation and shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one hundred fifty dollars.”

       In addition to the state, the plaintiff also named the driver of the state owned vehicle, Vallerie Tyson, a state employee, as a defendant. On October 31, 1988, the court granted the defendants’ motion to strike the complaint as to Tyson. We therefore refer to the state of Connecticut as the defendant.

       We granted certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) “In the circumstances of this case, should the trial court have instructed the jury in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes § 14-240?” and (2) “If the first question is answered in the affirmative, does the failure to so charge require a new trial?” Wrinn v. State, 231 Conn. 930, 649 A.2d 255 (1994).

       Section 14-240 has mitigating elements which raise factual questions for the jury.

       Wisconsin Statutes § 346.14 provides in relevant part: “The operator of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.”

       It is clear, however, that § 14-240 sometimes may be applicable in rear end collisions with a stopped vehicle. See, e.g., State v. Tobey, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 485 (1964). Although a rear end collision is not a per se violation of § 14-240, such a collision may be the result of a violation of the statute. For example, if the front vehicle, which previously had been moving, stops and is rear-ended because the driver of the rear vehicle was “following” too closely, a jury instruction in accordance with § 14-240 would be proper. In order to reach the issue of causation, however, the plaintiff must first present evidence to show that prior to the collision, the defendant was following too closely.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    Michelle Horn v. Maryland Casualty Company
    (15017)
    Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.
    Argued May 26
    decision released July 25, 1995

      Daniel P. Scapellati, with whom were John W. Lemega and Michael S. Taylor, for the appellant (defendant).

      Robert T. Harrington, with whom, on the brief, was Donald W. Celotto, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Per Curiam.

The defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application of the plaintiff, Michelle Horn, to vacate a voluntary uninsured motorist arbitration award. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the applicable law. We agree and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

In June, 1987, the plaintiff was in her automobile, which was stopped at a traffic light on Route 1, in Bran-ford, when her automobile was struck from behind by the automobile of Benjamin D’Acunto, an uninsured motorist. Two of the arbitrators, citing O’Brien v. Cordova, 171 Conn. 303, 370 A.2d 933 (1976), determined that the plaintiff had not introduced sufficient evidence to remove the issue of D’Acunto’s negligence from the area of surmise and conjecture.

In response to the plaintiff’s claim that the rear end collision constituted a violation of General Statutes § 14-240, the majority of the arbitrators ruled that, in accordance with the Superior Court opinion of Wrinn v. State, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. CV 8893573S (April 15, 1993), 8 Conn. L. Rptr. 600 (May 10, 1993), § 14-240 did not apply where the plaintiffs car was stopped when the defendant first saw it or should have seen it. Accordingly, by an award dated July 12, 1993, the panel denied the plaintiffs claim.

The plaintiff applied to the trial court to vacate the award. The trial court determined that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the applicable law. The court, therefore, rendered judgment granting the application to vacate the arbitration award. This appeal followed.

“[A]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to [General Statutes] § 52-418 (a) (4) because the arbitrator has ‘exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.’ We emphasize, however, that the ‘manifest disregard of the law’ ground for vacating an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator’s extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles.” Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 10, 612 A.2d 742 (1992).

On the basis of our decision in Wrinn v. State, 234 Conn. 401, 661 A.2d 1034 (1995), it is clear that, in deciding this voluntary arbitration claim, the arbitrators did not manifest an egregious or patently irrational application of the law to those facts, and they did not exhibit an extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles. Their award, therefore, was not subject to being vacated under § 52-418 (a) (4).

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to deny the application to vacate the award.

       The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

       Because the only issues before the arbitrators involved the negligence of the uninsured motorist and the damages incurred by the plaintiff, and did not involve any issues of coverage, the parties agree that the arbitration proceeding was voluntary, rather than compulsory.

       The third arbitrator inferred from D’Acunto’s testimony that he had been negligent.

       General Statutes § 14-240 provides: “vehicles to be driven reasonable distance apart, (a) No driver of a motor vehicle shall follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway and weather conditions.
      “(b) No person shall drive a vehicle in such proximity to another vehicle as to obstruct or impede traffic.
      “(c) Motor vehicles being driven upon any highway in a caravan shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between such vehicles or combination of vehicles to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy such space without danger. This provision shall not apply to funeral processions or to motor vehicles under official escort or traveling under a special permit.
      “(d) Violation of any of the provisions of this section shall be an infraction, provided any person operating a commercial vehicle combination in violation of any such provision shall have committed a violation and shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one hundred fifty dollars.”

       See Wrinn v. State, 35 Conn. App. 464, 646 A.2d 869, aff'd, 234 Conn. 401, 661 A.2d 1034 (1995).

       General Statutes § 52-418 provides in relevant part: “VACATING AWARD, (a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”


text:
    John T. Derwin v. State Employees Retirement Commission
    (14980)
    Peters, C. J., and Bbrdon, Norcott, Katz and Palmer, Js.

      Argued January 3
    decision released July 25, 1995

      Thomas P. Clifford III, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Charles A. Over end, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).

      Gary R. Kevorkian, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Palmer, J.

This case requires us to determine whether the decision of an administrative agency after reconsideration is appealable under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) even though the agency decision prior to reconsideration was itself not final for purposes of appeal. The plaintiff, John T. Derwin, sought certain additional retirement benefits from the defendant, the state employees retirement commission (commission), under General Statutes §§ 5-173 and 5-192b. The commission denied the plaintiff’s request and, after granting the plaintiff’s application for reconsideration, affirmed its original decision. The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the commission after reconsideration to the Superior Court, which sustained his appeal. The commission appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. The plaintiff was continuously employed by the state of Connecticut from April, 1970, until his retirement in May, 1990, serving first as a correctional officer and then as a state police officer. Because the plaintiff had accumulated over twenty years of hazardous duty service, he was entitled to hazardous duty retirement benefits pursuant to § 5-173.

Prior to his state service, the plaintiff had been employed as a police officer by the town of Windsor Locks from April, 1967, to April, 1970. During the period of his municipal service, the plaintiff had been a member of the municipal employees retirement system and had contributed to the municipal employees’ retirement fund. Because his membership in the municipal retirement system terminated upon his resignation from the Windsor Locks police department, the plaintiff petitioned the commission to transfer his municipal retirement funds to the state retirement system. See footnote 2. The commission granted the plaintiff’s request on February 29, 1972.

Upon his state retirement, the plaintiff applied for and received hazardous duty retirement benefits under § 5-173. The commission, however, declined to include the plaintiff’s municipal service in its calculation of the plaintiff’s retirement benefits. On July 5, 1990, the plaintiff filed a claim with the commission under General Statutes § 5-155a (j) seeking credit for his municipal service in the determination of his hazardous duty retirement benefits. The commission granted the plaintiff a hearing on his claim pursuant to § 5-155a (g) and, on August 20, 1992, denied his request for additional hazardous duty retirement credit. The commission also voted to refund to the plaintiff all moneys that he had paid into the municipal retirement fund, with five percent annual interest from the date on which those payments were transferred from the municipal retirement fund to the state retirement fund. The plaintiff thereafter sought reconsideration of the commission’s decision under § 5-155a (k). The commission granted the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration and, after a hearing, affirmed its original decision denying the plaintiffs claim.

The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the commission to the Superior Court under General Statutes § 4-183 (a), claiming that the commission improperly had failed to include his years of municipal service in its calculation of his hazardous duty retirement benefits. The commission filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it. The trial court, on March 3,1993, denied the commission’s motion to dismiss. On August 4,1993, the commission sought reconsideration of its motion to dismiss, citing this court’s decision in Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 226 Conn. 792, 629 A.2d 367 (1993), which had been released on August 3,1993. After denying the commission’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court sustained the plaintiff’s appeal and remanded the case to the commission for a recalculation of the plaintiff’s retirement benefits to include credit for his prior municipal service. This appeal followed.

The commission claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s appeal because the commission’s decision upon reconsideration was not a “final decision” for purposes of the UAPA. The plaintiff maintains that the commission’s denial of his claim after reconsideration was an appealable final decision under the UAPA and, further, that the trial court properly-determined that he was entitled to credit for his prior municipal service in the calculation of his hazardous duty retirement benefits. We conclude that the decision of the commission after reconsideration was not a final decision and, accordingly, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s appeal.

The appealability of an agency decision is governed by § 4-183 (a) of the UAPA, which provides that “[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the superior court as provided in this section.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, we have consistently held that the Superior Court has jurisdiction only over appeals from a “final decision” of an administrative agency. See, e.g., State v. State Employees’ Review Board, 231 Conn. 391, 400 n.13, 650 A.2d 158 (1994); Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 226 Conn. 811-12. Under General Statutes § 4-166 (3), “ ‘[fjinal decision’ means (A) the agency determination in a contested case, (B) a declaratory ruling issued by an agency pursuant to section 4-176 or (C) an agency decision made after reconsideration. . . ,”

The plaintiff claims that the trial court correctly concluded that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs appeal because the commission’s denial of his request constituted “an agency decision made after reconsideration” within the meaning of § 4-166 (3) (C). In the plaintiff’s view, the language of § 4-166 (3) (C) is clear on its face and, consequently, we need look no further than the words of the statute to determine its meaning. The commission, on the other hand, contends that § 4-166 (3) (C), when read in context, cannot be interpreted literally to include all agency decisions made after reconsideration but, rather, must be construed to apply only to those agency decisions that were “final decisions” before reconsideration because they were made in contested eases. We agree with the commission.

Because our fundamental objective in construing a statute “ ‘is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature’ Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 91-92, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994); State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); we will not undertake an examination of § 4-166 (3) (C) “with blinders on regarding what the legislature intended [it] to mean.” Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). Accordingly, our analysis of § 4-166 (3) (C) is not limited solely to the words of the statute. Instead, we must also “look ... to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” State v. Metz, supra, 409; Fleming v. Garnett, supra, 92.

Furthermore, we are guided by the principle that “the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 510, 624 A.2d 876 (1993); see also Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187-88, 640 A.2d 601 (1994). Indeed, this tenet of statutory construction, which requires us to “read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter”; Simms v. Warden, supra, 188; has special applicability here because the “ ‘main objective [of the UAPA is] uniform procedure.’ ” Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Windsor Hall Rest Home, 232 Conn. 181, 189, 653 A.2d 181 (1995), quoting Hirschfeld v. Commission on Claims, 172 Conn. 603, 607-608, 376 A.2d 71 (1977).

In determining the proper scope of § 4-166 (3) (C), we look first to General Statutes § 4-181a, which governs the reconsideration of agency decisions pursuant to the UAPA. Under § 4-181a (a) (1), an agency is authorized to reconsider only final decisions in contested cases. Thus, an agency decision is subject to reconsideration under the UAPA only if the decision already is a final decision for purposes of appeal. The plaintiff, however, urges an interpretation of § 4-166 (3) (C) that would convert a nonfinal decision for purposes of appeal into an appealable final decision, a construction that is inconsistent with the dictates of § 4-181a. Absent a clear legislative mandate to do so, we will not construe § 4-166 (3) (C) so as to render it incompatible with another provision of the same statutory scheme.

No such mandate can be found in the pertinent legislative history. On the contrary, that history squarely supports the conclusion that § 4-166 (3) (C) applies only to those agency determinations that are subject to reconsideration under § 4-181a, namely, final decisions in contested cases. In 1988, the legislature undertook “ ‘a comprehensive revision of the UAPA, based upon recommendations made after nearly three years of study and review by the Connecticut law [revision] commission.’ ” Glastonbury Volunteer Ambulance Assn., Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 848, 853, 633 A.2d 305 (1993). Among other amendments to the UAPA, the legislature expressly authorized the reconsideration of final agency decisions in contested cases under § 4-181a and, in addition, defined “final decision” under § 4-166 (3) to include in subsection (C), “an agency decision made after reconsideration.” Public Acts 1988, No. 88-317, §§ 1, 107. In its report to the General Assembly regarding the proposed changes to the UAPA, the law revision commission explained that “[§ 4-181a] . . . set[s] detailed standards for reconsideration of final decisions .... A petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review [under § 4-183 (a)] and does not stay the time to appeal. If, however, the reconsideration petition is granted, the agency’s subsequent action affirming, modifying, or reversing the final decision is, under [§ 4-166 (3)], a new final decision to which a new appeal period applies.” (Emphasis added.) 1987 13th Annual Report of the Connecticut Law Revision Commission to the General Assembly, March, 1988, p. 38. As understood by its drafters, therefore, § 4-166 (3) (C) was not intended to create a new category of appealable decisions for noncontested cases but, rather, to clarify that a party in a contested case may appeal either from a final decision of an agency under § 4-166 (3) (A) or from an agency decision rendered after reconsideration pursuant to § 4-181a.

These conclusions were echoed during the public hearings on the proposed changes to the UAPA before the Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary. For example, Stephen F. Frazzini, the executive director of the Hartford County Legal Aid Society and a member of the advisory group that had worked with the law revision commission on the proposed revision to the UAPA, testified as follows: “The final thing that [the bill] does is, that I’d like to call your attention [to also involves] the appeal process. Let’s say that you are dissatisfied with an agency decision, that you think you can get the agency to change its mind because it’s overlooked a point. You ask for reconsideration. [Case] law allowfs] you to ask for reconsideration, but it doesn’t make clear what the standards are . . . what standards of the agency should apply or many of the procedures related to consideration. We realize[d] that that was true and we tried to set up some standards in the act for how an agency reconsiders its decision once it’s issued a final decision, and how . . . appeals [will then be taken] from that decision if you still don’t like the reconsidered decision.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 1, 1988 Sess., p. 265. Similarly, during the floor debate on No. 88-317 of the 1988 Public Acts in the House of Representatives, Representative Martin M. Looney, a proponent of the legislation, remarked that the act “clarifies when a final decision can be reconsidered or modified [under the UAPA] . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 31 H.R. Proc., Pt. 21,1988 Sess., p. 7321. In view of these comments, it is apparent that the proponents of the proposed legislation did not intend for § 4-166 (3) (C) to convert a nonfinal decision for purposes of appeal into an appealable final decision.

When read in the proper statutory and historical context, § 4-166 (3) (C) may fairly be construed only to include decisions after reconsideration in contested cases. Because the commission’s denial of additional retirement benefits was not a final decision in a contested case, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s appeal.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189.

       General Statutes § 5-173 provides in relevant part: “STATE POLICE; CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION GUARDS AND INSTRUCTORS; EMPLOYEES AT WHITING FORENSIC INSTITUTE; HAZARDOUS DUTY MEMBERS OF TIER I. RETIREMENT OF COMMISSIONER OR DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY before forty-seventh birthday, (a) A state policeman in the active service of the division of state police within the department of public safety, or any person who is engaged in guard or instructional duties at the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Medium, the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution, Enfield, the John R. Manson Youth Institution, Cheshire, the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Niantie, the Connecticut Correctional Center, Cheshire and the community correctional centers, or any person exempt from collective bargaining who is engaged in custodial or instructional duties within the department of correction, or any person who is an employee of the Whiting Forensic Institute with direct and substantial patient contact, or any member of tier I who has been designated as a hazardous duty member pursuant to an applicable collective bargaining agreement, who has reached his forty-seventh birthday and completed at least twenty years of hazardous duty service for the state or service as a state policeman or as guard or instructor at said correctional institutions or correctional centers, or service in a custodial or instructional position within the department of correction which is exempt from collective bargaining, or as an employee of the Whiting Forensic Institute or its predecessor institutions, shall be retired on his own application or on the application of the commissioner of public safety or the commissioner of correction, as the case may be.
      “(b) On or after October 1,1982, each such person shall receive a monthly retirement income equal to one-twelfth of (1) fifty per cent of his base salary, as defined in subsection (b) of section 5-162, for such twenty years of service, plus (2) two per cent of his base salary for each year, taken to completed months, of Connecticut state service in excess of twenty years, except that any such person who is both a member of the division of state police within the department of public safety and a member of part B shall receive a permanently reduced retirement income upon reaching the age of sixty-five or, if earlier, upon receipt of Social Security disability benefits or, for any such state policeman, upon receipt of benefits under subsection (d) of section 5-142. Any such state police member shall have his monthly retirement income reduced by an amount equal to one-twelfth of one per cent of four thousand eight hundred dollars multiplied by the number of years of state service, taken to completed months.
      * * *
      “(f) A member who has completed twenty years of hazardous duty service under this section, but who leaves such service on or after October 1,1982, but prior to reaching his forty-seventh birthday shall, upon his own application be entitled to the benefits provided in subsection (b)of this section at any time after reaching his forty-seventh birthday.

        “(g) On and after October 1,1982, an employee who has met the twenty-year minimum service requirement and is thus eligible for benefits under this section shall have any other Connecticut state employment recognized in calculating the amount of his benefits.”
      General Statutes § 5-192b provides: “credit for previous membership in A MUNICIPAL retirement system, (a) Any person who became a member of the state employees retirement system and who previously was a member of the Connecticut municipal employees’ retirement system shall receive credit for the purpose of retirement under the provisions of this chapter for the period of his service with such municipality, provided there shall be transferred to the State Employees Retirement Fund from the Connecticut Municipal Employees’ Retirement Fund, on application of a state employee who is a member of tier I, the entire amount paid into the Connecticut Municipal Employees’ Retirement Fund by the employee as a result of the service of such employee, plus interest at the rate being paid by the Connecticut Municipal Employees’ Retirement Fund from which such amount is transferred from the date of each payment into such fund to the date such employee became a member of the state employees retirement system, such amount to be computed by the State Retirement Commission. No transfer of municipal employee contributions and interest shall be required whenever a member of the tier II plan applies for such retirement credit.
      “(b) On or before the first of the month following three months after June 28,1985, any member of the tier I plan in the state employees retirement system who was previously a member of the Connecticut municipal employees’ retirement system and who, pursuant to the terms of section 7-440, withdrew all his contributions in the Municipal Employees’ Retirement Fund upon leaving municipal employment shall be credited, for retirement purposes under this chapter, with such period of prior municipal service upon payment into the State Employees Retirement Fund of an amount equal to the total of all contributions refunded to him from the Municipal Employees’ Retirement Fund plus five per cent interest on such contributions from the effective date of his withdrawal from the municipal fund to the date of his application for credit under this subsection. Such municipal service shall be considered to be active state service for the purposes of this chapter.
      “(c) Any member of the state employees retirement system who has prior service in a municipality, or a department of a municipality, which has not accepted the provisions of part II of chapter 113 shall receive credit for the purpose of retirement under the provisions of this chapter for the period of such service, or any portion thereof, if he complies with the requirements of either subdivision (1) or subdivision (2) of this subsection. (1) Such member may purchase credit for such service upon payment to the State Employees Retirement Fund of either two or five per cent, as appropriate, of his municipal salary for the period of such service, plus an amount determined by the Retirement Commission as necessary to fund the increased benefits payable by reason of such purchase with interest at the rate of six and one-half per cent, compounded annually, on such payment. (2) Such member may obtain credit for such service upon transfer of the entire amount paid into a municipal retirement fund by the member and the municipality during the period of such service including any earned interest, and payment of an amount determined by the retirement commission as necessary to fund the increased benefits payable by reason of such credit, to the State Employees Retirement Fund. Where required by a municipal ordinance or charter provision, the comptroller may enter into a reciprocal agreement with a municipality in order to effect a transfer of funds under this subdivision. No credit shall be granted under this subsection for any period of service for which a retirement benefit is being paid by any governmental unit or where such grant would result in multiple service credit for the same period of service.”

       The plaintiff served as a correctional officer in the state department of correction from April 14, 1970, to November 29, 1981, and as a state police officer in the division of state police from November 30,1981, until his retirement on May 31, 1990. Both positions qualify as hazardous duty service.

       Under § 5-173, the plaintiff was eligible to retire on his forty-seventh birthday with a monthly retirement income equal to one-twelfth of (1) 50 percent of his base salary, as defined by General Statutes § 5-162 (b), for his twenty years of hazardous duty service, plus (2) 2 percent of his base salary for each year of Connecticut state service in excess of twenty years. See footnote 2.

       See General Statutes §§ 7-425 through 7-459a.

       General Statutes § 5-155a (j) provides: “claims procedure. Any claim for a pension or any other benefit which may become available in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may be submitted to the commission provided it is submitted in writing. Any such claim will be reviewed and decided by the commission. The claimant shall be advised of the processing status of his claim upon reasonable request.”

       General Statutes § 5-155a (g) provides: “hearings. The commission may hold hearings when deemed necessary in the performance of its duty. The hearings shall be governed by rules and regulations of the commission and the commission shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.”

       General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 5-155a (k) provides: “claims review and appeal procedure. If any claim is denied, a claimant may request that the decision be reviewed and reconsidered by the commission. Thereafter, any contested case shall be decided in accordance with chapter 54.”

       General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: “appeal to superior court, (a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the superior court as provided in this section. The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite to the filing of such an appeal.”

       We do not, therefore, reach the merits of the plaintiff’s appeal.

       Under § 4-166 (3), a “[final decision] . . . does not include a preliminary or intermediate ruling or order of an agency . . . .” Because the commission’s denial of the plaintiff’s initial request for hazardous duty retirement credit definitively resolved the plaintiff’s claim, its decision was not a preliminary or intermediate ruling or order. See State v. State Employees’ Review Board, supra, 231 Conn. 403-404.

       Although the plaintiff concedes that the commission’s decision was not a declaratory ruling under § 4-166 (3) (B), he also claims, without elaboration, that the commission’s ruling prior to reconsideration was a decision in a “contested case” under § 4-166 (3) (A). As we have recently stated, however, a “contested case” is a case in which an “agency is required by statute to provide an opportunity for a hearing to determine a party’s legal rights or privileges.” (Emphasis added) Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 226 Conn. 811; see also General Statutes § 4-166 (2) (definition of “contested case”). The plaintiff’s right to a hearing on his request for additional retirement credit was governed by § 5-155a (g), which provides that “[t]he commission may hold hearings when deemed necessary in the performance of its duty.” (Emphasis added.) See footnote 7. “To conclude that [§ 5-155a (g)] mandates that the [commission] make a . . . determination in a hearing or after an opportunity for a hearing would confuse ‘[may]’ with ‘must’ and would establish by judicial fiat a statutory requirement that the legislature did not in fact create.” Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 805. Because the hearing was not statutorily mandated, the fact that the commission actually held a hearing on the plaintiff’s claim does not convert his case into a “contested case” under § 4-166 (2). Id., 811. Furthermore, since the commission was not statutorily required to conduct a hearing in connection with the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration under § 5-155a (k); see footnote 8; the commission’s decision after reconsideration likewise was not a “determination in a contested case” under § 4-166 (3) (A).

       General Statutes § 4-181 a provides: “contested cases, keconsidekAtion. modification, (a) (1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a party in a contested case may, within fifteen days after the personal delivery or mailing of the final decision, file with the agency a petition for reconsideration of the decision on the ground that: (A) An error of fact or law should be corrected; (B) new evidence has been discovered which materially affects the merits of the case and which for good reasons was not presented in the agency proceeding; or (C) other good cause for reconsideration has been shown. Within twenty-five days of the filing of the petition, the agency shall decide whether to reconsider the final decision. The failure of the agency to make that determination within twenty-five days of such filing shall constitute a denial of the petition. (2) Within forty days of the personal delivery or mailing of the final decision, the agency, regardless of whether a petition for reconsideration has been filed, may decide to reconsider the final decision. (3) If the agency decides to reconsider a final decision, pursuant to subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection, the agency shall proceed in a reasonable time to conduct such additional proceedings as may be necessary to render a decision modifying, affirming, or reversing the final decision.
      “(b) On a showing of changed conditions, the agency may reverse or modify the final decision, at any time, at the request of any person or on the agency’s own motion. The procedure set forth in this chapter for contested cases shall be applicable to any proceeding in which such reversal or modification of any final decision is to be considered. The party or parties who were the subject of the original final decision, or their successors, if known, and intervenors in the original contested case, shall be notified of the proceeding and shall be given the opportunity to participate in the proceeding. Any decision to reverse or modify a final decision shall make provision for the rights or privileges of any person who has been shown to have relied on such final decision.
      “(c) The agency may, without further proceedings, modify a final decision to correct any clerical error. A person may appeal that modification under the provisions of section 4-183 or, if an appeal is pending when the modification is made, may amend the appeal.”

       As we have previously noted in a similar context, the plaintiff’s construction would tend to discourage an agency from granting a petition for reconsideration because such review would spawn a final decision under § 4-166 (3), thereby enabling the aggrieved party to appeal an otherwise nonappealable agency decision. See Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 226 Conn. 808.