author: Abdus-Salaam, J. Pigott, J.

text:
    [38 NE3d 325, 16 NYS3d 796]
    In the Matter of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellant, v Patrick Fitzgerald, Respondent.
    Argued February 12, 2015;
    reargued June 2, 2015;
    decided July 1, 2015

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale (Henry Mascia, Evan H. Krinick and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for appellant.
    The Appellate Division erred in concluding that “motor vehicle” includes police vehicles for purposes of the SUM endorsement and Officer Knauss’s private automobile insurance policy. (Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Wagoner, 45 NY2d 581; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Amato, 72 NY2d 288; Raffellini v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 196; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Rivera, 12 NY3d 602; Matter of Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v Mancuso, 93 NY2d 487; Matter of Reilley v Department of Motor Vehs. of State of N.Y., 240 AD2d 296; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Fitzgerald, 112 AD3d 166; Matter of Progressive Northeastern Ins. Co. v Scalamandre, 51 AD3d 932; Matter of Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Rondina, 32 AD3d 1230.)

      Frank J. Laine, P.C., Plainview (Frank Braunstein of counsel), for respondent.
    State Farm Automobile Insurance Company’s argument is replete with false premises designed to avoid the reality that absent a specific provision to the contrary the term “motor vehicle” clearly encompasses police vehicles and that Insurance Law § 3420 contains no exclusion for police vehicles. (Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. [Hogan], 82 NY2d 57; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Amato, 72 NY2d 288; Matter of Knickerbocker Ins. Co. [Faison], 22 NY2d 554; Cohen v Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 264; Matter of Eveready Ins. Co. v Asante, 153 AD2d 890; Matter of CountryWide Ins. Co. v Wagoner, 45 NY2d 581; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Shaw, 52 NY2d 818; Matter of Progressive Northeastern Ins. Co. v Scalamandre, 51 AD3d 932; Matter of Liberty Mut.

      Fire Ins. Co. v Rondina, 32 AD3d 1230; Harper v Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 174 AD2d 1031.)

       Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, designated pursuant to NY Constitution, article VI, § 2 to serve as an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals.

   OPINION OF THE COURT

Abdus-Salaam, J.

More than a quarter-century ago, in Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Amato (72 NY2d 288 [1988]), we squarely “h[e]ld” that “Insurance Law § 3420 (f) — providing that all ‘motor vehicle’ insurance policies must contain uninsured motorist coverage — has no application to police vehicles” {id. at 295). Nonetheless, in this case, the Appellate Division deemed that holding inapplicable to supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist (SUM) coverage mandated by Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2). Distinguishing Amato on its facts, the Appellate Division proceeded to define “motor vehicle” for purposes of statutorily required SUM coverage as inclusive of police vehicles.

This was error. With respect to the statutory definition of the critical term “motor vehicle,” there is no material distinction between the uninsured motorist coverage at issue in Amato and the disputed SUM coverage here, and the factual differences between this case and Amato do not compel a different result. Consequently, a police vehicle is not a “motor vehicle” covered by a SUM endorsement under Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) (A). Furthermore, to the extent there is any question of the continuing precedential force of Amato — and the parties here have not raised such a question — the language and legislative history of Insurance Law § 3420, as well as the doctrine of stare decisis, fully support our retention of Amato as binding precedent in this matter of statutory interpretation.

I

While riding in a police vehicle driven by fellow Officer Michael Knauss, respondent Police Officer Patrick Fitzgerald was injured when the allegedly intoxicated driver of an underinsured vehicle struck the police car. At the time, Knauss maintained an automobile liability insurance policy issued by appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and the policy included a SUM endorsement. In addition to covering Knauss as the named insured and his family, the SUM endorsement insured against injuries to “any other person while occupying” Knauss’s personal vehicle or “any other motor vehicle while being operated by [the named insured] or [the named insured’s] spouse” (some emphasis added and some emphasis omitted). The policy did not define the term “motor vehicle.”

On or before July 25, 2011, GEICO, the insurer for the underinsured motorist who had hit Knauss’s car, tendered payment to Fitzgerald in the amount of $25,000, which was the limit of the underinsured motorist’s policy. On August 18, 2011, based on the injuries he received while occupying Knauss’s police vehicle during the accident, Fitzgerald made a demand upon State Farm for underinsured motorist arbitration under the SUM endorsement of Knauss’s policy. State Farm refused to make any payment to Fitzgerald on the ground that he had occupied a police vehicle at the time of the accident, which was not a covered “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the SUM endorsement. State Farm then filed a petition to permanently stay arbitration based on the asserted unavailability of SUM benefits for Fitzgerald.

Supreme Court granted State Farm’s petition to permanently stay arbitration. As relevant here, the court held that, although an individual who is the principal insured can receive benefits under his or her own insurance policy when he or she is in a police vehicle during an accident, that rule does not apply to an individual such as Fitzgerald, who seeks coverage under a SUM endorsement in someone else’s insurance policy. Citing Amato, the court determined that Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) (A), which controls the SUM endorsement in Knauss’s policy, incorporates Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)’s definition of a covered “motor vehicle,” which specifically excludes police vehicles such as the one containing Fitzgerald at the time of the accident. Thus, the court concluded that Knauss’s policy does not cover Fitzgerald, and it permanently stayed arbitration on Fitzgerald’s claim for coverage. Fitzgerald appealed.

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed Supreme Court’s order and denied the petition to permanently stay arbitration, holding that the police car in which Fitzgerald had been riding at the time of the accident constituted a “motor vehicle” under the SUM endorsement in Knauss’s automobile insurance policy (see 112 AD3d 166, 167-170 [2d Dept 2013]). In that regard, since neither the SUM endorsement itself nor Insurance Law § 3420 (f) defines the term “motor vehicle,” the Appellate Division looked to the provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law defining that term (see id. at 168). In that Court’s view, since Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 sets forth the general definition of a “motor vehicle” to be used throughout the Vehicle and Traffic Law, that statute provides the most widely applicable definition of the term, which encompasses all motor-powered vehicles and includes police vehicles (see id. at 168-169). Thus, the Court opined, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 “should be used to define the term ‘motor vehicle,’ as it appears in the uninsured/underinsured motorist endorsement,” because “Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 is a general provision that defines the relevant terminology for the entire Vehicle and Traffic Law” (id. at 169). Citing its prior decision in Matter of Progressive Northeastern Ins. Co. v Scalamandre (51 AD3d 932 [2d Dept 2008]) and the Fourth Department’s decision in Matter of Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Rondina (32 AD3d 1230 [4th Dept 2006]), the Court said, “Additionally, it has been recognized that uninsured motorist coverage extends to all ‘motor vehicles,’ as defined by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125” (id.).

The Court noted that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2) defines the term “vehicle” for purposes of civil liability as “a ‘motor vehicle,’ as defined in [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125] . . . , except fire and police vehicles,” but the Court found that definition inapplicable because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2) does not feature the most common general definition of “vehicle” and defines the term “vehicle” rather than the critical term “motor vehicle” at issue here (id. at 168-169). The Court attempted to distinguish Amato, positing that, there, this Court decided only that New York City as a self-regulating insurer did not have to provide liability coverage for police vehicles under Insurance Law § 3420 (e) and (f) (1) because a police vehicle does not qualify as a “motor vehicle” under those statutes, whereas here the issue is whether a separate statutory subsection, Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2), classifies a police car as a “motor vehicle” (see id.). Given that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125’s definition of “motor vehicle” applies to Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) and encompasses police vehicles, the Court maintained, “the police vehicle at issue here falls within the definition of a ‘motor vehicle’ under the uninsured/underinsured motorist endorsement,” and consequently, respondent was entitled to SUM benefits under the policy that State Farm issued to Knauss (id. at 170).

Upon State Farm’s application, we granted a stay of the Appellate Division’s order and leave to appeal (22 NY3d 1168 [2014]). We now reverse.

II

Principles of Interpretation, Insurance Law § 3420 and Amato

Although provisions of an insurance policy drafted by the insurer are generally construed against the insurer if ambiguous (see Dean v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y., 19 NY3d 704, 708 [2012]), a policy provision mandated by statute must be interpreted in a neutral manner consistently with the intent of the legislative and administrative sources of the legislation (see Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Wagoner, 45 NY2d 581, 586-587 [1978]). Since State Farm did not choose the terms of the SUM endorsement here of its own accord but, rather, was required to offer SUM coverage in compliance with the terms of Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) (A) and Department of Insurance regulations (see 11 NYCRR 60-2.3 [f]), we must interpret the SUM endorsement and the language of the statute in the manner intended by the neutral sources of that enactment (see generally Governor’s Approval Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1977, ch 892; see also Bill Jacket, L 1958, ch 759; Letter from Executive Secretary of NY Law Rev Commn to Governor’s Counsel, Mar. 28, 1958, Bill Jacket, L 1958, ch 577).

Insurance Law § 3420 specifies the standard forms of coverage that must be included in a liability insurance policy. Subsection (e) requires automobile insurance policies to insure against civil liability for the negligence of those who drive the principal insured’s car with his or her permission, saying:

“No policy or contract of personal injury liability insurance or of property damage liability insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or operation of any motor vehicle or of any vehicle as defined in section three hundred eighty-eight of the vehicle and traffic law, or an aircraft, or any vessel as defined in section forty-eight of the navigation law, shall be issued or delivered in this state . . . unless it contains a provision insuring the named insured against liability for death or injury sustained . . . as a result of negligence in the operation or use of such vehicle, aircraft or vessel” (Insurance Law § 3420 [e] [emphasis added]).

Subsection (f) (1) mandates that automobile insurance policies feature uninsured motorist coverage, which covers liability arising from an accident involving the named insured and a motorist who has no applicable insurance coverage. Thus, subsection (f) (1) states that

“[n]o policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any natural person arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of a motor vehicle by the insured shall be issued or delivered . . . unless it contains a provision whereby the insurer agrees that it will pay to the insured, as defined in such provision . . .all sums . . . which the insured or his legal representative shall be entitled to recover as damages from an owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.” (Insurance Law § 3420 [f] [1] [emphasis added].)

Subsection (f) (2) (A) declares that “[a]ny such policy shall, at the option of the insured, also provide supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorists insurance for bodily injury,” which is a species of uninsured motorist insurance that covers liability stemming from accidents involving the named insured and a motorist who possesses automotive insurance with limits or other restrictions that are inadequate to cover the full extent of the loss. The statute further states that SUM coverage is triggered “if the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies of another motor vehicle liable for damages are in a lesser amount than the bodily injury liability insurance limits of coverage provided by such policy” (Insurance Law § 3420 [f] [2] [A]). Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) does not use the term “motor vehicle,” but because that subsection applies to “[a]ny such policy,” referring to a policy of the kind described in Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (1), Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) necessarily restricts SUM coverage to “motor vehicle[s]” in the same manner as subsection (f) (1).

As noted, Insurance Law § 3420 (e) and (í) (1) do not directly define “motor vehicle” in so many words, but Insurance Law § 3420 (e) does refer to “a[ ] motor vehicle or . . . a[ ] vehicle as defined in [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)].” Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 is the sole provision of Vehicle and Traffic Law article 11, which governs civil liability for negligence in the operation of vehicles. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2) states, “As used in this section, ‘vehicle’ means a ‘motor vehicle’, as defined in [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125], except fire and police vehicles,” and certain other vehicles not relevant here. The Vehicle and Traffic Law also includes a definition of the term “motor vehicle” in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125, which is part of the article defining terms of general use in the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Under that statute, “motor vehicle” means “[e]very vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power,” with exceptions for all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles and mobility aids for the disabled (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125). Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 exempts police vehicles from registration requirements under title IV of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, but does not otherwise list any exclusion for police vehicles. Other provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the Insurance Law also set forth definitions of the term “motor vehicle,” often exempting police vehicles (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 311 [2]; Insurance Law § 5202 [a]).

In Amato, this Court resolved two consolidated cases by specifying the types of vehicles that, when involved in an accident, can trigger uninsured motorist coverage under Insurance Law § 3420 (f). In one case, Police Officer Amato had uninsured motorist coverage for his personal vehicle under a policy issued by State Farm (see Amato, 72 NY2d at 291). The City insured any police vehicles used by Amato, but it did not provide uninsured motorist coverage under its policy (see id. at 290-291). While Amato was riding on his police scooter, he was struck by a stolen taxicab, which was not covered by the cab owner’s insurance (see id. at 290). When Amato filed a claim with State Farm, State Farm petitioned for a permanent stay of arbitration under the policy, asserting that Amato had to look to the City for uninsured motorist coverage because the City was required by statute to provide such coverage (see id. at 291). Special Term denied the petition, reasoning that the City did not have to give Amato uninsured motorist coverage and that therefore State Farm was responsible for covering Amato’s loss (see id.).

In the companion case, a motorist, who ultimately turned out not to have active insurance coverage, ran into the rear of Police Officer Rutherford’s police car (see id. at 291). Rutherford filed a claim with State Farm, which, as in Amato’s case, denied coverage, citing the City’s status as the primary insurer and its supposed statutory obligation to provide uninsured motorist coverage for police vehicles (see id. at 292). In a consolidated appeal in Amato’s and Rutherford’s cases, the Appellate Division reversed and held that the City had the primary obligation to grant uninsured motorist coverage to the officers pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (see id. at 292; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Amato, 129 AD2d 221, 225-227 [2d Dept 1987]).

On further appeal, this Court reversed (72 NY2d 288, 290-292 [1988]). The Court began its opinion by describing the statutory provisions, such as Vehicle and Traffic Law articles 6 and 7, which reflect the legislature’s desire to ensure that motorists have sufficient financial security to cover the consequences of an accident, and the Court explained that Insurance Law § 3420 (f) mandates the inclusion of uninsured motorist coverage in every automobile insurance policy issued in New York addressing the “use of a motor vehicle by the insured” (id. at 292-293, quoting Insurance Law § 3420 [f]).

The Court agreed with the Appellate Division that self-insurers, such as the City, “generally have the same statutory responsibility as other insurers to provide uninsured motorist coverage,” but it found that point irrelevant to the question at hand because no liability coverage existed at all, regardless of the insurer, if the liability does not arise from the use of a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 3420 (e) (id. at 294). And, the Court determined, Insurance Law § 3420 (e) excludes police vehicles from the term “motor vehicle,” for that statute cites Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2), which governs civil liability for negligence in the use of motor vehicles and explicitly excludes police vehicles from its scope (see id.). “Although this exclusionary language is not repeated in the uninsured motorist provision of the Insurance Law (Insurance Law § 3420 [f]),” the Court concluded that “it would be illogical to assume that, while there is no legal obligation to insure police vehicles for death or bodily injury in the first instance, the City is nevertheless required to provide uninsured motorist coverage for its police vehicles” (id.).

Thus, the Court stated that, in light of the “need to interpret the statutes relating to uninsured motorist coverage as a whole and in a way consistent with their legislative purpose,” “we hold that Insurance Law § 3420 (f) — providing that all ‘motor vehicle’ insurance policies must contain uninsured motorist coverage — has no application to police vehicles” (id. at 295). The Court further “h[e]ld” that “there is no such statutory obligation” for the City, as an unregulated self-insurer, to insure police officers against injuries caused by an uninsured motorist hitting their police vehicles (id. at 290). Accordingly, the Court decided that the City had no statutory obligation to provide uninsured motorist coverage for Amato’s and Rutherford’s police vehicles (see id. at 290, 294). Two Judges dissented because, in their view, the legislature’s failure to create an express exemption for police vehicles within the text of Insurance Law § 3420 (f) reflected a legislative intent to place all motor vehicles, including police vehicles, within the scope of statutory uninsured motorist coverage (see id. at 295-296 [Wachtler, Ch. J., dissenting]).

The Parties’ Contentions

With this legal background in mind, we turn to the arguments advanced by the parties here. In this case, State Farm and Fitzgerald agree that the disputed SUM endorsement’s coverage of accidents involving a “motor vehicle” must use the same definition of that term employed by Insurance Law § 3420 (f), and Fitzgerald has not proceeded under any other statute, such as the No-Fault Law. However, the parties dispute whether that definition includes police vehicles like the one occupied by Fitzgerald.

State Farm contends that, because Insurance Law § 3420 (e) refers to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)’s definition of “vehicle,” which in turn incorporates Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125’s definition of “motor vehicle” and yet also excludes police vehicles, the closely related provisions of Insurance Law § 3420 (f) should be read to similarly define “motor vehicle” in accordance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2), thereby excluding police vehicles from SUM coverage. According to State Farm, Amato adopted this approach, as the Amato Court interpreted the term “motor vehicle” in Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (1) to have the same meaning as it does in Insurance Law § 3420 (e), i.e., to exclude police vehicles. By logical extension, State Farm urges, “motor vehicle” must mean the same thing under Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) as it does in subsections (e) and (f) (1) because the statute must be interpreted as a cohesive whole.

In response, Fitzgerald does not argue that Amato was wrongly decided or should be altered in any way, but instead tries to parse that decision and the statutory text in a manner favorable to him. Fitzgerald asserts that Insurance Law § 3420 (f) must be read to incorporate the most common and generalized statutory meaning of the term “motor vehicle,” and that therefore one must look to the general definition of “motor vehicle” in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 to define the same term in the insurance statute. Because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 defines a “motor vehicle” as essentially any powered vehicle, including a police vehicle, Fitzgerald posits that Insurance Law § 3420 (f) provides SUM coverage for accidents involving police vehicles via its inherent incorporation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 definition of “motor vehicle.” In Fitzgerald’s view, it does not matter that Insurance Law § 3420 (e) covers accidents arising from the operation “of any motor vehicle or of any vehicle as defined in [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)]” (emphasis added) because that statute only references Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2) to define the distinct term “vehicle,” and it does not define the separate term “motor vehicle.” That being so, Fitzgerald says, Insurance Law § 3420 (f) does not adopt Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)’s exclusion of police vehicles from the definition of “vehicle” because Insurance Law § 3420 (f) does not use the term “vehicle” at all, instead using the entirely different term “motor vehicle” as defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 to establish the breadth of its coverage. According to Fitzgerald, Amato is factually distinguishable because that case involved the liability of an unregulated self-insurer for uninsured motorist coverage under Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (1), whereas the issue here is whether a private insurer must provide SUM coverage under Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2).

The simple answer to Fitzgerald’s claims, and hence to this whole case, is that Amato means what it says: “Insurance Law § 3420 (f) — providing that all ‘motor vehicle’ insurance policies must contain uninsured motorist coverage — has no application to police vehicles” (Amato, 72 NY2d at 295). Just as the term “motor vehicle” in Insurance Law § 3420 (f) generally, and paragraph (1) in particular, does not encompass police vehicles, that same term in paragraph (2) likewise does not bring police vehicles within its scope. Therefore, both uninsured motorist coverage under paragraph (1) and SUM coverage under paragraph (2) clearly exclude police vehicles in accordance with subsection (f) (l)’s reference to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2).

Indeed, as we have noted post-Amato, SUM coverage under Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) is a subspecies of uninsured motorist coverage under Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (1), and the reach of the two statutory subsections is essentially coterminous, except that Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) covers accidents involving underinsured motorists and can provide for a higher limit on the amount of recovery (see Raffellini v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 196, 204-205 [2007]). In light of the similarities between the two paragraphs of Insurance Law § 3420 (f), the term “motor vehicle” must have the same definition under those paragraphs and limit the benefits they provide in the same manner. Given that police vehicles do not fall within the ambit of Insurance Law § 3420 (í) (1) and (2), State Farm rightly declined to cover Fitzgerald, who was a passenger in a police vehicle at the time of the crash.

Fitzgerald seeks to distinguish Amato, observing that Amato involved the priority of coverage to be provided by a self-insurer, the City of New York, and an automobile insurance company, State Farm. But, in Amato, we never suggested that we were limiting our holding to a self-insurer or to situations involving the priority or “stacking” of coverage. In fact, we specifically noted that, under prior precedent, “self-insurers generally have the same statutory responsibility as other insurers to provide uninsured motorist coverage,” and thus, our decision turned not on the City’s status as a self-insurer but instead on the definition of the term “motor vehicle” under Insurance Law § 3420 (f), which we found to exclude police vehicles (Amato, 72 NY2d at 294-295). Nor does it make sense to conclude that the term “motor vehicle” in Insurance Law § 3420 (f) means one thing when the priority of coverage must be determined and yet means something completely different when the scope of coverage is at issue. Surely, a term in a single undivided subsection of a statute — here subsection (f) (2) (A) — cannot have more than one definition depending on the facts of the case to which it is applied.

Fitzgerald also points out that Insurance Law § 3420 (e) applies to a policy that covers any “motor vehicle” as well as any “vehicle as defined in [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)],” whereas Insurance Law § 3420 (f) applies to a policy that covers only “motor vehicles” without mentioning “vehicles” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2). Fitzgerald takes this as proof that Insurance Law § 3420 (f), unlike Insurance Law § 3420 (e), extends coverage to cases involving any “motor vehicle” as that term is defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125, including police vehicles.

But we essentially rejected that notion in Amato. There, we noted, as Fitzgerald does now, that Insurance Law § 3420 (e)’s “exclusionary language” and citation to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2) are “not repeated in the uninsured motorist provision of the Insurance Law (Insurance Law § 3420 [f])” {Amato, 72 NY2d at 294). Nonetheless, we determined that the legislature intended to carry the exclusion of police vehicles from Insurance Law § 3420 (e) over to Insurance Law § 3420 (f) because “it would be illogical to assume that, while there is no legal obligation to insure police vehicles for death or bodily injury in the first instance, the City is nevertheless required to provide uninsured motorist coverage for its police vehicles” {id.).

Even without the benefit of Amato's binding precedent, Fitzgerald’s attempt to import Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125’s definition of “motor vehicle” into Insurance Law § 3420 (f), but not into Insurance Law § 3420 (e), would make no sense. After all, Insurance Law § 3420 (e) and (f) do not mention Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 at all, and as a result, there is no reason to suppose, as Fitzgerald does, that the legislature meant to incorporate Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125’s broad definition of “motor vehicle” into either of those insurance statutes. Rather, the only Vehicle and Traffic Law provision cited by the relevant statutes is Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2), which explicitly exempts police vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicle.” Accordingly, the legislature presumably meant to exclude police vehicles from coverage under the interrelated provisions of Insurance Law § 3420 (e), (f) (1) and (2), and the SUM endorsement here necessarily features that same exclusion. For that reason, we have never looked to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 for guidance as to the meaning of the term “motor vehicle” under Insurance Law § 3420 (f), instead relying on the use of comparable terms in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2) (see Amato, 72 NY2d at 293-294) and the MVAIC Act (Insurance Law art 52) (see Wagoner, 45 NY2d at 586-588).

While Insurance Law § 3420 (e)’s use of the phrase “of any motor vehicle or of any vehicle as defined in [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)]” may be confusing insofar as the terms are inherently conflicting in their scope under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, it appears that the legislature chose those words as an imprecise expression of its intent to incorporate Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)’s limitations into the relevant sections of the Insurance Law. Significantly, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)’s definition of “vehicle” is narrower than that of “motor vehicle” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 in most respects. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2) incorporates nearly all of the exclusions listed in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 by defining “vehicle” as a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125, and adding extra exclusions for a variety of agricultural equipment, fire vehicles, police vehicles and onsite construction vehicles. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2)’s only additional inclusions are for trailers and for vehicles used on roads other than highways.

As a result, a literal reading of Insurance Law § 3420 (e)’s reference to the negligent operation “of any motor vehicle or of any vehicle as defined in [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388]” would be largely self-contradictory. It would suggest that the statute covers “[e]very vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power,” including police vehicles, agricultural vehicles and the like (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125), or, somewhat paradoxically, a motor vehicle, excluding police vehicles, agricultural vehicles, and onsite construction equipment, but including non-highway vehicles and trailers. Of course, had the legislature wished for the broader definition of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 to apply to Insurance Law § 3420 (e) and (f), it could have easily referred to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 alone. And if the legislature was solely concerned about placing trailers and vehicles on non-public roads in the ambit of the insurance statute, it could have directly referred to those minor differences between the inclusions of the two Vehicle and Traffic Law statutes without citing Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2). Since the legislature did not refer to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 at all in drafting Insurance Law § 3420 (e), did not indicate a desire to define “motor vehicle” without limitation in that section and directly cited the narrow provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, it plainly intended to narrow the definition of “motor vehicle” for purposes of Insurance Law § 3420 (e).

Legislative History Supporting Amato

The legislative history of these statutes buttresses our conclusion, as previously stated in Amato, that Insurance Law § 3420 (f) does not define “motor vehicle” to include police vehicles. In that regard, even at the time of the passage of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the general definition of “motor vehicle” in that statutory scheme excluded police vehicles, and the original civil liability provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law imposed such liability only for the negligent operation of “motor vehicles,” excluding police vehicles (see L 1936, ch 911, § 1; L 1929, ch 54 [enacting Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 2 (8); 59]; Letter from Commr of Highways, St Dept of Pub Works, to Governor’s Counsel, Mar. 6, 1929, Bill Jacket, L 1929, ch 54 at 8; see also Arnold W. Wise, The History of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 62A at xv [1960 ed]). Hence, from its inception, the Vehicle and Traffic Law did not provide for civil liability arising out of the negligent operation of police vehicles.

Later, when the legislature amended the predecessor to Insurance Law § 3420, it used language that paralleled the civil liability provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and it used the term “motor vehicle” to define the scope of statutorily required automobile liability insurance, thereby presumably excluding police vehicles in a similar way (see L 1939, ch 882 [enacting Insurance Law § 167]). Accordingly, at the time the predecessors to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 and Insurance Law § 3420 (e) were enacted, the relevant laws had these salient features: (1) the term “motor vehicle” in general excluded police vehicles; (2) statutory civil liability did not lie for the negligent use of police vehicles; and (3) insurers were not statutorily required to cover vicarious liability with respect to vehicles that were not “motor vehicles,” which term was continued in the Insurance Law at a time when the only statute defining it, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 2 (8), clearly excluded police vehicles (see L 1938, ch 183, § 1).

When Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 was enacted, it did not contain the police vehicle exclusion in its definition of “motor vehicle,” but that was of no moment because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 did not apply to the civil liability statute within the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see L 1957, ch 698 [adding Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 125, 100]). Likewise, after the predecessor to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 was amended to define the scope of civil liability based on the operation of “vehicles” rather than “motor vehicles,” a 1958 bill ensured that it still referred to a section of the Vehicle and Traffic Law that incorporated the police vehicle exclusion, thereby maintaining that limitation (see L 1958, ch 577, § 1).

The same bill made a “conformity amendment” to the predecessor to Insurance Law § 3420 (e) to “make it clear that the term ‘motor vehicle’ as used in that section includes all vehicles as defined in section 59 [the predecessor to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388]” (Recommendation of Law Rev Commn to Legislature, Bill Jacket, L 1958, ch 577 at 45). Maintaining the consistency between the predecessors to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 and Insurance Law § 3420 (e), the legislature added a citation to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388’s predecessor and its terminology to define the coverage of the requisite liability insurance policy. To the existing clause of Insurance Law § 3420 (e)’s predecessor that said, “No policy or contract of personal injury liability insurance . . . covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or operation of any motor vehicle,” the legislature appended the phrase “or of any vehicle as defined in section fifty-nine of the vehicle and traffic law” (L 1958, ch 577, § 3). As the Bar Association of the City of New York noted, this change was “a source of confusion” insofar as the terms “vehicle” and “motor vehicle” were conflicting under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, but it was nonetheless “under-st[oo]d” that “the intended application of Section 167(2) [the predecessor to Insurance Law § 3420 (e)] [wa]s only to the liability arising under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 59” (Mem of Assn of Bar of City of NY Common St Legis, Bill Jacket, L 1958, ch 577 at 19 [emphasis added]). The Law Revision Commission, which proposed the legislation, essentially confirmed this understanding of the reach of the predecessor to Insurance Law § 3420 (e) (see Recommendation of Law Rev Commn to Legislature, Bill Jacket, L 1958, ch 577 at 38-39). Therefore, in enacting the 1958 amendments to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388’s and Insurance Law § 3420 (e)’s antecedents, the legislature adopted legislation meant to continue to exclude police vehicles from the ambit of the predecessor to Insurance Law § 3420 (e) (see also Mem of Assistant Director of Research of Law Rev Commn, Bill Jacket, L 1962, ch 825 at 19 [“section 167(2) of the Insurance Law . . . now require(s) coverage of the insured’s liability under section 388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law,” which was the successor to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 59 and still exempted police vehicles]).

1958 also brought the advent of uninsured motorist coverage. The legislature sought to guarantee that all owners of covered vehicles had uninsured motorist coverage from one of two sources: (1) automobile insurance policies including that coverage; or (2) uninsured motorist benefits paid by the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation to those who did not have such insurance (see generally L 1958, ch 759). Accordingly, the legislature crafted a new article 17-A of the Insurance Law, establishing MVAIC and directing it to process all claims for uninsured motorist benefits, regardless of whether the claims ultimately were to be paid by an insurance company or by MVAIC itself (see id.). Under that article, a “motor vehicle” to which uninsured motorist benefits applied was not inclusive of police vehicles (see L 1958, ch 759, § 2; see also former Vehicle and Traffic Law § 2 [1958]).

The legislature also amended Insurance Law § 167 (2), the predecessor to Insurance Law § 3420 (e), to compel insurers to add uninsured motorist endorsements to automobile insurance policies. The legislature placed the uninsured motorist provision in a new subsection (2-a) immediately following subsection (2) of Insurance Law § 167 (see L 1958, ch 759, § 4). Like its modern counterpart, Insurance Law § 167 (2-a) mandated that uninsured motorist coverage be contained in any “policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death . . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of a motor vehicle by the insured,” and that the policy had to establish that coverage either through the insurer itself or through MVAIC (L 1958, ch 759, § 4 [emphasis added]). Tellingly, although the statute did not define “motor vehicle,” it was placed immediately following Insurance Law § 167 (2) and its incorporation of a definition of “motor vehicle” that exempts police vehicles. Indeed, the legislature saw the relationship between these two statutory subsections as quite close, for Insurance Law § 167 (2-a) was meant to fill what were simply “loopholes” (Sponsor’s Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1958, ch 759 at 6) or “gaps” (Governor’s Open Letter to Legislature, Bill Jacket, L 1958, ch 759 at 11) in the compulsory insurance statutes and Insurance Law § 167 (2), merely adding an uninsured motorist subdivision as an appendage to the existing law.

Along those lines, uninsured motorist endorsements under Insurance Law § 167 (2-a) were also intended to extend the same coverage as the MVAIC statute, and nothing more, because the statutory uninsured motorist endorsements and MVAIC were regarded as related “prong[s]” of the same “attack” on the problem of uninsured motorists (Mem of Supt, St Ins Dept, Bill Jacket, L 1958, ch 759 at 23; see also McCarthy v Motor Veh. Acc. Indent. Corp., 16 AD2d 35, 38-42 [4th Dept 1962] [“The MVAIC Law was not designed to supplement the insurance coverage of insured automobiles or to protect injured persons against risks which were not covered by the standard automobile liability policies” because “(t)hey are, and under the scheme of the statute, they must be, coextensive,” and certain terms in policies under Insurance Law § 167 (2-a) must be given the same meaning as under the MVAIC Law], affd 12 NY2d 922 [1963]; Moffitt v Moffitt, 46 AD2d 944, 945 [3d Dept 1974] [in the context of uninsured motorist accident, “MVAIC coverage is coextensive with that of a standard policy and article 17-A of the Insurance Law does not supplement the coverage of insured automobiles or protect insured persons against risks not covered by a standard policy”]). So it was that, in Wagoner (45 NY2d 581), we looked to the definitions section of the MVAIC Law as authority for the proposition that a “motorcycle” was a “motor vehicle” under Insurance Law § 167 (2-a), which was section 3420 (f)’s predecessor, because it was defined as such for purposes of the MVAIC Law (see id. at 586-588). This suggests that, just as MVAIC did not generally define a “motor vehicle” as inclusive of police vehicles, the uninsured motorist statute likewise removed police vehicles from the ambit of that term. And, the state of affairs remained the same following the passage of the legislation that rearranged and renumbered portions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law into its modern configuration (see L 1959, ch 775 [adding Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 125, 125-a, 388 (2)]; L 1960, ch 608, § 4; L 1967, ch 139, § 1).

SUM coverage became compulsory in 1977 via an amendment to Insurance Law § 167 (2-a). This combined uninsured motorist/SUM coverage statute retained the original language of the uninsured motorist provision and added within that same undivided subsection the following: As we have recognized, these statutory SUM benefits were “designed to give insureds the same level of protection that would have been available to others under the policy if the insureds were the tortfeasors who caused personal injuries,” and the legislature first addressed SUM coverage and general uninsured motorist coverage in the same statutory section because “both paragraphs of section 167 (2-a) related to uninsured motorist benefits and supplementary coverage was framed as an extension of the mandatory coverage outlined in the first paragraph” (Raffellini, 9 NY3d at 204-205). Therefore, SUM coverage was an extension of uninsured motorist coverage that generally applied in the same situations, just with different policy limits.

“Any such policy shall, at the option of the insured, also provide supplementary uninsured motorists insurance for bodily injury, in an amount up to the bodily injury liability insurance limits of coverage provided under such policy, subject to a maximum of [$100,000 due to bodily injury or death per accident].” (L 1977, ch 892, § 3.)

Finally, in 1984, the Insurance Law was renumbered in its entirety, resulting in the transfer of the old SUM, uninsured motorist and general liability coverage provisions into new Insurance Law § 3420. As a result, the requirements of general liability insurance policies are now outlined in Insurance Law § 3420 (e), uninsured motorist coverage requirements can be found in Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (1), and SUM coverage provisions are in Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) (A) (see L 1984, ch 367). Despite the separation of the uninsured motorist and SUM measures into distinct subsections (f) (1) and (f) (2), “[t]his recodification was not meant to effect a substantive change in the law — certainly, there is no reason to conclude that the Legislature split the two paragraphs into separate subsections to create a distinction between the two types of coverages that did not already exist” (Raffellini, 9 NY3d at 205; see Letter from Supt of Ins to Governor’s Counsel, July 13, 1984, Bill Jacket, L 1984, ch 367 at 7).

When Amato arrived in this Court, the law stood as follows: New York had traditionally exempted police vehicles from statutes dealing with civil liability under the Vehicle and Traffic Law; the legislature had long bound the Vehicle and Traffic Law civil liability statute and the predecessors to Insurance Law § 3420 (e) together, making their coverage coextensive; the legislature had also created essentially coterminous MVAIC and uninsured motorist statutes, the former of which defined “motor vehicle” to exclude police vehicles; the legislature had expressed a desire to maintain consistency in the scope of coverage of general automobile liability insurance and uninsured motorist coverage; and statutory uninsured motorist coverage and SUM coverage gave rise to matching benefits and limitations, such that if one excluded police vehicles, the other logically did so as well.

Against this backdrop, the Amato Court had every reason to conclude that, because the liability insurance provision of Insurance Law § 3420 (e) had traditionally dovetailed with the coverage of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 and its predecessors, Insurance Law § 3420 (e) employed the phrase “of a motor vehicle or of a vehicle as defined in [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388]” as an imprecise way of incorporating the limitations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 into Insurance Law § 3420 (e). In other words, Insurance Law § 3420 (e) used Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (2) to redefine “motor vehicle” as exempting police vehicles from the automobile insurance sections of Insurance Law § 3420. Given that the uninsured motorist and SUM coverage sections of Insurance Law § 3420 had originated as outgrowths designed to simply fill the uninsured or underinsured motorist “gaps” in the compulsory insurance statute and Insurance Law § 3420 (e), rather than to expand the class of covered vehicles, the Court rightly decided that Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (1) and (2) logically applied to the limited category of “motor vehicles” referenced in Insurance Law § 3420 (e), thus also excluding police vehicles. Since SUM coverage under Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) was just a variant of uninsured coverage under subsection (f) (1) of the same statute, the Court appropriately found that SUM coverage was likewise limited to non-police vehicles. Accordingly, the Amato Court properly interpreted Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) in a manner fully consistent with the legislature’s intent.

Stare Decisis and Developments Post-Amato

Even if we were to disagree with our holding in Amato, we would nonetheless be bound to follow it under the doctrine of stare decisis. “ ‘Stare decisis is the doctrine which holds that common-law decisions should stand as precedents for guidance in cases arising in the future’ and that a rule of law ‘once decided by a court, will generally be followed in subsequent cases presenting the same legal problem’ ” (People v Peque, 22 NY3d 168, 194 [2013], quoting People v Damiano, 87 NY2d 477, 488 [1996, Simons, J., concurring]). Even under the most flexible version of the doctrine applicable to constitutional jurisprudence, prior decisions should not be overruled unless a “compelling justification” exists for such a drastic step (People v Lopez, 16 NY3d 375, 384 n 5 [2011]; see People v Silva, 24 NY3d 294, 300 [2014]). As we recently reiterated, an even more extraordinary and compelling justification is needed to overturn precedents involving statutory interpretation, such as Amato, because unlike in constitutional cases, “if the precedent or precedents have misinterpreted the legislative intention [embodied in a statute], the Legislature’s competency to correct the misinterpretation is readily at hand” (Palladino v CNY Centro, Inc., 23 NY3d 140, 151 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Indeed, in Palladino, we upheld a statutory interpretation precedent that we found to be riddled with shortcomings both at the time it had been decided and thereafter. While we openly “question [ed] ” the “utility or wisdom” of that precedent, we nonetheless followed it (id. at 150; see also id. at 147-150).

Here, Fitzgerald does not so much as ask us to overturn Amato, much less advance any compelling justification for disturbing that precedent. Nor do we find it appropriate to discard Amato on our own initiative, as there is no evidence that it has become unworkable, is unjust or has created an irreconcilable conflict in our case law. Certainly, legislative developments since our decision in Amato have not cast doubt on its validity, for the legislature has repeatedly amended Insurance Law § 3420 after Amato without making any effort to undo that decision (see L 2013, ch 11, § 1; L 2012, ch 496, § 1; L 2008, ch 388, §§ 2-6; L 2002, ch 584, §§ 1-2; L 1997, ch 568, § 1; L 1997, ch 547, § 2; L 1995, ch 305, § 1; L 1994, ch 425, § 2; see generally Bill Jacket, L 2013, ch 11; Bill Jacket, L 2012, ch 496; Bill Jacket, L 2008, ch 388; Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 584; Bill Jacket, L 1997, ch 547; Bill Jacket, L 1995, ch 305). This is true even with respect to the specific amendments altering the limits of SUM coverage, and even at times when the legislature made efforts to overturn other pertinent judicial decisions with which it disagreed (see L 2012, ch 496, § 1; L 1997, ch 568, § 1; L 1997, ch 547, § 2; see e.g. Sponsor’s Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1997, ch 547 at 6-7 [seeking to expedite disclosure of coverage of SUM policies in response to Appellate Division case law strictly construing timing requirements for filing of SUM claims, and also citing this Court’s decision in Maurizzio v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. (73 NY2d 951 [1989])]; Mem of NY Law Rev Commn, Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 584 at 9 [calling legislature’s attention to need for amendment to overrule Black v Allstate Ins. Co. (274 AD2d 346 [1st Dept 2000])]).

Therefore, stare decisis compels retention oí Amato. Because there is no basis for distinguishing that case from the one before us, Fitzgerald’s status as a passenger of a police vehicle at the time of the accident dooms his claim under Amato and Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) (A).

m

An unbroken line of historical practice, legislative history, statutory text and precedent establishes that a SUM endorsement prescribed by Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) (A) exempts police vehicles from its definition of the term “motor vehicle” absent a specific provision to the contrary in a given SUM endorsement. Since there is no contrary provision in the SUM endorsement here, it does not cover liability for injuries arising from the use of a police vehicle of the sort occupied by Fitzgerald during his accident. While Fitzgerald may pursue the available remedies, if any, under the No-Fault Law, a lawsuit or any insurance policy he has purchased for himself, he cannot recover under the SUM endorsement of Knauss’s policy, and the Appellate Division erred in overturning the stay of arbitration under that policy. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the petition for a permanent stay of arbitration granted.

Pigott, J.

(dissenting). The issue in this case is simple: whether plaintiff can recover from State Farm, the carrier that issued a SUM endorsement to Knauss’s personal motor vehicle insurance policy. Plaintiff, a person injured while occupying a motor vehicle driven by Knauss, is entitled to recover under the SUM endorsement.

In Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Amato (72 NY2d 288 [1988]), this Court was asked to decide whether the City of New York, as an unregulated self-insurer, was statutorily required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to two of its police officers who were injured when their police vehicles were struck by uninsured motor vehicles {Amato, 72 NY2d at 294). The officers each filed uninsured motorist claims with State Farm, their insurance carrier, to recover for their personal injuries (see id.). When State Farm denied their claims, both officers sought to arbitrate their uninsured motorist claims, and, in both cases, State Farm petitioned to stay the arbitration (see id.). State Farm argued that it was not obligated to provide uninsured motorist coverage because the City of New York, “as owner of the host vehicle, had the primary obligation to provide uninsured motorist coverage” (id. at 292 [internal quotation marks omitted]). This Court rejected that contention, holding that, as an unregulated self-insurer, the City was not statutorily required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to its officers (id. at 290). The Amato Court recognized nonetheless that the officers may make a claim against their own uninsured motorist policy (id. at 293 n 1; see also Williams v City of New York, 144 AB2d 553 [2d Dept 1988] [finding that while the City had no obligation to provide uninsured motorist benefits to the police officer plaintiff, she was entitled to summary judgment against the insurer of her personal vehicle]).

Here, plaintiff is not seeking uninsured motorist coverage from the City, as it is settled under Amato that the City has no obligation to provide the plaintiff with uninsured motorist benefits. It therefore follows, as in our prior precedent, that plaintiff is entitled to coverage under the Knauss’s SUM endorsement.

The legislature intended to make compensation available in cases in which insured persons suffer automobile accident injuries at the hands of financially irresponsible motorists. As this Court recognized in Amato, “[The] Legislature has specifically declared its grave concern that motorists who use the public highways be financially responsible to ensure that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents be recompensed for their injuries and losses” (Amato, 72 NY2d 288, 292, citing Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Shaw, 52 NY2d 818, 819 [1980]). Under the majority’s holding, plaintiff is left without uninsured motorist coverage altogether. Clearly, neither the legislature nor this Court would ever intend such a result.

For these reasons, I dissent and would affirm the order of the Appellate Division.

Judges Read, Stein and Gonzalez concur; Judge Pigott dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Fahey concur; Judge Rivera taking no part.

Order reversed, with costs, and petition for a permanent stay of arbitration granted.

      . The record does not disclose whether Fitzgerald had automobile insurance or liability insurance at the time of the accident. In his motion papers and correspondence with State Farm, Fitzgerald did not discuss his own insurance status, and he did not claim to be uninsured.

      . At the time of the Court’s decision in Amato, Insurance Law § 3420 (f) had already been divided into paragraphs (1) and (2) (see L 1984, ch 367), though the Court did not distinguish between those two paragraphs for purposes of its analysis.

      . The dissent opines that we should direct State Farm to extend coverage to Fitzgerald because, in Amato, we noted that the officers there could receive SUM coverage under their own insurance policies (see dissenting op at 822). But that aspect of Amato is of no help to Fitzgerald. In Amato, we commented that the officers could not receive Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) benefits because they were designated “beneficiaries” of the particular “uninsured motorist indorsement contained in their respective policies with State Farm” (Amato, 72 NY2d at 293 n 1). In other words, the officers in Amato could still receive uninsured motorist benefits because, presumably, they were named insureds under State Farm’s policy, and State Farm extended uninsured motorist coverage to them regardless of the type of vehicle they occupied. In fact, here, Officer Knauss was covered for the same reason: the SUM indorsement expressly identified him as a named insured entitled to such coverage under any circumstances. By contrast, Fitzgerald was not a named insured under Knauss’s policy, and hence he could not receive coverage on the same grounds that Knauss or the officers in Amato could. Rather, Fitzgerald could only qualify for SUM coverage under the statutorily required SUM clause in Knauss’s policy, which limited coverage to occupants of statutory “motor vehicles.” As we have explained, Fitzgerald was not occupying a “motor vehicle” at the time of his accident, and he was not entitled to SUM coverage.

      . When confronted with another phrase in this statute joined by a similarly perplexing coordinating conjunction, we have previously declined to construe the phrase literally to create an expansion of coverage not otherwise clearly contemplated by the legislature (see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Li-bow, 65 NY2d 807, 809 [1985] [affirming “for the reasons stated in the opinion” of the Appellate Division, which refused to interpret literally a clause in former Insurance Law § 3420 (f), which requires payment of “all sums, not exceeding a maximum amount or limit of ten thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs, on account of injury to and all sums, not exceeding a maximum amount or limit of fifty thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs, on account of death of one person, in any one accident” because the literal reading would have permitted the unintended aggregation of certain claims under that statute]; see also Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Libow, 106 AD2d 110, 116-118 [2d Dept 1984]).

      . Today, the MVAIC statute still defines “motor vehicle” as “excluding] fire and police vehicles” (Insurance Law § 5202 [a]). The Amato Court stated that “the uninsured occupant of a police vehicle may file a claim with the MVAIC for injuries sustained in an accident caused by an uninsured motor vehicle,” but that “police vehicles are exempted from the provisions of the MVAIC statute to the extent that otherwise eligible claimants are barred from filing a claim for injuries caused by the negligent operation of a police vehicle” (Amato, 72 NY2d at 294 n 2). Thus, the Court seems to have found that, although a police vehicle is not a “motor vehicle” under the MVAIC Law, it can still be involved in an actionable “motor vehicle accident” under that statutory scheme (Insurance Law § 5208 [a] [1]), as long as its operation is not the cause of the accident.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    [28 NE3d 534, 5 NYS3d 355]
    In the Matter of Jeffrey P. Dorrance.
    Decided March 26, 2015
   OPINION OF THE COURT

On the Court’s own motion, it is determined that the Honorable Jeffrey P. Dorrance is suspended, with pay, effective immediately, from the office of Justice of the Green Island Town Court, Albany County, pursuant to New York Constitution, article VI, § 22 (f) and Judiciary Law § 44 (8) (b).

Concur: Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Association of Mortgage Investors for leave to appear amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted only to the extent that the proposed brief is accepted as filed.

Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Association of Financial Guaranty Insurers for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed.

Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by National Credit Union Administration Board for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.

Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by LNR Partners, LLC et al. for leave to appear amici curiae on the appeal herein granted only to the extent that the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.

Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. for leave to file a brief amici curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.

Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.

Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
    Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Steven L. Schwarcz for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.

Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Ethan J. Leib et al. for leave to appear amici curiae on the appeal herein granted only to the extent that the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.

Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    ACE Securities Corp., Appellant, v DB Structured Products, Inc., Respondent.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston et al. for leave to appear amici curiae on the appeal herein granted only to the extent that the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.

Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.


text:
    In the Matter of Carolann Baker, Respondent, v Christopher Baker, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.


text:
    Jennifer Cangro, Appellant, v Park South Towers Associates et al., Respondents.
    Decided March 26, 2015
   Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that the order appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.


text:
    In the Matter of Marvin Dennard, Appellant, v City of Buffalo Examining Board of Plumbers, Respondent.
    Decided March 26, 2015
   Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.


text:
    In the Matter of Jevon Henry, Appellant, v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.
    Submitted March 9, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. A copy of the brief must be served and an original and two copies filed within seven days.


text:
    In the Matter of Michael Lee, Appellant, v Department of Correctional Services et al., Respondents.
    Submitted December 29, 2014;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed as untimely (see CPLR 5513 [b]; Eaton v State of New York, 76 NY2d 824 [1990]). Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.

Judge Stein taking no part.


text:
    In the Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., Appellants, v New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Respondent.
    Submitted March 2, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Nadia B. Ahmad et al. for leave to file a brief amici curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.


text:
    In the Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., Appellants, v New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Respondent.
    Submitted March 2, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by City of New York et al. for leave to appear amici curiae on the appeal herein granted only to the extent that the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.


text:
    In the Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., Appellants, v New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Respondent.
    Submitted March 9, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by Citizens Campaign for the Environment for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.


text:
    In the Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., Appellants, v New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Respondent.
    Submitted March 9, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by East of Hudson Coalition for leave to appear amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted only to the extent that the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.


text:
    In the Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation. Doris Kay Dummitt, Individually and as Executrix of Ronald Dummitt, Deceased, Respondent, v A.W. Chesterton et al., Defendants, and Crane Co., Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by New York State Trial Lawyers Association for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Abdelouahad Afilal, Appellant.
    Submitted March 2, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Seymour James, Jr., Esq., The Legal Aid Society, 199 Water Street, New York, NY 10038 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Antonio Aragon, Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Seymour James, Jr., Esq., The Legal Aid Society, 199 Water Street, New York, NY 10038 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jamell S. Caraway, Appellant.
    Submitted March 16, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for an extension of the time within which to apply for permission to appeal pursuant to CPL 460.20 granted and motion papers treated as a timely CPL 460.20 application.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Earl Coleman, Respondent.
    Submitted March 16, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Jane M. Bloom, Esq., PO Box 209, Monticello, New York 12701 assigned as counsel to the respondent on the appeal herein.

Judge Stein taking no part.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jonathan J. Connolly, Appellant.
    Submitted February 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and David C. Schopp, Esq., The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., 237 Main Street, Suite 1602, Buffalo, New York 14203 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.

Judge Fahey taking no part.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Perry C. Griggs, Appellant.
    Submitted February 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and David C. Schopp, Esq., The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., 237 Main Street, Suite 1602, Buffalo, New York 14203 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.

Judge Fahey taking no part.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Todd R. Heatley, Appellant.
    Submitted March 2, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   On the Court’s own motion, appeal dismissed upon the ground that the criminal prosecution abated by reason of defendant’s death (see People v Ortiz, 77 NY2d 821 [1990]).

Judge Fahey taking no part.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Marcus D. Hogan, Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Shirley A. Gorman, Esq., PO Box 629, 19 Market St., Brockport, New York 14420 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Keith Johnson, Respondent.
    Submitted March 16, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Robert S. Dean, Esq., Center for Appellate Litigation, 120 Wall Street, 28th Floor, New York, NY 10005 assigned as counsel to the respondent on the appeal herein.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Raymond Leach, Appellant.
    Submitted March 2, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Steven A. Feldman, Esq., care of Feldman and Feldman, 626 Reckson Plaza, West Tower, 6th Floor, Uniondale, New York 11556 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dennis J. Sincerbeaux, Appellant.
    Submitted March 16, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for poor person relief granted.

Judge Fahey taking no part.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles Smith, Appellant.
    Submitted February 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Robert S. Dean, Esq., Center for Appellate Litigation, 120 Wall Street, 28th Floor, New York, NY 10005 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christopher Stover, Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for an extension of the time within which to apply for permission to appeal pursuant to CPL 460.20 granted and motion papers treated as a timely CPL 460.20 application.

Judge Stein taking no part.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Lawrence Watson, Respondent.
    Submitted March 2, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Richard M. Greenberg, Esq., Office of the Appellate Defender, 11 Park Place, Suite 1601, New York, NY 10007 assigned as counsel to the respondent on the appeal herein.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Christian Williams, Respondent.
    Submitted February 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Richard M. Greenberg, Esq., Office of the Appellate Defender, 11 Park Place, Suite 1601, New York, NY 10007 assigned as counsel to the respondent on the appeal herein.


text:
    The Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Board, Interpleader Plaintiff, v Leon Snow et al., Appellants. Estate of Clark Flesher et al., Respondents.
    Decided March 26, 2015

      See 780 F3d 150.
   Certification of questions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pursuant to section 500.27 of the Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.27), accepted and the issues presented are to be considered after briefing and argument.

Concur: Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey.


text:
    Viviane Etienne Medical Care, P.C., as Assignee of Alem Cardenas, Respondent, v Country-Wide Ins. Co., Appellant.
    Submitted March 23, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
   Motion by American Transit et al. for leave to file a brief amici curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Three copies of the brief must be served and an original and nine copies filed within seven days.


text:
    [28 NE3d 1181, 5 NYS3d 741]
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jeffrey Mercado, Appellant.
    Decided March 26, 2015

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (Claudia Flores of counsel), for appellant.

      Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Allen J. Vickey of counsel), for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. The determinations regarding founded suspicion of criminality justifying a request to search the car, and then the trunk, and defendant’s consent to a search of the vehicle, all involve mixed questions of law and fact. The determinations are supported by the record, and are beyond further review (see People v Valerio, 95 NY2d 924, 925 [2000]).

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, in a memorandum.


text:
    [29 NE3d 235, 6 NYS3d 226]
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony C., Appellant.
    Decided March 31, 2015

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (David J. Klem of counsel), for appellant.

      Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Susan Gliner of counsel), for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. The Appellate Division opinion does not suggest a misapprehension or misapplication of its authority to review youthful offender adjudications for abuse of discretion (CPL 720.20 [1] [a]), or under its broad interest-of-justice jurisdiction (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]; People v Dawn Maria C., 67 NY2d 625, 627 [1986]).

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, in a memorandum.


text:
    [29 NE3d 888, 6 NYS3d 541]
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dennis Ford, Appellant.
    Argued February 18, 2015;
    decided March 26, 2015
    APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Seymour W. James, Jr., The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Michael C. Taglieri and Scott A. Rosenberg of counsel), for appellant.

      Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Anthea H. Bruffee and Leonard Joblove of counsel), for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The Appellate Division order should be reversed, without costs, and the case remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this memorandum.

In January 2009, defendant entered a livery cab and requested that the female driver take him to a particular address in Brooklyn. While in the cab, defendant pointed a gun at the victim and stole her money and wallet. Defendant then demanded that she pull her pants down, and after the victim complied, defendant inserted two of his fingers into her vagina. Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree and was sentenced to a determinate term of three years’ imprisonment and five years of postrelease supervision. While imprisoned, defendant committed 16 tier II and four tier III disciplinary violations. As a consequence of the disciplinary penalties, defendant’s violations prevented him from participating in any sex offender treatment while incarcerated.

In anticipation of defendant’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) hearing, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders prepared a risk assessment instrument (RAI) assessing defendant a total of 100 points, making him a presumptive level two sex offender. As relevant here, the Board assessed 10 points under risk factor 13 for unsatisfactory conduct while confined. However, the Board did not assess any points for post-offense behavior under risk factor 12. The Board recommended an upward departure to level three based on the violent and opportunistic nature of defendant’s crime, his failure to participate in sex offender treatment, and his lack of remorse for the crime.

Supreme Court questioned whether defendant should have been assessed points under failure to accept responsibility because his multiple prison violations prevented him from participating in sex offender treatment. The People then urged that the court assess points under risk factor 12 or grant an upward departure. Defendant objected to the assessment of points and opposed an upward departure. Ultimately, the court assessed 15 points for failure to accept responsibility, reasoning that defendant put “himself into a situation where he end[ed] up in special housing and, therefore, [could not] receive treatment.” The court, however, determined that the People failed to meet their burden for an upward departure. With the additional 15 points under risk factor 12, defendant was adjudicated a level three sex offender. The Appellate Division affirmed (People v Ford, 112 AD3d 600 [2013]), stating that “Supreme Court properly considered . . . defendant’s lengthy disciplinary record while incarcerated, which prevented him from participating in a sex offender treatment program, as evidence of a refusal of treatment” (id. at 600 [citations omitted]). This Court granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal (22 NY3d 1135 [2014]).

The SORA Guidelines provide:

“An offender who does not accept responsibility for his [or her] conduct or minimizes what occurred is a poor prospect for rehabilitation. Such acknowledgment is critical, since an offender’s ability to identify and modify the thoughts and behaviors that are proximal to his [or her] sexual misconduct is often a prerequisite to stopping that misconduct.” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 15 [2006] [citation omitted].)

In calculating an offender’s risk level for post-offense behavior, 15 points are added under risk factor 12 if an “offender has refused or been expelled from treatment since such conduct is powerful evidence of the offender’s continued denial and his [or her] unwillingness to alter his [or her] behavior” (id. at 16). Alternatively, the Board may assess an offender 10 points under risk factor 12 for failure to accept responsibility based on other facts indicating the defendant’s lack of remorse.

Whether a defendant’s prison disciplinary violations which prevent him or her from attending treatment can trigger an assessment of points under risk factor 12 has not been addressed by this Court. We hold that defendant’s inability to participate in sex offender treatment due to his disciplinary violations was not tantamount to a refusal to participate in treatment under the SORA Guidelines. Refusal contemplates an intentional explicit rejection of what is being offered. There is no indication here that defendant explicitly refused treatment. Conduct that places a defendant in a position where he or she could not receive treatment is not equal to refusal to participate in treatment. Inferring refusal from a defendant’s disciplinary record is not supported by the Guidelines, which state that points should be assessed where a defendant refuses treatment or is expelled from treatment.

Certainly defendant had a substantial number of disciplinary violations. Beyond assessing a defendant points under risk factor 13 for his or her conduct while confined, the People may seek an upward departure based on the RAI not adequately taking into account the considerable number of disciplinary violations incurred by a defendant. Additionally, the People may seek an upward departure based on the defendant not receiving sex offender treatment. This is a route available to the People to account for a defendant’s repeated disciplinary violations. Supreme Court erred as a matter of law in determining that defendant’s disciplinary violations were tantamount to a refusal to participate in sex offender treatment.

Based upon the error of the lower courts, this proceeding should be remitted for appropriate designation of defendant’s risk level without the assessment of 15 points under risk factor 12 for refusal to participate in treatment.

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey concur.

Order reversed, without costs, and case remitted to Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings in accordance with the memorandum herein.


text:
    [29 NE3d 893, 6 NYS3d 546]
    In the Matter of Katie Kickertz, Respondent, v New York University, Appellant.
    Argued February 10, 2015;
    decided April 2, 2015

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Hogan Lovells US LLP, New York City (Ira M. Feinberg and Jordan L. Estes of counsel), for appellant.

      Leeds Brown Law, PC., Carle Place {Bryan Arbeit and Jeffrey K. Brown of counsel), for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The judgment appealed from and the order of the Appellate Division brought up for review should be modified, without costs, by vacating that portion of the order granting the petition and remitting to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this memorandum and, as so modified, affirmed.

Based on a determination of academic misconduct, New York University (NYU or the University) expelled Katie Kickertz from its College of Dentistry without possibility of readmission. In this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner Kickertz sought a judgment directing respondent NYU to reinstate her as a student, grant her the degree of Doctor of Dental Surgery and award attorneys’ fees. The University now appeals as of right, pursuant to CPLR 5601 (d), from Supreme Court’s judgment granting Kickertz’s petition. In so doing, NYU brings up for review the Appellate Division’s prior nonfinal order which, with two Justices dissenting in part, reversed and vacated Supreme Court’s earlier judgment dismissing Kickertz’s petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (30 Misc 3d 1220[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50131 [U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2011]); and reinstated and granted the petition (99 AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2012]).

The principal issue raised by this appeal is whether the Appellate Division erred by failing to remand to Supreme Court to permit NYU to file an answer pursuant to CPLR 7804 (f). That provision specifies that where a respondent moves to dismiss a CPLR article 78 petition and the motion is denied, “the court shall permit the respondent to answer, upon such terms as may be just” (emphasis added). We have indicated, however, that a court need not do so if the “facts are so fully presented in the papers of the respective parties that it is clear that no dispute as to the facts exists and no prejudice will result from the failure to require an answer” (Matter of Nassau BOCES Cent. Council of Teachers v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Nassau County, 63 NY2d 100, 102 [1984] [emphasis added]). Since “the motion papers” in BOCES “clearly did not establish that there were no triable issues of fact,” we held that “the procedure dictated by CPLR 7804 (subd [f]) should have been followed” (id. at 104). For the same reason, NYU should be permitted to answer in this case.

A student subject to disciplinary action at a private educational institution is not entitled to the “full panoply of due process rights” (Matter of Ebert v Yeshiva Univ., 28 AD3d 315, 315 [1st Dept 2006]). Such an institution need only ensure that its published rules are “substantially observed” (Tedeschi v Wagner Coll., 49 NY2d 652, 660 [1980]). And here, triable issues of fact exist with regard to whether NYU substantially complied with its established disciplinary procedures. Because of our disposition of this appeal, we do not reach and express no opinion about the propriety of the penalty imposed or any other issue raised by the parties and decided by the courts below.

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Rivera, Stein and Fahey concur; Judge Abdus-Salaam taking no part.

Judgment appealed from and order of the Appellate Division brought up for review modified, without costs, by vacating that portion of the Appellate Division order granting the petition and remitting to Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings in accordance with the memorandum herein and, as so modified, affirmed.


text:
    [29 NE3d 896, 6 NYS3d 549]
    Rosemond Barney-Yeboah, Respondent, v Metro-North Commuter Railroad, Appellant.
    Decided April 2, 2015

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Krez & Flores, LLP, New York City (Paul A. Krez of counsel), for appellant.

      Buttafuoco & Associates PLLC, Woodbury (Jason M. Murphy of counsel), for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, Supreme Court’s order reinstated, and the certified question answered in the negative. This is not the type of rare case in which the circumstantial proof presented by plaintiff “is so convincing and the defendant’s response so weak that the inference of defendant’s negligence is inescapable” (Morejon v Rais Constr. Co., 7 NY3d 203, 209 [2006]).

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Rivera, AbdusSalaam, Stein and Fahey concur; Judge Pigott dissents and votes to affirm for reasons stated in the memorandum at the Appellate Division (120 AD3d 1023 [2014]).

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order reversed, with costs, order of Supreme Court, New York County, reinstated, and certified question answered in the negative, in a memorandum.


text:
    [29 NE3d 896, 6 NYS3d 549]
    In the Matter of Anthony J. Russo, Respondent, v New York City Department of Education, Appellant.
    Decided April 7, 2015

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Kathy Chang Park and Richard Dearing of counsel), for appellant.

      Anthony J. Russo, respondent pro se.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order insofar as appealed from reversed, with costs, New York City Department of Education’s cross motion to dismiss the petition granted in its entirety, and certified question answered in the negative. We cannot say that “the penalty of [termination] . . . shocks the judicial conscience” (Matter of Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32, 40 [2001]; see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 234-235 [1974]).

Concur: Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey.


text:
    [30 NE3d 896, 8 NYS3d 253]
    Keith Holmes, Respondent, v Business Relocation Services, Inc., Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. United Staffing Systems, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.
    Decided March 26, 2015

      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

      Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York City (Daniel S. Kotler of counsel), for third-party plaintiff-appellant.

      Burns & Harris, New York City (Blake G. Goldfarb of counsel), for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in the affirmative. As a matter of law, it cannot be said that Business Relocation Services, Inc., the alleged special employer, overcame the presumption of continuing general employment by “clear [ly] demonstrati [ng] . . . surrender of control by the general employer and assumption of control by the special employer” (Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 NY2d 553, 557 [1991]). The Appellate Division correctly determined that issues of fact remained as to the alleged special employment relationship.

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in the affirmative, in a memorandum.


text:
    Mark Fabiano et al., Respondents, v State of New York, Appellant.
    Submitted February 2, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.


text:
    Richard N. Golden, Respondent, v Bernadette M. Lynch, Appellant.
    Submitted February 9, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied [see 24 NY3d 1079 (2014)].

Judges Stein and Fahey taking no part.


text:
    Greater New York Taxi Association et al., Appellants, v New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, a Charter-Mandated Agency, et al., Respondents, and Nissan Taxi Marketing, N.A., LLC, et al., Intervenors-Respondents.
    Submitted March 16, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motion for a stay granted.


text:
    Joseph Martens, as Commissioner of Environmental Conservation, et al., Respondents, v Frederick J. Neroni et al., Appellants.
    Decided March 31, 2015
   Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.

Judge Stein taking no part.


text:
    In the Matter of Michael O.F. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Fausat O., Appellant. In the Matter of Joseph O.A., Jr. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Fausat O., Appellant.
    Decided March 31, 2015
   Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that the orders appealed from do not finally determine the proceedings within the meaning of the Constitution.


text:
    In the Matter of Ming Tung et al., Appellants, v China Buddhist Association et al., Respondents.
    Decided March 31, 2015
   Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.


text:
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Marcos Llibre, Appellant.
    Submitted January 5, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motion to dismiss appeal denied. A criminal leave application to the Court of Appeals is assigned to and decided by a single Judge of the Court of Appeals (see CPL 460.20 [4]; Rules of Ct of Appeals [22 NYCRR] § 500.20). While a motion to the full Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal may be made on the ground that there is no jurisdiction over the appeal, a motion may not be made, as it has been here, upon the ground that leave was improvidently granted. Such motion does not constitute a basis for the full Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal taken pursuant to leave of a single Judge of the Court of Appeals.


text:
    In the Matter of Charles T. Rawley, Respondent, v Jessica Graham, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motions for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the orders sought to be appealed from do not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motions for poor person relief dismissed as academic.


text:
    In the Matter of Charles T. Rawley, Respondent, v Jessica Graham, Appellant.
    Submitted February 2, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.


text:
    RCM Elmwood LLC et al., Respondents, v Carol Niznik, Appellant.
    Submitted January 26, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   On the Court’s own motion, appeal dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that it does not lie (see NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b]; CPLR 5601). Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to entertain it (see NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b]; CPLR 5602). Motion for a stay dismissed as academic.


text:
    In the Matter of Solomon R. Michael R., Respondent. Usher P, Nonparty Appellant.
    Decided March 31, 2015
   Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.


text:
    Susan Stassa, Respondent, v George Stassa, Appellant.
    Submitted January 20, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for a stay dismissed as academic.


text:
    In the Matter of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellant, v Patrick Fitzgerald, Respondent.
    Decided March 31, 2015
   Reargument ordered and case set down for argument during a future session of the Court of Appeals.

Concur: Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Pigott, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey.

Taking no part: Judge Rivera.


text:
    Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc., Respondent, v Lewiston Golf Course Corporation, Appellant, et al., Defendants.
    Submitted January 5, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motion for reargument denied with $100 costs and necessary reproduction disbursements [see 24 NY3d 538 (2014)].

Judges Stein and Fahey taking no part.


text:
    Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc., Respondent, v Lewiston Golf Course Corporation, Appellant, et al., Defendants.
    Submitted January 12, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motion by the Seneca Nation of Indians for leave to appear amicus curiae on the motion for reargument herein granted and the brief is accepted as filed [see 24 NY3d 538 (2014)].

Judges Stein and Fahey taking no part.


text:
    Robert Thomas, Respondent, v Rita Gray, Appellant.
    Submitted February 9, 2015;
    decided March 31, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal denied with $100 costs and necessary reproduction disbursements. Motion for a stay dismissed as academic.


text:
    Michael A. Cervini, Respondent, v Cisco General Construction, Inc., Appellant.
    Submitted February 9, 2015;
    decided April 2, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.


text:
    In the Matter of Rafael Cortorreal, Appellant, v Anthony J. Annucci, as Acting Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.
    Submitted February 9, 2015;
    decided April 2, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal granted. Motion for poor person relief granted.

Judge Stein taking no part.


text:
    Noel Davidson, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.
    Submitted February 9, 2015;
    decided April 2, 2015
   On the Court’s own motion, appeal transferred, without costs, to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, upon the ground that a direct appeal does not lie when questions other than the constitutional validity of a statutory provision are involved (see NY Const, art VI, §§ 3 [b] [2]; 5 [b]; CPLR 5601 [b] [2]). Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that it does not lie (see CPLR 5602 [a]).


text:
    In the Matter of Jessica Graham, Appellant, v Charles T. Rawley, Respondent.
    Submitted February 23, 2015;
    decided April 2, 2015
   Motions for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the orders sought to be appealed from do not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motions for poor person relief dismissed as academic.


text:
    Sedina Levin, Appellant, v New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (Harlem Hospital Center), Respondent.
    Submitted January 12, 2015;
    decided April 2, 2015
   Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the Appellate Division order denying reargument or leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, dismissed upon the ground that such order does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution; motion for leave to appeal otherwise denied.


text:
    In the Matter of Lucinda A. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Luba A., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Manuel A., Respondent, v Luba A., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.)
    Submitted March 2, 2015;
    decided April 2, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal etc. denied. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.


text:
    In the Matter of Dontie S. Mitchell, Appellant, v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.
    Submitted February 17, 2015;
    decided April 2, 2015
   On the Court’s own motion, appeal, insofar as taken from the September 2014 Appellate Division judgment, dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that it is untimely (see CPLR 5513 [a]); appeal, insofar as taken from the October 2014 and December 2014 Appellate Division orders denying the motions for costs and disbursements and for reconsideration, dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that such orders do not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the September 2014 Appellate Division judgment, dismissed upon the ground that it is untimely (see CPLR 5513 [b]); motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the October 2014 and December 2014 Appellate Division orders denying the motions for costs and disbursements and for reconsideration, dismissed upon the ground that such orders do not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.


text:
    In the Matter of NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc., Appellant, v New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation et al., Respondents.
    Submitted February 9, 2015;
    decided April 2, 2015
   Motion for leave to appeal denied as unnecessary.