author: By the Court. Paine, J.

text:
    Sturgis v. Law and St. John.
    In the absence of an express agreement, the question whether services in assisting to save a vessel are to be compensated on a quantum, meruit, or on salvage principles, depends upon the circumstances of the case.
    Where a steamboat struck and became fast upon the rocks, in a river or narrow strait, in tide water, the plaintiff was employed by her owners to aid in relieving her (she being in great danger), and took the principal superintendence of the same, but the vessel remained in the owners, possession and control, she was at no time derelict, it did not appear that the plaintiff’s compensation was risked upon the.success of his efforts, and there were other circumstances indicating that he was to be remunerated according to the value of his services; it was held, that his claim could not be enforced as for salvage or upon salvage principles.
    Where valuable services are rendered upon the employment of the owners, to a vessel in imminent peril, by one having great skill in rescuing wrecked vessels, and unusual means adapted to such exigencies, but under circumstances which prevented him from being compensated on the principles of salvage; it was held that he was entitled to recover a very liberal allowance for his services, to be measured, as well by the extent of such skill and means, as by the time and number of men employed. Courts of common law have no jurisdiction to enforce a claim for salvage. Per Paine, J.
    The jurisdiction to enforce claims for salvage considered on principle and on the English authorities, by Paine, J.
    (Before Oakley, Ch. J., and Sandforb and Paine, J.J.)
    Jan. 7, 8;
    Feb. 16, 1850.
    Motion to set aside the report of referees. The declaration .contained several counts. The first. count alleged, that the defendants, on the eighteenth day of April, 1846, at the city and county of New York, were the owners and possessed of a certain steamboat or vessel, called the Oregon, and which said steamboat or vessel had, on the day and year aforesaid, at Hell Gate, in the East River, to wit, at the city and county of Hew York aforesaid, struck upon a rock or rocks, and was, on the day and year aforesaid, lying thereon and leaking very badly, and in a very dangerous condition, and liable to go to pieces or be destroyed or very seriously injured. And the said plaintiff, having great skill, knowledge, and experience in the business of raising, floating, removing, and saving steamboats and other vessels, which had been wrecked, stranded, or run upon rocks, did, at the special instance and request of the said defendants, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, at the place aforesaid, bestow great labor, care, and diligence, and paid, laid out, and expended large sums of money, and did, at great expense, employ many persons and laborers, and various pumps, machinery, rigging, and apparatus, and laid out great skill and toil in and about the raising, floating, and removing off from said rock or rocks, and in saving the said vessel for the said defendants, and did, on to wit, the 23d day of April, 1846, at the city and county aforesaid, raise, set afloat, and remove the said steamboat off from the said rocks, and deliver the same to the said defendants. And, in consideration thereof, the said defendants, afterwards, to wit, on1 the same day and year, and at the place last aforesaid, undertook, and then and there faithfully promised the said plaintiff, well and truly to pay unto the said plaintiff, so much money as the said plaintiff reasonably deserved to have of the said defendants for the same, when the said defendants should be thereunto afterwards requested; and the said plaintiff avers, that he reasonably deserved to have of the said defendants for the same, the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars, lawful money of the United States of America, to wit, at the place aforesaid, whereof the said defendants, afterwards, to wit, on the same day and year, and at the place aforesaid, had notice.”
    There were counts in indebitatus assumpsit for the same services, but not in any respect varying the nature of the claim.
    The cause was referred to three referees, who made a general report in favor of the plaintiff for $2062 59.
    It appeared, on the trial before them, that the Oregon struck and grounded on the rocks at Hell Gate, a narrow strait, in tide water, between New York Bay and Long Island Sound, on Saturday, the 18th of April, 1846, and lay there until the following Wednesday afternoon, when she was got off, and was towed into the city by two steamboats. After she struck, she was in a very perilous situation, the rocks having pierced her side or bottom, so that it was difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the water from flowing freely through her; and as she lay about midships upon the rocks, and her bows and stem were considerably depressed, there was danger of her breaking in two. The plaintiff was requested in this city by Mr. Law, one of the defendants, to go up and assist in getting off the Oregon, and take charge of the work. He accordingly went up on Saturday, and remained with the Oregon until she was finally got off. There were other persons also employed by the owners, to assist, and capable of superintending the work; but the principal charge was committed to the plaintiff, who was at the time in the general employment of the board of underwriters of New York, for the purpose of assisting and getting off vessels insured by them, at a salary of one thousand dollars per annum; and it was proved, that he was exceedingly competent for the business. Whenever the plaintiff was in the employment of the underwriters, which he was not on this occasion, he received from the parties interested ten dollars per day for his services, in addition to his salary. Hie plaintiff, under the owners’ control, had the principal charge and direction of getting the Oregon off. This was effected by the use of two steam pumps to free her of water, and by means of empty casks, and canal boats, applied under her guards, so as to raise her out of the water.
    It appeared that the plaintiff’s opinion, in the first instance, was, that she could have been got off, simply by heaving upon her, when freed by the pumps, and hauling her off. But this mode was strongly opposed by the owners and several of those engaged, and not attempted; and the evidence showed, that the attempt would have torn the steamboat in two, as the rocks projected into her a foot or two through her side.
    Besides his own services, the plaintiff paid out $62 59 for labor and materials engaged by himself. He also procured from the board of underwriters, and used in the work, a steam pump, belonging to the board, which they had refused to let the defendants have; it beipg their rule not to permit it to go out of the charge of their own agents. Their usual charge for such a steam pump, was two hundred and fifty dollars, and they charged this sum to the plaintiff. It was not proved that he had paid it. The plaintiff, in addition, founded his claim partly on the ground that his situation as agent for the board of underwriters, and constant employment in similar undertakings, gave him facilities in obtaining the necessary men and means for such enterprises, and for these he was entitled to compensation.
    The value of the Oregon was proved to have been about one hundred thousand dollars. Some of the plaintifPs witnesses testified that his services in the premises were worth from one to five thousand dollars ; other witnesses estimated the value at five hundred dollars ; and some, on the footing of a daily compensation, made it much less. The owners were at all times in jDOSsession of the steamboat, and controlled the operations for her relief. They paid the men, boats, and vessels employed, and there were other circumstances tending to show that the plaintiff exjDected a condensation, irrespective of the success of the efforts to get the steamboat off of the rocks.
    The referees allowed to the plaintiff two thousand dollars for his services in removing the Oregon from the rocks at Hell Gate, and for the use of the steam pump, and the $62 59 paid for cordage, &c., used in the work, making $2,062 59. The defendants moved to set aside the report as against law and evidence.

      & Sherwood, for the defendants.
    I. The allowance of two thousand dollars for four days work, and the use of a pump about two days, is neither reasonable nor justified by the testimony, and induces the belief that the report is founded upon misapprehension. (McConnell v. Hampton, 12 John. 237.)
    It is manifest that the referees have mistaken or exceeded their authority, and given damages as in a case of tort, instead of “ depending in any wise upon calculation,” in assumpsit. (Duberly v. Gunning, 4 T. R. 656.)
    II. The plaintiff was only entitled to pay for the ordinary services of the captain controlling a gang of men.
    His plan of “ hauling off” was not adopted, and if it had been, would have proved ruinous. The canal boats, not suggested by plaintifl) were most effective. The highest estimate of the plaintiff’s services, upon the supposition of his skill, was for himself $1,000, and $250 for pump. The average estimate would have been much less; and if paid as other captains, not over $10 or $12 per day. The plaintiff, by his bill of particulars, shows, that as salvage service he only claimed for himself $500, and for pump $250.
    IH. The facts in the ease do not present a case of salvage, oían action in the nature of salvage, the plaintiff not being in possession as salvor, but merely acting under the employment and in the aid of the owners.
    He was acting under a contract, and not as a volunteer, risking his whole compensation on his success. If it were a case of salvage, the exclusive jurisdiction is in admiralty. (10 Peters R. 108, 102; 3 Kent’s Comm. 244.)

      J. 8. Woodward and F. B. Cutting, for the plaintiff,
    insisted that the referees were justified by the evidence in determining-the sum of two thousand dollars to be a reasonable compensation to the plaintiff, for his services as such superintendent, and for the use of the steam pump. And on a question of fact, the court will not interfere with their report, unless there be a preponderance of evidence against their finding, so great as to satisfy the court that there was either an absolute mistake on the part of the referees, or that they acted under the influence of passion, prejudice or corruption. (Cohen v. Dupont, 1 Sand. S. C. R. 260; Doyle's Adm'r v. St. James Church, 7 Wend. 198; Winchell v. Latham, 6 Cow. R. 682.)
    The service was in the nature of a salvage service, and to be compensated according to its value considering the peculiar circumstances of the case; such as the great value of the steamboat, and her very critical situation requiring immediate use of powerful apparatus and skilful men. The plaintiff by his great experience had acquired means which no one else possessed. He had gangs of very skilful, disciplined and obedient men, set apart and devoted to this pursuit; and he had the means of procuring the steam pump of the underwriters, which was indispensable. He also had at hand all the other requisite apparatus. The referees were to decide it as a question of salvage, and they had jurisdiction. (Cashmere v. De Wolfe, 2 Sand. S. C. R. 379.)
    Mr. Cutting also cited Duke of Clarence, 1 Rob. Adm. R. 346; Newman v. Walters, 3 Bos. & Pull. 612; Abbott on Shipp. [556, 557,] 660, 662; 8 East. 70; 2 Chitty’s Pl. 68; 3 Hagg. Adm. R. 117; 1 Sumner 328; 1 Story’s R. 414.
   By the Court. Paine, J.

Although we cannot regard the declaration as setting up a claim for salvage, yet the plaintiff’s counsel on the argument attempted to sustain the referees’ report upon the ground that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation upon salvage principles. And although the report gives us no light as to the views of the referees in this respect, yet we are inclined to suppose from the amount reported by them, that they must have regarded it as a case of salvage. Did it clearly appear that the referees had so treated it, we should feel ourselves obliged to set aside their report upon that ground. .

The services rendered by Captain Sturgis have undoubtedly a resemblance, at least, to salvage services, and if presented for compensation to a court competent to grant it, would have been entitled to full consideration. But we think that a want of jurisdiction prevents this court from inquiring into their merits as salvage services.

Strange as it may seem, there is no instance which we are aware of, where the question has been raised, whether a court of common law has jurisdiction to award a salvage compensation. It is generally supposed that courts of common law have concurrent jurisdiction, in eases of salvage, as they have in many other cases with courts of admiralty; and undoubtedly there are one or two instances, where courts themselves have acted upon the supposition. How far it has been acted upon, however, and whether to a sufficient extent to establish the jurisdiction, can only be learned from an examination of the cases and the weight of the objections to the jurisdiction.

Salvage, although applied by the Romans to cases coming under the jus-jyostlimmii, appears not to have attracted notice at an early period in modern times, except in cases of wrecks. The statute of 27 Edw. HI. ch. 13, is probably the earliest men? tion of salvage, which provides that goods coming to land shall be delivered to their owners on payment of sal/vage. The only remedy in use for its recovery, appears to have been a detention of the goods until it was paid; and this gave rise to a tender of the salvage, and an action of trover for the recovery of the goods, in case the tender was not. accepted and the goods delivered up. The courts of common law were then, as they are now, perfectly competent to administer this remedy; and we find several actions of trover in the books, where, if the tender was sufficient, the owner recovered his goods, if it was not, the salvor still retained them. The first of these cases reported, (although probably, in practice, others had occurred,) is that of Hartford v. Jones, 1 Ld. Raym. 393; S. C. 2 Salk. 654; 3 Ibid. 366. The remaining cases of this description to be found, are Baring v. Day, 8 East. R. 57; Sutton v. Buck, 2 Taunt. 302; Clark v. Chamberlain, 2 Mees. & Wels. 77.

This right to demand and receive one’s goods, upon paying the possessor of them his just claim for salvage, seems to be founded in necessity, and has always been permitted both by courts of common law and courts of admiralty. If the tender is sufficient, there ought to be no litigation, unless among those entitled to the salvage; and to this the owner of the goods need not be a party. He has been able, as every one ought to be, by doing all that justice demanded of him, to extricate himself, merely, from a law suit; and he could have done it in no other way.

But a very different question is presented, when a salvor is to select a tribunal to decide upon his rights. If there is a court of ancient and acknowledged jurisdiction in such cases, which is peculiarly adapted to apply those extraordinary and anomalous principles of justice which govern salvage cases; which has facilities for bringing all the necessary parties before it, however unconnected and difficult to be reached, and of adjudicating upon all their rights, however conflicting and difficult to be reconciled and adjusted ; which has a system, of practice and of equitable rules admirably adajDted to such cases, and which have grown up from the constant, unquestioned, an'd long continued exercise of its jurisdiction; it deserves consideration 'whether the salvor should not be required to select such a court, rather than one which possesses none of these qualifications, and which can lay no other claim to the jurisdiction, than that in the course of centuries it has once exercised it in a single case.

In the first place, the principles which govern salvage compensation have no analogy to any principles acted upon in courts of law or equity in other cases. There is no possible form of action, in which it could ever be recovered, except in the general form of assumpsit; an action in which one may recover what in strict justice is his own-, but no more. For services, he can recover no more than their ordinary value. And it was never heard of that courts in such cases could have any regard to public policy in estimating the compensation.

Very’different are the principles applied to cases of salvage. “ If we search,” says Oh. J. Marshall (in the case of The Blmreau, 2 Crunch R. 266,) for the motives producing this apparent prodigality, in rewarding services rendered at sea, we shall find them in a liberal and enlarged policy. The allowance of a very ample compensation for those services, (one very much exceeding the mere risque encountered and labor employed in effecting them,) is intended as an inducement to render them; which it is for the public interests, and for the general interests of humanity, to hold forth to those who navigate the ocean. It is, perhaps, difficult on any other principle, to account satisfactorily for the very great difference which is made between the retribution allowed for services at sea and on land; neither will a fair calculation of the real hazard or labor be a foundation for such a difference; nor will the benefit received, always account for it.” Certainly these are unusual grounds of recovery, under a quantum meruit, or indebitatus assumpsit

In estimating salvage, the ordinary quantum meruit is almost, if not entirely, lost sight of. The elements. of salvage service which are principally regarded are, the enterprise, alacrity, intrepidity, and spirit of adventure of the salvor; the damages and difficulties he has to encounter; the fatigue, exposure, anxiety, and suffering which he endures; and the value of the property and degree of peril from which it is rescued. And an indispensable requisite, is, that he should be successful; for unless successful, he can make no claim for his services.

But the greatest objection to a common law action for salvage is, the unfitness of a jury to deal with it. The principles which govern its allowance can never be familiar to jurors, for they have no resemblance to the ordinary principles xipon which justice is administered. In most cases of salvage, there are many claimants among whom distribution is to be made according to rules which are only known to a coiut of admiralty, and which it requires great judicial ability to apjDly. There is one rate for the owner, another for the master, another for the mate, another for the seaman, another for the apprentice; all varying according to relative degrees of merit. There are sometimes different sets of successive salvors, whose respective claims are governed by well-established rules in admiralty. There are also well-settled rules, governing the proportions allowed in cases of derelict, and cases not derelict; in cases of great value, and cases of little value. In truth, there are often in cases of salvage, fifty different issues to be tried and decided, instead of the one or two single and simple issues, to which the wisdom of the common law has confined the function of a jury. Had not the subject of salvage been confided to the court of admiralty, it must have been assumed by a court of equity. The English chancery, which was wisely allowed to circumscribe the common law actions, would never have devised a writ for so complex and difficult a subject; but would, as it did in other similar cases, have itself afforded that relief which could- not safely be intrusted to a jlu7-

■ A court of admiralty has also the means of bringing before it all claimants of the property saved, or of barring their claims if they cannot be found or brought in. .It may also have plaintiffs before it whose claims are conflicting; and if all the salvors are not before it, or represented in court, it may reserve and set aside their shares until called for. Such are some of the advantages and facilities, which a court of admiralty possesses for doing justice to all parties, and maiding a complete and final disposition of the whole subject in a single suit for salvage.

The difference between a court of admiralty and a court of common law in this respect, is well illustrated by the case before us. There were altogether some 50 men, probably, employed in the undertaking to get off the Oregon. There were also several steam-boats, vessels, and canal-boats engaged in the business, and two valuable steam pumps were used on the occasion. Several of those employed in getting her off, appear to have exercised a judgment quite as good as the plaintiff’s, and possibly rendered nearly as valuable services. At all events, every one employed, and every owner of property used to get her off, were entitled, probably, to salvage as well as the plaintiff, although not perhaps to so large a share. But the plaintiff is the only one who makes a claim in this suit; and I know of no common law rule which would have authorized the joining of any of the rest with him in this action. He' must sue alone, and every one of them must sue alone ; and if every one recovers, in proportion to the $2,000 allowed to him, the Oregon might better have been left to repose upon the rocks of Hellgate. The horrors of any alternative were better than such a litigation.

I need not pursue this subject further. It is obvious, that, although there may be cases of great simplicity, compared with those I have referred to, yet all, as regards the jurisdiction of courts over them, must occupy the same ground, and possess the same rights. The question of jurisdiction cannot depend upon the number of parties, or the complexity or difficulty of a case, but upon its character. If a court has jurisdiction of a single salvage case, it must have of all.

Hothing remains but to inquire how far courts of common law have exercised this jurisdiction, and what are the opinions of jurists in support of it.

But one instance is to be found in the English reports of a suit for salvage in a court of common law ; that of Newman v. Walters, (3 Bos. & Pul. 612.) It was an action of indebitatus assumpsit for salvage, brought by a passenger for acting as master, after the master .had left the vessel with part of the crew, and with the rest of the crew bringing the vessel safely into port. No objection was made to the jurisdiction of the court, and it seems not to have been thought of. This probably arose from there being no difficulty as to parties, the mate and crew being clearly not entitled to salvage, and the plaintiff being the only one who could have any claim. The only question raised or considered by the court was, whether a passenger under such circumstances could be entitled to salvage.

I have not been able to find the subject mentioned in any elementary writer, except in Lord Tenterden’s treatise on shipping, and in a note to the form of a count for salvage in Ohitty’s pleadings. Lord Tenterden, (Abbott on Ship. 398, § 2,) says, that, -by the common law of England, salvage may be ascertained by a jury, in an action brought by the salvor- against the owner of the goods. But he cites no authority for it, although he does afterwards cite Newman v. Walters, to show under what circumstances a passenger may be entitled to salvage. Chitty in his second volume, p. 68, barely gives a form of indebitatus assumpsit “ for salvage of a certain anchor and cable,” and refers to Newman v. Walters as the precedent. These are the only forms of a declaration for salvage to be found.

A case has occurred in our own courts, (Peck v. Randall, 1 J. R. 165,) of a suit for salvage, but no question was raised or doubt expressed as to the jurisdiction; the case of Newman v. Walters having been cited and apparently regarded as furnishing a safe and reliable precedent.

We think that the occurrence of a single case of salvage in a court of common law, at so late a period as that of Newman v. Walters, while the court of admiralty had for ages been in the undisputed possession of the jurisdiction over such cases, is no evidence of a right to the jurisdiction, but rather the contrary ; the question of jurisdiction not having been raised or considered. And we think that the mere occurrence of such a case, ought not, under the circumstances, to weigh at all against the objections which wre have considered to a court of common law possessing jurisdiction. It was probably the frequent occurrence of the cases of trover which led to no question of jurisdiction being raised in Newman v. Walters.

As I have already remarked, if we could ascertain that the case was decided upon salvage principles, we should set aside the report of the referees; but as this does not already appear, we shall only reduce the amount of damages, still allowing the plaintiff an amount so liberal, that it may well be doubted, whether it coaid be recovered under the quantum meruit, were it not for the extraordinary skill and ability which some witnesses have testified that he possessed. We think that the measure of his compensation should be governed as well by the extent of his skill and experience and his means and appliances for such duties, as by the number of days labor performed, or the number of men whose employment he secured.

On this footing, and having regard to the evidence, we agree that five hundred dollars will be a sufficiently liberal compensation for his services, and that he should recover two hundred and fifty dollars for the use of the underwriters’ steam pump, and the sum paid for cordage, &c., as allowed by the referees.

We will give to the plaintiff the option of reducing his report to the amount thus made up, and having it confirmed, or of having the report set aside and a new trial ordered; and the rule will provide for his election accordingly.

Oaklet, Oh. J. and Sandeokd, J., concurred in the judgment, on the ground that the referees evidently valued the services rendered, as upon a salvage; and that under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff’s demand could not be enforced as a claim for salvage, or in the nature of salvage. Their reasons were, that when there is no express agreement, the circumstances of each case must govern in determining whether the services rendered are to be compensated on a qiicmtum meruit, or as salvage. In this case, the vessel was in a river or narrow strait, she was not derelict, she was never out of the actual possession of her owners, and although in great peril, not beyond their power to protect and secure by hiring suitable men and means. The plaintiff acted under an express employment from them; and a great many men, and numerous canal boats and other vessels were likewise employed "by the owners, assisted in the work, and were paid "by them. It does not appear that the plaintiff’s compensation was at all risked on the event of success in saving the steamboat; and on the contrary, the circumstances tend strongly to show that he was to be remunerated according to the value of his services, on the same principle that others were paid who labored in subordinate stations in relieving her from the danger in which she was placed.

Paine, J., concurred in the result of these views, also reposing his judgment on the ground stated in his opinion.

(The plaintiff acquiesced in the decision, and took a judgment for the reduced amount prescribed in the rule.)


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: By the Court. Mason, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Mayne v. Griswold.
    Where equity hao once acquired jurisdiction over a subject or class of cases, by reason of the inability or refusal of courts of law to grant relief, its jurisdiction is not lost, if the courts of law subsequently assume, or are authorized, to grant relief in those cases.
    Where the object of a suit is to have a contract rescinded and declared void for fraud, equity has jurisdiction, although the same amount of money will be recovered on such rescission as would be given as damages in an action at law. The rescinding of the contract is the principal object of the suit in equity, and the recovery of money is incidental; at law, the principal object is damages.
    The jurisdiction of the court of chancery in matter's of fraud, is probably coeval with its existence; and it is not*affected by the circumstance that there is a concurrent remedy at law.
    The waiver of a discovery from the defendant does not affect the jurisdiction in equity, where the ground of relief is fraud.
    The fifty-first section of the chapter of the revised statutes, relative to the limitation of actions, which.provides that “bills for relief on the ground of fraud, shall be filed within six years after the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting such fraud, and not after that time;” applies to bills for relief on the ground of fraud in all cases, and is not confined to cases where the jurisdiction of equity was exclusive.
    This section was intended to qualify the general terms of section forty-nine, by which the limitations prescribed for suits at law wore applied to courts of equity, when they had concurrent jurisdiction of the same cause of action, and to create an exception in cases of fraud, both of concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction, in which the fraud was not discovered at the time it was committed.

      A bill for relief on the ground of fraud, which shows that the fraud wa% committed more than six years before the filing of the bill, must not only state, by way of anticipation of the defence of the statute of limitations, that the fraud was discovered within six years; but must also show that it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered sooner.
    A bill was filed to charge the defendant with certain bonds of an incorporated company in this country, of which he was a director, taken by the plaintiff residing in England, on the faith of false and deceptive statements made by the defendant as to the company’s affairs, intended and artfully contrived to mislead; the interest on the bonds being paid regularly till within six years, and until payment thereof ceased, there was nothing to excite the plaintiff’s suspicions, and he did not discover the fraud until within six years. On a demurrer to the bill which contained these allegations, it was held that it satisfactorily accounted for the plaintiff’s omission to discover the fraud until the time stated.
    A bill is not rendered multifarious, by stating facts which show that the plaintiff may be entitled to two kinds of relief distinct from and inconsistent with each other, provided the prayer for special relief be confined to one of those kinds, ‘ The addition of a prayer for general relief, does not alter the case.
    A bill which brings before the court the proper parties for the relief it specifically prays, is not defective for want of parties, because the facts stated might be made the foundation for other relief to which other parties would be necessary.
    (Before Dueb, Mason, and Campbell, J.J.)
    Dee. 11, 12, 13, 1849 ;
    April 1, 1850.
    The bill in this cause was filed in the late court of chancery, on the 24th day of April, 1846, by Charles Otway Mayne, of the county of Middlesex, in England, against George Griswold, of the city of Hew Tort. It set forth the incorporation of “The Morris Canal and Banking Company,” by the legislature of Hew Jersey, in 1824, with a capital of one million of dollars. The hill then proceeded with a very full and minute statement of facts. It will be sufficient for understanding the judgment of the court, to state that among other things the hill made the following allegations:
    That the Morris Canal and Banking Company, in the beginning of the year 1835, was greatly embarrassed and in a failing condition ; a large amount of the stock originally subscribed, had been forfeited by reason of the non-payment of the instalments; the whole property of the company was under mortgage to W. Willink of Amsterdam, for seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars ; and the canal, as far as it had been built, was entirely unproductive. That on the 5th of March, 1836, an act was passed by the legislature of New Jersey, authorizing an increase of the capital stock, for the purpose of completing the canal, to the extent of six hundred thousand dollars, in shares of one hundred dollars each.
    That the defendant was appointed a director by the last mentioned act; and that he being and acting as a director and stockholder, and agent of the company, but covertly and secretly as a principal for his own private and individual benefit, conspired and confederated with various persons, who were also directors and stockholders, and earned into effect divers schemes and measures, the object and tendency of which was to hold out inducements to persons in England, who were not and could not be possessed of the same knowledge or means of knowledge of the situation of the company, with themselves, to purchase bonds issued by the company, and thereby to derive pecuniary benefit and advantage to themselves. These various schemes and measures were set forth at length in the bill. They consisted principally, in the directors taking to themselves and to their friends all the forfeited stock at par, paying or securing only instalments of ten per cent., and giving their notes payable at long dates for the remaining ninety per cent.; and in taking among themselves and their friends the whole of the six hundred thousand dollars of the new stock, paying or seeming in like manner not more than ten per cent, of the nominal amount, and giving their notes at long dates for the residue, and reserving to themselves the right of taking two hundred dollars of the sterling bonds for every hundred dollars of stock so subscribed, on advantageous terms, and also the privilege of surrendering the stock, and cancelling the notes given therefor, in case they should be unable to raise the credit of the company. That the defendant had allotted to him three hundred and forty shares of this new stock, and after settling for ten per cent, of the amount, gave his note for the ninety per cent., or $30,400, and interest, for eighteen months; and he also took three hundred shares of such forfeited stock, and other individuals other amounts, and that sterling bonds to a large amount were issued under those agreements to the defendant and other subscribers. That the forfeited shares and the new or increased stock were thus nominally taken np by the defendant and his confederates, in order that they might state "in a report intended to be made of the condition of the company, that the stock had been taken and paid for at par by honá fide subscribers, so that the company might be represented as in possession of a large amount of bills receivable, and in the actual prosecution of an active and profitable banking business, when, in'fact, such was not the case.
    That the defendant was, in the year 1836; when these- transactions took place, a member of the house of If. L. & G. Griswold,, a firm of known respectability, solvency, and character, in the city of Hew York, and weH known to the house of Morrison, Cryder & Go. of London; that it was deemed highly important and necessary for the propose of introducing in London the bonds issued by the company, to obtain for them and for the forthcoming report,, the recommendation of the house of Morrison, Cryder & Co., which it was supposed could be obtained by the confidence they reposed in the character and solvency of the house of If. L. & G. Griswold, and of George Griswold, the defendant, and by the belief that the defendant or his firm had become the purchaser of the bonds and bad advanced the money therefor.
    The bill then set forth certain letters written by the defendant to Morrison, Cryd'er & Co., in anticipation of the report, recommending the bonds and the goodness of the securities, and . also referring them to the report then about to be made, as giving a true account of the condition of the company.
    The bill' then states that on or about the 17th of June, 1836, the confederates with the aid of the defendant got up and adopted a plausible statement of the affairs of the company, in the form of a report of the president and directors and statement annexed thereto; which report and statement were artfully, wilfully, and in a manner calculated to mislead and deceive, filled with various false and deceptive statements, some of which were wilfully false, and others untrue, and represented to be true, but of which the defendant and his confederates were ignorant, and others which, though literally true, were yet substantially false and deceptive.
    The bill then particularized several of these false and deceptive statements, and among them, those which represented that the capital stock, amounting altogether to four million one hundred thousand dollars, had been paid in, when, in fact, a large part of the sum represented to have been paid in as capital, was made up in bills receivable from persons who were quite irresponsible; and charges that a large part of the increased stock of six hundred thousand dollars was shortly afterwards surrendered and the notes given therefor cancelled, including the note of defendant for $30,400. That the report and statement was sent to Morrison, Gryder & Co. with the view of inducing persons in England, relying on its truth and fairness, to purchase bonds.
    That a dividend was shortly after and about the 14th of July, 1836, declared on the stock, by means of which it rose to one hundred and two per cent., and was held at that price when the report arrived in England.
    That the plaintiff, in reliance on the report, and also the letters • of the defendant to Morrison, Gryder & Co., was induced to purchase five of the sterling bonds of the company of £1000 each, for which he gave £4300, which bonds are still held by him and are ready to be produced. That afterwards, and in January, 1837, the company declared another dividend of four per cent.; that the interest on the bonds was paid up to January, 1841, since which time no interest had been paid, and that flaintiff since the last day mentioned had discovered all the before mentioned frauds of which he had before been entirely ignorant.

    The bill also set forth the sale of the canal under the mortgage to Willink, and the appointment of receivers of the company by an order of the chancellor of New Jersey.
    The bill claimed and insisted that the defendant ought to be held responsible for the amount of the note for $30,400 so given, by him for the three hundred and forty shares of stock, and which was delivered up to him when he surrendered the stock. The prayer of the bill is “ that it may be declared that the plaintiff was induced to purchase the bonds by the aforesaid fraudulent contrivances and representations, of the defendant, and that the purchase by the plaintiff of the said bonds may, as between him and the. defendant, be declared to be void and be rescinded; and that defendant be decreed to pay him. the purchase money with interest and expenses, less the interest received ; the plaintiff offering to re-assign and deliver the bonds to defendant, and for other or further relief.” It also prayed for general relief.
    To this bill the defendant demurred, assigning for causes of demurrer, the several matters stated in the points. The cause came to this comt from the supreme court.

      W. C. Koyes, for the defendant, argued the following points ;
    I. The bill should have been filed in the names, or on behalf and for the benefit, of all the parties holding the bonds of the Monis Oanal and Banking Company alleged to have been fraudulently issued and purchased upon the faith of the defendant’s representations. (Story’s Eq. Pl. § 99; Calvert on Parties, 220; Crease v. Babcock, 10 Met. R. 525; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 222.)
    IT. The bill should have been filed against all the directors of the company who are charged with participating in the fraudulent acts set forth; and there is no sufficient excuse for omitting to make them parties. (Attorney General v. Leicester 7 Beav. 176; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., Am. ed. 529; Perry v. Knott, 5 Beav. 293; Kellaway v. Johnson, Id. 319; Allen v. Honeden, 6 Id. 148; Att. Gen. v. Wilson, 1 Craig & P. 1; Hill on Trustees, 315; Pitt v. Bonner, 6 London Jurist, 636; Knatchbull v. Fearnhead, 3 Mylne & Cr. 124; 2 Fowler’s Ex. Pr. 300.)
    TIT. The complainant had a perfect remedy at law, especially as no discovery was asked. The bill states a mere legal claim, and seeks to make it of equitable cognizance. (Gelston v. Hoyt, 1 John. Ch. R. 543; Jer. Eq. 290, 383; 1 Story’s Eq. § 184; Russel v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 89; Hardwick v. Forbes, 1 Bibb, 212; Bradley v. Bosley, 1 Barb. Ch. R. 125; Crane v. Bunnell, 10 Paige 333; Ferson v. Sanger, 5 N. Y. Legal Obs. 43.)
    IT. The bill is multifarious. (1 Dan. Ch. Pr., Am. ed. 384 and notes; Story’s Eq. Pl. § 211.)
    "The bill .should have been filed by the receivers of the company or the company itself, at least so far as it seeks to make the defendant liable for the notes, and the excuse for not uniting them in the bill is not sufficient.
    VL So it should have been filed in their name in respect of all the matters embraced in it.
    VII. It appears upon the face of the bill, that it was not exhibited within six years from the time the alleged causes of complaint accrued, and therefore the statute of limitations has attached. There is no valid excuse for not bringing the suit within the six years. The cause of action accrued the moment the bonds were taken on the faith of the alleged false representations. (Argall v. Bryant, 1 Sand. Sup. Ct. R. 98.) More than six years from that time having elapsed, the statute of limitations attached. (2 R. S. 296, § 18; Id. 301, §§ 49, 50, 51; Rev. Notes, part 3, ch. 4, p. 20; M'Carty v. Camel, 1 Barb. Ch. R. 466; Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns. 33; leonard v. Pitney, 5 Wend. 30; Allen v. Mille, 17 Id. 202; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Id. 476; Ferson v. Sanger, 5 N. Y. Legal Obs. 43; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 7 Paige 195; S. C. 24 Wend. 487.) In this ease, the statute of limitations is a good defence upon demurrer. (Story Eq. Pl. §§ 751, 756; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 7 Paige 195; S. C. 24 Wend. 587; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., Am. ed., 621 and notes; Esp. on Penal Stat. 78.)

      C. B. Moore and F B. Cuttmg, for the plaintiff.
    I. The bill sets forth a ease, entitling the plaintiff to relief on the ground of fraud. The defendant, by a resort to unjust artifices, took advantage of his own knowledge and peculiar situation; and, for his own profit, misrepresented the facts upon which the value of the bonds rested, and misled the plaintiff, (who was necessarily ignorant, and known to be so,) and thus induced the latter to purchase the bonds. And the defendant, himself a corporator, acting for his own interest, and combining with others in a common scheme, was so situated, that, under the circumstances, he should be treated as the borrower, and be stripped of any protection or exemption from individual liability, by reason of the charter, or else, as the seller of the bonds, and should either pay the bonds, or rescind the purchase, an assignment of the bonds being tendered to him. He must, at least, refund any profit or gain to himself, individually, out of the scheme. (Steinbach v. Feruley, 9 Simons 556; Siddon v. Connell, 10 Simons 58, 79; Bradley v. Bosley, 1 Barb. Ch. Rep. 125, 148.)
    H. The bill was filed in due time, viz., on 24th April, 1846, within ten years after the bonds in question were issued, within six years after the discovery of the fraud, and promptly after the bonds fell due, and the damage accrued.
    It is not affected by the statute of limitations. (2 R. S. 296 to 301, § 49 to 53, 18 and 25, 44; Story’s Eq. Juris. 908, sec. 1521, a; Brickenring v. Churchill, 3 J. J. Marshall, 15.)
    The statute, although it fixes the same limitations in equity, as at law, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, intends to except the case of relief, on the ground of fraud, where (as in this case) the bill is filed, within six years after the discovery by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting such fraud. So far, therefore, as there is even a concurrent remedy at law for fraud, the plaintiff is still entitled to relief. (2 R. S. 301, § 49, 51.)
    The statute cannot be applied to cases of exclusive equitable jurisdiction, even if it can to cases of concurrent jurisdiction, when the fraud (as in this case) was discovered within six years next before the commencement of the suit.
    The excepted cases in which courts of equity do not give redress for fraud, do not embrace the present case. It is not a suit for damages against a stranger, but seeks a rescission of a contract and relief, as against a real party to the agreement, acting partly under the guise of a corporator. The plan of taking and selling bonds separately, is charged to have been a part of the fraudulent scheme.
    Plaintiff is entitled to relief, upon principles peculiar to a court of equity. The jurisdiction at law is not concurrent, and there is no difficulty under the statute of limitation. (Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Vesey, Sen. 155; Lyon v. Tallmadge, 14 John. Rep. 501; 1 Story, Eq. Juris. § 184 to 440; 1 John. Ch. R. 402, 556; 4 ibid. 18; 7 ibid. 194; 3 Cowen, 537; 4 ibid. 209; 8 ibid. 370; 9 ibid. 309; 1 Hopkins, 48, 75, and 494; 1 Paige, 147, 148, 302, 492; 2 ibid. 169, 390, 406; 4 ibid. 94; 7 ibid. 316; 9 ibid. 152.)
    HL The grounds of demurrer alleged do not apply, if the plaintiff’s case be sustained on the basis above claimed. Other bondholders must stand on their own footing. They may not have relied upon the defendant.
    Other fraudulent directors need not be parties. (See 10 Simons 58, and 5 Paige 612.)
    The court loses no jurisdiction by the waiver of an answer on oath.
    The charges of the bill, about a withdrawal of notes, &c., are a part of the principal case, and cannot make the bill multifarious. (See 1 Barbour 99; 1 Hogan 290.)
    The receivers have nothing to do with .the plaintiff’s claim on ¿he foregoing basis, nor has the company. The defendant may take plaintiff’s place as holder of the bonds.
    IV. The plaintiff, independently of his case of fraud, relating back to his purchase of the bond, is still entitled to a remedy, and to protection against the acts of the defendant, in respect to the dividends and illegal withdrawal of notes without payment. On this basis, it is not necessary to make other fraudulent persons parties. (Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige 612; Wood v. Dunner, 3 Mason C. C. R. 308; 1 Craig & Philips 1; 2 Myl. & Craig 613; Atkyns 400.)
    Nor is it necessary to make the Morris Canal Company, or its receivers, parties. The Company was broken up, “ all its chartered rights” gone. The receivers are officers of another court and state, are non-residents, and have refused to prosecute. They are not amenable to the process of this court. (Hallett v. Hallett, 2 Paige, 18, 19.)
   By the Court. Mason, J.

This case presents several points of interest and importance; some of which are of no ordinary difficulty. They have been, elaborately and ably argued by the counsel for the respective parties, and the court has been .greatly aided in its judgment by their extensive and learned investigations.

Before proceeding to the main points in controversy, we shall ©onsider the formal objections raised by the demurrer.

First. It is contended by the defendant that the bill is multifarious,—that it seeks relief not only by reason of the representations which induced the plaintiff to purchase the bonds of the company, and which are alleged to have been false and fraudulent, but also in regard to the stock note of $30,400 of the defendant, which, it is charged, was fraudulently surrendered to him by the board of directors. If such be the necessary construction of the bill, the objection would, in our judgment, be well founded; for the bill would then present two claims not only distinct from, but inconsistent with each other, one in effect disaffirming the purchase of the bonds, and asking that it might be rescinded in consequence ‘of the defendant’s deceitful and fraudulent misrepresentations concerning them, and the other, affirming the purchase, and insisting that the plaintiff, as a purchaser, has a right to call on the defendant for their payment out of the amount of the note, which, he says, belongs to the company, and was fraudulently withdrawn from it. A careful perusal of the bill, however, has satisfied us that it is not liable to this objection. It does indeed set forth the facts of the giving of the stock note by the defendant, and of its subsequent surrender to him by the company, but these matters are stated in connexion with several other’s, only as parts of the fraudulent scheme of the defendant and his associates, in order to give color to the report and statement of the condition of the company by which the plaintiff was induced to purchase the bonds. They are introduced as evidence of a premeditated design to deceive and defraud. The specific prayer for relief, however, has no reference to the note, but simply prays that it may be declared, that the plaintiff was “induced to purchase the said sterling bonds by the aforesaid fraudulent contrivances and practices of the said George Griswold and his confederates, and that such purchase as between the plaintiff and the defendant, may be declared void and rescinded, and that the defendant may repay to the plaintiff the purchase money and expenses with interest.” It may be true, as suggested by the defendant’s counsel, that the bill contains sufficient allegations respecting the note, which if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to relief with regard to it under the general prayer. Tet it would not be proper for the court to interpret the bill as necessarily calling for such relief, when the plaintiff himself does not pray for it, and the effect of such interpretation would be to give to the bill that objectionable feature which the pleader has been careful to avoid.

Moreover, if the bill is to be treated as seeking relief with regard to the note, it is defective for want of parties, and the next objection of the defendant that it should have been filed on behalf of all the bond-holders as well as of the plaintiff would undoubtedly be good; for all those who are in a similar situation with the plaintiff, ought to have an opportunity of participating in a fund in which they all have an equal interest. But, as Ave have seen, the bill merely seeks to make the defendant respond to the plaintiff individually, for the fraud which he has committed upon him, by inducing him to purchase the company’s bonds. There is no common fund here to be distributed; it does not even appear that there are any others who stand precisely in the same situation with the plaintiff in respect to the bonds issued by the company. And we think that the principle adopted by the late chancellor in Dart v. Palmer, (1 Barb. Ch. R. 92,) is applicable to both these objections. He there held that ifthe complainant in his bill claims specific relief, and then adds a prayer for such further or other relief as may be proper, and the case made by his bill entitles him to the specific relief prayed for, and no other parties are necessary to entitle him to that relief, the court at the hearing ought not to give other or further relief under the general prayer, when persons not before the court are necessary parties to such relief, even when the case made by the bill would have entitled the complainant to that relief also against the defendant, if all the proper persons had been made parties. How, the ground of the demurrer in this case is, that other parties are necessary so far as relates to the stock note of $30,400, and that no relief can be granted in regard to it unless they are before the court; but if the plaintiff does not ask for relief on that ground, and the frame of his bill is such that in its present state Avithout the addition of other parties he cannot obtain it at the hearing, but he can obtain the specific relief for which he prays, upon what principle is the coiu't called upon to declare that he shall frame his bill with a view to that relief which he does not ask, especially when the alteration would subject the bill to the fatal objection of multifariousness? Both these objections therefore must be overruled.

The objection that the other directors are not made parties is also untenable.

We are not called upon by the frame of the bill, to decide whether all the directors or trustees of a company are necessary parties to a bill seeking to charge them for a fraudulent breach of trust, although the authorities seem to be decisive that they are not. (Attorney General v. Wilson, 1 Cr. & Ph. 1; Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige 612.) The defendant in this case was not in any sense a trustee for the plaintiff, at least until after he purchased the bonds. The fraud complained of was perpetrated, if at all, before their purchase; it was only in consequence of the purchase, and by its means, that the defendant and the other directors were brought into the relations of trustees and cestui que trust, if the ownership of the bonds can be said to have constituted that relation. And the ground on which the defendant is sought to be charged is, not that he violated his duty as trustee for the bondholders, arising out of his position as a director, but that as a man .he violated the laws of truth and fair dealing, which all are bound to. observe in their transactions with each other. It matters not in this point of view, that others united with him in these frauds. The general principle, that there can be no contribution between wrong doers, and that each is liable for all the wrongful acts in which he participated, is well established both at law and in equity. (Attorney General v. Wilson, 1 Cr. & P. 1; and the authorities cited in note to page 28.)

Having disposed of these objections to the frame of the bill, and for want of parties, we come to a more important inquiry, viz. whether a court of equity has jurisdiction of the case.

The defendant insists that the bill states a mere legal claim, while the plaintiff on the other hand contends that it presents a case peculiarly of equitable cognizance.

We have no doubt that the case made by the bill comes within the principle of Pasley v. Freeman, and that the plaintiff upon proof of the facts he has alleged, might, on the authority of that case, recognized as it has been repeatedly in our courts, have recovered in a court of law, damages for the injury he had sustained, and that the amount of the bonds with interest and expenses would be the true measure of those damages. This is substantially the relief prayed for in this bill; and we do not think it would have formed any impediment to a recovery in a comt of law, as was contended by the plaintiff’s counsel, that there was no direct communication between himself and the defendant. It would have been sufficient, that he had been deceived by the false representations which the defendant sanctioned and circulated in regard to the situation of the company, with the intent to induce persons, on the faith of such representations, to purchase the bonds.

This was expressly held in the case of Allen v. Addington, 7 Wend. 9, affirmed in the court of errors, 11 Wend. 374. In that case there was no direct communication between the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant, however, had written a letter to a third person respecting Baker, who bought the goods of the plaintiff, and that third person represented to the plaintiff that he would trust Baker on Addington’s representations, and the court laid down the broad principle, that if a person intending to defraud somebody, gives a general recommendation of credit to an insolvent person, any one who sustains damage by reason of such recommendation, is entitled to an action for such damage, grounded on the fraud.

But does it follow that because the plaintiff can obtain in substance the same relief at law, as in equity, therefore this court has no jurisdiction ? This is a question of no small difficulty. The cases are conflicting, and it is, perhaps, impossible to reconcile them all. There were several referred to by the counsel for the defendant, which it was contended conclusively showed that a court of equity had no jurisdiction in a case like the present. Among them was the case of Newham v. May, 13 Price 749, in which Lord Chief Baron Alexander says, “ It is not in every case of fraud that relief is to be administered in a corn-t of equity. In the case, for instance, of a fraudulent warranty on the sale of a horse, or any fraud upon the sale of a chattel, no one, I apprehencl, ever thought of filing a bill in equity.” And he adds, that the case before him was no more than a common case of fraud by means of misrepresentation, raising a dry question of damages; in effect a mere money demand. The case before him was that of a bill filed by a purchaser of real estate, not to rescind a contract on the ground of fraud, but for compensation for the difference in the actual value of the property sold, and the stated value as appearing by the rental, which was represented to be ¿6110 per annum, when in fact it was only £89, and this was a suit, merely to recover damages, the party retaining and affirming the contract. The bill was dismissed, not, however, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, but because it was not supported by the evidence.

In Russell v. Clark's Exrs., (9 Cranch 69,) also cited by the defendant’s counsel, and which was a bill in equity, seeldng to make the defendants responsible for the amount of certain protested bills, on the ground of two letters of guaranty representing that the drawers were perfectly responsible ; Chief Justice Marshall remarked, that on the question of fraud the remedy at law was complete, and that if a discovery was not needed, or if. the answer disclosed nothing, and the plaintiff supported his claim by evidence in his own possession, unaided by the confessions of the defendant, the established rules limiting the jurisdiction of courts required that he should be dismissed from the court of chancery, and permitted to assert his rights in a court of law. But the bill in that case was sustained on other grounds.

In Bradley v. Bosley, (1 Barb. Ch. C. 125,) also cited on the argument, Chancellor Walworth, in a very elaborate opinion, intimates his approbation of the remarks made by the Lord Chief Baron, and Chief Justice Marshall, in the case above quoted, and after referring to some cases decided in the court of apjDeals in Kentucky, adds, “ I am disj>osed to follow these decisions, so far as to hold that a bill in equity, for the purpose of obtaining a compensation in damages merely, to be paid by the defendant personally, cannot be sustained, where the defendant makes the objection at the proper time by demurrer or answer, that the complainant has a full and perfect remedy by action at law against the defendant.” He admits, however, the general rule to be “ that in case of fraud a court of equity has jurisdiction, although the party may obtain relief in an action at law.” In this case, too, the bill was sustained on other grounds.

The cases in Kentucky, referred to by the chancellor, were Hardwick v. Foster’s Administrator, 1 Bibb. 212; Cocke v. Hardin, Littell’s Select Cases 374; and Blackwell v. Oldham, 4 Dana 195. Upon examination, it will be found that they all admit and allege the jurisdiction of the court of equity, in setting aside contracts founded in fraud and misrepresentation, but maintain that if a party who has been defrauded does not seek to rescind a sale, but affirms it, and asks for damages which he has sustained by reason of fraud or imposition practised on him in relation to it, he must seek his damages in a court of law. We apprehend the decision is correctly stated in the Kentucky cases. If your claim is solely for damages, whether for breach of the contract or for fraud in making it, and you seek not to rescind it altogether, you are, as a general rule, confined to your action at law; but if you seek to have the contract rescinded and declared void, you may have relief in equity*although you may only recover money, and the same amount that you would have recovered at law/ In the suit at law, the money by way of damages, is the principal object; in equity, however, the rescinding of the contract is the principal, and the recovery in money is an incidental, though a necessary consequence.

However this may be, and without undertaking to pronounce positively on this point, we apprehend that there are certain other principles well established, which will lead us to a correct conclusion. Thus, it is one of the doctrines of a court of equity, that where a plaintiff has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, a court of equity generally will not interfere, and for this reason they will not as a general rule sustain a bill for damages merely, whether for breach of contract or for tort, a court of law giving in such case full and adequate relief. The application of this rule, however, must be controlled and governed by another equally well established; that if the jurisdiction originally has properly attached in equity on account of the supposed defect of remedy at law, that jurisdiction is not changed or taken away by the fact that courts of law have subsequently exercised jurisdiction in similar cases. “ This has been repeatedly asserted,” Mr. Justice Story remarks, (1 St. Eq. Jur. § 641,) “by courts of equity, and constitutes, in some sort, the pole-star of its jurisdiction.” While then on the one hand, courts of equity will not assume jurisdiction where there is already a complete and adequate remedy at law; so on the other hand, when their jurisdiction is once established, whether in consequence of the inability or refusal of courts of law to grant relief, or otherwise, they do not lose jurisdiction by reason of the subsequent greater liberality or enlarged powers of courts of law.

The decision of the point before us, then depends, not merely on the question whether the party has an adequate remedy at law, but also on this other question, whether the case falls within one of the acknowledged heads of equity jurisdiction; for if it does, the mere fact that a court of law will now grant the same relief as a court of equity, does not oust the previously well established jurisdiction of the latter. A reference to a few adjudged cases will abundantly confirm this position.

Thus, the jurisdiction of chancery was settled and acknowledged in the case of lost bonds. It had been originally assumed, because courts of law would not entertain a suit on a bond without a prof&rt. But when afterwards they allowed a plaintiff to allege in his declaration the loss of his bond as an excuse for not making profert, and to recover on proving its loss and contents, it was uniformly, held that the liberality of courts of law on this head did not deprive chancery of its jurisdiction. (1 St. Eq. Jur. § 81; Atkinson v. Leonard, 3 Brown C. C. 218; Kemp v. Prior, 7 Ves. 249: Walmesly v. Child, 1 Ves. 341; Toulman v. Price, 5 Ves. 239.)

So, the jurisdiction of chancery in matters of account, has long been well established. It was assumed at a time when the old action of account was the only method of settling accounts at common law. Yet it has frequently been held, that the jurisdiction has not been taken away, in consequence of the courts of law adopting more simple and expeditious modes of settlement, by action on the money counts and references to referees; even in those cases where the oath of the defendant is not required to establish the case. This doctrine was expressly recognized by Chief Justice Kent and Mr. J. Thompson, in Ludlow v. Simond, (2 C. C. E. 39-51;), and in the case of The Corporation of Carlisle v. Wilson, (13 Ves. 275,) Lord Erskine said, “It cannot be maintained that this court interferes in matters of account only when no remedy can be had at law. The contrary is notorious. The proposition asserted against this bill,” he added, “ is that this court ought to refuse to interfere by directing an account, if an action for money had and received or indebitatus assumpsit can be maintained. " That proposition cannot be supported.”

In matters of fraud, the jurisdiction of the court of chancery is probably coeval with its existence. There is no period in the history of the court, when it did not possess it. It is concurrent with courts of law in all. cases of fraud, except that of wills of real estate, and the court it is said will not lay down rules restrictive of such jurisdiction, but will proceed in every case of fraud upon its own peculiar circumstances. (1 Fonb. b. 1, § 3, p. 12.) The objection now made has been frequently made before, and it has been uniformly held, in cases which turned upon -the question of jurisdiction, as far as our researches have extended, that the jurisdiction in cases of fraud was not taken away because the parties had an adequate remedy at law. We will mention only two or three cases, and those of a similar character with the one now before us. The first is Colt v. Wollaston, 2 P. Wms. 156, decided in 1723, in which the bill was filed to recover back two several sums which the plaintiff had paid to the defendants as managers of a land security and oil patent company for extracting oil out of radishes. The master of the rolls observed, “ It is no objection that the parties have their remedy at law, and may bring an action for money had and received for the plaintiffs own use, for in casés of fraud the court of equity has a concurrent jurisdiction with the common law, matter of fraud being the great subject of relief here. Accordingly, cases of this nature have frequently met with relief in this court.” The next case we shall cite is Green v. Barrett, 1 Simons 45, decided in 1826. That was a bill to recover back deposits paid by a subscriber to a joint stock company, where the project was a bubble. The bill was demurred to, and one ground of demurrer was, that the only remedy of the plaintiff was by an action for money had and received; but the vice-chancellor, after remarking on the facts, said that the only question was whether a bill in equity would hold or whether the plaintiff must have recourse to law; and as it appeared the whole scheme was a mere snare to entrap the unwary, on the authority of Colt v. Wollaston, he overruled the demurrer. We shall look in vain for any case in England for the one hundred and three years intervening between Colt v. Wollaston and Green v. Barrett, in the least affecting the authority of these cases. Green v. Barrett was followed in 1828 by Blain v. Agar, 5 Sim. R. 289, which was similar in its general features, and was similarly decided. Indeed, so well was the jurisdiction considered to be established in England, that in the late case of Seddon v. Connell, decided in 1840, (16 Sim. 58,) and which in some respects resembled the case before us, although the bill was demurred to, yet the objection we are now considering was not even raised.

All the cases which we have cited, under this head, were cases of deceitful and fraudulent representations, where the only relief sought was, as in the present, the rescinding of the contract and the repayment of the money paid by the deceived and defrauded parties, as a consequence of declaring the contract void: and it is worthy of notice, that until the case of Pasley v. Freeman, decided in 1189, it never had been solemnly decided by a court of law, that an action could be maintained for fraudulent and ■ deceitful representations of the kind mentioned in that case. Even then, Mr. Justice Grose dissented from the opinion of the other judges; and Lord Erskine in adverting to that case in Clifford v. Brook, (13 Ves. 131,) as late as 1806, stated that a considerable difference of opinion at that time prevailed upon it, and that many of the most correct judges appeared to have been surprised. Lord Eldon, it is well known, always maintained that Pasley v. Freeman was wrongly decided, and that a court of equity alone had jurisdiction in such cases. (Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 186.)

Since then, before the decision of Pasley v. Freeman, courts of law did not entertain jurisdiction in cases like the present, and the only remedy was in a court of equity; it lies upon the party objecting to the jurisdiction of this court to show when and how it was deprived of that jurisdiction, which it formerly unquestionably possessed. Until that is done we shall feel bound to decide that the original jurisdiction of chancery in cases of fraud, remained when this bill was filed, in its pristine vigor.

It was also urged as a reason for turning the plaintiff over to a court of law, that he had waived an answer under oath. This would be a sufficient reason, if the relief asked for depended on the discovery under oath. There are many cases in which a party’s title to relief in a- court of chancery depends on such discovery, and in which, when the discovery is waived, the whole foundation of equitable jurisdiction is taken away. Cases of fraud, however, do not depend on the discovery sought, but belong, as we have seen, to the original jurisdiction of the court.

The next and most important question is, whether the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. If the plaintiff had no right to come into a court of chancery at all, then the claim he now makes is clearly haired by the statute. If he can sustain himself in this court, then, whether the statute is a bar or not, depends upon the construction to be given to the forty-ninth, fiftieth, and fifty-first sections of the fourth chapter of the third part of the revised statutes. They are as follows: .

§ 49. Whenever there is a concurrent jurisdiction in the courts of common law, and in courts of equity, of any cause of action, the provisions of this title limiting a time for the commencement of a suit for such cause of action, in a court of common law, shall apply to all suits hereafter to be brought for the same cause, in the court of chancery.
“ § 50. But the?last section shall not extend to suits over the subject matter of which a court- of equity has peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction, and which subject matter is not cognizable in courts of common law.
“ § 51. Bills for relief on the ground of fraud, shall be filed within six years after the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting such fraud, and not after that time.”

We have seen that the jurisdiction in the case before us is concurrent in courts of law and equity, and if the forty-ninth section governs, then the statute of limitations is a bar to this suit. If, however, the fifty-first section applies to cases of concurrent as well as of exclusive equitable jurisdiction, the result may be different; and the question is, did the legislature mean by the fifty-first section, to exempt from the operation of the forty-ninth section all bills for relief in cases of fraud, or did they mean to confine that section to those bills in which courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction?

Prior to the passage of this act, there was no statute of limitations, which, in terms, applied to courts of equity. But the principles adopted by those courts on this subject were well settled. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law, they held themselves to be bound by the statutes of limitation. They acted not merely by analogy, but in obedieuce to them. They would, nevertheless, interfere in cases of alleged fraud, to prevent the statute from running, where to allow it to run would be inequitable or unjust; and this upon an acknowledged principle on which courts of equity give relief, viz: to prevent an advantage gained at law from being used against conscience.

Thus in a case of fraud, where the jurisdiction was concurrent, if the statute of limitations was a bar to the suit at law, although under ordinary circumstances, it would also be a bar in equity, yet if the fraud had not been discovered until more than six years after its commission, equity would not allow the statutory bar to be set up, if the suit was commenced within six years after the discovery. While the fraud was concealed, said Lord Eedesdale in Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, (2 Sch. & Lef. 634,) the statute of limitations ought not in conscience to run. See also Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Ib. 418-431; Blannerhasset v. Day, 2 Ball and B. 129; 2 Story Eq. Jur. § 1521, and 1521 a. This was expressly admitted to be the rule in chancery by our supreme court, in Troup v. Smith, 20 John. 33, and by the court of errors, in Murray v. Coster, Ib. 583; and it is so consonant with the first principles of justice, that ■ it has been adopted ex necessitate, in those states where the court of chancery is not established. Thus in Massachusetts, the plaintiff may avoid the bar of the statute, by replying that the cause of action had been fraudulently concealed from his knowledge by the defendant, and that it was not discovered by him until six years before the commencement of the action. (First Mass. Turnpike Co. v. Field, 3 Mass. 201; Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 435. See also Pennock v. Freeman, 1 Watts 401; Jones v. Conoway, 4 Yeates 109.) It is not necessary to allow such a replication where a plaintiff can have relief in chancery, and therefore it was held in this state, in Troup v. Smith, cited above, that such a replication was not good.

The question now recurs, what did the legislature mean when they enacted the several sections quoted above ? Did they intend to declare that in those cases of fraud, in which courts of equity have peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction, the statute should not begin to run until after the discovery of the fraud, but in those cases in which the courts of law and equity had concurrent jurisdiction, the statute should begin to run from the commission of the fraud, though it might not be discovered until six years afterwards ? Considering the large class of cases of this kind in which the jurisdiction of the two courts is concurrent, such an event would be a great innovation upon established law; it would create a distinction between the two kinds of causes in equity, where none ought to be made, and would afford a protection to fraud which did not before exist, and which, in our judgment, never ought to exist.

We cannot suppose that such was the intention of the legislature. If' it had been they could easily have said so; or if they had omitted the fifty-ffrst section altogether, the construction contended for by the defendant’s counsel, would have followed as a necessary consequence; for section forty-nine applies in terms to all suits to be thereafter brought in the court of chancery, where there should be a concurrent remedy at law, and section fifty expressly excepts suits, over the subject matter of which courts of equity have peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction. Why then was the fifty-first section added, without specifying that the bills for relief intended by it were those only over the subject matter of which courts of equity had peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction ? Manifestly, because the section was intended to qualify and restrict the general terms of section forty-nine, and to apply a different rule to bills for fraud, whether they were cases of concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction, from that adopted in all other cases, and thus to declare or enact by statute, the rules which we have seen had been adopted by the courts on this subject.

This appears also from the notes of the revisers, (3 E. S. 2d ed. p. 705,) in which they refer to the cases before cited from 20 Johns, and also to 2 Ball & Beatty, 129, 2 Sch. & Lef. 636, and state it to be their intention to enact as part of the statute law, the rules laid down in those cases; and as the legislature adopted the sections in the form proposed by the revisers, it is natural to infer, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, that they adopted also their views.

We have met with only one case in our boohs involving the construction of the sections of the statutes we have been considering ; the case of Bertine v. Varian, 1 Edwards’ Ch. R. 343, where the vice chancellor referred to this statute; and after deciding that the case before him was one in which a court of law has concurrent jurisdiction with a court of equity, he observes with regard to the allegation that there was fraud and concealment on the part of the defendants, that such facts, whenever they exist, are sufficient to prevent the operation of the statute in the view of a court of equity; thus giving a construction to the statute then before him in accordance with the views above expressed.

But it is objected, that admitting the case comes within the fifty-first section, yet the bill is defective in not stating why the fraud was not discovered sooner; and it was contended that as the bill upon its face showed a fraud committed more than six years before; the plaintiff, if he wished to get rid of the bar of the statute, should not merely state by way of anticipation, the fact of the discovery of the fraud within six years, but show that it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered sooner. The correctness of this position was not seriously questioned by the counsel for the plaintiff, but he insisted that the allegations of the bill were sufficient to satisfy the most stringent application of the rule contended for.

It appears from the bill, that the plaintiff resided in England. He was therefore unable personally to make himself acquainted with the true state of the case. The fraudulent representations were put forth by the directors of a monied institution with a large capital, who were entrusted by the legislature of one of the states with a most important and expensive public work, requiring not only a large amount of funds, but integrity and enterprise of no ordinary character. The report and statement by which the plaintiff was deceived, were, it is alleged, artfully and purposely filled, by these directors, of wThom the defendant was one, and with his aid, concurrence and sanction, with fraudulent and deceptive statements, calculated and intended to mislead ; some of which though literally true, were yet substantially false and deceptive by reason of the manner of stating them, and the suppression of important facts which ought to have been disclosed. The particulars of these statements are set forth, and also the points in which they are alleged to have been false and fraudulent. The bill then alleges that in the year 1836, the company declared a dividend with the same fraudulent purpose, when they had made no profits or earnings out of which it could have legitimately been declared, by means of which and of the statements beforementioned, the stock advanced to one hundred and two per cent.; that the plaintiff purchased upon the faith of this report and statement, and of the dividend and the letter of the defendant set out in the bill; that after his purchase of the bonds in 1836, the interest on them was regularly paid by the company until January, 1841, since which time no interest had been paid; that the company with the like fraudulent purpose had declared another, dividend in January, 1837, without having made any earnings or profits upon which to declare the same, and that the frauds above specified were not discovered by the plaintiff until after the first of January, 1841, and within six years next before the filing of the bill.

How, it appears to us, that the • plaintiff had a right to rely upon the statements put forth by such authority as true; especially when there was not only no circumstance calculated to excite suspicion, but the statements were artfully contrived to prevent any suspicion being excited of their untruth; and he had a right to continue his confidence in the soundness of the institution, when a subsequent dividend was declared, and as long as the interest on the bonds was punctually paid. We think then that the defendant cannot object that the plaintiff did not sooner discover the frauds which he and his associates are alleged to have been so careful to conceal. There was in fact nothing to put him on inquiry till the default in the payment of the interest.

The plaintiff, moreover, was in England; the company was in this country. He did not come or send here to invest in these bonds—they sent to him in a foreign country. The report and statement were made for the avowed purpose of giving him, in common with other capitalists in England, that information which, by reason of their distance, they could not learn from personal observation; and the defendant and his associates were therefore under the most sacred obligations to deal fairly and honestly, and the plaintiff was justified in placing the most implicit confidence in the statements made under such circumstances.

But admitting it to have been his duty to have made earlier inquiries, of whom was he to inquire ? Of the defendant ? He had his letters. Or of him and the other directors ? He had their official report and statement. Was it to be expected that they would give the lie to these formal and carefully prepared documents, and confess them own fraud, especially while the company was still in good credit ? Could he have examined the books of the company ? Asa bond—holder before the maturity of the bond, and while the interest was regularly paid, it is at least doubtful whether he could have demanded an inspection of the books, any more than the holder of a note of an individual can, before its maturity and while the maker is in good credit, pry into his private transactions. He may require to be informed of his true situation before he give him credit, but having done so, he must remain satisfied until an actual insolvency happens.

We think it manifest from these considerations that the plaintiff has sufficiently anticipated in his bill the defence of the statute of limitations, and that the facts stated fully and satisfactorily account for his not having discovered the fraud charged until within six years before the commencement of the suit.

The result at which we have arrived then, is, that this demurrer cannot he sustained, hut the defendant must answer.

We trust that none of our remarks will he construed as.expressing any opinion, on the truth or falsity of the charges made by the plaintiff. We have considered the bill, merely as a pleading, admitted by the demurrer to be true for the sake of the argument. And we have proceeded on the same assumption, with the same view and object, viz: to determine whether the bill on its face can be maintained.

The counsel for the defendant has properly interposed this demurrer. He was perfectly justified, even though all the material charges of the bill can be shown to he untrue, in presenting the very grave questions raised by it to the consideration of the court, and endeavoring to relieve his client from the expense and vexation necessarily attending the defence of a suit of this kind. All that we have decided is, that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie ease. And that on the supposition that the statements in his bill are true, he had a right to bring the suit in this form, and to support his allegations by proof. Beyond this we have not intended, and it would he manifestly improper for us to express any opinion.

The demurrer is overruled, and the defendant must answer the hill, and pay the costs of the demurrer in forty days.