source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CALLAHAN, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    JAMES FULLERTON ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE SERVICES, GAMING POLICY BOARD
    (SC 15848)
    Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Palmer, Peters and Leuba, Js.
    Argued June 4
    officially released July 21, 1998

      William F. Gallagher, with whom was Kurt D. Koehler, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

      Robert F. Vacchelli, assistant attorney general, with whom were Pamela A. Raposa, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

      Joseph J. Packtor, with whom, on the brief, was James F. McCormack, for the appellee (Connecticut Lottery Corporation).
   Opinion

CALLAHAN, C. J.

The sole issue in this administrative appeal is whether the plaintiffs, James Fullerton and Mary Fullerton, the holders of one of two Lotto tickets with all six winning numbers from the December 21, 1993 Lotto drawing, are entitled to the entire first level prize from that drawing because the holder of the other ticket did not come forward within one year of the drawing. The plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to the entire prize, rather than one half of the prize, because: (1) they were the only “winners” of the drawing in that the holder of the second ticket never came forward; and (2) failure to award them the entire first level prize would violate § 12-568-1 (e) (1) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which provides that “[a]t least forty-five percent (45%) of the total gross sales in any lottery game shall be returned as prizes to holders of winning tickets.” We disagree with the plaintiffs’ claim and conclude that the trial court properly dismissed their administrative appeal.

The parties stipulated to the following facts. James Fullerton purchased a Lotto ticket at G&S Video in Wallingford on December 21, 1993. There was a Lotto drawing that evening, and the six winning numbers selected matched those on the plaintiffs’ ticket. On May 10, 1994, the plaintiffs presented their winning ticket to the lottery claims center in Newington and were informed that two tickets containing the six winning numbers had been sold for the December 21,1993 drawing. The second ticket containing the same six winning numbers as the Fullertons’ ticket had been purchased on December 21, 1993, at the Depot Deli in Roxbury (Roxbury ticket). The plaintiffs were told, therefore, that they were entitled to only one of the two shares of the first level prize pool of $5,618,438.86. Thus, the plaintiffs’ share of the first level prize pool was valued at $2,809,219.43, payable in twenty annual installments of $94,809.97.

Three weeks prior to the expiration of the claim period for the Roxbury ticket, a “Search for the Missing Millionaire” media promotion was conducted. When the holder of the Roxbury ticket failed to claim his or her share of the prize within the one year claim period, which expired December 21,1994, the unclaimed share of the prize reverted to the prize structure for the December 23,1994 Lotto drawing, pursuant to § 12-568-5 (p) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.* ****

On December 23, 1994, the plaintiffs sent a facsimile to John B. Meskill, executive director of the division of special revenue (division), making a demand for immediate payment of the unclaimed one-half portion of the first level prize for the December 21, 1993 Lotto drawing. Meskill sent a letter to the plaintiffs denying their demand for payment on the basis of his opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to and had received only one of the two shares of the first level prize pool for the December 21,1993 Lotto drawing. Meskill stated in his letter that the failure of the other winning ticket holder to present that ticket for validation did not convert the plaintiffs’ ticket into the one winning ticket for the December 21,1993 Lotto drawing. Rather, he stated that “[t]he number of winners and the portion of their share of the prize pool is determined very shortly after the drawing . . . .”

The plaintiffs appealed to the gaming policy board (board), which held a hearing regarding the plaintiffs’ claim to the other one half of the first level prize pool. The board upheld Meskill’s ruling. The plaintiffs thereafter appealed to the trial court, which dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal, concluding that the board’s decision was not illegal, arbitrary or an abuse of its discretion, and that the lottery regulations were neither vague nor standardless. Furthermore, the court concluded that the 45 percent payout requirement of § 12-568-1 (e) (1) applies to the lottery in general, rather than to the individual games, and that the board’s interpretation comports with the regulatory requirements. The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, now § 65-1, and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

I

“The standard of review of an agency decision is well established. Ordinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute’s purposes. . . . [A]n agency’s factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts. . . . Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Furthermore, when a state agency’s determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled to special deference. . . . [I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Assn. of Not-for-Profit Providers for the Aging v. Dept. of Social Services, 244 Conn. 378, 389, 709 A.2d 1116 (1998). Because our review of questions of law is plenary, we address the substantive merits of the plaintiffs’ appeal. Id., 390.

The plaintiffs first assert that, under the applicable lottery regulations, they are the only “winners” of the December 21, 1993 Lotto drawing, and, therefore, are entitled to the entire first level prize. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that, although the regulations refer to “winners” and “holders of winning tickets,” they do not define the term “winner.” The plaintiffs contend that when § 12-568-1 (e) (1) and § 12-568-5 (p) are read together, the term “winner” must mean a person holding a ticket containing all six of the winning numbers drawn who presents the ticket to the claims center for payment. In other words, the plaintiffs maintain that in order to be a winner one must not only hold a winning ticket, but must also present the winning ticket to the claims center.

According to the defendants’ contrary interpretation of the relevant regulations and the Lotto game procedures, a winner is any ticket holder whose ticket matches all six of the winning numbers drawn. They do not interpret the regulations to require that a winner be a person who has presented a ticket to the claims center for payment. In support of their argument, the defendants rely on § V (A) (1) of the Lotto game procedures, which provides in part that “[w]inner(s) matching all six (6) of the winning numbers in any order will equally share the first-level prize pool.” The defendants contend that § V (A) (1) of the game procedures contemplates that there may be more than one winning ticket because the first level prize pool is divided equally by the number of winners. Furthermore, the defendants claim that § 12-568-5 (p) provides for the reversion of unclaimed prize money if winning ticket holders fail to present their claims for the prize within the claim period. We agree with the defendants.

The division of special revenue has broad statutory authority to adopt regulations pertaining to the state lottery, including regulations relating to prize payments. See General Statutes § 12-562 and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-568 (a). “Our rules of statutory construction apply to administrative regulations.” Preston v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 218 Conn. 821, 829 n.9, 591 A.2d 421 (1991). Although the plaintiffs are correct that the regulations do not contain an express definition of the term winner, we conclude that the regulations establish that a winner is determined at the time of the drawing.

One who purchases a ticket for an authorized lottery game agrees to abide by the lottery regulations and is bound by the official procedures of that particular game. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 12-568-5 (a) and (b). Section V (A) (1) of the Lotto game procedures provides in part that “[w]inner(s) matching all six (6) of the winning numbers in any order will equally share in the first-level prize pool.” Section V (A) (1) also provides that the first level prize pool, in addition to being funded by 34.182 percent of the Lotto sales applicable to that drawing, also is funded by unclaimed lottery prizes. Section 12-568-5 (p) requires the division to “retain for the holder of a winning ticket any prize which that holder has not claimed. . . .’’If at the expiration of the claim period any prize remains unclaimed, it “shall revert to the prize structure of future lottery games to be distributed to future winners. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 12-568-5 (p).

The provisions of § 12-568-5 (p) and § V (A) (1) of the game procedures clearly contemplate that a winner is determined at the time of the drawing. After the drawing, the division is required to divide the prize pool into as many shares as there are winners, and retain each share until it is claimed. Upon a winning ticket holder’s failure to claim the prize within the applicable claim period, the prize reverts to the prize structure of future games to be distributed to future winners.

Further support for the defendant’s interpretation of the term winner is found in the definitions set forth in the lottery regulations. Pursuant to § 12-568-2 (a) (11) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, a “drawing” is defined as the “process as established in the procedures whereby winners in a lottery game are conclusively determined.” (Emphasis added.) Although the term winner is not defined expressly, § 12-568-2 (a) (11) makes it clear that a winner is “conclusively determined” at the time of the drawing.

Applying the plain language of the regulations and the Lotto game procedures, we are persuaded that the term winner means the holder of a ticket that matches all six of the winning numbers selected. Thus, contrary to the plaintiffs’ position, winners are conclusively determined at the time of the drawing, not at the time of presentment of the ticket. We conclude, therefore, that because there were two winning tickets drawn in the December 21, 1993 Lotto game, there were two winners. The plaintiffs therefore are entitled to one half of the first level prize pool. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiffs have been awarded their one-half share and are not entitled to the share that was payable to the holder of the Roxbury ticket. See Booker v. Rogers, 256 Ill. App. 3d 605, 628 N.E.2d 1192 (1994) (holder of one of two winning Lotto tickets not entitled to entire prize when other ticket is not presented for collection).

II

The plaintiffs also contend that adoption of the defendants’ construction of the regulations will result in a violation of § 12-568-1 (e) (1), which provides that “[a]t least forty-five percent (45%) of the total gross sales in any lottery game shall be returned as prizes to holders of winning tickets.” The plaintiffs argue that at least 45 percent of the total gross sales for a given Lotto drawing must be distributed to winners of that Lotto drawing, rather than to winners of future drawings. We disagree.

Section 12-568-1 (e) (1) requires that at least 45 percent of the total gross sales in any lottery game shall be returned as prizes to the holders of winning tickets. The plaintiffs are confusing the broader term “game” with the more narrow term “drawing.” The term “game” as used in the lottery regulations refers generally to the “different types of lottery games” established by the executive director with the advice and consent of the board. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 12-568-1 (b).

Thus, § 12-568-1 (e) (1) applies to the distribution of the sales of the games in general, rather than to any individual drawing. Therefore, the 45 percent distribution requirement applies, in general, over time, to the various “games” run by the agency, and not to any particular drawing of any game.

Moreover, if we were to adopt the interpretation urged by the plaintiffs, after the expiration of each claim period, the defendants would be required to supplement the winnings of all levels of winners who had claimed their prizes by the amount of the unclaimed prize. If the division intended to take on this substantial burden, it could have drafted the regulation so that the 45 percent requirement applied to each “drawing.” Furthermore, § 12-568-5 (p) provides that unclaimed prizes “shall revert to the prize structure of future lottery games to be distributed to future winners.” See footnote 6 of this opinion. Thus, § 12-568-5 (p) clearly contemplates that unclaimed, undisbursed portions of the 45 percent prize payout should be paid not to winners of a particular drawing, but to future lottery game winners.

When interpreting a regulation, we must use common sense. Citerella v. United Illuminating Co., 158 Conn. 600, 609, 266 A.2d 382 (1969). “Courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended and construe the regulation accordingly.” Id. When confronted with two possible interpretations, courts will adopt the interpretation that makes the regulations effective and workable, and not the one that leads to unreasonable results. Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 212 Conn. 727, 737-38, 563 A.2d 1347 (1989). “The unreasonableness of the result obtained by the acceptance of one possible alternative interpretation of an act is a reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would provide aresultthatisreasonable.”Maciejewski v. West Hartford, 194 Conn. 139, 151-52, 480 A.2d 519 (1984). We must presume that a reasonable and rational result was intended by the division in adopting § 12-568-1 (e) (1). See id., 152.

The unreasonableness of the plaintiffs’ inteipretation of § 12-568-1 (e) (1) compels us to reject that inteipretation in favor of the interpretation advanced by the division and affirmed by the trial court. See id. The trial court correctly concluded that an adoption of the plaintiffs’ interpretation would lead to confusion and an administrative burden that would interfere with the defendants’ ability effectively to operate the lottery. The division has interpreted the 45 percent requirement to apply to lottery distribution as to particular catago-ries of games in general, over time, not to each lottery drawing. This interpretation provides for an effective and workable method of distributing the regulatory 45 percent mandate.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

       The defendants are the department of revenue services, gaming policy board (board) and the Connecticut Lottery Corporation (lottery corporation). The initial action was brought in the trial court by the plaintiffs against the board. On appeal, the board raised the issue of mootness, asserting that Public Acts 1997, No. 97-233, transferred the lottery to the lottery corporation. On January 15, 1998, acting sua sponte, we ordered that the appeal be stayed without prejudice to the filing of a motion to join the lottery corporation as a necessary party. On February 15, 1998, we granted the plaintiffs’ motion to join the lottery corporation as a party, and the lottery corporation filed its brief on April 17, 1998. At oral argument on June 4,1998, the board conceded that, with the lottery corporation properly joined as a party, the case is no longer moot. Thus, we need not address the issue of mootness.

       Notice of Game Procedures, Connecticut Lotto, § V (A) (1) provides in relevant part: “Winner(s) matching all six (6) of the winning numbers in any order will equally share the first-level prize pool. The first-level prize pool will be equal to 34.182% of LOTTO sales applicable to said drawing and it shall be funded by LOTTO sales proceeds and unclaimed lottery prizes in accordance with procedures described hereinbelow. . . .” The game procedures that govern the Connecticut Lotto program are adopted by the division of special revenue, with the advice and consent of the gaming policy board, pursuant to §§ 12-568-1 (c) and 12-568-5 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, and are on file with the division.

       The value of each share of the first level prize pool for the December 21, 1993 Lotto drawing was calculated as follows:
      Current Sales for Dec. 21. 1993 Drawing $1,992,252.00
      x 34.182% (first level percent allocation)
      $ 680,991.58
      Carry Forward Sales (“Roll over” funds) $6,930,257.00
      x 34.182% (first level percent allocation) $2,368,900.45
      First level allocation from Dec. 21, 1993 sales: $ 680,991.58
      First level allocation from carry forward sales: 2.368.900.45
      Total pool allocation for first level prize: $3,049,892.03
      + Augmentation (from unclaimed prize money) +$ 300.000.00
      $3,349,892.03
      Divide by number of winning tickets _2
      = Adjusted pool $1,674,946.01
      x Annuity factor x 1.6772
      Value of each share of first level prize: $2,809,219.43

       A check was issued for $94,811 ($140,461 less federal and state taxes) representing the first installment payment of the plaintiffs’ share of the prize, with nineteen additional annual installments of $94,809.97 due on or about May 10 of each year.

       Section 12-568-5 (c) (2) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part: “To be valid, claims must be presented to the division within the following time periods . . .
      “(B) Category 2, On-line: One year from the drawing date printed on the ticket. . .

       Section 12-568-5 (p) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “Unclaimed prizes. The division shall retain for the holder of a winning ticket any prize which that holder has not claimed. If the prize remains unclaimed at the expiration of the appropriate time period pursuant to subsection (c) (2) of this section such prize shall revert to the prize structure of future lottery games to be distributed to future winners. Unclaimed prize money from one game or type or category of game may be added to the prize structure of another game or type or category of game at the discretion of the executive director.”

       Section 12-568-8 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part: “Powers and duties. The gaming policy board shall work in cooperation with the division of special revenue to implement and administer the provisions of the act. In carrying out its duties the board’s responsibilities shall include, but not be limited to . . .

        “(4) Hearing all appeals as provided in the act, the regulations, and the division’s rules of practice and hearing procedures. . . .”

       General Statutes § 12-562 provides: “(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the executive director shall have power to enforce the provisions of this chapter and chapter 226b, and with the advice and consent of the board, shall adopt all necessary regulations for that purpose and for carrying out, enforcing and preventing violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, for the inspection of licensed premises or enterprises, for insuring proper, safe and orderly conduct of licensed premises or enterprises and for protecting the public against fraud or overcharge. The executive director shall have power generally to do whatever is reasonably necessary for the carrying out of the intent of this chapter; and may call upon other administrative departments of the state government and of municipal governments for such information and assistance as he deems necessary to the performance of his duties.
      “(b) The special policemen in the Division of Special Revenue and the legalized gambling investigative unit in the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety shall be responsible for the criminal enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and chapter 226b. They shall have the powers and duties specified in section 29-7c.”
      General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-568 (a) provides: “The executive director, with the advice and consent of the board, shall determine the number of times a lottery shall be held in each year, the form and price of the tickets therefor and shall award prizes to winning participants, determined in a manner designated by the executive director. The proceeds of the sale of tickets shall be deposited in the lottery fund from which prizes shall be paid, upon vouchers signed by the executive director, or by either of two persons designated and authorized by him, in such numbers and amounts as the executive director determines.” Public Acts 1996, No. 96-212, § 31, repealed General Statutes § 12-568, effective July 1, 1996. Public Acts 1996, No. 96-212, § 23, subsequently codified as General Statutes § 12-568a, was adopted and became effective July 1, 1996. Because that was subsequent to the action before us, we look to the authority of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-568.

       Section 12-568-5 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “Generally. One who participates in an authorized lottery game by purchasing a ticket from a licensed lottery agent or by lawfully receiving a ticket so purchased by another shall be deemed for the purposes of this rule a purchaser, and such purchaser agrees to abide by all provisions of these regulations and agrees further to the conditions of this section.”
      Section 12-568-5 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “Official procedure. A purchaser shall be bound by the official procedures of the particular game as on file with the division.”

       “The first level prize pool for the December 21, 1993 Lotto drawing was augmented by $300,000 from past prizes that were unclaimed at the expiration of their respective claim periods. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Thus, the plaintiffs benefited from this system of reverting unclaimed prizes to the prize structure of future lottery games to be distributed to future winners. The plaintiffs now ask this court to declare this regulatory scheme arbitrary so that they may receive, in addition to their winnings, the unclaimed share from the Roxbury ticket, a result that would deprive future winners of the same augmentation benefit.

       Section 12-568-2 (a) (11) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “Drawing. That process as established in the procedures whereby winners in a lottery game are conclusively determined.”

       Section 12-568-1 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “Games. The different types of lottery games shall be established by the executive director with the advice and consent of the board. For purposes of these regulations, the types or categories of games shall be (1) instant; (2) on-line; (3) others, including any variations of these. Any game or type or category of game, once having been established may thereafter be discontinued in similar manner provided reasonable notice of such intention is given at a regularly scheduled board meeting. Except as otherwise provided herein, a discontinuation shall not affect the rights of those who purchased tickets prior to the effective date of termination.”


author: PETERS, J. BERDON, J.,

text:
    JANET HANSON v. TRANSPORTATION GENERAL, INC., ET AL.
    (SC 15766)
    Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz and Peters, Js.
    Argued February 20
    officially released July 28, 1998

      Lawrence C. Scrignari, for the appellant (plaintiff).

      Jason M. Dodge, for the appellees (defendants).

      JeanE. Tomasco, Richard F. Vitarelli, Craig A. Ber-rington, Bruce C. Wood and Steven A. Bennett filed a brief for the American Insurance Association as ami-cus curiae.

      Jeffrey R. Bobbin, Joan Allen Rowe and John G. Zandy filed a brief for the Connecticut Business and Industry Association as amicus curiae.
   Opinion

PETERS, J.

The Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 etseq., provides benefits only for those workers who have the status of “employees” at the time of their injury. The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether an owner-operator of a taxicab qualifies as an employee of the taxicab company with which he contracted to provide taxicab service.

The plaintiff, Janet Hanson, the surviving spouse of Allen Hanson (decedent), filed a workers’ compensation claim to recover survivor benefits for the death of the decedent while he was driving a taxicab in accordance with his written agreement with the defendants, Transportation General, Inc. doing business as Metro

Taxi Service (Metro), and Hartford Insurance Company. The compensation commissioner for the third district (commissioner) dismissed Hanson’s claim as a result of his finding that, on the date of the decedent’s death, he had been an independent contractor and not an employee of Metro. Hanson appealed to the compensation review board (board), which affirmed the decision of the commissioner. That decision was then affirmed by the Appellate Court. Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 45 Conn. App. 441, 447, 696 A.2d 1026 (1997).

We granted Hanson’s petition for certification to consider the merits of her claim for compensation, either under a proposed “relative nature of the work” test or under the existing “right to control” test. Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 243 Conn. 914, 914-15, 701 A.2d 329 (1997). We also agreed to determine Hanson’s ancillary evidentiary claim. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court outlines the basic facts. “[Metro] . . . operated a fleet of taxicabs through the use of both owner-operator and lease agreements. Drivers could either lease or purchase cabs from [Metro]. The decedent, under an owner-operator agreement, drove a Metro [cab] from 1987 until he was murdered while operating a Metro [taxicab] on April 16, 1990. Under the terms of [Metro’s] standard owner-operator agreement, [Metro] held legal title to the [taxicab] and the owner-operator maintained a beneficial ownership. Upon the termination of the relationship, which could be done by either party after forty-eight hours notice, legal title [to the taxicab] would be transferred back to the owner-operator. In return for the weekly payment by the owner-operator of ‘stand dues’ in the approximate amount of $425, plus an additional $100 per week if a second driver was used, [Metro], under a certificate issued to it by the department of transportation, allowed the owner-operator the right to operate a taxicab. [Metro] required the owner-operator to be properly licensed, to use a taxicab meter and radio approved by the department of transportation and to obey its regulations and to adhere to all federal, state and local laws. The owner-operators also were required to maintain insurance in the minimum amount required by law at their own expense and to pay for the use and operation of the [taxicab] including repairs, maintenance, fines, tickets, towing and all taxes or other assessments imposed by governmental agencies. Under the agreement, the owner-operator could set the hours of operation, hire a driver for the taxicab, use the vehicle for personal use and keep all fares derived from the operation of the [taxicab]. [Metro] did not pay the owner-operator, provide benefits, request income records or collect payroll or social security taxes.” Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., supra, 45 Conn. App. 442-43.

I

The first issue presented by Hanson’s appeal is whether, in deciding whether a worker is an employee under the act, we should adopt the “relative nature of the work” test as an alternative to the “right to control” test. The Appellate Court declined to address this issue on its merits because it felt bound by this court’s decision in Ross v. Post Publishing Co., 129 Conn. 564, 29 A.2d 768 (1943). In that case, we held that “[t]here is no dispute about the ultimate test. It is the right of general control of the means and methods used by the person whose status is involved.” Id., 567. Although the issue of the propriety of recourse to the “relative nature of the work” test raises serious questions that warrant plenary exploration by this court; Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692, 696-97, 699 A.2d 52 (1997); we are not persuaded that we should engraft this test onto our longstanding workers’ compensation law.

A

The issue that Hanson has raised must be decided in the context of two jurisprudential principles that limit our authority to afford her the relief that she seeks. First, because this is a workers’ compensation case, it is governed by the special rules of construction that we have long held applicable in such cases. Second, because this is a case in which Hanson asks us to overrule a line of judicial precedents that the legislature has left intact for eighty years, it must be reconciled with the principles of stare decisis.

Connecticut first adopted a statutory scheme of workers’ compensation in 1913. Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 381, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). Although some statutes have common-law roots that may enlighten their construction, the act is not such a statute. “[T]he workers’ compensation system in Connecticut is derived exclusively from statute. ... A commissioner may exercise jurisdiction to hear a claim only under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570, 576, 698 A.2d 873 (1997); see also Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 60, 566 A.2d 670 (1989); Gagnon v. United Aircraft Corp., 159 Conn. 302, 305, 268 A.2d 660 (1970). “Because of the statutory nature of our workers’ compensation system, policy determinations as to what injuries are compensable and what jurisdictional limitations apply thereto are for the legislature, not the judiciary or the board, to make.” Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 577. Whatever the policy implications of this case may be, “the issue presented is, at bottom, a matter of statutory construction.” Doe v. Stamford, supra, 241 Conn. 697.

As a matter of statutory construction, to overrule our long-standing invocation of the “right to control” test, we would have to reconcile such a ruling with the presumption of legislative acquiescence in judicial interpretations that the legislature has not overturned. We have long acted on the hypothesis that the legislature is aware of the interpretation that the courts have placed upon one of its legislative enactments. Once an appropriate interval to permit legislative reconsideration has passed without corrective legislative action, the inference of legislative acquiescence limits judicial authority to reconsider the merits of its earlier decision. Hall v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 241 Conn. 282, 297-98, 695 A.2d 1051 (1997); see Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 196, 676 A.2d 831 (1996); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 333-34, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990); Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 63, 111 A.2d 4 (1955). In this context, only “the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic”; Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 196; can justify judicial abandonment of judicial precedents dating back more than eighty years. See Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 447, 97 A. 328 (1916).

We can perceive no such cogent reasons or inescapable logic to justify altering our long-standing judicial interpretation of one of the fundamental premises of our workers’ compensation statute. This is particularly true for this statute, which has been the subject of extensive legislative amendment over its entire life, without any legislative indication of disagreement with the right to control test. Furthermore, it is fair to assume that employers and insurers have relied justifiably on that interpretation in ordering their business affairs. For us to abandon that interpretation would upset their legitimate expectations.

B

Recognizing that these principles create obstacles to judicial reconsideration of our long-standing “right to control” test, Hanson attempts a bypass, arguing that the “relative nature of the work” test can coexist with the “right to control” test. We disagree.

The “relative nature of the work” test determines the relationship between a worker and a putative employer by asking whether the worker’s performance is an integral part of the regular business of the putative employer. 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation (1997) § 45.00, p. 8-193. The “right to control” test determines the same relationship by asking whether the putative employer has “the right to control the means and methods” used by the worker in the performance of his or her job. Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Conn. 146, 154, 680 A.2d 1231 (1996); Silverberg v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 214 Conn. 632, 639, 573 A.2d 724 (1990); Ross v. Post Publishing Co., supra, 129 Conn. 567.

Dual standards for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor would complicate the administration of our workers’ compensation system. Although there well may be circumstances under which the results reached by application of the two tests will be identical, more often than not the results will differ. In all probability, a workers’ compensation commissioner applying the “relative nature of the work” test would be required to broaden the class of “employees” to include workers who currently are characterized as independent contractors. See, e.g., Harger v. Structural Services, Inc., 121 N.M. 657, 916 P.2d 1324, 1329-31 (1996). Indeed, unless differing results were contemplated, there would be little to gain from adopting a new test. Hanson has proffered no criteria to define the underlying circumstances under which one or the other test would be the more appropriate. If a workers’ compensation commissioner had undefined and hence unlimited authority to invoke either test, the scope of the term “employee” would be left in confusion. We are persuaded, therefore, that we must evaluate Hanson’s argument in favor of the “relative nature of the work” test as an outright alternative to the “right to control” test.

C

We turn now to the merits of replacing the “right to control” test with the “relative nature of the work” test. As advocated by Hanson, the “relative nature of the work” test would require a two part analysis, each part requiring consideration of three separate factors. With respect to the character of the work performed, the claimant would be required to show: (1) the degree of skill involved; (2) the degree to which the work is a separate calling or business; and (3) the extent to which a worker so situated reasonably can be expected to carry the burden of accident. With respect to the relationship of the work to the putative employer’s business, the claimant would have to establish: (1) the extent to which the work is a regular part of the putative employer’s regular business; (2) the extent to which the work is being performed continuously or intermittently; and (3) the extent to which the work is of sufficient duration to constitute continuing services rather than a particular assignment. See 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra, § 43.51, p. 8-23, and § 45.10, p. 8-193.

Hanson advances four arguments in favor of adoption of the “relative nature of the work” test. She derives three of these arguments from the unchallenged proposition that workers’ compensation is social legislation. In that light, she argues that, in preference to the “right to control” test, the proposed test: (1) more effectively implements the objectives of this social legislation; (2) more accurately depicts the employer-employee relationship by precluding employer reliance on contracts drafted to avoid the costs of this social legislation; (3) more directly advances the remedial purposes of social legislation. In addition, she argues that the “right to control” test is too vague to be applied fairly. We are not persuaded. Evaluation of Hanson’s first three arguments cannot be undertaken by this forum; their resolution is grist only for the legislative mill. Hanson’s final argument is unpersuasive on its merits.

In the absence of any claim of constitutional vagueness in the “right to control” test, Hanson must demonstrate that fact-finding under this test exceeds the discretionary authority normally afforded to any trier of fact. Undeniably, whenever the parties disagree, a determination of fact has elements of uncertainty. Hanson has not shown that, in application, the “right to control” test has created more uncertainty than factual disputes about, for example, contractual intent or tor-tious misbehavior. Indeed, as is illustrated by the Alaska case upon which Hanson relies, close questions of fact are also likely to arise in the application of the “relative nature of the work” test. Grothe v. Olafson, 659 P.2d 602, 606 (Alaska 1983).

II

The second issue raised by Hanson’s appeal is whether, if the “right to control” test applies, the trier of fact improperly determined that the decedent was not an employee at the time of his death. She claims that Metro retained enough authority over the taxicab fleet bearing its name to demonstrate a right to general control that made the decedent its employee rather than an independent contractor. We disagree.

“The determination of whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact for the commissioner.” Spatafore v. Yale University, 239 Conn. 408, 418, 684 A.2d 1155 (1996). Accordingly, we apply the same deferential standard of review that we accord to findings of fact by a trial judge or jury. Id., 419. Keeping these principles in mind, we turn to Hanson’s claim that Metro retained sufficient control to render her decedent an employee.

For Connecticut authority, Hanson relies principally on Lassen v. Stamford Transit Co., 102 Conn. 76, 128 A. 117 (1925), a case which, like this one, involved the “right to control” test for taxicab drivers, and which held that the drivers were employees. That case, however, is distinguishable on its facts. For example, the taxicab company in that case required drivers to turn over their fares to the company and paid the drivers 75 percent of that amount. Id., 79. Furthermore, company dispatchers designated the driver who was to transport any particular passenger. Id., 78-79. In this case, Metro took care to avoid such indicia of control, leaving it to taxicab drivers like the decedent to decide, in the exercise of their own discretion, when and where they would take the taxicabs on the road.

As a more general matter, Hanson cites the fact that Metro required cabdrivers to conform to department of transportation regulations with respect to such matters as licenses, meters, fares, records, dispatch and safety. The argument that such state regulatory requirements automatically satisfy the right to control test would make irrelevant the contractual terms of the relationship between the parties. It is axiomatic that every taxicab company must comply with state regulations. We are not persuaded, therefore, that Metro’s requirement that owner-operators comply with government regulations definitively demonstrates an employer-employee relationship. See, e.g., La Grande v. B & L Services, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Fla. App. 1983).

Contrary to Hanson’s argument, we agree with the Appellate Court, the board and the commissioner that the totality of the evidence did not demonstrate that Metro had retained sufficient control to require a finding of an employer-employee relationship between Metro and the decedent. True, the commissioner made some subordinate factual findings that, if viewed in isolation, might have supported a different determination. For example, Metro required its drivers to: (1) report all traffic violations to Metro; and (2) obtain Metro’s approval of any outside insurance. Metro also held legal title to the vehicles, and painted and marked the cars as Metro cabs. Other subordinate findings by the commissioner, however, paint a clearer picture of the contractual relationship between Metro and its drivers. In the daily use of their cabs, drivers could set their own hours, work anywhere in the Metro service area, refuse to accept dispatch calls, and hire a second driver for the cab. Drivers had sole responsibility for all expenses related to operation of their cabs and had the right to regain total ownership rights to their cabs upon the termination of their relationship with Metro. Administratively, moreover, Metro did not pay any salary or fringe benefits to the drivers and did not require the drivers to report their fares to Metro. We conclude that the commissioner reasonably found that the totality of factors in this case indicates that Metro taxi drivers were not employees as that term is used under the act.

In sum, the Appellate Court properly reviewed the commissioner’s determination under the terms of the “right to control” test. We concur in the Appellate Court’s conclusion that, under the circumstances of this case, Hanson’s decedent was not an employee, but, rather, an independent contractor.

Ill

The third and final issue raised by Hanson’s appeal is whether the commissioner improperly refused to amend its findings to include certain requested additions of fact. We agree with the Appellate Court’s resolution of this issue. Once it has been decided that the appropriate test is the “right to control” test, “even if the findings were corrected as requested, the ultimate conclusion would not change.” Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., supra, 45 Conn. App. 447.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion BORDEN, NORCOTT and KATZ, Js., concurred.

BERDON, J.,

dissenting. The majority, in applying the right to control test in determining whether the deceased husband (decedent) of the plaintiff Janet Hanson was an employee within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., ignores this court’s long-standing precedent for determining whether there exists such a relationship. Furthermore, the majority’s narrow interpretation of this remedial statute runs contrary to our fundamental principle that the act “must be interpreted liberally to achieve its humanitarian purposes . . . [and] this court should not impose limitations on the benefits provided for a . . . worker that the statute itself does not clearly specify.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gil v. Courthouse One, 239 Conn. 676, 682-83, 687 A.2d 146 (1997). Today, the majority, by failing to recognize this precedent, allows the named defendant, Transportation General, Inc., doing business as Metro Taxi (Metro), to contract out the very heart of its business for the purposes of avoiding social legislation put in place to protect employees and their families.

Nevertheless, even if we should interpret the act narrowly — that is, focus on whether, at the time of the decedent’s death, Metro retained the right to control the decedent with respect to the performance of his services as a taxicab operator — the plaintiff is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits as the widow of the decedent because, as I point out in part II of this dissent, Metro admitted that the decedent was under its direction at the time of his death. The majority fails to address this claim because, in focusing on whether this court should adopt the relative nature of the work test as an alternative test for the purpose of determining whether a claimant is an employee under the act, it appears to have lost sight of the proverbial forest.

Indeed, the majority, in footnote 5 of its opinion, without citing to any supporting authority, characterizes the issue in this appeal as follows: “[W]hat the decedent driver knew or should have known of his own status under the act.” Such a characterization is absurd because the issue in any workers’ compensation case in which the employment status of the claimant is contested is whether the defendant had the right to control the claimant with respect to the performance of his services. If the issue was what the claimant knew of his own status, many employees who allegedly do not know, or should not have known of their employment status, could avoid the exclusivity provision of the act and bring an action in tort against their employers.

By losing sight of the real issue in this case, the majority deprives the plaintiff of her just compensation.

I

Reversal is required in this case because the compensation commissioner for the third district (commissioner) did not properly review all the circumstances of the decedent’s work relationship to determine whether he was an employee or an independent contractor. The act does not specifically set forth the factors to consider in determining whether a claimant was an employee. General Statutes § 31-275 (9) (A) (i) defines an employee for purposes of the act to mean any person who “[h]as entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer . . . .” When the state adopted the act in 1913, this court’s determination of whether there existed an employer-employee relation was dependent on the traditional common-law right to control test. See Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 447, 97 A. 328 (1916), citing Alexander v. Sherman’s Sons Co., 86 Conn. 292, 297, 85 A. 514 (1912), and Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495, 28 A. 32 (1893) (pivotal question is “who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how it shall be done? [In other words] [w]ho has the right to the general control?”). In 1933, when the American Law Institute adopted the right to control test for determining the existence of a master-servant relationship, it recognized that many factors were germane in determining whether that relationship exists. 1 Restatement, Agency § 220 (1933). Soon thereafter, this court acknowledged that it looked to the Restatement when it applied the right to control test to determine whether a claimant was an employee. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 190, 4 A.2d 640 (1939) (“Various elements may enter into the determination of the question whether one who performs services for another is his servant or is exercising an independent employment. Restatement, 1 Agency, 220.”); see also Robert C. Buell & Co. v. Danaher, 127 Conn. 606, 610, 18 A.2d 697 (1941) (same).

The Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 220 (1958) (hereinafter referred to as § 220), which is substantially the same as its predecessor, defines the relationship of master and servant as follows: “(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control. (2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered; (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer of the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.”

When the claimant proves, pursuant to § 220 (1), that the purported employer had a right to control the person’s work, the analysis stops there and the employment relationship for purposes of the act has been satisfied. The “relation of master and servant is one not capable of exact definition. It cannot ... be defined in general terms with substantial accuracy.” 1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 220, comment (1) (c). “Many factors are ordinarily present for consideration, no one of which is, by itself, necessarily conclusive.” Bourgeois v. Cacciapuoti, 138 Conn. 317, 321, 84 A.2d 122 (1951). Indeed, the Restatement recognizes, as we have, that “[although control or right to control the physical conduct of the person giving service is important and in many situations is determinative, the control or right to control needed to establish the relation of master and servant may be veiy attenuated.”1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 220, comment (1) (d). Therefore, when subsection (1) does not definitively establish the employer-employee relationship, triers of fact must consider all the factors in § 220 (2), and then determine “whether or not there is a sufficient group of favorable factors to establish” that the claimant is an employee. Id., § 220, comment (1) (c). For example, “[w]hile the method of paying by the hour or day rather than by a fixed sum is characteristic of the relationship of employer and employee, it is not decisive. Thompson v. Twiss, supra, [90 Conn.] 448; Stier v. Derby, 119 Conn. 44, 52, 174 A. 332 [1934], Nor is it decisive that the injured party uses his own tools and equipment.” Bourgeois v. Cacciapuoti, supra, 321; see Ceradsky v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo. App. 1979) (“[w]here the evidence lacks such a conclusiveness, however, whether the one who renders the service for the other acts as employee or independent contractor depends upon all the circumstances of the work relationship — so that control becomes only one indicium weighted with the several others to determine the true status” [emphasis added]).

On the basis of the undisputed findings by the commissioner in this case, I conclude that Metro’s right to control the decedent was not so attenuated as to mandate a finding, under subsection (1) of § 220, that the decedent was an independent contractor. Therefore, consideration of all the factors in subsection (2) of § 220 is required to determine the true status of the decedent at the time of his fatal injury. The majority, like the commissioner, however, limits its review of the decedent’s relationship to a summary analysis of some, but not all, of the factors set forth in § 220 (2).

In general, the “inquiry [into all the factors of subsection (2) of § 220] turns to the economic and functional relationship between the nature of the work and the operation of the business served.” Ceradsky v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., supra, 583 S.W.2d 199. Several factors in § 220 (2) specifically focus on the relative nature of the claimant’s work. For instance, subsection (2) (b) requires us to take into consideration whether the decedent was engaged in a distinct occupation. “It would appear that to truly be independent contractors, [Metro’s] drivers are required [to have a certificate of operation issued by the state department of transportation] ... in order to present themselves as a business entity.” Petition of City Cab of Manchester, 139 N.H. 220, 222, 652 A.2d 1202 (1994). The owner-operator agreement signed by the decedent provides that he “acknowledges that he has acquired no property rights in ... [the] certificate to operate . . . assigned to him by [Metro] during the term of this Agreement . . . .” Moreover, Metro’s drivers do not present themselves as being separate business entities. Indeed, at the time of the decedent’s injury, he was operating a vehicle painted orange and white — like all other Metro taxicabs — and emblazoned with the Metro name and telephone number. Consequently, most of Metro’s customers “would have no reason to suspect that a driver was a business entity distinct from [Metro].” Id., 223. Under these circumstances, it cannot reasonably be said that the decedent was engaged in an occupation distinct and separate from that of a Metro taxicab operator.

Most importantly, the Restatement directs this court to consider whether the decedent’s work was “a part of the regular business of the employer.”1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 220 (2) (h). In this case, Metro’s sole business was to supply taxi service, precisely what the decedent was doing as a result of his employment by Metro. Indeed, pursuant to Metro’s owner-operator agreement, the decedent was hired to perform a continual service of carrying passengers to and from points in Metro’s area of operations in order to ensure fulfillment of Metro’s obligations to the department of transportation to provide a quality taxicab service meeting certain standards. Although Metro argued before the commissioner that it was in the business of “leasing cars to drivers,” Metro was obligated to provide taxi service in accordance with its franchise with the department of transportation. In doing so, Metro received telephone calls from customers for taxi service and dispatched drivers, including the decedent, to these customers. While Metro adopted an ingenious method of fixing the decedent’s compensation and permitted him to exercise much discretion over the use of his taxicab, there was, still, “a continuous, essential connection between [Metro’s] work and that of the [decedent] . . . making the [decedent’s] labor a critical part of the regular business of [Metro].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Petition of City Cab of Manchester, supra, 139 N.H. 222; Aisenberg v. C.F. Adams Co., 95 Conn. 419, 422, 111 A. 591 (1920) (“[t]he means and method of conducting this business, as we have in part detailed, comprise the essence of this business”).

This last factor, § 220 (2) (h), is closely related to the “relative nature of the work” test that the plaintiff urges this court to adopt and that has been embraced by other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Stampados v. Colorado D. & S. Enterprises, 833 P.2d 815, 817 (Colo. App. 1992); Ceradsky v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., supra, 583 S.W.2d 193; Petition of City Cab of Manchester, supra, 139 N.H. 221; Kertesz v Korsh, 296 N.J. Super. 146, 153, 686 A.2d 368 (App. Div. 1996); Claim of Griffin, 466 N.W.2d 148, 150 (N.D. 1991); Kaiel v. Cultural Homes-tay Institute, 129 Or. App. 471, 477, 879 P.2d 1319 (1994).

It is unnecessary for this court to consider the issue of adopting the relative nature of the work test in order to decide this case because, according to our precedent, most of the factors of this test have relevance in the application of the right to control test. For example, in Higley v. Woodford, 106 Conn. 284, 285-86, 137 A. 755 (1927), this court specifically relied on the following factor — the degree to which the claimant’s work is a separate calling or business — to conclude that the claimant woodcutter was not an employee of the defendant. The court in Higley emphasized that because the claimant was “ ‘exercising an independent employment . . . was doing his own business ... in his own way and under his own will’ ” he was an independent contractor. Id. Most importantly, in at least two cases this court has relied on the extent to which the work is a regular part of the purported employer’s regular business to determine whether a claimant was an employee or an independent contractor. See, e.g., Robert C. Buell & Co. v. Danaher, supra, 127 Conn. 612 (claimant was employee because “ ‘[o]n the whole the work which the salesmen are doing is the business of the plaintiff [and t]he advancement of that business depends very largely upon the method and manner of the doing of their work by the salesmen’ ”); Lassen v. Stamford Transit Co., 102 Conn. 76, 81, 128 A.2d 117 (1925) (negligent operator of taxicab was employee of defendant who had concession for operating taxi service, in part, because defendant had no “other means of performing this service”).

II

In my view, reversal of the commissioner’s decision is also required because he failed to include in his findings material undisputed facts that clearly would have established an employer-employee relationship. It is well settled law that the “finding [of the commissioner] cannot be changed unless the record discloses that the finding includes facts found without evidence or fails to include material facts which are admitted or undisputed.” Wheat v. Red Star Express Lines, 156 Conn. 245, 248, 240 A.2d 859 (1968). Moreover, “[t]he conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539, 542 A.2d 1118 (1988).

As previously pointed out, the undisputed facts found by the commissioner provided sufficient proof of the decedent’s employee status. Nevertheless, when the findings requested by the plaintiff, based upon Metro’s own admission before the commissioner, are added to the commissioner’s findings, the evidence is overwhelming that the decedent was an employee of Metro at the time of his fatal injury. The commissioner found that “[w]hen a driver agreed to service a call through the radio dispatcher he was under the orders and direction of the dispatcher.” After the commissioner released its decision, the plaintiff requested that he amend this finding to include the following facts: “[The decedent] always utilized the radio dispatch service [of Metro] and at the time of his death, he was responding to a radio dispatch call [from Metro] and was under orders and direction of the dispatcher.” The transcript of the hearing before the commissioner reflects that the defendant had conceded that the decedent utilized the services of the dispatcher “most of the time” he operated the taxicab, and that he was “utilizing it for at least some of the night [he was killed] because the people who killed him were a radio dispatched call.” Remarkably, the majority concludes, without specific reference or identification of the requested finding, that even if the commissioner had granted the plaintiffs request to correct this and fifteen other findings, “ ‘the ultimate conclusion [that the decedent was not an employee] would not change.’ ”

Clearly, if the decedent was responding to Metro directed dispatches on the night he was murdered, he was “under the orders and direction of’ Metro and for that time, at least, he was under the direct control of Metro in full satisfaction of § 220 (1). The majority seems to hold that for the decedent to qualify for workers’ compensation benefits he must have worked exclusively or predominantly for Metro. This requirement is contrary to our long-standing rule of law that “[a] person may be a contractor as to part of his service and a servant as to another part . . . [and that] the question of compensability [under the act] is determined by the particular relationship existing at the time the injury was suffered.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Clough v. Estate of Malley, 126 Conn. 379, 382, 11 A.2d 398 (1940); Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 573-75, 362 A.2d 871 (1975) (public defender is employee of state for certain purposes, and independent contractor for other purposes); Scorpion v. American-Republican, Inc., 131 Conn. 42, 45, 37 A.2d 802 (1944) (issue for jury was whether newsboys were agents of defendant, or independent contractors as to removal of wires from stacks of delivered papers); Markham v. Middletown, 102 Conn. 571, 574, 129 A.2d 524 (1925) (town tree warden, as independent contractor, was acting as employee of town when he was injured removing limbs from tree on public property); see also 1 T. Shearman & A. Redfield, Negligence (6th Ed. 1913) § 165 (“[o]ne who has an independent business, and generally serves only in the capacity of a contractor, may abandon that character for a time, and become a mere servant or agent, and this, too, without doing work of a different nature from that to which he is accustomed”). Moreover, by Metro’s own admission and the commissioner’s finding, “most of the time” Metro’s dispatcher exercised direct control over the decedent.

Furthermore, even when the decedent operated the taxicab at his own discretion, Metro retained the right to exercise control over him. “It is not the fact of actual interference with control but the right to interfere which makes the difference between an independent contractor and a servant or agent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaliszewski v. Weathermaster Alsco Corp., 148 Conn. 624, 629, 173 A.2d 497 (1961). The conclusion that Metro had a right to control the decedent is supported by the fact that it had the right to terminate the decedent’s owner-operator agreement — the agreement that was the foundation of Metro’s business, and that required each owner-operator to: (1) maintain a neat and clear appearance at all times while on duty; (2) exercise courtesy and consideration and help passengers load and unload baggage; (3) use the shortest available route to the passenger’s destination, or as directed by the passenger; and (4) follow all relevant department of transportation regulations. See Lassen v. Stamford Transit Co., supra, 102 Conn. 80-81 (“it must be implied that the company directed and required its drivers to conform to these methods of dealing with the company’s customers”). Nevertheless, even if Metro never disciplined drivers who did not conform, the fact that it had the right to discipline those said drivers is “one of the strong indications that the relation is one of employment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aisenberg v. C.F. Adams Co., supra, 95 Conn. 423.

At the very least, because the commissioner omitted material facts from his findings, his conclusion that “the proof does not indicate that [Metro] had the degree of control necessary to show that [the decedent] was an employee of [Metro] on [the night he was killed]” is unreasonably drawn from the subordinate facts. Therefore, I would reverse the Appellate Court, and remand the case with instruction to remand the case to the review board and the commissioner for reconsideration in view of these material facts and any other fact which was admitted or undisputed.

Accordingly I dissent.

       Because the defendants apparently present the same arguments to this court, having filed a joint brief that makes no distinctions between them in this respect, we will refer to them as one party, Metro. They were so denominated in the proceedings before the commissioner and the board.

       Our grant of certification was limited to the following issues:
      “Should the relative nature of the work test be adopted as an alternative to the right to control test in concluding whether the plaintiffs decedent, a cab driver, was an independent contractor and not an employee of the defendant taxi cab company?
      “Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the finding of dismissal pursuant to the right to control test in light of the department of transportation regulations?
      “Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the compensation review board’s refusal to correct the finding of dismissal as requested by the plaintiff?” Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., supra, 243 Conn. 914-15.

       “[Metro] was required to hold legal title to the vehicle because, in accordance with Connecticut law, all taxicabs are required to be titled in the name of the certificate holder, in this case, [Metro].” Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., supra, 45 Conn. App. 442 n.2.

       “ ‘Stand dues’ are a combination of leasing, taxes and insurance costs.” Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., supra, 45 Conn. App. 442 n.3.

       This appeal does not, involve the rights of a third party tort victim to recover against Metro for the misconduct of one of its drivers on the basis of the principles of actual, implied, or apparent authority. See, e.g., Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 120, 132-41, 464 A.2d 6 (1983) (discussing agency principles in contract case); Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co. v. Longshore Beach & Country Club, Inc., 127 Conn. 493, 496-97, 18 A.2d 347 (1941) (applying similar agency principles in tort action). The issue, rather, is what the decedent driver knew or should have known of his own status under the act.
      It is true that the right to control test, in its present form, was embedded into the act by early cases relying on similar rules in tort cases. Nonetheless, that construction of the act has been ratified by legislative acquiescence.

       Hanson’s argument relies on four out-of-state cases that we find unpersuasive. See Stampados v. Colorado D. & S. Enterprises, 833 P.2d 815, 817 (Colo. App. 1992); Kertesz v. Korsh, 296 N.J. Super. 146, 152-55, 686 A.2d 368 (App. Div. 1996); Claim of Griffin, 466 N.W.2d 148, 150 (N.D. 1991);
        Kaiel v. Cultural Homestay Institute, 129 Or. App. 471, 477, 879 P.2d 1319, rev. denied, 320 Or. 453, 887 P.2d 792 (1994).

       As Metro observes, although Professor Larson’s treatise describes the “relative nature of the work” test as a new test currently superseding the “right to control” test, that statement no longer reflects the totality of the relevant case law. Earlier editions of his celebrated work demonstrate that, for almost thirty years, Professor Larson has been a staunch advocate of the “relative nature of the work” test. During this time period, however, only a few state courts have adopted this test in substitution for the “right to control” test. See, e.g., cases cited in footnote 6 of this opinion. Connecticut has not done so, either by way of legislation or by way of judicial opinion. See DaSilva v. Danbury Publishing Co., 39 Conn. App. 653, 656, 666 A.2d 440, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 936, 668 A.2d 374 (1995). Connecticut is not alone. See, e.g., Kirkwood v. Industrial Commission, 84 Ill. 2d 14, 23-24, 416 N.E.2d 1078 (1981); Youngblood v. North State Ford Truck Sales, 87 N.C. App. 35, 37-38, 359 S.E.2d 256 (1987), aff'd, 321 N.C. 380, 364 S.E.2d 433 (1988). A contrary decision by the Supreme Court of Maine; Timberlake v. Frigon & Frigon, 438 A.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Me. 1982); was overturned five years later by that state’s legislature. See West v. C.A.M. Logging, 670 A.2d 934, 937 n.2 (Me. 1996).

       The relationship between the parties in this case illustrates the factual uncertainties that may arise in the application of the “relative nature of the work” test. Concededly, the decedent was free to use his taxicab for private engagements entirely unrelated to the business of Metro. Would the decedent’s status depend on whether, when he was killed, he was engaged in business obtained through Metro’s dispatcher or through his own enterprise? Would the status of other taxi drivers who were accidently injured depend solely, or principally, on the percentage of the time that they used the taxicab for Metro business? We do not suggest that these questions are unanswerable. They illustrate, however, that there will be close issues of fact, whichever test is applied.

       Contrary to the implied assertion of Justice Berdon’s dissenting opinion, Metro could not order a driver to take radio dispatch calls. Metro dispatched drivers who agreed to be available ad hoc, it could not prevent a driver from sharing a car with other drivers.

       The principal issue was the propriety of a motion to correct to add a finding that, on the date of his death, the decedent was on the road in response to a call that he had received from Metro’s radio dispatcher. There was, however, neither a finding, nor a request to add a finding, to the effect that the decedent had used his taxicab exclusively or even predominantly in response to calls from the dispatcher. Significantly, the commissioner found that the decedent had used his own cellular phone for servicing customers and that he had shared the use of his cab with a second driver. Furthermore, in one of the requests for correction of the finding, Hanson herself asked for inclusion of a finding that: “The work performed by [the decedent] was not for the completion of a particular job but consisted of an ongoing relationship between [the decedent] and [Metro].”

       In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Court concurred in the reasoning of the board.

       Professor Arthur Larson points out in his comprehensive treatise on workers’ compensation that: “With the advent of social and labor legislation, chain store taxation, and other modem enactments drawing a distinction between independent contractors and employees, there has been an increasing effort on the part of employers to avoid both the financial cost and the bookkeeping and reporting inconvenience that goes with workmen’s compensation, unemployment compensation, social security, and the like.” 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation (1997) § 45.10, p. 9. Today’s decision effectively insulates Metro, the operator of a fleet of taxicabs that relies almost exclusively on taxicab drivers like the decedent to carry out its business, from the legal requirements of unemployment compensation and social security legislation as well as workers’ compensation legislation.

       See part II of this dissent; see part III of the majority opinion, which summarily rejected this claim, as did the Appellate Court, without even identifying what findings the plaintiff was attempting to add to the compensation commissioner’s findings.

       General Statutes § 31-284 (a), the exclusivity provision of the act, provides in relevant part: “All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal ipiury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.”

       “[T]he word ‘employee’ has largely displaced ‘servant’ ... [in modem social legislation. Whether it is] the usual Employers’ Liability Acts [or] the Workmen’s Compensation Acts the tests given in [§ 220] for the existence of the relation of master and servant are valid.” 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 220 (1) (g), comment (1958).

       Section 220 of the first Restatement is identical in all respects to § 220 of the Restatement (Second), except for the addition of factor (j) in subsection 2 of the Restatement (Second).

       For example, “[i]n some types of cases which involve persons customarily considered as servants, there may even be an understanding that the employer shall not exercise control. Thus, the full-time cook is regarded as a servant although it is understood that the employer will exercise no control over the cooking.” 1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 220, comment (1) (d); see also Hannigan v. Goldfarb, 53 N.J. Super. 190, 196-97, 147 A.2d 56 (App. Div. 1958) (“[w]hen the manner of performing the service is beyond another’s control because of its nature, absence of direct control over such details may become insignificant in the overall view of the facts . . . especially . . . where . . . [the state by regulation] licenses the [taxi] drivers and tells them how to behave, under pain of losing their licenses” [citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]).

       “That is to say, on analysis, the right to control the detail of the work factor given predominance as proof of the employee status shows through as merely an euphemism for worker activity of such a nature as to be a regular and continuous part of the manufacture of the product or other service.” Ceradskyv. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., supra, 583 S.W.2d 198.

       Metro was awarded a certificate to operate 109 taxicabs by the department of transportation for the transportation of passengers within and between the cities of New Haven, East Haven, West Haven, Hamden and Woodbridge.

       The final factor of the relative nature of the work test, the degree to which a worker so situated reasonably can be expected to carry the burden of the accident, is not comparable to any of the factors of § 220 (2), but it is clearly in keeping with the well recognized purposes of workers’ compensation legislation.
      “As an integrated system of social welfare legislation, [workers’] compensation embodies two principal and unique social policy purposes. These can be characterized as the social bargain and social insurance purposes. The first of these is related to the immediate impetus for the adoption of this legislation. The impetus, of course, was to alleviate the plight of injured workers who often suffered without remedy under the common law. This purpose has been characterized as ‘ . . .a socially-enforced bargain which compels an employee to give up his valuable right to sue in the courts for full recovery of damages ... in return for a certain, but limited, award. It compels the employer to give up his right to assert common-law defenses in return for assurance that the amount of recovery by the employee will be limited.’ ” D. Samuelsen, “Employee or Independent Contractor: The Need For a Reassessment of the Standard Used Under California’s Workmen’s Compensation,” 10 U.S.F.L. Rev. 133,136-37 (1975); see Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 97, 491 A.2d 368 (1985) (the act establishes, as part of on-going social compact, system that “compromise[s] an employee’s right to a common law tort action for work related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation”).
      “The second principal social policy purpose [is] the social insurance form through which workmen’s compensation [is] to operate. This would be its risk distribution aspect. The fact that modem industrial life will inevitably generate work-related injuries and possibly death is one of the major premises underlying workmen’s compensation.” D. Samuelsen, supra, 10 U.S.F.L. Rev. 137. “The law was intended for the protection of workmen and their families; it was intended to afford machinery by which the burdens of injuries sustained by those who do the actual work of a business, and are not themselves employers with a duty of insurance under the act, may be socially distributed and borne by society in general.” Matter of Rheinwald v. Builders’ Brick Supply Co., 168 App. Div. 425, 440, 153 N.Y.S. 598 (1915).
      The plaintiffs decedent took a regular and continuous part in the defendant’s economic activity of providing taxi service to residents of and visitors to the New Haven metropolitan area. Like many of Metro’s other drivers, the decedent and his family could not be expected to bear the cost of a serious traffic accident, nor was his place in the overall transportation business such that he could distribute the risk of injury on his own. In every respect then, he is the kind of worker for whose benefit the compensation act was thought necessary. Shinuald v. Mound City Yellow Cab Co., 666 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Mo. App. 1984) (“It is a business of the [company] to supply taxicab service to the customers .... There is substantial evidence that claimant’s work was a regular and continuous part of that business and not an independent business through which it would be feasible to channel the cost of work-connected injury. . . . Therefore, [the] claimant is a fortiori an employee for purposes of the Workers Compensation Law." [Internal quotation marks omitted.])

       By implication, if the defendant in Lassen did not have any other means of providing taxi service to its customers, the taxicab operator’s work was a regular part of the defendant’s business, and, consequently, was a good indication that the defendant was the operator’s employer.

       Incredibly, the majority concludes that the plaintiffs request to add a finding that the decedent “always utilized the radio dispatch service” is not a “request to add a finding, to the effect that the decedent had used his taxicab exclusively or even predominantly in response to calls from the dispatcher.” Clearly, if the decedent always used the dispatch service, he used his taxicab exclusively or predominantly in response to calls from the dispatcher.
      Moreover, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the plaintiffs request to add a finding that the work performed by the decedent “consisted of an ongoing relationship between [him] and [Metro]” buttresses her claim that the decedent was an employee of Metro. If the decedent, as part of his ongoing relationship with Metro, always utilized the radio dispatch service, then he was under the direction and control of Metro whenever he transported passengers in his taxicab.

       See testimony of William Scalzi, Metro’s president.

       I agree with the majority’s statement in footnote 9 of its opinion that “Metro could not order a driver to take radio dispatch calls.” When, however, the decedent did respond to dispatched calls, which according to Metro was “most of the time,” he was under the direction and control of the dispatcher.