text:
    Moses Blackstock v. New York and Erie Railroad Company.
    A common carrier, in respect to the time of the delivery of goods received by him for transportation, when there is no express agreement, is bound only to use due diligence, and may excuse delay by showing that it was caused by "some accident or misfortune occurring, without any fault on his part.
    But this immunity does not extend to cases in which, although the carrier himself is free from fault, the delay has been caused by the negligence or misconduct of the agents or servants whom he employs.
    The liability of a master, for a neglect of duty by his servant, exists independently of the question, whether any fault is imputable to himself; for the master, in assuming to perform a duty to third persons, assumes also the hazard of the competency and fidelity of the agents he employs.
    This rule, which undoubtedly applies where the master is a natural person, applies even with greater force when the employer is a corporation.
    The operations of corporations are necessarily conducted by the instrumentality of agents, and to excuse them from the performance of any duty which they owe to third persons, on the ground of the misconduct of their servants, would be, practically, to exempt them from liability for any negligence or misfeasance not the immediate or necessary consequence of a corporate act.
    In the case before the Court, the delay in the transportation upon the defendants’ road, of the plaintiff's goods, by which they were rendered nearly worthless, was caused solely by the misconduct of nearly all the engineers, and other persons, in the employ of the Company—whose services, in conducting the road, were indispensable, and who, without any justifiable cause, broke their contract with the Company, and by a combined action, upon one and the same day, abandoned their employment.
    Held, that although no want of prudence or foresight in not anticipating this event, and guarding against its consequences, could be attributed to the defendants, and although it was not in their power to procure, immediately, the services of competent persons, to replace those by whom they were deserted, the law furnished no reasons for exempting them from a liability to make good to the plaintiff the loss which he had sustained from the misconduct of those whom they had emjdoyed. A sudden combination and strike of engineers is an event that may occur upon every railroad, and the hazard of its occurrence must, in all cases, rest upon the employers, who alone have it in their power to. secure, by proper contracts, an indemnity against its consequences.
    A Court of Justice has no power to relieve Bailroad Companios from the hazard to which, the nature of their business, and the vast extent, to which it involves the employment of agents, necessarily subjects them. If a single engineer, having charge of a train, by his sudden refusal to perform his duly, should produce an injurious delay, the liability of the Company employing- him, would hardly be doubted, and certainly the rule of liability cannot be varied by the number of the agents or servants who at one time are guiliy of the same misconduct.
    Held, that the allegation that the engineers who, in this case, abandoned their engines, were not the servants ofthe defendants when the delay complained of occurred, and that for this reason the defendants are not responsible, was unsupported by proof, since there was no evidence that their contracts with the Company had expired, or by any mutual act had been rescinded.
    Held, further, that even upon the supposition that the desertion of the engineers put an end to their connexion with the Company, still, as this desertion was itself the cause of the delay' that followed, and was a wrongful act committed by persons who, at the time, were the servants of the Company, the defendants were responsible for its consequences.
    Judgment for plaintiff affirmed, with costs.
    (Before Hoffman, Siosson, and Woodruff, J.J.)
    Heard January 3,
    decided April 11, 1857.
    This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment for the plaintiff entered upon the report of a referee.
    The following, as it appears from the case and the report of the referee, are the material facts upon which his decision was founded.
    The action was brought to recover damages incurred by reason of delay in the delivery of goods received by the defendants, as common carriers, for transportation upon their railroad, from places in the vicinity of Hornellsville to the city of New York.

      The goods consisted of potatoes, which it was alleged became decayed, and greatly deteriorated in value, by reason of the time improperly consumed, after they were delivered to the defendants, and before they reached their destination.
    The precise times when the several lots of potatoes were delivered to the defendants, although apparently proved on the trial, do not appear in the printed case, furnished on the hearing, but it was conceded on the argument, by the counsel for both parties, that there was no evidence of any delivery to the defendants on a day earlier than the 19th day of June, 1854.
    The potatoes reached New York on the 7th, 8th, and 10th of July following, and were then found to be very much decayed, and the proof tended to show that the damage was caused by the unusual period, during which, in hot weather, they were kept in the packages in which they were forwarded.
    The answer, so far as it is material to state its contents for the purposes of the present appeal, insists that the delay and detention were reasonable and unavoidable, and were “ without the fault and in spite of the reasonable and all the exertions the defendants were able to make to prevent the same.”
    And the answer then further proceeds, “ And they aver, that said delay was caused by the wrongful refusal of the engineers, agents, and employees of the defendants, to perform their duty, and to obey the just and necessary rules and by-laws of the defendants, and by reason of such engineers and the agents of the company, and other persons preventing the running of the cars and engines of the defendants by their unlawful opposition) obstructions and combinations to prevent the same, and by preventing the defendants from procuring other persons to serve in the places of said persons so unlawfully and wrongfully obstructing the defendants in their just efforts to run their cars and enforce reasonable and necessary regulations as the good of the public demanded.”
    The Eeferee has found that the potatoes were delivered to the defendants in May and June 1854, to be transported to New York. That in the usual course of the defendants’ business “ they would have gone to New York in 8, 4, or 5 days.” That they “ were delayed and detained for about seventeen days, and by that delay were damaged, as in the complaint allegedand “that the delay was occasioned by a strike of defendants’ engineers, and their refusal, for about fourteen days to work.”
    The Referee has then given the “history and cause of the strike,” by which it appears, that in consequence of an alteration of a rule of the defendants, which alteration had become necessary, and has proved beneficial and salutary in its operation, tending to prevent accidents involving the loss of life, the engineers, (although the new rule was, when adopted, acceptable to them,) when they found it would be enforced, and on the 18th of June, gave notice that unless the rule should be previously rescinded, they would stop work on the 20th of that month, at noon. And in pursuance of such notice, one hundred and forty, out of a total of one hundred and sixty-eight engineers in the employment of the company, stopped work, and continued to refuse to work for fourteen days, by reason whereof, the defendants were unable to transport the potatoes, and the damages claimed by the plaintiff were a consequence of this inability.
    And the Referee further finds that the “defendants used diligent efforts to get other engineers to run their trains, and could not.”
    The Referee ordered judgment for the plaintiff for the damages proved.
    The notice given by the engineers, on the 18th of June, mentioned in the report of the referee, referring to the rules objected to, stated that they “ take this method to inform you ” (the defendants’ superintendant) “that on the morning of the 20th of June, at 12 o’clock, m., we cease to work under them.” And the proofs, given by the defendants, (if the language of one of the witnesses be adopted as giving the true legal effect of the acts of the engineers,) tended to show that the engineers, in pursuance of this notice, and under a preconcerted arrangement for that purpose, on the 20th of June “left the employ of the road,” and, “were out- of employ thirteen or fourteen day's.” That the company made extraordinary exertions to procure other engineers to supply their places, without success; That some of the engineers who were in their employment, and were not in the combination, refused to run engines, saying they were afraid of their lives, and that the disaffected' and resisting engineers stayed around the stations, and in several cases committed violence; And that the defendants did all the business they could possibly do under the circumstances.
    The other witness for the defendants characterizes the conduct of the engineers simply as a “ refusal to work ”—“ a strike,” as “ stopping work on the 20th,” &c.
    The defendants appealed from the judgment.
    About six months after the report of the referee was made, and judgment thereon entered, the defendants applied, by motion at the special term, to amend their answer in so far as it contained a statement that the delay in question was caused by “the wrongful refusal and negligence and acts of the engineers and employees and agents of the defendants.” And the motion was urged under a claim, that the Court ought to conform the answer to the facts proved, which the defendants insist were, that such delay was caused by the acts of persons not then in the employment of the company, and in that respect they insisted that the report of the referee was against the evidence. This application was ordered (as the counsel appear to have understood the disposition made of the motion) to be heard at the General Term, in connection with the appeal from the judgment, . and with the main question, viz., whether the defendants are liable for damages caused by -a delay produced by the circumstances stated.

      George Parker, for the plaintiff, respondent.

      D, B, Eaton, for the defendants, appellants.
   By the Court. Woodruff, J.

We have had occasion, quite recently, to follow the decision made in the case of Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend, 215; and approved in Wibert v. The New York & Erie Rail Road Company, 2 Kernan, 245. The principle, of which cases, is that a common carrier, in respect to the time of the delivery of goods received for carriage, in the absence of an express agreement, is only bound to due diligence, and he may excuse delay by proof of accident or misfortune, although not inevitable in the highest sense of that word, i. e., i he is not responsible for delays occurring without Ms fault. And / upon this principle ,we held that, where the damages claimed were the mere consequences of delay, (such as deterioration in the value of the goods, arising solely from the increased time consumed in the transportation,) if the delay was excused such damages could not be recovered, (See Conger v. The Hudson River Railroad Company, 6 Duer, 875.)

But neither these cases, nor any other which has fallen under our observation, extend this immunity to cases in which the delay is caused either by the negligence or misconduct of the agents, servants or employees of the carrier. In Parsons v. Hardy, the alleged cause of delay was that the carrier’s boat was run against and injured by a scow, and the decision assumes, (for the purposes of the case) that the accident occurred without any want of care and skill on his part.

The Statute of 1850 (Sess. Laws of 1850, p. 231, chap. 140, § 36), requires that railroad companies shall furnish sufficient accommodations for the transportation of all such property as shall, within a reasonable time previous thereto, be offered for transportation, &c., and shall take, transport, and discharge such property, &c., and be liable for neglect or refusal, &c.

This statute came under review in Wibert v. The N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. It was insisted, that extraordinary circumstances, wholly beyond the control of the Company, and which no ordinary prudence or foresight would have anticipated, did not excuse the carrier for delay in the transportation. But the Court held otherwise. That the reasonable time mentioned in the statute must be judged of by the circumstances existing when the property was received; and an unusual accumulation of goods at their stations, exceeding the capacity of the road itself to allow immediate transportation thereon with safety, was held a sufficient excuse for temporary delay.

But the case proceeds upon an express finding that the defendants’ road was in good order, and well provided with cars and engines, and as many freight trains were run thereon as could be run with safety. Nothing in the case warrants the idea that, if the negligence or misconduct of the agents or servants of the Company caused the delay, the Company could be said to be without fault.

The liability of the master for a neglect of duty by the servant exists independently of the question whether there is any fault in the master himself. True, the master is sometimes held liable for the employment of an improper or unskilful servant, but he is often liable when no blame attaches to himself personally. And, for the same reason, he may not excuse himself for a failure to perform a duty which he owes to third persons, by showing that his servant, who. was charged' with its performance, neglected or refused to do it. The master, assuming to perform the duty, assumes also the hazard of the competency and fidelity of the servants whom he employs.

The same rule must be applied to corporations. Their operations are, necessarily, conducted by the instrumentality of agents, and to say that the want of fidelity on the part of their servants excuses them from the performance of any duty which they owe . to third persons, would be, practically, to exempt them from liability for any negligence, or any misfeasance, which was not the immediate or necessary consequence of a corporate act.

The present case is, undoubtedly, one of some hardship. It cannot, for a moment, be claimed that a combination, resulting in a refusal to work, by one hundred and forty out of one hundred and sixty-eight men of skill, whose services were indispensable to the conduct of the defendants’ business, ought to have been foreseen, when there was no just cause for such a refusal: And it was probably impossible, by any ordinary means, to have supplied their places on the day on which their refusal took effect; indeed, on so short a notice as the defendants received, it may be regarded as quite impossible. Nevertheless we must regard the hazard of such an occurrence as resting upon the employers. They alone have it in their power to secure, by proper contracts, indemnity against the consequences of misconduct by the employee. The owner of goods has no control, .or right of interference in the matter, and we perceive no ground on which to relieve the defendants from the hazard to which the nature of their business, and the vast extent to which, it involves the employment of assistants, necessarily subject them. And although they are, in a degree, placed within the power of extensive combinations among their servants, that, we think, furnishes no legal reason for visiting the consequence upon third persons. Practically, the defendants in such circumstances may suffer, by the misconduct of their servants, without redress, but the law imposes no such hardship, on the contrary, it will hold the unfaithful servant liable for the direct and immediate consequences of his own fault, and' this will, so far as the law can do so, give to' the master indemnity.

It ought not to be doubted, and probably would not be doubted, that if, by the negligence of a single engineer in charge of a train, or by his perverse refusal to perform his duty, his train was unnecessarily delayed, the Company would be liable for the delay. When the delay is said to be excused if it happen without their ‘‘fault,” the term is not.used as imputing personal blame, but it means without fault on their part, in their servants or otherwise.

If this be so, it is difficult to perceive how, in principle,- the' rule of liability is affected by increasing the number of servants who are guilty.

An individual carrier may be so conducting his business, that it is only necessary for him to employ one servant to drive one of his wagons; Suppose that servant, when at a distance on his journey, abandons the wagon, and days elapse before the carrier hears: of its non-arrival, or learns the cause; In such case, assuming .that there was no want of care or judgment in selecting his servant, the delay was as to the master personally, without his fault, and in a sense unavoidable, and yet he cannot be held excused. The fidelity of the servant was at his risk—the fault of .his servant is, in a legal sense, his fault.

We cannot think the rule would be otherwise if his business require him to employ a hundred servants, and they all prove unfaithful. Such a case is, of course, extraordinary, and may create a hardship, but we. do not perceive that any new rule is to be prescribed for that reason. If it may be, what number of servants must combine to call for its application ? Ho answer to this.question suggests itself to our minds.

We apprehend the rule then to be, that the causes of delay, Which will excuse a carrier, from the performance of his duty to carry within the usual or ordinary period required for the transportation he undertakes, must be those only which occur without his fault, or the fault of his agents, servants, or employees.

And a hindrance caused by the tortious acts of third persons, over whom the carrier has no control, and to whom he stands in no relation involving responsibility for their acts or defaults, will excuse his delay, according to the cases above referred to.

Unless then the defendants were in the present case hindered t in transporting the goods, without their fault, or that of their agents, or servants, they are liable in this action.

Their answer in terms avers that the delay was caused by the wrongful refusal of their engineers, agents, and employees to perform their duty, or to obey the defendants’ just and necessary rules, etc. And the Referee has found that the delay was occasioned by a strike of the defendants’ engineers, and their refusal to work.

If the views above expressed are correct, and we do not doubt that they are, then upon this finding, and this statement in the answer, the defendants are liable.

But the defendants’ counsel insists that the finding of the referee, in this particular, is against the evidence, and it is sought to avoid the effect of the averment in the answer, by a motion to conform the answer to the facts proved.

If we were of opinion that the proofs showed, that when the fault of the engineers happened, which caused the delay, they had left the employment of the company, in such wise that the company were not responsible for their acts, it is not entirely clear that, under the 173d section of the code, upon which the motion is founded, we could allow such an amendment.

The defence had, in this respect, been rested upon the ground that the delay was caused by the wrongful combination, and subsequent misconduct, of the defendants’ servants. The plaintiff had a right to go to trial, assuming that the persons causing the delay, were such servants. The case appears to have been tried upon that theory. Not only so; the objections to evidence indicate that the defendants’ counsel insisted that evidence in support of the answer, as put in, was relevant as establishing a defence.

Under such circumstances, it is very questionable whether the proposed “amendment does not change substantially the defence.” If it does, we are not authorized to grant the amendment. The defendants, in such case, are bound by their admission. The plaintiff was under no obligation to offer evidence of the fact so admitted; and the report of the referee is supported by the admission, although no proof was given of its truth, or though the defendants may have given some evidence which tended to prove the contrary. (Brown v. Colie, 1E. D. Smith, 270.)

But, without resting upon this view of the subject, we think the report of the referee was not against the evidence upon this point, and therefore that the amendment is not proper in any aspect.

It was the strike' of the defendants’ engineers, the refusal of men in the employment of the company to perform their work, that caused the delay. It is true, that one of the defendants’ witnesses says, that on the day agreed upon, the engineers “ left the employ of the road.” Be it so, and still it was that wrongful act which caused the delay. In truth, that language, in the mouth of the witness, meant no more than the testimony of the other witness, that they refused to work, or stopped work. It was not shown, or attempted to be shown, that the period of the employment of these engineers expired on the day referred to, and that their refusal to work was an actual separation of themselves from all connexion with the company; on the contrary, the correspondence, given in evidence, exhibits the defendants as inviting them to return to duty. Indeed, had it appeared that the company had made no provision for the future, but voluntarily suffered all these contracts to expire, without securing the services of the requisite number of engineers, for the time next ensuing, a further ground for charging the defendants with fault, would at once arise, in their own neglect to hire engineers, for the service, which they, of course, knew would be necessary. But the proofs do not call for this view of their liability.

It is entirely clear, that on the 20th of June, the one hundred and forty engineers were in the employment of the defendants, and were their servants, and that on that day, in utter neglect. of their duty, they abandoned their engines, and suffered the work of the company to stand still.

The purpose of the proposed amendment is, no doubt, to enable the defendants to say, that after the engineers left their engines, they had, by their own act, terminated their relation to the defendants as servants, and are therefore to be regarded as strangers and tort feasors, for whose acts, if they operated to" cause delay, the defendants are not liable within the cases referred to.

Doubtless, the act of one who, being a servant, is discharged, or voluntarily abandons the service, committed after the actual termination of his relation to the master, may, if it cause delay, without the fault of the master or his servants, excuse such delay, and even although the act of the servant, in so abandoning the service, was wrongful and in violation of his express engagement. But when the very act of abandonment causes the delay, the case is plainly otherwise: then it is his want of fidelity as a servant, and not the tortious act of one not a servant, which causes the delay complained of.

It is true that there was some evidence that other engineers were prevented from performing service, after the rebellious engineers had quit their work, by fear of their lives, and that some acts of violence were committed. But the scope and tendency of the evidence, as a whole, is to show that it was the sudden and faulty refusal of this large body of the Company’s engineers, then their servants, to do their duty, that caused the delay in question; and we think that the finding of the referee, in this particular, is not without evidence, nor against evidence. The amendment sought ought not to be allowed.

The case is novel and peculiar; Our view of the subject seems to place the defendants in a condition of onerous responsibility; indeed, to place them in a good degree in the power of their own employees, and it may be to drive the defendants, under similar circumstances, to submit to unreasonable requirements made by their servants, involving a revocation of rules and regulations of great importance to themselves, and necessary to the preservation of the lives and safety of their passengers. In this aspect, the question assumes an importance affecting the public as well as the defendants. But the rules governing their liabilities are not, in truth,' conceived in any harsh spirit. We perceive no ground, upon which they can be relieved from duties which apply to others, whose business is less extensive, and who, therefore, are less at the mercy of employees. W e are bound, we think, to say it is their duty to make and enforce obedience to reasonable and prudent rules for the preservation of life and property; and also, their duty to employ faithful servants, and answer for their fidelity. The points urged by the appellants on the argument, embrace many particulars, but what has been said seems necessarily to cover them all, except, perhaps, one, which is founded upon a conceded error in the report of the referee, in which he states that the plaintiff’s goods were received for transportation in May and June, 1854, when Counsel on both sides agree that there is no evidence that any were received prior to the 19th of June. Indeed, the referee upon proof that the goods arrived in Hew York on the 7th, 8th, and 10th of July, finds a delay and detention of about seventeen days. His report is, therefore, substantially in conformity to the proof; the word “ May,” is a clear mistake. The period of delay is correctly found, and its cause is correctly stated. This mistake (which is probably only clerical), did not affect the result, and ought not to affect it. The defendants have not .been charged with any delay occurring between May and the 19th of June. They are, by the report of the referee, held liable for the damages caused by the detention produced by the misconduct of their engineers, in the interval between the 19th of June and the 10th of July; and only for the delay within that period. The mistake appearing in the report, therefore, does not prejudice the defendants. It is inconsistent with the other part of the finding, and has not, in fact, entered into the question or ground of liability. We think the judgment ought not to be reversed by reason of such a mistake, when the error has not affected the result.

The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed with costs. -


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: By the Court. Hoffman, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    John M. Davison v. Silas Seymour and others.
    The plaintiff was employed by the firm of H. 0. Seymour & Co., of whom the defendants are the survivors, to procure for the firm from the directors of a Railroad Co. authorised to construct a railroad from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Illinois town, Illinois, a contract for building the road, and agreed to pay him for his services, should he succeed in obtaining the contract, the sum of $] 0,000. The plaintiff concealed his own agency, and the contract was obtained through the influence, with the directors of the company, of third persons employed by the plaintiff, and acting for a pecuniary reward. He claimed in this action to recover the $10,000 with interest, which the firm of H. 0. Seymour & Co. had stipulated to pay him.

      Held, upon a foil examination of adjudged cases, that the contract, upon which the action was founded, if not in its terms, yet from the nature of the means that were used to influence the action of the directors of the Railroad Co., by an agent of the plaintiff, was an agreement, which, as contrary to morality and public policy could not be enforced.
    Judgment for plaintiff reversed, and complaint dismissed with costs.
    (Before Hoffman, Slosson, & Woodbuff, J. J.)
    Heard January 20,
    decided April 11, 1857.
    This is an appeal by the defendants, from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, for the sum of $13,250.83 upon a verdict of a jury.
    The cause was tried before Chief Justice Oaklet, and a jury, in January 1856. The defendants’ counsel moved, when the testimony was closed, to dismiss the complaint, which motion was denied, and the defendants duly excepted.
    The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

      Jas. T. Brady, for the defendants, appellants.

      F. B. Cutting, for the plaintiff, respondent.
   By the Court. Hoffman, J.

The first question to be considered is the important one, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover against any one, upon his own showing; whether his agreement was not one which public policy forbids to be enforced.

The case to present this question is briefly this. A company had been incorporated by the State of Illinois, to construct a railroad within that State. Acts of the States of Indiana and Ohio had also been procured, under which, together, a road was to be made from Cincinnati in Ohio, to Illinois Town. The plaintiff was employed by Hezekiah C. Seymour, one of the firm of H. C. Seymour & Co., acting on behalf of such firm, to procure for such firm contracts with such Railroad Company, for the constructing of the said roads¡ and furnishing and equipping the same. .That by his labor and services, the contracts were procured for the firm; and that they agreed to pay him $10,000. That the contracts were of great pecuniary emolument; that the firm realized large.profits, and the sum agreed to be paid him was reasonable.

That the firm was to receive for completing the road from Illinois town, a portion of the route, two millions five hundred thousand dollars, and, for the residue of the route, six millions five hundred thousand dollars.

Since the 24th of July 1853, the firm had sold and transferred all their interest to Henry D. Bacon, or to a firm of Page & Bacon, or Bacon, Page, & Co. Such is an outline of the complaint.

It appears that the contract with H. C. Seymour and associates, was made in November 1851,—That H. C. Seymour died in July 1853. It does not appear that anything was done under the contract in his lifetime; but it is shown, that, after his death, the whole interest in the contract was disposed of, and realized five hundred thousand dollars.

And the case made by the plaintiff is, that he recommended Seymour to one Clements, who knew nothing of him. That Clements recommended Seymour to the Directors, in consequence of the plaintiff’s attestation to his qualities. That Clements was employed when the Company was preparing to let the Road, and was to have a good commission, which was adjusted afterwards at $10,000. That Clements engaged, for these considerations, to use his influence, and did use it, to procure the contract for Seymour. . That such influence was successful, or at least influential in obtaining the object. As he deposes—“We did not stand upon the street corners to do this, but went to work through third parties, and in every way we could.”

In addition, when Clements first undertook this office, Davison did not even name to him the intended contractors. He did not appear before the Directors openly as Seymour’s agent. On the contrary, he first informed them that he had friends at the East who could send on good men to take the contract. In the course of the negotiations he named Seymour; but this was to the Directors individually, as I infer. To the Board he was unknown.

Undoubtedly, this was the employment of Clements for a' bribe, to use personal influence with the Directors to secure a lucrative contract for one, of whose capacity or responsibility .he was entirely ignorant. He was to nse this secretly, and with individuals.

The-directors of this great rail-road scheme, if they stood not in the capacity of public officers owing a duty to the state, yet were trustees of the stock-holders of the road, and owed the best efforts of industry, integrity, and economy to them.

No one can deny that a stipulation for any personal advantage or profit, which might attend and influence the discharge of their trust to the stock-holders, would be a violation of duty; and no ' engagement given to them, or contract made with them, for that object, could bear the scrutiny of the law.

If, again, one of their officers—if Mitchell, for example, empowered to negotiate, and finally to settle the contract with Seymour, had received an obligation for the payment of a sum of money for his services, it could never have been enforced.

Does the present case fall within the principle which would avoid such agreements ? Numerous authorities have been cited by the Counsel of the defendants. The most of them are reviewed in Gray v. Hook (4 Comstock, 451.)

That case was one of an agreement between two applicants for the office of Inspector of flour, that one should withdraw his application, and aid the appointment of the other; in consideration of which, he was to receive half the emoluments of the office. This was held void at common law, though not within the statute prohibiting the sale of public offices.

The case of Waldo v. Martin (4 Barnwell & Cresswell, 319, and 1st Carr. & Payne 1) is very similar, where the power of appointment was in an individual. The holder of an office resigned it in favor of another, with an agreement to procure the appointment for him in consideration of receiving a moiety of the profits. A covenant was executed to carry the arrangement into effect, and the deed was held void, as a fraud upon the party making the appointment.

Hanington v. Duchastel (2 Swanton, 167 n.)reported imperfectly in 1 Br. C. R. 115, is one of the most striking decisions of that rough, great lawyer, Lord Thurlow. The Earl of Rochford was Groom of the stole, and had the appointment of royal pages. He agreed with Hanington, to get him the place, on his giving a bond securing an annuity'of £100 to one St. Feroil, who was a foreigner, and could not hold the station. The present defendant brought an action as administrator of St. Feroil, to recover arrears of the annuity; and this bill was brought to have the bond given up, and declared void.

Lord Thurlow observed, that there was no distinction, whether the office was public or private; none between public and private servants; and next, that the King’s servants were not merely private servants. He proceeded: It is impossible to bring the case to any other point than this, that the encouragement of the contract is contrary to the good of the public; and such good requires that the contract be put an end to; otherwise it would be a declaration of the law, that the party shall have the benefit of the contract, for the law approves what it refuses to rescind. It is a transaction on a foundation which ought not to be the basis of a civil contract. What I am to determine upon is, whether, if one person be authorized to recommend or appoint another to an office under a third person, he can, without the privity of the third person, for a private consideration of his own, recommend or appoint such other person ? It does not now seem to be contended that the bond would have been good, had it been given to Lord Bochford himself; now, if the contract itself was wrong, how can I make a difference? It would, perhaps, have made the point stronger.”

The case is very strong. Hanington received the profit of the station. St. Feroil, was as near as possible, innocent in the transaction. Lord Bochford sold,his influence, not directly, for a personal advantage, but to provide for his tutor. If this case be law, it must have a powerful influence upon the present.

The case of Hopkins v. Prescott (4 Com. Bench Rep. 518), was one of a bargain to use influence in obtaining an office connected with the collection of the revenue. It was held void under a particular statute; but Coleman Justice held, that it would have been void at common law, under the decision of Lord Thurlow, in Hanington v. Duchastel.

To these English cases may be added Money v. Macleod (2 Simon & Stuart, 301) where the question was, as to the legality of a contract to account for a share of emoluments for procuring the command of an East India Company ship. A material point of difference, however, is, that the plaintiff, whose influence it was alleged, had been procured, was in the employ of the Company. He was not a director, nor in any way entitled to a voice in the selection. The Court directed an issue as to the consideration of the bond.

The case is not an absolute decision; but I do not see why an issue was ordered to the point of consideration, except upon the ground of an illegality, if it should be found to be what it was alleged.

The case of Marshall v. The Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. (16 Howard U. S. Rep. 325,) was one of a contract to make a certain compensation to an agent engaged in soliciting the votes and influence of members of a Legislature.

There are two propositions in the charge of the Judge, at the trial, which received the entire approbation of the Court, on a writ of error, and are of the highest pertinency and importance. I may assume that the Court was unanimous on these points. The three judges who dissented, did so upon the question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.

After instructing the jury as to whether the contents of a letter was part of the agreement, which letter indicated' the use of improper means with the Legislature, the Judge charged:—“ That even if there were no such agreement, yet the contract was against the policy of the law, and void, if, at the time it was made, the parties agreed to conceal from the members of the Legislature, the fact, that the plaintiff was employed by the defendants as their agent, to advocate the passage of the law, and was to receive a compensation in money for his services, in case the law was passed.”

“ Next, if there were no actual agreement to practise such concealment, yet he was not entitled to recover, if he did conceal from the members of the Legislature, when advocating the passage of the law, that he was acting as agent of the defendants, and was to receive a compensation in case the law passed.”

This authority is, to my mind, conclusive, unless there be a distinction between the cases of undue influence used with members of a Legislature, and cases of the same influence used with Directors of a Corporation.

The authorities cited in Gray v. Hook, especially Fuller v. Daine (18 Pick. 472), tend to sustain a similar principle.

The latter case has been much criticised by counsel, and it is proper to make some observations upon it.

One Daine, the defendant, was the owner of land adjacent certain flats. It was an object to him to get the Worcester railroad company to erect a depot on these flats. He entered into an agreement with one Henry H. Fuller, that they should unite in getting up a company to purchase the flats, and procure the railroad company to locate the depot there. He was to make Fuller a pecuniary compensation (by delivery of a note executed and put in escrow) if the location took place. A company was formed; the flats purchased; and the railroad company agreed to establish the depot on the flats. Fuller was a member of this latter company at the time of the agreement, and afterwards became a member of the joint-stock company. The agreement was known only to the parties and a witness. The note had been endorsed to the present plaintiff after its maturity. It was held that the agreement was against public policy, and void. It affected the public interest. It affected the interests of the Worcester Railroad, and also those of the Joint Stock Company.

The promise in this case was, it is true, with one who held the position of a director in one of the companies. But it will be found that the reasoning of the Chief Justice rests upon principles which must extend to every contract with any one engaged to use similar means for an undue influence.

The case of Sedgwick v. Staunton (18 Barbour Rep. 475), does not affect these positions. Legitimate efforts were made by an avowed attorney and agent, to present to the Commissioners of the Land Office a case favorable to the applicant. See further, Harris v. Roof's Executors (10 Barbour Rep. 489).

I am led to the conclusion that it would be impossible to allow Clements to sustain ah action upon the agreement with him, There was in it most of those elements of a vicious contract, which have avoided similar obligations in the leading cases cited. There was secrecy, applications to individuals, a concealed promise of compensation, and utter ignorance and recklessness as to the competency of the party whose cause he was promoting, and whose reward he was to receive. There is this difference, that these directors were servants of an organization inferior to that of a State, yet acting in a very spacious sphere, and repre? seating an extensive body of constituents. The distinction between their position and that of Legislators, upon a question like this, appears to me but shadowy,

If, then, the claim of Clements would be promptly rejected, does the present plaintiff stand in a better position ? His original employment might have been consistent with an open avowed agency—with an intent, or instructions, to make it known; and thus be free from all objection. But we are left in ignorance of what the terms of such original agreement were; and how far they extended. All is indefinite, except merely an employment. He engages Clements; and here again that employment may have been perfectly free from censure on the plaintiff’s part. But, we cannot separate the acts of Clements from the acts of the plaintiff. There is a legal identity between them for the purposes of this action. The plaintiff must be held, to have employed Clements to do what he did do, or to have been bound to superintend his proceedings, and free them from what was illegal. It is impossible to permit him to profit by the misdeeds of his own agent, however ignorant and exempt from them himself. His ignorance, when knowledge was a duty, becomes equivalent to a fault.

The judgment must be reversed and the complaint dismissed.