text:
    [961 NE2d 634, 938 NYS2d 243]
    The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Raymond Clyde, Respondent.
    Argued October 20, 2011;
    decided November 22, 2011

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Jon E. Budelmann, District Attorney, Auburn (Christopher T. Valdina of counsel), for appellant.
    I. The overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt renders the shackling error harmless. (Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622; People v Rouse, 79 NY2d 934; People v Buchanan, 13 NY3d 1; Chapman v California, 386 US 18; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230; People v Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750; People v Bayard, 15 NY3d 896; People v Wardlaw, 6 NY3d 556; People v Jacobs, 6 NY3d 188; People v Douglas, 4 NY3d 777.) II. The overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt renders harmless the insignificant errors in the prosecutor’s questioning of the two physician-witnesses. (People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740; People v Fordone, 156 AD2d 952, 75 NY2d 919; People v Cronin, 60 NY2d 430; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230; People v McMillion, 181 AD2d 997, 80 NY2d 835.) III. The uncontested trial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding defendant guilty of attempted rape in the first degree. (People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620; Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307; People v

      Glover, 66 NY2d 931; People v Coleman, 74 NY2d 381; People v Bracey, 48 AD2d 860, 41 NY2d 296; People v Naradzay, 11 NY3d 460; People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174; People v McDade, 14 NY3d 760; People v Cano, 12 NY3d 876; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490.)

      David P. Elkovitch, Auburn, for respondent.
    I. The pro se defendant was denied a right to a fair trial by keeping him shackled in leg irons for the jury to see and hear from jury selection to verdict. (Matter of State of New York v Rashid, 16 NY3d 1; Matter of Seitelman v Lavine, 36 NY2d 165; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230; People v Roman, 35 NY2d 978; People v Jenkins, 88 NY2d 948; Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501; People v Buchanan, 13 NY3d 1; People v Mees, 47 NY2d 997; People ex rel. Battista v Christian, 249 NY 314; People v Britt, 43 NY2d 111.) II. The trial court allowed two expert witnesses to usurp the function of the jury. (People v Grutz, 212 NY 72; People v Negron, 280 AD2d 557; People v Fordone, 156 AD2d 952.) III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion granting defendant’s motion to dismiss with regard to rape. (People v Glover, 66 NY2d 931; People v Naradzay, 11 NY3d 460; People v Warren, 66 NY2d 831; People v Sullivan, 173 NY 122; People v Werblow, 241 NY 55.)

      Mintz & Oppenheim LLP, New York City (Marshall A. Mintz of counsel), and Green & Willstatter, White Plains (Richard D. Willstatter of counsel), for New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae.
    The Appellate Division majority was correct that reversal was required where the trial court made no findings as to why defendant should be shackled and failed to give any curative instruction to the jury. (Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622; Holbrook v Flynn, 475 US 560; Rlinois v Allen, 397 US 337; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230; People v Dawson, 125 AD2d 860; People v Mattison, 97 AD2d 621; People v Vivenzio, 103 AD2d 1044; People v Harper, 47 NY2d 857; People v Hilliard, 73 NY2d 584; Kennedy v Cardwell, 487 F2d 101.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Pigott, J.

We hold that harmless error analysis is applicable when a trial court has ordered the use of visible shackles without adequate justification articulated on the record (see Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622 [2005]). Here, defendant’s shackling during trial was harmless, as was an evidentiary error committed by the trial court. We also agree with the People that the count of defendant’s indictment charging him with attempted rape should not have been dismissed.

I

A female, civilian employee of Auburn Correctional Facility was attacked in the prison on the afternoon of July 7, 2006. She was walking along an otherwise empty corridor, towards the south mess hall kitchen when a man attacked her from behind, putting his hand over her mouth and nose. The employee, managing to get free of her attacker’s grasp momentarily, begged him not to hurt her, and asked, “What do you want?” The man did not answer. He slammed the woman against a wall, and thrust a sock or towel into her mouth. After she succeeded in getting the object out of her mouth, and screamed for help, the assailant threatened to kill her if she did not keep quiet, placed the same object into her mouth again, and pushed her onto her knees.

Remaining behind the employee at all times, so that she could not see him, the man pulled her head back by her hair, while continuing to push the sock or towel into her throat. He then pushed her to the floor. When the sock or towel fell out again, the man replaced it, shouted profanities, and punched the employee in the face. The assailant demanded her hands, and started wrapping a cord around one hand. The employee refused to yield her other arm, and bit one of the man’s hands, experiencing a sensation that made her think he was wearing gloves. The attacker, straddling the employee as she lay on her stomach, got both her hands behind her back.

It was at this point that another civilian employee of the prison, Anthony Rebich, who had heard his coworker’s cries, came to her rescue. He saw his colleague lying on the floor of the corridor struggling with an inmate who was trying to tie her hands with white strips of cloth. Rebich activated an alarm and yelled at the inmate who started running towards him. Rebich tripped the inmate, and the two men exchanged blows. Rebich chased the inmate along the corridor, but the inmate ran out of the building. Going to the aid of the female employee, Rebich and another colleague found her screaming for help and repeating that the man had tried to rape her.

Corrections Officer John Exner found defendant Raymond Clyde in the yard, in the vicinity of the south mess hall. He was sweating profusely, was acting nervously, and gave an explanation for his presence in the yard that made no sense to the officer. Rebich identified Clyde as the man he had encountered in the corridor. The female employee who had been attacked was unable to identify her assailant.

Clyde’s DNA was found on a sock, a towel, and a glove, left behind when the attacker fled the corridor. The DNA samples on the towel and glove came from semen-stained areas of those items. Semen was also found on the female victim’s T-shirt, but was insufficient for identification purposes. A tape roll and a strip of cloth left at the crime scene matched a tape roll spindle and a torn bed sheet found in Clyde’s single-occupancy cell.

The female employee had numerous facial lacerations, abrasions, and bruises, and a deep oral laceration. She told the nurse who treated her at the prison infirmary that an inmate had tried to rape her. She was treated at Auburn Memorial Hospital, and released. Rebich was treated at the same hospital, and was diagnosed with a concussion.

IL

Clyde was indicted on charges of attempted rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree (two counts), unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, and promoting prison contraband in the first degree. Defense counsel sought an order from County Court directing that Clyde be permitted to appear in court without prison garb, chains or shackles. The People, while not opposing this request, produced a report of Clyde’s criminal history, showing that he was serving a prison sentence of 25 to 50 years, following a 1996 conviction for rape in the first degree (two counts), sodomy in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and burglary in the first degree. The People also pointed to Clyde’s earlier convictions and to a history of over 20 disciplinary findings during his present incarceration.

When Clyde’s trial began in December 2007, County Court agreed that Clyde could wear noninstitutional clothes and need not wear handcuffs, but insisted that he wear leg irons. The trial court offered to have a “curtain” draped around the defense table to conceal the leg irons. After some discussion with Clyde about the practical difficulties of such an arrangement, which would not allow Clyde to attend sidebar conferences without revealing the leg irons, Clyde agreed to forgo the curtain. At no point did County Court place on the record its findings showing that Clyde needed restraint by means of leg irons.

Clyde waived his right to counsel. Properly warned of the risks of self-representation, Clyde proceeded pro se throughout jury selection and his trial. Clyde did not raise the subject of his shackles again, and sought no cautionary instruction in that regard.

In all, 29 witnesses testified at Clyde’s trial, including, among others, the female victim, Rebich, Exner, and the forensic scientists who had performed the DNA analysis. Sergeant Craig Diego testified that on the day before the attack, and twice on the morning of the attack, he had seen Clyde in a prison alleyway that he was not authorized to remain in, which was frequented by “teachers . . . go[ing] down to the [prison] school, [and] any civilians going down to the shops.” He had twice admonished Clyde, for being in the alleyway.

On cross-examination of the female victim, Clyde brought out that the assailant had not put his hands under her clothes, or touched her “private parts.” No evidence was presented to show that the assailant had disrobed.

In relation to the injuries suffered by Rebich, the prosecutor asked Dr. Mervyn Whelan, an emergency staff physician at Auburn Memorial, who had treated him, whether Rebich’s injuries met the definition of “physical injury,” namely “substantial pain or limitation of physical condition.” Clyde objected that this was a determination to be made by the jury. County Court overruled the objection, and Whelan testified that, in his opinion, Rebich had suffered a physical injury. Similarly, the prosecutor asked Dr. Barbara J. Connor, also an emergency staff physician at Auburn Memorial, who had treated the female employee, whether her injuries satisfied the same definition of “physical injury” and whether the attack had created a “risk of serious physical injury,” defined as physical injury that “creates a substantial risk of death.” Connor answered these questions in the affirmative, again over Clyde’s objection.

At the close of the People’s case, Clyde, who called no witnesses, moved for a trial order of dismissal. County Court reserved decision. The jury found Clyde guilty on all counts. County Court granted Clyde’s motion with respect to the charge of attempted first-degree rape, dismissing that count of the indictment, but denied the motion in all other respects.

Following his conviction, Clyde appealed, arguing that County Court had failed to articulate a reasonable basis on the record for its determination to restrain him in shackles during the trial. The People appealed County Court’s order dismissing the charge of attempted first-degree rape. The Appellate Division reversed County Court’s judgment of conviction, ruling that the use of shackles was reversible error, and further held that the trial court had properly dismissed the attempted rape charge (72 AD3d 1538 [2010]). One Justice dissented, and granted the People leave to appeal. We now reverse.

III.

In Deck v Missouri (544 US 622 [2005]), the United States Supreme Court, surveying law from Blackstone to the present day, held that the Federal Constitution prohibits the use of physical restraints visible to the jury during a criminal trial, absent a court determination that they are “justified by an essential state interest . . . specific to the defendant on trial” (id. at 624 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Such essential state interests include “physical security, escape prevention, [and] courtroom decorum” (id. at 628). The trial court must exercise “close judicial scrutiny” (Holbrook v Flynn, 475 US 560, 568 [1986], quoting Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 504 [1976]), in determining whether such an interest requires shackling.

The Court enunciated three fundamental legal principles that underlie this well-grounded holding: the presumption of innocence, securing a meaningful defense, and maintaining dignified proceedings (see Deck, 544 US at 630-632). The Court concluded that visible shackles may not be used unless justified by an individualized security determination conducted by the trial court, which “must be case specific; that is to say, it should reflect particular concerns, say, special security needs or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial” (id. at 633). The Supreme Court made it clear that, to avoid committing error, a trial court requiring a defendant to be visibly shackled should place its individualized findings on the record (see id. at 633-634; see also id. at 640-641, 643, 649 [Thomas and Scalia, JJ., dissenting]).

Finally, the Supreme Court clarified that

“where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. The State must prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained’ ” (id. at 635, quoting Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 [1967]).

Here, County Court did not place on the record its reasons for considering leg irons necessary during Clyde’s trial. Clyde’s history would have supported a decision to require shackles, but the trial court has to make that determination and articulate its reasons itself. We cannot tell from the record whether County Court shackled Clyde as a matter of routine because he had already been convicted of a violent crime, or whether the court engaged in case-specific reasoning that led to the conclusion that shackles were necessary. The use of leg irons was therefore a violation of Clyde’s constitutional rights under Deck.

IV.

The issue then becomes whether the trial court’s error was harmless. Because we find that the trial court committed error as a matter of federal constitutional law, we apply Supreme Court precedent in deciding whether the error is of a type that may be harmless (see Chapman, 386 US at 20-21). In Deck, the Supreme Court declared that the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a shackling error “did not contribute to the verdict obtained” (544 US 622, 635 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Chapman, 386 US at 24). By quoting language from Chapman, a case that holds, as a matter of federal law, that federal “constitutional errors can be harmless” (Hedgpeth v Pulido, 555 US 57, 60 [2008]), the Deck Court made it clear that harmless error analysis applies to shackling errors.

Were we to decide this question under state constitutional law, the result would be the same. A defendant has the right to be free of visible shackles, unless there has been a case-specific, on-the-record finding of necessity. However, we would not hold, as a matter of state law, that an error in ordering shackles requires automatic reversal.

A constitutional error is “considered harmless when, in light of the totality of the evidence, there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the jury’s verdict” (People v Douglas, 4 NY3d 777, 779 [2005]). We take into account “two discrete factors: (1) the quantum and nature of the evidence against defendant if the error is excised and (2) the causal effect the error may nevertheless have had on the jury” (People v Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750, 756 [1988]). We therefore must decide whether the proof of Clyde’s guilt was overwhelming and whether there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted him were it not for the shackling error.

With respect to the charges of which Clyde was convicted after County Court granted his motion to dismiss with respect to the attempted rape charge, the evidence was overwhelming. In particular, DNA evidence and Rebich’s identification placed Clyde at the crime scene, and articles left behind by the perpetrator when he fled matched items in Clyde’s single-occupancy cell. Moreover, we do not believe that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted Clyde had he not worn visible shackles at trial. A jury, faced with a defendant accused of assaulting and/or attempting to rape a civilian while incarcerated, is more likely to conclude that the defendant was shackled as a precaution, because of the nature of the crimes charged, than to conclude that the defendant was shackled because he was independently known to be dangerous.

V

Clyde also argues on appeal, as he did pro se at his trial, that the testifying physicians were improperly allowed to testify as to their conclusions regarding the female victim’s and Rebich’s injuries, in the context of statutory interpretation, because those conclusions were for the jury to draw. Here, “admissibility turns on whether, given the nature of the subject, the facts cannot be stated or described to the jury in such a manner as to enable them to form an accurate judgment thereon” (People v Cronin, 60 NY2d 430, 432-433 [1983] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The facts that underlie physical injury and risk of serious physical injury can readily be stated to a jury so as to enable the jurors to form an accurate judgment concerning the elements of assault and unlawful imprisonment. It was therefore error to overrule Clyde’s objections and permit this expert testimony.

That said, nonconstitutional harmless error analysis applies to this error. The evidence that Clyde assaulted the female employee and Rebich, and unlawfully imprisoned the former, was overwhelming. Moreover, there is no significant probability that the jury’s verdict on these counts would have been different had it been required to draw its own conclusions with regard to the extent of the two victims’ injuries. Consequently, the evidentiary error was harmless.

VI

Finally, we turn to the question whether the evidence of attempted rape was sufficient. “A verdict is legally sufficient when, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the People, there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Acosta, 80 NY2d 665, 672 [1993]).

The jury heard evidence that, before the attack, Clyde was seen lurking in an alleyway that civilian employees often walked along; that he attacked a female victim in an otherwise empty corridor; that he brought items that could be used to silence and restrain a person; that he tried to incapacitate his victim; that he spoke to his victim but did not ask her to help him escape from the prison or direct her to do anything other than be quiet; and that he forced his victim to the floor. The jury also heard evidence from which it could infer that Clyde ejaculated before he fled the scene. A jury could logically conclude that the People sustained its burden of proving that Clyde intended to rape.

We also believe that the evidence was sufficient to show that Clyde “came dangerously near commission of the completed crime” (People v Kassebaum, 95 NY2d 611, 618 [2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The jury heard that testimony that Clyde had straddled his gagged victim, and was in the process of binding her hands, when he was disturbed by Rebich’s appearance in the corridor. A rational jury could have concluded that the attack was carried forward to a point that came within dangerous proximity to forcible sexual intercourse.

With respect to the attempted rape charge, therefore, Supreme Court erred in dismissing the count on sufficiency grounds. That was the only issue raised by the People’s appeal to the Appellate Division from County Court’s dismissal order, and it is the only issue we reach as to that count. Upon reversing the Appellate Division’s affirmance of County Court’s dismissal order, we remit the matter to County Court for sentencing on the conviction. Defendant then may take his own appeal to the Appellate Division, raising any issues available to him.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, reversing County Court’s judgment, should be reversed, and the case remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on the appeal to that court from the judgment. The order of the Appellate Division, affirming County Court’s order, should be reversed, and the case remitted to County Court for sentencing on the conviction of attempted rape in the first degree.

Chief Judge Lippman (dissenting).

It is not a novel principle

that compelling a criminal defendant to appear before his or her jury in shackles without record, case specific justification, although a due process violation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, is not categorically barred from being proved harmless by the prosecution. Deck v Missouri (544 US 622 [2005]) recognizes the possibility that in hypothetically rare, extraordinarily overdetermined cases the prosecution may be able to “prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 . . . (1967)” (id. at 635). The question now posed, then, is not what Deck in theory allows the prosecution to prove in order to save a conviction, but whether the prosecution here met its burden under Deck to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the unjustified visible shackling of this pro se defendant during his week-long jury trial—now conceded by all concerned to have been accomplished in violation of his right to due process—did not contribute to the verdict against him.

It is plain not only that no such demonstration was made, but that it was not possible given the verdict. Defendant was convicted of every count charged in the indictment. Although the evidence of some of the charged offenses was overwhelming, as the majority concedes, the evidence was not overwhelming as it bore upon the indictment’s top count, charging attempted rape in the first degree. Even if one disagrees with the conclusion shared by the trial court and Appellate Division that the evidence in proof of that count was legally insufficient, it is not arguable that the count was, at best, marginally supported. In this evidentiary context, it is apparent that it would be impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s appearance before the jury constantly clad in officially provided implements subversive of the presumption of innocence as well as naturally and eloquently indicative of the wearer’s antisocial propensities, could not have contributed to the verdict.

Were the Court not reinstating the attempted rape verdict, as it is, it would at least be possible to argue that the shackling error did not contribute to so much of the verdict that survived. But even that argument would not in the end be analytically sound because once it is admitted that the shackling error could have infected the deliberative process, it becomes virtually impossible to prove that it affected only isolated portions of the verdict. The relevant question it must be emphasized is not whether the shackling error itself caused the jury to return the verdict it did, i.e., whether but for the error defendant would have been acquitted, but whether there is any reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. The proof of noncontribution to which the People are put under Deck is quite simply impossible where, as here, the jury has convicted with respect to any count on evidence that is less than overwhelming.

While shackling errors are not, under Deck, categorically immune from harmless error analysis but merely, as a practical matter, extraordinarily difficult to prove harmless, some shackling errors, many of which in any event would be impossible to prove harmless under Deck, are I believe sheltered from harmless error analysis under our state jurisprudence. We have long recognized that

“if in any instance, an appellate court concludes that there has been such error of a trial court, such misconduct of a prosecutor, such inadequacy of defense counsel, or such other wrong as to have operated to deny any individual defendant his fundamental right to a fair trial, the reviewing court must reverse the conviction and grant a new trial, quite without regard to any evaluation as to whether the errors contributed to the defendant’s conviction. The right to a fair trial is self-standing and proof of guilt, however overwhelming, can never be permitted to negate this right” (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 238 [1975]).

“The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice” (Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 503 [1976]). Where, as here, shackles or other physical restraints imposed without adequate record justification are extensively viewed by the jury during trial and the jury is simply left to speculate upon their significance, the possibility of a fair trial becomes virtually irretrievable. The error involved, effectively depriving defendant of the presumption whose “enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law” (Coffin v United States, 156 US 432, 453 [1895]) was preclusive of a fair trial. While there are cases in which the brief and inadvertent exposure of a defendant in shackles to jurors will not necessarily have that consequence (see e.g. People v Harper, 47 NY2d 857 [1979]), here defendant, evidently with the Court’s imprimatur, was during his entire week-long trial made to appear before his jury visibly restrained by implements commonly and nearly inevitably understood to be reserved for the management of dangerous and explosive individuals—persons presumptively predisposed to violent crime. It is, or should be, clear that this appearance must have skewed the basic structure of the proceeding; the presumption of defendant’s innocence and concomitant burden of the People to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt cannot reasonably be supposed to have survived. If, as Crimmins contemplates, there is a category of cases in which the fundamental, freestanding right to a fair trial must be vindicated even when there is overwhelming evidence favoring conviction, this case falls within it.

This trial was, practically speaking, hardly different from one conducted without a presumption of innocence charge or an instruction placing upon the People the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When there is added to this the circumstance that the pro se defendant was literally hobbled as he exercised his Sixth Amendment right to plead his own case, it would seem clear beyond peradventure that what is at issue is error of a sort incompatible with the basic premises upon which trials are characterized as fair.

Accordingly, I would affirm the orders of the Appellate Division.

Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concur with Judge Pigott; Chief Judge Lippman dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judges Ciparick and Jones concur.

Order, reversing County Court’s judgment, reversed, etc.

       Clyde’s defense counsel was present in a standby capacity.

      . This conclusion, it seems to me, was correct. As the trial court observed in dismissing the attempted rape count, “[i]t is undisputed that there is no mention of sex or rape, that there [was at trial no evidence of] touching of any sexual part of the victim and that there is no attempt to remove any clothing or gain access beneath any clothing.” The probative value of the DNA evidence is overstated by the majority. There was no proof as to when defendant’s semen was deposited on the leather gloves and certainly no proof that the deposits occurred during the charged assault. And, although there was testimony as to a “possibility” that there was a seminal fluid residue on the victim’s tee shirt, there was, apart from the admittedly indeterminate nature of the residue, no evidence as to its source.

      . The majority is not wrong to say that the jury might have viewed the shackles as precautionary, but it is hard to understand how such a view would have been benign to defendant or his chances for a fair adjudication based on the fairly probative evidence.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Read, J. Chief Judge Lippman (dissenting).

license: Public Domain

text:
    [960 NE2d 405, 936 NYS2d 636]
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christian Bueno, Appellant.
    Argued October 11, 2011;
    decided November 21, 2011

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Appellate Advocates, New York City CDenise A. Corsi and Lynn W.L. Fahey of counsel), for appellant.
    The People failed to establish appellant’s guilt of second-degree assault under Penal Law § 120.05 (3) because they failed to show that he caused injury to an emergency medical technician, who had completed his tasks at the scene and would merely return to his post and await the next call for emergency medical services, with the intent to prevent him from performing a lawful duty. (Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307; People v Campbell, 72 NY2d 602; People v McDonald, 291 AD2d 832; People v Milhouse, 246 AD2d 119; People v Greene, 221 AD2d 559; People v Cruz, 48 NY2d 419; Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577; People v Versaggi, 83 NY2d 123; People v Eulo, 63 NY2d 341; People v Shakun, 251 NY 107.)

      Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn CRhea A. Grob and Leonard Joblove of counsel), for respondent.
    The evidence was legally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of second-degree assault, under Penal Law § 120.05 (3), for causing physical injury to an emergency medical service technician with the intent to prevent him from performing a lawful duty. (People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620; People v Steinberg, 79 NY2d 673; People v Getch, 50 NY2d 456; People v Barnes, 50 NY2d 375; People v Castillo, 47 NY2d 270; People v Olomonsa, 71 AD3d 1491; People v Allah, 126 AD2d 778; Matter of Theroux v Reilly, 1 NY3d 232; People v Jackson, 87 NY2d 782.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Read, J.

The issue in this appeal is whether the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to establish that defendant Christian Bueno acted “[w]ith intent to prevent” an emergency medical technician (EMT) “from performing a lawful duty” when he caused an EMT to suffer physical injury (see Penal Law § 120.05 [3]). As the uniformed EMT was climbing into the driver’s side of an ambulance, defendant blindsided him with a blow to the head, threw him to the ground and pummeled him repeatedly about the face and head. The EMT and his partner on a two-person ambulance crew were about to drive away from the premises where they had just treated an injured woman. We conclude that the People made out a prima facie case of intent by presenting evidence that defendant attacked someone he had reason to know was an EMT on duty at the time.

I.

At about 2:20 a.m. on the day before Christmas in 2006, EMTs William Spinelli and Linda Aanonsen were dispatched by ambulance to 190 Butler Street in Brooklyn in response to a call for medical assistance for a woman who injured her hand and a man who suffered a bleeding face in a fight. Their work shift was from 12:30 a.m. until 8:30 a.m. that day. Spinelli described the ambulance as a big, white vehicle with the words “Lutheran Medical Center Ambulance” imprinted on it, and Fire Department, 911 and emergency medical services (EMS) stickers on both doors. Spinelli drove the ambulance on this occasion, and activated its lights and siren. Spinelli and Aanonsen were wearing their uniforms—navy pants and a matching pullover displaying their names, the letters “EMT” and their shield numbers, as well as insignia identifying them as EMTs associated with Lutheran Medical Center Emergency Medical Services.

Upon arrival at 190 Butler Street—the address of a small, three-story apartment house—Spinelli parked the ambulance in the street in front of the building. Eight to 10 people were congregating outside the building’s entrance. One of them, who identified himself as an off-duty auxiliary police officer, told the EMTs that there was an injured woman inside, and led them to the rear apartment on the first floor. Spinelli and Aanonsen were carrying their equipment—a small collapsible wheelchair called a stair chair; a trauma bag, which is “a larger size bag . . . about 2 feet long,” red in color, where supplies such as bandaging, water and ice packs are stored; and a similarly sized oxygen bag, which contained an oxygen tank and devices used to administer oxygen.

The EMTs observed about 15 people in the apartment, as well as beer cans and coolers, causing Spinelli to conclude that there had been “a party of some sorts.” The injured woman complained of pain in her right hand, on which she had placed an ice pack; she told the EMTs that “she had been in a verbal altercation with somebody, and punched a wall with her right hand.” The EMTs did not see and were not directed to or approached by anyone bleeding from the face.

Aanonsen gave the woman another ice pack and took her vital signs. The EMTs advised her to go to the hospital for X rays in light of the possibility of a broken hand. Spinelli described the woman as “[p]leasant” and “[fjine”; she declined to accompany them to the hospital. Since at that point “[t]here was not much more [the EMTs] could do other than what [they] had done already,” they left the apartment about 15 minutes after their arrival at 190 Butler Street. On their way back to the ambulance, they again passed by 8 to 10 people standing outside near the building. Someone called out, “Have a safe night. Merry Christmas,” and the EMTs responded in kind.

After the EMTs stowed their gear in the ambulance, Spinelli unlocked the passenger side door for Aanonsen, who climbed in. He then walked around to the driver’s side and opened the door. But as Spinelli was about to step into the ambulance, he became aware that “somebody [was] screaming out loudly, cursing.” He “turned around to see what was going on,” and noticed defendant, standing six or seven feet away, “looking in [his] direction, screaming” and moving toward the ambulance. At that point, defendant reared back and threw a beer can at Spinelli’s head. Spinelli ducked, and the can flew through the open door into the vehicle, hit the dashboard and “poured alcohol all over,” splashing Aanonsen.

Then, as Spinelli attempted to enter the ambulance, having just planted his left foot on the outside step into the cabin, defendant hit him in the back of the head, grabbed his sweater collar and threw him to the ground, where he landed face up. Defendant “kneel[ed] down on one knee[,] right next to” Spinelli and struck his face two or three times with a closed hand. As Spinelli attempted to deflect these blows, the two men rolled on the ground. Spinelli did not throw any punches because he had “always been told, working this job, from the point [he] was hired, that [EMTs] are not allowed to raise [their] fists, or do anything in any way.” Spinelli eventually managed to wriggle free from defendant, but just as he was getting to his feet, a second man struck him from behind on the right side of his head. This blow stupefied Spinelli, causing him to sink down on his hands and knees.

Aanonsen, who hit the emergency button to alert the dispatcher to an urgent situation the minute her partner came under attack, exited the ambulance in time to push the second man off Spinelli. She and that man fell to the ground. He hit her in the face, and she punched back. After another round of punches was exchanged, Aanonsen regained her feet. Bystanders were “trying to break [them] up,” and her attacker moved off and stood by a nearby fence where he kept “yelling things. But there was no other physical altercation.” Aanonsen then reentered the ambulance, and radioed a request for help before leaving again to assist her partner.

In the meantime, defendant had resumed his attack on Spinelli, “[s]traddl[ing]” him and “punching [him] about the head and face” with “[c]lose-handed fists” more than 15 times. Spinelli was still on his hands and knees, and was “basically trying to crawl away.” He described himself as “dazed,” and testified further that his head was by this time “really hurting.” Defendant eventually broke off the assault, and the two EMTs scrambled into the ambulance. From the safety of their vantage point there, they observed the second man, who was never identified or caught, running down the street away from the ambulance; they saw defendant walk to a nearby building, where he sat down on the stoop.

When police and emergency personnel (two other ambulances and fire department supervisors) arrived one or two minutes later, the two EMTs got out of the ambulance and walked to the front of the vehicle. Spinelli pointed out defendant, who was still lingering nearby, to Officer Eduardo Mercado. As Mercado and his partner approached defendant, Mercado called out, “Come over here.” Defendant, who appeared intoxicated to Mercado, ignored this direction and turned to enter the building at 188 Butler Street, but Mercado and his partner intercepted and arrested him. Not until he reached his police vehicle with the handcuffed defendant in tow did Mercado notice bruises on defendant’s face and blood on his tee shirt. At the police station, defendant attributed the contusions to a fight earlier in the evening; he twice refused offers of medical assistance.

Spinelli endured swelling to his face and head and a deviated septum as a result of the beating he took; Aanonsen suffered from swelling to her right wrist and knee and bruises to the left side of her face, as well as dizziness, nausea and vomiting on the way to the hospital by ambulance for treatment. Spinelli was also afflicted with dizziness, nausea, vomiting and an uncommonly severe “splitting” headache several hours later in the day, necessitating a return visit to the hospital on Christmas Eve. He did not go back to work for three weeks; Aanonsen was absent from work for 10 days. For his role in this incident, defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree assault (Penal Law § 120.05 [3]) (one count for Spinelli and one for Aanonsen), a felony; and two counts of third-degree assault (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]) (one count for Spinelli and one for Aanonsen), a misdemeanor.

In a brief opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that defendant was “the victim here”—i.e., he was the man with a bleeding face whom the EMTs were dispatched to treat (along with the woman with an injured hand), but they failed in their duty to render him aid and “[i]nstead . . . got him arrested.” The People called Spinelli, Aanonsen and Mercado as witnesses, and they testified as already described.

At the close of the People’s case, defense counsel moved to dismiss both second-degree assault counts. As relevant to this appeal, she argued that, since the EMTs had “finished at 190 Butler Street, they finished with their call, their duty,” the People had not made out a prima facie case that defendant assaulted them with intent to prevent the performance of a lawful duty, as required by Penal Law § 120.05 (3). The prosecutor countered that “the fact that these EMTs were finished with one specific call[ ] is not the way in which the Court should determine whether they were on/or off-duty, or during the performance of their actual duties. These EMTs were in uniform waiting to respond to other calls.” In short, just because the EMTs had “finished treating someone [did not suggest that] they were not acting in the performance of their official duties.”

While finding “an element of the truth” in both parties’ arguments, the trial judge denied the motion. He opined that

“the fact that the EMTs had finished providing medical care to the patient at that scene, doesn’t mean they weren’t still performing their lawful duty[;] they were in uniform, and going back into the ambulance. Part of their lawful duties is to remain on duty for further calls. They still had some paperwork they had to fill out.
“They were loading up their truck, and they were acting in their capacity at that time as EMTs, that’s what they were doing. So, I agree with [the prosecutor] about that. I also agree with [defense counsel] that there is an issue as to the intent, as to whether or not the intent was to prevent them from performing their lawful duty.
“I think that’s why we have a jury, because I believe that’s a question of fact, and I think you can look at these facts and argue it, both cases, and I think it’s going to be up to the jury to decide. That’s a question of fact for them whether or not the defendant’s actions were with the intent to prevent them from performing their lawful duty. The facts are what they are. I think the inference will be up to the jury to draw what those facts involved. I am sure that’s what [defense counsel is] going to argue to the jury. Therefore, I am not going to grant [the defense] motion to dismiss. I am going to leave the issue of intent up to the jury to decide” (emphasis added).

The defense then rested without calling any witnesses. In her closing argument, defense counsel disputed the People’s case on several grounds: that Mercado “did less than thorough police work” because he only spoke to Spinelli and Aanonsen at the scene and did .not question any bystanders about what had happened; that, even assuming events unfolded as portrayed by the People’s witnesses, there was insufficient evidence that defendant sought to prevent the EMTs from performing a lawful duty because Spinelli and Aanonsen had completed administering aid to the woman with the injured hand and so “the duty was over” before any altercation occurred and, in any event, defendant was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent; that there was insufficient evidence that defendant acted together with the unapprehended stranger, who dealt the heaviest blow to Spinelli and punched Aanonsen; and that Spinelli and Aanonsen did not suffer physical injury within the meaning of the Penal Law (i.e., impairment of physical condition or substantial pain).

As to each victim, the trial judge submitted the charges of second- and third-degree assault under an acting-in-concert theory; he gave an intoxication instruction pursuant to Penal Law § 15.25. The jury convicted defendant of second-degree assault and did not return a verdict on the corresponding misdemeanor count with respect to Spinelli; and acquitted defendant of both counts with respect to Aanonsen. The trial judge adjudicated defendant a second violent felony offender, and sentenced him to a five-year prison term plus five years of postrelease supervision.

Upon defendant’s appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The court considered the evidence legally sufficient to support the conviction because “there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant possessed the requisite intent to prevent an emergency medical service technician from performing a lawful duty” (71 AD3d 908 [2d Dept 2010]). A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal (15 NY3d 772 [2010]), and we now affirm.

II.

Section 120.05 (3), adopted in 1965 as part of the revised Penal Law, originally provided that a person was guilty of second-degree assault, a class D felony, when “[w]ith intent to prevent a peace officer from performing a lawful duty, he causes physical injury to such peace officer” (L 1965, ch 1030). Through the years, the Legislature has extended the statute’s coverage to numerous categories of public servants exposed to a heightened risk of violence because of the fraught circumstances in which they must often perform their job duties. “The rationale [underlying section 120.05 (3)] is to give people who provide public services, during the performance of those services, the protection which may be afforded by the deterrent effect of higher penalties” (Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 120.00, at 209 [2009]). The Legislature accomplished this by classifying as second-degree assault attacks on certain public servants doing their jobs in a lawful manner where an assailant intended thereby to disrupt their job performance.

The bill that became chapter 262 of the Laws of 1985, which included EMTs within section 120.05 (3), was introduced at the behest of the City of New York. In its memorandum in support, the City justified the bill by pointing out that “[i]n recent months, a number of EMS uniformed personnel have been assaulted, while others have been intentionally prevented or hindered in the performance of their duties”; and that “EMS personnel are sometimes called upon to enter unsafe areas or to deal with tense situations in responding to emergency calls” (see Mem of Legis Representative of City of NY, Bill Jacket, L 1985, ch 262, at 5, 1985 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 3004). Here, for example, the EMTs were dispatched in the middle of a winter night to a residential address to treat individuals reportedly injured in a fight.

Defendant argues that he could not have violated section 120.05 (3) because “Spinelli and Aanonsen had finished treating a patient who refused to go to the hospital, had packed up their equipment, and were about to leave the scene to await future calls when [he] accosted Spinelli,” and “a defendant must intend to prevent an EMT from performing a specific task, not merely to disrupt his passive status of being ‘on duty.’ ” Under his view of the statute, then, the jury apparently would have been entitled to consider whether defendant possessed the intent for second-degree assault if he had struck Spinelli when Spinelli stepped out of the ambulance upon his arrival at 190 Butler Street, or while Spinelli and Aanonsen were treating the woman, or when Spinelli climbed into the ambulance to leave 190 Butler Street so long as the EMTs were transporting the woman to the hospital for treatment, or had been dispatched directly from 190 Butler Street to render medical assistance at another location. But because the EMTs were returning to Lutheran Medical Center without the woman, they were in the “passive status of being ‘on duty,’ ” awaiting such further assignments as might arise during their shift, and could not possibly “perform! ] a lawful duty” within the meaning of the statute until and unless they were sent out on another call.

We see no reason to read the statute this way. As an initial matter, it is not apparent why the EMTs’ response to the request for medical assistance at 190 Butler Street was “finished” once the EMTs left the apartment without the injured woman rather than when they actually drove away or returned to the hospital. Defendant takes the position that “a defendant must intend to prevent an EMT from performing a specific task,” and then defines the task to be more narrow than the facts require. Certainly the jurors might have logically concluded that Spinelli was performing the routine job duties of an EMT in a lawful manner when he attempted to leave premises where he had furnished medical assistance, whether he was then on his way to another call or to his home base at the hospital. The People were not required to prove that defendant intended to injure Spinelli. Even so, the ferocity and persistence of his attack on Spinelli might have reasonably caused the jurors to decide that he intended to interfere with Spinelli’s performance of his job duties as an EMT. As the jury heard, Spinelli was, in fact, unable to return to work for three weeks after defendant assaulted him. And the jurors were certainly entitled to disbelieve that defendant was too intoxicated to form an intent to prevent Spinelli from performing a lawful duty.

The standard for reviewing legal sufficiency in a criminal case is whether, “[v]iewing the evidence . . . in a manner most favorable to the prosecution and indulging in all reasonable inferences in the People’s favor,” a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 437 [1985]). A jury is entitled to infer that a defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts (People v Steinberg, 79 NY2d 673, 685 [1992]). The element of intent is rarely proved “by an explicit expression of culpability by the perpetrator” (People v Barnes, 50 NY2d 375, 381 [1980]); and “[c]ompeting inferences to be drawn [regarding the defendant’s intent], if not unreasonable, are within the exclusive domain of the finders of fact, not to be disturbed” by us (id.). In light of these principles, the evidence in this case was sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant attacked Spinelli with the intent to prevent an EMT from performing a lawful duty.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Chief Judge Lippman (dissenting).

Because I believe that the majority has ignored the plain words of Penal Law § 120.05 (3), I respectfully dissent. Under the majority’s view, a person who knowingly assaults an on-duty emergency medical technician (EMT) (or any other type of public servant enumerated in the statute) and causes physical injury is guilty of assault in the second degree pursuant to section 120.05 (3). By contrast, the actual language of the statute provides that a person is guilty of assault in the second degree when “[w]ith intent to prevent . . . [an] emergency medical service technician . . . from performing a lawful duty ... he or she causes physical injury to such . . . technician.”

I believe the majority misses the point in this case in focusing on the victim’s activity at the time of the assault (see majority op at 168). The victim’s attempt to enter his ambulance may well be a lawful duty within the meaning of the statute. However, the proper focus here should not be on the nature of the victim’s activity itself, but on whether defendant had the specific intent to prevent the performance of a lawful duty. In other words, it is not enough to determine whether the victim was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the assault. The question remains: did the People bring forth legally sufficient evidence that defendant had the requisite intent at the time that he committed the assault?

The evidence here was certainly sufficient to show that the defendant intended to injure the victim—that is, assault in the third degree. As to the second degree count charged, however, I agree with the majority that the People need not prove intent to injure (see majority op at 169). Indeed, “a defendant’s intent to injure is irrelevant to the crime of assault in the second degree under Penal Law § 120.05 (3)” (People v Rojas, 97 NY2d 32, 40 [2001] [emphasis added]). But the majority errs when it seamlessly moves from stating that the People were not required to show intent to injure to concluding that “[e]ven so, the ferocity and persistence of [defendant’s] attack on Spinelli might have reasonably caused the jurors to decide that he intended to interfere with Spinelli’s performance of his job duties as an EMT” (majority op at 169). The intent to injure and the extent of the injuries do not suffice to show the intent to prevent the victim from performing a lawful duty required under subdivision (3) of Penal Law § 120.05. The viciousness of the assault does not rationally lead to the conclusion that defendant had the specific requisite intent to interfere with the victim’s performance of his lawful duties in his capacity as an EMT.

The majority relies on this Court’s opinion in People v Steinberg (79 NY2d 673, 685 [1992]) for the proposition that “[a] jury is entitled to infer that a defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts” (majority op at 169), but it is not true that specific intent can be inferred solely from an act’s result. In Steinberg, the jury wrote a note to the court asking, “ ‘[i]f there was no apparent intention to cause injury, but the acts resulted in serious physical injury nonetheless, would that be grounds to conclude intent as spelled out by law?’ ” (Steinberg, 79 NY2d at 684) and this Court held that

“while a simple negative response would have informed the jury that it could not automatically infer intent to cause the injuries merely because the injuries occurred, such a response might have obscured the jury’s right to make a factual finding of intent based on the natural and probable consequences of defendant’s acts and the surrounding circumstances” (id. at 685).

Steinberg does not stand for the proposition that any time a particular result actually occurred, the jury is entitled to infer intent to cause that result. Rather, the jury is charged with looking at the natural and probable consequences and the surrounding circumstances. Otherwise, the result in itself would always be sufficient to support a finding of intent.

Here, the People established only that the victim was subjected to an entirely unexplained, senseless assault at the hands of defendant, and that is precisely why the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction under Penal Law § 120.05 (3).

As the rule announced by the majority conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute, I dissent and I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division.

Judges Cipabick, Gbaffeo, Pigott and Jones concur with Judge Read; Chief Judge Lippman dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Judge Smith concurs.

Order affirmed.

      . The trial judge instructed the jurors not to consider the third-degree count as to a victim unless they first found defendant not guilty of the second-degree crime.

      . Section 120.05 (3) currently encompasses a peace officer or police officer; “a firefighter, including a firefighter acting as a paramedic or emergency medical technician administering first aid in the course of performance of duty as such firefighter”; an emergency medical service paramedic or technician; “medical or related personnel in a hospital emergency department”; a city marshal, or a traffic enforcement officer or agent; a registered nurse or licensed practical nurse; or a sanitation enforcement agent. Interestingly, the Legislature recently added a new section 120.09 to the Penal Law to create a class C felony of assault on a judge. To be guilty of this crime, a person must intend to cause serious physical injury and to “prevent a judge from performing official judicial duties” (see L 2011, ch 148).

      . The dissent, unlike defendant, seems to concede that Spinelli was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the attack, and argues principally that “the People established only that the victim was subjected to an entirely unexplained, senseless assault at the hands of defendant” (dissenting op at 171). Under this reading of section 120.05 (3), it is hard to see how any case would ever go to the jury unless the defendant “explained” that his intent in attacking an on-the-job public servant was to prevent him from carrying out his job duties.

       Nor is it sufficient in this case to show intent to cause physical injury while the EMT was “performing an assigned duty” as is the case with assaults on certain transit workers (Penal Law § 120.05 [11]).