author: Hardin, P. J.: ■Martin, J.

text:
    Maria A. Lewis, Appellant, v. Julia R. Duane, Individually, and as Administratrix, etc., of Patrick H. Drake, Deceased, and as Executrix, etc., of Jane E. Drake and Virginia M. Drake, Deceased, Respondent.

      Mortgage — statutory foreclosure — right of redemption — property purchased by the •mortgagee — no trust created in favor of the mortgagor — admissions by an attorney.

    On the foreclosure, by advertisement under the statute, of a mortgage containing a power of sale, given to secure commercial paper of the mortgagor indorsed, by the mortgagee, and advances to satisfy judgments, the amount due inserted in the notice of foreclosure was the principal sum mentioned in the mortgage, with interest.
    The property was bought in by the mortgagee and by his attorney for sums which aggregated less than the mortgagee’s payments and advances secured by the mortgage, which were themselves less than the principal of the mortgage.
    In an action brought by the mortgagor to redeem, claiming that the foreclosure was inoperative,
    Meld, that, in the absence of averments of fraudulent intent and evidence that the amount inserted in the notice was swollen for a fraudulent purpose beyond the indebtedness of the mortgagor, the foreclosure should not be declared inoperative, nor should it be held that the statutory sale and the power of sale in the mortgage did not cut off the legal rights of the mortgagor, who had personal notice of the foreclosure sale and who had acquiesced therein .and yielded up possession to the purchasers.
    At the time of making the mortgage an instrument was executed, as part of the transaction, which stated that the mortgagee, in taking the mortgage, only desired to secure himself for the amount of his liability as indorser for the mortgagor and for the advances he was to make in satisfying judgments, and that anything more than this was not contemplated by him, and that when the amount of such liability and advances was ascertained or liquidated the mortgagee was to indorse the same or reduce the mortgage to the true amount so advanced by him.

      Held, that this instrument did not make such ascertainment or liquidation a condition precedent to the right to foreclose (Martin, J., dissenting);
    That the mortgage and this instrument read together did not operate to place the legal title to the mortgaged property in the mortgagee, and that he did not by force thereof become a trustee of the mortgaged real estate, nor did the papers create an express trust;
    And, hence, that although the mortgagor might have required an ascertainment of the amount of the mortgagee’s liability and advancements, and its indorsement on the mortgage at any time before foreclosure, he was not entitled to an accounting after the sale, of which he had notice and in which he had acquiesced, on the ground that a trust as to his real property had been created;
    That, under the circumstances of the case, it was immaterial whether the mortgagor was or was not present at the foreclosure sale, it appearing that he had notice of the time and place thereof.
    Evidence to establish the fact that the purchaser at a foreclosure sale consented to hold the property acquired thereby, as a security merely, must be clear, unequivocal and convincing.
    A declaration of an attorney, made at the time of the service of papers under a statutory foreclosure upon the mortgagor, is not admissible in evidence so as to bind his client, unless made within the scope of the attorney’s authority (Martin, J., dissenting).
    Appeal by tbe plaintiff, Maria A. Lewis, from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court, entered in the office of tbe clerk of Broome county on tbe 14th day of September, 1891, upon tbe report of a referee, dismissing tbe complaint upon tbe merits.
    Tbe action was begun September 1, 1883, by Frederick Lewis and Maria A'. Lewis against Virginia M. Drake and Julia B. Drake, as tbe lieirs, legatees, devisees and representatives of Patrick H.. Drake and also of Jane E. Drake, bis wife. It was an action brought for an accounting and to redeem certain lands formerly owned by Frederick Lewis, and which were covered by a mortgage executed by him and his wife to Patrick H. Drake, who, in 1875, foreclosed tbe mortgage by advertisement and bid off tbe larger portion of tbe property himself, one parcel having been purchased by Giles W. Hotchkiss at tbe foreclosure sale. In June, 1873, Frederick Lewis, then a resident of tbe city of Binghamton, was the owner of tbe real estate covered by tbe mortgage in question, and he, with his wife, executed a mortgage to Patrick H. Drake in the nominal sum of $60,000, tbe mortgage containing a clause that it was given “ as a /security for the payment of the sum of $60,000 one year from date, with interest.” It also contained the clause: “And in case default shall be made in the payment of the principal sum hereby intended ■to be secured, or in the payment of the interest thereof, or’any part •of such principal or interest, as above provided, it shall be lawful for the party of the second part, executors, administrators or assigns, at any time thereafter, to sell the premises hereby granted, •or any part thereof, in the manner prescribed by law, and out of all moneys arising from such sale, to retain the amount then due'for principal and interest, together with the costs and charges of making •such sale, and the overplus, if any there be, shall be paid by the party making such sale on demand to the said Frederick A. Lewis and Maria A. Lewis, their heirs and assigns.” The mortgage was recorded on the 4th day of June, 1873, in Liber 51 of Mortgages, page 152. On the 4th day of June, 1873, the mortgagee in said mortgage, .Patrick H. Drake, executed an agreement in writing as follows:
    “ Frederick Lewis, and Maria A. Lewis, his wife, both of the city •of Binghamton, Broome county, N. Y., have this 4th day of June, 1873, executed and delivered to Patrick IL. Drake, of the city and county of New York, a mortgage upon all their real estate situate in the said county of Broome, for sixty thousand ($60,000) dollars. The value of the property covered by the said mortgage is about •one hundred thousand ($100,000) dollars. The intention of the undersigned by this said mortgage is to secure the said Drake against ■all liability he has or may have incurred as indorser for the said Lewis. The precise amount of such liability as such indorser is unknown but supposed to be about thirty-two thousand ($32,000) dollars. And also to secure the said Drake for advances which he is to make to liquidate and satisfy the large amount of judgments against the said Lewis, which are a lien upon the property covered by the said mortgage. The said Drake in the taking of the said mortgage only desires to secure himself for the amount of his liability as such indorser, and for the advances which he is to make in taking up and satisfying the judgments against the said Lewis. Anything more than this is not contemplated by the said Drake. When the amount of such liabilities and advances is ascertained or liquidated, then said Drake to indorse same or reduce said mortgage to the true amount so advanced by him. In case he shall assign or part witb tbe control of tbe said mortgage, he is to account to tbe said Lewis for tbe full amount that said Lewis may have to pay upon tbe same or which be will be liable to pay to tbe bolder thereof. In tbe meantime tbe said Drake will take care of and protect tbe said Lewis and bis property from tbe enforcement of any of tbe judgments against tbe said Lewis or bis property, and save tbe property of tbe said Ltewis from sacrifice and tbe said Lewis from damages and costs. And that be will at any time assign said mortgage to said Lewis’ order upon being reimbursed on bis advances in case be shall not have previously assigned tbe same.
    “ (Signed.) P. H. DEANE.”
    Tbe referee found that: “The execution and delivery of the said mortgage and tbe execution and delivery of tbe said agreement formed a single transaction between tbe said parties, and each was a consideration for tbe other.” Jane E. Drake, tbe wife of Patrick H. Drake, was a sister of tbe mortgagor, Frederick Lewis, and at that time Lewis was financially embarrassed, and “ was unable to procure ready money to pay his debts and obligations when payment thereof was demanded of him. Judgments were duly recovered and docketed against him, and promissory notes made by him were due and unpaid. Patrick H. Drake was tbe first indorser upon such notes, and was, by tbe due protest thereof, charged as such indorser.” Tbe referee found that on tbe, 3d of July, 1875, the mortgagee commenced foreclosure of tbe mortgage by advertisement, and that tbe notice of sale of said mortgaged premises, among other things, stated, viz.: “ And whereas, tbe amount claimed to be due on said mortgage at tbe time of tbe first publication of this notice is $68,750. Now, therefore, notice is hereby given that by virtue of tbe power of sale contained in said mortgage, and duly recorded as, aforesaid, and in pursuance of tbe statute in such case made and provided, tbe said mortgage will be foreclosed by a sale of tbe premises therein described at public auction, at tbe front door of tbe Court House in tbe city of Binghamton,” etc. Notices of'such foreclosure were served upon tbe mortgagors and upon tbe other parties, and posted in accordance witb tbe provisions of tbe statute. Tbe sale was duly adjourned to tbe 6th day of November, 1875, and notice thereof given, and tbe referee finds “ said mortgaged premises, in pursuance of such notice of sale and such notice of postponement,

      were oil the 6th day of November, 1875, and at the place and hour named in said notices, sold at public auction, or at public sale; each parcel thereof was sold and bid off separately, and each of such mortgaged tracts or parcels was thereat sold and bid off by Patrick H. Drake, except the following described parcel ” (then follows a description of a 250-acre lot), which the referee found “ was sold to Giles ~W. Hotchkiss, he being one of the attorneys for the mortgagee.” The referee found: “ And the aggregate of the sums bidden therefor, and for which said mortgaged premises then and there sold, was $24,366.” The referee also found: “ Subsequent to June 4, 1873, and prior to the 3d day of July, 1875, the said Patrick H. Drake, under the provisions of said mortgage and agreement, advanced moneys for the liquidation and satisfaction of judgments against the said Frederick Lewis, which were a lien upon the property covered by the said mortgage of June 3, 1873, and prior to the 3d day of July, 1875, the said Drake paid notes of the said Lewis, upon which, on the 3d day of June, 1873, the said Drake had incurred liability as an indorser for the said Frederick Lewis.” The referee then proceeded to state the amount of each of said judgments and notes, with a statement of interest thereon, due July 3, 1875, and then he found that “ on the 3d day of July, 1875, the aggregate of the sums so advanced and paid by said Drake, in payment of such notes and judgments and taxes, with interest computed thereon, as stated, was $42,014.48.” The referee found that prior in time “ to the execution and delivery of the said mortgage by Frederick Lewis and Maria A. Lewis ” there were judgments docketed in the clerk’s office, and liens upon the mortgaged premises, “ amounting to upwards of the sum of twenty thousand dollars, exclusive of interest. Subsequent to said foreclosure and sale, the said Patrick H. Drake paid or contributed to the payment of said judgments, and no one thereof has been at any time enforced against the said Lewis or his property.” The referee also found that “ prior to the said foreclosure of and sale under said mortgage, the aggregate amount so paid and advanced by the said Patrick H. Drake upon the notes of Frederick Lewis, upon which said. Drake was liable as an indorser, and the judgments against Frederick Lewis, was not ascertained between the said Drake and Lewis, nor was there an offer on the part of said Drake, or a demand on the part of the said Lewis, that such amount should be ascertained prior to such foreclosure and sale.” During the trial Frederick Lewis died. Prior to his death he transferred and “conviyed to John B. Yan Name all of his right, title and interest in and to the several parcels of land described in the said mortgage and complaint, and the cause of action described in said complaint for the purpose of transferring the same to the said Maria A* Lewis, the wife of Frederick, through the said Yan Name, and all of such right, title and interest was by said Yan Name transferred and conveyed by deed or writing, dated September 3d, 1883, to the said Maria A. Lewis.” On March 25, 1890, an order was entered at Special Term “ That this action be continued in the name .of Maria A. Lewis as sole plaintiff, such order and the application therefor having been made subsequent to the death of the said Frederick Lewis.” It is found that “ The defendant, Yirginia M. Drake, died January, 1884, leaving a last will and testament, in and by which she left her property to the defendant Julia B. Duane.” That: “ At the time of the commencement of the proceedings to foreclose the said mortgage, and of the sale of said mortgaged premises thereunder, the said Frederick Lewis and Maria A. Lewis had made default in the payment of the principal sum thereby intended to be secured, and in the payment of the interest thereof, whereby it became and was lawful for the said Patrick H. Drake to sell the said mortgaged premises or any part thereof in the manner prescribed by law, and out of all the moneys arising from such sale to retain the amount then due for principal and interest, together with the costs and charges of making such sales, and to pay the overplus, if any there might be, on demand to the said Frederick Lewis and Maria A. Lewis, their heirs and assigns.” He also found that by virtue of the proceedings to foreclose and the affidavits “ the legal title, interest and ownership of the mortgagors, Frederick Lewis and Maria A. Lewis, in or of said mortgaged premises, was transferred and conveyed to the respective purchasers at said sale, and the equity of redemption therein of the mortgagors foreclosed and their .right to redeem terminated.”
    And as matter of law, that “ The plaintiff, Maria A. Lewis, is not entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint in this action,1 or the right to maintain the same, or the right to redeem said mortgaged premises or any part thereof.”
    Exceptions were filed to several of the findings of fact and requests were made to find and refusals were made to certain requests and exceptions taken thereto. No opinion was written by the referee. The case contains all the evidence.

      Edward K. Olarh, for the appellant.

      Millard c& Stewart, for the respondent.
   Hardin, P. J.:

Plaintiff insists “ that the statutory foreclosure was inoperative and the plaintiff has the right to redeem.”

In Jencks v. Alexander (11 Paige, 626), it was said, viz.: “But a mere mistake in computing the amount due at the time of the first publication of the notice, does not of itself furnish any sufficient ground for setting aside the sale under the’ statute. The direction in the statute, that the notice of sale shall contain a statement of the amount claimed to be due upon the mortgage, was, undoubtedly, for the purpose of apprising the owners of the equity of redemption of the "extent of the claim of the mortgagee, so that they might not be surprised at the sale by an unfounded claim for what had in fact been previously paid; and to enable them to apply to this court for relief, in due season, if the amount due could-not be otherwise adjusted between the parties.” A similar doctrine was laid down in Bunce v. Reed (16 Barb. 350). The effect of an error in the amount claimed to be due was under consideration in Mowry et al. v. Sanborn et al. (68 N. Y. 165), and the court observed: “ Without considering whether the claim of a much larger amount to be due than was due, would, in the absence of fraud, invalidate the proceedings, we are of the opinion it does not appear that the amount claimed was more than was secured by the mortgage.” In that case the mortgage was given, as the one before us, to secure commercial paper of the mortgagor. The case of Ferguson v. Kimball (3 Barb. Ch. 619) is unlike the one before us, as the mortgage under consideration in that case was conditioned for the support of the widow of the mortgagee, and was, therefore, • “ given as a security to cover unliquidated damages.”

In Klock v. Cronkhite (1 Hill, 110), Bronson, J., said: “ But the statute imposes no penalty for claiming more than is really due; and if such a claim could, under any circumstances, affect the validity of the sale, it certainly could not, in a case like this, where, if the plaintiff has in fact demanded too much, it has not resulted from a fraudulent purpose, but from a mistake concerning his legal rights.” In the case in hand we are not furnished any evidence indicative of a fraudulent intent on the part of the mortgagee or his attorneys who conducted the foreclosure of the mortgage in inserting in the notice of foreclosure the principal sum mentioned in the mortgage, augmented by the interest thereon from the date of the mortgage to the time of the foreclosure; and in the absence of averments of fraudulent intent and evidence that the amount inserted in the notice was swollen for the fraudulent purpose beyond the indebtedness of the mortgagors, we are not prepared to say that the foreclosure was inoperative, or that the sale in virtue of the statute and the power of sale found in the mortgage did not cut off the legal rights of the mortgagors in the premises covered by the mortgage. ' The mortgagors had personal notice and acquiesced in the sale, and yielded up possession of the premises to the purchasers at the sale. *

In Jackson v. Slater (5 Wend. 296), it was said : “ In this case the foreclosure was under the statute; and that statute provides, that every foreclosure made under it shall be an absolute bar of the equity of redemption, and shall have the like effect as if the mortgage had been foreclosed in a court of chancery by a decree against all parties in interest.”

In, Ingraham v. Baldwin (12 Barb. 20), it was said, viz.: The statute foreclosure was equivalent to a decree in equity.”

In Warner v. Blakeman (36 Barb. 518), it was said, viz.: “ It is not a good answer to say that these statutory proceedings are not in court, and that the mortgagor is not required to contest them. The notice of such proceedings with a claim against him for a certain amount due upon the mortgage, at least imposes upon him the duty of notifying purchasers at the sale of his claim, or the duty of silence afterwards. If he will not speak when duty towards others requires it, he will not be permitted to speak afterwards, when his interest prompts him to do it.”

In Elliott v. Wood (53 Barb. 305), it was said: “ Undoubtedly courts of equity have always held that the equity of redemption is so inseparable from the mortgage, it cannot be disannexed even by an express agreement of the parties. But by statutes of the State, it has been long declared that mortgaged land can be sold by advertisement in all cases where the mortgage contains a power to the mortgagee, or any other person, to sell it, upon default being made in any condition of the mortgage. Every sale pursuant to such a power is declared to be equivalent to a foreclosure and sale under the decree of a court of equity. * * * The seventh section of the statute expressly declares that the mortgagee, his assigns, and.his or their representatives, may fairly and in good faith purchase the premises at the sale.”

In this case the referee has found that on the 3d day of July, 1875, “ the aggregate of the sums so advanced and paid by said Drake in payment of such notes and judgments and taxes, with interest computed thereon as stated, was $42,014.48. No part of said aggregate sum had at said date been repaid to the said Drake by the said Lewis, or any person in his behalf.” The referee also found “ Each of said tracts or parcels was sold to the highest bidder and for the greatest sum bidden therefor, and the aggregate of the sums bidden therefor, and for which said mortgaged premises then and there sold, was $24,366. Said sale or sales was or were in all respects honestly and fairly conducted. And said Giles W. Hotchkiss purchased the premises bid off by him fairly and in good faith, and said Patrick H. Drake purchased each parcel of the premises bid off by him fairly and in good faith.” The referee further found that the affidavits of the foreclosure of the said mortgage and of the sale thereunder “ were, on the 11th day of February, 1876, duly hied in the office of the clerk of the county of Broome, and were on that day duly recorded in the office of said clerk in Book of Mortgages No. 51, at page 1. Said Frederick Lewis was present at said foreclosure sale and did not in any manner forbid such sale or object to the making thereof.”

In Hubbell v. Sibley (5 Lans. 51; S. C. affd., 50 N. Y. 468), it was held by this court that “ The statute providing for foreclosure of a mortgage by advertisement is to be complied with substantially, but with regard to the objects intended by it.”

Attention lias been given to Burnet v. Lenniston (5 Johns. Ch. 35), which is unlike the case before us; there the advertisement under a power contained a false assumption “ as that the premises are to be sold for default of three mortgages, when they were only two, the third being on other land, by which the public might be misled, or purchasers deterred from bidding; ” and there was also another defect in that no jdace of sale was designated in the advertisement ; and it also appeared That the power inserted in the third mortgage thus intruded upon the public was void, for the mortgagor was not of twenty-five years of age, when the mortgage was executed;” and it also appeared that the sale was made after a tender of the sum due upon the two mortgages; and by reason of such defects and imperfections the chancellor held the sale invalid. We see nothing in the case militating against the sale now under review.

Our attention is invited to Soule v. Ludlow (3 Hun, 503), in which case it was held that “ A mortgagee in the execution, by advertisement, of the power of sale contained in his mortgage, is regarded as a trustee executing a power in trust, and is bound to conduct the proceedings in a fair and just manner and in good faith. Belief will be granted setting aside such proceedings upon the same grounds upon which a court would set aside a sale had under foreclosure by action.” In that case a party had taken an assignment of a mortgage and a foreclosure of a prior mortgage had taken place without service being made upon the assignee of the second mortgage, whose assignment had not been recorded,” and under the circumstances disclosed it was said that the foreclosure “ was a practical fraud upon him,” inasmuch as the defendant well knew that the plaintiff was the assignee and owner of said mortgage, for he had paid to him, or to his attorney, several installments of interest thereon, and knew that Goss had no interest in said foreclosure.” Under such circumstances relief was given. We find nothing in the case that aids the position of the appellant.

In Elliott v. Wood (45 N. Y. 78), Allen, J.,. said : “ But a mortgagee is not solely a trustee for the mortgagor, he is a creditor having interests to protect, and has rights which a naked trustee may not have. If it be conceded that a mortgagee with power .of sal.e, being a trustee for sale, cannot either directly or indirectly, except by tbe express authority of the mortgagor, purchase the mortgaged estate, still he may do so when such authority is conferred either by the terms of the power or in any other way.” And he further adds, viz.: “ Powers of sale are construed liberally for the purpose of effecting the general object, and neither the interest of the mortgagee or mortgagor will he advanced by forbidding purchases by the mortgagee. The security of the mortgagee would be less valuable and the mortgagor would lose the benefit of the competition of the mortgagee upon the sale.” In the mortgage before us it was expressly stipulated, viz.: “ This grant is intended as a security for the payment of the sum of $60,000 one year from date with interest * * * and in case default shall be made in the payment of the principal sum hereby intended to be secured, or in the payment of the interest thereof, or any part of such principal or interest, as abovq provided, it shall be lawful for the party of the second part, executors, administrators or assigns at any time thereafter, to sell the premises hereby granted, or any part thereof, in the manner prescribed by law,” etc. We thus see there was ample power given by the mortgage to the mortgagee to make sale of the premises after the expiration of one year; and section T, 2 B. S. 546, provides as follows: The mortgagee, his assigns and his or their legal representatives, may fairly and in good faith, purchase the premises so advertised, or any part thereof, at such sale ;” and section 8 provides that every sale pursuant to a power * * * shall be equivalent to a foreclosure and sale under the decree of a court of equity.”

In Tuthill v. Tracy (31 N. Y. 162), it was said : “ It is the decree and sale, or the perfection of the statutory proceedings by a sale, that extinguishes such equity ” of the interest of the mortgagor. Upon the evidence found, we are, therefore, of the opinion that Under the power of sale and the statute in such cases made and provided the purchasers at the sale acquired legal title to the mortgaged premises.

Second. It is insisted in behalf of the appellant that a trust was created as to the real property of the mortgagors, and that, therefore, an accounting should be had. It is to be observed that the instrument signed by Drake first recited the fact that the mortgage was given as a security, and secondly it declared, viz.: The intention of the undersigned by this said mortgage is to secure the said Drake against all liability he has, or may have, incurred as indorser for the said Lewis.” When that phraseology was prepared presumably it was expected that the paper should be executed by Lewis ; however, it never was executed by him ; it only bears the signature of Drake, the mortgagee. It further declares that the intent of the mortgage was “ To secure the said Drake for advances which he is to make to liquidate and satisfy the large amount of judgments against the said Lewis, which are a lien upon the property covered by the said mortgage.” That language is in harmony with the language found in the mortgage. The instrument then contains the following declaration : “ The said Drake in the taking of the said'mortgage only desires to secure himself for the amount of his liability as such indorser, and for the advances which he is to make in taking up and satisfying the judgments against the said Lewis.” This language is in harmony with the language found in the mortgage, and simply indicates that Drake had taken security to indemnify him against any loss by reason of his indorsements and to reimburse him for any advances which he might make at the instance of Lewis. Then follows a clause, as follows: “Anything more than this is not contemplated by the said Drake.” If we give full effect to that sentence, it is simply a declaration that he'has taken the mortgage to indemnify him against any loss in the premises ; but it is insisted in behalf of the appellant that the right to foreclose the mortgage was dependent upon an ascertainment or liquidation of the indebtedness secured thereby. We think the instrument contains nothing making it á condition precedent to the right to foreclose that such ascertainment or liquidation should be first had. The language relating to that subject is as follows: “ When the amount of such liabilities and advances is ascertained or liquidated, then said Drake to indorse same or reduce said mortgage to the true amount so advanced by him.” This language only provides for an indorsement if the ascertainment or liquidation shall be determined before the maturity of the mortgage or before the same shall be foreclosed or pass from the hands of the mortgagee. Doubtless the mortgagor, upon a proper demand or- a suit for that purpose, might have required an ascertainment of the amount advanced by Drake and1 an indorsement thereof upon tlie mortgage at any time before tlie same was foreclosed, and perhaps a suit in equity for such pui'pose might have been maintained by Lewis at any time prior to the foreclosure.

Another clause is found in the instrument relating to a supposed possibility that the mortgagee might assign the mortgage, and it is stipulated that in case he does assign it or part with the control of it, “ he is to account to the said Lewis for the full amount that said Lewis may have to pay upon the same or which he will be liable to pay to the holder thereof.” As no assignment was made of the mortgage by Lewis, this language is inoperative upon the rights of the parties as to the property. It must be borne in mind that at the the time of the execution of this instrument several judgments were existing liens against the property of Lewis, and by reason thereof the instrument contained the following language : In the meantime the said Drake will take care of and protect the said Lewis and his property from the enforcement of any of the judgments against the said Lewis or his property, and save the property of the said Lewis from sacrifice' and the said Lewis from damages and costs.” Perhaps a fair construction of the expression “ In the meantime ” would be to assume that until the mortgage matured, it was the duty of Drake to avoid a sale of the real estate upon the judgments. Apparently that was accomplished, and the property of Lewis was saved from sacrifice by sale upon such judgments. We find nothing in the language in the instrument which prevented the operation of the stipulations of the mortgage or restricted the right to enforce the mortgage by means of the power of sale contained therein. The last clause of the instrument which provided that the mortgagee should assign the mortgage “ to said Lewis’ order upon being reimbursed on his ad vanees” doubtless would have required Drake to assign the mortgage if he had been reimbursed his advances prior to the foreclosure thereof. We are of the opinion, that reading the mortgage and the instrument together, they did not operate to place the legal title to the property in Drake, and that he did not per force of the stipulations in the two instruments become a trustee of the real estate; that he sustained' the relation of mortgagee to the property, and that the title to the property remained in the mortgagor until he was divested by the exercise of the power of sale given in the mortgage. Nor do we think the papers constituted an express trust. (Norris v. Schuyler, 23 N. Y. St. Repr. 84; The Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Carroll, 5 Barb. 615.)

This case is unlike Slee v. Manhattan Company (1 Paige, 48), and the principle there laid down is not applicable to the case. That was an assignment of the mortgage to the defendant as security for a debt, which mortgage was foreclosed by the assignee and the mortgaged premises were bid in by him for a sum less than the amount of the mortgage and less than the amount of the debt which the assignment was made to secure; and there the assignee was required on receiving the amount of the debt and interest to convey the mortgaged premises to the assignor, and the relief was granted upon the equitable rule which forbids a trustee or person acting in a fiduciary capacity from speculating out of the subject of the trust.” That case was explained and followed in Hoyt v. Martense, (16 N. Y. 231).

This case is unlike Case v. Carroll (35 N. Y. 385), as in that case the defendant was the attorney of the plaintiffs in relation to the bond and mortgage and their advisor as to the manner of obtaining and using them for the purpose of enabling them to obtain and give a clear title to the farm, and it was held that by reason of his confidential relations to the plaintiffs his purchase of the premises should be deemed to be for and in behalf of the plaintiffs, and that a trust was created “ which a court of equity will enforce against the defendant by requiring him to convey the legal title (of the premises) to the plaintiffs, upon being paid what was necessarily expended by-him in procuring such title.”

In Dalton v. Smith (86 N. Y. 116) a bond and mortgage were .assigned as collateral for a loan, and the' mortgage was foreclosed by ■(he lender without making the borrower a party thereto, and the mortgaged premises were bid in by the lender, and it was held that the equitable interest which the borrower obtained in the mortgage .attached to the land, and that he was entitled to the surplus in case of a sale thereof by the lender for more than the amount of his claim. We find nothing in the case which aids the position of the appellant. A similar doctrine was laid down in Gilbert v. Thayer (5 N. Y. St. Repr. 613). In the latter case it was held that if the assignee forecloses the mortgage without foreclosing the assignor’s right and becomes a purchaser at the sale, he holds the lands as a substitute for the mortgage “ and precisely as he held the latter and by no different or stronger title.” We find nothing in either of the cases last cited which aids the contention of the appellant.

In Williams v. Townsend (31 N. Y. 415), it was said, viz.: “ A mortgage is a mere security for a debt; and there is no such relation of trust or confidence between the maker and holder of a mortgage as prevents the latter from acquiring title to its subject-matter, either under his own or any other valid lien.” That case was referred to in Ten Eyck v. Craig (2 Hun, 464), and Gilbert, J., said : “We think, therefore, it is a misnomer to call a mortgagee a trustee of the mortgaged estate. He is a creditor having a lien.”

Our attention is invited to Terrett v. Crombie (6 Lans. 82). In that case the defendant took a deed of building lots which were under a contract of sale and agreed with his grantor to make advances for building purposes to the purchaser and in due time convey to him and receive back mortgages, and, after deducting his advances and certain other sums and claims from the price under the contract, pay the surplus to the grantors by the second mortgages of the purchaser, and it was held that he was a trustee sub modo for the grantor, and was bound to convey the subject of the trust to her on payment of the amount due him, with expenses of management and interest, and until discharged from the trust, to hold, manage and preserve the property for the grantor. And it was also held that he could not divest himself of the character of trustee by becoming the purchaser of the property upon foreclosure, sales in actions brought by himself upon the second mortgages, no settlement having been made with the grantor, and she not having been party to the action. And it was made a query in that case whether the fact would have been otherwise if the grantor had been a party to the foreclosure actions. The case differs very essentially from the one before us. We are of the opinion that neither the instruments nor the evidence disclosed upon the trial establish that Drake was a trustee for the mortgagors at the time of the foreclosure and sale and purchase by him of the premises covered by the mortgage. The power of sale was exercised in pursuance of its terms and in accordance with the statute and he became the purchaser, and the referee has found, upon ample evidence, that he was. a purchaser in good faith and the sale was regularly conducted, and that the affidavits were filed and recorded, showing the sale to have been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the statute. ¥e think the effect of the sale was to cut off the mortgagor’s interest in the property; that the legal title was, through the instrumenr tality of the sale, transferred to the purchasers at the sale, and that, the right of redemption was extinguished. It is disclosed in the evidence that the purchasers at the sale went into possession under a claim of title, and the evidence indicates several acts on the part of the mortgagor and his wife in acquiescence, approval and ratification of the sale; and no satisfactory evidence is furnished to indicate that the purchasers at the sale in any way consented to hold the property acquired through the instrumentality of the sale as a; security. Before such a position can be established, evidence must be given which is clear, unequivocal and convincing. (Erwin v. Curtis, 43 Hun, 292; Ensign v. Ensign, 120 N. Y. 655.) Considerable evidence was given tending to show that the mortgagors acquiesced in the sale. It appeared that on the 21st of March, 1876,, .Drake paid to one Phelps $31,874.45 for the judgments which were-a lien on the property covered by the mortgage at the time of its execution and the accrued interest thereon, and on the fifteenth of March he sold the Lewis homestead to McKinney for $22,000, and in order to obtain possession of the premises on the twenty-second of March he commenced summary proceedings for the recovery of the possession of the premises, and on the return of the summons Lewis appeared in person and made no objection to the demand,, and that judgment was given awarding the possession of the premises to Drake, who, on the 26th of March, 1877, was put into-possession thereof, and on that day Lewis and his wife executed an instrument referring to the premises on the west side of Washington street as “formerly owned by me (Lewis) and now occupied by Patrick H. Drake * * * and purchased by him at a mortgage sale November 6th, 1875, * * * are hereby1 unqualifiedly surrendered to the said Patrick H. Drake and he is. hereby put in full and uninterrupted possession thereof. * * * ” That instrument was signed by Frederick Lewis and Maria A.' Lewis. Other evidence appears indicative of the knowledge on the part of Lewis of the sale and of the fact that Drake claimed to be the absolute owner of all the property which he had purchased •at the foreclosure sale. Such acquiescence appears to have continued down to about the time of the commencement of this action in 1883. Upon the whole evidence, we are satisfied that at the time of the commencement of this action neither Lewis nor his successor in interest had any right in the real estate in law or equity, and that this action, so far as it seeks to redeem any portion of the property from the sale, was properly dismissed upon the merits.

Third. It is claimed that the referee fell into an error in finding that Frederick Lewis was present at said foreclosure sale and did not in any manner forbid such sale or object to the making thereof.” In the view we have taken of the case it is of no importance whether he was present at the sale or not. It does appear, however, that he had notice that the sale would take place at the time and place where it did take place, and that circumstances are disclosed which indicate that it is óf no importance whether he was personally present and forbade the sale or not. Plaintiff was sworn in her •own behalf, and in the course of her redirect-examination she testh fied that she was served with a notice of foreclosure, and she added, viz.: “ Mr. Hotchkiss came and consulted with me about it; ” thereupon, the following question was propounded to her: “ Q. Did Mi’. Hotchkiss tell you or say to Mr. Lewis in your presence that the foreclosure should make no difference as to the agreement between Mr. Drake and Mr. Frederick Lewis ? ” (It was conceded that Mr. Hotchkiss was dead.) Thereupon the defendant’s counsel objected to the evidence, on the ground that she is not competent under section 829, and it was objected to on the further ground “ that it is incompetent, improper and inadmissible.” The objections were sustained, ^and the plaintiff took an exception. It does not appear ■clearly when the alleged conversation took place, whether it was before the sale or not; nor does it appear that any transaction was taking place in regard to the property at the time of the supposed ■conversation.

In Breck v. Ringler (36 N. Y. St. Repr. 619), it was said : “ An ■exception was also taken to the exclusion of a statement made by the attorney, Mr. Clapp. But as this was in the absence of the plaintiff and the attorney was not shown to be authorized to compromise him by any statement he might make, the evidence was rightly excluded.” The reversal of this case (42 N. Y. St. Repr. 356) was upon other grounds.

In Gutchess v. Gutchess (66 Barb. 483), it was said: “ The admissions of an agent are not admissible against the principal, unless made while he is performing some act for his principal, and. in reference to the thing done.” It did not appear that the proposed declaration of Mr. Hotchkiss was within the scope of his authority and that it would, therefore, bind the mortgagee. (Story on Agency, § 134; Anderson v. R. W. & O. R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 341; White v. Miller, 11 id. 118.)

In Adee v. Howe (15 Hun, 21), in delivering the opinion, Boardman, J., said that an admission by an attorney “must be within the scope of the attorney’s authority in the proceedings ■he is engaged in.” We think the exception taken to the ruling is unavailing. Several exceptions are taken to the findings as made and to the refusals to find upon requests made by the plaintiff, and it is not deemed important to examine them in detail as the views already expressed, if adopted, lead to the conclusion that the referee’s disposition of the case was proper; and we are of the opinion that his report should be sustained and the judg■ment be affirmed, with costs.

Merwin, J., concurred.

■Martin, J.

(dissenting):

The mortgage given by Lewis and wife to Drake, and the contract signed by Drake, formed a single transaction or agreement between the parties, each being the consideration for the other. When read together, they disclose that the consideration mentioned in the mortgage at the sum of $60,000 was merely nominal and not the actual consideration therefor; that the mortgage was given upon property of the value of about $100,000, to secure the mortgagee against liability as indorser, the amount of which was unknown, but supposed to be about $32,000, and also to secure the mortgagee for such advances as he might make to satisfy any -judgments that were a lien upon the property mortgaged.

The purpose of taking the mortgage was declared to be only to secure the mortgagee for his indorsements and any advances, which. he might make in taking up and satisfying any judgments against the mortgagor, which were a lien upon the mortgaged property. The amount of such liabilities and advances was to be subsequently ascertained when the mortgagee was to reduce the mortgage to the actual amount paid and advanced. If the mortgagee assigned the mortgage, he was to account to the mortgagor for the full amount that he might have to pay upon the same, or which he would be liable to pay the holder thereof.

When these two instruments are construed together, I think it becomes quite manifest that the intent and purpose of the agreements between the parties was that the amount of such indebtedness should be ascertained and determined before the mortgage should be enforced against the property of the mortgagor. Until the amount was thus ascertained, clearly the amount due upon such mortgage was unliquidated. The proof discloses that the amount actually due upon the mortgage was at least $25,000 less than the amount stated in the notice of sale in proceedings to foreclose the mortgage by advertisement.

Taking into consideration the mortgage, the agreement signed by the mortgagee at the time the mortgage was given, and the evidence given before the referee, I am led to the conclusion that it was the intent of the parties that the amount due under such mortgage should be ascertained as provided in the agreement signed by the mortgagee, and either indorsed upon the mortgage, or the consideration thereof reduced to the actual amount of the mortgagor’s indebtedness, before the same should be enforced against him, and that the mortgagee could not properly foreclose his mortgage by advertisement until the amount was liquidated between the parties. While this might, perhaps, have been done in an action to liquidate the amount and foreclose the mortgage for the amount found due, the mortgage could not, I think, be foreclosed by advertisement, where the amount, as in this case, was wholly unliquidated. ]

It also appears from the evidence that many, if not most, of the judgments against the mortgagor were not paid and satisfied by the mortgagee, but were procured to be assigned to his (the mortgagee’s) wife, so that when the foreclosure was had, the principal amount due upon the mortgage was the amount paid upon notes which had been indorsed by the mortgagee. It is, therefore, obvious that the statement contained in the notice of sale was neither actually nor substantially correct. ,

The evidence also discloses that on July 23, 1873, the mortgagor paid to the mortgagee $5,000, to be paid by him on the liabilities of "the mortgagor. On November 15,1873, he received from the mortgagor, through Bosworth & Company, the sum of $4,725, which was used by the mortgagee in purchasing a judgment against the mortgagor.

There is other testimony in the case showing quite plainly that, before the amount due upon the mortgage could be ascertained, a careful accounting "between the parties was necessary, and that a proper liquidation of the amount due under the provisions of the mortgage required the taking of proof as to the payments and receipts by the mortgagee, and something more than a mere calculation was necessary. I am of the opinion that the proceeding to foreclose this mortgage was premature, as the right to enforce it did not exist until the amount of the mortgagee’s liabilities was ascertained or liquidated, the mortgage reduced by indorsement or otherwise to the correct amount secured thereby, and that the statement of the amount .due in the notice of sale was so erroneous as to invalidate the proceeding as between the parties.

The statement in the notice of sale as to the amount due was not mistaken or inadvertent, but false, and must have been known to the mortgagee to be so, and rendered the proceeding invalid and the sale thereunder void as between the parties. (Burnet v. Denniston, 5 Johns. Ch. 35, 42.)

In Soule v. Ludlow (3 Hun, 503, 505), it is said: “ Belief will be given by suit to set aside foreclosure proceedings by advertisement whenever by any fraud, mistake, deceit or unfair contrivance or practice or bad faith, in conducting the proceedings of the foreclosure or sale, the rights of the mortgagor or of subsequent incumbrancers have been injuriously affected upon pretty much the same grounds as the court would recognize as sufficient for opening the sale if the foreclosure had been by action.”

A mortgage cannot be foreclosed by advertisement, where it is given to secure an unliquidated amount. (Ferguson v. Kimball, 3 Barb. Ch. 616, 619 ; Jones on Mortgages [4th ed.], § 1776 ; Wilkins v. Gordon, 11 Leigh [Va.], 547.)

The appellant does not seek by this action to disturb, the title ot any bona fide purchaser of the i-eal estate sold under the pretended foreclosure. The property was bid off by the mortgagee, or his attorney, who was conversant with all the facts relating to the transaction between the parties. It is an action for an accounting and recovery of the possession from the heirs of the mortgagee of .the property sold, which has not passed into the hands of purchasers in good faith, upon the payment of the amount that shall be found due the mortgagee, after deducting the amount he has received from the property sold to purchasers in good faith.

The statute in operation when this mortgage was foreclosed, like the present statute, provided that every sale made to a purchaser in good faith should be equivalent to a foreclosure and sale under a decree of a court of equity, so far only as to be an entire bar of all claim or equity of redemption of the mortgagor or his heirs, etc Therefore, under this statute, the mortgagee was protected against the mortgagor’s equity of redemption only so far as he, or those claiming under him, were purchasers in good faith.

On the trial the plaintiff offered to prove by her own testimony, that Mr. Hotchkiss, who was one of the defendant’s attorneys and served the notice of the mortgage sale upon her, said to the mortgagor at the time and in her presence, that the foreclosure should make no difference as to the agreement between Mr. Drake and Mr. Lewis. This evidence was objected to on the ground that the plaintiff was not competent, under section 829 ; that it already appeared that Mr. Hotchkiss was acting for Mr. Drake, and on the ground that it was incompetent, improper and inadmissible. It was conceded that Mr. Hotchkiss was dead at the time of the trial. It is quite clear, I think, that the purpose of this evidence was to show that the agent and attorney, when engaged in the transaction of the business of the mortgagee, stated to the mortgagor that his rights in the property mortgaged should not be changed to his disadvantage by a foreclosure and sale under the mortgage. If this evidence was admissible, it was important evidence in favor of the plaintiff, when considered in connection with the transaction which had previously taken place between the parties, and the situation of their affairs at the time of such foreclosure. That the evidence was competent, proper and admissible, unless prohibited by section 829, is, I think, quite obvious. It was the statement of the mortgagor’s attorney and agent, who had the entire charge and management of the mortgagee’s business and affairs which related to the taking of this mortgage and to its foreclosure, while engaged in the act of foreclosing the mortgage, and related to the rights of the parties upon such foreclosure.

Whenever an agent makes a business arrangement or does an act representing his principal, what he does in respect to the arrangement or act, while it is in progress, is so far part of the res gestae as to be subsequently admissible in evidence on behalf of either party. Whenever the agent’s acts are so admissible, then his contemporaneous declarations, explanatory of these acts, are admissible, nor in proving such declarations is it necessary that he should be himself called.” (Whart. on Ev. [3d ed.] § 1173. See, also, opinion of Earl, J., in Anderson v. R., W. & O. R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 340 ; Merchants’ Bank v. Griswold, 72 id. 472, 480; North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262.) Therefore, if it was admissible under section 829, the referee erred in excluding the evidence. It seems to be settled that section 829 does not apply to transactions and communications with, the agents of a deceased person, although both the agent and the principal are dead. (Hildebrant v. Crawford, 65 N. Y. 107.)

I am of the opinion that the learned referee erred in excluding the evidence offered, as it was of such a character, that with the other circumstances and proof hi the case, it might well have justified a determination of the case in the plaintiff’s favor. If such was the arrangement under which the mortgage was foreclosed, it might well be claimed by the plaintiff that the defendant’s intestate purchased and held the property in question as a trustee for the mortgagor, and that upon receiving the amount of his mortgage debt, the mortgagee was liable to account to the plaintiff for the property remaining in his hands.

1 think the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Hardin, P. J. :

license: Public Domain

text:
    In the Matter of the Final Accounting of De Witt Gardner, as Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Mary D. Tyler, Deceased. Fannie M. Rice and Another, Appellants; R. Frederick Tyler and Others, Respondents.

      Will — power conferred upon the testator’s widow to dispose by will of property remaining at her death.

    A will after making a small devise to the testator’s son, who was his only heir at law and next of kin, proceeded as follows: “All the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate both real and personal whether in law or equity of what nature or kind soever, I give, bequeath and devise to my dearly beloved wife Mary Douglas Tyler, to have and to hold the same and every part and parcel thereof to my said wife, her heirs and assigns forever, provided however, that if any of the same shall remain unexpended or undisposed of at the decease of my said wife, what shall so remain, I give, bequeath and devise to my said son Eansom Frederick Tyler, his heirs and assigns, and I expect and desire that my said wife will not dispose of any of said estate by will in such a way that the whole that might remain at her death shall go out of my own family and blood relation. I have already advanced at different times to my said son since he started out for himself or for his benefit, in the aggregate, over §5,000, which is one reason why I do not now see fit to make a more liberal provision for him in this will.”

      Held, that the testator’s intention was to clothe his widow with power to dispose of what remained of his estate in her hands at her death, by will, circumscribed by his desire that she should not so dispose thereof that the whole of it should go out of his family and blood relationship.
    That a will left by the widow at her death, whereby she disposed of the portion of the testator’s estate which remained in her hands, giving a part thereof to the testator’s son, was valid and effectual.
    Appeal by Fannie M. Rice and Anna Bunnelle, legatees under tbe will of Mary D. Tyler, deceased, from a decree of tbe Surrogate’s Court of tbe county of Oswego, granted on tbe 2d day of August, 1892, and entered in said surrogate’s office on tbe 23d day of August, 1892, and also from tbe decree of said court granted and entered on tbe 22d of June, 1892.
    Hon. Ransom H. Tyler, ex-county judge of Oswego county, died at Fulton on tbe 2d day of November, 1881, leaving a last will and testament bearing date tbe 19tb day of February, 1880, wbicb was admitted to probate on tbe 1st of December, 1881, and letters testamentary were issued to De Witt Gardner and Mary D. Tyler (his widow), who are named in said will as executors. He left him surviving his widow, Mary D. Tyler, and his son, R. Frederick Tyler, his only heir at law and next of kin. He left three pieces of real estate valued at about $13,000, and personal property amounting to about $8,791.82. The executors took possession of the property; paid his debts and funeral expenses, and on the 11th of September, 1883, paid to his son, Frederick, $500, and took from him a release under seal, of all right, title and interest in and to his estate, bearing date the 11th day of September, 1883.
    On the 28th day of June, 1884, Mary D. Tyler (his widow) died in Oswego county, leaving her last will and testament bearing date April 9,1884, and a codicil thereto bearing date the 28th day of May, 1884; and her will and codicil were admitted to probate on the 5th day of July, 1884, and letters testamentary thereon were issued to De Witt Gardner, Mrs. D. W. Gardner and Mrs. B. J. Dyer, executors named therein. She left her surviving Charles F. Douglas, a brother, her only surviving heir at law and next of kin, she having been the" second wife of Tyler and stepmother of his son Frederick. In the testator’s will the first clause gave the piece of real estate situated in the village of Oneonta to his son Frederick during his natural life, with power to sell and convey, provided the executors would join in the conveyance. That parcel was conveyed by the testator in his lifetime, and he requested his executors to pay to his son $500 in substitution therefor, which they did as already stated. The testator’s will contained the following:
    “ Second. All the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate both real and personal whether in law or equity-of what nature or kind soever, I give, bequeath and devise to my dearly beloved wife Mary Douglas Tyler, to have and to hold the same and .every part and parcel thereof to my said wife her heirs and assigns forever, provided however, that if any of the same shall remain unexpended' or undisposed of at the decease of my said wife, what shall so remain, I give, bequeath and devise to my said son Ransom Frederick Tyler, his heirs and assigns, and I expect and desire that my said wife will not dispose of any of said estate by will in such a way that the whole that might remain at her death shall go out of my own family and blood relation. I have already advanced at different times to my said son since he started ont for himself or for his benefit, in the aggregate, over $5,000, which is one reason why I do not now see fit to make a more liberal provision for him in this will.”
    The surrogate found as conclusions of law, viz.:
    “ First. That such and so much of the personal assets and property mentioned in the account of De Witt Gardner, executor of said Mary D. Tyler, deceased, in this proceeding as came from the estate of Ransom H. Tyler, deceased, are not assets, and do not belong to the estate of Mary D. Tyler, deceased, and are not applicable to the payment of the legacies and bequests contained in her will.

      “ Second. That no power or authority was given to Mary D. Tyler by the last will and testament of Ransom H. Tyler, deceased, to dispose by will of any of the property or estate of' said Ransom TI. Tyler, deceased, remaining at the time of the death of said Mary D. Tyrer.

      “ Third. That the only legal effect of the receipt given the executors of Ransom H. Tyler’s will by Ransom F. Tyler, of date September 11, 1883, was an acknowledgment by him of the receipt of the verbal bequest of $500, and-an acquiescence in the provisions of his father’s will, and in no degree did said receipt enlarge, extend or fortify the title of Mrs. Mary D. Tyler to the estate of her deceased husband beyond that given her by his will.
    “ Fourth. That said executor is entitled in this proceeding to be credited with the amount of such personal assets now in his hands which came from and belonged to the estate of Ransom H. Tyler, husband of his testatrix.”
    At the close of the opinion delivered by the surrogate, he says : “ It is clearly apparent that the will of her husband gave this testatrix no power to dispose of any part of his estate by will, and that her will is inoperative as to any of such property which remained undisposed of at the time of her death.”

      George T. Glarlc, for the appellant Rice.

      Piper <& Rice, for the appellant Bunnelle.

      G. H. Rcovid, for the respondents.
   Hardin, P. J. :

Apparently the intention of the testator was to confide to bis wife tbe poiver “ to liave and to bold ” bis “ property and estate, both real and personal,” and to give her tbe power to use tbe income thereof, as well as tbe body of tbe estate; and foreseeing that she might not use up or consume tbe whole of tbe property be provided for two contingencies: first, that in tbe event slie did not make a disposition of any of tbe property that remained at tbe time of her death, that tbe same should pass to bis son Frederick; and, secondly, be apparently clothed her with power to dispose of what remained of tbe property at her death by will; and be circumscribed' tbe execution of that power by a declaration of bis expectation and desire to be observed and followed by bis wife in tbe event she exercised tbe power of disposition, of tbe property; and in doing so be used tbe words, “ and I expect and desire that my said wife will not dispose of any of said estate by will in such a way that tbe whole that might remain at her death shall go out of my own family and blood relation.” Such interpretation, such declaration of tbe intention of tbe testator, seems to be reasonable in tbe light of tbe language used by tbe testator. Such construction gives full force and effect to all tbe language used in tbe will, whereas, tbe construction put thereon by tbe surrogate seems to be in defiance or disregard of tbe last clause of tbe will. When tbe testator, by tbe language in tbe early part of tbe second clause of the will, had provided liberally for bis wife, evidently two ideas came to bis mind in respect to bis property; tbe one being a contingency that bis wife might leave at tbe time of her death unexpended or undisposed of, a portion of bis estate, and in that event be provided it to pass to bis son ; and bis second idea seemed to be that if she should dispose of tbe same (that is by will) then in providing for tbe contingency of her disposing of tbe same by will, be declares to her bis expectation and desire that she “ will not dispose of any of said estate by will in such a way that tbe whole that should remain at her death shall go out of my (his) own family and blood relation.” Apparently he bad great confidence that bis wife would carry out bis wishes. Tbe clause which we have been considering is followed by a declaration by the testator that be bad at different times advanced over $5,000 to bis son, and having said that be inserts a clause, viz., “ which is one reason why I do not now see fit to make a more liberal provision for him in this will.” The words “ not now see fit to make a more liberal provision for him in this will ” are suggestive of the idea that he had reposed confidence in his wife that when she came to dispose of such part of the estate as should remain at her death that she would provide for his son. She seems to have acted upon that expectation and desire and fulfilled to a large extent the confidence reposed in her by her husband, as in the first clause of her will she devises to the son the brick house and lot situated on the corner of Broadway and Third street, and also bequeaths to him his father’s gold watch and the family library, “ all silver purchased by his father; his father’s portrait in oil, dinner, breakfast and tea set of white china, best black walnut chamber set with some bedding,” as well as some other articles of furniture. And in the residuary clause of her will she provides that what shall remain after disposing of the specific legacies and devises, that the remainder shall be divided into four equal parts, one of which is given to the son. In view of all the provisions alluded to we are of the opinion that what portion of the testator’s estate remained unexpended or otherwise undisposed of at the time of the decease of the wife, passed under the provisions of her will, and that the execution of her will was in pursuance of the expectation and desire expressed to her by the testator, and the authority and power given to her by his will to dispose of such portion of his estate as remained in her hands at the time of her death. (Terry v. Wiggins, 47 N. Y. 512; Flanagan v. Flanagan, 8 Abb. N. C. 418; Greyston v. Clark, 41 Hun, 125; Wells v. Seeley, 47 id. 109; Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. (3 Kernan) 273; Leggett v. Firth, 53 Hun, 152; Crozier v. Bray, 120 N. Y. 366 ; Smith v. Van Ostrand, 64 id. 278; Rose v. Hatch, 125 id. 433; Wortman v. Robinson, 44 Hun, 357; In re Williamson's Estate, 9 N. Y. Supp. 476; Colt v. Heard, 10 Hun, 189; Matter of Blauvelt, 39 N. Y. St. Repr. 774.) The foregoing views lead to a reversal of the orders appealed from.

Martin and Merwin, JJ., concurred.

Order or decree reversed and proceedings remitted to the Surrogate’s Court for further hearing, with a provision that the costs of appellants be paid out of the estate.


author: Barnard, P. J.:

text:
    Allen P. Becker, Respondent, v. National Prohibition Park Company, Appellant.

      Building contract — extra work.

    When the owner of premises, with whom a builder has contracted to erect a building for a stipulated price, agrees to do the preliminary grading, and violates such agreement, and the contractor, in the performance of his duty, to mitigate the damages caused by such violation of the owner’s agreement, furnishes extra work made necessary because of such defective grading, he will be entitled to recover from the owner for such extra work.
    Appeal by tbe defendant, National Prohibition' Park Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of Richmond county on the 20th day of October, 1892, upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff rendered at the Richmond Circuit, and from an order entered on the 19th day of October, 1892, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

      Allen 8. Bacon, for the appellant.

      W. J. Powers, for the respondent.
   Barnard, P. J.:

The defendant employed the plaintiff to furnish the materials, except stone, and to do the work for the erection of some 100 feet of sheds in Richmond county. It was admitted that the last installment, $565, was unpaid. The plaintiff seeks to recover this sum and $22.50 in addition for extra work. The answer avers that the materials were not good, and also that the work was not skillfully done, to the defendant’s damage of $250. The answer also avers a tender of the last installment of $565, which the plaintiff refuses to take. Upon the trial the principal issue was as to the extra work. The agreement bound the plaintiff to lay up the stone piers under the shed and the defendant was to furnish the stone. The defendant was to do the grading. The plaintiff gave evidence tending to show that the defendant did not make an even- grade or a good grade. That the piers were of irregular height, and made higher in some cases by reason of a greater excavation than was needed at particular points, and that the plaintiff was compelled to do the rest of the work to carry up these piers higher than the contract and specifications called for. That the defendant’s superintendent told the plaintiff to do the work and that he must use smaU stones of the •defendant, instead of one stone as was designed and not of uniform height. The defendant gave evidence tending to contradict plaintiff’s theory, and the case went to the jury under a charge from the court that if the $22.50 was made necessary by the improper grading of defendant, plaintiff was entitled to- recover therefor. It was a pure question of fact, and the finding of the jury should settle it. The fact being settled, the principle of law is sufficient to support the plaintiff’s claim. The defendant violated an independent contract upon which the plaintiff’s contract rested. It was plaintiff’s duty to mitigate the damages, therefore, as much as he could, and to that end he furnished the work necessary to accommodate the defective work of the defendant. He was thus entitled to recover for his extra expenditure. (Kidd v. McCormick, 83 N. Y. 391.)

The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.

Pkatt, J., concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.


text:
    Albert G. Howe, Respondent, v. Edward M. Oldham, Appellant.

      Malicious prosecution, — malice inferred — advice of counsel.

    Or the trial of an action brought to recover damages for a malicious prosecution, malice on the part of the defendant is properly inferred from the facts that the defendant obstructed the plaintiff, a commissioner of highways, in his duties to the public; that when the plaintiff attempted to remove the obstruction the defendant threw him into a stream and subsequently struck him; that the defendant falsely asserted that the plaintiff committed an assault upon him and caused the plaintiff's arrest and trial, which resulted in an acquittal.
    Advice of counsel cannot affect even the question of damages in an action for malicious prosecution, unless the advice was based on the facts truly stated to the counsel.
    On the trial of an action for malicious prosecution, the defendant was asked, when testifying in his own behalf, whether he made the charge against the plaintiff of his own volition.

      Held, that this raised no question of advice of counsel.
    Appeal by the defendant, Edward M. Oldham, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of Orange county on the 23d day of November, 1892, upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, rendered at the Orange Circuit, and from an order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
    The action was brought to recover damages for a malicious prosecution.
    The defendant was called as a witness in his own behalf, and after having stated that he went to a justice of the peace with his employer, a Mr. Harriman, and made a statement, on which the justice issued a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff, the following question was put to him by his counsel: “ Did you go there and make this information of your own volition ? ”
    This question was objected to as improper and immaterial, and the objection was sustained.

      William D. Guthrie, Grant B. Baylor and George C. Austin, for the appellant.

      William Dielcey, for the respondent.
   Barnard, P. J.:

The defendant procured the arrest of the plaintiff for an assault in the third degree committed by the plaintiff upon him. The plaintiff was acquitted. Upon the trial it appeared that the plaintiff was a commissioner of highways of the town of Woodbury. On the 23d of May, 1892, he was working upon a road claimed to be a public highway. The defendant for the purpose of obstructing the work, had drawn a wagon in the brook to prevent the building of a bridge over the brook. The defendant did this under a claim that the road ivas not a highway. The plaintiff put his hands on the wagon to draw it out of the way and the defendant committed an assault on him. Plaintiff made a complaint against defendant for the assault and battery on the 24th of May, 1892. Defendant was arrested thereon and on the 2d of June, 1892, pleaded guilty to the charge. The defendant made the complaint and procured the arrest of plaintiff, after his plea of guilty, on the 2d of June, 1892. The plaintiff gave evidence tending to show that he committed no assault upon defendant. The defendant gave evidence tending to show that an assault was committed on him. If there was no assault committed then a case is made out to go to a jury, and if the jury find no assault committed, then defendant has made a false charge and thereby caused plaintiff’s arrest. The jury were told that if from the evidence the defendant as a reasonable man had probable cause for the complaint, the action failed. The jury were told that if the arrest of plaintiff was made without sufficient cause, they might infer malice, and in such ease give damages for the injury. Under the finding of the jury the judgment should be affirmed. It is established by the verdict upon positive and clear proof that the defendant obstructed the plaintiff, a public officer, in his duties to the public. That when the plaintiff attempted to remove the obstruction the defendant threw him into the stream and subsequently struck him. That the defendant falsely asserted that the plaintiff committed an assault upon him and caused the plaintiff’s arrest and trial. Assuming these facts, the malice of the defendant is easily and necessarily inferred. (Heyne v. Blair, 62 N. Y. 19; English v. Mayor, 36 N. Y. St. Repr. 69.)

The question whether the defendant made the charge “ of his own volition ” raised no question of advice of counsel. He had admitted in Ms testimony that be made tbe complaint at the request of bis employer and so far as that affected the question of damages, be bad tbe evidence! Tbe sole question presented to tbe jury was whether tbe complaint of defendant against plaintiff was false or not and m> advice of counsel could affect even tbe question of damages unless tbe advice was based on tbe facts truly stated to the counsel.' The-charge was not excepted to in respect to so far as it related to tbe assault. It is too late on appeal under tbe circumstances of this-case to claim error. The jury were told what an assault was, but-they were also told that defendant could act on appearances,, which is ail that appellant now urges for error.

Tbe judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Pratt, J., concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.


author: Barnard, P. J.: Pratt, J.:

text:
    The New York Rubber Company, Appellant, v. John Rothery and Another, Respondents.

      Diversion of the waters of a natural stream — a question for the jury.

    In an action brought to recover damages for the diversion of the waters of a natural stream, in which the only question for the jury was whether the defendants had materially and perceptibly diminished the natural flow of water in front of the plaintiff’s premises, it was shown that a dam maintained by the defendants above the plaintiff’s premises overflowed every day in the' dryest time for its entire length, and that when the defendants were operating their factory at the lowest state of the water no perceptible diminution was seen in the stream running in its natural bed.
    Held, that a verdict for the defendants was supported by the evidence.
    Appeal by tbe plaintiff, tbe New York Rubber Company, from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court, entered in tbe office of tbe clerk of Dutchess county on the 23d day of November, 1892, upon a verdict in favor of tbe defendants rendered at the Dutchess Circuit,, and from an order denying tbe plaintiff’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
    Tbe action was brought to recover damages for the diversion of tbe waters of a natural stream, known as Fishkill or Matteawan creek,, from tlieir natural flow in front of tbe plaintiff’s premises.
    Tbe plaintiff owned two lots of land on one side of tbe stream; tbe defendants owned land on tbe opposite side, extending both above and below the plaintiff’s lands; the defendants maintained a dam across the stream above the plaintiff’s lands, and to procure water to operate a factory they coiistructed and maintained a race, which took water from the stream above the dam, carried it through their lands parallel to the stream, and after using the water in operating the factory by means of a thirty-inch turbine wheel discharged it back into the stream opposite the lower part of the plaintiff’s land.
    The plaintiff claimed that the use of this race diverted and diminished the natural flow of the water from his side of the stream, in front of his premises.

      Frcmhlm Ba/rtlett and W. H. L. Lee, for the appellant.

      LI. II. Ilustis, for the respondents.
   Barnard, P. J.:

Under the extremely restricted rule applied to this case, the verdict of the jury 'is supported by the evidence. The stream is a large stream sixty or seventy feet wide. The defendants have a dam some 200 feet wide just above the point where the defendants take the water-for their factory, and the dam for its extreme width overflows each day in the dryest of time for its entire length. The stream below the dam at its lowest period is ten or twelve feet wide, and when the defendants are running their factory and at the lowest of water, no perceptible' diminution is seen in the stream running in its natural bed. The defendants’ wheel is but a thirty-inch wheel. Proof which would have legitimately tended to show that the fluctuation in the stream reducing it from a sixty-foot width to a ten or twelve-foot width, was caused by the ponding of the water of the stream in the great body called Whaley pond and in and by the numerous large ponds between that great reservoir and the defendants’ dam, was excluded. With this proof in, the stream would have been a very large stream in the lowest of water.

The judgment should be affirmed with costs.

Pratt, J.:

If we correctly understand the decisions of the Court of Appeals (107 N. Y. 310 ; 132 id. 293) the tiu-ning point of this case is this: Have defendants, by their raceway, materially and perceptibly diminished the natural flow of the waters of Matteawan creek from their natural channel in front of plaintiffs two lots or either of them ? We understand that it has also been decided by that court that this question was for the jury. The learned trial judge so held and refused to direct a verdict for the plaintiff even for nominal damages. This question was broadly and fairly submitted to the jury and the verdict was for the defendant. It follows that the judgment should.be affirmed, with costs.

DveMAN, J., not sitting.

Judgment and order denying new trial affirmed, with costs.


author: BarNard, P. J.:

text:
    Adelaide L. Painter, as Administratrix, etc., of Thomas A. Painter, Deceased, Respondent, v. Robert J. Power, Appellant.

      Application of payments — effect of a receipt stating the application of a poi’Uon of the money received.

    In an action brought by an administratrix to recover upon a promissory note made by the defendant to the plaintiff’s intestate, it appeared from the books of the deceased that he had received from the defendant, after the making- of the note, certain sums, which, if applied on the note, would have extinguished it; that a portion of the last money received was applied on the note, and the deceased gave the defendant a receipt stating that such portion had been indorsed on the note; it also appeared that there were other transactions between the parties, upon which the payments by the defendant could have been applied!'

      Held, that this tended to prove that after all the payments in question weremade, the parties recognized the note as unpaid and applied on it a portion of the sum then received, and that the other payments were not applied on the note, and that it supported a finding that the note was unpaid except as to the portion for which the receipt had been given.
    Appeal by tbe defendant, Robert J. Power, from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court, entered in tbe office of tbe clerk of Suffolk county on tbe 26th day of August, 1892, upon tbe report of a referee in favor of tbe plaintiff.

      B. A. Carpenter, for. tbe appellant.

      Thos. F. JBisgood, for tbe respondent.
   BarNard, P. J.:

The plaintiff, as administratrix of her husband, seeks to recover tbe amount of a note dated May 24, 1889, for $100. Fifty dollars was admitted to have been paid. Tbe defendant set up a counterclaim for $1,132.45, for moneys bad and received by tbe plaintiffs deceased busband in bis lifetime. Tbe trial before tbe referee was wholly taken up by proof for and against tbis counterclaim. Tbe referee found against the same, and tbe appeal is from bis finding on that question. Tbe evidence is quite unsatisfactory as to tbe real truth of tbe indebtedness to the deceased. One party is dead and tbe other cannot testify. Tbe books of deceased do not show tbe real balance. Tbe account, as proven, includes large amounts satisfactorily proven to have been paid in tbe lifetime of tbe deceased. 'The question is narrowed by the proof to a credit' of three items on the books of deceased. As lias been stated the note was dated and given on May 24, 1889. On August 4, 1889, tbe deceased received from tbe defendant $52Y. On tbe 30th of August, 1889, $100, and on tbe 14th of September, 1889, $110. If these moneys were paid on tbe note and not credited, tbe note is extinguished by tbe moneys received. Tbe proof is decisive against tbis application. On tbe 14th of September, 1889, the date of tbe last payment of $110, tbe deceased applied on tbe note tbe amount of fifty dollars and gave a receipt to defendant acknowledging tbe receipt of fifty dollars and stating that he bad indorsed that amount on tbe note. If tbe previous payments were made in extinguishment of tbe note, the receipt should have stated it and not have left the note outstanding, .■except tbis one reduction. Tbe general rule must be applied to tbe case that checks will be deemed to rest upon a debt when there is no explanation. In tbis case tbe proof shows that after all tbe payments were made tbe parties recognized tbe note as unpaid and ■applied on it a portion of a sum then received. There is also proof that there were considerable previous transactions between them upon which tbe sum paid could be applied. Tbe referee, therefore, is supported by the evidence in finding that the note is unpaid, deducting tbe fifty-dollar payment on it, and that there is no ■counterclaim proven.

His judgment should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.

Pbatt, J., concurred.

•Judgment affirmed, with costs.


author: BarNAed, P. J.:

text:
    George Moore, Respondent, v. The Brooklyn Advertising Company, Appellant.

      Oontmot of employment — vernation of.

    When a written contract of employment is sure in its terms, strong proof is required to establish a variation thereof; and the writing should he upheld when the variation is not fully proven.
    Appeal by the defendant, the Brooklyn Advertising Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of Kings county on the 26th day of September, 1892, upon the report of a referee.
    The action was brought to recover the balance claimed by the plaintiff to be due him from the defendant for commissions earned under a contract of employment.

      Wm. J. G-aynor, for the appellant.

      Charles II. Otis, for the respondent.
   BarNAed, P. J.:

On the 17th day of August, 1888, the defendant entered into a written agreement with the plaintiff to employ him for three years in soliciting and obtaining advertising business for the defendant. The plaintiff was to give his entire and exclusive time, and his best efforts, to increase the defendant’s business. The rates for the services were fixed. Fifteen per cent was to be paid plaintiff for all business secured by the defendant, which was closed by the plaintiff, and ten per cent on all business closed by outside agents. Fifty per cent of the commissions was to be left to cover defaulting or void contracts, but there was to be a settlement every six months. If $20,000 in advertising was not put in the first year, the defendant had the right to cancel the contract. The proof shows that the plaintiff continued in the employment for three years, and that $20,000 was put in the first year. The parties differed widely as to the facts. The plaintiff gave evidence tending to show that he was entitled to recover, over and above payments, the sum of $3,766. The items which were involved in the examination were very numerous, and the same were scrutinized before the referee, item by item. The defendant pleaded payment, and gave evidence tending to show that the dealings between the parties were all entered on a blotter, and were settled at short intervals; that the plaintiff accepted in some cases a change of rules as between the ten and fifteen per cent in the contract, and in others made special rates different from those named in the contract. The plaintiff denied this wholly. He testified that the account was kept on a blotter, but that the contract as to rates and as to what was due the plaintiff was a subject of contest and dispute from the very commencement until the end of the employment. The referee heard the oath of the plaintiff and the writing on one side, and the testimony of defendant’s president and of the two bookkeepers on the other. On these questions of fixing rates and of settlement, he has found for the plaintiff. There was a question whether the plaintiff was to be paid for business closed by one William Rogers. The plaintiff and the defendants were at variance as to the fact, and the referee has decided in favor of the plaintiff. There should be no reversal upon appeal from the findings of the referee upon questions of fact when the evidence is so strong in favor of the finding. The contract was sure in its terms. A variation requires strong proof of the fact. The writing should be upheld when the variation of its terms is not fully proven. The plaintiff had a second cause of action in his complaint. One William P. Flinden, an agent of the defendant, obtained a contract from the Coster Medicine Company for advertising by defendant for five years at the rate of $510 per year. The plaintiff is the assignee of this agent. Flinden was entitled to be paid ten per cent for procuring this contract, only a part of which had been paid. The findings include this balance as due the plaintiff under the assignment, being $102.

The case shows no reversible error committed upon the trial, and the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

PRATT, J., concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.


author: Baekaed, P. J.:

text:
    Henry E. Brundage, Respondent, v. Ruth M. McCormick, Appellant.

      Employment to procure a purchaser of real estate — compensation for services in effecting an exchange.

    In an action brought to recover the value of services rendered in procuring a sale of real estate under an employment by the owner, proof that the employment was only to produce a purchaser, that the plaintiff introduced a party to the defendant, and that an agreement, which resulted in an exchange of properties, was brought about between the defendant and such party by a third person acting for the plaintiff, is sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
    Appeal by the defendant, Ruth M. McCormick, from an order of the County Court of Kings county, made on the 23d day of July, 1892, and from a judgment entered on said order in the office of the clerk of Kings county on the 5th day of August, 1892, affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff given, made and docketed in the Justice’s Court of the third district of the city of Brooklyn on the 25th day of October, 1890.-
    The action was brought to recover the sum of $115, with interest, as the reasonable worth, at the rate of one per centum upon the exchange price of the defendant’s premises, of procuring the exchange of real estate belonging to the defendant for real estate of one William Gibson, under an employment by the defendant of the plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint, to find a purchaser for the defendant’s land or some one who would exchange improved property for it.

      D. JVemirs, for the appellant.

      J. H. McDi/vitt, for the respondent.
   Baekaed, P. J.:

The complaint in this case avers that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant to find a purchaser for a lot of land she owned in the city of Brooklyn, and that he was the procuring cause of a sale under the employment. The answer avers a termination of the agency before sale and contains a denial that the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale. The employment was only to produce a purchaser, and the proof shows that the plaintiff introduced one Gibson to the defendant, to whom she subsequently sold the property. The defendant gave evidence tending to show that the first effort to sell to Gibson failed, and that he subsequently reduced the value of his property which was to be exchanged for defendant’s property and took the deed. The plaintiff and one Grant occupy the same offices and there is proof that Grant subsequently to the failure to make a sale conducted the negotiations for Gibson. All the parties were fully examined before the jury and they found for the plaintiff. The question is one of fact. There is proof enough to sustain the finding if it be credited. The plaintiff was employed to find a purchaser. He introduced Gibson to the defendant. Gibson asked too much for his property. Grant subsequently conducted the negotiations for the plaintiff which finally resulted in an exchange. The buyer and seller were brought to an agreement through plaintiff and Grant acting for him and his title to the commission was made out. (Lloyd v. Matthews, 51 N. Y. 124.)

The exceptions are not sufficient to reverse the judgment.

The question excluded at folios 64 and 65 as to the agreement between plaintiff and Grant as to the commission, was admitted at folios 113 and 114.

The question put to the witness Grant at folio 120 was needless. The negotiations were renewed by Grant upon plaintiff’s promise to compensate him and because Mr. Nemirs declined to negotiate with plaintiff. The facts were proven.

The question rejected was but an inference from them.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Pkatt, J., concurred’.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.


text:
    Edithe W. Austin, as Administratrix, etc., of John H. Austin, Deceased, Respondent, v. The Long Island Railroad Company, Appellant.

      Obstruction of the view of a railroad track by a signboard — negligence—duty of looking along the track before crossing.

    The maintenance, by a railroad company, of a signboard upon its right of way, so obstructed the view of the track to a pedestrian when fifty feet from a crossing as to cut off some 850 feet of the track, beginning 125 feet from the crossing.

      Held, thatisuch obstruction was sufficient proof of negligence on the part of the railroad company to go to the jury.
    A pedestrian was killed by a passing train at a crossing where the view was so obstructed by a signboard.

      Held, that the question whether he was careless in looking along the track when fifty feet from the crossing and not afterwards, was one for the jury, if they should find the fact to be so.
    Appeal by tbe defendant, tbe Long Island Railroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of Queens county on the 15th day of October, 1892, upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, rendered at the Queens County Circuit, and from an order entered on the 25th day of October, 1892, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
    The action was brought to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence.

      E. B. Hinsdale, for the appellant.

      Louis O lemde Whiton, for the respondent.
   Barnard, P. J.:

On the 28th of June, 1891, John H. Austin, the husband of the plaintiff, was killed by a train upon the defendant’s railroad. The accident happened about midday and near Woodhaven Junction, in Queens county. The deceased was on a street called Ocean avenue, but which appears not to be a public highway, but one commonly used by pedestrians as a place of crossing the tracks of the Long Island Railroad Company. The train which struck the deceased came from the east. It was proven that wheii the deceased and his companions got within about fifty feet of the crossing, he looked east. They saw nothing; but, in point of fact, there was a train coming from the east which was hidden by a signboard with two sides at right angles, each arm being about twelve or thirteen feet long. This sign hid from view about 850 feet of the defendant’s track, and gave only about 125 feet actual view of the track west of the signboard. The deceased started rapidly to cross the road of the defendant and was hit and killed. "While it was a question upon the trial whether the bell and whistle were sounded on approaching Ocean avenue, it was found by the jury that no alarm was" given. Without the signboard an unobstructed view of about a mile would have been given eastward from Ocean avenue.

This proof was sufficient proof of negligence to go to the jury. The signboard was on defendant’s right of way and it was so placed that a traveler across the avenue could infer from the view of the track, that he had a mile in which to go fifty feet, while in point of fact, he might have but a little over 100 feet.

The proof established that the westward view was obstructed, calling for vigilant attention upon the part of deceased to avoid danger from that quarter. That he had protected himself from the east by a view which did not protect him by reason of defendant’s signboard.

Whether the deceased looked at the right moment exactly and in the right direction successively, is a question of fact. (Greany v. L. I. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 419; Oldenberg v. N. Y. V. & H. R. R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. St. Repr. 402.)

If there was enough evidence to go to the jury on the question of the negligence of defendant, there was also sufficient to submit to them the question as to the freedom of deceased from any contributory negligence on his part. If the defendant had not obstructed his view from the east, he could have saved his life; and the question whether he was careless in looking to the east, fifty fe<^t from the crossing and not afterwards, if they should so find the fact to be, was for the jury. (Swift v. Staten Island R. T. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 645.)

The judgment and order denying new trial should be affirmed, with costs.

Pratt, J., concurred.

Judgment and order denying new trial affirmed, with costs.


text:
    Augustus W. Blazo, Respondent, v. William P. Gill, Appellant.

      Contract to erect a building for its cost and a stipulated sum for services — evidence, as to the agreement — as to the cost.

    Blazo, an architect and builder, agreed to “supervise, build, furnish and complete ” a house for Gill for a certain sum for his services, in addition to the exact cost of the labor and material; there was a memorandum annexed to the agreement, containing a list of work and materials, with sums set opposite each, which footed up a certain amount. Blazo having brought an action against Gill to recover a balance unpaid on his claim for services and the cost of the house, the defendant claimed that there was an agreement that the house should cost only the amount stated in the memorandum, and that the cost so stated was less than the sum claimed by the plaintiff.

      Held, that the evidence warranted a finding that the amount stated in the memorandum was a mere estimate of the cost.
    The plaintiff testified as to the cost of the house in gross and detail, and was supported by vouchers,' and it appeared that he looked over and specified everything that was ordered and sent to the house.

      Held, that the rule would be too strict which should require the plaintiff personally to know that each article was furnished and day’s work done, and that, in the absence of proof that articles ordered were not delivered, a finding in his favor as to the cost was warranted by the evidence.
    Appeal by tbe defendant, William P. Gill, from a judgment in favor of tbe plaintiff, entered in tbe office of the clerk of Kings county on tbe 7th day of July, 1891, upon the report of a referee.

      G. G. <& F. Reynolds, for tbe appellant.

      Josiah T. Mariam.,, for tbe respondent.
   Barnard, P. J.:

Tbe plaintiff, who is an architect and builder, agreed to “ supervise, build, furnish and complete ” a bouse for tbe defendant for the sum of $1,500. The plaintiff was to contract for tbe building in all its details with tbe greatest economy and was to charge everything at the exact cost. Tbe plaintiff completed the bouse at a cost for materials and labor of $18,224.68. Tbe defendant has paid on account of this $16,234.57. Tbe plaintiff seeks to recover in this action tbe balance, $1,990.11. Tbe first issue which tbe defendant makes is that tbe plaintiff agreed that tbe house was to be completed for $16,498, besides the plaintiff’s pay for supervision. There was a memorandum annexed to the eontract containing a list of work and materials and there were sums of money opposite each which footed up at $16,498. The question tried before the referee was whether' there was an estimate only and not an agreement by the plaintiff that the building should cost no more. The parties differed in their testimony. The paper purports to be an estimate memorandum only. The plaintiff so testifies. The contract favors this view. It provides that the plaintiff shall have all cost and there is no limitation. that the cost shall not exceed the estimate. The finding of the referee on this question is supported by the evidence. The defendant makes an issue whether or not the cost was as much as claimed. The plaintiff makes a very clear case upon this question. He testifies to the sum in gross and to its details. He is supported by vouchers. A large number of the labor and material bills are supported by the parties showing that their bills were reasonable and just, and thus amount to over $10,000-. Touchers for every bill were given defendant by the plaintiff. The rule would be too strict which should require the plaintiff to personally know that each article and day’s work was done, or that the material-' man should himself know the cost of his articles] An order was given. It was apparently filled. The employees loaded the wagon and the contents were delivered at the house. The plaintiff looked over and specified everything which had been ordered and sent to the building, before it was paid for. In the absence of proof showing that the articles were not delivered, the finding is warranted by the evidence.

The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.

Pratt, J., concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.