author: Chief Judge Lippman. Stein, J.

text:
    [42 NE3d 655, 21 NYS3d 158]
    The People of the State of New York, by Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York, et al., Respondents, v Sprint Nextel Corp. et al., Appellants.
    Argued September 9, 2015;
    decided October 20, 2015

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, D.C. (Kannon K. Shanmugam, of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, Dane H. Butswinkas, of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, David S. Blatt of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Kenneth J. Brown of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), and Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, New York City (E. Leo Milonas and David G. Keyko of counsel), for appellants.
    I. The Tax Law does not impose sales tax on interstate mobile voice services sold as part of a fixed monthly charge. (Matter of Albany Law School v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 19 NY3d 106; Debevoise & Plimpton v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 80 NY2d 657; Expedia, Inc. v City of N.Y. Dept. of Fin., 22 NY3d 121; American Locker Co. v City of New York, 308 NY 264; Matter of Grace v New York State Tax Commn., 37 NY2d 193; Flores v Lower E. Side Serv. Ctr., Inc., 4 NY3d 363; Matter of Albano v Kirby, 36 NY2d 526; Matter of Lloyd v Grella, 83 NY2d 537; Matter of Belmonte v Snashall, 2 NY3d 560; Matter of SIN, Inc. v Department of Fin. of City of N.Y., 71 NY2d 616; Matter of Carey Transp. v Perrotta, 34 AD2d 147.) II. The Attorney General’s interpretation of the Tax Law, if correct, would be preempted by the Federal Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act. (Lee v Astoria Generating Co., L.P., 13 NY3d 382; Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v Connecticut, 542 F3d 341.) III. The complaint fails to state a claim under the New York False Claims Act. (United States ex rel. Pervez v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 736 F Supp 2d 804; State of New York ex rel. Seiden v Utica First Ins. Co., 96 AD3d 67; United States ex rel. Ramadoss v Caremark Inc., 586 F Supp 2d 668; Safeco Ins. Co. of America v Burr, 551 US 47; United States ex rel. Hixson v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 613 F3d 1186; Louisiana Mun. Police Employees’ Retirement Sys. v Hesse, 962 F Supp 2d 576; Debevoise & Plimpton v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 80 NY2d 657; Smith v Doe, 538 US 84; United States v Ward, 448 US 242; Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144.)

      Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Steven C. Wu, Barbara D. Underwood and Won S. Shin of counsel), for respondents.
    I. Sprint Nextel Corporation, Sprint Spectrum L.P., Nextel of New York, Inc. and Nextel Partners of Upstate New York, Inc. failed to collect sales taxes owed on mobile voice service sold for fixed monthly charges and falsely stated their taxable receipts. (Matter of Jewish Home & Infirmary of Rochester v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 84 NY2d 252; People v Velez, 19 NY3d 642; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d 316; Matter of Greer v Wing, 95 NY2d 676; Barnhart v Thomas, 540 US 20; Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85 NY2d 382; Matter of Fox v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 140 AD2d 771, 72 NY2d 808; Zanghi v

      Greyhound Lines, 234 AD2d 930; Heard v Cuomo, 80 NY2d 684; Matter of 677 New Loudon Corp. v State of N.Y. Tax Appeals Trib., 19 NY3d 1058.) II. Sprint Nextel Corporation, Sprint Spectrum L.P., Nextel of New York, Inc. and Nextel Partners of Upstate New York, Inc. knowingly made false statements about their taxable receipts. (Pludeman v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 NY3d 486; Polonetsky v Better Homes Depot, 97 NY2d 46; People v Greenberg, 21 NY3d 439; Minnesota Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F3d 1032; United States v R&F Props. of Lake County, Inc., 433 F3d 1349; Overstock.com, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 20 NY3d 586; Matter of Spencer v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 251 AD2d 764; Matter of Friesch-Groningsche Hypotheekbank Realty Credit Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 185 AD2d 466; Oneida Nation of N.Y. v Cuomo, 645 F3d 154.) III. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not bar retroactive application of the New York False Claims Act. (Kellogg v Travis, 100 NY2d 407; Smith v Doe, 538 US 84; Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144; Hudson v United States, 522 US 93; United States ex rel. Marcus v Hess, 317 US 537; Helvering v Mitchell, 303 US 391; Stockwell v United States, 80 US 531; Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346; United States v Bornstein, 423 US 303; Cook County v United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 US 119.)

      Reed Smith LLP, New York City {Jack Trachtenberg, Adam P. Beckerink and Jennifer S. Goldstein of counsel), for Institute for Professionals in Taxation, amicus curiae.
    I. The lower courts erroneously failed to consider whether Sprint Nextel Corporation, Sprint Spectrum L.P., Nextel of New York, Inc. and Nextel Partners of Upstate New York, Inc.’s interpretation of the Tax Law was reasonable. (United States, ex rel. Ramadoss v Caremark Inc., 586 F Supp 2d 668; United States ex rel. Wilson v Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F3d 370; United States ex rel. Lamers v City of Green Bay, 168 F3d 1013; United States ex rel. Hopper v Anton, 91 F3d 1261; United States ex rel. Hixson v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 613 F3d 1186; United States v Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 248 F3d 781; United States ex rel. Oliver v Parsons Co., 195 F3d 457; United States ex rel. Hochman v Nackman, 145 F3d 1069; United States ex rel. K & R Ltd. Partnership v Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, 456 F Supp 2d 46, 530 F3d 980.) II. The Supreme Court’s failure to treat Tax Law § 1105 (b) as a tax imposition statute was erroneous and compounded its error in failing to consider the reasonableness of Sprint Nextel Corporation, Sprint Spectrum L.P., Nextel of New York, Inc. and Nextel Partners of Upstate New York, Inc.’s conduct. (Debevoise & Plimpton v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 80 NY2d 657.) III. The Court should provide clear guidance regarding the application of the False Claims Act to tax matters to prevent future violations of the rights and privileges granted to taxpayers under the Tax Law. (Ryan v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 63 AD3d 816.)

      McDermott Will & Emery LLP, New York City (Arthur R. Rosen and Lindsay M. LaCava of counsel), for Council on State Taxation, amicus curiae.
    I. The application of the New York False Claims Act to cases involving legitimate differences in statutory interpretation — which, by definition, do not constitute “knowingly . . . false records or statements” — undermines the efficiency and fairness of state tax administration. (United States ex rel. Hixson v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 613 F3d 1186; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v State Tax Commn. of State of N.Y., 24 NY2d 114; New York State Cable Tel. Assn. v State Tax Commn., 59 AD2d 81; Celestial Food of Massapequa Corp. v New York State Tax Commn., 98 AD2d 157, 63 NY2d 1020; Matter of City of New York v New York State Tax Appeals Trib., 231 AD2d 267; Debevoise & Plimpton v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 80 NY2d 657; Matter of Easylink Servs. Intl., Inc. v New York State Tax Appeals Trib., 101 AD3d 1180; State of N.Y. ex rel. Grupp v DHL Express [USA], Inc., 19 NY3d 278; People v Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 40 Misc 3d 1232[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51394[U]; In re AT & T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F Supp 2d 935.) II. Absent fraud-like or criminal conduct, the Department of Taxation and Finance is the only appropriate body to administer New York’s taxes, particularly in situations such as this where an audit of appellants had already been commenced by the Department of Taxation and Finance. (Ryan v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 63 AD3d 816; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v Brady, 430 US 274; Quill Corp. v North Dakota, 504 US 298.)

      Ingram Yuzek Gainen Carroll & Bertolotti, LLP, New York City (John G. Nicolich and Roger Cukras of counsel), for Broadband Tax Institute, amicus curiae.
    I. The Matter of Helio (2015 WL 4192425, 2015 NY City Tax LEXIS 8 [Tax Appeals Tribunal, July 2, 2015, DTANo. 825010]) proceeding undercuts the Attorney General’s position. II. The Attorney General overstates Tax Law § 1105 (b) and the significance of the Department of Taxation and Finance’s technical memorandum. III. Unbundling is a well-accepted practice in the communications industry. (Caprio v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 25 NY3d 744.)

      Willens & Scarvalone LLP, New York City (Jonathan A. Willens of counsel), and Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, Washington, D.C. (Cleveland Lawrence III and Jacklyn N. DeMar of counsel), for Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, amicus curiae.
    I. Sprint Nextel Corporation, Sprint Spectrum L.P., Nextel of New York, Inc. and Nextel Partners of Upstate New York, Inc.’s motion to dismiss on scienter grounds should be denied because the plaintiffs have alleged a knowing violation of the New York False Claims Act. (United States ex rel. Pervez v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 736 F Supp 2d 804; United States ex rel. Bilotta v Novartis Pharms. Corp., 50 F Supp 3d 497; State of New York ex rel. Seiden v Utica First Ins. Co., 96 AD3d 67; Visiting Nurse Assn. of Brooklyn v Thompson, 378 F Supp 2d 75; Pludeman v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 NY3d 486; United States v Incorporated Vil. of Is. Park, 888 F Supp 419; United States v Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 775 F3d 255; United States ex rel. Osmose, Inc. v Chemical Specialties, Inc., 994 F Supp 2d 353; United States ex rel. Fox Rx, Inc. v Omnicare, Inc., 38 F Supp 3d 398; Lerner v Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F3d 273.) II. Retroactive application of the tax fraud provision of the New York False Claims Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto provision of the US Constitution. (Smith v Doe, 538 US 84; United States ex rel. Drake v NSI, Inc., 736 F Supp 2d 489; Colder v Bull, 3 US 386; United States ex rel. Bilotta v Novartis Pharms. Corp., 50 F Supp 3d 497; United States ex rel. Augustine v Century Health Servs., Inc., 136 F Supp 2d 876; Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 US 280; Seling v Young, 531 US 250; Cook County v United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 US 119; United States v Halper, 490 US 435; State of N.Y. ex rel. Grupp v DHL Express [USA], Inc., 19 NY3d 278.)

      Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York City {Lewis J. Liman of counsel), for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, amicus curiae.
    I. The New York False Claims Act is reserved for cases of a knowingly false claim, statement or record and is not the proper mechanism for addressing interpretations of the Tax Law that are not objectively unreasonable. (New York State Socy. of Enrolled Agents v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, 161 AD2d 1; Gold v Morrison-

      Knudsen Co., 68 F3d 1475; Allison Engine Co. v United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 US 662; Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 US 765; United States v Neifert-White Co., 390 US 228; Rainwater v United States, 356 US 590; State of New York ex rel. Seiden v Utica First Ins. Co., 96 AD3d 67, 19 NY3d 810; Matter of Plato’s Cave Corp. v State Liq. Auth., 68 NY2d 791; Safeco Ins. Co. of America v Burr, 551 US 47; United States ex rel. Hixson v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 613 F3d 1186.) II. Allowing the Attorney General to use the New York False Claims Act’s treble damages regime to combat objectively reasonable interpretations of the law would chill the rights of citizens to challenge the views of the State and undermine development of the law. (Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137; Matter of Council of City of N.Y. v Bloomberg, 6 NY3d 380; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d 316; Matter of SIN, Inc. v Department of Fin. of City of N.Y., 71 NY2d 616; Matter of Quotron Sys. v Irizarry, 48 NY2d 795; New York State Cable Tel. Assn. v State Tax Commn., 59 AD2d 81; American Net & Twine Co. v Worthington, 141 US 468; Trump Vil. Section 3, Inc. v City of New York, 24 NY3d 451; Debevoise & Plimpton v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 80 NY2d 657; Matter of Manhattan Cable Tel. v New York State Tax Commn., 137 AD2d 925.) III. Retroactive liability under the New York False Claims Act is not compatible with the Ex Post Facto Clause. (Sanders v Allison Engine Co., Inc., 703 F3d 930; United States ex rel. Miller v Bill Harbert Intl. Constr., Inc., 608 F3d 871; United States v Rogan, 517 F3d 449; Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US 244; Cook County v United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 US 119; Doe v Pataki, 120 F3d 1263; Law v National Coll. Athletic Assn., 134 F3d 1438; United States ex rel. Bilotta v Novartis Pharms. Corp., 50 F Supp 3d 497; Louis Vuitton S.A. v Spencer Handbags Corp., 765 F2d 966.)

      Heather C. Briccetti, The Business Council of New York State, Inc., Albany, for The Business Council of New York State, Inc., amicus curiae.
    I. The False Claims Act is an extraordinary measure that requires knowing, reckless, or deliberately ignorant intent. (State of New York ex rel. Seiden v Utica First Ins. Co., 96 AD3d 67; United States ex rel. Gross v AIDS Research Alliance-Chicago, 415 F3d 601; Hopper v Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F3d 1318; United States ex rel. Clausen v Laboratory Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F3d 1301; Hagood v Sonoma County Water Agency, 81 F3d 1465; United States ex rel. Hixson v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 613 F3d 1186; United States ex

      rel. Siewick v Jamieson Science & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F3d 1372; Matter of General Elec. Capital Corp. v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, Tax Appeals Trib., 2 NY3d 249.) II. The plaintiffs’ asserted position turns the False Claims Act on its head. (Matter of Suburban Carting Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 263 AD2d 793; Matter of Kourakos v Tully, 92 AD2d 1051; Matter of Hwang v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 105 AD3d 1151; Matter of Lombard v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 197 AD2d 799; Debevoise & Plimpton v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 80 NY2d 657; Expedia, Inc. v City of N.Y. Dept. of Fin., 22 NY3d 121; Matter of Grace v New York State Tax Commn., 37 NY2d 193; American Locker Co. v City of New York, 308 NY 264; Matter of Gaied v New York State Tax Appeals Trib., 22 NY3d 592.) III. The Attorney General’s position is infeasible. (Hesse v Sprint Corp., 598 F3d 581; In re AT & T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F Supp 2d 935.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Chief Judge Lippman.

We hold that: (1) the Tax Law imposes sales tax on interstate voice service sold by a mobile provider along with other services for a fixed monthly charge; (2) the statute is unambiguous; (3) the statute is not preempted by federal law; (4) the Attorney General’s (AG) complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action under the New York False Claims Act (FCA) (State Finance Law § 187 et seq.); and (5) the damages recoverable under the FCA are not barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.

In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution limited the states’ authority to tax interstate telephone calls. A telephone call was taxable only if it originated or terminated within the state and was charged to an in-state billing or service address (see Goldberg v Sweet, 488 US 252, 256 n 6, 263 [1989]).

The Goldberg rule was easy to apply to landline telephones, which had fixed physical locations. But the next decade saw “an explosion of growth in the wireless telecommunications industry” (HR Rep 106-719, 106th Cong, 2d Sess at 7, reprinted in 2000 US Code Cong & Admin News at 509), and states and service providers struggled to adapt the Goldberg nexus requirement to mobile telephone calls. States developed different methods to determine which mobile calls to tax. As a result, some mobile telephone calls were subject to taxation by multiple jurisdictions (HR Rep 106-719, 106th Cong, 2d Sess at 7-8, reprinted in 2000 US Code Cong & Admin News at 509).

A further complication was introduced as mobile carriers began to sell flat-rate voice plans that charged a fixed monthly price for access to a nationwide network, as opposed to charging calls by the minute, regardless of where the calls were placed or received. These flat-rate plans made it “virtually impossible to determine the portion of th[e] price charged for individual calls, each of which may be subject to tax by a different jurisdiction,” and thus “impossible to determine the amount of revenues to which each of the various state and local transaction taxes should be applied” (S Rep 106-326, 106th Cong, 2d Sess at 2).

Congress responded by enacting the Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act (MTSA) (4 USC § 116 et seq.) The MTSA establishes a uniform “sourcing” rule for state taxation of mobile telecommunications services: the only state that may impose a tax is the state of the customer’s “place of primary use” — either a residential or primary business address, as selected by the customer (4 USC §§ 117 [b]; 124 [8]).

The New York Legislature responded to the MTSA in 2002 by enacting multiple amendments to the Tax Law that clarified and amended the State’s treatment of mobile telecommunications services. Under the preexisting law that was enacted in 1965, New York did not tax any interstate or international calls. As relevant here, the 2002 amendments implemented a new set of rules — specifically, those applicable to voice services sold through flat-rate plans.

Another legislative amendment, this one from 2010, led directly to the issues posed by this litigation. The FCA provides for enforcement by both the AG (in civil enforcement actions) and private plaintiffs on behalf of the government (in “qui tarn civil actions”), and the AG has the right to intervene and file a superceding complaint in a qui tarn action (State Finance Law § 190 [1], [2], [5]). The Act provides for the imposition of treble damages and civil penalties against violators (id. § 189 [1]).

The FCA applies to any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to” the government (id. § 189 [1] [g]). The statute provides that a defendant acts “knowingly’’ when defendant has “actual knowledge” of a record’s or statement’s truth or falsity or “acts in deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard” of its truth or falsity (id. § 188 [3] [a]).

As originally enacted, the New York FCA did not apply to false tax claims. But, in 2010, the legislature amended it to cover “claims, records, or statements made under the tax law” in certain circumstances (L 2010, ch 379, § 3, codified at State Finance Law § 189 [4] [a]). The amendment was designed to “provide an additional enforcement tool against those who file false claims under the Tax Law,” and thus “deter the submission of false tax claims” while also “provid[ing] additional recoveries to the State and to local governments” (Letter from St Dept of Tax & Fin, Aug. 4, 2010 at 2, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 379 at 13).

Sprint is a wireless telecommunications service provider that does business in New York, and it sells wireless “flat-rate” plans that include a certain number of minutes of talk time for a fixed monthly charge. After the Tax Law amendments were enacted in 2002, Sprint paid sales tax on all of its receipts from its flat-rate plans.

In 2005, however, Sprint began a nationwide program of “unbundling” charges within these flat-rate monthly plans. Specifically, Sprint unbundled the portion of the fixed monthly charge that it attributed to intrastate mobile voice services, and did not collect taxes on the portion that it attributed to interstate and international calls. For the tax years at issue, the percentage of the fixed monthly charge on which Sprint collected sales tax ranged from 71.5% to 86.3%. Sprint did not separately state on customers’ bills the charges for interstate and international voice services included in the flat-rate plan.

On March 31, 2011, Empire State Ventures, LLC, filed suit against Sprint under the New York FCA. On April 19, 2012, the AG filed a superceding complaint, which converted the relator’s action into a civil enforcement action by the AG.

The AG’s complaint, as relevant here, alleges that section 1105 (b) (2) of the Tax Law “requires the payment of sales taxes on the full amount of fixed periodic charges for wireless voice services sold by companies like Sprint to New York customers.” It further alleges that section 1111 (l) permits wireless providers to “treat separately for sales tax purposes certain components of a bundled charge for mobile telecommunication services, so long as the charges are not for voice services.” The complaint asserts that Sprint violated the Tax Law by failing to collect sales tax on the portion of its flat-rate charge that was attributable to interstate and international voice services. It further alleges that Sprint’s decision to unbundle its plans sold for a fixed monthly charge “was driven by its desire to gain an advantage over its competitors by reducing the amount of sales taxes it collected from its customers and, thereby, appearing to be a low-cost carrier.” According to the AG, the percentages of the flat-rate charges that Sprint allocated to interstate and international calls were completely arbitrary.

In support of its allegations that Sprint knowingly submitted false tax statements, the AG cites a Tax Department guidance memorandum published before the 2002 amendments became effective, which states that the sales tax is to be applied in the manner that the AG now advocates. The AG points out that Sprint adhered to this guidance until July 2005, when it changed its tax practices. Interestingly, Sprint did not seek a tax refund for the 2002-2005 tax years in which it paid those taxes.

The AG further alleges that Sprint also disregarded the statements of a Tax Department field auditor and enforcement official advising Sprint in 2009 and 2011, respectively, that its sales tax practice was illegal, and that it disregarded the fact that the other major wireless carriers, unlike Sprint, did not break their fixed monthly charges for voice services into intrastate and interstate subparts for sales tax purposes, but instead collected and paid sales tax on the full fixed periodic charge for voice services.

As relevant to this appeal, the complaint’s causes of action are all based on the same underlying contention that Sprint knowingly violated the Tax Law, engaged in fraudulent or illegal acts pursuant to Executive Law § 63 (12), and submitted false documents to the State pursuant to the FCA. The AG requests civil penalties and treble damages for each of the false tax documents submitted to the State.

Sprint moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211. As relevant here, Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that the Tax Law unambiguously imposes a tax on receipts from every sale of mobile telecommunications services that are voice services sold for a fixed periodic charge (see People v Sprint Nextel Corp., 41 Misc 3d 511 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013]). Moreover, even if the Tax Law permitted Sprint to exclude from taxable receipts a portion of its fixed monthly mobile voice charge to account for interstate and international calls, the Tax Law also required Sprint to use an objective, reasonable, and verifiable standard for identifying the nontaxable components of the charge — but the complaint alleges that Sprint failed to comply with this requirement by using “arbitrary” figures that were “not related to any customer’s actual usage” {id. at 515). The court also concluded that the complaint “alleges in great detail” how Sprint knowingly submitted false tax statements to the Tax Department, in violation of the FCA {id. at 516). Supreme Court further held that New York’s Tax Law does not conflict with the federal MTS A, and rejected Sprint’s assertion that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution bars retroactive application of the FCA penalties and damages.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the denial of Sprint’s motion to dismiss (114 AD3d 622 [1st Dept 2014]). The Court held that the AG’s complaint adequately alleges that Sprint violated the FCA, Executive Law § 63 (12), and the Tax Law “by knowingly making false statements material to an obligation to pay sales tax pursuant to Tax Law § 1105 (b) (2)” {id. at 622). In addition, the Court rejected Sprint’s claim that the Tax Law is preempted by the MTSA, and its claim that retroactive application of the FCA would be unconstitutional. The Appellate Division then certified the following question to this Court: “Was the order of the Supreme Court, as affirmed by . . . this Court, properly made?”

In Matter of Helio, LLC (2015 WL 4192425, 2015 NY City Tax LEXIS 8 [NY St Div of Tax Appeals DTA No. 825010, July 2, 2015]), the New York Tax Appeals Tribunal held that the language of Tax Law § 1105 (b) is unambiguous, and imposes sales tax on interstate voice service sold by a mobile provider along with other services for a fixed monthly charge. We agree.

Section 1105 (b) of the Tax Law provides that tax should be paid on:

“(1) [t]he receipts from every sale, other than sales for resale, of the following: . . . (B) telephony and telegraphy and telephone and telegraph service of whatever nature except interstate and international telephony and telegraphy and telephone and telegraph service and except any telecommunications service the receipts from the sale of which are subject to tax under paragraph two of this subdivision . . .
“(2) The receipts from every sale of mobile telecommunications service provided by a home service provider, other than sales for resale, that are voice services, or any other services that are taxable under subparagraph (B) of paragraph one of this subdivision, sold for a fixed periodic charge (not separately stated), whether or not sold with other services.”

The subject of the present dispute is the meaning of the phrase “or any other services that are taxable under subparagraph (B) of paragraph one of this subdivision” (Tax Law § 1105 [b] [2]). Sprint contends that this language excepts from sales tax its bundled charges from interstate and international calls. The AG, on the other hand, asserts that all mobile calls are subject to tax under subdivision (b) (2), unless they are separately stated on the customer’s bill.

First, subdivision (b) (1) does not affect the taxability of all mobile voice services under subdivision (b) (2) because (b) (2) is a specific provision under section 1105 which applies only to the sale of mobile telecommunications, whereas (b) (1) applies to telephony and telegraphy generally. “Whenever there is a general and a particular provision in the same statute, the general does not overrule the particular but applies only where the particular enactment is inapplicable” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 238).

Here, the plain language of the statute subjects to tax all “voice services” that are “sold for a fixed periodic charge” (Tax Law § 1105 [b] [2]). Sprint does not contest that the services at issue are such services. No part of subdivision (b) (2) differentiates between intrastate or interstate and international voice service. The statute also taxes “any other services . . . taxable under subparagraph (B)” (id.). Sprint’s interpretation of the statute would make superfluous the words “voice services, or any other” in subdivision (b) (2) (see Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95, 104 [2001] [“meaning and effect should be given to every word of a statute”]). The phrase “any other services that are taxable under subparagraph (B)” must refer to services other than “voice services.” Accordingly, it is unambiguous that Tax Law § 1105 (b) (2) imposes taxation on all voice services sold for a fixed periodic charge, including the interstate and international calls at issue here.

This interpretation of the statute is bolstered by Tax Law § 1111 (Z) (2), which provides special rules for computing receipts from the sale of mobile telecommunications. This section allows for the separate accounting of bundled services which are non-taxable, if the provider can provide “an objective, reasonable and verifiable standard for identifying each of the components of the charge” — but specifically applies only if it is “not a voice service” (Tax Law § 1111 [Z] [2] [emphasis added]).

Next, Sprint asserts that such an interpretation of the Tax Law is preempted by the MTSA. This argument is unavailing. Sprint cites 4 USC § 123 (b) for the presumption that taxes may not be applied to interstate and international calls which are bundled with intrastate calls where the service provider can reasonably identify charges not subject to the tax. Section 123 (b) provides:

“If a taxing jurisdiction does not otherwise subject charges for mobile telecommunications services to taxation and if these charges are aggregated with and not separately stated from charges that are subject to taxation, then the charges for nontaxable mobile telecommunications services may be subject to taxation unless the home service provider can reasonably identify charges not subject to such tax, charge, or fee from its books and records that are kept in the regular course of business” (emphasis added).

This bundling provision expressly opens by respecting and incorporating state authority, rather than restricting it. Section 123 (b) anticipates disaggregation only of charges “not otherwise subject ... to [state] taxation.” Because the Tax Law imposes a tax on the entire amount of the fixed monthly charge for voice services, there is no exemption for any interstate and international component that would even trigger section 123 (b)’s exception here. However, no provision of the MTSA prohibits the taxation of interstate and international mobile calls. In fact, Congress eliminated this distinction in light of advances in mobile telecommunications technology. Section 117 (b) of the MTSA allows for the taxation of “fajll charges for mobile telecommunications services . . . subject] ] to tax ... by the taxing jurisdictions whose territorial limits encompass the customer’s place of primary use, regardless of where the mobile telecommunication services originate, terminate, or pass through.” Accordingly, the AG’s interpretation of the Tax Law is not preempted by the federal MTSA.

As to the AG’s cause of action under the FCA, in order to be liable under the FCA, a party must knowingly make a false statement or knowingly file a false record. The FCA defines “knowingly” to mean “that a person, with respect to information: (i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information” (State Finance Law § 188 [3] [a]).

Sprint asserts that there is a reasonable interpretation of the Tax Law that does not subject bundled interstate and international calls to sales tax and, thus, there can be no knowingly false record or statement, and no valid FCA claim. This is not the stuff that a CPLR 3211 dismissal is made of. Even assuming there could be such a reasonable interpretation in the face of this unambiguous statute, it cannot shield a defendant from liability if, as the complaint alleges here, the defendant did not in fact act on that interpretation (see United States ex rel. Oliver v Parsons Co., 195 F3d 457, 463 [9th Cir 1999]). Otherwise, “[a] defendant could submit a claim, knowing it is false or at least with reckless disregard as to falsity . . . but nevertheless avoid liability by successfully arguing that its claim reflected a ‘reasonable interpretation’ of the requirements” (id. at 463 n 3). Sprint will have to substantiate in further proceedings that it actually held such reasonable belief and actually acted upon it.

Sprint argues that in Helio (DTA No. 825010), upon the taxpayer’s defeat at the Tax Appeals Tribunal on the issue of taxability of bundled interstate and international mobile telecommunications services, the Department of Taxation and Finance imposed only minimum interest because the audit report stated that “reasonable cause existed” for the taxpayer’s position (2015 WL 4192425, *9, 2015 NY City Tax LEXIS 8). But here, the AG alleges that Sprint, which is a much larger service provider, did not act in good faith and that it did not rely on what it now calls “its reasonable interpretation of the statute” when it made its decision to alter its tax practices. Importantly, although the Tax Appeals Tribunal stated that Helio’s similar position was reasonable, that case did not involve the level of deception and fraud alleged on the part of Sprint here.

Nevertheless, the AG has a high burden to surmount in this case. The FCA is certainly not to be applied in every case where taxes were not paid. Further, notice of a contrary administrative position alone is not nearly enough to prove fraud or recklessness under the FCA. There can be no doubt the AG will have to prove the allegations of fraud, that Sprint knew the AG’s interpretation of the statute was proper, and that Sprint did not actually rely on a reasonable interpretation of the statute in good faith. But, given the complaint’s allegations about the agency guidance and industry compliance with the AG’s position, Sprint’s payment of the proper amount of sales tax between 2002 and 2005, Sprint’s undisclosed reversal of its practices in 2005, and the explicit warnings that Sprint received from the Tax Department, the AG has stated a cause of action for a false claim. On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the Court accepts facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accords the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determines whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). It is premature to dismiss this complaint on such a motion. The AG is entitled to discovery, and there are factual issues that must be fleshed out in further proceedings.

We also hold that retroactive application of the FCA is not barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution (US Const, art I, § 10). In analyzing whether such application of the statute is barred by the US Constitution, we must first consider whether the legislature intended the FCA to establish “civil” proceedings, and if so, whether it is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil” (Smith v Doe, 538 US 84, 92 [2003] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). The FCA provides that a person who

“knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the state or a local government, or conspires to do the same; shall be liable to the state . . . for a civil penalty of not less than six thousand dollars and not more than twelve thousand dollars” plus treble damages (State Finance Law § 189 [1] [h]).

To assess whether the FCA is punitive, we look to seven factors highlighted by the United States Supreme Court “to determine whether an Act ... is penal or regulatory in character” (Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168 [1963]). These include:

“[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned” (id. at 168-169).

The balance of the factors here weighs in favor of permitting retroactive application. The penalty scheme does not impose an affirmative disability or restraint, and monetary penalties like those imposed by the FCA have not “historically been viewed as punishment” (United States ex rel. Bilotta v Novartis Pharms. Corp., 50 F Supp 3d 497, 544 [SD NY 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Although this Court previously stated that the FCA’s penalty and damage scheme serves the aims of punishment, retribution, and deterrence (State of N.Y. ex rel. Grupp v DHL Express [USA], Inc., 19 NY3d 278, 286-287 [2012]), federal courts have determined that the FCA’s provision imposing “treble damages carries a compensatory, remedial purpose alongside its punitive and deterrent goals” (Kane ex rel. United States v Health-first, Inc., 2015 WL 4619686, *22, 2015 US Dist LEXIS 101778, *69 [SD NY, Aug. 3, 2015, No. 11 Civ 2325 (ER)]; see also Bilotta, 50 F Supp 3d at 545-546; United States ex rel. Colucci v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 603 F Supp 2d 677, 683 [SD NY 2009]). As a result, the penalty and damages scheme of the FCA “does not compel a conclusion that the statute is penal” (Bilotta, 50 F Supp 3d at 546).

Also, the FCA does not regulate conduct that was already a crime, and the penalty scheme may be rationally connected to the nonpunitive purposes of allowing the government to be made whole (see Cook County v United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 US 119, 130-132 [2003]). Finally, given the compensatory, nonpunitive aims of the statute, the penalties are not unduly excessive.

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Smith, “only the clearest proof will suffice” to “transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty” (538 US at 92 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Here, while the treble damages to be imposed are severe, Sprint’s arguments do not outweigh the Mendoza factors that weigh in favor of retroactive application, nor do they amount to the “clearest proof” required by Smith. Therefore, the retroactive application of the FCA does not trigger the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in the affirmative.

Stein, J.

(dissenting in part). In my view, Tax Law § 1105 (b) (2) is an ambiguous statute. Given the procedural course the People have charted here, we are required to interpret any ambiguity in favor of Sprint, as the taxpayer, for the purpose of resolving Sprint’s motion to dismiss. Because the Attorney General cannot establish that Sprint’s tax filings were actually false in light of this ambiguity, the complaint’s principal allegation — that Sprint violated the Tax Law by failing to collect sales tax due on interstate mobile voice services based upon its purportedly erroneous interpretation of the applicable statute— must fail and cannot form the basis of a cause of action pursuant to the False Claims Act, Executive Law § 63 (12) or Tax Law article 28. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the majority insofar as its affirmative answer to the certified question is premised upon its conclusion that the complaint adequately alleges fraud by claiming “that Sprint knew the AG’s interpretation of the statute was proper, and that Sprint did not actually rely on a reasonable interpretation of the statute in good faith” (majority op at 113). To the contrary, the complaint has not sufficiently alleged a violation of the Tax Law on this basis in the first instance, let alone a knowing, fraudulent or “bad faith” violation.

However, while the complaint does not set forth viable claims arising out of Sprint’s interpretation of the statute, it does adequately allege actual falsity and illegality based upon the method used by Sprint in calculating the portion of its fixed monthly charges that were attributable to interstate mobile voice services. Accepting as true the complaint’s assertions that Sprint’s calculation of those charges was essentially arbitrary — and, therefore, that Sprint’s tax filings bore no rational relation to the amount of interstate mobile calls that were actually made — the complaint sufficiently alleges that Sprint violated the Tax Law, engaged in persistent fraud and illegality under Executive Law § 63 (12) and knowingly made or used false records within the meaning of the False Claims Act. Thus, although I would answer the certified question in the negative — the orders below were not properly made — I would partially affirm the Appellate Division order insofar as it allowed the action to proceed on that narrow ground.

L

Tax Law § 1105 (b) (2) is ambiguous because it lends itself to more than one plausible or reasonable interpretation (see Matter of Golf v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 91 NY2d 656, 662-663 [1998]). The language that the majority holds to be unambiguous reads as follows:

“[T]here is hereby imposed and there shall be paid a tax of four percent upon: . . .
“[t]he receipts from every sale of mobile telecommunications service provided by a home service provider . . . that are voice services, or any other services that are taxable under [subdivision (b) (1) (B)], sold for a fixed periodic charge (not separately stated), whether or not sold with other services” (Tax Law § 1105 [b] [2]).

The subparagraph referenced therein, Tax Law § 1105 (b) (1) (B), subjects to tax

“ [t]he receipts from every sale . . . of. . . telephony and telegraphy and telephone and telegraph service of whatever nature except interstate and international telephony and telegraphy and telephone and telegraph service and except any telecommunications service the receipts from the sale of which are subject to tax under [subdivision (b) (2)].”

Applying the canon of construction that a provision of a statute that applies to a specific situation will override a general provision, the majority concludes that subdivision (b) (1) (B) applies to telephony and telegraphy, generally, whereas subdivision (b) (2) applies specifically to the sale of “mobile telecommunications” (majority op at 110). The majority and the Attorney General read subdivision (b) (2) as providing for the taxation of “every sale of mobile telecommunications service . . . that are voice services . . . sold for a fixed periodic charge” (Tax Law § 1105 [b] [2]) (whether interstate or intrastate) and also allowing for the taxation of “other services that are taxable under [subdivision (b) (1) (B)]” (id.; see majority op at 110). The majority concludes that “it is unambiguous that Tax Law § 1105 (b) (2) imposes taxation on all voice services sold for a fixed periodic charge, including the interstate and international calls at issue here” because, to read the statute otherwise, “would make superfluous the words Voice services, or any other’ in subdivision (b) (2)” (majority op at 110-111.) The majority’s interpretation of the statute is unquestionably appealing in its simplicity. Under that reading, subdivision (b) (2) provides that mobile voice services are always taxable unless separately stated, regardless of whether they are interstate or intrastate, and the subdivision (b) (1) (B) limitation on taxation of interstate services does not govern mobile voice services at all.

While I cannot disagree that such interpretation is reasonable, I note that even the Attorney General concedes that subdivision (b) (1) (B), which differentiates between interstate and intrastate services, continues to exempt certain mobile voice services from taxation. Specifically, the Attorney General acknowledges that “[t]o be sure, (b)(2) itself provides that (b)(l)(B)’s tax rule persists for certain types of mobile service charges” and, therefore, “interstate mobile calls . . . that are not sold for a flat fee, but instead [are] ‘separately stated’ ” (emphasis added) remain taxable under subdivision (b) (1) (B). Similarly, the Attorney General’s complaint explains that, “[f]or overage minutes that are charged to customers on a per-minute usage basis, Sprint and other wireless carriers are required to collect and pay New York state and local sales taxes only when such calls are intrastate, and are not required to collect and pay them on such calls that are interstate” (emphasis added). Thus, although the majority notes that “[n]o part of subdivision (b) (2) differentiates between intrastate or interstate and international voice service” (majority op at 110), the Attorney General concedes that some interstate mobile voice services remain nontaxable under subdivision (b) (1) (B), and the statutory differentiation between intrastate and interstate service persists for such services.

Accepting the Attorney General’s concession that the limitation on interstate taxation in (b) (1) (B) continues to apply to at least some mobile voice services, I would hold that Sprint has plausibly read the language in dispute — “voice services, or any other services that are taxable under [subdivision (b) (1) (B)]” (Tax Law § 1105 [b] [2]) — as incorporating the (b) (1) (B) rule for both voice services and any other mobile services. Ultimately, the Attorney General reads subdivision (b) (2) as taxing all mobile voice services that are sold for a fixed periodic charge, while applying the (b) (1) (B) rule to other types of mobile telecommunications services, whereas Sprint reads the language at issue just slightly more broadly as applying the (b) (1) (B) rules to mobile “voice services, or any other [mobile] services” (Tax Law § 1105 [b] [2]). Under Sprint’s interpretation, the purpose of subdivision (b) (2) is to expressly provide that services that are taxable under subdivision (b) (1) (B)— text messaging, intrastate voice services, etc. — remain taxable even if bundled with nontaxable services. That reading of this less-than-clear statutory text — while perhaps not the most logical interpretation — is not unreasonable as a matter of law, particularly in light of the relatively small gap that exists between the parties’ interpretations.

Similarly, Tax Law § 1111 (Z) (2) can be read in more than one reasonable manner. That section provides that certain enumerated categories of untaxed nonvoice services, which are bundled with taxable services, are subject to sales tax unless the provider uses “an objective, reasonable and verifiable standard for identifying” and quantifying the amount of each component charge (Tax Law § 1111 [Z] [2]). The parties are in agreement that the statute applies only to nonvoice services. Applying the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of statutory construction (see Matter of Jewish Home & Infirmary of Rochester v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 84 NY2d 252, 262 [1994]), the Attorney General argues that the legislature’s creation of an exception from the general rule for the category of nonvoice services would imply that the category of voice services was not to be excluded from the general rule. That interpretation certainly is reasonable, and reading section 1111 (Z) (2) together with section 1105 (b) (2) supports the Attorney General’s assertion that the legislature intended to make all bundled voice services taxable, without permitting carriers to exclude the interstate portion as nontaxable. However, Sprint’s alternative construction of section 1111 (Z) (2) is also reasonable. Sprint argues that the focus of section 1111 (Z) (2) is on nonvoice services and that the purpose of that section is to enumerate the services — such as Internet access— that are also nontaxable, in addition to interstate voice services. Under Sprint’s view, there is no need to include interstate voice services in the section 1111 (Z) (2) list because they are already exempt from taxation under section 1105 (b) (1) (B).

In short, both the Attorney General and Sprint have advanced reasonable interpretations of the statutory language and, because that language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, it is inherently ambiguous. Indeed, the only other court to consider Sprint’s tax strategy under section 1105 (b) deemed the “legal concepts at issue” here “murky” (Louisiana Mun. Police Employees’ Retirement Sys. v Hesse, 962 F Supp 2d 576, 589 [US Dist Ct, SD NY 2013]).1 recognize that the shareholders’ derivative action with which that decision was concerned is distinguishable and involves a completely different body of law from that before us and, further, that the District Court expressly declined to rule on whether Sprint’s interpretation of the statute was “reasonable” (id. at 590 n 7). Notwithstanding those distinctions, I agree with the District Court that the legal concepts at issue here — as well as the statutory language — are murky at best, and I cannot join the majority decision holding that Tax Law § 1105 (b) is unambiguous.

IL

A finding that the statute is ambiguous has implications in the Tax Law context that are not present in other procedural contexts. Inasmuch as Sprint is not seeking a tax exemption but, arguing instead, that the “transaction or event is [not] subject to taxation” in the first instance (Matter of Grace v New York State Tax Commn., 37 NY2d 193, 196 [1975]), the tax statute at issue “must be narrowly construed and . . . any doubts concerning its scope and application are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer” (Debevoise & Plimpton v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 80 NY2d 657, 661 [1993]). In contrast, if this case had proceeded through the usual administrative process and the same arguments were before us in the context of a CPLR article 78 proceeding involving a challenge to a Tax Department audit and assessment, we could “defer to” the Tax Department as “the governmental agency charged with the responsibility for administration of [a] statute in [a] case[ ] where interpretation or application involves knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices or entails an evaluation of factual data and inferences to be drawn therefrom, and the agency’s interpretation is not irrational or unreasonable” (Matter of New York State Superfund Coalition, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 18 NY3d 289, 296 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d 316, 323 [2003]).

Here, however, the Tax Department is not before us as a party. Therefore, we cannot defer to its interpretation. Instead, the Attorney General has chosen to pursue Sprint in an action in which its interpretation of the statute is not entitled to deference and we are bound to resolve all ambiguities in Sprint’s favor, at least for the limited purpose of determining whether the complaint states a claim and, consequently, whether the courts below were correct in partially denying Sprint’s motion to dismiss. In turn, resolving the ambiguity in Sprint’s favor and adopting its interpretation necessarily means that the complaint fails to adequately allege that Sprint’s tax returns were false simply because Sprint did not report receipts from the interstate component of its mobile voice services for sales tax purposes.

III.

As explained in United States ex rel. Oliver v Parsons Co. (195 F3d 457, 461 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1228 [2000]), upon which the majority relies, the complaint must adequately allege three elements in order to state a cause of action under the False Claims Act: (1) that Sprint filed the tax records at issue, (2) that those records were actually false — i.e., that Sprint made a false statement or filed a false record because it incorrectly stated the amount of sales tax owed under Tax Law § 1105 (b) — and (3) that Sprint acted knowingly in doing so. Due to the procedural posture of this action, a conclusion that the statute is ambiguous precludes a showing of actual falsity, the second element of the False Claims Act cause of action, as a matter of law. That is, if the statute is ambiguous, our precedent requires that we interpret it in Sprint’s favor in this plenary action, as explained above; and, if the statute is interpreted in Sprint’s favor, the complaint fails to adequately allege that Sprint’s tax filings were based upon an incorrect interpretation of the statute and, therefore, were actually false. For the same reason, the complaint has not sufficiently stated a claim under Executive Law § 63 (12) and Tax Law article 28 to the extent that those causes of action are based upon allegations that Sprint knowingly relied upon an unreasonable interpretation of Tax Law § 1105 (b).

Actual falsity is a threshold element of a False Claims Act cause of action (see Parsons, 195 F3d at 461). Actual falsity does not relate to Sprint’s mental state; rather, the statutes’ “meaning is ultimately the subject of judicial interpretation, and it is [Sprint’s] compliance with these [statutes], as interpreted by this [C]ourt, that determines whether its [tax strategy] resulted in the submission of a ‘false claim’ under the Act” (Parsons, 195 F3d at 463). In other words, “while the reasonableness of [Sprint’s] interpretation of the applicable [statutes] may be relevant to whether it knowingly submitted a false claim, the question of ‘falsity’ itself is determined by whether [Sprint’s] representations were accurate in light of the applicable law,” as construed by the Court for the purpose of determining whether the complaint states a cause of action (id. [emphasis added]).

The complaint alleges that Sprint’s sales tax filings were false because Sprint “asserted [therein] that it owed less in sales taxes [on interstate voice services] than it really did” based upon an alleged misinterpretation of Tax Law § 1105 (b). However, because the statute is ambiguous and its ambiguities must be resolved in Sprint’s favor, the complaint fails to adequately allege any misinterpretation, regardless of whether Sprint acted knowingly, recklessly or with deliberate ignorance. Stated differently, the complaint does not identify any tax filings that satisfy the element of “falsity,” in relation to Sprint’s interpretation of the statute. Because the complaint does not adequately plead this threshold element, we need not reach the question on which the majority focuses, i.e., whether the complaint sufficiently alleges that Sprint acted “knowingly” in making its purportedly false statements.

IV.

That said, the determinations of the courts below should be affirmed, in part, on a different ground. As the Attorney General argues, even if the statutes at issue must be interpreted in this proceeding as permitting Sprint to exclude from its taxable receipts the portion of its flat-rate plans attributable to interstate mobile voice services, the complaint contains other allegations — sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss— that Sprint’s tax forms were false in another respect. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the arbitrary deduction that Sprint applied to its receipts from interstate mobile voice services did not, in fact, reflect the interstate calls of Sprint’s customers. The complaint sets forth detailed assertions that Sprint calculated the portion of its calls that were interstate by arbitrarily applying a percentage used to calculate an unrelated federal surcharge at times, but that Sprint did not modify its allocations when the federal government changed the percentage used to calculate the surcharge, nor did Sprint consistently adhere to the percentage allocations. In that regard, the Attorney General contends that Sprint did not even attempt to identify the interstate component of its mobile voice services, much less adhere to the disaggregation requirements set out in federal and state law and, thus, it violated the Tax Law in the manner in which it allocated the percentage of its fixed monthly charges that was attributable to interstate mobile voice service. On this appeal, which involves a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss,

“[w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory . . . [because] the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether [it] has stated one” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

While plaintiffs may not have expressly pleaded any claims based on Sprint’s failure to use an objective standard as required by state and federal laws addressing the proper unbundling of its fixed monthly charges, the allegations to support such a claim are set forth in the complaint and establish that plaintiffs have viable causes of action under the False Claims Act, Executive Law § 63 (12) and Tax Law article 28.

V.

In sum, Tax Law § 1105 (b) (2) is ambiguous because it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one manner and, inasmuch as it is a tax statute, section 1105 (b) (2) must be interpreted in Sprint’s favor for purposes of determining whether the complaint adequately states a cause of action. If Sprint’s interpretation is deemed correct, as it must be, the complaint necessarily fails to state a cause of action by asserting that Sprint filed false returns simply by virtue of the fact that the returns are consistent with that interpretation (whether Sprint believed the interpretation to be correct or not). Therefore, the causes of action under the False Claims Act, Executive Law § 63 (12) and Tax Law article 28 cannot be sustained on the basis of the Attorney General’s allegation that Sprint misinterpreted the Tax Law. Those causes of action could, however, proceed on the limited basis that Sprint’s tax forms were knowingly false, illegal and violative of the Tax Law because Sprint’s arbitrary method of calculating its deduction did not have any rational connection to the amount of interstate calls actually made by Sprint’s customers. Accordingly, I would answer the certified question in the negative and would modify the Appellate Division’s order by dismissing so much of the False Claims Act, Executive Law and Tax Law causes of action that were based upon Sprint’s purportedly erroneous interpretation of Tax Law § 1105 (b), and insofar as modified, would affirm the order allowing the claims to proceed on the narrow ground set forth in this opinion.

Judges Pigott, Abdus-Salaam and Fahey concur; Judge Stein dissents in part in an opinion; Judge Rivera taking no part.

Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in the affirmative.

      . That case involved a derivative action commenced by Sprint’s shareholders against its directors, alleging that they breached their fiduciary duties and wasted corporate assets by permitting Sprint to adopt the tax policy at issue here, which the shareholders alleged was clearly in violation of New York law. The District Court granted the directors’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

      . Resolution of the statutory ambiguities in Sprint’s favor is necessary only because the Attorney General has chosen to file a superseding complaint in this whistleblower action, rather than await the conclusion of the more typical administrative process. An acknowledgment of the facial ambiguities in the statute by this Court need not prevent the Tax Department from applying its expertise to the detailed labor of fitting tax filings into the language of Tax Law § 1105 (b) (2) (see Lorillard, 99 NY2d at 323) in other matters proceeding through the administrative pipeline, such as Matter of Helio, LLC (2015 WL 4192425, 2015 NY City Tax LEXIS 8 [NY St Div of Tax Appeals DTA No. 825010, July 2, 2015]). Nor would such acknowledgment require the Tax Department to grant refunds to other wireless carriers who adopted the interpretation advanced by the Attorney General and, therefore, collected and remitted sales tax on the receipts from all interstate mobile voice services.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Stein, J. Abdus-Salaam, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    [41 NE3d 1119, 20 NYS3d 304]
    The People of the State of New York ex rel. Lesley M. DeLia, as Director of Mental Hygiene Legal Service, on Behalf of Stephen S., Appellant, v Douglas Munsey, Respondent.
    Argued September 11, 2015;
    decided October 22, 2015

      POINTS OF COUNSEL

      Michael D. Neville, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Mineóla (Lisa Volpe, Dennis B. Feld and Ana Vuk-Pavlovic of counsel), for appellant.
    The Supreme Court properly ordered Mr. S. released pursuant to the “great writ” of habeas corpus where Holliswood Hospital involuntarily retained him without legal authority. (Vitek v Jones, 445 US 480; Savastano v Nurnberg, 152 AD2d 290, 77 NY2d 300; Project Release v Prevost, 722 F2d 960; Matter of Coates, 9 NY2d 242; Matter of Winslow v O’Neill, 153 AD2d 563; O’Connor v Donaldson, 422 US 563; Addington v Texas, 441 US 418; Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723; People ex rel. Tweed v Liscomb, 60 NY 559; People ex rel. Keitt v McMann, 18 NY2d 257.)

      Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Wolf, LLP, Lake Success CEric Broutman of counsel), for respondent.
    I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the court below based its decision on statutory grounds and there was no direct involvement of the construction of the New York or United States Constitution. (Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist. v Wieder, 72 NY2d 174; Matter of Twin Coast Newspapers v State Tax Commn., 64 NY2d 874.) II. The rules of statutory construction mandate that the procedures outlined in Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 must be applied. (Matter of Dandomar Co., LLC v Town of Pleasant Val. Town Bd., 86 AD3d 83; State of N.Y. ex rel. Harkavy v Consilvio, 29 AD3d 221.) III. The continued retention of Stephen S. past the time limitations delineated in Mental Hygiene Law article 9 does not result in the violation of his due process rights. (Algarin v New York City Dept. of Correction, 460 F Supp 2d 469; People ex rel. Noel B. v Jones, 230 AD2d 809; Matter of Rebecca Y. [Brunswick Hall Psychiatric Ctr.], 76 AD3d 1028; Matter of Harvey S., 38 AD3d 908; Matter of Thomas S., 58 AD3d 1063; State of N.Y. ex rel. Karur v Carmichael, 41 AD3d 349; Zinermon v Burch, 494 US 113; O’Connor v Donaldson, 422 US 563; Matter of Scopes, 59 AD2d 203; Rodriguez v City of New York, 72 F3d 1051.) IV. Whether utilizing a writ pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law or the CPLR, a hearing on the merits is the proper remedy.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Stein, J.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether a patient who is involuntarily committed under article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law and is unlawfully held beyond the authorized retention period may seek a writ of habeas corpus under article 70 of the CPLR. We answer this question in the affirmative, concluding that Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 is not the exclusive habeas corpus provision available to article 9 patients and does not govern habeas corpus proceedings for those patients whose detention is challenged for reasons other than the patient’s recovery.

L

As relevant here, Mental Hygiene Law article 9 governs the procedures and standards for the involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons who are in need of inpatient care and treatment but are unable to understand the necessity of such treatment. Pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law, “[t]he director of a hospital may receive and retain therein as a patient any person alleged to be mentally ill and in need of involuntary care and treatment upon the certificates of two examining physicians, accompanied by an application for the admission of such person” executed by a qualified person {id. § 9.27 [a]; see id. § 9.27 [b] [1H11]). When a patient is involuntarily admitted, the facility may hold that person for a limited period of time; if further retention is necessary, the director of the facility must apply to the court for an order authorizing continued retention within 60 days of the admission {see id. § 9.33 [a]). Upon request, the patient is entitled to a hearing on the application for a retention order {see id.). Once an order retaining the patient for a specific duration has been obtained, if the director believes that it is necessary to retain the patient beyond that time, the director “shall . . . apply during the period of retention authorized by the last order of the court . . . for an order authorizing further continued retention of such patient” {id. § 9.33 [d] [emphasis added]). The patient is, again, entitled to appear before the court on such an application {see id.).

The Mental Hygiene Law presents several specific avenues for a patient to challenge his or her retention. For example, Mental Hygiene Law § 9.31 allows the patient to request a hearing prior to the expiration of the 60-day admission period {see id. § 9.31 [a]). Section 9.35 permits a patient to seek a rehearing and review of a court’s order of retention within 30 days of the making of such an order. Additionally, and central to the present dispute, Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 provides that “[a] person retained by a facility ... is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to question the cause and legality of detention upon proper application” {id. § 33.15 [a]). This section requires the court to “examine the facts concerning the person’s alleged mental disability and detention,” and the court may discharge the patient only “if it finds that he [or she] is not mentally disabled or . . .in need of further retention for in-patient care and treatment” {id. § 33.15 [b]).

More generally, article 70 of the CPLR governs special proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus, the historic common-law writ that protects individuals from unlawful restraint or imprisonment and provides a means for those illegally detained to obtain release (see People ex rel. Duryee v Duryee, 188 NY 440, 445 [1907]). CPLR 7001 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by statute, the provisions of . . . article [70] are applicable to common [-] law or statutory writs of habeas corpus.” The CPLR does not specifically enumerate the circumstances in which a writ may be sought beyond providing that “[a] person illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his [or her] liberty within the state, or one acting on his [or her] behalf . . . , may petition without notice for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such detention and for deliverance” (CPLR 7002 [a]). “If the person is illegally detained a final judgment shall be directed discharging him [or her] forthwith” (CPLR 7010 [a] [emphasis added]).

IL

In March 2012, Stephen S. was involuntarily admitted to Holliswood Hospital upon two medical certifications averring that, as a result of his paranoid delusions, Stephen S. was unable to care for himself and required mental health treatment. In May 2012, the Hospital applied to Supreme Court for authorization to continue his involuntary retention. In June 2012, Supreme Court granted the application upon the parties’ consent, extending his retention for a period not to exceed three months. The Hospital thereafter failed to apply for court authorization of its continued involuntary retention of Stephen S. on or before the expiration date of the existing order, as was required by Mental Hygiene Law § 9.33 (d).

In October 2012, Mental Hygiene Legal Service commenced this habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of Stephen S., seeking his immediate release from the Hospital on the ground that he was being illegally detained. In response, the Hospital applied for an order authorizing his continued involuntary retention for a period of six months pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.33. The Hospital conceded that it had erroneously retained Stephen S. without a court order for approximately six weeks, but it argued that, under Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15, he could not be released without a hearing and, then, only if the court found him to be mentally fit for discharge. Conversely, Stephen S. argued that he was entitled to immediate release upon a writ of habeas corpus under CPLR article 70.

Supreme Court granted the writ and directed the Hospital to discharge Stephen S., but stayed his discharge for five days in order to allow for appellate review. In directing the release of Stephen S., the court reasoned that holding a hearing on his mental status would be a “non-remedy” for the violation of his due process rights because such a hearing would have been held had the Hospital filed a timely retention application. In other words, the court postulated that, if it merely granted the Hospital such a hearing, the Hospital’s failure to follow the Mental Hygiene Law would have had no effect on whether it could retain him without his consent.

The Hospital appealed. The Appellate Division, Second Department, initially stayed enforcement of the judgment pending its determination of the appeal (2012 NY Slip Op 90691[U] [2d Dept 2012]) and, thereafter, reversed (117 AD3d 84 [2d Dept 2014]). The Appellate Division determined that, although the matter had been rendered moot by the discharge of Stephen S. during the pendency of the appeal, the mootness exception applied. Despite the Hospital’s failure to comply with the Mental Hygiene Law, the Appellate Division held that Stephen S. was not entitled to immediate release without a determination of his mental fitness, reasoning that the habeas corpus petition was governed by Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15, not CPLR article 70.

Stephen S. appealed pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b) (1), and we now reverse.

III.

The Hospital argues that Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 governs all habeas corpus proceedings brought by article 9 patients and, therefore, a patient is not entitled to release unless a determination is made that further involuntary treatment is unnecessary. The Hospital contends that section 33.15 should be construed as the exclusive habeas corpus provision available to article 9 patients because the more general CPLR article 70 habeas provisions must yield to the specific mandate of section 33.15. According to the Hospital, such an interpretation is consistent with principles of due process because involuntary commitment of an individual is lawful so long as the individual is in need of treatment — without regard to whether the procedures of the Mental Hygiene Law were followed.

We disagree on all counts. The construction of Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 advanced by the Hospital and our dissenting colleague abrogates the common-law writ of habeas corpus for mentally ill patients and is not supported by our case law, the rules of statutory construction, or principles of due process. As explained below, section 33.15 does not supplant the common-law writ of habeas corpus available through CPLR article 70.

Although article 70 governs the procedure of the common-law writ of habeas corpus, “[r]elief from illegal imprisonment by means of this remedial writ is not the creature of any statute” (People ex rel. Tweed v Liscomb, 60 NY 559, 565 [1875]). As we have long emphasized, “the right to invoke habeas corpus, ‘the historic writ of liberty’, ‘the greatest of all writs’,” is a “primary and fundamental” one (People v Schildhaus, 8 NY2d 33, 36 [1960]; see US Const, art I, § 9; NY Const, art I, § 4). Due to its constitutional roots, “[t]his writ cannot be abrogated, or its efficiency curtailed, by legislative action,” except in certain emergency situations (People ex rel. Tweed, 60 NY at 566; see Hoff v State of New York, 279 NY 490, 492 [1939]; People ex rel. Sabatino v Jennings, 246 NY 258, 261 [1927]). Moreover, statutes pertaining to the writ of habeas corpus must be “construed in favor of, and not against, the liberty of the subject and the citizen” (People ex rel. Tweed, 60 NY at 569; see People ex rel. Perkins v Moss, 187 NY 410, 418 [1907]).

CPLR 7001 provides that article 70 applies to common-law and statutory writs of habeas corpus “[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by statute.” However, nothing in the plain language of Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 purports to limit the availability of the common-law writ in Mental Hygiene Law proceedings. Rather, section 33.15 enhances the efficacy of the writ of habeas corpus, as our case law dictates, and thereby ensures that patients are not committed and retained without due process of law. That is, Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 allows patients to seek a writ of habeas corpus when they are being held pursuant to a court order but, nevertheless, believe they have sufficiently recovered from their mental illness so that their continued retention is unwarranted; in such cases, determining the legality of their retention would require an inquiry into their mental state. On the other hand, patients whose detention is otherwise unauthorized may proceed under the habeas corpus provisions of CPLR article 70 since the legality of their detention can be determined on the basis of, for example, whether the appropriate procedures have been followed, without the need for a hearing into their mental state.

This interpretation — which reads section 33.15 and article 70 consistently with one another — accords with the rules of statutory construction (see generally Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Day, 96 NY2d 149, 153 [2001] [“Statutes which relate to the same subject matter must be construed together unless a contrary legislative intent is expressed”]; People v Epton, 19 NY2d 496, 505 [1967]). Most significantly, it preserves the availability of the great writ of habeas corpus (see People ex rel. Perkins, 187 NY at 418; People ex rel. Tweed, 60 NY at 569; see also Schildhaus, 8 NY2d at 36 [“the right to invoke habeas corpus . . . is so primary and fundamental that it must take precedence over considerations of procedural orderliness and conformity”]). By contrast, the Hospital’s reading of section 33.15 would effectively eliminate the availability of the writ for patients wishing to challenge the procedural methods by which they have been involuntarily retained and to obtain release from an unlawful detention. Such diminution of the great writ is impermissible (see People ex rel. Sabatino, 246 NY at 261; People ex rel. Tweed, 60 NY at 566; see also Mental Hygiene Law § 33.01; People ex rel. Thorpe v Von Holden, 63 NY2d 546, 554 [1984] [habeas corpus proceeding available to criminal offenders found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health where statutory time schedule was not followed]).

This is not the first time we have sanctioned a patient’s use of a writ of habeas corpus to obtain release where a facility failed to follow the appropriate procedures to lawfully retain the individual (see e.g. People ex rel. Jacobs v Director of Gowanda State Hosp., 14 NY2d 663, 665 [1964], affg 19 AD2d 858, 858 [4th Dept 1963]; People ex rel. Granskofski v Whitehead, 8 NY2d 962, 963 [1960], affg 10 AD2d 801, 801 [4th Dept 1960]). Indeed, the express extension of the writ to involuntarily committed patients who have become mentally fit for discharge — rather than curtailment of the writ — has long been considered the purpose of section 33.15 and its predecessor provisions (see Matter of Coates, 9 NY2d 242, 246 [1961] [noting that a patient may pursue discharge under Mental Hygiene Law habeas provision “at any time” upon ground that “the patient is sane”]; People ex rel. Sabatino, 246 NY at 261 [indicating that the question under section 93 of the Insanity Law, from which section 33.15 of the Mental Hygiene Law is derived, “is whether one lawfully committed to an asylum has thereafter become sane”]; People ex rel. Ledwith v Board of Trustees of Bellevue & Allied Hosps., 238 NY 403, 408 [1924] [where hospital failed to timely follow procedures, the patient “was entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, either under section 93 of the Insanity Law or, if that be inapplicable, under article 77 of the Civil Practice Act relating to habeas corpus”]; Matter of Andrews, 126 App Div 794, 799-800 [1st Dept 1908] [“In addition to the remedy for a discharge on writ of habeas corpus in case the detention is without lawful process, the Legislature . . . expressly extended the writ of habeas corpus to cases of lawful commitments of persons as insane who have subsequently, while held under such lawful commitments, recovered their reason”]). As these cases make clear, section 33.15 does not govern habeas proceedings where the right to release is premised upon unlawful process.

The dissent suggests that “there is no rational reason to determine that Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 does not apply’ in habeas proceedings alleging an unauthorized retention (dissenting op at 136). Yet, in addition to contravening the purpose of the historic writ, ratification of the Hospital’s interpretation of section 33.15 would undermine the procedural due process protections guaranteed by the various provisions of the Mental Hygiene Law requiring notice and regular judicial review in connection with a patient’s commitment (see generally Epton, 19 NY2d at 505). It is beyond dispute that “[t]he state ‘has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill,’ ” and that it “may rely on its parens patriae power to provide care to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves because of mental illness” (Matter of K.L., 1 NY3d 362, 370 [2004], quoting Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 426 [1979]). Nevertheless, it has long been recognized that involuntary civil commitment involves a “ ‘massive curtailment of liberty’ ” (Vitek v Jones, 445 US 480, 491 [1980], quoting Humphrey v Cady, 405 US 504, 509 [1972]) and, “therefore[,] [it] cannot permissibly be accomplished without due process of law” (Rodriguez v City of New York, 72 F3d 1051, 1061 [2d Cir 1995]; see Savastano v Nürnberg, 77 NY2d 300, 307 [1990]). Thus, contrary to the Hospital’s contention, a patient may be involuntarily committed only where the standards for commitment and the proce dures set forth in the Mental Hygiene Law — which satisfy the demands of due process — are met (see Matter of K.L., 1 NY3d at 371; Project Release v Prevost, 722 F2d 960, 971 [2d Cir 1983]; see generally Savastano, 77 NY2d at 305-309 [recognizing that the Mental Hygiene Law procedures and regulations provide a “network of procedural safeguards” for “the due process rights of those involuntary patients”]). This is not to say that every violation of the Mental Hygiene Law amounts to a due process violation or will entitle a patient to a writ of habeas corpus but, “[w]ithout a court order of continued retention [in accordance with the Mental Hygiene Law], or the consent of the patient, the hospital must release the patient” (Project Release, 722 F2d at 967; see People ex rel. Tweed, 60 NY at 569 [“The law is no respecter of persons, and suffers no (person) . . . to be deprived of his (or her) liberty, except ‘by due process of law;’ and the writ of habeas corpus is as available . . . (to) he (or she) whom the popular voice would condemn” (emphasis omitted)]).

The dissent’s statement that “patients will still receive the procedural protections required by due process” if Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 applies in a case such as this overlooks the fact that patients who are seeking a common-law writ under CPLR article 70 are alleging that they have already been deprived of due process by virtue of a violation of the procedural protections of the Mental Hygiene Law (dissenting op at 137). Thus, a conclusion that section 33.15, with its required hearing to determine the patient’s mental status, is the exclusive habeas corpus avenue available to article 9 patients would permit the flagrant disregard — either deliberately or through laxity — of the due process protections provided throughout the Mental Hygiene Law, and there would be no effective remedy available to a patient for a facility’s failure to comply with even the most basic of the statutory procedural requirements. Indeed, implicit in the dissent’s assertion that application of section 33.15 does not violate the due process rights of a patient who establishes that his or her detention is unauthorized by the court or the Mental Hygiene Law is the dissent’s conclusion that an article 9 patient has no enforceable due process rights so long as there exists proof that he or she could benefit from further treatment, regardless of whether that proof is presented six weeks or a matter of years after expiration of the court order authorizing the patient’s retention. Such a view of section 33.15 would essentially nullify the procedural due process protections contained in other provisions of the Mental Hygiene Law, which are already defined by reference to the rights and interests at stake (see generally Savastano, 77 NY2d at 307). Moreover, under the dissent’s reading, by failing to seek continued retention under section 9.33, thereby prompting the patient to seek a writ of habeas corpus, in cases such as this — where the patient’s application is based on the facility’s inaction — the Hospital would be able to shift the burden of proof to the patient to demonstrate his or her fitness in order to obtain release pursuant to section 33.15 (see Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. ex rel. James U. v Rhodes, 195 AD2d 160, 162 [3d Dept 1994]; Matter of Winslow v O’Neill, 153 AD2d 563, 564 [2d Dept 1989]). We cannot countenance, and the legislature surely did not intend, an interpretation of section 33.15 that would render meaningless such significant protections as are provided in Mental Hygiene Law article 9.

In sum, we declare that Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 does not preclude use of the writ of habeas corpus under CPLR article 70. Rather, Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 merely clarifies that an article 9 patient is entitled to bring a habeas proceeding where the commitment is authorized, but the patient believes that he or she has sufficiently recovered to be released. If a facility is of the opinion that a patient requires further treatment notwithstanding having been granted a writ of habeas pursuant to CPLR article 70 following an illegal detention, it is incumbent upon the facility to commence a new article 9 proceeding in compliance with the strictures of the Mental Hygiene Law (compare People ex rel. Thorpe, 63 NY2d at 555). The Hospital’s remaining arguments are unavailing. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, without costs, the habeas corpus proceeding converted into a declaratory judgment action, and judgment granted in accordance with this opinion.

Abdus-Salaam, J.

(dissenting). The majority holds that a mentally ill patient who was involuntarily committed under article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law based on a court’s determination that he was a danger to himself and to others should be released without a hearing to determine the status of his mental disability when a retention order has expired, despite the hospital’s proffer of evidence that the patient remains a peril. Indeed, the majority believes that even a mentally ill dangerous person must be automatically released, solely because the hospital, due to administrative oversight, failed to timely file an application seeking the patient’s further retention pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.33.

The majority reaches this ominous and untenable conclusion in spite of the plain language of Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 (b) which expressly directs that where a person retained by a facility brings a writ of habeas corpus to question the cause and legality of his or her detention, “[a] court shall examine the facts concerning the person’s alleged mental disability and detention” (emphasis added). The majority declares that Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 neither applies upon the filing of a writ of habeas corpus nor requires the court to examine the facts concerning a person’s mental condition prior to release. This proclamation is incongruous on its own terms, and the reasoning behind it is perplexing. By the majority’s rationale, adherence to the statute is not required in cases such as this one because the statute does not in so many words expressly supplant the common-law writ of habeas corpus in the context of detentions under Mental Hygiene Law article 9. But surely that cannot be true, if “shall” means “is required to” (Black’s Law Dictionary [10th ed 2014], shall). To the contrary, the statute on its face absolutely requires a factual determination of the patient’s mental state and fitness for release “[u]pon the return of such a writ of habeas corpus” (Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 [b]), and that unqualified statutory command is incompatible with the majority’s decision to grant automatic release to patients upon the filing of a common-law habeas writ. Because the majority declines to follow the unambiguous language of the statute or acknowledge its clear practical purpose, I must respectfully dissent.

The majority’s analysis is based on the premise that the habeas corpus provision of the Mental Hygiene Law “does not supplant the common-law writ of habeas corpus available through CPLR article 70” (majority op at 130) because the Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 habeas provision applies only where patients are being held pursuant to a lawful order of retention and seek an early release. However, the statute, on its face, applies to a person retained who brings a writ of habeas corpus. It does not restrict this provision only to cases where a patient is lawfully retained and seeks an early release. Thus, the majority’s conclusion flies in the face of the clear, unambiguous language of Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15, and runs afoul of the well-settled canon that “[t]he Legislature is presumed to mean what it says, and if there is no ambiguity in the act, it is generally construed according to its plain terms” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 94, Comment).

In my view, there is no rational reason to determine that Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 does not apply in this instance, and thereby conclude that without any review by the court, and over objection by the hospital, a patient involuntarily retained must be released solely because a hospital has failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the Mental Hygiene Law. Courts have held to the contrary, and for good reason (see e.g. State of N.Y. ex rel. Karur v Carmichael, 41 AD3d 349 [1st Dept 2007] [although hospital failed to respond to patient’s request for a hearing challenging his commitment pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.31 and failed to timely apply for continued retention, granting of writ of habeas corpus and directing immediate release was error and matter remanded for a hearing pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15]; see also State of N.Y. ex rel. Harkavy v Consilvio, 29 AD3d 221, 227-228 [1st Dept 2006] [Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15, “which is directed exclusively to those retained in psychiatric facilities,” is more specific than CPLR article 70 “and thus controlling in these mental hygiene cases” (citations omitted)], read on other grounds 7 NY3d 607 [2006]; People ex rel. Noel B. v Jones, 230 AD2d 809 [2d Dept 1996] [upon habeas petition brought by patient whose involuntary commitment order had expired, court required to conduct hearing to determine patient’s mental status despite the hospital’s failure to comply with two statutory deadlines]). The patient in this case, Stephen S., who is schizophrenic, had been hospitalized on several prior occasions for psychosis before he was involuntarily admitted to Holliswood Hospital. During his six-month admission, he struck and threatened staff members and patients numerous times, stabbed a staff member in the neck with a pen, assaulted his mother and attacked and choked his treating psychiatrist. Yet, because the hospital inadvertently missed the deadline for filing a retention application, the majority concludes that a court must grant his habeas petition without any consideration of his mental condition. This does not advance the treatment and care of the mentally ill patient or protect society from one who poses a danger to others.

Holding a hearing upon return of the writ of habeas corpus will not “effectively eliminate the availability of the writ” (majority op at 131) for patients who seek to obtain release from an unlawful detention. Such patients will still receive the procedural protections required by due process. As this Court noted in Savastano v Nurnberg (77 NY2d 300 [1990]):

“Although there can be no doubt that an involuntarily admitted mentally ill patient does not abandon his or her constitutional rights at the facility door, it is equally true that the procedural protections required by due process must be determined with reference to the rights and interests at stake” (77 NY2d at 307 [citations omitted]).

The rights and interests of a mentally ill person who is dangerous, and who requires continued involuntary commitment, will only be promoted by such a hearing. Thus, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, adherence to the mandate of Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 does in fact provide a patient with an effective remedy. If the patient should no longer be retained, he/she will be immediately released upon return of the writ. Requiring a hearing regarding the patient’s mental status does not, as suggested by the majority, somehow facilitate or encourage a hospital’s flagrant disregard for the due process protections embodied in the Mental Hygiene Law (majority op at 133). Rather, it protects the patient and the public.

Furthermore, contrary to the majority’s supposition, holding a hearing where a hospital brings a retention application in response to a patient’s habeas petition would not shift the burden of proof to the patient. Where a hospital seeks to retain a person for involuntary psychiatric care, “it must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the patient is mentally ill and in need of continued, supervised care and treatment, and that the patient poses a substantial threat of physical harm to himself and/or others” (New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v Brian H., 51 AD3d 412, 415 [2008]). The cases cited by the majority for this “burden shifting” concern are inapposite as they involve situations different from the one here. Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. ex rel. James U. v Rhodes (195 AD2d 160, 162 [3d Dept 1994]) involved a patient who pleaded not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect to charges of attempted murder and reckless endangerment, who was detained pursuant to a two-year retention order, and who sought early release. In Matter of Winslow v O’Neill (153 AD2d 563, 564 [2d Dept 1989]), a patient who was subject to a six-month retention order sought release prior to the expiration of the court order authorizing retention, but failed to submit any medical evidence to rebut the outstanding retention order that determined he was in need of inpatient care and treatment. Thus, in both of those cases, the patient was seeking to show that his mental condition had changed since the court had ordered him retained, whereas in this situation, there is no longer any court order in effect determining that the person required involuntary commitment.

In sum, the logical and plain interpretation of Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 is that the legislature intended that a mentally ill person who poses a danger to himself and/or to others would not be released without court review even under circumstances where the person’s commitment order had expired. Accordingly, I would affirm.

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Pigott, Rivera and Fahey concur; Judge Abdus-Salaam dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion.

Order reversed, without costs, the habeas corpus proceeding converted into a declaratory judgment action, and judgment granted in accordance with the opinion herein.

      . Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 sets forth an alternative procedure, to be used in emergency situations in which a person’s alleged mental illness “is likely to result in serious harm” to that person or another and immediate observation and treatment is appropriate (Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 [a]). If retention beyond a specified time frame is required, the procedures governing admission and commitment pursuant to that section converge with those governing admission upon medical certification under section 9.33 (see id. § 9.39 [b]).

      . In light of the Hospital’s discharge of Stephen S., we convert the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action (see People ex rel. McManus v Horn, 18 NY3d 660, 666 [2012]; Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v Ford, 92 NY2d 500, 505 [1998]).

       This Court’s terse opinions cited by the majority (People ex rel. Jacobs v Director of Gowanda State Hosp., 14 NY2d 663, 665 [1964], affg 19 AD2d 858, 858 [4th Dept 1963]; People ex rel. Granskofski v Whitehead, 8 NY2d 962, 963 [1960], affg 10 AD2d 801, 801 [4th Dept 1960]) for the proposition that a patient may use a writ of habeas corpus to obtain release where a facility failed to follow appropriate procedures do not analyze the issue presented here.